diff --git a/.env b/.env index c0364e29ae..a7a90108a6 100644 --- a/.env +++ b/.env @@ -6,14 +6,20 @@ PROWLER_UI_VERSION="stable" AUTH_URL=http://localhost:3000 API_BASE_URL=http://prowler-api:8080/api/v1 +# deprecated, use UI_API_BASE_URL NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL=${API_BASE_URL} +UI_API_BASE_URL=${API_BASE_URL} +# deprecated, use UI_API_DOCS_URL NEXT_PUBLIC_API_DOCS_URL=http://prowler-api:8080/api/v1/docs +UI_API_DOCS_URL=http://prowler-api:8080/api/v1/docs AUTH_TRUST_HOST=true UI_PORT=3000 # openssl rand -base64 32 AUTH_SECRET="N/c6mnaS5+SWq81+819OrzQZlmx1Vxtp/orjttJSmw8=" -# Google Tag Manager ID +# Google Tag Manager ID (empty/unset ⇒ GTM not loaded, zero egress) +# deprecated, use UI_GOOGLE_TAG_MANAGER_ID NEXT_PUBLIC_GOOGLE_TAG_MANAGER_ID="" +UI_GOOGLE_TAG_MANAGER_ID="" #### MCP Server #### PROWLER_MCP_VERSION=stable @@ -139,13 +145,19 @@ DJANGO_BROKER_VISIBILITY_TIMEOUT=86400 DJANGO_SENTRY_DSN= DJANGO_THROTTLE_TOKEN_OBTAIN=50/minute -# Sentry settings -SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT=local +# Sentry for the web app (server + browser). Empty/unset UI_SENTRY_DSN ⇒ +# Sentry disabled, zero egress. SENTRY_RELEASE (unprefixed) feeds the web app's +# server/edge SDKs. +UI_SENTRY_DSN= +UI_SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT=local SENTRY_RELEASE=local -NEXT_PUBLIC_SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT=${SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT} +# Reserved runtime public config (registered now; no UI consumer yet) +# POSTHOG_KEY= +# POSTHOG_HOST= +# REO_DEV_CLIENT_ID= #### Prowler release version #### -NEXT_PUBLIC_PROWLER_RELEASE_VERSION=v5.31.0 +NEXT_PUBLIC_PROWLER_RELEASE_VERSION=v5.32.0 # Social login credentials SOCIAL_GOOGLE_OAUTH_CALLBACK_URL="${AUTH_URL}/api/auth/callback/google" diff --git a/.github/CODEOWNERS b/.github/CODEOWNERS index 3300394d83..ed97ff5a1a 100644 --- a/.github/CODEOWNERS +++ b/.github/CODEOWNERS @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ # SDK /* @prowler-cloud/detection-remediation /prowler/ @prowler-cloud/detection-remediation -/prowler/compliance/ @prowler-cloud/compliance /tests/ @prowler-cloud/detection-remediation /dashboard/ @prowler-cloud/detection-remediation /docs/ @prowler-cloud/detection-remediation diff --git a/.github/actions/osv-scanner/action.yml b/.github/actions/osv-scanner/action.yml index 4bfb5993cb..de5116fdcf 100644 --- a/.github/actions/osv-scanner/action.yml +++ b/.github/actions/osv-scanner/action.yml @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ name: 'OSV-Scanner' -description: 'Install osv-scanner and scan a lockfile, failing on HIGH/CRITICAL/UNKNOWN severity findings. Posts/updates a PR comment with findings on pull_request events (requires pull-requests: write).' +description: 'Install osv-scanner and scan a lockfile, failing on CRITICAL severity findings. Posts/updates a PR comment with findings on pull_request events (requires pull-requests: write).' author: 'Prowler' inputs: @@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ inputs: description: 'Path to the lockfile to scan, relative to the repository root (e.g. uv.lock, api/uv.lock, ui/pnpm-lock.yaml).' required: true severity-levels: - description: 'Comma-separated severity levels that fail the scan. Default: HIGH,CRITICAL,UNKNOWN.' + description: 'Comma-separated severity levels that fail the scan. Default: CRITICAL.' required: false - default: 'HIGH,CRITICAL,UNKNOWN' + default: 'CRITICAL' version: description: 'osv-scanner release tag to install. When overriding, you MUST also override binary-sha256.' required: false diff --git a/.github/actions/setup-python-uv/action.yml b/.github/actions/setup-python-uv/action.yml index e23388d86e..d3293004a9 100644 --- a/.github/actions/setup-python-uv/action.yml +++ b/.github/actions/setup-python-uv/action.yml @@ -43,8 +43,17 @@ runs: if: github.repository_owner == 'prowler-cloud' && github.repository != 'prowler-cloud/prowler' shell: bash working-directory: ${{ inputs.working-directory }} + env: + GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }} run: | - LATEST_COMMIT=$(curl -s "https://api.github.com/repos/prowler-cloud/prowler/commits/master" | jq -r '.sha') + LATEST_COMMIT=$(curl -sf --retry 3 --retry-all-errors --retry-delay 2 --retry-max-time 60 \ + -H "Authorization: Bearer ${GITHUB_TOKEN}" \ + -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \ + "https://api.github.com/repos/prowler-cloud/prowler/commits/master" \ + | jq -er '.sha') || { + echo "::error::Failed to fetch latest prowler/master commit from the GitHub API (HTTP error or missing .sha). Check the GITHUB_TOKEN and API rate limits." + exit 1 + } echo "Latest commit hash: $LATEST_COMMIT" sed -i "s|\(git = \"https://github\.com/prowler-cloud/prowler\.git?rev=master\)#[a-f0-9]\{40\}\"|\1#${LATEST_COMMIT}\"|g" uv.lock echo "Updated uv.lock entry:" @@ -54,8 +63,17 @@ runs: if: github.event_name == 'push' && github.ref == 'refs/heads/master' && github.repository == 'prowler-cloud/prowler' shell: bash working-directory: ${{ inputs.working-directory }} + env: + GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }} run: | - LATEST_COMMIT=$(curl -s "https://api.github.com/repos/prowler-cloud/prowler/commits/master" | jq -r '.sha') + LATEST_COMMIT=$(curl -sf --retry 3 --retry-all-errors --retry-delay 2 --retry-max-time 60 \ + -H "Authorization: Bearer ${GITHUB_TOKEN}" \ + -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \ + "https://api.github.com/repos/prowler-cloud/prowler/commits/master" \ + | jq -er '.sha') || { + echo "::error::Failed to fetch latest prowler/master commit from the GitHub API (HTTP error or missing .sha). Check the GITHUB_TOKEN and API rate limits." + exit 1 + } echo "Latest commit hash: $LATEST_COMMIT" sed -i "s|\(git = \"https://github\.com/prowler-cloud/prowler\.git?rev=master\)#[a-f0-9]\{40\}\"|\1#${LATEST_COMMIT}\"|g" uv.lock echo "Updated uv.lock entry:" diff --git a/.github/actions/trivy-scan/action.yml b/.github/actions/trivy-scan/action.yml index 9073e2fbcb..b7b758fb64 100644 --- a/.github/actions/trivy-scan/action.yml +++ b/.github/actions/trivy-scan/action.yml @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ runs: exit-code: '0' scanners: 'vuln' timeout: '5m' - version: 'v0.69.2' + version: 'v0.71.2' - name: Run Trivy vulnerability scan (SARIF) if: inputs.upload-sarif == 'true' && github.event_name == 'push' @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ runs: exit-code: '0' scanners: 'vuln' timeout: '5m' - version: 'v0.69.2' + version: 'v0.71.2' - name: Upload Trivy results to GitHub Security tab if: inputs.upload-sarif == 'true' && github.event_name == 'push' diff --git a/.github/labeler.yml b/.github/labeler.yml index 1b0dfd0400..b9abb1dfd0 100644 --- a/.github/labeler.yml +++ b/.github/labeler.yml @@ -77,6 +77,11 @@ provider/okta: - any-glob-to-any-file: "prowler/providers/okta/**" - any-glob-to-any-file: "tests/providers/okta/**" +provider/linode: + - changed-files: + - any-glob-to-any-file: "prowler/providers/linode/**" + - any-glob-to-any-file: "tests/providers/linode/**" + github_actions: - changed-files: - any-glob-to-any-file: ".github/workflows/*" diff --git a/.github/scripts/osv-scan.sh b/.github/scripts/osv-scan.sh index d9c2e1a901..16afc6668c 100755 --- a/.github/scripts/osv-scan.sh +++ b/.github/scripts/osv-scan.sh @@ -6,8 +6,7 @@ # - .github/workflows/api-security.yml, sdk-security.yml, ui-security.yml # # Severity levels (comma-separated) are read from OSV_SEVERITY_LEVELS. -# Default: HIGH,CRITICAL,UNKNOWN — preserves prior .safety-policy.yml policy -# (ignore-cvss-severity-below: 7 + ignore-cvss-unknown-severity: False). +# Default: CRITICAL — only CVSS >= 9.0 findings fail the scan. # osv-scanner has no native CVSS threshold (google/osv-scanner#1400, closed # not-planned). Severity is derived from $group.max_severity (numeric CVSS # score string) which osv-scanner emits per group. @@ -33,7 +32,7 @@ set -euo pipefail ROOT="$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)" CONFIG="${ROOT}/osv-scanner.toml" -SEVERITY_LEVELS="${OSV_SEVERITY_LEVELS:-HIGH,CRITICAL,UNKNOWN}" +SEVERITY_LEVELS="${OSV_SEVERITY_LEVELS:-CRITICAL}" for bin in osv-scanner jq; do if ! command -v "${bin}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then diff --git a/.github/workflows/api-container-build-push.yml b/.github/workflows/api-container-build-push.yml index d4835db7d5..23f3e7fc6c 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/api-container-build-push.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/api-container-build-push.yml @@ -272,27 +272,3 @@ jobs: payload-file-path: "./.github/scripts/slack-messages/container-release-completed.json" step-outcome: ${{ steps.outcome.outputs.outcome }} update-ts: ${{ needs.notify-release-started.outputs.message-ts }} - - trigger-deployment: - needs: [setup, container-build-push] - if: always() && github.event_name == 'push' && needs.setup.result == 'success' && needs.container-build-push.result == 'success' - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - timeout-minutes: 5 - permissions: - contents: read - - steps: - - name: Harden Runner - uses: step-security/harden-runner@ab7a9404c0f3da075243ca237b5fac12c98deaa5 # v2.19.3 - with: - egress-policy: block - allowed-endpoints: > - api.github.com:443 - - - name: Trigger API deployment - uses: peter-evans/repository-dispatch@28959ce8df70de7be546dd1250a005dd32156697 # v4.0.1 - with: - token: ${{ secrets.PROWLER_BOT_ACCESS_TOKEN }} - repository: ${{ secrets.CLOUD_DISPATCH }} - event-type: api-prowler-deployment - client-payload: '{"sha": "${{ github.sha }}", "short_sha": "${{ needs.setup.outputs.short-sha }}"}' diff --git a/.github/workflows/api-container-checks.yml b/.github/workflows/api-container-checks.yml index 44482e2428..d12bf5d2d4 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/api-container-checks.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/api-container-checks.yml @@ -12,9 +12,6 @@ on: branches: - 'master' - 'v5.*' - paths: - - 'api/**' - - '.github/workflows/api-container-checks.yml' concurrency: group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }} @@ -134,5 +131,5 @@ jobs: with: image-name: ${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }} image-tag: ${{ github.sha }} - fail-on-critical: 'false' + fail-on-critical: 'true' severity: 'CRITICAL' diff --git a/.github/workflows/api-security.yml b/.github/workflows/api-security.yml index ba7f5fe58a..ed4e5476d2 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/api-security.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/api-security.yml @@ -16,13 +16,6 @@ on: branches: - "master" - "v5.*" - paths: - - 'api/**' - - '.github/workflows/api-tests.yml' - - '.github/workflows/api-security.yml' - - '.github/actions/setup-python-uv/**' - - '.github/actions/osv-scanner/**' - - '.github/scripts/osv-scan.sh' concurrency: group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }} diff --git a/.github/workflows/find-secrets.yml b/.github/workflows/find-secrets.yml index 6f8b47d17e..ac3efaaa69 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/find-secrets.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/find-secrets.yml @@ -29,10 +29,11 @@ jobs: with: # We can't block as Trufflehog needs to verify secrets against vendors egress-policy: audit - # allowed-endpoints: > - # github.com:443 - # ghcr.io:443 - # pkg-containers.githubusercontent.com:443 + allowed-endpoints: > + github.com:443 + ghcr.io:443 + pkg-containers.githubusercontent.com:443 + www.formbucket.com:443 - name: Checkout repository uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2 diff --git a/.github/workflows/mcp-container-build-push.yml b/.github/workflows/mcp-container-build-push.yml index 784d8b9595..bcad46ba49 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/mcp-container-build-push.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/mcp-container-build-push.yml @@ -263,27 +263,3 @@ jobs: payload-file-path: "./.github/scripts/slack-messages/container-release-completed.json" step-outcome: ${{ steps.outcome.outputs.outcome }} update-ts: ${{ needs.notify-release-started.outputs.message-ts }} - - trigger-deployment: - needs: [setup, container-build-push] - if: always() && github.event_name == 'push' && needs.setup.result == 'success' && needs.container-build-push.result == 'success' - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - timeout-minutes: 5 - permissions: - contents: read - - steps: - - name: Harden Runner - uses: step-security/harden-runner@ab7a9404c0f3da075243ca237b5fac12c98deaa5 # v2.19.3 - with: - egress-policy: block - allowed-endpoints: > - api.github.com:443 - - - name: Trigger MCP deployment - uses: peter-evans/repository-dispatch@28959ce8df70de7be546dd1250a005dd32156697 # v4.0.1 - with: - token: ${{ secrets.PROWLER_BOT_ACCESS_TOKEN }} - repository: ${{ secrets.CLOUD_DISPATCH }} - event-type: mcp-prowler-deployment - client-payload: '{"sha": "${{ github.sha }}", "short_sha": "${{ needs.setup.outputs.short-sha }}"}' diff --git a/.github/workflows/mcp-container-checks.yml b/.github/workflows/mcp-container-checks.yml index 7493e1b763..23e6ba2984 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/mcp-container-checks.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/mcp-container-checks.yml @@ -12,9 +12,6 @@ on: branches: - 'master' - 'v5.*' - paths: - - 'mcp_server/**' - - '.github/workflows/mcp-container-checks.yml' concurrency: group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }} @@ -127,5 +124,5 @@ jobs: with: image-name: ${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }} image-tag: ${{ github.sha }} - fail-on-critical: 'false' + fail-on-critical: 'true' severity: 'CRITICAL' diff --git a/.github/workflows/mcp-security.yml b/.github/workflows/mcp-security.yml index 66a5cd8c0d..4deb6a478d 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/mcp-security.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/mcp-security.yml @@ -15,12 +15,6 @@ on: branches: - 'master' - 'v5.*' - paths: - - 'mcp_server/pyproject.toml' - - 'mcp_server/uv.lock' - - '.github/workflows/mcp-security.yml' - - '.github/actions/osv-scanner/**' - - '.github/scripts/osv-scan.sh' concurrency: group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }} @@ -30,7 +24,6 @@ permissions: {} jobs: mcp-security-scans: - if: github.repository == 'prowler-cloud/prowler' runs-on: ubuntu-latest timeout-minutes: 15 permissions: diff --git a/.github/workflows/sdk-code-quality.yml b/.github/workflows/sdk-code-quality.yml index 5c76547989..2b1efc69a9 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/sdk-code-quality.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/sdk-code-quality.yml @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ jobs: - '3.10' - '3.11' - '3.12' + - '3.13' steps: - name: Harden Runner diff --git a/.github/workflows/sdk-container-checks.yml b/.github/workflows/sdk-container-checks.yml index 42709ac6f7..2b436db468 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/sdk-container-checks.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/sdk-container-checks.yml @@ -15,12 +15,6 @@ on: branches: - 'master' - 'v5.*' - paths: - - 'prowler/**' - - 'Dockerfile*' - - 'pyproject.toml' - - 'uv.lock' - - '.github/workflows/sdk-container-checks.yml' concurrency: group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }} @@ -111,25 +105,14 @@ jobs: id: check-changes uses: tj-actions/changed-files@9426d40962ed5378910ee2e21d5f8c6fcbf2dd96 # v47.0.6 with: - files: ./** + files: | + prowler/** + Dockerfile* + pyproject.toml + uv.lock + .github/workflows/sdk-container-checks.yml files_ignore: | - .github/** prowler/CHANGELOG.md - docs/** - permissions/** - api/** - ui/** - dashboard/** - mcp_server/** - skills/** - README.md - mkdocs.yml - .backportrc.json - .env - docker-compose* - examples/** - .gitignore - contrib/** **/AGENTS.md - name: Set up Docker Buildx @@ -153,5 +136,5 @@ jobs: with: image-name: ${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }} image-tag: ${{ github.sha }} - fail-on-critical: 'false' + fail-on-critical: 'true' severity: 'CRITICAL' diff --git a/.github/workflows/sdk-security.yml b/.github/workflows/sdk-security.yml index c18f56ea8f..11a7894ce8 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/sdk-security.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/sdk-security.yml @@ -19,16 +19,6 @@ on: branches: - 'master' - 'v5.*' - paths: - - 'prowler/**' - - 'tests/**' - - 'pyproject.toml' - - 'uv.lock' - - '.github/workflows/sdk-tests.yml' - - '.github/workflows/sdk-security.yml' - - '.github/actions/setup-python-uv/**' - - '.github/actions/osv-scanner/**' - - '.github/scripts/osv-scan.sh' concurrency: group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }} @@ -71,27 +61,18 @@ jobs: id: check-changes uses: tj-actions/changed-files@9426d40962ed5378910ee2e21d5f8c6fcbf2dd96 # v47.0.6 with: - files: - ./** + files: | + prowler/** + tests/** + pyproject.toml + uv.lock + .github/workflows/sdk-tests.yml .github/workflows/sdk-security.yml + .github/actions/setup-python-uv/** + .github/actions/osv-scanner/** + .github/scripts/osv-scan.sh files_ignore: | - .github/** prowler/CHANGELOG.md - docs/** - permissions/** - api/** - ui/** - dashboard/** - mcp_server/** - skills/** - README.md - mkdocs.yml - .backportrc.json - .env - docker-compose* - examples/** - .gitignore - contrib/** **/AGENTS.md - name: Setup Python with uv diff --git a/.github/workflows/sdk-tests.yml b/.github/workflows/sdk-tests.yml index 59316c0d95..4fc6cab0b7 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/sdk-tests.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/sdk-tests.yml @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ jobs: - '3.10' - '3.11' - '3.12' + - '3.13' steps: - name: Harden Runner @@ -540,7 +541,7 @@ jobs: with: flags: prowler-py${{ matrix.python-version }}-vercel files: ./vercel_coverage.xml - + # Scaleway Provider - name: Check if Scaleway files changed if: steps.check-changes.outputs.any_changed == 'true' @@ -588,7 +589,31 @@ jobs: with: flags: prowler-py${{ matrix.python-version }}-stackit files: ./stackit_coverage.xml - + + # Linode Provider + - name: Check if Linode files changed + if: steps.check-changes.outputs.any_changed == 'true' + id: changed-linode + uses: tj-actions/changed-files@9426d40962ed5378910ee2e21d5f8c6fcbf2dd96 # v47.0.6 + with: + files: | + ./prowler/**/linode/** + ./tests/**/linode/** + ./uv.lock + + - name: Run Linode tests + if: steps.changed-linode.outputs.any_changed == 'true' + run: uv run pytest -n auto --cov=./prowler/providers/linode --cov-report=xml:linode_coverage.xml tests/providers/linode + + - name: Upload Linode coverage to Codecov + if: steps.changed-linode.outputs.any_changed == 'true' + uses: codecov/codecov-action@671740ac38dd9b0130fbe1cec585b89eea48d3de # v5.5.2 + env: + CODECOV_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CODECOV_TOKEN }} + with: + flags: prowler-py${{ matrix.python-version }}-linode + files: ./linode_coverage.xml + # External Provider (dynamic loading) - name: Check if External Provider files changed if: steps.check-changes.outputs.any_changed == 'true' @@ -608,14 +633,14 @@ jobs: - name: Upload External Provider coverage to Codecov if: steps.changed-external.outputs.any_changed == 'true' - + uses: codecov/codecov-action@671740ac38dd9b0130fbe1cec585b89eea48d3de # v5.5.2 env: CODECOV_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CODECOV_TOKEN }} with: flags: prowler-py${{ matrix.python-version }}-external files: ./external_coverage.xml - + # Lib - name: Check if Lib files changed if: steps.check-changes.outputs.any_changed == 'true' diff --git a/.github/workflows/ui-container-build-push.yml b/.github/workflows/ui-container-build-push.yml index 984256af7f..44768fea80 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/ui-container-build-push.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/ui-container-build-push.yml @@ -32,9 +32,6 @@ env: PROWLERCLOUD_DOCKERHUB_REPOSITORY: prowlercloud PROWLERCLOUD_DOCKERHUB_IMAGE: prowler-ui - # Build args - NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL: http://prowler-api:8080/api/v1 - permissions: {} jobs: @@ -146,7 +143,6 @@ jobs: context: ${{ env.WORKING_DIRECTORY }} build-args: | NEXT_PUBLIC_PROWLER_RELEASE_VERSION=${{ (github.event_name == 'release' || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch') && format('v{0}', env.RELEASE_TAG) || needs.setup.outputs.short-sha }} - NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL=${{ env.NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL }} push: true platforms: ${{ matrix.platform }} tags: | @@ -262,27 +258,3 @@ jobs: payload-file-path: "./.github/scripts/slack-messages/container-release-completed.json" step-outcome: ${{ steps.outcome.outputs.outcome }} update-ts: ${{ needs.notify-release-started.outputs.message-ts }} - - trigger-deployment: - needs: [setup, container-build-push] - if: always() && github.event_name == 'push' && needs.setup.result == 'success' && needs.container-build-push.result == 'success' - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - timeout-minutes: 5 - permissions: - contents: read - - steps: - - name: Harden Runner - uses: step-security/harden-runner@ab7a9404c0f3da075243ca237b5fac12c98deaa5 # v2.19.3 - with: - egress-policy: block - allowed-endpoints: > - api.github.com:443 - - - name: Trigger UI deployment - uses: peter-evans/repository-dispatch@28959ce8df70de7be546dd1250a005dd32156697 # v4.0.1 - with: - token: ${{ secrets.PROWLER_BOT_ACCESS_TOKEN }} - repository: ${{ secrets.CLOUD_DISPATCH }} - event-type: ui-prowler-deployment - client-payload: '{"sha": "${{ github.sha }}", "short_sha": "${{ needs.setup.outputs.short-sha }}"}' diff --git a/.github/workflows/ui-container-checks.yml b/.github/workflows/ui-container-checks.yml index 0eae703fce..a931e50f22 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/ui-container-checks.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/ui-container-checks.yml @@ -12,9 +12,6 @@ on: branches: - 'master' - 'v5.*' - paths: - - 'ui/**' - - '.github/workflows/ui-container-checks.yml' concurrency: group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }} @@ -132,5 +129,5 @@ jobs: with: image-name: ${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }} image-tag: ${{ github.sha }} - fail-on-critical: 'false' + fail-on-critical: 'true' severity: 'CRITICAL' diff --git a/.github/workflows/ui-e2e-tests-v2.yml b/.github/workflows/ui-e2e-tests-v2.yml index 208dcdcb1f..6e0e1e1b6f 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/ui-e2e-tests-v2.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/ui-e2e-tests-v2.yml @@ -81,7 +81,8 @@ jobs: AUTH_SECRET: 'fallback-ci-secret-for-testing' AUTH_TRUST_HOST: true NEXTAUTH_URL: 'http://localhost:3000' - NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL: 'http://localhost:8080/api/v1' + AUTH_URL: 'http://localhost:3000' + UI_API_BASE_URL: 'http://localhost:8080/api/v1' E2E_ADMIN_USER: ${{ secrets.E2E_ADMIN_USER }} E2E_ADMIN_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.E2E_ADMIN_PASSWORD }} E2E_AWS_PROVIDER_ACCOUNT_ID: ${{ secrets.E2E_AWS_PROVIDER_ACCOUNT_ID }} @@ -118,6 +119,14 @@ jobs: E2E_ALIBABACLOUD_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.E2E_ALIBABACLOUD_ACCESS_KEY_ID }} E2E_ALIBABACLOUD_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.E2E_ALIBABACLOUD_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET }} E2E_ALIBABACLOUD_ROLE_ARN: ${{ secrets.E2E_ALIBABACLOUD_ROLE_ARN }} + E2E_OKTA_DOMAIN: ${{ secrets.E2E_OKTA_DOMAIN }} + E2E_OKTA_CLIENT_ID: ${{ secrets.E2E_OKTA_CLIENT_ID }} + E2E_OKTA_BASE64_PRIVATE_KEY: ${{ secrets.E2E_OKTA_BASE64_PRIVATE_KEY }} + E2E_GOOGLEWORKSPACE_CUSTOMER_ID: ${{ secrets.E2E_GOOGLEWORKSPACE_CUSTOMER_ID }} + E2E_GOOGLEWORKSPACE_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_JSON: ${{ secrets.E2E_GOOGLEWORKSPACE_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_JSON }} + E2E_GOOGLEWORKSPACE_DELEGATED_USER: ${{ secrets.E2E_GOOGLEWORKSPACE_DELEGATED_USER }} + E2E_VERCEL_TEAM_ID: ${{ secrets.E2E_VERCEL_TEAM_ID }} + E2E_VERCEL_API_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_VERCEL_API_TOKEN }} # Pass E2E paths from impact analysis E2E_TEST_PATHS: ${{ needs.impact-analysis.outputs.ui-e2e }} RUN_ALL_TESTS: ${{ needs.impact-analysis.outputs.run-all }} @@ -198,7 +207,7 @@ jobs: timeout=150 elapsed=0 while [ $elapsed -lt $timeout ]; do - if curl -s ${NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL}/docs >/dev/null 2>&1; then + if curl -s ${UI_API_BASE_URL}/docs >/dev/null 2>&1; then echo "Prowler API is ready!" exit 0 fi diff --git a/.github/workflows/ui-security.yml b/.github/workflows/ui-security.yml index 470fae1f9c..2dc444654f 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/ui-security.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/ui-security.yml @@ -15,12 +15,6 @@ on: branches: - 'master' - 'v5.*' - paths: - - 'ui/package.json' - - 'ui/pnpm-lock.yaml' - - '.github/workflows/ui-security.yml' - - '.github/actions/osv-scanner/**' - - '.github/scripts/osv-scan.sh' concurrency: group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }} @@ -30,7 +24,6 @@ permissions: {} jobs: ui-security-scans: - if: github.repository == 'prowler-cloud/prowler' runs-on: ubuntu-latest timeout-minutes: 15 permissions: diff --git a/.github/workflows/ui-tests.yml b/.github/workflows/ui-tests.yml index 918755a629..2dc50a26bb 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/ui-tests.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/ui-tests.yml @@ -131,6 +131,10 @@ jobs: if: steps.check-changes.outputs.any_changed == 'true' run: pnpm run healthcheck + - name: Check product-tour alignment + if: steps.check-changes.outputs.any_changed == 'true' + run: pnpm run tour:check + - name: Run pnpm audit if: steps.check-changes.outputs.any_changed == 'true' run: pnpm run audit diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index 4d73ffe990..6c11a8698c 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -169,3 +169,7 @@ GEMINI.md # Claude Code .claude/* + +# Docker +docker-compose.override.yml +docker-compose-dev.override.yml diff --git a/.pre-commit-config.yaml b/.pre-commit-config.yaml index 4e79141bb7..159c1f5a16 100644 --- a/.pre-commit-config.yaml +++ b/.pre-commit-config.yaml @@ -7,6 +7,10 @@ # P50 — dependency validation default_install_hook_types: [pre-commit] +# Hooks run on commit only by default; +# NOTE: default_stages does NOT override a hook's manifest stages, so fixers shipping pre-push in their +# manifest need an explicit stages: ["pre-commit"] below to stay off push. +default_stages: [pre-commit] repos: ## GENERAL (prek built-in — no external repo needed) @@ -21,13 +25,16 @@ repos: - id: check-json priority: 10 - id: end-of-file-fixer + stages: ["pre-commit"] priority: 0 - id: trailing-whitespace + stages: ["pre-commit"] priority: 0 - id: no-commit-to-branch priority: 10 - id: pretty-format-json args: ["--autofix", --no-sort-keys, --no-ensure-ascii] + stages: ["pre-commit"] priority: 10 ## TOML @@ -82,6 +89,7 @@ repos: name: "SDK - isort" files: { glob: ["{prowler,tests,dashboard,util,scripts}/**/*.py"] } args: ["--profile", "black"] + stages: ["pre-commit"] priority: 20 - repo: https://github.com/psf/black @@ -102,17 +110,36 @@ repos: priority: 30 ## PYTHON — API + MCP Server (ruff) - - repo: https://github.com/astral-sh/ruff-pre-commit - rev: v0.15.11 + # Run ruff through `uv run` against each project so prek uses the exact ruff + # version pinned in that project's uv.lock — the same version GitHub Actions + # runs via `uv run ruff`. This removes the drift between the local hooks and + # CI. api/ and mcp_server/ are separate uv projects, so they need separate + # hooks (each `uv run --project` resolves its own pinned ruff + config). + - repo: local hooks: - - id: ruff - name: "API + MCP - ruff check" - files: { glob: ["{api,mcp_server}/**/*.py"] } - args: ["--fix"] + - id: ruff-check-api + name: "API - ruff check" + entry: uv run --project ./api ruff check --fix + language: system + files: { glob: ["api/**/*.py"] } priority: 30 - - id: ruff-format - name: "API + MCP - ruff format" - files: { glob: ["{api,mcp_server}/**/*.py"] } + - id: ruff-format-api + name: "API - ruff format" + entry: uv run --project ./api ruff format + language: system + files: { glob: ["api/**/*.py"] } + priority: 20 + - id: ruff-check-mcp + name: "MCP - ruff check" + entry: uv run --project ./mcp_server ruff check --fix + language: system + files: { glob: ["mcp_server/**/*.py"] } + priority: 30 + - id: ruff-format-mcp + name: "MCP - ruff format" + entry: uv run --project ./mcp_server ruff format + language: system + files: { glob: ["mcp_server/**/*.py"] } priority: 20 ## PYTHON — uv (API + SDK) diff --git a/.trivyignore b/.trivyignore new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..744c94a193 --- /dev/null +++ b/.trivyignore @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +# Trivy ignore file for prowlercloud/prowler SDK container image. +# Each entry below documents (a) the affected package and why it ships in the +# image, (b) why the CVE is not exploitable in Prowler's runtime, and (c) the +# upstream fix status. Entries carry an expiry so they auto-force re-review. +# Entries are scoped per-package so suppressions cannot drift onto unrelated +# packages that may be assigned the same CVE in the future. +# +# Scanned by: .github/actions/trivy-scan via .github/workflows/sdk-container-checks.yml + +# CVE-2026-42496 — perl-archive-tar path traversal via crafted symlinks. +# CVE-2026-8376 — perl heap buffer overflow when compiling regex. +# Packages: perl, perl-base, perl-modules-5.36, libperl5.36. +# Why ignored: perl-base is part of Debian's "Essential: yes" set; it cannot be +# removed without breaking dpkg. The Prowler SDK does not invoke perl at runtime; +# neither vulnerable code path (Archive::Tar parsing or regex compilation of +# attacker-controlled input) is reachable from Prowler. No Debian bookworm fix +# is available yet. +CVE-2026-42496 pkg:perl exp:2026-07-15 +CVE-2026-42496 pkg:perl-base exp:2026-07-15 +CVE-2026-42496 pkg:perl-modules-5.36 exp:2026-07-15 +CVE-2026-42496 pkg:libperl5.36 exp:2026-07-15 +CVE-2026-8376 pkg:perl exp:2026-07-15 +CVE-2026-8376 pkg:perl-base exp:2026-07-15 +CVE-2026-8376 pkg:perl-modules-5.36 exp:2026-07-15 +CVE-2026-8376 pkg:libperl5.36 exp:2026-07-15 + +# CVE-2025-7458 — SQLite integer overflow. +# Package: libsqlite3-0. +# Why ignored: transitive dependency of CPython's stdlib sqlite3 module. The +# Prowler SDK does not open user-supplied SQLite databases; SQLite usage is +# internal and bounded. No Debian bookworm fix is available. +CVE-2025-7458 pkg:libsqlite3-0 exp:2026-07-15 + +# CVE-2026-43185 — Linux kernel ksmbd signedness bug. +# Package: linux-libc-dev. +# Why ignored: linux-libc-dev ships kernel headers for build-time compilation, +# not a running kernel. Containers execute against the host kernel, so these +# headers are inert at runtime. The upstream fix landed in kernel 7.0-rc2 and +# has not been backported to Debian's 6.1 LTS line. +CVE-2026-43185 pkg:linux-libc-dev exp:2026-07-15 + +# CVE-2023-45853 — zlib MiniZip integer overflow / heap overflow in +# zipOpenNewFileInZip4_64. +# Packages: zlib1g, zlib1g-dev. +# Why ignored: Debian Security Tracker status for bookworm is , with +# the published rationale "contrib/minizip not built and src:zlib not producing +# binary packages" — i.e. the vulnerable symbol is not present in the libz.so +# shipped by Debian. Real-not-affected, not unpatched. Upstream fix is in +# zlib 1.3.1, available in Debian trixie (13); migrating the base image would +# clear it fully. +# Ref: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-45853 +CVE-2023-45853 pkg:zlib1g exp:2026-07-15 +CVE-2023-45853 pkg:zlib1g-dev exp:2026-07-15 + +# CVE-2026-55200 — libssh2 out-of-bounds write in ssh2_transport_read() due to +# an unchecked packet_length field in transport.c (heap corruption, possible RCE). +# Package: libssh2-1. +# Why ignored: libssh2-1 is pulled in only as a transitive dependency of libcurl4 +# (installed in the SDK Dockerfile for the networking/PowerShell stack). The +# vulnerable path is reached exclusively when libssh2 acts as an SSH/SCP/SFTP +# client parsing transport packets from a server. Prowler never uses libcurl's +# SSH/SCP/SFTP transports; it talks to cloud provider HTTPS endpoints only, so the +# affected code is unreachable at runtime. Fixed upstream in libssh2 commit +# 97acf3df (PR #2052); no Debian bookworm fix is available yet. +# Ref: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-55200 +CVE-2026-55200 pkg:libssh2-1 exp:2026-07-15 + +# --- API container image (api/Dockerfile) --- +# The entries below are specific to the Prowler API image, which ships +# PowerShell and additional build tooling on top of the same bookworm base. + +# CVE-2026-7210 — CPython/Expat hash-flooding denial of service in +# `xml.parsers.expat` and `xml.etree.ElementTree`. +# Packages: the Debian system Python 3.11 (python3.11*, libpython3.11*). +# Why ignored: the API runs under the Python 3.12 interpreter shipped in its +# `.venv`; the system `python3.11` is only present because `python3-dev` is +# pulled in to compile native extensions (xmlsec, lxml) and is never executed +# at runtime. The vulnerable path requires parsing attacker-controlled XML with +# the affected interpreter, which Prowler does not do with the system Python. +# Full mitigation also needs libexpat >= 2.8.0; no Debian bookworm fix yet. +CVE-2026-7210 pkg:python3.11 exp:2026-07-15 +CVE-2026-7210 pkg:python3.11-dev exp:2026-07-15 +CVE-2026-7210 pkg:python3.11-minimal exp:2026-07-15 +CVE-2026-7210 pkg:libpython3.11 exp:2026-07-15 +CVE-2026-7210 pkg:libpython3.11-dev exp:2026-07-15 +CVE-2026-7210 pkg:libpython3.11-minimal exp:2026-07-15 +CVE-2026-7210 pkg:libpython3.11-stdlib exp:2026-07-15 + +# CVE-2026-33278 — Unbound DNSSEC validator use-after-free (DoS, possible RCE). +# CVE-2026-42960 — Unbound DNS cache poisoning via promiscuous additional records. +# Package: libunbound8. +# Why ignored: libunbound8 is a transitive apt dependency of the TLS/networking +# stack (GnuTLS DANE support); only the shared library ships in the image. Both +# vulnerabilities require operating a live Unbound recursive DNSSEC validator +# that processes attacker-influenced DNS responses. Prowler never starts an +# Unbound resolver, so neither code path is reachable. No Debian bookworm fix yet. +CVE-2026-33278 pkg:libunbound8 exp:2026-07-15 +CVE-2026-42960 pkg:libunbound8 exp:2026-07-15 diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md index 1cf023889c..c9d63a8c27 100644 --- a/AGENTS.md +++ b/AGENTS.md @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ Use these skills for detailed patterns on-demand: | `django-migration-psql` | Django migration best practices for PostgreSQL | [SKILL.md](skills/django-migration-psql/SKILL.md) | | `postgresql-indexing` | PostgreSQL indexing, EXPLAIN, monitoring, maintenance | [SKILL.md](skills/postgresql-indexing/SKILL.md) | | `prowler-attack-paths-query` | Create Attack Paths openCypher queries | [SKILL.md](skills/prowler-attack-paths-query/SKILL.md) | +| `prowler-tour` | Keep product-tour definitions aligned with the UI | [SKILL.md](skills/prowler-tour/SKILL.md) | | `gh-aw` | GitHub Agentic Workflows (gh-aw) | [SKILL.md](skills/gh-aw/SKILL.md) | | `skill-creator` | Create new AI agent skills | [SKILL.md](skills/skill-creator/SKILL.md) | @@ -67,10 +68,12 @@ When performing these actions, ALWAYS invoke the corresponding skill FIRST: | Adding new providers | `prowler-provider` | | Adding privilege escalation detection queries | `prowler-attack-paths-query` | | Adding services to existing providers | `prowler-provider` | +| Adding, updating, or removing a tour definition (*.tour.ts) | `prowler-tour` | | After creating/modifying a skill | `skill-sync` | | App Router / Server Actions | `nextjs-16` | | Auditing check-to-requirement mappings as a cloud auditor | `prowler-compliance` | | Building AI chat features | `ai-sdk-5` | +| Changing button labels or section headings on a tour-covered page | `prowler-tour` | | Committing changes | `prowler-commit` | | Configuring MCP servers in agentic workflows | `gh-aw` | | Create PR that requires changelog entry | `prowler-changelog` | @@ -89,6 +92,7 @@ When performing these actions, ALWAYS invoke the corresponding skill FIRST: | Creating/updating compliance frameworks | `prowler-compliance` | | Debug why a GitHub Actions job is failing | `prowler-ci` | | Debugging gh-aw compilation errors | `gh-aw` | +| Editing a UI file containing data-tour-id attributes | `prowler-tour` | | Fill .github/pull_request_template.md (Context/Description/Steps to review/Checklist) | `prowler-pr` | | Fixing bug | `tdd` | | Fixing compliance JSON bugs (duplicate IDs, empty Section, stale refs) | `prowler-compliance` | @@ -105,6 +109,8 @@ When performing these actions, ALWAYS invoke the corresponding skill FIRST: | Modifying gh-aw workflow frontmatter or safe-outputs | `gh-aw` | | Refactoring code | `tdd` | | Regenerate AGENTS.md Auto-invoke tables (sync.sh) | `skill-sync` | +| Renaming or removing a data-tour-id attribute value | `prowler-tour` | +| Restructuring routes or layouts covered by a tour | `prowler-tour` | | Review PR requirements: template, title conventions, changelog gate | `prowler-pr` | | Review changelog format and conventions | `prowler-changelog` | | Reviewing JSON:API compliance | `jsonapi` | diff --git a/Dockerfile b/Dockerfile index 0ab4458fad..205fa239be 100644 --- a/Dockerfile +++ b/Dockerfile @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -FROM python:3.12.11-slim-bookworm@sha256:519591d6871b7bc437060736b9f7456b8731f1499a57e22e6c285135ae657bf7 AS build +FROM python:3.12.13-slim-bookworm@sha256:76d4b7b6305788c6b4c6a19d6a22a3921bf802e9af4d5e1e5bd771208dba74bf AS build LABEL maintainer="https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler" LABEL org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler" @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ LABEL org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler" ARG POWERSHELL_VERSION=7.5.0 ENV POWERSHELL_VERSION=${POWERSHELL_VERSION} -ARG TRIVY_VERSION=0.70.0 +ARG TRIVY_VERSION=0.71.2 ENV TRIVY_VERSION=${TRIVY_VERSION} ARG ZIZMOR_VERSION=1.24.1 @@ -95,6 +95,18 @@ RUN uv sync --locked --compile-bytecode && \ # Install PowerShell modules RUN .venv/bin/python prowler/providers/m365/lib/powershell/m365_powershell.py +USER root + +# Remove build-only packages from the final image after Python dependencies are installed. +RUN apt-get purge -y --auto-remove \ + build-essential \ + pkg-config \ + libzstd-dev \ + zlib1g-dev \ + && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* + +USER prowler + # Remove deprecated dash dependencies RUN pip uninstall dash-html-components -y && \ pip uninstall dash-core-components -y diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 8bdb9bf156..b05a7dc2db 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,5 +1,34 @@ .DEFAULT_GOAL:=help +DEV_LOCAL := ./scripts/development/dev-local.sh + +.PHONY: dev dev-setup dev-attach dev-launch dev-stop dev-clean dev-wipe dev-status + +##@ Local Development +dev: ## Start local API, worker, and database logs + $(DEV_LOCAL) all + +dev-setup: ## Bootstrap local dependencies, migrations, and fixtures + $(DEV_LOCAL) setup + +dev-attach: ## Attach to the local tmux development session + $(DEV_LOCAL) attach + +dev-launch: ## Start the local stack on fixed ports and attach + $(DEV_LOCAL) launch + +dev-stop: ## Stop the local tmux session and containers + $(DEV_LOCAL) kill + +dev-clean: ## Remove stopped local development containers + $(DEV_LOCAL) clean + +dev-wipe: ## Stop everything and delete local development data + $(DEV_LOCAL) wipe + +dev-status: ## Show local development container status + $(DEV_LOCAL) status + ##@ Testing test: ## Test with pytest rm -rf .coverage && \ @@ -16,18 +45,41 @@ coverage-html: ## Show Test Coverage coverage html && \ open htmlcov/index.html -##@ Linting -format: ## Format Code - @echo "Running black..." - black . +##@ Code Quality +# `make` is the single entrypoint and mirrors CI exactly (uv run + same flags): +# SDK (prowler/, util/) -> flake8 + black + pylint +# API & MCP server -> ruff (rules live in each project's pyproject.toml) +# `format` applies fixes (incl. ruff's import/upgrade autofixes); `lint` only +# verifies and is what CI gates on. +.PHONY: format format-sdk format-api format-mcp lint lint-sdk lint-api lint-mcp -lint: ## Lint Code - @echo "Running flake8..." - flake8 . --ignore=E266,W503,E203,E501,W605,E128 --exclude .venv,contrib - @echo "Running black... " - black --check . - @echo "Running pylint..." - pylint --disable=W,C,R,E -j 0 prowler util +format: format-sdk format-api format-mcp ## Format & autofix all components (SDK, API, MCP) + +lint: lint-sdk lint-api lint-mcp ## Lint all components (SDK, API, MCP) — mirrors CI + +format-sdk: ## Format SDK code (black) + uv run black --exclude "\.venv|api|ui|skills|mcp_server" . + +lint-sdk: ## Lint SDK code (flake8, black --check, pylint) + uv run flake8 . --ignore=E266,W503,E203,E501,W605,E128 --exclude .venv,contrib,ui,api,skills,mcp_server + uv run black --exclude "\.venv|api|ui|skills|mcp_server" --check . + uv run pylint --disable=W,C,R,E -j 0 -rn -sn prowler/ + +format-api: ## Format & autofix API code (ruff) + cd api && uv run ruff check . --exclude contrib --fix + cd api && uv run ruff format . --exclude contrib + +lint-api: ## Lint API code (ruff check + format --check) + cd api && uv run ruff check . --exclude contrib + cd api && uv run ruff format --check . --exclude contrib + +format-mcp: ## Format & autofix MCP server code (ruff) + cd mcp_server && uv run ruff check . --fix + cd mcp_server && uv run ruff format . + +lint-mcp: ## Lint MCP server code (ruff check + format --check) + cd mcp_server && uv run ruff check . + cd mcp_server && uv run ruff format --check . ##@ PyPI pypi-clean: ## Delete the distribution files diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 74e91021ca..e2314d8a69 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -83,16 +83,35 @@ prowler dashboard ## Attack Paths -Attack Paths automatically extends every completed AWS scan with a Neo4j graph that combines Cartography's cloud inventory with Prowler findings. The feature runs in the API worker after each scan and therefore requires: +Attack Paths automatically extends every completed AWS scan with a graph that combines Cartography's cloud inventory with Prowler findings. The feature runs in the API worker after each scan. -- An accessible Neo4j instance (the Docker Compose files already ships a `neo4j` service). -- The following environment variables so Django and Celery can connect: +Two graph backends are supported as the long-lived sink: - | Variable | Description | Default | - | --- | --- | --- | - | `NEO4J_HOST` | Hostname used by the API containers. | `neo4j` | - | `NEO4J_PORT` | Bolt port exposed by Neo4j. | `7687` | - | `NEO4J_USER` / `NEO4J_PASSWORD` | Credentials with rights to create per-tenant databases. | `neo4j` / `neo4j_password` | +- **Neo4j** (default; the Docker Compose files already ship a `neo4j` service). +- **Amazon Neptune** (cloud-managed; opt-in). + +Select the sink with `ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE` (`neo4j` or `neptune`; default `neo4j`). + +> Note: Cartography ingestion always uses a temporary Neo4j database, regardless of the configured sink. The `NEO4J_*` variables below must remain set even when `ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE=neptune`. + +### Neo4j sink + +| Variable | Description | Default | +| --- | --- | --- | +| `NEO4J_HOST` | Hostname used by the API containers. | `neo4j` | +| `NEO4J_PORT` | Bolt port exposed by Neo4j. | `7687` | +| `NEO4J_USER` / `NEO4J_PASSWORD` | Credentials with rights to create per-tenant databases. | `neo4j` / `neo4j_password` | + +### Neptune sink + +| Variable | Description | Default | +| --- | --- | --- | +| `NEPTUNE_WRITER_ENDPOINT` | Bolt host for the Neptune writer instance. Required when sink is `neptune`. | _empty_ | +| `NEPTUNE_READER_ENDPOINT` | Optional reader endpoint for read-only queries. Falls back to the writer when unset. | _empty_ | +| `NEPTUNE_PORT` | Bolt port exposed by Neptune. | `8182` | +| `AWS_REGION` | Region the Neptune cluster lives in. Required when sink is `neptune`. | _empty_ | + +Neptune authenticates with SigV4 using the standard boto3 credential chain. The worker's IAM role (or `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID` / `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`) supplies the credentials. There is no Neptune password variable. Every AWS provider scan will enqueue an Attack Paths ingestion job automatically. Other cloud providers will be added in future iterations. @@ -104,26 +123,27 @@ Every AWS provider scan will enqueue an Attack Paths ingestion job automatically | Provider | Checks | Services | [Compliance Frameworks](https://docs.prowler.com/projects/prowler-open-source/en/latest/tutorials/compliance/) | [Categories](https://docs.prowler.com/projects/prowler-open-source/en/latest/tutorials/misc/#categories) | Support | Interface | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| -| AWS | 600 | 84 | 44 | 18 | Official | UI, API, CLI | -| Azure | 167 | 22 | 19 | 16 | Official | UI, API, CLI | -| GCP | 102 | 18 | 17 | 12 | Official | UI, API, CLI | -| Kubernetes | 83 | 7 | 7 | 11 | Official | UI, API, CLI | -| GitHub | 24 | 3 | 1 | 5 | Official | UI, API, CLI | -| M365 | 102 | 10 | 4 | 10 | Official | UI, API, CLI | -| OCI | 51 | 14 | 4 | 10 | Official | UI, API, CLI | -| Alibaba Cloud | 63 | 9 | 4 | 9 | Official | UI, API, CLI | -| Cloudflare | 29 | 3 | 0 | 5 | Official | UI, API, CLI | +| AWS | 615 | 86 | 47 | 19 | Official | UI, API, CLI | +| Azure | 190 | 22 | 21 | 16 | Official | UI, API, CLI | +| GCP | 109 | 20 | 19 | 12 | Official | UI, API, CLI | +| Kubernetes | 90 | 7 | 8 | 11 | Official | UI, API, CLI | +| GitHub | 24 | 3 | 2 | 5 | Official | UI, API, CLI | +| M365 | 109 | 10 | 6 | 10 | Official | UI, API, CLI | +| OCI | 52 | 14 | 5 | 10 | Official | UI, API, CLI | +| Alibaba Cloud | 63 | 9 | 6 | 9 | Official | UI, API, CLI | +| Cloudflare | 29 | 3 | 2 | 5 | Official | UI, API, CLI | | IaC | [See `trivy` docs.](https://trivy.dev/latest/docs/coverage/iac/) | N/A | N/A | N/A | Official | UI, API, CLI | -| MongoDB Atlas | 10 | 3 | 0 | 8 | Official | UI, API, CLI | +| MongoDB Atlas | 10 | 3 | 1 | 8 | Official | UI, API, CLI | | LLM | [See `promptfoo` docs.](https://www.promptfoo.dev/docs/red-team/plugins/) | N/A | N/A | N/A | Official | CLI | | Image | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Official | CLI, API | -| Google Workspace | 39 | 5 | 2 | 5 | Official | UI, API, CLI | -| OpenStack | 34 | 5 | 0 | 9 | Official | UI, API, CLI | -| Vercel | 26 | 6 | 0 | 8 | Official | UI, API, CLI | -| Okta | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Official | CLI | -| Scaleway [Contact us](https://prowler.com/contact) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Unofficial | CLI | -| StackIT [Contact us](https://prowler.com/contact) | 7 | 2 | 0 | 3 | Unofficial | CLI | -| NHN | 6 | 2 | 1 | 0 | Unofficial | CLI | +| Google Workspace | 65 | 11 | 3 | 6 | Official | UI, API, CLI | +| OpenStack | 34 | 5 | 1 | 9 | Official | UI, API, CLI | +| Vercel | 26 | 6 | 1 | 8 | Official | UI, API, CLI | +| Okta | 29 | 8 | 2 | 2 | Official | UI, API, CLI | +| Linode [Contact us](https://prowler.com/contact) | 10 | 3 | 1 | 4 | Unofficial | CLI | +| Scaleway [Contact us](https://prowler.com/contact) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Unofficial | CLI | +| StackIT [Contact us](https://prowler.com/contact) | 7 | 2 | 1 | 3 | Unofficial | CLI | +| NHN | 6 | 2 | 2 | 0 | Unofficial | CLI | > [!Note] > The numbers in the table are updated periodically. diff --git a/api/.env.example b/api/.env.example index 0be5388790..f97d868890 100644 --- a/api/.env.example +++ b/api/.env.example @@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ DJANGO_THROTTLE_TOKEN_OBTAIN=50/minute # Decide whether to allow Django manage database table partitions DJANGO_MANAGE_DB_PARTITIONS=[True|False] DJANGO_CELERY_DEADLOCK_ATTEMPTS=5 +# Optional: bound Celery's prefork pool size. Unset → Celery uses os.cpu_count(). +# Useful on Kubernetes nodes with many CPUs where unbounded prefork balloons memory. +# DJANGO_CELERY_WORKER_CONCURRENCY=4 DJANGO_BROKER_VISIBILITY_TIMEOUT=86400 DJANGO_SENTRY_DSN= diff --git a/api/CHANGELOG.md b/api/CHANGELOG.md index cc86538823..067bb192a6 