From f63e9e5e773d9f8173c4b05e2f589754e827f8d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hugo Pereira Brito <101209179+HugoPBrito@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 09:37:13 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 01/23] fix(m365): invalid user credentials exception (#7677) --- .../providers/m365/exceptions/exceptions.py | 20 ++++----- prowler/providers/m365/m365_provider.py | 42 +++++++++++-------- tests/providers/m365/m365_provider_test.py | 13 +++--- 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/exceptions/exceptions.py b/prowler/providers/m365/exceptions/exceptions.py index 2b5840dd10..7d599386f9 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/m365/exceptions/exceptions.py +++ b/prowler/providers/m365/exceptions/exceptions.py @@ -98,21 +98,21 @@ class M365BaseException(ProwlerException): "message": "User and Password environment variables are needed to use Credentials authentication method.", "remediation": "Ensure your environment variables are properly set up.", }, - (6023, "M365EnvironmentUserCredentialsError"): { - "message": "User or Password environment variables are not correct.", - "remediation": "Ensure you are using the right credentials.", + (6023, "M365UserCredentialsError"): { + "message": "The provided User credentials are not valid.", + "remediation": "Check the User credentials and ensure they are valid.", }, (6024, "M365NotValidUserError"): { - "message": "The provided M365 User is not valid.", - "remediation": "Check the M365 User and ensure it is a valid user.", + "message": "The provided User is not valid.", + "remediation": "Check the User and ensure it is a valid user.", }, (6025, "M365NotValidEncryptedPasswordError"): { - "message": "The provided M365 Encrypted Password is not valid.", - "remediation": "Check the M365 Encrypted Password and ensure it is a valid password.", + "message": "The provided Encrypted Password is not valid.", + "remediation": "Check the Encrypted Password and ensure it is a valid password.", }, (6026, "M365UserNotBelongingToTenantError"): { - "message": "The provided M365 User does not belong to the specified tenant.", - "remediation": "Check the M365 User email domain and ensure it belongs to the specified tenant.", + "message": "The provided User does not belong to the specified tenant.", + "remediation": "Check the User email domain and ensure it belongs to the specified tenant.", }, } @@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ class M365MissingEnvironmentCredentialsError(M365CredentialsError): ) -class M365EnvironmentUserCredentialsError(M365CredentialsError): +class M365UserCredentialsError(M365CredentialsError): def __init__(self, file=None, original_exception=None, message=None): super().__init__( 6023, file=file, original_exception=original_exception, message=message diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/m365_provider.py b/prowler/providers/m365/m365_provider.py index a8e4ce4ec2..f5011c9c27 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/m365/m365_provider.py +++ b/prowler/providers/m365/m365_provider.py @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ from prowler.providers.m365.exceptions.exceptions import ( M365ConfigCredentialsError, M365CredentialsUnavailableError, M365DefaultAzureCredentialError, - M365EnvironmentUserCredentialsError, M365EnvironmentVariableError, M365GetTokenIdentityError, M365HTTPResponseError, @@ -51,6 +50,7 @@ from prowler.providers.m365.exceptions.exceptions import ( M365SetUpSessionError, M365TenantIdAndClientIdNotBelongingToClientSecretError, M365TenantIdAndClientSecretNotBelongingToClientIdError, + M365UserCredentialsError, ) from prowler.providers.m365.lib.mutelist.mutelist import M365Mutelist from prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell import ( @@ -434,9 +434,9 @@ class M365Provider(Provider): if init_modules: initialize_m365_powershell_modules() return credentials - raise M365EnvironmentUserCredentialsError( + raise M365UserCredentialsError( file=os.path.basename(__file__), - message="M365_USER or M365_ENCRYPTED_PASSWORD environment variables are not correct. Please ensure you are using the right credentials.", + message="The provided User credentials are not valid.", ) finally: test_session.close() @@ -994,7 +994,7 @@ class M365Provider(Provider): except ValueError: raise M365NotValidTenantIdError( file=os.path.basename(__file__), - message="The provided M365 Tenant ID is not valid.", + message="The provided Tenant ID is not valid.", ) # Validate the Client ID @@ -1003,28 +1003,28 @@ class M365Provider(Provider): except ValueError: raise M365NotValidClientIdError( file=os.path.basename(__file__), - message="The provided M365 Client ID is not valid.", + message="The provided Client ID is not valid.", ) # Validate the Client Secret if not client_secret: raise M365NotValidClientSecretError( file=os.path.basename(__file__), - message="The provided M365 Client Secret is not valid.", + message="The provided Client Secret is not valid.", ) # Validate the User if not user: raise M365NotValidUserError( file=os.path.basename(__file__), - message="The provided M365 User is not valid.", + message="The provided User is not valid.", ) # Validate the Encrypted Password if not encrypted_password: raise M365NotValidEncryptedPasswordError( file=os.path.basename(__file__), - message="The provided M365 Encrypted Password is not valid.", + message="The provided Encrypted Password is not valid.", ) try: @@ -1042,7 +1042,7 @@ class M365Provider(Provider): ) raise M365ClientIdAndClientSecretNotBelongingToTenantIdError( file=os.path.basename(__file__), - message="The provided M365 Client ID and Client Secret do not belong to the specified Tenant ID.", + message="The provided Client ID and Client Secret do not belong to the specified Tenant ID.", ) except M365NotValidClientIdError as client_id_error: logger.error( @@ -1050,7 +1050,7 @@ class M365Provider(Provider): ) raise M365TenantIdAndClientSecretNotBelongingToClientIdError( file=os.path.basename(__file__), - message="The provided M365 Tenant ID and Client Secret do not belong to the specified Client ID.", + message="The provided Tenant ID and Client Secret do not belong to the specified Client ID.", ) except M365NotValidClientSecretError as client_secret_error: logger.error( @@ -1058,7 +1058,7 @@ class M365Provider(Provider): ) raise M365TenantIdAndClientIdNotBelongingToClientSecretError( file=os.path.basename(__file__), - message="The provided M365 Tenant ID and Client ID do not belong to the specified Client Secret.", + message="The provided Tenant ID and Client ID do not belong to the specified Client Secret.", ) @staticmethod @@ -1100,19 +1100,25 @@ class M365Provider(Provider): if f"Tenant '{tenant_id}'" in error_description: raise M365NotValidTenantIdError( file=os.path.basename(__file__), - message="The provided Microsoft 365 Tenant ID is not valid for the specified Client ID and Client Secret.", + message="The provided Tenant ID is not valid for the specified Client ID and Client Secret.", ) if f"Application with identifier '{client_id}'" in error_description: raise M365NotValidClientIdError( file=os.path.basename(__file__), - message="The provided Microsoft 365 Client ID is not valid for the specified Tenant ID and Client Secret.", + message="The provided Client ID is not valid for the specified Tenant ID and Client Secret.", ) if "Invalid client secret provided" in error_description: raise M365NotValidClientSecretError( file=os.path.basename(__file__), - message="The provided Microsoft 365 Client Secret is not valid for the specified Tenant ID and Client ID.", + message="The provided Client Secret is not valid for the specified Tenant ID and Client ID.", ) - - except Exception as e: - # Generic exception handling (if needed) - raise RuntimeError(f"An unexpected error occurred: {str(e)}") + except ( + M365NotValidTenantIdError, + M365NotValidClientIdError, + M365NotValidClientSecretError, + ) as m365_error: + # M365 specific errors already raised + raise RuntimeError(f"{m365_error}") + except Exception as error: + # Generic exception handling for unexpected errors + raise RuntimeError(f"An unexpected error occurred: {str(error)}") diff --git a/tests/providers/m365/m365_provider_test.py b/tests/providers/m365/m365_provider_test.py index c891ab2d45..1d8c0759e6 100644 --- a/tests/providers/m365/m365_provider_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/m365/m365_provider_test.py @@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ class TestM365Provider: user="test@example.com", encrypted_password="test_password", ) - assert "The provided M365 Tenant ID is not valid." in str(exception.value) + assert "The provided Tenant ID is not valid." in str(exception.value) def test_validate_static_credentials_missing_client_id(self): with pytest.raises(M365NotValidClientIdError) as exception: @@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ class TestM365Provider: user="test@example.com", encrypted_password="test_password", ) - assert "The provided M365 Client ID is not valid." in str(exception.value) + assert "The provided Client ID is not valid." in str(exception.value) def test_validate_static_credentials_missing_client_secret(self): with pytest.raises(M365NotValidClientSecretError) as exception: @@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ class TestM365Provider: user="test@example.com", encrypted_password="test_password", ) - assert "The provided M365 Client Secret is not valid." in str(exception.value) + assert "The provided Client Secret is not valid." in str(exception.value) def test_validate_static_credentials_missing_user(self): with pytest.raises(M365NotValidUserError) as exception: @@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ class TestM365Provider: user="", encrypted_password="test_password", ) - assert "The provided M365 User is not valid." in str(exception.value) + assert "The provided User is not valid." in str(exception.value) def test_validate_static_credentials_missing_encrypted_password(self): with pytest.raises(M365NotValidEncryptedPasswordError) as exception: @@ -566,9 +566,7 @@ class TestM365Provider: user="test@example.com", encrypted_password="", ) - assert "The provided M365 Encrypted Password is not valid." in str( - exception.value - ) + assert "The provided Encrypted Password is not valid." in str(exception.value) def test_validate_arguments_missing_env_credentials(self): with pytest.raises(M365MissingEnvironmentCredentialsError) as exception: @@ -583,6 +581,7 @@ class TestM365Provider: user=None, encrypted_password=None, ) + assert ( "M365 provider requires AZURE_CLIENT_ID, AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET, AZURE_TENANT_ID, M365_USER and M365_ENCRYPTED_PASSWORD environment variables to be set when using --env-auth" in str(exception.value) From 50c5294bc0fd739956419033d0313830a28e3c3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alejandro Bailo <59607668+alejandrobailo@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 10:32:40 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 02/23] feat: accordion component (#7700) --- ui/CHANGELOG.md | 6 ++ ui/components/ui/accordion/Accordion.tsx | 109 +++++++++++++++++++++++ ui/components/ui/index.ts | 1 + 3 files changed, 116 insertions(+) create mode 100644 ui/components/ui/accordion/Accordion.tsx diff --git a/ui/CHANGELOG.md b/ui/CHANGELOG.md index a3a45bb720..a39cf3f878 100644 --- a/ui/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/ui/CHANGELOG.md @@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ All notable changes to the **Prowler UI** are documented in this file. +## [v1.7.0] (Prowler v5.7.0) + +### 🚀 Added + +- Added `Accordion` component. [(#7700)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7700) + --- ## [v1.6.0] (Prowler v5.6.0) diff --git a/ui/components/ui/accordion/Accordion.tsx b/ui/components/ui/accordion/Accordion.tsx new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..aa029a121c --- /dev/null +++ b/ui/components/ui/accordion/Accordion.tsx @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +"use client"; + +import { + Accordion as NextUIAccordion, + AccordionItem, + Selection, +} from "@nextui-org/react"; +import { ChevronDown } from "lucide-react"; +import React, { ReactNode, useCallback, useState } from "react"; + +import { cn } from "@/lib/utils"; + +export interface AccordionItemProps { + key: string; + title: ReactNode; + subtitle?: ReactNode; + content: ReactNode; + items?: AccordionItemProps[]; + isDisabled?: boolean; +} + +export interface AccordionProps { + items: AccordionItemProps[]; + variant?: "light" | "shadow" | "bordered" | "splitted"; + className?: string; + defaultExpandedKeys?: string[]; + selectionMode?: "single" | "multiple"; + isCompact?: boolean; + showDivider?: boolean; +} + +const AccordionContent = ({ + content, + items, +}: { + content: ReactNode; + items?: AccordionItemProps[]; +}) => { + return ( +
+ {content} + {items && items.length > 0 && ( +
+ +
+ )} +
+ ); +}; + +export const Accordion = ({ + items, + variant = "light", + className, + defaultExpandedKeys = [], + selectionMode = "single", + isCompact = false, + showDivider = true, +}: AccordionProps) => { + const [expandedKeys, setExpandedKeys] = useState( + new Set(defaultExpandedKeys), + ); + + const handleSelectionChange = useCallback((keys: Selection) => { + setExpandedKeys(keys); + }, []); + + return ( + + {items.map((item, index) => ( + } + classNames={{ + base: index === 0 || index === 1 ? "my-2" : "my-1", + title: "text-sm font-medium", + subtitle: "text-xs text-gray-500", + trigger: + "p-2 rounded-lg data-[hover=true]:bg-gray-50 dark:data-[hover=true]:bg-gray-800/50", + content: "p-2", + }} + > + + + ))} + + ); +}; + +Accordion.displayName = "Accordion"; diff --git a/ui/components/ui/index.ts b/ui/components/ui/index.ts index 181ad5e4c1..6fb4555d80 100644 --- a/ui/components/ui/index.ts +++ b/ui/components/ui/index.ts @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +export * from "./accordion/Accordion"; export * from "./action-card/ActionCard"; export * from "./alert/Alert"; export * from "./alert-dialog/AlertDialog"; From 0737d9e8bb2957d740bf36f876cf189855dd9ce9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Prowler Bot Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 10:56:28 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 03/23] chore(release): Bump version to v5.7.0 (#7697) Co-authored-by: prowler-bot <179230569+prowler-bot@users.noreply.github.com> --- prowler/config/config.py | 2 +- pyproject.toml | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/prowler/config/config.py b/prowler/config/config.py index 52bd2fd742..41d6e3e842 100644 --- a/prowler/config/config.py +++ b/prowler/config/config.py @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ from prowler.lib.logger import logger timestamp = datetime.today() timestamp_utc = datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc) -prowler_version = "5.6.0" +prowler_version = "5.7.0" html_logo_url = "https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/" square_logo_img = "https://prowler.com/wp-content/uploads/logo-html.png" aws_logo = "https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/38561120/235953920-3e3fba08-0795-41dc-b480-9bea57db9f2e.png" diff --git a/pyproject.toml b/pyproject.toml index ce1f648702..1c1e3a49c7 100644 --- a/pyproject.toml +++ b/pyproject.toml @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ maintainers = [{name = "Prowler Engineering", email = "engineering@prowler.com"} name = "prowler" readme = "README.md" requires-python = ">3.9.1,<3.13" -version = "5.6.0" +version = "5.7.0" [project.scripts] prowler = "prowler.__main__:prowler" From 4d84529ba2ade50bab3cf6ff5f988255fb4d1329 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Adri=C3=A1n=20Jes=C3=BAs=20Pe=C3=B1a=20Rodr=C3=ADguez?= Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 11:00:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 04/23] docs: update the download export documentation (#7682) --- docs/img/compliance_download.png | Bin 0 -> 66869 bytes docs/img/compliance_section.png | Bin 0 -> 9204 bytes docs/img/download_output.png | Bin 156252 -> 39755 bytes docs/img/output_folder.png | Bin 27683 -> 55522 bytes docs/img/scan_jobs_section.png | Bin 0 -> 16068 bytes docs/tutorials/prowler-app.md | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 docs/img/compliance_download.png create mode 100644 docs/img/compliance_section.png create mode 100644 docs/img/scan_jobs_section.png diff --git a/docs/img/compliance_download.png b/docs/img/compliance_download.png new file mode 100644 index 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z3NmQ%4dtG2;2{ox8`epa*ZV6AzoO33Q$?a34ft-YJm3Zhe!r70$!YlPZ^(Dp0lDUqPBR~vj-gHVf!3!HCGK3c7(c3Lz^KZK4)~V~WFCfR?0GI5 zfsS>ppFly38o6Y^rwF63rpa`+(*)_)Uf3Rk)vy{%e05bw{(OmT*=|cFB-$UnAz+v) z^m8me6Q};H0Z=e4l!^!4RN9(OTm66Zq{OYxUrE(!Y=dCZYuI%8Y$3h~aOqFA7C(w& zJd%dFI9~8XbBC(>o`)400cLk5D<^*Y?wiH3b0llmaT*G0Wu-`*avuq7b3 zpmneWv0P*b1J)%>ke-!k?NRxpTAx(O$K0Ny9Wk2n<4>p-&u{1SoFr_oAy*ZZ%lG~A zZJMBaA_-*d)@%`z4e*!?LmU4>KLFK(3xwI>dtN%hCO&8_3Bm`#pvk8v!}Apv!|TV- znf*K>Fv(A_3;r~Dm{3Rgx%&pX!zd{4usnZ1{$63=`8EAajH3hs#4Vr$3Arp3=cIrV qmIkr}MEigkZQx@0e^Y()WAzxk!Q1|+2zcfbL_$PXxI$3Z?|%Wo + +These outputs are bundled into a single .zip archive containing: + +- CSV report + +- JSON-OSCF formatted results + +- HTML report + +- A folder with individual compliance reports + +???+ note "Note" + The Download button only becomes active after a scan completes successfully. Download output -This action downloads a `zip` file containing an `output` folder, which includes the files mentioned above: CSV, JSON-OSCF, and HTML reports. +The `zip` file unpacks into a folder named like `prowler-output--`, which includes all of the above outputs. In the example below, you can see the `.csv`, .`json`, and `.html` reports alongside a subfolder for detailed compliance checks. Output folder ???+ note "API Note" - To learn more about the API endpoint the UI uses to download ZIP exports, see: [Prowler API Reference - Download Scan Output](https://api.prowler.com/api/v1/docs#tag/Scan/operation/scans_report_retrieve) + For more information about the API endpoint used by the UI to download the ZIP archive, refer to: [Prowler API Reference - Download Scan Output](https://api.prowler.com/api/v1/docs#tag/Scan/operation/scans_report_retrieve) + +## **Step 10: Download specified compliance report** + +Once your scan has finished, you don’t need to grab the entire ZIP—just pull down the specific compliance report you want: + +- Navigate to the **Compliance** section of the UI. + +Compliance section + +- Find the Framework report you need. + +- Click its **Download** icon to retrieve that report’s CSV file with all the detailed findings. + +Download compliance output + +???+ note "API Note" + To fetch a single compliance report via API, see the Retrieve compliance report as CSV endpoint in the Prowler API Reference.[Prowler API Reference - Retrieve compliance report as CSV](https://api.prowler.com/api/v1/docs#tag/Scan/operation/scans_compliance_retrieve) From 5c375d63c5f971b026291547aff513bf13bd362b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alejandro Bailo <59607668+alejandrobailo@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 11:14:10 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 05/23] feat: Horizontal bar chart (#7680) --- ui/CHANGELOG.md | 2 + .../ui/chart/horizontal-split-chart.tsx | 241 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 243 insertions(+) create mode 100644 ui/components/ui/chart/horizontal-split-chart.tsx diff --git a/ui/CHANGELOG.md b/ui/CHANGELOG.md index a39cf3f878..3b092ee06c 100644 --- a/ui/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/ui/CHANGELOG.md @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ All notable changes to the **Prowler UI** are documented in this file. ### 🚀 Added +- Add a new chart to show the split between passed and failed findings. [(#7680)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7680) - Added `Accordion` component. [(#7700)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7700) --- @@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ All notable changes to the **Prowler UI** are documented in this file. - Add a button to download the CSV report in compliance card. [(#7665)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7665) - Show loading state while checking provider connection. [(#7669)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7669) + ### 🔄 Changed - Finding URLs now include the ID, allowing them to be shared within the organization. [(#7654)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7654) diff --git a/ui/components/ui/chart/horizontal-split-chart.tsx b/ui/components/ui/chart/horizontal-split-chart.tsx new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b3b4c783a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/ui/components/ui/chart/horizontal-split-chart.tsx @@ -0,0 +1,241 @@ +"use client"; + +import { Tooltip } from "@nextui-org/react"; +import * as React from "react"; +import { useEffect, useState } from "react"; + +import { cn } from "@/lib/utils"; + +interface HorizontalSplitBarProps { + /** + * First value (left) + */ + valueA: number; + /** + * Second value (right) + */ + valueB: number; + /** + * Additional CSS classes for the main container + */ + className?: string; + /** + * Color for value A (Tailwind classes) + * @default "bg-system-success" + */ + colorA?: string; + /** + * Color for value B (Tailwind classes) + * @default "bg-system-error" + */ + colorB?: string; + /** + * Value format suffix (like "%", "$", etc.) + * Will be appended to the values when displayed + * @example "%" + */ + valueSuffix?: string; + /** + * Bar height + * @default "h-4" + */ + barHeight?: string; + /** + * Color for the empty state (when both values are 0) + * @default "bg-gray-300" + */ + emptyColor?: string; + /** + * Text to display when there is no data + * @default "No data available" + */ + emptyText?: string; + /** + * Minimum width for small values (in pixels) + * @default 25 + */ + minBarWidth?: number; + /** + * Custom tooltip content for value A (optional) + * If not provided, the formatted value will be used + */ + tooltipContentA?: string; + /** + * Custom tooltip content for value B (optional) + * If not provided, the formatted value will be used + */ + tooltipContentB?: string; + /** + * Text color for labels + * @default "text-gray-700" + */ + labelColor?: string; +} + +/** + * Horizontal split bar chart component that displays two values + * with bars growing from a central separator. + * + * @example + * ```tsx + * + * ``` + */ +export const HorizontalSplitBar = ({ + valueA, + valueB, + className, + colorA = "bg-system-success", + colorB = "bg-system-error", + valueSuffix = "", + barHeight = "h-4", + emptyColor = "bg-gray-300", + emptyText = "No data available", + minBarWidth = 25, + tooltipContentA, + tooltipContentB, + labelColor = "text-gray-700", +}: HorizontalSplitBarProps) => { + // Reference to the container to measure its width + const containerRef = React.useRef(null); + const [maxContainerWidth, setMaxContainerWidth] = useState(0); + + // Effect to measure the container width + useEffect(() => { + if (containerRef.current) { + const updateWidth = () => { + const containerWidth = containerRef.current?.clientWidth || 0; + setMaxContainerWidth(containerWidth); + }; + + updateWidth(); + + window.addEventListener("resize", updateWidth); + return () => window.removeEventListener("resize", updateWidth); + } + }, []); + + // Ensure values are positive + const valA = Math.max(0, valueA); + const valB = Math.max(0, valueB); + + const hasNoData = valA === 0 && valB === 0; + const formattedValueA = `${valA}${valueSuffix}`; + const formattedValueB = `${valB}${valueSuffix}`; + + if (hasNoData) { + return ( +

+
+
+ + {emptyText} + +
+
+
+ ); + } + + const availableWidth = Math.max(0, maxContainerWidth); + const halfWidth = availableWidth / 2; + const separatorWidth = 1; + + let rawWidthA = valA; + let rawWidthB = valB; + + // Determine if we need to scale to fit in available space + const maxSideWidth = halfWidth - separatorWidth / 2; + const needsScaling = rawWidthA > maxSideWidth || rawWidthB > maxSideWidth; + + if (needsScaling) { + // Calculate scale factor based on the largest value + const maxRawWidth = Math.max(rawWidthA, rawWidthB); + const scaleFactor = maxSideWidth / maxRawWidth; + + // Apply the scale factor to both sides + rawWidthA = rawWidthA * scaleFactor; + rawWidthB = rawWidthB * scaleFactor; + } + + // Apply minimum width if needed + const barWidthA = Math.max(rawWidthA, valA > 0 ? minBarWidth : 0); + const barWidthB = Math.max(rawWidthB, valB > 0 ? minBarWidth : 0); + + return ( +
+
+
+ {/* Left label */} +
+ {valA > 0 ? formattedValueA : "0"} +
+ {/* Left bar */} + {valA > 0 && ( + +
+ + )} +
+ + {/* Central separator */} +
+ +
+ {/* Right bar */} + {valB > 0 && ( + +
+ + )} + {/* Right label */} +
+ {valB > 0 ? formattedValueB : "0"} +
+
+
+
+ ); +}; + +export default HorizontalSplitBar; From 60e0040577a452224dca5c18e4cd33cccc46ddd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Lara Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 11:54:42 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 06/23] fix: move ProviderType to shared types and update usages (#7710) --- ui/CHANGELOG.md | 8 ++- ui/app/(prowler)/findings/page.tsx | 8 +-- .../compliance/compliance-scan-info.tsx | 4 +- .../findings/table/column-findings.tsx | 4 +- .../findings/table/finding-detail.tsx | 7 +- .../table/column-new-findings-to-date.tsx | 4 +- ui/components/providers/provider-info.tsx | 5 +- .../workflow/forms/connect-account-form.tsx | 2 +- .../workflow/forms/test-connection-form.tsx | 2 +- .../forms/update-via-credentials-form.tsx | 2 +- .../workflow/forms/via-credentials-form.tsx | 2 +- .../workflow/provider-title-docs.tsx | 2 +- .../scans/table/scans/column-get-scans.tsx | 4 +- .../ui/entities/entity-info-short.tsx | 4 +- .../ui/entities/get-provider-logo.tsx | 3 +- ui/types/components.ts | 72 ++----------------- ui/types/index.ts | 1 + ui/types/providers.ts | 67 +++++++++++++++++ 18 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 99 deletions(-) create mode 100644 ui/types/providers.ts diff --git a/ui/CHANGELOG.md b/ui/CHANGELOG.md index 3b092ee06c..8c9c12db4e 100644 --- a/ui/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/ui/CHANGELOG.md @@ -2,13 +2,18 @@ All notable changes to the **Prowler UI** are documented in this file. -## [v1.7.0] (Prowler v5.7.0) +## [v1.7.0] (Prowler v5.7.0) – Not released ### 🚀 Added - Add a new chart to show the split between passed and failed findings. [(#7680)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7680) - Added `Accordion` component. [(#7700)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7700) +### 🐞 Fixes + +- Fix form validation in launch scan workflow. [(#7693)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7693) +- Moved ProviderType to a shared types file and replaced all occurrences across the codebase. [(#7710)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7710) + --- ## [v1.6.0] (Prowler v5.6.0) @@ -22,7 +27,6 @@ All notable changes to the **Prowler UI** are documented in this file. - Add a button to download the CSV report in compliance card. [(#7665)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7665) - Show loading state while checking provider connection. [(#7669)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7669) - ### 🔄 Changed - Finding URLs now include the ID, allowing them to be shared within the organization. [(#7654)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7654) diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/findings/page.tsx b/ui/app/(prowler)/findings/page.tsx index 6166ed4f94..0ddf609b6e 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/findings/page.tsx +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/findings/page.tsx @@ -14,12 +14,8 @@ import { import { ContentLayout } from "@/components/ui"; import { DataTable, DataTableFilterCustom } from "@/components/ui/table"; import { createDict } from "@/lib"; -import { - FindingProps, - ProviderProps, - ScanProps, - SearchParamsProps, -} from "@/types/components"; +import { ProviderProps } from "@/types"; +import { FindingProps, ScanProps, SearchParamsProps } from "@/types/components"; export default async function Findings({ searchParams, diff --git a/ui/components/compliance/compliance-scan-info.tsx b/ui/components/compliance/compliance-scan-info.tsx index 9cd062259a..c4bff1d7ad 100644 --- a/ui/components/compliance/compliance-scan-info.tsx +++ b/ui/components/compliance/compliance-scan-info.tsx @@ -2,11 +2,11 @@ import { Divider } from "@nextui-org/react"; import React from "react"; import { DateWithTime, EntityInfoShort } from "@/components/ui/entities"; - +import { ProviderType } from "@/types"; interface ComplianceScanInfoProps { scan: { providerInfo: { - provider: "aws" | "azure" | "gcp" | "kubernetes"; + provider: ProviderType; alias?: string; uid?: string; }; diff --git a/ui/components/findings/table/column-findings.tsx b/ui/components/findings/table/column-findings.tsx index fca06afe39..8bfeac0a7f 100644 --- a/ui/components/findings/table/column-findings.tsx +++ b/ui/components/findings/table/column-findings.tsx @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import { SeverityBadge, StatusFindingBadge, } from "@/components/ui/table"; -import { FindingProps } from "@/types"; +import { FindingProps, ProviderType } from "@/types"; import { Muted } from "../muted"; import { DeltaIndicator } from "./delta-indicator"; @@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ export const ColumnFindings: ColumnDef[] = [ return ( <> diff --git a/ui/components/findings/table/finding-detail.tsx b/ui/components/findings/table/finding-detail.tsx index c6426d33e7..e58040a374 100644 --- a/ui/components/findings/table/finding-detail.tsx +++ b/ui/components/findings/table/finding-detail.tsx @@ -6,12 +6,9 @@ import Link from "next/link"; import { CodeSnippet } from "@/components/ui/code-snippet/code-snippet"; import { InfoField } from "@/components/ui/entities"; import { DateWithTime } from "@/components/ui/entities/date-with-time"; -import { - getProviderLogo, - type ProviderType, -} from "@/components/ui/entities/get-provider-logo"; +import { getProviderLogo } from "@/components/ui/entities/get-provider-logo"; import { SeverityBadge } from "@/components/ui/table/severity-badge"; -import { FindingProps } from "@/types"; +import { FindingProps, ProviderType } from "@/types"; import { Muted } from "../muted"; import { DeltaIndicator } from "./delta-indicator"; diff --git a/ui/components/overview/new-findings-table/table/column-new-findings-to-date.tsx b/ui/components/overview/new-findings-table/table/column-new-findings-to-date.tsx index fa9a3e58ed..7d04fa9722 100644 --- a/ui/components/overview/new-findings-table/table/column-new-findings-to-date.tsx +++ b/ui/components/overview/new-findings-table/table/column-new-findings-to-date.tsx @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import { InfoIcon } from "@/components/icons"; import { DateWithTime, EntityInfoShort } from "@/components/ui/entities"; import { TriggerSheet } from "@/components/ui/sheet"; import { SeverityBadge, StatusFindingBadge } from "@/components/ui/table"; -import { FindingProps } from "@/types"; +import { FindingProps, ProviderType } from "@/types"; import { Muted } from "../../../findings/muted"; @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ export const ColumnNewFindingsToDate: ColumnDef[] = [ return ( <> diff --git a/ui/components/providers/provider-info.tsx b/ui/components/providers/provider-info.tsx index ac96d29ef2..8798d68f38 100644 --- a/ui/components/providers/provider-info.tsx +++ b/ui/components/providers/provider-info.tsx @@ -1,9 +1,10 @@ import { Tooltip } from "@nextui-org/react"; import React from "react"; -import { ConnectionFalse, ConnectionPending, ConnectionTrue } from "../icons"; -import { getProviderLogo, ProviderType } from "../ui/entities"; +import { ProviderType } from "@/types"; +import { ConnectionFalse, ConnectionPending, ConnectionTrue } from "../icons"; +import { getProviderLogo } from "../ui/entities"; interface ProviderInfoProps { connected: boolean | null; provider: ProviderType; diff --git a/ui/components/providers/workflow/forms/connect-account-form.tsx b/ui/components/providers/workflow/forms/connect-account-form.tsx index ed59d16be0..a33ebd786b 100644 --- a/ui/components/providers/workflow/forms/connect-account-form.tsx +++ b/ui/components/providers/workflow/forms/connect-account-form.tsx @@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ import * as z from "zod"; import { useToast } from "@/components/ui"; import { CustomButton, CustomInput } from "@/components/ui/custom"; -import { ProviderType } from "@/components/ui/entities"; import { Form } from "@/components/ui/form"; +import { ProviderType } from "@/types"; import { addProvider } from "../../../../actions/providers/providers"; import { addProviderFormSchema, ApiError } from "../../../../types"; diff --git a/ui/components/providers/workflow/forms/test-connection-form.tsx b/ui/components/providers/workflow/forms/test-connection-form.tsx index db32c4f3cf..6fdc6e2215 100644 --- a/ui/components/providers/workflow/forms/test-connection-form.tsx +++ b/ui/components/providers/workflow/forms/test-connection-form.tsx @@ -18,9 +18,9 @@ import { getTask } from "@/actions/task/tasks"; import { CheckIcon, RocketIcon } from "@/components/icons"; import { useToast } from "@/components/ui"; import { CustomButton } from "@/components/ui/custom"; -import { ProviderType } from "@/components/ui/entities"; import { Form } from "@/components/ui/form"; import { checkTaskStatus } from "@/lib/helper"; +import { ProviderType } from "@/types"; import { ApiError, testConnectionFormSchema } from "@/types"; import { ProviderInfo } from "../.."; diff --git a/ui/components/providers/workflow/forms/update-via-credentials-form.tsx b/ui/components/providers/workflow/forms/update-via-credentials-form.tsx index f34fab12e0..9c751eb399 100644 --- a/ui/components/providers/workflow/forms/update-via-credentials-form.tsx +++ b/ui/components/providers/workflow/forms/update-via-credentials-form.tsx @@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ import * as z from "zod"; import { updateCredentialsProvider } from "@/actions/providers/providers"; import { useToast } from "@/components/ui"; import { CustomButton } from "@/components/ui/custom"; -import { ProviderType } from "@/components/ui/entities"; import { Form } from "@/components/ui/form"; +import { ProviderType } from "@/types"; import { addCredentialsFormSchema, ApiError, diff --git a/ui/components/providers/workflow/forms/via-credentials-form.tsx b/ui/components/providers/workflow/forms/via-credentials-form.tsx index 072d2f3640..38b3a98a86 100644 --- a/ui/components/providers/workflow/forms/via-credentials-form.tsx +++ b/ui/components/providers/workflow/forms/via-credentials-form.tsx @@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ import * as z from "zod"; import { addCredentialsProvider } from "@/actions/providers/providers"; import { useToast } from "@/components/ui"; import { CustomButton } from "@/components/ui/custom"; -import { ProviderType } from "@/components/ui/entities"; import { Form } from "@/components/ui/form"; +import { ProviderType } from "@/types"; import { addCredentialsFormSchema, ApiError, diff --git a/ui/components/providers/workflow/provider-title-docs.tsx b/ui/components/providers/workflow/provider-title-docs.tsx index a09b05acb1..15ca7f92e3 100644 --- a/ui/components/providers/workflow/provider-title-docs.tsx +++ b/ui/components/providers/workflow/provider-title-docs.tsx @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ import Link from "next/link"; import { getProviderName } from "@/components/ui/entities/get-provider-logo"; -import { ProviderType } from "@/components/ui/entities/get-provider-logo"; import { getProviderLogo } from "@/components/ui/entities/get-provider-logo"; +import { ProviderType } from "@/types"; export const ProviderTitleDocs = ({ providerType, diff --git a/ui/components/scans/table/scans/column-get-scans.tsx b/ui/components/scans/table/scans/column-get-scans.tsx index f21be24299..9082618eb8 100644 --- a/ui/components/scans/table/scans/column-get-scans.tsx +++ b/ui/components/scans/table/scans/column-get-scans.tsx @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import { DateWithTime, EntityInfoShort } from "@/components/ui/entities"; import { TriggerSheet } from "@/components/ui/sheet"; import { DataTableColumnHeader, StatusBadge } from "@/components/ui/table"; import { downloadScanZip } from "@/lib/helper"; -import { ScanProps } from "@/types"; +import { ProviderType, ScanProps } from "@/types"; import { LinkToFindingsFromScan } from "../../link-to-findings-from-scan"; import { TriggerIcon } from "../../trigger-icon"; @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ export const ColumnGetScans: ColumnDef[] = [ return ( diff --git a/ui/components/ui/entities/entity-info-short.tsx b/ui/components/ui/entities/entity-info-short.tsx index fcfbe84ae2..c1c957642b 100644 --- a/ui/components/ui/entities/entity-info-short.tsx +++ b/ui/components/ui/entities/entity-info-short.tsx @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ import React from "react"; +import { ProviderType } from "@/types"; + import { getProviderLogo } from "./get-provider-logo"; import { SnippetId } from "./snippet-id"; interface EntityInfoProps { - cloudProvider: "aws" | "azure" | "gcp" | "kubernetes"; + cloudProvider: ProviderType; entityAlias?: string; entityId?: string; hideCopyButton?: boolean; diff --git a/ui/components/ui/entities/get-provider-logo.tsx b/ui/components/ui/entities/get-provider-logo.tsx index 4bfe7cb419..17ab559988 100644 --- a/ui/components/ui/entities/get-provider-logo.tsx +++ b/ui/components/ui/entities/get-provider-logo.tsx @@ -7,8 +7,7 @@ import { KS8ProviderBadge, M365ProviderBadge, } from "@/components/icons/providers-badge"; - -export type ProviderType = "aws" | "azure" | "gcp" | "kubernetes" | "m365"; +import { ProviderType } from "@/types"; export const getProviderLogo = (provider: ProviderType) => { switch (provider) { diff --git a/ui/types/components.ts b/ui/types/components.ts index 8b9696473c..e45913efc7 100644 --- a/ui/types/components.ts +++ b/ui/types/components.ts @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ import { LucideIcon } from "lucide-react"; import { SVGProps } from "react"; +import { ProviderType } from "./providers"; + export type IconSvgProps = SVGProps & { size?: number; }; @@ -45,7 +47,7 @@ export interface CollapseMenuButtonProps { export interface SelectScanComplianceDataProps { scans: (ScanProps & { providerInfo: { - provider: "aws" | "azure" | "gcp" | "kubernetes"; + provider: ProviderType; uid: string; alias: string; }; @@ -174,27 +176,6 @@ export interface FindingsSeverityOverview { }; } -export interface ProviderOverviewProps { - data: { - type: "provider-overviews"; - id: "aws" | "gcp" | "azure" | "kubernetes"; - attributes: { - findings: { - pass: number; - fail: number; - manual: number; - total: number; - }; - resources: { - total: number; - }; - }; - }[]; - meta: { - version: string; - }; -} - export interface TaskDetails { attributes: { state: string; @@ -509,51 +490,6 @@ export interface UserProps { }[]; } -export interface ProviderProps { - id: string; - type: "providers"; - attributes: { - provider: "aws" | "azure" | "m365" | "gcp" | "kubernetes"; - uid: string; - alias: string; - status: "completed" | "pending" | "cancelled"; - resources: number; - connection: { - connected: boolean; - last_checked_at: string; - }; - scanner_args: { - only_logs: boolean; - excluded_checks: string[]; - aws_retries_max_attempts: number; - }; - inserted_at: string; - updated_at: string; - created_by: { - object: string; - id: string; - }; - }; - relationships: { - secret: { - data: { - type: string; - id: string; - } | null; - }; - provider_groups: { - meta: { - count: number; - }; - data: Array<{ - type: string; - id: string; - }>; - }; - }; - groupNames?: string[]; -} - export interface ScanProps { type: "scans"; id: string; @@ -596,7 +532,7 @@ export interface ScanProps { }; }; providerInfo?: { - provider: "aws" | "azure" | "gcp" | "kubernetes"; + provider: ProviderType; uid: string; alias: string; }; diff --git a/ui/types/index.ts b/ui/types/index.ts index c247bc2080..e35a2815da 100644 --- a/ui/types/index.ts +++ b/ui/types/index.ts @@ -2,3 +2,4 @@ export * from "./authFormSchema"; export * from "./components"; export * from "./filters"; export * from "./formSchemas"; +export * from "./providers"; diff --git a/ui/types/providers.ts b/ui/types/providers.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..50353125e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/ui/types/providers.ts @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +export type ProviderType = "aws" | "azure" | "m365" | "gcp" | "kubernetes"; + +export interface ProviderProps { + id: string; + type: "providers"; + attributes: { + provider: ProviderType; + uid: string; + alias: string; + status: "completed" | "pending" | "cancelled"; + resources: number; + connection: { + connected: boolean; + last_checked_at: string; + }; + scanner_args: { + only_logs: boolean; + excluded_checks: string[]; + aws_retries_max_attempts: number; + }; + inserted_at: string; + updated_at: string; + created_by: { + object: string; + id: string; + }; + }; + relationships: { + secret: { + data: { + type: string; + id: string; + } | null; + }; + provider_groups: { + meta: { + count: number; + }; + data: Array<{ + type: string; + id: string; + }>; + }; + }; + groupNames?: string[]; +} + +export interface ProviderOverviewProps { + data: { + type: "provider-overviews"; + id: ProviderType; + attributes: { + findings: { + pass: number; + fail: number; + manual: number; + total: number; + }; + resources: { + total: number; + }; + }; + }[]; + meta: { + version: string; + }; +} From 0a71628298ccf66b771ab9e19ca39be09d02980b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?C=C3=A9sar=20Arroba?= <19954079+cesararroba@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 11:55:00 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 07/23] chore: add pass PR url (#7711) --- .github/workflows/pull-request-merged.yml | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/pull-request-merged.yml b/.github/workflows/pull-request-merged.yml index 500ca5d0c4..b4ad343a4e 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/pull-request-merged.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/pull-request-merged.yml @@ -30,5 +30,6 @@ jobs: "PROWLER_COMMIT_SHORT_SHA": "${{ env.SHORT_SHA }}", "PROWLER_PR_TITLE": "${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}", "PROWLER_PR_LABELS": ${{ toJson(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name) }}, - "PROWLER_PR_BODY": ${{ toJson(github.event.pull_request.body) }} + "PROWLER_PR_BODY": ${{ toJson(github.event.pull_request.body) }}, + "PROWLER_PR_URL":${{ toJson(github.event.pull_request.html_url) }} }' From c8d2a44ab0f4cf1b31b8c92e7ec0b31ab3e24408 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sergio Garcia Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 06:28:04 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 08/23] feat(kubernetes): allow setting cluster name in in-cluster mode (#7695) --- docs/tutorials/kubernetes/in-cluster.md | 16 +++++++ prowler/providers/common/provider.py | 1 + .../kubernetes/kubernetes_provider.py | 17 +++++-- .../kubernetes/lib/arguments/arguments.py | 6 +++ .../kubernetes/kubernetes_provider_test.py | 48 +++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/tutorials/kubernetes/in-cluster.md b/docs/tutorials/kubernetes/in-cluster.md index 9b16b21f09..667b1f6436 100644 --- a/docs/tutorials/kubernetes/in-cluster.md +++ b/docs/tutorials/kubernetes/in-cluster.md @@ -20,3 +20,19 @@ kubectl logs prowler-XXXXX --namespace prowler-ns ???+ note By default, `prowler` will scan all namespaces in your active Kubernetes context. Use the [`--namespace`](https://docs.prowler.com/projects/prowler-open-source/en/latest/tutorials/kubernetes/namespace/) flag to specify the namespace(s) to be scanned. + +???+ tip "Identifying the cluster in reports" + When running in in-cluster mode, the Kubernetes API does not expose the actual cluster name by default. + + To uniquely identify the cluster in logs and reports, you can: + + - Use the `--cluster-name` flag to manually set the cluster name: + ```bash + prowler -p kubernetes --cluster-name production-cluster + ``` + - Or set the `CLUSTER_NAME` environment variable: + ```yaml + env: + - name: CLUSTER_NAME + value: production-cluster + ``` diff --git a/prowler/providers/common/provider.py b/prowler/providers/common/provider.py index aaa94b21d1..118346d6b5 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/common/provider.py +++ b/prowler/providers/common/provider.py @@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ class Provider(ABC): kubeconfig_file=arguments.kubeconfig_file, context=arguments.context, namespace=arguments.namespace, + cluster_name=arguments.cluster_name, config_path=arguments.config_file, mutelist_path=arguments.mutelist_file, fixer_config=fixer_config, diff --git a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/kubernetes_provider.py b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/kubernetes_provider.py index 0f11a41fb0..160ef4e897 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/kubernetes_provider.py +++ b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/kubernetes_provider.py @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ class KubernetesProvider(Provider): kubeconfig_file: str = None, context: str = None, namespace: list = None, + cluster_name: str = None, config_path: str = None, config_content: dict = {}, fixer_config: dict = {}, @@ -84,6 +85,7 @@ class KubernetesProvider(Provider): kubeconfig_file (str): Path to the kubeconfig file. kubeconfig_content (str or dict): Content of the kubeconfig file. context (str): Context name. + cluster_name (str): Cluster name. namespace (list): List of namespaces. config_content (dict): Audit configuration. config_path (str): Path to the configuration file. @@ -147,7 +149,9 @@ class KubernetesProvider(Provider): """ logger.info("Instantiating Kubernetes Provider ...") - self._session = self.setup_session(kubeconfig_file, kubeconfig_content, context) + self._session = self.setup_session( + kubeconfig_file, kubeconfig_content, context, cluster_name + ) if not namespace: logger.info("Retrieving all namespaces ...") self._namespaces = self.get_all_namespaces() @@ -227,6 +231,7 @@ class KubernetesProvider(Provider): kubeconfig_file: str = None, kubeconfig_content: Union[dict, str] = None, context: str = None, + cluster_name: str = None, ) -> KubernetesSession: """ Sets up the Kubernetes session. @@ -235,7 +240,7 @@ class KubernetesProvider(Provider): kubeconfig_file (str): Path to the kubeconfig file. kubeconfig_content (str or dict): Content of the kubeconfig file. context (str): Context name. - + cluster_name (str): Cluster name. Returns: Tuple: A tuple containing the API client and the context. @@ -270,11 +275,15 @@ class KubernetesProvider(Provider): # If the kubeconfig file is not found, try to use the in-cluster config logger.info("Using in-cluster config") config.load_incluster_config() + # Use CLI flag or env var to set cluster name + resolved_cluster_name = cluster_name or os.getenv( + "CLUSTER_NAME", "in-cluster" + ) context = { "name": "In-Cluster", "context": { - "cluster": "in-cluster", # Placeholder, as the real cluster name is not available - "user": "service-account-name", # Also a placeholder + "cluster": resolved_cluster_name, + "user": "service-account-name", }, } return KubernetesSession( diff --git a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/lib/arguments/arguments.py b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/lib/arguments/arguments.py index c6aeace363..a3eb4b55b1 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/lib/arguments/arguments.py +++ b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/lib/arguments/arguments.py @@ -27,3 +27,9 @@ def init_parser(self): metavar="NAMESPACES", help="The namespaces where to scan for the Kubernetes resources. By default, Prowler will scan all namespaces available.", ) + k8s_auth_subparser.add_argument( + "--cluster-name", + nargs="?", + metavar="CLUSTER_NAME", + help="Manually specify the cluster name in in-cluster mode, by default it will be 'in-cluster'", + ) diff --git a/tests/providers/kubernetes/kubernetes_provider_test.py b/tests/providers/kubernetes/kubernetes_provider_test.py index 681e9b9b39..411693117d 100644 --- a/tests/providers/kubernetes/kubernetes_provider_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/kubernetes/kubernetes_provider_test.py @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ from argparse import Namespace from unittest.mock import patch +from kubernetes.config.config_exception import ConfigException + from kubernetes import client from prowler.config.config import ( default_config_file_path, @@ -305,3 +307,49 @@ class TestKubernetesProvider: assert connection.is_connected assert connection.error is None + + def test_kubernetes_provider_incluster_with_env_var(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("CLUSTER_NAME", "env-cluster-name") + + with ( + patch( + "kubernetes.config.load_kube_config", + side_effect=ConfigException("No kubeconfig"), + ), + patch("kubernetes.config.load_incluster_config", return_value=None), + patch("prowler.providers.kubernetes.kubernetes_provider.client.ApiClient"), + patch( + "prowler.providers.kubernetes.kubernetes_provider.KubernetesProvider.get_all_namespaces", + return_value=["default"], + ), + ): + session = KubernetesProvider.setup_session( + kubeconfig_file=None, + kubeconfig_content=None, + context=None, + cluster_name=None, + ) + assert isinstance(session, KubernetesSession) + assert session.context["context"]["cluster"] == "env-cluster-name" + + def test_kubernetes_provider_incluster_with_cli_flag(self): + with ( + patch( + "kubernetes.config.load_kube_config", + side_effect=ConfigException("No kubeconfig"), + ), + patch("kubernetes.config.load_incluster_config", return_value=None), + patch("prowler.providers.kubernetes.kubernetes_provider.client.ApiClient"), + patch( + "prowler.providers.kubernetes.kubernetes_provider.KubernetesProvider.get_all_namespaces", + return_value=["default"], + ), + ): + session = KubernetesProvider.setup_session( + kubeconfig_file=None, + kubeconfig_content=None, + context=None, + cluster_name="cli-cluster-name", + ) + assert isinstance(session, KubernetesSession) + assert session.context["context"]["cluster"] == "cli-cluster-name" From 458c51dda362bf505c13d638158dc026a7dd4ab4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Pedro=20Mart=C3=ADn?= Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 12:28:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 09/23] feat(m365): add Prowler Threatscore (#7692) Co-authored-by: Sergio Garcia --- README.md | 2 +- .../compliance/prowler_threatscore_m365.py | 24 + prowler/CHANGELOG.md | 1 + prowler/__main__.py | 15 + .../m365/prowler_threatscore_m365.json | 1081 +++++++++++++++++ .../compliance/prowler_threatscore/models.py | 26 + .../prowler_threatscore_m365.py | 91 ++ ...egacy_authentication_blocked.metadata.json | 4 +- 8 files changed, 1241 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 dashboard/compliance/prowler_threatscore_m365.py create mode 100644 prowler/compliance/m365/prowler_threatscore_m365.json create mode 100644 prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_m365.py diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index fa89204448..15763cb4b0 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ It contains hundreds of controls covering CIS, NIST 800, NIST CSF, CISA, RBI, Fe | GCP | 79 | 13 | 7 | 3 | | Azure | 140 | 18 | 8 | 3 | | Kubernetes | 83 | 7 | 4 | 7 | -| M365 | 44 | 2 | 1 | 0 | +| M365 | 44 | 2 | 2 | 0 | | NHN (Unofficial) | 6 | 2 | 1 | 0 | > You can list the checks, services, compliance frameworks and categories with `prowler --list-checks`, `prowler --list-services`, `prowler --list-compliance` and `prowler --list-categories`. diff --git a/dashboard/compliance/prowler_threatscore_m365.py b/dashboard/compliance/prowler_threatscore_m365.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..94558f33ad --- /dev/null +++ b/dashboard/compliance/prowler_threatscore_m365.py @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +import warnings + +from dashboard.common_methods import get_section_containers_cis + +warnings.filterwarnings("ignore") + + +def get_table(data): + aux = data[ + [ + "REQUIREMENTS_ID", + "REQUIREMENTS_DESCRIPTION", + "REQUIREMENTS_ATTRIBUTES_SECTION", + "CHECKID", + "STATUS", + "REGION", + "ACCOUNTID", + "RESOURCEID", + ] + ].copy() + + return get_section_containers_cis( + aux, "REQUIREMENTS_ID", "REQUIREMENTS_ATTRIBUTES_SECTION" + ) diff --git a/prowler/CHANGELOG.md b/prowler/CHANGELOG.md index 1ca2c64635..c9d9cad18e 100644 --- a/prowler/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/prowler/CHANGELOG.md @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ All notable changes to the **Prowler SDK** are documented in this file. - Modified check `exchange_mailbox_properties_auditing_enabled` to make it configurable. [(#7662)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7662) - Add snapshots to m365 documentation. [(#7673)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7673) - Add support for static credentials for sending findings to Amazon S3 and AWS Security Hub. [(#7322)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7322) +- Add Prowler ThreatScore for M365 provider. [(#7692)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7692) ### Fixed diff --git a/prowler/__main__.py b/prowler/__main__.py index b201268da3..590f3e3bdb 100644 --- a/prowler/__main__.py +++ b/prowler/__main__.py @@ -79,6 +79,9 @@ from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.prowler_threatscore.prowler_threatscore_azur from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.prowler_threatscore.prowler_threatscore_gcp import ( ProwlerThreatScoreGCP, ) +from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.prowler_threatscore.prowler_threatscore_m365 import ( + ProwlerThreatScoreM365, +) from prowler.lib.outputs.csv.csv import CSV from prowler.lib.outputs.finding import Finding from prowler.lib.outputs.html.html import HTML @@ -726,6 +729,18 @@ def prowler(): ) generated_outputs["compliance"].append(cis) cis.batch_write_data_to_file() + elif compliance_name == "prowler_threatscore_m365": + filename = ( + f"{output_options.output_directory}/compliance/" + f"{output_options.output_filename}_{compliance_name}.csv" + ) + prowler_threatscore = ProwlerThreatScoreM365( + findings=finding_outputs, + compliance=bulk_compliance_frameworks[compliance_name], + file_path=filename, + ) + generated_outputs["compliance"].append(prowler_threatscore) + prowler_threatscore.batch_write_data_to_file() else: filename = ( f"{output_options.output_directory}/compliance/" diff --git a/prowler/compliance/m365/prowler_threatscore_m365.json b/prowler/compliance/m365/prowler_threatscore_m365.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..24d100064d --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/compliance/m365/prowler_threatscore_m365.json @@ -0,0 +1,1081 @@ +{ + "Framework": "ProwlerThreatScore", + "Version": "1.0", + "Provider": "M365", + "Description": "Prowler ThreatScore Compliance Framework for Microsoft 365 ensures that the Microsoft 365 tenant is compliant taking into account four main pillars: Identity and Access Management, Attack Surface, Forensic Readiness and Encryption", + "Requirements": [ + { + "Id": "1.1.1", + "Description": "Ensure the 'Password expiration policy' is set to 'Set passwords to never expire'", + "Checks": [ + "admincenter_settings_password_never_expire" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Password expiration policy' is set to 'Set passwords to never expire'", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.1 Authentication", + "AttributeDescription": "Microsoft cloud-only accounts are governed by a built-in password policy that cannot be customized. The only configurable options are the password expiration period and whether password expiration is enabled at all.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Modern security guidance from organizations like NIST and Microsoft recommends against forcing regular password changes unless there is a known compromise or the user has forgotten the password. Arbitrary password expiration policies can lead to weaker password practices, such as predictable patterns or reused credentials. This is especially relevant even in single-factor (password-only) scenarios. When combined with strong security measures like Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) and Entra ID password protection, the need for periodic password changes becomes less critical. As such, it’s more effective to focus on strengthening overall authentication practices rather than enforcing frequent password resets.", + "LevelOfRisk": 2 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.2", + "Description": "Ensure multifactor authentication is enabled for all users in administrative roles", + "Checks": [ + "entra_admin_users_mfa_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Multifactor authentication is enabled for all users in administrative roles", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.1 Authentication", + "AttributeDescription": "Multifactor Authentication (MFA) enhances account security by requiring users to provide at least two forms of identity verification during sign-in—such as a password and a one-time code from a mobile device, biometric scan, or authentication app. It is critical to ensure that all users in administrator roles have MFA enabled to protect privileged access.", + "AdditionalInformation": "MFA significantly reduces the risk of unauthorized access by requiring attackers to compromise multiple independent authentication factors. For administrative accounts—often targeted due to their elevated privileges—this additional layer of security is essential. Enforcing MFA for admins helps ensure that only authorized individuals can access sensitive systems and configurations, thereby strengthening the overall security posture of the organization.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.3", + "Description": "Ensure multifactor authentication is enabled for all users", + "Checks": [ + "entra_users_mfa_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Multifactor authentication is enabled for all users", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.1 Authentication", + "AttributeDescription": "Enable Multifactor Authentication (MFA) for all users in the Microsoft 365 tenant to strengthen identity security. Once enabled, users will be prompted to verify their identity using a second factor during sign-in. Common second factors include a one-time code sent via SMS or generated through an authentication app such as Microsoft Authenticator.", + "AdditionalInformation": "MFA adds a critical layer of protection by requiring users to provide two or more independent forms of authentication before access is granted. This significantly reduces the likelihood of unauthorized access, as an attacker would need to compromise both the primary credentials and the second authentication factor. Enabling MFA across all user accounts helps protect the organization from phishing, credential theft, and other identity-based threats.", + "LevelOfRisk": 5 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.4", + "Description": "Enable Conditional Access policies to block legacy authentication", + "Checks": [ + "entra_legacy_authentication_blocked" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Conditional Access policies to block legacy authentication", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.1 Authentication", + "AttributeDescription": "Microsoft Entra ID supports a variety of authentication and authorization protocols, including legacy authentication methods. Legacy authentication typically refers to Basic Authentication, which prompts users to submit a username and password without support for modern security features like Multifactor Authentication (MFA). Several messaging and connection protocols fall under legacy authentication, including: • Authenticated SMTP – Sends authenticated email messages. • Autodiscover – Helps Outlook and Exchange ActiveSync (EAS) clients locate mailboxes. • Exchange ActiveSync (EAS) – Connects mobile devices to Exchange Online. • Exchange Online PowerShell – Requires the Exchange Online PowerShell Module when Basic Auth is blocked. • Exchange Web Services (EWS) – Used by Outlook, Outlook for Mac, and third-party applications. • IMAP4 and POP3 – Used by legacy email clients. • MAPI over HTTP (MAPI/HTTP) – Primary protocol for Outlook 2010 SP2 and newer. • Offline Address Book (OAB) – Downloads address lists for Outlook. • Outlook Anywhere (RPC over HTTP) – Legacy access method for Outlook. • Reporting Web Services – Retrieves reporting data from Exchange Online.•Universal Outlook – Used by the Windows 10 Mail and Calendar app. • Other clients – Protocols identified as using legacy authentication patterns.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Legacy authentication protocols do not support multifactor authentication, making them a common attack vector for credential theft and brute-force attacks. Blocking legacy authentication significantly reduces the organization’s attack surface and helps enforce modern, more secure sign-in methods that support MFA.", + "LevelOfRisk": 5 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.5", + "Description": "Ensure 'Phishing-resistant MFA strength' is required for Administrators", + "Checks": [ + "entra_admin_users_phishing_resistant_mfa_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Phishing-resistant MFA strength' is required for Administrators", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.1 Authentication", + "AttributeDescription": "Authentication Strength is a Conditional Access (CA) control in Microsoft Entra ID that allows administrators to define which authentication methods are permitted for accessing specific resources. This enables a tailored approach to security—stronger methods can be enforced for sensitive assets, while less secure methods may be acceptable for lower-risk scenarios. Microsoft provides three built-in authentication strength levels: • MFA Strength • Passwordless MFA Strength • Phishing-resistant MFA Strength It is recommended that all users in administrator roles are protected by a Conditional Access policy that enforces Phishing-resistant MFA Strength. Administrators can meet this requirement by registering and using one of the following phishing-resistant authentication methods: • FIDO2 Security Key • Windows Hello for Business • Certificate-based Authentication (CBA) Note: Configuration steps for these methods (e.g., setting up FIDO2 keys) are not covered here but are available in Microsoft’s documentation. The Conditional Access policy only enforces that at least one of these methods is used. Warning: Ensure that administrators are pre-registered for one of the supported strong authentication methods before enforcing the policy. As also recommended elsewhere in the CIS Benchmark, a break-glass account should be excluded from this policy to maintain emergency access.", + "AdditionalInformation": "As MFA adoption increases, so does the sophistication of attacks designed to bypass it. Phishing-resistant authentication methods are more secure because they eliminate passwords from the authentication process. These methods rely on strong public/private key cryptography and ensure that authentication can only occur between trusted devices and providers—preventing login attempts from fake or phishing websites.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.6", + "Description": "Ensure a managed device is required for authentication", + "Checks": [ + "entra_managed_device_required_for_authentication" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "A managed device is required for authentication", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.1 Authentication", + "AttributeDescription": "Conditional Access (CA) policies can be configured to enforce access controls based on whether a device is compliant or Microsoft Entra hybrid joined. These conditions allow organizations to distinguish between managed and unmanaged devices, enabling more granular enforcement of authentication policies. • The Require device to be marked as compliant control ensures that devices meet the compliance standards defined in Intune compliance policies. Devices must first be enrolled in Intune Mobile Device Management (MDM) before these policies can be evaluated. • The Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device control applies to devices synchronized from an on-premises Active Directory environment, marking them as trusted within the hybrid identity model. When both conditions are included in the same Conditional Access policy, the evaluation functions as an OR logic—only one of the two conditions needs to be met for the user to authenticate successfully from a device. Recommended configuration: • Require device to be marked as compliant • Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device • Require one of the selected controls", + "AdditionalInformation": "Managed devices are generally more secure due to enforced configurations such as Group Policy, mobile device compliance policies, endpoint detection and response (EDR), managed patching, and centralized alerting. Limiting access to only compliant or hybrid joined devices ensures that users are authenticating from secure environments. This policy helps mitigate the risk of compromised credentials by requiring attackers to first obtain access to a trusted device. When combined with additional CA controls—such as multi-factor authentication—it adds a further barrier to unauthorized access and strengthens the organization’s overall security posture.", + "LevelOfRisk": 5 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.7", + "Description": "Ensure a managed device is required for MFA registration", + "Checks": [ + "entra_managed_device_required_for_mfa_registration" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Managed device is required for MFA registration", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.1 Authentication", + "AttributeDescription": "Conditional Access (CA) policies can be used to restrict the registration of multi-factor authentication (MFA) methods based on a device’s compliance status or whether it is Microsoft Entra hybrid joined. This allows organizations to enforce that only managed devices are used when users register security information.• Require device to be marked as compliant enforces that the device meets all conditions defined in Intune compliance policies. Devices must be enrolled in Intune Mobile Device Management (MDM) for this to apply. • Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device ensures the device has been synchronized from an on-premises Active Directory, marking it as trusted within the hybrid identity environment. When both controls are included in a Conditional Access policy for MFA registration, they operate with OR logic—only one of the conditions must be satisfied for the user to proceed. Recommended configuration: Restrict the “Register security information” operation to devices that are either compliant or Microsoft Entra hybrid joined.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Restricting MFA registration to trusted, managed devices significantly reduces the risk of attackers using stolen credentials to set up fraudulent authentication methods. Accounts that exist but are not yet registered for MFA are particularly vulnerable to takeover. This policy ensures that security information is registered only from secured, policy-enforced endpoints—which often include additional layers of protection such as endpoint detection, encryption, and monitoring—thereby reducing the attack surface and strengthening the organization’s identity security posture.", + "LevelOfRisk": 5 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.8", + "Description": "Ensure modern authentication for SharePoint applications is required", + "Checks": [ + "sharepoint_modern_authentication_required" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Modern authentication for SharePoint applications is required", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.1 Authentication", + "AttributeDescription": "Modern authentication in Microsoft 365 enables advanced authentication capabilities such as multifactor authentication (MFA), smart card support, certificate-based authentication (CBA), and integration with third-party SAML identity providers. It replaces legacy authentication protocols with more secure, token-based authentication methods. It is recommended to enforce modern authentication for SharePoint applications to ensure secure access.", + "AdditionalInformation": "If SharePoint applications are allowed to use basic authentication, they may bypass strong authentication controls such as MFA, exposing the environment to potential compromise. Enforcing modern authentication ensures that all sessions between users, applications, and SharePoint utilize robust, policy-enforced authentication methods—significantly reducing the risk of credential theft and unauthorized access.", + "LevelOfRisk": 5 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.9", + "Description": "Ensure that SharePoint guest users cannot share items they don't own", + "Checks": [ + "sharepoint_guest_sharing_restricted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "SharePoint guest users cannot share items they don't own", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.1 Authentication", + "AttributeDescription": "SharePoint Online allows users to share files, folders, and entire site collections both internally and externally. With appropriate permissions, internal users can extend access to external collaborators, enabling seamless cross-organizational collaboration.", + "AdditionalInformation": "While external sharing supports productivity and collaboration, it’s essential that owners of files, folders, or site collections retain control over what content is shared and with whom. This helps prevent unauthorized data disclosure and ensures that sensitive information is only accessible to intended recipients. Proper sharing governance empowers data owners to make informed decisions and reinforces accountability across the organization.", + "LevelOfRisk": 2 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.10", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Multi-Factor Auth Status' is 'Enabled' for all Privileged Users", + "Checks": [ + "entra_admin_users_mfa_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Multi-Factor Auth Status' is 'Enabled' for all Privileged Users", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.1 Authentication", + "AttributeDescription": "The “Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) Status” setting determines whether users are required to authenticate using a second factor beyond their password. For privileged users—those with administrative roles or elevated permissions—this setting should be set to “Enabled” to ensure that MFA is enforced whenever they sign in.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Privileged accounts have access to critical systems, sensitive data, and administrative functions that, if compromised, could lead to significant security breaches. Enforcing MFA for all privileged users greatly reduces the risk of unauthorized access by requiring attackers to compromise two or more independent authentication factors. MFA is one of the most effective defenses against phishing, credential theft, and brute-force attacks, making it a foundational control for protecting administrative accounts in any secure identity and access management strategy.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.11", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Multi-Factor Auth Status' is 'Enabled' for all Non-Privileged Users", + "Checks": [ + "entra_users_mfa_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Multi-Factor Auth Status' is 'Enabled' for all Non-Privileged Users", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.1 Authentication", + "AttributeDescription": "The “Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) Status” setting determines whether users must verify their identity using a second factor in addition to their password. For non-privileged users—those without administrative or elevated permissions—it is recommended that MFA is enabled across the entire user base to provide comprehensive protection against identity-based attacks.", + "AdditionalInformation": "While non-privileged users may not have administrative access, they still have access to email, internal systems, and potentially sensitive business data. These accounts are often targeted in phishing campaigns, credential stuffing attacks, and social engineering tactics to gain an initial foothold in the organization. Enforcing MFA for all users significantly reduces the likelihood of account compromise by requiring a second form of verification, such as a mobile app, hardware token, or one-time passcode. This broad protection is essential in a Zero Trust security model and ensures that every account—regardless of privilege—is secured against unauthorized access.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.12", + "Description": "Ensure email from external senders is identified", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_external_email_tagging_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Email from external senders is identified", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.1 Authentication", + "AttributeDescription": "The External Callouts feature in Exchange Online introduces a native visual indicator for emails originating from outside the organization. When enabled, this feature displays a localized “External” tag within supported Outlook clients, along with additional user interface elements at the top of the message reading pane. These enhancements help users easily identify and verify the actual sender’s email address, providing critical context when evaluating incoming messages. The feature is enabled via PowerShell using the Set-ExternalInOutlook cmdlet, and typically becomes visible to end users within 24–48 hours, provided their Outlook client version supports the functionality. Note: While Exchange administrators have historically used mail flow rules to prepend “[External]” or similar text to subject lines, this method is less reliable and may not consistently apply across all message types or clients. The CIS Benchmark recommends enabling the native External tagging feature for a more consistent and secure user experience.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Tagging emails from external senders increases user awareness and vigilance, enabling recipients to recognize messages that originate outside the organization’s trusted environment. This visual cue acts as a simple but effective layer of defense, encouraging users to treat unexpected or suspicious emails with caution—especially those that may be phishing attempts, impersonation attacks, or social engineering lures. By clearly marking external messages, organizations enhance their users’ ability to make informed security decisions, reducing the likelihood of credential compromise, malware infection, or inadvertent data disclosure.", + "LevelOfRisk": 2 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.13", + "Description": "Ensure modern authentication for Exchange Online is enabled", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_organization_modern_authentication_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Modern authentication for Exchange Online is enabled", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.1 Authentication", + "AttributeDescription": "Modern authentication in Microsoft 365 enables advanced authentication capabilities such as multi-factor authentication (MFA), smart card-based login, certificate-based authentication (CBA), and integration with third-party SAML identity providers. When enabled for Exchange Online, clients like Outlook 2016 and Outlook 2013 utilize modern authentication protocols (such as OAuth 2.0) to securely connect to Microsoft 365 mailboxes. If modern authentication is disabled, these clients fall back to basic authentication, a legacy protocol that transmits credentials in plaintext and lacks support for MFA. Newer clients—including Outlook for Mac 2016, Outlook Mobile, and all Microsoft 365 Apps for Enterprise versions of Outlook—are built to use modern authentication by default.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Allowing basic authentication significantly weakens the security posture of an organization. It bypasses modern controls like multi-factor authentication, exposing user credentials to a higher risk of compromise through phishing, brute-force attacks, or session hijacking. By enabling modern authentication in Exchange Online, organizations enforce the use of strong, token-based authentication methods that are resistant to credential theft and session replay. This is critical for protecting sensitive email data and ensuring secure communication between user devices and Microsoft 365 services. Enabling modern authentication also supports compliance mandates and zero-trust principles, making it a foundational step in securing user identities and email infrastructure.", + "LevelOfRisk": 5 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.14", + "Description": "Ensure anonymous users can't join a meeting", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_anonymous_user_join_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Anonymous users can't join a meeting", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.1 Authentication", + "AttributeDescription": "This policy setting in Microsoft Teams controls who is allowed to bypass the meeting lobby and directly join a meeting. When properly configured, only explicitly invited attendees—either those directly invited by the organizer or individuals to whom the invitation was intentionally forwarded—can skip the lobby and enter the meeting. All other participants, including anonymous users or those with access to the meeting link but not explicitly invited, must wait in the lobby for approval by the meeting organizer or a designated participant.", + "AdditionalInformation": "For meetings involving sensitive, confidential, or regulated information, it is essential to tightly control participant access. Requiring all non-invited individuals to wait in the lobby allows the organizer to review and manually admit attendees, thereby preventing unauthorized access or accidental exposure of sensitive content. Additionally, this setting prevents misuse of the meeting link by anonymous or unintended users, such as initiating unauthorized meetings outside scheduled times. Even organizations that do not regularly operate in high-security (Level 2) environments but occasionally handle sensitive data should consider enabling this policy to reinforce data protection and meeting integrity. By limiting automatic entry to only verified, intended participants, this control supports secure collaboration, reduces risk of information leakage, and enhances confidence in Microsoft Teams as a platform for sensitive communications.", + "LevelOfRisk": 5 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.15", + "Description": "Ensure anonymous users and dial-in callers can't start a meeting", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_anonymous_user_start_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Anonymous users and dial-in callers can't start a meeting", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.1 Authentication", + "AttributeDescription": "This policy setting in Microsoft Teams determines whether anonymous participants can start a meeting before a verified user from the organization or a trusted external organization has joined. When this setting is enabled, anonymous users and dial-in callers must wait in the meeting lobby until the meeting is initiated by an authenticated participant. Anonymous participants are defined as: • Users not signed in with a work or school account • Participants from non-trusted organizations, based on external access configuration • Individuals from organizations without mutual trust relationships Note: This setting only applies when the “Who can bypass the lobby” policy is set to Everyone. If the broader setting “Anonymous users can join a meeting” is disabled at the organizational level, this policy applies only to dial-in callers.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Disallowing anonymous participants from starting meetings helps mitigate the risk of meeting abuse, such as spamming, hijacking, or unauthorized use of Teams meetings for unintended purposes. Anonymous users pose a higher risk because their identities cannot be verified, and they are not subject to organizational controls or compliance policies. Requiring an authenticated user to start the meeting ensures that someone with verified access and accountability is present before the session begins. This adds a layer of security and governance, especially in meetings that could involve sensitive discussions or are exposed to a wide range of external participants. Enforcing this policy supports a secure and controlled meeting environment and aligns with best practices for preventing unauthorized or disruptive activity in collaborative platforms.", + "LevelOfRisk": 5 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.16", + "Description": "Ensure only people in my org can bypass the lobby", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_external_lobby_bypass_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Only people in my org can bypass the lobby", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.1 Authentication", + "AttributeDescription": "This policy setting in Microsoft Teams defines who can bypass the meeting lobby and join a meeting directly, versus who must wait in the lobby until admitted by a meeting organizer, co-organizer, or designated presenter. Options include allowing access to everyone, people in your organization, trusted external organizations, or only invited users.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Restricting direct access to meetings—particularly those that involve sensitive, confidential, or regulated information—ensures that only authorized and expected attendees can participate. Requiring participants to wait in the lobby gives meeting organizers the opportunity to vet and approve each attendee before admitting them. This policy also helps prevent unauthorized access through forwarded meeting links and reduces the risk of anonymous users joining meetings at unscheduled times, which can lead to disruptions or even security breaches. Enforcing lobby controls aligns with zero trust principles and is a best practice for maintaining the integrity and confidentiality of Teams meetings.", + "LevelOfRisk": 5 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.17", + "Description": "Ensure users dialing in can't bypass the lobby", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_dial_in_lobby_bypass_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Users dialing in can't bypass the lobby", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.1 Authentication", + "AttributeDescription": "This policy setting in Microsoft Teams determines whether dial-in participants—users who join meetings by phone—can bypass the lobby and join directly, or if they must wait in the lobby until admitted by a meeting organizer, co-organizer, or presenter.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Dial-in participants typically cannot be authenticated in the same way as users joining via Teams apps or web clients, making it more difficult to verify their identity. For meetings that may involve sensitive, confidential, or regulated information, it is essential that the meeting organizer has the opportunity to manually vet and admit these participants.", + "LevelOfRisk": 5 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.1", + "Description": "Ensure that only organizationally managed/approved public groups exist", + "Checks": [ + "admincenter_groups_not_public_visibility" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Only organizationally managed/approved public groups exist", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.2 Authorization", + "AttributeDescription": "Microsoft 365 Groups serve as the foundation for collaboration across Microsoft 365, providing shared resources (e.g., Outlook inbox, SharePoint site, Teams workspace) to group members. While various group types exist, this recommendation specifically addresses Microsoft 365 Groups. By default, when a Microsoft 365 Group is created via the admin panel, its privacy setting is set to “Public”, meaning anyone in the organization can access its content unless the setting is manually changed.", + "AdditionalInformation": "To protect sensitive organizational data, it’s important to ensure that only authorized and managed public groups exist. Public groups expose their content to all users in the organization through several access paths: • Users can add themselves to a public group using the Azure portal. • Users can request access via the Access Panel’s Groups app—this sends a request to the group owner but still grants immediate access. • Users may discover and directly access the associated SharePoint site via a guessable or easily discoverable URL.While admins are notified when Azure Portal access is used, other methods may not generate alerts. If group privacy settings are not properly managed, sensitive data could be inadvertently exposed. For this reason, privacy settings should be reviewed and adjusted to Private by default unless a public setting is explicitly required and approved.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.2", + "Description": "Ensure a dynamic group for guest users is created", + "Checks": [ + "entra_dynamic_group_for_guests_created" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Dynamic group for guest users is created", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.2 Authorization", + "AttributeDescription": "A dynamic group in Microsoft Entra ID automatically manages group membership based on user attributes such as userType, department, or country/region. Administrators can define rules to ensure that users meeting specific criteria are added to—or removed from—a group without manual intervention. The recommended configuration is to create a dynamic group that specifically includes guest accounts.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Dynamic groups streamline user management by automating group assignments. By including guest users in a dynamic group, organizations can consistently apply existing Conditional Access policies, access controls, and other security measures. This ensures that new guest accounts are governed by the same security standards as existing ones, reducing the risk of misconfiguration or oversight.", + "LevelOfRisk": 3 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.3", + "Description": "entra_managed_device_required_for_mfa_registration", + "Checks": [ + "entra_admin_consent_workflow_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Admin consent workflow is enabled", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.2 Authorization", + "AttributeDescription": "The admin consent workflow provides a secure and controlled process for granting access to applications that require administrator approval. When a user attempts to access an application but lacks permission to grant consent, they can submit a request for review. This request is sent via email to designated administrators, who act as reviewers. Once a decision is made, the user is notified of the outcome.", + "AdditionalInformation": "The admin consent workflow (Preview) enhances security by ensuring that access to sensitive applications is reviewed and approved by authorized administrators. It prevents users from unintentionally granting permissions to potentially risky applications while maintaining a clear approval process with full visibility and accountability.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.4", + "Description": "Enable Identity Protection user risk policies", + "Checks": [ + "entra_identity_protection_user_risk_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Identity Protection user risk policies", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.2 Authorization", + "AttributeDescription": "Microsoft Entra ID Protection uses user risk policies to evaluate the likelihood that a user account has been compromised. These policies assign a risk level (low, medium, or high) based on detected anomalies, such as unfamiliar sign-ins, leaked credentials, or atypical behavior. Note: While Entra ID Protection includes built-in user risk policies, Microsoft strongly recommends implementing risk-based Conditional Access (CA) policies instead of relying on the older, legacy policy model. The modern CA approach offers several key advantages:• Access to enhanced diagnostic and troubleshooting data • Integration with report-only mode for safe testing • Support for automation via Microsoft Graph API • Greater flexibility through advanced Conditional Access attributes, such as sign-in frequency and session controls", + "AdditionalInformation": "Enabling user risk policies through Conditional Access allows organizations to automatically respond to suspected account compromise by enforcing real-time controls—such as blocking access or requiring secure reauthentication. This proactive approach enhances the organization’s ability to detect and mitigate identity-based threats before they escalate.", + "LevelOfRisk": 3 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.5", + "Description": "Enable Identity Protection sign-in risk policies ", + "Checks": [ + "entra_identity_protection_sign_in_risk_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Identity Protection sign-in risk policies ", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.2 Authorization", + "AttributeDescription": "Microsoft Entra ID Protection evaluates sign-in risk by detecting potentially suspicious sign-in attempts—both in real time and through offline analysis. A risky sign-in indicates that the attempt may not have been performed by the legitimate account owner, based on signals such as unusual location, device anomalies, or unfamiliar sign-in behavior. Note: Although Microsoft Entra ID Protection includes built-in sign-in risk policies, it is strongly recommended to implement risk-based policies using Conditional Access instead of relying on legacy risk policies. The Conditional Access method provides several key advantages: • Access to enhanced diagnostic and investigation data • Ability to test with report-only mode • Integration with Microsoft Graph API for automation and management • Use of additional CA attributes such as sign-in frequency and session controls", + "AdditionalInformation": "Enabling a sign-in risk Conditional Access policy allows organizations to automatically challenge suspicious sign-ins with multi-factor authentication (MFA). This reduces the likelihood of unauthorized access by requiring an additional verification step whenever unusual activity is detected, strengthening identity protection and reducing the risk of account compromise.", + "LevelOfRisk": 2 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.6", + "Description": "Ensure external content sharing is restricted", + "Checks": [ + "sharepoint_external_sharing_restricted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "External content sharing is restricted", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.2 Authorization", + "AttributeDescription": "External sharing settings in Microsoft 365 govern how content is shared outside the organization. While each SharePoint site can have its own sharing configuration, it must be equal to or more restrictive than the organization-wide setting. The recommended configuration is “New and existing guests” or a more restrictive option. This setting requires external users to either sign in with a Microsoft 365 work or school account, a personal Microsoft account, or verify their identity using a one-time passcode. Users can share content with existing guests in the directory or invite new guests, who will be added to the directory upon sign-in.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Requiring guest authentication ensures that external users are registered and identifiable within the organization’s directory. This allows administrators to apply governance controls—such as Conditional Access policies, group-based restrictions, and activity monitoring—to external identities. By enforcing authenticated sharing, organizations maintain visibility and control over externally shared resources, reducing the risk of unauthorized data access and supporting compliance with security and privacy policies.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.7", + "Description": "Ensure SharePoint external sharing is managed through domain whitelist/blacklists", + "Checks": [ + "sharepoint_external_sharing_managed" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "SharePoint external sharing is managed through domain whitelist/blacklists", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.2 Authorization", + "AttributeDescription": "Organizations can control how documents are shared externally by configuring domain-based restrictions. This can be done by either blocking specific external domains or allowing sharing only with a defined list of trusted domains. These settings apply to services like SharePoint and OneDrive to help manage external collaboration securely.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Restricting document sharing to approved domains reduces the risk of accidental or malicious data exposure. Attackers may attempt to exfiltrate sensitive information by sharing it with external entities. By limiting sharing to trusted domains, organizations minimize their external attack surface and maintain greater control over data flow.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.8", + "Description": "Ensure inbound anti-spam policies do not contain allowed domains", + "Checks": [ + "defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Inbound anti-spam policies do not contain allowed domains", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.2 Authorization", + "AttributeDescription": "Anti-spam protection in Exchange Online leverages configurable policies to reduce the volume of unwanted emails—such as junk, bulk, and phishing messages—received by users. These policies include several configurable lists that influence how email from specific sources is treated:• Allowed Senders List • Allowed Domains List • Blocked Senders List • Blocked Domains List While these features offer flexibility, it is strongly recommended not to define any entries in the Allowed Domains List in a production environment.", + "AdditionalInformation": "When a sender or domain is added to the Allowed Domains List, their messages bypass key security checks—including spam filtering and authentication mechanisms like SPF, DKIM, and DMARC—unless flagged as containing malware or high-confidence phishing. This introduces a significant security risk, as attackers may exploit these exceptions to deliver malicious emails directly to users’ inboxes. The risk is especially high when common or widely used domains are allow-listed, as these are frequent targets for spoofing attempts. Moreover, Microsoft’s official guidance clearly states that allowed domains should only be used for testing purposes, not for general use in production environments. To maintain a strong email security posture, organizations should avoid defining Allowed Domains and instead rely on more controlled methods such as block lists, quarantine policies, or targeted safe sender configurations for trusted entities.", + "LevelOfRisk": 1 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.9", + "Description": "Ensure all forms of mail forwarding are blocked and/or disabled", + "Checks": [ + "defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled", + "exchange_transport_rules_mail_forwarding_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "All forms of mail forwarding are blocked and/or disabled", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.2 Authorization", + "AttributeDescription": "Exchange Online provides multiple mechanisms to manage and control the flow of outbound email messages, helping organizations prevent unauthorized data exfiltration. These mechanisms include: • Remote Domain Settings • Transport Rules • Anti-Spam Outbound Policies These tools work in tandem to control and monitor various email forwarding methods that users or attackers may exploit, such as: • Inbox rules configured in Outlook • Automatic forwarding via Out of Office (OOF) rules • Forwarding settings in Outlook Web Access (OWA) using ForwardingSmtpAddress • Admin-defined forwarding in the Exchange Admin Center (EAC) using ForwardingAddress • Automated forwarding using Power Automate / Microsoft Flow To effectively reduce the risk of unauthorized data leaks, organizations should implement both a Transport Rule and an Outbound Anti-Spam Policy to block automatic mail forwarding. Note: If any exclusions are required (e.g., for trusted third-party systems or compliance tools), they should be strictly defined and approved in accordance with organizational policy.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.10", + "Description": "Ensure mail transport rules do not whitelist specific domains", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_transport_rules_whitelist_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Mail transport rules do not whitelist specific domains", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.2 Authorization", + "AttributeDescription": "Mail flow rules (also known as transport rules) in Exchange Online allow administrators to inspect, modify, or block email messages as they pass through the organization. These rules can be configured based on a wide range of conditions—such as sender, recipient, subject content, or attachment type—and can enforce actions including message redirection, header modification, or delivery rejection. While transport rules offer powerful control over email behavior, they must be implemented with caution—particularly when it comes to whitelisting domains or bypassing standard filtering mechanisms.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Whitelisting external domains through transport rules can disable critical security checks such as anti-malware scanning, phishing detection, and sender authentication (e.g., SPF, DKIM, DMARC). If a trusted domain is later compromised—or was malicious from the start—this bypass can allow attackers to deliver malicious content directly to user inboxes without scrutiny. By avoiding broad or permanent domain whitelisting in transport rules, organizations preserve the integrity of their email filtering and reduce the risk of successful phishing campaigns, malware delivery, or data exfiltration originating from seemingly trusted sources. Transport rules should be reviewed regularly, and any exceptions must be justified, narrowly scoped, and documented according to organizational policy.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.11", + "Description": "Ensure MailTips are enabled for end users", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_organization_mailtips_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "MailTips are enabled for end users", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.2 Authorization", + "AttributeDescription": "MailTips are real-time, context-aware notifications displayed to users as they compose email messages in Outlook. These tips are generated by Exchange while a message is being drafted and are based on an analysis of the email’s content and recipient list. If Exchange detects potential issues—such as the message being sent to a large distribution group, an external recipient, or someone who is out of office—it presents the user with a MailTip alert before the message is sent.This proactive feedback helps users avoid common issues like sending sensitive information to unintended recipients, triggering non-delivery reports (NDRs), or violating communication policies.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Enabling MailTips provides valuable visual cues that promote user awareness and responsible communication. For example, users are warned when they are sending emails to external recipients or large distribution lists, which helps prevent data leakage, unintentional over-sharing, and excessive email traffic. MailTips serve as a lightweight but effective safeguard by nudging users to review recipients and message context before sending, reducing the risk of human error. In regulated or security-conscious environments, this feature reinforces compliance by helping users adhere to organizational communication policies in real time.", + "LevelOfRisk": 2 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.12", + "Description": "Ensure users can't send emails to a channel email address", + "Checks": [ + "teams_email_sending_to_channel_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Users can't send emails to a channel email address", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.2 Authorization", + "AttributeDescription": "Microsoft Teams channel email addresses are an optional feature that enables users to send emails directly into a Teams channel. When enabled, each channel is assigned a unique email address that users can use to forward messages, share content, or initiate discussions from outside Teams. While this can enhance collaboration by bridging email and Teams-based communication, the generated email addresses are typically not part of the organization’s primary domain, and their usage is subject to broader Microsoft 365 infrastructure settings.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Channel email addresses introduce potential security and governance concerns, as they are not managed under the organization’s domain and are exposed to external communication. If an attacker is able to discover or guess a channel’s email address, they could send messages directly into Teams, potentially introducing phishing links, malicious attachments, or inappropriate content into collaborative spaces. Furthermore, since organizations have limited control over the security configurations and exposure of these addresses, they may become a blind spot in security monitoring and email filtering. Disabling or restricting the use of Teams channel email addresses helps reduce the attack surface, prevent unauthorized message injection, and strengthen the overall security posture of Microsoft Teams.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.13", + "Description": "Ensure external domains are restricted in the Teams admin center", + "Checks": [ + "teams_external_domains_restricted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "External domains are restricted in the Teams admin center", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.2 Authorization", + "AttributeDescription": "This policy governs how external access is managed in Microsoft Teams, specifically determining whether users in your organization can communicate and collaborate with individuals from external domains. Administrators can configure this setting to: • Allow communication with all external domains • Block all external domains • Allow only specific (approved) external domains using an allowlist When external access is enabled, users can chat, invite external participants to meetings, and use audio/video conferencing with users in other Microsoft 365 or federated organizations. Recommended Configuration: To reduce exposure, it is recommended to either allow only specific external domains with whom collaboration is necessary or block all external domains entirely.", + "AdditionalInformation": "While external collaboration can be valuable, unrestricted access to external domains introduces significant security risks. Without proper controls, users may inadvertently engage with untrusted or malicious entities, opening the door to phishing, social engineering, malware delivery, or data exfiltration. Notable threats that have leveraged Teams’ external access features include: • DarkGate malware distributed through malicious Teams messages • Phishing and impersonation campaigns by actors like Midnight Blizzard (APT29) • GIFShell, a technique for covert communication using GIFs within Teams • Username enumeration, allowing attackers to confirm the existence of user accounts By allowlisting only trusted domains, organizations retain the benefits of external collaboration while maintaining tight control over who can interact with internal users. This aligns with zero trust principles and helps ensure that external communication is both intentional and secure.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.14", + "Description": "Ensure communication with unmanaged Teams users is disabled", + "Checks": [ + "teams_unmanaged_communication_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Communication with unmanaged Teams users is disabled", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.2 Authorization", + "AttributeDescription": "This policy setting in Microsoft Teams controls whether users in your organization can chat or join meetings with external Teams users who are not affiliated with a managed organization—for example, users of Microsoft Teams (free) or those without an associated Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) tenant. These unmanaged accounts operate outside of enterprise governance and lack the administrative oversight, compliance enforcement, and security controls typically applied in organizational environments. Recommended Configuration: Set the policy to “Off” for “People in my organization can communicate with Teams users whose accounts aren’t managed by an organization” to block communication with unmanaged Teams users.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Allowing communication with unmanaged external Teams users introduces a significant security risk. Since anyone can register for a free Teams account, attackers can easily create unmanaged identities and attempt to initiate contact with internal users. These interactions can be used to deliver malicious content, perform social engineering, or carry out reconnaissance. Documented attacks exploiting this communication channel include: • DarkGate malware delivery via malicious messages • Phishing and impersonation campaigns attributed to Midnight Blizzard (APT29) • GIFShell, a technique allowing covert exfiltration via GIFs in Teams chats • Username enumeration, enabling attackers to identify valid users in an organization Disabling communication with unmanaged Teams users helps enforce a zero trust posture, ensuring that all external interactions occur only with verified and trusted organizations under enforceable security policies. This reduces the organization’s exposure to external threats, protects sensitive communications, and upholds compliance standards.", + "LevelOfRisk": 5 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.15", + "Description": "Ensure external Teams users cannot initiate conversations", + "Checks": [ + "teams_external_users_cannot_start_conversations" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "External Teams users cannot initiate conversations", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.2 Authorization", + "AttributeDescription": "This policy setting in Microsoft Teams controls whether external users with unmanaged Teams accounts—such as those using Microsoft Teams (free)—can initiate conversations with users in your organization. These unmanaged users do not belong to a verified Microsoft Entra (Azure AD) tenant and are not subject to organizational controls or governance. Recommended Configuration: Uncheck the option “External users with Teams accounts not managed by an organization can contact users in my organization” to prevent these users from initiating communication. This setting is designed as an additional safeguard to complement the broader policy that disables communication with unmanaged Teams users entirely. In scenarios where an organization allows limited interaction with such users, this control ensures that only internal users can initiate communication, further reducing exposure to unsolicited or malicious contact attempts.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Enabling unmanaged Teams users to initiate contact with internal users poses a significant security risk, as anyone can easily register for a free Teams account with minimal identity verification. Threat actors can exploit this feature to deliver malicious content, impersonate legitimate contacts, or conduct reconnaissance by probing user availability and behavior. Notable real-world threats facilitated through external Teams access include:• DarkGate malware delivered via malicious chats • Social engineering and phishing campaigns by advanced threat actors such as Midnight Blizzard (APT29) • GIFShell, a covert data exfiltration method using GIFs in Teams • Username enumeration, enabling discovery of valid user accounts within an organization By preventing unmanaged external users from initiating conversations, organizations can better protect their internal users from unsolicited and potentially harmful contact attempts. This policy reinforces a defense-in-depth strategy, ensuring that even in exceptional cases where limited unmanaged communication is permitted, external contact remains tightly controlled and monitored.", + "LevelOfRisk": 5 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.16", + "Description": "Ensure meeting chat does not allow anonymous users", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_chat_anonymous_users_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Meeting chat does not allow anonymous users", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.2 Authorization", + "AttributeDescription": "This policy setting in Microsoft Teams controls who can read and write messages in the meeting chat. It allows administrators or meeting organizers to specify whether chat is available to everyone, only specific roles (such as presenters), or is disabled entirely for participants. This setting applies to chat interactions during the meeting and helps manage the flow and visibility of information shared in the chat pane.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Limiting chat access to only authorized participants helps prevent the unintended disclosure of sensitive information and reduces the risk of inappropriate or disruptive content being shared during a meeting. In meetings involving confidential topics or external participants, restricting chat can safeguard against data leakage and maintain focus on the meeting agenda.", + "LevelOfRisk": 5 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.17", + "Description": "Ensure only organizers and co-organizers can present", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_presenters_restricted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Only organizers and co-organizers can present", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.2 Authorization", + "AttributeDescription": "This policy setting in Microsoft Teams determines who is allowed to present content during a meeting. Presenters have elevated permissions that allow them to share their screen, display files, manage participants, and control other collaborative features. This setting can be configured at the organizational or meeting level to allow only organizers, co-organizers, or a designated group of participants to present.