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freeswitch/tests/unit/switch_core_media.c
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Dmitry Verenitsin 86b10358e2 Merge commit from fork
`switch_core_media_add_crypto()` parses the SDP `a=crypto` keysalt and
decodes it into a fixed-size key buffer. Enforce the buffer contract at
the call site:

- Reject a zero-length, negative, or over-long keysalt (the length
  check now has both a lower bound and an upper bound against the copy
  buffer).
- Copy the keysalt token into a NUL-terminated buffer and decode from
  that, so `switch_b64_decode` stops at the token instead of reading on
  into the following key material (it consumes input to the NUL and
  skips non-base64 bytes).
- Pass the destination buffer size as the decode bound rather than the
  parsed token length.
- Require the decoded length to cover the crypto suite's key+salt so the
  subsequent copy cannot read past the decoded bytes.

Add `test_add_crypto_keysalt_bounds`, a table-driven test covering the
accepted and rejected keysalt shapes across suites (AES-128/192/256),
including RFC 4568 lifetime/MKI and multi-key lines.
2026-08-08 19:47:47 +03:00

145 lines
7.3 KiB
C

/*
* FreeSWITCH Modular Media Switching Software Library / Soft-Switch Application
* Copyright (C) 2005-2021, Anthony Minessale II <anthm@freeswitch.org>
*
* Version: MPL 1.1
*
* The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public License Version
* 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
* the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
* http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/
*
* Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" basis,
* WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License
* for the specific language governing rights and limitations under the
* License.
*
* The Original Code is FreeSWITCH Modular Media Switching Software Library / Soft-Switch Application
*
* The Initial Developer of the Original Code is
* Anthony Minessale II <anthm@freeswitch.org>
* Portions created by the Initial Developer are Copyright (C)
* the Initial Developer. All Rights Reserved.
*
* switch_core_media.c -- tests for the core media layer.
*/
#include <switch.h>
#include <test/switch_test.h>
FST_CORE_BEGIN("./conf")
{
FST_SUITE_BEGIN(switch_core_media)
{
FST_SETUP_BEGIN()
{
fst_requires_module("mod_loopback");
}
FST_SETUP_END()
FST_TEARDOWN_BEGIN()
{
}
FST_TEARDOWN_END()
FST_TEST_BEGIN(test_add_crypto_keysalt_bounds)
{
switch_core_session_t *session = NULL;
switch_status_t status;
switch_call_cause_t cause;
switch_secure_settings_t ssec;
int i;
/* Writable buffers: switch_core_media_add_crypto() strips spaces in place. Each key||salt is a
40-char base64 that decodes to the 30-byte key+salt of AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80. RFC 4568 crypto
line: "<tag> <suite> inline:<key||salt> ["|" lifetime] ["|" MKI ":" length]". rfc_full and
rfc_mki_only are the RFC's two verbatim examples; a multi-key attribute requires every key to
carry an equal-length MKI (RFC 4568 section 6.1). '/' (base64 63) decodes to 0xFF bytes. */
char valid_crypto[] = "1 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
char nonzero_crypto[] = "1 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:////////////////////////////////////////";
char rfc_full[] = "1 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:d0RmdmcmVCspeEc3QGZiNWpVLFJhQX1cfHAwJSoj|2^20|1:4";
char rfc_mki_only[] = "1 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:YUJDZGVmZ2hpSktMbW9QUXJzVHVWd3l6MTIzNDU2|1066:4";
char rfc_multikey[] = "1 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:d0RmdmcmVCspeEc3QGZiNWpVLFJhQX1cfHAwJSoj|2^20|1:4 inline:YUJDZGVmZ2hpSktMbW9QUXJzVHVWd3l6MTIzNDU2|2^20|2:4";
char zero_len_space[] = "1 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline: AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
char zero_len_pipe[] = "1 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:|2^20|1:4";
char short_keysalt[] = "1 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:QUJD";