100644 --- a/api/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/api/CHANGELOG.md @@ -2,6 +2,76 @@ All notable changes to the **Prowler API** are documented in this file. +## [1.33.0] (Prowler UNRELEASED) + +### 🔄 Changed + +- Attack Paths: AWS Neptune is now supported as a persistent sink database, selectable via `ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE=neptune` (default `neo4j`), Cartography's (bumped to 0.138.1) per-scan ingest database stays on Neo4j [(#11524)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11524) +- Attack Paths: Scan task now checks the ingest Neo4j database and configured graph sink before starting graph ingestion [(#11743)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11743) + +--- + +## [1.32.2] (Prowler UNRELEASED) + +### 🐞 Fixed + +- `scan-perform` no longer reports an error when a provider is deleted during a running scan [(#11696)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11696) + +--- + +## [1.32.1] (Prowler v5.31.1) + +### 🐞 Fixed + +- API key auth no longer mutates `TenantAPIKey.objects` during admin DB lookups [(#11686)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11686) + +--- + +## [1.32.0] (Prowler v5.31.0) + +### 🚀 Added + +- Provider group filters for API endpoints that support cloud provider filtering, including exact and `__in` variants [(#11573)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11573) +- Provider filters for `GET /api/v1/compliance-overviews`, `/metadata`, and `/requirements`, using latest completed scans per matching provider [(#11587)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11587) +- Server-Sent Events (SSE) infrastructure for the API: a base viewset, a tenant-aware channel manager, and channel-name helpers backed by `django-eventstream` over Valkey Pub/Sub and served through the Gunicorn ASGI worker, so feature endpoints can stream events to clients over a single long-lived connection [(#11556)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11556) +- `DJANGO_CELERY_WORKER_CONCURRENCY` to configure Celery workers concurrency. Unset for default behaviour [(#11075)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11075) + +### 🔄 Changed + +- Gunicorn worker timeout raised from the 30s default to 120s, so long-running requests are no longer killed prematurely [(#11631)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11631) +- Sentry now drops ASGI's `RequestAborted` errors from health-check probe disconnects on `/health/live` [(#11632)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11632) +- Gunicorn keep-alive timeout now exceeds the load balancer idle timeout, stopping 502s from reused connections [(#11647)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11647) +- API runs under the Uvicorn worker so keep-alive outlives the load balancer idle timeout, fixing Gunicorn's intermittent 502s [(#11663)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11663) +- SAML logins no longer wipe a user's roles when the IdP does not send the `userType` attribute; existing roles are kept, and when `userType` names a role that does not exist it is now created with read-only access (visibility over all providers, no management permissions) instead of no permissions at all [(#11520)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11520) + +### 🐞 Fixed + +- Database connections no longer leak under the ASGI worker, which previously exhausted the read replica's connection slots and caused 500s on read endpoints [(#11640)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11640) + +### 🔐 Security + +- `aiohttp` to 3.14.0 and `idna` to 3.15, patching known CVEs [(#11596)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11596) +- Container base image to `python:3.12.13-slim-bookworm` and `trivy` to 0.71.0, patching OS and Go module CVEs [(#11596)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11596) +- `trivy` binary bumped to 0.71.0 patching embedded `golang.org/x/crypto`, `golang.org/x/net`, and Go `stdlib` CVEs [(#11592)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11592) + +--- + +## [1.31.3] (Prowler v5.30.3) + +### 🔐 Security + +- SAML logins now link to an existing account only when the asserted email domain matches the ACS endpoint and the user is already a member of that domain's tenant, fixing a cross-tenant account takeover [(GHSA-h8m9-jgf8-vwvp)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/security/advisories/GHSA-h8m9-jgf8-vwvp) + +--- + +## [1.31.2] (Prowler v5.30.2) + +### 🔄 Changed + +- `scan-compliance-overviews` task now streams the findings aggregation and the requirement-row writes so it runs faster and its peak memory no longer grows with the number of regions and frameworks [(#11591)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11591) + +--- + ## [1.31.1] (Prowler v5.30.1) ### 🐞 Fixed diff --git a/api/Dockerfile b/api/Dockerfile index 259492cb08..9da0ffafed 100644 --- a/api/Dockerfile +++ b/api/Dockerfile @@ -1,11 +1,11 @@ -FROM python:3.12.10-slim-bookworm@sha256:fd95fa221297a88e1cf49c55ec1828edd7c5a428187e67b5d1805692d11588db AS build +FROM python:3.12.13-slim-bookworm@sha256:76d4b7b6305788c6b4c6a19d6a22a3921bf802e9af4d5e1e5bd771208dba74bf AS build LABEL maintainer="https://github.com/prowler-cloud/api" ARG POWERSHELL_VERSION=7.5.0 ENV POWERSHELL_VERSION=${POWERSHELL_VERSION} -ARG TRIVY_VERSION=0.70.0 +ARG TRIVY_VERSION=0.71.2 ENV TRIVY_VERSION=${TRIVY_VERSION} ARG ZIZMOR_VERSION=1.24.1 @@ -102,6 +102,23 @@ RUN uv sync --locked --no-install-project && \ RUN .venv/bin/python .venv/lib/python3.12/site-packages/prowler/providers/m365/lib/powershell/m365_powershell.py +USER root + +# Remove build-only packages from the final image after Python dependencies are installed. +RUN apt-get purge -y --auto-remove \ + gcc \ + g++ \ + make \ + libxml2-dev \ + libxmlsec1-dev \ + pkg-config \ + libtool \ + libxslt1-dev \ + python3-dev \ + && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* + +USER prowler + COPY --chown=prowler:prowler src/backend/ ./backend/ COPY --chown=prowler:prowler docker-entrypoint.sh ./docker-entrypoint.sh diff --git a/api/README.md b/api/README.md index ea9661366f..c510479ab2 100644 --- a/api/README.md +++ b/api/README.md @@ -196,6 +196,42 @@ python -m celery -A config.celery worker -l info -E The Celery worker does not detect and reload changes in the code, so you need to restart it manually when you make changes. +### Makefile-Assisted Local Deployment + +This method is an additional local development workflow. It does not replace the manual local deployment or the Docker deployment described in this guide. + +PostgreSQL, Valkey, and Neo4j run with Docker Compose, while Django and the Celery worker run natively through `uv`. Additionally, this workflow creates a `tmux` session with panes for the API, worker, and PostgreSQL logs. + +Before using this method, ensure `docker compose`, `tmux`, and `uv` are installed. + +This workflow is designed for macOS and should also work on Linux when Docker, `tmux`, and `uv` are available. Windows requires script changes before it can be supported. + +From the repository root, run: + +```console +make dev +``` + +The API will be available at: + +```console +http://localhost:8080/api/v1 +``` + +Use these commands to manage the local stack: + +```console +make dev-setup # Bootstrap dependencies, migrations, and fixtures +make dev-attach # Attach to the tmux session +make dev-launch # Start the stack on fixed ports and attach +make dev-stop # Stop the tmux session and containers +make dev-clean # Remove stopped development containers +make dev-wipe # Stop everything and delete local development data +make dev-status # Show development container status +``` + +This workflow does not start the UI. Start it separately from the `ui/` directory when needed. + ### Docker deployment This method requires `docker` and `docker compose`. diff --git a/api/docker-entrypoint.sh b/api/docker-entrypoint.sh index 9b2964b479..e077a3bfd6 100755 --- a/api/docker-entrypoint.sh +++ b/api/docker-entrypoint.sh @@ -21,13 +21,19 @@ apply_fixtures() { } start_dev_server() { - echo "Starting the development server..." - exec uv run python manage.py runserver 0.0.0.0:"${DJANGO_PORT:-8080}" + echo "Starting the development server (Gunicorn ASGI, debug + reload)..." + # Same server/worker as prod (config.asgi via the native `asgi` worker), so + # SSE streams run on the event loop exactly as they do in production. DEBUG is + # on so guniconf's `reload = DEBUG` hot-reloads edited code (and flips + # `preload_app` off so reload actually takes). + export DJANGO_DEBUG="${DJANGO_DEBUG:-True}" + export DJANGO_BIND_ADDRESS="${DJANGO_BIND_ADDRESS:-0.0.0.0}" + exec uv run gunicorn -c config/guniconf.py config.asgi:application } start_prod_server() { echo "Starting the Gunicorn server..." - exec uv run gunicorn -c config/guniconf.py config.wsgi:application + exec uv run gunicorn -c config/guniconf.py config.asgi:application } resolve_worker_hostname() { diff --git a/api/docs/orphan-task-recovery.md b/api/docs/orphan-task-recovery.md index a47b4f36a9..af4eefc1ac 100644 --- a/api/docs/orphan-task-recovery.md +++ b/api/docs/orphan-task-recovery.md @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ All settings have safe defaults; override via environment variables. | Env var | Default | Purpose | | --- | --- | --- | | `DJANGO_CELERY_WORKER_PREFETCH_MULTIPLIER` | `1` | Tasks reserved per worker process. | +| `DJANGO_CELERY_WORKER_CONCURRENCY` | unset | Optional Celery prefork pool size. When unset, Celery uses its CPU-based default. Set this on worker containers to bound idle memory on hosts with many CPUs. | | `DJANGO_CELERY_WORKER_SOFT_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT` | `60` | Seconds the worker drains/re-queues on `SIGTERM` before force-kill. | | `DJANGO_CELERY_TASK_TIME_LIMIT` | `21600` (6h) | Hard limit for most tasks; connection checks are capped at 120s. | | `DJANGO_CELERY_TASK_SOFT_TIME_LIMIT` | hard - 600 | Soft limit; raises `SoftTimeLimitExceeded` for cleanup. | diff --git a/api/pyproject.toml b/api/pyproject.toml index 2b34eb6e19..5d55a6bcf4 100644 --- a/api/pyproject.toml +++ b/api/pyproject.toml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ dev = [ "pytest-env==1.1.3", "pytest-randomly==3.15.0", "pytest-xdist==3.6.1", - "ruff==0.5.0", + "ruff==0.15.11", "tqdm==4.67.1", "vulture==2.14", "prek==0.3.9" @@ -41,7 +41,9 @@ dependencies = [ "drf-spectacular==0.27.2", "drf-spectacular-jsonapi==0.5.1", "defusedxml==0.7.1", - "gunicorn==23.0.0", + "django-eventstream==5.3.3", + "gunicorn==26.0.0", + "uvloop==0.22.1", "lxml==6.1.0", "prowler @ git+https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler.git@master", "psycopg2-binary==2.9.9", @@ -56,11 +58,12 @@ dependencies = [ "matplotlib (==3.10.8)", "reportlab (==4.4.10)", "neo4j (==6.1.0)", - "cartography (==0.135.0)", + "cartography (==0.138.1)", "gevent (==25.9.1)", "werkzeug (==3.1.7)", "sqlparse (==0.5.5)", - "fonttools (==4.62.1)" + "fonttools (==4.62.1)", + "uvicorn-worker (==0.4.0)", ] description = "Prowler's API (Django/DRF)" license = "Apache-2.0" @@ -68,7 +71,24 @@ name = "prowler-api" package-mode = false # Needed for the SDK compatibility requires-python = ">=3.11,<3.13" -version = "1.32.0" +version = "1.33.0" + +# Shared ruff baseline (kept in sync with mcp_server/pyproject.toml). +# target-version tracks this project's lowest supported Python. +[tool.ruff] +src = ["src"] +target-version = "py311" + +[tool.ruff.lint] +# Defaults (E4/E7/E9, F) plus import sorting, modern-syntax upgrades, and +# comprehension lints — all mechanically auto-fixable. flake8-bugbear (B) is a +# good next step but needs manual cleanup (e.g. B904 raise-from), so it is left +# out of the shared baseline for now. +extend-select = [ + "I", # isort — import ordering (prek's isort hook covers only the SDK) + "UP", # pyupgrade — modern syntax for the min supported Python + "C4" # flake8-comprehensions +] [tool.uv] # Transitive pins matching master to avoid silent drift; bump deliberately. @@ -79,7 +99,7 @@ constraint-dependencies = [ "aiobotocore==2.25.1", "aiofiles==24.1.0", "aiohappyeyeballs==2.6.1", - "aiohttp==3.13.5", + "aiohttp==3.14.0", "aioitertools==0.13.0", "aiosignal==1.4.0", "alibabacloud-actiontrail20200706==2.4.1", @@ -124,9 +144,8 @@ constraint-dependencies = [ "astroid==3.2.4", "async-timeout==5.0.1", "attrs==25.4.0", - "authlib==1.6.9", + "authlib==1.6.12", "autopep8==2.3.2", - "awsipranges==0.3.3", "azure-cli-core==2.83.0", "azure-cli-telemetry==1.1.0", "azure-common==1.1.28", @@ -174,7 +193,7 @@ constraint-dependencies = [ "blinker==1.9.0", "boto3==1.40.61", "botocore==1.40.61", - "cartography==0.135.0", + "cartography==0.138.1", "celery==5.6.2", "certifi==2026.1.4", "cffi==2.0.0", @@ -199,7 +218,6 @@ constraint-dependencies = [ "debugpy==1.8.20", "decorator==5.2.1", "defusedxml==0.7.1", - "detect-secrets==1.5.0", "dill==0.4.1", "distro==1.9.0", "dj-rest-auth==7.0.1", @@ -209,6 +227,7 @@ constraint-dependencies = [ "django-celery-results==2.6.0", "django-cors-headers==4.4.0", "django-environ==0.11.2", + "django-eventstream==5.3.3", "django-filter==24.3", "django-guid==3.5.0", "django-postgres-extra==2.0.9", @@ -253,7 +272,7 @@ constraint-dependencies = [ "grpc-google-iam-v1==0.14.3", "grpcio==1.76.0", "grpcio-status==1.76.0", - "gunicorn==23.0.0", + "gunicorn==26.0.0", "h11==0.16.0", "h2==4.3.0", "hpack==4.1.0", @@ -262,8 +281,8 @@ constraint-dependencies = [ "httpx==0.28.1", "humanfriendly==10.0", "hyperframe==6.1.0", - "iamdata==0.1.202602021", - "idna==3.11", + "iamdata==0.1.202605131", + "idna==3.15", "importlib-metadata==8.7.1", "inflection==0.5.1", "iniconfig==2.3.0", @@ -281,6 +300,7 @@ constraint-dependencies = [ "jsonschema==4.23.0", "jsonschema-specifications==2025.9.1", "keystoneauth1==5.13.0", + "kingfisher-bin==1.104.0", "kiwisolver==1.4.9", "knack==0.11.0", "kombu==5.6.2", @@ -315,7 +335,7 @@ constraint-dependencies = [ "neo4j==6.1.0", "nest-asyncio==1.6.0", "nltk==3.9.4", - "numpy==2.0.2", + "numpy==2.2.6", "oauthlib==3.3.1", "oci==2.169.0", "openai==1.109.1", @@ -344,7 +364,7 @@ constraint-dependencies = [ "psutil==7.2.2", "psycopg2-binary==2.9.9", "py-deviceid==0.1.1", - "py-iam-expand==0.1.0", + "py-iam-expand==0.3.0", "py-ocsf-models==0.8.1", "pyasn1==0.6.3", "pyasn1-modules==0.4.2", @@ -390,7 +410,7 @@ constraint-dependencies = [ "rpds-py==0.30.0", "rsa==4.9.1", "ruamel-yaml==0.19.1", - "ruff==0.5.0", + "ruff==0.15.11", "s3transfer==0.14.0", "scaleway==2.10.3", "scaleway-core==2.10.3", @@ -420,12 +440,14 @@ constraint-dependencies = [ "uritemplate==4.2.0", "urllib3==2.7.0", "uuid6==2024.7.10", + "uvicorn==0.49.0", + "uvloop==0.22.1", "vine==5.1.0", "vulture==2.14", "wcwidth==0.5.3", "websocket-client==1.9.0", "werkzeug==3.1.7", - "workos==6.0.4", + "workos==6.0.8", "wrapt==1.17.3", "xlsxwriter==3.2.9", "xmlsec==1.3.17", @@ -436,8 +458,13 @@ constraint-dependencies = [ "zope-interface==8.2", "zstd==1.5.7.3" ] -# prowler@master needs okta==3.4.2; cartography 0.135.0 declares okta<1.0.0 for an -# integration prowler does not import. +# prowler@master needs okta==3.4.2, but cartography 0.138.1 requires okta<1.0.0. +# Attack Paths does not ingest Okta today, so override the Cartography +# dependency to the Prowler pin. +# +# prowler@master needs azure-mgmt-containerservice==34.1.0, but cartography +# 0.138.1 requires azure-mgmt-containerservice>=41.0.0. Attack Paths does not +# ingest Azure today, so override the Cartography dependency to the Prowler pin. # # prowler@master hard-pins microsoft-kiota-abstractions==1.9.2 in [project.dependencies]. # The microsoft-kiota-http security bump to 1.9.9 (GHSA-7j59-v9qr-6fq9) requires @@ -453,6 +480,7 @@ constraint-dependencies = [ # that request pyjwt[crypto] and leave cryptography (needed for RS256) only transitive. override-dependencies = [ "okta==3.4.2", + "azure-mgmt-containerservice==34.1.0", "microsoft-kiota-abstractions==1.9.9", "dulwich==1.2.5", "pyjwt[crypto]==2.13.0" diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/adapters.py b/api/src/backend/api/adapters.py index e09dc972b4..cbd6795731 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/adapters.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/adapters.py @@ -1,9 +1,15 @@ from allauth.socialaccount.adapter import DefaultSocialAccountAdapter -from django.db import transaction - from api.db_router import MainRouter from api.db_utils import rls_transaction -from api.models import Membership, Role, Tenant, User, UserRoleRelationship +from api.models import ( + Membership, + Role, + SAMLConfiguration, + Tenant, + User, + UserRoleRelationship, +) +from django.db import transaction class ProwlerSocialAccountAdapter(DefaultSocialAccountAdapter): @@ -18,7 +24,42 @@ class ProwlerSocialAccountAdapter(DefaultSocialAccountAdapter): # Link existing accounts with the same email address email = sociallogin.account.extra_data.get("email") if sociallogin.provider.id == "saml": + # For SAML, the asserted NameID email cannot be trusted on its own: + # any tenant can claim any email domain in its SAML configuration. To + # prevent cross-tenant account takeover (GHSA-h8m9-jgf8-vwvp), only link + # the incoming SAML session to an existing account when (1) the email + # domain matches the tenant whose ACS endpoint is being used and (2) the + # existing user is already a member of that tenant. email = sociallogin.user.email + if not email: + return + + domain = email.rsplit("@", 1)[-1].lower() + resolver_match = getattr(request, "resolver_match", None) + organization_slug = ( + (resolver_match.kwargs or {}).get("organization_slug", "") + if resolver_match + else "" + ).lower() + # The ACS endpoint is scoped per email domain; reject mismatches so an + # attacker cannot replay an assertion through another tenant's endpoint. + if organization_slug != domain: + return + + try: + saml_config = SAMLConfiguration.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db).get( + email_domain=domain + ) + except SAMLConfiguration.DoesNotExist: + return + + existing_user = self.get_user_by_email(email) + if existing_user and existing_user.is_member_of_tenant( + str(saml_config.tenant_id) + ): + sociallogin.connect(request, existing_user) + return + if email: existing_user = self.get_user_by_email(email) if existing_user: diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/apps.py b/api/src/backend/api/apps.py index 6c3a4ec2d9..1aa0f8f54f 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/apps.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/apps.py @@ -1,14 +1,12 @@ import logging import os import sys - from pathlib import Path -from django.apps import AppConfig -from django.conf import settings - from config.custom_logging import BackendLogger from config.env import env +from django.apps import AppConfig +from django.conf import settings logger = logging.getLogger(BackendLogger.API) @@ -30,8 +28,10 @@ class ApiConfig(AppConfig): name = "api" def ready(self): - from api import schema_extensions # noqa: F401 - from api import signals # noqa: F401 + from api import ( + schema_extensions, # noqa: F401 + signals, # noqa: F401 + ) # Generate required cryptographic keys if not present, but only if: # `"manage.py" not in sys.argv[0]`: If an external server (e.g., Gunicorn) is running the app @@ -42,9 +42,6 @@ class ApiConfig(AppConfig): ): self._ensure_crypto_keys() - # Neo4j driver is created lazily on first use (see api.attack_paths.database). - # App init never contacts Neo4j, so a Neo4j outage cannot block API startup. - def _ensure_crypto_keys(self): """ Orchestrator method that ensures all required cryptographic keys are present. diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/__init__.py b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/__init__.py index b2917e1d86..fc41fb63c1 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/__init__.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/__init__.py @@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ from api.attack_paths.queries import ( get_query_by_id, ) - __all__ = [ "AttackPathsQueryDefinition", "AttackPathsQueryParameterDefinition", diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/cypher_sanitizer.py b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/cypher_sanitizer.py index 3772b4cbef..35752b3ec9 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/cypher_sanitizer.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/cypher_sanitizer.py @@ -4,10 +4,10 @@ Cypher sanitizer for custom (user-supplied) Attack Paths queries. Two responsibilities: 1. **Validation** - reject queries containing SSRF or dangerous procedure - patterns (defense-in-depth; the primary control is ``neo4j.READ_ACCESS``). + patterns (defense-in-depth; the primary control is `neo4j.READ_ACCESS`). 2. **Provider-scoped label injection** - inject a dynamic - ``_Provider_{uuid}`` label into every node pattern so the database can + `_Provider_{uuid}` label into every node pattern so the database can use its native label index for provider isolation. Label-injection pipeline: @@ -22,18 +22,16 @@ Label-injection pipeline: import re from rest_framework.exceptions import ValidationError - from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import get_provider_label - # Step 1 - String / comment protection -# Single combined regex: strings first, then line comments. +# Single combined regex: strings first, then line comments # The regex engine finds the leftmost match, so a string like 'https://prowler.com' -# is consumed as a string before the // inside it can match as a comment. +# is consumed as a string before the // inside it can match as a comment _PROTECTED_RE = re.compile(r"'(?:[^'\\]|\\.)*'|\"(?:[^\"\\]|\\.)*\"|//[^\n]*") # Step 2 - Clause splitting -# OPTIONAL MATCH must come before MATCH to avoid partial matching. +# `OPTIONAL MATCH` must come before `MATCH` to avoid partial matching _CLAUSE_RE = re.compile( r"\b(OPTIONAL\s+MATCH|MATCH|WHERE|RETURN|WITH|ORDER\s+BY" r"|SKIP|LIMIT|UNION|UNWIND|CALL)\b", @@ -41,10 +39,10 @@ _CLAUSE_RE = re.compile( ) # Pass A - Labeled node patterns (all segments) -# Matches node patterns that have at least one :Label. -# (? str: node pattern. """ label = get_provider_label(provider_id) + return inject_label(cypher, label) + + +def inject_label(cypher: str, label: str) -> str: + """Rewrite a Cypher query to append a label to every node pattern.""" # Step 1: Protect strings and comments (single pass, leftmost-first) protected: list[str] = [] @@ -136,9 +139,7 @@ def inject_provider_label(cypher: str, provider_id: str) -> str: return work -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Validation -# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Patterns that indicate SSRF or dangerous procedure calls # Defense-in-depth layer - the primary control is `neo4j.READ_ACCESS` diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/database.py b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/database.py index 0e6cc083dc..3a33b964b7 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/database.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/database.py @@ -1,263 +1,32 @@ -import atexit -import logging -import threading +"""Backwards-compatible facade over the ingest and sink modules. -from contextlib import contextmanager -from typing import Any, Iterator +Historically this module owned a single Neo4j driver used for both the +cartography temp database and the per-tenant sink database. The port to AWS +Neptune split those roles: the cartography ingest (temp) database is always +Neo4j and lives in `api.attack_paths.ingest`; the sink is configurable +(Neo4j or Neptune) and lives in `api.attack_paths.sink`. This shim preserves +the public API that `tasks/` and `api/v1/views.py` already depend on, and +dispatches to the right module by database-name prefix. + +A database name starting with `db-tmp-scan-` is a cartography temp DB and +routes to ingest. Everything else routes to the configured sink. +""" + +from contextlib import AbstractContextManager +from typing import Any from uuid import UUID -import neo4j -import neo4j.exceptions - +import neo4j # noqa: F401 - kept for tests that patch api.attack_paths.database.neo4j +from api.attack_paths import ingest +from api.attack_paths import sink as sink_module from config.env import env -from django.conf import settings - -from api.attack_paths.retryable_session import RetryableSession -from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import ( - BATCH_SIZE, - PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL, - get_provider_label, +from django.conf import ( + settings, # noqa: F401 - kept for tests that patch ...database.settings ) -# Without this Celery goes crazy with Neo4j logging -logging.getLogger("neo4j").setLevel(logging.ERROR) -logging.getLogger("neo4j").propagate = False - -SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE_MAX_RETRIES = env.int( - "ATTACK_PATHS_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE_MAX_RETRIES", default=3 -) -READ_QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = env.int( - "ATTACK_PATHS_READ_QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", default=30 -) MAX_CUSTOM_QUERY_NODES = env.int("ATTACK_PATHS_MAX_CUSTOM_QUERY_NODES", default=250) -# Shorter than CONN_ACQUISITION_TIMEOUT — the driver requires acquisition to be -# the longer of the two (it may include opening a new connection). -CONNECTION_TIMEOUT = env.int("NEO4J_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT", default=5) -CONN_ACQUISITION_TIMEOUT = env.int("NEO4J_CONN_ACQUISITION_TIMEOUT", default=15) -READ_EXCEPTION_CODES = [ - "Neo.ClientError.Statement.AccessMode", - "Neo.ClientError.Procedure.ProcedureNotFound", -] -CLIENT_STATEMENT_EXCEPTION_PREFIX = "Neo.ClientError.Statement." -# Module-level process-wide driver singleton -_driver: neo4j.Driver | None = None -_lock = threading.Lock() - -# Base Neo4j functions - - -def get_uri() -> str: - host = settings.DATABASES["neo4j"]["HOST"] - port = settings.DATABASES["neo4j"]["PORT"] - return f"bolt://{host}:{port}" - - -def init_driver() -> neo4j.Driver: - global _driver - if _driver is not None: - return _driver - - with _lock: - if _driver is None: - uri = get_uri() - config = settings.DATABASES["neo4j"] - - driver = neo4j.GraphDatabase.driver( - uri, - auth=(config["USER"], config["PASSWORD"]), - keep_alive=True, - max_connection_lifetime=7200, - connection_timeout=CONNECTION_TIMEOUT, - connection_acquisition_timeout=CONN_ACQUISITION_TIMEOUT, - max_connection_pool_size=50, - ) - # Publish the singleton only after connectivity is verified so a - # failed probe does not leave an unverified driver behind. Close the - # driver on failure so a repeatedly-probed outage cannot leak pools. - try: - driver.verify_connectivity() - except Exception: - driver.close() - raise - _driver = driver - - # Register cleanup handler (only runs once since we're inside the _driver is None block) - atexit.register(close_driver) - - return _driver - - -def get_driver() -> neo4j.Driver: - return init_driver() - - -def close_driver() -> None: # TODO: Use it - global _driver - with _lock: - if _driver is not None: - try: - _driver.close() - - finally: - _driver = None - - -@contextmanager -def get_session( - database: str | None = None, default_access_mode: str | None = None -) -> Iterator[RetryableSession]: - session_wrapper: RetryableSession | None = None - - try: - session_wrapper = RetryableSession( - session_factory=lambda: get_driver().session( - database=database, default_access_mode=default_access_mode - ), - max_retries=SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE_MAX_RETRIES, - ) - yield session_wrapper - - except neo4j.exceptions.Neo4jError as exc: - if ( - default_access_mode == neo4j.READ_ACCESS - and exc.code - and exc.code in READ_EXCEPTION_CODES - ): - message = "Read query not allowed" - code = READ_EXCEPTION_CODES[0] - raise WriteQueryNotAllowedException(message=message, code=code) - - message = exc.message if exc.message is not None else str(exc) - - if exc.code and exc.code.startswith(CLIENT_STATEMENT_EXCEPTION_PREFIX): - raise ClientStatementException(message=message, code=exc.code) - - raise GraphDatabaseQueryException(message=message, code=exc.code) - - finally: - if session_wrapper is not None: - session_wrapper.close() - - -def execute_read_query( - database: str, - cypher: str, - parameters: dict[str, Any] | None = None, -) -> neo4j.graph.Graph: - with get_session(database, default_access_mode=neo4j.READ_ACCESS) as session: - - def _run(tx: neo4j.ManagedTransaction) -> neo4j.graph.Graph: - result = tx.run( - cypher, parameters or {}, timeout=READ_QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS - ) - return result.graph() - - return session.execute_read(_run) - - -def create_database(database: str) -> None: - query = "CREATE DATABASE $database IF NOT EXISTS" - parameters = {"database": database} - - with get_session() as session: - session.run(query, parameters) - - -def drop_database(database: str) -> None: - query = f"DROP DATABASE `{database}` IF EXISTS DESTROY DATA" - - with get_session() as session: - session.run(query) - - -def drop_subgraph(database: str, provider_id: str) -> int: - """ - Delete all nodes for a provider from the tenant database. - - Deletes relationships then nodes in batches (not `DETACH DELETE`) so a dense - provider's graph cannot exceed Neo4j's transaction memory limit. - Silently returns 0 if the database doesn't exist. - """ - provider_label = get_provider_label(provider_id) - deleted_nodes = 0 - - try: - with get_session(database) as session: - # Phase 1: delete relationships incident to provider nodes in batches. - deleted_count = 1 - while deleted_count > 0: - result = session.run( - f""" - MATCH (:`{provider_label}`)-[r]-() - WITH DISTINCT r LIMIT $batch_size - DELETE r - RETURN COUNT(r) AS deleted_rels_count - """, - {"batch_size": BATCH_SIZE}, - ) - deleted_count = result.single().get("deleted_rels_count", 0) - - # Phase 2: delete the now relationship-free nodes in batches. - deleted_count = 1 - while deleted_count > 0: - result = session.run( - f""" - MATCH (n:{PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL}:`{provider_label}`) - WITH n LIMIT $batch_size - DELETE n - RETURN COUNT(n) AS deleted_nodes_count - """, - {"batch_size": BATCH_SIZE}, - ) - deleted_count = result.single().get("deleted_nodes_count", 0) - deleted_nodes += deleted_count - - except GraphDatabaseQueryException as exc: - if exc.code == "Neo.ClientError.Database.DatabaseNotFound": - return 0 - raise - - return deleted_nodes - - -def has_provider_data(database: str, provider_id: str) -> bool: - """ - Check if any ProviderResource node exists for this provider. - - Returns `False` if the database doesn't exist. - """ - provider_label = get_provider_label(provider_id) - query = f"MATCH (n:{PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL}:`{provider_label}`) RETURN 1 LIMIT 1" - - try: - with get_session(database, default_access_mode=neo4j.READ_ACCESS) as session: - result = session.run(query) - return result.single() is not None - - except GraphDatabaseQueryException as exc: - if exc.code == "Neo.ClientError.Database.DatabaseNotFound": - return False - raise - - -def clear_cache(database: str) -> None: - query = "CALL db.clearQueryCaches()" - - try: - with get_session(database) as session: - session.run(query) - - except GraphDatabaseQueryException as exc: - logging.warning(f"Failed to clear query cache for database `{database}`: {exc}") - - -# Neo4j functions related to Prowler + Cartography - - -def get_database_name(entity_id: str | UUID, temporary: bool = False) -> str: - prefix = "tmp-scan" if temporary else "tenant" - return f"db-{prefix}-{str(entity_id).lower()}" +TEMP_DB_PREFIX = "db-tmp-scan-" # Exceptions @@ -272,7 +41,6 @@ class GraphDatabaseQueryException(Exception): def __str__(self) -> str: if self.code: return f"{self.code}: {self.message}" - return self.message @@ -282,3 +50,177 @@ class WriteQueryNotAllowedException(GraphDatabaseQueryException): class ClientStatementException(GraphDatabaseQueryException): pass + + +# Routing + + +def _is_ingest_database(database: str | None) -> bool: + return bool(database) and database.startswith(TEMP_DB_PREFIX) + + +# Driver lifecycle + + +def init_driver() -> Any: + """Initialize the configured sink backend. + + The ingest driver (Neo4j for cartography temp DBs) stays lazy: it is + only initialized when a temp-DB operation actually runs, which never + happens on API pods. + """ + return sink_module.init() + + +def close_driver() -> None: + """Close every driver held by this process.""" + sink_module.close() + ingest.close_driver() + + +def get_driver() -> neo4j.Driver: + """Return the sink backend's underlying driver. + + Only meaningful for the Neo4j sink (where the backend has a single Neo4j + driver). On Neptune this returns the writer driver. Kept for tests and + legacy call-sites; prefer `get_session` for new code. + """ + backend = sink_module.get_backend() + + # Neo4jSink exposes get_driver(); NeptuneSink exposes get_writer() + if hasattr(backend, "get_driver"): + return backend.get_driver() + + if hasattr(backend, "get_writer"): + return backend.get_writer() + + raise RuntimeError("Active sink backend does not expose a driver handle") + + +def verify_connectivity() -> None: + """Raise if the configured graph database is unreachable on the API read path. + + Backend-agnostic entry point for the readiness probe: Neo4j verifies its + driver, Neptune verifies the reader endpoint. + """ + sink_module.get_backend().verify_connectivity() + + +def verify_scan_databases_available() -> None: + """Raise if either graph database needed by an Attack Paths scan is unavailable.""" + errors: list[str] = [] + first_error: Exception | None = None + + try: + ingest.get_driver().verify_connectivity() + except Exception as exc: + errors.append(f"ingest Neo4j: {exc}") + first_error = exc + + try: + get_driver().verify_connectivity() + except Exception as exc: + errors.append(f"sink {settings.ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE}: {exc}") + if first_error is None: + first_error = exc + + if errors: + raise RuntimeError( + "Attack Paths graph database unavailable before scan start: " + + "; ".join(errors) + ) from first_error + + +def get_uri() -> str: + """Return the sink URI. Retained for backwards compatibility.""" + if settings.ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE == "neptune": + cfg = settings.DATABASES["neptune"] + return f"bolt+s://{cfg['WRITER_ENDPOINT']}:{cfg['PORT']}" + + cfg = settings.DATABASES["neo4j"] + return f"bolt://{cfg['HOST']}:{cfg['PORT']}" + + +def get_ingest_uri() -> str: + """Neo4j URI for the cartography temp (ingest) database, which is always + Neo4j regardless of the configured sink.""" + return ingest.get_uri() + + +# Session API + + +def get_session( + database: str | None = None, + default_access_mode: str | None = None, +) -> AbstractContextManager: + """Return a session against the right backend. + + - `database` names starting with `db-tmp-scan-` always go to ingest. + - No database name → ingest (used for CREATE / DROP DATABASE admin ops). + - Any other name → sink. + """ + if _is_ingest_database(database) or database is None: + return ingest.get_session( + database=database, default_access_mode=default_access_mode + ) + + return sink_module.get_backend().get_session( + database=database, default_access_mode=default_access_mode + ) + + +def execute_read_query( + database: str, + cypher: str, + parameters: dict[str, Any] | None = None, +) -> neo4j.graph.Graph: + """Read-only query against the sink.""" + return sink_module.get_backend().execute_read_query(database, cypher, parameters) + + +def create_database(database: str) -> None: + """Create a database. Temp DBs always land on ingest (Neo4j). + + On the Neo4j sink, tenant DBs also route to ingest because both drivers + connect to the same Neo4j cluster. On the Neptune sink, tenant DB creates + are no-ops. + """ + if _is_ingest_database(database): + ingest.create_database(database) + return + + sink_module.get_backend().create_database(database) + + +def drop_database(database: str) -> None: + """Drop a database. Mirrors `create_database` routing.""" + if _is_ingest_database(database): + ingest.drop_database(database) + return + + sink_module.get_backend().drop_database(database) + + +def drop_subgraph(database: str, provider_id: str) -> int: + return sink_module.get_backend().drop_subgraph(database, provider_id) + + +def has_provider_data(database: str, provider_id: str) -> bool: + return sink_module.get_backend().has_provider_data(database, provider_id) + + +def clear_cache(database: str) -> None: + if _is_ingest_database(database): + ingest.clear_cache(database) + return + + sink_module.get_backend().clear_cache(database) + + +# Name helper + + +def get_database_name(entity_id: str | UUID, temporary: bool = False) -> str: + prefix = "tmp-scan" if temporary else "tenant" + return f"db-{prefix}-{str(entity_id).lower()}" diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/ingest/__init__.py b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/ingest/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5833b8b373 --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/ingest/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +"""Cartography ingest layer. + +Public surface for the per-scan Neo4j temp database driver. Implementation +lives in `api.attack_paths.ingest.driver`. +""" + +from api.attack_paths.ingest.driver import ( + clear_cache, + close_driver, + create_database, + drop_database, + get_driver, + get_session, + get_uri, + init_driver, + run_cypher, +) + +__all__ = [ + "clear_cache", + "close_driver", + "create_database", + "drop_database", + "get_driver", + "get_session", + "get_uri", + "init_driver", + "run_cypher", +] diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/ingest/driver.py b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/ingest/driver.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1b05c721e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/ingest/driver.py @@ -0,0 +1,187 @@ +"""Cartography ingest driver: per-scan throw-away Neo4j database. + +Cartography writes each scan's graph into a throw-away Neo4j database named +`db-tmp-scan-{scan_uuid}`. This is always Neo4j, regardless of the configured +sink: Neptune is single-database and cannot host per-scan throw-away +databases. This module owns the Neo4j driver used for those temp DBs and the +admin ops they need (CREATE / DROP DATABASE). +""" + +import atexit +import logging +import threading +from collections.abc import Iterator +from contextlib import contextmanager +from typing import Any + +import neo4j +import neo4j.exceptions +from api.attack_paths.retryable_session import RetryableSession +from config.env import env +from django.conf import settings + +logging.getLogger("neo4j").setLevel(logging.ERROR) +logging.getLogger("neo4j").propagate = False + +SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE_MAX_RETRIES = env.int( + "ATTACK_PATHS_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE_MAX_RETRIES", default=3 +) +CONN_ACQUISITION_TIMEOUT = env.int("NEO4J_CONN_ACQUISITION_TIMEOUT", default=15) +# TCP connect timeout, ordered below the acquisition timeout so an unreachable +# host can't pin a worker on a temp-DB op longer than this. +CONNECTION_TIMEOUT = env.int("NEO4J_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT", default=5) +MAX_CONNECTION_LIFETIME = env.int("NEO4J_MAX_CONNECTION_LIFETIME", default=7200) +MAX_CONNECTION_POOL_SIZE = env.int("NEO4J_MAX_CONNECTION_POOL_SIZE", default=50) + +_driver: neo4j.Driver | None = None +_lock = threading.Lock() + + +def _neo4j_config() -> dict: + return settings.DATABASES["neo4j"] + + +def get_uri() -> str: + """Bolt URI for the Neo4j temp (ingest) database. Always Neo4j.""" + config = _neo4j_config() + host = config["HOST"] + port = config["PORT"] + if not host or not port: + raise RuntimeError( + "NEO4J_HOST / NEO4J_PORT must be set to use the attack-paths " + "temp database. Workers require Neo4j env even when the sink is Neptune." + ) + + return f"bolt://{host}:{port}" + + +def init_driver() -> neo4j.Driver: + """Initialize the temp-database Neo4j driver. Idempotent.""" + global _driver + if _driver is not None: + return _driver + + with _lock: + if _driver is None: + config = _neo4j_config() + _driver = neo4j.GraphDatabase.driver( + get_uri(), + auth=(config["USER"], config["PASSWORD"]), + keep_alive=True, + max_connection_lifetime=MAX_CONNECTION_LIFETIME, + connection_timeout=CONNECTION_TIMEOUT, + connection_acquisition_timeout=CONN_ACQUISITION_TIMEOUT, + max_connection_pool_size=MAX_CONNECTION_POOL_SIZE, + ) + # Best-effort connectivity check: a Neo4j that is down at boot must + # not crash the worker. The driver reconnects lazily on first use. + try: + _driver.verify_connectivity() + + except Exception: + logging.warning( + "Neo4j temp-database unreachable at init; continuing with a " + "lazily-reconnecting driver", + exc_info=True, + ) + + atexit.register(close_driver) + + return _driver + + +def get_driver() -> neo4j.Driver: + return init_driver() + + +def close_driver() -> None: + global _driver + with _lock: + if _driver is not None: + try: + _driver.close() + finally: + _driver = None + + +@contextmanager +def get_session( + database: str | None = None, + default_access_mode: str | None = None, +) -> Iterator[RetryableSession]: + """Session against the Neo4j temp-database cluster. Used for temp DB sessions + and for admin operations (CREATE / DROP DATABASE) when `database` is None.""" + from api.attack_paths.database import ( + ClientStatementException, + GraphDatabaseQueryException, + WriteQueryNotAllowedException, + ) + + READ_EXCEPTION_CODES = [ + "Neo.ClientError.Statement.AccessMode", + "Neo.ClientError.Procedure.ProcedureNotFound", + ] + CLIENT_STATEMENT_EXCEPTION_PREFIX = "Neo.ClientError.Statement." + + session_wrapper: RetryableSession | None = None + try: + session_wrapper = RetryableSession( + session_factory=lambda: get_driver().session( + database=database, default_access_mode=default_access_mode + ), + max_retries=SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE_MAX_RETRIES, + ) + yield session_wrapper + + except neo4j.exceptions.Neo4jError as exc: + if ( + default_access_mode == neo4j.READ_ACCESS + and exc.code + and exc.code in READ_EXCEPTION_CODES + ): + raise WriteQueryNotAllowedException( + message="Read query not allowed", code=READ_EXCEPTION_CODES[0] + ) + + message = exc.message if exc.message is not None else str(exc) + if exc.code and exc.code.startswith(CLIENT_STATEMENT_EXCEPTION_PREFIX): + raise ClientStatementException(message=message, code=exc.code) + raise GraphDatabaseQueryException(message=message, code=exc.code) + + finally: + if session_wrapper is not None: + session_wrapper.close() + + +def create_database(database: str) -> None: + """Create a database on the Neo4j cluster. Used for temp scan DBs.""" + with get_session() as session: + session.run("CREATE DATABASE $database IF NOT EXISTS", {"database": database}) + + +def drop_database(database: str) -> None: + """Drop a database on the Neo4j cluster. Used for temp scan DBs.""" + with get_session() as session: + session.run(f"DROP DATABASE `{database}` IF EXISTS DESTROY DATA") + + +def clear_cache(database: str) -> None: + """Best-effort cache clear for a Neo4j database.""" + from api.attack_paths.database import GraphDatabaseQueryException + + try: + with get_session(database) as session: + session.run("CALL db.clearQueryCaches()") + + except GraphDatabaseQueryException as exc: + logging.warning(f"Failed to clear query cache for database `{database}`: {exc}") + + +def run_cypher( + database: str | None, + cypher: str, + parameters: dict[str, Any] | None = None, +) -> Any: + """Execute Cypher directly without the context manager. Thin helper.""" + with get_session(database) as session: + return session.run(cypher, parameters or {}) diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/queries/__init__.py b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/queries/__init__.py index c5e6ab0393..aa90ba6878 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/queries/__init__.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/queries/__init__.py @@ -1,12 +1,11 @@ -from api.attack_paths.queries.types import ( - AttackPathsQueryDefinition, - AttackPathsQueryParameterDefinition, -) from api.attack_paths.queries.registry import ( get_queries_for_provider, get_query_by_id, ) - +from api.attack_paths.queries.types import ( + AttackPathsQueryDefinition, + AttackPathsQueryParameterDefinition, +) __all__ = [ "AttackPathsQueryDefinition", diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/queries/aws.py b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/queries/aws.py index 81f91de24f..fa42854156 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/queries/aws.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/queries/aws.py @@ -5,9 +5,7 @@ from api.attack_paths.queries.types import ( ) from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL - # Custom Attack Path Queries -# -------------------------- AWS_INTERNET_EXPOSED_EC2_SENSITIVE_S3_ACCESS = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( id="aws-internet-exposed-ec2-sensitive-s3-access", @@ -23,14 +21,18 @@ AWS_INTERNET_EXPOSED_EC2_SENSITIVE_S3_ACCESS = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WHERE ec2.exposed_internet = true AND ipi.toport = 22 - MATCH path_role = (r:AWSRole)--(pol:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE ANY(x IN stmt.resource WHERE x CONTAINS s3.name) - AND ANY(x IN stmt.action WHERE toLower(x) =~ 's3:(listbucket|getobject).*') + MATCH path_role = (r:AWSRole)-[:POLICY]->(pol:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value CONTAINS s3.name + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) STARTS WITH 's3:listbucket' + OR toLower(act.value) STARTS WITH 's3:getobject' MATCH path_assume_role = (ec2)-[p:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW*1..9]-(r:AWSRole) OPTIONAL MATCH (internet:Internet)-[can_access:CAN_ACCESS]->(ec2) + WITH DISTINCT path_s3, path_ec2, path_role, path_assume_role, internet, can_access WITH collect(path_s3) + collect(path_ec2) + collect(path_role) + collect(path_assume_role) AS paths, head(collect(internet)) AS internet, collect(can_access) AS can_access UNWIND paths AS p @@ -38,7 +40,7 @@ AWS_INTERNET_EXPOSED_EC2_SENSITIVE_S3_ACCESS = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, internet, can_access, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr, internet, can_access """, @@ -60,7 +62,6 @@ AWS_INTERNET_EXPOSED_EC2_SENSITIVE_S3_ACCESS = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( # Basic Resource Queries -# ---------------------- AWS_RDS_INSTANCES = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( id="aws-rds-instances", @@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ AWS_RDS_INSTANCES = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -100,7 +101,7 @@ AWS_RDS_UNENCRYPTED_STORAGE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -123,7 +124,7 @@ AWS_S3_ANONYMOUS_ACCESS_BUCKETS = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -137,17 +138,18 @@ AWS_IAM_STATEMENTS_ALLOW_ALL_ACTIONS = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( description="Find IAM policy statements that allow all actions via '*' within the selected account.", provider="aws", cypher=f""" - MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(pol:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(x IN stmt.action WHERE x = '*') + MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(pol:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT path WITH collect(path) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]->(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -161,17 +163,18 @@ AWS_IAM_STATEMENTS_ALLOW_DELETE_POLICY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( description="Find IAM policy statements that allow the iam:DeletePolicy action within the selected account.", provider="aws", cypher=f""" - MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(pol:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(x IN stmt.action WHERE x = "iam:DeletePolicy") + MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(pol:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE act.value = 'iam:DeletePolicy' + WITH DISTINCT path WITH collect(path) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -185,17 +188,18 @@ AWS_IAM_STATEMENTS_ALLOW_CREATE_ACTIONS = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( description="Find IAM policy statements that allow actions containing 'create' within the selected account.", provider="aws", cypher=f""" - MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(pol:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = "Allow" - AND any(x IN stmt.action WHERE toLower(x) CONTAINS "create") + MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(pol:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) CONTAINS 'create' + WITH DISTINCT path WITH collect(path) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -204,7 +208,6 @@ AWS_IAM_STATEMENTS_ALLOW_CREATE_ACTIONS = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( # Network Exposure Queries -# ------------------------ AWS_EC2_INSTANCES_INTERNET_EXPOSED = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( id="aws-ec2-instances-internet-exposed", @@ -224,7 +227,7 @@ AWS_EC2_INSTANCES_INTERNET_EXPOSED = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, internet, can_access, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr, internet, can_access """, @@ -250,7 +253,7 @@ AWS_SECURITY_GROUPS_OPEN_INTERNET_FACING = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, internet, can_access, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr, internet, can_access """, @@ -275,7 +278,7 @@ AWS_CLASSIC_ELB_INTERNET_EXPOSED = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, internet, can_access, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr, internet, can_access """, @@ -300,7 +303,7 @@ AWS_ELBV2_INTERNET_EXPOSED = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, internet, can_access, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr, internet, can_access """, @@ -328,7 +331,7 @@ AWS_PUBLIC_IP_RESOURCE_LOOKUP = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, internet, can_access, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr, internet, can_access """, @@ -344,7 +347,6 @@ AWS_PUBLIC_IP_RESOURCE_LOOKUP = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( # Privilege Escalation Queries (based on pathfinding.cloud research) # https://github.com/DataDog/pathfinding.cloud -# ------------------------------------------------------------------- # APPRUNNER-001 AWS_APPRUNNER_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_SERVICE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( @@ -359,31 +361,27 @@ AWS_APPRUNNER_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_SERVICE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find apprunner:CreateService permission - MATCH (principal)--(apprunner_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_apprunner:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_apprunner.