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Restricting presentation privileges to authorized individuals helps ensure that only trusted participants can share content with the group. This minimizes the risk of inappropriate, disruptive, or unapproved material being displayed, whether intentionally or accidentally.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.18", + "Description": "Ensure external participants can't give or request control", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_external_control_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "External participants can't give or request control", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.2 Authorization", + "AttributeDescription": "This policy setting in Microsoft Teams provides control over who can present content and who can request control of shared content during a meeting. It enables administrators and meeting organizers to limit these privileges to internal, trusted participants, while restricting or blocking external participants—including guests, external users, and anonymous users—from taking control of the presentation or initiating content sharing.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Restricting presentation and control capabilities to authorized, internal participants significantly reduces the risk of accidental or malicious content sharing, interruptions, or abuse of meeting privileges. External participants—including guests, federated users, and anonymous joiners—may not be subject to the same identity verification or policy enforcement as users within the organization.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.19", + "Description": "Ensure meeting recording is off by default", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_recording_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Meeting recording is off by default", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.2 Authorization", + "AttributeDescription": "This policy setting in Microsoft Teams determines whether a user is allowed to initiate the recording of a meeting in progress. When enabled, participants with the appropriate permissions can start recording audio, video, and screen-sharing content during the session.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Restricting the ability to start a meeting recording ensures that only authorized individuals—such as organizers, co-organizers, team leads, or designated presenters—can capture meeting content. This is especially important for meetings that involve sensitive, confidential, or regulated information, where inappropriate or unauthorized recording could lead to data exposure, compliance violations, or reputational harm.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.1", + "Description": "Ensure that between two and four global admins are designated", + "Checks": [ + "admincenter_users_between_two_and_four_global_admins" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Between two and four global admins are designated", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.3 Privilege Escalation Prevention", + "AttributeDescription": "Each tenant should have more than one designated Global Administrator to ensure both accountability and redundancy in case one administrator leaves the organization. However, it’s equally important to limit the total number of Global Administrators to no more than four to reduce the overall security risk. Ideally, Global Administrator accounts should not have any user licenses assigned, limiting their exposure to commonly targeted services.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Relying on a single Global Administrator creates a risk of unmonitored malicious activity. On the other hand, having too many Global Administrators increases the likelihood that one of their accounts could be compromised. A balanced approach supports both oversight and security.", + "LevelOfRisk": 2 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.2", + "Description": "Ensure administrative accounts use licenses with a reduced application footprint", + "Checks": [ + "admincenter_users_admins_reduced_license_footprint" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Administrative accounts use licenses with a reduced application footprint", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.3 Privilege Escalation Prevention", + "AttributeDescription": "Administrative accounts are privileged identities with elevated access to critical data, user management, and system settings. Assigning a license to these accounts may grant access to various applications, depending on the license type. The recommended practice is to avoid assigning licenses to privileged accounts altogether. If licensing is required—for example, to enable features such as Identity Protection, Privileged Identity Management (PIM), or Conditional Access—only Microsoft Entra ID P1 or P2 licenses should be used, as they do not include access to potentially vulnerable services like email or Teams.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Minimizing application access for administrative accounts significantly reduces the attack surface associated with high-privilege identities. Access to tools like mailboxes or collaboration apps increases the risk of exposure to phishing or social engineering attacks. Administrative tasks should be performed using dedicated, unlicensed accounts, while day-to-day activities should be conducted through separate, unprivileged “daily driver” accounts.", + "LevelOfRisk": 2 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.3", + "Description": "Ensure third party integrated applications are not allowed", + "Checks": [ + "entra_thirdparty_integrated_apps_not_allowed" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Third party integrated applications are not allowed", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.3 Privilege Escalation Prevention", + "AttributeDescription": "App registration allows users to register custom or third-party applications for use within the organization’s Microsoft Entra ID directory. These applications can request access to organizational data and integrate with various Microsoft 365 services.", + "AdditionalInformation": "While there are valid business cases for registering applications, this capability should be restricted to prevent unauthorized or insecure integrations. Attackers can exploit this feature by using compromised accounts to grant persistent access to third-party applications, enabling data exfiltration without needing to maintain direct control of the breached account. App registration should be disabled for standard users unless there is a clear business need and strong security controls—such as app consent policies and review workflows—are in place.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.4", + "Description": "Ensure 'Restrict non-admin users from creating tenants' is set to 'Yes'", + "Checks": [ + "entra_policy_ensure_default_user_cannot_create_tenants" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Restrict non-admin users from creating tenants' is set to 'Yes'", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.3 Privilege Escalation Prevention", + "AttributeDescription": "By default, non-privileged users can create new Microsoft Entra tenants through the “Manage tenant” option in the Entra admin portal. When a user creates a tenant, the action is logged in the Audit Log under the category DirectoryManagement with the activity Create Company. The user who creates the tenant is automatically assigned the Global Administrator role for that tenant. Note that newly created tenants do not inherit any of the organization’s existing security or configuration settings.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Allowing unrestricted tenant creation introduces the risk of unauthorized or unmanaged environments, often referred to as shadow IT. These tenants may be mistakenly perceived as part of the organization’s secure infrastructure, leading users to adopt them for business use. This can fragment IT governance, complicate security oversight, and increase the likelihood of data exposure or policy violations. Restricting tenant creation ensures centralized control over the organization’s cloud environment and helps maintain consistent security and compliance standards.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.5", + "Description": "Ensure user consent to apps accessing company data on their behalf is not allowed", + "Checks": [ + "entra_policy_restricts_user_consent_for_apps" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "User consent to apps accessing company data on their behalf is not allowed", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.3 Privilege Escalation Prevention", + "AttributeDescription": "Organizations can control whether end users and group owners are allowed to grant consent to applications, or whether such requests require administrator review and approval. While allowing user consent can enhance productivity by enabling access to useful apps, it also introduces potential security risks if not properly managed.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Attackers often exploit application consent mechanisms by tricking users into authorizing malicious apps, thereby gaining access to sensitive company data. Disabling user consent for future app authorizations helps mitigate this risk by reducing the overall attack surface. When user consent is disabled, any existing consent remains valid, but all future consent requests must be explicitly approved by an administrator—ensuring better oversight and stronger security controls.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.6", + "Description": "Ensure that guest user access is restricted", + "Checks": [ + "entra_policy_guest_users_access_restrictions" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Guest user access is restricted", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.3 Privilege Escalation Prevention", + "AttributeDescription": "Microsoft Entra ID, as part of the Microsoft Entra suite, allows organizations to control what external guest users can view and access within the directory. By default, guest users are assigned a more limited permission level than internal members, who receive the full set of user permissions. These directory-level permissions apply across Microsoft Entra services, including Microsoft Graph, PowerShell v2, the Azure portal, and the My Apps portal. They also affect Microsoft 365 services that rely on Microsoft 365 Groups for collaboration—such as Outlook, Microsoft Teams, and SharePoint—though they do not override guest-specific settings within Teams or SharePoint. The recommended configuration is to ensure that guest users have limited access to directory properties and group memberships, or an even more restrictive setting.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Restricting guest access helps prevent unauthorized enumeration of users and groups within the directory—a common reconnaissance tactic used by attackers during the early stages of a targeted attack (as defined in the Cyber Kill Chain framework). Limiting this visibility reduces the organization’s exposure to potential threats and supports a stronger security posture.", + "LevelOfRisk": 3 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.7", + "Description": "Ensure guest user invitations are limited to the Guest Inviter role", + "Checks": [ + "entra_policy_guest_invite_only_for_admin_roles" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Guest user invitations are limited to the Guest Inviter role", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.3 Privilege Escalation Prevention", + "AttributeDescription": "By default, all users in the organization—including B2B collaboration guest users—can invite external users to collaborate via Microsoft Entra ID. This invitation capability can be broadly enabled or disabled, or it can be restricted to users in specific administrative roles. The recommended configuration is to limit guest invitations to only those users assigned to specific admin roles.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Restricting who can invite external guests reduces the risk of unauthorized or unmanaged external access. By limiting this ability to trusted administrative roles, organizations can maintain tighter control over their environment and reduce potential exposure to security threats originating from unvetted accounts.", + "LevelOfRisk": 2 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.8", + "Description": "Ensure Sign-in frequency is enabled and browser sessions are not persistent for Administrative users", + "Checks": [ + "entra_admin_users_sign_in_frequency_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Sign-in frequency is enabled and browser sessions are not persistent for Administrative users", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.3 Privilege Escalation Prevention", + "AttributeDescription": "In complex environments, organizations may need to place limits on authentication session durations to reduce risk. Microsoft Entra Conditional Access (CA) policies allow organizations to enforce session controls based on user roles, device state, location, and application sensitivity. Common scenarios include: • Access from unmanaged or shared devices • External access to sensitive resources • High-privileged user accounts • Business-critical applications The following configurations are recommended: • Sign-in frequency: Require reauthentication at least every 4 hours for Microsoft 365 E3 tenants, or every 24 hours for E5 tenants using Privileged Identity Management (PIM). • Persistent browser session: Set to Never persistent. Note: These settings can be integrated into the Conditional Access policy that enforces multifactor authentication for users in administrative roles.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Limiting the duration of authentication sessions helps prevent long-lived sessions that could be hijacked by attackers. Requiring periodic reauthentication ensures that a session cannot remain active indefinitely. Disabling persistent browser sessions further reduces the risk of drive-by browser attacks and ensures that session cookies are not stored, leaving nothing behind for an attacker to reuse in case of a compromised device.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.9", + "Description": "Ensure OneDrive sync is restricted for unmanaged devices", + "Checks": [ + "sharepoint_onedrive_sync_restricted_unmanaged_devices" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "OneDrive sync is restricted for unmanaged devices", + "Section": "1. IAM", + "SubSection": "1.3 Privilege Escalation Prevention", + "AttributeDescription": "Microsoft OneDrive allows users to sign in with their organizational (cloud tenant) account and sync their OneDrive files—including selected folders or the entire contents of their storage—to a local computer. By default, synchronization is permitted on any device where OneDrive is installed, regardless of whether the device is Microsoft Entra ID Joined, Hybrid Entra ID Joined, or Active Directory Domain Joined. To improve control over where organizational data can be synchronized, it is recommended to restrict OneDrive syncing to only those devices joined to specific, trusted domains by enabling the policy: “Allow syncing only on computers joined to specific domains”, and specifying the appropriate Active Directory (AD) domain GUID(s)", + "AdditionalInformation": "Allowing users to sync OneDrive data to unmanaged or personal devices introduces significant risk, as those endpoints may not comply with corporate security policies, lack endpoint protection, or be subject to malicious activity. When organizational data is synchronized to such devices, the organization loses visibility and control over how that data is accessed, shared, or protected. This opens the door to accidental data leaks, intentional misuse, or loss of sensitive information through theft or compromise. Restricting synchronization to verified, domain-joined devices ensures that only endpoints under the organization’s management and monitoring can access and store OneDrive data locally. This approach aligns with zero-trust principles, enforces data governance policies, and significantly reduces the risk of unauthorized access or exfiltration.", + "LevelOfRisk": 5 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.1", + "Description": "Ensure the connection filter IP allow list is not used", + "Checks": [ + "defender_antispam_connection_filter_policy_empty_ip_allowlist" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Connection filter IP allow list is not used", + "Section": "2. Attack Surface", + "SubSection": "2.1 Network", + "AttributeDescription": "In Microsoft 365 environments—whether using Exchange Online mailboxes or standalone Exchange Online Protection (EOP)—connection filtering policies play a critical role in determining the trustworthiness of incoming email based on the source IP address. The default connection filter policy includes three main components: the IP Allow List, the IP Block List, and a Safe List. These lists influence how email messages are processed before any content filtering occurs. It is recommended that the IP Allow List remains empty or undefined to avoid bypassing essential security checks.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Email originating from IP addresses on the Allow List bypasses several key layers of protection, including spam filtering and sender authentication protocols such as SPF, DKIM, and DMARC. Without additional safeguards like mail flow rules, this configuration introduces a significant risk: malicious actors can exploit the Allow List to deliver spoofed or harmful emails directly to users’ inboxes. Maintaining an empty IP Allow List ensures that all messages undergo full evaluation and filtering, reducing the likelihood of malware, phishing attempts, and impersonation attacks reaching end users.", + "LevelOfRisk": 2 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.2", + "Description": "Ensure the connection filter safe list is off", + "Checks": [ + "defender_antispam_connection_filter_policy_safe_list_off" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Connection filter safe list is off", + "Section": "2. Attack Surface", + "SubSection": "2.1 Network", + "AttributeDescription": "In Microsoft 365 environments—whether using Exchange Online mailboxes or standalone Exchange Online Protection (EOP)—connection filtering policies are used to evaluate and classify incoming email based on the IP address of the sending server. The default connection filter policy includes three main components: the IP Allow List, the IP Block List, and the Safe List. The Safe List is a Microsoft-managed, dynamically updated set of sender IP addresses that are automatically treated as trusted sources. The recommended configuration is to have the Safe List disabled (set to Off or False) to ensure all incoming mail is properly evaluated by the organization’s email security policies.", + "AdditionalInformation": "When the Safe List is enabled, messages from IP addresses on this list bypass key security mechanisms, including spam filtering and sender authentication checks such as SPF, DKIM, and DMARC. Although Microsoft manages this list dynamically, administrators have no visibility or control over which senders are included. As a result, allowing Safe List traffic to skip verification introduces significant risk—malicious actors could exploit this blind spot to deliver spam, phishing, or malware directly to user inboxes. Disabling the Safe List ensures that all messages undergo full inspection, allowing organizations to maintain strict control over the email filtering pipeline and reduce the likelihood of successful compromise.", + "LevelOfRisk": 2 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.3", + "Description": "Ensure SMTP AUTH is disabled", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_transport_config_smtp_auth_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "SMTP AUTH is disabled", + "Section": "2. Attack Surface", + "SubSection": "2.1 Network", + "AttributeDescription": "The SMTP AUTH (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol Authentication) setting in Exchange Online controls whether authenticated client SMTP submission is enabled at the organization level. This legacy protocol is used primarily by older applications and devices to send email via SMTP using basic authentication. By default, Microsoft recommends disabling SMTP AUTH at the tenant level to enhance security posture. Modern email clients and applications that connect to Microsoft 365 mailboxes no longer require SMTP AUTH and can use more secure, modern authentication methods (such as OAuth 2.0).", + "AdditionalInformation": "SMTP AUTH is an outdated and insecure protocol that relies on basic authentication, which transmits credentials in plaintext and lacks support for multifactor authentication. Leaving this protocol enabled increases the risk of credential theft, account compromise, and unauthorized access, especially in environments not protected by additional controls such as Conditional Access or legacy protocol blocking. Disabling SMTP AUTH supports the principle of least functionality by reducing protocol exposure and hardening the email infrastructure against exploitation attempts. This action also aligns with Microsoft’s broader security guidance and helps organizations phase out legacy authentication methods in favor of modern, secure protocols.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.2.1", + "Description": "Ensure additional storage providers are restricted in Outlook on the web", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_mailbox_policy_additional_storage_restricted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Additional storage providers are restricted in Outlook on the web", + "Section": "2. Attack Surface", + "SubSection": "2.2 Storage", + "AttributeDescription": "The AdditionalStorageProvidersAvailable setting in Microsoft 365 controls whether users can connect to and open files from third-party storage services while using Outlook on the Web (OWA). When enabled, users may link external services such as Dropbox, Box, Google Drive, Facebook, or OneDrive Personal to access and interact with files directly within the Outlook web interface. Although this can enhance user productivity, it also introduces third-party services that Microsoft does not govern, meaning their terms of use, privacy policies, and security practices are outside the organization’s control. To mitigate potential risks, it is recommended to restrict or disable access to additional storage providers, limiting file access to only trusted organizational sources.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Allowing connections to external storage providers from within Outlook on the Web significantly increases the risk of data leakage and malware exposure. Users may inadvertently upload or download sensitive organizational data to or from non-sanctioned storage platforms, where proper security controls and compliance measures may not be in place. Additionally, files retrieved from these services could serve as vectors for malware or phishing payloads, especially if users are unaware of their origin or if access controls on those platforms are weak. Restricting access to third-party storage providers helps enforce data governance policies, reduces the organization’s attack surface, and ensures that sensitive communications and files remain within controlled and monitored environments. This is especially important in industries with regulatory or compliance obligations.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.2.2", + "Description": "Ensure external file sharing in Teams is enabled for only approved cloud storage services", + "Checks": [ + "teams_external_file_sharing_restricted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "External file sharing in Teams is enabled for only approved cloud storage services", + "Section": "2. Attack Surface", + "SubSection": "2.2 Storage", + "AttributeDescription": "Microsoft Teams facilitates collaboration by enabling users to share and access files within chat, meetings, and channels. By default, file sharing in Teams is integrated with SharePoint Online for team channels and OneDrive for Business for private chats. However, the platform also supports third-party cloud storage providers such as Dropbox, Box, and Google Drive, which can be made available within the Teams interface. Administrators have the ability to configure and restrict which external storage providers are accessible to end users. This helps align file-sharing capabilities with organizational data governance and compliance requirements. Note: While Skype for Business was officially deprecated on July 31, 2021, some configuration settings inherited from its infrastructure may still apply for a limited time. Refer to Microsoft’s official documentation for ongoing support timelines.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Allowing unrestricted access to third-party cloud storage providers within Microsoft Teams can undermine an organization’s data protection and compliance efforts. Users may unintentionally store or share sensitive information using non-sanctioned platforms that fall outside of the organization’s control, monitoring, or security policies. By restricting file-sharing capabilities to only approved storage providers, organizations can ensure that collaboration remains within trusted ecosystems. This reduces the risk of data leakage, non-compliant data transfers, and unauthorized access, while also reinforcing secure and consistent file management practices across the collaboration environment.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.3.1", + "Description": "Ensure the Common Attachment Types Filter is Enabled", + "Checks": [ + "defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Common Attachment Types Filter is Enabled", + "Section": "2. Attack Surface", + "SubSection": "2.3 Application", + "AttributeDescription": "The Common Attachment Types Filter allows users to block both well-known and custom-defined malicious file types from being attached to email messages.", + "AdditionalInformation": "By blocking commonly exploited file types, this filter helps prevent the delivery of malware-laden attachments, reducing the risk of endpoint compromise and broader system infection.", + "LevelOfRisk": 5 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.3.2", + "Description": "Ensure comprehensive attachment filtering is applied", + "Checks": [ + "defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Comprehensive attachment filtering is applied", + "Section": "2. Attack Surface", + "SubSection": "2.3 Application", + "AttributeDescription": "The Common Attachment Types Filter allows users to block both known and custom-defined malicious file types from being attached to email messages. While Microsoft provides a default policy that blocks 53 high-risk file extensions, organizations can extend this protection by defining their own custom list. This recommendation includes a broader set of 186 potentially dangerous file extensions, offering a more robust safeguard. Although comprehensive, the list is not exhaustive and should be tailored to fit organizational needs.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Blocking file types commonly associated with malware helps prevent the delivery of malicious payloads that can compromise hosts, exfiltrate data, or facilitate phishing attacks. By enforcing a strict attachment policy, organizations reduce their exposure to threats delivered through legacy formats, binary executables, and compressed archives. Allow-listing only those file types necessary for business operations and blocking all others is an effective strategy for mitigating risks such as Business Email Compromise (BEC) and enhancing overall email security posture.", + "LevelOfRisk": 2 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.3.3", + "Description": "Ensure users installing Outlook add-ins is not allowed", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_roles_assignment_policy_addins_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Users installing Outlook add-ins is not allowed", + "Section": "2. Attack Surface", + "SubSection": "2.3 Application", + "AttributeDescription": "In Exchange Online, administrators have the ability to control who can install and manage Outlook add-ins within the Microsoft 365 environment. By default, end users are allowed to install third-party or custom add-ins directly in their Outlook desktop client, which can access data within the application such as emails, calendar events, and contacts. To enhance security and reduce potential risks, it is recommended to restrict add-in management privileges to a limited set of trusted administrators and users. This can be configured via the Microsoft 365 admin center or PowerShell, providing centralized control over which add-ins are allowed and who can deploy them.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Allowing end users to install Outlook add-ins introduces a potential attack surface, especially if the add-ins are vulnerable, poorly maintained, or intentionally malicious. Threat actors can exploit this capability to gain unauthorized access to sensitive mailbox data or to execute malicious code within the Outlook client. By disabling or restricting user-installed add-ins, organizations can significantly reduce the risk of data exfiltration, phishing, and privilege abuse. Managing add-ins centrally ensures that only vetted and trusted integrations are used, aligning with best practices for securing email clients and minimizing exposure to third-party threats.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.3.4", + "Description": "Ensure external meeting chat is off", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_external_chat_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "External meeting chat is off", + "Section": "2. Attack Surface", + "SubSection": "2.3 Application", + "AttributeDescription": "This meeting policy setting in Microsoft Teams governs whether users in your organization can read or write messages in meeting chats hosted by external, untrusted organizations. If the external meeting is hosted by an organization that has been explicitly designated as trusted, this restriction does not apply.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Allowing unrestricted chat participation in meetings hosted by untrusted external organizations increases the risk of exposure to malicious content, including links, files, or payloads designed to exploit user behavior or application vulnerabilities.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.3.5", + "Description": "Ensure users can report security concerns in Teams", + "Checks": [ + "teams_security_reporting_enabled", + "defender_chat_report_policy_configured" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Users can report security concerns in Teams", + "Section": "2. Attack Surface", + "SubSection": "2.3 Application", + "AttributeDescription": "User reporting settings in Microsoft Teams and Microsoft 365 allow end users to report messages they believe to be malicious or suspicious, enabling quicker response and investigation by security teams. To ensure the reporting feature functions as intended, this recommendation encompasses three distinct but interdependent settings that must all be correctly configured: 1. Teams Admin Center – User Reporting: This setting controls whether users can report messages directly from the Teams interface. It is enabled by default for new tenants. If disabled, users cannot report messages in Teams, and downstream settings in Microsoft Defender will not have any effect. 2. Microsoft 365 Defender Portal – User Reporting Integration: Also enabled by default in new tenants, this setting must be explicitly enabled for existing tenants. It ensures that messages reported from Teams are properly surfaced on the “User reported” tab of the Submissions page in Microsoft 365 Defender. 3. Defender – Report Message Destinations: This broader configuration applies to multiple Microsoft 365 services, including Teams. It allows organizations to control where reported messages are routed, such as keeping them within the organization or forwarding them to Microsoft for deeper analysis. Given its influence on how user submissions are processed, it is included as a required configuration in this assessment.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Enabling user reporting equips employees with a straightforward mechanism to flag suspicious or potentially malicious content in Teams, acting as a critical early warning system for security teams. This improves organizational responsiveness to phishing, social engineering, or targeted attacks that may initially evade automated detection.", + "LevelOfRisk": 2 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.1.1", + "Description": "Ensure 'AuditDisabled' organizationally is set to 'False'", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_organization_mailbox_auditing_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "AuditDisabled organizationally is set to False", + "Section": "3. Logging and monitoring", + "SubSection": "3.1 Logging", + "AttributeDescription": "The setting “Mailbox auditing on by default” determines whether mailbox auditing is automatically enabled across all mailboxes in the organization, regardless of their individual auditing configuration. When this setting is configured as False, it enables auditing at the organization level, overriding the AuditEnabled property for individual mailboxes—even if it is explicitly set to False. With this setting enabled, default audit actions are automatically recorded for all mailboxes without requiring manual configuration. Conversely, disabling this setting (True) effectively turns off mailbox auditing across the organization and overrides any mailbox-level auditing settings. The consequences of disabling this setting include: • Mailbox auditing is completely disabled organization-wide. • No mailbox actions are logged, even if AuditEnabled is set to True for individual mailboxes. • New mailboxes do not inherit auditing, and setting AuditEnabled=True has no effect. • Bypass audit rules set via Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation are ignored. • Existing audit records remain in place until they expire based on the audit log retention policy. The recommended configuration is to set this value to False at the organization level to ensure auditing is enforced consistently.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Enforcing mailbox auditing by default ensures that audit logging cannot be unintentionally or maliciously disabled on individual mailboxes. This setting provides vital visibility for forensic investigations and incident response (IR) teams, allowing them to trace suspicious or malicious activity—such as unauthorized inbox access, message deletion, or rule manipulation—that may signal account compromise. Consistent auditing across all mailboxes is critical for detecting threat actor behaviors (TTPs) and correlating events across users. While organizations without Microsoft 365 E5 licenses are limited to 90 days of audit log retention, enabling this setting still significantly improves detection and accountability within that window.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.1.2", + "Description": "Ensure mailbox auditing for E3 users is Enabled", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_user_mailbox_auditing_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Mailbox auditing for E3 users is Enabled", + "Section": "3. Logging and monitoring", + "SubSection": "3.1 Logging", + "AttributeDescription": "As of January 2019, Microsoft enables mailbox audit logging by default across all organizations. This feature ensures that specific actions performed by mailbox owners, delegates, and administrators are automatically captured and recorded. These audit records can then be searched by administrators through the mailbox audit log in Microsoft 365. Each mailbox type—whether user, shared, resource, or public folder—can have tailored audit settings to track activities that are most relevant to the organization. While audit logging is enabled by default at the organizational level, it is important to explicitly configure the AuditEnabled property to True on all user mailboxes, and to expand the list of audited actions beyond the Microsoft defaults to meet specific visibility or compliance needs. Note: This recommendation is particularly relevant to users with Microsoft 365 E3 licenses, where audit actions differ slightly from the default configurations in E5.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Mailbox auditing plays a critical role in supporting both regulatory compliance and security monitoring. Whether investigating unauthorized configuration changes, potential account compromise, or insider threats, detailed mailbox audit logs provide essential evidence for security operations, forensic analysis, and general administrative oversight. While mailbox auditing is enabled by default for most user mailboxes, certain mailbox types—such as Resource Mailboxes, Public Folder Mailboxes, and the DiscoverySearch Mailbox—do not inherit the organizational auditing default. For these mailboxes, AuditEnabled must be manually set to True to ensure relevant activities are captured. Note: Organizations without Microsoft 365 E5 licenses are subject to a 90-day audit log retention limit, but enabling comprehensive mailbox auditing remains a best practice for operational readiness and incident response.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.1.3", + "Description": "Ensure mailbox auditing for E5 users is Enabled", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_user_mailbox_auditing_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Mailbox auditing for E5 users is Enabled", + "Section": "3. Logging and monitoring", + "SubSection": "3.1 Logging", + "AttributeDescription": "Since January 2019, mailbox audit logging has been enabled by default in all Microsoft 365 organizations. This feature ensures that specific actions performed by mailbox owners, delegates, and administrators are automatically captured and stored as audit records. These logs are accessible to administrators through the Microsoft 365 mailbox audit log, enabling visibility into key mailbox-level activity. Although logging is enabled by default, each mailbox—particularly user and shared mailboxes—can have custom audit actions assigned to capture the specific types of events deemed valuable by the organization. For environments with Microsoft 365 E5 licenses or the advanced auditing add-on, it is recommended to explicitly set AuditEnabled to True on all user mailboxes and to configure additional audit actions beyond Microsoft’s default settings for enhanced visibility. Note: This recommendation specifically applies to E5 or equivalent auditing-enabled license holders, as the available audit depth and event coverage differ from E3.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Mailbox audit logging is essential for supporting security investigations, regulatory compliance, and operational forensics in Microsoft 365. Whether you’re tracking unauthorized changes, detecting suspicious access, or conducting post-incident analysis, having a complete and accurate mailbox audit trail is critical. While audit logging is broadly applied by default, certain mailbox types bypass the organizational setting and require manual configuration to enable auditing. These include: • Resource Mailboxes • Public Folder Mailboxes • DiscoverySearch Mailboxes For these mailbox types, the AuditEnabled property must be explicitly set to True to ensure that audit events are captured. Important: Without advanced auditing (included in E5 or via add-on), mailbox audit logs are retained for only 90 days, limiting the historical window for investigations. Nonetheless, enabling detailed auditing remains a key best practice for maintaining strong visibility and compliance readiness.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.1.4", + "Description": "Ensure 'AuditBypassEnabled' is not enabled on mailboxes", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_mailbox_audit_bypass_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "AuditBypassEnabled is not enabled on mailboxes", + "Section": "3. Logging and monitoring", + "SubSection": "3.1 Logging", + "AttributeDescription": "The AuditBypassEnabled setting in Microsoft 365 allows specific user or computer accounts to bypass mailbox audit logging, meaning that any actions they perform on mailboxes will not be recorded in the audit logs. This includes actions such as reading, deleting, moving, or modifying messages.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Allowing an account to bypass mailbox audit logging creates a blind spot in security monitoring. If the account is compromised, misused, or maliciously configured, it can access and interact with mailboxes without leaving any trace in the logs. This significantly undermines the organization’s ability to conduct forensic investigations, detect insider threats, or comply with audit requirements.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.2.1", + "Description": "Ensure Microsoft 365 audit log search is Enabled ", + "Checks": [ + "purview_audit_log_search_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Microsoft 365 audit log search is Enabled ", + "Section": "3. Logging and monitoring", + "SubSection": "3.2 Retention", + "AttributeDescription": "Audit log search in the Microsoft Purview compliance portal allows organizations to track and retain user and administrator activities across Microsoft 365 services. When enabled, audit events—such as sign-ins, file access, configuration changes, and other operational actions—are captured and stored for up to 90 days by default. While some organizations may choose to integrate auditing data with third-party Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems, audit log search in Microsoft Purview remains a critical native capability for centralized visibility and incident response. Although global administrators have the ability to disable audit log search, it is generally recommended to keep it enabled to maintain full visibility into user and system activity.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Activating audit log search provides essential forensic and compliance value. It enables organizations to detect anomalous behavior, investigate potential security incidents, and demonstrate adherence to regulatory and legal requirements. In addition, it supports operational monitoring, internal audits, and proactive threat detection. By retaining and centralizing audit data within the Microsoft 365 ecosystem, security and compliance teams gain faster access to actionable insights, reducing response times and strengthening the organization’s overall security posture.", + "LevelOfRisk": 5 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.3.1", + "Description": "Ensure notifications for internal users sending malware is Enabled", + "Checks": [ + "defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Notifications for internal users sending malware is Enabled", + "Section": "3. Logging and monitoring", + "SubSection": "3.3 Monitoring", + "AttributeDescription": "Exchange Online Protection (EOP) is Microsoft’s cloud-based email filtering service designed to safeguard organizations against spam, malware, and other email-borne threats. It is included by default in all Microsoft 365 tenants with Exchange Online mailboxes. EOP provides customizable anti-malware policies that allow administrators to define protection settings and configure alerts for detected malicious activity.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Enabling notifications for malware detections ensures that administrators are alerted when an internal user sends a message containing malware. Such incidents may signal a compromised user account or infected device, requiring immediate investigation to mitigate potential security breaches.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.1.1", + "Description": "Ensure that DKIM is enabled for all Exchange Online Domains", + "Checks": [ + "defender_domain_dkim_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "DKIM is enabled for all Exchange Online Domains", + "Section": "4. Encryption", + "SubSection": "4.1 In-Transit", + "AttributeDescription": "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) is one of the three key email authentication technologies—alongside SPF and DMARC—used to protect domains from being spoofed by malicious actors. DKIM allows organizations to apply a cryptographic digital signature to the header of outbound email messages. When properly configured, DKIM enables a domain to associate its identity with the message, allowing recipient email systems to verify the authenticity of the sender. Combined with SPF and DMARC, DKIM helps prevent unauthorized use of your domain in phishing or spoofing attacks.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Enabling DKIM in Office 365 ensures that all outbound emails sent via Exchange Online are cryptographically signed. This enables recipient mail servers to verify that messages originate from an authorized source, significantly reducing the risk of email spoofing and reinforcing trust in the organization’s email communications.", + "LevelOfRisk": 4 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.1.2", + "Description": "Ensure that password hash sync is enabled for hybrid deployments", + "Checks": [ + "entra_password_hash_sync_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Title": "Password hash sync is enabled for hybrid deployments", + "Section": "4. Encryption", + "SubSection": "4.1 In-Transit", + "AttributeDescription": "Password Hash Synchronization (PHS) is a hybrid identity sign-in method that enables secure synchronization of user credentials from an on-premises Active Directory to Microsoft Entra ID. Microsoft Entra Connect performs this by syncing a hash of the password hash, ensuring credentials are not exposed in transit or storage. Note: This recommendation applies only to Microsoft 365 tenants configured with Entra Connect synchronization in a hybrid environment. It does not apply to tenants using federated domain configurations.", + "AdditionalInformation": "PHS simplifies the user experience by allowing a single password to be used across both on-premises and cloud resources. It also enables leaked credential detection via Microsoft Entra ID Protection, helping identify compromised accounts when passwords appear in known data breaches or public forums. Compared to other synchronization methods like federation, PHS offers greater resilience—users can still sign in to Microsoft 365 even if connectivity to the on-premises environment is temporarily unavailable.", + "LevelOfRisk": 2 + } + ] + } + ] +} diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/models.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/models.py index 2b5f5ada66..f1908b8de3 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/models.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/models.py @@ -79,3 +79,29 @@ class ProwlerThreatScoreGCPModel(BaseModel): ResourceName: str CheckId: str Muted: bool + + +class ProwlerThreatScoreM365Model(BaseModel): + """ + ProwlerThreatScoreM365Model generates a finding's output in M365 Prowler ThreatScore Compliance format. + """ + + Provider: str + Description: str + TenantId: str + Location: str + AssessmentDate: str + Requirements_Id: str + Requirements_Description: str + Requirements_Attributes_Title: str + Requirements_Attributes_Section: str + Requirements_Attributes_SubSection: Optional[str] + Requirements_Attributes_AttributeDescription: str + Requirements_Attributes_AdditionalInformation: str + Requirements_Attributes_LevelOfRisk: int + Status: str + StatusExtended: str + ResourceId: str + ResourceName: str + CheckId: str + Muted: bool diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_m365.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_m365.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..26c5d01af0 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_m365.py @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance +from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput +from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.prowler_threatscore.models import ( + ProwlerThreatScoreM365Model, +) +from prowler.lib.outputs.finding import Finding + + +class ProwlerThreatScoreM365(ComplianceOutput): + """ + This class represents the M365 Prowler ThreatScore compliance output. + + Attributes: + - _data (list): A list to store transformed data from findings. + - _file_descriptor (TextIOWrapper): A file descriptor to write data to a file. + + Methods: + - transform: Transforms findings into M365 Prowler ThreatScore compliance format. + """ + + def transform( + self, + findings: list[Finding], + compliance: Compliance, + compliance_name: str, + ) -> None: + """ + Transforms a list of findings into M365 Prowler ThreatScore compliance format. + + Parameters: + - findings (list): A list of findings. + - compliance (Compliance): A compliance model. + - compliance_name (str): The name of the compliance model. + + Returns: + - None + """ + for finding in findings: + # Get the compliance requirements for the finding + finding_requirements = finding.compliance.get(compliance_name, []) + for requirement in compliance.Requirements: + if requirement.Id in finding_requirements: + for attribute in requirement.Attributes: + compliance_row = ProwlerThreatScoreM365Model( + Provider=finding.provider, + Description=compliance.Description, + TenantId=finding.account_uid, + Location=finding.region, + AssessmentDate=str(finding.timestamp), + Requirements_Id=requirement.Id, + Requirements_Description=requirement.Description, + Requirements_Attributes_Title=attribute.Title, + Requirements_Attributes_Section=attribute.Section, + Requirements_Attributes_SubSection=attribute.SubSection, + Requirements_Attributes_AttributeDescription=attribute.AttributeDescription, + Requirements_Attributes_AdditionalInformation=attribute.AdditionalInformation, + Requirements_Attributes_LevelOfRisk=attribute.LevelOfRisk, + Status=finding.status, + StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, + ResourceName=finding.resource_name, + CheckId=finding.check_id, + Muted=finding.muted, + ) + self._data.append(compliance_row) + # Add manual requirements to the compliance output + for requirement in compliance.Requirements: + if not requirement.Checks: + for attribute in requirement.Attributes: + compliance_row = ProwlerThreatScoreM365Model( + Provider=compliance.Provider.lower(), + Description=compliance.Description, + TenantId="", + Location="", + AssessmentDate=str(finding.timestamp), + Requirements_Id=requirement.Id, + Requirements_Description=requirement.Description, + Requirements_Attributes_Title=attribute.Title, + Requirements_Attributes_Section=attribute.Section, + Requirements_Attributes_SubSection=attribute.SubSection, + Requirements_Attributes_AttributeDescription=attribute.AttributeDescription, + Requirements_Attributes_AdditionalInformation=attribute.AdditionalInformation, + Requirements_Attributes_LevelOfRisk=attribute.LevelOfRisk, + Status="MANUAL", + StatusExtended="Manual check", + ResourceId="manual_check", + ResourceName="Manual check", + CheckId="manual", + Muted=False, + ) + self._data.append(compliance_row) diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_legacy_authentication_blocked/entra_legacy_authentication_blocked.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_legacy_authentication_blocked/entra_legacy_authentication_blocked.metadata.json index f8bedfb15d..9c7541dfda 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_legacy_authentication_blocked/entra_legacy_authentication_blocked.metadata.json +++ b/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_legacy_authentication_blocked/entra_legacy_authentication_blocked.metadata.json @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ "CheckID": "entra_legacy_authentication_blocked", "CheckTitle": "Ensure that Conditional Access policy blocks legacy authentication", "CheckType": [], - "ServiceName": "critical", + "ServiceName": "entra", "SubServiceName": "", "ResourceIdTemplate": "", - "Severity": "medium", + "Severity": "critical", "ResourceType": "Conditional Access Policy", "Description": "Ensure that Conditional Access policy blocks legacy authentication in Microsoft Entra ID to enforce modern authentication methods and protect against credential-stuffing and brute-force attacks.", "Risk": "Legacy authentication protocols do not support MFA, making them vulnerable to credential-stuffing and brute-force attacks. Attackers commonly exploit these protocols to bypass security controls and gain unauthorized access.", From abf51eceee96a531fe2f58ffdea8310f3c32603d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andoni Alonso <14891798+andoniaf@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 12:29:30 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 10/23] fix(typo): rename `generate_compliance_json_from_csv_threatscore` (#7698) --- ...tscope.py => generate_compliance_json_from_csv_threatscore.py} | 0 1 file changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) rename util/{generate_compliance_json_from_csv_threatscope.py => generate_compliance_json_from_csv_threatscore.py} (100%) diff --git a/util/generate_compliance_json_from_csv_threatscope.py b/util/generate_compliance_json_from_csv_threatscore.py similarity index 100% rename from util/generate_compliance_json_from_csv_threatscope.py rename to util/generate_compliance_json_from_csv_threatscore.py From 55fc8cb55b0b5ad1330a6ba54889adb5873fff2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pepe Fagoaga Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 16:16:29 +0545 Subject: [PATCH 11/23] chore(api): Set tab name for API reference (#7713) --- api/src/backend/config/django/base.py | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/api/src/backend/config/django/base.py b/api/src/backend/config/django/base.py index 876bd6096c..8f3f0bb42e 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/config/django/base.py +++ b/api/src/backend/config/django/base.py @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ SPECTACULAR_SETTINGS = { "PREPROCESSING_HOOKS": [ "drf_spectacular_jsonapi.hooks.fix_nested_path_parameters", ], + "TITLE": "API Reference - Prowler", } WSGI_APPLICATION = "config.wsgi.application" From aa8119970e3c49346ea0a761c8b3d6b95d9ba856 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Prowler Bot Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 12:37:21 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 12/23] chore(regions_update): Changes in regions for AWS services (#7709) Co-authored-by: prowler-bot <179230569+prowler-bot@users.noreply.github.com> --- .../providers/aws/aws_regions_by_service.json | 35 +++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/aws_regions_by_service.json b/prowler/providers/aws/aws_regions_by_service.json index 535c7e8aa0..da9bba3923 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/aws_regions_by_service.json +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/aws_regions_by_service.json @@ -750,6 +750,7 @@ "eu-central-1", "eu-west-1", "eu-west-2", + "eu-west-3", "sa-east-1", "us-east-1", "us-east-2", @@ -1989,10 +1990,13 @@ "ap-northeast-2", "ap-northeast-3", "ap-south-1", + "ap-south-2", "ap-southeast-1", "ap-southeast-2", "ap-southeast-3", + "ap-southeast-4", "ca-central-1", + "ca-west-1", "eu-central-1", "eu-north-1", "eu-south-1", @@ -2000,6 +2004,7 @@ "eu-west-1", "eu-west-2", "eu-west-3", + "il-central-1", "me-central-1", "me-south-1", "sa-east-1", @@ -2845,6 +2850,7 @@ "ap-southeast-3", "ap-southeast-4", "ap-southeast-5", + "ap-southeast-7", "ca-central-1", "ca-west-1", "eu-central-1", @@ -2858,6 +2864,7 @@ "il-central-1", "me-central-1", "me-south-1", + "mx-central-1", "sa-east-1", "us-east-1", "us-east-2", @@ -3342,6 +3349,7 @@ "ap-southeast-2", "ca-central-1", "eu-central-1", + "eu-north-1", "eu-south-1", "eu-south-2", "eu-west-1", @@ -4203,6 +4211,7 @@ "ap-northeast-2", "ap-southeast-1", "ap-southeast-2", + "ca-central-1", "eu-central-1", "eu-west-1", "eu-west-2", @@ -4682,6 +4691,7 @@ "ap-southeast-3", "ap-southeast-4", "ap-southeast-5", + "ap-southeast-7", "ca-central-1", "ca-west-1", "eu-central-1", @@ -4695,6 +4705,7 @@ "il-central-1", "me-central-1", "me-south-1", + "mx-central-1", "sa-east-1", "us-east-1", "us-east-2", @@ -5129,6 +5140,7 @@ "il-central-1", "me-central-1", "me-south-1", + "mx-central-1", "sa-east-1", "us-east-1", "us-east-2", @@ -5265,6 +5277,7 @@ "ap-southeast-3", "ap-southeast-4", "ap-southeast-5", + "ap-southeast-7", "ca-central-1", "ca-west-1", "eu-central-1", @@ -5918,7 +5931,10 @@ "us-west-1", "us-west-2" ], - "aws-cn": [], + "aws-cn": [ + "cn-north-1", + "cn-northwest-1" + ], "aws-us-gov": [] } }, @@ -8249,6 +8265,7 @@ "il-central-1", "me-central-1", "me-south-1", + "mx-central-1", "sa-east-1", "us-east-1", "us-east-2", @@ -11133,9 +11150,20 @@ }, "timestream-query": { "regions": { - "aws": [], + "aws": [ + "ap-northeast-1", + "ap-south-1", + "ap-southeast-2", + "eu-central-1", + "eu-west-1", + "us-east-1", + "us-east-2", + "us-west-2" + ], "aws-cn": [], - "aws-us-gov": [] + "aws-us-gov": [ + "us-gov-west-1" + ] } }, "timestream-write": { @@ -11893,6 +11921,7 @@ "eu-central-1", "eu-west-1", "eu-west-2", + "eu-west-3", "il-central-1", "sa-east-1", "us-east-1", From 40eaa797776cde06b4f7dfcbd2a7089741fe4a00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Pedro=20Mart=C3=ADn?= Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 12:37:43 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 13/23] docs(compliance): update compliance page with latest changes (#7694) Co-authored-by: MrCloudSec --- docs/tutorials/compliance.md | 50 +----------------------------------- prowler/CHANGELOG.md | 11 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/tutorials/compliance.md b/docs/tutorials/compliance.md index b3424dbf27..7e9d2f5e82 100644 --- a/docs/tutorials/compliance.md +++ b/docs/tutorials/compliance.md @@ -23,55 +23,7 @@ In order to see which compliance frameworks are cover by Prowler, you can use op prowler --list-compliance ``` -### AWS - -- `aws_account_security_onboarding_aws` -- `aws_audit_manager_control_tower_guardrails_aws` -- `aws_foundational_security_best_practices_aws` -- `aws_foundational_technical_review_aws` -- `aws_well_architected_framework_reliability_pillar_aws` -- `aws_well_architected_framework_security_pillar_aws` -- `cis_1.4_aws` -- `cis_1.5_aws` -- `cis_2.0_aws` -- `cis_3.0_aws` -- `cisa_aws` -- `ens_rd2022_aws` -- `fedramp_low_revision_4_aws` -- `fedramp_moderate_revision_4_aws` -- `ffiec_aws` -- `gdpr_aws` -- `gxp_21_cfr_part_11_aws` -- `gxp_eu_annex_11_aws` -- `hipaa_aws` -- `iso27001_2013_aws` -- `kisa_isms_p_2023_aws` -- `kisa_isms_p_2023_korean_aws` -- `mitre_attack_aws` -- `nist_800_171_revision_2_aws` -- `nist_800_53_revision_4_aws` -- `nist_800_53_revision_5_aws` -- `nist_csf_1.1_aws` -- `pci_3.2.1_aws` -- `rbi_cyber_security_framework_aws` -- `soc2_aws` - -### Azure - -- `cis_2.0_azure` -- `cis_2.1_azure` -- `ens_rd2022_azure` -- `mitre_attack_azure` - -### GCP - -- `cis_2.0_gcp` -- `ens_rd2022_gcp` -- `mitre_attack_gcp` - -### Kubernetes - -- `cis_1.8_kubernetes` +The full and updated list of supported compliance frameworks for each provider is available at [Prowler Hub](https://hub.prowler.com/compliance). ## List Requirements of Compliance Frameworks For each compliance framework, you can use option `--list-compliance-requirements` to list its requirements: diff --git a/prowler/CHANGELOG.md b/prowler/CHANGELOG.md index c9d9cad18e..d9efeb20bd 100644 --- a/prowler/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/prowler/CHANGELOG.md @@ -2,6 +2,17 @@ All notable changes to the **Prowler SDK** are documented in this file. +## [v5.7.0] (Prowler v5.7.0) + +### Added +- Update the compliance list supported for each provider from docs. [(#7694)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7694) +- Allow setting cluster name in in-cluster mode in Kubernetes. [(#7695)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7695) +- Add Prowler ThreatScore for M365 provider. [(#7692)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7692) + +### Fixed + +--- + ## [v5.6.0] (Prowler v5.6.0) ### Added From ea3c71e22ceed7ade1d1535cab3130808eb6399b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pepe Fagoaga Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 16:30:17 +0545 Subject: [PATCH 14/23] fix(bump-version): bump for fix also in minors (#7712) --- .github/workflows/sdk-bump-version.yml | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/sdk-bump-version.yml b/.github/workflows/sdk-bump-version.yml index bc28afa1e4..e5e5dba4e0 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/sdk-bump-version.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/sdk-bump-version.yml @@ -25,17 +25,31 @@ jobs: MINOR_VERSION=${BASH_REMATCH[2]} FIX_VERSION=${BASH_REMATCH[3]} + # Export version components to GitHub environment + echo "MAJOR_VERSION=${MAJOR_VERSION}" >> "${GITHUB_ENV}" + echo "MINOR_VERSION=${MINOR_VERSION}" >> "${GITHUB_ENV}" + echo "FIX_VERSION=${FIX_VERSION}" >> "${GITHUB_ENV}" + if (( MAJOR_VERSION == 5 )); then if (( FIX_VERSION == 0 )); then echo "Minor Release: $PROWLER_VERSION" + # Set up next minor version for master BUMP_VERSION_TO=${MAJOR_VERSION}.$((MINOR_VERSION + 1)).${FIX_VERSION} echo "BUMP_VERSION_TO=${BUMP_VERSION_TO}" >> "${GITHUB_ENV}" TARGET_BRANCH=${BASE_BRANCH} echo "TARGET_BRANCH=${TARGET_BRANCH}" >> "${GITHUB_ENV}" + # Set up patch version for version branch + PATCH_VERSION_TO=${MAJOR_VERSION}.${MINOR_VERSION}.1 + echo "PATCH_VERSION_TO=${PATCH_VERSION_TO}" >> "${GITHUB_ENV}" + + VERSION_BRANCH=v${MAJOR_VERSION}.${MINOR_VERSION} + echo "VERSION_BRANCH=${VERSION_BRANCH}" >> "${GITHUB_ENV}" + echo "Bumping to next minor version: ${BUMP_VERSION_TO} in branch ${TARGET_BRANCH}" + echo "Bumping to next patch version: ${PATCH_VERSION_TO} in branch ${VERSION_BRANCH}" else echo "Patch Release: $PROWLER_VERSION" @@ -74,7 +88,6 @@ jobs: git --no-pager diff - - name: Create Pull Request uses: peter-evans/create-pull-request@271a8d0340265f705b14b6d32b9829c1cb33d45e # v7.0.8 with: @@ -92,3 +105,41 @@ jobs: ### License By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license. + + - name: Handle patch version for minor release + if: env.FIX_VERSION == '0' + run: | + echo "Using PROWLER_VERSION=$PROWLER_VERSION" + echo "Using PATCH_VERSION_TO=$PATCH_VERSION_TO" + + set -e + + echo "Bumping version in pyproject.toml ..." + sed -i "s|version = \"${PROWLER_VERSION}\"|version = \"${PATCH_VERSION_TO}\"|" pyproject.toml + + echo "Bumping version in prowler/config/config.py ..." + sed -i "s|prowler_version = \"${PROWLER_VERSION}\"|prowler_version = \"${PATCH_VERSION_TO}\"|" prowler/config/config.py + + echo "Bumping version in .env ..." + sed -i "s|NEXT_PUBLIC_PROWLER_RELEASE_VERSION=v${PROWLER_VERSION}|NEXT_PUBLIC_PROWLER_RELEASE_VERSION=v${PATCH_VERSION_TO}|" .env + + git --no-pager diff + + - name: Create Pull Request for patch version + if: env.FIX_VERSION == '0' + uses: peter-evans/create-pull-request@271a8d0340265f705b14b6d32b9829c1cb33d45e # v7.0.8 + with: + author: prowler-bot <179230569+prowler-bot@users.noreply.github.com> + token: ${{ secrets.PROWLER_BOT_ACCESS_TOKEN }} + base: ${{ env.VERSION_BRANCH }} + commit-message: "chore(release): Bump version to v${{ env.PATCH_VERSION_TO }}" + branch: "version-bump-to-v${{ env.PATCH_VERSION_TO }}" + title: "chore(release): Bump version to v${{ env.PATCH_VERSION_TO }}" + body: | + ### Description + + Bump Prowler version to v${{ env.PATCH_VERSION_TO }} + + ### License + + By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license. From 7c3a53908b1da23a5d3f34180d15f56a4f48b8c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hugo Pereira Brito <101209179+HugoPBrito@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 12:59:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 15/23] chore(compliance): update `CIS 4.0` for `M365` (#7699) Co-authored-by: MrCloudSec --- prowler/CHANGELOG.md | 1 + prowler/compliance/m365/cis_4.0_m365.json | 2660 ++++++++++++++++- ...ce_json_from_csv_for_cis40_microsoft365.py | 8 +- 3 files changed, 2599 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-) diff --git a/prowler/CHANGELOG.md b/prowler/CHANGELOG.md index d9efeb20bd..3909b08498 100644 --- a/prowler/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/prowler/CHANGELOG.md @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ All notable changes to the **Prowler SDK** are documented in this file. - Add Prowler ThreatScore for M365 provider. [(#7692)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7692) ### Fixed +- Update CIS 4.0 for M365 provider. [(#7699)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7699) --- diff --git a/prowler/compliance/m365/cis_4.0_m365.json b/prowler/compliance/m365/cis_4.0_m365.json index a85f8a953d..608258a387 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/m365/cis_4.0_m365.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/m365/cis_4.0_m365.json @@ -6,127 +6,2653 @@ "Requirements": [ { "Id": "1.1.1", - "Description": "Ensure Administrative accounts are cloud-only", - "Checks": [], + "Description": "Administrative accounts are special privileged accounts that could have varying levels of access to data, users, and settings. Regular user accounts should never be utilized for administrative tasks and care should be taken, in the case of a hybrid environment, to keep Administrative accounts separated from on-prem accounts. Administrative accounts should not have applications assigned so that they have no access to potentially vulnerable services (EX. email, Teams, SharePoint, etc.) and only access to perform tasks as needed for administrative purposes.Ensure administrative accounts are not `On-premises sync enabled`.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_admin_account_cloud_only" + ], "Attributes": [ { - "Section": "1.Microsoft 365 admin center", - "Profile": "Level 1", - "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", - "Description": "Administrative accounts are special privileged accounts that could have varying levels of access to data, users, and settings. Regular user accounts should never be utilized for administrative tasks and care should be taken, in the case of a hybrid environment, to keep Administrative accounts separated from on-prem accounts. Administrative accounts should not have applications assigned so that they have no access to potentially vulnerable services (e.g., email, Teams, SharePoint, etc.) and only access to perform tasks as needed for administrative purposes. Ensure administrative accounts are not On-premises sync enabled.", + "Section": "1.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Administrative accounts are special privileged accounts that could have varying levels of access to data, users, and settings. Regular user accounts should never be utilized for administrative tasks and care should be taken, in the case of a hybrid environment, to keep Administrative accounts separated from on-prem accounts. Administrative accounts should not have applications assigned so that they have no access to potentially vulnerable services (EX. email, Teams, SharePoint, etc.) and only access to perform tasks as needed for administrative purposes.Ensure administrative accounts are not `On-premises sync enabled`.", "RationaleStatement": "In a hybrid environment, having separate accounts will help ensure that in the event of a breach in the cloud, that the breach does not affect the on-prem environment and vice versa.", - "ImpactStatement": "Administrative users will have to switch accounts and utilize login/logout functionality when performing administrative tasks, as well as not benefiting from SSO. This will require a migration process from the 'daily driver' account to a dedicated admin account. When migrating permissions to the admin account, both M365 and Azure RBAC roles should be migrated as well. Once the new admin accounts are created, both of these permission sets should be moved from the daily driver account to the new admin account. Failure to migrate Azure RBAC roles can cause an admin to not be able to see their subscriptions/resources while using their admin accounts.", - "RemediationProcedure": "Review all administrative accounts and ensure they are configured as cloud-only. Remove any on-premises synchronization for these accounts. Assign necessary roles and permissions exclusively to the dedicated cloud administrative accounts.", - "AuditProcedure": "Log in to the Microsoft 365 Admin Center and review the list of administrative accounts. Verify that none of them are on-premises sync enabled.", - "AdditionalInformation": "This recommendation is particularly relevant for hybrid environments and is aimed at enhancing the security of administrative accounts by isolating them from on-prem infrastructure.", - "DefaultValue": "By default, administrative accounts may be either cloud-only or hybrid. This setting needs to be verified and adjusted according to the recommendation.", - "References": "CIS Microsoft 365 Foundations Benchmark v4.0, Section 1.1.1" + "ImpactStatement": "Administrative users will have to switch accounts and utilizing login/logout functionality when performing administrative tasks, as well as not benefiting from SSO. This will require a migration process from the 'daily driver' account to a dedicated admin account.When migrating permissions to the admin account, both M365 and Azure RBAC roles should be migrated as well. Once the new admin accounts are created both of these permission sets should be moved from the daily driver account to the new admin account. Failure to migrate Azure RBAC roles can cause an admin to not be able to see their subscriptions/resources while using their admin accounts.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Remediation will require first identifying the privileged accounts that are synced from on-premises and then creating a new cloud-only account for that user. Once a replacement account is established, the hybrid account should have its role reduced to that of a non-privileged user or removed depending on the need.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity` > `Users` select `All users`.3. To the right of the search box click the `Add filter` button.4. Add the `On-premises sync enabled` filter and click `Apply.`5. For each user account known to be in an administrative role verify it is not present in the filtered list.**To audit using PowerShell:** 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using `Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"RoleManagement.Read.Directory\",\"User.Read.All\"`2. Run the following PowerShell script:```# Get privileged role IDs$PrivilegedRoles = $DirectoryRoles | Where-Object { $_.DisplayName -like \"*Administrator*\" -or $_.DisplayName -eq \"Global Reader\"}# Get the members of these various roles$RoleMembers = $PrivilegedRoles | ForEach-Object { Get-MgDirectoryRoleMember -DirectoryRoleId $_.Id } | Select-Object Id -Unique# Retrieve details about the members in these roles$PrivilegedUsers = $RoleMembers | ForEach-Object { Get-MgUser -UserId $_.Id -Property UserPrincipalName, DisplayName, Id, OnPremisesSyncEnabled}$PrivilegedUsers | Where-Object { $_.OnPremisesSyncEnabled -eq $true } | ft DisplayName,UserPrincipalName,OnPremisesSyncEnabled```3. The script will output any hybrid users that are also members of privileged roles. If nothing returns then no users with that criteria exist.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/add-users/add-users?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/enterprise/protect-your-global-administrator-accounts?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/best-practices#9-use-cloud-native-accounts-for-microsoft-entra-roles:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/whatis:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference", + "DefaultValue": "N/A" } ] }, { "Id": "1.1.2", - "Description": "Ensure two emergency access accounts have been defined", + "Description": "Emergency access or \"break glass\" accounts are limited for emergency scenarios where normal administrative accounts are unavailable. They are not assigned to a specific user and will have a combination of physical and technical controls to prevent them from being accessed outside a true emergency. These emergencies could be due to several things, including:- Technical failures of a cellular provider or Microsoft related service such as MFA.- The last remaining Global Administrator account is inaccessible.Ensure two `Emergency Access` accounts have been defined.**Note:** Microsoft provides several recommendations for these accounts and how to configure them. For more information on this, please refer to the references section. The CIS Benchmark outlines the more critical things to consider.", "Checks": [], "Attributes": [ { - "Section": "1.Microsoft 365 admin center", - "Profile": "Level 1", + "Section": "1.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", - "Description": "Emergency access or 'break glass' accounts are limited for emergency scenarios where normal administrative accounts are unavailable. They are not assigned to a specific user and will have a combination of physical and technical controls to prevent them from being accessed outside a true emergency. These emergencies could include technical failures of a cellular provider or Microsoft-related service such as MFA, or the last remaining Global Administrator account becoming inaccessible. Ensure two Emergency Access accounts have been defined.", - "RationaleStatement": "In various situations, an organization may require the use of a break glass account to gain emergency access. Losing access to administrative functions could result in a significant loss of support capability, reduced visibility into the security posture, and potential financial losses.", - "ImpactStatement": "Improper implementation of emergency access accounts could weaken the organization's security posture. To mitigate this, at least one account should be excluded from all conditional access rules, and strong authentication mechanisms (e.g., long, high-entropy passwords or FIDO2 security keys) must be used to secure the accounts.", - "RemediationProcedure": "Create two emergency access accounts and configure them according to Microsoft's recommendations. Ensure that these accounts are not assigned to specific users and are excluded from all conditional access rules. Secure the accounts with strong passwords or passwordless authentication methods, such as FIDO2 security keys. Regularly review and test these accounts to confirm their functionality.", - "AuditProcedure": "Log in to the Microsoft 365 Admin Center and verify the existence of at least two emergency access accounts. Check their configurations to ensure they comply with Microsoft's recommendations, including exclusion from conditional access rules and proper security settings.", - "AdditionalInformation": "Emergency access accounts are critical for maintaining administrative control during unexpected events. Regular audits and strict access controls are recommended to prevent misuse.", - "DefaultValue": "By default, emergency access accounts are not configured. Organizations must create and secure these accounts proactively.", - "References": "CIS Microsoft 365 Foundations Benchmark v4.0, Section 1.1.2; Microsoft documentation on emergency access accounts." + "Description": "Emergency access or \"break glass\" accounts are limited for emergency scenarios where normal administrative accounts are unavailable. They are not assigned to a specific user and will have a combination of physical and technical controls to prevent them from being accessed outside a true emergency. These emergencies could be due to several things, including:- Technical failures of a cellular provider or Microsoft related service such as MFA.- The last remaining Global Administrator account is inaccessible.Ensure two `Emergency Access` accounts have been defined.**Note:** Microsoft provides several recommendations for these accounts and how to configure them. For more information on this, please refer to the references section. The CIS Benchmark outlines the more critical things to consider.", + "RationaleStatement": "In various situations, an organization may require the use of a break glass account to gain emergency access. In the event of losing access to administrative functions, an organization may experience a significant loss in its ability to provide support, lose insight into its security posture, and potentially suffer financial losses.", + "ImpactStatement": "If care is not taken in properly implementing an emergency access account this could weaken security posture. Microsoft recommends to excluding at least one of these accounts from all conditional access rules therefore passwords must have sufficient entropy and length to protect against random guesses. FIDO2 security keys may be used instead of a password for secure passwordless solution.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Step 1 - Create two emergency access accounts:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com2. Expand `Users` > `Active Users`3. Click `Add user` and create a new user with this criteria: - Name the account in a way that does NOT identify it with a particular person. - Assign the account to the default `.onmicrosoft.com` domain and not the organization's. - The password must be at least 16 characters and generated randomly. - Do not assign a license. - Assign the user the `Global Administrator` role.4. Repeat the above steps for the second account.**Step 2 - Exclude at least one account from conditional access policies:**1. Navigate `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/2. Expand `Protection` > `Conditional Access`.3. Inspect the conditional access policies.4. For each rule add an exclusion for at least one of the emergency access accounts.5. `Users` > `Exclude` > `Users and groups` and select one emergency access account.**Step 3 - Ensure the necessary procedures and policies are in place:**- In order for accounts to be effectively used in a break glass situation the proper policies and procedures must be authorized and distributed by senior management.- FIDO2 Security Keys should be locked in a secure separate fireproof location. - Passwords should be at least 16 characters, randomly generated and MAY be separated in multiple pieces to be joined on emergency.**Warning:** As of 10/15/2024 MFA is required for all users including Break Glass Accounts. It is recommended to update these accounts to use passkey (FIDO2) or configure certificate-based authentication for MFA. Both methods satisfy the MFA requirement.**Additional suggestions for emergency account management:**- Create access reviews for these users.- Exclude users from conditional access rules.- Add the account to a [restricted management administrative unit](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/admin-units-restricted-management).**Warning**: If CA (conditional access) exclusion is managed by a group, this group should be added to PIM for groups (licensing required) or be created as a role-assignable group. If it is a regular security group, then users with the Group Administrators role are able to bypass CA entirely.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Step 1 - Ensure a policy and procedure is in place at the organization:**- In order for accounts to be effectively used in a break-glass situation the proper policies and procedures must be authorized and distributed by senior management.- FIDO2 Security Keys should be locked in a secure separate fireproof location. - Passwords should be at least 16 characters, randomly generated and MAY be separated in multiple pieces to be joined on emergency.**Step 2 - Ensure two emergency access accounts are defined:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com2. Expand `Users` > `Active Users`3. Inspect the designated emergency access accounts and ensure the following: - The accounts are named correctly, and do NOT identify with a particular person. - The accounts use the default `.onmicrosoft.com` domain and not the organization's. - The accounts are cloud-only. - The accounts are unlicensed. - The accounts are assigned the `Global Administrator` directory role.**Step 3 - Ensure at least one account is excluded from all conditional access rules:**1. Navigate `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/2. Expand `Protection` > `Conditional Access`.3. Inspect the conditional access rules.4. Ensure one of the emergency access accounts is excluded from all rules.**Warning:** As of 10/15/2024 MFA is required for all users including Break Glass Accounts. It is recommended to update these accounts to use passkey (FIDO2) or configure certificate-based authentication for MFA. Both methods satisfy the MFA requirement.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Microsoft has additional instructions regarding using Azure Monitor to capture events in the Log Analytics workspace, and then generate alerts for Emergency Access accounts. This requires an Azure subscription but should be strongly considered as a method of monitoring activity on these accounts:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/security-emergency-access#monitor-sign-in-and-audit-logs", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/security-planning#stage-1-critical-items-to-do-right-now:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/security-emergency-access:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/admin-units-restricted-management:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-mandatory-multifactor-authentication#accounts", + "DefaultValue": "Not defined." } ] }, { "Id": "1.1.3", - "Description": "Ensure that between two and four global admins are designated", + "Description": "More than one global administrator should be designated so a single admin can be monitored and to provide redundancy should a single admin leave an organization. Additionally, there should be no more than four global admins set for any tenant. Ideally global administrators will have no licenses assigned to them.", "Checks": [ "admincenter_users_between_two_and_four_global_admins" ], "Attributes": [ { - "Section": "1.Microsoft 365 admin center", - "Profile": "Level 1", + "Section": "1.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", - "Description": "More than one global administrator should be designated so a single admin can be monitored and to provide redundancy should a single admin leave an organization. Additionally, there should be no more than four global admins set for any tenant. Ideally, global administrators will have no licenses assigned to them.", + "Description": "More than one global administrator should be designated so a single admin can be monitored and to provide redundancy should a single admin leave an organization. Additionally, there should be no more than four global admins set for any tenant. Ideally global administrators will have no licenses assigned to them.", "RationaleStatement": "If there is only one global tenant administrator, he or she can perform malicious activity without the possibility of being discovered by another admin. If there are numerous global tenant administrators, the more likely it is that one of their accounts will be successfully breached by an external attacker.", - "ImpactStatement": "If there is only one global administrator in a tenant, an additional global administrator will need to be identified and configured. If there are more than four global administrators, a review of role requirements for current global administrators will be required to identify which of the users require global administrator access.", - "RemediationProcedure": "Review the list of global administrators in the tenant and ensure there are at least two but no more than four accounts assigned this role. Remove excess global administrator accounts and create additional ones if necessary. Avoid assigning licenses to these accounts.", - "AuditProcedure": "Log in to the Microsoft 365 Admin Center and review the list of global administrators. Verify that there are at least two but no more than four global administrators configured.", - "AdditionalInformation": "Global administrators play a critical role in tenant management. Ensuring a proper number of global administrators improves redundancy and security.", - "DefaultValue": "By default, there may be a single global administrator configured for the tenant. Organizations need to manually adjust the count as per best practices.", - "References": "CIS Microsoft 365 Foundations Benchmark v4.0, Section 1.1.3" + "ImpactStatement": "The potential impact associated with ensuring compliance with this requirement is dependent upon the current number of global administrators configured in the tenant. If there is only one global administrator in a tenant, an additional global administrator will need to be identified and configured. If there are more than four global administrators, a review of role requirements for current global administrators will be required to identify which of the users require global administrator access.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to the `Microsoft 365 admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com2. Select `Users` > `Active Users`.3. In the `Search` field enter the name of the user to be made a Global Administrator.4. To create a new Global Admin: 1. Select the user's name. 2. A window will appear to the right. 3. Select `Manage roles`. 4. Select `Admin center access`. 4. Check `Global Administrator`. 5. Click `Save changes`.5. To remove Global Admins: 1. Select User. 2. Under `Roles` select `Manage roles` 3. De-Select the appropriate role. 4. Click `Save changes`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to the `Microsoft 365 admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com2. Select `Users` > `Active Users`.3. Select `Filter` then select `Global Admins`.4. Review the list of `Global Admins` to confirm there are from two to four such accounts.**To audit using PowerShell:** 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using `Connect-MgGraph -Scopes Directory.Read.All`2. Run the following PowerShell script:```# Determine Id of role using the immutable RoleTemplateId value.$globalAdminRole = Get-MgDirectoryRole -Filter \"RoleTemplateId eq '62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10'\"$globalAdmins = Get-MgDirectoryRoleMember -DirectoryRoleId $globalAdminRole.IdWrite-Host \"*** There are\" $globalAdmins.AdditionalProperties.Count \"Global Administrators assigned.\"```This information is also available via the Microsoft Graph Security API: ```GET https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/security/secureScores```**Note:** When tallying the number of Global Administrators the above does not account for Partner relationships. Those are located under `Settings` > `Partner Relationships` and should be reviewed on a reoccurring basis.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.graph.identity.directorymanagement/get-mgdirectoryrole?view=graph-powershell-1.0:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference#all-roles", + "DefaultValue": "" } ] }, { "Id": "1.1.4", - "Description": "Ensure administrative accounts use licenses with a reduced application footprint", + "Description": "Administrative accounts are special privileged accounts that could have varying levels of access to data, users, and settings. A license can enable an account to gain access to a variety of different applications, depending on the license assigned.The recommended state is to not license a privileged account or use `Microsoft Entra ID P1` or `Microsoft Entra ID P2` licenses.", "Checks": [ "admincenter_users_admins_reduced_license_footprint" ], "Attributes": [ { - "Section": "1.Microsoft 365 admin center", - "Profile": "Level 1", + "Section": "1.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", - "Description": "Administrative accounts are special privileged accounts with varying levels of access to data, users, and settings. It is recommended that privileged accounts either not be licensed or use Microsoft Entra ID P1 or Microsoft Entra ID P2 licenses to minimize application exposure.", - "RationaleStatement": "Ensuring administrative accounts do not use licenses with applications assigned to them reduces the attack surface of high-privileged identities. This minimizes the likelihood of these accounts being targeted by social engineering attacks or exposed to malicious content via licensed applications. Administrative activities should be restricted to dedicated accounts without access to collaborative tools like mailboxes.", - "ImpactStatement": "Administrative users will need to switch accounts to perform privileged actions, requiring login/logout functionality and potentially losing the convenience of SSO. Alerts sent to Global Administrators or TenantAdmins by default might not be received if these accounts lack application-based licenses. Proper alert routing must be configured to avoid missed notifications.", - "RemediationProcedure": "Review the licenses assigned to administrative accounts. Remove licenses granting access to collaborative applications and assign Microsoft Entra ID P1 or P2 licenses if participation in Microsoft 365 security services is required. Configure alerts to be sent to valid email addresses for monitoring.", - "AuditProcedure": "Log in to the Microsoft 365 Admin Center and review the licenses assigned to administrative accounts. Confirm that administrative accounts either have no licenses or are limited to Microsoft Entra ID P1 or P2 licenses without collaborative applications enabled.", - "AdditionalInformation": "Reducing the application footprint of administrative accounts improves security by minimizing potential attack vectors. Special care should be taken to configure alert routing properly to ensure critical notifications are not missed.", - "DefaultValue": "By default, administrative accounts may have licenses assigned based on organizational setup. Manual review and adjustment are necessary to comply with this recommendation.", - "References": "CIS Microsoft 365 Foundations Benchmark v4.0, Section 1.1.4; Microsoft documentation on Entra ID licenses and privileged account security." + "Description": "Administrative accounts are special privileged accounts that could have varying levels of access to data, users, and settings. A license can enable an account to gain access to a variety of different applications, depending on the license assigned.The recommended state is to not license a privileged account or use `Microsoft Entra ID P1` or `Microsoft Entra ID P2` licenses.", + "RationaleStatement": "Ensuring administrative accounts do not use licenses with applications assigned to them will reduce the attack surface of high privileged identities in the organization's environment. Granting access to a mailbox or other collaborative tools increases the likelihood that privileged users might interact with these applications, raising the risk of exposure to social engineering attacks or malicious content. These activities should be restricted to an unprivileged 'daily driver' account.**Note:** In order to participate in Microsoft 365 security services such as Identity Protection, PIM and Conditional Access an administrative account will need a license attached to it. Ensure that the license used does not include any applications with potentially vulnerable services by using either **Microsoft Entra ID P1** or **Microsoft Entra ID P2** for the cloud-only account with administrator roles.", + "ImpactStatement": "Administrative users will have to switch accounts and utilize login/logout functionality when performing administrative tasks, as well as not benefiting from SSO.**Note:** Alerts will be sent to the **TenantAdmins**, including Global Administrators, by default. To ensure proper receipt, configure alerts to be sent to security or operations staff with valid email addresses or a security operations center. Otherwise, after adoption of this recommendation, alerts sent to **TenantAdmins** may go unreceived due to the lack of an application-based license assigned to the Global Administrator accounts.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Users` select `Active users`3. Click `Add a user`.4. Fill out the appropriate fields for Name, user, etc.5. When prompted to assign licenses select as needed `Microsoft Entra ID P1` or `Microsoft Entra ID P2`, then click `Next`.6. Under the `Option settings` screen you may choose from several types of privileged roles. Choose `Admin center access` followed by the appropriate role then click `Next`.7. Select `Finish adding`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Users` select `Active users`.3. Sort by the `Licenses` column.4. For each user account in an administrative role verify the account is assigned a license that is not associated with applications i.e. (Microsoft Entra ID P1, Microsoft Entra ID P2).**To audit using PowerShell:** 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using `Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"RoleManagement.Read.Directory\",\"User.Read.All\"`2. Run the following PowerShell script:```$DirectoryRoles = Get-MgDirectoryRole# Get privileged role IDs$PrivilegedRoles = $DirectoryRoles | Where-Object { $_.DisplayName -like \"*Administrator*\" -or $_.DisplayName -eq \"Global Reader\"}# Get the members of these various roles$RoleMembers = $PrivilegedRoles | ForEach-Object { Get-MgDirectoryRoleMember -DirectoryRoleId $_.Id } | Select-Object Id -Unique# Retrieve details about the members in these roles$PrivilegedUsers = $RoleMembers | ForEach-Object { Get-MgUser -UserId $_.Id -Property UserPrincipalName, DisplayName, Id}$Report = [System.Collections.Generic.List[Object]]::new()foreach ($Admin in $PrivilegedUsers) { $License = $null $License = (Get-MgUserLicenseDetail -UserId $Admin.id).SkuPartNumber -join \", \" $Object = [pscustomobject][ordered]@{ DisplayName = $Admin.DisplayName UserPrincipalName = $Admin.UserPrincipalName License = $License } $Report.Add($Object)}$Report```3. The output will display users assigned privileged roles alongside their assigned licenses. Additional manual assessment is required to determine if the licensing is appropriate for the user.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/add-users/add-users?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/enterprise/protect-your-global-administrator-accounts?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/whatis:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference", + "DefaultValue": "N/A" } ] }, { "Id": "1.2.1", - "Description": "Ensure that only organizationally managed/approved public groups exist", + "Description": "Microsoft 365 Groups is the foundational membership service that drives all teamwork across Microsoft 365. With Microsoft 365 Groups, you can give a group of people access to a collection of shared resources. While there are several different group types this recommendation concerns **Microsoft 365 Groups**.In the Administration panel, when a group is created, the default privacy value is \"Public\".", "Checks": [ "admincenter_groups_not_public_visibility" ], "Attributes": [ { - "Section": "1.Microsoft 365 admin center", - "Profile": "Level 2", + "Section": "1.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", - "Description": "Microsoft 365 Groups enable shared resource access across Microsoft 365 services. The default privacy setting for groups is 'Public,' which allows users within the organization to access the group's resources. Ensure that only organizationally managed and approved public groups exist to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive information.", - "RationaleStatement": "Public groups can be accessed by any user within the organization via several methods, such as self-adding through the Azure portal, sending an access request, or directly using the SharePoint URL. Without control over group privacy, sensitive organizational data might be exposed to unintended users.", - "ImpactStatement": "Implementing this recommendation may result in an increased volume of access requests for group owners, particularly for groups previously intended to be public.", - "RemediationProcedure": "Audit all Microsoft 365 public groups and ensure they are organizationally managed and approved. Convert unnecessary public groups to private groups and enforce strict policies for creating and approving public groups. Group owners should be instructed to monitor and review access requests.", - "AuditProcedure": "Log in to the Microsoft 365 Admin Center and review the list of public groups. Verify that all public groups have been approved and are necessary for organizational purposes.", - "AdditionalInformation": "Public groups expose data to all users within the organization, increasing the risk of accidental or unauthorized access. Periodic reviews of group privacy settings are recommended.", - "DefaultValue": "By default, groups created in Microsoft 365 are set to 'Public' privacy.", - "References": "CIS Microsoft 365 Foundations Benchmark v4.0, Section 1.2.1; Microsoft documentation on managing group privacy." + "Description": "Microsoft 365 Groups is the foundational membership service that drives all teamwork across Microsoft 365. With Microsoft 365 Groups, you can give a group of people access to a collection of shared resources. While there are several different group types this recommendation concerns **Microsoft 365 Groups**.In the Administration panel, when a group is created, the default privacy value is \"Public\".", + "RationaleStatement": "Ensure that only organizationally managed and approved public groups exist. When a group has a \"public\" privacy, users may access data related to this group (e.g. SharePoint), through three methods:- By using the Azure portal, and adding themselves into the public group- By requesting access to the group from the Group application of the Access Panel- By accessing the SharePoint URLAdministrators are notified when a user uses the Azure Portal. Requesting access to the group forces users to send a message to the group owner, but they still have immediate access to the group. The SharePoint URL is usually guessable and can be found from the Group application of the Access Panel. If group privacy is not controlled, any user may access sensitive information, according to the group they try to access.**Note:** Public in this case means public to the identities within the organization.", + "ImpactStatement": "If the recommendation is applied, group owners could receive more access requests than usual, especially regarding groups originally meant to be public.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Teams & groups` select `Active teams & groups`..3. On the **Active teams and groups page**, select the group's name that is public.4. On the popup **groups name page**, Select `Settings`.5. Under Privacy, select `Private`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Teams & groups` select `Active teams & groups`.3. On the **Active teams and groups page**, check that no groups have the status 'Public' in the privacy column.**To audit using PowerShell:** 1. Connect to the Microsoft Graph service using `Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Group.Read.All\"`.2. Run the following Microsoft Graph PowerShell command:```Get-MgGroup | where {$_.Visibility -eq \"Public\"} | select DisplayName,Visibility```3. Ensure `Visibility` is `Private` for each group.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/users/groups-self-service-management:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/create-groups/compare-groups?view=o365-worldwide", + "DefaultValue": "Public when created from the Administration portal; private otherwise." } ] }, { "Id": "1.2.2", - "Description": "Ensure sign-in to shared mailboxes is blocked", + "Description": "Shared mailboxes are used when multiple people need access to the same mailbox, such as a company information or support email address, reception desk, or other function that might be shared by multiple people.Users with permissions to the group mailbox can send as or send on behalf of the mailbox email address if the administrator has given that user permissions to do that. This is particularly useful for help and support mailboxes because users can send emails from \"Contoso Support\" or \"Building A Reception Desk.\"Shared mailboxes are created with a corresponding user account using a system generated password that is unknown at the time of creation.The recommended state is `Sign in blocked` for `Shared mailboxes`.", "Checks": [], "Attributes": [ { - "Section": "1.Microsoft 365 admin center", - "Profile": "Level 1", - "AssessmentStatus": "Manuel", - "Description": "Shared mailboxes are used when multiple people need access to the same mailbox for functions such as support or reception. These mailboxes are created with a corresponding user account that includes a system-generated password. To enhance security, sign-in should be blocked for these shared mailbox accounts, ensuring access is granted only through delegation.", - "RationaleStatement": "Blocking sign-in for shared mailbox accounts prevents unauthorized access or direct sign-in, ensuring that all interactions with the shared mailbox are through authorized delegation. This reduces the risk of attackers exploiting shared mailboxes for malicious purposes such as sending emails with spoofed identities.", - "ImpactStatement": "Blocking sign-in to shared mailboxes requires users to access these mailboxes only through delegation. Administrators will need to monitor and ensure proper access permissions are assigned.", - "RemediationProcedure": "Log in to the Microsoft 365 Admin Center and locate the shared mailboxes. For each shared mailbox, verify that sign-in is blocked by reviewing the associated user account settings. If sign-in is not blocked, adjust the account settings to enforce this configuration.", - "AuditProcedure": "Review all shared mailboxes in the Microsoft 365 Admin Center. Confirm that the user accounts associated with these mailboxes have sign-in blocked.", - "AdditionalInformation": "Shared mailboxes are often a target for exploitation due to their broad access and functional role. Blocking sign-in significantly reduces the attack surface.", - "DefaultValue": "By default, shared mailboxes may have sign-in enabled unless explicitly configured otherwise.", - "References": "CIS Microsoft 365 Foundations Benchmark v4.0, Section 1.2.2; Microsoft documentation on managing shared mailboxes." + "Section": "1.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Shared mailboxes are used when multiple people need access to the same mailbox, such as a company information or support email address, reception desk, or other function that might be shared by multiple people.Users with permissions to the group mailbox can send as or send on behalf of the mailbox email address if the administrator has given that user permissions to do that. This is particularly useful for help and support mailboxes because users can send emails from \"Contoso Support\" or \"Building A Reception Desk.\"Shared mailboxes are created with a corresponding user account using a system generated password that is unknown at the time of creation.The recommended state is `Sign in blocked` for `Shared mailboxes`.", + "RationaleStatement": "The intent of the shared mailbox is the only allow delegated access from other mailboxes. An admin could reset the password, or an attacker could potentially gain access to the shared mailbox allowing the direct sign-in to the shared mailbox and subsequently the sending of email from a sender that does not have a unique identity. To prevent this, block sign-in for the account that is associated with the shared mailbox.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/2. Click to expand `Teams & groups` and select `Shared mailboxes`.3. Take note of all shared mailboxes.4. Click to expand `Users` and select `Active users`.5. Select a shared mailbox account to open it's properties pane and then select `Block sign-in`.6. Check the box for `Block this user from signing in`.7. Repeat for any additional shared mailboxes.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using `Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"User.ReadWrite.All\"`2. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.3. To disable sign-in for a single account:```$MBX = Get-EXOMailbox -Identity TestUser@example.comUpdate-MgUser -UserId $MBX.ExternalDirectoryObjectId -AccountEnabled:$false```3. The following will block sign-in to all Shared Mailboxes.```$MBX = Get-EXOMailbox -RecipientTypeDetails SharedMailbox$MBX | ForEach-Object { Update-MgUser -UserId $_.ExternalDirectoryObjectId -AccountEnabled:$false }```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/2. Click to expand `Teams & groups` and select `Shared mailboxes`.3. Take note of all shared mailboxes.4. Click to expand `Users` and select `Active users`.5. Select a shared mailbox account to open its properties pane, and review.6. Ensure the text under the name reads `Sign-in blocked`.7. Repeat for any additional shared mailboxes.**Note:** If sign-in is not blocked where will be an option to `Block sign-in`. This means the shared mailbox is out of compliance with this recommendation.**To audit using PowerShell:** 1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`2. Connect to Microsoft Graph using `Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.Read.All\"`3. Run the following PowerShell commands:```$MBX = Get-EXOMailbox -RecipientTypeDetails SharedMailbox$MBX | ForEach-Object { Get-MgUser -UserId $_.ExternalDirectoryObjectId ` -Property DisplayName, UserPrincipalName, AccountEnabled } | Format-Table DisplayName, UserPrincipalName, AccountEnabled```4. Ensure `AccountEnabled` is set to `False` for all Shared Mailboxes.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/email/about-shared-mailboxes?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/email/create-a-shared-mailbox?view=o365-worldwide#block-sign-in-for-the-shared-mailbox-account:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/enterprise/block-user-accounts-with-microsoft-365-powershell?view=o365-worldwide#block-individual-user-accounts", + "DefaultValue": "AccountEnabled: `True`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.1", + "Description": "Microsoft cloud-only accounts have a pre-defined password policy that cannot be changed. The only items that can change are the number of days until a password expires and whether or whether passwords expire at all.", + "Checks": [ + "admincenter_settings_password_never_expire" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1.3", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Microsoft cloud-only accounts have a pre-defined password policy that cannot be changed. The only items that can change are the number of days until a password expires and whether or whether passwords expire at all.", + "RationaleStatement": "Organizations such as NIST and Microsoft have updated their password policy recommendations to not arbitrarily require users to change their passwords after a specific amount of time, unless there is evidence that the password is compromised, or the user forgot it. They suggest this even for single factor (Password Only) use cases, with a reasoning that forcing arbitrary password changes on users actually make the passwords less secure. Other recommendations within this Benchmark suggest the use of MFA authentication for at least critical accounts (at minimum), which makes password expiration even less useful as well as password protection for Entra ID.", + "ImpactStatement": "When setting passwords not to expire it is important to have other controls in place to supplement this setting. See below for related recommendations and user guidance.- Ban common passwords.- Educate users to not reuse organization passwords anywhere else.- Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication registration for all users.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Settings` select `Org Settings`.3. Click on `Security & privacy`.4. Check the `Set passwords to never expire (recommended)` box.5. Click `Save`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to the Microsoft Graph service using `Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Domain.ReadWrite.All\"`.2. Run the following Microsoft Graph PowerShell command:```Update-MgDomain -DomainId -PasswordValidityPeriodInDays 2147483647```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Settings` select `Org Settings`.3. Click on `Security & privacy`.4. Select `Password expiration policy` ensure that `Set passwords to never expire (recommended)` has been checked.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to the Microsoft Graph service using `Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Domain.Read.All\"`.2. Run the following Microsoft Online PowerShell command:```Get-MgDomain | ft id,PasswordValidityPeriodInDays```3. Verify the value returned for valid domains is `2147483647`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html:https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/cis-password-policy-guide/:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/misc/password-policy-recommendations?view=o365-worldwide", + "DefaultValue": "If the property is not set, a default value of 90 days will be used" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.2", + "Description": "Idle session timeout allows the configuration of a setting which will timeout inactive users after a pre-determined amount of time. When a user reaches the set idle timeout session, they'll get a notification that they're about to be signed out. They have to select to stay signed in or they'll be automatically signed out of all Microsoft 365 web apps. Combined with a Conditional Access rule this will only impact unmanaged devices. A managed device is considered a device managed that is compliant or joined to a domain and using a supported browser like Microsoft Edge or Google Chrome (with the Microsoft Single Sign On) extension.The following Microsoft 365 web apps are supported.- Outlook Web App- OneDrive- SharePoint- Microsoft Fabric- Microsoft365.com and other start pages- Microsoft 365 web apps (Word, Excel, PowerPoint)- Microsoft 365 Admin Center- M365 Defender Portal- Microsoft Purview Compliance PortalThe recommended setting is `3 hours` (or less) for unmanaged devices. **Note:** Idle session timeout doesn't affect Microsoft 365 desktop and mobile apps.