char overlong_keysalt[] = "1 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
char zero_len_tail[] = "1 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline: AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
/* Other suites carry longer key+salts (RFC 6188): AES_192 is 38 bytes (52 base64 chars),
AES_256 is 46 bytes (64 chars - the largest keysalt that fits the copy buffer). Both
decode to all-0xFF bytes. aes256_short is a 128-length keysalt (30 bytes) offered under
the 256 suite. */
char aes192_crypto[] = "1 AES_192_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline://////////////////////////////////////////////////8=";
char aes256_crypto[] = "1 AES_256_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline://///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////w==";
char aes256_short[] = "1 AES_256_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
/* Independent base64 reference decode (not the parser's) of RFC 4568's first example key||salt. */
unsigned char rfc_full_raw[30] = {
0x77, 0x44, 0x66, 0x76, 0x67, 0x26, 0x54, 0x2b, 0x29, 0x78,
0x47, 0x37, 0x40, 0x66, 0x62, 0x35, 0x6a, 0x55, 0x2c, 0x52,
0x61, 0x41, 0x7d, 0x5c, 0x7c, 0x70, 0x30, 0x25, 0x2a, 0x23 };
unsigned char ff_raw[46]; /* all-'/' keysalts decode to 0xFF bytes; raw_len of them compared per suite */
/* One row per crypto line: expected add_crypto() result and, for accepted lines, the expected
decoded key+salt over raw_len bytes (raw == NULL skips the content check). Covers: valid AES-128;
byte-exact decode; RFC lifetime+MKI, MKI-only (lifetime/MKI disambiguation) and multi-key
(loop + buffer reuse); the AES-192 (38-byte) and AES-256 (46-byte, max-length) suite key+salts;
a keysalt too short for its suite; both zero-length rejects (space and '|' opts branch); short
decode; over-long. */
struct {
const char *desc;
char *crypto;
switch_status_t expect;
const unsigned char *raw;
size_t raw_len;
} cases[] = {
{ "well-formed keysalt (AES-128)", valid_crypto, SWITCH_STATUS_SUCCESS, NULL, 0 },
{ "byte-exact decode (AES-128)", nonzero_crypto, SWITCH_STATUS_SUCCESS, ff_raw, 30 },
{ "RFC lifetime+MKI key", rfc_full, SWITCH_STATUS_SUCCESS, rfc_full_raw, 30 },
{ "RFC MKI-only key", rfc_mki_only, SWITCH_STATUS_SUCCESS, NULL, 0 },
{ "RFC multi-key attribute", rfc_multikey, SWITCH_STATUS_SUCCESS, rfc_full_raw, 30 },
{ "AES-192 keysalt (38-byte)", aes192_crypto, SWITCH_STATUS_SUCCESS, ff_raw, 38 },
{ "AES-256 keysalt (46-byte)", aes256_crypto, SWITCH_STATUS_SUCCESS, ff_raw, 46 },
{ "keysalt too short for AES-256", aes256_short, SWITCH_STATUS_FALSE, NULL, 0 },
{ "zero-length keysalt (space)", zero_len_space, SWITCH_STATUS_FALSE, NULL, 0 },
{ "zero-length keysalt (pipe)", zero_len_pipe, SWITCH_STATUS_FALSE, NULL, 0 },
{ "short keysalt", short_keysalt, SWITCH_STATUS_FALSE, NULL, 0 },
{ "over-long keysalt", overlong_keysalt, SWITCH_STATUS_FALSE, NULL, 0 },
{ "zero-length, long tail", zero_len_tail, SWITCH_STATUS_FALSE, NULL, 0 },
};
memset(ff_raw, 0xFF, sizeof(ff_raw));
status = switch_ivr_originate(NULL, &session, &cause, "null/+15553334444", 2, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, SOF_NONE, NULL, NULL);
if (!session) {
fst_fail("failed to originate session");
goto add_crypto_bounds_done;
}
fst_xcheck(status == SWITCH_STATUS_SUCCESS, "originate must succeed");
for (i = 0; i < (int)(sizeof(cases) / sizeof(cases[0])); i++) {
memset(&ssec, 0, sizeof(ssec));
ssec.remote_crypto_key = cases[i].crypto;
status = switch_core_media_add_crypto(session, &ssec, SWITCH_RTP_CRYPTO_RECV);
fst_xcheck(status == cases[i].expect,
switch_core_sprintf(fst_pool, "add_crypto(%s): unexpected status", cases[i].desc));
if (cases[i].raw) {
fst_xcheck(memcmp(ssec.remote_raw_key, cases[i].raw, cases[i].raw_len) == 0,
switch_core_sprintf(fst_pool, "add_crypto(%s): decoded key+salt mismatch", cases[i].desc));
}
}
add_crypto_bounds_done:
if (session) {
switch_channel_hangup(switch_core_session_get_channel(session), SWITCH_CAUSE_NORMAL_CLEARING);
switch_core_session_rwunlock(session);
}
}
FST_TEST_END()
}
FST_SUITE_END()
}
FST_CORE_END()