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_apprunner.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'apprunner:createservice' - OR toLower(action) = 'apprunner:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(apprunner_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_apprunner:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_apprunner)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['apprunner:*', 'apprunner:createservice'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find roles that trust App Runner tasks service (can be passed to App Runner) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'tasks.apprunner.amazonaws.com'}}) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -391,7 +389,7 @@ AWS_APPRUNNER_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_SERVICE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -411,25 +409,23 @@ AWS_APPRUNNER_PRIVESC_UPDATE_SERVICE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with apprunner:UpdateService permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(update_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_update:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_update.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_update.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'apprunner:updateservice' - OR toLower(action) = 'apprunner:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(update_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_update:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_update)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['apprunner:*', 'apprunner:updateservice'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH aws, collect(DISTINCT path_principal) AS principal_paths // Find existing App Runner services with roles attached (potential targets) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'tasks.apprunner.amazonaws.com'}}) - WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + WITH principal_paths + collect(DISTINCT path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -449,49 +445,41 @@ AWS_BEDROCK_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CODE_INTERPRETER = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find bedrock-agentcore:CreateCodeInterpreter permission - MATCH (principal)--(bedrock_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_bedrock:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_bedrock.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_bedrock.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'bedrock-agentcore:createcodeinterpreter' - OR toLower(action) = 'bedrock-agentcore:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(bedrock_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_bedrock:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_bedrock)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['bedrock-agentcore:*', 'bedrock-agentcore:createcodeinterpreter'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find bedrock-agentcore:StartCodeInterpreterSession permission - MATCH (principal)--(session_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_session:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_session.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_session.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'bedrock-agentcore:startcodeinterpretersession' - OR toLower(action) = 'bedrock-agentcore:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(session_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_session:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_session)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act3:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act3.value) IN ['bedrock-agentcore:*', 'bedrock-agentcore:startcodeinterpretersession'] + OR act3.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find bedrock-agentcore:InvokeCodeInterpreter permission - MATCH (principal)--(invoke_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_invoke:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_invoke.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_invoke.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'bedrock-agentcore:invokecodeinterpreter' - OR toLower(action) = 'bedrock-agentcore:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(invoke_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_invoke:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_invoke)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act4:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act4.value) IN ['bedrock-agentcore:*', 'bedrock-agentcore:invokecodeinterpreter'] + OR act4.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find roles that trust the Bedrock AgentCore service (can be passed to a code interpreter) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'bedrock-agentcore.amazonaws.com'}}) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -499,7 +487,7 @@ AWS_BEDROCK_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CODE_INTERPRETER = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -519,34 +507,30 @@ AWS_BEDROCK_PRIVESC_INVOKE_CODE_INTERPRETER = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with bedrock-agentcore:StartCodeInterpreterSession permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(session_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_session:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_session.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_session.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'bedrock-agentcore:startcodeinterpretersession' - OR toLower(action) = 'bedrock-agentcore:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(session_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_session:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_session)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['bedrock-agentcore:*', 'bedrock-agentcore:startcodeinterpretersession'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, path_principal // Find bedrock-agentcore:InvokeCodeInterpreter permission - MATCH (principal)--(invoke_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_invoke:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_invoke.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_invoke.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'bedrock-agentcore:invokecodeinterpreter' - OR toLower(action) = 'bedrock-agentcore:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(invoke_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_invoke:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_invoke)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['bedrock-agentcore:*', 'bedrock-agentcore:invokecodeinterpreter'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH aws, collect(DISTINCT path_principal) AS principal_paths // Find roles that trust the Bedrock AgentCore service (already attached to existing code interpreters) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'bedrock-agentcore.amazonaws.com'}}) - WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + WITH principal_paths + collect(DISTINCT path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -566,31 +550,27 @@ AWS_CLOUDFORMATION_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_STACK = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find cloudformation:CreateStack permission - MATCH (principal)--(cfn_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_cfn:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_cfn.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_cfn.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:createstack' - OR toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(cfn_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_cfn:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_cfn)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['cloudformation:*', 'cloudformation:createstack'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find roles that trust CloudFormation service (can be passed to CloudFormation) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'cloudformation.amazonaws.com'}}) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -598,7 +578,7 @@ AWS_CLOUDFORMATION_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_STACK = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -618,25 +598,23 @@ AWS_CLOUDFORMATION_PRIVESC_UPDATE_STACK = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with cloudformation:UpdateStack permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(update_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_update:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_update.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_update.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:updatestack' - OR toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(update_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_update:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_update)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['cloudformation:*', 'cloudformation:updatestack'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH aws, collect(DISTINCT path_principal) AS principal_paths // Find roles that trust CloudFormation service (already attached to existing stacks) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'cloudformation.amazonaws.com'}}) - WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + WITH principal_paths + collect(DISTINCT path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -656,40 +634,34 @@ AWS_CLOUDFORMATION_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_STACKSET = AttackPathsQueryDefinition provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find cloudformation:CreateStackSet permission - MATCH (principal)--(cfn_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_cfn:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_cfn.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_cfn.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:createstackset' - OR toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(cfn_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_cfn:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_cfn)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['cloudformation:*', 'cloudformation:createstackset'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find cloudformation:CreateStackInstances permission - MATCH (principal)--(cfn_instances_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_cfn_instances:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_cfn_instances.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_cfn_instances.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:createstackinstances' - OR toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(cfn_instances_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_cfn_instances:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_cfn_instances)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act3:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act3.value) IN ['cloudformation:*', 'cloudformation:createstackinstances'] + OR act3.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find roles that trust CloudFormation service (can be passed as execution role) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'cloudformation.amazonaws.com'}}) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -697,7 +669,7 @@ AWS_CLOUDFORMATION_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_STACKSET = AttackPathsQueryDefinition WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -717,31 +689,27 @@ AWS_CLOUDFORMATION_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_UPDATE_STACKSET = AttackPathsQueryDefinition provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find cloudformation:UpdateStackSet permission - MATCH (principal)--(cfn_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_cfn:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_cfn.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_cfn.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:updatestackset' - OR toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(cfn_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_cfn:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_cfn)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['cloudformation:*', 'cloudformation:updatestackset'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find roles that trust CloudFormation service (can be passed as execution role) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'cloudformation.amazonaws.com'}}) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -749,7 +717,7 @@ AWS_CLOUDFORMATION_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_UPDATE_STACKSET = AttackPathsQueryDefinition WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -769,34 +737,30 @@ AWS_CLOUDFORMATION_PRIVESC_CHANGESET = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with cloudformation:CreateChangeSet permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(create_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_create:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_create.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_create.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:createchangeset' - OR toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(create_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_create:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_create)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['cloudformation:*', 'cloudformation:createchangeset'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, path_principal // Find cloudformation:ExecuteChangeSet permission - MATCH (principal)--(exec_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_exec:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_exec.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_exec.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:executechangeset' - OR toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(exec_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_exec:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_exec)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['cloudformation:*', 'cloudformation:executechangeset'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH aws, collect(DISTINCT path_principal) AS principal_paths // Find roles that trust CloudFormation service (already attached to existing stacks) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'cloudformation.amazonaws.com'}}) - WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + WITH principal_paths + collect(DISTINCT path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -816,40 +780,34 @@ AWS_CODEBUILD_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_PROJECT = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find codebuild:CreateProject permission - MATCH (principal)--(create_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_create:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_create.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_create.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'codebuild:createproject' - OR toLower(action) = 'codebuild:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(create_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_create:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_create)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['codebuild:*', 'codebuild:createproject'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find codebuild:StartBuild permission - MATCH (principal)--(build_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_build:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_build.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_build.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'codebuild:startbuild' - OR toLower(action) = 'codebuild:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(build_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_build:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_build)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act3:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act3.value) IN ['codebuild:*', 'codebuild:startbuild'] + OR act3.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find roles that trust CodeBuild service (can be passed to CodeBuild) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'codebuild.amazonaws.com'}}) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -857,7 +815,7 @@ AWS_CODEBUILD_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_PROJECT = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -877,25 +835,23 @@ AWS_CODEBUILD_PRIVESC_START_BUILD = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with codebuild:StartBuild permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(build_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_build:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_build.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_build.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'codebuild:startbuild' - OR toLower(action) = 'codebuild:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(build_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_build:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_build)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['codebuild:*', 'codebuild:startbuild'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH aws, collect(DISTINCT path_principal) AS principal_paths // Find roles that trust CodeBuild service (already attached to existing projects) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'codebuild.amazonaws.com'}}) - WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + WITH principal_paths + collect(DISTINCT path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -915,25 +871,23 @@ AWS_CODEBUILD_PRIVESC_START_BUILD_BATCH = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with codebuild:StartBuildBatch permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(build_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_build:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_build.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_build.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'codebuild:startbuildbatch' - OR toLower(action) = 'codebuild:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(build_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_build:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_build)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['codebuild:*', 'codebuild:startbuildbatch'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH aws, collect(DISTINCT path_principal) AS principal_paths // Find roles that trust CodeBuild service (already attached to existing projects) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'codebuild.amazonaws.com'}}) - WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + WITH principal_paths + collect(DISTINCT path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -953,40 +907,34 @@ AWS_CODEBUILD_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_PROJECT_BATCH = AttackPathsQueryDefinition provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find codebuild:CreateProject permission - MATCH (principal)--(create_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_create:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_create.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_create.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'codebuild:createproject' - OR toLower(action) = 'codebuild:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(create_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_create:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_create)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['codebuild:*', 'codebuild:createproject'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find codebuild:StartBuildBatch permission - MATCH (principal)--(batch_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_batch:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_batch.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_batch.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'codebuild:startbuildbatch' - OR toLower(action) = 'codebuild:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(batch_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_batch:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_batch)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act3:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act3.value) IN ['codebuild:*', 'codebuild:startbuildbatch'] + OR act3.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find roles that trust CodeBuild service (can be passed to CodeBuild) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'codebuild.amazonaws.com'}}) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -994,7 +942,7 @@ AWS_CODEBUILD_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_PROJECT_BATCH = AttackPathsQueryDefinition WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -1014,50 +962,42 @@ AWS_DATAPIPELINE_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_PIPELINE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find datapipeline:CreatePipeline permission - MATCH (principal)--(create_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_create:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_create.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_create.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'datapipeline:createpipeline' - OR toLower(action) = 'datapipeline:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(create_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_create:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_create)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['datapipeline:*', 'datapipeline:createpipeline'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find datapipeline:PutPipelineDefinition permission - MATCH (principal)--(put_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_put:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_put.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_put.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'datapipeline:putpipelinedefinition' - OR toLower(action) = 'datapipeline:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(put_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_put:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_put)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act3:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act3.value) IN ['datapipeline:*', 'datapipeline:putpipelinedefinition'] + OR act3.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find datapipeline:ActivatePipeline permission - MATCH (principal)--(activate_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_activate:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_activate.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_activate.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'datapipeline:activatepipeline' - OR toLower(action) = 'datapipeline:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(activate_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_activate:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_activate)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act4:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act4.value) IN ['datapipeline:*', 'datapipeline:activatepipeline'] + OR act4.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find roles that trust Data Pipeline or EMR service (can be passed to DataPipeline) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(trusted_principal:AWSPrincipal) WHERE trusted_principal.arn IN ['datapipeline.amazonaws.com', 'elasticmapreduce.amazonaws.com'] - AND any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -1065,7 +1005,7 @@ AWS_DATAPIPELINE_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_PIPELINE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -1085,31 +1025,27 @@ AWS_EC2_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_IAM = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find ec2:RunInstances permission - MATCH (principal)--(ec2_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_ec2:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_ec2.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_ec2.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'ec2:runinstances' - OR toLower(action) = 'ec2:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(ec2_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_ec2:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_ec2)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['ec2:*', 'ec2:runinstances'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find roles that trust EC2 service (can be passed to EC2) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'ec2.amazonaws.com'}}) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -1117,7 +1053,7 @@ AWS_EC2_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_IAM = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -1137,43 +1073,37 @@ AWS_EC2_PRIVESC_MODIFY_INSTANCE_ATTRIBUTE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with ec2:ModifyInstanceAttribute permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(modify_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_modify:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_modify.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_modify.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'ec2:modifyinstanceattribute' - OR toLower(action) = 'ec2:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(modify_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_modify:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_modify)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['ec2:*', 'ec2:modifyinstanceattribute'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, path_principal // Find ec2:StopInstances permission (can be same or different policy) - MATCH (principal)--(stop_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_stop:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_stop.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_stop.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'ec2:stopinstances' - OR toLower(action) = 'ec2:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(stop_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_stop:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_stop)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['ec2:*', 'ec2:stopinstances'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, path_principal // Find ec2:StartInstances permission (can be same or different policy) - MATCH (principal)--(start_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_start:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_start.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_start.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'ec2:startinstances' - OR toLower(action) = 'ec2:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(start_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_start:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_start)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act3:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act3.value) IN ['ec2:*', 'ec2:startinstances'] + OR act3.value = '*' + WITH aws, collect(DISTINCT path_principal) AS principal_paths // Find EC2 instances with instance profiles (potential targets) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(ec2:EC2Instance)-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]->(target_role:AWSRole) - WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + WITH principal_paths + collect(DISTINCT path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -1193,31 +1123,27 @@ AWS_EC2_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_SPOT_INSTANCES = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find ec2:RequestSpotInstances permission - MATCH (principal)--(spot_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_spot:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_spot.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_spot.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'ec2:requestspotinstances' - OR toLower(action) = 'ec2:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(spot_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_spot:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_spot)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['ec2:*', 'ec2:requestspotinstances'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find roles that trust EC2 service (can be passed to EC2 spot instances) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'ec2.amazonaws.com'}}) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -1225,7 +1151,7 @@ AWS_EC2_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_SPOT_INSTANCES = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -1245,34 +1171,30 @@ AWS_EC2_PRIVESC_LAUNCH_TEMPLATE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with ec2:CreateLaunchTemplateVersion permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(create_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_create:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_create.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_create.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'ec2:createlaunchtemplateversion' - OR toLower(action) = 'ec2:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(create_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_create:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_create)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['ec2:*', 'ec2:createlaunchtemplateversion'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, path_principal // Find ec2:ModifyLaunchTemplate permission - MATCH (principal)--(modify_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_modify:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_modify.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_modify.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'ec2:modifylaunchtemplate' - OR toLower(action) = 'ec2:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(modify_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_modify:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_modify)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['ec2:*', 'ec2:modifylaunchtemplate'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH aws, collect(DISTINCT path_principal) AS principal_paths // Find launch templates in the account (potential targets) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(template:LaunchTemplate) - WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + WITH principal_paths + collect(DISTINCT path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -1292,25 +1214,23 @@ AWS_EC2INSTANCECONNECT_PRIVESC_SEND_SSH_PUBLIC_KEY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with ec2-instance-connect:SendSSHPublicKey permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(connect_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_connect:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_connect.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_connect.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'ec2-instance-connect:sendsshpublickey' - OR toLower(action) = 'ec2-instance-connect:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(connect_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_connect:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_connect)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['ec2-instance-connect:*', 'ec2-instance-connect:sendsshpublickey'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH aws, collect(DISTINCT path_principal) AS principal_paths // Find EC2 instances with attached roles (targets for credential theft via IMDS) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(ec2:EC2Instance)-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]->(target_role:AWSRole) - WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + WITH principal_paths + collect(DISTINCT path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -1329,58 +1249,46 @@ AWS_ECS_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_SERVICE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/ecs-001", ), cypher=f""" - // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission (this IS path_principal) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal - // Find ecs:CreateCluster permission - MATCH (principal)--(cluster_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_cluster:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_cluster.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_cluster.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'ecs:createcluster' - OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Gate: ecs:CreateCluster (existence only) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}})-[:HAS_ACTION]->(a2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(a2.value) IN ['ecs:*', 'ecs:createcluster'] + OR a2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal - // Find ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition permission - MATCH (principal)--(taskdef_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_taskdef:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_taskdef.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_taskdef.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'ecs:registertaskdefinition' - OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Gate: ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition (existence only) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}})-[:HAS_ACTION]->(a3:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(a3.value) IN ['ecs:*', 'ecs:registertaskdefinition'] + OR a3.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal - // Find ecs:CreateService permission - MATCH (principal)--(service_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_service:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_service.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_service.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'ecs:createservice' - OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Gate: ecs:CreateService (existence only) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}})-[:HAS_ACTION]->(a4:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(a4.value) IN ['ecs:*', 'ecs:createservice'] + OR a4.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal - // Find roles that trust ECS tasks service (can be passed to ECS tasks) + // Target: a role trusting ECS tasks that the passrole resource can target MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com'}}) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -1399,58 +1307,48 @@ AWS_ECS_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_RUN_TASK = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( ), provider="aws", cypher=f""" - // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission (this IS path_principal) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' - // Find ecs:CreateCluster permission - MATCH (principal)--(cluster_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_cluster:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_cluster.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_cluster.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'ecs:createcluster' - OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Collapse: one row per (passrole chain), independent of how many action items matched + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal - // Find ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition permission - MATCH (principal)--(taskdef_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_taskdef:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_taskdef.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_taskdef.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'ecs:registertaskdefinition' - OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Gate: ecs:CreateCluster exists on the principal -> collapse back to one row + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(s2:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}})-[:HAS_ACTION]->(a2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(a2.value) IN ['ecs:*', 'ecs:createcluster'] + OR a2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal - // Find ecs:RunTask permission - MATCH (principal)--(runtask_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_runtask:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_runtask.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_runtask.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'ecs:runtask' - OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Gate: ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition exists on the principal + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(s3:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}})-[:HAS_ACTION]->(a3:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(a3.value) IN ['ecs:*', 'ecs:registertaskdefinition'] + OR a3.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal - // Find roles that trust ECS tasks service (can be passed to ECS tasks) + // Gate: ecs:RunTask exists on the principal + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(s4:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}})-[:HAS_ACTION]->(a4:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(a4.value) IN ['ecs:*', 'ecs:runtask'] + OR a4.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal + + // Target: a role that trusts ECS tasks and that the passrole resource can target MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com'}}) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -1469,49 +1367,40 @@ AWS_ECS_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_SERVICE_EXISTING_CLUSTER = AttackPathsQueryDefin ), provider="aws", cypher=f""" - // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission (this IS path_principal) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal - // Find ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition permission - MATCH (principal)--(taskdef_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_taskdef:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_taskdef.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_taskdef.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'ecs:registertaskdefinition' - OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Gate: ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition (existence only) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}})-[:HAS_ACTION]->(a2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(a2.value) IN ['ecs:*', 'ecs:registertaskdefinition'] + OR a2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal - // Find ecs:CreateService permission - MATCH (principal)--(service_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_service:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_service.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_service.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'ecs:createservice' - OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Gate: ecs:CreateService (existence only) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}})-[:HAS_ACTION]->(a3:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(a3.value) IN ['ecs:*', 'ecs:createservice'] + OR a3.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal - // Find roles that trust ECS tasks service (can be passed to ECS tasks) + // Target: a role trusting ECS tasks that the passrole resource can target MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com'}}) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -1530,49 +1419,40 @@ AWS_ECS_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_RUN_TASK_EXISTING_CLUSTER = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( ), provider="aws", cypher=f""" - // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission (this IS path_principal) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal - // Find ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition permission - MATCH (principal)--(taskdef_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_taskdef:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_taskdef.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_taskdef.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'ecs:registertaskdefinition' - OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Gate: ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition (existence only) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}})-[:HAS_ACTION]->(a2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(a2.value) IN ['ecs:*', 'ecs:registertaskdefinition'] + OR a2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal - // Find ecs:RunTask permission - MATCH (principal)--(runtask_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_runtask:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_runtask.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_runtask.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'ecs:runtask' - OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Gate: ecs:RunTask (existence only) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}})-[:HAS_ACTION]->(a3:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(a3.value) IN ['ecs:*', 'ecs:runtask'] + OR a3.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal - // Find roles that trust ECS tasks service (can be passed to ECS tasks) + // Target: a role trusting ECS tasks that the passrole resource can target MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com'}}) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -1591,49 +1471,40 @@ AWS_ECS_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_START_TASK_EXISTING_CLUSTER = AttackPathsQueryDefinitio ), provider="aws", cypher=f""" - // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission (this IS path_principal) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal - // Find ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition permission - MATCH (principal)--(taskdef_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_taskdef:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_taskdef.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_taskdef.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'ecs:registertaskdefinition' - OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Gate: ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition (existence only) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}})-[:HAS_ACTION]->(a2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(a2.value) IN ['ecs:*', 'ecs:registertaskdefinition'] + OR a2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal - // Find ecs:StartTask permission - MATCH (principal)--(starttask_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_starttask:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_starttask.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_starttask.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'ecs:starttask' - OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Gate: ecs:StartTask (existence only) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}})-[:HAS_ACTION]->(a3:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(a3.value) IN ['ecs:*', 'ecs:starttask'] + OR a3.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal - // Find roles that trust ECS tasks service (can be passed to ECS tasks) + // Target: a role trusting ECS tasks that the passrole resource can target MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com'}}) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -1652,35 +1523,29 @@ AWS_ECS_PRIVESC_EXECUTE_COMMAND = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( ), provider="aws", cypher=f""" - // Find principals with ecs:ExecuteCommand permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(exec_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_exec:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_exec.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_exec.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'ecs:executecommand' - OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Find principals with ecs:ExecuteCommand permission (this IS path_principal) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(exec_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_exec:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_exec)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['ecs:*', 'ecs:executecommand'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, path_principal - // Find ecs:DescribeTasks permission (required by AWS CLI to get container runtime ID) - MATCH (principal)--(describe_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_describe:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_describe.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_describe.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'ecs:describetasks' - OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Gate: ecs:DescribeTasks (existence only) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}})-[:HAS_ACTION]->(a2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(a2.value) IN ['ecs:*', 'ecs:describetasks'] + OR a2.value = '*' + WITH aws, collect(DISTINCT path_principal) AS principal_paths - // Find roles that trust ECS tasks service (already attached to running tasks) + // Target: roles already attached to running tasks (trust ECS tasks service) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com'}}) - WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + WITH principal_paths + collect(DISTINCT path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -1700,31 +1565,27 @@ AWS_GLUE_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_DEV_ENDPOINT = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find glue:CreateDevEndpoint permission - MATCH (principal)--(glue_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_glue:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_glue.