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1.3", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Idle session timeout allows the configuration of a setting which will timeout inactive users after a pre-determined amount of time. When a user reaches the set idle timeout session, they'll get a notification that they're about to be signed out. They have to select to stay signed in or they'll be automatically signed out of all Microsoft 365 web apps. Combined with a Conditional Access rule this will only impact unmanaged devices. A managed device is considered a device managed that is compliant or joined to a domain and using a supported browser like Microsoft Edge or Google Chrome (with the Microsoft Single Sign On) extension.The following Microsoft 365 web apps are supported.- Outlook Web App- OneDrive- SharePoint- Microsoft Fabric- Microsoft365.com and other start pages- Microsoft 365 web apps (Word, Excel, PowerPoint)- Microsoft 365 Admin Center- M365 Defender Portal- Microsoft Purview Compliance PortalThe recommended setting is `3 hours` (or less) for unmanaged devices. **Note:** Idle session timeout doesn't affect Microsoft 365 desktop and mobile apps.", + "RationaleStatement": "Ending idle sessions through an automatic process can help protect sensitive company data and will add another layer of security for end users who work on unmanaged devices that can potentially be accessed by the public. Unauthorized individuals onsite or remotely can take advantage of systems left unattended over time. Automatic timing out of sessions makes this more difficult.", + "ImpactStatement": "If step 2 in the Audit/Remediation procedure is left out, then there is no issue with this from a security standpoint. However, it will require users on trusted devices to sign in more frequently which could result in credential prompt fatigue.**Note:** Idle session timeout also affects the Azure Portal idle timeout if this is not explicitly set to a different timeout. The Azure Portal idle timeout applies to all kind of devices, not just unmanaged. See : [change the directory timeout setting admin](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-portal/set-preferences#change-the-directory-timeout-setting-admin)", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Step 1 - Configure Idle session timeout:**1. Navigate to the `Microsoft 365 admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Settings` Select `Org settings`.3. Click `Security & Privacy` tab.4. Select `Idle session timeout`.5. Check the box `Turn on to set the period of inactivity for users to be signed off of Microsoft 365 web apps` 6. Set a maximum value of `3 hours`.7. Click save.**Step 2 - Ensure the Conditional Access policy is in place:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/2. Expand `Protect` > `Conditional Access`.3. Click `New policy` and give the policy a name. - Select `Users` > `All users`. - Select `Cloud apps or actions` > `Select apps` and select `Office 365` - Select `Conditions` > `Client apps` > `Yes` check only `Browser` unchecking all other boxes. - Select `Sessions` and check `Use app enforced restrictions`.4. Set `Enable policy` to `On` and click `Create`.**Note:** To ensure that idle timeouts affect only unmanaged devices, both steps must be completed.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Step 1 - Ensure Idle session timeout is configured:**1. Navigate to the `Microsoft 365 admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Settings` Select `Org settings`.3. Click `Security & Privacy` tab.4. Select `Idle session timeout`.5. Verify `Turn on to set the period of inactivity for users to be signed off of Microsoft 365 web apps` is set to `3 hours` (or less).**Step 2 - Ensure the Conditional Access policy is in place:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/2. Expand `Protect` > `Conditional Access`.3. Inspect existing conditional access rules for one that meets the below conditions: - `Users` is set to `All users`. - `Cloud apps or actions` > `Select apps` is set to `Office 365`. - `Conditions` > `Client apps` is `Browser` and nothing else. - `Session` is set to `Use app enforced restrictions`. - `Enable Policy` is set to `On`**Note:** To ensure that idle timeouts affect only unmanaged devices, both steps must be completed.", + "AdditionalInformation": "According to Microsoft idle session timeout isn't supported when third party cookies are disabled in the browser. Users won't see any sign-out prompts.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/manage/idle-session-timeout-web-apps?view=o365-worldwide", + "DefaultValue": "Not configured. (Idle sessions will not timeout.)" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.3", + "Description": "External calendar sharing allows an administrator to enable the ability for users to share calendars with anyone outside of the organization. Outside users will be sent a URL that can be used to view the calendar.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1.3", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "External calendar sharing allows an administrator to enable the ability for users to share calendars with anyone outside of the organization. Outside users will be sent a URL that can be used to view the calendar.", + "RationaleStatement": "Attackers often spend time learning about organizations before launching an attack. Publicly available calendars can help attackers understand organizational relationships and determine when specific users may be more vulnerable to an attack, such as when they are traveling.", + "ImpactStatement": "This functionality is not widely used. As a result, it is unlikely that implementation of this setting will cause an impact to most users. Users that do utilize this functionality are likely to experience a minor inconvenience when scheduling meetings or synchronizing calendars with people outside the tenant.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Settings` select `Org settings`.3. In the `Services` section click `Calendar`.4. Uncheck `Let your users share their calendars with people outside of your organization who have Office 365 or Exchange`.5. Click `Save`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following Exchange Online PowerShell command:```Set-SharingPolicy -Identity \"Default Sharing Policy\" -Enabled $False```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Settings` select `Org settings`.3. In the `Services` section click `Calendar`.4. Verify `Let your users share their calendars with people outside of your organization who have Office 365 or Exchange` is unchecked.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following Exchange Online PowerShell command:```Get-SharingPolicy -Identity \"Default Sharing Policy\"```3. Verify `Enabled` is set to `False`", + "AdditionalInformation": "**The following script can be used to audit any mailboxes that might be sharing calendars prior to disabling the feature globally:**```$mailboxes = Get-Mailbox -ResultSize Unlimited foreach ($mailbox in $mailboxes) { # Get the name of the default calendar folder (depends on the mailbox's language) $calendarFolder = [string](Get-ExoMailboxFolderStatistics $mailbox.PrimarySmtpAddress -FolderScope Calendar| Where-Object { $_.FolderType -eq 'Calendar' }).Name # Get users calendar folder settings for their default Calendar folder # calendar has the format identity:\\ $calendar = Get-MailboxCalendarFolder -Identity \"$($mailbox.PrimarySmtpAddress):\\$calendarFolder\" if ($calendar.PublishEnabled) { Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow \"Calendar publishing is enabled for $($mailbox.PrimarySmtpAddress) on $($calendar.PublishedCalendarUrl)\" }}```", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/manage/share-calendars-with-external-users?view=o365-worldwide", + "DefaultValue": "Enabled (True)" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.4", + "Description": "By default, users can install add-ins in their Microsoft Word, Excel, and PowerPoint applications, allowing data access within the application.Do not allow users to install add-ins in Word, Excel, or PowerPoint.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1.3", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "By default, users can install add-ins in their Microsoft Word, Excel, and PowerPoint applications, allowing data access within the application.Do not allow users to install add-ins in Word, Excel, or PowerPoint.", + "RationaleStatement": "Attackers commonly use vulnerable and custom-built add-ins to access data in user applications.While allowing users to install add-ins by themselves does allow them to easily acquire useful add-ins that integrate with Microsoft applications, it can represent a risk if not used and monitored carefully.Disable future user's ability to install add-ins in Microsoft Word, Excel, or PowerPoint helps reduce your threat-surface and mitigate this risk.", + "ImpactStatement": "Implementation of this change will impact both end users and administrators. End users will not be able to install add-ins that they may want to install.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Settings` > `Org settings`.3. In `Services` select `User owned apps and services`.4. Uncheck `Let users access the Office Store` and `Let users start trials on behalf of your organization`.5. Click `Save`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Settings` > `Org settings`.3. In `Services` select `User owned apps and services`.4. Verify `Let users access the Office Store` and `Let users start trials on behalf of your organization` are **not checked**.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/manage/manage-addins-in-the-admin-center?view=o365-worldwide#manage-add-in-downloads-by-turning-onoff-the-office-store-across-all-apps-except-outlook", + "DefaultValue": "`Let users access the Office Store` is `Checked``Let users start trials on behalf of your organization` is `Checked`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.5", + "Description": "Microsoft Forms can be used for phishing attacks by asking personal or sensitive information and collecting the results. Microsoft 365 has built-in protection that will proactively scan for phishing attempt in forms such personal information request.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1.3", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Microsoft Forms can be used for phishing attacks by asking personal or sensitive information and collecting the results. Microsoft 365 has built-in protection that will proactively scan for phishing attempt in forms such personal information request.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling internal phishing protection for Microsoft Forms will prevent attackers using forms for phishing attacks by asking personal or other sensitive information and URLs.", + "ImpactStatement": "If potential phishing was detected, the form will be temporarily blocked and cannot be distributed, and response collection will not happen until it is unblocked by the administrator or keywords were removed by the creator.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Settings` then select `Org settings`.3. Under Services select `Microsoft Forms`.4. Click the checkbox labeled `Add internal phishing protection` under `Phishing protection`.5. Click Save.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 admin` center https://admin.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Settings` then select `Org settings`.3. Under Services select `Microsoft Forms`.4. Ensure the checkbox labeled `Add internal phishing protection` is checked under `Phishing protection`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-US/microsoft-forms/administrator-settings-microsoft-forms:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-US/microsoft-forms/review-unblock-forms-users-detected-blocked-potential-phishing", + "DefaultValue": "Internal Phishing Protection is enabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.6", + "Description": "Customer Lockbox is a security feature that provides an additional layer of control and transparency to customer data in Microsoft 365. It offers an approval process for Microsoft support personnel to access organization data and creates an audited trail to meet compliance requirements.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1.3", + "Profile": "E5 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Customer Lockbox is a security feature that provides an additional layer of control and transparency to customer data in Microsoft 365. It offers an approval process for Microsoft support personnel to access organization data and creates an audited trail to meet compliance requirements.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling this feature protects organizational data against data spillage and exfiltration.", + "ImpactStatement": "Administrators will need to grant Microsoft access to the tenant environment prior to a Microsoft engineer accessing the environment for support or troubleshooting.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Settings` then select `Org settings`.3. Select `Security & privacy` tab.4. Click `Customer lockbox`.5. Check the box `Require approval for all data access requests`. 6. Click `Save`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command\\:```Set-OrganizationConfig -CustomerLockBoxEnabled $true```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Settings` then select `Org settings`.3. Select `Security & privacy` tab.4. Click `Customer lockbox`.5. Ensure the box labeled `Require approval for all data access requests` is checked. **To audit using SecureScore:** 1. Navigate to the Microsoft 365 SecureScore portal. https://securescore.microsoft.com2. Search for `Turn on customer lockbox feature` under `Improvement actions`.**To audit using PowerShell:** 1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Get-OrganizationConfig | Select-Object CustomerLockBoxEnabled```3. Verify the value is set to `True`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/customer-lockbox-overview", + "DefaultValue": "`Require approval for all data access requests` - `Unchecked``CustomerLockboxEnabled` - `False`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.7", + "Description": "Third-party storage can be enabled for users in Microsoft 365, allowing them to store and share documents using services such as Dropbox, alongside OneDrive and team sites.Ensure `Microsoft 365 on the web` third-party storage services are restricted.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1.3", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Third-party storage can be enabled for users in Microsoft 365, allowing them to store and share documents using services such as Dropbox, alongside OneDrive and team sites.Ensure `Microsoft 365 on the web` third-party storage services are restricted.", + "RationaleStatement": "By using external storage services an organization may increase the risk of data breaches and unauthorized access to confidential information. Additionally, third-party services may not adhere to the same security standards as the organization, making it difficult to maintain data privacy and security.", + "ImpactStatement": "Impact associated with this change is highly dependent upon current practices in the tenant. If users do not use other storage providers, then minimal impact is likely. However, if users do regularly utilize providers outside of the tenant this will affect their ability to continue to do so.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com2. Go to `Settings` > `Org Settings` > `Services` > `Microsoft 365 on the web` 3. Uncheck `Let users open files stored in third-party storage services in Microsoft 365 on the web`", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com2. Go to `Settings` > `Org Settings` > `Services` > `Microsoft 365 on the web` 3. Ensure `Let users open files stored in third-party storage services in Microsoft 365 on the web` is not checked.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/setup/set-up-file-storage-and-sharing?view=o365-worldwide#enable-or-disable-third-party-storage-services", + "DefaultValue": "Enabled - Users are able to open files stored in third-party storage services" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.8", + "Description": "Sway is a Microsoft 365 app that lets organizations create interactive, web-based presentations using images, text, videos and other media. Its design engine simplifies the process, allowing for quick customization. Presentations can then be shared via a link.This setting controls user Sway sharing capability, both within and outside of the organization. By default, Sway is enabled for everyone in the organization.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1.3", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Sway is a Microsoft 365 app that lets organizations create interactive, web-based presentations using images, text, videos and other media. Its design engine simplifies the process, allowing for quick customization. Presentations can then be shared via a link.This setting controls user Sway sharing capability, both within and outside of the organization. By default, Sway is enabled for everyone in the organization.", + "RationaleStatement": "Disable external sharing of Sway documents that can contain sensitive information to prevent accidental or arbitrary data leaks.", + "ImpactStatement": "Interactive reports, presentations, newsletters, and other items created in Sway will not be shared outside the organization by users.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Settings` then select `Org settings`.3. Under Services select `Sway` - Uncheck: `Let people in your organization share their sways with people outside your organization`.4. Click `Save`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Settings` then select `Org settings`.3. Under Services select `Sway`.4. Confirm that under `Sharing` the following is not checked - Option: `Let people in your organization share their sways with people outside your organization`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/administrator-settings-for-sway-d298e79b-b6ab-44c6-9239-aa312f5784d4:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/servicedescriptions/microsoft-sway-service-description", + "DefaultValue": "`Let people in your organization share their sways with people outside your organization` - Enabled" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.1", + "Description": "Enabling Safe Links policy for Office applications allows URL's that exist inside of Office documents and email applications opened by Office, Office Online and Office mobile to be processed against Defender for Office time-of-click verification and rewritten if required.**Note:** E5 Licensing includes a number of Built-in Protection policies. When auditing policies note which policy you are viewing, and keep in mind CIS recommendations often extend the Default or Build-in Policies provided by MS. In order to **Pass** the highest priority policy must match all settings recommended.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2.1", + "Profile": "E5 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Enabling Safe Links policy for Office applications allows URL's that exist inside of Office documents and email applications opened by Office, Office Online and Office mobile to be processed against Defender for Office time-of-click verification and rewritten if required.**Note:** E5 Licensing includes a number of Built-in Protection policies. When auditing policies note which policy you are viewing, and keep in mind CIS recommendations often extend the Default or Build-in Policies provided by MS. In order to **Pass** the highest priority policy must match all settings recommended.", + "RationaleStatement": "Safe Links for Office applications extends phishing protection to documents and emails that contain hyperlinks, even after they have been delivered to a user.", + "ImpactStatement": "User impact associated with this change is minor - users may experience a very short delay when clicking on URLs in Office documents before being directed to the requested site. Users should be informed of the change as, in the event a link is unsafe and blocked, they will receive a message that it has been blocked.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com2. Under `Email & collaboration` select `Policies & rules`3. Select `Threat policies` then `Safe Links`4. Click on `+Create`5. Name the policy then click `Next`6. In `Domains` select all valid domains for the organization and `Next`7. Ensure the following `URL & click protection settings` are defined: **Email** - Checked `On: Safe Links checks a list of known, malicious links when users click links in email. URLs are rewritten by default` - Checked `Apply Safe Links to email messages sent within the organization` - Checked `Apply real-time URL scanning for suspicious links and links that point to files` - Checked `Wait for URL scanning to complete before delivering the message` - Unchecked `Do not rewrite URLs, do checks via Safe Links API only.` **Teams** - Checked `On: Safe Links checks a list of known, malicious links when users click links in Microsoft Teams. URLs are not rewritten` **Office 365 Apps** - Checked `On: Safe Links checks a list of known, malicious links when users click links in Microsoft Office apps. URLs are not rewritten` **Click protection settings** - Checked `Track user clicks` - Unchecked `Let users click through the original URL` - There is no recommendation for organization branding.8. Click `Next` twice and finally `Submit`**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell script to create a policy at highest priority that will apply to all valid domains on the tenant:```# Create the Policy$params = @{ Name = \"CIS SafeLinks Policy\" EnableSafeLinksForEmail = $true EnableSafeLinksForTeams = $true EnableSafeLinksForOffice = $true TrackClicks = $true AllowClickThrough = $false ScanUrls = $true EnableForInternalSenders = $true DeliverMessageAfterScan = $true DisableUrlRewrite = $false}New-SafeLinksPolicy @params# Create the rule for all users in all valid domains and associate with PolicyNew-SafeLinksRule -Name \"CIS SafeLinks\" -SafeLinksPolicy \"CIS SafeLinks Policy\" -RecipientDomainIs (Get-AcceptedDomain).Name -Priority 0```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com2. Under `Email & collaboration` select `Policies & rules`3. Select `Threat policies` then `Safe Links`4. Inspect each policy and attempt to identify one that matches the parameters outlined below.5. Scroll down the pane and click on `Edit Protection settings` (Global Readers will look for on or off values)6. Ensure the following protection settings are set as outlined: **Email** - Checked `On: Safe Links checks a list of known, malicious links when users click links in email. URLs are rewritten by default` - Checked `Apply Safe Links to email messages sent within the organization` - Checked `Apply real-time URL scanning for suspicious links and links that point to files` - Checked `Wait for URL scanning to complete before delivering the message` - Unchecked `Do not rewrite URLs, do checks via Safe Links API only.` **Teams** - Checked `On: Safe Links checks a list of known, malicious links when users click links in Microsoft Teams. URLs are not rewritten` **Office 365 Apps** - Checked `On: Safe Links checks a list of known, malicious links when users click links in Microsoft Office apps. URLs are not rewritten` **Click protection settings** - Checked `Track user clicks` - Unchecked `Let users click through the original URL`7. There is no recommendation for organization branding.8. Click close**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Get-SafeLinksPolicy | Format-Table Name```3. Once this returns the list of policies run the following command to view the policies.```Get-SafeLinksPolicy -Identity \"Policy Name\"```4. Verify the value for the following. - `EnableSafeLinksForEmail: True` - `EnableSafeLinksForTeams: True` - `EnableSafeLinksForOffice: True` - `TrackClicks: True` - `AllowClickThrough: False` - `ScanUrls: True` - `EnableForInternalSenders: True` - `DeliverMessageAfterScan: True` - `DisableUrlRewrite: False`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/safe-links-policies-configure?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-safelinkspolicy?view=exchange-ps:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/preset-security-policies?view=o365-worldwide", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.2", + "Description": "The Common Attachment Types Filter lets a user block known and custom malicious file types from being attached to emails.", + "Checks": [ + "defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The Common Attachment Types Filter lets a user block known and custom malicious file types from being attached to emails.", + "RationaleStatement": "Blocking known malicious file types can help prevent malware-infested files from infecting a host.", + "ImpactStatement": "Blocking common malicious file types should not cause an impact in modern computing environments.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Email & collaboration` select `Policies & rules`. 3. On the Policies & rules page select `Threat policies`.4. Under polices select `Anti-malware` and click on the `Default (Default)` policy.5. On the Policy page that appears on the right hand pane scroll to the bottom and click on `Edit protection settings`, check the `Enable the common attachments filter`.6. Click Save.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following Exchange Online PowerShell command:```Set-MalwareFilterPolicy -Identity Default -EnableFileFilter $true```**Note:** Audit and Remediation guidance may focus on the **Default policy** however, if a Custom Policy exists in the organization's tenant, then ensure the setting is set as outlined in the highest priority policy listed.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Email & collaboration` select `Policies & rules`. 3. On the Policies & rules page select `Threat policies`.4. Under **Policies** select `Anti-malware` and click on the `Default (Default)` policy.5. On the policy page that appears on the righthand pane, under `Protection settings`, verify that the `Enable the common attachments filter` has the value of `On`. **To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following Exchange Online PowerShell command:```Get-MalwareFilterPolicy -Identity Default | Select-Object EnableFileFilter```3. Verify `EnableFileFilter` is set to `True`.**Note:** Audit and Remediation guidance may focus on the **Default policy** however, if a Custom Policy exists in the organization's tenant, then ensure the setting is set as outlined in the highest priority policy listed.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/get-malwarefilterpolicy?view=exchange-ps:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/anti-malware-policies-configure?view=o365-worldwide", + "DefaultValue": "Always on" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.3", + "Description": "Exchange Online Protection (EOP) is the cloud-based filtering service that protects organizations against spam, malware, and other email threats. EOP is included in all Microsoft 365 organizations with Exchange Online mailboxes.EOP uses flexible anti-malware policies for malware protection settings. These policies can be set to notify Admins of malicious activity.", + "Checks": [ + "defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Exchange Online Protection (EOP) is the cloud-based filtering service that protects organizations against spam, malware, and other email threats. EOP is included in all Microsoft 365 organizations with Exchange Online mailboxes.EOP uses flexible anti-malware policies for malware protection settings. These policies can be set to notify Admins of malicious activity.", + "RationaleStatement": "This setting alerts administrators that an internal user sent a message that contained malware. This may indicate an account or machine compromise that would need to be investigated.", + "ImpactStatement": "Notification of account with potential issues should not have an impact on the user.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `E-mail & Collaboration` select `Policies & rules`. 3. On the Policies & rules page select `Threat policies`.4. Under Policies select `Anti-malware`.5. Click on the `Default (Default)` policy.6. Click on `Edit protection settings` and change the settings for `Notify an admin about undelivered messages from internal senders` to `On` and enter the email address of the administrator who should be notified under `Administrator email address`.7. Click Save.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following command: ```Set-MalwareFilterPolicy -Identity '{Identity Name}' -EnableInternalSenderAdminNotifications $True -InternalSenderAdminAddress {admin@domain1.com}```**Note:** Audit and Remediation guidance may focus on the **Default policy** however, if a Custom Policy exists in the organization's tenant, then ensure the setting is set as outlined in the highest priority policy listed.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `E-mail & Collaboration` select `Policies & rules`. 3. On the Policies & rules page select `Threat policies`.4. Under Policies select `Anti-malware`.5. Click on the `Default (Default)` policy.6. Ensure the setting `Notify an admin about undelivered messages from internal senders` is set to `On` and that there is at least one email address under `Administrator email address`.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following command: ```Get-MalwareFilterPolicy | fl Identity, EnableInternalSenderAdminNotifications, InternalSenderAdminAddress```**Note:** Audit and Remediation guidance may focus on the **Default policy** however, if a Custom Policy exists in the organization's tenant, then ensure the setting is set as outlined in the highest priority policy listed.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/anti-malware-protection-about:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/anti-malware-policies-configure", + "DefaultValue": "```EnableInternalSenderAdminNotifications : FalseInternalSenderAdminAddress : $null```" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.4", + "Description": "The Safe Attachments policy helps protect users from malware in email attachments by scanning attachments for viruses, malware, and other malicious content. When an email attachment is received by a user, Safe Attachments will scan the attachment in a secure environment and provide a verdict on whether the attachment is safe or not.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2.1", + "Profile": "E5 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The Safe Attachments policy helps protect users from malware in email attachments by scanning attachments for viruses, malware, and other malicious content. When an email attachment is received by a user, Safe Attachments will scan the attachment in a secure environment and provide a verdict on whether the attachment is safe or not.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling Safe Attachments policy helps protect against malware threats in email attachments by analyzing suspicious attachments in a secure, cloud-based environment before they are delivered to the user's inbox. This provides an additional layer of security and can prevent new or unseen types of malware from infiltrating the organization's network.", + "ImpactStatement": "Delivery of email with attachments may be delayed while scanning is occurring.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `E-mail & Collaboration` select `Policies & rules`. 3. On the Policies & rules page select `Threat policies`.4. Under `Policies` select `Safe Attachments`.5. Click `+ Create`.6. Create a Policy Name and Description, and then click `Next`.7. Select all valid domains and click `Next`.8. Select `Block`.9. Quarantine policy is `AdminOnlyAccessPolicy`.10. Leave `Enable redirect` unchecked.11. Click `Next` and finally `Submit`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `E-mail & Collaboration` select `Policies & rules`. 3. On the Policies & rules page select `Threat policies`.4. Under `Policies` select `Safe Attachments`.5. Inspect the highest priority policy.6. Ensure `Users and domains` and `Included recipient domains` are in scope for the organization.7. Ensure `Safe Attachments detection response:` is set to `Block - Block current and future messages and attachments with detected malware`.8. Ensure the `Quarantine Policy` is set to `AdminOnlyAccessPolicy`.9. Ensure the policy is not disabled.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Get-SafeAttachmentPolicy | where-object {$_.Enable -eq \"True\"}```", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/safe-attachments-about:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/safe-attachments-policies-configure", + "DefaultValue": "disabled" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.5", + "Description": "Safe Attachments for SharePoint, OneDrive, and Microsoft Teams scans these services for malicious files.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2.1", + "Profile": "E5 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Safe Attachments for SharePoint, OneDrive, and Microsoft Teams scans these services for malicious files.", + "RationaleStatement": "Safe Attachments for SharePoint, OneDrive, and Microsoft Teams protect organizations from inadvertently sharing malicious files. When a malicious file is detected that file is blocked so that no one can open, copy, move, or share it until further actions are taken by the organization's security team.", + "ImpactStatement": "Impact associated with Safe Attachments is minimal, and equivalent to impact associated with anti-virus scanners in an environment.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com2. Under `Email & collaboration` select `Policies & rules`3. Select Threat policies then `Safe Attachments`.4. Click on `Global settings`5. Click to `Enable` `Turn on Defender for Office 365 for SharePoint, OneDrive, and Microsoft Teams`6. Click to `Enable` `Turn on Safe Documents for Office clients`7. Click to `Disable` `Allow people to click through Protected View even if Safe Documents identified the file as malicious`.8. Click `Save`**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: ```Set-AtpPolicyForO365 -EnableATPForSPOTeamsODB $true -EnableSafeDocs $true -AllowSafeDocsOpen $false```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com2. Under `Email & collaboration` select `Policies & rules`3. Select Threat policies then `Safe Attachments`.4. Click on `Global settings`5. Ensure the toggle is `Enabled` to `Turn on Defender for Office 365 for SharePoint, OneDrive, and Microsoft Teams`.6. Ensure the toggle is `Enabled` to `Turn on Safe Documents for Office clients`. 6. Ensure the toggle is `Deselected/Disabled` to `Allow people to click through Protected View even if Safe Documents identified the file as malicious`. **To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: ```Get-AtpPolicyForO365 | fl Name,EnableATPForSPOTeamsODB,EnableSafeDocs,AllowSafeDocsOpen```Verify the values for each parameter as below: EnableATPForSPOTeamsODB : True EnableSafeDocs : True AllowSafeDocsOpen : False", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/safe-attachments-for-spo-odfb-teams-about", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.6", + "Description": "In Microsoft 365 organizations with mailboxes in Exchange Online or standalone Exchange Online Protection (EOP) organizations without Exchange Online mailboxes, email messages are automatically protected against spam (junk email) by EOP.Configure Exchange Online Spam Policies to copy emails and notify someone when a sender in the organization has been blocked for sending spam emails.", + "Checks": [ + "defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "In Microsoft 365 organizations with mailboxes in Exchange Online or standalone Exchange Online Protection (EOP) organizations without Exchange Online mailboxes, email messages are automatically protected against spam (junk email) by EOP.Configure Exchange Online Spam Policies to copy emails and notify someone when a sender in the organization has been blocked for sending spam emails.", + "RationaleStatement": "A blocked account is a good indication that the account in question has been breached and an attacker is using it to send spam emails to other people.", + "ImpactStatement": "Notification of users that have been blocked should not cause an impact to the user.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Email & collaboration` select `Policies & rules`> `Threat policies`. 3. Under Policies select `Anti-spam`.4. Click on the `Anti-spam outbound policy (default)`.5. Select `Edit protection settings` then under `Notifications`6. Check `Send a copy of suspicious outbound messages or message that exceed these limits to these users and groups` then enter the desired email addresses.7. Check `Notify these users and groups if a sender is blocked due to sending outbound spam` then enter the desired email addresses.8. Click `Save`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```$BccEmailAddress = @(\"\")$NotifyEmailAddress = @(\"\")Set-HostedOutboundSpamFilterPolicy -Identity Default -BccSuspiciousOutboundAdditionalRecipients $BccEmailAddress -BccSuspiciousOutboundMail $true -NotifyOutboundSpam $true -NotifyOutboundSpamRecipients $NotifyEmailAddress```**Note:** Audit and Remediation guidance may focus on the **Default policy** however, if a Custom Policy exists in the organization's tenant, then ensure the setting is set as outlined in the highest priority policy listed.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Email & collaboration` select `Policies & rules` > `Threat policies`. 3. Under Policies select `Anti-spam`.4. Click on the `Anti-spam outbound policy (default)`.5. Verify that `Send a copy of suspicious outbound messages or message that exceed these limits to these users and groups` is set to `On`, ensure the email address is correct.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Get-HostedOutboundSpamFilterPolicy | Select-Object Bcc*, Notify*```3. Verify both `BccSuspiciousOutboundMail` and `NotifyOutboundSpam` are set to `True` and the email addresses to be notified are correct.**Note:** Audit and Remediation guidance may focus on the **Default policy** however, if a Custom Policy exists in the organization's tenant, then ensure the setting is set as outlined in the highest priority policy listed.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/outbound-spam-protection-about", + "DefaultValue": "```BccSuspiciousOutboundAdditionalRecipients : {}BccSuspiciousOutboundMail : FalseNotifyOutboundSpamRecipients : {}NotifyOutboundSpam : False```" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.7", + "Description": "By default, Office 365 includes built-in features that help protect users from phishing attacks. Set up anti-phishing polices to increase this protection, for example by refining settings to better detect and prevent impersonation and spoofing attacks. The default policy applies to all users within the organization and is a single view to fine-tune anti-phishing protection. Custom policies can be created and configured for specific users, groups or domains within the organization and will take precedence over the default policy for the scoped users.", + "Checks": [ + "defender_antiphishing_policy_configured" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2.1", + "Profile": "E5 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "By default, Office 365 includes built-in features that help protect users from phishing attacks. Set up anti-phishing polices to increase this protection, for example by refining settings to better detect and prevent impersonation and spoofing attacks. The default policy applies to all users within the organization and is a single view to fine-tune anti-phishing protection. Custom policies can be created and configured for specific users, groups or domains within the organization and will take precedence over the default policy for the scoped users.", + "RationaleStatement": "Protects users from phishing attacks (like impersonation and spoofing) and uses safety tips to warn users about potentially harmful messages.", + "ImpactStatement": "Mailboxes that are used for support systems such as helpdesk and billing systems send mail to internal users and are often not suitable candidates for impersonation protection. Care should be taken to ensure that these systems are excluded from Impersonation Protection.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Email & collaboration` select `Policies & rules` 3. Select `Threat policies`.4. Under Policies select `Anti-phishing` and click `Create`.5. Name the policy, continuing and clicking `Next` as needed: - Add `Groups` and/or `Domains` that contain a majority of the organization. - Set `Phishing email threshold` to `3 - More Aggressive` - Check `Enable users to protect` and add up to 350 users. - Check `Enable domains to protect` and check `Include domains I own`. - Check `Enable mailbox intelligence (Recommended)`. - Check `Enable Intelligence for impersonation protection (Recommended)`. - Check `Enable spoof intelligence (Recommended).`6. Under **Actions** configure the following: - Set `If a message is detected as user impersonation` to `Quarantine the message`. - Set `If a message is detected as domain impersonation` to `Quarantine the message`. - Set `If Mailbox Intelligence detects an impersonated user` to `Quarantine the message`. - Leave `Honor DMARC record policy when the message is detected as spoof` checked. - Check `Show first contact safety tip (Recommended)`. - Check `Show user impersonation safety tip`. - Check `Show domain impersonation safety tip`. - Check `Show user impersonation unusual characters safety tip`.7. Finally click `Next` and `Submit` the policy.**Note:** `DefaultFullAccessWithNotificationPolicy` is suggested but not required. Users will be notified that impersonation emails are in the Quarantine.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online service using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following Exchange Online PowerShell script to create an AntiPhish policy:```# Create the Policy$params = @{ Name = \"CIS AntiPhish Policy\" PhishThresholdLevel = 3 EnableTargetedUserProtection = $true EnableOrganizationDomainsProtection = $true EnableMailboxIntelligence = $true EnableMailboxIntelligenceProtection = $true EnableSpoofIntelligence = $true TargetedUserProtectionAction = 'Quarantine' TargetedDomainProtectionAction = 'Quarantine' MailboxIntelligenceProtectionAction = 'Quarantine' TargetedUserQuarantineTag = 'DefaultFullAccessWithNotificationPolicy' MailboxIntelligenceQuarantineTag = 'DefaultFullAccessWithNotificationPolicy' TargetedDomainQuarantineTag = 'DefaultFullAccessWithNotificationPolicy' EnableFirstContactSafetyTips = $true EnableSimilarUsersSafetyTips = $true EnableSimilarDomainsSafetyTips = $true EnableUnusualCharactersSafetyTips = $true HonorDmarcPolicy = $true}New-AntiPhishPolicy @params# Create the rule for all users in all valid domains and associate with PolicyNew-AntiPhishRule -Name $params.Name -AntiPhishPolicy $params.Name -RecipientDomainIs (Get-AcceptedDomain).Name -Priority 0```3. The new policy can be edited in the UI or via PowerShell.**Note:** Remediation guidance is intended to help create a qualifying AntiPhish policy that meets the recommended criteria while protecting the majority of the organization. It's understood some individual user exceptions may exist or exceptions for the entire policy if another product acts as a similiar control.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Email & collaboration` select `Policies & rules` 3. Select `Threat policies`.4. Under Policies select `Anti-phishing`.5. Ensure an AntiPhish policy exists that is `On` and meets the following criteria:6. Under **Users, groups, and domains**. - Verify that the included domains and groups includes a majority of the organization.7. Under **Phishing threshold & protection** - Verify `Phishing email threshold` is at least `3 - More Aggressive`. - Verify `User impersonation protection` is `On` and contains a subset of users. - Verify `Domain impersonation protection` is `On for owned domains`. - Verify `Mailbox intelligence` and `Mailbox intelligence for impersonations` and `Spoof intelligence` are `On`.8. Under **Actions** review the following: - Verify `If a message is detected as user impersonation` is set to `Quarantine the message`. - Verify `If a message is detected as domain impersonation` is set to `Quarantine the message`. - Verify `If Mailbox Intelligence detects an impersonated user` is set to `Quarantine the message`. - Verify `First contact safety tip` is `On`. - Verify `User impersonation safety tip` is `On`. - Verify `Domain impersonation safety tip` is `On`. - Verify `Unusual characters safety tip` is `On`. - Verify `Honor DMARC record policy when the message is detected as spoof` is `On`.**Note:** `DefaultFullAccessWithNotificationPolicy` is suggested but not required. Users will be notified that impersonation emails are in the Quarantine.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online service using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following Exchange Online PowerShell commands:```$params = @( \"name\",\"Enabled\",\"PhishThresholdLevel\",\"EnableTargetedUserProtection\" \"EnableOrganizationDomainsProtection\",\"EnableMailboxIntelligence\" \"EnableMailboxIntelligenceProtection\",\"EnableSpoofIntelligence\" \"TargetedUserProtectionAction\",\"TargetedDomainProtectionAction\" \"MailboxIntelligenceProtectionAction\",\"EnableFirstContactSafetyTips\" \"EnableSimilarUsersSafetyTips\",\"EnableSimilarDomainsSafetyTips\" \"EnableUnusualCharactersSafetyTips\",\"TargetedUsersToProtect\" \"HonorDmarcPolicy\")Get-AntiPhishPolicy | fl $params```3. Verify there is a policy created the matches the values for the following parameters:```Enabled : TruePhishThresholdLevel : 3EnableTargetedUserProtection : TrueEnableOrganizationDomainsProtection : TrueEnableMailboxIntelligence : TrueEnableMailboxIntelligenceProtection : TrueEnableSpoofIntelligence : TrueTargetedUserProtectionAction : QuarantineTargetedDomainProtectionAction : QuarantineMailboxIntelligenceProtectionAction : QuarantineEnableFirstContactSafetyTips : TrueEnableSimilarUsersSafetyTips : TrueEnableSimilarDomainsSafetyTips : TrueEnableUnusualCharactersSafetyTips : TrueTargetedUsersToProtect : {}HonorDmarcPolicy : True```4. Verify that `TargetedUsersToProtect` contains a subset of the organization, up to 350 users, for targeted Impersonation Protection.5. Use PowerShell to verify the AntiPhishRule is configured and enabled.```Get-AntiPhishRule | ft AntiPhishPolicy,Priority,State,SentToMemberOf,RecipientDomainIs```6. Identity correct rule from the matching `AntiPhishPolicy` name in step 3. Ensure the rule defines groups or domains that include the majority of the organization by inspecting `SentToMemberOf` or `RecipientDomainIs`.**Note:** Audit guidance is intended to help identify a qualifying AntiPhish policy+rule that meets the recommended criteria while protecting the majority of the organization. It's understood some individual user exceptions may exist or exceptions for the entire policy if another product stands in as an equivalent control.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/anti-phishing-protection-about:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/anti-phishing-policies-eop-configure", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.8", + "Description": "For each domain that is configured in Exchange, a corresponding Sender Policy Framework (SPF) record should be created.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "For each domain that is configured in Exchange, a corresponding Sender Policy Framework (SPF) record should be created.", + "RationaleStatement": "SPF records allow Exchange Online Protection and other mail systems to know where messages from domains are allowed to originate. This information can be used by that system to determine how to treat the message based on if it is being spoofed or is valid.", + "ImpactStatement": "There should be minimal impact of setting up SPF records however, organizations should ensure proper SPF record setup as email could be flagged as spam if SPF is not setup appropriately.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using a DNS Provider:**1. If all email in your domain is sent from and received by Exchange Online, add the following TXT record for each Accepted Domain:```v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all```2. If there are other systems that send email in the environment, refer to this article for the proper SPF configuration: [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/SecurityCompliance/set-up-spf-in-office-365-to-help-prevent-spoofing](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/SecurityCompliance/set-up-spf-in-office-365-to-help-prevent-spoofing).", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Open a command prompt.2. Type the following command in PowerShell:```Resolve-DnsName [domain1.com] txt | fl```3. Ensure that a value exists and that it includes `v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com`. This designates Exchange Online as a designated sender.**To verify the SPF records are published, use the REST API for each domain:**```https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/domains/[DOMAIN.COM]/serviceConfigurationRecords```1. Ensure that a value exists that includes `v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com`. This designates Exchange Online as a designated sender.**Note:** Resolve-DnsName is not available on older versions of Windows prior to Windows 8 and Server 2012.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/email-authentication-spf-configure?view=o365-worldwide", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.9", + "Description": "DKIM is one of the trio of Authentication methods (SPF, DKIM and DMARC) that help prevent attackers from sending messages that look like they come from your domain. DKIM lets an organization add a digital signature to outbound email messages in the message header. When DKIM is configured, the organization authorizes it's domain to associate, or sign, its name to an email message using cryptographic authentication. Email systems that get email from this domain can use a digital signature to help verify whether incoming email is legitimate.Use of DKIM in addition to SPF and DMARC to help prevent malicious actors using spoofing techniques from sending messages that look like they are coming from your domain.", + "Checks": [ + "defender_domain_dkim_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "DKIM is one of the trio of Authentication methods (SPF, DKIM and DMARC) that help prevent attackers from sending messages that look like they come from your domain. DKIM lets an organization add a digital signature to outbound email messages in the message header. When DKIM is configured, the organization authorizes it's domain to associate, or sign, its name to an email message using cryptographic authentication. Email systems that get email from this domain can use a digital signature to help verify whether incoming email is legitimate.Use of DKIM in addition to SPF and DMARC to help prevent malicious actors using spoofing techniques from sending messages that look like they are coming from your domain.", + "RationaleStatement": "By enabling DKIM with Office 365, messages that are sent from Exchange Online will be cryptographically signed. This will allow the receiving email system to validate that the messages were generated by a server that the organization authorized and not being spoofed.", + "ImpactStatement": "There should be no impact of setting up DKIM however, organizations should ensure appropriate setup to ensure continuous mail-flow.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using a DNS Provider:**1. For each accepted domain in Exchange Online, two DNS entries are required.```Host name: selector1._domainkeyPoints to address or value: selector1-._domainkey. TTL: 3600Host name: selector2._domainkeyPoints to address or value: selector2-._domainkey. TTL: 3600```For Office 365, the selectors will always be `selector1` or `selector2`.domainGUID is the same as the domainGUID in the customized MX record for your custom domain that appears before mail.protection.outlook.com. For example, in the following MX record for the domain contoso.com, the domainGUID is contoso-com:```contoso.com. 3600 IN MX 5 contoso-com.mail.protection.outlook.com```The initial domain is the domain that you used when you signed up for Office 365. Initial domains always end with on.microsoft.com.1. After the DNS records are created, enable DKIM signing in Defender.2. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com/3. Expand `Email & collaboration` > `Policies & rules` > `Threat policies`.4. Under `Rules` section click `Email authentication settings`.5. Select `DKIM`6. Click on each domain and click `Enable` next to `Sign messages for this domain with DKIM signature`.**Final remediation step using the Exchange Online PowerShell Module:**1. Connect to Exchange Online service using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following Exchange Online PowerShell command:```Set-DkimSigningConfig -Identity < domainName > -Enabled $True```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com/2. Expand `Email & collaboration` > `Policies & rules` > `Threat policies`.3. Under `Rules` section click `Email authentication settings`.4. Select `DKIM`5. Click on each domain and confirm that `Sign messages for this domain with DKIM signatures` is `Enabled`.6. A status of `Not signing DKIM signatures for this domain` is an audit fail.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online service using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following Exchange Online PowerShell command:```Get-DkimSigningConfig```3. Verify `Enabled` is set to True", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/email-authentication-dkim-configure?view=o365-worldwide", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.10", + "Description": "DMARC, or Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance, assists recipient mail systems in determining the appropriate action to take when messages from a domain fail to meet SPF or DKIM authentication criteria.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "DMARC, or Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance, assists recipient mail systems in determining the appropriate action to take when messages from a domain fail to meet SPF or DKIM authentication criteria.", + "RationaleStatement": "DMARC strengthens the trustworthiness of messages sent from an organization's domain to destination email systems. By integrating DMARC with SPF (Sender Policy Framework) and DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail), organizations can significantly enhance their defenses against email spoofing and phishing attempts.Leaving a DMARC policy set to `p=none` can result in failed action when a spear phishing email fails DMARC but passes SPF and DKIM checks. Having DMARC fully configured is a critical part in preventing business email compromise.", + "ImpactStatement": "There should be no impact of setting up DMARC however, organizations should ensure appropriate setup to ensure continuous mail-flow.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using a DNS Provider:**1. For each Exchange Online Accepted Domain, add the following record to DNS:``` Record: _dmarc.domain1.comType: TXTValue: v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:; ruf=mailto:```2. This will create a basic DMARC policy that will allow the organization to start monitoring message statistics.3. One week is enough time for data generated by the reports to be useful in understanding email trends and traffic. The final step requires implementing a policy of `p=reject` OR `p=quarantine` and `pct=100` with the necessary `rua` and `ruf` email addresses defined:```Record: _dmarc.domain1.comType: TXTValue: v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:; ruf=mailto:```**Also remediate the MOREA domain using the UI:**1. Navigate to the Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/2. Expand `Settings` and select `Domains`.3. Select your tenant domain (for example, contoso.onmicrosoft.com).4. Select `DNS records` and click `+ Add record`.5. Add a new record with the TXT name of `_dmarc` with the appropriate values outlined above.**Note:** The remediation portion involves a multi-staged approach over a period of time. First, a baseline of the current state of email will be established with `p=none` and `rua` and `ruf`. Once the environment is better understood and reports have been analyzed an organization will move to the final state with dmarc record values as outlined in the audit section.Microsoft has a list of [best practices for implementing DMARC](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/email-authentication-dmarc-configure?view=o365-worldwide#best-practices-for-implementing-dmarc-in-microsoft-365) that cover these steps in detail.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Open a command prompt.2. For each of the Accepted Domains in Exchange Online run the following in PowerShell:```Resolve-DnsName _dmarc.[domain1.com] txt```3. Ensure that the record exists and has at minimum the following flags defined as follows: `v=DMARC1;` (`p=quarantine` OR `p=reject`), `pct=100`, `rua=mailto:` and `ruf=mailto:`The below example records would pass as they contain a policy that would either `quarantine` or `reject` messages failing DMARC, the policy affects 100% of mail `pct=100` as well as containing valid reporting addresses:```v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:rua@contoso.com; ruf=mailto:ruf@contoso.com; fo=1v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; fo=1; ri=3600; rua=mailto:rua@contoso.com; ruf=mailto:ruf@contoso.comv=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100; sp=none; fo=1; ri=3600; rua=mailto:rua@contoso.com; ruf=ruf@contoso.com;```4. Ensure the Microsoft MOERA domain is also configured.```Resolve-DnsName _dmarc.[tenant].onmicrosoft.com txt```5. Ensure the record meets the same criteria listed in step #3.**Note:** Resolve-DnsName is not available on older versions of Windows prior to Windows 8 and Server 2012.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/email-authentication-dmarc-configure?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/step-by-step-guides/how-to-enable-dmarc-reporting-for-microsoft-online-email-routing-address-moera-and-parked-domains?view=o365-worldwide:https://media.defense.gov/2024/May/02/2003455483/-1/-1/0/CSA-NORTH-KOREAN-ACTORS-EXPLOIT-WEAK-DMARC.PDF", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.11", + "Description": "The Common Attachment Types Filter lets a user block known and custom malicious file types from being attached to emails. The policy provided by Microsoft covers 53 extensions, and an additional custom list of extensions can be defined.The list of 186 extensions provided in this recommendation is comprehensive but not exhaustive.", + "Checks": [ + "defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The Common Attachment Types Filter lets a user block known and custom malicious file types from being attached to emails. The policy provided by Microsoft covers 53 extensions, and an additional custom list of extensions can be defined.The list of 186 extensions provided in this recommendation is comprehensive but not exhaustive.", + "RationaleStatement": "Blocking known malicious file types can help prevent malware-infested files from infecting a host or performing other malicious attacks such as phishing and data extraction.Defining a comprehensive list of attachments can help protect against additional unknown and known threats. Many legacy file formats, binary files and compressed files have been used as delivery mechanisms for malicious software. Organizations can protect themselves from Business E-mail Compromise (BEC) by allow-listing only the file types relevant to their line of business and blocking all others.", + "ImpactStatement": "For file types that are business necessary users will need to use other organizationally approved methods to transfer blocked extension types between business partners.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To Remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following script:```# Create an attachment policy and associated rule. The rule is# intentionally disabled allowing the org to enable it when ready$Policy = @{ Name = \"CIS L2 Attachment Policy\" EnableFileFilter = $true ZapEnabled = $true EnableInternalSenderAdminNotifications = $true InternalSenderAdminAddress = 'admin@contoso.com' # Change this.}$L2Extensions = @( \"7z\", \"a3x\", \"ace\", \"ade\", \"adp\", \"ani\", \"app\", \"appinstaller\", \"applescript\", \"application\", \"appref-ms\", \"appx\", \"appxbundle\", \"arj\", \"asd\", \"asx\", \"bas\", \"bat\", \"bgi\", \"bz2\", \"cab\", \"chm\", \"cmd\", \"com\", \"cpl\", \"crt\", \"cs\", \"csh\", \"daa\", \"dbf\", \"dcr\", \"deb\", \"desktopthemepackfile\", \"dex\", \"diagcab\", \"dif\", \"dir\", \"dll\", \"dmg\", \"doc\", \"docm\", \"dot\", \"dotm\", \"elf\", \"eml\", \"exe\", \"fxp\", \"gadget\", \"gz\", \"hlp\", \"hta\", \"htc\", \"htm\", \"htm\", \"html\", \"html\", \"hwpx\", \"ics\", \"img\", \"inf\", \"ins\", \"iqy\", \"iso\", \"isp\", \"jar\", \"jnlp\", \"js\", \"jse\", \"kext\", \"ksh\", \"lha\", \"lib\", \"library-ms\", \"lnk\", \"lzh\", \"macho\", \"mam\", \"mda\", \"mdb\", \"mde\", \"mdt\", \"mdw\", \"mdz\", \"mht\", \"mhtml\", \"mof\", \"msc\", \"msi\", \"msix\", \"msp\", \"msrcincident\", \"mst\", \"ocx\", \"odt\", \"ops\", \"oxps\", \"pcd\", \"pif\", \"plg\", \"pot\", \"potm\", \"ppa\", \"ppam\", \"ppkg\", \"pps\", \"ppsm\", \"ppt\", \"pptm\", \"prf\", \"prg\", \"ps1\", \"ps11\", \"ps11xml\", \"ps1xml\", \"ps2\", \"ps2xml\", \"psc1\", \"psc2\", \"pub\", \"py\", \"pyc\", \"pyo\", \"pyw\", \"pyz\", \"pyzw\", \"rar\", \"reg\", \"rev\", \"rtf\", \"scf\", \"scpt\", \"scr\", \"sct\", \"searchConnector-ms\", \"service\", \"settingcontent-ms\", \"sh\", \"shb\", \"shs\", \"shtm\", \"shtml\", \"sldm\", \"slk\", \"so\", \"spl\", \"stm\", \"svg\", \"swf\", \"sys\", \"tar\", \"theme\", \"themepack\", \"timer\", \"uif\", \"url\", \"uue\", \"vb\", \"vbe\", \"vbs\", \"vhd\", \"vhdx\", \"vxd\", \"wbk\", \"website\", \"wim\", \"wiz\", \"ws\", \"wsc\", \"wsf\", \"wsh\", \"xla\", \"xlam\", \"xlc\", \"xll\", \"xlm\", \"xls\", \"xlsb\", \"xlsm\", \"xlt\", \"xltm\", \"xlw\", \"xnk\", \"xps\", \"xsl\", \"xz\", \"z\")# Create the policyNew-MalwareFilterPolicy @Policy -FileTypes $L2Extensions# Create the rule for all accepted domains$Rule = @{ Name = $Policy.Name Enabled = $false MalwareFilterPolicy = $Policy.Name RecipientDomainIs = (Get-AcceptedDomain).Name Priority = 0}New-MalwareFilterRule @Rule```3. When prepared enable the rule either through the UI or PowerShell.**Note:** Due to the number of extensions the UI method is not covered. The objects can however be edited in the UI or manually added using the list from the script.1. Navigate to `Microsoft Defender` at https://security.microsoft.com/2. Browse to `Policies & rules` > `Threat policies` > `Anti-malware`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Note:** Utilizing the UI for auditing Anti-malware policies can be very time consuming so it is recommended to use a script like the one supplied below.**To Audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following script:```# Evaluate each Malware policy. If one exist with more than 120 extensions then # the script will output a report showing a list of missing extensions along with# other parameters.$L2Extensions = @( \"7z\", \"a3x\", \"ace\", \"ade\", \"adp\", \"ani\", \"app\", \"appinstaller\", \"applescript\", \"application\", \"appref-ms\", \"appx\", \"appxbundle\", \"arj\", \"asd\", \"asx\", \"bas\", \"bat\", \"bgi\", \"bz2\", \"cab\", \"chm\", \"cmd\", \"com\", \"cpl\", \"crt\", \"cs\", \"csh\", \"daa\", \"dbf\", \"dcr\", \"deb\", \"desktopthemepackfile\", \"dex\", \"diagcab\", \"dif\", \"dir\", \"dll\", \"dmg\", \"doc\", \"docm\", \"dot\", \"dotm\", \"elf\", \"eml\", \"exe\", \"fxp\", \"gadget\", \"gz\", \"hlp\", \"hta\", \"htc\", \"htm\", \"htm\", \"html\", \"html\", \"hwpx\", \"ics\", \"img\", \"inf\", \"ins\", \"iqy\", \"iso\", \"isp\", \"jar\", \"jnlp\", \"js\", \"jse\", \"kext\", \"ksh\", \"lha\", \"lib\", \"library-ms\", \"lnk\", \"lzh\", \"macho\", \"mam\", \"mda\", \"mdb\", \"mde\", \"mdt\", \"mdw\", \"mdz\", \"mht\", \"mhtml\", \"mof\", \"msc\", \"msi\", \"msix\", \"msp\", \"msrcincident\", \"mst\", \"ocx\", \"odt\", \"ops\", \"oxps\", \"pcd\", \"pif\", \"plg\", \"pot\", \"potm\", \"ppa\", \"ppam\", \"ppkg\", \"pps\", \"ppsm\", \"ppt\", \"pptm\", \"prf\", \"prg\", \"ps1\", \"ps11\", \"ps11xml\", \"ps1xml\", \"ps2\", \"ps2xml\", \"psc1\", \"psc2\", \"pub\", \"py\", \"pyc\", \"pyo\", \"pyw\", \"pyz\", \"pyzw\", \"rar\", \"reg\", \"rev\", \"rtf\", \"scf\", \"scpt\", \"scr\", \"sct\", \"searchConnector-ms\", \"service\", \"settingcontent-ms\", \"sh\", \"shb\", \"shs\", \"shtm\", \"shtml\", \"sldm\", \"slk\", \"so\", \"spl\", \"stm\", \"svg\", \"swf\", \"sys\", \"tar\", \"theme\", \"themepack\", \"timer\", \"uif\", \"url\", \"uue\", \"vb\", \"vbe\", \"vbs\", \"vhd\", \"vhdx\", \"vxd\", \"wbk\", \"website\", \"wim\", \"wiz\", \"ws\", \"wsc\", \"wsf\", \"wsh\", \"xla\", \"xlam\", \"xlc\", \"xll\", \"xlm\", \"xls\", \"xlsb\", \"xlsm\", \"xlt\", \"xltm\", \"xlw\", \"xnk\", \"xps\", \"xsl\", \"xz\", \"z\")$MissingCount = 0$ExtensionPolicies = $null$RLine = $ExtensionReport = @()$FilterRules = Get-MalwareFilterRule$DateTime = $(((Get-Date).ToUniversalTime()).ToString(\"yyyyMMddTHHmmssZ\"))$OutputFilePath = \"$PWD\\CIS-Report_$($DateTime).txt\"$RLine += \"$(Get-Date)`n\"function Test-MalwarePolicy { param ( $PolicyId ) # Find the matching rule for custom policies $FoundRule = $null $FoundRule = $FilterRules | Where-Object { $_.MalwareFilterPolicy -eq $PolicyId } if ($PolicyId.EnableFileFilter -eq $false) { $script:RLine += \"WARNING: Common attachments filter is disabled.\" } if ($FoundRule.State -eq 'Disabled') { $script:RLine += \"WARNING: The Anti-malware rule is disabled.\" } $script:RLine += \"`nManual review needed - Domains, inclusions and exclusions must be valid:\" $script:RLine += $FoundRule | Format-List Name, RecipientDomainIs, Sent*, Except*}# Match any policy that has over 120 extensions defined$ExtensionPolicies = Get-MalwareFilterPolicy | Where-Object {$_.FileTypes.Count -gt 120 }if (!$ExtensionPolicies) { Write-Host \"`nFAIL: A policy containing the minimum number of extensions was not found.\" -ForegroundColor Red Write-Host \"Only policies with over 120 extensions defined will be evaluated.\" -ForegroundColor Red Exit}# Check each policy for missing extensionsforeach ($policy in $ExtensionPolicies) { $MissingExtensions = $L2Extensions | Where-Object { $extension = $_; -not $policy.FileTypes.Contains($extension) } if ($MissingExtensions.Count -eq 0) { $RLine += \"-\" * 60 $RLine += \"[FOUND] $($policy.Identity)\" $RLine += \"-\" * 60 $RLine += \"PASS: Policy contains all extensions\" Test-MalwarePolicy -PolicyId $policy } else { $MissingCount++ $ExtensionReport += @{ Identity = $policy.Identity MissingExtensions = $MissingExtensions -join ', ' } }}if ($MissingCount -gt 0) { foreach ($fpolicy in $ExtensionReport) { $RLine += \"-\" * 60 $RLine += \"[PARTIAL] $($fpolicy.Identity)\" $RLine += \"-\" * 60 $RLine += \"NOTICE - The following extensions were not found:`n\" $RLine += \"$($fpolicy.MissingExtensions)`n\" Test-MalwarePolicy -PolicyId $fpolicy.Identity }}# Output the report to a text fileOut-File -FilePath $OutputFilePath -InputObject $RLineGet-Content $OutputFilePathWrite-Host \"`nLog file exported to\" $OutputFilePath```3. Review the exported results which are stored in the present working directory.4. A pass for this recommendation is made when an active policy is in place that covers all extensions except for those explicitly defined as an exception by the organization. A passing policy must also be `enabled` and have the `EnableFileFilter` parameter enabled.5. Review any manual steps listed in the output, exceptions and inclusions are organizational specific.**Note:** The audit procedure intentionally does not include the action taken for matched extensions, e.g. Reject with NDR or Quarantine the message. These are considered organization specific and are not scored. When `FileTypeAction` is not specified the action will default to `Reject the message with a non-delivery receipt (NDR)`. The Quarantine Policy is also considered organization specific.**Note 2:** Weighting by individual extension risk is beyond the scope of this document. Organizations should evaluate these both independently and based on business need.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/get-malwarefilterpolicy?view=exchange-ps:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-malware-policies-configure?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/office/compatibility/office-file-format-reference", + "DefaultValue": "The following extensions are blocked by default:ace, ani, apk, app, appx, arj, bat, cab, cmd, com, deb, dex, dll, docm, elf, exe, hta, img, iso, jar, jnlp, kext, lha, lib, library, lnk, lzh, macho, msc, msi, msix, msp, mst, pif, ppa, ppam, reg, rev, scf, scr, sct, sys, uif, vb, vbe, vbs, vxd, wsc, wsf, wsh, xll, xz, z" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.12", + "Description": "In Microsoft 365 organizations with Exchange Online mailboxes or standalone Exchange Online Protection (EOP) organizations without Exchange Online mailboxes, connection filtering and the default connection filter policy identify good or bad source email servers by IP addresses. The key components of the default connection filter policy are **IP Allow List**, **IP Block List** and **Safe list**.The recommended state is `IP Allow List` empty or undefined.", + "Checks": [ + "defender_antispam_connection_filter_policy_empty_ip_allowlist" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "In Microsoft 365 organizations with Exchange Online mailboxes or standalone Exchange Online Protection (EOP) organizations without Exchange Online mailboxes, connection filtering and the default connection filter policy identify good or bad source email servers by IP addresses. The key components of the default connection filter policy are **IP Allow List**, **IP Block List** and **Safe list**.The recommended state is `IP Allow List` empty or undefined.", + "RationaleStatement": "Without additional verification like mail flow rules, email from sources in the IP Allow List skips spam filtering and sender authentication (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) checks. This method creates a high risk of attackers successfully delivering email to the Inbox that would otherwise be filtered. Messages that are determined to be malware or high confidence phishing are filtered.", + "ImpactStatement": "This is the default behavior. IP Allow lists may reduce false positives, however, this benefit is outweighed by the importance of a policy which scans all messages regardless of the origin. This supports the principle of zero trust.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Email & collaboration` select `Policies & rules`> `Threat policies`. 3. Under Policies select `Anti-spam`.4. Click on the `Connection filter policy (Default)`.5. Click `Edit connection filter policy`.6. Remove any IP entries from `Always allow messages from the following IP addresses or address range:`.7. Click `Save`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Set-HostedConnectionFilterPolicy -Identity Default -IPAllowList @{}```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Email & collaboration` select `Policies & rules` > `Threat policies`. 3. Under Policies select `Anti-spam`.4. Click on the `Connection filter policy (Default)`.5. Ensure `IP Allow list` contains no entries.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Get-HostedConnectionFilterPolicy -Identity Default | fl IPAllowList```3. Ensure `IPAllowList` is empty or `{}`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/connection-filter-policies-configure:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/create-safe-sender-lists-in-office-365#use-the-ip-allow-list:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/how-policies-and-protections-are-combined#user-and-tenant-settings-conflict", + "DefaultValue": "IPAllowList : {}" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.13", + "Description": "In Microsoft 365 organizations with Exchange Online mailboxes or standalone Exchange Online Protection (EOP) organizations without Exchange Online mailboxes, connection filtering and the default connection filter policy identify good or bad source email servers by IP addresses. The key components of the default connection filter policy are **IP Allow List**, **IP Block List** and **Safe list**.The safe list is a pre-configured allow list that is dynamically updated by Microsoft.The recommended safe list state is: `Off` or `False`", + "Checks": [ + "defender_antispam_connection_filter_policy_safe_list_off" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "In Microsoft 365 organizations with Exchange Online mailboxes or standalone Exchange Online Protection (EOP) organizations without Exchange Online mailboxes, connection filtering and the default connection filter policy identify good or bad source email servers by IP addresses. The key components of the default connection filter policy are **IP Allow List**, **IP Block List** and **Safe list**.The safe list is a pre-configured allow list that is dynamically updated by Microsoft.The recommended safe list state is: `Off` or `False`", + "RationaleStatement": "Without additional verification like mail flow rules, email from sources in the IP Allow List skips spam filtering and sender authentication (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) checks. This method creates a high risk of attackers successfully delivering email to the Inbox that would otherwise be filtered. Messages that are determined to be malware or high confidence phishing are filtered.The safe list is managed dynamically by Microsoft, and administrators do not have visibility into which sender are included. Incoming messages from email servers on the safe list bypass spam filtering.", + "ImpactStatement": "This is the default behavior. IP Allow lists may reduce false positives, however, this benefit is outweighed by the importance of a policy which scans all messages regardless of the origin. This supports the principle of zero trust.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Email & collaboration` select `Policies & rules`> `Threat policies`. 3. Under Policies select `Anti-spam`.4. Click on the `Connection filter policy (Default)`.5. Click `Edit connection filter policy`.6. Uncheck `Turn on safe list`.7. Click `Save`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Set-HostedConnectionFilterPolicy -Identity Default -EnableSafeList $false```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Email & collaboration` select `Policies & rules` > `Threat policies`. 3. Under Policies select `Anti-spam`.4. Click on the `Connection filter policy (Default)`.5. Ensure `Safe list` is `Off`. **To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Get-HostedConnectionFilterPolicy -Identity Default | fl EnableSafeList```3. Ensure `EnableSafeList` is `False`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/connection-filter-policies-configure:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/create-safe-sender-lists-in-office-365#use-the-ip-allow-list:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/how-policies-and-protections-are-combined#user-and-tenant-settings-conflict", + "DefaultValue": "EnableSafeList : False" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.14", + "Description": "Anti-spam protection is a feature of Exchange Online that utilizes policies to help to reduce the amount of junk email, bulk and phishing emails a mailbox receives. These policies contain lists to allow or block specific senders or domains. - The allowed senders list- The allowed domains list- The blocked senders list- The blocked domains listThe recommended state is: Do not define any `Allowed domains`", + "Checks": [ + "defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Anti-spam protection is a feature of Exchange Online that utilizes policies to help to reduce the amount of junk email, bulk and phishing emails a mailbox receives. These policies contain lists to allow or block specific senders or domains. - The allowed senders list- The allowed domains list- The blocked senders list- The blocked domains listThe recommended state is: Do not define any `Allowed domains`", + "RationaleStatement": "Messages from entries in the allowed senders list or the allowed domains list bypass most email protection (except malware and high confidence phishing) and email authentication checks (SPF, DKIM and DMARC). Entries in the allowed senders list or the allowed domains list create a high risk of attackers successfully delivering email to the Inbox that would otherwise be filtered. The risk is increased even more when allowing common domain names as these can be easily spoofed by attackers.Microsoft specifies in its documentation that allowed domains should be used for testing purposes only.", + "ImpactStatement": "This is the default behavior. Allowed domains may reduce false positives, however, this benefit is outweighed by the importance of having a policy which scans all messages regardless of the origin. As an alternative consider sender based lists. This supports the principle of zero trust.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Email & collaboration` select `Policies & rules`> `Threat policies`. 3. Under Policies select `Anti-spam`.4. Open each out of compliance inbound anti-spam policy by clicking on it.5. Click `Edit allowed and blocked senders and domains`.6. Select `Allow domains`.7. Delete each domain from the domains list.8. Click `Done` > `Save`.9. Repeat as needed.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Set-HostedContentFilterPolicy -Identity -AllowedSenderDomains @{}```Or, run this to remove allowed domains from all inbound anti-spam policies:```$AllowedDomains = Get-HostedContentFilterPolicy | Where-Object {$_.AllowedSenderDomains}$AllowedDomains | Set-HostedContentFilterPolicy -AllowedSenderDomains @{}```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Email & collaboration` select `Policies & rules` > `Threat policies`. 3. Under Policies select `Anti-spam`.4. Inspect each **inbound anti-spam** policy5. Ensure `Allowed domains` does not contain any domain names.6. Repeat as needed for any additional inbound anti-spam policy.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Get-HostedContentFilterPolicy | ft Identity,AllowedSenderDomains```3. Ensure `AllowedSenderDomains` is undefined for each inbound policy.**Note:** Each inbound policy must pass for this recommendation to be considered to be in a passing state.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/anti-spam-protection-about#allow-and-block-lists-in-anti-spam-policies", + "DefaultValue": "AllowedSenderDomains : {}" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.4.1", + "Description": "Identify _priority accounts_ to utilize Microsoft 365's advanced custom security features. This is an essential tool to bolster protection for users who are frequently targeted due to their critical positions, such as executives, leaders, managers, or others who have access to sensitive, confidential, financial, or high-priority information.Once these accounts are identified, several services and features can be enabled, including threat policies, enhanced sign-in protection through conditional access policies, and alert policies, enabling faster response times for incident response teams.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2.4", + "Profile": "E5 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Identify _priority accounts_ to utilize Microsoft 365's advanced custom security features. This is an essential tool to bolster protection for users who are frequently targeted due to their critical positions, such as executives, leaders, managers, or others who have access to sensitive, confidential, financial, or high-priority information.Once these accounts are identified, several services and features can be enabled, including threat policies, enhanced sign-in protection through conditional access policies, and alert policies, enabling faster response times for incident response teams.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling priority account protection for users in Microsoft 365 is necessary to enhance security for accounts with access to sensitive data and high privileges, such as CEOs, CISOs, CFOs, and IT admins. These priority accounts are often targeted by spear phishing or whaling attacks and require stronger protection to prevent account compromise. To address this, Microsoft 365 and Microsoft Defender for Office 365 offer several key features that provide extra security, including the identification of incidents and alerts involving priority accounts and the use of built-in custom protections designed specifically for them.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "_Remediate with a 3-step process_**Step 1: Enable Priority account protection in Microsoft 365 Defender:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com/2. Click to expand `System` select `Settings`.3. Select `E-mail & Collaboration` > `Priority account protection`4. Ensure `Priority account protection` is set to `On`**Step 2: Tag priority accounts:**5. Select `User tags`6. Select the `PRIORITY ACCOUNT` tag and click `Edit`7. Select `Add members` to add users, or groups. **Groups are recommended.**8. Repeat the previous 2 steps for any additional tags needed, such as Finance or HR.9. `Next` and `Submit`.**Step 3: Configure E-mail alerts for Priority Accounts:**10. Expand `E-mail & Collaboration` on the left column. 11. Select `New Alert Policy`12. Enter a valid policy Name & Description. Set `Severity` to `High` and `Category` to `Threat management`.13. Set `Activity is` to `Detected malware in an e-mail message`14. Mail direction is `Inbound`15. Select `Add Condition` and `User: recipient tags are` 16. In the `Selection option` field add chosen priority tags such as Priority account.17. Select `Every time an activity matches the rule`.18. `Next` and verify valid recipient(s) are selected.19. `Next` and select `Yes, turn it on right away.` Click `Submit` to save the alert.20. Repeat steps 10 - 18 for the Activity field `Activity is`: `Phishing email detected at time of delivery`**NOTE:** Any additional activity types may be added as needed. Above are the minimum recommended.", + "AuditProcedure": "_Audit with a 3-step process_**Step 1: Verify Priority account protection is enabled:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com/2. Click to expand `System` select `Settings`.3. Select `E-mail & collaboration` > `Priority account protection`4. Ensure `Priority account protection` is set to `On`**Step 2: Verify that priority accounts are identified and tagged accordingly:**5. Select `User tags`6. Select the `PRIORITY ACCOUNT` tag and click `Edit`7. Verify the assigned members match the organization's defined priority accounts or groups.8. Repeat the previous 2 steps for any additional tags identified, such as Finance or HR.**Step 3: Ensure alerts are configured:**9. Expand `E-mail & Collaboration` on the left column. 10. Select `Policies & rules` > `Alert policy`11. Ensure alert policies are configured for priority accounts, enabled and have a valid recipient. The tags column can be used to identify policies using a specific tag.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/setup/priority-accounts:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/priority-accounts-security-recommendations", + "DefaultValue": "By default, priority accounts are undefined." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.4.2", + "Description": "Preset security policies have been established by Microsoft, utilizing observations and experiences within datacenters to strike a balance between the exclusion of malicious content from users and limiting unwarranted disruptions. These policies can apply to all, or select users and encompass recommendations for addressing spam, malware, and phishing threats. The policy parameters are pre-determined and non-adjustable.`Strict protection` has the most aggressive protection of the 3 presets.- EOP: Anti-spam, Anti-malware and Anti-phishing- Defender: Spoof protection, Impersonation protection and Advanced phishing- Defender: Safe Links and Safe Attachments**NOTE: The preset security polices cannot target Priority account TAGS currently, groups should be used instead.**", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2.4", + "Profile": "E5 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Preset security policies have been established by Microsoft, utilizing observations and experiences within datacenters to strike a balance between the exclusion of malicious content from users and limiting unwarranted disruptions. These policies can apply to all, or select users and encompass recommendations for addressing spam, malware, and phishing threats. The policy parameters are pre-determined and non-adjustable.`Strict protection` has the most aggressive protection of the 3 presets.- EOP: Anti-spam, Anti-malware and Anti-phishing- Defender: Spoof protection, Impersonation protection and Advanced phishing- Defender: Safe Links and Safe Attachments**NOTE: The preset security polices cannot target Priority account TAGS currently, groups should be used instead.**", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling priority account protection for users in Microsoft 365 is necessary to enhance security for accounts with access to sensitive data and high privileges, such as CEOs, CISOs, CFOs, and IT admins. These priority accounts are often targeted by spear phishing or whaling attacks and require stronger protection to prevent account compromise.The implementation of stringent, pre-defined policies may result in instances of false positive, however, the benefit of requiring the end-user to preview junk email before accessing their inbox outweighs the potential risk of mistakenly perceiving a malicious email as safe due to its placement in the inbox.", + "ImpactStatement": "Strict policies are more likely to cause false positives in anti-spam, phishing, impersonation, spoofing and intelligence responses.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com/2. Select to expand `E-mail & collaboration`.3. Select `Policies & rules` > `Threat policies` > `Preset security policies`.4. Click to `Manage protection settings` for `Strict protection` preset.5. For `Apply Exchange Online Protection` select at minimum `Specific recipients` and include the Accounts/Groups identified as Priority Accounts.6. For `Apply Defender for Office 365 Protection` select at minimum `Specific recipients` and include the Accounts/Groups identified as Priority Accounts.7. For `Impersonation protection` click `Next` and add valid e-mails or priority accounts both internal and external that may be subject to impersonation.8. For `Protected custom domains` add the organization's domain name, along side other key partners.9. Click `Next` and finally `Confirm`", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com/2. Select to expand `E-mail & collaboration`.3. Select `Policies & rules` > `Threat policies`.4. From here visit each section in turn: `Anti-phishing` `Anti-spam` `Anti-malware` `Safe Attachments` `Safe Links`5. Ensure in each there is a policy named `Strict Preset Security Policy` which includes the organization's priority Accounts/Groups.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/preset-security-policies?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/priority-accounts-security-recommendations:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/recommended-settings-for-eop-and-office365?view=o365-worldwide#impersonation-settings-in-anti-phishing-policies-in-microsoft-defender-for-office-365", + "DefaultValue": "By default, presets are not applied to any users or groups." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.4.3", + "Description": "Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps is a Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB). It provides visibility into suspicious activity in Microsoft 365, enabling investigation into potential security issues and facilitating the implementation of remediation measures if necessary.Some risk detection methods provided by Entra Identity Protection also require Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps:- Suspicious manipulation of inbox rules- Suspicious inbox forwarding- New country detection- Impossible travel detection- Activity from anonymous IP addresses- Mass access to sensitive files", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2.4", + "Profile": "E5 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps is a Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB). It provides visibility into suspicious activity in Microsoft 365, enabling investigation into potential security issues and facilitating the implementation of remediation measures if necessary.Some risk detection methods provided by Entra Identity Protection also require Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps:- Suspicious manipulation of inbox rules- Suspicious inbox forwarding- New country detection- Impossible travel detection- Activity from anonymous IP addresses- Mass access to sensitive files", + "RationaleStatement": "Security teams can receive notifications of triggered alerts for atypical or suspicious activities, see how the organization's data in Microsoft 365 is accessed and used, suspend user accounts exhibiting suspicious activity, and require users to log back in to Microsoft 365 apps after an alert has been triggered.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com/2. Click to expand `System` select `Settings` > `Cloud apps`.3. Scroll to `Information Protection` and select `Files`.4. Check `Enable file monitoring`.5. Scroll up to `Cloud Discovery` and select `Microsoft Defender for Endpoint.`6. Check `Enforce app access`, configure a Notification URL and `Save`.**Note:** Defender for Endpoint requires a Defender for Endpoint license.**Configure App Connectors:** 1. Scroll to `Connected apps` and select `App connectors`. 2. Click on `Connect an app` and select `Microsoft 365`.3. Check all Azure and Office 365 boxes then click `Connect Office 365`.4. Repeat for the `Microsoft Azure` application.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com/2. Click to expand `System` select `Settings` > `Cloud apps`.3. Scroll to `Connected apps` and select `App connectors`. 4. Ensure that **Microsoft 365** and **Microsoft Azure** both show in the list as `Connected`.5. Go to `Cloud Discovery` > `Microsoft Defender for Endpoint` and check if the integration is enabled.6. Go to `Information Protection` > `Files` and verify `Enable file monitoring` is checked.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Additional Microsoft 365 Defender features include:- The option to use Defender for cloud apps as a reverse proxy, allowing for the application of access or session controls through the definition of a conditional access policy.- The purchase and implementation of the \"App Governance\" add-on, which provides more precise control over OAuth app permissions and includes additional built-in policies.A list of Defender for Cloud Apps built-in policies for Office 365 can be found at https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/protect-office-365.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/protect-office-365#connect-microsoft-365-to-microsoft-defender-for-cloud-apps:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/protect-azure#connect-azure-to-microsoft-defender-for-cloud-apps:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/best-practices:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/get-started:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks", + "DefaultValue": "Disabled" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.4.4", + "Description": "Zero-hour auto purge (ZAP) is a protection feature that retroactively detects and neutralizes malware and high confidence phishing. When ZAP for Teams protection blocks a message, the message is blocked for everyone in the chat. The initial block happens right after delivery, but ZAP occurs up to 48 hours after delivery.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2.4", + "Profile": "E5 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Zero-hour auto purge (ZAP) is a protection feature that retroactively detects and neutralizes malware and high confidence phishing. When ZAP for Teams protection blocks a message, the message is blocked for everyone in the chat. The initial block happens right after delivery, but ZAP occurs up to 48 hours after delivery.", + "RationaleStatement": "ZAP is intended to protect users that have received zero-day malware messages or content that is weaponized after being delivered to users. It does this by continually monitoring spam and malware signatures taking automated retroactive action on messages that have already been delivered.", + "ImpactStatement": "As with any anti-malware or anti-phishing product, false positives may occur.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Defender` https://security.microsoft.com/2. Click to expand `System` select `Settings` > `Email & collaboration` > `Microsoft Teams protection`.3. Set `Zero-hour auto purge (ZAP)` to `On (Default)`**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following cmdlet:```Set-TeamsProtectionPolicy -Identity \"Teams Protection Policy\" -ZapEnabled $true```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Defender` https://security.microsoft.com/2. Click to expand `System` select `Settings` > `Email & collaboration` > `Microsoft Teams protection`.3. Ensure `Zero-hour auto purge (ZAP)` is set to `On (Default)`4. Under `Exclude these participants` review the list of exclusions and ensure they are justified and within tolerance for the organization.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following cmdlets:```Get-TeamsProtectionPolicy | fl ZapEnabledGet-TeamsProtectionPolicyRule | fl ExceptIf*```3. Ensure `ZapEnabled` is `True`.4. Review the list of exclusions and ensure they are justified and within tolerance for the organization. If nothing returns from the 2nd cmdlet then there are no exclusions defined.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/zero-hour-auto-purge?view=o365-worldwide#zero-hour-auto-purge-zap-in-microsoft-teams:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/mdo-support-teams-about?view=o365-worldwide#configure-zap-for-teams-protection-in-defender-for-office-365-plan-2", + "DefaultValue": "On (Default)" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.1.1", + "Description": "When audit log search is enabled in the Microsoft Purview compliance portal, user and admin activity within the organization is recorded in the audit log and retained for 90 days. However, some organizations may prefer to use a third-party security information and event management (SIEM) application to access their auditing data. In this scenario, a global admin can choose to turn off audit log search in Microsoft 365.", + "Checks": [ + "purview_audit_log_search_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "When audit log search is enabled in the Microsoft Purview compliance portal, user and admin activity within the organization is recorded in the audit log and retained for 90 days. However, some organizations may prefer to use a third-party security information and event management (SIEM) application to access their auditing data. In this scenario, a global admin can choose to turn off audit log search in Microsoft 365.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling audit log search in the Microsoft Purview compliance portal can help organizations improve their security posture, meet regulatory compliance requirements, respond to security incidents, and gain valuable operational insights.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Purview` https://compliance.microsoft.com.2. Select `Audit` to open the audit search.3. Click `Start recording user and admin activity` next to the information warning at the top.4. Click `Yes` on the dialog box to confirm.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Set-AdminAuditLogConfig -UnifiedAuditLogIngestionEnabled $true```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Purview` https://compliance.microsoft.com.2. Select `Audit` to open the audit search.3. Choose a date and time frame in the past 30 days.4. Verify search capabilities (e.g. try searching for Activities as `Accessed file` and results should be displayed).**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Get-AdminAuditLogConfig | Select-Object UnifiedAuditLogIngestionEnabled```3. Ensure `UnifiedAuditLogIngestionEnabled` is set to `True`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-enable-disable?view=o365-worldwide&tabs=microsoft-purview-portal:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-adminauditlogconfig?view=exchange-ps", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.2.1", + "Description": "Data Loss Prevention (DLP) policies allow Exchange Online and SharePoint Online content to be scanned for specific types of data like social security numbers, credit card numbers, or passwords.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Data Loss Prevention (DLP) policies allow Exchange Online and SharePoint Online content to be scanned for specific types of data like social security numbers, credit card numbers, or passwords.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling DLP policies alerts users and administrators that specific types of data should not be exposed, helping to protect the data from accidental exposure.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling a Teams DLP policy will allow sensitive data in Exchange Online and SharePoint Online to be detected or blocked. Always ensure to follow appropriate procedures during testing and implementation of DLP policies based on organizational standards.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Purview` https://compliance.microsoft.com.2. Under `Solutions` select `Data loss prevention` then `Policies`. 3. Click `Create policy`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Purview` https://compliance.microsoft.com.2. Under `Solutions` select `Data loss prevention` then `Policies`. 3. Verify that policies exist and are enabled.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/dlp-learn-about-dlp?view=o365-worldwide", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.2.2", + "Description": "The default Teams Data Loss Prevention (DLP) policy rule in Microsoft 365 is a preconfigured rule that is automatically applied to all Teams conversations and channels. The default rule helps prevent accidental sharing of sensitive information by detecting and blocking certain types of content that are deemed sensitive or inappropriate by the organization. By default, the rule includes a check for the sensitive info type _Credit Card Number_ which is pre-defined by Microsoft.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3.2", + "Profile": "E5 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "The default Teams Data Loss Prevention (DLP) policy rule in Microsoft 365 is a preconfigured rule that is automatically applied to all Teams conversations and channels. The default rule helps prevent accidental sharing of sensitive information by detecting and blocking certain types of content that are deemed sensitive or inappropriate by the organization. By default, the rule includes a check for the sensitive info type _Credit Card Number_ which is pre-defined by Microsoft.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling the default Teams DLP policy rule in Microsoft 365 helps protect an organization's sensitive information by preventing accidental sharing or leakage Credit Card information in Teams conversations and channels.DLP rules are not one size fits all, but at a minimum something should be defined. The organization should identify sensitive information important to them and seek to intercept it using DLP.", + "ImpactStatement": "End-users may be prevented from sharing certain types of content, which may require them to adjust their behavior or seek permission from administrators to share specific content. Administrators may receive requests from end-users for permission to share certain types of content or to modify the policy to better fit the needs of their teams.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Purview` compliance portal https://compliance.microsoft.com.2. Under `Solutions` select `Data loss prevention` then `Policies`. 3. Click `Policies` tab.4. Check `Default policy for Teams` then click `Edit policy`.5. The edit policy window will appear click Next6. At the `Choose locations to apply the policy` page, turn the status toggle to `On` for `Teams chat and channel messages` location and then click Next.7. On Customized advanced DLP rules page, ensure the `Default Teams DLP policy rule` Status is `On` and click Next.9. On the Policy mode page, select the radial for `Turn it on right away` and click Next.10. Review all the settings for the created policy on the Review your policy and create it page, and then click submit.11. Once the policy has been successfully submitted click Done.**Note:** Some tenants may not have a default policy for teams as Microsoft started creating these by default at a particular point in time. In this case a new policy will have to be created that includes a rule to protect data important to the organization such as credit cards and PII.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit the using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Purview` compliance portal https://compliance.microsoft.com.2. Under `Solutions` select `Data loss prevention` then `Policies`. 3. Locate the `Default policy for Teams`.4. Verify the `Status` is `On`.5. Verify `Locations` include `Teams chat and channel messages - All accounts`.6. Verify `Policy settings` incudes the Default Teams DLP policy rule or one specific to the organization.**Note:** If there is not a default policy for teams inspect existing policies starting with step 4. DLP rules are specific to the organization and each organization should take steps to protect the data that matters to them. The default teams DLP rule will only alert on Credit Card matches.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to the Security & Compliance PowerShell using `Connect-IPPSSession`.2. Run the following to return policies that include Teams chat and channel messages:```$DlpPolicy = Get-DlpCompliancePolicy$DlpPolicy | Where-Object {$_.Workload -match \"Teams\"} | ft Name,Mode,TeamsLocation*```3. If nothing returns then there are no policies that include Teams and remediation is required.4. For any returned policy verify `Mode` is set to `Enable`.5. Verify `TeamsLocation` includes `All`.6. Verify `TeamsLocationException` includes only permitted exceptions. **Note:** Some tenants may not have a default policy for teams as Microsoft started creating these by default at a particular point in time. In this case a new policy will have to be created that includes a rule to protect data important to the organization such as credit cards and PII.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/exchange/connect-to-scc-powershell?view=exchange-ps:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/dlp-teams-default-policy:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/connect-ippssession?view=exchange-ps", + "DefaultValue": "Enabled (On)" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.3.1", + "Description": "SharePoint Online Data Classification Policies enables organizations to classify and label content in SharePoint Online based on its sensitivity and business impact. This setting helps organizations to manage and protect sensitive data by automatically applying labels to content, which can then be used to apply policy-based protection and governance controls.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3.3", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "SharePoint Online Data Classification Policies enables organizations to classify and label content in SharePoint Online based on its sensitivity and business impact. This setting helps organizations to manage and protect sensitive data by automatically applying labels to content, which can then be used to apply policy-based protection and governance controls.", + "RationaleStatement": "By categorizing and applying policy-based protection, SharePoint Online Data Classification Policies can help reduce the risk of data loss or exposure and enable more effective incident response if a breach does occur.", + "ImpactStatement": "The creation of data classification policies is unlikely to have a significant impact on an organization. However, maintaining long-term adherence to policies may require ongoing training and compliance efforts across the organization. Therefore, organizations should include training and compliance planning as part of the data classification policy creation process.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Purview` compliance portal https://compliance.microsoft.com.2. Under `Solutions` select `Information protection`.3. Click on the `Label policies` tab.4. Click `Create a label` to create a label.5. Select the label and click on the `Publish label`.6. Fill out the forms to create the policy.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Purview` compliance portal https://compliance.microsoft.com.2. Under `Solutions` select `Information protection`.3. Click on the `Label policies` tab.4. Ensure that a Label policy exists and is published accordingly.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/data-classification-overview?view=o365-worldwide#top-sensitivity-labels-applied-to-content:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/sensitivity-labels-sharepoint-onedrive-files", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.1.1", + "Description": "Security defaults in Microsoft Entra ID make it easier to be secure and help protect the organization. Security defaults contain preconfigured security settings for common attacks.By default, Microsoft enables security defaults. The goal is to ensure that all organizations have a basic level of security enabled. The security default setting is manipulated in the Entra admin center.The use of security defaults, however, will prohibit custom settings which are being set with more advanced settings from this benchmark.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.1.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Security defaults in Microsoft Entra ID make it easier to be secure and help protect the organization. Security defaults contain preconfigured security settings for common attacks.By default, Microsoft enables security defaults. The goal is to ensure that all organizations have a basic level of security enabled. The security default setting is manipulated in the Entra admin center.The use of security defaults, however, will prohibit custom settings which are being set with more advanced settings from this benchmark.", + "RationaleStatement": "Security defaults provide secure default settings that are managed on behalf of organizations to keep customers safe until they are ready to manage their own identity security settings.For example, doing the following:- Requiring all users and admins to register for MFA.- Challenging users with MFA - mostly when they show up on a new device or app, but more often for critical roles and tasks.- Disabling authentication from legacy authentication clients, which can’t do MFA.", + "ImpactStatement": "The potential impact associated with disabling of Security Defaults is dependent upon the security controls implemented in the environment. It is likely that most organizations disabling Security Defaults plan to implement equivalent controls to replace Security Defaults.It may be necessary to check settings in other Microsoft products, such as Azure, to ensure settings and functionality are as expected when disabling security defaults for MS365.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to the `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Click to expand `Identity` select `Overview`3. Click `Properties`.4. Click `Manage security defaults`.5. Set the `Security defaults` dropdown to `Disabled`.6. Select Save.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to the Microsoft Graph service using `Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.ReadWrite.ConditionalAccess\"`.2. Run the following Microsoft Graph PowerShell command:```$params = @{ IsEnabled = $false }Update-MgPolicyIdentitySecurityDefaultEnforcementPolicy -BodyParameter $params```**Warning:** It is recommended not to disable security defaults until you are ready to implement conditional access rules in the benchmark. Rules such as requiring MFA for all users and blocking legacy protocols are required in CA to make up for the gap created by disabling defaults. Plan accordingly. See the reference section for more details on what coverage Security Defaults provide.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Click to expand `Identity` select `Overview`3. Click `Properties`.3. Review the section **Security Defaults** near the bottom4. If `Manage security defaults` appears clickable then proceed to the remediation section, otherwise read the note below.**Note:** If `Manage Conditional Access` appears in blue then Security defaults are already disabled, and CA is in use. The audit can be considered a Pass.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to the Microsoft Graph service using `Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.Read.All\"`.2. Run the following Microsoft Graph PowerShell command:```Get-MgPolicyIdentitySecurityDefaultEnforcementPolicy | ft IsEnabled ```3. If the value is false then Security Defaults is disabled.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/security-defaults:https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-entra-blog/introducing-security-defaults/ba-p/1061414", + "DefaultValue": "Enabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.2.1", + "Description": "Legacy per-user Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) can be configured to require individual users to provide multiple authentication factors, such as passwords and additional verification codes, to access their accounts. It was introduced in earlier versions of Office 365, prior to the more comprehensive implementation of Conditional Access (CA).", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.1.