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_glue.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'glue:createdevendpoint' - OR toLower(action) = 'glue:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(glue_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_glue:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_glue)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['glue:*', 'glue:createdevendpoint'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find roles that trust Glue service (can be passed to Glue) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'glue.amazonaws.com'}}) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -1732,7 +1593,7 @@ AWS_GLUE_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_DEV_ENDPOINT = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -1752,25 +1613,23 @@ AWS_GLUE_PRIVESC_UPDATE_DEV_ENDPOINT = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with glue:UpdateDevEndpoint permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'glue:updatedevendpoint' - OR toLower(action) = 'glue:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['glue:*', 'glue:updatedevendpoint'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH aws, collect(DISTINCT path_principal) AS principal_paths // Find roles that trust Glue service (already attached to existing dev endpoints) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'glue.amazonaws.com'}}) - WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + WITH principal_paths + collect(DISTINCT path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -1790,40 +1649,34 @@ AWS_GLUE_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_JOB = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find glue:CreateJob permission - MATCH (principal)--(createjob_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_createjob:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_createjob.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_createjob.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'glue:createjob' - OR toLower(action) = 'glue:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(createjob_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_createjob:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_createjob)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['glue:*', 'glue:createjob'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find glue:StartJobRun permission - MATCH (principal)--(startjob_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_startjob:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_startjob.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_startjob.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'glue:startjobrun' - OR toLower(action) = 'glue:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(startjob_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_startjob:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_startjob)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act3:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act3.value) IN ['glue:*', 'glue:startjobrun'] + OR act3.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find roles that trust Glue service (can be passed to Glue jobs) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'glue.amazonaws.com'}}) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -1831,7 +1684,7 @@ AWS_GLUE_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_JOB = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -1851,40 +1704,34 @@ AWS_GLUE_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_JOB_TRIGGER = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find glue:CreateJob permission - MATCH (principal)--(createjob_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_createjob:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_createjob.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_createjob.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'glue:createjob' - OR toLower(action) = 'glue:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(createjob_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_createjob:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_createjob)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['glue:*', 'glue:createjob'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find glue:CreateTrigger permission - MATCH (principal)--(trigger_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_trigger:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_trigger.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_trigger.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'glue:createtrigger' - OR toLower(action) = 'glue:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(trigger_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_trigger:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_trigger)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act3:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act3.value) IN ['glue:*', 'glue:createtrigger'] + OR act3.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find roles that trust Glue service (can be passed to Glue jobs) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'glue.amazonaws.com'}}) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -1892,7 +1739,7 @@ AWS_GLUE_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_JOB_TRIGGER = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -1912,40 +1759,34 @@ AWS_GLUE_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_UPDATE_JOB = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find glue:UpdateJob permission - MATCH (principal)--(updatejob_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_updatejob:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_updatejob.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_updatejob.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'glue:updatejob' - OR toLower(action) = 'glue:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(updatejob_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_updatejob:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_updatejob)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['glue:*', 'glue:updatejob'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find glue:StartJobRun permission - MATCH (principal)--(startjob_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_startjob:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_startjob.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_startjob.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'glue:startjobrun' - OR toLower(action) = 'glue:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(startjob_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_startjob:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_startjob)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act3:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act3.value) IN ['glue:*', 'glue:startjobrun'] + OR act3.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find roles that trust Glue service (can be passed to Glue jobs) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'glue.amazonaws.com'}}) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -1953,7 +1794,7 @@ AWS_GLUE_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_UPDATE_JOB = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -1973,40 +1814,34 @@ AWS_GLUE_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_UPDATE_JOB_TRIGGER = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find glue:UpdateJob permission - MATCH (principal)--(updatejob_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_updatejob:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_updatejob.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_updatejob.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'glue:updatejob' - OR toLower(action) = 'glue:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(updatejob_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_updatejob:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_updatejob)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['glue:*', 'glue:updatejob'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find glue:CreateTrigger permission - MATCH (principal)--(trigger_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_trigger:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_trigger.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_trigger.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'glue:createtrigger' - OR toLower(action) = 'glue:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(trigger_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_trigger:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_trigger)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act3:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act3.value) IN ['glue:*', 'glue:createtrigger'] + OR act3.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find roles that trust Glue service (can be passed to Glue jobs) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'glue.amazonaws.com'}}) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -2014,7 +1849,7 @@ AWS_GLUE_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_UPDATE_JOB_TRIGGER = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -2034,22 +1869,20 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_CREATE_POLICY_VERSION = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:CreatePolicyVersion permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:createpolicyversion' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:createpolicyversion'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal // Find customer-managed policies attached to the same principal that can be overwritten MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_policy:AWSPolicy)--(principal) WHERE target_policy.arn CONTAINS $provider_uid - AND any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_policy.arn CONTAINS resource - ) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR target_policy.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -2057,7 +1890,7 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_CREATE_POLICY_VERSION = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -2077,22 +1910,20 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_CREATE_ACCESS_KEY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:CreateAccessKey permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:createaccesskey' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:createaccesskey'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal // Find target users that the principal can create access keys for MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_user:AWSUser) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_user.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_user.name - ) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_user.name + OR target_user.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -2100,7 +1931,7 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_CREATE_ACCESS_KEY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -2119,45 +1950,39 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_DELETE_CREATE_ACCESS_KEY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( ), provider="aws", cypher=f""" - // Find principals with iam:CreateAccessKey permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:createaccesskey' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Find principals with iam:CreateAccessKey permission (this IS path_principal) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:createaccesskey'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal - // Find iam:DeleteAccessKey permission - MATCH (principal)--(delete_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_delete:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_delete.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_delete.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:deleteaccesskey' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Find iam:DeleteAccessKey permission (keep stmt2: its resource is checked) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt2)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:deleteaccesskey'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, stmt2, path_principal // Find target users that the principal can rotate access keys for MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_user:AWSUser) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_user.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_user.name - ) - AND any(resource IN stmt_delete.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_user.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_user.name - ) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_user.name + OR target_user.arn CONTAINS res.value + MATCH (stmt2)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res2:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res2.value = '*' + OR res2.value CONTAINS target_user.name + OR target_user.arn CONTAINS res2.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -2177,22 +2002,20 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_CREATE_LOGIN_PROFILE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:CreateLoginProfile permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:createloginprofile' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:createloginprofile'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal // Find target users that the principal can create login profiles for MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_user:AWSUser) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_user.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_user.name - ) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_user.name + OR target_user.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -2200,7 +2023,7 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_CREATE_LOGIN_PROFILE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -2220,19 +2043,16 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_PUT_ROLE_POLICY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find roles with iam:PutRolePolicy permission scoped to themselves - MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(role:AWSRole)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:putrolepolicy' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) - AND any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS role.name - ) + MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(role:AWSRole)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:putrolepolicy'] + OR act.value = '*' + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS role.name + OR role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path WITH collect(path) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -2240,7 +2060,7 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_PUT_ROLE_POLICY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -2260,22 +2080,20 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_UPDATE_LOGIN_PROFILE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:UpdateLoginProfile permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:updateloginprofile' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:updateloginprofile'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal // Find target users that the principal can update login profiles for MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_user:AWSUser) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_user.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_user.name - ) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_user.name + OR target_user.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -2283,7 +2101,7 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_UPDATE_LOGIN_PROFILE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -2303,19 +2121,16 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_PUT_USER_POLICY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find users with iam:PutUserPolicy permission scoped to themselves - MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(user:AWSUser)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:putuserpolicy' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) - AND any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR user.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS user.name - ) + MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(user:AWSUser)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:putuserpolicy'] + OR act.value = '*' + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS user.name + OR user.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path WITH collect(path) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -2323,7 +2138,7 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_PUT_USER_POLICY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -2343,19 +2158,16 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ATTACH_USER_POLICY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find users with iam:AttachUserPolicy permission scoped to themselves - MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(user:AWSUser)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:attachuserpolicy' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) - AND any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR user.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS user.name - ) + MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(user:AWSUser)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:attachuserpolicy'] + OR act.value = '*' + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS user.name + OR user.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path WITH collect(path) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -2363,7 +2175,7 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ATTACH_USER_POLICY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -2383,19 +2195,16 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ATTACH_ROLE_POLICY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find roles with iam:AttachRolePolicy permission scoped to themselves - MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(role:AWSRole)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:attachrolepolicy' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) - AND any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS role.name - ) + MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(role:AWSRole)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:attachrolepolicy'] + OR act.value = '*' + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS role.name + OR role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path WITH collect(path) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -2403,7 +2212,7 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ATTACH_ROLE_POLICY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -2423,22 +2232,20 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ATTACH_GROUP_POLICY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find users with iam:AttachGroupPolicy permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(user:AWSUser)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:attachgrouppolicy' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(user:AWSUser)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:attachgrouppolicy'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, user, stmt, path_principal // Find groups the user is a member of and can attach policies to - MATCH path_target = (aws)-[:RESOURCE]->(target_group:AWSGroup)<-[:MEMBER_AWS_GROUP]-(user) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_group.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_group.name - ) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_group:AWSGroup)<-[:MEMBER_AWS_GROUP]-(user) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_group.name + OR target_group.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -2446,7 +2253,7 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ATTACH_GROUP_POLICY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -2466,22 +2273,20 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_PUT_GROUP_POLICY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find users with iam:PutGroupPolicy permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(user:AWSUser)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:putgrouppolicy' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(user:AWSUser)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:putgrouppolicy'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, user, stmt, path_principal // Find groups the user is a member of and can put policies on - MATCH path_target = (aws)-[:RESOURCE]->(target_group:AWSGroup)<-[:MEMBER_AWS_GROUP]-(user) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_group.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_group.name - ) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_group:AWSGroup)<-[:MEMBER_AWS_GROUP]-(user) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_group.name + OR target_group.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -2489,7 +2294,7 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_PUT_GROUP_POLICY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -2508,31 +2313,30 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_UPDATE_ASSUME_ROLE_POLICY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( ), provider="aws", cypher=f""" - // Find principals with iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:updateassumerolepolicy' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Find principals with iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy permission (this IS path_principal) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:updateassumerolepolicy'] + OR act.value = '*' - // Find target roles whose trust policy can be modified + // Collapse the action-item fan-out: one row per (statement chain), not per matching action + WITH DISTINCT aws, stmt, path_principal + + // Find target roles whose trust policy this statement's resource can target MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -2552,22 +2356,20 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ADD_USER_TO_GROUP = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:AddUserToGroup permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:addusertogroup' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:addusertogroup'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal // Find target groups the principal can add users to - MATCH path_target = (aws)-[:RESOURCE]->(target_group:AWSGroup) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_group.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_group.name - ) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_group:AWSGroup) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_group.name + OR target_group.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -2575,7 +2377,7 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ADD_USER_TO_GROUP = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -2595,22 +2397,20 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ATTACH_ROLE_POLICY_ASSUME_ROLE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:AttachRolePolicy permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:attachrolepolicy' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:attachrolepolicy'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal // Find target roles the principal can assume and attach policies to MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)<-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]-(principal) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -2618,7 +2418,7 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ATTACH_ROLE_POLICY_ASSUME_ROLE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -2637,45 +2437,39 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ATTACH_USER_POLICY_CREATE_ACCESS_KEY = AttackPathsQueryDefinitio ), provider="aws", cypher=f""" - // Find principals with iam:AttachUserPolicy permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:attachuserpolicy' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Find principals with iam:AttachUserPolicy permission (this IS path_principal) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:attachuserpolicy'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal - // Find iam:CreateAccessKey permission - MATCH (principal)--(policy2:AWSPolicy)--(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt2.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt2.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:createaccesskey' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Find iam:CreateAccessKey permission (keep stmt2: its resource is checked) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt2)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:createaccesskey'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, stmt2, path_principal // Find target users the principal can attach policies to and create keys for MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_user:AWSUser) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_user.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_user.name - ) - AND any(resource IN stmt2.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_user.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_user.name - ) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_user.name + OR target_user.arn CONTAINS res.value + MATCH (stmt2)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res2:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res2.value = '*' + OR res2.value CONTAINS target_user.name + OR target_user.arn CONTAINS res2.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -2695,23 +2489,21 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_CREATE_POLICY_VERSION_ASSUME_ROLE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:CreatePolicyVersion permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:createpolicyversion' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:createpolicyversion'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal // Find target roles the principal can assume that have customer-managed policies the principal can modify MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)<-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]-(principal) MATCH (target_role)--(target_policy:AWSPolicy) WHERE target_policy.arn CONTAINS $provider_uid - AND any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_policy.arn CONTAINS resource - ) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR target_policy.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -2719,7 +2511,7 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_CREATE_POLICY_VERSION_ASSUME_ROLE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -2739,22 +2531,20 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_PUT_ROLE_POLICY_ASSUME_ROLE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:PutRolePolicy permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:putrolepolicy' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:putrolepolicy'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal // Find target roles the principal can assume and put inline policies on MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)<-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]-(principal) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -2762,7 +2552,7 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_PUT_ROLE_POLICY_ASSUME_ROLE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -2781,45 +2571,39 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_PUT_USER_POLICY_CREATE_ACCESS_KEY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( ), provider="aws", cypher=f""" - // Find principals with iam:PutUserPolicy permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:putuserpolicy' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Find principals with iam:PutUserPolicy permission (this IS path_principal) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:putuserpolicy'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal - // Find iam:CreateAccessKey permission - MATCH (principal)--(policy2:AWSPolicy)--(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt2.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt2.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:createaccesskey' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Find iam:CreateAccessKey permission (keep stmt2: its resource is checked) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt2)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:createaccesskey'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, stmt2, path_principal // Find target users the principal can put policies on and create keys for MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_user:AWSUser) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_user.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_user.name - ) - AND any(resource IN stmt2.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_user.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_user.name - ) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_user.name + OR target_user.arn CONTAINS res.value + MATCH (stmt2)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res2:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res2.value = '*' + OR res2.value CONTAINS target_user.name + OR target_user.arn CONTAINS res2.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -2838,45 +2622,39 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ATTACH_ROLE_POLICY_UPDATE_ASSUME_ROLE = AttackPathsQueryDefiniti ), provider="aws", cypher=f""" - // Find principals with iam:AttachRolePolicy permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:attachrolepolicy' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Find principals with iam:AttachRolePolicy permission (this IS path_principal) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:attachrolepolicy'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal - // Find iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy permission - MATCH (principal)--(policy2:AWSPolicy)--(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt2.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt2.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:updateassumerolepolicy' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Find iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy permission (keep stmt2: its resource is checked) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt2)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:updateassumerolepolicy'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, stmt2, path_principal // Find target roles the principal can attach policies to and update trust policy for MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) - AND any(resource IN stmt2.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + MATCH (stmt2)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res2:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res2.value = '*' + OR res2.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res2.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -2895,46 +2673,40 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_CREATE_POLICY_VERSION_UPDATE_ASSUME_ROLE = AttackPathsQueryDefin ), provider="aws", cypher=f""" - // Find principals with iam:CreatePolicyVersion permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:createpolicyversion' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Find principals with iam:CreatePolicyVersion permission (this IS path_principal) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:createpolicyversion'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal - // Find iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy permission - MATCH (principal)--(policy2:AWSPolicy)--(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt2.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt2.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:updateassumerolepolicy' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Find iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy permission (keep stmt2: its resource is checked) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt2)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:updateassumerolepolicy'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, stmt2, path_principal // Find target roles with customer-managed policies the principal can modify and update trust policy for MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt2.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) - MATCH (target_role)--(target_policy:AWSPolicy) + MATCH (stmt2)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res2:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res2.value = '*' + OR res2.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res2.value + MATCH (target_role)-[:POLICY]->(target_policy:AWSPolicy) WHERE target_policy.arn CONTAINS $provider_uid - AND any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_policy.arn CONTAINS resource - ) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR target_policy.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -2953,45 +2725,39 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_PUT_ROLE_POLICY_UPDATE_ASSUME_ROLE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( ), provider="aws", cypher=f""" - // Find principals with iam:PutRolePolicy permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:putrolepolicy' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Find principals with iam:PutRolePolicy permission (this IS path_principal) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:putrolepolicy'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal - // Find iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy permission - MATCH (principal)--(policy2:AWSPolicy)--(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt2.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt2.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:updateassumerolepolicy' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Find iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy permission (keep stmt2: its resource is checked) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt2)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:updateassumerolepolicy'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, stmt2, path_principal // Find target roles the principal can put inline policies on and update trust policy for MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) - AND any(resource IN stmt2.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + MATCH (stmt2)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res2:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res2.value = '*' + OR res2.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res2.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -3011,40 +2777,34 @@ AWS_LAMBDA_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_FUNCTION = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find lambda:CreateFunction permission - MATCH (principal)--(create_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_create:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_create.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_create.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'lambda:createfunction' - OR toLower(action) = 'lambda:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(create_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_create:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_create)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['lambda:*', 'lambda:createfunction'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find lambda:InvokeFunction permission - MATCH (principal)--(invoke_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_invoke:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_invoke.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_invoke.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'lambda:invokefunction' - OR toLower(action) = 'lambda:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(invoke_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_invoke:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_invoke)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act3:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act3.value) IN ['lambda:*', 'lambda:invokefunction'] + OR act3.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find roles that trust Lambda service (can be passed to Lambda) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'lambda.amazonaws.com'}}) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -3052,7 +2812,7 @@ AWS_LAMBDA_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_FUNCTION = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -3072,40 +2832,34 @@ AWS_LAMBDA_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_FUNCTION_EVENT_SOURCE = AttackPathsQueryDefin provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find lambda:CreateFunction permission - MATCH (principal)--(create_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_create:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_create.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_create.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'lambda:createfunction' - OR toLower(action) = 'lambda:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(create_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_create:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_create)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['lambda:*', 'lambda:createfunction'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find lambda:CreateEventSourceMapping permission - MATCH (principal)--(event_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_event:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_event.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_event.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'lambda:createeventsourcemapping' - OR toLower(action) = 'lambda:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(event_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_event:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_event)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act3:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act3.value) IN ['lambda:*', 'lambda:createeventsourcemapping'] + OR act3.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find roles that trust Lambda service (can be passed to Lambda) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'lambda.amazonaws.com'}}) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -3113,7 +2867,7 @@ AWS_LAMBDA_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_FUNCTION_EVENT_SOURCE = AttackPathsQueryDefin WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -3133,22 +2887,20 @@ AWS_LAMBDA_PRIVESC_UPDATE_FUNCTION_CODE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with lambda:UpdateFunctionCode permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'lambda:updatefunctioncode' - OR toLower(action) = 'lambda:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['lambda:*', 'lambda:updatefunctioncode'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal // Find existing Lambda functions with execution roles - MATCH path_target = (aws)-[:RESOURCE]->(lambda_fn:AWSLambda)-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]->(target_role:AWSRole) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR lambda_fn.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS lambda_fn.name - ) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(lambda_fn:AWSLambda)-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]->(target_role:AWSRole) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS lambda_fn.name + OR lambda_fn.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -3156,7 +2908,7 @@ AWS_LAMBDA_PRIVESC_UPDATE_FUNCTION_CODE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -3175,45 +2927,39 @@ AWS_LAMBDA_PRIVESC_UPDATE_FUNCTION_CODE_INVOKE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( ), provider="aws", cypher=f""" - // Find principals with lambda:UpdateFunctionCode permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'lambda:updatefunctioncode' - OR toLower(action) = 'lambda:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Find principals with lambda:UpdateFunctionCode permission (this IS path_principal) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['lambda:*', 'lambda:updatefunctioncode'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal - // Find lambda:InvokeFunction permission - MATCH (principal)--(policy2:AWSPolicy)--(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt2.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt2.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'lambda:invokefunction' - OR toLower(action) = 'lambda:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Find lambda:InvokeFunction permission (keep stmt2: its resource is checked) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt2)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['lambda:*', 'lambda:invokefunction'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, stmt2, path_principal // Find existing Lambda functions with execution roles - MATCH path_target = (aws)-[:RESOURCE]->(lambda_fn:AWSLambda)-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]->(target_role:AWSRole) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR lambda_fn.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS lambda_fn.name - ) - AND any(resource IN stmt2.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR lambda_fn.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS lambda_fn.name - ) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(lambda_fn:AWSLambda)-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]->(target_role:AWSRole) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS lambda_fn.name + OR lambda_fn.arn CONTAINS res.value + MATCH (stmt2)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res2:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res2.value = '*' + OR res2.value CONTAINS lambda_fn.name + OR lambda_fn.arn CONTAINS res2.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -3232,45 +2978,39 @@ AWS_LAMBDA_PRIVESC_UPDATE_FUNCTION_CODE_ADD_PERMISSION = AttackPathsQueryDefinit ), provider="aws", cypher=f""" - // Find principals with lambda:UpdateFunctionCode permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'lambda:updatefunctioncode' - OR toLower(action) = 'lambda:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Find principals with lambda:UpdateFunctionCode permission (this IS path_principal) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['lambda:*', 'lambda:updatefunctioncode'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal - // Find lambda:AddPermission permission - MATCH (principal)--(policy2:AWSPolicy)--(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt2.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt2.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'lambda:addpermission' - OR toLower(action) = 'lambda:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Find lambda:AddPermission permission (keep stmt2: its resource is checked) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt2)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['lambda:*', 'lambda:addpermission'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, stmt2, path_principal // Find existing Lambda functions with execution roles - MATCH path_target = (aws)-[:RESOURCE]->(lambda_fn:AWSLambda)-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]->(target_role:AWSRole) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR lambda_fn.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS lambda_fn.name - ) - AND any(resource IN stmt2.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR lambda_fn.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS lambda_fn.name - ) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(lambda_fn:AWSLambda)-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]->(target_role:AWSRole) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS lambda_fn.name + OR lambda_fn.arn CONTAINS res.value + MATCH (stmt2)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res2:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res2.value = '*' + OR res2.value CONTAINS lambda_fn.name + OR lambda_fn.arn CONTAINS res2.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -3290,40 +3030,34 @@ AWS_LAMBDA_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_FUNCTION_ADD_PERMISSION = AttackPathsQueryDef provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find lambda:CreateFunction permission - MATCH (principal)--(create_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_create:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_create.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_create.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'lambda:createfunction' - OR toLower(action) = 'lambda:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(create_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_create:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_create)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['lambda:*', 'lambda:createfunction'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find lambda:AddPermission permission - MATCH (principal)--(perm_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_perm:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_perm.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_perm.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'lambda:addpermission' - OR toLower(action) = 'lambda:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(perm_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_perm:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_perm)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act3:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act3.value) IN ['lambda:*', 'lambda:addpermission'] + OR act3.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find roles that trust Lambda service (can be passed to Lambda) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'lambda.amazonaws.com'}}) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -3331,7 +3065,7 @@ AWS_LAMBDA_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_FUNCTION_ADD_PERMISSION = AttackPathsQueryDef WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -3351,31 +3085,27 @@ AWS_SAGEMAKER_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_NOTEBOOK = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find sagemaker:CreateNotebookInstance permission - MATCH (principal)--(sm_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_sm:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_sm.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_sm.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:createnotebookinstance' - OR toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(sm_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_sm:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_sm)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['sagemaker:*', 'sagemaker:createnotebookinstance'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find roles that trust SageMaker service (can be passed to SageMaker) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'sagemaker.amazonaws.com'}}) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -3383,7 +3113,7 @@ AWS_SAGEMAKER_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_NOTEBOOK = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -3403,31 +3133,27 @@ AWS_SAGEMAKER_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_TRAINING_JOB = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob permission - MATCH (principal)--(sm_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_sm:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_sm.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_sm.