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Legacy per-user Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) can be configured to require individual users to provide multiple authentication factors, such as passwords and additional verification codes, to access their accounts. It was introduced in earlier versions of Office 365, prior to the more comprehensive implementation of Conditional Access (CA).", + "RationaleStatement": "Both security defaults and conditional access with security defaults turned off are not compatible with per-user multi-factor authentication (MFA), which can lead to undesirable user authentication states. The CIS Microsoft 365 Benchmark explicitly employs Conditional Access for MFA as an enhancement over security defaults and as a replacement for the outdated per-user MFA. To ensure a consistent authentication state disable per-user MFA on all accounts.", + "ImpactStatement": "Accounts using per-user MFA will need to be migrated to use CA.Prior to disabling per-user MFA the organization must be prepared to implement conditional access MFA to avoid security gaps and allow for a smooth transition. This will help ensure relevant accounts are covered by MFA during the change phase from disabling per-user MFA to enabling CA MFA. Section 5.2.2 in this document covers creating of a CA rule for both administrators and all users in the tenant.Microsoft has documentation on migrating from per-user MFA [Convert users from per-user MFA to Conditional Access based MFA](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/authentication/howto-mfa-getstarted#convert-users-from-per-user-mfa-to-conditional-access-based-mfa)", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity` > `Users` select `All users`.3. Click on `Per-user MFA` on the top row.4. Click the empty box next to `Display Name` to select all accounts.5. On the far right under _quick steps_ click `Disable`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity` > `Users` select `All users`.3. Click on `Per-user MFA` on the top row.4. Ensure under the column `Multi-factor Auth Status` that each account is set to `Disabled`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-mfa-userstates#convert-users-from-per-user-mfa-to-conditional-access:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/security-and-compliance/set-up-multi-factor-authentication?view=o365-worldwide#use-conditional-access-policies:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-mfa-userstates#convert-per-user-mfa-enabled-and-enforced-users-to-disabled", + "DefaultValue": "Disabled" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.2.2", + "Description": "App registration allows users to register custom-developed applications for use within the directory.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_thirdparty_integrated_apps_not_allowed" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.1.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "App registration allows users to register custom-developed applications for use within the directory.", + "RationaleStatement": "Third-party integrated applications connection to services should be disabled unless there is a very clear value and robust security controls are in place. While there are legitimate uses, attackers can grant access from breached accounts to third party applications to exfiltrate data from your tenancy without having to maintain the breached account.", + "ImpactStatement": "Implementation of this change will impact both end users and administrators. End users will not be able to integrate third-party applications that they may wish to use. Administrators are likely to receive requests from end users to grant them permission to necessary third-party applications.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity` > `Users` select `Users settings`.3. Set `Users can register applications` to `No`.4. Click Save.**To remediate using PowerShell:** 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using `Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.ReadWrite.Authorization\"`2. Run the following commands:```$param = @{ AllowedToCreateApps = \"$false\" }Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -DefaultUserRolePermissions $param```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity` > `Users` select `Users settings`.3. Verify `Users can register applications` is set to `No`.**To audit using PowerShell:** 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using `Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.Read.All\"`2. Run the following command:```(Get-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy).DefaultUserRolePermissions | fl AllowedToCreateApps```3. Ensure the returned value is `False`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/how-applications-are-added", + "DefaultValue": "Yes (Users can register applications.)" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.2.3", + "Description": "Non-privileged users can create tenants in the Entra administration portal under Manage tenant. The creation of a tenant is recorded in the Audit log as category \"DirectoryManagement\" and activity \"Create Company\". Anyone who creates a tenant becomes the Global Administrator of that tenant. The newly created tenant doesn't inherit any settings or configurations.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_policy_ensure_default_user_cannot_create_tenants" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.1.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Non-privileged users can create tenants in the Entra administration portal under Manage tenant. The creation of a tenant is recorded in the Audit log as category \"DirectoryManagement\" and activity \"Create Company\". Anyone who creates a tenant becomes the Global Administrator of that tenant. The newly created tenant doesn't inherit any settings or configurations.", + "RationaleStatement": "Restricting tenant creation prevents unauthorized or uncontrolled deployment of resources and ensures that the organization retains control over its infrastructure. User generation of shadow IT could lead to multiple, disjointed environments that can make it difficult for IT to manage and secure the organization's data, especially if other users in the organization began using these tenants for business purposes under the misunderstanding that they were secured by the organization's security team.", + "ImpactStatement": "Non-admin users will need to contact I.T. if they have a valid reason to create a tenant.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/2. Click to expand `Identity`> `Users` > `User settings`.3. Set `Restrict non-admin users from creating tenants` to `Yes` then `Save`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using `Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.ReadWrite.Authorization\"`2. Run the following commands:```# Create hashtable and update the auth policy$params = @{ AllowedToCreateTenants = $false }Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -DefaultUserRolePermissions $params```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/2. Click to expand `Identity`> `Users` > `User settings`.3. Ensure `Restrict non-admin users from creating tenants` is set to `Yes`**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using `Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.Read.All\"`2. Run the following commands:```(Get-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy).DefaultUserRolePermissions | Select-Object AllowedToCreateTenants```3. Ensure the returned value is `False`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/users-default-permissions#restrict-member-users-default-permissions", + "DefaultValue": "No - Non-administrators can create tenants.`AllowedToCreateTenants` is `True`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.2.4", + "Description": "Restrict non-privileged users from signing into the Microsoft Entra admin center.**Note:** This recommendation only affects access to the web portal. It does not prevent privileged users from using other methods such as Rest API or PowerShell to obtain information. Those channels are addressed elsewhere in this document.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.1.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Restrict non-privileged users from signing into the Microsoft Entra admin center.**Note:** This recommendation only affects access to the web portal. It does not prevent privileged users from using other methods such as Rest API or PowerShell to obtain information. Those channels are addressed elsewhere in this document.", + "RationaleStatement": "The Microsoft Entra admin center contains sensitive data and permission settings, which are still enforced based on the user's role. However, an end user may inadvertently change properties or account settings that could result in increased administrative overhead. Additionally, a compromised end user account could be used by a malicious attacker as a means to gather additional information and escalate an attack.**Note:** Users will still be able to sign into Microsoft Entra admin center but will be unable to see directory information.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/2. Click to expand `Identity`> `Users` > `User settings`.3. Set `Restrict access to Microsoft Entra admin center` to `Yes` then `Save`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/2. Click to expand `Identity`> `Users` > `User settings`.3. Verify under the **Administration center** section that `Restrict access to Microsoft Entra admin center` is set to `Yes`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/users-default-permissions#restrict-member-users-default-permissions", + "DefaultValue": "No - Non-administrators can access the Microsoft Entra admin center." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.2.5", + "Description": "The option for the user to `Stay signed in`, or the `Keep me signed in` option, will prompt a user after a successful login. When the user selects this option, a persistent refresh token is created. The refresh token lasts for 90 days by default and does not prompt for sign-in or multifactor.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.1.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "The option for the user to `Stay signed in`, or the `Keep me signed in` option, will prompt a user after a successful login. When the user selects this option, a persistent refresh token is created. The refresh token lasts for 90 days by default and does not prompt for sign-in or multifactor.", + "RationaleStatement": "Allowing users to select this option presents risk, especially if the user signs into their account on a publicly accessible computer/web browser. In this case it would be trivial for an unauthorized person to gain access to any associated cloud data from that account.", + "ImpactStatement": "Once this setting is hidden users will no longer be prompted upon sign-in with the message `Stay signed in?`. This may mean users will be forced to sign in more frequently. Important: some features of SharePoint Online and Office 2010 have a dependency on users remaining signed in. If you hide this option, users may get additional and unexpected sign in prompts.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity`> `Users` > `User settings`.3. Set `Show keep user signed in` to `No`.4. Click `Save`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity`> `Users` > `User settings`.3. Ensure `Show keep user signed in` is highlighted `No`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concepts-azure-multi-factor-authentication-prompts-session-lifetime:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/how-to-manage-stay-signed-in-prompt", + "DefaultValue": "Users may select `stay signed in`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.2.6", + "Description": "LinkedIn account connections allow users to connect their Microsoft work or school account with LinkedIn. After a user connects their accounts, information and highlights from LinkedIn are available in some Microsoft apps and services.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.1.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "LinkedIn account connections allow users to connect their Microsoft work or school account with LinkedIn. After a user connects their accounts, information and highlights from LinkedIn are available in some Microsoft apps and services.", + "RationaleStatement": "Disabling LinkedIn integration prevents potential phishing attacks and risk scenarios where an external party could accidentally disclose sensitive information.", + "ImpactStatement": "Users will not be able to sync contacts or use LinkedIn integration.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity` > `Users` select `User settings`.3. Under `LinkedIn account connections` select `No`.4. Click `Save`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity` > `Users` select `User settings`.3. Under `LinkedIn account connections` ensure `No` is highlighted.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/users/linkedin-integration:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/users/linkedin-user-consent", + "DefaultValue": "LinkedIn integration is enabled by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.3.1", + "Description": "A dynamic group is a dynamic configuration of security group membership for Microsoft Entra ID. Administrators can set rules to populate groups that are created in Entra ID based on user attributes (such as userType, department, or country/region). Members can be automatically added to or removed from a security group based on their attributes.The recommended state is to create a dynamic group that includes guest accounts.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_dynamic_group_for_guests_created" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.1.3", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "A dynamic group is a dynamic configuration of security group membership for Microsoft Entra ID. Administrators can set rules to populate groups that are created in Entra ID based on user attributes (such as userType, department, or country/region). Members can be automatically added to or removed from a security group based on their attributes.The recommended state is to create a dynamic group that includes guest accounts.", + "RationaleStatement": "Dynamic groups allow for an automated method to assign group membership.Guest user accounts will be automatically added to this group and through this existing conditional access rules, access controls and other security measures will ensure that new guest accounts are restricted in the same manner as existing guest accounts.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity` > `Groups` select `All groups`.3. Select `New group` and assign the following values: - Group type: `Security` - Microsoft Entra roles can be assigned to the group: `No` - Membership type: `Dynamic User`4. Select `Add dynamic query`.5. Above the `Rule syntax` text box, select `Edit`. 6. Place the following expression in the box:```(user.userType -eq \"Guest\")```7. Select `OK` and `Save`**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using `Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Group.ReadWrite.All\"`2. In the script below edit `DisplayName` and `MailNickname` as needed and run:```$params = @{ DisplayName = \"Dynamic Test Group\" MailNickname = \"DynGuestUsers\" MailEnabled = $false SecurityEnabled = $true GroupTypes = \"DynamicMembership\" MembershipRule = '(user.userType -eq \"Guest\")' MembershipRuleProcessingState = \"On\"}New-MgGroup @params```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity` > `Groups` select `All groups`.3. On the right of the search field click `Add filter`.4. Set `Filter` to `Membership type` and `Value` to `Dynamic` then apply.5. Identify a dynamic group and select it.6. Under manage, select `Dynamic membership rules` and ensure the rule syntax contains `(user.userType -eq \"Guest\")`7. If necessary, inspect other dynamic groups for the value above.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using `Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Group.Read.All\"`2. Run the following commands:```$groups = Get-MgGroup | Where-Object { $_.GroupTypes -contains \"DynamicMembership\" }$groups | ft DisplayName,GroupTypes,MembershipRule```3. Look for a dynamic group containing the rule `(user.userType -eq \"Guest\")`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/users/groups-create-rule:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/users/groups-dynamic-membership:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/external-id/use-dynamic-groups", + "DefaultValue": "Undefined" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.5.1", + "Description": "Control when end users and group owners are allowed to grant consent to applications, and when they will be required to request administrator review and approval. Allowing users to grant apps access to data helps them acquire useful applications and be productive but can represent a risk in some situations if it's not monitored and controlled carefully.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_policy_restricts_user_consent_for_apps" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.1.5", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Control when end users and group owners are allowed to grant consent to applications, and when they will be required to request administrator review and approval. Allowing users to grant apps access to data helps them acquire useful applications and be productive but can represent a risk in some situations if it's not monitored and controlled carefully.", + "RationaleStatement": "Attackers commonly use custom applications to trick users into granting them access to company data. Disabling future user consent operations setting mitigates this risk and helps to reduce the threat-surface. If user consent is disabled previous consent grants will still be honored but all future consent operations must be performed by an administrator.", + "ImpactStatement": "If user consent is disabled, previous consent grants will still be honored but all future consent operations must be performed by an administrator. Tenant-wide admin consent can be requested by users through an integrated administrator consent request workflow or through organizational support processes.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity` > `Applications` select `Enterprise applications`.3. Under `Security` select `Consent and permissions` > `User consent settings`.4. Under `User consent for applications` select `Do not allow user consent`.5. Click the `Save` option at the top of the window.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity` > `Applications` select `Enterprise applications`.3. Under `Security` select `Consent and permissions` > `User consent settings`.4. Verify `User consent for applications` is set to `Do not allow user consent`.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using `Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.Read.All\"`2. Run the following command:```(Get-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy).DefaultUserRolePermissions | Select-Object -ExpandProperty PermissionGrantPoliciesAssigned```3. Ensure `ManagePermissionGrantsForSelf.microsoft-user-default-low` is not present OR that nothing is returned.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/enterprise-apps/configure-user-consent?pivots=portal", + "DefaultValue": "UI - `Allow user consent for apps`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.5.2", + "Description": "The admin consent workflow gives admins a secure way to grant access to applications that require admin approval. When a user tries to access an application but is unable to provide consent, they can send a request for admin approval. The request is sent via email to admins who have been designated as reviewers. A reviewer takes action on the request, and the user is notified of the action.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_admin_consent_workflow_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.1.5", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "The admin consent workflow gives admins a secure way to grant access to applications that require admin approval. When a user tries to access an application but is unable to provide consent, they can send a request for admin approval. The request is sent via email to admins who have been designated as reviewers. A reviewer takes action on the request, and the user is notified of the action.", + "RationaleStatement": "The admin consent workflow (Preview) gives admins a secure way to grant access to applications that require admin approval. When a user tries to access an application but is unable to provide consent, they can send a request for admin approval. The request is sent via email to admins who have been designated as reviewers. A reviewer acts on the request, and the user is notified of the action.", + "ImpactStatement": "To approve requests, a reviewer must be a global administrator, cloud application administrator, or application administrator. The reviewer must already have one of these admin roles assigned; simply designating them as a reviewer doesn't elevate their privileges.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity` > `Applications` select `Enterprise applications`.3. Under Security select `Consent and permissions`.4. Under Manage select `Admin consent settings`.5. Set `Users can request admin consent to apps they are unable to consent to", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity` > `Applications` select `Enterprise applications`.3. Under Security select `Consent and permissions`.4. Under Manage select `Admin consent settings`.5. Verify that `Users can request admin consent to apps they are unable to consent to", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/enterprise-apps/configure-admin-consent-workflow", + "DefaultValue": "'- `Users can request admin consent to apps they are unable to consent to`: `No`- `Selected users to review admin consent requests`: `None`- `Selected users will receive email notifications for requests`: `Yes`- `Selected users will receive request expiration reminders`: `Yes`- `Consent request expires after (days)`: `30`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.6.1", + "Description": "B2B collaboration is a feature within Microsoft Entra External ID that allows for guest invitations to an organization.Ensure users can only send invitations to `specified domains`.**Note:** This list works independently from OneDrive for Business and SharePoint Online allow/block lists. To restrict individual file sharing in SharePoint Online, set up an allow or blocklist for OneDrive for Business and SharePoint Online. For instance, in SharePoint or OneDrive users can still share with external users from prohibited domains by using Anyone links if they haven't been disabled.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.1.6", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "B2B collaboration is a feature within Microsoft Entra External ID that allows for guest invitations to an organization.Ensure users can only send invitations to `specified domains`.**Note:** This list works independently from OneDrive for Business and SharePoint Online allow/block lists. To restrict individual file sharing in SharePoint Online, set up an allow or blocklist for OneDrive for Business and SharePoint Online. For instance, in SharePoint or OneDrive users can still share with external users from prohibited domains by using Anyone links if they haven't been disabled.", + "RationaleStatement": "By specifying allowed domains for collaborations, external user's companies are explicitly identified. Also, this prevents internal users from inviting unknown external users such as personal accounts and granting them access to resources.", + "ImpactStatement": "This could make harder collaboration if the setting is not quickly updated when a new domain is identified as \"allowed\".", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity` > `External Identities` select `External collaboration settings`.3. Under **Collaboration restrictions**, select `Allow invitations only to the specified domains (most restrictive)` is selected. Then specify the allowed domains under `Target domains`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity` > `External Identities` select `External collaboration settings`.3. Under **Collaboration restrictions**, verify that `Allow invitations only to the specified domains (most restrictive)` is selected. Then verify allowed domains are specified under `Target domains`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/external-id/allow-deny-list:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/external-id/what-is-b2b", + "DefaultValue": "Allow invitations to be sent to any domain (most inclusive)" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.6.2", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra ID, part of Microsoft Entra, allows you to restrict what external guest users can see in their organization in Microsoft Entra ID. Guest users are set to a limited permission level by default in Microsoft Entra ID, while the default for member users is the full set of user permissions. These directory level permissions are enforced across Microsoft Entra services including Microsoft Graph, PowerShell v2, the Azure portal, and My Apps portal. Microsoft 365 services leveraging Microsoft 365 groups for collaboration scenarios are also affected, specifically Outlook, Microsoft Teams, and SharePoint. They do not override the SharePoint or Microsoft Teams guest settings.The recommended state is at least `Guest users have limited access to properties and memberships of directory objects` or more restrictive.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_policy_guest_users_access_restrictions" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.1.6", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra ID, part of Microsoft Entra, allows you to restrict what external guest users can see in their organization in Microsoft Entra ID. Guest users are set to a limited permission level by default in Microsoft Entra ID, while the default for member users is the full set of user permissions. These directory level permissions are enforced across Microsoft Entra services including Microsoft Graph, PowerShell v2, the Azure portal, and My Apps portal. Microsoft 365 services leveraging Microsoft 365 groups for collaboration scenarios are also affected, specifically Outlook, Microsoft Teams, and SharePoint. They do not override the SharePoint or Microsoft Teams guest settings.The recommended state is at least `Guest users have limited access to properties and memberships of directory objects` or more restrictive.", + "RationaleStatement": "By limiting guest access to the _most restrictive_ state this helps prevent malicious group and user object enumeration in the Microsoft 365 environment. This first step, known as _reconnaissance_ in The Cyber Kill Chain, is often conducted by attackers prior to more advanced targeted attacks.", + "ImpactStatement": "The default is `Guest users have limited access to properties and memberships of directory objects`. When using the 'most restrictive' setting, guests will only be able to access their own profiles and will not be allowed to see other users' profiles, groups, or group memberships.There are some known issues with Yammer that will prevent guests that are signed in from leaving the group.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity` > `External Identities` select `External collaboration settings`.3. Under **Guest user access** set `Guest user access restrictions` to one of the following: - State: `Guest users have limited access to properties and memberships of directory objects` - State: `Guest user access is restricted to properties and memberships of their own directory objects (most restrictive)`**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using `Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.ReadWrite.Authorization\"`2. Run the following command to set the guest user access restrictions to default:```# Guest users have limited access to properties and memberships of directory objectsUpdate-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -GuestUserRoleId '10dae51f-b6af-4016-8d66-8c2a99b929b3'```3. Or, run the following command to set it to the \"most restrictive\":```# Guest user access is restricted to properties and memberships of their own directory objects (most restrictive)Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -GuestUserRoleId '2af84b1e-32c8-42b7-82bc-daa82404023b'```**Note:** Either setting allows for a passing state.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity` > `External Identities` select `External collaboration settings`.3. Under **Guest user access** verify that `Guest user access restrictions` is set to one of the following: - State: `Guest users have limited access to properties and memberships of directory objects` - State: `Guest user access is restricted to properties and memberships of their own directory objects (most restrictive)`**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using `Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.Read.All\"`2. Run the following command:```Get-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy | fl GuestUserRoleId```3. Ensure the value returned is `10dae51f-b6af-4016-8d66-8c2a99b929b3` or `2af84b1e-32c8-42b7-82bc-daa82404023b` (most restrictive)**Note:** Either setting allows for a passing state.**Note 2:** The value of `a0b1b346-4d3e-4e8b-98f8-753987be4970` is equal to `Guest users have the same access as members (most inclusive)` and should not be used.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/users/users-restrict-guest-permissions:https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/capabilities/cyber/cyber-kill-chain.html", + "DefaultValue": "'- UI: `Guest users have limited access to properties and memberships of directory objects` - PowerShell: `10dae51f-b6af-4016-8d66-8c2a99b929b3`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.6.3", + "Description": "By default, all users in the organization, including B2B collaboration guest users, can invite external users to B2B collaboration. The ability to send invitations can be limited by turning it on or off for everyone, or by restricting invitations to certain roles.The recommended state for guest invite restrictions is `Only users assigned to specific admin roles can invite guest users`.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_policy_guest_invite_only_for_admin_roles" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.1.6", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "By default, all users in the organization, including B2B collaboration guest users, can invite external users to B2B collaboration. The ability to send invitations can be limited by turning it on or off for everyone, or by restricting invitations to certain roles.The recommended state for guest invite restrictions is `Only users assigned to specific admin roles can invite guest users`.", + "RationaleStatement": "Restricting who can invite guests limits the exposure the organization might face from unauthorized accounts.", + "ImpactStatement": "This introduces an obstacle to collaboration by restricting who can invite guest users to the organization. Designated Guest Inviters must be assigned, and an approval process established and clearly communicated to all users.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity` > `External Identities` select `External collaboration settings`.3. Under **Guest invite settings** set `Guest invite restrictions` to `Only users assigned to specific admin roles can invite guest users`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using `Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.ReadWrite.Authorization\"`2. Run the following command:```Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -AllowInvitesFrom 'adminsAndGuestInviters'```**Note:** The more restrictive position of the value will also pass audit, it is however not required.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity` > `External Identities` select `External collaboration settings`.3. Under **Guest invite settings** verify that `Guest invite restrictions` is set to `Only users assigned to specific admin roles can invite guest users` or more restrictive.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using `Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.Read.All\"`2. Run the following command:```Get-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy | fl AllowInvitesFrom```3. Ensure the value returned is `adminsAndGuestInviters` or more restrictive.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/external-id/external-collaboration-settings-configure:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference#guest-inviter", + "DefaultValue": "'- UI: `Anyone in the organization can invite guest users including guests and non-admins (most inclusive)` - PowerShell: `everyone`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.8.1", + "Description": "Password hash synchronization is one of the sign-in methods used to accomplish hybrid identity synchronization. Microsoft Entra Connect synchronizes a hash, of the hash, of a user's password from an on-premises Active Directory instance to a cloud-based Entra ID instance.**Note:** Audit and remediation procedures in this recommendation only apply to Microsoft 365 tenants operating in a hybrid configuration using Entra Connect sync, and does not apply to federated domains.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_password_hash_sync_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.1.8", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Password hash synchronization is one of the sign-in methods used to accomplish hybrid identity synchronization. Microsoft Entra Connect synchronizes a hash, of the hash, of a user's password from an on-premises Active Directory instance to a cloud-based Entra ID instance.**Note:** Audit and remediation procedures in this recommendation only apply to Microsoft 365 tenants operating in a hybrid configuration using Entra Connect sync, and does not apply to federated domains.", + "RationaleStatement": "Password hash synchronization helps by reducing the number of passwords your users need to maintain to just one and enables leaked credential detection for your hybrid accounts. Leaked credential protection is leveraged through Entra ID Protection and is a subset of that feature which can help identify if an organization's user account passwords have appeared on the dark web or public spaces.Using other options for your directory synchronization may be less resilient as Microsoft can still process sign-ins to 365 with Hash Sync even if a network connection to your on-premises environment is not available.", + "ImpactStatement": "Compliance or regulatory restrictions may exist, depending on the organization's business sector, that preclude hashed versions of passwords from being securely transmitted to cloud data centers.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the on-prem Microsoft Entra Connect tool:**1. Log in to the on premises server that hosts the Microsoft Entra Connect tool2. Double-click the `Azure AD Connect` icon that was created on the desktop3. Click `Configure`.4. On the `Additional tasks` page, select `Customize synchronization options` and click `Next`.5. Enter the username and password for your global administrator. 6. On the `Connect your directories` screen, click `Next`.7. On the `Domain and OU filtering` screen, click `Next`.8. On the `Optional features` screen, check `Password hash synchronization` and click `Next`. 9. On the `Ready to configure` screen click `Configure`.10. Once the configuration completes, click `Exit`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity` > `Hybrid management` > `Microsoft Entra Connect`.3. Select `Connect Sync`4. Under **Microsoft Entra Connect sync**, verify Password Hash Sync is `Enabled`.**To audit for the on-prem tool:**1. Log in to the server that hosts the Microsoft Entra Connect tool.2. Run `Azure AD Connect`, and then click `Configure` and `View or export current configuration`.3. Determine whether `PASSWORD HASH SYNCHRONIZATION` is enabled on your tenant.**This information is also available via the Microsoft Graph Security API:** ```GET https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/security/secureScores```**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to the Microsoft Graph service using `Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Organization.Read.All\"`.2. Run the following Microsoft Graph PowerShell command:```Get-MgOrganization | ft OnPremisesSyncEnabled```3. If nothing returns then password sync is not enabled for the on premises AD.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/whatis-phs:https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=47594", + "DefaultValue": "'- Microsoft Entra Connect sync `disabled` by default - Password Hash Sync is Microsoft's recommended setting for new deployments" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.1", + "Description": "Multifactor authentication is a process that requires an additional form of identification during the sign-in process, such as a code from a mobile device or a fingerprint scan, to enhance security.Ensure users in administrator roles have MFA capabilities enabled.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_admin_users_mfa_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.2.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Multifactor authentication is a process that requires an additional form of identification during the sign-in process, such as a code from a mobile device or a fingerprint scan, to enhance security.Ensure users in administrator roles have MFA capabilities enabled.", + "RationaleStatement": "Multifactor authentication requires an individual to present a minimum of two separate forms of authentication before access is granted. Multifactor authentication provides additional assurance that the individual attempting to gain access is who they claim to be. With multifactor authentication, an attacker would need to compromise at least two different authentication mechanisms, increasing the difficulty of compromise and thus reducing the risk.", + "ImpactStatement": "Implementation of multifactor authentication for all users in administrative roles will necessitate a change to user routine. All users in administrative roles will be required to enroll in multifactor authentication using phone, SMS, or an authentication application. After enrollment, use of multifactor authentication will be required for future access to the environment.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to the `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com.2. Click expand `Protection` > `Conditional Access` select `Policies`.3. Click `New policy`. - Under `Users` include `Select users and groups` and check `Directory roles`. - At a minimum, include the directory roles listed below in this section of the document. - Under `Target resources` include `All cloud apps` and do not create any exclusions. - Under `Grant` select `Grant Access` and check `Require multifactor authentication`. - Click `Select` at the bottom of the pane.4. Under `Enable policy` set it to `Report Only` until the organization is ready to enable it.5. Click `Create`.**At minimum these directory roles should be included for MFA:**- Application administrator- Authentication administrator- Billing administrator- Cloud application administrator- Conditional Access administrator- Exchange administrator- Global administrator- Global reader- Helpdesk administrator- Password administrator- Privileged authentication administrator- Privileged role administrator- Security administrator- SharePoint administrator- User administrator**Note:** Report-only is an acceptable first stage when introducing any CA policy. The control, however, is not complete until the policy is on.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to the `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Protection` > `Conditional Access` select `Policies`.3. Ensure that a policy exists with the following criteria and is set to `On`: - Under `Users` verify `Directory roles` specific to administrators are included. - Under `Target resources` verify `All cloud apps` is selected with no exclusions. - Under `Grant` verify `Grant Access` and `Require multifactor authentication` checked.4. Ensure `Enable policy` is set to `On`.**To audit using SecureScore:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com.2. Select `Secure score`.3. Select `Recommended actions`.4. Click on `Ensure multifactor authentication is enabled for all users in administrative roles`. 5. Review the number of Admin users who do not have MFA configured. **This information is also available via the Microsoft Graph Security API:**```GET https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/security/secureScores```**Note:** A list of required `Directory roles` can be found in the Remediation section.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/howto-conditional-access-policy-admin-mfa", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.2", + "Description": "Enable multifactor authentication for all users in the Microsoft 365 tenant. Users will be prompted to authenticate with a second factor upon logging in to Microsoft 365 services. The second factor is most commonly a text message to a registered mobile phone number where they type in an authorization code, or with a mobile application like Microsoft Authenticator.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_users_mfa_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.2.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Enable multifactor authentication for all users in the Microsoft 365 tenant. Users will be prompted to authenticate with a second factor upon logging in to Microsoft 365 services. The second factor is most commonly a text message to a registered mobile phone number where they type in an authorization code, or with a mobile application like Microsoft Authenticator.", + "RationaleStatement": "Multifactor authentication requires an individual to present a minimum of two separate forms of authentication before access is granted. Multifactor authentication provides additional assurance that the individual attempting to gain access is who they claim to be. With multifactor authentication, an attacker would need to compromise at least two different authentication mechanisms, increasing the difficulty of compromise and thus reducing the risk.", + "ImpactStatement": "Implementation of multifactor authentication for all users will necessitate a change to user routine. All users will be required to enroll in multifactor authentication using phone, SMS, or an authentication application. After enrollment, use of multifactor authentication will be required for future authentication to the environment.**Note:** Organizations that have difficulty enforcing MFA globally due lack of the budget to provide company owned mobile devices to every user, or equally are unable to force end users to use their personal devices due to regulations, unions, or policy have another option. FIDO2 Security keys may be used as a stand in for this recommendation. They are more secure, phishing resistant, and are affordable for an organization to issue to every end user.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to the `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com.2. Click expand `Protection` > `Conditional Access` select `Policies`.3. Click `New policy`. - Under `Users` include `All users` (and do not exclude any user). - Under `Target resources` include `All cloud apps` and do not create any exclusions. - Under `Grant` select `Grant Access` and check `Require multifactor authentication`. - Click `Select` at the bottom of the pane.4. Under `Enable policy` set it to `Report Only` until the organization is ready to enable it.5. Click `Create`.**Note:** Report-only is an acceptable first stage when introducing any CA policy. The control, however, is not complete until the policy is on.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to the `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com.2. Click expand `Protection` > `Conditional Access` select `Policies`.3. Ensure that a policy exists with the following criteria and is set to `On`: - Under `Users` verify `All users` is included. - Under `Target resources` verify `All cloud apps` is selected with no exclusions. - Under `Grant` verify `Grant Access` and `Require multifactor authentication` checked.4. Ensure `Enable policy` is set to `On`.**To audit using SecureScore:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com.2. Select `Secure score`.3. Select `Recommended actions`.4. Click on `Ensure multifactor authentication is enabled for all users`. 5. Review the list of users who do not have MFA configured.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/howto-conditional-access-policy-all-users-mfa", + "DefaultValue": "Disabled" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.3", + "Description": "Entra ID supports the most widely used authentication and authorization protocols including legacy authentication. This authentication pattern includes basic authentication, a widely used industry-standard method for collecting username and password information.The following messaging protocols support legacy authentication:- Authenticated SMTP - Used to send authenticated email messages.- Autodiscover - Used by Outlook and EAS clients to find and connect to mailboxes in Exchange Online.- Exchange ActiveSync (EAS) - Used to connect to mailboxes in Exchange Online.- Exchange Online PowerShell - Used to connect to Exchange Online with remote PowerShell. If you block Basic authentication for Exchange Online PowerShell, you need to use the Exchange Online PowerShell Module to connect. For instructions, see Connect to Exchange Online PowerShell using multifactor authentication.- Exchange Web Services (EWS) - A programming interface that's used by Outlook, Outlook for Mac, and third-party apps.- IMAP4 - Used by IMAP email clients.- MAPI over HTTP (MAPI/HTTP) - Primary mailbox access protocol used by Outlook 2010 SP2 and later.- Offline Address Book (OAB) - A copy of address list collections that are downloaded and used by Outlook.- Outlook Anywhere (RPC over HTTP) - Legacy mailbox access protocol supported by all current Outlook versions.- POP3 - Used by POP email clients.- Reporting Web Services - Used to retrieve report data in Exchange Online.- Universal Outlook - Used by the Mail and Calendar app for Windows 10.- Other clients - Other protocols identified as utilizing legacy authentication.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_legacy_authentication_blocked" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.2.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Entra ID supports the most widely used authentication and authorization protocols including legacy authentication. This authentication pattern includes basic authentication, a widely used industry-standard method for collecting username and password information.The following messaging protocols support legacy authentication:- Authenticated SMTP - Used to send authenticated email messages.- Autodiscover - Used by Outlook and EAS clients to find and connect to mailboxes in Exchange Online.- Exchange ActiveSync (EAS) - Used to connect to mailboxes in Exchange Online.- Exchange Online PowerShell - Used to connect to Exchange Online with remote PowerShell. If you block Basic authentication for Exchange Online PowerShell, you need to use the Exchange Online PowerShell Module to connect. For instructions, see Connect to Exchange Online PowerShell using multifactor authentication.- Exchange Web Services (EWS) - A programming interface that's used by Outlook, Outlook for Mac, and third-party apps.- IMAP4 - Used by IMAP email clients.- MAPI over HTTP (MAPI/HTTP) - Primary mailbox access protocol used by Outlook 2010 SP2 and later.- Offline Address Book (OAB) - A copy of address list collections that are downloaded and used by Outlook.- Outlook Anywhere (RPC over HTTP) - Legacy mailbox access protocol supported by all current Outlook versions.- POP3 - Used by POP email clients.- Reporting Web Services - Used to retrieve report data in Exchange Online.- Universal Outlook - Used by the Mail and Calendar app for Windows 10.- Other clients - Other protocols identified as utilizing legacy authentication.", + "RationaleStatement": "Legacy authentication protocols do not support multi-factor authentication. These protocols are often used by attackers because of this deficiency. Blocking legacy authentication makes it harder for attackers to gain access.**Note:** Basic authentication is now disabled in all tenants. Before December 31 2022, you could re-enable the affected protocols if users and apps in your tenant couldn't connect. Now no one (you or Microsoft support) can re-enable Basic authentication in your tenant.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling this setting will prevent users from connecting with older versions of Office, ActiveSync or using protocols like IMAP, POP or SMTP and may require upgrades to older versions of Office, and use of mobile mail clients that support modern authentication.This will also cause multifunction devices such as printers from using scan to e-mail function if they are using a legacy authentication method. Microsoft has mail flow best practices in the link below which can be used to configure a MFP to work with modern authentication:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/mail-flow-best-practices/how-to-set-up-a-multifunction-device-or-application-to-send-email-using-microsoft-365-or-office-365", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to the `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com.2. Click expand `Protection` > `Conditional Access` select `Policies`.3. Create a new policy by selecting `New policy`. - Under `Users` include `All users`. - Under `Target resources` include `All cloud apps` and do not create any exclusions. - Under `Conditions` select `Client apps` and check the boxes for `Exchange ActiveSync clients` and `Other clients`. - Under `Grant` select `Block Access`. - Click `Select`.4. Set the policy `On` and click `Create`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to the `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com.2. Click expand `Protection` > `Conditional Access` select `Policies`.3. Ensure that a policy exists with the following criteria and is set to `On`: - Under `Users` verify `All users` is included and that there are only valid exclusions. - Under `Target resources` verify `All cloud apps` is selected with no exclusions. - Under `Conditions` select `Client apps` then verify `Exchange ActiveSync clients` and `Other clients` is checked. - Under `Grant` verify `Block access` is selected.4. Ensure `Enable policy` is set to `On`.This information is also available via the Microsoft Graph Security API: ```GET https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/security/secureScores```", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/clients-and-mobile-in-exchange-online/disable-basic-authentication-in-exchange-online:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/mail-flow-best-practices/how-to-set-up-a-multifunction-device-or-application-to-send-email-using-microsoft-365-or-office-365:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/clients-and-mobile-in-exchange-online/deprecation-of-basic-authentication-exchange-online", + "DefaultValue": "Basic authentication is disabled by default as of January 2023." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.4", + "Description": "In complex deployments, organizations might have a need to restrict authentication sessions. Conditional Access policies allow for the targeting of specific user accounts. Some scenarios might include:- Resource access from an unmanaged or shared device- Access to sensitive information from an external network- High-privileged users- Business-critical applicationsEnsure Sign-in frequency periodic reauthentication does not exceed `4 hours` for E3 tenants, or `24 hours` for E5 tenants using Privileged Identity Management.Ensure `Persistent browser session` is set to `Never persistent`**Note:** This CA policy can be added to the previous CA policy in this benchmark \"Ensure multifactor authentication is enabled for all users in administrative roles\"", + "Checks": [ + "entra_admin_users_sign_in_frequency_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.2.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "In complex deployments, organizations might have a need to restrict authentication sessions. Conditional Access policies allow for the targeting of specific user accounts. Some scenarios might include:- Resource access from an unmanaged or shared device- Access to sensitive information from an external network- High-privileged users- Business-critical applicationsEnsure Sign-in frequency periodic reauthentication does not exceed `4 hours` for E3 tenants, or `24 hours` for E5 tenants using Privileged Identity Management.Ensure `Persistent browser session` is set to `Never persistent`**Note:** This CA policy can be added to the previous CA policy in this benchmark \"Ensure multifactor authentication is enabled for all users in administrative roles\"", + "RationaleStatement": "Forcing a time out for MFA will help ensure that sessions are not kept alive for an indefinite period of time, ensuring that browser sessions are not persistent will help in prevention of drive-by attacks in web browsers, this also prevents creation and saving of session cookies leaving nothing for an attacker to take.", + "ImpactStatement": "Users with Administrative roles will be prompted at the frequency set for MFA.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Protection` > `Conditional Access` Select `Policies`.3. Click `New policy`. - Under `Users` include `Select users and groups` and check `Directory roles`. - At a minimum, include the directory roles listed below in this section of the document. - Under `Target resources` include `All cloud apps` and do not create any exclusions. - Under `Grant` select `Grant Access` and check `Require multifactor authentication`. - Under `Session` select `Sign-in frequency` select `Periodic reauthentication` and set it to `4` `hours` for E3 tenants. E5 tenants with PIM can be set to a maximum value of `24` `hours`. - Check `Persistent browser session` then select `Never persistent` in the drop-down menu.4. Under `Enable policy` set it to `Report Only` until the organization is ready to enable it.**At minimum these directory roles should be included in the policy:**- Application administrator- Authentication administrator- Billing administrator- Cloud application administrator- Conditional Access administrator- Exchange administrator- Global administrator- Global reader- Helpdesk administrator- Password administrator- Privileged authentication administrator- Privileged role administrator- Security administrator- SharePoint administrator- User administrator", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Protection` > `Conditional Access` Select `Policies`.3. Ensure that a policy exists with the following criteria and is set to `On`: - Under `Users` verify `Directory roles` specific to administrators are included. - Under `Session` verify `Sign-in frequency` is checked and set to `Periodic reauthentication`. - Verify the timeframe is set to the time determined by the organization. - Ensure `Periodic reauthentication` does not exceed `4` `hours` for E3 tenants. E5 tenants using PIM may be set to a maximum of `24` `hours`. - Verify `Persistent browser session` is set to `Never persistent`.4. Ensure `Enable policy` is set to `On`**Note:** A list of directory roles applying to Administrators can be found in the remediation section.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/howto-conditional-access-session-lifetime", + "DefaultValue": "The default configuration for user sign-in frequency is a rolling window of 90 days." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.5", + "Description": "Authentication strength is a Conditional Access control that allows administrators to specify which combination of authentication methods can be used to access a resource. For example, they can make only phishing-resistant authentication methods available to access a sensitive resource. But to access a non-sensitive resource, they can allow less secure multifactor authentication (MFA) combinations, such as password + SMS.Microsoft has 3 built-in authentication strengths. MFA strength, Passwordless MFA strength, and Phishing-resistant MFA strength. Ensure administrator roles are using a CA policy with `Phishing-resistant MFA strength`.Administrators can then enroll using one of 3 methods:- FIDO2 Security Key- Windows Hello for Business- Certificate-based authentication (Multi-Factor)**Note:** Additional steps to configure methods such as FIDO2 keys are not covered here but can be found in related MS articles in the references section. The Conditional Access policy only ensures 1 of the 3 methods is used.**Warning:** Administrators should be pre-registered for a strong authentication mechanism before this Conditional Access Policy is enforced. Additionally, as stated elsewhere in the CIS Benchmark a break-glass administrator account should be excluded from this policy to ensure unfettered access in the case of an emergency.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_admin_users_phishing_resistant_mfa_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.2.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Authentication strength is a Conditional Access control that allows administrators to specify which combination of authentication methods can be used to access a resource. For example, they can make only phishing-resistant authentication methods available to access a sensitive resource. But to access a non-sensitive resource, they can allow less secure multifactor authentication (MFA) combinations, such as password + SMS.Microsoft has 3 built-in authentication strengths. MFA strength, Passwordless MFA strength, and Phishing-resistant MFA strength. Ensure administrator roles are using a CA policy with `Phishing-resistant MFA strength`.Administrators can then enroll using one of 3 methods:- FIDO2 Security Key- Windows Hello for Business- Certificate-based authentication (Multi-Factor)**Note:** Additional steps to configure methods such as FIDO2 keys are not covered here but can be found in related MS articles in the references section. The Conditional Access policy only ensures 1 of the 3 methods is used.**Warning:** Administrators should be pre-registered for a strong authentication mechanism before this Conditional Access Policy is enforced. Additionally, as stated elsewhere in the CIS Benchmark a break-glass administrator account should be excluded from this policy to ensure unfettered access in the case of an emergency.", + "RationaleStatement": "Sophisticated attacks targeting MFA are more prevalent as the use of it becomes more widespread. These 3 methods are considered phishing-resistant as they remove passwords from the login workflow. It also ensures that public/private key exchange can only happen between the devices and a registered provider which prevents login to fake or phishing websites.", + "ImpactStatement": "If administrators aren't pre-registered for a strong authentication method prior to a conditional access policy being created, then a condition could occur where a user can't register for strong authentication because they don't meet the conditional access policy requirements and therefore are prevented from signing in.Additionally, Internet Explorer based credential prompts in PowerShell do not support prompting for a security key. Implementing phishing-resistant MFA with a security key may prevent admins from running their existing sets of PowerShell scripts. Device Authorization Grant Flow can be used as a workaround in some instances.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to the `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com.2. Click expand `Protection` > `Conditional Access` select `Policies`.3. Click `New policy`. - Under `Users` include `Select users and groups` and check `Directory roles`. - At a minimum, include the directory roles listed below in this section of the document. - Under `Target resources` include `All cloud apps` and do not create any exclusions. - Under `Grant` select `Grant Access` and check `Require authentication strength` and set `Phishing-resistant MFA` in the dropdown box. - Click `Select`.4. Under `Enable policy` set it to `Report Only` until the organization is ready to enable it.5. Click `Create`.**At minimum these directory roles should be included for the policy:**- Application administrator- Authentication administrator- Billing administrator- Cloud application administrator- Conditional Access administrator- Exchange administrator- Global administrator- Global reader- Helpdesk administrator- Password administrator- Privileged authentication administrator- Privileged role administrator- Security administrator- SharePoint administrator- User administrator**Warning:** Ensure administrators are pre-registered with strong authentication before enforcing the policy. After which the policy must be set to `On`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to the `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com.2. Click expand `Protection` > `Conditional Access` select `Policies`.3. Ensure that a policy exists with the following criteria and is set to `On`: - Under `Users` verify `Directory roles` specific to administrators are included. - Directory Roles should include at minimum the roles listed in the remediation section. - Under `Target resources` verify `All cloud apps` is selected with no exclusions. - Under `Grant` verify `Grant Access` is selected and `Require authentication strength` is checked with `Phishing-resistant MFA` set as the value.4. Ensure `Enable policy` is set to `On`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-passwordless#fido2-security-keys:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/how-to-enable-passkey-fido2:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-strengths:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/howto-identity-protection-configure-mfa-policy", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.6", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra ID Protection user risk policies detect the probability that a user account has been compromised. **Note:** While Identity Protection also provides two risk policies with limited conditions, Microsoft highly recommends setting up risk-based policies in Conditional Access as opposed to the \"legacy method\" for the following benefits:- Enhanced diagnostic data- Report-only mode integration- Graph API support- Use more Conditional Access attributes like sign-in frequency in the policy", + "Checks": [ + "entra_identity_protection_user_risk_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.2.2", + "Profile": "E5 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra ID Protection user risk policies detect the probability that a user account has been compromised. **Note:** While Identity Protection also provides two risk policies with limited conditions, Microsoft highly recommends setting up risk-based policies in Conditional Access as opposed to the \"legacy method\" for the following benefits:- Enhanced diagnostic data- Report-only mode integration- Graph API support- Use more Conditional Access attributes like sign-in frequency in the policy", + "RationaleStatement": "With the user risk policy turned on, Entra ID protection detects the probability that a user account has been compromised. Administrators can configure a user risk conditional access policy to automatically respond to a specific user risk level.", + "ImpactStatement": "Upon policy activation, account access will be either blocked or the user will be required to use multi-factor authentication (MFA) and change their password. Users without registered MFA will be denied access, necessitating an admin to recover the account. To avoid inconvenience, it is advised to configure the MFA registration policy for all users under the User Risk policy. Additionally, users identified in the Risky Users section will be affected by this policy. To gain a better understanding of the impact on the organization's environment, the list of Risky Users should be reviewed before enforcing the policy.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to the `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com.2. Click expand `Protection` > `Conditional Access` select `Policies`.3. Create a new policy by selecting `New policy`.4. Set the following conditions within the policy: - Under `Users or workload identities` choose `All users` - Under `Cloud apps or actions` choose `All cloud apps` - Under `Conditions` choose `User risk` then `Yes` and select the user risk level `High`. - Under `Access Controls` select `Grant` then in the right pane click `Grant access` then select `Require multifactor authentication` and `Require password change`. - Under `Session` ensure `Sign-in frequency` is set to `Every time`. - Click `Select`.6. Under `Enable policy` set it to `Report Only` until the organization is ready to enable it.7. Click `Create`.**Note:** for more information regarding risk levels refer to [Microsoft's Identity Protection & Risk Doc](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks)", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to the `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com.2. Click expand `Protection` > `Conditional Access` select `Policies`.3. Ensure that a policy exists with the following criteria and is set to `On`: - Under `Users or workload identities` choose `All users` - Under `Cloud apps or actions` choose `All cloud apps` - Under `Conditions` choose `User risk` then `Yes` is set to `High`. - Under `Access Controls` select `Grant` then in the right pane click `Grant access`, then select `Require multifactor authentication` and `Require password change`. - Under `Session` ensure `Sign-in frequency` is set to `Every time`.4. Ensure `Enable policy` is set to `On`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/howto-identity-protection-risk-feedback:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.7", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra ID Protection sign-in risk detects risks in real-time and offline. A risky sign-in is an indicator for a sign-in attempt that might not have been performed by the legitimate owner of a user account.**Note:** While Identity Protection also provides two risk policies with limited conditions, Microsoft highly recommends setting up risk-based policies in Conditional Access as opposed to the \"legacy method\" for the following benefits:- Enhanced diagnostic data- Report-only mode integration- Graph API support- Use more Conditional Access attributes like sign-in frequency in the policy", + "Checks": [ + "entra_identity_protection_sign_in_risk_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.2.2", + "Profile": "E5 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra ID Protection sign-in risk detects risks in real-time and offline. A risky sign-in is an indicator for a sign-in attempt that might not have been performed by the legitimate owner of a user account.**Note:** While Identity Protection also provides two risk policies with limited conditions, Microsoft highly recommends setting up risk-based policies in Conditional Access as opposed to the \"legacy method\" for the following benefits:- Enhanced diagnostic data- Report-only mode integration- Graph API support- Use more Conditional Access attributes like sign-in frequency in the policy", + "RationaleStatement": "Turning on the sign-in risk policy ensures that suspicious sign-ins are challenged for multi-factor authentication.", + "ImpactStatement": "When the policy triggers, the user will need MFA to access the account. In the case of a user who hasn't registered MFA on their account, they would be blocked from accessing their account. It is therefore recommended that the MFA registration policy be configured for all users who are a part of the Sign-in Risk policy.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To configure a Sign-In risk policy, use the following steps:**1. Navigate to the `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com.2. Click expand `Protection` > `Conditional Access` select `Policies`.3. Create a new policy by selecting `New policy`.4. Set the following conditions within the policy. - Under `Users or workload identities` choose `All users`. - Under `Cloud apps or actions` choose `All cloud apps`. - Under `Conditions` choose `Sign-in risk` then `Yes` and check the risk level boxes `High` and `Medium`. - Under `Access Controls` select `Grant` then in the right pane click `Grant access` then select `Require multifactor authentication`. - Under `Session` select `Sign-in Frequency` and set to `Every time`. - Click `Select`.5. Under `Enable policy` set it to `Report Only` until the organization is ready to enable it.6. Click `Create`.**Note:** For more information regarding risk levels refer to [Microsoft's Identity Protection & Risk Doc](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks)", + "AuditProcedure": "**To ensure Sign-In a risk policy is enabled:**1. Navigate to the `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com.2. Click expand `Protection` > `Conditional Access` select `Policies`.3. Ensure that a policy exists with the following criteria and is set to `On`: - Under `Users or workload identities` choose `All users` - Under `Cloud apps or actions` choose `All cloud apps` - Under `Conditions` choose `Sign-in risk` then `Yes` ensuring `High` and `Medium` are selected. - Under `Access Controls` select `Grant` then in the right pane click `Grant access` then select `Require multifactor authentication`. - Under `Session` select `Sign-in Frequency` is set to `Every time`.4. Ensure `Enable policy` is set to `On`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/howto-identity-protection-risk-feedback:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.8", + "Description": "When a Conditional Access policy targets the Microsoft Admin Portals cloud app, the policy is enforced for tokens issued to application IDs of the following Microsoft administrative portals:- Azure portal- Exchange admin center- Microsoft 365 admin center- Microsoft 365 Defender portal- Microsoft Entra admin center- Microsoft Intune admin center- Microsoft Purview compliance portal- Power Platform admin center- SharePoint admin center- Microsoft Teams admin center`Microsoft Admin Portals` should be restricted to specific pre-determined administrative roles.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_admin_portals_role_limited_access" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.2.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "When a Conditional Access policy targets the Microsoft Admin Portals cloud app, the policy is enforced for tokens issued to application IDs of the following Microsoft administrative portals:- Azure portal- Exchange admin center- Microsoft 365 admin center- Microsoft 365 Defender portal- Microsoft Entra admin center- Microsoft Intune admin center- Microsoft Purview compliance portal- Power Platform admin center- SharePoint admin center- Microsoft Teams admin center`Microsoft Admin Portals` should be restricted to specific pre-determined administrative roles.", + "RationaleStatement": "Conditional Access (CA) policies are not enforced for other role types, including administrative unit-scoped or custom roles. By restricting access to built-in directory roles, users granted privileged permissions outside of these roles will be blocked from accessing admin centers. For example, the **Organization Management** admin role in Exchange Online has equivalent permissions to the built-in directory role **Exchange Administrator**. A user assigned only the Organization Management role would not be subject to CA policies targeting the Exchange Administrator role, or any and all Directory Roles. This could also allow a user with high privileges to be excluded from access reviews and other technical or management controls.Restricting access to `Microsoft Admin Portals` while impactful, covers a gap that is otherwise not bridged by Conditional Access.", + "ImpactStatement": "PIM functionality will be impacted unless non-privileged users are first assigned to a permanent group or role that is excluded from this policy. When attempting to checkout a role in the Entra ID PIM area they will receive the message \"You don't have access to this Your sign-in was successful but you don't have permission to access this resource.\"- Users included in the policy will be unable to manually installs applications when clicking on `Install Microsoft 365 apps`.- Users included in the policy will be unable to access the Quarantine in the Defender admin center at https://security.microsoft.com/quarantine", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to the `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com.2. Click expand `Protection` > `Conditional Access` select `Policies`.3. Click `New Policy`. - Under `Users` include `All Users`. - Under `Users` select `Exclude` and check `Directory roles` and select only administrative roles and a group of PIM eligible users. - Under `Target resources` select `Cloud apps` and `Select apps` then select the `Microsoft Admin Portals` app. - Confirm by clicking `Select`. - Under `Grant` select `Block access` and click `Select`.4. Under `Enable policy` set it to `Report Only` until the organization is ready to enable it.5. Click `Create`.**Warning:** Exclude `Global Administrator` at a minimum to avoid being locked out. Report-only is a good option to use when testing any Conditional Access policy for the first time.**Note:** In order for PIM to function a group of users eligible for PIM roles must be excluded from the policy.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to the `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com.2. Click expand `Protection` > `Conditional Access` select `Policies`.3. Ensure that a policy exists with the following criteria and is set to `On`: - Under `Users` verify `All Users` is included. - Under `Users` > `Exclude` verify `Guest or external users` is checked and `Users and groups` contain only a group of PIM eligible users. - Under `Users` > `Exclude` verify `Directory Roles` contains only administrative roles. See below for details on roles. - Under `Target resources` verify `Cloud apps` is selected and includes `Microsoft Admin Portals`. - Under `Grant` verify `Block Access` is selected.4. Ensure `Enable policy` is set to `On`.**_Directory Roles and Exclusions_**In `Directory roles` > `Exclude` the role `Global Administrator` at a minimum should be selected to avoid I.T. being locked out. The organization should pre-determine roles in the exclusion list as there is not a one size fits all. Auditors and system administrators should exercise due diligence balancing operation while exercising least privilege. As the size of the organization increases so will the number of roles being utilized.A an example starting list of Administrator roles can be found under **Additional Information****Note:** In order for PIM to function a group of users eligible for PIM roles must be excluded from the policy.", + "AdditionalInformation": "**Below is an example list of Administrator roles that could be excluded**- Application administrator- Authentication administrator- Billing administrator- Cloud application administrator- Conditional Access administrator- Exchange administrator- Global administrator- Global reader- Helpdesk administrator- Password administrator- Privileged authentication administrator- Privileged role administrator- Security administrator- SharePoint administrator- User administrator", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/concept-conditional-access-cloud-apps#microsoft-admin-portals", + "DefaultValue": "No - Non-administrators can access the Microsoft admin portals." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.9", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra ID Protection sign-in risk detects risks in real-time and offline. A risky sign-in is an indicator for a sign-in attempt that might not have been performed by the legitimate owner of a user account.**Note:** While Identity Protection also provides two risk policies with limited conditions, Microsoft highly recommends setting up risk-based policies in Conditional Access as opposed to the \"legacy method\" for the following benefits:- Enhanced diagnostic data- Report-only mode integration- Graph API support- Use more Conditional Access attributes like sign-in frequency in the policy", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.2.2", + "Profile": "E5 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra ID Protection sign-in risk detects risks in real-time and offline. A risky sign-in is an indicator for a sign-in attempt that might not have been performed by the legitimate owner of a user account.**Note:** While Identity Protection also provides two risk policies with limited conditions, Microsoft highly recommends setting up risk-based policies in Conditional Access as opposed to the \"legacy method\" for the following benefits:- Enhanced diagnostic data- Report-only mode integration- Graph API support- Use more Conditional Access attributes like sign-in frequency in the policy", + "RationaleStatement": "Sign-in risk is determined at the time of sign-in and includes criteria across both real-time and offline detections for risk. Blocking sign-in to accounts that have risk can prevent undesired access from potentially compromised devices or unauthorized users.", + "ImpactStatement": "Sign-in risk is heavily dependent on detecting risk based on atypical behaviors. Due to this it is important to run this policy in a report-only mode to better understand how the organization's environment and user activity may influence sign-in risk before turning the policy on. Once it's understood what actions may trigger a medium or high sign-in risk event I.T. can then work to create an environment to reduce false positives. For example, employees might be required to notify security personnel when they intend to travel with intent to access work resources.**Note:** Break-glass accounts should always be excluded from risk detection.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to the `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com.2. Click expand `Protection` > `Conditional Access` select `Policies`.3. Create a new policy by selecting `New policy`.4. Set the following conditions within the policy. - Under `Users` include `All users` and only exclude valid users. - Under `Target resources` include `All cloud apps` and do not set any exclusions. - Under `Conditions` choose `Sign-in risk` values of `High` and `Medium` and click `Done`. - Under `Grant` choose `Block access` and click `Select`.5. Under `Enable policy` set it to `Report Only` until the organization is ready to enable it.6. Click `Create`.**Note:** Break-glass accounts should be excluded from sign-in risk policies.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to the `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com.2. Click expand `Protection` > `Conditional Access` select `Policies`.3. Ensure that a policy exists with the following criteria and is set to `On`: - Under `Users` verify `All users` are included and only valid users are excluded. - Under `Target resources` verify `All cloud apps` is selected with no exclusions. - Under `Conditions` verify `Sign-in risk` values of `High` and `Medium` are selected. - Under `Grant` verify `Block access` is selected.4. Ensure `Enable policy` is set to `On`.**Note:** Break-glass accounts should be excluded from sign-in risk policies", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#risk-detections-mapped-to-riskeventtype", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.10", + "Description": "Conditional Access (CA) can be configured to enforce access based on the device's compliance status or whether it is Entra hybrid joined. Collectively this allows CA to classify devices as managed or unmanaged, providing more granular control over authentication policies.When using `Require device to be marked as compliant`, the device must pass checks configured in **Compliance** policies defined within Intune (Endpoint Manager). Before these checks can be applied, the device must first be enrolled in Intune MDM.By selecting `Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device` this means the device must first be synchronized from an on-premises Active Directory to qualify for authentication.When configured to the recommended state below only one condition needs to be met for the user to authenticate from the device. This functions as an \"OR\" operator.The recommended state is:- `Require device to be marked as compliant`- `Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device`- `Require one of the selected controls`", + "Checks": [ + "entra_managed_device_required_for_authentication" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.2.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Conditional Access (CA) can be configured to enforce access based on the device's compliance status or whether it is Entra hybrid joined. Collectively this allows CA to classify devices as managed or unmanaged, providing more granular control over authentication policies.When using `Require device to be marked as compliant`, the device must pass checks configured in **Compliance** policies defined within Intune (Endpoint Manager). Before these checks can be applied, the device must first be enrolled in Intune MDM.By selecting `Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device` this means the device must first be synchronized from an on-premises Active Directory to qualify for authentication.When configured to the recommended state below only one condition needs to be met for the user to authenticate from the device. This functions as an \"OR\" operator.The recommended state is:- `Require device to be marked as compliant`- `Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device`- `Require one of the selected controls`", + "RationaleStatement": "\"Managed\" devices are considered more secure because they often have additional configuration hardening enforced through centralized management such as Intune or Group Policy. These devices are also typically equipped with MDR/EDR, managed patching and alerting systems. As a result, they provide a safer environment for users to authenticate and operate from.This policy also ensures that attackers must first gain access to a compliant or trusted device before authentication is permitted, reducing the risk posed by compromised account credentials. When combined with other distinct Conditional Access (CA) policies, such as requiring multi-factor authentication, this adds one additional factor before authentication is permitted. **Note:** Avoid combining these two settings with other `Grant` settings in the same policy. In a single policy you can only choose between `Require all the selected controls` or `Require one of the selected controls`, which limits the ability to integrate this recommendation with others in this benchmark. CA policies function as an \"AND\" operator across multiple policies. The goal here is to both (Require MFA for all users) **AND** (Require device to be marked as compliant **OR** Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device).", + "ImpactStatement": "Unmanaged devices will not be permitted as a valid authenticator. As a result this may require the organization to mature their device enrollment and management. The following devices can be considered managed:- Entra hybrid joined from Active Directory- Entra joined and enrolled in Intune, with compliance policies- Entra registered and enrolled in Intune, with compliances policies", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to the `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com.2. Click expand `Protection` > `Conditional Access` select `Policies`.3. Create a new policy by selecting `New policy`. - Under `Users` include `All users`. - Under `Target resources` include `All cloud apps`. - Under `Grant` select `Grant access`. - Check `Require multifactor authentication` and `Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device`. - Choose `Require one of the selected controls` and click `Select` at the bottom.4. Under `Enable policy` set it to `Report Only` until the organization is ready to enable it.5. Click `Create`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to the `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com.2. Click expand `Protection` > `Conditional Access` select `Policies`.3. Ensure that a policy exists with the following criteria and is set to `On`: - Under `Users` verify `All users` is included. - Under `Target resources` verify `All cloud apps` is selected. - Under `Grant` verify `Require device to be marked as compliant` and `Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device` are checked. - Under `Grant` verify `Require one of the selected controls` is selected.4. Ensure `Enable policy` is set to `On`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/concept-conditional-access-grant#require-device-to-be-marked-as-compliant:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/devices/concept-hybrid-join:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/fundamentals/deployment-guide-enrollment", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.11", + "Description": "Conditional Access (CA) can be configured to enforce access based on the device's compliance status or whether it is Entra hybrid joined. Collectively this allows CA to classify devices as managed or not, providing more granular control over whether or not a user can register MFA on a device.When using `Require device to be marked as compliant`, the device must pass checks configured in **Compliance** policies defined within Intune (Endpoint Manager). Before these checks can be applied, the device must first be enrolled in Intune MDM.By selecting `Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device` this means the device must first be synchronized from an on-premises Active Directory to qualify for authentication.When configured to the recommended state below only one condition needs to be met for the user to register MFA from the device. This functions as an \"OR\" operator.The recommended state is to restrict `Register security information` to a device that is marked as compliant or Entra hybrid joined.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_managed_device_required_for_mfa_registration" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.2.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Conditional Access (CA) can be configured to enforce access based on the device's compliance status or whether it is Entra hybrid joined. Collectively this allows CA to classify devices as managed or not, providing more granular control over whether or not a user can register MFA on a device.When using `Require device to be marked as compliant`, the device must pass checks configured in **Compliance** policies defined within Intune (Endpoint Manager). Before these checks can be applied, the device must first be enrolled in Intune MDM.By selecting `Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device` this means the device must first be synchronized from an on-premises Active Directory to qualify for authentication.When configured to the recommended state below only one condition needs to be met for the user to register MFA from the device. This functions as an \"OR\" operator.The recommended state is to restrict `Register security information` to a device that is marked as compliant or Entra hybrid joined.", + "RationaleStatement": "Requiring registration on a managed device significantly reduces the risk of bad actors using stolen credentials to register security information. Accounts that are created but never registered with an MFA method are particularly vulnerable to this type of attack. Enforcing this requirement will both reduce the attack surface for fake registrations and ensure that legitimate users register using trusted devices which typically have additional security measures in place already.", + "ImpactStatement": "The organization will be required to have a mature device management process. New devices provided to users will need to be pre-enrolled in Intune, auto-enrolled or be Entra hybrid joined. Otherwise, the user will be unable to complete registration, requiring additional resources from I.T. This could be more disruptive in remote worker environments where the MDM maturity is low.In these cases where the person enrolling in MFA (enrollee) doesn't have physical access to a managed device, a help desk process can be created using a Teams meeting to complete enrollment using: 1) a durable process to verify the enrollee's identity including government identification with a photograph held up to the camera, information only the enrollee should know, and verification by the enrollee's direct manager in the same meeting; 2) complete enrollment in the same Teams meeting with the enrollee being granted screen and keyboard access to the help desk person's InPrivate Edge browser session.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to the `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com.2. Click expand `Protection` > `Conditional Access` select `Policies`.3. Create a new policy by selecting `New policy`. - Under `Users` include `All users`. - Under `Target resources` select `User actions` and check `Register security information`. - Under `Grant` select `Grant access`. - Check `Require multifactor authentication` and `Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device`. - Choose `Require one of the selected controls` and click `Select` at the bottom.4. Under `Enable policy` set it to `Report Only` until the organization is ready to enable it.5. Click `Create`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to the `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com.2. Click expand `Protection` > `Conditional Access` select `Policies`.3. Ensure that a policy exists with the following criteria and is set to `On`: - Under `Users` verify `All users` is included. - Under `Target resources` verify `User actions` is selected with `Register security information` checked. - Under `Grant` verify `Require device to be marked as compliant` and `Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device` are checked. - Under `Grant` verify `Require one of the selected controls` is selected.4. Ensure `Enable policy` is set to `On`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/concept-conditional-access-grant#require-device-to-be-marked-as-compliant:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/devices/concept-hybrid-join:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/fundamentals/deployment-guide-enrollment:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/concept-conditional-access-cloud-apps#user-actions", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.3.1", + "Description": "Microsoft has released additional settings to enhance the configuration of the Microsoft Authenticator application. These settings provide additional information and context to users who receive MFA passwordless and push requests, such as geographic location the request came from, the requesting application and requiring a number match.Ensure the following are `Enabled`.- `Require number matching for push notifications`- `Show application name in push and passwordless notifications`- `Show geographic location in push and passwordless notifications`**NOTE:** On February 27, 2023 Microsoft started enforcing number matching tenant-wide for all users using Microsoft Authenticator.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.2.3", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Microsoft has released additional settings to enhance the configuration of the Microsoft Authenticator application. These settings provide additional information and context to users who receive MFA passwordless and push requests, such as geographic location the request came from, the requesting application and requiring a number match.Ensure the following are `Enabled`.- `Require number matching for push notifications`- `Show application name in push and passwordless notifications`- `Show geographic location in push and passwordless notifications`**NOTE:** On February 27, 2023 Microsoft started enforcing number matching tenant-wide for all users using Microsoft Authenticator.", + "RationaleStatement": "As the use of strong authentication has become more widespread, attackers have started to exploit the tendency of users to experience \"MFA fatigue.\" This occurs when users are repeatedly asked to provide additional forms of identification, leading them to eventually approve requests without fully verifying the source. To counteract this, number matching can be employed to ensure the security of the authentication process. With this method, users are prompted to confirm a number displayed on their original device and enter it into the device being used for MFA. Additionally, other information such as geolocation and application details are displayed to enhance the end user's awareness. Among these 3 options, number matching provides the strongest net security gain.", + "ImpactStatement": "Additional interaction will be required by end users using number matching as opposed to simply pressing \"Approve\" for login attempts.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to the `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Protection` > `Authentication methods` select `Policies`.3. Select `Microsoft Authenticator`4. Under `Enable and Target` ensure the setting is set to `Enable`.5. Select `Configure`6. Set the following Microsoft Authenticator settings: - `Require number matching for push notifications` Status is set to `Enabled`, Target `All users` - `Show application name in push and passwordless notifications` is set to `Enabled`, Target `All users` - `Show geographic location in push and passwordless notifications` is set to `Enabled`, Target `All users`**Note:** Valid groups such as break glass accounts can be excluded per organization policy.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to the `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Protection` > `Authentication methods` select `Policies`.3. Under **Method** select `Microsoft Authenticator`.4. Under `Enable and Target` verify the setting is set to `Enable`.5. In the `Include` tab ensure `All users` is selected.6. In the `Exclude` tab ensure only valid groups are present (i.e. Break Glass accounts).7. Select `Configure`8. Verify the following Microsoft Authenticator settings: - `Require number matching for push notifications` Status is set to `Enabled`, Target `All users` - `Show application name in push and passwordless notifications` is set to `Enabled`, Target `All users` - `Show geographic location in push and passwordless notifications` is set to `Enabled`, Target `All users`9. In each setting select `Exclude` and verify only groups are present (i.e. Break Glass accounts).", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-default-enablement:https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-entra-blog/defend-your-users-from-mfa-fatigue-attacks/ba-p/2365677:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/how-to-mfa-number-match", + "DefaultValue": "Microsoft-managed" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.3.2", + "Description": "With Entra Password Protection, default global banned password lists are automatically applied to all users in an Entra ID tenant. To support business and security needs, custom banned password lists can be defined. When users change or reset their passwords, these banned password lists are checked to enforce the use of strong passwords.A custom banned password list should include some of the following examples:- Brand names- Product names- Locations, such as company headquarters- Company-specific internal terms- Abbreviations that have specific company meaning", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.2.3", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "With Entra Password Protection, default global banned password lists are automatically applied to all users in an Entra ID tenant. To support business and security needs, custom banned password lists can be defined. When users change or reset their passwords, these banned password lists are checked to enforce the use of strong passwords.A custom banned password list should include some of the following examples:- Brand names- Product names- Locations, such as company headquarters- Company-specific internal terms- Abbreviations that have specific company meaning", + "RationaleStatement": "Creating a new password can be difficult regardless of one's technical background. It is common to look around one's environment for suggestions when building a password, however, this may include picking words specific to the organization as inspiration for a password. An adversary may employ what is called a 'mangler' to create permutations of these specific words in an attempt to crack passwords or hashes making it easier to reach their goal.", + "ImpactStatement": "If a custom banned password list includes too many common dictionary words, or short words that are part of compound words, then perfectly secure passwords may be blocked. The organization should consider a balance between security and usability when creating a list.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/2. Click to expand `Protection` > `Authentication methods`3. Select `Password protection`4. Set `Enforce custom list` to `Yes`5. In `Custom banned password list` create a list using suggestions outlined in this document.6. Click `Save`**Note:** Below is a list of examples that can be used as a starting place. The references section contains more suggestions.- Brand names- Product names- Locations, such as company headquarters- Company-specific internal terms- Abbreviations that have specific company meaning", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/2. Click to expand `Protection` > `Authentication methods`3. Select `Password protection`4. Verify `Enforce custom list` is set to `Yes`5. Verify `Custom banned password list` contains entries specific to the organization or matches a pre-determined list.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-password-ban-bad#custom-banned-password-list:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/tutorial-configure-custom-password-protection", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.3.3", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra Password Protection provides a global and custom banned password list. A password change request fails if there's a match in these banned password list. To protect on-premises Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) environment, install and configure Entra Password Protection.**Note**: This recommendation applies to Hybrid deployments only and will have no impact unless working with on-premises Active Directory.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.2.3", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra Password Protection provides a global and custom banned password list. A password change request fails if there's a match in these banned password list. To protect on-premises Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) environment, install and configure Entra Password Protection.**Note**: This recommendation applies to Hybrid deployments only and will have no impact unless working with on-premises Active Directory.", + "RationaleStatement": "This feature protects an organization by prohibiting the use of weak or leaked passwords. In addition, organizations can create custom banned password lists to prevent their users from using easily guessed passwords that are specific to their industry. Deploying this feature to Active Directory will strengthen the passwords that are used in the environment.", + "ImpactStatement": "The potential impact associated with implementation of this setting is dependent upon the existing password policies in place in the environment. For environments that have strong password policies in place, the impact will be minimal. For organizations that do not have strong password policies in place, implementation of Microsoft Entra Password Protection may require users to change passwords and adhere to more stringent requirements than they have been accustomed to.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**- Download and install the `Azure AD Password Proxies` and `DC Agents` from the following location: https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=57071 After installed follow the steps below.1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Protection` select `Authentication methods`.3. Select `Password protection` and set `Enable password protection on Windows Server Active Directory` to `Yes` and `Mode` to `Enforced`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Protection` select `Authentication methods`.3. Select `Password protection` and ensure that `Enable password protection on Windows Server Active Directory` is set to `Yes` and that `Mode` is set to `Enforced`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-password-ban-bad-on-premises-operations", + "DefaultValue": "Enable - YesMode - Audit" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.3.4", + "Description": "Microsoft defines Multifactor authentication capable as being registered and enabled for a strong authentication method. The method must also be allowed by the authentication methods policy.Ensure all member users are `MFA capable`.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.2.3", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Microsoft defines Multifactor authentication capable as being registered and enabled for a strong authentication method. The method must also be allowed by the authentication methods policy.Ensure all member users are `MFA capable`.", + "RationaleStatement": "Multifactor authentication requires an individual to present a minimum of two separate forms of authentication before access is granted. Users who are not `MFA Capable` have never registered a strong authentication method for multifactor authentication that is within policy and may not be using MFA. This could be a result of having never signed in, exclusion from a Conditional Access (CA) policy requiring MFA, or a CA policy does not exist. Reviewing this list of users will help identify possible lapses in policy or procedure.", + "ImpactStatement": "When using the UI audit method guest users will appear in the report and unless the organization is applying MFA rules to guests then they will need to be manually filtered. Accounts that provide on-premises directory synchronization also appear in these reports.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Remediation steps will depend on the status of the personnel in question or configuration of Conditional Access policies and will not be covered in detail. Administrators should review each user identified on a case-by-case basis using the conditions below.**User has never signed on:**- Employment status should be reviewed, and appropriate action taken on the user account's roles, licensing and enablement.**Conditional Access policy applicability:**- Ensure a CA policy is in place requiring all users to use MFA.- Ensure the user is not excluded from the CA MFA policy.- Ensure the policy's state is set to `On`.- Use `What if` to determine applicable CA policies. (Protection > Conditional Access > Policies)- Review the user account in `Sign-in logs`. Under the `Activity Details` pane click the `Conditional Access` tab to view applied policies.**Note:** Conditional Access is covered step by step in section 5.2.2", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Protection` select `Authentication methods`.3. Select `User registration details`.4. Set the filter option `Multifactor authentication capable` to `Not Capable`.5. Review the non-guest users in this list.6. Excluding any exceptions users found in this report may require remediation.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Graph using `Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"UserAuthenticationMethod.Read.All,AuditLog.Read.All\"`2. Run the following:```Get-MgReportAuthenticationMethodUserRegistrationDetail ` -Filter \"IsMfaCapable eq false and UserType eq 'Member'\" | ft UserPrincipalName,IsMfaCapable,IsAdmin```3. Ensure `IsMfaCapable` is set to `True`.4. Excluding any exceptions users found in this report may require remediation.**Note:** The CA rule must be in place for a successful deployment of Multifactor Authentication. This policy is outlined in the conditional access section 5.2.2**Note 2:** Possible exceptions include on-premises synchronization accounts.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.graph.reports/update-mgreportauthenticationmethoduserregistrationdetail?view=graph-powershell-1.0#-ismfacapable:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/how-to-view-applied-conditional-access-policies:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/what-if-tool:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-authentication-methods-activity", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.3.5", + "Description": "Authentication methods support a wide variety of scenarios for signing in to Microsoft 365 resources. Some of these methods are inherently more secure than others but require more investment in time to get users enrolled and operational.SMS and Voice Call rely on telephony carrier communication methods to deliver the authenticating factor.The email one-time passcode feature is a way to authenticate B2B collaboration users when they can't be authenticated through other means, such as Microsoft Entra ID, Microsoft account (MSA), or social identity providers. When a B2B guest user tries to redeem your invitation or sign in to your shared resources, they can request a temporary passcode, which is sent to their email address. Then they enter this passcode to continue signing in.The recommended state is to `Disable` these methods:- SMS- Voice Call- Email OTP", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.2.3", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Authentication methods support a wide variety of scenarios for signing in to Microsoft 365 resources. Some of these methods are inherently more secure than others but require more investment in time to get users enrolled and operational.SMS and Voice Call rely on telephony carrier communication methods to deliver the authenticating factor.The email one-time passcode feature is a way to authenticate B2B collaboration users when they can't be authenticated through other means, such as Microsoft Entra ID, Microsoft account (MSA), or social identity providers. When a B2B guest user tries to redeem your invitation or sign in to your shared resources, they can request a temporary passcode, which is sent to their email address. Then they enter this passcode to continue signing in.The recommended state is to `Disable` these methods:- SMS- Voice Call- Email OTP", + "RationaleStatement": "The SMS and Voice call methods are vulnerable to SIM swapping which could allow an attacker to gain access to your Microsoft 365 account.", + "ImpactStatement": "Disabling Email OTP will prevent one-time pass codes from being sent to unverified guest users accessing Microsoft 365 resources on the tenant. They will be required to use a personal Microsoft account, a managed Microsoft Entra account, be part of a federation or be configured as a guest in the host tenant's Microsoft Entra ID.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Protection` select `Authentication methods`.3. Select `Policies`.4. Inspect each method that is out of compliance and remediate: - Click on the method to open it. - Change the `Enable` toggle to the off position. - Click `Save`.**Note:** If the save button remains greyed out after toggling a method off, then first turn it back on and then change the position of the `Target` selection (all users or select groups). Turn the method off again and save. This was observed to be a bug in the UI at the time this document was published.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Protection` select `Authentication methods`.3. Select `Policies`.4. Verify that the following methods in the `Enabled` column or set to `No`. - Method: `SMS` - Method: `Voice call` - Method: `Email OTP`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-methods-manage:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/external-id/one-time-passcode:https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365-life-hacks/privacy-and-safety/what-is-sim-swapping", + "DefaultValue": "'- SMS : Disabled- Voice Call : Disabled- Email OTP : Enabled" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.4.1", + "Description": "Enabling self-service password reset allows users to reset their own passwords in Entra ID. When users sign in to Microsoft 365, they will be prompted to enter additional contact information that will help them reset their password in the future. If combined registration is enabled additional information, outside of multi-factor, will not be needed. **Note:** Effective Oct. 1st, 2022, Microsoft will begin to enable combined registration for all users in Entra ID tenants created before August 15th, 2020. Tenants created after this date are enabled with combined registration by default.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.2.4", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Enabling self-service password reset allows users to reset their own passwords in Entra ID. When users sign in to Microsoft 365, they will be prompted to enter additional contact information that will help them reset their password in the future. If combined registration is enabled additional information, outside of multi-factor, will not be needed. **Note:** Effective Oct. 1st, 2022, Microsoft will begin to enable combined registration for all users in Entra ID tenants created before August 15th, 2020. Tenants created after this date are enabled with combined registration by default.", + "RationaleStatement": "Users will no longer need to engage the helpdesk for password resets, and the password reset mechanism will automatically block common, easily guessable passwords.", + "ImpactStatement": "Users will be required to provide additional contact information to enroll in self-service password reset. Additionally, minor user education may be required for users that are used to calling a help desk for assistance with password resets. **Note:** This is unavailable if using Entra Connect / Sync in a hybrid environment.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Protection` > `Password reset` select `Properties`.3. Set `Self service password reset enabled` to `All`", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Protection` > `Password reset` select `Properties`.3. Ensure `Self service password reset enabled` is set to `All`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/add-users/let-users-reset-passwords?