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:createtrainingjob' - OR toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(sm_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_sm:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_sm)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['sagemaker:*', 'sagemaker:createtrainingjob'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find roles that trust SageMaker service (can be passed to SageMaker) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'sagemaker.amazonaws.com'}}) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -3435,7 +3161,7 @@ AWS_SAGEMAKER_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_TRAINING_JOB = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -3455,31 +3181,27 @@ AWS_SAGEMAKER_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_PROCESSING_JOB = AttackPathsQueryDefinitio provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:*', 'iam:passrole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find sagemaker:CreateProcessingJob permission - MATCH (principal)--(sm_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_sm:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt_sm.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt_sm.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:createprocessingjob' - OR toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(sm_policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt_sm:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt_sm)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['sagemaker:*', 'sagemaker:createprocessingjob'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt_passrole, path_principal // Find roles that trust SageMaker service (can be passed to SageMaker) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'sagemaker.amazonaws.com'}}) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt_passrole)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -3487,7 +3209,7 @@ AWS_SAGEMAKER_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_PROCESSING_JOB = AttackPathsQueryDefinitio WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -3507,22 +3229,20 @@ AWS_SAGEMAKER_PRIVESC_PRESIGNED_NOTEBOOK_URL = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with sagemaker:CreatePresignedNotebookInstanceUrl permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:createpresignednotebookinstanceurl' - OR toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['sagemaker:*', 'sagemaker:createpresignednotebookinstanceurl'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal // Find existing SageMaker notebook instances with execution roles - MATCH path_target = (aws)-[:RESOURCE]->(notebook:AWSSageMakerNotebookInstance)-[:HAS_EXECUTION_ROLE]->(target_role:AWSRole) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR notebook.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS notebook.notebook_instance_name - ) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(notebook:AWSSageMakerNotebookInstance)-[:HAS_EXECUTION_ROLE]->(target_role:AWSRole) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS notebook.notebook_instance_name + OR notebook.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -3530,7 +3250,7 @@ AWS_SAGEMAKER_PRIVESC_PRESIGNED_NOTEBOOK_URL = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -3549,58 +3269,46 @@ AWS_SAGEMAKER_PRIVESC_LIFECYCLE_CONFIG_NOTEBOOK = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( ), provider="aws", cypher=f""" - // Find principals with sagemaker:CreateNotebookInstanceLifecycleConfig permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:createnotebookinstancelifecycleconfig' - OR toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Find principals with sagemaker:CreateNotebookInstanceLifecycleConfig permission (this IS path_principal) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['sagemaker:*', 'sagemaker:createnotebookinstancelifecycleconfig'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, path_principal - // Find sagemaker:UpdateNotebookInstance permission - MATCH (principal)--(policy2:AWSPolicy)--(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt2.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt2.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:updatenotebookinstance' - OR toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Gate: sagemaker:UpdateNotebookInstance (keep stmt2: its resource is checked) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}})-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['sagemaker:*', 'sagemaker:updatenotebookinstance'] + OR act2.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt2, path_principal - // Find sagemaker:StopNotebookInstance permission - MATCH (principal)--(policy3:AWSPolicy)--(stmt3:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt3.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt3.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:stopnotebookinstance' - OR toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Gate: sagemaker:StopNotebookInstance (existence only) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}})-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act3:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act3.value) IN ['sagemaker:*', 'sagemaker:stopnotebookinstance'] + OR act3.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt2, path_principal - // Find sagemaker:StartNotebookInstance permission - MATCH (principal)--(policy4:AWSPolicy)--(stmt4:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt4.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt4.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:startnotebookinstance' - OR toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + // Gate: sagemaker:StartNotebookInstance (existence only) + MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}})-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act4:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act4.value) IN ['sagemaker:*', 'sagemaker:startnotebookinstance'] + OR act4.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt2, path_principal // Find existing SageMaker notebook instances with execution roles - MATCH path_target = (aws)-[:RESOURCE]->(notebook:AWSSageMakerNotebookInstance)-[:HAS_EXECUTION_ROLE]->(target_role:AWSRole) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt2.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR notebook.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS notebook.notebook_instance_name - ) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(notebook:AWSSageMakerNotebookInstance)-[:HAS_EXECUTION_ROLE]->(target_role:AWSRole) + MATCH (stmt2)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS notebook.notebook_instance_name + OR notebook.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -3620,25 +3328,23 @@ AWS_SSM_PRIVESC_START_SESSION = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with ssm:StartSession permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'ssm:startsession' - OR toLower(action) = 'ssm:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['ssm:*', 'ssm:startsession'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH aws, collect(DISTINCT path_principal) AS principal_paths // Find EC2 instances with attached roles (targets for credential theft via IMDS) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(ec2:EC2Instance)-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]->(target_role:AWSRole) - WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + WITH principal_paths + collect(DISTINCT path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -3658,25 +3364,23 @@ AWS_SSM_PRIVESC_SEND_COMMAND = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with ssm:SendCommand permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'ssm:sendcommand' - OR toLower(action) = 'ssm:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['ssm:*', 'ssm:sendcommand'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH aws, collect(DISTINCT path_principal) AS principal_paths // Find EC2 instances with attached roles (targets for credential theft via IMDS) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(ec2:EC2Instance)-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]->(target_role:AWSRole) - WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + WITH principal_paths + collect(DISTINCT path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -3696,22 +3400,20 @@ AWS_STS_PRIVESC_ASSUME_ROLE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with sts:AssumeRole permission - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'sts:assumerole' - OR toLower(action) = 'sts:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['sts:*', 'sts:assumerole'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal // Find target roles the principal can assume (bidirectional trust via Cartography) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)<-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]-(principal) - WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name - ) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n @@ -3719,7 +3421,7 @@ AWS_STS_PRIVESC_ASSUME_ROLE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -3727,7 +3429,6 @@ AWS_STS_PRIVESC_ASSUME_ROLE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( ) # AWS Queries List -# ---------------- AWS_QUERIES: list[AttackPathsQueryDefinition] = [ AWS_INTERNET_EXPOSED_EC2_SENSITIVE_S3_ACCESS, diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/queries/aws_deprecated.py b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/queries/aws_deprecated.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b94c329202 --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/queries/aws_deprecated.py @@ -0,0 +1,3819 @@ +# TODO: drop after Neptune cutover +# +# Pre-cutover query catalog for AWS scans whose graph data was written under +# the previous schema, where list-typed policy properties were serialised as +# comma-delimited strings on the parent node. The registry routes scans with +# `is_migrated=False` to this module; all other scans use `aws.py`. Both +# files expose the same query IDs and parameter shapes so the API surface +# stays uniform across the cutover window. This file is deleted, along with +# `AttackPathsScan.is_migrated`, once the legacy data is fully drained. +from api.attack_paths.queries.types import ( + AttackPathsQueryAttribution, + AttackPathsQueryDefinition, + AttackPathsQueryParameterDefinition, +) +from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL + +# Custom Attack Path Queries +# -------------------------- + +AWS_INTERNET_EXPOSED_EC2_SENSITIVE_S3_ACCESS = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-internet-exposed-ec2-sensitive-s3-access", + name="Internet-Exposed EC2 with Sensitive S3 Access", + short_description="Find SSH-exposed EC2 instances that can assume roles to read tagged sensitive S3 buckets.", + description="Detect EC2 instances with SSH exposed to the internet that can assume higher-privileged roles to read tagged sensitive S3 buckets despite bucket-level public access blocks.", + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + MATCH path_s3 = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(s3:S3Bucket)--(t:AWSTag) + WHERE toLower(t.key) = toLower($tag_key) AND toLower(t.value) = toLower($tag_value) + + MATCH path_ec2 = (aws)--(ec2:EC2Instance)--(sg:EC2SecurityGroup)--(ipi:IpPermissionInbound) + WHERE ec2.exposed_internet = true + AND ipi.toport = 22 + + MATCH path_role = (r:AWSRole)--(pol:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE ANY(x IN stmt.resource WHERE x CONTAINS s3.name) + AND ANY(x IN stmt.action WHERE toLower(x) =~ 's3:(listbucket|getobject).*') + + MATCH path_assume_role = (ec2)-[p:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW*1..9]-(r:AWSRole) + + OPTIONAL MATCH (internet:Internet)-[can_access:CAN_ACCESS]->(ec2) + + WITH collect(path_s3) + collect(path_ec2) + collect(path_role) + collect(path_assume_role) AS paths, + head(collect(internet)) AS internet, collect(can_access) AS can_access + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, internet, can_access, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr, internet, can_access + """, + parameters=[ + AttackPathsQueryParameterDefinition( + name="tag_key", + label="Tag key", + description="Tag key to filter the S3 bucket, e.g. DataClassification.", + placeholder="DataClassification", + ), + AttackPathsQueryParameterDefinition( + name="tag_value", + label="Tag value", + description="Tag value to filter the S3 bucket, e.g. Sensitive.", + placeholder="Sensitive", + ), + ], +) + + +# Basic Resource Queries +# ---------------------- + +AWS_RDS_INSTANCES = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-rds-instances", + name="RDS Instances Inventory", + short_description="List all provisioned RDS database instances in the account.", + description="List the selected AWS account alongside the RDS instances it owns.", + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(rds:RDSInstance) + + WITH collect(path) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +AWS_RDS_UNENCRYPTED_STORAGE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-rds-unencrypted-storage", + name="Unencrypted RDS Instances", + short_description="Find RDS instances with storage encryption disabled.", + description="Find RDS instances with storage encryption disabled within the selected account.", + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(rds:RDSInstance) + WHERE rds.storage_encrypted = false + + WITH collect(path) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +AWS_S3_ANONYMOUS_ACCESS_BUCKETS = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-s3-anonymous-access-buckets", + name="S3 Buckets with Anonymous Access", + short_description="Find S3 buckets that allow anonymous access.", + description="Find S3 buckets that allow anonymous access within the selected account.", + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(s3:S3Bucket) + WHERE s3.anonymous_access = true + + WITH collect(path) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +AWS_IAM_STATEMENTS_ALLOW_ALL_ACTIONS = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-iam-statements-allow-all-actions", + name="IAM Statements Allowing All Actions", + short_description="Find IAM policy statements that allow all actions via wildcard (*).", + description="Find IAM policy statements that allow all actions via '*' within the selected account.", + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(pol:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(x IN stmt.action WHERE x = '*') + + WITH collect(path) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +AWS_IAM_STATEMENTS_ALLOW_DELETE_POLICY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-iam-statements-allow-delete-policy", + name="IAM Statements Allowing Policy Deletion", + short_description="Find IAM policy statements that allow iam:DeletePolicy.", + description="Find IAM policy statements that allow the iam:DeletePolicy action within the selected account.", + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(pol:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(x IN stmt.action WHERE x = "iam:DeletePolicy") + + WITH collect(path) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +AWS_IAM_STATEMENTS_ALLOW_CREATE_ACTIONS = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-iam-statements-allow-create-actions", + name="IAM Statements Allowing Create Actions", + short_description="Find IAM policy statements that allow any create action.", + description="Find IAM policy statements that allow actions containing 'create' within the selected account.", + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(pol:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = "Allow" + AND any(x IN stmt.action WHERE toLower(x) CONTAINS "create") + + WITH collect(path) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + + +# Network Exposure Queries +# ------------------------ + +AWS_EC2_INSTANCES_INTERNET_EXPOSED = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-ec2-instances-internet-exposed", + name="Internet-Exposed EC2 Instances", + short_description="Find EC2 instances flagged as exposed to the internet.", + description="Find EC2 instances flagged as exposed to the internet within the selected account.", + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(ec2:EC2Instance) + WHERE ec2.exposed_internet = true + + OPTIONAL MATCH (internet:Internet)-[can_access:CAN_ACCESS]->(ec2) + + WITH collect(path) AS paths, head(collect(internet)) AS internet, collect(can_access) AS can_access + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, internet, can_access, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr, internet, can_access + """, + parameters=[], +) + +AWS_SECURITY_GROUPS_OPEN_INTERNET_FACING = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-security-groups-open-internet-facing", + name="Open Security Groups on Internet-Facing Resources", + short_description="Find internet-facing resources with security groups allowing inbound from 0.0.0.0/0.", + description="Find internet-facing resources associated with security groups that allow inbound access from '0.0.0.0/0'.", + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(ec2:EC2Instance)--(sg:EC2SecurityGroup)--(ipi:IpPermissionInbound)--(ir:IpRange) + WHERE ec2.exposed_internet = true + AND ir.range = "0.0.0.0/0" + + OPTIONAL MATCH (internet:Internet)-[can_access:CAN_ACCESS]->(ec2) + + WITH collect(path) AS paths, head(collect(internet)) AS internet, collect(can_access) AS can_access + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, internet, can_access, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr, internet, can_access + """, + parameters=[], +) + +AWS_CLASSIC_ELB_INTERNET_EXPOSED = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-classic-elb-internet-exposed", + name="Internet-Exposed Classic Load Balancers", + short_description="Find Classic Load Balancers exposed to the internet with their listeners.", + description="Find Classic Load Balancers exposed to the internet along with their listeners.", + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(elb:LoadBalancer)--(listener:ELBListener) + WHERE elb.exposed_internet = true + + OPTIONAL MATCH (internet:Internet)-[can_access:CAN_ACCESS]->(elb) + + WITH collect(path) AS paths, head(collect(internet)) AS internet, collect(can_access) AS can_access + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, internet, can_access, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr, internet, can_access + """, + parameters=[], +) + +AWS_ELBV2_INTERNET_EXPOSED = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-elbv2-internet-exposed", + name="Internet-Exposed ALB/NLB Load Balancers", + short_description="Find ELBv2 (ALB/NLB) load balancers exposed to the internet with their listeners.", + description="Find ELBv2 load balancers exposed to the internet along with their listeners.", + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(elbv2:LoadBalancerV2)--(listener:ELBV2Listener) + WHERE elbv2.exposed_internet = true + + OPTIONAL MATCH (internet:Internet)-[can_access:CAN_ACCESS]->(elbv2) + + WITH collect(path) AS paths, head(collect(internet)) AS internet, collect(can_access) AS can_access + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, internet, can_access, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr, internet, can_access + """, + parameters=[], +) + +AWS_PUBLIC_IP_RESOURCE_LOOKUP = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-public-ip-resource-lookup", + name="Resource Lookup by Public IP", + short_description="Find the AWS resource associated with a given public IP address.", + description="Given a public IP address, find the related AWS resource and its adjacent node within the selected account.", + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})-[r]-(x)-[q]-(y) + WHERE (x:EC2PrivateIp AND x.public_ip = $ip) + OR (x:EC2Instance AND x.publicipaddress = $ip) + OR (x:NetworkInterface AND x.public_ip = $ip) + OR (x:ElasticIPAddress AND x.public_ip = $ip) + + OPTIONAL MATCH (internet:Internet)-[can_access:CAN_ACCESS]->(x) + + WITH collect(path) AS paths, head(collect(internet)) AS internet, collect(can_access) AS can_access + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, internet, can_access, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr, internet, can_access + """, + parameters=[ + AttackPathsQueryParameterDefinition( + name="ip", + label="IP address", + description="Public IP address, e.g. 192.0.2.0.", + placeholder="192.0.2.0", + ), + ], +) + +# Privilege Escalation Queries (based on pathfinding.cloud research) +# https://github.com/DataDog/pathfinding.cloud +# ------------------------------------------------------------------- + +# APPRUNNER-001 +AWS_APPRUNNER_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_SERVICE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-apprunner-privesc-passrole-create-service", + name="App Runner Service Creation with Privileged Role (APPRUNNER-001)", + short_description="Create an App Runner service with a privileged IAM role to gain its permissions.", + description="Detect principals who can pass IAM roles and create App Runner services. This allows creating a service with a privileged role attached, gaining that role's permissions via StartCommand execution, a container web shell, or a malicious apprunner.yaml configuration.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - APPRUNNER-001 - iam:PassRole + apprunner:CreateService", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/apprunner-001", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find apprunner:CreateService permission + MATCH (principal)--(apprunner_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_apprunner:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_apprunner.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_apprunner.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'apprunner:createservice' + OR toLower(action) = 'apprunner:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust App Runner tasks service (can be passed to App Runner) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'tasks.apprunner.amazonaws.com'}}) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# APPRUNNER-002 +AWS_APPRUNNER_PRIVESC_UPDATE_SERVICE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-apprunner-privesc-update-service", + name="App Runner Service Update for Role Access (APPRUNNER-002)", + short_description="Update an existing App Runner service to leverage its already-attached privileged role.", + description="Detect principals who can update existing App Runner services. This allows modifying a service's configuration to execute arbitrary code with the service's already-attached IAM role, without requiring iam:PassRole. Exploitation methods include injecting a malicious StartCommand, updating to a container image with a web shell, or pointing to a repository with a malicious apprunner.yaml file.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - APPRUNNER-002 - apprunner:UpdateService", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/apprunner-002", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with apprunner:UpdateService permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(update_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_update:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_update.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_update.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'apprunner:updateservice' + OR toLower(action) = 'apprunner:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find existing App Runner services with roles attached (potential targets) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'tasks.apprunner.amazonaws.com'}}) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# BEDROCK-001 +AWS_BEDROCK_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CODE_INTERPRETER = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-bedrock-privesc-passrole-code-interpreter", + name="Bedrock Code Interpreter with Privileged Role (BEDROCK-001)", + short_description="Create a Bedrock AgentCore Code Interpreter with a privileged role attached.", + description="Detect principals who can pass IAM roles and create Bedrock AgentCore Code Interpreters. This allows creating a code interpreter with a privileged role attached, gaining that role's permissions.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - BEDROCK-001 - iam:PassRole + bedrock-agentcore:CreateCodeInterpreter + bedrock-agentcore:StartCodeInterpreterSession + bedrock-agentcore:InvokeCodeInterpreter", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/bedrock-001", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find bedrock-agentcore:CreateCodeInterpreter permission + MATCH (principal)--(bedrock_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_bedrock:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_bedrock.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_bedrock.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'bedrock-agentcore:createcodeinterpreter' + OR toLower(action) = 'bedrock-agentcore:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find bedrock-agentcore:StartCodeInterpreterSession permission + MATCH (principal)--(session_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_session:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_session.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_session.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'bedrock-agentcore:startcodeinterpretersession' + OR toLower(action) = 'bedrock-agentcore:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find bedrock-agentcore:InvokeCodeInterpreter permission + MATCH (principal)--(invoke_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_invoke:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_invoke.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_invoke.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'bedrock-agentcore:invokecodeinterpreter' + OR toLower(action) = 'bedrock-agentcore:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust the Bedrock AgentCore service (can be passed to a code interpreter) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'bedrock-agentcore.amazonaws.com'}}) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# BEDROCK-002 +AWS_BEDROCK_PRIVESC_INVOKE_CODE_INTERPRETER = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-bedrock-privesc-invoke-code-interpreter", + name="Bedrock Code Interpreter Session Hijacking (BEDROCK-002)", + short_description="Start a session on an existing Bedrock code interpreter to exfiltrate its privileged role credentials.", + description="Detect principals who can start sessions and invoke code on existing Bedrock AgentCore code interpreters. This allows executing arbitrary Python code within an interpreter that has a privileged role attached, gaining that role's credentials via the MicroVM Metadata Service without requiring iam:PassRole.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - BEDROCK-002 - bedrock-agentcore:StartCodeInterpreterSession + bedrock-agentcore:InvokeCodeInterpreter", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/bedrock-002", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with bedrock-agentcore:StartCodeInterpreterSession permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(session_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_session:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_session.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_session.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'bedrock-agentcore:startcodeinterpretersession' + OR toLower(action) = 'bedrock-agentcore:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find bedrock-agentcore:InvokeCodeInterpreter permission + MATCH (principal)--(invoke_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_invoke:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_invoke.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_invoke.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'bedrock-agentcore:invokecodeinterpreter' + OR toLower(action) = 'bedrock-agentcore:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust the Bedrock AgentCore service (already attached to existing code interpreters) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'bedrock-agentcore.amazonaws.com'}}) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# CLOUDFORMATION-001 +AWS_CLOUDFORMATION_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_STACK = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-cloudformation-privesc-passrole-create-stack", + name="CloudFormation Stack Creation with Privileged Role (CLOUDFORMATION-001)", + short_description="Create a CloudFormation stack with a privileged role to provision arbitrary AWS resources.", + description="Detect principals who can pass IAM roles and create CloudFormation stacks. This allows launching a stack with a malicious template that executes with the passed role's permissions, enabling creation of resources like IAM users, Lambda functions, or EC2 instances controlled by the attacker.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - CLOUDFORMATION-001 - iam:PassRole + cloudformation:CreateStack", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/cloudformation-001", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find cloudformation:CreateStack permission + MATCH (principal)--(cfn_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_cfn:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_cfn.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_cfn.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:createstack' + OR toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust CloudFormation service (can be passed to CloudFormation) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'cloudformation.amazonaws.com'}}) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# CLOUDFORMATION-002 +AWS_CLOUDFORMATION_PRIVESC_UPDATE_STACK = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-cloudformation-privesc-update-stack", + name="CloudFormation Stack Update for Role Access (CLOUDFORMATION-002)", + short_description="Update an existing CloudFormation stack to leverage its already-attached privileged service role.", + description="Detect principals who can update existing CloudFormation stacks. This allows modifying a stack's template to add new resources (such as IAM roles with admin access) that are created with the stack's already-attached service role permissions, without requiring iam:PassRole.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - CLOUDFORMATION-002 - cloudformation:UpdateStack", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/cloudformation-002", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with cloudformation:UpdateStack permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(update_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_update:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_update.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_update.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:updatestack' + OR toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust CloudFormation service (already attached to existing stacks) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'cloudformation.amazonaws.com'}}) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# CLOUDFORMATION-003 +AWS_CLOUDFORMATION_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_STACKSET = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-cloudformation-privesc-passrole-create-stackset", + name="CloudFormation StackSet Creation with Privileged Role (CLOUDFORMATION-003)", + short_description="Create a CloudFormation StackSet with a privileged execution role to provision arbitrary resources across accounts.", + description="Detect principals who can pass IAM roles, create CloudFormation StackSets, and deploy stack instances. This allows creating a StackSet with a malicious template and a privileged execution role, then deploying instances that create resources (such as IAM roles with admin access) using that role's permissions.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - CLOUDFORMATION-003 - iam:PassRole + cloudformation:CreateStackSet + cloudformation:CreateStackInstances", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/cloudformation-003", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find cloudformation:CreateStackSet permission + MATCH (principal)--(cfn_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_cfn:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_cfn.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_cfn.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:createstackset' + OR toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find cloudformation:CreateStackInstances permission + MATCH (principal)--(cfn_instances_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_cfn_instances:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_cfn_instances.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_cfn_instances.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:createstackinstances' + OR toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust CloudFormation service (can be passed as execution role) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'cloudformation.amazonaws.com'}}) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# CLOUDFORMATION-004 +AWS_CLOUDFORMATION_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_UPDATE_STACKSET = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-cloudformation-privesc-passrole-update-stackset", + name="CloudFormation StackSet Update with Privileged Role (CLOUDFORMATION-004)", + short_description="Update an existing CloudFormation StackSet to inject malicious resources using a privileged execution role.", + description="Detect principals who can pass IAM roles and update CloudFormation StackSets. This allows modifying an existing StackSet's template to add resources (such as IAM roles with admin access) that are provisioned by the StackSet's privileged execution role across target accounts.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - CLOUDFORMATION-004 - iam:PassRole + cloudformation:UpdateStackSet", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/cloudformation-004", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find cloudformation:UpdateStackSet permission + MATCH (principal)--(cfn_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_cfn:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_cfn.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_cfn.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:updatestackset' + OR toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust CloudFormation service (can be passed as execution role) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'cloudformation.amazonaws.com'}}) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# CLOUDFORMATION-005 +AWS_CLOUDFORMATION_PRIVESC_CHANGESET = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-cloudformation-privesc-changeset", + name="CloudFormation Change Set Privilege Escalation (CLOUDFORMATION-005)", + short_description="Create and execute a change set on an existing stack to leverage its privileged service role.", + description="Detect principals who can create and execute CloudFormation change sets. This allows modifying an existing stack's template through a staged change set, inheriting the stack's already-attached service role permissions to provision arbitrary resources without requiring iam:PassRole.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - CLOUDFORMATION-005 - cloudformation:CreateChangeSet + cloudformation:ExecuteChangeSet", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/cloudformation-005", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with cloudformation:CreateChangeSet permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(create_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_create:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_create.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_create.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:createchangeset' + OR toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find cloudformation:ExecuteChangeSet permission + MATCH (principal)--(exec_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_exec:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_exec.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_exec.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:executechangeset' + OR toLower(action) = 'cloudformation:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust CloudFormation service (already attached to existing stacks) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'cloudformation.amazonaws.com'}}) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# CODEBUILD-001 +AWS_CODEBUILD_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_PROJECT = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-codebuild-privesc-passrole-create-project", + name="CodeBuild Project Creation with Privileged Role (CODEBUILD-001)", + short_description="Create a CodeBuild project with a privileged role to execute arbitrary code via a malicious buildspec.", + description="Detect principals who can pass IAM roles, create CodeBuild projects, and start builds. This allows creating a project with a privileged role attached and executing arbitrary code through a malicious buildspec, gaining that role's permissions.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - CODEBUILD-001 - iam:PassRole + codebuild:CreateProject + codebuild:StartBuild", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/codebuild-001", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find codebuild:CreateProject permission + MATCH (principal)--(create_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_create:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_create.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_create.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'codebuild:createproject' + OR toLower(action) = 'codebuild:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find codebuild:StartBuild permission + MATCH (principal)--(build_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_build:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_build.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_build.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'codebuild:startbuild' + OR toLower(action) = 'codebuild:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust CodeBuild service (can be passed to CodeBuild) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'codebuild.amazonaws.com'}}) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# CODEBUILD-002 +AWS_CODEBUILD_PRIVESC_START_BUILD = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-codebuild-privesc-start-build", + name="CodeBuild Buildspec Override for Role Access (CODEBUILD-002)", + short_description="Start a build on an existing CodeBuild project with a buildspec override to execute code with its privileged role.", + description="Detect principals who can start builds on existing CodeBuild projects. This allows overriding the buildspec with malicious commands that execute with the project's already-attached service role permissions, without requiring iam:PassRole or codebuild:CreateProject.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - CODEBUILD-002 - codebuild:StartBuild", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/codebuild-002", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with codebuild:StartBuild permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(build_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_build:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_build.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_build.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'codebuild:startbuild' + OR toLower(action) = 'codebuild:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust CodeBuild service (already attached to existing projects) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'codebuild.amazonaws.com'}}) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# CODEBUILD-003 +AWS_CODEBUILD_PRIVESC_START_BUILD_BATCH = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-codebuild-privesc-start-build-batch", + name="CodeBuild Batch Buildspec Override for Role Access (CODEBUILD-003)", + short_description="Start a batch build on an existing CodeBuild project with a buildspec override to execute code with its privileged role.", + description="Detect principals who can start batch builds on existing CodeBuild projects. This allows overriding the buildspec with malicious commands that execute with the project's already-attached service role permissions, without requiring iam:PassRole or codebuild:CreateProject.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - CODEBUILD-003 - codebuild:StartBuildBatch", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/codebuild-003", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with codebuild:StartBuildBatch permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(build_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_build:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_build.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_build.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'codebuild:startbuildbatch' + OR toLower(action) = 'codebuild:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust CodeBuild service (already attached to existing projects) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'codebuild.amazonaws.com'}}) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# CODEBUILD-004 +AWS_CODEBUILD_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_PROJECT_BATCH = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-codebuild-privesc-passrole-create-project-batch", + name="CodeBuild Batch Project Creation with Privileged Role (CODEBUILD-004)", + short_description="Create a CodeBuild project configured for batch builds with a privileged role to execute arbitrary code via a malicious buildspec.", + description="Detect principals who can pass IAM roles, create CodeBuild projects, and start batch builds. This allows creating a project with a privileged role attached and executing arbitrary code through a malicious batch buildspec, gaining that role's permissions.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - CODEBUILD-004 - iam:PassRole + codebuild:CreateProject + codebuild:StartBuildBatch", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/codebuild-004", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find codebuild:CreateProject permission + MATCH (principal)--(create_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_create:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_create.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_create.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'codebuild:createproject' + OR toLower(action) = 'codebuild:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find codebuild:StartBuildBatch permission + MATCH (principal)--(batch_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_batch:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_batch.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_batch.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'codebuild:startbuildbatch' + OR toLower(action) = 'codebuild:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust CodeBuild service (can be passed to CodeBuild) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'codebuild.amazonaws.com'}}) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# DATAPIPELINE-001 +AWS_DATAPIPELINE_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_PIPELINE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-datapipeline-privesc-passrole-create-pipeline", + name="Data Pipeline Creation with Privileged Role (DATAPIPELINE-001)", + short_description="Create a Data Pipeline with a privileged role to execute arbitrary commands on provisioned infrastructure.", + description="Detect principals who can pass IAM roles, create Data Pipelines, define pipeline objects, and activate them. This allows creating a pipeline with a privileged role attached and executing arbitrary commands on the provisioned EC2 instances or EMR clusters, gaining that role's permissions.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - DATAPIPELINE-001 - iam:PassRole + datapipeline:CreatePipeline + datapipeline:PutPipelineDefinition + datapipeline:ActivatePipeline", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/datapipeline-001", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find datapipeline:CreatePipeline permission + MATCH (principal)--(create_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_create:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_create.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_create.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'datapipeline:createpipeline' + OR toLower(action) = 'datapipeline:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find datapipeline:PutPipelineDefinition permission + MATCH (principal)--(put_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_put:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_put.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_put.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'datapipeline:putpipelinedefinition' + OR toLower(action) = 'datapipeline:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find datapipeline:ActivatePipeline permission + MATCH (principal)--(activate_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_activate:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_activate.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_activate.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'datapipeline:activatepipeline' + OR toLower(action) = 'datapipeline:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust Data Pipeline or EMR service (can be passed to DataPipeline) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(trusted_principal:AWSPrincipal) + WHERE trusted_principal.arn IN ['datapipeline.amazonaws.com', 'elasticmapreduce.amazonaws.com'] + AND any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# EC2-001 +AWS_EC2_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_IAM = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-ec2-privesc-passrole-iam", + name="EC2 Instance Launch with Privileged Role (EC2-001)", + short_description="Launch EC2 instances with privileged IAM roles to gain their permissions via IMDS.", + description="Detect principals who can launch EC2 instances with privileged IAM roles attached. This allows gaining the permissions of the passed role by accessing the EC2 instance metadata service.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - EC2-001 - iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/ec2-001", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find ec2:RunInstances permission + MATCH (principal)--(ec2_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_ec2:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_ec2.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_ec2.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'ec2:runinstances' + OR toLower(action) = 'ec2:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust EC2 service (can be passed to EC2) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'ec2.amazonaws.com'}}) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# EC2-002 +AWS_EC2_PRIVESC_MODIFY_INSTANCE_ATTRIBUTE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-ec2-privesc-modify-instance-attribute", + name="EC2 Role Hijacking via UserData Injection (EC2-002)", + short_description="Inject malicious scripts into EC2 instance userData to gain the attached role's permissions.", + description="Detect principals who can modify EC2 instance userData, stop, and start instances. This allows injecting malicious scripts that execute on instance restart, gaining the permissions of the instance's attached IAM role.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - EC2-002 - ec2:ModifyInstanceAttribute + ec2:StopInstances + ec2:StartInstances", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/ec2-002", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with ec2:ModifyInstanceAttribute permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(modify_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_modify:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_modify.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_modify.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'ec2:modifyinstanceattribute' + OR toLower(action) = 'ec2:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find ec2:StopInstances permission (can be same or different policy) + MATCH (principal)--(stop_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_stop:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_stop.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_stop.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'ec2:stopinstances' + OR toLower(action) = 'ec2:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find ec2:StartInstances permission (can be same or different policy) + MATCH (principal)--(start_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_start:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_start.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_start.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'ec2:startinstances' + OR toLower(action) = 'ec2:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find EC2 instances with instance profiles (potential targets) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(ec2:EC2Instance)-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]->(target_role:AWSRole) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# EC2-003 +AWS_EC2_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_SPOT_INSTANCES = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-ec2-privesc-passrole-spot-instances", + name="Spot Instance Launch with Privileged Role (EC2-003)", + short_description="Launch EC2 Spot Instances with privileged IAM roles to gain their permissions via IMDS.", + description="Detect principals who can pass IAM roles and request EC2 Spot Instances. This allows launching a spot instance with a privileged role attached, gaining that role's permissions via the instance metadata service.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - EC2-003 - iam:PassRole + ec2:RequestSpotInstances", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/ec2-003", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find ec2:RequestSpotInstances permission + MATCH (principal)--(spot_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_spot:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_spot.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_spot.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'ec2:requestspotinstances' + OR toLower(action) = 'ec2:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust EC2 service (can be passed to EC2 spot instances) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'ec2.amazonaws.com'}}) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# EC2-004 +AWS_EC2_PRIVESC_LAUNCH_TEMPLATE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-ec2-privesc-launch-template", + name="Launch Template Poisoning for Role Access (EC2-004)", + short_description="Inject malicious userData into launch templates that reference privileged roles, no PassRole needed.", + description="Detect principals who can create new launch template versions and modify launch templates. This allows injecting malicious user data into existing templates that already reference privileged IAM roles, without requiring iam:PassRole permissions.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - EC2-004 - ec2:CreateLaunchTemplateVersion + ec2:ModifyLaunchTemplate", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/ec2-004", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with ec2:CreateLaunchTemplateVersion permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(create_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_create:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_create.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_create.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'ec2:createlaunchtemplateversion' + OR toLower(action) = 'ec2:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find ec2:ModifyLaunchTemplate permission + MATCH (principal)--(modify_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_modify:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_modify.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_modify.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'ec2:modifylaunchtemplate' + OR toLower(action) = 'ec2:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find launch templates in the account (potential targets) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(template:LaunchTemplate) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# EC2INSTANCECONNECT-003 +AWS_EC2INSTANCECONNECT_PRIVESC_SEND_SSH_PUBLIC_KEY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-ec2instanceconnect-privesc-send-ssh-public-key", + name="EC2 Instance Connect SSH Access for Role Credentials (EC2INSTANCECONNECT-003)", + short_description="Push a temporary SSH key to an EC2 instance via Instance Connect to access its attached role credentials through IMDS.", + description="Detect principals who can send SSH public keys via EC2 Instance Connect. This allows establishing an SSH session on a running EC2 instance and retrieving the attached IAM role's temporary credentials from the Instance Metadata Service (IMDS), gaining that role's permissions.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - EC2INSTANCECONNECT-003 - ec2-instance-connect:SendSSHPublicKey", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/ec2instanceconnect-003", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with ec2-instance-connect:SendSSHPublicKey permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(connect_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_connect:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_connect.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_connect.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'ec2-instance-connect:sendsshpublickey' + OR toLower(action) = 'ec2-instance-connect:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find EC2 instances with attached roles (targets for credential theft via IMDS) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(ec2:EC2Instance)-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]->(target_role:AWSRole) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# ECS-001 +AWS_ECS_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_SERVICE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-ecs-privesc-passrole-create-service", + name="ECS Service Creation with Privileged Role (ECS-001 - New Cluster)", + short_description="Create an ECS cluster and service with a privileged Fargate task role to execute arbitrary code.", + description="Detect principals who can pass IAM roles, create ECS clusters, register task definitions, and create services. This allows creating a Fargate task with a privileged role attached, gaining that role's permissions to execute arbitrary code via the container.", + provider="aws", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - ECS-001 - iam:PassRole + ecs:CreateCluster + ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition + ecs:CreateService", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/ecs-001", + ), + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find ecs:CreateCluster permission + MATCH (principal)--(cluster_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_cluster:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_cluster.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_cluster.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'ecs:createcluster' + OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition permission + MATCH (principal)--(taskdef_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_taskdef:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_taskdef.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_taskdef.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'ecs:registertaskdefinition' + OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find ecs:CreateService permission + MATCH (principal)--(service_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_service:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_service.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_service.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'ecs:createservice' + OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust ECS tasks service (can be passed to ECS tasks) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com'}}) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# ECS-002 +AWS_ECS_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_RUN_TASK = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-ecs-privesc-passrole-run-task", + name="ECS Task Execution with Privileged Role (ECS-002 - New Cluster)", + short_description="Create an ECS cluster and run a one-off Fargate task with a privileged role to execute arbitrary code.", + description="Detect principals who can pass IAM roles, create ECS clusters, register task definitions, and run tasks. This allows creating a Fargate task with a privileged role attached, gaining that role's permissions to execute arbitrary code via the container. Unlike ecs:CreateService, ecs:RunTask executes the task once without creating a persistent service.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - ECS-002 - iam:PassRole + ecs:CreateCluster + ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition + ecs:RunTask", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/ecs-002", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find ecs:CreateCluster permission + MATCH (principal)--(cluster_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_cluster:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_cluster.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_cluster.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'ecs:createcluster' + OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition permission + MATCH (principal)--(taskdef_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_taskdef:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_taskdef.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_taskdef.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'ecs:registertaskdefinition' + OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find ecs:RunTask permission + MATCH (principal)--(runtask_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_runtask:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_runtask.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_runtask.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'ecs:runtask' + OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust ECS tasks service (can be passed to ECS tasks) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com'}}) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# ECS-003 +AWS_ECS_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_SERVICE_EXISTING_CLUSTER = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-ecs-privesc-passrole-create-service-existing-cluster", + name="ECS Service Creation with Privileged Role (ECS-003 - Existing Cluster)", + short_description="Deploy a Fargate service with a privileged role on an existing ECS cluster.", + description="Detect principals who can pass IAM roles, register ECS task definitions, and create services on existing clusters. Unlike ECS-001, this does not require ecs:CreateCluster since it targets clusters that already exist. The attacker registers a task definition with a privileged role and launches it as a Fargate service, gaining that role's permissions.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - ECS-003 - iam:PassRole + ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition + ecs:CreateService", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/ecs-003", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition permission + MATCH (principal)--(taskdef_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_taskdef:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_taskdef.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_taskdef.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'ecs:registertaskdefinition' + OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find ecs:CreateService permission + MATCH (principal)--(service_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_service:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_service.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_service.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'ecs:createservice' + OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust ECS tasks service (can be passed to ECS tasks) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com'}}) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# ECS-004 +AWS_ECS_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_RUN_TASK_EXISTING_CLUSTER = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-ecs-privesc-passrole-run-task-existing-cluster", + name="ECS Task Execution with Privileged Role (ECS-004 - Existing Cluster)", + short_description="Run a one-off Fargate task with a privileged role on an existing ECS cluster.", + description="Detect principals who can pass IAM roles, register ECS task definitions, and run tasks on existing clusters. Unlike ECS-002, this does not require ecs:CreateCluster since it targets clusters that already exist. The attacker registers a task definition with a privileged role and runs it as a one-off Fargate task, gaining that role's permissions.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - ECS-004 - iam:PassRole + ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition + ecs:RunTask", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/ecs-004", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition permission + MATCH (principal)--(taskdef_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_taskdef:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_taskdef.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_taskdef.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'ecs:registertaskdefinition' + OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find ecs:RunTask permission + MATCH (principal)--(runtask_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_runtask:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_runtask.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_runtask.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'ecs:runtask' + OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust ECS tasks service (can be passed to ECS tasks) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com'}}) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# ECS-005 +AWS_ECS_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_START_TASK_EXISTING_CLUSTER = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-ecs-privesc-passrole-start-task-existing-cluster", + name="ECS Task Start with Privileged Role on EC2 (ECS-005 - Existing Cluster)", + short_description="Register a task definition with a privileged role and start it on an EC2 container instance to execute arbitrary code.", + description="Detect principals who can pass IAM roles, register ECS task definitions, and start tasks on existing EC2 container instances. Unlike ecs:RunTask which works with both EC2 and Fargate, ecs:StartTask is specific to EC2 launch types and requires specifying an existing container instance ARN. The attacker registers a task definition with a privileged role and starts it on a container instance, gaining that role's permissions.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - ECS-005 - iam:PassRole + ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition + ecs:StartTask", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/ecs-005", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition permission + MATCH (principal)--(taskdef_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_taskdef:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_taskdef.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_taskdef.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'ecs:registertaskdefinition' + OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find ecs:StartTask permission + MATCH (principal)--(starttask_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_starttask:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_starttask.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_starttask.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'ecs:starttask' + OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust ECS tasks service (can be passed to ECS tasks) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com'}}) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# ECS-006 +AWS_ECS_PRIVESC_EXECUTE_COMMAND = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-ecs-privesc-execute-command", + name="ECS Exec Container Hijacking for Role Credentials (ECS-006)", + short_description="Shell into a running ECS container via ECS Exec to steal the attached task role's credentials.", + description="Detect principals who can execute commands in running ECS containers and describe tasks. This allows establishing an interactive shell session in a container where ECS Exec is enabled, then retrieving the task role's temporary credentials from the container metadata service, without requiring iam:PassRole.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - ECS-006 - ecs:ExecuteCommand + ecs:DescribeTasks", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/ecs-006", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with ecs:ExecuteCommand permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(exec_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_exec:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_exec.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_exec.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'ecs:executecommand' + OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find ecs:DescribeTasks permission (required by AWS CLI to get container runtime ID) + MATCH (principal)--(describe_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_describe:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_describe.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_describe.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'ecs:describetasks' + OR toLower(action) = 'ecs:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust ECS tasks service (already attached to running tasks) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com'}}) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# GLUE-001 +AWS_GLUE_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_DEV_ENDPOINT = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-glue-privesc-passrole-dev-endpoint", + name="Glue Dev Endpoint with Privileged Role (GLUE-001)", + short_description="Create a Glue development endpoint with a privileged role attached to gain its permissions.", + description="Detect principals who can pass IAM roles and create Glue development endpoints. This allows creating a dev endpoint with a privileged role attached, gaining that role's permissions.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - GLUE-001 - iam:PassRole + glue:CreateDevEndpoint", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/glue-001", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find glue:CreateDevEndpoint permission + MATCH (principal)--(glue_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_glue:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_glue.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_glue.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'glue:createdevendpoint' + OR toLower(action) = 'glue:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust Glue service (can be passed to Glue) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'glue.amazonaws.com'}}) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# GLUE-002 +AWS_GLUE_PRIVESC_UPDATE_DEV_ENDPOINT = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-glue-privesc-update-dev-endpoint", + name="Glue Dev Endpoint SSH Hijacking via Update (GLUE-002)", + short_description="Update an existing Glue development endpoint to inject an SSH public key and access its attached role credentials.", + description="Detect principals who can update Glue development endpoints. This allows adding an attacker-controlled SSH public key to an existing dev endpoint that already has a privileged role attached, then SSHing into it to steal the role's temporary credentials without requiring iam:PassRole.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - GLUE-002 - glue:UpdateDevEndpoint", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/glue-002", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with glue:UpdateDevEndpoint permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'glue:updatedevendpoint' + OR toLower(action) = 'glue:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust Glue service (already attached to existing dev endpoints) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'glue.amazonaws.com'}}) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# GLUE-003 +AWS_GLUE_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_JOB = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-glue-privesc-passrole-create-job", + name="Glue Job Creation with Privileged Role (GLUE-003)", + short_description="Create a Glue job with a privileged role and start it to execute arbitrary code with that role's permissions.", + description="Detect principals who can pass IAM roles, create Glue jobs, and start job runs. This allows creating a Python shell job with a privileged role attached and executing arbitrary code that modifies IAM permissions, a cost-effective alternative to Glue development endpoints.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - GLUE-003 - iam:PassRole + glue:CreateJob + glue:StartJobRun", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/glue-003", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find glue:CreateJob permission + MATCH (principal)--(createjob_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_createjob:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_createjob.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_createjob.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'glue:createjob' + OR toLower(action) = 'glue:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find glue:StartJobRun permission + MATCH (principal)--(startjob_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_startjob:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_startjob.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_startjob.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'glue:startjobrun' + OR toLower(action) = 'glue:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust Glue service (can be passed to Glue jobs) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'glue.amazonaws.com'}}) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# GLUE-004 +AWS_GLUE_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_JOB_TRIGGER = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-glue-privesc-passrole-create-job-trigger", + name="Glue Job Creation with Scheduled Trigger and Privileged Role (GLUE-004)", + short_description="Create a Glue job with a privileged role and a scheduled trigger to persistently execute arbitrary code.", + description="Detect principals who can pass IAM roles, create Glue jobs, and create triggers with automatic activation. Unlike manual execution via StartJobRun, this creates a persistent attack by scheduling the job to run repeatedly, making it harder to detect and remediate.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - GLUE-004 - iam:PassRole + glue:CreateJob + glue:CreateTrigger", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/glue-004", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find glue:CreateJob permission + MATCH (principal)--(createjob_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_createjob:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_createjob.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_createjob.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'glue:createjob' + OR toLower(action) = 'glue:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find glue:CreateTrigger permission + MATCH (principal)--(trigger_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_trigger:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_trigger.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_trigger.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'glue:createtrigger' + OR toLower(action) = 'glue:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust Glue service (can be passed to Glue jobs) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'glue.amazonaws.com'}}) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# GLUE-005 +AWS_GLUE_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_UPDATE_JOB = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-glue-privesc-passrole-update-job", + name="Glue Job Hijacking via Update with Privileged Role (GLUE-005)", + short_description="Update an existing Glue job to attach a privileged role and inject malicious code, then start it to gain that role's permissions.", + description="Detect principals who can pass IAM roles, update existing Glue jobs, and start job runs. This allows modifying an existing job's role and script to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges, a stealthier variant of job creation since it reuses existing infrastructure rather than creating new resources.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - GLUE-005 - iam:PassRole + glue:UpdateJob + glue:StartJobRun", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/glue-005", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find glue:UpdateJob permission + MATCH (principal)--(updatejob_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_updatejob:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_updatejob.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_updatejob.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'glue:updatejob' + OR toLower(action) = 'glue:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find glue:StartJobRun permission + MATCH (principal)--(startjob_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_startjob:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_startjob.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_startjob.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'glue:startjobrun' + OR toLower(action) = 'glue:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust Glue service (can be passed to Glue jobs) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'glue.amazonaws.com'}}) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# GLUE-006 +AWS_GLUE_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_UPDATE_JOB_TRIGGER = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-glue-privesc-passrole-update-job-trigger", + name="Glue Job Hijacking with Scheduled Trigger and Privileged Role (GLUE-006)", + short_description="Update an existing Glue job to attach a privileged role and inject malicious code, then create a scheduled trigger for persistent automated execution.", + description="Detect principals who can pass IAM roles, update existing Glue jobs, and create triggers with automatic activation. This combines the stealth of modifying existing infrastructure with the persistence of scheduled automation, creating a recurring backdoor that re-executes even after remediation attempts.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - GLUE-006 - iam:PassRole + glue:UpdateJob + glue:CreateTrigger", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/glue-006", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find glue:UpdateJob permission + MATCH (principal)--(updatejob_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_updatejob:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_updatejob.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_updatejob.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'glue:updatejob' + OR toLower(action) = 'glue:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find glue:CreateTrigger permission + MATCH (principal)--(trigger_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_trigger:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_trigger.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_trigger.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'glue:createtrigger' + OR toLower(action) = 'glue:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust Glue service (can be passed to Glue jobs) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'glue.amazonaws.com'}}) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# IAM-001 +AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_CREATE_POLICY_VERSION = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-iam-privesc-create-policy-version", + name="Policy Version Override for Self-Escalation (IAM-001)", + short_description="Create a new version of an attached policy with administrative permissions, instantly escalating the principal's own privileges.", + description="Detect principals who can create new policy versions. If a customer-managed policy is already attached to a principal and that principal has iam:CreatePolicyVersion on that policy, they can replace its contents with a fully permissive policy and set it as the default, gaining immediate administrative access.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - IAM-001 - iam:CreatePolicyVersion", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/iam-001", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:CreatePolicyVersion permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:createpolicyversion' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find customer-managed policies attached to the same principal that can be overwritten + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_policy:AWSPolicy)--(principal) + WHERE target_policy.arn CONTAINS $provider_uid + AND any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_policy.arn CONTAINS resource + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# IAM-002 +AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_CREATE_ACCESS_KEY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-iam-privesc-create-access-key", + name="Access Key Creation for Lateral Movement (IAM-002)", + short_description="Create access keys for other IAM users to gain their permissions and move laterally across the account.", + description="Detect principals who can create access keys for other IAM users. This allows generating new credentials for any target user within the resource scope, immediately gaining that user's permissions without needing their password or existing keys.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - IAM-002 - iam:CreateAccessKey", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/iam-002", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:CreateAccessKey permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:createaccesskey' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find target users that the principal can create access keys for + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_user:AWSUser) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_user.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_user.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# IAM-003 +AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_DELETE_CREATE_ACCESS_KEY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-iam-privesc-delete-create-access-key", + name="Access Key Rotation Attack for Lateral Movement (IAM-003)", + short_description="Delete and recreate access keys for other IAM users to bypass the two-key limit and gain their permissions.", + description="Detect principals who can both delete and create access keys for other IAM users. This variation of IAM-002 handles the scenario where a target user already has the maximum of two access keys by first deleting one, then creating a replacement under the attacker's control.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - IAM-003 - iam:CreateAccessKey + iam:DeleteAccessKey", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/iam-003", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:CreateAccessKey permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:createaccesskey' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find iam:DeleteAccessKey permission + MATCH (principal)--(delete_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_delete:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_delete.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_delete.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:deleteaccesskey' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find target users that the principal can rotate access keys for + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_user:AWSUser) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_user.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_user.name + ) + AND any(resource IN stmt_delete.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_user.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_user.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# IAM-004 +AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_CREATE_LOGIN_PROFILE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-iam-privesc-create-login-profile", + name="Console Login Profile Creation for Lateral Movement (IAM-004)", + short_description="Create console login profiles for other IAM users to access the AWS Console with their permissions.", + description="Detect principals who can create console login profiles for other IAM users. By setting a known password on a target user that lacks a login profile, the attacker gains AWS Console access with that user's permissions without needing their existing credentials.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - IAM-004 - iam:CreateLoginProfile", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/iam-004", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:CreateLoginProfile permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:createloginprofile' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find target users that the principal can create login profiles for + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_user:AWSUser) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_user.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_user.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# IAM-005 +AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_PUT_ROLE_POLICY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-iam-privesc-put-role-policy", + name="Inline Policy Injection for Self-Escalation (IAM-005)", + short_description="Attach an inline policy with administrative permissions to your own role, instantly escalating privileges.", + description="Detect roles that can use iam:PutRolePolicy on themselves. A role with this permission can attach an inline policy granting any permissions, including full administrative access, without needing to modify or assume any other resource.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - IAM-005 - iam:PutRolePolicy", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/iam-005", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find roles with iam:PutRolePolicy permission scoped to themselves + MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(role:AWSRole)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:putrolepolicy' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + AND any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# IAM-006 +AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_UPDATE_LOGIN_PROFILE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-iam-privesc-update-login-profile", + name="Console Password Override for Lateral Movement (IAM-006)", + short_description="Change the console password of other IAM users to log in as them and gain their permissions.", + description="Detect principals who can update console login profiles for other IAM users. By resetting a target user's password, the attacker gains AWS Console access with that user's permissions. Unlike IAM-004, this targets users who already have a login profile configured.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - IAM-006 - iam:UpdateLoginProfile", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/iam-006", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:UpdateLoginProfile permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:updateloginprofile' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find target users that the principal can update login profiles for + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_user:AWSUser) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_user.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_user.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# IAM-007 +AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_PUT_USER_POLICY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-iam-privesc-put-user-policy", + name="Inline Policy Injection on User for Self-Escalation (IAM-007)", + short_description="Attach an inline policy with administrative permissions to your own IAM user, instantly escalating privileges.", + description="Detect IAM users that can use iam:PutUserPolicy on themselves. A user with this permission can attach an inline policy granting any permissions, including full administrative access, without needing to modify or assume any other resource. This is the user equivalent of IAM-005 (PutRolePolicy).", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - IAM-007 - iam:PutUserPolicy", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/iam-007", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find users with iam:PutUserPolicy permission scoped to themselves + MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(user:AWSUser)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:putuserpolicy' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + AND any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR user.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS user.name + ) + + WITH collect(path) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# IAM-008 +AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ATTACH_USER_POLICY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-iam-privesc-attach-user-policy", + name="Managed Policy Attachment on User for Self-Escalation (IAM-008)", + short_description="Attach existing managed policies with administrative permissions to your own IAM user, instantly escalating privileges.", + description="Detect IAM users that can use iam:AttachUserPolicy on themselves. A user with this permission can attach any existing managed policy, including AdministratorAccess, to themselves without needing to modify or assume any other resource. Unlike IAM-007 (PutUserPolicy), this requires an existing managed policy with elevated permissions.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - IAM-008 - iam:AttachUserPolicy", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/iam-008", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find users with iam:AttachUserPolicy permission scoped to themselves + MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(user:AWSUser)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:attachuserpolicy' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + AND any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR user.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS user.name + ) + + WITH collect(path) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# IAM-009 +AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ATTACH_ROLE_POLICY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-iam-privesc-attach-role-policy", + name="Managed Policy Attachment on Role for Self-Escalation (IAM-009)", + short_description="Attach existing managed policies with administrative permissions to your own IAM role, instantly escalating privileges.", + description="Detect IAM roles that can use iam:AttachRolePolicy on themselves. A role with this permission can attach any existing managed policy, including AdministratorAccess, to itself without needing to modify or assume any other resource. Unlike IAM-005 (PutRolePolicy), this requires an existing managed policy with elevated permissions.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - IAM-009 - iam:AttachRolePolicy", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/iam-009", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find roles with iam:AttachRolePolicy permission scoped to themselves + MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(role:AWSRole)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:attachrolepolicy' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + AND any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# IAM-010 +AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ATTACH_GROUP_POLICY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-iam-privesc-attach-group-policy", + name="Managed Policy Attachment on Group for Self-Escalation (IAM-010)", + short_description="Attach existing managed policies with administrative permissions to a group you belong to, escalating privileges for all group members.", + description="Detect IAM users that can use iam:AttachGroupPolicy on a group they are a member of. A user with this permission can attach any existing managed policy, including AdministratorAccess, to a group they belong to, immediately escalating privileges for all group members.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - IAM-010 - iam:AttachGroupPolicy", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/iam-010", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find users with iam:AttachGroupPolicy permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(user:AWSUser)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:attachgrouppolicy' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find groups the user is a member of and can attach policies to + MATCH path_target = (aws)-[:RESOURCE]->(target_group:AWSGroup)<-[:MEMBER_AWS_GROUP]-(user) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_group.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_group.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# IAM-011 +AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_PUT_GROUP_POLICY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-iam-privesc-put-group-policy", + name="Inline Policy Injection on Group for Self-Escalation (IAM-011)", + short_description="Attach an inline policy with administrative permissions to a group you belong to, escalating privileges for all group members.", + description="Detect IAM users that can use iam:PutGroupPolicy on a group they are a member of. A user with this permission can attach an inline policy granting any permissions to a group they belong to, immediately escalating privileges for all group members. Unlike IAM-010, this does not require an existing managed policy.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - IAM-011 - iam:PutGroupPolicy", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/iam-011", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find users with iam:PutGroupPolicy permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(user:AWSUser)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:putgrouppolicy' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find groups the user is a member of and can put policies on + MATCH path_target = (aws)-[:RESOURCE]->(target_group:AWSGroup)<-[:MEMBER_AWS_GROUP]-(user) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_group.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_group.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# IAM-012 +AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_UPDATE_ASSUME_ROLE_POLICY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-iam-privesc-update-assume-role-policy", + name="Trust Policy Hijacking for Role Assumption (IAM-012)", + short_description="Modify a role's trust policy to allow yourself to assume it, gaining the role's permissions.", + description="Detect principals who can update the assume role policy (trust policy) of other IAM roles. By modifying a target role's trust policy to trust the attacker's principal, the attacker can then assume the role and gain all its permissions, including potential administrative access.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - IAM-012 - iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/iam-012", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:updateassumerolepolicy' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find target roles whose trust policy can be modified + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# IAM-013 +AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ADD_USER_TO_GROUP = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-iam-privesc-add-user-to-group", + name="Group Membership Hijacking for Privilege Escalation (IAM-013)", + short_description="Add yourself to a privileged IAM group to inherit its permissions, gaining access to all policies attached to the group.", + description="Detect principals who can add users to IAM groups. By adding themselves to a group with elevated permissions such as AdministratorAccess, the attacker immediately inherits all policies attached to that group. The level of access gained depends on the permissions of the target group.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - IAM-013 - iam:AddUserToGroup", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/iam-013", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:AddUserToGroup permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:addusertogroup' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find target groups the principal can add users to + MATCH path_target = (aws)-[:RESOURCE]->(target_group:AWSGroup) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_group.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_group.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# IAM-014 +AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ATTACH_ROLE_POLICY_ASSUME_ROLE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-iam-privesc-attach-role-policy-assume-role", + name="Managed Policy Attachment with Role Assumption for Lateral Movement (IAM-014)", + short_description="Attach administrative managed policies to another role you can assume, then assume it to gain elevated privileges.", + description="Detect principals who can attach managed policies to a different IAM role and also assume that role. By attaching AdministratorAccess to a target role and then assuming it, the attacker gains full administrative access. This is a variation of IAM-009 for lateral movement where the principal targets another assumable role instead of their own.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - IAM-014 - iam:AttachRolePolicy + sts:AssumeRole", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/iam-014", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:AttachRolePolicy permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:attachrolepolicy' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find target roles the principal can assume and attach policies to + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)<-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]-(principal) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# IAM-015 +AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ATTACH_USER_POLICY_CREATE_ACCESS_KEY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-iam-privesc-attach-user-policy-create-access-key", + name="Managed Policy Attachment with Access Key Creation for Lateral Movement (IAM-015)", + short_description="Attach administrative managed policies to another IAM user and create access keys for them to gain programmatic access with elevated privileges.", + description="Detect principals who can attach managed policies to another IAM user and also create access keys for that user. By attaching AdministratorAccess to a target user and creating access keys, the attacker gains programmatic access with the target user's elevated permissions. This combines IAM-008 (AttachUserPolicy) with IAM-002 (CreateAccessKey) for lateral movement.