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/tutorial-enable-sspr:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-registration-mfa-sspr-combined", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.3.1", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management can be used to audit roles, allow just in time activation of roles and allow for periodic role attestation. Organizations should remove permanent members from privileged Office 365 roles and instead make them eligible, through a JIT activation workflow.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.3", + "Profile": "E5 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management can be used to audit roles, allow just in time activation of roles and allow for periodic role attestation. Organizations should remove permanent members from privileged Office 365 roles and instead make them eligible, through a JIT activation workflow.", + "RationaleStatement": "Organizations want to minimize the number of people who have access to secure information or resources, because that reduces the chance of a malicious actor getting that access, or an authorized user inadvertently impacting a sensitive resource. However, users still need to carry out privileged operations in Entra ID. Organizations can give users just-in-time (JIT) privileged access to roles. There is a need for oversight for what those users are doing with their administrator privileges. PIM helps to mitigate the risk of excessive, unnecessary, or misused access rights.", + "ImpactStatement": "Implementation of Just in Time privileged access is likely to necessitate changes to administrator routine. Administrators will only be granted access to administrative roles when required. When administrators request role activation, they will need to document the reason for requiring role access, anticipated time required to have the access, and to reauthenticate to enable role access.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity Governance` select `Privileged Identity Management`.3. Under **Manage** select `Microsoft Entra Roles`.4. Under **Manage** select `Roles`.5. Inspect at a minimum the following sensitive roles. For each of the members that have an `ASSIGNMENT TYPE` of `Permanent`, click on the `...` and choose `Make eligible`:- `Application Administrator`- `Authentication Administrator`- `Azure Information Protection Administrator`- `Billing Administrator`- `Cloud Application Administrator`- `Cloud Device Administrator`- `Compliance Administrator`- `Customer LockBox Access Approver`- `Exchange Administrator`- `Fabric Administrator`- `Global Administrator`- `HelpDesk Administrator`- `Intune Administrator`- `Kaizala Administrator`- `License Administrator`- `Microsoft Entra Joined Device Local Administrator`- `Password Administrator`- `Privileged Authentication Administrator`- `Privileged Role Administrator`- `Security Administrator`- `SharePoint Administrator`- `Skype for Business Administrator`- `Teams Administrator`- `User Administrator`", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity Governance` select `Privileged Identity Management`.3. Under **Manage** select `Microsoft Entra Roles`.4. Under **Manage** select `Roles`.5. Inspect at a minimum the following sensitive roles to ensure the members are `Eligible` and not `Permanent`:- `Application Administrator`- `Authentication Administrator`- `Azure Information Protection Administrator`- `Billing Administrator`- `Cloud Application Administrator`- `Cloud Device Administrator`- `Compliance Administrator`- `Customer LockBox Access Approver`- `Exchange Administrator`- `Fabric Administrator`- `Global Administrator`- `HelpDesk Administrator`- `Intune Administrator`- `Kaizala Administrator`- `License Administrator`- `Microsoft Entra Joined Device Local Administrator`- `Password Administrator`- `Privileged Authentication Administrator`- `Privileged Role Administrator`- `Security Administrator`- `SharePoint Administrator`- `Skype for Business Administrator`- `Teams Administrator`- `User Administrator`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-configure", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.3.2", + "Description": "Access reviews enable administrators to establish an efficient automated process for reviewing group memberships, access to enterprise applications, and role assignments. These reviews can be scheduled to recur regularly, with flexible options for delegating the task of reviewing membership to different members of the organization.Ensure `Access reviews` for Guest Users are configured to be performed no less frequently than `monthly`.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.3", + "Profile": "E5 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Access reviews enable administrators to establish an efficient automated process for reviewing group memberships, access to enterprise applications, and role assignments. These reviews can be scheduled to recur regularly, with flexible options for delegating the task of reviewing membership to different members of the organization.Ensure `Access reviews` for Guest Users are configured to be performed no less frequently than `monthly`.", + "RationaleStatement": "Access to groups and applications for guests can change over time. If a guest user's access to a particular folder goes unnoticed, they may unintentionally gain access to sensitive data if a member adds new files or data to the folder or application. Access reviews can help reduce the risks associated with outdated assignments by requiring a member of the organization to conduct the reviews. Furthermore, these reviews can enable a fail-closed mechanism to remove access to the subject if the reviewer does not respond to the review.", + "ImpactStatement": "Access reviews that are ignored may cause guest users to lose access to resources temporarily.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/2. Click to expand `Identity Governance` and select `Access reviews`3. Click `New access review`.4. `Select what to review` choose `Teams + Groups`.5. `Review Scope` set to `All Microsoft 365 groups with guest users`, do not exclude groups.6. `Scope` set to `Guest users only` then click `Next: Reviews`.7. `Select reviewers` an appropriate user that is NOT the guest user themselves.8. `Duration (in days)` at most `3`.9. `Review recurrence` is `Monthly` or more frequent.10. `End` is set to `Never`, then click `Next: Settings`.11. Check `Auto apply results to resource`.12. Set `If reviewers don't respond` to `Remove access`.13. Check the following: `Justification required`, `E-mail notifications`, `Reminders`.14. Click `Next: Review + Create` and finally click `Create`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/2. Click to expand `Identity Governance` and select `Access reviews`3. Inspect the access reviews, and ensure an access review is created with the following criteria: - `Overview`: `Scope` is set to `Guest users only` and status is `Active` - `Reviewers`: Ensure appropriate reviewer(s) are designated. - `Settings` > `General`: `Mail notifications` and `Reminders` are set to `Enable` - `Reviewers`: `Require reason on approval` is set to `Enable` - `Scheduling`: `Frequency` is `Monthly` or more frequent. - `When completed`: `Auto apply results to resource` is set to `Enable` - `When completed`: `If reviewers don't respond` is set to `Remove access`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/access-reviews-overview:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/create-access-review", + "DefaultValue": "By default access reviews are not configured." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.3.3", + "Description": "Access reviews enable administrators to establish an efficient automated process for reviewing group memberships, access to enterprise applications, and role assignments. These reviews can be scheduled to recur regularly, with flexible options for delegating the task of reviewing membership to different members of the organization.Ensure `Access reviews` for high privileged Entra ID roles are done `monthly` or more frequently. These reviews should include **at a minimum** the roles listed below:- Global Administrator- Exchange Administrator- SharePoint Administrator- Teams Administrator- Security Administrator**Note:** An access review is created for each role selected after completing the process.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.3", + "Profile": "E5 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Access reviews enable administrators to establish an efficient automated process for reviewing group memberships, access to enterprise applications, and role assignments. These reviews can be scheduled to recur regularly, with flexible options for delegating the task of reviewing membership to different members of the organization.Ensure `Access reviews` for high privileged Entra ID roles are done `monthly` or more frequently. These reviews should include **at a minimum** the roles listed below:- Global Administrator- Exchange Administrator- SharePoint Administrator- Teams Administrator- Security Administrator**Note:** An access review is created for each role selected after completing the process.", + "RationaleStatement": "Regular review of critical high privileged roles in Entra ID will help identify role drift, or potential malicious activity. This will enable the practice and application of \"separation of duties\" where even non-privileged users like security auditors can be assigned to review assigned roles in an organization. Furthermore, if configured these reviews can enable a fail-closed mechanism to remove access to the subject if the reviewer does not respond to the review.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/2. Click to expand `Identity Governance` and select `Privileged Identity Management`3. Select `Microsoft Entra Roles` under Manage4. Select `Access reviews` and click `New access review`.5. Provide a name and description.6. `Frequency` set to `Monthly` or more frequently.7. `Duration (in days)` is set to at most `3`.8. `End` set to `Never`.9. `Role` select these roles: `Global Administrator`,`Exchange Administrator`,`SharePoint Administrator`,`Teams Administrator`,`Security Administrator`9. `Assignment type` set to `All active and eligible assignments`.10. `Reviewers` set to `Selected user(s) or group(s)`11. `Select reviewers` are member(s) responsible for this type of review.12. `Auto apply results to resource` set to `Enable`13. `If reviewers don't respond` is set to `No change`14. `Show recommendations` set to `Enable`15. `Require reason or approval` set to `Enable`16. `Mail notifications` set to `Enable`17. `Reminders` set to `Enable`18. Click `Start` to save the review.**Note:** Reviewers will have the ability to revoke roles should be trusted individuals who understand the impact of the access reviews. The principle of separation of duties should be considered so that no one administrator is reviewing their own access levels.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/2. Click to expand `Identity Governance` and select `Privileged Identity Management`3. Select `Microsoft Entra Roles` under Manage4. Select `Access reviews`5. Ensure there are access reviews configured for each high privileged roles and each meets the criteria laid out below: - `Scope` - `Everyone` - `Status` - `Active` - `Reviewers` - Role reviewers should be designated personnel. Preferably not a self-review. - `Mail notifications` - `Enable` - `Reminders` - `Enable` - `Require reason on approval` - `Enable` - `Frequency` - `Monthly` or more frequently. - `Duration (in days)` - `4` at most - `Auto apply results to resource` - `Enable` - `If reviewers don't respond` - `No change`Any remaining settings are discretionary.**Note:** Reviewers will have the ability to revoke roles should be trusted individuals who understand the impact of the access reviews. The principle of separation of duties should be considered so that no one administrator is reviewing their own access levels.**Note2:** The setting `If reviewers don't respond` is recommended to be set to `Remove access` due to the potential of all Global Administrators being unassigned if the review is not addressed.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-create-roles-and-resource-roles-review:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/access-reviews-overview", + "DefaultValue": "By default access reviews are not configured." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.3.4", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management can be used to audit roles, allow just in time activation of roles and allow for periodic role attestation. Requiring approval before activation allows one of the selected approvers to first review and then approve the activation prior to PIM granted the role. The approver doesn't have to be a group member or owner.The recommended state is `Require approval to activate` for the Global Administrator role.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5.3", + "Profile": "E5 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management can be used to audit roles, allow just in time activation of roles and allow for periodic role attestation. Requiring approval before activation allows one of the selected approvers to first review and then approve the activation prior to PIM granted the role. The approver doesn't have to be a group member or owner.The recommended state is `Require approval to activate` for the Global Administrator role.", + "RationaleStatement": "Requiring approval for Global Administrator role activation enhances visibility and accountability every time this highly privileged role is used. This process reduces the risk of an attacker elevating a compromised account to the highest privilege level, as any activation must first be reviewed and approved by a trusted party.**Note:** This only acts as protection for eligible users that are activating a role. Directly assigning a role does require an approval workflow so therefore it is important to implement and use PIM correctly.", + "ImpactStatement": "Approvers do not need to be assigned the same role or be members of the same group. It's important to have at least two approvers and an emergency access (break-glass) account to prevent a scenario where no Global Administrators are available. For example, if the last active Global Administrator leaves the organization, and only eligible but inactive Global Administrators remain, a trusted approver without the Global Administrator role or an emergency access account would be essential to avoid delays in critical administrative tasks.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity Governance` select `Privileged Identity Management`.3. Under **Manage** select `Microsoft Entra Roles`.4. Under **Manage** select `Roles`.5. Select `Global Administrator` in the list.6. Select `Role settings` and click `Edit`.7. Check the `Require approval to activate` box.8. Add at least two approvers.9. Click `Update`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Entra admin center` https://entra.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Identity Governance` select `Privileged Identity Management`.3. Under **Manage** select `Microsoft Entra Roles`.4. Under **Manage** select `Roles`.5. Select `Global Administrator` in the list.6. Select `Role settings` and click `Edit`.7. Verify `Require approval to activate` is set.8. Verify there are at least two approvers selected.9. Click `Update`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-configure:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/groups-role-settings#require-approval-to-activate", + "DefaultValue": "`Require approval to activate` is unchecked." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.1", + "Description": "The value False indicates that mailbox auditing on by default is turned on for the organization. Mailbox auditing on by default in the organization overrides the mailbox auditing settings on individual mailboxes. For example, if mailbox auditing is turned off for a mailbox (the AuditEnabled property on the mailbox is False), the default mailbox actions are still audited for the mailbox, because mailbox auditing on by default is turned on for the organization.Turning off mailbox auditing on by default ($true) has the following results:- Mailbox auditing is turned off for your organization.- From the time you turn off mailbox auditing on by default, no mailbox actions are audited, even if mailbox auditing is enabled on a mailbox (the AuditEnabled property on the mailbox is True).- Mailbox auditing isn't turned on for new mailboxes and setting the AuditEnabled property on a new or existing mailbox to True is ignored.- Any mailbox audit bypass association settings (configured by using the Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation cmdlet) are ignored.- Existing mailbox audit records are retained until the audit log age limit for the record expires.The recommended state for this setting is `False` at the organization level. This will enable auditing and enforce the default.", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_organization_mailbox_auditing_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The value False indicates that mailbox auditing on by default is turned on for the organization. Mailbox auditing on by default in the organization overrides the mailbox auditing settings on individual mailboxes. For example, if mailbox auditing is turned off for a mailbox (the AuditEnabled property on the mailbox is False), the default mailbox actions are still audited for the mailbox, because mailbox auditing on by default is turned on for the organization.Turning off mailbox auditing on by default ($true) has the following results:- Mailbox auditing is turned off for your organization.- From the time you turn off mailbox auditing on by default, no mailbox actions are audited, even if mailbox auditing is enabled on a mailbox (the AuditEnabled property on the mailbox is True).- Mailbox auditing isn't turned on for new mailboxes and setting the AuditEnabled property on a new or existing mailbox to True is ignored.- Any mailbox audit bypass association settings (configured by using the Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation cmdlet) are ignored.- Existing mailbox audit records are retained until the audit log age limit for the record expires.The recommended state for this setting is `False` at the organization level. This will enable auditing and enforce the default.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enforcing the default ensures auditing was not turned off intentionally or accidentally. Auditing mailbox actions will allow forensics and IR teams to trace various malicious activities that can generate TTPs caused by inbox access and tampering.**Note:** Without advanced auditing (E5 function) the logs are limited to 90 days.", + "ImpactStatement": "None - this is the default behavior as of 2019.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Set-OrganizationConfig -AuditDisabled $false```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Get-OrganizationConfig | Format-List AuditDisabled```3. Ensure `AuditDisabled` is set to `False`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-mailboxes?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-organizationconfig?view=exchange-ps#-auditdisabled", + "DefaultValue": "False" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.2", + "Description": "Mailbox audit logging is turned on by default in all organizations. This effort started in January 2019, and means that certain actions performed by mailbox owners, delegates, and admins are automatically logged. The corresponding mailbox audit records are available for admins to search in the mailbox audit log. Mailboxes and shared mailboxes have actions assigned to them individually in order to audit the data the organization determines valuable at the mailbox level.The recommended state is `AuditEnabled` to `True` on all user mailboxes along with additional audit actions beyond the Microsoft defaults.**Note:** Due to some differences in defaults for audit actions this recommendation is specific to users assigned an E3 license only.", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_user_mailbox_auditing_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Mailbox audit logging is turned on by default in all organizations. This effort started in January 2019, and means that certain actions performed by mailbox owners, delegates, and admins are automatically logged. The corresponding mailbox audit records are available for admins to search in the mailbox audit log. Mailboxes and shared mailboxes have actions assigned to them individually in order to audit the data the organization determines valuable at the mailbox level.The recommended state is `AuditEnabled` to `True` on all user mailboxes along with additional audit actions beyond the Microsoft defaults.**Note:** Due to some differences in defaults for audit actions this recommendation is specific to users assigned an E3 license only.", + "RationaleStatement": "Whether it is for regulatory compliance or for tracking unauthorized configuration changes in Microsoft 365, enabling mailbox auditing, and ensuring the proper mailbox actions are accounted for allows for Microsoft 365 teams to run security operations, forensics or general investigations on mailbox activities. The following mailbox types ignore the organizational default and must have `AuditEnabled` set to `True` at the mailbox level in order to capture relevant audit data.- Resource Mailboxes- Public Folder Mailboxes- DiscoverySearch Mailbox **Note:** Without advanced auditing (E5 function) the logs are limited to 90 days.", + "ImpactStatement": "None - this is the default behavior.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell script:```$AuditAdmin = @( \"ApplyRecord\", \"Copy\", \"Create\", \"FolderBind\", \"HardDelete\", \"Move\", \"MoveToDeletedItems\", \"SendAs\", \"SendOnBehalf\", \"SoftDelete\", \"Update\", \"UpdateCalendarDelegation\", \"UpdateFolderPermissions\", \"UpdateInboxRules\")$AuditDelegate = @( \"ApplyRecord\", \"Create\", \"FolderBind\", \"HardDelete\", \"Move\", \"MoveToDeletedItems\", \"SendAs\", \"SendOnBehalf\", \"SoftDelete\", \"Update\", \"UpdateFolderPermissions\", \"UpdateInboxRules\")$AuditOwner = @( \"ApplyRecord\", \"Create\", \"HardDelete\", \"MailboxLogin\", \"Move\", \"MoveToDeletedItems\", \"SoftDelete\", \"Update\", \"UpdateCalendarDelegation\", \"UpdateFolderPermissions\", \"UpdateInboxRules\")$MBX = Get-EXOMailbox -ResultSize Unlimited | Where-Object { $_.RecipientTypeDetails -eq \"UserMailbox\" }$MBX | Set-Mailbox -AuditEnabled $true `-AuditLogAgeLimit 90 -AuditAdmin $AuditAdmin -AuditDelegate $AuditDelegate `-AuditOwner $AuditOwner```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell script:```$MailAudit = Get-EXOMailbox -PropertySets Audit -ResultSize Unlimited | Select-Object UserPrincipalName, AuditEnabled, AuditAdmin, AuditDelegate, AuditOwner$MailAudit | Export-Csv -Path C:\\CIS\\AuditSettings.csv -NoTypeInformation```3. Analyze the output and verify `AuditEnabled` is set to `True` and all audit actions are included in what is defined in the script in the remediation section.**Optionally, this more comprehensive script can assess each user mailbox:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following script:```$AdminActions = @( \"ApplyRecord\", \"Copy\", \"Create\", \"FolderBind\", \"HardDelete\", \"Move\", \"MoveToDeletedItems\", \"SendAs\", \"SendOnBehalf\", \"SoftDelete\", \"Update\", \"UpdateCalendarDelegation\", \"UpdateFolderPermissions\", \"UpdateInboxRules\" )$DelegateActions = @( \"ApplyRecord\", \"Create\", \"FolderBind\", \"HardDelete\", \"Move\", \"MoveToDeletedItems\", \"SendAs\", \"SendOnBehalf\", \"SoftDelete\", \"Update\", \"UpdateFolderPermissions\", \"UpdateInboxRules\")$OwnerActions = @( \"ApplyRecord\", \"Create\", \"HardDelete\", \"MailboxLogin\", \"Move\", \"MoveToDeletedItems\", \"SoftDelete\", \"Update\", \"UpdateCalendarDelegation\", \"UpdateFolderPermissions\", \"UpdateInboxRules\")function VerifyActions { param ( [string]$type, [array]$actions, [array]$auditProperty, [string]$mailboxName ) $missingActions = @() $actionCount = 0 foreach ($action in $actions) { if ($auditProperty -notcontains $action) { $missingActions += \" Failure: Audit action '$action' missing from $type\" $actionCount++ } } if ($actionCount -eq 0) { Write-Host \"[$mailboxName]: $type actions are verified.\" -ForegroundColor Green } else { Write-Host \"[$mailboxName]: $type actions are not all verified.\" -ForegroundColor Red foreach ($missingAction in $missingActions) { Write-Host \" $missingAction\" -ForegroundColor Red } }}$mailboxes = Get-EXOMailbox -PropertySets Audit,Minimum -ResultSize Unlimited | Where-Object { $_.RecipientTypeDetails -eq \"UserMailbox\" }foreach ($mailbox in $mailboxes) { Write-Host \"--- Now assessing [$($mailbox.UserPrincipalName)] ---\" if ($mailbox.AuditEnabled) { Write-Host \"[$($mailbox.UserPrincipalName)]: AuditEnabled is true\" -ForegroundColor Green } else { Write-Host \"[$($mailbox.UserPrincipalName)]: AuditEnabled is false\" -ForegroundColor Red } VerifyActions -type \"AuditAdmin\" -actions $AdminActions -auditProperty $mailbox.AuditAdmin ` -mailboxName $mailbox.UserPrincipalName VerifyActions -type \"AuditDelegate\" -actions $DelegateActions -auditProperty $mailbox.AuditDelegate ` -mailboxName $mailbox.UserPrincipalName VerifyActions -type \"AuditOwner\" -actions $OwnerActions -auditProperty $mailbox.AuditOwner ` -mailboxName $mailbox.UserPrincipalName Write-Host}```", + "AdditionalInformation": "Additional mailbox actions outside of the scope of this recommendations that can be audited for with an E5 license include: - MailItemsAccessed- SearchQueryInitiated- Send", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-mailboxes?view=o365-worldwide", + "DefaultValue": "`AuditEnabled`: `True` for all mailboxes except below:- Resource Mailboxes- Public Folder Mailboxes- DiscoverySearch Mailbox**AuditAdmin:** ApplyRecord, Create, HardDelete, MoveToDeletedItems, SendAs, SendOnBehalf, SoftDelete, Update, UpdateCalendarDelegation, UpdateFolderPermissions, UpdateInboxRules**AuditDelegate:** ApplyRecord, Create, HardDelete, MoveToDeletedItems, SendAs, SendOnBehalf, SoftDelete, Update, UpdateFolderPermissions, UpdateInboxRules**AuditOwner:** ApplyRecord, HardDelete, MoveToDeletedItems, SoftDelete, Update, UpdateCalendarDelegation, UpdateFolderPermissions, UpdateInboxRules" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.3", + "Description": "Mailbox audit logging is turned on by default in all organizations. This effort started in January 2019, and means that certain actions performed by mailbox owners, delegates, and admins are automatically logged. The corresponding mailbox audit records are available for admins to search in the mailbox audit log. Mailboxes and shared mailboxes have actions assigned to them individually in order to audit the data the organization determines valuable at the mailbox level.The recommended state is `AuditEnabled` to `True` on all user mailboxes along with additional audit actions beyond the Microsoft defaults.Note: Due to some differences in defaults for audit actions this recommendation is specific to users assigned an E5 license, or auditing addon license, only.", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_user_mailbox_auditing_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6.1", + "Profile": "E5 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Mailbox audit logging is turned on by default in all organizations. This effort started in January 2019, and means that certain actions performed by mailbox owners, delegates, and admins are automatically logged. The corresponding mailbox audit records are available for admins to search in the mailbox audit log. Mailboxes and shared mailboxes have actions assigned to them individually in order to audit the data the organization determines valuable at the mailbox level.The recommended state is `AuditEnabled` to `True` on all user mailboxes along with additional audit actions beyond the Microsoft defaults.Note: Due to some differences in defaults for audit actions this recommendation is specific to users assigned an E5 license, or auditing addon license, only.", + "RationaleStatement": "Whether it is for regulatory compliance or for tracking unauthorized configuration changes in Microsoft 365, enabling mailbox auditing and ensuring the proper mailbox actions are accounted for allows for Microsoft 365 teams to run security operations, forensics or general investigations on mailbox activities. The following mailbox types ignore the organizational default and must have `AuditEnabled` set to `True` at the mailbox level in order to capture relevant audit data.- Resource Mailboxes- Public Folder Mailboxes- DiscoverySearch Mailbox **NOTE:** Without advanced auditing (E5 function) the logs are limited to 90 days.", + "ImpactStatement": "None - this is the default behavior.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell script:```$AuditAdmin = @( \"ApplyRecord\", \"Copy\", \"Create\", \"FolderBind\", \"HardDelete\", \"MailItemsAccessed\", \"Move\", \"MoveToDeletedItems\", \"SendAs\", \"SendOnBehalf\", \"Send\", \"SoftDelete\", \"Update\", \"UpdateCalendarDelegation\", \"UpdateFolderPermissions\", \"UpdateInboxRules\")$AuditDelegate = @( \"ApplyRecord\", \"Create\", \"FolderBind\", \"HardDelete\", \"Move\", \"MailItemsAccessed\", \"MoveToDeletedItems\", \"SendAs\", \"SendOnBehalf\", \"SoftDelete\", \"Update\", \"UpdateFolderPermissions\", \"UpdateInboxRules\")$AuditOwner = @( \"ApplyRecord\", \"Create\", \"HardDelete\", \"MailboxLogin\", \"Move\", \"MailItemsAccessed\", \"MoveToDeletedItems\", \"Send\", \"SoftDelete\", \"Update\", \"UpdateCalendarDelegation\", \"UpdateFolderPermissions\", \"UpdateInboxRules\")$MBX = Get-EXOMailbox -ResultSize Unlimited | Where-Object { $_.RecipientTypeDetails -eq \"UserMailbox\" }$MBX | Set-Mailbox -AuditEnabled $true `-AuditLogAgeLimit 180 -AuditAdmin $AuditAdmin -AuditDelegate $AuditDelegate `-AuditOwner $AuditOwner```**Note:** When running this script mailboxes without an E5 or Azure Audit Premium license applied will generate an error as they are not licensed for the additional actions which come default with E5.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell script:```$MailAudit = Get-EXOMailbox -PropertySets Audit -ResultSize Unlimited | Select-Object UserPrincipalName, AuditEnabled, AuditAdmin, AuditDelegate, AuditOwner$MailAudit | Export-Csv -Path C:\\CIS\\AuditSettings.csv -NoTypeInformation```3. Analyze the output and verify `AuditEnabled` is set to `True` and all audit actions are included in what is defined in the script in the remediation section.**Optionally, this more comprehensive script can assess each user mailbox:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following script:```$AdminActions = @( \"ApplyRecord\", \"Copy\", \"Create\", \"FolderBind\", \"HardDelete\", \"MailItemsAccessed\", \"Move\", \"MoveToDeletedItems\", \"SendAs\", \"SendOnBehalf\", \"Send\", \"SoftDelete\", \"Update\", \"UpdateCalendarDelegation\", \"UpdateFolderPermissions\", \"UpdateInboxRules\" )$DelegateActions = @( \"ApplyRecord\", \"Create\", \"FolderBind\", \"HardDelete\", \"Move\", \"MailItemsAccessed\", \"MoveToDeletedItems\", \"SendAs\", \"SendOnBehalf\", \"SoftDelete\", \"Update\", \"UpdateFolderPermissions\", \"UpdateInboxRules\")$OwnerActions = @( \"ApplyRecord\", \"Create\", \"HardDelete\", \"MailboxLogin\", \"Move\", \"MailItemsAccessed\", \"MoveToDeletedItems\", \"Send\", \"SoftDelete\", \"Update\", \"UpdateCalendarDelegation\", \"UpdateFolderPermissions\", \"UpdateInboxRules\")function VerifyActions { param ( [string]$type, [array]$actions, [array]$auditProperty, [string]$mailboxName ) $missingActions = @() $actionCount = 0 foreach ($action in $actions) { if ($auditProperty -notcontains $action) { $missingActions += \" Failure: Audit action '$action' missing from $type\" $actionCount++ } } if ($actionCount -eq 0) { Write-Host \"[$mailboxName]: $type actions are verified.\" -ForegroundColor Green } else { Write-Host \"[$mailboxName]: $type actions are not all verified.\" -ForegroundColor Red foreach ($missingAction in $missingActions) { Write-Host \" $missingAction\" -ForegroundColor Red } }}$mailboxes = Get-EXOMailbox -PropertySets Audit,Minimum -ResultSize Unlimited | Where-Object { $_.RecipientTypeDetails -eq \"UserMailbox\" }foreach ($mailbox in $mailboxes) { Write-Host \"--- Now assessing [$($mailbox.UserPrincipalName)] ---\" if ($mailbox.AuditEnabled) { Write-Host \"[$($mailbox.UserPrincipalName)]: AuditEnabled is true\" -ForegroundColor Green } else { Write-Host \"[$($mailbox.UserPrincipalName)]: AuditEnabled is false\" -ForegroundColor Red } VerifyActions -type \"AuditAdmin\" -actions $AdminActions -auditProperty $mailbox.AuditAdmin ` -mailboxName $mailbox.UserPrincipalName VerifyActions -type \"AuditDelegate\" -actions $DelegateActions -auditProperty $mailbox.AuditDelegate ` -mailboxName $mailbox.UserPrincipalName VerifyActions -type \"AuditOwner\" -actions $OwnerActions -auditProperty $mailbox.AuditOwner ` -mailboxName $mailbox.UserPrincipalName Write-Host}```**Note:** In order for a mailbox to pass the above it must have an E5 or Microsoft Purview Audit Premium addon license assigned to it. For the purposes of this recommendation shared mailboxes are ignored.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-mailboxes?view=o365-worldwide", + "DefaultValue": "`AuditEnabled`: `True` for all mailboxes except below:- Resource Mailboxes- Public Folder Mailboxes- DiscoverySearch Mailbox**AuditAdmin:** ApplyRecord, Create, HardDelete, MailItemsAccessed, MoveToDeletedItems, Send, SendAs, SendOnBehalf, SoftDelete, Update, UpdateCalendarDelegation, UpdateFolderPermissions, UpdateInboxRules**AuditDelegate:** ApplyRecord, Create, HardDelete, MailItemsAccessed, MoveToDeletedItems, SendAs, SendOnBehalf, SoftDelete, Update, UpdateFolderPermissions, UpdateInboxRules**AuditOwner:** ApplyRecord, HardDelete, MailItemsAccessed, MoveToDeletedItems, Send, SoftDelete, Update, UpdateCalendarDelegation, UpdateFolderPermissions, UpdateInboxRules" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.4", + "Description": "When configuring a user or computer account to bypass mailbox audit logging, the system will not record any access, or actions performed by the said user or computer account on any mailbox. Administratively this was introduced to reduce the volume of entries in the mailbox audit logs on trusted user or computer accounts.Ensure `AuditBypassEnabled` is not enabled on accounts without a written exception.", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_mailbox_audit_bypass_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "When configuring a user or computer account to bypass mailbox audit logging, the system will not record any access, or actions performed by the said user or computer account on any mailbox. Administratively this was introduced to reduce the volume of entries in the mailbox audit logs on trusted user or computer accounts.Ensure `AuditBypassEnabled` is not enabled on accounts without a written exception.", + "RationaleStatement": "If a mailbox audit bypass association is added for an account, the account can access any mailbox in the organization to which it has been assigned access permissions, without generating any mailbox audit logging entries for such access or recording any actions taken, such as message deletions.Enabling this parameter, whether intentionally or unintentionally, could allow insiders or malicious actors to conceal their activity on specific mailboxes. Ensuring proper logging of user actions and mailbox operations in the audit log will enable comprehensive incident response and forensics.", + "ImpactStatement": "None - this is the default behavior.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. The following example PowerShell script will disable AuditBypass for all mailboxes which currently have it enabled:```# Get mailboxes with AuditBypassEnabled set to $true$MBXAudit = Get-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation -ResultSize unlimited | Where-Object { $_.AuditBypassEnabled -eq $true }foreach ($mailbox in $MBXAudit) { $mailboxName = $mailbox.Name Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation -Identity $mailboxName -AuditBypassEnabled $false Write-Host \"Audit Bypass disabled for mailbox Identity: $mailboxName\" -ForegroundColor Green}```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```$MBX = Get-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation -ResultSize unlimited$MBX | where {$_.AuditBypassEnabled -eq $true} | Format-Table Name,AuditBypassEnabled```3. If nothing is returned, then there are no accounts with Audit Bypass enabled.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/get-mailboxauditbypassassociation?view=exchange-ps", + "DefaultValue": "AuditBypassEnabled `False`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.2.1", + "Description": "Exchange Online offers several methods of managing the flow of email messages. These are Remote domain, Transport Rules, and Anti-spam outbound policies. These methods work together to provide comprehensive coverage for potential automatic forwarding channels:- Outlook forwarding using inbox rules.- Outlook forwarding configured using OOF rule.- OWA forwarding setting (ForwardingSmtpAddress).- Forwarding set by the admin using EAC (ForwardingAddress).- Forwarding using Power Automate / Flow.Ensure a `Transport rule` and `Anti-spam outbound policy` are used to block mail forwarding.**NOTE:** Any exclusions should be implemented based on organizational policy.", + "Checks": [ + "defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled", + "exchange_transport_rules_mail_forwarding_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Exchange Online offers several methods of managing the flow of email messages. These are Remote domain, Transport Rules, and Anti-spam outbound policies. These methods work together to provide comprehensive coverage for potential automatic forwarding channels:- Outlook forwarding using inbox rules.- Outlook forwarding configured using OOF rule.- OWA forwarding setting (ForwardingSmtpAddress).- Forwarding set by the admin using EAC (ForwardingAddress).- Forwarding using Power Automate / Flow.Ensure a `Transport rule` and `Anti-spam outbound policy` are used to block mail forwarding.**NOTE:** Any exclusions should be implemented based on organizational policy.", + "RationaleStatement": "Attackers often create these rules to exfiltrate data from your tenancy, this could be accomplished via access to an end-user account or otherwise. An insider could also use one of these methods as a secondary channel to exfiltrate sensitive data.", + "ImpactStatement": "Care should be taken before implementation to ensure there is no business need for case-by-case auto-forwarding. Disabling auto-forwarding to remote domains will affect all users and in an organization. Any exclusions should be implemented based on organizational policy.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Note:** _Remediation is a two step procedure as follows:_**STEP 1: Transport rules****To remediate using the UI:** 1. Select `Exchange` to open the Exchange admin center.2. Select `Mail Flow` then `Rules`.3. For each rule that redirects email to external domains, select the rule and click the 'Delete' icon.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Remove-TransportRule {RuleName}```**STEP 2: Anti-spam outbound policy****To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com/2. Expand `E-mail & collaboration` then select `Policies & rules`.3. Select `Threat policies` > `Anti-spam`.4. Select `Anti-spam outbound policy (default)` 5. Click `Edit protection settings`6. Set `Automatic forwarding rules` dropdown to `Off - Forwarding is disabled` and click `Save`7. Repeat steps 4-6 for any additional higher priority, custom policies.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Set-HostedOutboundSpamFilterPolicy -Identity {policyName} -AutoForwardingMode Off```3. To remove AutoForwarding from all outbound policies you can also run:```Get-HostedOutboundSpamFilterPolicy | Set-HostedOutboundSpamFilterPolicy -AutoForwardingMode Off```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Note:** _Audit is a two step procedure as follows:_**STEP 1: Transport rules****To audit using the UI:** 1. Select `Exchange` to open the Exchange admin center.2. Select `Mail Flow` then `Rules`.3. Review the rules and verify that none of them are forwards or redirects e-mail to external domains.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command to review the Transport Rules that are redirecting email:```Get-TransportRule | Where-Object {$_.RedirectMessageTo -ne $null} | ft Name,RedirectMessageTo```3. Verify that none of the addresses listed belong to external domains outside of the organization. If nothing returns then there are no transport rules set to redirect messages.**STEP 2: Anti-spam outbound policy****To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com/2. Expand `E-mail & collaboration` then select `Policies & rules`.3. Select `Threat policies` > `Anti-spam`.4. Inspect `Anti-spam outbound policy (default)` and ensure `Automatic forwarding` is set to `Off - Forwarding is disabled`5. Inspect any additional custom outbound policies and ensure `Automatic forwarding` is set to `Off - Forwarding is disabled`, in accordance with the organization's exclusion policies.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell cmdlet:```Get-HostedOutboundSpamFilterPolicy | ft Name, AutoForwardingMode```3. In each outbound policy verify `AutoForwardingMode` is `Off`.**Note:** According to Microsoft if a recipient is defined in multiple policies of the same type (anti-spam, anti-phishing, etc.), only the policy with the highest priority is applied to the recipient. Any remaining policies of that type are not evaluated for the recipient (including the default policy). However, it is our recommendation to audit the default policy as well in the case a higher priority custom policy is removed. This will keep the organization's security posture strong.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/security-and-compliance/mail-flow-rules/mail-flow-rules:https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/all-you-need-to-know-about-automatic-email-forwarding-in/ba-p/2074888#:~:text=%20%20%20Automatic%20forwarding%20option%20%20,%:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/outbound-spam-policies-external-email-forwarding?view=o365-worldwide", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.2.2", + "Description": "Mail flow rules (transport rules) in Exchange Online are used to identify and take action on messages that flow through the organization.", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_transport_rules_whitelist_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Mail flow rules (transport rules) in Exchange Online are used to identify and take action on messages that flow through the organization.", + "RationaleStatement": "Whitelisting domains in transport rules bypasses regular malware and phishing scanning, which can enable an attacker to launch attacks against your users from a safe haven domain.", + "ImpactStatement": "Care should be taken before implementation to ensure there is no business need for case-by-case whitelisting. Removing all whitelisted domains could affect incoming mail flow to an organization although modern systems sending legitimate mail should have no issue with this.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Exchange admin center` https://admin.exchange.microsoft.com..2. Click to expand `Mail Flow` and then select `Rules`.3. For each rule that whitelists specific domains, select the rule and click the 'Delete' icon.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Remove-TransportRule {RuleName}```3. Verify the rules no longer exists.```Get-TransportRule | Where-Object {($_.setscl -eq -1 -and $_.SenderDomainIs -ne $null)} | ft Name,SenderDomainIs```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Exchange admin center` https://admin.exchange.microsoft.com..2. Click to expand `Mail Flow` and then select `Rules`.3. Review the rules and verify that none of them whitelist any specific domains.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Get-TransportRule | Where-Object {($_.setscl -eq -1 -and $_.SenderDomainIs -ne $null)} | ft Name,SenderDomainIs```", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/security-and-compliance/mail-flow-rules/configuration-best-practices:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/security-and-compliance/mail-flow-rules/mail-flow-rules", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.2.3", + "Description": "External callouts provide a native experience to identify emails from senders outside the organization. This is achieved by presenting a new tag on emails called \"External\" (the string is localized based on the client language setting) and exposing related user interface at the top of the message reading view to see and verify the real sender's email address.Once this feature is enabled via PowerShell, it might take 24-48 hours for users to start seeing the External sender tag in email messages received from external sources (outside of your organization), providing their Outlook version supports it.The recommended state is `ExternalInOutlook` set to `Enabled` `True`**Note:** Mail flow rules are often used by Exchange administrators to accomplish the External email tagging by appending a tag to the front of a subject line. There are limitations to this outlined [here.](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/native-external-sender-callouts-on-email-in-outlook/ba-p/2250098) The preferred method in the CIS Benchmark is to use the native experience.", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_external_email_tagging_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "External callouts provide a native experience to identify emails from senders outside the organization. This is achieved by presenting a new tag on emails called \"External\" (the string is localized based on the client language setting) and exposing related user interface at the top of the message reading view to see and verify the real sender's email address.Once this feature is enabled via PowerShell, it might take 24-48 hours for users to start seeing the External sender tag in email messages received from external sources (outside of your organization), providing their Outlook version supports it.The recommended state is `ExternalInOutlook` set to `Enabled` `True`**Note:** Mail flow rules are often used by Exchange administrators to accomplish the External email tagging by appending a tag to the front of a subject line. There are limitations to this outlined [here.](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/native-external-sender-callouts-on-email-in-outlook/ba-p/2250098) The preferred method in the CIS Benchmark is to use the native experience.", + "RationaleStatement": "Tagging emails from external senders helps to inform end users about the origin of the email. This can allow them to proceed with more caution and make informed decisions when it comes to identifying spam or phishing emails.**Note:** Existing emails in a user's inbox from external senders are not tagged retroactively.", + "ImpactStatement": "Mail flow rules using external tagging will need to be disabled before enabling this to avoid duplicate [External] tags. The Outlook desktop client is the last to receive this update and the feature is only available for certain versions see below:Outlook for Windows: **Update 4/26/23:** _External Tag view in Outlook for Windows (matching other clients) released to production for Current Channel and Monthly Enterprise Channel in Version 2211 for builds 15831.20190 and higher. We anticipate the External tag to reach Semi-Annual Preview Channel with Version 2308 on the September 12th 2023 public update and reach Semi-Annual Enterprise Channel with Version 2308 with the January 9th 2024 public update._", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Set-ExternalInOutlook -Enabled $true```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Get-ExternalInOutlook```3. For each identity verify `Enabled` is set to `True` and the `AllowList` only contains email addresses the organization has permitted to bypass external tagging.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/native-external-sender-callouts-on-email-in-outlook/ba-p/2250098:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-externalinoutlook?view=exchange-ps", + "DefaultValue": "Disabled (False)" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.3.1", + "Description": "Specify the administrators and users who can install and manage add-ins for Outlook in Exchange OnlineBy default, users can install add-ins in their Microsoft Outlook Desktop client, allowing data access within the client application.", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_roles_assignment_policy_addins_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6.3", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Specify the administrators and users who can install and manage add-ins for Outlook in Exchange OnlineBy default, users can install add-ins in their Microsoft Outlook Desktop client, allowing data access within the client application.", + "RationaleStatement": "Attackers exploit vulnerable or custom add-ins to access user data. Disabling user-installed add-ins in Microsoft Outlook reduces this threat surface.", + "ImpactStatement": "Implementing this change will impact both end users and administrators. End users will be unable to integrate third-party applications they desire, and administrators may receive requests to grant permission for necessary third-party apps.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Exchange admin center` https://admin.exchange.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Roles` select `User roles`.3. Select `Default Role Assignment Policy`.4. In the properties pane on the right click on `Manage permissions`.5. Under _Other roles_ uncheck `My Custom Apps`, `My Marketplace Apps` and `My ReadWriteMailboxApps`.6. Click `Save changes`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following command:```$policy = \"Role Assignment Policy - Prevent Add-ins\"$roles = \"MyTextMessaging\", \"MyDistributionGroups\", ` \"MyMailSubscriptions\", \"MyBaseOptions\", \"MyVoiceMail\", ` \"MyProfileInformation\", \"MyContactInformation\", \"MyRetentionPolicies\", ` \"MyDistributionGroupMembership\"New-RoleAssignmentPolicy -Name $policy -Roles $rolesSet-RoleAssignmentPolicy -id $policy -IsDefault# Assign new policy to all mailboxesGet-EXOMailbox -ResultSize Unlimited | Set-Mailbox -RoleAssignmentPolicy $policy``` **If you have other Role Assignment Policies modify the last line to filter out your custom policies**", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Exchange admin center` https://admin.exchange.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Roles` select `User roles`.3. Select `Default Role Assignment Policy`.4. In the properties pane on the right click on `Manage permissions`.5. Under _Other roles_ verify `My Custom Apps`, `My Marketplace Apps` and `My ReadWriteMailboxApps` are **unchecked**.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following command:```Get-EXOMailbox | Select-Object -Unique RoleAssignmentPolicy | ForEach-Object { Get-RoleAssignmentPolicy -Identity $_.RoleAssignmentPolicy | Where-Object {$_.AssignedRoles -like \"*Apps*\"}} | Select-Object Identity, @{Name=\"AssignedRoles\"; Expression={ Get-Mailbox | Select-Object -Unique RoleAssignmentPolicy | ForEach-Object { Get-RoleAssignmentPolicy -Identity $_.RoleAssignmentPolicy | Select-Object -ExpandProperty AssignedRoles | Where-Object {$_ -like \"*Apps*\"} }}}```3. Verify `My Custom Apps`, `My Marketplace Apps` and `My ReadWriteMailboxApps` are not present.**Note:** As of the current release the manage permissions link no longer displays anything when a user assigned the Global Reader role clicks on it. Global Readers as an alternative can inspect the Roles column or use the PowerShell method to perform the audit.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/clients-and-mobile-in-exchange-online/add-ins-for-outlook/specify-who-can-install-and-manage-add-ins?source=recommendations:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/permissions-exo/role-assignment-policies", + "DefaultValue": "UI - `My Custom Apps`, `My Marketplace Apps`, and `My ReadWriteMailboxApps` are checkedPowerShell - `My Custom Apps` `My Marketplace Apps` and `My ReadWriteMailboxApps` are assigned" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.5.1", + "Description": "Modern authentication in Microsoft 365 enables authentication features like multifactor authentication (MFA) using smart cards, certificate-based authentication (CBA), and third-party SAML identity providers. When you enable modern authentication in Exchange Online, Outlook 2016 and Outlook 2013 use modern authentication to log in to Microsoft 365 mailboxes. When you disable modern authentication in Exchange Online, Outlook 2016 and Outlook 2013 use basic authentication to log in to Microsoft 365 mailboxes.When users initially configure certain email clients, like Outlook 2013 and Outlook 2016, they may be required to authenticate using enhanced authentication mechanisms, such as multifactor authentication. Other Outlook clients that are available in Microsoft 365 (for example, Outlook Mobile and Outlook for Mac 2016) always use modern authentication to log in to Microsoft 365 mailboxes.", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_organization_modern_authentication_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6.5", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Modern authentication in Microsoft 365 enables authentication features like multifactor authentication (MFA) using smart cards, certificate-based authentication (CBA), and third-party SAML identity providers. When you enable modern authentication in Exchange Online, Outlook 2016 and Outlook 2013 use modern authentication to log in to Microsoft 365 mailboxes. When you disable modern authentication in Exchange Online, Outlook 2016 and Outlook 2013 use basic authentication to log in to Microsoft 365 mailboxes.When users initially configure certain email clients, like Outlook 2013 and Outlook 2016, they may be required to authenticate using enhanced authentication mechanisms, such as multifactor authentication. Other Outlook clients that are available in Microsoft 365 (for example, Outlook Mobile and Outlook for Mac 2016) always use modern authentication to log in to Microsoft 365 mailboxes.", + "RationaleStatement": "Strong authentication controls, such as the use of multifactor authentication, may be circumvented if basic authentication is used by Exchange Online email clients such as Outlook 2016 and Outlook 2013. Enabling modern authentication for Exchange Online ensures strong authentication mechanisms are used when establishing sessions between email clients and Exchange Online.", + "ImpactStatement": "Users of older email clients, such as Outlook 2013 and Outlook 2016, will no longer be able to authenticate to Exchange using Basic Authentication, which will necessitate migration to modern authentication practices.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Run the Microsoft Exchange Online PowerShell Module.2. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.3. Run the following PowerShell command:```Set-OrganizationConfig -OAuth2ClientProfileEnabled $True```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Run the Microsoft Exchange Online PowerShell Module.2. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.3. Run the following PowerShell command:```Get-OrganizationConfig | Format-Table -Auto Name, OAuth*```4. Verify `OAuth2ClientProfileEnabled` is `True`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/clients-and-mobile-in-exchange-online/enable-or-disable-modern-authentication-in-exchange-online", + "DefaultValue": "True" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.5.2", + "Description": "MailTips are informative messages displayed to users while they're composing a message. While a new message is open and being composed, Exchange analyzes the message (including recipients). If a potential problem is detected, the user is notified with a MailTip prior to sending the message. Using the information in the MailTip, the user can adjust the message to avoid undesirable situations or non-delivery reports (also known as NDRs or bounce messages).", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_organization_mailtips_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6.5", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "MailTips are informative messages displayed to users while they're composing a message. While a new message is open and being composed, Exchange analyzes the message (including recipients). If a potential problem is detected, the user is notified with a MailTip prior to sending the message. Using the information in the MailTip, the user can adjust the message to avoid undesirable situations or non-delivery reports (also known as NDRs or bounce messages).", + "RationaleStatement": "Setting up MailTips gives a visual aid to users when they send emails to large groups of recipients or send emails to recipients not within the tenant.", + "ImpactStatement": "Not applicable.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```$TipsParams = @{ MailTipsAllTipsEnabled = $true MailTipsExternalRecipientsTipsEnabled = $true MailTipsGroupMetricsEnabled = $true MailTipsLargeAudienceThreshold = '25'}Set-OrganizationConfig @TipsParams```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Get-OrganizationConfig | fl MailTips*```3. Verify the values for `MailTipsAllTipsEnabled`, `MailTipsExternalRecipientsTipsEnabled`, and `MailTipsGroupMetricsEnabled` are set to `True` and `MailTipsLargeAudienceThreshold` is set to an acceptable value; `25` is the default value.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/clients-and-mobile-in-exchange-online/mailtips/mailtips:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-organizationconfig?view=exchange-ps", + "DefaultValue": "MailTipsAllTipsEnabled: TrueMailTipsExternalRecipientsTipsEnabled: FalseMailTipsGroupMetricsEnabled: TrueMailTipsLargeAudienceThreshold: 25" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.5.3", + "Description": "This setting allows users to open certain external files while working in Outlook on the web. If allowed, keep in mind that ", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_mailbox_policy_additional_storage_restricted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6.5", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting allows users to open certain external files while working in Outlook on the web. If allowed, keep in mind that ", + "RationaleStatement": "By default, additional storage providers are allowed in Office on the Web (such as Box, Dropbox, Facebook, Google Drive, OneDrive Personal, etc.). This could lead to information leakage and additional risk of infection from organizational non-trusted storage providers. Restricting this will inherently reduce risk as it will narrow opportunities for infection and data leakage.", + "ImpactStatement": "The impact associated with this change is highly dependent upon current practices in the tenant. If users do not use other storage providers, then minimal impact is likely. However, if users do regularly utilize providers outside of the tenant this will affect their ability to continue to do so.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Set-OwaMailboxPolicy -Identity OwaMailboxPolicy-Default -AdditionalStorageProvidersAvailable $false```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Get-OwaMailboxPolicy | Format-Table Name, AdditionalStorageProvidersAvailable```3. Verify that the value returned is `False`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-owamailboxpolicy?view=exchange-ps:https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/3rd-party-cloud-storage-services-supported-by-office-apps-fce12782-eccc-4cf5-8f4b-d1ebec513f72", + "DefaultValue": "`Additional Storage Providers` - `True`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.5.4", + "Description": "This setting enables or disables authenticated client SMTP submission (SMTP AUTH) at an organization level in Exchange Online. The recommended state is `Turn off SMTP AUTH protocol for your organization` (checked).", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_transport_config_smtp_auth_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6.5", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting enables or disables authenticated client SMTP submission (SMTP AUTH) at an organization level in Exchange Online. The recommended state is `Turn off SMTP AUTH protocol for your organization` (checked).", + "RationaleStatement": "SMTP AUTH is a legacy protocol. Disabling it at the organization level supports the principle of least functionality and serves to further back additional controls that block legacy protocols, such as in Conditional Access. Virtually all modern email clients that connect to Exchange Online mailboxes in Microsoft 365 can do so without using SMTP AUTH.", + "ImpactStatement": "This enforces the default behavior, so no impact is expected unless the organization is using it globally. A per-mailbox setting exists that overrides the tenant-wide setting, allowing an individual mailbox SMTP AUTH capability for special cases.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Exchange admin center` https://admin.exchange.microsoft.com.2. Select `Settings` > `Mail flow`.3. Uncheck `Turn off SMTP AUTH protocol for your organization`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Set-TransportConfig -SmtpClientAuthenticationDisabled $true```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Exchange admin center` https://admin.exchange.microsoft.com.2. Select `Settings` > `Mail flow`.3. Ensure `Turn off SMTP AUTH protocol for your organization` is checked.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Exchange Online using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Get-TransportConfig | Format-List SmtpClientAuthenticationDisabled```3. Verify that the value returned is `True`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/clients-and-mobile-in-exchange-online/authenticated-client-smtp-submission", + "DefaultValue": "SmtpClientAuthenticationDisabled : True" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.2.1", + "Description": "Modern authentication in Microsoft 365 enables authentication features like multifactor authentication (MFA) using smart cards, certificate-based authentication (CBA), and third-party SAML identity providers.", + "Checks": [ + "sharepoint_modern_authentication_required" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Modern authentication in Microsoft 365 enables authentication features like multifactor authentication (MFA) using smart cards, certificate-based authentication (CBA), and third-party SAML identity providers.", + "RationaleStatement": "Strong authentication controls, such as the use of multifactor authentication, may be circumvented if basic authentication is used by SharePoint applications. Requiring modern authentication for SharePoint applications ensures strong authentication mechanisms are used when establishing sessions between these applications, SharePoint, and connecting users.", + "ImpactStatement": "Implementation of modern authentication for SharePoint will require users to authenticate to SharePoint using modern authentication. This may cause a minor impact to typical user behavior.This may also prevent third-party apps from accessing SharePoint Online resources. Also, this will also block apps using the SharePointOnlineCredentials class to access SharePoint Online resources.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `SharePoint admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint.2. Click to expand `Policies` select `Access control`.3. Select `Apps that don't use modern authentication`. 4. Select the radio button for `Block access`.5. Click `Save`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online using `Connect-SPOService -Url https://tenant-admin.sharepoint.com` replacing tenant with your value.2. Run the following SharePoint Online PowerShell command:```Set-SPOTenant -LegacyAuthProtocolsEnabled $false```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `SharePoint admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint.2. Click to expand `Policies` select `Access control`.3. Select `Apps that don't use modern authentication` and ensure that it is set to `Block access`.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online using `Connect-SPOService -Url https://tenant-admin.sharepoint.com` replacing tenant with your value.2. Run the following SharePoint Online PowerShell command:```Get-SPOTenant | ft LegacyAuthProtocolsEnabled```3. Ensure the returned value is `False`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/sharepoint-online/set-spotenant?view=sharepoint-ps", + "DefaultValue": "True (Apps that don't use modern authentication are allowed)" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.2.2", + "Description": "Entra ID B2B provides authentication and management of guests. Authentication happens via one-time passcode when they don't already have a work or school account or a Microsoft account. Integration with SharePoint and OneDrive allows for more granular control of how guest user accounts are managed in the organization's AAD, unifying a similar guest experience already deployed in other Microsoft 365 services such as Teams.**Note:** Global Reader role currently can't access SharePoint using PowerShell.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Entra ID B2B provides authentication and management of guests. Authentication happens via one-time passcode when they don't already have a work or school account or a Microsoft account. Integration with SharePoint and OneDrive allows for more granular control of how guest user accounts are managed in the organization's AAD, unifying a similar guest experience already deployed in other Microsoft 365 services such as Teams.**Note:** Global Reader role currently can't access SharePoint using PowerShell.", + "RationaleStatement": "External users assigned guest accounts will be subject to Entra ID access policies, such as multi-factor authentication. This provides a way to manage guest identities and control access to SharePoint and OneDrive resources. Without this integration, files can be shared without account registration, making it more challenging to audit and manage who has access to the organization's data.", + "ImpactStatement": "B2B collaboration is used with other Entra services so should not be new or unusual. Microsoft also has made the experience seamless when turning on integration on SharePoint sites that already have active files shared with guest users. The referenced Microsoft article on the subject has more details on this.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online using `Connect-SPOService`2. Run the following command:```Set-SPOTenant -EnableAzureADB2BIntegration $true```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online using `Connect-SPOService`2. Run the following command:```Get-SPOTenant | ft EnableAzureADB2BIntegration```3. Ensure the returned value is `True`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/sharepoint-azureb2b-integration#enabling-the-integration:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/external-id/what-is-b2b:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/sharepoint-online/set-spotenant?view=sharepoint-ps", + "DefaultValue": "False" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.2.3", + "Description": "The external sharing settings govern sharing for the organization overall. Each site has its own sharing setting that can be set independently, though it must be at the same or more restrictive setting as the organization. The new and existing guests option requires people who have received invitations to sign in with their work or school account (if their organization uses Microsoft 365) or a Microsoft account, or to provide a code to verify their identity. Users can share with guests already in your organization's directory, and they can send invitations to people who will be added to the directory if they sign in.The recommended state is `New and existing guests` or less permissive.", + "Checks": [ + "sharepoint_external_sharing_restricted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The external sharing settings govern sharing for the organization overall. Each site has its own sharing setting that can be set independently, though it must be at the same or more restrictive setting as the organization. The new and existing guests option requires people who have received invitations to sign in with their work or school account (if their organization uses Microsoft 365) or a Microsoft account, or to provide a code to verify their identity. Users can share with guests already in your organization's directory, and they can send invitations to people who will be added to the directory if they sign in.The recommended state is `New and existing guests` or less permissive.", + "RationaleStatement": "Forcing guest authentication on the organization's tenant enables the implementation of controls and oversight over external file sharing. When a guest is registered with the organization, they now have an identity which can be accounted for. This identity can also have other restrictions applied to it through group membership and conditional access rules.", + "ImpactStatement": "When using B2B integration, Entra ID external collaboration settings, such as guest invite settings and collaboration restrictions apply.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `SharePoint admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint2. Click to expand `Policies` > `Sharing`.3. Locate the `External sharing section`.4. Under SharePoint, move the slider bar to `New and existing guests` or a less permissive level. - OneDrive will also be moved to the same level and can never be more permissive than SharePoint.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online service using `Connect-SPOService`.2. Run the following cmdlet to establish the minimum recommended state:```Set-SPOTenant -SharingCapability ExternalUserSharingOnly```**Note:** Other acceptable values for this parameter that are more restrictive include: `Disabled` and `ExistingExternalUserSharingOnly`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `SharePoint admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint2. Click to expand `Policies` > `Sharing`.3. Locate the `External sharing section`.4. Under SharePoint, ensure the slider bar is set to `New and existing guests` or a less permissive level.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online service using `Connect-SPOService`.2. Run the following cmdlet:```Get-SPOTenant | fl SharingCapability```3. Ensure `SharingCapability` is set to one of the following values: - Value1: `ExternalUserSharingOnly` - Value2: `ExistingExternalUserSharingOnly` - Value3: `Disabled`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/turn-external-sharing-on-or-off:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/sharepoint-online/set-spotenant?view=sharepoint-ps", + "DefaultValue": "Anyone (ExternalUserAndGuestSharing)" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.2.4", + "Description": "This setting governs the global permissiveness of OneDrive content sharing in the organization. OneDrive content sharing can be restricted independent of SharePoint but can never be more permissive than the level established with SharePoint.The recommended state is `Only people in your organization`.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting governs the global permissiveness of OneDrive content sharing in the organization. OneDrive content sharing can be restricted independent of SharePoint but can never be more permissive than the level established with SharePoint.The recommended state is `Only people in your organization`.", + "RationaleStatement": "OneDrive, designed for end-user cloud storage, inherently provides less oversight and control compared to SharePoint, which often involves additional content overseers or site administrators. This autonomy can lead to potential risks such as inadvertent sharing of privileged information by end users. Restricting external OneDrive sharing will require users to transfer content to SharePoint folders first which have those tighter controls.", + "ImpactStatement": "Users will be required to take additional steps to share OneDrive content or use other official channels.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `SharePoint admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint2. Click to expand `Policies` > `Sharing`.3. Locate the `External sharing section`.4. Under OneDrive, set the slider bar to `Only people in your organization`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online service using `Connect-SPOService`.2. Run the following cmdlet:```Set-SPOTenant -OneDriveSharingCapability Disabled```**Alternative remediation method using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online.2. Run one of the following:```# Replace [tenant] with your tenant idSet-SPOSite -Identity https://[tenant]-my.sharepoint.com/ -SharingCapability Disabled# Or run this to filter to the specific site without supplying the tenant name.$OneDriveSite = Get-SPOSite -Filter { Url -like \"*-my.sharepoint.com/\" }Set-SPOSite -Identity $OneDriveSite -SharingCapability Disabled```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `SharePoint admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint2. Click to expand `Policies` > `Sharing`.3. Locate the `External sharing section`.4. Under OneDrive, ensure the slider bar is set to `Only people in your organization`.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online service using `Connect-SPOService`.2. Run the following cmdlet:```Get-SPOTenant | fl OneDriveSharingCapability```3. Ensure the returned value is `Disabled`.**Alternative audit method using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online.2. Use one of the following methods:```# Replace [tenant] with your tenant idGet-SPOSite -Identity https://[tenant]-my.sharepoint.com/ | fl Url,SharingCapability# Or run this to filter to the specific site without supplying the tenant name.$OneDriveSite = Get-SPOSite -Filter { Url -like \"*-my.sharepoint.com/\" }Get-SPOSite -Identity $OneDriveSite | fl Url,SharingCapability```2. Ensure the returned value for `SharingCapability` is `Disabled`**Note:** As of March 2024, using `Get-SPOSite` with Where-Object or filtering against the entire site and then returning the `SharingCapability` parameter can result in a different value as opposed to running the cmdlet specifically against the OneDrive specific site using the -Identity switch as shown in the example.**Note 2:** The parameter `OneDriveSharingCapability` may not be yet fully available in all tenants. It is demonstrated in official Microsoft documentation as linked in the references section but not in the Set-SPOTenant cmdlet itself. If the parameter is unavailable, then either use the UI method or alternative PowerShell audit method.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/sharepoint-online/set-spotenant?view=sharepoint-ps#-onedrivesharingcapability", + "DefaultValue": "Anyone (ExternalUserAndGuestSharing)" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.2.5", + "Description": "SharePoint gives users the ability to share files, folders, and site collections. Internal users can share with external collaborators, and with the right permissions could share to other external parties.", + "Checks": [ + "sharepoint_guest_sharing_restricted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "SharePoint gives users the ability to share files, folders, and site collections. Internal users can share with external collaborators, and with the right permissions could share to other external parties.", + "RationaleStatement": "Sharing and collaboration are key; however, file, folder, or site collection owners should have the authority over what external users get shared with to prevent unauthorized disclosures of information.", + "ImpactStatement": "The impact associated with this change is highly dependent upon current practices. If users do not regularly share with external parties, then minimal impact is likely. However, if users do regularly share with guests/externally, minimum impacts could occur as those external users will be unable to 're-share' content.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `SharePoint admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint2. Click to expand `Policies` then select `Sharing`.3. Expand `More external sharing settings`, uncheck `Allow guests to share items they don't own`.4. Click `Save`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online service using `Connect-SPOService`.2. Run the following SharePoint Online PowerShell command:```Set-SPOTenant -PreventExternalUsersFromResharing $True```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `SharePoint admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint2. Click to expand `Policies` then select `Sharing`.3. Expand `More external sharing settings`, verify that `Allow guests to share items they don't own` is unchecked.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online service using `Connect-SPOService`.2. Run the following SharePoint Online PowerShell command:```Get-SPOTenant | ft PreventExternalUsersFromResharing```3. Ensure the returned value is `True`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/turn-external-sharing-on-or-off:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/external-sharing-overview", + "DefaultValue": "Checked (False)" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.2.6", + "Description": "Control sharing of documents to external domains by either blocking domains or only allowing sharing with specific named domains.", + "Checks": [ + "sharepoint_external_sharing_managed" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Control sharing of documents to external domains by either blocking domains or only allowing sharing with specific named domains.", + "RationaleStatement": "Attackers will often attempt to expose sensitive information to external entities through sharing, and restricting the domains that users can share documents with will reduce that surface area.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling this feature will prevent users from sharing documents with domains outside of the organization unless allowed.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `SharePoint admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint.2. Expand `Policies` then click `Sharing`.3. Expand `More external sharing settings` and check `Limit external sharing by domain`.4. Select `Add domains` to add a list of approved domains.5. Click `Save` at the bottom of the page.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online using `Connect-SPOService`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Set-SPOTenant -SharingDomainRestrictionMode AllowList -SharingAllowedDomainList \"domain1.com domain2.com\"```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `SharePoint admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint2. Expand `Policies` then click `Sharing`.3. Expand `More external sharing settings` and confirm that `Limit external sharing by domain` is checked.4. Verify that an accurate list of allowed domains is listed.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online using `Connect-SPOService`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Get-SPOTenant | fl SharingDomainRestrictionMode,SharingAllowedDomainList```3. Ensure that `SharingDomainRestrictionMode` is set to `AllowList` and `SharingAllowedDomainList` contains domains trusted by the organization for external sharing.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "Limit external sharing by domain is uncheckedSharingDomainRestrictionMode: `None`SharingDomainRestrictionMode: " + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.2.7", + "Description": "This setting sets the default link type that a user will see when sharing content in OneDrive or SharePoint. It does not restrict or exclude any other options.The recommended state is `Specific people (only the people the user specifies)`", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting sets the default link type that a user will see when sharing content in OneDrive or SharePoint. It does not restrict or exclude any other options.The recommended state is `Specific people (only the people the user specifies)`", + "RationaleStatement": "By defaulting to specific people, the user will first need to consider whether or not the content being shared should be accessible by the entire organization versus select individuals. This aids in reinforcing the concept of least privilege.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `SharePoint admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint2. Click to expand `Policies` > `Sharing`.3. Scroll to `File and folder links`.4. Set `Choose the type of link that's selected by default when users share files and folders in SharePoint and OneDrive` to `Specific people (only the people the user specifies)`**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online using `Connect-SPOService`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Set-SPOTenant -DefaultSharingLinkType Direct```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `SharePoint admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint2. Click to expand `Policies` > `Sharing`.3. Scroll to `File and folder links`.4. Ensure that the setting `Choose the type of link that's selected by default when users share files and folders in SharePoint and OneDrive` is set to `Specific people (only the people the user specifies)`**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online using `Connect-SPOService`.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Get-SPOTenant | fl DefaultSharingLinkType```3. Ensure the returned value is `Direct`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/sharepoint-online/set-spotenant?view=sharepoint-ps", + "DefaultValue": "Only people in your organization (Internal)" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.2.8", + "Description": "External sharing of content can be restricted to specific security groups. This setting is global, applies to sharing in both SharePoint and OneDrive and cannot be set at the site level in SharePoint.The recommended state is `Enabled` or `Checked`.**Note:** Users in these security groups must be allowed to invite guests in the guest invite settings in Microsoft Entra. Identity > External Identities > External collaboration settings", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "External sharing of content can be restricted to specific security groups. This setting is global, applies to sharing in both SharePoint and OneDrive and cannot be set at the site level in SharePoint.The recommended state is `Enabled` or `Checked`.**Note:** Users in these security groups must be allowed to invite guests in the guest invite settings in Microsoft Entra. Identity > External Identities > External collaboration settings", + "RationaleStatement": "Organizations wishing to create tighter security controls for external sharing can set this to enforce role-based access control by using security groups already defined in Microsoft Entra.", + "ImpactStatement": "OneDrive will also be governed by this and there is no granular control at the SharePoint site level.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `SharePoint admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint2. Click to expand `Policies` > `Sharing`.3. Scroll to and expand `More external sharing settings`.4. Set the following: - Check `Allow only users in specific security groups to share externally` - Define `Manage security groups` in accordance with company procedure.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `SharePoint admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint2. Click to expand `Policies` > `Sharing`.3. Scroll to and expand `More external sharing settings`.4. Ensure the following: - Verify `Allow only users in specific security groups to share externally` is checked - Verify `Manage security groups` is defined and accordance with company procedure.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/manage-security-groups", + "DefaultValue": "Unchecked/Undefined" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.2.9", + "Description": "This policy setting configures the expiration time for each guest that is invited to the SharePoint site or with whom users share individual files and folders with.The recommended state is `30` or less.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This policy setting configures the expiration time for each guest that is invited to the SharePoint site or with whom users share individual files and folders with.The recommended state is `30` or less.", + "RationaleStatement": "This setting ensures that guests who no longer need access to the site or link no longer have access after a set period of time. Allowing guest access for an indefinite amount of time could lead to loss of data confidentiality and oversight. **Note:** Guest membership applies at the Microsoft 365 group level. Guests who have permission to view a SharePoint site or use a sharing link may also have access to a Microsoft Teams team or security group.", + "ImpactStatement": "Site collection administrators will have to renew access to guests who still need access after 30 days. They will receive an e-mail notification once per week about guest access that is about to expire. **Note:** The guest expiration policy only applies to guests who use sharing links or guests who have direct permissions to a SharePoint site after the guest policy is enabled. The guest policy does not apply to guest users that have pre-existing permissions or access through a sharing link before the guest expiration policy is applied.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `SharePoint admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint2. Click to expand `Policies` > `Sharing`.3. Scroll to and expand `More external sharing settings`.4. Set `Guest access to a site or OneDrive will expire automatically after this many days` to `30`**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online service using `Connect-SPOService`.2. Run the following cmdlet:```Set-SPOTenant -ExternalUserExpireInDays 30 -ExternalUserExpirationRequired $True```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `SharePoint admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint2. Click to expand `Policies` > `Sharing`.3. Scroll to and expand `More external sharing settings`.4. Ensure `Guest access to a site or OneDrive will expire automatically after this many days` is checked and set to `30` or less.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online service using `Connect-SPOService`.2. Run the following cmdlet:```Get-SPOTenant | fl ExternalUserExpirationRequired,ExternalUserExpireInDays```3. Ensure the following values are returned: - ExternalUserExpirationRequired is `True`. - ExternalUserExpireInDays is `30` or less.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/turn-external-sharing-on-or-off#change-the-organization-level-external-sharing-setting:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/community/sharepoint-security-a-team-effort", + "DefaultValue": "ExternalUserExpirationRequired `$false`ExternalUserExpireInDays `60` days" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.2.10", + "Description": "This setting configures if guests who use a verification code to access the site or links are required to reauthenticate after a set number of days.The recommended state is `15` or less.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting configures if guests who use a verification code to access the site or links are required to reauthenticate after a set number of days.The recommended state is `15` or less.", + "RationaleStatement": "By increasing the frequency of times guests need to reauthenticate this ensures guest user access to data is not prolonged beyond an acceptable amount of time.", + "ImpactStatement": "Guests who use Microsoft 365 in their organization can sign in using their work or school account to access the site or document. After the one-time passcode for verification has been entered for the first time, guests will authenticate with their work or school account and have a guest account created in the host's organization.**Note:** If OneDrive and SharePoint integration with Entra ID B2B is enabled as per the CIS Benchmark the one-time-passcode experience will be replaced. Please visit [Secure external sharing in SharePoint - SharePoint in Microsoft 365 | Microsoft Learn](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-US/sharepoint/what-s-new-in-sharing-in-targeted-release?WT.mc_id=365AdminCSH_spo) for more information.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `SharePoint admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint2. Click to expand `Policies` > `Sharing`.3. Scroll to and expand `More external sharing settings`.4. Set `People who use a verification code must reauthenticate after this many days` to `15` or less.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online service using `Connect-SPOService`.2. Run the following cmdlet:```Set-SPOTenant -EmailAttestationRequired $true -EmailAttestationReAuthDays 15```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `SharePoint admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint2. Click to expand `Policies` > `Sharing`.3. Scroll to and expand `More external sharing settings`.4. Ensure `People who use a verification code must reauthenticate after this many days` is set to `15` or less.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online service using `Connect-SPOService`.2. Run the following cmdlet:```Get-SPOTenant | fl EmailAttestationRequired,EmailAttestationReAuthDays```3. Ensure the following values are returned: - EmailAttestationRequired `True` - EmailAttestationReAuthDays `15` or less days.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/what-s-new-in-sharing-in-targeted-release:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/turn-external-sharing-on-or-off#change-the-organization-level-external-sharing-setting:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/external-id/one-time-passcode", + "DefaultValue": "EmailAttestationRequired : `False`EmailAttestationReAuthDays : `30`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.2.11", + "Description": "This setting configures the permission that is selected by default for sharing link from a SharePoint site.The recommended state is `View`.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting configures the permission that is selected by default for sharing link from a SharePoint site.The recommended state is `View`.", + "RationaleStatement": "Setting the view permission as the default ensures that users must deliberately select the edit permission when sharing a link. This approach reduces the risk of unintentionally granting edit privileges to a resource that only requires read access, supporting the principle of least privilege.", + "ImpactStatement": "Not applicable.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `SharePoint admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint2. Click to expand `Policies` > `Sharing`.3. Scroll to **File and folder links**.4. Set `Choose the permission that's selected by default for sharing links` to `View`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online service using `Connect-SPOService`.2. Run the following cmdlet:```Set-SPOTenant -DefaultLinkPermission View```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `SharePoint admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint2. Click to expand `Policies` > `Sharing`.3. Scroll to **File and folder links**.4. Ensure `Choose the permission that's selected by default for sharing links` is set to `View`.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online service using `Connect-SPOService`.2. Run the following cmdlet:```Get-SPOTenant | fl DefaultLinkPermission```3. Ensure the returned value is `View`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/turn-external-sharing-on-or-off#file-and-folder-links", + "DefaultValue": "DefaultLinkPermission : Edit" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.3.1", + "Description": "By default, SharePoint online allows files that Defender for Office 365 has detected as infected to be downloaded.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7.3", + "Profile": "E5 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "By default, SharePoint online allows files that Defender for Office 365 has detected as infected to be downloaded.", + "RationaleStatement": "Defender for Office 365 for SharePoint, OneDrive, and Microsoft Teams protects your organization from inadvertently sharing malicious files. When an infected file is detected that file is blocked so that no one can open, copy, move, or share it until further actions are taken by the organization's security team.", + "ImpactStatement": "The only potential impact associated with implementation of this setting is potential inconvenience associated with the small percentage of false positive detections that may occur.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online using `Connect-SPOService -Url https://tenant-admin.sharepoint.com`, replacing \"tenant\" with the appropriate value.2. Run the following PowerShell command to set the recommended value:```Set-SPOTenant –DisallowInfectedFileDownload $true```**Note:** The Global Reader role cannot access SharePoint using PowerShell according to Microsoft. See the reference section for more information.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online using `Connect-SPOService -Url https://tenant-admin.sharepoint.com`, replacing \"tenant\" with the appropriate value.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Get-SPOTenant | Select-Object DisallowInfectedFileDownload```3. Ensure the value for `DisallowInfectedFileDownload` is set to `True`.**Note:** According to Microsoft, SharePoint cannot be accessed through PowerShell by users with the Global Reader role. For further information, please refer to the reference section.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/safe-attachments-for-spo-odfb-teams-configure?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/anti-malware-protection-for-spo-odfb-teams-about?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference#global-reader", + "DefaultValue": "False" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.3.2", + "Description": "Microsoft OneDrive allows users to sign in their cloud tenant account and begin syncing select folders or the entire contents of OneDrive to a local computer. By default, this includes any computer with OneDrive already installed, whether it is Entra Joined , Entra Hybrid Joined or Active Directory Domain joined.The recommended state for this setting is `Allow syncing only on computers joined to specific domains` `Enabled: Specify the AD domain GUID(s)`", + "Checks": [ + "sharepoint_onedrive_sync_restricted_unmanaged_devices" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7.3", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Microsoft OneDrive allows users to sign in their cloud tenant account and begin syncing select folders or the entire contents of OneDrive to a local computer. By default, this includes any computer with OneDrive already installed, whether it is Entra Joined , Entra Hybrid Joined or Active Directory Domain joined.The recommended state for this setting is `Allow syncing only on computers joined to specific domains` `Enabled: Specify the AD domain GUID(s)`", + "RationaleStatement": "Unmanaged devices pose a risk, since their security cannot be verified through existing security policies, brokers or endpoint protection. Allowing users to sync data to these devices takes that data out of the control of the organization. This increases the risk of the data either being intentionally or accidentally leaked.**Note:** This setting is only applicable to **Active Directory domains** when operating in a hybrid configuration. It does not apply to Entra domains. If there are devices which are only Entra ID joined, consider using a Conditional Access Policy instead.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling this feature will prevent users from using the OneDrive for Business Sync client on devices that are not joined to the domains that were defined.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `SharePoint admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint2. Click `Settings` then select `OneDrive - Sync`.3. Check the `Allow syncing only on computers joined to specific domains`.4. Use the `Get-ADDomain` PowerShell command on the on-premises server to obtain the GUID for each on-premises domain.5. Click `Save`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online using `Connect-SPOService`2. Run the following PowerShell command and provide the DomainGuids from the Get-AADomain command:```Set-SPOTenantSyncClientRestriction -Enable -DomainGuids \"786548DD-877B-4760-A749-6B1EFBC1190A; 877564FF-877B-4760-A749-6B1EFBC1190A\"```**Note:** Utilize the `-BlockMacSync:$true` parameter if you are not using conditional access to ensure Macs cannot sync.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `SharePoint admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint2. Click `Settings` followed by `OneDrive - Sync`3. Verify that `Allow syncing only on computers joined to specific domains` is checked.4. Verify that the Active Directory domain GUIDS are listed in the box. - Use the `Get-ADDomain` PowerShell command on the on-premises server to obtain the GUID for each on-premises domain.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online using `Connect-SPOService -Url https://tenant-admin.sharepoint.com`, replacing \"tenant\" with the appropriate value.2. Run the following PowerShell command:```Get-SPOTenantSyncClientRestriction | fl TenantRestrictionEnabled,AllowedDomainList```3. Ensure `TenantRestrictionEnabled` is set to `True` and `AllowedDomainList` contains the trusted domains GUIDs from the on premises environment.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/allow-syncing-only-on-specific-domains:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/sharepoint-online/set-spotenantsyncclientrestriction?view=sharepoint-ps", + "DefaultValue": "By default there are no restrictions applied to the syncing of OneDrive.TenantRestrictionEnabled : `False`AllowedDomainList : `{}`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.3.3", + "Description": "This setting controls custom script execution on self-service created sites.Custom scripts can allow users to change the look, feel and behavior of sites and pages. Every script that runs in a SharePoint page (whether it's an HTML page in a document library or a JavaScript in a Script Editor Web Part) always runs in the context of the user visiting the page and the SharePoint application. This means:- Scripts have access to everything the user has access to.- Scripts can access content across several Microsoft 365 services and even beyond with Microsoft Graph integration.The recommended state is `Prevent users from running custom script on self-service created sites`.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7.3", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "This setting controls custom script execution on self-service created sites.Custom scripts can allow users to change the look, feel and behavior of sites and pages. Every script that runs in a SharePoint page (whether it's an HTML page in a document library or a JavaScript in a Script Editor Web Part) always runs in the context of the user visiting the page and the SharePoint application. This means:- Scripts have access to everything the user has access to.- Scripts can access content across several Microsoft 365 services and even beyond with Microsoft Graph integration.The recommended state is `Prevent users from running custom script on self-service created sites`.", + "RationaleStatement": "Custom scripts could contain malicious instructions unknown to the user or administrator. When users are allowed to run custom script, the organization can no longer enforce governance, scope the capabilities of inserted code, block specific parts of code, or block all custom code that has been deployed. If scripting is allowed the following things can't be audited:- What code has been inserted- Where the code has been inserted- Who inserted the code**Note:** Microsoft recommends using the [SharePoint Framework](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/dev/spfx/sharepoint-framework-overview) instead of custom scripts.", + "ImpactStatement": "None - this is the default behavior.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `SharePoint admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint2. Select `Settings`.3. At the bottom of the page click the `classic settings page` hyperlink.4. Scroll to locate the **Custom Script** section. On the right set the following: - Select `Prevent users from running custom script on self-service created sites`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `SharePoint admin center` https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint2. Select `Settings`.3. At the bottom of the page click the `classic settings page` hyperlink.4. Scroll to locate the **Custom Script** section. On the right ensure the following: - Verify `Prevent users from running custom script on self-service created sites` is set.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/allow-or-prevent-custom-script:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/security-considerations-of-allowing-custom-script:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/sharepoint-online/set-sposite?view=sharepoint-ps", + "DefaultValue": "Selected `Prevent users from running custom script on self-service created sites`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.3.4", + "Description": "This setting controls custom script execution on a particular site (previously called \"site collection\").Custom scripts can allow users to change the look, feel and behavior of sites and pages. Every script that runs in a SharePoint page (whether it's an HTML page in a document library or a JavaScript in a Script Editor Web Part) always runs in the context of the user visiting the page and the SharePoint application. This means:- Scripts have access to everything the user has access to.- Scripts can access content across several Microsoft 365 services and even beyond with Microsoft Graph integration.The recommended state is `DenyAddAndCustomizePages` set to `$true`.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7.3", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting controls custom script execution on a particular site (previously called \"site collection\").Custom scripts can allow users to change the look, feel and behavior of sites and pages. Every script that runs in a SharePoint page (whether it's an HTML page in a document library or a JavaScript in a Script Editor Web Part) always runs in the context of the user visiting the page and the SharePoint application. This means:- Scripts have access to everything the user has access to.- Scripts can access content across several Microsoft 365 services and even beyond with Microsoft Graph integration.The recommended state is `DenyAddAndCustomizePages` set to `$true`.", + "RationaleStatement": "Custom scripts could contain malicious instructions unknown to the user or administrator. When users are allowed to run custom script, the organization can no longer enforce governance, scope the capabilities of inserted code, block specific parts of code, or block all custom code that has been deployed. If scripting is allowed the following things can't be audited:- What code has been inserted- Where the code has been inserted- Who inserted the code**Note:** Microsoft recommends using the [SharePoint Framework](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/dev/spfx/sharepoint-framework-overview) instead of custom scripts.", + "ImpactStatement": "None - this is the default behavior.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online using `Connect-SPOService`.2. Edit the below and run for each site as needed:```Set-SPOSite -Identity -DenyAddAndCustomizePages $true```**Note:** The property `DenyAddAndCustomizePages` cannot be set on the MySite host, which is displayed with a URL like https://`tenant id`-my.sharepoint.com/", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to SharePoint Online using `Connect-SPOService`.2. Run the following PowerShell command to show non-compliant results:```Get-SPOSite | Where-Object { $_.DenyAddAndCustomizePages -eq \"Disabled\" ` -and $_.Url -notlike \"*-my.sharepoint.com/\" } | ft Title, Url, DenyAddAndCustomizePages```3. Ensure the returned value is for `DenyAddAndCustomizePages` is `Enabled` for each site.**Note:** The property `DenyAddAndCustomizePages` cannot be set on the MySite host, which is displayed with a URL like https://`tenant id`-my.sharepoint.com/", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/allow-or-prevent-custom-script:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/security-considerations-of-allowing-custom-script:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/sharepoint-online/set-sposite?view=sharepoint-ps", + "DefaultValue": "DenyAddAndCustomizePages `$true` or `Enabled`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.1", + "Description": "Microsoft Teams enables collaboration via file sharing. This file sharing is conducted within Teams, using SharePoint Online, by default; however, third-party cloud services are allowed as well.**Note:** Skype for business is deprecated as of July 31, 2021 although these settings may still be valid for a period of time. See the link in the references section for more information.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_external_file_sharing_restricted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Microsoft Teams enables collaboration via file sharing. This file sharing is conducted within Teams, using SharePoint Online, by default; however, third-party cloud services are allowed as well.**Note:** Skype for business is deprecated as of July 31, 2021 although these settings may still be valid for a period of time. See the link in the references section for more information.", + "RationaleStatement": "Ensuring that only authorized cloud storage providers are accessible from Teams will help to dissuade the use of non-approved storage providers.", + "ImpactStatement": "The impact associated with this change is highly dependent upon current practices in the tenant. If users do not use other storage providers, then minimal impact is likely. However, if users do regularly utilize providers outside of the tenant this will affect their ability to continue to do so.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Teams` select `Teams settings`.3. Set any unauthorized providers to `Off`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`2. Run the following PowerShell command to disable external providers that are not authorized. (the example disables Citrix Files, DropBox, Box, Google Drive and Egnyte)```$storageParams = @{ AllowGoogleDrive = $false AllowShareFile = $false AllowBox = $false AllowDropBox = $false AllowEgnyte = $false}Set-CsTeamsClientConfiguration @storageParams```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Teams` select `Teams settings`.3. Under files verify that only authorized cloud storage options are set to `On` and all others `Off`.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`2. Run the following to verify the recommended state:```Get-CsTeamsClientConfiguration | fl AllowDropbox,AllowBox,AllowGoogleDrive,AllowShareFile,AllowEgnyte```3. Verify that only authorized providers are set to `True` and all others `False.`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/enterprise/manage-skype-for-business-online-with-microsoft-365-powershell?view=o365-worldwide", + "DefaultValue": "AllowDropBox : `True`AllowBox : `True`AllowGoogleDrive : `True`AllowShareFile : `True`AllowEgnyte : `True`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.2", + "Description": "Teams channel email addresses are an optional feature that allows users to email the Teams channel directly.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_email_sending_to_channel_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Teams channel email addresses are an optional feature that allows users to email the Teams channel directly.", + "RationaleStatement": "Channel email addresses are not under the tenant’s domain and organizations do not have control over the security settings for this email address. An attacker could email channels directly if they discover the channel email address.", + "ImpactStatement": "Users will not be able to email the channel directly.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Teams` select `Teams settings`.3. Under email integration set `Users can send emails to a channel email address` to `Off`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`.2. Run the following command to set the recommended state:```Set-CsTeamsClientConfiguration -Identity Global -AllowEmailIntoChannel $false```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Teams` select `Teams settings`.3. Under email integration verify that `Users can send emails to a channel email address` is `Off`.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`.2. Run the following command to verify the recommended state:```Get-CsTeamsClientConfiguration -Identity Global | fl AllowEmailIntoChannel```3. Ensure the returned value is `False`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/step-by-step-guides/reducing-attack-surface-in-microsoft-teams?view=o365-worldwide#restricting-channel-email-messages-to-approved-domains:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/skype/set-csteamsclientconfiguration?view=skype-ps:https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/send-an-email-to-a-channel-in-microsoft-teams-d91db004-d9d7-4a47-82e6-fb1b16dfd51e", + "DefaultValue": "On (True)" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.2.1", + "Description": "This policy controls whether external domains are allowed, blocked or permitted based on an allowlist or denylist. When external domains are allowed, users in your organization can chat, add users to meetings, and use audio video conferencing with users in external organizations.The recommended state is `Allow only specific external domains` or `Block all external domains`.