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - IAM-015 - iam:AttachUserPolicy + iam:CreateAccessKey", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/iam-015", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:AttachUserPolicy permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:attachuserpolicy' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find iam:CreateAccessKey permission + MATCH (principal)--(policy2:AWSPolicy)--(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt2.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt2.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:createaccesskey' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find target users the principal can attach policies to and create keys for + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_user:AWSUser) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_user.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_user.name + ) + AND any(resource IN stmt2.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_user.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_user.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# IAM-016 +AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_CREATE_POLICY_VERSION_ASSUME_ROLE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-iam-privesc-create-policy-version-assume-role", + name="Policy Version Override with Role Assumption for Lateral Movement (IAM-016)", + short_description="Create a new version of a customer-managed policy attached to another role with administrative permissions, then assume that role to gain elevated access.", + description="Detect principals who can create new versions of customer-managed policies attached to other roles and also assume those roles. By creating a new policy version with administrative permissions on a policy attached to a target role, then assuming that role, the attacker gains full administrative access. This is a variation of IAM-001 for lateral movement where the modified policy is attached to an assumable role rather than the attacker's own principal.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - IAM-016 - iam:CreatePolicyVersion + sts:AssumeRole", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/iam-016", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:CreatePolicyVersion permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:createpolicyversion' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find target roles the principal can assume that have customer-managed policies the principal can modify + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)<-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]-(principal) + MATCH (target_role)--(target_policy:AWSPolicy) + WHERE target_policy.arn CONTAINS $provider_uid + AND any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_policy.arn CONTAINS resource + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# IAM-017 +AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_PUT_ROLE_POLICY_ASSUME_ROLE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-iam-privesc-put-role-policy-assume-role", + name="Inline Policy Injection with Role Assumption for Lateral Movement (IAM-017)", + short_description="Attach an inline policy with administrative permissions to another role you can assume, then assume it to gain elevated privileges.", + description="Detect principals who can add inline policies to a different IAM role and also assume that role. By adding an inline policy granting administrative permissions to a target role and then assuming it, the attacker gains full administrative access. This is a variation of IAM-005 for lateral movement where the principal targets another assumable role instead of their own.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - IAM-017 - iam:PutRolePolicy + sts:AssumeRole", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/iam-017", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PutRolePolicy permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:putrolepolicy' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find target roles the principal can assume and put inline policies on + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)<-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]-(principal) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# IAM-018 +AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_PUT_USER_POLICY_CREATE_ACCESS_KEY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-iam-privesc-put-user-policy-create-access-key", + name="Inline Policy Injection with Access Key Creation for Lateral Movement (IAM-018)", + short_description="Attach an inline policy with administrative permissions to another IAM user and create access keys for them to gain programmatic access with elevated privileges.", + description="Detect principals who can add inline policies to another IAM user and also create access keys for that user. By adding an administrative inline policy to a target user and creating access keys, the attacker gains programmatic access with the target user's elevated permissions. This combines IAM-007 (PutUserPolicy) with IAM-002 (CreateAccessKey) for lateral movement.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - IAM-018 - iam:PutUserPolicy + iam:CreateAccessKey", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/iam-018", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PutUserPolicy permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:putuserpolicy' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find iam:CreateAccessKey permission + MATCH (principal)--(policy2:AWSPolicy)--(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt2.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt2.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:createaccesskey' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find target users the principal can put policies on and create keys for + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_user:AWSUser) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_user.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_user.name + ) + AND any(resource IN stmt2.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_user.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_user.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# IAM-019 +AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ATTACH_ROLE_POLICY_UPDATE_ASSUME_ROLE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-iam-privesc-attach-role-policy-update-assume-role", + name="Managed Policy Attachment with Trust Policy Hijacking for Privilege Escalation (IAM-019)", + short_description="Attach administrative managed policies to a role and modify its trust policy to allow yourself to assume it, gaining elevated privileges without prior assume-role access.", + description="Detect principals who can attach managed policies to an IAM role and also update that role's trust policy. By attaching AdministratorAccess and modifying the trust policy to allow the attacker, the principal can then assume the role without needing pre-existing sts:AssumeRole permission. This combines IAM-009 (AttachRolePolicy) with IAM-012 (UpdateAssumeRolePolicy).", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - IAM-019 - iam:AttachRolePolicy + iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/iam-019", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:AttachRolePolicy permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:attachrolepolicy' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy permission + MATCH (principal)--(policy2:AWSPolicy)--(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt2.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt2.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:updateassumerolepolicy' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find target roles the principal can attach policies to and update trust policy for + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + AND any(resource IN stmt2.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# IAM-020 +AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_CREATE_POLICY_VERSION_UPDATE_ASSUME_ROLE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-iam-privesc-create-policy-version-update-assume-role", + name="Policy Version Override with Trust Policy Hijacking for Privilege Escalation (IAM-020)", + short_description="Create a new version of a customer-managed policy attached to a role with administrative permissions and modify its trust policy to assume it, without prior assume-role access.", + description="Detect principals who can create new versions of customer-managed policies attached to roles and also update those roles' trust policies. By creating an administrative policy version and modifying the trust policy to allow the attacker, the principal can assume the role without needing pre-existing sts:AssumeRole permission. This combines IAM-001 (CreatePolicyVersion) with IAM-012 (UpdateAssumeRolePolicy).", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - IAM-020 - iam:CreatePolicyVersion + iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/iam-020", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:CreatePolicyVersion permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:createpolicyversion' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy permission + MATCH (principal)--(policy2:AWSPolicy)--(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt2.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt2.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:updateassumerolepolicy' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find target roles with customer-managed policies the principal can modify and update trust policy for + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt2.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + MATCH (target_role)--(target_policy:AWSPolicy) + WHERE target_policy.arn CONTAINS $provider_uid + AND any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_policy.arn CONTAINS resource + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# IAM-021 +AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_PUT_ROLE_POLICY_UPDATE_ASSUME_ROLE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-iam-privesc-put-role-policy-update-assume-role", + name="Inline Policy Injection with Trust Policy Hijacking for Privilege Escalation (IAM-021)", + short_description="Add an inline policy with administrative permissions to a role and modify its trust policy to allow yourself to assume it, gaining elevated privileges without prior assume-role access.", + description="Detect principals who can add inline policies to an IAM role and also update that role's trust policy. By adding an administrative inline policy and modifying the trust policy to allow the attacker, the principal can then assume the role without needing pre-existing sts:AssumeRole permission. This combines IAM-005 (PutRolePolicy) with IAM-012 (UpdateAssumeRolePolicy).", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - IAM-021 - iam:PutRolePolicy + iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/iam-021", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PutRolePolicy permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:putrolepolicy' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy permission + MATCH (principal)--(policy2:AWSPolicy)--(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt2.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt2.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:updateassumerolepolicy' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find target roles the principal can put inline policies on and update trust policy for + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + AND any(resource IN stmt2.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# LAMBDA-001 +AWS_LAMBDA_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_FUNCTION = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-lambda-privesc-passrole-create-function", + name="Lambda Function Creation with Privileged Role (LAMBDA-001)", + short_description="Create a Lambda function with a privileged IAM role and invoke it to execute code with that role's permissions.", + description="Detect principals who can create Lambda functions with privileged IAM roles and invoke them. By passing a privileged role to a new Lambda function and invoking it, the attacker executes code with the role's permissions, gaining access to any resources the role can access.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - LAMBDA-001 - iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction + lambda:InvokeFunction", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/lambda-001", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find lambda:CreateFunction permission + MATCH (principal)--(create_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_create:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_create.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_create.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'lambda:createfunction' + OR toLower(action) = 'lambda:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find lambda:InvokeFunction permission + MATCH (principal)--(invoke_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_invoke:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_invoke.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_invoke.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'lambda:invokefunction' + OR toLower(action) = 'lambda:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust Lambda service (can be passed to Lambda) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'lambda.amazonaws.com'}}) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# LAMBDA-002 +AWS_LAMBDA_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_FUNCTION_EVENT_SOURCE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-lambda-privesc-passrole-create-function-event-source", + name="Lambda Function Creation with Event Source Trigger (LAMBDA-002)", + short_description="Create a Lambda function with a privileged IAM role and an event source mapping to trigger it automatically, executing code with the role's permissions.", + description="Detect principals who can create Lambda functions with privileged IAM roles and configure event source mappings to trigger them. By passing a privileged role to a new Lambda function and creating an event source mapping (DynamoDB stream, Kinesis, SQS), the attacker executes code with elevated privileges without needing to invoke the function directly.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - LAMBDA-002 - iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction + lambda:CreateEventSourceMapping", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/lambda-002", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find lambda:CreateFunction permission + MATCH (principal)--(create_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_create:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_create.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_create.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'lambda:createfunction' + OR toLower(action) = 'lambda:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find lambda:CreateEventSourceMapping permission + MATCH (principal)--(event_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_event:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_event.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_event.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'lambda:createeventsourcemapping' + OR toLower(action) = 'lambda:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust Lambda service (can be passed to Lambda) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'lambda.amazonaws.com'}}) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# LAMBDA-003 +AWS_LAMBDA_PRIVESC_UPDATE_FUNCTION_CODE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-lambda-privesc-update-function-code", + name="Lambda Function Code Injection (LAMBDA-003)", + short_description="Modify the code of an existing Lambda function to execute arbitrary commands with the function's execution role permissions.", + description="Detect principals who can update the code of existing Lambda functions. By replacing a Lambda function's code with malicious code, the attacker executes arbitrary commands with the privileges of the function's execution role when it is next invoked, either manually or via automatic triggers.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - LAMBDA-003 - lambda:UpdateFunctionCode", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/lambda-003", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with lambda:UpdateFunctionCode permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'lambda:updatefunctioncode' + OR toLower(action) = 'lambda:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find existing Lambda functions with execution roles + MATCH path_target = (aws)-[:RESOURCE]->(lambda_fn:AWSLambda)-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]->(target_role:AWSRole) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR lambda_fn.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS lambda_fn.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# LAMBDA-004 +AWS_LAMBDA_PRIVESC_UPDATE_FUNCTION_CODE_INVOKE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-lambda-privesc-update-function-code-invoke", + name="Lambda Function Code Injection with Direct Invocation (LAMBDA-004)", + short_description="Modify the code of an existing Lambda function and invoke it directly to execute arbitrary commands with the function's execution role permissions.", + description="Detect principals who can update the code of existing Lambda functions and invoke them. By replacing a Lambda function's code with malicious code and invoking it directly, the attacker executes arbitrary commands with the privileges of the function's execution role immediately, without waiting for automatic triggers.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - LAMBDA-004 - lambda:UpdateFunctionCode + lambda:InvokeFunction", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/lambda-004", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with lambda:UpdateFunctionCode permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'lambda:updatefunctioncode' + OR toLower(action) = 'lambda:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find lambda:InvokeFunction permission + MATCH (principal)--(policy2:AWSPolicy)--(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt2.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt2.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'lambda:invokefunction' + OR toLower(action) = 'lambda:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find existing Lambda functions with execution roles + MATCH path_target = (aws)-[:RESOURCE]->(lambda_fn:AWSLambda)-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]->(target_role:AWSRole) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR lambda_fn.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS lambda_fn.name + ) + AND any(resource IN stmt2.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR lambda_fn.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS lambda_fn.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# LAMBDA-005 +AWS_LAMBDA_PRIVESC_UPDATE_FUNCTION_CODE_ADD_PERMISSION = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-lambda-privesc-update-function-code-add-permission", + name="Lambda Function Code Injection with Resource Policy Grant (LAMBDA-005)", + short_description="Modify the code of an existing Lambda function and grant yourself invocation permission via its resource-based policy to execute code with the function's execution role.", + description="Detect principals who can update the code of existing Lambda functions and add permissions to their resource-based policies. By replacing a Lambda function's code and granting themselves invoke access through the resource-based policy, the attacker executes malicious code with the function's execution role without needing lambda:InvokeFunction as an IAM permission.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - LAMBDA-005 - lambda:UpdateFunctionCode + lambda:AddPermission", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/lambda-005", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with lambda:UpdateFunctionCode permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'lambda:updatefunctioncode' + OR toLower(action) = 'lambda:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find lambda:AddPermission permission + MATCH (principal)--(policy2:AWSPolicy)--(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt2.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt2.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'lambda:addpermission' + OR toLower(action) = 'lambda:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find existing Lambda functions with execution roles + MATCH path_target = (aws)-[:RESOURCE]->(lambda_fn:AWSLambda)-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]->(target_role:AWSRole) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR lambda_fn.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS lambda_fn.name + ) + AND any(resource IN stmt2.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR lambda_fn.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS lambda_fn.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# LAMBDA-006 +AWS_LAMBDA_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_FUNCTION_ADD_PERMISSION = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-lambda-privesc-passrole-create-function-add-permission", + name="Lambda Function Creation with Resource Policy Invocation (LAMBDA-006)", + short_description="Create a Lambda function with a privileged IAM role and grant yourself invocation permission via its resource-based policy to execute code with the role's permissions.", + description="Detect principals who can create Lambda functions with privileged IAM roles and add permissions to their resource-based policies. By passing a privileged role to a new Lambda function and granting themselves invoke access through the resource-based policy, the attacker executes malicious code with elevated privileges without needing lambda:InvokeFunction as an IAM permission.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - LAMBDA-006 - iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction + lambda:AddPermission", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/lambda-006", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find lambda:CreateFunction permission + MATCH (principal)--(create_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_create:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_create.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_create.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'lambda:createfunction' + OR toLower(action) = 'lambda:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find lambda:AddPermission permission + MATCH (principal)--(perm_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_perm:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_perm.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_perm.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'lambda:addpermission' + OR toLower(action) = 'lambda:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust Lambda service (can be passed to Lambda) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'lambda.amazonaws.com'}}) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# SAGEMAKER-001 +AWS_SAGEMAKER_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_NOTEBOOK = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-sagemaker-privesc-passrole-create-notebook", + name="SageMaker Notebook Creation with Privileged Role (SAGEMAKER-001)", + short_description="Create a SageMaker notebook instance with a privileged IAM role to execute arbitrary code with the role's permissions via the Jupyter environment.", + description="Detect principals who can create SageMaker notebook instances with privileged IAM roles. By passing a privileged role to a new notebook instance, the attacker gains shell access through the Jupyter environment and can execute arbitrary commands with the role's permissions.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - SAGEMAKER-001 - iam:PassRole + sagemaker:CreateNotebookInstance", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/sagemaker-001", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find sagemaker:CreateNotebookInstance permission + MATCH (principal)--(sm_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_sm:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_sm.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_sm.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:createnotebookinstance' + OR toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust SageMaker service (can be passed to SageMaker) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'sagemaker.amazonaws.com'}}) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# SAGEMAKER-002 +AWS_SAGEMAKER_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_TRAINING_JOB = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-sagemaker-privesc-passrole-create-training-job", + name="SageMaker Training Job Creation with Privileged Role (SAGEMAKER-002)", + short_description="Create a SageMaker training job with a privileged IAM role to execute arbitrary container code with the role's permissions.", + description="Detect principals who can create SageMaker training jobs with privileged IAM roles. By passing a privileged role to a new training job with a malicious training script or container, the attacker executes code with elevated privileges and can exfiltrate credentials or modify AWS resources.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - SAGEMAKER-002 - iam:PassRole + sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/sagemaker-002", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob permission + MATCH (principal)--(sm_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_sm:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_sm.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_sm.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:createtrainingjob' + OR toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust SageMaker service (can be passed to SageMaker) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'sagemaker.amazonaws.com'}}) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# SAGEMAKER-003 +AWS_SAGEMAKER_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_PROCESSING_JOB = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-sagemaker-privesc-passrole-create-processing-job", + name="SageMaker Processing Job Creation with Privileged Role (SAGEMAKER-003)", + short_description="Create a SageMaker processing job with a privileged IAM role to execute arbitrary container code with the role's permissions.", + description="Detect principals who can create SageMaker processing jobs with privileged IAM roles. By passing a privileged role to a new processing job with a malicious script or container, the attacker executes code with elevated privileges and can exfiltrate credentials or modify AWS resources.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - SAGEMAKER-003 - iam:PassRole + sagemaker:CreateProcessingJob", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/sagemaker-003", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with iam:PassRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' + OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find sagemaker:CreateProcessingJob permission + MATCH (principal)--(sm_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_sm:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt_sm.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt_sm.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:createprocessingjob' + OR toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find roles that trust SageMaker service (can be passed to SageMaker) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {{arn: 'sagemaker.amazonaws.com'}}) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# SAGEMAKER-004 +AWS_SAGEMAKER_PRIVESC_PRESIGNED_NOTEBOOK_URL = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-sagemaker-privesc-presigned-notebook-url", + name="SageMaker Presigned Notebook URL for Privilege Escalation (SAGEMAKER-004)", + short_description="Generate a presigned URL to access an existing SageMaker notebook instance and execute code with its execution role's permissions.", + description="Detect principals who can generate presigned URLs to access existing SageMaker notebook instances. By accessing the Jupyter environment via a presigned URL, the attacker can execute arbitrary code with the permissions of the notebook's execution role without creating any new resources.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - SAGEMAKER-004 - sagemaker:CreatePresignedNotebookInstanceUrl", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/sagemaker-004", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with sagemaker:CreatePresignedNotebookInstanceUrl permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:createpresignednotebookinstanceurl' + OR toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find existing SageMaker notebook instances with execution roles + MATCH path_target = (aws)-[:RESOURCE]->(notebook:AWSSageMakerNotebookInstance)-[:HAS_EXECUTION_ROLE]->(target_role:AWSRole) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR notebook.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS notebook.notebook_instance_name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# SAGEMAKER-005 +AWS_SAGEMAKER_PRIVESC_LIFECYCLE_CONFIG_NOTEBOOK = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-sagemaker-privesc-lifecycle-config-notebook", + name="SageMaker Notebook Lifecycle Config Injection (SAGEMAKER-005)", + short_description="Inject a malicious lifecycle configuration into an existing SageMaker notebook to execute code with the notebook's execution role during startup.", + description="Detect principals who can inject malicious lifecycle configurations into existing SageMaker notebook instances. By stopping a notebook, attaching a malicious lifecycle config, and restarting it, the attacker executes arbitrary code with the notebook's execution role permissions during startup.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - SAGEMAKER-005 - sagemaker:CreateNotebookInstanceLifecycleConfig + sagemaker:StopNotebookInstance + sagemaker:UpdateNotebookInstance + sagemaker:StartNotebookInstance", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/sagemaker-005", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with sagemaker:CreateNotebookInstanceLifecycleConfig permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:createnotebookinstancelifecycleconfig' + OR toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find sagemaker:UpdateNotebookInstance permission + MATCH (principal)--(policy2:AWSPolicy)--(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt2.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt2.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:updatenotebookinstance' + OR toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find sagemaker:StopNotebookInstance permission + MATCH (principal)--(policy3:AWSPolicy)--(stmt3:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt3.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt3.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:stopnotebookinstance' + OR toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find sagemaker:StartNotebookInstance permission + MATCH (principal)--(policy4:AWSPolicy)--(stmt4:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt4.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt4.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:startnotebookinstance' + OR toLower(action) = 'sagemaker:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find existing SageMaker notebook instances with execution roles + MATCH path_target = (aws)-[:RESOURCE]->(notebook:AWSSageMakerNotebookInstance)-[:HAS_EXECUTION_ROLE]->(target_role:AWSRole) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt2.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR notebook.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS notebook.notebook_instance_name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# SSM-001 +AWS_SSM_PRIVESC_START_SESSION = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-ssm-privesc-start-session", + name="SSM Session Access for EC2 Role Credentials (SSM-001)", + short_description="Start an SSM session on an EC2 instance to access its attached role credentials through IMDS.", + description="Detect principals who can start SSM sessions on EC2 instances. This allows establishing a shell session on a running EC2 instance and retrieving the attached IAM role's temporary credentials from the Instance Metadata Service (IMDS), gaining that role's permissions.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - SSM-001 - ssm:StartSession", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/ssm-001", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with ssm:StartSession permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'ssm:startsession' + OR toLower(action) = 'ssm:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find EC2 instances with attached roles (targets for credential theft via IMDS) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(ec2:EC2Instance)-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]->(target_role:AWSRole) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# SSM-002 +AWS_SSM_PRIVESC_SEND_COMMAND = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-ssm-privesc-send-command", + name="SSM Send Command for EC2 Role Credentials (SSM-002)", + short_description="Execute commands on an EC2 instance via SSM Run Command to access its attached role credentials through IMDS.", + description="Detect principals who can send SSM commands to EC2 instances. This allows executing arbitrary commands on a running EC2 instance and retrieving the attached IAM role's temporary credentials from the Instance Metadata Service (IMDS), gaining that role's permissions.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - SSM-002 - ssm:SendCommand", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/ssm-002", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with ssm:SendCommand permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'ssm:sendcommand' + OR toLower(action) = 'ssm:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find EC2 instances with attached roles (targets for credential theft via IMDS) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(ec2:EC2Instance)-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]->(target_role:AWSRole) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# STS-001 +AWS_STS_PRIVESC_ASSUME_ROLE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( + id="aws-sts-privesc-assume-role", + name="Role Assumption for Privilege Escalation (STS-001)", + short_description="Assume IAM roles with elevated permissions by exploiting bidirectional trust between the starting principal and the target role.", + description="Detect principals who can assume other IAM roles via sts:AssumeRole. When a principal has sts:AssumeRole permission and the target role's trust policy allows the principal to assume it (bidirectional trust), the attacker gains all permissions of the target role. This enables privilege escalation when the target role has higher privileges than the starting principal.", + attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( + text="pathfinding.cloud - STS-001 - sts:AssumeRole", + link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/sts-001", + ), + provider="aws", + cypher=f""" + // Find principals with sts:AssumeRole permission + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) + WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE + toLower(action) = 'sts:assumerole' + OR toLower(action) = 'sts:*' + OR action = '*' + ) + + // Find target roles the principal can assume (bidirectional trust via Cartography) + MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)<-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]-(principal) + WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE + resource = '*' + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource + OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name + ) + + WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + + WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr + """, + parameters=[], +) + +# AWS Queries List +# ---------------- + +AWS_DEPRECATED_QUERIES: list[AttackPathsQueryDefinition] = [ + AWS_INTERNET_EXPOSED_EC2_SENSITIVE_S3_ACCESS, + AWS_RDS_INSTANCES, + AWS_RDS_UNENCRYPTED_STORAGE, + AWS_S3_ANONYMOUS_ACCESS_BUCKETS, + AWS_IAM_STATEMENTS_ALLOW_ALL_ACTIONS, + AWS_IAM_STATEMENTS_ALLOW_DELETE_POLICY, + AWS_IAM_STATEMENTS_ALLOW_CREATE_ACTIONS, + AWS_EC2_INSTANCES_INTERNET_EXPOSED, + AWS_SECURITY_GROUPS_OPEN_INTERNET_FACING, + AWS_CLASSIC_ELB_INTERNET_EXPOSED, + AWS_ELBV2_INTERNET_EXPOSED, + AWS_PUBLIC_IP_RESOURCE_LOOKUP, + AWS_APPRUNNER_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_SERVICE, + AWS_APPRUNNER_PRIVESC_UPDATE_SERVICE, + AWS_BEDROCK_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CODE_INTERPRETER, + AWS_BEDROCK_PRIVESC_INVOKE_CODE_INTERPRETER, + AWS_CLOUDFORMATION_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_STACK, + AWS_CLOUDFORMATION_PRIVESC_UPDATE_STACK, + AWS_CLOUDFORMATION_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_STACKSET, + AWS_CLOUDFORMATION_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_UPDATE_STACKSET, + AWS_CLOUDFORMATION_PRIVESC_CHANGESET, + AWS_CODEBUILD_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_PROJECT, + AWS_CODEBUILD_PRIVESC_START_BUILD, + AWS_CODEBUILD_PRIVESC_START_BUILD_BATCH, + AWS_CODEBUILD_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_PROJECT_BATCH, + AWS_DATAPIPELINE_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_PIPELINE, + AWS_EC2_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_IAM, + AWS_EC2_PRIVESC_MODIFY_INSTANCE_ATTRIBUTE, + AWS_EC2_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_SPOT_INSTANCES, + AWS_EC2_PRIVESC_LAUNCH_TEMPLATE, + AWS_EC2INSTANCECONNECT_PRIVESC_SEND_SSH_PUBLIC_KEY, + AWS_ECS_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_SERVICE, + AWS_ECS_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_RUN_TASK, + AWS_ECS_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_SERVICE_EXISTING_CLUSTER, + AWS_ECS_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_RUN_TASK_EXISTING_CLUSTER, + AWS_ECS_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_START_TASK_EXISTING_CLUSTER, + AWS_ECS_PRIVESC_EXECUTE_COMMAND, + AWS_GLUE_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_DEV_ENDPOINT, + AWS_GLUE_PRIVESC_UPDATE_DEV_ENDPOINT, + AWS_GLUE_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_JOB, + AWS_GLUE_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_JOB_TRIGGER, + AWS_GLUE_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_UPDATE_JOB, + AWS_GLUE_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_UPDATE_JOB_TRIGGER, + AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_CREATE_POLICY_VERSION, + AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_CREATE_ACCESS_KEY, + AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_DELETE_CREATE_ACCESS_KEY, + AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_CREATE_LOGIN_PROFILE, + AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_PUT_ROLE_POLICY, + AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_UPDATE_LOGIN_PROFILE, + AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_PUT_USER_POLICY, + AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ATTACH_USER_POLICY, + AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ATTACH_ROLE_POLICY, + AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ATTACH_GROUP_POLICY, + AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_PUT_GROUP_POLICY, + AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_UPDATE_ASSUME_ROLE_POLICY, + AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ADD_USER_TO_GROUP, + AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ATTACH_ROLE_POLICY_ASSUME_ROLE, + AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ATTACH_USER_POLICY_CREATE_ACCESS_KEY, + AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_CREATE_POLICY_VERSION_ASSUME_ROLE, + AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_PUT_ROLE_POLICY_ASSUME_ROLE, + AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_PUT_USER_POLICY_CREATE_ACCESS_KEY, + AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ATTACH_ROLE_POLICY_UPDATE_ASSUME_ROLE, + AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_CREATE_POLICY_VERSION_UPDATE_ASSUME_ROLE, + AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_PUT_ROLE_POLICY_UPDATE_ASSUME_ROLE, + AWS_LAMBDA_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_FUNCTION, + AWS_LAMBDA_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_FUNCTION_EVENT_SOURCE, + AWS_LAMBDA_PRIVESC_UPDATE_FUNCTION_CODE, + AWS_LAMBDA_PRIVESC_UPDATE_FUNCTION_CODE_INVOKE, + AWS_LAMBDA_PRIVESC_UPDATE_FUNCTION_CODE_ADD_PERMISSION, + AWS_LAMBDA_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_FUNCTION_ADD_PERMISSION, + AWS_SAGEMAKER_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_NOTEBOOK, + AWS_SAGEMAKER_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_TRAINING_JOB, + AWS_SAGEMAKER_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_CREATE_PROCESSING_JOB, + AWS_SAGEMAKER_PRIVESC_PRESIGNED_NOTEBOOK_URL, + AWS_SAGEMAKER_PRIVESC_LIFECYCLE_CONFIG_NOTEBOOK, + AWS_SSM_PRIVESC_START_SESSION, + AWS_SSM_PRIVESC_SEND_COMMAND, + AWS_STS_PRIVESC_ASSUME_ROLE, +] diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/queries/registry.py b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/queries/registry.py index c683b2cb80..358b1d6aed 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/queries/registry.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/queries/registry.py @@ -1,13 +1,14 @@ -from api.attack_paths.queries.types import AttackPathsQueryDefinition from api.attack_paths.queries.aws import AWS_QUERIES +# TODO: drop after Neptune cutover +from api.attack_paths.queries.aws_deprecated import AWS_DEPRECATED_QUERIES +from api.attack_paths.queries.types import AttackPathsQueryDefinition -# Query definitions organized by provider +# Query definitions for scans synced with the current schema. _QUERY_DEFINITIONS: dict[str, list[AttackPathsQueryDefinition]] = { "aws": AWS_QUERIES, } -# Flat lookup by query ID for O(1) access _QUERIES_BY_ID: dict[str, AttackPathsQueryDefinition] = { definition.id: definition for definitions in _QUERY_DEFINITIONS.values() @@ -15,11 +16,45 @@ _QUERIES_BY_ID: dict[str, AttackPathsQueryDefinition] = { } -def get_queries_for_provider(provider: str) -> list[AttackPathsQueryDefinition]: - """Get all attack path queries for a specific provider.""" - return _QUERY_DEFINITIONS.get(provider, []) +# TODO: drop after Neptune cutover +# +# Query definitions for pre-cutover scans (`AttackPathsScan.is_migrated=False`) +# whose graph data was written under the previous schema. Both maps expose the +# same query IDs so the API contract is identical regardless of which set is +# routed to. +_DEPRECATED_QUERY_DEFINITIONS: dict[str, list[AttackPathsQueryDefinition]] = { + "aws": AWS_DEPRECATED_QUERIES, +} + +_DEPRECATED_QUERIES_BY_ID: dict[str, AttackPathsQueryDefinition] = { + definition.id: definition + for definitions in _DEPRECATED_QUERY_DEFINITIONS.values() + for definition in definitions +} -def get_query_by_id(query_id: str) -> AttackPathsQueryDefinition | None: - """Get a specific attack path query by its ID.""" - return _QUERIES_BY_ID.get(query_id) +def get_queries_for_provider( + provider: str, + is_migrated: bool = True, +) -> list[AttackPathsQueryDefinition]: + """Get all attack path queries for a provider. + + `is_migrated` selects the catalog: True for scans synced with the current + schema, False for pre-cutover scans still using the legacy graph shape. + # TODO: drop the `is_migrated` parameter after Neptune cutover + """ + catalog = _QUERY_DEFINITIONS if is_migrated else _DEPRECATED_QUERY_DEFINITIONS + return catalog.get(provider, []) + + +def get_query_by_id( + query_id: str, + is_migrated: bool = True, +) -> AttackPathsQueryDefinition | None: + """Get a specific attack path query by ID. + + `is_migrated` selects the catalog (see `get_queries_for_provider`). + # TODO: drop the `is_migrated` parameter after Neptune cutover + """ + by_id = _QUERIES_BY_ID if is_migrated else _DEPRECATED_QUERIES_BY_ID + return by_id.get(query_id) diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/retryable_session.py b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/retryable_session.py index 8723fe3ec9..16f0d9e31a 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/retryable_session.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/retryable_session.py @@ -1,5 +1,4 @@ import logging - from collections.abc import Callable from typing import Any diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/sink/__init__.py b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/sink/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b90fd6e442 --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/sink/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +"""Attack-paths sink database layer. + +The sink is the persistent store where attack-paths graphs live after a scan +finishes. Currently selectable between Neo4j (OSS / local dev default) and +AWS Neptune (hosted dev/staging/prod). Backend is picked by the +`ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE` setting at process init. + +This package exposes the public factory API; the implementation lives in +`api.attack_paths.sink.factory`. +""" + +from api.attack_paths.sink.factory import ( + SinkBackend, + close, + get_backend, + get_backend_for_name, + get_backend_for_scan, + init, +) + +__all__ = [ + "SinkBackend", + "close", + "get_backend", + "get_backend_for_name", + "get_backend_for_scan", + "init", +] diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/sink/base.py b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/sink/base.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0ba4737f5e --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/sink/base.py @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +"""Protocol every sink backend must implement.""" + +from contextlib import AbstractContextManager +from typing import Any, Protocol + +import neo4j + + +class SinkDatabase(Protocol): + """Contract for the persistent attack-paths graph store. + + The `database` argument is an opaque identifier passed through from the + legacy `database.py` API surface. On Neo4j it is the per-tenant database + name (e.g. `db-tenant-{uuid}`). On Neptune it is ignored (the cluster + has a single graph, and isolation is label-based). + """ + + def init(self) -> None: ... + + def close(self) -> None: ... + + def verify_connectivity(self) -> None: + """Raise if the backend the API read path uses is unreachable. + + Neo4j verifies its single driver. Neptune verifies the reader + driver (the endpoint the API serves reads from); on single-endpoint + clusters the reader aliases the writer, so that path is covered too. + Used by the readiness probe; must not block longer than the caller's + probe budget. + """ + ... + + def get_session( + self, + database: str | None = None, + default_access_mode: str | None = None, + ) -> AbstractContextManager: ... + + def execute_read_query( + self, + database: str, + cypher: str, + parameters: dict[str, Any] | None = None, + ) -> neo4j.graph.Graph: ... + + def create_database(self, database: str) -> None: ... + + def drop_database(self, database: str) -> None: ... + + def drop_subgraph(self, database: str, provider_id: str) -> int: ... + + def has_provider_data(self, database: str, provider_id: str) -> bool: ... + + def clear_cache(self, database: str) -> None: ... + + def ensure_sync_indexes(self, database: str) -> None: + """Create any index needed for the sync write path. + + Called once at the start of each provider sync; must be idempotent. + Neo4j creates a `_provider_element_id` index on `_ProviderResource`; + Neptune is a no-op (its `~id` lookup needs no index). + """ + ... + + def write_nodes( + self, + database: str, + labels: str, + rows: list[dict[str, Any]], + ) -> None: + """Upsert a batch of nodes into the sink. + + `labels` is a pre-rendered Cypher label string ready to drop after + the node variable (e.g. `` `AWSUser`:`_ProviderResource`:`_Tenant_x` ``). + Each row carries `provider_element_id` and `props`. + """ + ... + + def write_relationships( + self, + database: str, + rel_type: str, + provider_id: str, + rows: list[dict[str, Any]], + ) -> None: + """Upsert a batch of relationships into the sink. + + Each row carries `start_element_id`, `end_element_id`, + `provider_element_id` and `props`. `rel_type` is the relationship + type (already a valid Cypher identifier). + """ + ... diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/sink/factory.py b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/sink/factory.