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_external_domains_restricted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This policy controls whether external domains are allowed, blocked or permitted based on an allowlist or denylist. When external domains are allowed, users in your organization can chat, add users to meetings, and use audio video conferencing with users in external organizations.The recommended state is `Allow only specific external domains` or `Block all external domains`.", + "RationaleStatement": "Allowlisting external domains that an organization is collaborating with allows for stringent controls over who an organization's users are allowed to make contact with.Some real-world attacks and exploits delivered via Teams over external access channels include:- DarkGate malware- Social engineering / Phishing attacks by \"Midnight Blizzard\"- GIFShell- Username enumeration", + "ImpactStatement": "The impact in terms of the type of collaboration users are allowed to participate in and the I.T. resources expended to manage an allowlist will increase. If a user attempts to join the inviting organization's meeting they will be prevented from joining unless they were created as a guest in EntraID or their domain was added to the allowed external domains list.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Users` select `External access`.3. Under **Teams and Skype for Business users in external organizations** set `Choose which external domains your users have access to` to one of the following: - `Allow only specific external domains` - `Block all external domains` 4. Click `Save`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`2. Run one of the following commands:- To allow only specific external domains run these commands replacing the example domains with approved domains:```$list = New-Object Collections.Generic.List[String]$list.add(\"contoso.com\")$list.add(\"fabrikam.com\")Set-CsTenantFederationConfiguration -AllowFederatedUsers $true -AllowedDomainsAsAList $list```- To block all external domains:```Set-CsTenantFederationConfiguration -AllowFederatedUsers $false```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Users` select `External access`.3. Under **Teams and Skype for Business users in external organization** ensure `Choose which external domains your users have access to` is set to one of the following: - `Allow only specific external domains` - `Block all external domains` **To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`2. Run the following command:```Get-CsTenantFederationConfiguration | fl AllowFederatedUsers,AllowedDomains```Ensure the following conditions:- State: `AllowFederatedUsers` is set to `False` **OR**, - If: `AllowFederatedUsers` is `True` then ensure `AllowedDomains` contains authorized domain names and is _not_ set to `AllowAllKnownDomains`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/trusted-organizations-external-meetings-chat?tabs=organization-settings:https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/security-essentials/darkgate-malware-delivered-via-microsoft-teams-detection-and-response:https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/08/02/midnight-blizzard-conducts-targeted-social-engineering-over-microsoft-teams/:https://www.bitdefender.com/blog/hotforsecurity/gifshell-attack-lets-hackers-create-reverse-shell-through-microsoft-teams-gifs/", + "DefaultValue": "'- AllowFederatedUsers : `True`- AllowedDomains : `AllowAllKnownDomains`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.2.2", + "Description": "This policy setting controls chats and meetings with external unmanaged Teams users (those not managed by an organization, such as Microsoft Teams (free)). The recommended state is: `People in my organization can communicate with Teams users whose accounts aren't managed by an organization` set to `Off`.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_unmanaged_communication_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This policy setting controls chats and meetings with external unmanaged Teams users (those not managed by an organization, such as Microsoft Teams (free)). The recommended state is: `People in my organization can communicate with Teams users whose accounts aren't managed by an organization` set to `Off`.", + "RationaleStatement": "Allowing users to communicate with unmanaged Teams users presents a potential security threat as little effort is required by threat actors to gain access to a trial or free Microsoft Teams account.Some real-world attacks and exploits delivered via Teams over external access channels include:- DarkGate malware- Social engineering / Phishing attacks by \"Midnight Blizzard\"- GIFShell- Username enumeration", + "ImpactStatement": "Users will be unable to communicate with Teams users who are not managed by an organization.**Note:** The settings that govern chats and meetings with external unmanaged Teams users aren't available in GCC, GCC High, or DOD deployments, or in private cloud environments.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Users` select `External access`.3. Scroll to **Teams accounts not managed by an organization** 4. Set `People in my organization can communicate with Teams users whose accounts aren't managed by an organization` to `Off`.5. Click `Save`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`2. Run the following command:```Set-CsTenantFederationConfiguration -AllowTeamsConsumer $false```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Users` select `External access`.3. Scroll to **Teams accounts not managed by an organization** 4. Ensure `People in my organization can communicate with Teams users whose accounts aren't managed by an organization` is set to `Off`.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`2. Run the following command:```Get-CsTenantFederationConfiguration | fl AllowTeamsConsumer```Ensure `AllowTeamsConsumer` is `False`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/trusted-organizations-external-meetings-chat?tabs=organization-settings:https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/security-essentials/darkgate-malware-delivered-via-microsoft-teams-detection-and-response:https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/08/02/midnight-blizzard-conducts-targeted-social-engineering-over-microsoft-teams/:https://www.bitdefender.com/blog/hotforsecurity/gifshell-attack-lets-hackers-create-reverse-shell-through-microsoft-teams-gifs/", + "DefaultValue": "'- AllowTeamsConsumer : `True`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.2.3", + "Description": "This setting prevents external users who are not managed by an organization from initiating contact with users in the protected organization.The recommended state is to uncheck `External users with Teams accounts not managed by an organization can contact users in my organization`.**Note:** Disabling this setting is used as an additional stop gap for the previous setting which disables communication with unmanaged Teams users entirely. If an organization chooses to have an exception to **(L1) Ensure communication with unmanaged Teams users is disabled** they can do so while also disabling the ability for the same group of users to initiate contact. Disabling communication entirely will also disable the ability for unmanaged users to initiate contact.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_external_users_cannot_start_conversations" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting prevents external users who are not managed by an organization from initiating contact with users in the protected organization.The recommended state is to uncheck `External users with Teams accounts not managed by an organization can contact users in my organization`.**Note:** Disabling this setting is used as an additional stop gap for the previous setting which disables communication with unmanaged Teams users entirely. If an organization chooses to have an exception to **(L1) Ensure communication with unmanaged Teams users is disabled** they can do so while also disabling the ability for the same group of users to initiate contact. Disabling communication entirely will also disable the ability for unmanaged users to initiate contact.", + "RationaleStatement": "Allowing users to communicate with unmanaged Teams users presents a potential security threat as little effort is required by threat actors to gain access to a trial or free Microsoft Teams account.Some real-world attacks and exploits delivered via Teams over external access channels include:- DarkGate malware- Social engineering / Phishing attacks by \"Midnight Blizzard\"- GIFShell- Username enumeration", + "ImpactStatement": "The impact of disabling this is very low.**Note:** Chats and meetings with external unmanaged Teams users isn't available in GCC, GCC High, or DOD deployments, or in private cloud environments.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Users` select `External access`.3. Scroll to **Teams accounts not managed by an organization** 4. Uncheck `External users with Teams accounts not managed by an organization can contact users in my organization`.5. Click `Save`.**Note:** If `People in my organization can communicate with Teams users whose accounts aren't managed by an organization` is already set to `Off` then this setting will not be visible and can be considered to be in a passing state.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`2. Run the following command:```Set-CsTenantFederationConfiguration -AllowTeamsConsumerInbound $false```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Users` select `External access`.3. Scroll to **Teams accounts not managed by an organization** 4. Ensure `External users with Teams accounts not managed by an organization can contact users in my organization` is set to `Unchecked`.**Note:** If `People in my organization can communicate with Teams users whose accounts aren't managed by an organization` is already set to `Off` then this setting will not be visible and can be considered to be in a passing state.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`2. Run the following command:```Get-CsTenantFederationConfiguration | fl AllowTeamsConsumerInbound```Ensure `AllowTeamsConsumerInbound` is `False`**Note:** If the previous setting `AllowTeamsConsumer` is already false then this setting is ignored and can be considered to be in a passing state.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/trusted-organizations-external-meetings-chat?tabs=organization-settings:https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/security-essentials/darkgate-malware-delivered-via-microsoft-teams-detection-and-response:https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/08/02/midnight-blizzard-conducts-targeted-social-engineering-over-microsoft-teams/:https://www.bitdefender.com/blog/hotforsecurity/gifshell-attack-lets-hackers-create-reverse-shell-through-microsoft-teams-gifs/", + "DefaultValue": "'- AllowTeamsConsumerInbound : `True`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.2.4", + "Description": "This policy setting controls chat with external unmanaged Skype users.**Note:** Skype for business is deprecated as of July 31, 2021, although these settings may still be valid for a period of time. See the link in the reference section for more information.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8.2", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This policy setting controls chat with external unmanaged Skype users.**Note:** Skype for business is deprecated as of July 31, 2021, although these settings may still be valid for a period of time. See the link in the reference section for more information.", + "RationaleStatement": "Skype was deprecated July 31, 2021. Disabling communication with skype users reduces the attack surface of the organization. If a partner organization or satellite office wishes to collaborate and has not yet moved off of Skype, then a valid exception will need to be considered for this recommendation.", + "ImpactStatement": "Teams users will be unable to communicate with Skype users that are not in the same organization.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Users` select `External access`.3. Locate **Skype users**4. Set `Allow users in my organization to communicate with Skype users` to `Off`.5. Click `Save`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**- Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`- Run the following command:```Set-CsTenantFederationConfiguration -AllowPublicUsers $false```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com/.2. Click to expand `Users` select `External access`.3. Locate **Skype users**4. Ensure `Allow users in my organization to communicate with Skype users` is `Off`.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`2. Run the following command:```Get-CsTenantFederationConfiguration | fl AllowPublicUsers```Ensure `AllowPublicUsers` is `False`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/trusted-organizations-external-meetings-chat:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-US/microsoftteams/manage-external-access?WT.mc_id=TeamsAdminCenterCSH", + "DefaultValue": "'- AllowPublicUsers : `True`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.4.1", + "Description": "This policy setting controls which class of apps are available for users to install.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8.4", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "This policy setting controls which class of apps are available for users to install.", + "RationaleStatement": "Allowing users to install third-party or unverified apps poses a potential risk of introducing malicious software to the environment.", + "ImpactStatement": "Users will only be able to install approved classes of apps.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Teams apps` select `Manage apps`.3. In the upper right click `Actions` > `Org-wide app settings`.4. For `Microsoft apps` set `Let users install and use available apps by default` to `On` or less permissive.5. For `Third-party apps` set `Let users install and use available apps by default` to `Off`.6. For `Custom apps` set `Let users install and use available apps by default` to `Off`.7. For `Custom apps` set `Upload custom apps for personal use` to `Off`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Teams apps` select `Manage apps`.3. In the upper right click `Actions` > `Org-wide app settings`.4. For `Microsoft apps` verify that `Let users install and use available apps by default` is `On` or less permissive.5. For `Third-party apps` verify `Let users install and use available apps by default` is `Off`.6. For `Custom apps` verify `Let users install and use available apps by default` is `Off`.7. For `Custom apps` verify `Upload custom apps for personal use` is `Off`.**Note:** The _Global Reader_ role is not able to view the `Teams apps` blade, _Teams Administrator_ or higher is required.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/app-centric-management:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/step-by-step-guides/reducing-attack-surface-in-microsoft-teams?view=o365-worldwide#disabling-third-party--custom-apps", + "DefaultValue": "Microsoft apps: OnThird-party apps: OnCustom apps: On" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.5.1", + "Description": "This policy setting can prevent anyone other than invited attendees (people directly invited by the organizer, or to whom an invitation was forwarded) from bypassing the lobby and entering the meeting.For more information on how to setup a sensitive meeting, please visit **Configure Teams meetings with protection for sensitive data - Microsoft Teams:** https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/MicrosoftTeams/configure-meetings-sensitive-protection", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_anonymous_user_join_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8.5", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This policy setting can prevent anyone other than invited attendees (people directly invited by the organizer, or to whom an invitation was forwarded) from bypassing the lobby and entering the meeting.For more information on how to setup a sensitive meeting, please visit **Configure Teams meetings with protection for sensitive data - Microsoft Teams:** https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/MicrosoftTeams/configure-meetings-sensitive-protection", + "RationaleStatement": "For meetings that could contain sensitive information, it is best to allow the meeting organizer to vet anyone not directly sent an invite before admitting them to the meeting. This will also prevent the anonymous user from using the meeting link to have meetings at unscheduled times.**Note:** Those companies that don't normally operate at a Level 2 environment, but do deal with sensitive information, may want to consider this policy setting.", + "ImpactStatement": "Individuals who were not sent or forwarded a meeting invite will not be able to join the meeting automatically.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Meetings` select `Meeting policies`.3. Click `Global (Org-wide default)`3. Under meeting join & lobby set `Anonymous users can join a meeting` to `Off`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`2. Run the following command to set the recommended state:```Set-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global -AllowAnonymousUsersToJoinMeeting $false```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Meetings` select `Meeting policies`.3. Click `Global (Org-wide default)`.3. Under meeting join & lobby verify that `Anonymous users can join a meeting` is set to `Off`.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`.2. Run the following command to verify the recommended state:```Get-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global | fl AllowAnonymousUsersToJoinMeeting```3. Ensure the returned value is `False`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/MicrosoftTeams/configure-meetings-sensitive-protection", + "DefaultValue": "On (True)" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.5.2", + "Description": "This policy setting controls if an anonymous participant can start a Microsoft Teams meeting without someone in attendance. Anonymous users and dial-in callers must wait in the lobby until the meeting is started by someone in the organization or an external user from a trusted organization.Anonymous participants are classified as:- Participants who are not logged in to Teams with a work or school account.- Participants from non-trusted organizations (as configured in external access).- Participants from organizations where there is not mutual trust.**Note:** This setting only applies when `Who can bypass the lobby` is set to `Everyone`. If the `anonymous users can join a meeting` organization-level setting or meeting policy is `Off`, this setting only applies to dial-in callers.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_anonymous_user_start_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8.5", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This policy setting controls if an anonymous participant can start a Microsoft Teams meeting without someone in attendance. Anonymous users and dial-in callers must wait in the lobby until the meeting is started by someone in the organization or an external user from a trusted organization.Anonymous participants are classified as:- Participants who are not logged in to Teams with a work or school account.- Participants from non-trusted organizations (as configured in external access).- Participants from organizations where there is not mutual trust.**Note:** This setting only applies when `Who can bypass the lobby` is set to `Everyone`. If the `anonymous users can join a meeting` organization-level setting or meeting policy is `Off`, this setting only applies to dial-in callers.", + "RationaleStatement": "Not allowing anonymous participants to automatically join a meeting reduces the risk of meeting spamming.", + "ImpactStatement": "Anonymous participants will not be able to start a Microsoft Teams meeting.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Meetings` select `Meeting policies`.3. Click `Global (Org-wide default)`.3. Under meeting join & lobby set `Anonymous users and dial-in callers can start a meeting` to `Off`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`.2. Run the following command to set the recommended state:```Set-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global -AllowAnonymousUsersToStartMeeting $false```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Meetings` select `Meeting policies`.3. Click `Global (Org-wide default)`.3. Under meeting join & lobby verify that `Anonymous users and dial-in callers can start a meeting` is set to `Off`.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`.2. Run the following command to verify the recommended state:```Get-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global | fl AllowAnonymousUsersToStartMeeting```3. Ensure the returned value is `False`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/anonymous-users-in-meetings:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/who-can-bypass-meeting-lobby#overview-of-lobby-settings-and-policies", + "DefaultValue": "Off (False)" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.5.3", + "Description": "This policy setting controls who can join a meeting directly and who must wait in the lobby until they're admitted by an organizer, co-organizer, or presenter of the meeting.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_external_lobby_bypass_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8.5", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This policy setting controls who can join a meeting directly and who must wait in the lobby until they're admitted by an organizer, co-organizer, or presenter of the meeting.", + "RationaleStatement": "For meetings that could contain sensitive information, it is best to allow the meeting organizer to vet anyone not directly sent an invite before admitting them to the meeting. This will also prevent the anonymous user from using the meeting link to have meetings at unscheduled times.", + "ImpactStatement": "Individuals who are not part of the organization will have to wait in the lobby until they're admitted by an organizer, co-organizer, or presenter of the meeting. Any individual who dials into the meeting regardless of status will also have to wait in the lobby. This includes internal users who are considered unauthenticated when dialing in.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Meetings` select `Meeting policies`.3. Click `Global (Org-wide default)`.3. Under meeting join & lobby set `Who can bypass the lobby` to `People in my org`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`.2. Run the following command to set the recommended state:```Set-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global -AutoAdmittedUsers \"EveryoneInCompanyExcludingGuests\"```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Meetings` select `Meeting policies`.3. Click `Global (Org-wide default)`.3. Under meeting join & lobby verify `Who can bypass the lobby` is set to `People in my org`.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`.2. Run the following command to verify the recommended state:```Get-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global | fl AutoAdmittedUsers```3. Ensure the returned value is `EveryoneInCompanyExcludingGuests`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/who-can-bypass-meeting-lobby#overview-of-lobby-settings-and-policies:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/skype/set-csteamsmeetingpolicy?view=skype-ps", + "DefaultValue": "People in my org and guests (EveryoneInCompany)" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.5.4", + "Description": "This policy setting controls if users who dial in by phone can join the meeting directly or must wait in the lobby. Admittance to the meeting from the lobby is authorized by the meeting organizer, co-organizer, or presenter of the meeting.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_dial_in_lobby_bypass_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8.5", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This policy setting controls if users who dial in by phone can join the meeting directly or must wait in the lobby. Admittance to the meeting from the lobby is authorized by the meeting organizer, co-organizer, or presenter of the meeting.", + "RationaleStatement": "For meetings that could contain sensitive information, it is best to allow the meeting organizer to vet anyone not directly from the organization.", + "ImpactStatement": "Individuals who are dialing in to the meeting must wait in the lobby until a meeting organizer, co-organizer, or presenter admits them.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Meetings` select `Meeting policies`.3. Click `Global (Org-wide default)`.3. Under meeting join & lobby set `People dialing in can bypass the lobby` to `Off`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`.2. Run the following command to set the recommended state:```Set-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global -AllowPSTNUsersToBypassLobby $false```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Meetings` select `Meeting policies`.3. Click `Global (Org-wide default)`.3. Under meeting join & lobby verify that `People dialing in can bypass the lobby` is set to `Off`.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`.2. Run the following command to verify the recommended state:```Get-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global | fl AllowPSTNUsersToBypassLobby```3. Ensure the value is `False`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/who-can-bypass-meeting-lobby#overview-of-lobby-settings-and-policies:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/skype/set-csteamsmeetingpolicy?view=skype-ps", + "DefaultValue": "Off (False)" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.5.5", + "Description": "This policy setting controls who has access to read and write chat messages during a meeting.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_chat_anonymous_users_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8.5", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This policy setting controls who has access to read and write chat messages during a meeting.", + "RationaleStatement": "Ensuring that only authorized individuals can read and write chat messages during a meeting reduces the risk that a malicious user can inadvertently show content that is not appropriate or view sensitive information.", + "ImpactStatement": "Only authorized individuals will be able to read and write chat messages during a meeting.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Meetings` select `Meeting policies`.3. Click `Global (Org-wide default)`.3. Under meeting engagement set `Meeting chat` to `On for everyone but anonymous users`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`.2. Run the following command to set the recommended state:```Set-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global -MeetingChatEnabledType \"EnabledExceptAnonymous\"```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Meetings` select `Meeting policies`.3. Click `Global (Org-wide default)`.3. Under meeting engagement verify that `Meeting chat` is set to `On for everyone but anonymous users`.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`.2. Run the following command to verify the recommended state:```Get-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global | fl MeetingChatEnabledType```3. Ensure the returned value is `EnabledExceptAnonymous`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/skype/set-csteamsmeetingpolicy?view=skype-ps#-meetingchatenabledtype", + "DefaultValue": "On for everyone (Enabled)" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.5.6", + "Description": "This policy setting controls who can present in a Teams meeting. **Note:** Organizers and co-organizers can change this setting when the meeting is set up.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_presenters_restricted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8.5", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This policy setting controls who can present in a Teams meeting. **Note:** Organizers and co-organizers can change this setting when the meeting is set up.", + "RationaleStatement": "Ensuring that only authorized individuals are able to present reduces the risk that a malicious user can inadvertently show content that is not appropriate.", + "ImpactStatement": "Only organizers and co-organizers will be able to present without being granted permission.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Meetings` select `Meeting policies`.3. Click `Global (Org-wide default)`.3. Under content sharing set `Who can present` to `Only organizers and co-organizers`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`.2. Run the following command to set the recommended state:```Set-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global -DesignatedPresenterRoleMode \"OrganizerOnlyUserOverride\"```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Meetings` select `Meeting policies`.3. Click `Global (Org-wide default)`.3. Under content sharing verify `Who can present` is set to `Only organizers and co-organizers`.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`.2. Run the following command to verify the recommended state:```Get-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global | fl DesignatedPresenterRoleMode```3. Ensure the returned value is `OrganizerOnlyUserOverride`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-US/microsoftteams/meeting-who-present-request-control:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/meeting-who-present-request-control#manage-who-can-present:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/step-by-step-guides/reducing-attack-surface-in-microsoft-teams?view=o365-worldwide#configure-meeting-settings-restrict-presenters:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/skype/set-csteamsmeetingpolicy?view=skype-ps", + "DefaultValue": "Everyone (EveryoneUserOverride)" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.5.7", + "Description": "This policy setting allows control of who can present in meetings and who can request control of the presentation while a meeting is underway.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_external_control_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8.5", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This policy setting allows control of who can present in meetings and who can request control of the presentation while a meeting is underway.", + "RationaleStatement": "Ensuring that only authorized individuals and not external participants are able to present and request control reduces the risk that a malicious user can inadvertently show content that is not appropriate. External participants are categorized as follows: external users, guests, and anonymous users.", + "ImpactStatement": "External participants will not be able to present or request control during the meeting.**Warning:** This setting also affects webinars.**Note:** At this time, to give and take control of shared content during a meeting, both parties must be using the Teams desktop client. Control isn't supported when either party is running Teams in a browser.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Meetings` select `Meeting policies`.3. Click `Global (Org-wide default)`.4. Under content sharing set `External participants can give or request control` to `Off`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`.2. Run the following command to set the recommended state:```Set-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global -AllowExternalParticipantGiveRequestControl $false```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Meetings` select `Meeting policies`.3. Click `Global (Org-wide default)`.4. Under content sharing verify that `External participants can give or request control` is `Off`.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`.2. Run the following command to verify the recommended state:```Get-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global | fl AllowExternalParticipantGiveRequestControl```3. Ensure the returned value is `False`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/meeting-who-present-request-control:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/skype/set-csteamsmeetingpolicy?view=skype-ps", + "DefaultValue": "Off (False)" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.5.8", + "Description": "This meeting policy setting controls whether users can read or write messages in external meeting chats with untrusted organizations. If an external organization is on the list of trusted organizations this setting will be ignored.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_external_chat_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8.5", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This meeting policy setting controls whether users can read or write messages in external meeting chats with untrusted organizations. If an external organization is on the list of trusted organizations this setting will be ignored.", + "RationaleStatement": "Restricting access to chat in meetings hosted by external organizations limits the opportunity for an exploit like GIFShell or DarkGate malware from being delivered to users.", + "ImpactStatement": "When joining external meetings users will be unable to read or write chat messages in Teams meetings with organizations that they don't have a trust relationship with. This will completely remove the chat functionality in meetings. From an I.T. perspective both the upkeep of adding new organizations to the trusted list and the decision-making process behind whether to trust or not trust an external partner will increase time expenditure.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Meetings` select `Meeting policies`.3. Click `Global (Org-wide default)`.4. Under meeting engagement set `External meeting chat` to `Off`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`.2. Run the following command to set the recommended state:```Set-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global -AllowExternalNonTrustedMeetingChat $false```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Meetings` select `Meeting policies`.3. Click `Global (Org-wide default)`.4. Under meeting engagement verify that `External meeting chat` is set to `Off`.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`.2. Run the following command to verify the recommended state:```Get-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global | fl AllowExternalNonTrustedMeetingChat```3. Ensure the returned value is `False`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/settings-policies-reference#meeting-engagement", + "DefaultValue": "On(True)" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.5.9", + "Description": "This setting controls the ability for a user to initiate a recording of a meeting in progress.The recommended state is `Off` for the `Global (Org-wide default)` meeting policy.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_recording_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8.5", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting controls the ability for a user to initiate a recording of a meeting in progress.The recommended state is `Off` for the `Global (Org-wide default)` meeting policy.", + "RationaleStatement": "Disabling meeting recordings in the Global meeting policy ensures that only authorized users, such as organizers, co-organizers, and leads, can initiate a recording. This measure helps safeguard sensitive information by preventing unauthorized individuals from capturing and potentially sharing meeting content. Restricting recording capabilities to specific roles allows organizations to exercise greater control over what is recorded, aligning it with the meeting's confidentiality requirements.**Note:** Creating a separate policy for users or groups who are allowed to record is expected and in compliance. This control is only for the default meeting policy.", + "ImpactStatement": "If there are no additional policies allowing anyone to record, then recording will effectively be disabled.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Meetings` select `Meeting policies`.3. Click `Global (Org-wide default)`.4. Under **Recording & transcription** set `Meeting recording` to `Off`.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`.2. Run the following command to set the recommended state:```Set-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global -AllowCloudRecording $false```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Meetings` select `Meeting policies`.3. Click `Global (Org-wide default)`.4. Under **Recording & transcription** verify that `Meeting recording` is set to `Off`.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`.2. Run the following command to verify the recommended state:```Get-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global | fl AllowCloudRecording```3. Ensure the returned value is `False`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/settings-policies-reference#recording--transcription", + "DefaultValue": "On (True)" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.6.1", + "Description": "User reporting settings allow a user to report a message as malicious for further analysis. This recommendation is composed of 3 different settings and all be configured to pass:- **In the Teams admin center:** On by default and controls whether users are able to report messages from Teams. When this setting is turned off, users can't report messages within Teams, so the corresponding setting in the Microsoft 365 Defender portal is irrelevant.- **In the Microsoft 365 Defender portal:** On by default for new tenants. Existing tenants need to enable it. If user reporting of messages is turned on in the Teams admin center, it also needs to be turned on the Defender portal for user reported messages to show up correctly on the User reported tab on the Submissions page.- **Defender - Report message destinations:** This applies to more than just Microsoft Teams and allows for an organization to keep their reports contained. Due to how the parameters are configured on the backend it is included in this assessment as a requirement.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_security_reporting_enabled", + "defender_chat_report_policy_configured" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8.6", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "User reporting settings allow a user to report a message as malicious for further analysis. This recommendation is composed of 3 different settings and all be configured to pass:- **In the Teams admin center:** On by default and controls whether users are able to report messages from Teams. When this setting is turned off, users can't report messages within Teams, so the corresponding setting in the Microsoft 365 Defender portal is irrelevant.- **In the Microsoft 365 Defender portal:** On by default for new tenants. Existing tenants need to enable it. If user reporting of messages is turned on in the Teams admin center, it also needs to be turned on the Defender portal for user reported messages to show up correctly on the User reported tab on the Submissions page.- **Defender - Report message destinations:** This applies to more than just Microsoft Teams and allows for an organization to keep their reports contained. Due to how the parameters are configured on the backend it is included in this assessment as a requirement.", + "RationaleStatement": "Users will be able to more quickly and systematically alert administrators of suspicious malicious messages within Teams. The content of these messages may be sensitive in nature and therefore should be kept within the organization and not shared with Microsoft without first consulting company policy.**Note:** - The reported message remains visible to the user in the Teams client.- Users can report the same message multiple times.- The message sender isn't notified that messages were reported.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling message reporting has an impact beyond just addressing security concerns. When users of the platform report a message, the content could include messages that are threatening or harassing in nature, possibly stemming from colleagues.Due to this the security staff responsible for reviewing and acting on these reports should be equipped with the skills to discern and appropriately direct such messages to the relevant departments, such as Human Resources (HR).", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Messaging` select `Messaging policies`.3. Click `Global (Org-wide default)`.4. Set `Report a security concern` to `On`.5. Next, navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com/6. Click on `Settings` > `Email & collaboration` > `User reported settings`.7. Scroll to `Microsoft Teams`.8. Check `Monitor reported messages in Microsoft Teams` and `Save`.9. Set `Send reported messages to:` to `My reporting mailbox only` with reports configured to be sent to authorized staff.**To remediate using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`.2. Connect to Exchange Online PowerShell using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.3. Run the following cmdlet:```Set-CsTeamsMessagingPolicy -Identity Global -AllowSecurityEndUserReporting $true```4. To configure the Defender reporting policies, edit and run this script:```$usersub = \"userreportedmessages@fabrikam.com\" # Change this.$params = @{ Identity = \"DefaultReportSubmissionPolicy\" EnableReportToMicrosoft = $false ReportChatMessageEnabled = $false ReportChatMessageToCustomizedAddressEnabled = $true ReportJunkToCustomizedAddress = $true ReportNotJunkToCustomizedAddress = $true ReportPhishToCustomizedAddress = $true ReportJunkAddresses = $usersub ReportNotJunkAddresses = $usersub ReportPhishAddresses = $usersub}Set-ReportSubmissionPolicy @paramsNew-ReportSubmissionRule -Name DefaultReportSubmissionRule -ReportSubmissionPolicy DefaultReportSubmissionPolicy -SentTo $usersub```", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Teams admin center` https://admin.teams.microsoft.com.2. Click to expand `Messaging` select `Messaging policies`.3. Click `Global (Org-wide default)`.4. Ensure `Report a security concern` is `On`.5. Next, navigate to `Microsoft 365 Defender` https://security.microsoft.com/6. Click on `Settings` > `Email & collaboration` > `User reported settings`.7. Scroll to `Microsoft Teams`.8. Ensure `Monitor reported messages in Microsoft Teams` is checked.9. Ensure `Send reported messages to:` is set to `My reporting mailbox only` with report email addresses defined for authorized staff.**To audit using PowerShell:**1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using `Connect-MicrosoftTeams`.2. Connect to Exchange Online PowerShell using `Connect-ExchangeOnline`.3. Run the following cmdlet for to assess Teams:```Get-CsTeamsMessagingPolicy -Identity Global | fl AllowSecurityEndUserReporting```4. Ensure the value returned is `True`.5. Run this cmdlet to assess Defender:```Get-ReportSubmissionPolicy | fl Report*```6. Ensure the output matches the following values with organization specific email addresses:```ReportJunkToCustomizedAddress : TrueReportNotJunkToCustomizedAddress : TrueReportPhishToCustomizedAddress : TrueReportJunkAddresses : {SOC@contoso.com}ReportNotJunkAddresses : {SOC@contoso.com}ReportPhishAddresses : {SOC@contoso.com}ReportChatMessageEnabled : FalseReportChatMessageToCustomizedAddressEnabled : True```", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/submissions-teams?view=o365-worldwide", + "DefaultValue": "On (`True`)Report message destination: `Microsoft Only`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.1", + "Description": "This setting allows business-to-business (B2B) guests access to Microsoft Fabric, and contents that they have permissions to. With the setting turned off, B2B guest users receive an error when trying to access Power BI.The recommended state is `Enabled for a subset of the organization` or `Disabled`.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "This setting allows business-to-business (B2B) guests access to Microsoft Fabric, and contents that they have permissions to. With the setting turned off, B2B guest users receive an error when trying to access Power BI.The recommended state is `Enabled for a subset of the organization` or `Disabled`.", + "RationaleStatement": "Establishing and enforcing a dedicated security group prevents unauthorized access to Microsoft Fabric for guests collaborating in Azure that are new or assigned guest status from other applications. This upholds the principle of least privilege and uses role-based access control (RBAC). These security groups can also be used for tasks like conditional access, enhancing risk management and user accountability across the organization.", + "ImpactStatement": "Security groups will need to be more closely tended to and monitored.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Fabric` https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal2. Select `Tenant settings`.3. Scroll to `Export and Sharing settings`.4. Set `Guest users can access Microsoft Fabric` to one of these states: - State 1: `Disabled` - State 2: `Enabled` with `Specific security groups` selected and defined.**Important:** If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it `Disabled`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Fabric` https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal2. Select `Tenant settings`.3. Scroll to `Export and Sharing settings`.4. Ensure that `Guest users can access Microsoft Fabric` adheres to one of these states: - State 1: `Disabled` - State 2: `Enabled` with `Specific security groups` selected and defined.**Important:** If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it `Disabled`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/fabric/admin/service-admin-portal-export-sharing", + "DefaultValue": "Enabled for Entire Organization" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.2", + "Description": "This setting helps organizations choose whether new external users can be invited to the organization through Power BI sharing, permissions, and subscription experiences. This setting only controls the ability to invite through Power BI.The recommended state is `Enabled for a subset of the organization` or `Disabled`.**Note:** To invite external users to the organization, the user must also have the Microsoft Entra Guest Inviter role.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "This setting helps organizations choose whether new external users can be invited to the organization through Power BI sharing, permissions, and subscription experiences. This setting only controls the ability to invite through Power BI.The recommended state is `Enabled for a subset of the organization` or `Disabled`.**Note:** To invite external users to the organization, the user must also have the Microsoft Entra Guest Inviter role.", + "RationaleStatement": "Establishing and enforcing a dedicated security group prevents unauthorized access to Microsoft Fabric for guests collaborating in Azure that are new or assigned guest status from other applications. This upholds the principle of least privilege and uses role-based access control (RBAC). These security groups can also be used for tasks like conditional access, enhancing risk management and user accountability across the organization.", + "ImpactStatement": "Guest user invitations will be limited to only specific employees.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Fabric` https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal2. Select `Tenant settings`.3. Scroll to `Export and Sharing settings`.4. Set `Users can invite guest users to collaborate through item sharing and permissions` to one of these states: - State 1: `Disabled` - State 2: `Enabled` with `Specific security groups` selected and defined.**Important:** If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it `Disabled`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Fabric` https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal2. Select `Tenant settings`.3. Scroll to `Export and Sharing settings`.4. Ensure that `Users can invite guest users to collaborate through item sharing and permissions` adheres to one of these states: - State 1: `Disabled` - State 2: `Enabled` with `Specific security groups` selected and defined.**Important:** If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it `Disabled`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/fabric/admin/service-admin-portal-export-sharing:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/power-bi/enterprise/service-admin-azure-ad-b2b#invite-guest-users", + "DefaultValue": "Enabled for the entire organization" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.3", + "Description": "This setting allows Microsoft Entra B2B guest users to have full access to the browsing experience using the left-hand navigation pane in the organization. Guest users who have been assigned workspace roles or specific item permissions will continue to have those roles and/or permissions, even if this setting is disabled.The recommended state is `Enabled for a subset of the organization` or `Disabled`.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "This setting allows Microsoft Entra B2B guest users to have full access to the browsing experience using the left-hand navigation pane in the organization. Guest users who have been assigned workspace roles or specific item permissions will continue to have those roles and/or permissions, even if this setting is disabled.The recommended state is `Enabled for a subset of the organization` or `Disabled`.", + "RationaleStatement": "Establishing and enforcing a dedicated security group prevents unauthorized access to Microsoft Fabric for guests collaborating in Entra that are new or assigned guest status from other applications. This upholds the principle of least privilege and uses role-based access control (RBAC). These security groups can also be used for tasks like conditional access, enhancing risk management and user accountability across the organization.", + "ImpactStatement": "Security groups will need to be more closely tended to and monitored.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Fabric` https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal2. Select `Tenant settings`.3. Scroll to `Export and Sharing settings`.4. Set `Guest users can browse and access Fabric content` to one of these states: - State 1: `Disabled` - State 2: `Enabled` with `Specific security groups` selected and defined.**Important:** If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it `Disabled`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Fabric` https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal2. Select `Tenant settings`.3. Scroll to `Export and Sharing settings`.4. Ensure that `Guest users can browse and access Fabric content` adheres to one of these states: - State 1: `Disabled` - State 2: `Enabled` with `Specific security groups` selected and defined.**Important:** If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it `Disabled`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/fabric/admin/service-admin-portal-export-sharing", + "DefaultValue": "Disabled" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.4", + "Description": "Power BI enables users to share reports and materials directly on the internet from both the application's desktop version and its web user interface. This functionality generates a publicly reachable web link that doesn't necessitate authentication or the need to be an Entra ID user in order to access and view it.The recommended state is `Enabled for a subset of the organization` or `Disabled`.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Power BI enables users to share reports and materials directly on the internet from both the application's desktop version and its web user interface. This functionality generates a publicly reachable web link that doesn't necessitate authentication or the need to be an Entra ID user in order to access and view it.The recommended state is `Enabled for a subset of the organization` or `Disabled`.", + "RationaleStatement": "When using Publish to Web anyone on the Internet can view a published report or visual. Viewing requires no authentication. It includes viewing detail-level data that your reports aggregate. By disabling the feature, restricting access to certain users and allowing existing embed codes organizations can mitigate the exposure of confidential or proprietary information.", + "ImpactStatement": "Depending on the organization's utilization administrators may experience more overhead managing embed codes, and requests.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Fabric` https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal2. Select `Tenant settings`.3. Scroll to `Export and Sharing settings`.4. Set `Publish to web` to one of these states: - State 1: `Disabled` - State 2: `Enabled` with `Choose how embed codes work` set to `Only allow existing codes` **AND** `Specific security groups` selected and defined**Important:** If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it `Disabled`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Fabric` https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal2. Select `Tenant settings`.3. Scroll to `Export and Sharing settings`.4. Ensure that `Publish to web` adheres to one of these states: - State 1: `Disabled` - State 2: `Enabled` with `Choose how embed codes work` set to `Only allow existing codes` **AND** `Specific security groups` selected and defined**Important:** If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it `Disabled`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/power-bi/collaborate-share/service-publish-to-web:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/fabric/admin/service-admin-portal-export-sharing#publish-to-web", + "DefaultValue": "Enabled for the entire organizationOnly allow existing codes" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.5", + "Description": "Power BI allows the integration of R and Python scripts directly into visuals. This feature allows data visualizations by incorporating custom calculations, statistical analyses, machine learning models, and more using R or Python scripts. Custom visuals can be created by embedding them directly into Power BI reports. Users can then interact with these visuals and see the results of the custom code within the Power BI interface.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Power BI allows the integration of R and Python scripts directly into visuals. This feature allows data visualizations by incorporating custom calculations, statistical analyses, machine learning models, and more using R or Python scripts. Custom visuals can be created by embedding them directly into Power BI reports. Users can then interact with these visuals and see the results of the custom code within the Power BI interface.", + "RationaleStatement": "Disabling this feature can reduce the attack surface by preventing potential malicious code execution leading to data breaches, or unauthorized access. The potential for sensitive or confidential data being leaked to unintended users is also increased with the use of scripts.", + "ImpactStatement": "Use of R and Python scripting will require exceptions for developers, along with more stringent code review.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Fabric` https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal2. Select `Tenant settings`.3. Scroll to `R and Python visuals settings`.4. Set `Interact with and share R and Python visuals` to `Disabled`", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Fabric` https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal2. Select `Tenant settings`.3. Scroll to `R and Python visuals settings`.4. Ensure that `Interact with and share R and Python visuals` is `Disabled`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/fabric/admin/service-admin-portal-r-python-visuals:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/power-bi/visuals/service-r-visuals:https://www.r-project.org/", + "DefaultValue": "Enabled" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.6", + "Description": "Information protection tenant settings help to protect sensitive information in the Power BI tenant. Allowing and applying sensitivity labels to content ensures that information is only seen and accessed by the appropriate users.The recommended state is `Enabled` or `Enabled for a subset of the organization`.**Note:** Sensitivity labels and protection are only applied to files exported to Excel, PowerPoint, or PDF files, that are controlled by \"Export to Excel\" and \"Export reports as PowerPoint presentation or PDF documents\" settings. All other export and sharing options do not support the application of sensitivity labels and protection.**Note 2:** There are some prerequisite steps that need to be completed in order to fully utilize labeling. See [here](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/power-bi/enterprise/service-security-enable-data-sensitivity-labels#licensing-and-requirements).", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Information protection tenant settings help to protect sensitive information in the Power BI tenant. Allowing and applying sensitivity labels to content ensures that information is only seen and accessed by the appropriate users.The recommended state is `Enabled` or `Enabled for a subset of the organization`.**Note:** Sensitivity labels and protection are only applied to files exported to Excel, PowerPoint, or PDF files, that are controlled by \"Export to Excel\" and \"Export reports as PowerPoint presentation or PDF documents\" settings. All other export and sharing options do not support the application of sensitivity labels and protection.**Note 2:** There are some prerequisite steps that need to be completed in order to fully utilize labeling. See [here](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/power-bi/enterprise/service-security-enable-data-sensitivity-labels#licensing-and-requirements).", + "RationaleStatement": "Establishing data classifications and affixing labels to data at creation enables organizations to discern the data's criticality, sensitivity, and value. This initial identification enables the implementation of appropriate protective measures, utilizing technologies like Data Loss Prevention (DLP) to avert inadvertent exposure and enforcing access controls to safeguard against unauthorized access.This practice can also promote user awareness and responsibility in regard to the nature of the data they interact with. Which in turn can foster awareness in other areas of data management across the organization.", + "ImpactStatement": "Additional license requirements like Power BI Pro are required, as outlined in the Licensed and requirements page linked in the description and references sections.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Fabric` https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal2. Select `Tenant settings`.3. Scroll to `Information protection`.4. Set `Allow users to apply sensitivity labels for content` to one of these states: - State 1: `Enabled` - State 2: `Enabled` with `Specific security groups` selected and defined.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Fabric` https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal2. Select `Tenant settings`.3. Scroll to `Information protection`.4. Ensure that `Allow users to apply sensitivity labels for content` adheres to one of these states: - State 1: `Enabled` - State 2: `Enabled` with `Specific security groups` selected and defined.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/power-bi/enterprise/service-security-enable-data-sensitivity-labels:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/fabric/governance/data-loss-prevention-overview:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/power-bi/enterprise/service-security-enable-data-sensitivity-labels#licensing-and-requirements", + "DefaultValue": "Disabled" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.7", + "Description": "Creating a shareable link allows a user to create a link to a report or dashboard, then add that link to an email or another messaging application. There are 3 options that can be selected when creating a shareable link:- People in your organization- People with existing access- Specific peopleThis setting solely deals with restrictions to `People in the organization`. External users by default are not included in any of these categories, and therefore cannot use any of these links regardless of the state of this setting.The recommended state is `Enabled for a subset of the organization` or `Disabled`.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Creating a shareable link allows a user to create a link to a report or dashboard, then add that link to an email or another messaging application. There are 3 options that can be selected when creating a shareable link:- People in your organization- People with existing access- Specific peopleThis setting solely deals with restrictions to `People in the organization`. External users by default are not included in any of these categories, and therefore cannot use any of these links regardless of the state of this setting.The recommended state is `Enabled for a subset of the organization` or `Disabled`.", + "RationaleStatement": "While external users are unable to utilize shareable links, disabling or restricting this feature ensures that a user cannot generate a link accessible by individuals within the same organization who lack the necessary clearance to the shared data. For example, a member of Human Resources intends to share sensitive information with a particular employee or another colleague within their department. The owner would be prompted to specify either `People with existing access` or `Specific people` when generating the link requiring the person clicking the link to pass a first layer access control list. This measure along with proper file and folder permissions can help prevent unintended access and potential information leakage.", + "ImpactStatement": "If the setting is `Enabled` then only specific people in the organization would be allowed to create general links viewable by the entire organization.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Fabric` https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal2. Select `Tenant settings`.3. Scroll to `Export and Sharing settings`.4. Set `Allow shareable links to grant access to everyone in your organization` to one of these states: - State 1: `Disabled` - State 2: `Enabled` with `Specific security groups` selected and defined.**Important:** If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it `Disabled`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Fabric` https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal2. Select `Tenant settings`.3. Scroll to `Export and Sharing settings`.4. Ensure that `Allow shareable links to grant access to everyone in your organization` adheres to one of these states: - State 1: `Disabled` - State 2: `Enabled` with `Specific security groups` selected and defined.**Important:** If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it `Disabled`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/power-bi/collaborate-share/service-share-dashboards?wt.mc_id=powerbi_inproduct_sharedialog#link-settings:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/fabric/admin/service-admin-portal-export-sharing", + "DefaultValue": "Enabled for Entire Organization" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.8", + "Description": "Power BI admins can specify which users or user groups can share datasets externally with guests from a different tenant through the in-place mechanism. Disabling this setting prevents any user from sharing datasets externally by restricting the ability of users to turn on external sharing for datasets they own or manage.The recommended state is `Enabled for a subset of the organization` or `Disabled`.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Power BI admins can specify which users or user groups can share datasets externally with guests from a different tenant through the in-place mechanism. Disabling this setting prevents any user from sharing datasets externally by restricting the ability of users to turn on external sharing for datasets they own or manage.The recommended state is `Enabled for a subset of the organization` or `Disabled`.", + "RationaleStatement": "Establishing and enforcing a dedicated security group prevents unauthorized access to Microsoft Fabric for guests collaborating in Azure that are new or from other applications. This upholds the principle of least privilege and uses role-based access control (RBAC). These security groups can also be used for tasks like conditional access, enhancing risk management and user accountability across the organization.", + "ImpactStatement": "Security groups will need to be more closely tended to and monitored.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Fabric` https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal2. Select `Tenant settings`.3. Scroll to `Export and Sharing settings`.4. Set `Allow specific users to turn on external data sharing` to one of these states: - State 1: `Disabled` - State 2: `Enabled` with `Specific security groups` selected and defined.**Important:** If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it `Disabled`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Fabric` https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal2. Select `Tenant settings`.3. Scroll to `Export and Sharing settings`.4. Ensure that `Allow specific users to turn on external data sharing` adheres to one of these states: - State 1: `Disabled` - State 2: `Enabled` with `Specific security groups` selected and defined.**Important:** If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it `Disabled`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/fabric/admin/service-admin-portal-export-sharing", + "DefaultValue": "Enabled for the entire organization" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.9", + "Description": "This setting blocks the use of resource key based authentication. The Block ResourceKey Authentication setting applies to streaming and PUSH datasets. If blocked users will not be allowed send data to streaming and PUSH datasets using the API with a resource key.The recommended state is `Enabled`.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "This setting blocks the use of resource key based authentication. The Block ResourceKey Authentication setting applies to streaming and PUSH datasets. If blocked users will not be allowed send data to streaming and PUSH datasets using the API with a resource key.The recommended state is `Enabled`.", + "RationaleStatement": "Resource keys are a form of authentication that allows users to access Power BI resources (such as reports, dashboards, and datasets) without requiring individual user accounts. While convenient, this method bypasses the organization's centralized identity and access management controls. Enabling ensures that access to Power BI resources is tied to the organization's authentication mechanisms, providing a more secure and controlled environment.", + "ImpactStatement": "Developers will need to request a special exception in order to use this feature.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Fabric` https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal2. Select `Tenant settings`.3. Scroll to `Developer settings`.4. Set `Block ResourceKey Authentication` to `Enabled`", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:**1. Navigate to `Microsoft Fabric` https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal2. Select `Tenant settings`.3. Scroll to `Developer settings`.4. Ensure that `Block ResourceKey Authentication` is `Enabled`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/fabric/admin/service-admin-portal-developer:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/power-bi/connect-data/service-real-time-streaming", + "DefaultValue": "Disabled for the entire organization" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.10", + "Description": "Web apps registered in Microsoft Entra ID use an assigned service principal to access Power BI APIs without a signed-in user. This setting allows an app to use service principal authentication.The recommended state is `Enabled for a subset of the organization` or `Disabled`.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Web apps registered in Microsoft Entra ID use an assigned service principal to access Power BI APIs without a signed-in user. This setting allows an app to use service principal authentication.The recommended state is `Enabled for a subset of the organization` or `Disabled`.", + "RationaleStatement": "Leaving API access unrestricted increases the attack surface in the event an adversary gains access to a Service Principal. APIs are a feature-rich method for programmatic access to many areas of Power Bi and should be guarded closely.", + "ImpactStatement": "Disabled is the default behavior.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Fabric` https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal2. Select `Tenant settings`.3. Scroll to `Developer settings`.4. Set `Service principals can use Fabric APIs` to one of these states: - State 1: `Disabled` - State 2: `Enabled` with `Specific security groups` selected and defined.**Important:** If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it `Disabled`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Fabric` https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal2. Select `Tenant settings`.3. Scroll to `Developer settings`.4. Ensure that `Service principals can use Fabric APIs` adheres to one of these states: - State 1: `Disabled` - State 2: `Enabled` with `Specific security groups` selected and defined.**Important:** If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it `Disabled`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/fabric/admin/service-admin-portal-developer", + "DefaultValue": "Disabled for the entire organization" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.11", + "Description": "Service principal profiles provide a flexible solution for apps used in a multitenancy deployment. The profiles enable customer data isolation and tighter security boundaries between customers that are utilizing the app.The recommended state is `Enabled for a subset of the organization` or `Disabled`.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9.1", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Service principal profiles provide a flexible solution for apps used in a multitenancy deployment. The profiles enable customer data isolation and tighter security boundaries between customers that are utilizing the app.The recommended state is `Enabled for a subset of the organization` or `Disabled`.", + "RationaleStatement": "Service Principals should be restricted to a security group to limit which Service Principals can interact with profiles. This supports the principle of least privilege", + "ImpactStatement": "Disabled is the default behavior.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**To remediate using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Fabric` https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal2. Select `Tenant settings`.3. Scroll to `Developer settings`.4. Set `Allow service principals to create and use profiles` to one of these states: - State 1: `Disabled` - State 2: `Enabled` with `Specific security groups` selected and defined.**Important:** If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it `Disabled`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**To audit using the UI:** 1. Navigate to `Microsoft Fabric` https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal2. Select `Tenant settings`.3. Scroll to `Developer settings`.4. Ensure that `Allow service principals to create and use profiles` adheres to one of these states: - State 1: `Disabled` - State 2: `Enabled` with `Specific security groups` selected and defined.**Important:** If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it `Disabled`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/fabric/admin/service-admin-portal-developer:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/power-bi/developer/embedded/embed-multi-tenancy", + "DefaultValue": "Disabled for the entire organization" } ] } diff --git a/util/generate_compliance_json_from_csv_for_cis40_microsoft365.py b/util/generate_compliance_json_from_csv_for_cis40_microsoft365.py index 11a1dd8cca..ee806f0e90 100644 --- a/util/generate_compliance_json_from_csv_for_cis40_microsoft365.py +++ b/util/generate_compliance_json_from_csv_for_cis40_microsoft365.py @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import sys # Convert a CSV file following the CIS 4.0 M365 Benchmark into a Prowler v3.0 Compliance JSON file # CSV fields: -# Section #,Recommendation #,Profile,Title,Assessment Status,Description,Rationale Statement,Impact Statement,Remediation Procedure,Audit Procedure,Additional Information,CIS Controls,CIS Safeguards 1 (v8),CIS Safeguards 2 (v8),CIS Safeguards 3 (v8),v8 IG1,v8 IG2,v8 IG3,CIS Safeguards 1 (v7),CIS Safeguards 2 (v7),CIS Safeguards 3 (v7),v7 IG1,v7 IG2,v7 IG3,References,Default Value +# Section #;Recommendation #;Profile;Title;Assessment Status;Description;Rationale Statement;Impact Statement;Remediation Procedure;Audit Procedure;Additional Information;CIS Controls;CIS Safeguards 1 (v8);CIS Safeguards 2 (v8);CIS Safeguards 3 (v8);v8 IG1;v8 IG2;v8 IG3;CIS Safeguards 1 (v7);CIS Safeguards 2 (v7);CIS Safeguards 3 (v7);v7 IG1;v7 IG2;v7 IG3;References;Default Value # Get the CSV filename to convert from file_name = sys.argv[1] @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ output = {"Framework": "CIS", "Version": "4.0", "Requirements": []} # Open the CSV file and read the rows try: with open(file_name, newline="", encoding="utf-8") as f: - reader = csv.reader(f, delimiter=",") + reader = csv.reader(f, delimiter=";") next(reader) # Skip the header row for row in reader: attribute = { @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ try: "AuditProcedure": row[9], "AdditionalInformation": row[10], "References": row[24], + "DefaultValue": row[25], } if row[4] != "": output["Requirements"].append( @@ -42,7 +43,7 @@ try: except UnicodeDecodeError: # If there is an error reading the file with the default encoding, try with ISO-8859-1 with open(file_name, newline="", encoding="ISO-8859-1") as f: - reader = csv.reader(f, delimiter=",") + reader = csv.reader(f, delimiter=";") next(reader) # Skip the header row for row in reader: attribute = { @@ -56,6 +57,7 @@ except UnicodeDecodeError: "AuditProcedure": row[9], "AdditionalInformation": row[10], "References": row[24], + "DefaultValue": row[25], } if row[4] != "": output["Requirements"].append( From c20f07ced4a05bef7cf0ad9cf67c2b1ffc5299a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?V=C3=ADctor=20Fern=C3=A1ndez=20Poyatos?= Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 14:34:37 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 16/23] feat(findings): Improve performance on /findings/metadata, /overviews and filters (#7690) --- api/CHANGELOG.md | 8 + api/docker-entrypoint.sh | 2 +- api/pyproject.toml | 2 +- api/src/backend/api/db_utils.py | 71 ++++++ api/src/backend/api/filters.py | 25 +- .../api/management/commands/findings.py | 54 +++- .../0018_resource_scan_summaries.py | 81 ++++++ ...019_finding_denormalize_resource_fields.py | 42 ++++ ...ings_new_performance_indexes_partitions.py | 86 +++++++ ...findings_new_performance_indexes_parent.py | 37 +++ ...0022_scan_summaries_performance_indexes.py | 38 +++ .../0023_resources_lookup_optimization.py | 28 +++ api/src/backend/api/models.py | 120 +++++++-- api/src/backend/api/specs/v1.yaml | 4 +- api/src/backend/api/tests/test_views.py | 15 +- api/src/backend/api/utils.py | 35 ++- api/src/backend/api/v1/views.py | 238 +++++++++++------- api/src/backend/conftest.py | 9 + api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/backfill.py | 61 +++++ api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/scan.py | 150 ++++++----- api/src/backend/tasks/tasks.py | 13 + api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_backfill.py | 79 ++++++ api/tests/performance/benchmark.py | 4 +- api/tests/performance/requirements.txt | 1 + api/tests/performance/scenarios/findings.py | 18 +- 25 files changed, 1031 insertions(+), 190 deletions(-) create mode 100644 api/src/backend/api/migrations/0018_resource_scan_summaries.py create mode 100644 api/src/backend/api/migrations/0019_finding_denormalize_resource_fields.py create mode 100644 api/src/backend/api/migrations/0020_findings_new_performance_indexes_partitions.py create mode 100644 api/src/backend/api/migrations/0021_findings_new_performance_indexes_parent.py create mode 100644 api/src/backend/api/migrations/0022_scan_summaries_performance_indexes.py create mode 100644 api/src/backend/api/migrations/0023_resources_lookup_optimization.py create mode 100644 api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/backfill.py create mode 100644 api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_backfill.py diff --git a/api/CHANGELOG.md b/api/CHANGELOG.md index 2dbcd57ea6..f25354e058 100644 --- a/api/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/api/CHANGELOG.md @@ -2,6 +2,14 @@ All notable changes to the **Prowler API** are documented in this file. +## [v1.8.0] (Prowler UNRELEASED) + +### Added +- Added huge improvements to `/findings/metadata` and resource related filters for findings [(#7690)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7690). +- Added improvements to `/overviews` endpoints [(#7690)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7690). +- Added new queue to perform backfill background tasks [(#7690)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7690). + +--- ## [v1.7.0] (Prowler v5.6.0) diff --git a/api/docker-entrypoint.sh b/api/docker-entrypoint.sh index 7d7711a321..0dff279d08 100755 --- a/api/docker-entrypoint.sh +++ b/api/docker-entrypoint.sh @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ start_prod_server() { start_worker() { echo "Starting the worker..." - poetry run python -m celery -A config.celery worker -l "${DJANGO_LOGGING_LEVEL:-info}" -Q celery,scans,scan-reports,deletion -E --max-tasks-per-child 1 + poetry run python -m celery -A config.celery worker -l "${DJANGO_LOGGING_LEVEL:-info}" -Q celery,scans,scan-reports,deletion,backfill -E --max-tasks-per-child 1 } start_worker_beat() { diff --git a/api/pyproject.toml b/api/pyproject.toml index 6ad2ddc9df..ce79dcbc7a 100644 --- a/api/pyproject.toml +++ b/api/pyproject.toml @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ name = "prowler-api" package-mode = false # Needed for the SDK compatibility requires-python = ">=3.11,<3.13" -version = "1.7.0" +version = "1.8.0" [project.scripts] celery = "src.backend.config.settings.celery" diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/db_utils.py b/api/src/backend/api/db_utils.py index 63a7769c25..ca98b6b592 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/db_utils.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/db_utils.py @@ -227,6 +227,77 @@ def register_enum(apps, schema_editor, enum_class): # noqa: F841 register_adapter(enum_class, enum_adapter) +def create_index_on_partitions( + apps, # noqa: F841 + schema_editor, + parent_table: str, + index_name: str, + columns: str, + method: str = "BTREE", + where: str = "", +): + """ + Create an index on every existing partition of `parent_table`. + + Args: + parent_table: The name of the root table (e.g. "findings"). + index_name: A short name for the index (will be prefixed per-partition). + columns: The parenthesized column list, e.g. "tenant_id, scan_id, status". + method: The index method—BTREE, GIN, etc. Defaults to BTREE. + where: Optional WHERE clause (without the leading "WHERE"), e.g. "status = 'FAIL'". + """ + with connection.cursor() as cursor: + cursor.execute( + """ + SELECT inhrelid::regclass::text + FROM pg_inherits + WHERE inhparent = %s::regclass + """, + [parent_table], + ) + partitions = [row[0] for row in cursor.fetchall()] + + where_sql = f" WHERE {where}" if where else "" + for partition in partitions: + idx_name = f"{partition.replace('.', '_')}_{index_name}" + sql = ( + f"CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY IF NOT EXISTS {idx_name} " + f"ON {partition} USING {method} ({columns})" + f"{where_sql};" + ) + schema_editor.execute(sql) + + +def drop_index_on_partitions( + apps, # noqa: F841 + schema_editor, + parent_table: str, + index_name: str, +): + """ + Drop the per-partition indexes that were created by create_index_on_partitions. + + Args: + parent_table: The name of the root table (e.g. "findings"). + index_name: The same short name used when creating them. + """ + with connection.cursor() as cursor: + cursor.execute( + """ + SELECT inhrelid::regclass::text + FROM pg_inherits + WHERE inhparent = %s::regclass + """, + [parent_table], + ) + partitions = [row[0] for row in cursor.fetchall()] + + for partition in partitions: + idx_name = f"{partition.replace('.', '_')}_{index_name}" + sql = f"DROP INDEX CONCURRENTLY IF EXISTS {idx_name};" + schema_editor.execute(sql) + + # Postgres enum definition for member role diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/filters.py b/api/src/backend/api/filters.py index fc16cf394b..6d9512f2e2 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/filters.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/filters.py @@ -293,16 +293,16 @@ class FindingFilter(FilterSet): resources = UUIDInFilter(field_name="resource__id", lookup_expr="in") - region = CharFilter(field_name="resources__region") - region__in = CharInFilter(field_name="resources__region", lookup_expr="in") + region = CharFilter(method="filter_resource_region") + region__in = CharInFilter(field_name="resource_regions", lookup_expr="overlap") region__icontains = CharFilter( - field_name="resources__region", lookup_expr="icontains" + field_name="resource_regions", lookup_expr="icontains" ) - service = CharFilter(field_name="resources__service") - service__in = CharInFilter(field_name="resources__service", lookup_expr="in") + service = CharFilter(method="filter_resource_service") + service__in = CharInFilter(field_name="resource_services", lookup_expr="overlap") service__icontains = CharFilter( - field_name="resources__service", lookup_expr="icontains" + field_name="resource_services", lookup_expr="icontains" ) resource_uid = CharFilter(field_name="resources__uid") @@ -317,8 +317,8 @@ class FindingFilter(FilterSet): field_name="resources__name", lookup_expr="icontains" ) - resource_type = CharFilter(field_name="resources__type") - resource_type__in = CharInFilter(field_name="resources__type", lookup_expr="in") + resource_type = CharFilter(method="filter_resource_type") + resource_type__in = CharInFilter(field_name="resource_types", lookup_expr="overlap") resource_type__icontains = CharFilter( field_name="resources__type", lookup_expr="icontains" ) @@ -385,6 +385,15 @@ class FindingFilter(FilterSet): }, } + def filter_resource_type(self, queryset, name, value): + return queryset.filter(resource_types__contains=[value]) + + def filter_resource_region(self, queryset, name, value): + return queryset.filter(resource_regions__contains=[value]) + + def filter_resource_service(self, queryset, name, value): + return queryset.filter(resource_services__contains=[value]) + def filter_queryset(self, queryset): if not (self.data.get("scan") or self.data.get("scan__in")) and not ( self.data.get("inserted_at") diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/management/commands/findings.py b/api/src/backend/api/management/commands/findings.py index f81f8012a3..e62f8f8e8e 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/management/commands/findings.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/management/commands/findings.py @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ from api.models import ( Provider, Resource, ResourceFindingMapping, + ResourceScanSummary, Scan, StatusChoices, ) @@ -133,6 +134,7 @@ class Command(BaseCommand): region=random.choice(possible_regions), service=random.choice(possible_services), type=random.choice(possible_types), + inserted_at="2024-10-01T00:00:00Z", ) ) @@ -181,6 +183,10 @@ class Command(BaseCommand): "servicename": assigned_resource.service, "resourcetype": assigned_resource.type, }, + resource_types=[assigned_resource.type], + resource_regions=[assigned_resource.region], + resource_services=[assigned_resource.service], + inserted_at="2024-10-01T00:00:00Z", ) ) @@ -197,12 +203,22 @@ class Command(BaseCommand): # Create ResourceFindingMapping mappings = [] - for index, f in enumerate(findings): + scan_resource_cache: set[tuple] = set() + for index, finding_instance in enumerate(findings): + resource_instance = resources[findings_resources_mapping[index]] mappings.append( ResourceFindingMapping( tenant_id=tenant_id, - resource=resources[findings_resources_mapping[index]], - finding=f, + resource=resource_instance, + finding=finding_instance, + ) + ) + scan_resource_cache.add( + ( + str(resource_instance.id), + resource_instance.service, + resource_instance.region, + resource_instance.type, ) ) @@ -220,6 +236,38 @@ class Command(BaseCommand): "Resource-finding mappings created successfully.\n\n" ) ) + + with rls_transaction(tenant_id): + scan.progress = 99 + scan.save() + + self.stdout.write(self.style.WARNING("Creating finding filter values...")) + resource_scan_summaries = [ + ResourceScanSummary( + tenant_id=tenant_id, + scan_id=str(scan.id), + resource_id=resource_id, + service=service, + region=region, + resource_type=resource_type, + ) + for resource_id, service, region, resource_type in scan_resource_cache + ] + num_batches = ceil(len(resource_scan_summaries) / batch_size) + with rls_transaction(tenant_id): + for i in tqdm( + range(0, len(resource_scan_summaries), batch_size), + total=num_batches, + ): + with rls_transaction(tenant_id): + ResourceScanSummary.objects.bulk_create( + resource_scan_summaries[i : i + batch_size], + ignore_conflicts=True, + ) + + self.stdout.write( + self.style.SUCCESS("Finding filter values created successfully.\n\n") + ) except Exception as e: self.stdout.write(self.style.ERROR(f"Failed to populate test data: {e}")) scan_state = "failed" diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0018_resource_scan_summaries.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0018_resource_scan_summaries.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e9e2ffbe69 --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0018_resource_scan_summaries.py @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +# Generated by Django 5.1.7 on 2025-05-05 10:01 + +import uuid + +import django.db.models.deletion +import uuid6 +from django.db import migrations, models + +import api.rls + + +class Migration(migrations.Migration): + dependencies = [ + ("api", "0017_m365_provider"), + ] + + operations = [ + migrations.CreateModel( + name="ResourceScanSummary", + fields=[ + ( + "id", + models.BigAutoField( + auto_created=True, + primary_key=True, + serialize=False, + verbose_name="ID", + ), + ), + ("scan_id", models.UUIDField(db_index=True, default=uuid6.uuid7)), + ("resource_id", models.UUIDField(db_index=True, default=uuid.uuid4)), + ("service", models.CharField(max_length=100)), + ("region", models.CharField(max_length=100)), + ("resource_type", models.CharField(max_length=100)), + ( + "tenant", + models.ForeignKey( + on_delete=django.db.models.deletion.CASCADE, to="api.tenant" + ), + ), + ], + options={ + "db_table": "resource_scan_summaries", + "indexes": [ + models.Index( + fields=["tenant_id", "scan_id", "service"], + name="rss_tenant_scan_svc_idx", + ), + models.Index( + fields=["tenant_id", "scan_id", "region"], + name="rss_tenant_scan_reg_idx", + ), + models.Index( + fields=["tenant_id", "scan_id", "resource_type"], + name="rss_tenant_scan_type_idx", + ), + models.Index( + fields=["tenant_id", "scan_id", "region", "service"], + name="rss_tenant_scan_reg_svc_idx", + ), + models.Index( + fields=["tenant_id", "scan_id", "service", "resource_type"], + name="rss_tenant_scan_svc_type_idx", + ), + models.Index( + fields=["tenant_id", "scan_id", "region", "resource_type"], + name="rss_tenant_scan_reg_type_idx", + ), + ], + "unique_together": {("tenant_id", "scan_id", "resource_id")}, + }, + ), + migrations.AddConstraint( + model_name="resourcescansummary", + constraint=api.rls.RowLevelSecurityConstraint( + "tenant_id", + name="rls_on_resourcescansummary", + statements=["SELECT", "INSERT", "UPDATE", "DELETE"], + ), + ), + ] diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0019_finding_denormalize_resource_fields.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0019_finding_denormalize_resource_fields.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..837b741223 --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0019_finding_denormalize_resource_fields.py @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +import django.contrib.postgres.fields +import django.contrib.postgres.indexes +from django.db import migrations, models + + +class Migration(migrations.Migration): + dependencies = [ + ("api", "0018_resource_scan_summaries"), + ] + + operations = [ + migrations.AddField( + model_name="finding", + name="resource_regions", + field=django.contrib.postgres.fields.ArrayField( + base_field=models.CharField(max_length=100), + blank=True, + null=True, + size=None, + ), + ), + migrations.AddField( + model_name="finding", + name="resource_services", + field=django.contrib.postgres.fields.ArrayField( + base_field=models.CharField(max_length=100), + blank=True, + null=True, + size=None, + ), + ), + migrations.AddField( + model_name="finding", + name="resource_types", + field=django.contrib.postgres.fields.ArrayField( + base_field=models.CharField(max_length=100), + blank=True, + null=True, + size=None, + ), + ), + ] diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0020_findings_new_performance_indexes_partitions.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0020_findings_new_performance_indexes_partitions.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eef7e10b99 --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0020_findings_new_performance_indexes_partitions.py @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +from functools import partial + +from django.db import migrations + +from api.db_utils import create_index_on_partitions, drop_index_on_partitions + + +class Migration(migrations.Migration): + atomic = False + + dependencies = [ + ("api", "0019_finding_denormalize_resource_fields"), + ] + + operations = [ + migrations.RunPython( + partial( + create_index_on_partitions, + parent_table="findings", + index_name="gin_find_service_idx", + columns="resource_services", + method="GIN", + ), + reverse_code=partial( + drop_index_on_partitions, + parent_table="findings", + index_name="gin_find_service_idx", + ), + ), + migrations.RunPython( + partial( + create_index_on_partitions, + parent_table="findings", + index_name="gin_find_region_idx", + columns="resource_regions", + method="GIN", + ), + reverse_code=partial( + drop_index_on_partitions, + parent_table="findings", + index_name="gin_find_region_idx", + ), + ), + migrations.RunPython( + partial( + create_index_on_partitions, + parent_table="findings", + index_name="gin_find_rtype_idx", + columns="resource_types", + method="GIN", + ), + reverse_code=partial( + drop_index_on_partitions, + parent_table="findings", + index_name="gin_find_rtype_idx", + ), + ), + migrations.RunPython( + partial( + drop_index_on_partitions, + parent_table="findings", + index_name="findings_uid_idx", + ), + reverse_code=partial( + create_index_on_partitions, + parent_table="findings", + index_name="findings_uid_idx", + columns="uid", + method="BTREE", + ), + ), + migrations.RunPython( + partial( + drop_index_on_partitions, + parent_table="findings", + index_name="findings_filter_idx", + ), + reverse_code=partial( + create_index_on_partitions, + parent_table="findings", + index_name="findings_filter_idx", + columns="scan_id, impact, severity, status, check_id, delta", + method="BTREE", + ), + ), + ] diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0021_findings_new_performance_indexes_parent.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0021_findings_new_performance_indexes_parent.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3165af9030 --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0021_findings_new_performance_indexes_parent.py @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +import django.contrib.postgres.indexes +from django.db import migrations + + +class Migration(migrations.Migration): + dependencies = [ + ("api", "0020_findings_new_performance_indexes_partitions"), + ] + + operations = [ + migrations.AddIndex( + model_name="finding", + index=django.contrib.postgres.indexes.GinIndex( + fields=["resource_services"], name="gin_find_service_idx" + ), + ), + migrations.AddIndex( + model_name="finding", + index=django.contrib.postgres.indexes.GinIndex( + fields=["resource_regions"], name="gin_find_region_idx" + ), + ), + migrations.AddIndex( + model_name="finding", + index=django.contrib.postgres.indexes.GinIndex( + fields=["resource_types"], name="gin_find_rtype_idx" + ), + ), + migrations.RemoveIndex( + model_name="finding", + name="findings_uid_idx", + ), + migrations.RemoveIndex( + model_name="finding", + name="findings_filter_idx", + ), + ] diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0022_scan_summaries_performance_indexes.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0022_scan_summaries_performance_indexes.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d56f310b8f --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0022_scan_summaries_performance_indexes.py @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +# Generated by Django 5.1.8 on 2025-05-12 10:04 + +from django.contrib.postgres.operations import AddIndexConcurrently +from django.db import migrations, models + + +class Migration(migrations.Migration): + atomic = False + + dependencies = [ + ("api", "0021_findings_new_performance_indexes_parent"), + ("django_celery_beat", "0019_alter_periodictasks_options"), + ] + + operations = [ + AddIndexConcurrently( + model_name="scan", + index=models.Index( + condition=models.Q(("state", "completed")), + fields=["tenant_id", "provider_id", "state", "-inserted_at"], + name="scans_prov_state_ins_desc_idx", + ), + ), + AddIndexConcurrently( + model_name="scansummary", + index=models.Index( + fields=["tenant_id", "scan_id", "service"], + name="ss_tenant_scan_service_idx", + ), + ), + AddIndexConcurrently( + model_name="scansummary", + index=models.Index( + fields=["tenant_id", "scan_id", "severity"], + name="ss_tenant_scan_severity_idx", + ), + ), + ] diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0023_resources_lookup_optimization.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0023_resources_lookup_optimization.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9709f17eb4 --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0023_resources_lookup_optimization.py @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +# Generated by Django 5.1.8 on 2025-05-12 10:18 + +from django.contrib.postgres.operations import AddIndexConcurrently +from django.db import migrations, models + + +class Migration(migrations.Migration): + atomic = False + + dependencies = [ + ("api", "0022_scan_summaries_performance_indexes"), + ] + + operations = [ + AddIndexConcurrently( + model_name="resource", + index=models.Index( + fields=["tenant_id", "id"], name="resources_tenant_id_idx" + ), + ), + AddIndexConcurrently( + model_name="resource", + index=models.Index( + fields=["tenant_id", "provider_id"], + name="resources_tenant_provider_idx", + ), + ), + ] diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/models.py b/api/src/backend/api/models.py index 01f88178f0..676b3b116c 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/models.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/models.py @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ from uuid import UUID, uuid4 from cryptography.fernet import Fernet from django.conf import settings from django.contrib.auth.models import AbstractBaseUser +from django.contrib.postgres.fields import ArrayField from django.contrib.postgres.indexes import GinIndex from django.contrib.postgres.search import SearchVector, SearchVectorField from django.core.validators import MinLengthValidator @@ -447,6 +448,11 @@ class Scan(RowLevelSecurityProtectedModel): fields=["tenant_id", "provider_id", "state", "inserted_at"], name="scans_prov_state_insert_idx", ), + models.Index( + fields=["tenant_id", "provider_id", "state", "-inserted_at"], + condition=Q(state=StateChoices.COMPLETED), + name="scans_prov_state_ins_desc_idx", + ), ] class JSONAPIMeta: @@ -573,6 +579,11 @@ class Resource(RowLevelSecurityProtectedModel): name="resource_tenant_metadata_idx", ), GinIndex(fields=["text_search"], name="gin_resources_search_idx"), + models.Index(fields=["tenant_id", "id"], name="resources_tenant_id_idx"), + models.Index( + fields=["tenant_id", "provider_id"], + name="resources_tenant_provider_idx", + ), ] constraints = [ @@ -673,6 +684,21 @@ class Finding(PostgresPartitionedModel, RowLevelSecurityProtectedModel): muted = models.BooleanField(default=False, null=False) compliance = models.JSONField(default=dict, null=True, blank=True) + # Denormalize resource data for performance + resource_regions = ArrayField( + models.CharField(max_length=100), blank=True, null=True + ) + resource_services = ArrayField( + models.CharField(max_length=100), + blank=True, + null=True, + ) + resource_types = ArrayField( + models.CharField(max_length=100), + blank=True, + null=True, + ) + # Relationships scan = models.ForeignKey(to=Scan, related_name="findings", on_delete=models.CASCADE) @@ -713,18 +739,6 @@ class Finding(PostgresPartitionedModel, RowLevelSecurityProtectedModel): ] indexes = [ - models.Index(fields=["uid"], name="findings_uid_idx"), - models.Index( - fields=[ - "scan_id", - "impact", - "severity", - "status", - "check_id", - "delta", - ], - name="findings_filter_idx", - ), models.Index(fields=["tenant_id", "id"], name="findings_tenant_and_id_idx"), GinIndex(fields=["text_search"], name="gin_findings_search_idx"), models.Index(fields=["tenant_id", "scan_id"], name="find_tenant_scan_idx"), @@ -736,19 +750,38 @@ class Finding(PostgresPartitionedModel, RowLevelSecurityProtectedModel): condition=Q(delta="new"), name="find_delta_new_idx", ), + GinIndex(fields=["resource_services"], name="gin_find_service_idx"), + GinIndex(fields=["resource_regions"], name="gin_find_region_idx"), + GinIndex(fields=["resource_types"], name="gin_find_rtype_idx"), ] class JSONAPIMeta: resource_name = "findings" def add_resources(self, resources: list[Resource] | None): - # Add new relationships with the tenant_id field + if not resources: + return + + self.resource_regions = self.resource_regions or [] + self.resource_services = self.resource_services or [] + self.resource_types = self.resource_types or [] + + # Deduplication + regions = set(self.resource_regions) + services = set(self.resource_services) + types = set(self.resource_types) + for resource in resources: ResourceFindingMapping.objects.update_or_create( resource=resource, finding=self, tenant_id=self.tenant_id ) + regions.add(resource.region) + services.add(resource.service) + types.add(resource.type) - # Save the instance + self.resource_regions = list(regions) + self.resource_services = list(services) + self.resource_types = list(types) self.save() @@ -1150,7 +1183,15 @@ class ScanSummary(RowLevelSecurityProtectedModel): models.Index( fields=["tenant_id", "scan_id"], name="scan_summaries_tenant_scan_idx", - ) + ), + models.Index( + fields=["tenant_id", "scan_id", "service"], + name="ss_tenant_scan_service_idx", + ), + models.Index( + fields=["tenant_id", "scan_id", "severity"], + name="ss_tenant_scan_severity_idx", + ), ] class JSONAPIMeta: @@ -1232,3 +1273,52 @@ class IntegrationProviderRelationship(RowLevelSecurityProtectedModel): statements=["SELECT", "INSERT", "UPDATE", "DELETE"], ), ] + + +class ResourceScanSummary(RowLevelSecurityProtectedModel): + scan_id = models.UUIDField(default=uuid7, db_index=True) + resource_id = models.UUIDField(default=uuid4, db_index=True) + service = models.CharField(max_length=100) + region = models.CharField(max_length=100) + resource_type = models.CharField(max_length=100) + + class Meta: + db_table = "resource_scan_summaries" + unique_together = (("tenant_id", "scan_id", "resource_id"),) + + indexes = [ + # Single-dimension lookups: + models.Index( + fields=["tenant_id", "scan_id", "service"], + name="rss_tenant_scan_svc_idx", + ), + models.Index( + fields=["tenant_id", "scan_id", "region"], + name="rss_tenant_scan_reg_idx", + ), + models.Index( + fields=["tenant_id", "scan_id", "resource_type"], + name="rss_tenant_scan_type_idx", + ), + # Two-dimension cross-filters: + models.Index( + fields=["tenant_id", "scan_id", "region", "service"], + name="rss_tenant_scan_reg_svc_idx", + ), + models.Index( + fields=["tenant_id", "scan_id", "service", "resource_type"], + name="rss_tenant_scan_svc_type_idx", + ), + models.Index( + fields=["tenant_id", "scan_id", "region", "resource_type"], + name="rss_tenant_scan_reg_type_idx", + ), + ] + + constraints = [ + RowLevelSecurityConstraint( + field="tenant_id", + name="rls_on_%(class)s", + statements=["SELECT", "INSERT", "UPDATE", "DELETE"], + ), + ] diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/specs/v1.yaml b/api/src/backend/api/specs/v1.yaml index 962ec773c2..534a232ca8 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/specs/v1.yaml +++ b/api/src/backend/api/specs/v1.yaml @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ openapi: 3.0.3 info: title: Prowler API - version: 1.7.0 + version: 1.8.0 description: |- Prowler API specification. @@ -4505,7 +4505,7 @@ paths: description: '' /api/v1/scans/{id}/compliance/{name}: get: - operationId: scan_compliance_download + operationId: scans_compliance_retrieve description: Download a specific compliance report (e.g., 'cis_1.4_aws') as a CSV file. summary: Retrieve compliance report as CSV diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_views.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_views.py index 455f9f98af..91de5775c9 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_views.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_views.py @@ -3096,7 +3096,9 @@ class TestFindingViewSet: ) assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND - def test_findings_metadata_retrieve(self, authenticated_client, findings_fixture): + def test_findings_metadata_retrieve( + self, authenticated_client, findings_fixture, backfill_scan_metadata_fixture + ): finding_1, *_ = findings_fixture response = authenticated_client.get( reverse("finding-metadata"), @@ -3119,14 +3121,14 @@ class TestFindingViewSet: ) # assert data["data"]["attributes"]["tags"] == expected_tags - def test_findings_metadata_severity_retrieve( - self, authenticated_client, findings_fixture + def test_findings_metadata_resource_filter_retrieve( + self, authenticated_client, findings_fixture, backfill_scan_metadata_fixture ): finding_1, *_ = findings_fixture response = authenticated_client.get( reverse("finding-metadata"), { - "filter[severity__in]": ["low", "medium"], + "filter[region]": "eu-west-1", "filter[inserted_at]": finding_1.inserted_at.strftime("%Y-%m-%d"), }, ) @@ -4814,9 +4816,8 @@ class TestOverviewViewSet: assert response.json()["data"][0]["attributes"]["findings"]["pass"] == 2 assert response.json()["data"][0]["attributes"]["findings"]["fail"] == 1 assert response.json()["data"][0]["attributes"]["findings"]["muted"] == 1 - assert response.json()["data"][0]["attributes"]["resources"]["total"] == len( - resources_fixture - ) + # Since we rely on completed scans, there are only 2 resources now + assert response.json()["data"][0]["attributes"]["resources"]["total"] == 2 def test_overview_services_list_no_required_filters( self, authenticated_client, scan_summaries_fixture diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/utils.py b/api/src/backend/api/utils.py index 63581c266e..ce3f4feb52 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/utils.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/utils.py @@ -1,11 +1,14 @@ from datetime import datetime, timezone from allauth.socialaccount.providers.oauth2.client import OAuth2Client +from django.contrib.postgres.aggregates import ArrayAgg +from django.db.models import Subquery from rest_framework.exceptions import NotFound, ValidationError from api.db_router import MainRouter from api.exceptions import InvitationTokenExpiredException -from api.models import Invitation, Provider +from api.models import Invitation, Provider, Resource +from api.v1.serializers import FindingMetadataSerializer from prowler.providers.aws.aws_provider import AwsProvider from prowler.providers.azure.azure_provider import AzureProvider from prowler.providers.common.models import Connection @@ -205,3 +208,33 @@ def validate_invitation( ) return invitation + + +# ToRemove after removing the fallback mechanism in /findings/metadata +def get_findings_metadata_no_aggregations(tenant_id: str, filtered_queryset): + filtered_ids = filtered_queryset.order_by().values("id") + + relevant_resources = Resource.all_objects.filter( + tenant_id=tenant_id, findings__id__in=Subquery(filtered_ids) + ).only("service", "region", "type") + + aggregation = relevant_resources.aggregate( + services=ArrayAgg("service", flat=True), + regions=ArrayAgg("region", flat=True), + resource_types=ArrayAgg("type", flat=True), + ) + + services = sorted(set(aggregation["services"] or [])) + regions = sorted({region for region in aggregation["regions"] or [] if region}) + resource_types = sorted(set(aggregation["resource_types"] or [])) + + result = { + "services": services, + "regions": regions, + "resource_types": resource_types, + } + + serializer = FindingMetadataSerializer(data=result) + serializer.is_valid(raise_exception=True) + + return serializer.data diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/v1/views.py b/api/src/backend/api/v1/views.py index c0a2e824fe..19b21df92e 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/v1/views.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/v1/views.py @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ import glob import os +from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone import sentry_sdk from allauth.socialaccount.providers.github.views import GitHubOAuth2Adapter @@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ from django.db.models import Count, Exists, F, OuterRef, Prefetch, Q, Subquery, from django.db.models.functions import Coalesce from django.http import HttpResponse from django.urls import reverse +from django.utils.dateparse import parse_date from django.utils.decorators import method_decorator from django.views.decorators.cache import cache_control from django_celery_beat.models import PeriodicTask @@ -48,6 +50,7 @@ from rest_framework_simplejwt.exceptions import InvalidToken, TokenError from tasks.beat import schedule_provider_scan from tasks.jobs.export import get_s3_client from tasks.tasks import ( + backfill_scan_resource_summaries_task, check_provider_connection_task, delete_provider_task, delete_tenant_task, @@ -87,6 +90,7 @@ from api.models import ( ProviderSecret, Resource, ResourceFindingMapping, + ResourceScanSummary, Role, RoleProviderGroupRelationship, Scan, @@ -100,7 +104,12 @@ from api.models import ( from api.pagination import ComplianceOverviewPagination from api.rbac.permissions import Permissions, get_providers, get_role from api.rls import Tenant -from api.utils import CustomOAuth2Client, validate_invitation +from api.utils import ( + CustomOAuth2Client, + get_findings_metadata_no_aggregations, + validate_invitation, +) +from api.uuid_utils import datetime_to_uuid7, uuid7_start from api.v1.serializers import ( ComplianceOverviewFullSerializer, ComplianceOverviewMetadataSerializer, @@ -249,7 +258,7 @@ class SchemaView(SpectacularAPIView): def get(self, request, *args, **kwargs): spectacular_settings.TITLE = "Prowler API" - spectacular_settings.VERSION = "1.7.0" + spectacular_settings.VERSION = "1.8.0" spectacular_settings.DESCRIPTION = ( "Prowler API specification.\n\nThis file is auto-generated." ) @@ -1780,25 +1789,103 @@ class FindingViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): @action(detail=False, methods=["get"], url_name="metadata") def metadata(self, request): - tenant_id = self.request.tenant_id - queryset = self.get_queryset() - filtered_queryset = self.filter_queryset(queryset) + # Force filter validation + filtered_queryset = self.filter_queryset(self.get_queryset()) - filtered_ids = filtered_queryset.order_by().values("id") + tenant_id = request.tenant_id + query_params = request.query_params - relevant_resources = Resource.all_objects.filter( - tenant_id=tenant_id, findings__id__in=Subquery(filtered_ids) - ).only("service", "region", "type") + queryset = ResourceScanSummary.objects.filter(tenant_id=tenant_id) + scan_based_filters = {} - aggregation = relevant_resources.aggregate( - services=ArrayAgg("service", flat=True), - regions=ArrayAgg("region", flat=True), - resource_types=ArrayAgg("type", flat=True), + if scans := query_params.get("filter[scan__in]") or query_params.get( + "filter[scan]" + ): + queryset = queryset.filter(scan_id__in=scans.split(",")) + scan_based_filters = {"id__in": scans.split(",")} + else: + exact = query_params.get("filter[inserted_at]") + gte = query_params.get("filter[inserted_at__gte]") + lte = query_params.get("filter[inserted_at__lte]") + + date_filters = {} + if exact: + date = parse_date(exact) + datetime_start = datetime.combine( + date, datetime.min.time(), tzinfo=timezone.utc + ) + datetime_end = datetime_start + timedelta(days=1) + date_filters["scan_id__gte"] = uuid7_start( + datetime_to_uuid7(datetime_start) + ) + date_filters["scan_id__lt"] = uuid7_start( + datetime_to_uuid7(datetime_end) + ) + else: + if gte: + date_start = parse_date(gte) + datetime_start = datetime.combine( + date_start, datetime.min.time(), tzinfo=timezone.utc + ) + date_filters["scan_id__gte"] = uuid7_start( + datetime_to_uuid7(datetime_start) + ) + if lte: + date_end = parse_date(lte) + datetime_end = datetime.combine( + date_end + timedelta(days=1), + datetime.min.time(), + tzinfo=timezone.utc, + ) + date_filters["scan_id__lt"] = uuid7_start( + datetime_to_uuid7(datetime_end) + ) + + if date_filters: + queryset = queryset.filter(**date_filters) + scan_based_filters = { + key.lstrip("scan_"): value for key, value in date_filters.items() + } + + # ToRemove: Temporary fallback mechanism + if not queryset.exists(): + scan_ids = Scan.objects.filter( + tenant_id=tenant_id, **scan_based_filters + ).values_list("id", flat=True) + for scan_id in scan_ids: + backfill_scan_resource_summaries_task.apply_async( + kwargs={"tenant_id": tenant_id, "scan_id": scan_id} + ) + return Response( + get_findings_metadata_no_aggregations(tenant_id, filtered_queryset) + ) + + if service_filter := query_params.get("filter[service]") or query_params.get( + "filter[service__in]" + ): + queryset = queryset.filter(service__in=service_filter.split(",")) + if region_filter := query_params.get("filter[region]") or query_params.get( + "filter[region__in]" + ): + queryset = queryset.filter(region__in=region_filter.split(",")) + if resource_type_filter := query_params.get( + "filter[resource_type]" + ) or query_params.get("filter[resource_type__in]"): + queryset = queryset.filter( + resource_type__in=resource_type_filter.split(",") + ) + + services = list( + queryset.values_list("service", flat=True).distinct().order_by("service") + ) + regions = list( + queryset.values_list("region", flat=True).distinct().order_by("region") + ) + resource_types = list( + queryset.values_list("resource_type", flat=True) + .distinct() + .order_by("resource_type") ) - - services = sorted(set(aggregation["services"] or [])) - regions = sorted({region for region in aggregation["regions"] or [] if region}) - resource_types = sorted(set(aggregation["resource_types"] or [])) result = { "services": services, @@ -1808,7 +1895,7 @@ class FindingViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): serializer = self.get_serializer(data=result) serializer.is_valid(raise_exception=True) - return Response(serializer.data, status=status.HTTP_200_OK) + return Response(serializer.data) @extend_schema_view( @@ -2375,8 +2462,8 @@ class OverviewViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): def _get_filtered_queryset(model): if role.unlimited_visibility: - return model.objects.filter(tenant_id=self.request.tenant_id) - return model.objects.filter( + return model.all_objects.filter(tenant_id=self.request.tenant_id) + return model.all_objects.filter( tenant_id=self.request.tenant_id, scan__provider__in=providers ) @@ -2420,51 +2507,38 @@ class OverviewViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): tenant_id = self.request.tenant_id latest_scan_ids = ( - Scan.objects.filter( - tenant_id=tenant_id, - state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, - ) + Scan.all_objects.filter(tenant_id=tenant_id, state=StateChoices.COMPLETED) .order_by("provider_id", "-inserted_at") .distinct("provider_id") .values_list("id", flat=True) ) - findings_aggregated = ( - ScanSummary.objects.filter(tenant_id=tenant_id, scan_id__in=latest_scan_ids) - .values("scan__provider__provider") + resource_count_queryset = ( + Resource.all_objects.filter( + tenant_id=tenant_id, + provider_id=OuterRef("scan__provider_id"), + ) + .order_by() + .values("provider_id") + .annotate(cnt=Count("id")) + .values("cnt") + ) + + overview_queryset = ( + ScanSummary.all_objects.filter( + tenant_id=tenant_id, scan_id__in=latest_scan_ids + ) + .values(provider=F("scan__provider__provider")) .annotate( findings_passed=Coalesce(Sum("_pass"), 0), findings_failed=Coalesce(Sum("fail"), 0), findings_muted=Coalesce(Sum("muted"), 0), total_findings=Coalesce(Sum("total"), 0), + total_resources=Coalesce(Subquery(resource_count_queryset), 0), ) ) - resources_aggregated = ( - Resource.objects.filter(tenant_id=tenant_id) - .values("provider__provider") - .annotate(total_resources=Count("id")) - ) - resources_dict = { - row["provider__provider"]: row["total_resources"] - for row in resources_aggregated - } - - overview = [] - for row in findings_aggregated: - provider_type = row["scan__provider__provider"] - overview.append( - { - "provider": provider_type, - "total_resources": resources_dict.get(provider_type, 0), - "total_findings": row["total_findings"], - "findings_passed": row["findings_passed"], - "findings_failed": row["findings_failed"], - "findings_muted": row["findings_muted"], - } - ) - - serializer = OverviewProviderSerializer(overview, many=True) + serializer = OverviewProviderSerializer(overview_queryset, many=True) return Response(serializer.data, status=status.HTTP_200_OK) @action(detail=False, methods=["get"], url_name="findings") @@ -2473,22 +2547,16 @@ class OverviewViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): queryset = self.get_queryset() filtered_queryset = self.filter_queryset(queryset) - latest_scan_subquery = ( - Scan.objects.filter( - tenant_id=tenant_id, - state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, - provider_id=OuterRef("scan__provider_id"), - ) - .order_by("-inserted_at") - .values("id")[:1] + latest_scan_ids = ( + Scan.all_objects.filter(tenant_id=tenant_id, state=StateChoices.COMPLETED) + .order_by("provider_id", "-inserted_at") + .distinct("provider_id") + .values_list("id", flat=True) ) - - annotated_queryset = filtered_queryset.annotate( - latest_scan_id=Subquery(latest_scan_subquery) + filtered_queryset = filtered_queryset.filter( + tenant_id=tenant_id, scan_id__in=latest_scan_ids ) - filtered_queryset = annotated_queryset.filter(scan_id=F("latest_scan_id")) - aggregated_totals = filtered_queryset.aggregate( _pass=Sum("_pass") or 0, fail=Sum("fail") or 0, @@ -2518,22 +2586,16 @@ class OverviewViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): queryset = self.get_queryset() filtered_queryset = self.filter_queryset(queryset) - latest_scan_subquery = ( - Scan.objects.filter( - tenant_id=tenant_id, - state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, - provider_id=OuterRef("scan__provider_id"), - ) - .order_by("-inserted_at") - .values("id")[:1] + latest_scan_ids = ( + Scan.all_objects.filter(tenant_id=tenant_id, state=StateChoices.COMPLETED) + .order_by("provider_id", "-inserted_at") + .distinct("provider_id") + .values_list("id", flat=True) ) - - annotated_queryset = filtered_queryset.annotate( - latest_scan_id=Subquery(latest_scan_subquery) + filtered_queryset = filtered_queryset.filter( + tenant_id=tenant_id, scan_id__in=latest_scan_ids ) - filtered_queryset = annotated_queryset.filter(scan_id=F("latest_scan_id")) - severity_counts = ( filtered_queryset.values("severity") .annotate(count=Sum("total")) @@ -2554,22 +2616,16 @@ class OverviewViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): queryset = self.get_queryset() filtered_queryset = self.filter_queryset(queryset) - latest_scan_subquery = ( - Scan.objects.filter( - tenant_id=tenant_id, - state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, - provider_id=OuterRef("scan__provider_id"), - ) - .order_by("-inserted_at") - .values("id")[:1] + latest_scan_ids = ( + Scan.all_objects.filter(tenant_id=tenant_id, state=StateChoices.COMPLETED) + .order_by("provider_id", "-inserted_at") + .distinct("provider_id") + .values_list("id", flat=True) ) - - annotated_queryset = filtered_queryset.annotate( - latest_scan_id=Subquery(latest_scan_subquery) + filtered_queryset = filtered_queryset.filter( + tenant_id=tenant_id, scan_id__in=latest_scan_ids ) - filtered_queryset = annotated_queryset.filter(scan_id=F("latest_scan_id")) - services_data = ( filtered_queryset.values("service") .annotate(_pass=Sum("_pass")) diff --git a/api/src/backend/conftest.py b/api/src/backend/conftest.py index acd33ea4d1..2fba4cebb7 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/conftest.py +++ b/api/src/backend/conftest.py @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ from django.urls import reverse from django_celery_results.models import TaskResult from rest_framework import status from rest_framework.test import APIClient +from tasks.jobs.backfill import backfill_resource_scan_summaries from api.db_utils import rls_transaction from api.models import ( @@ -920,6 +921,14 @@ def integrations_fixture(providers_fixture): return integration1, integration2 +@pytest.fixture +def backfill_scan_metadata_fixture(scans_fixture, findings_fixture): + for scan_instance in scans_fixture: + tenant_id = scan_instance.tenant_id + scan_id = scan_instance.id + backfill_resource_scan_summaries(tenant_id=tenant_id, scan_id=scan_id) + + def get_authorization_header(access_token: str) -> dict: return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {access_token}"} diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/backfill.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/backfill.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6c83e6a69b --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/backfill.py @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +from api.db_utils import rls_transaction +from api.models import ( + Resource, + ResourceFindingMapping, + ResourceScanSummary, + Scan, + StateChoices, +) + + +def backfill_resource_scan_summaries(tenant_id: str, scan_id: str): + with rls_transaction(tenant_id): + if ResourceScanSummary.objects.filter( + tenant_id=tenant_id, scan_id=scan_id + ).exists(): + return {"status": "already backfilled"} + + with rls_transaction(tenant_id): + if not Scan.objects.filter( + tenant_id=tenant_id, + id=scan_id, + state__in=(StateChoices.COMPLETED, StateChoices.FAILED), + ).exists(): + return {"status": "scan is not completed"} + + resource_ids_qs = ( + ResourceFindingMapping.objects.filter( + tenant_id=tenant_id, finding__scan_id=scan_id + ) + .values_list("resource_id", flat=True) + .distinct() + ) + + resource_ids = list(resource_ids_qs) + + if not resource_ids: + return {"status": "no resources to backfill"} + + resources_qs = Resource.objects.filter( + tenant_id=tenant_id, id__in=resource_ids + ).only("id", "service", "region", "type") + + summaries = [] + for resource in resources_qs.iterator(): + summaries.append( + ResourceScanSummary( + tenant_id=tenant_id, + scan_id=scan_id, + resource_id=str(resource.id), + service=resource.service, + region=resource.region, + resource_type=resource.type, + ) + ) + + for i in range(0, len(summaries), 500): + ResourceScanSummary.objects.bulk_create( + summaries[i : i + 500], ignore_conflicts=True + ) + + return {"status": "backfilled", "inserted": len(summaries)} diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/scan.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/scan.py index d143d5d2c6..81fbfbb0e9 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/scan.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/scan.py @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ from api.models import ( Finding, Provider, Resource, + ResourceScanSummary, ResourceTag, Scan, ScanSummary, @@ -121,6 +122,7 @@ def perform_prowler_scan( check_status_by_region = {} exception = None unique_resources = set() + scan_resource_cache: set[tuple[str, str, str, str]] = set() start_time = time.time() with rls_transaction(tenant_id): @@ -295,6 +297,16 @@ def perform_prowler_scan( continue region_dict[finding.check_id] = finding.status.value + # Update scan resource summaries + scan_resource_cache.add( + ( + str(resource_instance.id), + resource_instance.service, + resource_instance.region, + resource_instance.type, + ) + ) + # Update scan progress with rls_transaction(tenant_id): scan_instance.progress = progress @@ -314,66 +326,90 @@ def perform_prowler_scan( scan_instance.unique_resource_count = len(unique_resources) scan_instance.save() - if exception is None: - try: - regions = prowler_provider.get_regions() - except AttributeError: - regions = set() - - compliance_template = PROWLER_COMPLIANCE_OVERVIEW_TEMPLATE[ - provider_instance.provider - ] - compliance_overview_by_region = { - region: deepcopy(compliance_template) for region in regions - } - - for region, check_status in check_status_by_region.items(): - compliance_data = compliance_overview_by_region.setdefault( - region, deepcopy(compliance_template) - ) - for check_name, status in check_status.items(): - generate_scan_compliance( - compliance_data, - provider_instance.provider, - check_name, - status, - ) - - # Prepare compliance overview objects - compliance_overview_objects = [] - for region, compliance_data in compliance_overview_by_region.items(): - for compliance_id, compliance in compliance_data.items(): - compliance_overview_objects.append( - ComplianceOverview( - tenant_id=tenant_id, - scan=scan_instance, - region=region, - compliance_id=compliance_id, - framework=compliance["framework"], - version=compliance["version"], - description=compliance["description"], - requirements=compliance["requirements"], - requirements_passed=compliance["requirements_status"]["passed"], - requirements_failed=compliance["requirements_status"]["failed"], - requirements_manual=compliance["requirements_status"]["manual"], - total_requirements=compliance["total_requirements"], - ) - ) - try: - with rls_transaction(tenant_id): - ComplianceOverview.objects.bulk_create( - compliance_overview_objects, batch_size=100 - ) - except Exception as overview_exception: - import sentry_sdk - - sentry_sdk.capture_exception(overview_exception) - logger.error( - f"Error storing compliance overview for scan {scan_id}: {overview_exception}" - ) if exception is not None: raise exception + try: + regions = prowler_provider.get_regions() + except AttributeError: + regions = set() + + compliance_template = PROWLER_COMPLIANCE_OVERVIEW_TEMPLATE[ + provider_instance.provider + ] + compliance_overview_by_region = { + region: deepcopy(compliance_template) for region in regions + } + + for region, check_status in check_status_by_region.items(): + compliance_data = compliance_overview_by_region.setdefault( + region, deepcopy(compliance_template) + ) + for check_name, status in check_status.items(): + generate_scan_compliance( + compliance_data, + provider_instance.provider, + check_name, + status, + ) + + # Prepare compliance overview objects + compliance_overview_objects = [] + for region, compliance_data in compliance_overview_by_region.items(): + for compliance_id, compliance in compliance_data.items(): + compliance_overview_objects.append( + ComplianceOverview( + tenant_id=tenant_id, + scan=scan_instance, + region=region, + compliance_id=compliance_id, + framework=compliance["framework"], + version=compliance["version"], + description=compliance["description"], + requirements=compliance["requirements"], + requirements_passed=compliance["requirements_status"]["passed"], + requirements_failed=compliance["requirements_status"]["failed"], + requirements_manual=compliance["requirements_status"]["manual"], + total_requirements=compliance["total_requirements"], + ) + ) + try: + with rls_transaction(tenant_id): + ComplianceOverview.objects.bulk_create( + compliance_overview_objects, batch_size=500 + ) + except Exception as overview_exception: + import sentry_sdk + + sentry_sdk.capture_exception(overview_exception) + logger.error( + f"Error storing compliance overview for scan {scan_id}: {overview_exception}" + ) + + try: + resource_scan_summaries = [ + ResourceScanSummary( + tenant_id=tenant_id, + scan_id=scan_id, + resource_id=resource_id, + service=service, + region=region, + resource_type=resource_type, + ) + for resource_id, service, region, resource_type in scan_resource_cache + ] + with rls_transaction(tenant_id): + ResourceScanSummary.objects.bulk_create( + resource_scan_summaries, batch_size=500, ignore_conflicts=True + ) + except Exception as filter_exception: + import sentry_sdk + + sentry_sdk.capture_exception(filter_exception) + logger.error( + f"Error storing filter values for scan {scan_id}: {filter_exception}" + ) + serializer = ScanTaskSerializer(instance=scan_instance) return serializer.data diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/tasks.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/tasks.py index fa7012e7d8..090c0c33d3 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/tasks.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/tasks.py @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger from config.celery import RLSTask from config.django.base import DJANGO_FINDINGS_BATCH_SIZE, DJANGO_TMP_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY from django_celery_beat.models import PeriodicTask +from tasks.jobs.backfill import backfill_resource_scan_summaries from tasks.jobs.connection import check_provider_connection from tasks.jobs.deletion import delete_provider, delete_tenant from tasks.jobs.export import ( @@ -358,3 +359,15 @@ def generate_outputs(scan_id: str, provider_id: str, tenant_id: str): Scan.all_objects.filter(id=scan_id).update(output_location=final_location) logger.info(f"Scan outputs at {final_location}") return {"upload": did_upload} + + +@shared_task(name="backfill-scan-resource-summaries", queue="backfill") +def backfill_scan_resource_summaries_task(tenant_id: str, scan_id: str): + """ + Tries to backfill the resource scan summaries table for a given scan. + + Args: + tenant_id (str): The tenant identifier. + scan_id (str): The scan identifier. + """ + return backfill_resource_scan_summaries(tenant_id=tenant_id, scan_id=scan_id) diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_backfill.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_backfill.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b436f13151 --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_backfill.py @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +from uuid import uuid4 + +import pytest +from tasks.jobs.backfill import backfill_resource_scan_summaries + +from api.models import ResourceScanSummary, Scan, StateChoices + + +@pytest.mark.django_db +class TestBackfillResourceScanSummaries: + @pytest.fixture(scope="function") + def resource_scan_summary_data(self, scans_fixture): + scan = scans_fixture[0] + return ResourceScanSummary.objects.create( + tenant_id=scan.tenant_id, + scan_id=scan.id, + resource_id=str(uuid4()), + service="aws", + region="us-east-1", + resource_type="instance", + ) + + @pytest.fixture(scope="function") + def get_not_completed_scans(self, providers_fixture): + provider_id = providers_fixture[0].id + tenant_id = providers_fixture[0].tenant_id + scan_1 = Scan.objects.create( + tenant_id=tenant_id, + trigger=Scan.TriggerChoices.MANUAL, + state=StateChoices.EXECUTING, + provider_id=provider_id, + ) + scan_2 = Scan.objects.create( + tenant_id=tenant_id, + trigger=Scan.TriggerChoices.MANUAL, + state=StateChoices.AVAILABLE, + provider_id=provider_id, + ) + return scan_1, scan_2 + + def test_already_backfilled(self, resource_scan_summary_data): + tenant_id = resource_scan_summary_data.tenant_id + scan_id = resource_scan_summary_data.scan_id + + result = backfill_resource_scan_summaries(tenant_id, scan_id) + + assert result == {"status": "already backfilled"} + + def test_not_completed_scan(self, get_not_completed_scans): + for scan_instance in get_not_completed_scans: + tenant_id = scan_instance.tenant_id + scan_id = scan_instance.id + result = backfill_resource_scan_summaries(tenant_id, scan_id) + + assert result == {"status": "scan is not completed"} + + def test_successful_backfill_inserts_one_summary( + self, resources_fixture, findings_fixture + ): + tenant_id = findings_fixture[0].tenant_id + scan_id = findings_fixture[0].scan_id + + # This scan affects the first two resources + resources = resources_fixture[:2] + + result = backfill_resource_scan_summaries(tenant_id, scan_id) + assert result == {"status": "backfilled", "inserted": len(resources)} + + # Verify correct values + summaries = ResourceScanSummary.objects.filter( + tenant_id=tenant_id, scan_id=scan_id + ) + assert summaries.count() == len(resources) + for resource in resources: + summary = summaries.get(resource_id=resource.id) + assert summary.resource_id == resource.id + assert summary.service == resource.service + assert summary.region == resource.region + assert summary.resource_type == resource.type diff --git a/api/tests/performance/benchmark.py b/api/tests/performance/benchmark.py index 1df7f81645..c527a3c729 100644 --- a/api/tests/performance/benchmark.py +++ b/api/tests/performance/benchmark.py @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ #!/usr/bin/env python3 import argparse +import os import re import subprocess import sys @@ -122,8 +123,7 @@ def main() -> None: args = parser.parse_args() metrics_dir = Path(args.metrics_dir) - if not metrics_dir.is_dir(): - sys.exit(f"Metrics directory not found: {metrics_dir}") + os.makedirs(metrics_dir, exist_ok=True) metrics_data: dict[str, pd.DataFrame] = {} for csv_file in sorted(metrics_dir.glob("*.csv")): diff --git a/api/tests/performance/requirements.txt b/api/tests/performance/requirements.txt index 139690df29..3b713953c7 100644 --- a/api/tests/performance/requirements.txt +++ b/api/tests/performance/requirements.txt @@ -1,2 +1,3 @@ locust==2.34.1 matplotlib==3.10.1 +pandas==2.2.3 diff --git a/api/tests/performance/scenarios/findings.py b/api/tests/performance/scenarios/findings.py index aef484a7ea..acd32f2497 100644 --- a/api/tests/performance/scenarios/findings.py +++ b/api/tests/performance/scenarios/findings.py @@ -180,13 +180,27 @@ class APIUser(APIUserBase): ) endpoint = ( - f"/findings?filter[{filter_name}]={filter_value}" + f"/findings/metadata?filter[{filter_name}]={filter_value}" f"&filter[inserted_at]={TARGET_INSERTED_AT}" f"&{get_sort_value(FINDINGS_UI_SORT_VALUES)}" ) self.client.get(endpoint, headers=get_auth_headers(self.token), name=name) - @task + @task(3) + def findings_metadata_resource_filter_scan_large(self): + name = "/findings/metadata?filter[resource_filter]&filter[scan_id] - 500k" + filter_name, filter_value = get_next_resource_filter( + self.available_resource_filters + ) + + endpoint = ( + f"/findings/metadata?filter[{filter_name}]={filter_value}" + f"&filter[scan]={self.l_scan_id}" + f"&{get_sort_value(FINDINGS_UI_SORT_VALUES)}" + ) + self.client.get(endpoint, headers=get_auth_headers(self.token), name=name) + + @task(2) def findings_resource_filter_large_scan_include(self): name = "/findings?filter[resource_filter][scan]&include - 500k" filter_name, filter_value = get_next_resource_filter( From b78f53a72232342d47cd72b363fcfbf20c9541ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hugo Pereira Brito <101209179+HugoPBrito@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 14:46:32 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 17/23] chore(findings): enhance m365 authentication method information (#7681) --- prowler/CHANGELOG.md | 1 + prowler/lib/outputs/html/html.py | 3 ++ prowler/providers/m365/m365_provider.py | 6 ++++ prowler/providers/m365/models.py | 1 + tests/lib/outputs/html/html_test.py | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/providers/m365/m365_fixtures.py | 1 + 6 files changed, 55 insertions(+) diff --git a/prowler/CHANGELOG.md b/prowler/CHANGELOG.md index 3909b08498..95d593eae7 100644 --- a/prowler/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/prowler/CHANGELOG.md @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ All notable changes to the **Prowler SDK** are documented in this file. - Add snapshots to m365 documentation. [(#7673)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7673) - Add support for static credentials for sending findings to Amazon S3 and AWS Security Hub. [(#7322)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7322) - Add Prowler ThreatScore for M365 provider. [(#7692)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7692) +- Add Microsoft User and User Credential auth to reports [(#7681)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/7681) ### Fixed diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/html/html.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/html/html.py index aeb11aebfc..cb462396e6 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/html/html.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/html/html.py @@ -581,6 +581,9 @@ class HTML(Output):
  • M365 Identity ID: {provider.identity.identity_id}
    • + {f'''
  • + M365 User: {provider.identity.user} +
    • ''' if hasattr(provider.identity, 'user') and provider.identity.user is not None else ""}
    """ diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/m365_provider.py b/prowler/providers/m365/m365_provider.py index f5011c9c27..2b766171e6 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/m365/m365_provider.py +++ b/prowler/providers/m365/m365_provider.py @@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ class M365Provider(Provider): m365_credentials=m365_credentials, provider_id=self.identity.tenant_domain, init_modules=init_modules, + identity=self.identity, ) # Audit Config @@ -382,6 +383,7 @@ class M365Provider(Provider): m365_credentials: dict = {}, provider_id: str = None, init_modules: bool = False, + identity: M365IdentityInfo = None, ) -> M365Credentials: """Gets the M365 credentials. @@ -394,6 +396,7 @@ class M365Provider(Provider): If False, returns empty credentials. """ credentials = None + if m365_credentials: credentials = M365Credentials( user=m365_credentials.get("user", ""), @@ -428,6 +431,9 @@ class M365Provider(Provider): ) if credentials: + if identity: + identity.identity_type = "Service Principal and User Credentials" + identity.user = credentials.user test_session = M365PowerShell(credentials) try: if test_session.test_credentials(credentials): diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/models.py b/prowler/providers/m365/models.py index a2e3b68151..198c54e33e 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/m365/models.py +++ b/prowler/providers/m365/models.py @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ class M365IdentityInfo(BaseModel): tenant_id: str = "" tenant_domain: str = "Unknown tenant domain (missing AAD permissions)" location: str = "" + user: str = None class M365RegionConfig(BaseModel): diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/html/html_test.py b/tests/lib/outputs/html/html_test.py index 2bc6d9ab07..9ee634dc0f 100644 --- a/tests/lib/outputs/html/html_test.py +++ b/tests/lib/outputs/html/html_test.py @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ from tests.providers.gcp.gcp_fixtures import GCP_PROJECT_ID, set_mocked_gcp_prov from tests.providers.kubernetes.kubernetes_fixtures import ( set_mocked_kubernetes_provider, ) +from tests.providers.m365.m365_fixtures import set_mocked_m365_provider html_stats = { "total_pass": 25, @@ -222,6 +223,38 @@ kubernetes_html_assessment_summary = """
    """ +m365_html_assessment_summary = """ +
    +
    +
    + M365 Assessment Summary +
    +
      +
    • + M365 Tenant Domain: user.onmicrosoft.com +
      • +
    +
    +
    +
    +
    +
    + M365 Credentials +
    +
      +
    • + M365 Identity Type: Application +
      • +
    • + M365 Identity ID: 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 +
      • +
    • + M365 User: user@email.com +
      • +
    +
    +
    """ + def get_aws_html_header(args: list) -> str: """ @@ -554,3 +587,13 @@ class TestHTML: summary = output.get_assessment_summary(provider) assert summary == kubernetes_html_assessment_summary + + def test_m365_get_assessment_summary(self): + findings = [generate_finding_output()] + output = HTML(findings) + provider = set_mocked_m365_provider() + + summary = output.get_assessment_summary(provider) + + expected_summary = m365_html_assessment_summary + assert summary == expected_summary diff --git a/tests/providers/m365/m365_fixtures.py b/tests/providers/m365/m365_fixtures.py index 0eb3c203e1..f985f94b6a 100644 --- a/tests/providers/m365/m365_fixtures.py +++ b/tests/providers/m365/m365_fixtures.py @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ def set_mocked_m365_provider( identity_type=IDENTITY_TYPE, tenant_id=TENANT_ID, tenant_domain=DOMAIN, + user="user@email.com", ), audit_config: dict = None, azure_region_config: M365RegionConfig = M365RegionConfig(), From a19f5d9a9a69fbb95bee8cb585f36e81adbf1db0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alejandro Bailo <59607668+alejandrobailo@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 15:07:44 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 18/23] feat: scan label validation (#7693) --- .../launch-scan-workflow-form.tsx | 94 ++++++++++--------- ui/components/ui/custom/custom-input.tsx | 2 +- 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-) diff --git a/ui/components/scans/launch-workflow/launch-scan-workflow-form.tsx b/ui/components/scans/launch-workflow/launch-scan-workflow-form.tsx index 9937b5cc9d..74bfbf8fde 100644 --- a/ui/components/scans/launch-workflow/launch-scan-workflow-form.tsx +++ b/ui/components/scans/launch-workflow/launch-scan-workflow-form.tsx @@ -26,8 +26,16 @@ export const LaunchScanWorkflow = ({ }: { providers: ProviderInfo[]; }) => { - const formSchema = onDemandScanFormSchema(); - const form = useForm>({ + const formSchema = z.object({ + ...onDemandScanFormSchema().shape, + scanName: z + .string() + .min(3, "Must have at least 3 characters") + .or(z.literal("")) + .optional(), + }); + + const form = useForm({ resolver: zodResolver(formSchema), defaultValues: { providerId: "", @@ -77,25 +85,25 @@ export const LaunchScanWorkflow = ({
    -
    -
    - -
    - - {form.watch("providerId") && ( - <> +
    + +
    + + {form.watch("providerId") && ( + <> +
    -
    - } - > - {isLoading ? <>Loading : Start now} - - form.reset()} - className="w-fit border-gray-200 bg-transparent" - ariaLabel="Clear form" - variant="bordered" - size="sm" - radius="sm" - > - Cancel - -
    + } + > + {isLoading ? <>Loading : Start now} + + form.reset()} + className="w-fit border-gray-200 bg-transparent" + ariaLabel="Clear form" + variant="bordered" + size="sm" + radius="sm" + > + Cancel +     - - )} - - {/* +
    + + )} +     + {/*
    {form.watch("providerId") && ( @@ -169,7 +176,6 @@ export const LaunchScanWorkflow = ({ )}
    */} -
    ); diff --git a/ui/components/ui/custom/custom-input.tsx b/ui/components/ui/custom/custom-input.tsx index 3979c459f3..5b76ef6fda 100644 --- a/ui/components/ui/custom/custom-input.tsx +++ b/ui/components/ui/custom/custom-input.tsx @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ export const CustomInput = ({ /> {showFormMessage && ( - + )} )} From 44f26bc0d587fa1fab448582ce76fb804823ca24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sergio Garcia Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 09:23:14 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 19/23] chore(docs): quality redrive to README.md (#7616) Co-authored-by: dcanotrad <168282715+dcanotrad@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Andoni Alonso <14891798+andoniaf@users.noreply.github.com> --- README.md | 154 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 107 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 15763cb4b0..13c10cdd1c 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@

    - Prowler Open Source is as dynamic and adaptable as the environment they’re meant to protect. Trusted by the leaders in security. + Prowler Open Source is as dynamic and adaptable as the environment it secures. It is trusted by the industry leaders to uphold the highest standards in security.

    Learn more at prowler.com @@ -43,15 +43,29 @@ # Description -**Prowler** is an Open Source security tool to perform AWS, Azure, Google Cloud and Kubernetes security best practices assessments, audits, incident response, continuous monitoring, hardening and forensics readiness, and also remediations! We have Prowler CLI (Command Line Interface) that we call Prowler Open Source and a service on top of it that we call Prowler Cloud. +**Prowler** is an open-source security tool designed to assess and enforce security best practices across AWS, Azure, Google Cloud, and Kubernetes. It supports tasks such as security audits, incident response, continuous monitoring, system hardening, forensic readiness, and remediation processes. + +Prowler includes hundreds of built-in controls to ensure compliance with standards and frameworks, including: + +- **Industry Standards:** CIS, NIST 800, NIST CSF, and CISA +- **Regulatory Compliance and Governance:** RBI, FedRAMP, and PCI-DSS +- **Frameworks for Sensitive Data and Privacy:** GDPR, HIPAA, and FFIEC +- **Frameworks for Organizational Governance and Quality Control:** SOC2 and GXP +- **AWS-Specific Frameworks:** AWS Foundational Technical Review (FTR) and AWS Well-Architected Framework (Security Pillar) +- **National Security Standards:** ENS (Spanish National Security Scheme) +- **Custom Security Frameworks:** Tailored to your needs + +## Prowler CLI and Prowler Cloud + +Prowler offers a Command Line Interface (CLI), known as Prowler Open Source, and an additional service built on top of it, called Prowler Cloud. ## Prowler App -Prowler App is a web application that allows you to run Prowler in your cloud provider accounts and visualize the results in a user-friendly interface. +Prowler App is a web-based application that simplifies running Prowler across your cloud provider accounts. It provides a user-friendly interface to visualize the results and streamline your security assessments. ![Prowler App](docs/img/overview.png) ->More details at [Prowler App Documentation](https://docs.prowler.com/projects/prowler-open-source/en/latest/#prowler-app-installation) +>For more details, refer to the [Prowler App Documentation](https://docs.prowler.com/projects/prowler-open-source/en/latest/#prowler-app-installation) ## Prowler CLI @@ -60,6 +74,7 @@ prowler ``` ![Prowler CLI Execution](docs/img/short-display.png) + ## Prowler Dashboard ```console @@ -67,7 +82,7 @@ prowler dashboard ``` ![Prowler Dashboard](docs/img/dashboard.png) -It contains hundreds of controls covering CIS, NIST 800, NIST CSF, CISA, RBI, FedRAMP, PCI-DSS, GDPR, HIPAA, FFIEC, SOC2, GXP, AWS Well-Architected Framework Security Pillar, AWS Foundational Technical Review (FTR), ENS (Spanish National Security Scheme) and your custom security frameworks. +# Prowler at a Glance | Provider | Checks | Services | [Compliance Frameworks](https://docs.prowler.com/projects/prowler-open-source/en/latest/tutorials/compliance/) | [Categories](https://docs.prowler.com/projects/prowler-open-source/en/latest/tutorials/misc/#categories) | |---|---|---|---|---| @@ -78,15 +93,16 @@ It contains hundreds of controls covering CIS, NIST 800, NIST CSF, CISA, RBI, Fe | M365 | 44 | 2 | 2 | 0 | | NHN (Unofficial) | 6 | 2 | 1 | 0 | -> You can list the checks, services, compliance frameworks and categories with `prowler --list-checks`, `prowler --list-services`, `prowler --list-compliance` and `prowler --list-categories`. +> Use the following commands to list Prowler's available checks, services, compliance frameworks, and categories: `prowler --list-checks`, `prowler --list-services`, `prowler --list-compliance` and `prowler --list-categories`. # 💻 Installation ## Prowler App -Prowler App can be installed in different ways, depending on your environment: +Installing Prowler App +Prowler App offers flexible installation methods tailored to various environments: -> See how to use Prowler App in the [Prowler App Usage Guide](https://docs.prowler.com/projects/prowler-open-source/en/latest/tutorials/prowler-app/). +> For detailed instructions on using Prowler App, refer to the [Prowler App Usage Guide](https://docs.prowler.com/projects/prowler-open-source/en/latest/tutorials/prowler-app/). ### Docker Compose @@ -102,8 +118,16 @@ curl -LO https://raw.githubusercontent.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/refs/heads/mast docker compose up -d ``` -> Containers are built for `linux/amd64`. If your workstation's architecture is different, please set `DOCKER_DEFAULT_PLATFORM=linux/amd64` in your environment or use the `--platform linux/amd64` flag in the docker command. -> Enjoy Prowler App at http://localhost:3000 by signing up with your email and password. +> Containers are built for `linux/amd64`. + +### Configuring Your Workstation for Prowler App + +If your workstation's architecture is incompatible, you can resolve this by: + +- **Setting the environment variable**: `DOCKER_DEFAULT_PLATFORM=linux/amd64` +- **Using the following flag in your Docker command**: `--platform linux/amd64` + +> Once configured, access the Prowler App at http://localhost:3000. Sign up using your email and password to get started. ### From GitHub @@ -129,12 +153,12 @@ python manage.py migrate --database admin gunicorn -c config/guniconf.py config.wsgi:application ``` > [!IMPORTANT] -> Starting from Poetry v2.0.0, `poetry shell` has been deprecated in favor of `poetry env activate`. +> As of Poetry v2.0.0, the `poetry shell` command has been deprecated. Use `poetry env activate` instead for environment activation. > -> If your poetry version is below 2.0.0 you must keep using `poetry shell` to activate your environment. -> In case you have any doubts, consult the Poetry environment activation guide: https://python-poetry.org/docs/managing-environments/#activating-the-environment +> If your Poetry version is below v2.0.0, continue using `poetry shell` to activate your environment. +> For further guidance, refer to the Poetry Environment Activation Guide https://python-poetry.org/docs/managing-environments/#activating-the-environment. -> Now, you can access the API documentation at http://localhost:8080/api/v1/docs. +> After completing the setup, access the API documentation at http://localhost:8080/api/v1/docs. **Commands to run the API Worker** @@ -172,29 +196,31 @@ npm run build npm start ``` -> Enjoy Prowler App at http://localhost:3000 by signing up with your email and password. +> Once configured, access the Prowler App at http://localhost:3000. Sign up using your email and password to get started. ## Prowler CLI ### Pip package -Prowler CLI is available as a project in [PyPI](https://pypi.org/project/prowler-cloud/), thus can be installed using pip with Python > 3.9.1, < 3.13: +Prowler CLI is available as a project in [PyPI](https://pypi.org/project/prowler-cloud/). Consequently, it can be installed using pip with Python >3.9.1, <3.13: ```console pip install prowler prowler -v ``` ->More details at [https://docs.prowler.com](https://docs.prowler.com/projects/prowler-open-source/en/latest/#prowler-cli-installation) +>For further guidance, refer to [https://docs.prowler.com](https://docs.prowler.com/projects/prowler-open-source/en/latest/#prowler-cli-installation) ### Containers -The available versions of Prowler CLI are the following: +**Available Versions of Prowler CLI** -- `latest`: in sync with `master` branch (bear in mind that it is not a stable version) -- `v4-latest`: in sync with `v4` branch (bear in mind that it is not a stable version) -- `v3-latest`: in sync with `v3` branch (bear in mind that it is not a stable version) -- `` (release): you can find the releases [here](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/releases), those are stable releases. -- `stable`: this tag always point to the latest release. -- `v4-stable`: this tag always point to the latest release for v4. -- `v3-stable`: this tag always point to the latest release for v3. +The following versions of Prowler CLI are available, depending on your requirements: + +- `latest`: Synchronizes with the `master` branch. Note that this version is not stable. +- `v4-latest`: Synchronizes with the `v4` branch. Note that this version is not stable. +- `v3-latest`: Synchronizes with the `v3` branch. Note that this version is not stable. +- `` (release): Stable releases corresponding to specific versions. You can find the complete list of releases [here](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/releases). +- `stable`: Always points to the latest release. +- `v4-stable`: Always points to the latest release for v4. +- `v3-stable`: Always points to the latest release for v3. The container images are available here: - Prowler CLI: @@ -206,7 +232,7 @@ The container images are available here: ### From GitHub -Python > 3.9.1, < 3.13 is required with pip and poetry: +Python >3.9.1, <3.13 is required with pip and Poetry: ``` console git clone https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler @@ -216,25 +242,46 @@ poetry install python prowler-cli.py -v ``` > [!IMPORTANT] -> Starting from Poetry v2.0.0, `poetry shell` has been deprecated in favor of `poetry env activate`. -> -> If your poetry version is below 2.0.0 you must keep using `poetry shell` to activate your environment. -> In case you have any doubts, consult the Poetry environment activation guide: https://python-poetry.org/docs/managing-environments/#activating-the-environment +> To clone Prowler on Windows, configure Git to support long file paths by running the following command: `git config core.longpaths true`. -> If you want to clone Prowler from Windows, use `git config core.longpaths true` to allow long file paths. -# 📐✏️ High level architecture +> [!IMPORTANT] +> As of Poetry v2.0.0, the `poetry shell` command has been deprecated. Use `poetry env activate` instead for environment activation. +> +> If your Poetry version is below v2.0.0, continue using `poetry shell` to activate your environment. +> For further guidance, refer to the Poetry Environment Activation Guide https://python-poetry.org/docs/managing-environments/#activating-the-environment. + +# ✏️ High level architecture ## Prowler App -The **Prowler App** consists of three main components: +**Prowler App** is composed of three key components: -- **Prowler UI**: A user-friendly web interface for running Prowler and viewing results, powered by Next.js. -- **Prowler API**: The backend API that executes Prowler scans and stores the results, built with Django REST Framework. -- **Prowler SDK**: A Python SDK that integrates with the Prowler CLI for advanced functionality. +- **Prowler UI**: A web-based interface, built with Next.js, providing a user-friendly experience for executing Prowler scans and visualizing results. +- **Prowler API**: A backend service, developed with Django REST Framework, responsible for running Prowler scans and storing the generated results. +- **Prowler SDK**: A Python SDK designed to extend the functionality of the Prowler CLI for advanced capabilities. ![Prowler App Architecture](docs/img/prowler-app-architecture.png) ## Prowler CLI -You can run Prowler from your workstation, a Kubernetes Job, a Google Compute Engine, an Azure VM, an EC2 instance, Fargate or any other container, CloudShell and many more. + +**Running Prowler** + +Prowler can be executed across various environments, offering flexibility to meet your needs. It can be run from: + +- Your own workstation + +- A Kubernetes Job + +- Google Compute Engine + +- Azure Virtual Machines (VMs) + +- Amazon EC2 instances + +- AWS Fargate or other container platforms + +- CloudShell + +And many more environments. ![Architecture](docs/img/architecture.png) @@ -242,23 +289,36 @@ You can run Prowler from your workstation, a Kubernetes Job, a Google Compute En ## General - `Allowlist` now is called `Mutelist`. -- The `--quiet` option has been deprecated, now use the `--status` flag to select the finding's status you want to get from PASS, FAIL or MANUAL. -- All `INFO` finding's status has changed to `MANUAL`. -- The CSV output format is common for all the providers. +- The `--quiet` option has been deprecated. Use the `--status` flag to filter findings based on their status: PASS, FAIL, or MANUAL. +- All findings with an `INFO` status have been reclassified as `MANUAL`. +- The CSV output format is standardized across all providers. -We have deprecated some of our outputs formats: -- The native JSON is replaced for the JSON [OCSF](https://schema.ocsf.io/) v1.1.0, common for all the providers. +**Deprecated Output Formats** + +The following formats are now deprecated: +- Native JSON has been replaced with JSON in [OCSF] v1.1.0 format, which is standardized across all providers (https://schema.ocsf.io/). ## AWS -- Deprecate the AWS flag --sts-endpoint-region since we use AWS STS regional tokens. -- To send only FAILS to AWS Security Hub, now use either `--send-sh-only-fails` or `--security-hub --status FAIL`. + +**AWS Flag Deprecation** + +The flag --sts-endpoint-region has been deprecated due to the adoption of AWS STS regional tokens. + +**Sending FAIL Results to AWS Security Hub** + +- To send only FAILS to AWS Security Hub, use one of the following options: `--send-sh-only-fails` or `--security-hub --status FAIL`. # 📖 Documentation -Install, Usage, Tutorials and Developer Guide is at https://docs.prowler.com/ +**Documentation Resources** + +For installation instructions, usage details, tutorials, and the Developer Guide, visit https://docs.prowler.com/ # 📃 License -Prowler is licensed as Apache License 2.0 as specified in each file. You may obtain a copy of the License at - +**Prowler License Information** + +Prowler is licensed under the Apache License 2.0, as indicated in each file within the repository. Obtaining a Copy of the License + +A copy of the License is available at From 70e22af550edf34dac30ed29a13bca6891910709 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Lara Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 16:09:54 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 20/23] chore(deps): upgrade recharts from 2.13.0-alpha.4 to 2.15.2 (#7717) --- ui/package-lock.json | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------- ui/package.json | 2 +- 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/ui/package-lock.json b/ui/package-lock.json index f0a11642d6..f86d6169d2 100644 --- a/ui/package-lock.json +++ b/ui/package-lock.json @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ "react": "^18.3.1", "react-dom": "^18.3.1", "react-hook-form": "^7.52.2", - "recharts": "^2.13.0-alpha.4", + "recharts": "^2.15.2", "server-only": "^0.0.1", "shadcn-ui": "^0.2.3", "sharp": "^0.33.5", @@ -9420,6 +9420,7 @@ "version": "5.2.1", "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/dom-helpers/-/dom-helpers-5.2.1.tgz", "integrity": "sha512-nRCa7CK3VTrM2NmGkIy4cbK7IZlgBE/PYMn55rrXefr5xXDP0LdtfPnblFDoVdcAfslJ7or6iqAUnx0CCGIWQA==", + "license": "MIT", "dependencies": { "@babel/runtime": "^7.8.7", "csstype": "^3.0.2" @@ -10402,9 +10403,10 @@ "dev": true }, "node_modules/fast-equals": { - "version": "5.0.1", - "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/fast-equals/-/fast-equals-5.0.1.tgz", - "integrity": "sha512-WF1Wi8PwwSY7/6Kx0vKXtw8RwuSGoM1bvDaJbu7MxDlR1vovZjIAKrnzyrThgAjm6JDTu0fVgWXDlMGspodfoQ==", + "version": "5.2.2", + "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/fast-equals/-/fast-equals-5.2.2.tgz", + "integrity": "sha512-V7/RktU11J3I36Nwq2JnZEM7tNm17eBJz+u25qdxBZeCKiX6BkVSZQjwWIr+IobgnZy+ag73tTZgZi7tr0LrBw==", + "license": "MIT", "engines": { "node": ">=6.0.0" } @@ -13363,17 +13365,18 @@ } }, "node_modules/react-smooth": { - "version": "4.0.1", - "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/react-smooth/-/react-smooth-4.0.1.tgz", - "integrity": "sha512-OE4hm7XqR0jNOq3Qmk9mFLyd6p2+j6bvbPJ7qlB7+oo0eNcL2l7WQzG6MBnT3EXY6xzkLMUBec3AfewJdA0J8w==", + "version": "4.0.4", + "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/react-smooth/-/react-smooth-4.0.4.tgz", + "integrity": "sha512-gnGKTpYwqL0Iii09gHobNolvX4Kiq4PKx6eWBCYYix+8cdw+cGo3do906l1NBPKkSWx1DghC1dlWG9L2uGd61Q==", + "license": "MIT", "dependencies": { "fast-equals": "^5.0.1", "prop-types": "^15.8.1", "react-transition-group": "^4.4.5" }, "peerDependencies": { - "react": "^16.8.0 || ^17.0.0 || ^18.0.0", - "react-dom": "^16.8.0 || ^17.0.0 || ^18.0.0" + "react": "^16.8.0 || ^17.0.0 || ^18.0.0 || ^19.0.0", + "react-dom": "^16.8.0 || ^17.0.0 || ^18.0.0 || ^19.0.0" } }, "node_modules/react-style-singleton": { @@ -13419,6 +13422,7 @@ "version": "4.4.5", "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/react-transition-group/-/react-transition-group-4.4.5.tgz", "integrity": "sha512-pZcd1MCJoiKiBR2NRxeCRg13uCXbydPnmB4EOeRrY7480qNWO8IIgQG6zlDkm6uRMsURXPuKq0GWtiM59a5Q6g==", + "license": "BSD-3-Clause", "dependencies": { "@babel/runtime": "^7.5.5", "dom-helpers": "^5.0.1", @@ -13463,15 +13467,16 @@ } }, "node_modules/recharts": { - "version": "2.13.0-alpha.4", - "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/recharts/-/recharts-2.13.0-alpha.4.tgz", - "integrity": "sha512-K9naL6F7pEcDYJE6yFQASSCQecSLPP0JagnvQ9hPtA/aHgsxsnIOjouLP5yrFZehxzfCkV5TEORr7/uNtSr7Qw==", + "version": "2.15.3", + "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/recharts/-/recharts-2.15.3.tgz", + "integrity": "sha512-EdOPzTwcFSuqtvkDoaM5ws/Km1+WTAO2eizL7rqiG0V2UVhTnz0m7J2i0CjVPUCdEkZImaWvXLbZDS2H5t6GFQ==", + "license": "MIT", "dependencies": { "clsx": "^2.0.0", "eventemitter3": "^4.0.1", "lodash": "^4.17.21", "react-is": "^18.3.1", - "react-smooth": "^4.0.0", + "react-smooth": "^4.0.4", "recharts-scale": "^0.4.4", "tiny-invariant": "^1.3.1", "victory-vendor": "^36.6.8" @@ -13480,8 +13485,8 @@ "node": ">=14" }, "peerDependencies": { - "react": "^16.0.0 || ^17.0.0 || ^18.0.0", - "react-dom": "^16.0.0 || ^17.0.0 || ^18.0.0" + "react": "^16.0.0 || ^17.0.0 || ^18.0.0 || ^19.0.0", + "react-dom": "^16.0.0 || ^17.0.0 || ^18.0.0 || ^19.0.0" } }, "node_modules/recharts-scale": { diff --git a/ui/package.json b/ui/package.json index 25a1cdfb1a..13a4ae147e 100644 --- a/ui/package.json +++ b/ui/package.json @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ "react": "^18.3.1", "react-dom": "^18.3.1", "react-hook-form": "^7.52.2", - "recharts": "^2.13.0-alpha.4", + "recharts": "^2.15.2", "server-only": "^0.0.1", "shadcn-ui": "^0.2.3", "sharp": "^0.33.5", From 16f2209d3f333423cac7b343d7316aab28578da4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Lara Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 16:20:07 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 21/23] chore: add M365 to scan page filters (#7704) --- ui/components/filters/data-filters.ts | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/ui/components/filters/data-filters.ts b/ui/components/filters/data-filters.ts index ca09af434d..8d712bfb70 100644 --- a/ui/components/filters/data-filters.ts +++ b/ui/components/filters/data-filters.ts @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ export const filterScans = [ { key: "provider_type__in", labelCheckboxGroup: "Cloud Provider", - values: ["aws", "azure", "gcp", "kubernetes"], + values: ["aws", "azure", "m365", "gcp", "kubernetes"], }, { key: "state__in", From 1a8df3bf188b34813b18b541345a569965613f03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hugo Pereira Brito <101209179+HugoPBrito@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 17:02:30 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 22/23] fix(defender): enhance policies checks logic (#7666) Co-authored-by: Daniel Barranquero Co-authored-by: MrCloudSec --- .../m365/lib/powershell/m365_powershell.py | 20 + ...defender_antiphishing_policy_configured.py | 176 ++++- ...der_antispam_outbound_policy_configured.py | 176 ++++- ...pam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.py | 162 ++++- ...ispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains.py | 169 ++++- ...olicy_common_attachments_filter_enabled.py | 139 +++- ...omprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.py | 207 ++++-- ...ications_internal_users_malware_enabled.py | 167 ++++- .../services/defender/defender_service.py | 94 ++- ...der_antiphishing_policy_configured_test.py | 477 +++++++++---- ...ntispam_outbound_policy_configured_test.py | 493 +++++++++---- ...utbound_policy_forwarding_disabled_test.py | 668 ++++++++++++------ ..._policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains_test.py | 318 ++++++++- ..._common_attachments_filter_enabled_test.py | 370 +++++++++- ...hensive_attachments_filter_applied_test.py | 613 ++++++++++------ ...ons_internal_users_malware_enabled_test.py | 379 ++++++++-- .../defender/m365_defender_service_test.py | 134 +++- 17 files changed, 3766 insertions(+), 996 deletions(-) diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/lib/powershell/m365_powershell.py b/prowler/providers/m365/lib/powershell/m365_powershell.py index fead633b6d..f32921b001 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/m365/lib/powershell/m365_powershell.py +++ b/prowler/providers/m365/lib/powershell/m365_powershell.py @@ -525,6 +525,26 @@ class M365PowerShell(PowerShellSession): "Get-HostedContentFilterPolicy | ConvertTo-Json", json_parse=True ) + def get_inbound_spam_filter_rule(self) -> dict: + """ + Get Inbound Spam Filter Rule. + + Retrieves the current inbound spam filter rule settings for Exchange Online. + + Returns: + dict: Inbound spam filter rule settings in JSON format. + + Example: + >>> get_inbound_spam_filter_rule() + { + "Name": "Rule1", + "State": "Enabled" + } + """ + return self.execute( + "Get-HostedContentFilterRule | ConvertTo-Json", json_parse=True + ) + def get_report_submission_policy(self) -> dict: """ Get Exchange Online Report Submission Policy. diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antiphishing_policy_configured/defender_antiphishing_policy_configured.py b/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antiphishing_policy_configured/defender_antiphishing_policy_configured.py index 18ac8f9949..61727b9d3c 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antiphishing_policy_configured/defender_antiphishing_policy_configured.py +++ b/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antiphishing_policy_configured/defender_antiphishing_policy_configured.py @@ -23,37 +23,155 @@ class defender_antiphishing_policy_configured(Check): List[CheckReportM365]: A list of reports containing the result of the check. """ findings = [] - for policy_name, policy in defender_client.antiphishing_policies.items(): - report = CheckReportM365( - metadata=self.metadata(), - resource=policy, - resource_name="Defender Anti-Phishing Policy", - resource_id=policy_name, - ) - report.status = "FAIL" - report.status_extended = ( - f"Anti-phishing policy {policy_name} is not properly configured." - ) - if ( - not policy.default - and policy_name in defender_client.antiphising_rules - and defender_client.antiphising_rules[policy_name].state.lower() - == "enabled" - ) or policy.default: - if ( - policy.spoof_intelligence - and policy.spoof_intelligence_action.lower() == "quarantine" - and policy.dmarc_reject_action.lower() == "quarantine" - and policy.dmarc_quarantine_action.lower() == "quarantine" - and policy.safety_tips - and policy.unauthenticated_sender_action - and policy.show_tag - and policy.honor_dmarc_policy - ): + if defender_client.antiphishing_policies: + # Only Default Defender Anti-Phishing Policy exists since there are only anti phishing rules when there are custom policies + if not defender_client.antiphishing_rules: + # Get the only policy in the dictionary since there is only the default policy + policy = next(iter(defender_client.antiphishing_policies.values())) + + report = CheckReportM365( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=policy, + resource_name=policy.name, + resource_id=policy.name, + ) + + if self._is_policy_properly_configured(policy): + # Case 1: Default policy exists and is properly configured report.status = "PASS" - report.status_extended = f"Anti-phishing policy {policy_name} is properly configured and enabled." + report.status_extended = f"{policy.name} is the only policy and it's properly configured in the default Defender Anti-Phishing Policy." + else: + # Case 5: Default policy exists but is not properly configured + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"{policy.name} is the only policy and it's not properly configured in the default Defender Anti-Phishing Policy." + findings.append(report) - findings.append(report) + # Multiple Defender Anti-Phishing Policies + else: + default_policy_well_configured = False + + for ( + policy_name, + policy, + ) in defender_client.antiphishing_policies.items(): + report = CheckReportM365( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=policy, + resource_name=policy_name, + resource_id=policy_name, + ) + if policy.default: + if not self._is_policy_properly_configured(policy): + # Case 4: Default policy is not properly configured and there are other policies + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"{policy_name} is not properly configured in the default Defender Anti-Phishing Policy, but could be overridden by another well-configured Custom Policy." + findings.append(report) + else: + # Case 2: Default policy is properly configured and there are other policies + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"{policy_name} is properly configured in the default Defender Anti-Phishing Policy, but could be overridden by another bad-configured Custom Policy." + default_policy_well_configured = True + findings.append(report) + else: + if not self._is_policy_properly_configured(policy): + included_resources = [] + + if defender_client.antiphishing_rules[policy.name].users: + included_resources.append( + f"users: {', '.join(defender_client.antiphishing_rules[policy.name].users)}" + ) + if defender_client.antiphishing_rules[policy.name].groups: + included_resources.append( + f"groups: {', '.join(defender_client.antiphishing_rules[policy.name].groups)}" + ) + if defender_client.antiphishing_rules[policy.name].domains: + included_resources.append( + f"domains: {', '.join(defender_client.antiphishing_rules[policy.name].domains)}" + ) + + included_resources_str = "; ".join(included_resources) + + # Case 3: Default policy is properly configured but other custom policies are not + if default_policy_well_configured: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Anti-phishing policy {policy_name} is not properly configured and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {defender_client.antiphishing_rules[policy.name].priority} (0 is the highest). " + "However, the default policy is properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) + # Case 5: Default policy is not properly configured and other custom policies are not + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Anti-phishing policy {policy_name} is not properly configured and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {defender_client.antiphishing_rules[policy.name].priority} (0 is the highest). " + "Also, the default policy is not properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) + else: + included_resources = [] + + if defender_client.antiphishing_rules[policy.name].users: + included_resources.append( + f"users: {', '.join(defender_client.antiphishing_rules[policy.name].users)}" + ) + if defender_client.antiphishing_rules[policy.name].groups: + included_resources.append( + f"groups: {', '.join(defender_client.antiphishing_rules[policy.name].groups)}" + ) + if defender_client.antiphishing_rules[policy.name].domains: + included_resources.append( + f"domains: {', '.join(defender_client.antiphishing_rules[policy.name].domains)}" + ) + + included_resources_str = "; ".join(included_resources) + + # Case 2: Default policy is properly configured and other custom policies are too + if default_policy_well_configured: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Anti-phishing policy {policy_name} is properly configured and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {defender_client.antiphishing_rules[policy.name].priority} (0 is the highest). " + "Also, the default policy is properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could still be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) + + # Case 6: Default policy is not properly configured but other custom policies are + else: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Anti-phishing policy {policy_name} is properly configured and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {defender_client.antiphishing_rules[policy.name].priority} (0 is the highest). " + "However, the default policy is not properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) return findings + + def _is_policy_properly_configured(self, policy) -> bool: + """ + Check if a policy is properly configured according to best practices. + + Args: + policy: The anti-phishing policy to check. + + Returns: + bool: True if the policy is properly configured, False otherwise. + """ + return ( + ( + policy.default + or defender_client.antiphishing_rules[policy.name].state.lower() + == "enabled" + ) + and policy.spoof_intelligence + and policy.spoof_intelligence_action.lower() == "quarantine" + and policy.dmarc_reject_action.lower() == "quarantine" + and policy.dmarc_quarantine_action.lower() == "quarantine" + and policy.safety_tips + and policy.unauthenticated_sender_action + and policy.show_tag + and policy.honor_dmarc_policy + ) diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured.py b/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured.py index b4a0f2e31b..cd1eafdabf 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured.py +++ b/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured.py @@ -6,8 +6,7 @@ from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_client import defender_cl class defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured(Check): """ - Check if the Exchange Online Spam Policies are configured to notify administrators - when a sender is blocked for sending spam emails. + Check if the outbound spam policy is established and properly configured in the Defender service. Attributes: metadata: Metadata associated with the check (inherited from Check). @@ -15,40 +14,159 @@ class defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured(Check): def execute(self) -> List[CheckReportM365]: """ - Execute the check to verify if the Exchange Online Spam Policies notify administrators - when a sender is blocked for sending spam emails. + Execute the check to verify if an outbound spam policy is established and properly configured. + + This method checks the Defender outbound spam policies to ensure they are configured + according to best practices. Returns: List[CheckReportM365]: A list of reports containing the result of the check. """ findings = [] - for policy_name, policy in defender_client.outbound_spam_policies.items(): - report = CheckReportM365( - metadata=self.metadata(), - resource=policy, - resource_name="Defender Outbound Spam Policy", - resource_id=policy_name, - ) - report.status = "FAIL" - report.status_extended = ( - f"Outbound Spam Policy {policy_name} is not properly configured." - ) - if ( - not policy.default - and policy_name in defender_client.outbound_spam_rules - and defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy_name].state.lower() - == "enabled" - ) or policy.default: - if ( - policy.notify_limit_exceeded - and policy.notify_sender_blocked - and policy.notify_limit_exceeded_addresses - and policy.notify_sender_blocked_addresses - ): + if defender_client.outbound_spam_policies: + # Only Default Defender Outbound Spam Policy + if not defender_client.outbound_spam_rules: + # Get the only policy in the dictionary + policy = next(iter(defender_client.outbound_spam_policies.values())) + + report = CheckReportM365( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=policy, + resource_name=policy.name, + resource_id=policy.name, + ) + + if self._is_policy_properly_configured(policy): + # Case 1: Default policy exists and is properly configured report.status = "PASS" - report.status_extended = f"Outbound Spam Policy {policy_name} is properly configured and enabled." + report.status_extended = f"{policy.name} is the only policy and it's properly configured in the default Defender Outbound Spam Policy." + else: + # Case 5: Default policy exists but is not properly configured + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"{policy.name} is the only policy and it's not properly configured in the default Defender Outbound Spam Policy." + findings.append(report) - findings.append(report) + # Multiple Defender Outbound Spam Policies + else: + default_policy_well_configured = False + + for ( + policy_name, + policy, + ) in defender_client.outbound_spam_policies.items(): + report = CheckReportM365( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=policy, + resource_name=policy_name, + resource_id=policy_name, + ) + if policy.default: + if not self._is_policy_properly_configured(policy): + # Case 4: Default policy is not properly configured and there are other policies + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"{policy_name} is not properly configured in the default Defender Outbound Spam Policy, but could be overridden by another well-configured Custom Policy." + findings.append(report) + else: + # Case 2: Default policy is properly configured and there are other policies + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"{policy_name} is properly configured in the default Defender Outbound Spam Policy, but could be overridden by another bad-configured Custom Policy." + default_policy_well_configured = True + findings.append(report) + else: + if not self._is_policy_properly_configured(policy): + included_resources = [] + + if defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].users: + included_resources.append( + f"users: {', '.join(defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].users)}" + ) + if defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].groups: + included_resources.append( + f"groups: {', '.join(defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].groups)}" + ) + if defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].domains: + included_resources.append( + f"domains: {', '.join(defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].domains)}" + ) + + included_resources_str = "; ".join(included_resources) + + # Case 3: Default policy is properly configured but other custom policies are not + if default_policy_well_configured: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Outbound Spam policy {policy_name} is not properly configured and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].priority} (0 is the highest). " + "However, the default policy is properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) + # Case 5: Default policy is not properly configured and other custom policies are not + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Outbound Spam policy {policy_name} is not properly configured and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].priority} (0 is the highest). " + "Also, the default policy is not properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) + else: + included_resources = [] + + if defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].users: + included_resources.append( + f"users: {', '.join(defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].users)}" + ) + if defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].groups: + included_resources.append( + f"groups: {', '.join(defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].groups)}" + ) + if defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].domains: + included_resources.append( + f"domains: {', '.join(defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].domains)}" + ) + + included_resources_str = "; ".join(included_resources) + + # Case 2: Default policy is properly configured and other custom policies are too + if default_policy_well_configured: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Outbound Spam policy {policy_name} is properly configured and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].priority} (0 is the highest). " + "Also, the default policy is properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could still be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) + # Case 6: Default policy is not properly configured but other custom policies are + else: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Outbound Spam policy {policy_name} is properly configured and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].priority} (0 is the highest). " + "However, the default policy is not properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) return findings + + def _is_policy_properly_configured(self, policy) -> bool: + """ + Check if a policy is properly configured according to best practices. + + Args: + policy: The outbound spam policy to check. + + Returns: + bool: True if the policy is properly configured, False otherwise. + """ + return ( + ( + policy.default + or defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].state.lower() + == "enabled" + ) + and policy.notify_limit_exceeded + and policy.notify_sender_blocked + and policy.notify_limit_exceeded_addresses + and policy.notify_sender_blocked_addresses + ) diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.py b/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.py index 8bb8c4fa60..04f81f62b3 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.py +++ b/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.py @@ -20,28 +20,150 @@ class defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled(Check): List[CheckReportM365]: A list of reports containing the result of the check. """ findings = [] - for policy_name, policy in defender_client.outbound_spam_policies.items(): - report = CheckReportM365( - metadata=self.metadata(), - resource=policy, - resource_name="Defender Outbound Spam Policy", - resource_id=policy_name, - ) - report.status = "FAIL" - report.status_extended = ( - f"Outbound Spam Policy {policy_name} does allow mail forwarding." - ) - if ( - not policy.default - and policy_name in defender_client.outbound_spam_rules - and defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy_name].state.lower() - == "enabled" - ) or policy.default: - if not policy.auto_forwarding_mode: + if defender_client.outbound_spam_policies: + # Only Default Defender Outbound Spam Policy exists + if not defender_client.outbound_spam_rules: + policy = next(iter(defender_client.outbound_spam_policies.values())) + + report = CheckReportM365( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=policy, + resource_name=policy.name, + resource_id=policy.name, + ) + + if self._is_forwarding_disabled(policy): + # Case 1: Default policy exists and has forwarding disabled report.status = "PASS" - report.status_extended = f"Outbound Spam Policy {policy_name} does not allow mail forwarding." + report.status_extended = f"{policy.name} is the only policy and mail forwarding is disabled." + else: + # Case 5: Default policy exists but allows forwarding + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"{policy.name} is the only policy and mail forwarding is allowed." + findings.append(report) - findings.append(report) + # Multiple Defender Outbound Spam Policies exist + else: + default_policy_well_configured = False + + for ( + policy_name, + policy, + ) in defender_client.outbound_spam_policies.items(): + report = CheckReportM365( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=policy, + resource_name=policy_name, + resource_id=policy_name, + ) + + if policy.default: + if not self._is_forwarding_disabled(policy): + # Case 4: Default policy allows forwarding and there are other policies + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"{policy_name} is the default policy and mail forwarding is allowed, " + "but it could be overridden by another well-configured Custom Policy." + ) + findings.append(report) + else: + # Case 2: Default policy disables forwarding and there are other policies + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"{policy_name} is the default policy and mail forwarding is disabled, " + "but it could be overridden by another misconfigured Custom Policy." + ) + default_policy_well_configured = True + findings.append(report) + else: + if not self._is_forwarding_disabled(policy): + included_resources = [] + + if defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].users: + included_resources.append( + f"users: {', '.join(defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].users)}" + ) + if defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].groups: + included_resources.append( + f"groups: {', '.join(defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].groups)}" + ) + if defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].domains: + included_resources.append( + f"domains: {', '.join(defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].domains)}" + ) + + included_resources_str = "; ".join(included_resources) + + if default_policy_well_configured: + # Case 3: Default policy disables forwarding but custom one doesn't + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Outbound Spam policy {policy_name} allows mail forwarding and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].priority} (0 is the highest). " + "However, the default policy disables mail forwarding, so entities not included by this custom policy could be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) + else: + # Case 5: Neither default nor custom policies disable forwarding + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Outbound Spam policy {policy_name} allows mail forwarding and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].priority} (0 is the highest). " + "Also, the default policy allows mail forwarding, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) + else: + included_resources = [] + + if defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].users: + included_resources.append( + f"users: {', '.join(defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].users)}" + ) + if defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].groups: + included_resources.append( + f"groups: {', '.join(defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].groups)}" + ) + if defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].domains: + included_resources.append( + f"domains: {', '.join(defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].domains)}" + ) + + included_resources_str = "; ".join(included_resources) + + if default_policy_well_configured: + # Case 2: Both default and custom policies disable forwarding + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Outbound Spam policy {policy_name} disables mail forwarding and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].priority} (0 is the highest). " + "Also, the default policy disables mail forwarding, so entities not included by this custom policy could still be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) + else: + # Case 6: Default policy allows forwarding, custom policy disables it + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Outbound Spam policy {policy_name} disables mail forwarding and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].priority} (0 is the highest). " + "However, the default policy allows mail forwarding, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) return findings + + def _is_forwarding_disabled(self, policy) -> bool: + """ + Check if mail forwarding is disabled in the policy. + + Args: + policy: The outbound spam policy to check. + + Returns: + bool: True if mail forwarding is disabled, False otherwise. + """ + return ( + policy.default + or defender_client.outbound_spam_rules[policy.name].state.lower() + == "enabled" + ) and not policy.auto_forwarding_mode diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains/defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains.py b/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains/defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains.py index 71dbb7e45f..67b6643e9e 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains/defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains.py +++ b/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains/defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains.py @@ -23,20 +23,163 @@ class defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains(Check): List[CheckReportM365]: A list of reports containing the result of the check. """ findings = [] - for policy in defender_client.inbound_spam_policies: - report = CheckReportM365( - metadata=self.metadata(), - resource=policy, - resource_name="Defender Inbound Spam Policy", - resource_id=policy.identity, - ) - report.status = "PASS" - report.status_extended = f"Inbound anti-spam policy {policy.identity} does not contain allowed domains." - if policy.allowed_sender_domains: - report.status = "FAIL" - report.status_extended = f"Inbound anti-spam policy {policy.identity} contains allowed domains: {policy.allowed_sender_domains}." + if defender_client.inbound_spam_policies: + # Only Default Defender Inbound Spam Policy exists + if not defender_client.inbound_spam_rules: + policy = defender_client.inbound_spam_policies[0] - findings.append(report) + report = CheckReportM365( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=policy, + resource_name=policy.identity, + resource_id=policy.identity, + ) + + if self._has_no_allowed_domains(policy): + # Case 1: Default policy exists and has no allowed domains + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"{policy.identity} is the only policy and it does not contain allowed domains." + else: + # Case 5: Default policy exists but contains allowed domains + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"{policy.identity} is the only policy and it contains allowed domains: {', '.join(policy.allowed_sender_domains)}." + findings.append(report) + + # Multiple Defender Inbound Spam Policies exist + else: + default_policy_well_configured = False + + for policy in defender_client.inbound_spam_policies: + report = CheckReportM365( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=policy, + resource_name=policy.identity, + resource_id=policy.identity, + ) + + if policy.default: + if not self._has_no_allowed_domains(policy): + # Case 4: Default policy contains allowed domains + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"{policy.identity} is the default policy and it contains allowed domains: {', '.join(policy.allowed_sender_domains)}, " + "but it could be overridden by another well-configured Custom Policy." + ) + findings.append(report) + else: + # Case 2: Default policy has no allowed domains and there are other policies + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"{policy.identity} is the default policy and it does not contain allowed domains, " + "but it could be overridden by another misconfigured Custom Policy." + ) + default_policy_well_configured = True + findings.append(report) + else: + if not self._has_no_allowed_domains(policy): + included_resources = [] + + if defender_client.inbound_spam_rules[ + policy.identity + ].users: + included_resources.append( + f"users: {', '.join(defender_client.inbound_spam_rules[policy.identity].users)}" + ) + if defender_client.inbound_spam_rules[ + policy.identity + ].groups: + included_resources.append( + f"groups: {', '.join(defender_client.inbound_spam_rules[policy.identity].groups)}" + ) + if defender_client.inbound_spam_rules[ + policy.identity + ].domains: + included_resources.append( + f"domains: {', '.join(defender_client.inbound_spam_rules[policy.identity].domains)}" + ) + + included_resources_str = "; ".join(included_resources) + priority = defender_client.inbound_spam_rules[ + policy.identity + ].priority + + if default_policy_well_configured: + # Case 3: Default policy has no allowed domains but custom one does + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Inbound Spam policy {policy.identity} contains allowed domains and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {priority} (0 is the highest). However, the default policy does not contain allowed domains, " + "so entities not included by this custom policy could be correctly protected." + ) + else: + # Case 5: Neither default nor custom policies are correctly configured + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Inbound Spam policy {policy.identity} contains allowed domains and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {priority} (0 is the highest). Also, the default policy contains allowed domains, " + "so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) + else: + included_resources = [] + + if defender_client.inbound_spam_rules[ + policy.identity + ].users: + included_resources.append( + f"users: {', '.join(defender_client.inbound_spam_rules[policy.identity].users)}" + ) + if defender_client.inbound_spam_rules[ + policy.identity + ].groups: + included_resources.append( + f"groups: {', '.join(defender_client.inbound_spam_rules[policy.identity].groups)}" + ) + if defender_client.inbound_spam_rules[ + policy.identity + ].domains: + included_resources.append( + f"domains: {', '.join(defender_client.inbound_spam_rules[policy.identity].domains)}" + ) + + included_resources_str = "; ".join(included_resources) + priority = defender_client.inbound_spam_rules[ + policy.identity + ].priority + + if default_policy_well_configured: + # Case 2: Both default and custom policies do not contain allowed domains + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Inbound Spam policy {policy.identity} does not contain allowed domains and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {priority} (0 is the highest). Also, the default policy does not contain allowed domains, " + "so entities not included by this custom policy could still be correctly protected." + ) + else: + # Case 6: Default policy contains allowed domains, custom policy does not + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Inbound Spam policy {policy.identity} does not contain allowed domains and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {priority} (0 is the highest). However, the default policy contains allowed domains, " + "so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) return findings + + def _has_no_allowed_domains(self, policy) -> bool: + """ + Check if the policy has no allowed domains. + + Args: + policy: The inbound spam policy to check. + + Returns: + bool: True if the policy has no allowed domains, False otherwise. + """ + return ( + policy.default + or defender_client.inbound_spam_rules[policy.identity].state.lower() + == "enabled" + ) and not policy.allowed_sender_domains diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled/defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled/defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled.py index 75c9707d26..a0b817cda3 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled/defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled.py +++ b/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled/defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled.py @@ -16,39 +16,138 @@ class defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled(Check): """ Execute the check to verify if the Common Attachment Types Filter is enabled. - This method checks the Defender anti-malware policy to determine if the + This method checks the Defender anti-malware policies to determine if the Common Attachment Types Filter is enabled. Returns: List[CheckReportM365]: A list of reports containing the result of the check. """ findings = [] - if not defender_client.malware_policies: - report = CheckReportM365( - metadata=self.metadata(), - resource={}, - resource_name="Defender Malware Policy", - resource_id="defenderMalwarePolicy", - ) - report.status = "FAIL" - report.status_extended = "Common Attachment Types Filter is not enabled." - findings.append(report) - else: - for policy in defender_client.malware_policies: + + if defender_client.malware_policies: + # Only Default Defender Malware Policy exists + if not defender_client.malware_rules: + policy = defender_client.malware_policies[0] + report = CheckReportM365( metadata=self.metadata(), resource=policy, - resource_name="Defender Malware Policy", - resource_id="defenderMalwarePolicy", + resource_name=policy.identity, + resource_id=policy.identity, ) - report.status = "FAIL" - report.status_extended = f"Common Attachment Types Filter is not enabled in anti-malware policy {policy.identity}." if policy.enable_file_filter: + # Case 1: Default policy exists and has the setting enabled report.status = "PASS" - report.status_extended = f"Common Attachment Types Filter is enabled in anti-malware policy {policy.identity}." - break + report.status_extended = f"{policy.identity} is the only policy and Common Attachment Types Filter is enabled." + else: + # Case 5: Default policy exists but doesn't have the setting enabled + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"{policy.identity} is the only policy and Common Attachment Types Filter is not enabled." + findings.append(report) - findings.append(report) + # Multiple Defender Malware Policies exist + else: + default_policy_well_configured = False + + for policy in defender_client.malware_policies: + report = CheckReportM365( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=policy, + resource_name=policy.identity, + resource_id=policy.identity, + ) + + if policy.is_default: + if not policy.enable_file_filter: + # Case 4: Default policy doesn't have the setting enabled and there are other policies + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"{policy.identity} is the default policy and Common Attachment Types Filter is not enabled, " + "but it could be overridden by another well-configured Custom Policy." + ) + findings.append(report) + else: + # Case 2: Default policy has the setting enabled and there are other policies + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"{policy.identity} is the default policy and Common Attachment Types Filter is enabled, " + "but it could be overridden by another misconfigured Custom Policy." + ) + default_policy_well_configured = True + findings.append(report) + else: + if not policy.enable_file_filter: + included_resources = [] + + if defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].users: + included_resources.append( + f"users: {', '.join(defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].users)}" + ) + if defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].groups: + included_resources.append( + f"groups: {', '.join(defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].groups)}" + ) + if defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].domains: + included_resources.append( + f"domains: {', '.join(defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].domains)}" + ) + + included_resources_str = "; ".join(included_resources) + + if default_policy_well_configured: + # Case 3: Default policy enables the setting but custom one doesn't + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Malware policy {policy.identity} does not enable Common Attachment Types Filter and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].priority} (0 is the highest). " + "However, the default policy enables the filter, so entities not included by this custom policy could be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) + else: + # Case 5: Neither default nor custom policies enable the setting + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Malware policy {policy.identity} does not enable Common Attachment Types Filter and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].priority} (0 is the highest). " + "Also, the default policy does not enable the filter, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) + else: + included_resources = [] + + if defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].users: + included_resources.append( + f"users: {', '.join(defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].users)}" + ) + if defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].groups: + included_resources.append( + f"groups: {', '.join(defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].groups)}" + ) + if defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].domains: + included_resources.append( + f"domains: {', '.join(defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].domains)}" + ) + + included_resources_str = "; ".join(included_resources) + + if default_policy_well_configured: + # Case 2: Both default and custom policies enable the setting + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Malware policy {policy.identity} enables Common Attachment Types Filter and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].priority} (0 is the highest). " + "Also, the default policy enables the filter, so entities not included by this custom policy could still be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) + else: + # Case 6: Default policy doesn't enable the setting, but custom policy does + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Malware policy {policy.identity} enables Common Attachment Types Filter and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].priority} (0 is the highest). " + "However, the default policy does not enable the filter, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied/defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.py b/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied/defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.py index cd2682d538..87aa4ab50e 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied/defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.py +++ b/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied/defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.py @@ -14,17 +14,16 @@ class defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied(Check): def execute(self) -> List[CheckReportM365]: """ - Executes the check to determine if the Common Attachment Types Filter is enabled. + Executes the check to determine if the Common Attachment Types Filter is properly configured. - This method evaluates the Defender anti-malware policy to ensure it is enabled and the - Common Attachment Types Filter is active and applied to the recommended file types. + This method evaluates the Defender anti-malware policies to ensure the filter is enabled and applied + to all recommended file types. Returns: List[CheckReportM365]: A list of reports with the results of the check. """ findings = [] - # Default to Microsoft-recommended common file types default_recommended_extensions = [ "ace", "ani", @@ -81,63 +80,175 @@ class defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied(Check): "z", ] - # Load extensions from audit_config (user config), fallback to default recommended_extensions = defender_client.audit_config.get( "recommended_blocked_file_types", default_recommended_extensions ) - if not defender_client.malware_policies: - report = CheckReportM365( - metadata=self.metadata(), - resource={}, - resource_name="Defender Malware Policy", - resource_id="defenderMalwarePolicy", - ) - report.status = "FAIL" - report.status_extended = "Common Attachment Types Filter is not enabled." - findings.append(report) - else: - for policy in defender_client.malware_policies: + if defender_client.malware_policies: + # Only Default Defender Malware Policy exists + if not defender_client.malware_rules: + policy = defender_client.malware_policies[0] + report = CheckReportM365( metadata=self.metadata(), resource=policy, - resource_name="Defender Malware Policy", - resource_id="defenderMalwarePolicy", + resource_name=policy.identity, + resource_id=policy.identity, ) - report.status = "FAIL" - report.status_extended = f"Common Attachment Types Filter is not properly configured in anti-malware policy {policy.identity}." - if not policy.enable_file_filter: - report.status_extended = f"Common Attachment Types Filter is not enabled in anti-malware policy {policy.identity}." - break + if self._is_filter_properly_configured(policy, recommended_extensions): + # Case 1: Default policy exists and has filter properly configured + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"{policy.identity} is the only policy and Common Attachment Types Filter is properly configured." + else: + # Case 5: Default policy exists but doesn't have filter properly configured + missing = self._get_missing_extensions( + policy, recommended_extensions + ) + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"{policy.identity} is the only policy and Common Attachment Types Filter is not properly configured. Missing recommended file types: {', '.join(missing)}." + findings.append(report) - if ( - not policy.is_default - and policy.identity in defender_client.malware_rules - ) or policy.is_default: - if ( - not policy.is_default - and defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].state.lower() - == "enabled" - ) or policy.is_default: - blocked_extensions = [ext.lower() for ext in policy.file_types] - missing = [ - ext - for ext in recommended_extensions - if ext.lower() not in blocked_extensions - ] + # Multiple Defender Malware Policies exist + else: + default_policy_well_configured = False - if missing: - report.status_extended = f"Common Attachment Types Filter is enabled in anti-malware policy {policy.identity}, but the following recommended file types are missing: {', '.join(missing)}." - break - - report.status = "PASS" - report.status_extended = f"Common Attachment Types Filter is enabled in anti-malware policy {policy.identity}, the policy is enabled and the filter is applied to the recommended file types." + for policy in defender_client.malware_policies: + report = CheckReportM365( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=policy, + resource_name=policy.identity, + resource_id=policy.identity, + ) + if policy.is_default: + if not self._is_filter_properly_configured( + policy, recommended_extensions + ): + # Case 4: Default policy is not properly configured + missing = self._get_missing_extensions( + policy, recommended_extensions + ) + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"{policy.identity} is the default policy and Common Attachment Types Filter is not properly configured, " + f"but it could be overridden by another well-configured Custom Policy. Missing recommended file types: {', '.join(missing)}." + ) + findings.append(report) + else: + # Case 2: Default policy is properly configured + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"{policy.identity} is the default policy and Common Attachment Types Filter is properly configured, " + "but it could be overridden by another misconfigured Custom Policy." + ) + default_policy_well_configured = True + findings.append(report) else: - report.status_extended = f"Common Attachment Types Filter is enabled in anti-malware policy {policy.identity}, but the policy is disabled." - break + if not self._is_filter_properly_configured( + policy, recommended_extensions + ): + included_resources = [] - findings.append(report) + if defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].users: + included_resources.append( + f"users: {', '.join(defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].users)}" + ) + if defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].groups: + included_resources.append( + f"groups: {', '.join(defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].groups)}" + ) + if defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].domains: + included_resources.append( + f"domains: {', '.join(defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].domains)}" + ) + + included_resources_str = "; ".join(included_resources) + missing = self._get_missing_extensions( + policy, recommended_extensions + ) + + if default_policy_well_configured: + # Case 3: Default policy is configured, custom one isn't + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Malware policy {policy.identity} is not properly configured and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].priority} (0 is the highest). " + f"Missing recommended file types: {', '.join(missing)}. " + "However, the default policy is properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) + else: + # Case 5: Neither default nor custom policy is properly configured + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Malware policy {policy.identity} is not properly configured and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].priority} (0 is the highest). " + f"Missing recommended file types: {', '.join(missing)}. " + "Also, the default policy is not properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) + else: + included_resources = [] + + if defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].users: + included_resources.append( + f"users: {', '.join(defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].users)}" + ) + if defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].groups: + included_resources.append( + f"groups: {', '.join(defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].groups)}" + ) + if defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].domains: + included_resources.append( + f"domains: {', '.join(defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].domains)}" + ) + + included_resources_str = "; ".join(included_resources) + + if default_policy_well_configured: + # Case 2: Both default and custom policies are properly configured + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Malware policy {policy.identity} is properly configured and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].priority} (0 is the highest). " + "Also, the default policy is properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could still be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) + else: + # Case 6: Default policy not configured, custom policy is + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Malware policy {policy.identity} is properly configured and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].priority} (0 is the highest). " + "However, the default policy is not properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) return findings + + def _is_filter_properly_configured(self, policy, recommended_extensions) -> bool: + if not policy.enable_file_filter: + return False + + if ( + not policy.is_default + and policy.identity in defender_client.malware_rules + and defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].state.lower() + != "enabled" + ): + return False + + blocked_extensions = [ext.lower() for ext in policy.file_types] + return all(ext.lower() in blocked_extensions for ext in recommended_extensions) + + def _get_missing_extensions(self, policy, recommended_extensions) -> List[str]: + if not policy.enable_file_filter: + return recommended_extensions + + blocked_extensions = [ext.lower() for ext in policy.file_types] + return [ + ext + for ext in recommended_extensions + if ext.lower() not in blocked_extensions + ] diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled/defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled/defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled.py index 6eaf933c6a..735cc6b9e9 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled/defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled.py +++ b/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled/defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled.py @@ -16,47 +16,152 @@ class defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled(Check """ Execute the check to verify if notifications for internal users sending malware are enabled. - This method checks the Defender anti-malware policy to determine if notifications for internal users - sending malware are enabled. + This method evaluates the Defender anti-malware policies to ensure internal sender notifications + are properly configured. Returns: - List[CheckReportM365]: A list of reports containing the result of the check. + List[CheckReportM365]: A list of reports with the results of the check. """ findings = [] - if not defender_client.malware_policies: - report = CheckReportM365( - metadata=self.metadata(), - resource={}, - resource_name="Defender Malware Policy", - resource_id="defenderMalwarePolicy", - ) - report.status = "FAIL" - report.status_extended = ( - "Notifications for internal users sending malware are not enabled." - ) - findings.append(report) - else: - for policy in defender_client.malware_policies: + + if defender_client.malware_policies: + # Only Default Defender Malware Policy exists + if not defender_client.malware_rules: + policy = defender_client.malware_policies[0] + report = CheckReportM365( metadata=self.metadata(), resource=policy, - resource_name="Defender Malware Policy", - resource_id="defenderMalwarePolicy", - ) - report.status = "FAIL" - report.status_extended = ( - "Notifications for internal users sending malware are not enabled." + resource_name=policy.identity, + resource_id=policy.identity, ) - if policy.enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications: - if policy.internal_sender_admin_address: - report.status = "PASS" - report.status_extended = "Notifications for internal users sending malware are enabled." - break + if self._are_notifications_enabled(policy): + # Case 1: Default policy exists and has notifications enabled + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"{policy.identity} is the only policy and notifications for internal users sending malware are enabled." + else: + # Case 5: Default policy exists but doesn't have notifications enabled + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"{policy.identity} is the only policy and notifications for internal users sending malware are not enabled." + findings.append(report) + + # Multiple Defender Malware Policies exist + else: + default_policy_well_configured = False + + for policy in defender_client.malware_policies: + report = CheckReportM365( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=policy, + resource_name=policy.identity, + resource_id=policy.identity, + ) + + if policy.is_default: + if not self._are_notifications_enabled(policy): + # Case 4: Default policy not configured + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"{policy.identity} is the default policy and notifications for internal users sending malware are not enabled, " + "but it could be overridden by another well-configured Custom Policy." + ) + findings.append(report) + else: + # Case 2: Default policy is properly configured + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"{policy.identity} is the default policy and notifications for internal users sending malware are enabled, " + "but it could be overridden by another misconfigured Custom Policy." + ) + default_policy_well_configured = True + findings.append(report) else: - report.status = "FAIL" - report.status_extended = "Notifications for internal users sending malware are enabled, but no email addresses are configured." + if not self._are_notifications_enabled(policy): + included_resources = [] - findings.append(report) + if defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].users: + included_resources.append( + f"users: {', '.join(defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].users)}" + ) + if defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].groups: + included_resources.append( + f"groups: {', '.join(defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].groups)}" + ) + if defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].domains: + included_resources.append( + f"domains: {', '.join(defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].domains)}" + ) + + included_resources_str = "; ".join(included_resources) + + if default_policy_well_configured: + # Case 3: Default policy is configured, custom one isn't + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Malware policy {policy.identity} is not properly configured and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].priority} (0 is the highest). " + "However, the default policy is properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) + else: + # Case 5: Neither default nor custom policy is properly configured + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Malware policy {policy.identity} is not properly configured and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].priority} (0 is the highest). " + "Also, the default policy is not properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) + else: + included_resources = [] + + if defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].users: + included_resources.append( + f"users: {', '.join(defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].users)}" + ) + if defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].groups: + included_resources.append( + f"groups: {', '.join(defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].groups)}" + ) + if defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].domains: + included_resources.append( + f"domains: {', '.join(defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].domains)}" + ) + + included_resources_str = "; ".join(included_resources) + + if default_policy_well_configured: + # Case 2: Both default and custom policies are properly configured + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Malware policy {policy.identity} is properly configured and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].priority} (0 is the highest). " + "Also, the default policy is properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could still be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) + else: + # Case 6: Default policy not configured, custom policy is + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Custom Malware policy {policy.identity} is properly configured and includes {included_resources_str}, " + f"with priority {defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].priority} (0 is the highest). " + "However, the default policy is not properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + findings.append(report) return findings + + def _are_notifications_enabled(self, policy) -> bool: + if ( + not policy.is_default + and policy.identity in defender_client.malware_rules + and defender_client.malware_rules[policy.identity].state.lower() + != "enabled" + ): + return False + + return ( + policy.enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications + and policy.internal_sender_admin_address + ) diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_service.py b/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_service.py index cec2e7dce4..9ea4a64afd 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_service.py +++ b/prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_service.py @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -from typing import List +from typing import List, Optional from pydantic import BaseModel @@ -14,10 +14,11 @@ class Defender(M365Service): self.outbound_spam_policies = {} self.outbound_spam_rules = {} self.antiphishing_policies = {} - self.antiphising_rules = {} + self.antiphishing_rules = {} self.connection_filter_policy = None self.dkim_configurations = [] self.inbound_spam_policies = [] + self.inbound_spam_rules = {} self.report_submission_policy = None if self.powershell: self.powershell.connect_exchange_online() @@ -25,11 +26,12 @@ class Defender(M365Service): self.malware_rules = self._get_malware_filter_rule() self.outbound_spam_policies = self._get_outbound_spam_filter_policy() self.outbound_spam_rules = self._get_outbound_spam_filter_rule() - self.antiphishing_policies = self._get_antiphising_policy() - self.antiphising_rules = self._get_antiphising_rules() + self.antiphishing_policies = self._get_antiphishing_policy() + self.antiphishing_rules = self._get_antiphishing_rules() self.connection_filter_policy = self._get_connection_filter_policy() self.dkim_configurations = self._get_dkim_config() self.inbound_spam_policies = self._get_inbound_spam_filter_policy() + self.inbound_spam_rules = self._get_inbound_spam_filter_rule() self.report_submission_policy = self._get_report_submission_policy() self.powershell.close() @@ -44,7 +46,7 @@ class Defender(M365Service): if policy: malware_policies.append( MalwarePolicy( - enable_file_filter=policy.get("EnableFileFilter", True), + enable_file_filter=policy.get("EnableFileFilter", False), identity=policy.get("Identity", ""), enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=policy.get( "EnableInternalSenderAdminNotifications", False @@ -56,6 +58,7 @@ class Defender(M365Service): is_default=policy.get("IsDefault", False), ) ) + malware_policies.sort(key=lambda x: x.is_default, reverse=True) except Exception as error: logger.error( f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" @@ -73,6 +76,10 @@ class Defender(M365Service): if rule: malware_rules[rule.get("Name", "")] = MalwareRule( state=rule.get("State", ""), + priority=rule.get("Priority", 0), + users=rule.get("SentTo", None), + groups=rule.get("SentToMemberOf", None), + domains=rule.get("RecipientDomainIs", None), ) except Exception as error: logger.error( @@ -80,7 +87,7 @@ class Defender(M365Service): ) return malware_rules - def _get_antiphising_policy(self): + def _get_antiphishing_policy(self): logger.info("Microsoft365 - Getting Defender antiphishing policy...") antiphishing_policies = {} try: @@ -90,6 +97,7 @@ class Defender(M365Service): for policy in antiphishing_policy: if policy: antiphishing_policies[policy.get("Name", "")] = AntiphishingPolicy( + name=policy.get("Name", ""), spoof_intelligence=policy.get("EnableSpoofIntelligence", True), spoof_intelligence_action=policy.get( "AuthenticationFailAction", "" @@ -104,13 +112,21 @@ class Defender(M365Service): honor_dmarc_policy=policy.get("HonorDmarcPolicy", True), default=policy.get("IsDefault", False), ) + + antiphishing_policies = dict( + sorted( + antiphishing_policies.items(), + key=lambda item: item[1].default, + reverse=True, + ) + ) except Exception as error: logger.error( f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" ) return antiphishing_policies - def _get_antiphising_rules(self): + def _get_antiphishing_rules(self): logger.info("Microsoft365 - Getting Defender antiphishing rules...") antiphishing_rules = {} try: @@ -121,6 +137,10 @@ class Defender(M365Service): if rule: antiphishing_rules[rule.get("Name", "")] = AntiphishingRule( state=rule.get("State", ""), + priority=rule.get("Priority", 0), + users=rule.get("SentTo", None), + groups=rule.get("SentToMemberOf", None), + domains=rule.get("RecipientDomainIs", None), ) except Exception as error: logger.error( @@ -176,6 +196,7 @@ class Defender(M365Service): for policy in outbound_spam_policy: if policy: outbound_spam_policies[policy.get("Name", "")] = OutboundSpamPolicy( + name=policy.get("Name", ""), notify_sender_blocked=policy.get("NotifyOutboundSpam", True), notify_limit_exceeded=policy.get( "BccSuspiciousOutboundMail", True @@ -189,6 +210,14 @@ class Defender(M365Service): auto_forwarding_mode=policy.get("AutoForwardingMode", True), default=policy.get("IsDefault", False), ) + + outbound_spam_policies = dict( + sorted( + outbound_spam_policies.items(), + key=lambda item: item[1].default, + reverse=True, + ) + ) except Exception as error: logger.error( f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" @@ -206,6 +235,10 @@ class Defender(M365Service): if rule: outbound_spam_rules[rule.get("Name", "")] = OutboundSpamRule( state=rule.get("State", "Disabled"), + priority=rule.get("Priority", 0), + users=rule.get("From", None), + groups=rule.get("FromMemberOf", None), + domains=rule.get("SenderDomainIs", None), ) except Exception as error: logger.error( @@ -230,14 +263,38 @@ class Defender(M365Service): allowed_sender_domains=policy.get( "AllowedSenderDomains", [] ), + default=policy.get("IsDefault", False), ) ) + inbound_spam_policies.sort(key=lambda x: x.default, reverse=True) except Exception as error: logger.error( f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" ) return inbound_spam_policies + def _get_inbound_spam_filter_rule(self): + logger.info("Microsoft365 - Getting Defender inbound spam filter rule...") + inbound_spam_rules = {} + try: + inbound_spam_rule = self.powershell.get_inbound_spam_filter_rule() + if isinstance(inbound_spam_rule, dict): + inbound_spam_rule = [inbound_spam_rule] + for rule in inbound_spam_rule: + if rule: + inbound_spam_rules[rule.get("Name", "")] = InboundSpamRule( + state=rule.get("State", "Disabled"), + priority=rule.get("Priority", 0), + users=rule.get("SentTo", None), + groups=rule.get("SentToMemberOf", None), + domains=rule.get("RecipientDomainIs", None), + ) + except Exception as error: + logger.error( + f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + return inbound_spam_rules + def _get_report_submission_policy(self): logger.info("Microsoft365 - Getting Defender report submission policy...") report_submission_policy = None @@ -288,9 +345,14 @@ class MalwarePolicy(BaseModel): class MalwareRule(BaseModel): state: str + priority: int + users: Optional[list[str]] + groups: Optional[list[str]] + domains: Optional[list[str]] class AntiphishingPolicy(BaseModel): + name: str spoof_intelligence: bool spoof_intelligence_action: str dmarc_reject_action: str @@ -304,6 +366,10 @@ class AntiphishingPolicy(BaseModel): class AntiphishingRule(BaseModel): state: str + priority: int + users: Optional[list[str]] + groups: Optional[list[str]] + domains: Optional[list[str]] class ConnectionFilterPolicy(BaseModel): @@ -318,6 +384,7 @@ class DkimConfig(BaseModel): class OutboundSpamPolicy(BaseModel): + name: str notify_sender_blocked: bool notify_limit_exceeded: bool notify_limit_exceeded_addresses: List[str] @@ -328,11 +395,24 @@ class OutboundSpamPolicy(BaseModel): class OutboundSpamRule(BaseModel): state: str + priority: int + users: Optional[list[str]] + groups: Optional[list[str]] + domains: Optional[list[str]] class DefenderInboundSpamPolicy(BaseModel): identity: str allowed_sender_domains: list[str] = [] + default: bool + + +class InboundSpamRule(BaseModel): + state: str + priority: int + users: Optional[list[str]] + groups: Optional[list[str]] + domains: Optional[list[str]] class ReportSubmissionPolicy(BaseModel): diff --git a/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antiphishing_policy_configured/defender_antiphishing_policy_configured_test.py b/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antiphishing_policy_configured/defender_antiphishing_policy_configured_test.py index b460646dae..8610e96769 100644 --- a/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antiphishing_policy_configured/defender_antiphishing_policy_configured_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antiphishing_policy_configured/defender_antiphishing_policy_configured_test.py @@ -4,7 +4,69 @@ from tests.providers.m365.m365_fixtures import DOMAIN, set_mocked_m365_provider class Test_defender_antiphishing_policy_configured: - def test_properly_configured_custom_policy(self): + def test_case_1_default_policy_properly_configured(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antiphishing_policy_configured.defender_antiphishing_policy_configured.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antiphishing_policy_configured.defender_antiphishing_policy_configured import ( + defender_antiphishing_policy_configured, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + AntiphishingPolicy, + ) + + defender_client.antiphishing_policies = { + "Default": AntiphishingPolicy( + name="Default", + spoof_intelligence=True, + spoof_intelligence_action="Quarantine", + dmarc_reject_action="Quarantine", + dmarc_quarantine_action="Quarantine", + safety_tips=True, + unauthenticated_sender_action=True, + show_tag=True, + honor_dmarc_policy=True, + default=True, + ) + } + defender_client.antiphishing_rules = {} + + check = defender_antiphishing_policy_configured() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is the only policy and it's properly configured in the default Defender Anti-Phishing Policy." + ) + assert ( + result[0].resource_name + == defender_client.antiphishing_policies["Default"].name + ) + assert ( + result[0].resource_id + == defender_client.antiphishing_policies["Default"].name + ) + assert ( + result[0].resource + == defender_client.antiphishing_policies["Default"].dict() + ) + + def test_case_2_all_policies_properly_configured(self): defender_client = mock.MagicMock() defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN @@ -31,7 +93,20 @@ class Test_defender_antiphishing_policy_configured: ) defender_client.antiphishing_policies = { + "Default": AntiphishingPolicy( + name="Default", + spoof_intelligence=True, + spoof_intelligence_action="Quarantine", + dmarc_reject_action="Quarantine", + dmarc_quarantine_action="Quarantine", + safety_tips=True, + unauthenticated_sender_action=True, + show_tag=True, + honor_dmarc_policy=True, + default=True, + ), "Policy1": AntiphishingPolicy( + name="Policy1", spoof_intelligence=True, spoof_intelligence_action="Quarantine", dmarc_reject_action="Quarantine", @@ -41,29 +116,59 @@ class Test_defender_antiphishing_policy_configured: show_tag=True, honor_dmarc_policy=True, default=False, - ) + ), } - defender_client.antiphising_rules = { - "Policy1": AntiphishingRule(state="Enabled") + defender_client.antiphishing_rules = { + "Policy1": AntiphishingRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=1, + users=["test@example.com"], + groups=["example_group"], + domains=["example.com"], + ) } check = defender_antiphishing_policy_configured() result = check.execute() - assert len(result) == 1 + assert len(result) == 2 assert result[0].status == "PASS" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == "Anti-phishing policy Policy1 is properly configured and enabled." + == "Default is properly configured in the default Defender Anti-Phishing Policy, but could be overridden by another bad-configured Custom Policy." + ) + assert ( + result[0].resource_name + == defender_client.antiphishing_policies["Default"].name + ) + assert ( + result[0].resource_id + == defender_client.antiphishing_policies["Default"].name ) assert ( result[0].resource + == defender_client.antiphishing_policies["Default"].dict() + ) + assert result[1].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == f"Custom Anti-phishing policy {defender_client.antiphishing_policies['Policy1'].name} is properly configured and includes users: {', '.join(defender_client.antiphishing_rules['Policy1'].users)}; groups: {', '.join(defender_client.antiphishing_rules['Policy1'].groups)}; domains: {', '.join(defender_client.antiphishing_rules['Policy1'].domains)}, " + f"with priority {defender_client.antiphishing_rules['Policy1'].priority} (0 is the highest). " + "Also, the default policy is properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could still be correctly protected." + ) + assert ( + result[1].resource_name + == defender_client.antiphishing_policies["Policy1"].name + ) + assert ( + result[1].resource_id + == defender_client.antiphishing_policies["Policy1"].name + ) + assert ( + result[1].resource == defender_client.antiphishing_policies["Policy1"].dict() ) - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Anti-Phishing Policy" - assert result[0].resource_id == "Policy1" - assert result[0].location == "global" - def test_not_properly_configured_policy(self): + def test_case_3_default_ok_others_not(self): defender_client = mock.MagicMock() defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN @@ -89,66 +194,9 @@ class Test_defender_antiphishing_policy_configured: AntiphishingRule, ) - defender_client.antiphishing_policies = { - "Policy2": AntiphishingPolicy( - spoof_intelligence=False, - spoof_intelligence_action="None", - dmarc_reject_action="None", - dmarc_quarantine_action="None", - safety_tips=False, - unauthenticated_sender_action=False, - show_tag=False, - honor_dmarc_policy=False, - default=False, - ) - } - defender_client.antiphising_rules = { - "Policy2": AntiphishingRule(state="Enabled") - } - - check = defender_antiphishing_policy_configured() - result = check.execute() - assert len(result) == 1 - assert result[0].status == "FAIL" - assert ( - result[0].status_extended - == "Anti-phishing policy Policy2 is not properly configured." - ) - assert ( - result[0].resource - == defender_client.antiphishing_policies["Policy2"].dict() - ) - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Anti-Phishing Policy" - assert result[0].resource_id == "Policy2" - assert result[0].location == "global" - - def test_properly_configured_default_policy(self): - defender_client = mock.MagicMock() - defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" - defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN - - with ( - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", - return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), - ), - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" - ), - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antiphishing_policy_configured.defender_antiphishing_policy_configured.defender_client", - new=defender_client, - ), - ): - from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antiphishing_policy_configured.defender_antiphishing_policy_configured import ( - defender_antiphishing_policy_configured, - ) - from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( - AntiphishingPolicy, - ) - defender_client.antiphishing_policies = { "Default": AntiphishingPolicy( + name="Default", spoof_intelligence=True, spoof_intelligence_action="Quarantine", dmarc_reject_action="Quarantine", @@ -158,27 +206,149 @@ class Test_defender_antiphishing_policy_configured: show_tag=True, honor_dmarc_policy=True, default=True, + ), + "Policy1": AntiphishingPolicy( + name="Policy1", + spoof_intelligence=False, + spoof_intelligence_action="None", + dmarc_reject_action="None", + dmarc_quarantine_action="None", + safety_tips=False, + unauthenticated_sender_action=False, + show_tag=False, + honor_dmarc_policy=False, + default=False, + ), + } + defender_client.antiphishing_rules = { + "Policy1": AntiphishingRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=1, + users=["test@example.com"], + groups=["example_group"], + domains=["example.com"], ) } - defender_client.antiphising_rules = {} check = defender_antiphishing_policy_configured() result = check.execute() - assert len(result) == 1 + assert len(result) == 2 assert result[0].status == "PASS" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == "Anti-phishing policy Default is properly configured and enabled." + == "Default is properly configured in the default Defender Anti-Phishing Policy, but could be overridden by another bad-configured Custom Policy." ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" assert ( result[0].resource == defender_client.antiphishing_policies["Default"].dict() ) - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Anti-Phishing Policy" - assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" - assert result[0].location == "global" - def test_default_policy_not_properly_configured(self): + assert result[1].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Anti-phishing policy Policy1 is not properly configured and includes users: test@example.com; groups: example_group; domains: example.com, " + "with priority 1 (0 is the highest). However, the default policy is properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Policy1" + assert ( + result[1].resource + == defender_client.antiphishing_policies["Policy1"].dict() + ) + + def test_case_4_default_not_ok_potential_false_positive(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antiphishing_policy_configured.defender_antiphishing_policy_configured.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antiphishing_policy_configured.defender_antiphishing_policy_configured import ( + defender_antiphishing_policy_configured, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + AntiphishingPolicy, + AntiphishingRule, + ) + + defender_client.antiphishing_policies = { + "Default": AntiphishingPolicy( + name="Default", + spoof_intelligence=False, + spoof_intelligence_action="None", + dmarc_reject_action="None", + dmarc_quarantine_action="None", + safety_tips=False, + unauthenticated_sender_action=False, + show_tag=False, + honor_dmarc_policy=False, + default=True, + ), + "Policy1": AntiphishingPolicy( + name="Policy1", + spoof_intelligence=True, + spoof_intelligence_action="Quarantine", + dmarc_reject_action="Quarantine", + dmarc_quarantine_action="Quarantine", + safety_tips=True, + unauthenticated_sender_action=True, + show_tag=True, + honor_dmarc_policy=True, + default=False, + ), + } + defender_client.antiphishing_rules = { + "Policy1": AntiphishingRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=1, + users=["test@example.com"], + groups=["example_group"], + domains=["example.com"], + ) + } + + check = defender_antiphishing_policy_configured() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is not properly configured in the default Defender Anti-Phishing Policy, but could be overridden by another well-configured Custom Policy." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert ( + result[0].resource + == defender_client.antiphishing_policies["Default"].dict() + ) + assert result[1].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Anti-phishing policy Policy1 is properly configured and includes users: test@example.com; groups: example_group; domains: example.com, " + f"with priority {defender_client.antiphishing_rules['Policy1'].priority} (0 is the highest). " + "However, the default policy is not properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Policy1" + assert ( + result[1].resource + == defender_client.antiphishing_policies["Policy1"].dict() + ) + + def test_case_5_default_policy_not_properly_configured(self): defender_client = mock.MagicMock() defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN @@ -205,6 +375,7 @@ class Test_defender_antiphishing_policy_configured: defender_client.antiphishing_policies = { "Default": AntiphishingPolicy( + name="Default", spoof_intelligence=False, spoof_intelligence_action="None", dmarc_reject_action="None", @@ -216,7 +387,7 @@ class Test_defender_antiphishing_policy_configured: default=True, ) } - defender_client.antiphising_rules = {} + defender_client.antiphishing_rules = {} check = defender_antiphishing_policy_configured() result = check.execute() @@ -224,15 +395,103 @@ class Test_defender_antiphishing_policy_configured: assert result[0].status == "FAIL" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == "Anti-phishing policy Default is not properly configured." + == "Default is the only policy and it's not properly configured in the default Defender Anti-Phishing Policy." ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" assert ( result[0].resource == defender_client.antiphishing_policies["Default"].dict() ) - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Anti-Phishing Policy" + + def test_case_6_both_policies_not_properly_configured(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antiphishing_policy_configured.defender_antiphishing_policy_configured.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antiphishing_policy_configured.defender_antiphishing_policy_configured import ( + defender_antiphishing_policy_configured, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + AntiphishingPolicy, + AntiphishingRule, + ) + + defender_client.antiphishing_policies = { + "Default": AntiphishingPolicy( + name="Default", + spoof_intelligence=False, + spoof_intelligence_action="None", + dmarc_reject_action="None", + dmarc_quarantine_action="None", + safety_tips=False, + unauthenticated_sender_action=False, + show_tag=False, + honor_dmarc_policy=False, + default=True, + ), + "Policy1": AntiphishingPolicy( + name="Policy1", + spoof_intelligence=False, + spoof_intelligence_action="None", + dmarc_reject_action="None", + dmarc_quarantine_action="None", + safety_tips=False, + unauthenticated_sender_action=False, + show_tag=False, + honor_dmarc_policy=False, + default=False, + ), + } + defender_client.antiphishing_rules = { + "Policy1": AntiphishingRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=1, + users=[], + groups=[], + domains=["example.com"], + ) + } + + check = defender_antiphishing_policy_configured() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is not properly configured in the default Defender Anti-Phishing Policy, but could be overridden by another well-configured Custom Policy." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" - assert result[0].location == "global" + assert ( + result[0].resource + == defender_client.antiphishing_policies["Default"].dict() + ) + assert result[1].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Anti-phishing policy Policy1 is not properly configured and includes domains: example.com, " + "with priority 1 (0 is the highest). Also, the default policy is not properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Policy1" + assert ( + result[1].resource + == defender_client.antiphishing_policies["Policy1"].dict() + ) def test_no_antiphishing_policies(self): defender_client = mock.MagicMock() @@ -257,64 +516,8 @@ class Test_defender_antiphishing_policy_configured: ) defender_client.antiphishing_policies = {} - defender_client.antiphising_rules = {} + defender_client.antiphishing_rules = {} check = defender_antiphishing_policy_configured() result = check.execute() - assert result == [] - - def test_custom_policy_without_rule(self): - defender_client = mock.MagicMock() - defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" - defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN - - with ( - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", - return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), - ), - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" - ), - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antiphishing_policy_configured.defender_antiphishing_policy_configured.defender_client", - new=defender_client, - ), - ): - from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antiphishing_policy_configured.defender_antiphishing_policy_configured import ( - defender_antiphishing_policy_configured, - ) - from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( - AntiphishingPolicy, - ) - - defender_client.antiphishing_policies = { - "PolicyX": AntiphishingPolicy( - spoof_intelligence=True, - spoof_intelligence_action="Quarantine", - dmarc_reject_action="Quarantine", - dmarc_quarantine_action="Quarantine", - safety_tips=True, - unauthenticated_sender_action=True, - show_tag=True, - honor_dmarc_policy=True, - default=False, - ) - } - defender_client.antiphising_rules = {} - - check = defender_antiphishing_policy_configured() - result = check.execute() - assert len(result) == 1 - assert result[0].status == "FAIL" - assert ( - result[0].status_extended - == "Anti-phishing policy PolicyX is not properly configured." - ) - assert ( - result[0].resource - == defender_client.antiphishing_policies["PolicyX"].dict() - ) - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Anti-Phishing Policy" - assert result[0].resource_id == "PolicyX" - assert result[0].location == "global" + assert len(result) == 0 diff --git a/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured_test.py b/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured_test.py index dbb3ee3344..7baedbeb61 100644 --- a/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured_test.py @@ -4,119 +4,7 @@ from tests.providers.m365.m365_fixtures import DOMAIN, set_mocked_m365_provider class Test_defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured: - def test_properly_configured_custom_policy(self): - defender_client = mock.MagicMock() - defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" - defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN - - with ( - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", - return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), - ), - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" - ), - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured.defender_client", - new=defender_client, - ), - ): - from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured import ( - defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured, - ) - from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( - OutboundSpamPolicy, - OutboundSpamRule, - ) - - defender_client.outbound_spam_policies = { - "Policy1": OutboundSpamPolicy( - notify_sender_blocked=True, - notify_limit_exceeded=True, - notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=["test@correo.com"], - notify_sender_blocked_addresses=["test@correo.com"], - default=False, - auto_forwarding_mode=False, - ) - } - defender_client.outbound_spam_rules = { - "Policy1": OutboundSpamRule(state="Enabled") - } - - check = defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured() - result = check.execute() - assert len(result) == 1 - assert result[0].status == "PASS" - assert ( - result[0].status_extended - == "Outbound Spam Policy Policy1 is properly configured and enabled." - ) - assert ( - result[0].resource - == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Policy1"].dict() - ) - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Outbound Spam Policy" - assert result[0].resource_id == "Policy1" - assert result[0].location == "global" - - def test_not_properly_configured_policy(self): - defender_client = mock.MagicMock() - defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" - defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN - - with ( - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", - return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), - ), - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" - ), - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured.defender_client", - new=defender_client, - ), - ): - from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured import ( - defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured, - ) - from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( - OutboundSpamPolicy, - OutboundSpamRule, - ) - - defender_client.outbound_spam_policies = { - "Policy2": OutboundSpamPolicy( - notify_sender_blocked=False, - notify_limit_exceeded=False, - notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=[], - notify_sender_blocked_addresses=[], - default=False, - auto_forwarding_mode=False, - ) - } - defender_client.outbound_spam_rules = { - "Policy2": OutboundSpamRule(state="Enabled") - } - - check = defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured() - result = check.execute() - assert len(result) == 1 - assert result[0].status == "FAIL" - assert ( - result[0].status_extended - == "Outbound Spam Policy Policy2 is not properly configured." - ) - assert ( - result[0].resource - == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Policy2"].dict() - ) - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Outbound Spam Policy" - assert result[0].resource_id == "Policy2" - assert result[0].location == "global" - - def test_properly_configured_default_policy(self): + def test_case_1_default_policy_properly_configured(self): defender_client = mock.MagicMock() defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN @@ -143,12 +31,13 @@ class Test_defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured: defender_client.outbound_spam_policies = { "Default": OutboundSpamPolicy( - notify_sender_blocked=True, + name="Default", notify_limit_exceeded=True, - notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=["test@correo.com"], - notify_sender_blocked_addresses=["test@correo.com"], - default=True, + notify_sender_blocked=True, + notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=["admin@example.com"], + notify_sender_blocked_addresses=["admin@example.com"], auto_forwarding_mode=False, + default=True, ) } defender_client.outbound_spam_rules = {} @@ -159,17 +48,271 @@ class Test_defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured: assert result[0].status == "PASS" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == "Outbound Spam Policy Default is properly configured and enabled." + == "Default is the only policy and it's properly configured in the default Defender Outbound Spam Policy." ) + assert ( + result[0].resource_name + == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Default"].name + ) + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" assert ( result[0].resource == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Default"].dict() ) - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Outbound Spam Policy" - assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" - assert result[0].location == "global" - def test_policy_without_rule(self): + def test_case_2_all_policies_properly_configured(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured import ( + defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + OutboundSpamPolicy, + OutboundSpamRule, + ) + + defender_client.outbound_spam_policies = { + "Default": OutboundSpamPolicy( + name="Default", + notify_limit_exceeded=True, + notify_sender_blocked=True, + notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=["admin@example.com"], + notify_sender_blocked_addresses=["admin@example.com"], + auto_forwarding_mode=False, + default=True, + ), + "Policy1": OutboundSpamPolicy( + name="Policy1", + notify_limit_exceeded=True, + notify_sender_blocked=True, + notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=["admin@example.com"], + notify_sender_blocked_addresses=["admin@example.com"], + auto_forwarding_mode=False, + default=False, + ), + } + defender_client.outbound_spam_rules = { + "Policy1": OutboundSpamRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=1, + users=["test@example.com"], + groups=["group1"], + domains=["example.com"], + ) + } + + check = defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is properly configured in the default Defender Outbound Spam Policy, but could be overridden by another bad-configured Custom Policy." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert ( + result[0].resource + == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Default"].dict() + ) + + assert result[1].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Outbound Spam policy Policy1 is properly configured and includes users: test@example.com; groups: group1; domains: example.com, " + "with priority 1 (0 is the highest). Also, the default policy is properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could still be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Policy1" + assert ( + result[1].resource + == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Policy1"].dict() + ) + + def test_case_3_default_ok_others_not(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured import ( + defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + OutboundSpamPolicy, + OutboundSpamRule, + ) + + defender_client.outbound_spam_policies = { + "Default": OutboundSpamPolicy( + name="Default", + notify_limit_exceeded=True, + notify_sender_blocked=True, + notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=["admin@example.com"], + notify_sender_blocked_addresses=["admin@example.com"], + auto_forwarding_mode=False, + default=True, + ), + "Policy1": OutboundSpamPolicy( + name="Policy1", + notify_limit_exceeded=False, + notify_sender_blocked=False, + notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=[], + notify_sender_blocked_addresses=[], + auto_forwarding_mode=False, + default=False, + ), + } + defender_client.outbound_spam_rules = { + "Policy1": OutboundSpamRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=1, + users=["test@example.com"], + groups=["group1"], + domains=["example.com"], + ) + } + + check = defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is properly configured in the default Defender Outbound Spam Policy, but could be overridden by another bad-configured Custom Policy." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert ( + result[0].resource + == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Default"].dict() + ) + + assert result[1].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Outbound Spam policy Policy1 is not properly configured and includes users: test@example.com; groups: group1; domains: example.com, " + "with priority 1 (0 is the highest). However, the default policy is properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Policy1" + assert ( + result[1].resource + == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Policy1"].dict() + ) + + def test_case_4_default_not_ok_custom_good(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured import ( + defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + OutboundSpamPolicy, + OutboundSpamRule, + ) + + defender_client.outbound_spam_policies = { + "Default": OutboundSpamPolicy( + name="Default", + notify_limit_exceeded=False, + notify_sender_blocked=False, + notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=[], + notify_sender_blocked_addresses=[], + auto_forwarding_mode=False, + default=True, + ), + "Policy1": OutboundSpamPolicy( + name="Policy1", + notify_limit_exceeded=True, + notify_sender_blocked=True, + notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=["admin@example.com"], + notify_sender_blocked_addresses=["admin@example.com"], + auto_forwarding_mode=False, + default=False, + ), + } + defender_client.outbound_spam_rules = { + "Policy1": OutboundSpamRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=0, + users=["user1@example.com"], + groups=["group1"], + domains=["domain.com"], + ) + } + + check = defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is not properly configured in the default Defender Outbound Spam Policy, but could be overridden by another well-configured Custom Policy." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert ( + result[0].resource + == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Default"].dict() + ) + + assert result[1].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Outbound Spam policy Policy1 is properly configured and includes users: user1@example.com; groups: group1; domains: domain.com, " + "with priority 0 (0 is the highest). However, the default policy is not properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Policy1" + assert ( + result[1].resource + == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Policy1"].dict() + ) + + def test_case_5_only_default_not_ok(self): defender_client = mock.MagicMock() defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN @@ -195,13 +338,14 @@ class Test_defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured: ) defender_client.outbound_spam_policies = { - "PolicyX": OutboundSpamPolicy( - notify_sender_blocked=True, - notify_limit_exceeded=True, - notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=["admin@org.com"], - notify_sender_blocked_addresses=["admin@org.com"], - default=False, + "Default": OutboundSpamPolicy( + name="Default", + notify_limit_exceeded=False, + notify_sender_blocked=False, + notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=[], + notify_sender_blocked_addresses=[], auto_forwarding_mode=False, + default=True, ) } defender_client.outbound_spam_rules = {} @@ -212,15 +356,98 @@ class Test_defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured: assert result[0].status == "FAIL" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == "Outbound Spam Policy PolicyX is not properly configured." + == "Default is the only policy and it's not properly configured in the default Defender Outbound Spam Policy." ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" assert ( result[0].resource - == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["PolicyX"].dict() + == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Default"].dict() + ) + + def test_case_6_default_and_custom_not_ok(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured import ( + defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + OutboundSpamPolicy, + OutboundSpamRule, + ) + + defender_client.outbound_spam_policies = { + "Default": OutboundSpamPolicy( + name="Default", + notify_limit_exceeded=False, + notify_sender_blocked=False, + notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=[], + notify_sender_blocked_addresses=[], + auto_forwarding_mode=False, + default=True, + ), + "Policy1": OutboundSpamPolicy( + name="Policy1", + notify_limit_exceeded=False, + notify_sender_blocked=False, + notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=[], + notify_sender_blocked_addresses=[], + auto_forwarding_mode=False, + default=False, + ), + } + defender_client.outbound_spam_rules = { + "Policy1": OutboundSpamRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=5, + users=["user@example.com"], + groups=["group1"], + domains=["domain.com"], + ) + } + + check = defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is not properly configured in the default Defender Outbound Spam Policy, but could be overridden by another well-configured Custom Policy." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert ( + result[0].resource + == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Default"].dict() + ) + + assert result[1].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Outbound Spam policy Policy1 is not properly configured and includes users: user@example.com; groups: group1; domains: domain.com, " + "with priority 5 (0 is the highest). Also, the default policy is not properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Policy1" + assert ( + result[1].resource + == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Policy1"].dict() ) - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Outbound Spam Policy" - assert result[0].resource_id == "PolicyX" - assert result[0].location == "global" def test_no_outbound_spam_policies(self): defender_client = mock.MagicMock() diff --git a/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled_test.py b/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled_test.py index 0e911a33b2..64fce5f88b 100644 --- a/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled/defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled_test.py @@ -4,6 +4,456 @@ from tests.providers.m365.m365_fixtures import DOMAIN, set_mocked_m365_provider class Test_defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled: + def test_case_1_default_policy_forwarding_disabled(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled import ( + defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + OutboundSpamPolicy, + ) + + defender_client.outbound_spam_policies = { + "Default": OutboundSpamPolicy( + name="Default", + auto_forwarding_mode=False, + notify_limit_exceeded=True, + notify_sender_blocked=True, + notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=["admin@example.com"], + notify_sender_blocked_addresses=["admin@example.com"], + default=True, + ) + } + defender_client.outbound_spam_rules = {} + + check = defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is the only policy and mail forwarding is disabled." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert ( + result[0].resource + == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Default"].dict() + ) + + def test_case_2_all_policies_forwarding_disabled(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled import ( + defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + OutboundSpamPolicy, + OutboundSpamRule, + ) + + defender_client.outbound_spam_policies = { + "Default": OutboundSpamPolicy( + name="Default", + auto_forwarding_mode=False, + notify_limit_exceeded=True, + notify_sender_blocked=True, + notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=["admin@example.com"], + notify_sender_blocked_addresses=["admin@example.com"], + default=True, + ), + "Policy1": OutboundSpamPolicy( + name="Policy1", + auto_forwarding_mode=False, + notify_limit_exceeded=True, + notify_sender_blocked=True, + notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=["admin@example.com"], + notify_sender_blocked_addresses=["admin@example.com"], + default=False, + ), + } + + defender_client.outbound_spam_rules = { + "Policy1": OutboundSpamRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=1, + users=["test@example.com"], + groups=["group1"], + domains=["example.com"], + ) + } + + check = defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is the default policy and mail forwarding is disabled, but it could be overridden by another misconfigured Custom Policy." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert ( + result[0].resource + == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Default"].dict() + ) + + assert result[1].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Outbound Spam policy Policy1 disables mail forwarding and includes users: test@example.com; groups: group1; domains: example.com, " + "with priority 1 (0 is the highest). Also, the default policy disables mail forwarding, so entities not included by this custom policy could still be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Policy1" + assert ( + result[1].resource + == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Policy1"].dict() + ) + + def test_case_3_default_ok_custom_not(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled import ( + defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + OutboundSpamPolicy, + OutboundSpamRule, + ) + + defender_client.outbound_spam_policies = { + "Default": OutboundSpamPolicy( + name="Default", + auto_forwarding_mode=False, + notify_limit_exceeded=True, + notify_sender_blocked=True, + notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=["admin@example.com"], + notify_sender_blocked_addresses=["admin@example.com"], + default=True, + ), + "Policy1": OutboundSpamPolicy( + name="Policy1", + auto_forwarding_mode=True, + notify_limit_exceeded=False, + notify_sender_blocked=False, + notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=[], + notify_sender_blocked_addresses=[], + default=False, + ), + } + + defender_client.outbound_spam_rules = { + "Policy1": OutboundSpamRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=1, + users=["test@example.com"], + groups=["group1"], + domains=["example.com"], + ) + } + + check = defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is the default policy and mail forwarding is disabled, but it could be overridden by another misconfigured Custom Policy." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert ( + result[0].resource + == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Default"].dict() + ) + + assert result[1].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Outbound Spam policy Policy1 allows mail forwarding and includes users: test@example.com; groups: group1; domains: example.com, " + "with priority 1 (0 is the highest). However, the default policy disables mail forwarding, so entities not included by this custom policy could be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Policy1" + assert ( + result[1].resource + == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Policy1"].dict() + ) + + def test_case_4_default_not_ok_custom_good(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled import ( + defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + OutboundSpamPolicy, + OutboundSpamRule, + ) + + defender_client.outbound_spam_policies = { + "Default": OutboundSpamPolicy( + name="Default", + auto_forwarding_mode=True, + notify_limit_exceeded=False, + notify_sender_blocked=False, + notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=[], + notify_sender_blocked_addresses=[], + default=True, + ), + "Policy1": OutboundSpamPolicy( + name="Policy1", + auto_forwarding_mode=False, + notify_limit_exceeded=True, + notify_sender_blocked=True, + notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=["admin@example.com"], + notify_sender_blocked_addresses=["admin@example.com"], + default=False, + ), + } + + defender_client.outbound_spam_rules = { + "Policy1": OutboundSpamRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=0, + users=["user1@example.com"], + groups=["group1"], + domains=["domain.com"], + ) + } + + check = defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is the default policy and mail forwarding is allowed, but it could be overridden by another well-configured Custom Policy." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert ( + result[0].resource + == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Default"].dict() + ) + + assert result[1].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Outbound Spam policy Policy1 disables mail forwarding and includes users: user1@example.com; groups: group1; domains: domain.com, " + "with priority 0 (0 is the highest). However, the default policy allows mail forwarding, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Policy1" + assert ( + result[1].resource + == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Policy1"].dict() + ) + + def test_case_5_only_default_not_ok(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled import ( + defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + OutboundSpamPolicy, + ) + + defender_client.outbound_spam_policies = { + "Default": OutboundSpamPolicy( + name="Default", + auto_forwarding_mode=True, + notify_limit_exceeded=False, + notify_sender_blocked=False, + notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=[], + notify_sender_blocked_addresses=[], + default=True, + ) + } + defender_client.outbound_spam_rules = {} + + check = defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is the only policy and mail forwarding is allowed." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert ( + result[0].resource + == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Default"].dict() + ) + + def test_case_6_default_and_custom_not_ok(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled import ( + defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + OutboundSpamPolicy, + OutboundSpamRule, + ) + + defender_client.outbound_spam_policies = { + "Default": OutboundSpamPolicy( + name="Default", + auto_forwarding_mode=True, + notify_limit_exceeded=False, + notify_sender_blocked=False, + notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=[], + notify_sender_blocked_addresses=[], + default=True, + ), + "Policy1": OutboundSpamPolicy( + name="Policy1", + auto_forwarding_mode=True, + notify_limit_exceeded=False, + notify_sender_blocked=False, + notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=[], + notify_sender_blocked_addresses=[], + default=False, + ), + } + + defender_client.outbound_spam_rules = { + "Policy1": OutboundSpamRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=1, + users=["user@example.com"], + groups=["group1"], + domains=["domain.com"], + ) + } + + check = defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is the default policy and mail forwarding is allowed, but it could be overridden by another well-configured Custom Policy." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert ( + result[0].resource + == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Default"].dict() + ) + + assert result[1].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Outbound Spam policy Policy1 allows mail forwarding and includes users: user@example.com; groups: group1; domains: domain.com, " + "with priority 1 (0 is the highest). Also, the default policy allows mail forwarding, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Policy1" + assert ( + result[1].resource + == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Policy1"].dict() + ) + def test_no_outbound_spam_policies(self): defender_client = mock.MagicMock() defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" @@ -32,221 +482,3 @@ class Test_defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled: check = defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled() result = check.execute() assert len(result) == 0 - - def test_forwarding_disabled_custom_policy(self): - defender_client = mock.MagicMock() - defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" - defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN - - with ( - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", - return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), - ), - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" - ), - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_client", - new=defender_client, - ), - ): - from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled import ( - defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled, - ) - from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( - OutboundSpamPolicy, - OutboundSpamRule, - ) - - defender_client.outbound_spam_policies = { - "Policy1": OutboundSpamPolicy( - default=False, - notify_sender_blocked=True, - notify_limit_exceeded=True, - notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=["test@correo.com"], - notify_sender_blocked_addresses=["test@correo.com"], - auto_forwarding_mode=False, - ) - } - defender_client.outbound_spam_rules = { - "Policy1": OutboundSpamRule(state="Enabled") - } - - check = defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled() - result = check.execute() - assert len(result) == 1 - assert result[0].status == "PASS" - assert ( - result[0].status_extended - == "Outbound Spam Policy Policy1 does not allow mail forwarding." - ) - assert ( - result[0].resource - == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Policy1"].dict() - ) - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Outbound Spam Policy" - assert result[0].resource_id == "Policy1" - assert result[0].location == "global" - - def test_forwarding_enabled_policy(self): - defender_client = mock.MagicMock() - defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" - defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN - - with ( - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", - return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), - ), - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" - ), - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_client", - new=defender_client, - ), - ): - from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled import ( - defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled, - ) - from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( - OutboundSpamPolicy, - OutboundSpamRule, - ) - - defender_client.outbound_spam_policies = { - "Policy2": OutboundSpamPolicy( - default=False, - notify_sender_blocked=True, - notify_limit_exceeded=True, - notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=["test@correo.com"], - notify_sender_blocked_addresses=["test@correo.com"], - auto_forwarding_mode=True, - ) - } - defender_client.outbound_spam_rules = { - "Policy2": OutboundSpamRule(state="Enabled") - } - - check = defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled() - result = check.execute() - assert len(result) == 1 - assert result[0].status == "FAIL" - assert ( - result[0].status_extended - == "Outbound Spam Policy Policy2 does allow mail forwarding." - ) - assert ( - result[0].resource - == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Policy2"].dict() - ) - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Outbound Spam Policy" - assert result[0].resource_id == "Policy2" - assert result[0].location == "global" - - def test_forwarding_disabled_default_policy(self): - defender_client = mock.MagicMock() - defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" - defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN - - with ( - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", - return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), - ), - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" - ), - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_client", - new=defender_client, - ), - ): - from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled import ( - defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled, - ) - from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( - OutboundSpamPolicy, - ) - - defender_client.outbound_spam_policies = { - "Default": OutboundSpamPolicy( - default=True, - notify_sender_blocked=True, - notify_limit_exceeded=True, - notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=["test@correo.com"], - notify_sender_blocked_addresses=["test@correo.com"], - auto_forwarding_mode=False, - ) - } - defender_client.outbound_spam_rules = {} - - check = defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled() - result = check.execute() - assert len(result) == 1 - assert result[0].status == "PASS" - assert ( - result[0].status_extended - == "Outbound Spam Policy Default does not allow mail forwarding." - ) - assert ( - result[0].resource - == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["Default"].dict() - ) - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Outbound Spam Policy" - assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" - assert result[0].location == "global" - - def test_policy_without_rule(self): - defender_client = mock.MagicMock() - defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" - defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN - - with ( - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", - return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), - ), - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" - ), - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_client", - new=defender_client, - ), - ): - from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled.defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled import ( - defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled, - ) - from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( - OutboundSpamPolicy, - ) - - defender_client.outbound_spam_policies = { - "PolicyX": OutboundSpamPolicy( - default=False, - notify_sender_blocked=True, - notify_limit_exceeded=True, - notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=["test@correo.com"], - notify_sender_blocked_addresses=["test@correo.com"], - auto_forwarding_mode=False, - ) - } - defender_client.outbound_spam_rules = {} - - check = defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled() - result = check.execute() - assert len(result) == 1 - assert result[0].status == "FAIL" - assert ( - result[0].status_extended - == "Outbound Spam Policy PolicyX does allow mail forwarding." - ) - assert ( - result[0].resource - == defender_client.outbound_spam_policies["PolicyX"].dict() - ) - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Outbound Spam Policy" - assert result[0].resource_id == "PolicyX" - assert result[0].location == "global" diff --git a/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains/defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains_test.py b/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains/defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains_test.py index feba0c5bb4..625fc8ded3 100644 --- a/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains/defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains/defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains_test.py @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ from tests.providers.m365.m365_fixtures import DOMAIN, set_mocked_m365_provider class Test_defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains: - def test_policy_without_allowed_domains(self): + def test_case_1_default_policy_no_allowed_domains(self): defender_client = mock.MagicMock() defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN @@ -31,26 +31,240 @@ class Test_defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains: defender_client.inbound_spam_policies = [ DefenderInboundSpamPolicy( - identity="Policy1", + identity="Default", + default=True, allowed_sender_domains=[], ) ] + defender_client.inbound_spam_rules = {} check = defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains() result = check.execute() - assert len(result) == 1 assert result[0].status == "PASS" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == "Inbound anti-spam policy Policy1 does not contain allowed domains." + == "Default is the only policy and it does not contain allowed domains." ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" assert result[0].resource == defender_client.inbound_spam_policies[0].dict() - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Inbound Spam Policy" - assert result[0].resource_id == "Policy1" - assert result[0].location == "global" - def test_policy_with_allowed_domains(self): + def test_case_2_all_policies_no_allowed_domains(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains.defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains.defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains import ( + defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + DefenderInboundSpamPolicy, + InboundSpamRule, + ) + + defender_client.inbound_spam_policies = [ + DefenderInboundSpamPolicy( + identity="Default", + default=True, + allowed_sender_domains=[], + ), + DefenderInboundSpamPolicy( + identity="Policy1", + default=False, + allowed_sender_domains=[], + ), + ] + defender_client.inbound_spam_rules = { + "Policy1": InboundSpamRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=1, + users=["user1@example.com"], + groups=["group1"], + domains=["example.com"], + ) + } + + check = defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is the default policy and it does not contain allowed domains, but it could be overridden by another misconfigured Custom Policy." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert result[0].resource == defender_client.inbound_spam_policies[0].dict() + + assert result[1].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Inbound Spam policy Policy1 does not contain allowed domains and includes users: user1@example.com; groups: group1; domains: example.com, " + "with priority 1 (0 is the highest). Also, the default policy does not contain allowed domains, so entities not included by this custom policy could still be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource == defender_client.inbound_spam_policies[1].dict() + + def test_case_3_default_ok_custom_with_allowed_domains(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains.defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains.defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains import ( + defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + DefenderInboundSpamPolicy, + InboundSpamRule, + ) + + defender_client.inbound_spam_policies = [ + DefenderInboundSpamPolicy( + identity="Default", + default=True, + allowed_sender_domains=[], + ), + DefenderInboundSpamPolicy( + identity="Policy1", + default=False, + allowed_sender_domains=["spam.com"], + ), + ] + defender_client.inbound_spam_rules = { + "Policy1": InboundSpamRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=2, + users=["user@example.com"], + groups=["group1"], + domains=["domain.com"], + ) + } + + check = defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is the default policy and it does not contain allowed domains, but it could be overridden by another misconfigured Custom Policy." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert result[0].resource == defender_client.inbound_spam_policies[0].dict() + + assert result[1].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Inbound Spam policy Policy1 contains allowed domains and includes users: user@example.com; groups: group1; domains: domain.com, " + "with priority 2 (0 is the highest). However, the default policy does not contain allowed domains, so entities not included by this custom policy could be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource == defender_client.inbound_spam_policies[1].dict() + + def test_case_4_default_with_allowed_domains_custom_ok(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains.defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains.defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains import ( + defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + DefenderInboundSpamPolicy, + InboundSpamRule, + ) + + defender_client.inbound_spam_policies = [ + DefenderInboundSpamPolicy( + identity="Default", + default=True, + allowed_sender_domains=["example.org"], + ), + DefenderInboundSpamPolicy( + identity="Policy1", + default=False, + allowed_sender_domains=[], + ), + ] + + defender_client.inbound_spam_rules = { + "Policy1": InboundSpamRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=0, + users=["user@example.com"], + groups=["group1"], + domains=["domain.com"], + ) + } + + check = defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is the default policy and it contains allowed domains: example.org, but it could be overridden by another well-configured Custom Policy." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert result[0].resource == defender_client.inbound_spam_policies[0].dict() + + assert result[1].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Inbound Spam policy Policy1 does not contain allowed domains and includes users: user@example.com; groups: group1; domains: domain.com, " + "with priority 0 (0 is the highest). However, the default policy contains allowed domains, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource == defender_client.inbound_spam_policies[1].dict() + + def test_case_5_default_with_allowed_domains(self): defender_client = mock.MagicMock() defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN @@ -77,24 +291,96 @@ class Test_defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains: defender_client.inbound_spam_policies = [ DefenderInboundSpamPolicy( - identity="Policy2", - allowed_sender_domains=["bad-domain.com"], + identity="Default", + default=True, + allowed_sender_domains=["example.com"], ) ] + defender_client.inbound_spam_rules = {} check = defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains() result = check.execute() - assert len(result) == 1 assert result[0].status == "FAIL" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == "Inbound anti-spam policy Policy2 contains allowed domains: ['bad-domain.com']." + == "Default is the only policy and it contains allowed domains: example.com." ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" assert result[0].resource == defender_client.inbound_spam_policies[0].dict() - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Inbound Spam Policy" - assert result[0].resource_id == "Policy2" - assert result[0].location == "global" + + def test_case_6_both_default_and_custom_with_allowed_domains(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains.defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains.defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains import ( + defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + DefenderInboundSpamPolicy, + InboundSpamRule, + ) + + defender_client.inbound_spam_policies = [ + DefenderInboundSpamPolicy( + identity="Default", + default=True, + allowed_sender_domains=["example.com"], + ), + DefenderInboundSpamPolicy( + identity="Policy1", + default=False, + allowed_sender_domains=["spam.com"], + ), + ] + + defender_client.inbound_spam_rules = { + "Policy1": InboundSpamRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=5, + users=["user@example.com"], + groups=["group1"], + domains=["domain.com"], + ) + } + + check = defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is the default policy and it contains allowed domains: example.com, but it could be overridden by another well-configured Custom Policy." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert result[0].resource == defender_client.inbound_spam_policies[0].dict() + + assert result[1].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Inbound Spam policy Policy1 contains allowed domains and includes users: user@example.com; groups: group1; domains: domain.com, " + "with priority 5 (0 is the highest). Also, the default policy contains allowed domains, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource == defender_client.inbound_spam_policies[1].dict() def test_no_inbound_spam_policies(self): defender_client = mock.MagicMock() @@ -119,8 +405,8 @@ class Test_defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains: ) defender_client.inbound_spam_policies = [] + defender_client.inbound_spam_rules = {} check = defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains() result = check.execute() - assert len(result) == 0 diff --git a/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled/defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled/defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled_test.py index d7cbb59d9e..adb62b213d 100644 --- a/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled/defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled/defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled_test.py @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ from tests.providers.m365.m365_fixtures import DOMAIN, set_mocked_m365_provider class Test_defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled: - def test_enable_file_filter_disabled(self): + def test_case_1_only_default_policy_enabled(self): defender_client = mock.MagicMock() defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN @@ -31,30 +31,29 @@ class Test_defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled: defender_client.malware_policies = [ MalwarePolicy( - enable_file_filter=False, - identity="Policy1", - enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=False, - internal_sender_admin_address="", - file_types=[], + identity="Default", + enable_file_filter=True, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, + internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", + file_types=["exe", "js"], is_default=True, - ), + ) ] + defender_client.malware_rules = {} check = defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled() result = check.execute() assert len(result) == 1 - - assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].status == "PASS" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == "Common Attachment Types Filter is not enabled in anti-malware policy Policy1." + == "Default is the only policy and Common Attachment Types Filter is enabled." ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" assert result[0].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[0].dict() - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Malware Policy" - assert result[0].resource_id == "defenderMalwarePolicy" - assert result[0].location == "global" - def test_enable_file_filter_enabled(self): + def test_case_2_all_policies_enabled(self): defender_client = mock.MagicMock() defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN @@ -77,34 +76,345 @@ class Test_defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled: ) from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( MalwarePolicy, + MalwareRule, ) defender_client.malware_policies = [ MalwarePolicy( + identity="Default", enable_file_filter=True, - identity="Policy1", - enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=False, - internal_sender_admin_address="", - file_types=[], + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, + internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", + file_types=["exe", "js"], is_default=True, ), + MalwarePolicy( + identity="Policy1", + enable_file_filter=True, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, + internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", + file_types=["exe"], + is_default=False, + ), ] + defender_client.malware_rules = { + "Policy1": MalwareRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=1, + users=["user1@example.com"], + groups=["group1"], + domains=["domain.com"], + ) + } + check = defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled() result = check.execute() - assert len(result) == 1 + assert len(result) == 2 assert result[0].status == "PASS" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == "Common Attachment Types Filter is enabled in anti-malware policy Policy1." + == "Default is the default policy and Common Attachment Types Filter is enabled, but it could be overridden by another misconfigured Custom Policy." ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" assert result[0].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[0].dict() - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Malware Policy" - assert result[0].resource_id == "defenderMalwarePolicy" - assert result[0].location == "global" - def test_no_policy(self): + assert result[1].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Malware policy Policy1 enables Common Attachment Types Filter and includes users: user1@example.com; groups: group1; domains: domain.com, " + "with priority 1 (0 is the highest). Also, the default policy enables the filter, so entities not included by this custom policy could still be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[1].dict() + + def test_case_3_default_ok_custom_not_ok(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled.defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled.defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled import ( + defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + MalwarePolicy, + MalwareRule, + ) + + defender_client.malware_policies = [ + MalwarePolicy( + identity="Default", + enable_file_filter=True, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, + internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", + file_types=["exe"], + is_default=True, + ), + MalwarePolicy( + identity="Policy1", + enable_file_filter=False, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, + internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", + file_types=["js"], + is_default=False, + ), + ] + + defender_client.malware_rules = { + "Policy1": MalwareRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=2, + users=["user@example.com"], + groups=["group1"], + domains=["domain.com"], + ) + } + + check = defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is the default policy and Common Attachment Types Filter is enabled, but it could be overridden by another misconfigured Custom Policy." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert result[0].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[0].dict() + + assert result[1].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Malware policy Policy1 does not enable Common Attachment Types Filter and includes users: user@example.com; groups: group1; domains: domain.com, " + "with priority 2 (0 is the highest). However, the default policy enables the filter, so entities not included by this custom policy could be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[1].dict() + + def test_case_4_default_not_ok_custom_ok(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled.defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled.defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled import ( + defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + MalwarePolicy, + MalwareRule, + ) + + defender_client.malware_policies = [ + MalwarePolicy( + identity="Default", + enable_file_filter=False, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, + internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", + file_types=[], + is_default=True, + ), + MalwarePolicy( + identity="Policy1", + enable_file_filter=True, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, + internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", + file_types=["exe"], + is_default=False, + ), + ] + + defender_client.malware_rules = { + "Policy1": MalwareRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=0, + users=["user@example.com"], + groups=["group1"], + domains=["domain.com"], + ) + } + + check = defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is the default policy and Common Attachment Types Filter is not enabled, but it could be overridden by another well-configured Custom Policy." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert result[0].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[0].dict() + + assert result[1].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Malware policy Policy1 enables Common Attachment Types Filter and includes users: user@example.com; groups: group1; domains: domain.com, " + "with priority 0 (0 is the highest). However, the default policy does not enable the filter, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[1].dict() + + def test_case_5_only_default_not_ok(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled.defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled.defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled import ( + defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + MalwarePolicy, + ) + + defender_client.malware_policies = [ + MalwarePolicy( + identity="Default", + enable_file_filter=False, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, + internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", + file_types=[], + is_default=True, + ) + ] + defender_client.malware_rules = {} + + check = defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is the only policy and Common Attachment Types Filter is not enabled." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert result[0].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[0].dict() + + def test_case_6_default_and_custom_not_ok(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled.defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled.defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled import ( + defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + MalwarePolicy, + MalwareRule, + ) + + defender_client.malware_policies = [ + MalwarePolicy( + identity="Default", + enable_file_filter=False, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, + internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", + file_types=[], + is_default=True, + ), + MalwarePolicy( + identity="Policy1", + enable_file_filter=False, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, + internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", + file_types=["exe"], + is_default=False, + ), + ] + + defender_client.malware_rules = { + "Policy1": MalwareRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=5, + users=["user1@example.com"], + groups=["group1"], + domains=["domain.com"], + ) + } + + check = defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is the default policy and Common Attachment Types Filter is not enabled, but it could be overridden by another well-configured Custom Policy." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert result[0].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[0].dict() + + assert result[1].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Malware policy Policy1 does not enable Common Attachment Types Filter and includes users: user1@example.com; groups: group1; domains: domain.com, " + "with priority 5 (0 is the highest). Also, the default policy does not enable the filter, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[1].dict() + + def test_no_malware_policies(self): defender_client = mock.MagicMock() defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN @@ -127,16 +437,8 @@ class Test_defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled: ) defender_client.malware_policies = [] + defender_client.malware_rules = {} check = defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled() result = check.execute() - assert len(result) == 1 - assert result[0].status == "FAIL" - assert ( - result[0].status_extended - == "Common Attachment Types Filter is not enabled." - ) - assert result[0].resource == {} - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Malware Policy" - assert result[0].resource_id == "defenderMalwarePolicy" - assert result[0].location == "global" + assert len(result) == 0 diff --git a/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied/defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied_test.py b/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied/defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied_test.py index 9977de9a54..682f86c768 100644 --- a/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied/defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied/defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied_test.py @@ -1,53 +1,10 @@ from unittest import mock -from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( - MalwarePolicy, - MalwareRule, -) from tests.providers.m365.m365_fixtures import DOMAIN, set_mocked_m365_provider class Test_defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied: - def test_no_policy(self): - defender_client = mock.MagicMock() - defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" - defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN - defender_client.malware_policies = [] - defender_client.audit_config = {} - defender_client.malware_rules = {} - - with ( - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", - return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), - ), - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" - ), - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_client", - new=defender_client, - ), - ): - from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied import ( - defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied, - ) - - check = defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied() - result = check.execute() - - assert len(result) == 1 - assert result[0].status == "FAIL" - assert ( - result[0].status_extended - == "Common Attachment Types Filter is not enabled." - ) - assert result[0].resource == {} - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Malware Policy" - assert result[0].resource_id == "defenderMalwarePolicy" - assert result[0].location == "global" - - def test_policy_enabled_all_extensions_blocked(self): + def test_case_1_default_policy_properly_configured(self): defender_client = mock.MagicMock() defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN @@ -68,192 +25,430 @@ class Test_defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied: from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied import ( defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied, ) - - valid_extensions = ["exe", "bat", "js"] - defender_client.audit_config = { - "recommended_blocked_file_types": valid_extensions - } - defender_client.malware_rules = {"PolicyGood": MalwareRule(state="Enabled")} - defender_client.malware_policies = [ - MalwarePolicy( - enable_file_filter=True, - identity="PolicyGood", - enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, - internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", - file_types=valid_extensions, - is_default=True, - ) - ] - - check = defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied() - result = check.execute() - - assert len(result) == 1 - assert result[0].status == "PASS" - assert ( - result[0].status_extended - == "Common Attachment Types Filter is enabled in anti-malware policy PolicyGood, the policy is enabled and the filter is applied to the recommended file types." - ) - assert result[0].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[0].dict() - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Malware Policy" - assert result[0].resource_id == "defenderMalwarePolicy" - assert result[0].location == "global" - - def test_policy_enabled_missing_extensions(self): - defender_client = mock.MagicMock() - defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" - defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN - - with ( - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", - return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), - ), - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" - ), - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_client", - new=defender_client, - ), - ): - from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied import ( - defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied, + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + MalwarePolicy, ) defender_client.audit_config = { "recommended_blocked_file_types": ["exe", "bat", "js"] } - defender_client.malware_rules = { - "PolicyPartial": MalwareRule(state="Enabled") - } defender_client.malware_policies = [ MalwarePolicy( + identity="Default", enable_file_filter=True, - identity="PolicyPartial", enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", - file_types=["exe"], + file_types=["exe", "bat", "js"], is_default=True, ) ] - - check = defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied() - result = check.execute() - - assert len(result) == 1 - assert result[0].status == "FAIL" - assert ( - result[0].status_extended - == "Common Attachment Types Filter is enabled in anti-malware policy PolicyPartial, but the following recommended file types are missing: bat, js." - ) - assert result[0].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[0].dict() - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Malware Policy" - assert result[0].resource_id == "defenderMalwarePolicy" - assert result[0].location == "global" - - def test_policy_enabled_but_rule_disabled(self): - defender_client = mock.MagicMock() - defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" - defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN - - with ( - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", - return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), - ), - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" - ), - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_client", - new=defender_client, - ), - ): - from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied import ( - defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied, - ) - - valid_extensions = ["exe"] - defender_client.audit_config = { - "recommended_blocked_file_types": valid_extensions - } - defender_client.malware_rules = { - "PolicyDisabled": MalwareRule(state="Disabled") - } - defender_client.malware_policies = [ - MalwarePolicy( - enable_file_filter=True, - identity="PolicyDisabled", - enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, - internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", - file_types=valid_extensions, - is_default=False, - ) - ] - - check = defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied() - result = check.execute() - - assert len(result) == 1 - assert result[0].status == "FAIL" - assert ( - result[0].status_extended - == "Common Attachment Types Filter is enabled in anti-malware policy PolicyDisabled, but the policy is disabled." - ) - assert result[0].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[0].dict() - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Malware Policy" - assert result[0].resource_id == "defenderMalwarePolicy" - assert result[0].location == "global" - - def test_policy_enabled_but_no_rule_and_not_default(self): - defender_client = mock.MagicMock() - defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" - defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN - - with ( - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", - return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), - ), - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" - ), - mock.patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_client", - new=defender_client, - ), - ): - from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied import ( - defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied, - ) - - valid_extensions = ["exe"] - defender_client.audit_config = { - "recommended_blocked_file_types": valid_extensions - } defender_client.malware_rules = {} - defender_client.malware_policies = [ - MalwarePolicy( - enable_file_filter=True, - identity="PolicyNoRule", - enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, - internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", - file_types=valid_extensions, - is_default=False, - ) - ] check = defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied() result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is the only policy and Common Attachment Types Filter is properly configured." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert result[0].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[0].dict() + def test_case_2_all_policies_properly_configured(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied import ( + defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + MalwarePolicy, + MalwareRule, + ) + + defender_client.audit_config = { + "recommended_blocked_file_types": ["exe", "bat"] + } + defender_client.malware_policies = [ + MalwarePolicy( + identity="Default", + enable_file_filter=True, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, + internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", + file_types=["exe", "bat"], + is_default=True, + ), + MalwarePolicy( + identity="Custom1", + enable_file_filter=True, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, + internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", + file_types=["exe", "bat"], + is_default=False, + ), + ] + defender_client.malware_rules = { + "Custom1": MalwareRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=1, + users=["user1@example.com"], + groups=["group1"], + domains=["example.com"], + ) + } + + check = defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is the default policy and Common Attachment Types Filter is properly configured, but it could be overridden by another misconfigured Custom Policy." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert result[0].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[0].dict() + + assert result[1].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Malware policy Custom1 is properly configured and includes users: user1@example.com; groups: group1; domains: example.com, " + "with priority 1 (0 is the highest). Also, the default policy is properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could still be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Custom1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Custom1" + assert result[1].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[1].dict() + + def test_case_3_default_ok_custom_not(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied import ( + defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + MalwarePolicy, + MalwareRule, + ) + + defender_client.audit_config = { + "recommended_blocked_file_types": ["exe", "bat"] + } + defender_client.malware_policies = [ + MalwarePolicy( + identity="Default", + enable_file_filter=True, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, + internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", + file_types=["exe", "bat"], + is_default=True, + ), + MalwarePolicy( + identity="Custom1", + enable_file_filter=True, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, + internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", + file_types=["exe"], # missing bat + is_default=False, + ), + ] + defender_client.malware_rules = { + "Custom1": MalwareRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=1, + users=["user1@example.com"], + groups=["group1"], + domains=["example.com"], + ) + } + + check = defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is the default policy and Common Attachment Types Filter is properly configured, but it could be overridden by another misconfigured Custom Policy." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert result[0].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[0].dict() + + assert result[1].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Malware policy Custom1 is not properly configured and includes users: user1@example.com; groups: group1; domains: example.com, " + "with priority 1 (0 is the highest). Missing recommended file types: bat. However, the default policy is properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Custom1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Custom1" + assert result[1].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[1].dict() + + def test_case_4_default_not_ok_custom_ok(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied import ( + defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + MalwarePolicy, + MalwareRule, + ) + + defender_client.audit_config = { + "recommended_blocked_file_types": ["exe", "bat"] + } + defender_client.malware_policies = [ + MalwarePolicy( + identity="Default", + enable_file_filter=False, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, + internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", + file_types=[], + is_default=True, + ), + MalwarePolicy( + identity="Custom1", + enable_file_filter=True, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, + internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", + file_types=["exe", "bat"], + is_default=False, + ), + ] + defender_client.malware_rules = { + "Custom1": MalwareRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=0, + users=["user1@example.com"], + groups=["group1"], + domains=["domain.com"], + ) + } + + check = defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is the default policy and Common Attachment Types Filter is not properly configured, but it could be overridden by another well-configured Custom Policy. Missing recommended file types: exe, bat." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert result[0].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[0].dict() + + assert result[1].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Malware policy Custom1 is properly configured and includes users: user1@example.com; groups: group1; domains: domain.com, " + "with priority 0 (0 is the highest). However, the default policy is not properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Custom1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Custom1" + assert result[1].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[1].dict() + + def test_case_5_only_default_not_ok(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied import ( + defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + MalwarePolicy, + ) + + defender_client.audit_config = { + "recommended_blocked_file_types": ["exe", "bat"] + } + defender_client.malware_policies = [ + MalwarePolicy( + identity="Default", + enable_file_filter=False, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, + internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", + file_types=[], + is_default=True, + ) + ] + defender_client.malware_rules = {} + + check = defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied() + result = check.execute() assert len(result) == 1 assert result[0].status == "FAIL" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == "Common Attachment Types Filter is not properly configured in anti-malware policy PolicyNoRule." + == "Default is the only policy and Common Attachment Types Filter is not properly configured. Missing recommended file types: exe, bat." ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" assert result[0].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[0].dict() - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Malware Policy" - assert result[0].resource_id == "defenderMalwarePolicy" - assert result[0].location == "global" + + def test_case_6_default_and_custom_not_ok(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied import ( + defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + MalwarePolicy, + MalwareRule, + ) + + defender_client.audit_config = { + "recommended_blocked_file_types": ["exe", "bat"] + } + defender_client.malware_policies = [ + MalwarePolicy( + identity="Default", + enable_file_filter=False, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, + internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", + file_types=[], + is_default=True, + ), + MalwarePolicy( + identity="Custom1", + enable_file_filter=True, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, + internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", + file_types=["exe"], # missing bat + is_default=False, + ), + ] + defender_client.malware_rules = { + "Custom1": MalwareRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=2, + users=["user@example.com"], + groups=["group1"], + domains=["example.com"], + ) + } + + check = defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is the default policy and Common Attachment Types Filter is not properly configured, but it could be overridden by another well-configured Custom Policy. Missing recommended file types: exe, bat." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert result[0].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[0].dict() + + assert result[1].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Malware policy Custom1 is not properly configured and includes users: user@example.com; groups: group1; domains: example.com, " + "with priority 2 (0 is the highest). Missing recommended file types: bat. Also, the default policy is not properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Custom1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Custom1" + assert result[1].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[1].dict() + + def test_no_malware_policies(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + defender_client.malware_policies = [] + defender_client.malware_rules = {} + defender_client.audit_config = {} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied.defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied import ( + defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied, + ) + + check = defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 diff --git a/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled/defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled/defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled_test.py index fdd26415d0..16fe656c2b 100644 --- a/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled/defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled/defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled_test.py @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ from tests.providers.m365.m365_fixtures import DOMAIN, set_mocked_m365_provider class Test_defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled: - def test_notifications_disabled(self): + def test_case_1_default_properly_configured(self): defender_client = mock.MagicMock() defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN @@ -31,32 +31,322 @@ class Test_defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled: defender_client.malware_policies = [ MalwarePolicy( - enable_file_filter=True, identity="Default", + enable_file_filter=False, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, + internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", + file_types=[], + is_default=True, + ) + ] + defender_client.malware_rules = {} + + check = ( + defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled() + ) + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is the only policy and notifications for internal users sending malware are enabled." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert result[0].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[0].dict() + + def test_case_2_default_and_custom_properly_configured(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled.defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled.defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled import ( + defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + MalwarePolicy, + MalwareRule, + ) + + defender_client.malware_policies = [ + MalwarePolicy( + identity="Default", + enable_file_filter=False, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, + internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", + file_types=[], + is_default=True, + ), + MalwarePolicy( + identity="Policy1", + enable_file_filter=False, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, + internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", + file_types=[], + is_default=False, + ), + ] + + defender_client.malware_rules = { + "Policy1": MalwareRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=1, + users=["user@example.com"], + groups=["group1"], + domains=["domain.com"], + ) + } + + check = ( + defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled() + ) + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is the default policy and notifications for internal users sending malware are enabled, but it could be overridden by another misconfigured Custom Policy." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert result[0].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[0].dict() + + assert result[1].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Malware policy Policy1 is properly configured and includes users: user@example.com; groups: group1; domains: domain.com, " + "with priority 1 (0 is the highest). Also, the default policy is properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could still be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[1].dict() + + def test_case_3_default_ok_custom_not_configured(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled.defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled.defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled import ( + defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + MalwarePolicy, + MalwareRule, + ) + + defender_client.malware_policies = [ + MalwarePolicy( + identity="Default", + enable_file_filter=False, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, + internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", + file_types=[], + is_default=True, + ), + MalwarePolicy( + identity="Policy1", + enable_file_filter=False, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=False, + internal_sender_admin_address="", + file_types=[], + is_default=False, + ), + ] + + defender_client.malware_rules = { + "Policy1": MalwareRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=2, + users=["internal@example.com"], + groups=["group2"], + domains=["example.org"], + ) + } + + check = ( + defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled() + ) + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is the default policy and notifications for internal users sending malware are enabled, but it could be overridden by another misconfigured Custom Policy." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert result[0].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[0].dict() + + assert result[1].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Malware policy Policy1 is not properly configured and includes users: internal@example.com; groups: group2; domains: example.org, " + "with priority 2 (0 is the highest). However, the default policy is properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[1].dict() + + def test_case_4_default_not_ok_custom_properly_configured(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled.defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled.defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled import ( + defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + MalwarePolicy, + MalwareRule, + ) + + defender_client.malware_policies = [ + MalwarePolicy( + identity="Default", + enable_file_filter=False, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=False, + internal_sender_admin_address="", + file_types=[], + is_default=True, + ), + MalwarePolicy( + identity="Policy1", + enable_file_filter=False, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, + internal_sender_admin_address="admin@example.com", + file_types=[], + is_default=False, + ), + ] + + defender_client.malware_rules = { + "Policy1": MalwareRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=0, + users=["user@example.com"], + groups=["group1"], + domains=["domain.com"], + ) + } + + check = ( + defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled() + ) + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Default is the default policy and notifications for internal users sending malware are not enabled, but it could be overridden by another well-configured Custom Policy." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" + assert result[0].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[0].dict() + + assert result[1].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Malware policy Policy1 is properly configured and includes users: user@example.com; groups: group1; domains: domain.com, " + "with priority 0 (0 is the highest). However, the default policy is not properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[1].dict() + + def test_case_5_only_default_not_ok(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock() + defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled.defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled.defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled import ( + defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( + MalwarePolicy, + ) + + defender_client.malware_policies = [ + MalwarePolicy( + identity="Default", + enable_file_filter=False, enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=False, internal_sender_admin_address="", file_types=[], is_default=True, ) ] + defender_client.malware_rules = {} check = ( defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled() ) result = check.execute() - assert len(result) == 1 assert result[0].status == "FAIL" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == "Notifications for internal users sending malware are not enabled." + == "Default is the only policy and notifications for internal users sending malware are not enabled." ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" assert result[0].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[0].dict() - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Malware Policy" - assert result[0].resource_id == "defenderMalwarePolicy" - assert result[0].location == "global" - def test_notifications_enabled_without_email(self): + def test_case_6_default_and_custom_not_configured(self): defender_client = mock.MagicMock() defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN @@ -79,36 +369,64 @@ class Test_defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled: ) from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( MalwarePolicy, + MalwareRule, ) defender_client.malware_policies = [ MalwarePolicy( - enable_file_filter=True, identity="Default", - enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, + enable_file_filter=False, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=False, internal_sender_admin_address="", file_types=[], is_default=True, - ) + ), + MalwarePolicy( + identity="Policy1", + enable_file_filter=False, + enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=False, + internal_sender_admin_address="", + file_types=[], + is_default=False, + ), ] + defender_client.malware_rules = { + "Policy1": MalwareRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=3, + users=["u@example.com"], + groups=["g1"], + domains=["d.com"], + ) + } + check = ( defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled() ) result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 - assert len(result) == 1 assert result[0].status == "FAIL" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == "Notifications for internal users sending malware are enabled, but no email addresses are configured." + == "Default is the default policy and notifications for internal users sending malware are not enabled, but it could be overridden by another well-configured Custom Policy." ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "Default" + assert result[0].resource_id == "Default" assert result[0].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[0].dict() - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Malware Policy" - assert result[0].resource_id == "defenderMalwarePolicy" - assert result[0].location == "global" - def test_notifications_enabled_with_email(self): + assert result[1].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[1].status_extended + == "Custom Malware policy Policy1 is not properly configured and includes users: u@example.com; groups: g1; domains: d.com, " + "with priority 3 (0 is the highest). Also, the default policy is not properly configured, so entities not included by this custom policy could not be correctly protected." + ) + assert result[1].resource_name == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource_id == "Policy1" + assert result[1].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[1].dict() + + def test_no_malware_policies(self): defender_client = mock.MagicMock() defender_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" defender_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN @@ -129,33 +447,12 @@ class Test_defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled: from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled.defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled import ( defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled, ) - from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( - MalwarePolicy, - ) - defender_client.malware_policies = [ - MalwarePolicy( - enable_file_filter=True, - identity="Default", - enable_internal_sender_admin_notifications=True, - internal_sender_admin_address="security@example.com", - file_types=[], - is_default=True, - ) - ] + defender_client.malware_policies = [] + defender_client.malware_rules = {} check = ( defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled() ) result = check.execute() - - assert len(result) == 1 - assert result[0].status == "PASS" - assert ( - result[0].status_extended - == "Notifications for internal users sending malware are enabled." - ) - assert result[0].resource == defender_client.malware_policies[0].dict() - assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender Malware Policy" - assert result[0].resource_id == "defenderMalwarePolicy" - assert result[0].location == "global" + assert len(result) == 0 diff --git a/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/m365_defender_service_test.py b/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/m365_defender_service_test.py index 3e5a534f2c..35534a53e3 100644 --- a/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/m365_defender_service_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/m365/services/defender/m365_defender_service_test.py @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ from prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service import ( Defender, DefenderInboundSpamPolicy, DkimConfig, + InboundSpamRule, MalwarePolicy, MalwareRule, OutboundSpamPolicy, @@ -41,14 +42,27 @@ def mock_defender_get_malware_filter_policy(_): def mock_defender_get_malware_filter_rule(_): return { - "Policy1": MalwareRule(state="Enabled"), - "Policy2": MalwareRule(state="Disabled"), + "Policy1": MalwareRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=1, + users=["test@example.com"], + groups=["example_group"], + domains=["example.com"], + ), + "Policy2": MalwareRule( + state="Disabled", + priority=2, + users=["test@example.com"], + groups=["example_group"], + domains=["example.com"], + ), } -def mock_defender_get_antiphising_policy(_): +def mock_defender_get_antiphishing_policy(_): return { "Policy1": AntiphishingPolicy( + name="Policy1", spoof_intelligence=True, spoof_intelligence_action="Quarantine", dmarc_reject_action="Reject", @@ -60,6 +74,7 @@ def mock_defender_get_antiphising_policy(_): default=False, ), "Policy2": AntiphishingPolicy( + name="Policy2", spoof_intelligence=False, spoof_intelligence_action="None", dmarc_reject_action="None", @@ -73,13 +88,21 @@ def mock_defender_get_antiphising_policy(_): } -def mock_defender_get_antiphising_rules(_): +def mock_defender_get_antiphishing_rules(_): return { "Policy1": AntiphishingRule( state="Enabled", + priority=1, + users=["test@example.com"], + groups=["example_group"], + domains=["example.com"], ), "Policy2": AntiphishingRule( state="Disabled", + priority=2, + users=["test@example.com"], + groups=["example_group"], + domains=["example.com"], ), } @@ -89,14 +112,35 @@ def mock_defender_get_inbound_spam_policy(_): DefenderInboundSpamPolicy( identity="Policy1", allowed_sender_domains=[], + default=False, ), DefenderInboundSpamPolicy( identity="Policy2", allowed_sender_domains=["example.com"], + default=True, ), ] +def mock_defender_get_inbound_spam_rule(_): + return { + "Policy1": InboundSpamRule( + state="Enabled", + priority=1, + users=["test@example.com"], + groups=["example_group"], + domains=["example.com"], + ), + "Policy2": InboundSpamRule( + state="Disabled", + priority=2, + users=["test@example.com"], + groups=["example_group"], + domains=["example.com"], + ), + } + + def mock_defender_get_connection_filter_policy(_): return ConnectionFilterPolicy( ip_allow_list=[], @@ -131,6 +175,7 @@ def mock_defender_get_report_submission_policy(_): def mock_defender_get_outbound_spam_filter_policy(_): return { "Policy1": OutboundSpamPolicy( + name="Policy1", notify_sender_blocked=True, notify_limit_exceeded=True, notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=["security@example.com"], @@ -139,6 +184,7 @@ def mock_defender_get_outbound_spam_filter_policy(_): default=False, ), "Policy2": OutboundSpamPolicy( + name="Policy2", notify_sender_blocked=False, notify_limit_exceeded=False, notify_limit_exceeded_addresses=[], @@ -153,9 +199,17 @@ def mock_defender_get_outbound_spam_filter_rule(_): return { "Policy1": OutboundSpamRule( state="Enabled", + priority=1, + users=["test@example.com"], + groups=["example_group"], + domains=["example.com"], ), "Policy2": OutboundSpamRule( state="Disabled", + priority=2, + users=["test@example.com"], + groups=["example_group"], + domains=["example.com"], ), } @@ -230,14 +284,22 @@ class Test_Defender_Service: ) malware_rules = defender_client.malware_rules assert malware_rules["Policy1"].state == "Enabled" + assert malware_rules["Policy1"].priority == 1 + assert malware_rules["Policy1"].users == ["test@example.com"] + assert malware_rules["Policy1"].groups == ["example_group"] + assert malware_rules["Policy1"].domains == ["example.com"] assert malware_rules["Policy2"].state == "Disabled" + assert malware_rules["Policy2"].priority == 2 + assert malware_rules["Policy2"].users == ["test@example.com"] + assert malware_rules["Policy2"].groups == ["example_group"] + assert malware_rules["Policy2"].domains == ["example.com"] defender_client.powershell.close() @patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service.Defender._get_antiphising_policy", - new=mock_defender_get_antiphising_policy, + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service.Defender._get_antiphishing_policy", + new=mock_defender_get_antiphishing_policy, ) - def test_get_antiphising_policy(self): + def test_get_antiphishing_policy(self): with ( mock.patch( "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" @@ -249,6 +311,7 @@ class Test_Defender_Service: ) ) antiphishing_policies = defender_client.antiphishing_policies + assert antiphishing_policies["Policy1"].name == "Policy1" assert antiphishing_policies["Policy1"].spoof_intelligence is True assert ( antiphishing_policies["Policy1"].spoof_intelligence_action @@ -265,6 +328,7 @@ class Test_Defender_Service: assert antiphishing_policies["Policy1"].show_tag is True assert antiphishing_policies["Policy1"].honor_dmarc_policy is True assert antiphishing_policies["Policy1"].default is False + assert antiphishing_policies["Policy2"].name == "Policy2" assert antiphishing_policies["Policy2"].spoof_intelligence is False assert antiphishing_policies["Policy2"].spoof_intelligence_action == "None" assert antiphishing_policies["Policy2"].dmarc_reject_action == "None" @@ -279,10 +343,10 @@ class Test_Defender_Service: defender_client.powershell.close() @patch( - "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service.Defender._get_antiphising_rules", - new=mock_defender_get_antiphising_rules, + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service.Defender._get_antiphishing_rules", + new=mock_defender_get_antiphishing_rules, ) - def test_get_antiphising_rules(self): + def test_get_antiphishing_rules(self): with ( mock.patch( "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" @@ -293,9 +357,17 @@ class Test_Defender_Service: identity=M365IdentityInfo(tenant_domain=DOMAIN) ) ) - antiphishing_rules = defender_client.antiphising_rules + antiphishing_rules = defender_client.antiphishing_rules assert antiphishing_rules["Policy1"].state == "Enabled" + assert antiphishing_rules["Policy1"].priority == 1 + assert antiphishing_rules["Policy1"].users == ["test@example.com"] + assert antiphishing_rules["Policy1"].groups == ["example_group"] + assert antiphishing_rules["Policy1"].domains == ["example.com"] assert antiphishing_rules["Policy2"].state == "Disabled" + assert antiphishing_rules["Policy2"].priority == 2 + assert antiphishing_rules["Policy2"].users == ["test@example.com"] + assert antiphishing_rules["Policy2"].groups == ["example_group"] + assert antiphishing_rules["Policy2"].domains == ["example.com"] defender_client.powershell.close() @patch( @@ -357,6 +429,7 @@ class Test_Defender_Service: ) ) outbound_spam_policies = defender_client.outbound_spam_policies + assert outbound_spam_policies["Policy1"].name == "Policy1" assert outbound_spam_policies["Policy1"].notify_sender_blocked is True assert outbound_spam_policies["Policy1"].notify_limit_exceeded is True assert outbound_spam_policies[ @@ -367,6 +440,7 @@ class Test_Defender_Service: ].notify_sender_blocked_addresses == ["security@example.com"] assert outbound_spam_policies["Policy1"].auto_forwarding_mode is False assert outbound_spam_policies["Policy1"].default is False + assert outbound_spam_policies["Policy2"].name == "Policy2" assert outbound_spam_policies["Policy2"].notify_sender_blocked is False assert outbound_spam_policies["Policy2"].notify_limit_exceeded is False assert ( @@ -377,6 +451,7 @@ class Test_Defender_Service: ) assert outbound_spam_policies["Policy2"].auto_forwarding_mode is True assert outbound_spam_policies["Policy2"].default is True + defender_client.powershell.close() @patch( "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service.Defender._get_outbound_spam_filter_rule", @@ -395,7 +470,16 @@ class Test_Defender_Service: ) outbound_spam_rules = defender_client.outbound_spam_rules assert outbound_spam_rules["Policy1"].state == "Enabled" + assert outbound_spam_rules["Policy1"].priority == 1 + assert outbound_spam_rules["Policy1"].users == ["test@example.com"] + assert outbound_spam_rules["Policy1"].groups == ["example_group"] + assert outbound_spam_rules["Policy1"].domains == ["example.com"] assert outbound_spam_rules["Policy2"].state == "Disabled" + assert outbound_spam_rules["Policy2"].priority == 2 + assert outbound_spam_rules["Policy2"].users == ["test@example.com"] + assert outbound_spam_rules["Policy2"].groups == ["example_group"] + assert outbound_spam_rules["Policy2"].domains == ["example.com"] + defender_client.powershell.close() @patch( "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service.Defender._get_inbound_spam_filter_policy", @@ -417,6 +501,34 @@ class Test_Defender_Service: assert inbound_spam_policies[1].allowed_sender_domains == ["example.com"] defender_client.powershell.close() + @patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service.Defender._get_inbound_spam_filter_rule", + new=mock_defender_get_inbound_spam_rule, + ) + def test__get_inbound_spam_filter_rule(self): + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell.M365PowerShell.connect_exchange_online" + ), + ): + defender_client = Defender( + set_mocked_m365_provider( + identity=M365IdentityInfo(tenant_domain=DOMAIN) + ) + ) + inbound_spam_rules = defender_client.inbound_spam_rules + assert inbound_spam_rules["Policy1"].state == "Enabled" + assert inbound_spam_rules["Policy1"].priority == 1 + assert inbound_spam_rules["Policy1"].users == ["test@example.com"] + assert inbound_spam_rules["Policy1"].groups == ["example_group"] + assert inbound_spam_rules["Policy1"].domains == ["example.com"] + assert inbound_spam_rules["Policy2"].state == "Disabled" + assert inbound_spam_rules["Policy2"].priority == 2 + assert inbound_spam_rules["Policy2"].users == ["test@example.com"] + assert inbound_spam_rules["Policy2"].groups == ["example_group"] + assert inbound_spam_rules["Policy2"].domains == ["example.com"] + defender_client.powershell.close() + @patch( "prowler.providers.m365.services.defender.defender_service.Defender._get_report_submission_policy", new=mock_defender_get_report_submission_policy, From 02d7eaf268a2248e6a04b8841114b9d4d6f3aec4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Lara Date: Tue, 13 May 2025 09:27:27 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 23/23] chore: bump tailwind-merge from 2.5.3 to 3.2.0 (#7722) --- ui/package-lock.json | 8 ++++---- ui/package.json | 2 +- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/ui/package-lock.json b/ui/package-lock.json index f86d6169d2..b00fb5b597 100644 --- a/ui/package-lock.json +++ b/ui/package-lock.json @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ "server-only": "^0.0.1", "shadcn-ui": "^0.2.3", "sharp": "^0.33.5", - "tailwind-merge": "^2.5.3", + "tailwind-merge": "^3.2.0", "tailwindcss-animate": "^1.0.7", "uuid": "^11.0.5", "zod": "^3.23.8", @@ -14475,9 +14475,9 @@ } }, "node_modules/tailwind-merge": { - "version": "2.5.3", - "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/tailwind-merge/-/tailwind-merge-2.5.3.tgz", - "integrity": "sha512-d9ZolCAIzom1nf/5p4LdD5zvjmgSxY0BGgdSvmXIoMYAiPdAW/dSpP7joCDYFY7r/HkEa2qmPtkgsu0xjQeQtw==", + "version": "3.3.0", + "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/tailwind-merge/-/tailwind-merge-3.3.0.tgz", + "integrity": "sha512-fyW/pEfcQSiigd5SNn0nApUOxx0zB/dm6UDU/rEwc2c3sX2smWUNbapHv+QRqLGVp9GWX3THIa7MUGPo+YkDzQ==", "license": "MIT", "funding": { "type": "github", diff --git a/ui/package.json b/ui/package.json index 13a4ae147e..5d16567d19 100644 --- a/ui/package.json +++ b/ui/package.json @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ "server-only": "^0.0.1", "shadcn-ui": "^0.2.3", "sharp": "^0.33.5", - "tailwind-merge": "^2.5.3", + "tailwind-merge": "^3.2.0", "tailwindcss-animate": "^1.0.7", "uuid": "^11.0.5", "zod": "^3.23.8",