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ad2116fa40 --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/sink/factory.py @@ -0,0 +1,134 @@ +"""Sink backend factory and process-wide handle cache. + +Picks the active backend from `settings.ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE` at first +use, holds the active backend plus any secondary backends needed to serve +scans written under the previous configuration, and tears them all down on +process shutdown. Imported via `from api.attack_paths import sink as +sink_module`. +""" + +import threading +from enum import StrEnum, auto + +from api.attack_paths.sink.base import SinkDatabase +from api.models import AttackPathsScan +from django.conf import settings + +# Backend names + + +class SinkBackend(StrEnum): + NEO4J = auto() + NEPTUNE = auto() + + +# Backend cache + +_backend: SinkDatabase | None = None +_secondary_backends: dict[SinkBackend, SinkDatabase] = {} +_lock = threading.Lock() + + +def _resolve_setting() -> SinkBackend: + raw = settings.ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE.lower() + try: + return SinkBackend(raw) + + except ValueError: + valid = sorted(b.value for b in SinkBackend) + raise RuntimeError( + f"ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE must be one of {valid}; got {raw!r}" + ) + + +def _build_backend(name: SinkBackend) -> SinkDatabase: + if name is SinkBackend.NEO4J: + from api.attack_paths.sink.neo4j import Neo4jSink + + return Neo4jSink() + + if name is SinkBackend.NEPTUNE: + from api.attack_paths.sink.neptune import NeptuneSink + + return NeptuneSink() + + raise RuntimeError(f"Unknown sink backend {name!r}") + + +# Lifecycle + + +def init(name: SinkBackend | str | None = None) -> SinkDatabase: + """Initialize the configured sink backend. Idempotent.""" + global _backend + if _backend is not None: + return _backend + + with _lock: + if _backend is None: + resolved = SinkBackend(name) if name else _resolve_setting() + backend = _build_backend(resolved) + backend.init() + _backend = backend + + return _backend + + +def close() -> None: + """Close the active backend and every cached secondary backend.""" + global _backend + with _lock: + backends = [ + b for b in (_backend, *_secondary_backends.values()) if b is not None + ] + _backend = None + _secondary_backends.clear() + + for backend in backends: + try: + backend.close() + + except Exception: # pragma: no cover - best-effort + pass + + +def get_backend() -> SinkDatabase: + """Return the active sink. Initializes on first call.""" + return init() + + +# Per-scan routing + + +def get_backend_for_scan(scan: AttackPathsScan) -> SinkDatabase: + """Route reads by the sink that stores this scan's graph.""" + raw_backend = getattr(scan, "sink_backend", SinkBackend.NEO4J.value) + if not isinstance(raw_backend, str): + raw_backend = SinkBackend.NEO4J.value + return get_backend_for_name(raw_backend) + + +def get_backend_for_name(name: SinkBackend | str) -> SinkDatabase: + """Return the backend named by persisted scan metadata.""" + resolved = SinkBackend(name) + if resolved is _resolve_setting(): + return get_backend() + + return _build_backend_cached(resolved) + + +def _build_backend_cached(name: SinkBackend) -> SinkDatabase: + # TODO: drop after Neptune cutover + # Needed only during cutover to serve Neo4j-written scans from a Neptune- + # configured API pod (and vice versa). Once every scan is on Neptune, + # `get_backend_for_scan` becomes a one-liner returning `get_backend()`. + if name in _secondary_backends: + return _secondary_backends[name] + + with _lock: + if name not in _secondary_backends: + backend = _build_backend(name) + backend.init() + _secondary_backends[name] = backend + + return _secondary_backends[name] diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/sink/neo4j.py b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/sink/neo4j.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f8446afab3 --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/sink/neo4j.py @@ -0,0 +1,454 @@ +"""Neo4j sink implementation. + +Owns a Neo4j driver independent from the staging driver. On OSS and local dev +this is the only sink; on hosted deployments it runs only as a legacy read +path while phase-1 drains tenant DBs. +""" + +import atexit +import logging +import threading +import time +from collections.abc import Iterator +from contextlib import AbstractContextManager, contextmanager +from typing import Any + +import neo4j +import neo4j.exceptions +from api.attack_paths.retryable_session import RetryableSession +from api.attack_paths.sink.base import SinkDatabase +from config.env import env +from django.conf import settings + +logging.getLogger("neo4j").setLevel(logging.ERROR) +logging.getLogger("neo4j").propagate = False + +logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) + +SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE_MAX_RETRIES = env.int( + "ATTACK_PATHS_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE_MAX_RETRIES", default=3 +) +READ_QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = env.int( + "ATTACK_PATHS_READ_QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", default=30 +) +CONN_ACQUISITION_TIMEOUT = env.int("NEO4J_CONN_ACQUISITION_TIMEOUT", default=15) +# TCP connect timeout, ordered below the acquisition timeout so an unreachable +# host can't pin a request or the readiness probe longer than this. +CONNECTION_TIMEOUT = env.int("NEO4J_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT", default=5) +MAX_CONNECTION_LIFETIME = env.int("NEO4J_MAX_CONNECTION_LIFETIME", default=7200) +MAX_CONNECTION_POOL_SIZE = env.int("NEO4J_MAX_CONNECTION_POOL_SIZE", default=50) + +READ_EXCEPTION_CODES = [ + "Neo.ClientError.Statement.AccessMode", + "Neo.ClientError.Procedure.ProcedureNotFound", +] +CLIENT_STATEMENT_EXCEPTION_PREFIX = "Neo.ClientError.Statement." +DATABASE_NOT_FOUND_CODE = "Neo.ClientError.Database.DatabaseNotFound" + + +class Neo4jSink(SinkDatabase): + """Neo4j-backed sink. Multi-database cluster; tenant isolation is physical.""" + + def __init__(self) -> None: + self._driver: neo4j.Driver | None = None + self._lock = threading.Lock() + self._atexit_registered = False + + # Driver + + def _config(self) -> dict: + return settings.DATABASES["neo4j"] + + def _uri(self) -> str: + cfg = self._config() + host = cfg["HOST"] + port = cfg["PORT"] + if not host or not port: + raise RuntimeError( + "NEO4J_HOST / NEO4J_PORT must be set when ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE=neo4j" + ) + return f"bolt://{host}:{port}" + + def init(self) -> neo4j.Driver: + if self._driver is not None: + return self._driver + with self._lock: + if self._driver is None: + cfg = self._config() + self._driver = neo4j.GraphDatabase.driver( + self._uri(), + auth=(cfg["USER"], cfg["PASSWORD"]), + keep_alive=True, + max_connection_lifetime=MAX_CONNECTION_LIFETIME, + connection_timeout=CONNECTION_TIMEOUT, + connection_acquisition_timeout=CONN_ACQUISITION_TIMEOUT, + max_connection_pool_size=MAX_CONNECTION_POOL_SIZE, + ) + # Eager connectivity check is best-effort: + # A Neo4j that is down at boot must not crash the process, same degradation model as Postgres + # The driver reconnects lazily on first use + # /health/ready surfaces the outage until it recovers + try: + self._driver.verify_connectivity() + + except Exception: + logger.warning( + "Neo4j sink unreachable at init; continuing with a lazily-reconnecting driver", + exc_info=True, + ) + + if not self._atexit_registered: + atexit.register(self.close) + self._atexit_registered = True + return self._driver + + def _get_driver(self) -> neo4j.Driver: + return self.init() + + def verify_connectivity(self) -> None: + self._get_driver().verify_connectivity() + + def close(self) -> None: + with self._lock: + if self._driver is not None: + try: + self._driver.close() + finally: + self._driver = None + + # Sessions + + @contextmanager + def get_session( + self, + database: str | None = None, + default_access_mode: str | None = None, + ) -> Iterator[RetryableSession]: + from api.attack_paths.database import ( + ClientStatementException, + GraphDatabaseQueryException, + WriteQueryNotAllowedException, + ) + + session_wrapper: RetryableSession | None = None + try: + session_wrapper = RetryableSession( + session_factory=lambda: self._get_driver().session( + database=database, default_access_mode=default_access_mode + ), + max_retries=SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE_MAX_RETRIES, + ) + yield session_wrapper + + except neo4j.exceptions.Neo4jError as exc: + if ( + default_access_mode == neo4j.READ_ACCESS + and exc.code + and exc.code in READ_EXCEPTION_CODES + ): + raise WriteQueryNotAllowedException( + message="Read query not allowed", code=READ_EXCEPTION_CODES[0] + ) + + message = exc.message if exc.message is not None else str(exc) + if exc.code and exc.code.startswith(CLIENT_STATEMENT_EXCEPTION_PREFIX): + raise ClientStatementException(message=message, code=exc.code) + raise GraphDatabaseQueryException(message=message, code=exc.code) + + finally: + if session_wrapper is not None: + session_wrapper.close() + + # Operations + + def execute_read_query( + self, + database: str, + cypher: str, + parameters: dict[str, Any] | None = None, + ) -> neo4j.graph.Graph: + with self.get_session( + database, default_access_mode=neo4j.READ_ACCESS + ) as session: + + def _run(tx: neo4j.ManagedTransaction) -> neo4j.graph.Graph: + result = tx.run( + cypher, parameters or {}, timeout=READ_QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS + ) + return result.graph() + + return session.execute_read(_run) + + def create_database(self, database: str) -> None: + with self.get_session() as session: + session.run( + "CREATE DATABASE $database IF NOT EXISTS", {"database": database} + ) + + def drop_database(self, database: str) -> None: + with self.get_session() as session: + session.run(f"DROP DATABASE `{database}` IF EXISTS DESTROY DATA") + + def drop_subgraph(self, database: str, provider_id: str) -> int: + """Delete all nodes for a provider from a tenant database, batched. + + Deletes relationships then nodes in batches (not `DETACH DELETE`) so a + dense provider's graph cannot exceed Neo4j's transaction memory limit. + Silently returns 0 if the database doesn't exist. + """ + from api.attack_paths.database import GraphDatabaseQueryException + from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import ( + BATCH_SIZE, + PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL, + get_provider_label, + ) + + provider_label = get_provider_label(provider_id) + deleted_nodes = 0 + deleted_relationships = 0 + relationship_batches = 0 + node_batches = 0 + drop_t0 = time.perf_counter() + + logger.info( + "Dropping provider graph from Neo4j sink database %s " + "(provider=%s, provider_label=%s)", + database, + provider_id, + provider_label, + ) + + try: + logger.info( + "Opening Neo4j sink session for provider graph drop " + "(database=%s, provider=%s)", + database, + provider_id, + ) + with self.get_session(database) as session: + logger.info( + "Opened Neo4j sink session for provider graph drop " + "(database=%s, provider=%s)", + database, + provider_id, + ) + # Phase 1: delete relationships incident to provider nodes in + # batches. The undirected pattern matches an edge between two + # provider nodes from both ends, so `DISTINCT r` dedupes it to + # delete a full batch of unique relationships each round. + deleted_count = 1 + while deleted_count > 0: + next_batch = relationship_batches + 1 + logger.info( + "Deleting relationship batch from Neo4j sink database %s " + "(provider=%s, batch=%s, total_rels=%s, elapsed=%.3fs)", + database, + provider_id, + next_batch, + deleted_relationships, + time.perf_counter() - drop_t0, + ) + result = session.run( + f""" + MATCH (:`{provider_label}`)-[r]-() + WITH DISTINCT r LIMIT $batch_size + DELETE r + RETURN COUNT(r) AS deleted_rels_count + """, + {"batch_size": BATCH_SIZE}, + ) + deleted_count = result.single().get("deleted_rels_count", 0) + if deleted_count > 0: + relationship_batches += 1 + deleted_relationships += deleted_count + logger.info( + "Deleted relationship batch from Neo4j sink database %s " + "(provider=%s, batch=%s, deleted_rels=%s, " + "total_rels=%s, elapsed=%.3fs)", + database, + provider_id, + relationship_batches, + deleted_count, + deleted_relationships, + time.perf_counter() - drop_t0, + ) + + # Phase 2: delete the now relationship-free nodes in batches. + deleted_count = 1 + while deleted_count > 0: + next_batch = node_batches + 1 + logger.info( + "Deleting node batch from Neo4j sink database %s " + "(provider=%s, batch=%s, total_nodes=%s, elapsed=%.3fs)", + database, + provider_id, + next_batch, + deleted_nodes, + time.perf_counter() - drop_t0, + ) + result = session.run( + f""" + MATCH (n:{PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL}:`{provider_label}`) + WITH n LIMIT $batch_size + DELETE n + RETURN COUNT(n) AS deleted_nodes_count + """, + {"batch_size": BATCH_SIZE}, + ) + deleted_count = result.single().get("deleted_nodes_count", 0) + if deleted_count > 0: + node_batches += 1 + deleted_nodes += deleted_count + logger.info( + "Deleted node batch from Neo4j sink database %s " + "(provider=%s, batch=%s, deleted_nodes=%s, " + "total_nodes=%s, elapsed=%.3fs)", + database, + provider_id, + node_batches, + deleted_count, + deleted_nodes, + time.perf_counter() - drop_t0, + ) + + except GraphDatabaseQueryException as exc: + if exc.code == DATABASE_NOT_FOUND_CODE: + logger.info( + "Skipped provider graph drop from Neo4j sink database %s " + "(provider=%s, reason=database_not_found, elapsed=%.3fs)", + database, + provider_id, + time.perf_counter() - drop_t0, + ) + return 0 + raise + + logger.info( + "Finished dropping provider graph from Neo4j sink database %s " + "(provider=%s, relationship_batches=%s, deleted_rels=%s, " + "node_batches=%s, deleted_nodes=%s, elapsed=%.3fs)", + database, + provider_id, + relationship_batches, + deleted_relationships, + node_batches, + deleted_nodes, + time.perf_counter() - drop_t0, + ) + return deleted_nodes + + def has_provider_data(self, database: str, provider_id: str) -> bool: + from api.attack_paths.database import GraphDatabaseQueryException + from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import ( + PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL, + get_provider_label, + ) + + provider_label = get_provider_label(provider_id) + query = ( + f"MATCH (n:{PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL}:`{provider_label}`) RETURN 1 LIMIT 1" + ) + try: + with self.get_session( + database, default_access_mode=neo4j.READ_ACCESS + ) as session: + result = session.run(query) + return result.single() is not None + + except GraphDatabaseQueryException as exc: + if exc.code == DATABASE_NOT_FOUND_CODE: + return False + raise + + def clear_cache(self, database: str) -> None: + from api.attack_paths.database import GraphDatabaseQueryException + + try: + with self.get_session(database) as session: + session.run("CALL db.clearQueryCaches()") + except GraphDatabaseQueryException as exc: + logger.warning( + f"Failed to clear query cache for database `{database}`: {exc}" + ) + + # Sync write path + + def ensure_sync_indexes(self, database: str) -> None: + """Create the `_provider_element_id` lookup index on `_ProviderResource`. + + Every synced node carries the `_ProviderResource` label, so a single + index covers both node-upserts and relationship endpoint MATCHes. + Without this index the rel sync degrades to a label scan per row and + large provider syncs become unworkable. + """ + from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import ( + PROVIDER_ELEMENT_ID_PROPERTY, + PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL, + ) + + query = ( + f"CREATE INDEX provider_element_id_idx IF NOT EXISTS " + f"FOR (n:`{PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL}`) " + f"ON (n.`{PROVIDER_ELEMENT_ID_PROPERTY}`)" + ) + with self.get_session(database) as session: + session.run(query).consume() + + def write_nodes( + self, + database: str, + labels: str, + rows: list[dict[str, Any]], + ) -> None: + if not rows: + return + from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import ( + PROVIDER_ELEMENT_ID_PROPERTY, + PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL, + ) + + query = f""" + UNWIND $rows AS row + MERGE (n:`{PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL}` {{`{PROVIDER_ELEMENT_ID_PROPERTY}`: row.provider_element_id}}) + SET n:{labels} + SET n += row.props + """ + with self.get_session(database) as session: + session.run(query, {"rows": rows}).consume() + + def write_relationships( + self, + database: str, + rel_type: str, + provider_id: str, + rows: list[dict[str, Any]], + ) -> None: + if not rows: + return + from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import ( + PROVIDER_ELEMENT_ID_PROPERTY, + PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL, + get_provider_label, + ) + + provider_label = get_provider_label(provider_id) + query = f""" + UNWIND $rows AS row + MATCH (s:`{PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL}`:`{provider_label}` {{`{PROVIDER_ELEMENT_ID_PROPERTY}`: row.start_element_id}}) + MATCH (t:`{PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL}`:`{provider_label}` {{`{PROVIDER_ELEMENT_ID_PROPERTY}`: row.end_element_id}}) + MERGE (s)-[r:`{rel_type}` {{`{PROVIDER_ELEMENT_ID_PROPERTY}`: row.provider_element_id}}]->(t) + SET r += row.props + """ + with self.get_session(database) as session: + session.run(query, {"rows": rows}).consume() + + # For compatibility with test harnesses that patch the concrete driver + def get_driver(self) -> neo4j.Driver: + return self._get_driver() + + +# Helper for tests / external callers that want a writer session specifically +def get_read_session( + sink: Neo4jSink, database: str +) -> AbstractContextManager[RetryableSession]: + return sink.get_session(database, default_access_mode=neo4j.READ_ACCESS) diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/sink/neptune.py b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/sink/neptune.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ad20d080b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/sink/neptune.py @@ -0,0 +1,524 @@ +"""AWS Neptune sink implementation. + +Dual Bolt drivers: one against the writer endpoint for workers, one against +the reader endpoint for the API read path. If `NEPTUNE_READER_ENDPOINT` is +unset the reader falls back to the writer driver so single-node clusters work. + +Neptune is single-database. The `database` argument on the SinkDatabase +protocol is ignored; tenant / provider isolation is enforced by labels that +the sync step already writes on every node (see tasks/jobs/attack_paths/sync.py). + +SigV4 auth lives at the bottom of this file as `neptune_auth_provider`. The +neo4j driver invokes the returned callable on each token refresh. +""" + +import atexit +import datetime +import json +import logging +import threading +import time +from collections.abc import Callable, Iterator +from contextlib import contextmanager +from typing import Any +from urllib.parse import urlsplit + +import neo4j +import neo4j.exceptions +from api.attack_paths.retryable_session import RetryableSession +from api.attack_paths.sink.base import SinkDatabase +from botocore.auth import SigV4Auth +from botocore.awsrequest import AWSRequest +from botocore.session import Session as BotoSession +from config.env import env +from django.conf import settings +from neo4j.auth_management import AuthManagers, ExpiringAuth + +logging.getLogger("neo4j").setLevel(logging.ERROR) +logging.getLogger("neo4j").propagate = False + +logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) + +SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE_MAX_RETRIES = env.int( + "ATTACK_PATHS_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE_MAX_RETRIES", default=3 +) +READ_QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = env.int( + "ATTACK_PATHS_READ_QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", default=30 +) +# Neptune serverless cold-start can be >30s; give the driver room +CONN_ACQUISITION_TIMEOUT = env.int("NEPTUNE_CONN_ACQUISITION_TIMEOUT", default=60) +# TCP connect timeout, ordered below the acquisition timeout so an unreachable +# endpoint can't pin a request or the readiness probe longer than this. Kept +# generous: cold-start delays query execution, not the socket connect. +CONNECTION_TIMEOUT = env.int("NEPTUNE_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT", default=10) +# Roll connections hourly so SigV4 rotations and cert refreshes don't strand long-lived pool entries +MAX_CONNECTION_LIFETIME = env.int("NEPTUNE_MAX_CONNECTION_LIFETIME", default=3600) +MAX_CONNECTION_POOL_SIZE = env.int("NEPTUNE_MAX_CONNECTION_POOL_SIZE", default=50) + +READ_EXCEPTION_CODES = [ + "Neo.ClientError.Statement.AccessMode", + "Neo.ClientError.Procedure.ProcedureNotFound", +] +CLIENT_STATEMENT_EXCEPTION_PREFIX = "Neo.ClientError.Statement." + +# Refresh 60s before the 5-minute SigV4 window closes +SIGV4_TOKEN_LIFETIME_MINUTES = 4 + + +class NeptuneSink(SinkDatabase): + """Neptune-backed sink. Single database; isolation is label-based.""" + + def __init__(self) -> None: + self._writer: neo4j.Driver | None = None + self._reader: neo4j.Driver | None = None + self._lock = threading.Lock() + self._atexit_registered = False + + # Config + + def _config(self) -> dict: + return settings.DATABASES["neptune"] + + def _bolt_uri(self, endpoint: str, port: str) -> str: + return f"bolt+s://{endpoint}:{port}" + + def _https_url(self, endpoint: str, port: str) -> str: + return f"https://{endpoint}:{port}" + + def _build_driver(self, endpoint: str) -> neo4j.Driver: + cfg = self._config() + port = cfg["PORT"] + region = cfg["REGION"] + if not endpoint or not region: + raise RuntimeError( + "NEPTUNE_WRITER_ENDPOINT and AWS_REGION must be set when " + "ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE=neptune" + ) + return neo4j.GraphDatabase.driver( + self._bolt_uri(endpoint, port), + auth=AuthManagers.bearer( + neptune_auth_provider(region, self._https_url(endpoint, port)) + ), + keep_alive=True, + max_connection_lifetime=MAX_CONNECTION_LIFETIME, + connection_timeout=CONNECTION_TIMEOUT, + connection_acquisition_timeout=CONN_ACQUISITION_TIMEOUT, + max_connection_pool_size=MAX_CONNECTION_POOL_SIZE, + max_transaction_retry_time=0, + ) + + # Lifecycle + + def init(self) -> None: + if self._writer is not None: + return + with self._lock: + if self._writer is None: + cfg = self._config() + writer_endpoint = cfg["WRITER_ENDPOINT"] + reader_endpoint = cfg["READER_ENDPOINT"] or writer_endpoint + + # Eager connectivity checks are best-effort + # A Neptune that is down at boot must not crash the process, same degradation model as Postgres + # Drivers reconnect lazily on first use + # /health/ready surfaces the outage until it recovers + self._writer = self._build_driver(writer_endpoint) + self._verify_best_effort(self._writer, "writer") + + if reader_endpoint == writer_endpoint: + self._reader = self._writer + + else: + self._reader = self._build_driver(reader_endpoint) + self._verify_best_effort(self._reader, "reader") + + if not self._atexit_registered: + atexit.register(self.close) + self._atexit_registered = True + + def close(self) -> None: + with self._lock: + # `Driver.close()` is idempotent, so closing the same driver twice + # (when reader aliases writer on single-endpoint configs) is safe + for driver in (self._reader, self._writer): + if driver is None: + continue + try: + driver.close() + except Exception: # pragma: no cover - best-effort + pass + self._writer = None + self._reader = None + + # Sessions + + def _get_writer(self) -> neo4j.Driver: + self.init() + assert self._writer is not None + return self._writer + + def _get_reader(self) -> neo4j.Driver: + self.init() + assert self._reader is not None + return self._reader + + @staticmethod + def _verify_best_effort(driver: neo4j.Driver, role: str) -> None: + try: + driver.verify_connectivity() + + except Exception: + logger.warning( + "Neptune %s endpoint unreachable at init; continuing with a lazily-reconnecting driver", + role, + exc_info=True, + ) + + def verify_connectivity(self) -> None: + # The API read path uses the reader driver + # On single-endpoint clusters it aliases the writer, so this also covers the writer + # A writer-only outage is a workers' concern (no HTTP probe there) and deliberately does not fail API readiness + self._get_reader().verify_connectivity() + + @contextmanager + def get_session( + self, + database: str | None = None, # noqa: ARG002 - ignored on Neptune + default_access_mode: str | None = None, + ) -> Iterator[RetryableSession]: + from api.attack_paths.database import ( + ClientStatementException, + GraphDatabaseQueryException, + WriteQueryNotAllowedException, + ) + + driver = ( + self._get_reader() + if default_access_mode == neo4j.READ_ACCESS + else self._get_writer() + ) + + session_wrapper: RetryableSession | None = None + try: + session_wrapper = RetryableSession( + session_factory=lambda: driver.session( + default_access_mode=default_access_mode + ), + max_retries=SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE_MAX_RETRIES, + ) + yield session_wrapper + + except neo4j.exceptions.Neo4jError as exc: + if ( + default_access_mode == neo4j.READ_ACCESS + and exc.code + and exc.code in READ_EXCEPTION_CODES + ): + raise WriteQueryNotAllowedException( + message="Read query not allowed", code=READ_EXCEPTION_CODES[0] + ) + + message = exc.message if exc.message is not None else str(exc) + if exc.code and exc.code.startswith(CLIENT_STATEMENT_EXCEPTION_PREFIX): + raise ClientStatementException(message=message, code=exc.code) + raise GraphDatabaseQueryException(message=message, code=exc.code) + + finally: + if session_wrapper is not None: + session_wrapper.close() + + # Operations + + def execute_read_query( + self, + database: str, # noqa: ARG002 - ignored on Neptune + cypher: str, + parameters: dict[str, Any] | None = None, + ) -> neo4j.graph.Graph: + with self.get_session(default_access_mode=neo4j.READ_ACCESS) as session: + + def _run(tx: neo4j.ManagedTransaction) -> neo4j.graph.Graph: + result = tx.run( + cypher, parameters or {}, timeout=READ_QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS + ) + return result.graph() + + return session.execute_read(_run) + + def create_database(self, database: str) -> None: # noqa: ARG002 + # Neptune clusters are single-database; there is nothing to create. + return None + + def drop_database(self, database: str) -> None: # noqa: ARG002 + # Neptune clusters are single-database; there is nothing to drop. + return None + + def drop_subgraph(self, database: str, provider_id: str) -> int: # noqa: ARG002 + """Delete a provider's subgraph in two bounded phases. + + Neptune write transactions are capped at ~2 minutes. A naive + `DETACH DELETE` on a label-scanned batch grows unbounded with graph + density (one node can drag thousands of relationships into the same + transaction). Instead: + + 1. Delete relationships incident to provider nodes, one fixed-size + batch per transaction. + 2. Delete the now-orphaned nodes, one fixed-size batch per transaction. + + Each transaction does work proportional to `batch_size`, never to the + graph's branching factor. + """ + from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import ( + BATCH_SIZE, + PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL, + get_provider_label, + ) + + provider_label = get_provider_label(provider_id) + deleted_relationships = 0 + relationship_batches = 0 + node_batches = 0 + drop_t0 = time.perf_counter() + + logger.info( + "Dropping provider graph from Neptune sink " + "(provider=%s, provider_label=%s)", + provider_id, + provider_label, + ) + + logger.info( + "Opening Neptune writer session for provider graph drop (provider=%s)", + provider_id, + ) + with self.get_session() as session: + logger.info( + "Opened Neptune writer session for provider graph drop (provider=%s)", + provider_id, + ) + while True: + next_batch = relationship_batches + 1 + logger.info( + "Deleting relationship batch from Neptune sink " + "(provider=%s, batch=%s, total_rels=%s, elapsed=%.3fs)", + provider_id, + next_batch, + deleted_relationships, + time.perf_counter() - drop_t0, + ) + result = session.run( + f""" + MATCH (:`{provider_label}`)-[r]-() + WITH DISTINCT r LIMIT $batch_size + DELETE r + RETURN COUNT(r) AS deleted_rels_count + """, + {"batch_size": BATCH_SIZE}, + ) + record = result.single() + deleted_rels = (record["deleted_rels_count"] if record else 0) or 0 + if deleted_rels == 0: + break + relationship_batches += 1 + deleted_relationships += deleted_rels + logger.info( + "Deleted relationship batch from Neptune sink " + "(provider=%s, batch=%s, deleted_rels=%s, total_rels=%s, " + "elapsed=%.3fs)", + provider_id, + relationship_batches, + deleted_rels, + deleted_relationships, + time.perf_counter() - drop_t0, + ) + + deleted_nodes = 0 + while True: + next_batch = node_batches + 1 + logger.info( + "Deleting node batch from Neptune sink " + "(provider=%s, batch=%s, total_nodes=%s, elapsed=%.3fs)", + provider_id, + next_batch, + deleted_nodes, + time.perf_counter() - drop_t0, + ) + result = session.run( + f""" + MATCH (n:`{PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL}`:`{provider_label}`) + WITH n LIMIT $batch_size + DELETE n + RETURN COUNT(n) AS deleted_nodes_count + """, + {"batch_size": BATCH_SIZE}, + ) + record = result.single() + deleted = (record["deleted_nodes_count"] if record else 0) or 0 + if deleted == 0: + break + node_batches += 1 + deleted_nodes += deleted + logger.info( + "Deleted node batch from Neptune sink " + "(provider=%s, batch=%s, deleted_nodes=%s, total_nodes=%s, " + "elapsed=%.3fs)", + provider_id, + node_batches, + deleted, + deleted_nodes, + time.perf_counter() - drop_t0, + ) + + logger.info( + "Finished dropping provider graph from Neptune sink " + "(provider=%s, relationship_batches=%s, deleted_rels=%s, " + "node_batches=%s, deleted_nodes=%s, elapsed=%.3fs)", + provider_id, + relationship_batches, + deleted_relationships, + node_batches, + deleted_nodes, + time.perf_counter() - drop_t0, + ) + return deleted_nodes + + def has_provider_data(self, database: str, provider_id: str) -> bool: # noqa: ARG002 + from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import ( + PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL, + get_provider_label, + ) + + provider_label = get_provider_label(provider_id) + query = ( + f"MATCH (n:{PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL}:`{provider_label}`) RETURN 1 LIMIT 1" + ) + with self.get_session(default_access_mode=neo4j.READ_ACCESS) as session: + result = session.run(query) + return result.single() is not None + + def clear_cache(self, database: str) -> None: # noqa: ARG002 + # Neptune has no user-facing cache-clear procedure; no-op. + return None + + # Sync write path + + def ensure_sync_indexes(self, database: str) -> None: # noqa: ARG002 + # Neptune routes node and relationship lookups through `~id`, which is the cluster's primary key + # No additional index is needed or supported + return None + + def write_nodes( + self, + database: str, # noqa: ARG002 + labels: str, + rows: list[dict[str, Any]], + ) -> None: + if not rows: + return + from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import ( + PROVIDER_ELEMENT_ID_PROPERTY, + PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL, + ) + + # MERGE on `~id` is the documented and engine-optimized idempotent + # upsert pattern for Neptune openCypher. The label inside the MERGE + # matters: Neptune assigns a default `vertex` label to any node + # created without an explicit one, so we pin `_ProviderResource` + # (which every synced node carries anyway) at MERGE-time. Additional + # labels are added after + # + # We also write `_provider_element_id` as a regular property so + # non-sync code (drop_subgraph, query helpers) keeps a stable contract + # that doesn't know about `~id` + query = f""" + UNWIND $rows AS row + MERGE (n:`{PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL}` {{`~id`: row.provider_element_id}}) + SET n:{labels} + SET n += row.props + SET n.`{PROVIDER_ELEMENT_ID_PROPERTY}` = row.provider_element_id + """ + with self.get_session() as session: + session.run(query, {"rows": rows}).consume() + + def write_relationships( + self, + database: str, # noqa: ARG002 + rel_type: str, + provider_id: str, # noqa: ARG002 - encoded in start/end `~id` already + rows: list[dict[str, Any]], + ) -> None: + if not rows: + return + from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import PROVIDER_ELEMENT_ID_PROPERTY + + # `id(n) = $value` is Neptune's parameterized fast path; both endpoint + # MATCHes resolve in O(1) via the system `~id`, so per-row work stays + # bounded regardless of batch size + query = f""" + UNWIND $rows AS row + MATCH (s) WHERE id(s) = row.start_element_id + MATCH (e) WHERE id(e) = row.end_element_id + MERGE (s)-[r:`{rel_type}` {{`{PROVIDER_ELEMENT_ID_PROPERTY}`: row.provider_element_id}}]->(e) + SET r += row.props + """ + with self.get_session() as session: + session.run(query, {"rows": rows}).consume() + + # Test helpers + + def get_writer(self) -> neo4j.Driver: + return self._get_writer() + + def get_reader(self) -> neo4j.Driver: + return self._get_reader() + + +# SigV4 auth provider + + +class _NeptuneAuthToken(neo4j.Auth): + """Neo4j Auth backed by a SigV4-signed GET to `/opencypher`.""" + + def __init__(self, region: str, url: str) -> None: + session = BotoSession() + credentials = session.get_credentials() + if credentials is None: + raise RuntimeError( + "No AWS credentials available for Neptune SigV4 signing. " + "Ensure the boto3 credential chain can resolve." + ) + credentials = credentials.get_frozen_credentials() + + request = AWSRequest(method="GET", url=url + "/opencypher") + # SigV4 canonical Host must carry the real `host:port` + # Neptune runs on a non-default port (8182), so `.hostname` would drop it and break signing + request.headers.add_header("Host", urlsplit(url).netloc) + SigV4Auth(credentials, "neptune-db", region).add_auth(request) + + auth_obj = { + header: request.headers[header] + for header in ( + "Authorization", + "X-Amz-Date", + "X-Amz-Security-Token", + "Host", + ) + if header in request.headers + } + auth_obj["HttpMethod"] = "GET" + + super().__init__("basic", "username", json.dumps(auth_obj)) + + +def neptune_auth_provider(region: str, https_url: str) -> Callable[[], ExpiringAuth]: + """Return a callable the neo4j driver can invoke to refresh credentials.""" + + def _provider() -> ExpiringAuth: + token = _NeptuneAuthToken(region, https_url) + expires_at = ( + datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC) + + datetime.timedelta(minutes=SIGV4_TOKEN_LIFETIME_MINUTES) + ).timestamp() + return ExpiringAuth(auth=token, expires_at=expires_at) + + return _provider diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/views_helpers.py b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/views_helpers.py index 201527885e..d1b351f454 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/views_helpers.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/views_helpers.py @@ -1,12 +1,11 @@ import logging - -from typing import Any, Iterable +from collections.abc import Iterable +from typing import Any import neo4j - -from rest_framework.exceptions import APIException, PermissionDenied, ValidationError - -from api.attack_paths import database as graph_database, AttackPathsQueryDefinition +from api.attack_paths import AttackPathsQueryDefinition +from api.attack_paths import database as graph_database +from api.attack_paths import sink as sink_module from api.attack_paths.cypher_sanitizer import ( inject_provider_label, validate_custom_query, @@ -16,7 +15,10 @@ from api.attack_paths.queries.schema import ( RAW_SCHEMA_URL, get_cartography_schema_query, ) +from api.models import AttackPathsScan from config.custom_logging import BackendLogger +from config.env import env +from rest_framework.exceptions import APIException, PermissionDenied, ValidationError from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import ( INTERNAL_LABELS, INTERNAL_PROPERTIES, @@ -27,6 +29,10 @@ from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import ( logger = logging.getLogger(BackendLogger.API) +def _custom_query_timeout_ms() -> int: + return env.int("ATTACK_PATHS_READ_QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", default=30) * 1000 + + # Predefined query helpers @@ -103,13 +109,13 @@ def execute_query( definition: AttackPathsQueryDefinition, parameters: dict[str, Any], provider_id: str, + scan: AttackPathsScan, ) -> dict[str, Any]: try: - graph = graph_database.execute_read_query( - database=database_name, - cypher=definition.cypher, - parameters=parameters, - ) + # TODO: drop after Neptune cutover + # Route reads by the scan row's recorded sink, not by current settings. + backend = sink_module.get_backend_for_scan(scan) + graph = backend.execute_read_query(database_name, definition.cypher, parameters) return _serialize_graph(graph, provider_id) except graph_database.WriteQueryNotAllowedException: @@ -143,22 +149,31 @@ def execute_custom_query( database_name: str, cypher: str, provider_id: str, + scan: AttackPathsScan, ) -> dict[str, Any]: # Defense-in-depth for custom queries: - # 1. neo4j.READ_ACCESS — prevents mutations at the driver level - # 2. inject_provider_label() — regex-based label injection scopes node patterns - # 3. _serialize_graph() — post-query filter drops nodes without the provider label + # 1. `neo4j.READ_ACCESS` — prevents mutations at the driver level + # 2. `inject_provider_label()` — regex-based label injection scopes node patterns + # 3. `_serialize_graph()` — post-query filter drops nodes without the provider label + # 4. `USING QUERY:TIMEOUTMILLISECONDS` on Neptune — server-side runaway cutoff # # Layer 2 is best-effort (regex can't fully parse Cypher); # layer 3 is the safety net that guarantees provider isolation. validate_custom_query(cypher) cypher = inject_provider_label(cypher, provider_id) + # TODO: drop after Neptune cutover + backend = sink_module.get_backend_for_scan(scan) + + # Neptune enforces a cluster-level query timeout; prepending the hint + # makes the limit explicit and matches the client-side read timeout. + # Applies only when the scan's graph lives in Neptune. + if getattr(scan, "sink_backend", None) == "neptune": + timeout_ms = _custom_query_timeout_ms() + cypher = f"USING QUERY:TIMEOUTMILLISECONDS {timeout_ms}\n{cypher}" + try: - graph = graph_database.execute_read_query( - database=database_name, - cypher=cypher, - ) + graph = backend.execute_read_query(database_name, cypher, None) serialized = _serialize_graph(graph, provider_id) return _truncate_graph(serialized) @@ -181,10 +196,11 @@ def execute_custom_query( def get_cartography_schema( - database_name: str, provider_id: str + database_name: str, provider_id: str, scan: AttackPathsScan ) -> dict[str, str] | None: try: - with graph_database.get_session( + backend = sink_module.get_backend_for_scan(scan) + with backend.get_session( database_name, default_access_mode=neo4j.READ_ACCESS ) as session: result = session.run(get_cartography_schema_query(provider_id)) diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/authentication.py b/api/src/backend/api/authentication.py index 499e290bb7..755bd64e39 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/authentication.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/authentication.py @@ -1,18 +1,19 @@ -from typing import Optional, Tuple +from math import isfinite from uuid import UUID +from api.db_router import MainRouter +from api.models import TenantAPIKey, TenantAPIKeyManager from cryptography.fernet import InvalidToken +from django.core.exceptions import ObjectDoesNotExist from django.utils import timezone from drf_simple_apikey.backends import APIKeyAuthentication as BaseAPIKeyAuth from drf_simple_apikey.crypto import get_crypto +from drf_simple_apikey.settings import package_settings from rest_framework.authentication import BaseAuthentication from rest_framework.exceptions import AuthenticationFailed from rest_framework.request import Request from rest_framework_simplejwt.authentication import JWTAuthentication -from api.db_router import MainRouter -from api.models import TenantAPIKey, TenantAPIKeyManager - class TenantAPIKeyAuthentication(BaseAPIKeyAuth): model = TenantAPIKey @@ -23,18 +24,49 @@ class TenantAPIKeyAuthentication(BaseAPIKeyAuth): def _authenticate_credentials(self, request, key): """ Override to use admin connection, bypassing RLS during authentication. - Delegates to parent after temporarily routing model queries to admin DB. """ - # Temporarily point the model's manager to admin database - original_objects = self.model.objects - self.model.objects = self.model.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db) + try: + payload = self.key_crypto.decrypt(key) + except ValueError: + raise AuthenticationFailed("Invalid API Key.") + + if not isinstance(payload, dict): + raise AuthenticationFailed("Invalid API Key.") + + payload_pk = payload.get("_pk") + payload_exp = payload.get("_exp") + if ( + not isinstance(payload_pk, str) + or isinstance(payload_exp, bool) + or not isinstance(payload_exp, (int, float)) + or not isfinite(payload_exp) + ): + raise AuthenticationFailed("Invalid API Key.") try: - # Call parent method which will now use admin database - return super()._authenticate_credentials(request, key) - finally: - # Restore original manager - self.model.objects = original_objects + api_key_pk = UUID(payload_pk) + except ValueError: + raise AuthenticationFailed("Invalid API Key.") + + if payload_exp < timezone.now().timestamp(): + raise AuthenticationFailed("API Key has already expired.") + + try: + api_key = self.model.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db).get(id=api_key_pk) + except ObjectDoesNotExist: + raise AuthenticationFailed("No entity matching this api key.") + + if api_key.revoked: + raise AuthenticationFailed("This API Key has been revoked.") + + client_ip = request.META.get(package_settings.IP_ADDRESS_HEADER) + if api_key.blacklisted_ips and client_ip in api_key.blacklisted_ips: + raise AuthenticationFailed("Access denied from blacklisted IP.") + + if api_key.whitelisted_ips and client_ip not in api_key.whitelisted_ips: + raise AuthenticationFailed("Access restricted to specific IP addresses.") + + return api_key.entity, key def authenticate(self, request: Request): prefixed_key = self.get_key(request) @@ -81,7 +113,7 @@ class CombinedJWTOrAPIKeyAuthentication(BaseAuthentication): jwt_auth = JWTAuthentication() api_key_auth = TenantAPIKeyAuthentication() - def authenticate(self, request: Request) -> Optional[Tuple[object, dict]]: + def authenticate(self, request: Request) -> tuple[object, dict] | None: auth_header = request.headers.get("Authorization", "") # Prioritize JWT authentication if both are present @@ -93,3 +125,30 @@ class CombinedJWTOrAPIKeyAuthentication(BaseAuthentication): # Default fallback return self.jwt_auth.authenticate(request) + + +class SSEAuthentication(CombinedJWTOrAPIKeyAuthentication): + """JWT/API-Key auth that also accepts `?access_token=`. + + Browser `EventSource` is the only widely available SSE client API + and it cannot set the `Authorization` header (its constructor takes + only a URL and `withCredentials`). To keep browser SSE clients on + the same auth stack as the rest of the API, SSE endpoints additionally + accept a JWT via the `?access_token=` query parameter — the + standard parameter name defined in RFC 6750 Section 2.3 for bearer tokens. + """ + + def authenticate(self, request: Request): + auth_header = request.headers.get("Authorization", "") + if auth_header: + return super().authenticate(request) + + raw_token = request.query_params.get("access_token") + if not raw_token: + # No header and no query token — let the default path raise + # the canonical AuthenticationFailed via the parent class. + return super().authenticate(request) + + validated_token = self.jwt_auth.get_validated_token(raw_token) + user = self.jwt_auth.get_user(validated_token) + return user, validated_token diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/base_views.py b/api/src/backend/api/base_views.py index b14cc39529..e8dd728cb9 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/base_views.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/base_views.py @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +from api.authentication import CombinedJWTOrAPIKeyAuthentication +from api.db_router import MainRouter, reset_read_db_alias, set_read_db_alias +from api.db_utils import POSTGRES_USER_VAR, rls_transaction +from api.filters import CustomDjangoFilterBackend +from api.models import Role, UserRoleRelationship +from api.rbac.permissions import HasPermissions from django.conf import settings from django.db import transaction from rest_framework import permissions @@ -8,13 +14,6 @@ from rest_framework.response import Response from rest_framework_json_api import filters from rest_framework_json_api.views import ModelViewSet -from api.authentication import CombinedJWTOrAPIKeyAuthentication -from api.db_router import MainRouter, reset_read_db_alias, set_read_db_alias -from api.db_utils import POSTGRES_USER_VAR, rls_transaction -from api.filters import CustomDjangoFilterBackend -from api.models import Role, UserRoleRelationship -from api.rbac.permissions import HasPermissions - class BaseViewSet(ModelViewSet): authentication_classes = [CombinedJWTOrAPIKeyAuthentication] diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/compliance.py b/api/src/backend/api/compliance.py index 202825185b..854c7d8ba6 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/compliance.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/compliance.py @@ -112,14 +112,14 @@ def get_compliance_frameworks(provider_type: Provider.ProviderChoices) -> list[s """List compliance framework identifiers available for `provider_type`. Includes both per-provider frameworks and universal top-level frameworks - (e.g. ``dora``, ``csa_ccm_4.0``). + (e.g. ``dora_2022_2554``, ``csa_ccm_4.0``). Args: provider_type (Provider.ProviderChoices): The cloud provider type (e.g., "aws", "azure", "gcp", "m365"). Returns: - list[str]: Framework identifiers (e.g., "cis_1.4_aws", "dora"). + list[str]: Framework identifiers (e.g., "cis_1.4_aws", "dora_2022_2554"). """ global AVAILABLE_COMPLIANCE_FRAMEWORKS if provider_type not in AVAILABLE_COMPLIANCE_FRAMEWORKS: @@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ def generate_compliance_overview_template( total_requirements += 1 provider_check_list = list(requirement.checks.get(provider_type, [])) total_checks = len(provider_check_list) - checks_dict = {check: None for check in provider_check_list} + checks_dict = dict.fromkeys(provider_check_list) req_status_val = "MANUAL" if total_checks == 0 else "PASS" diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/db_utils.py b/api/src/backend/api/db_utils.py index e3b11d7084..2c378f2ea8 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/db_utils.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/db_utils.py @@ -3,8 +3,14 @@ import secrets import time import uuid from contextlib import contextmanager -from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta +from api.db_router import ( + READ_REPLICA_ALIAS, + get_read_db_alias, + reset_read_db_alias, + set_read_db_alias, +) from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger from config.env import env from django.conf import settings @@ -22,13 +28,6 @@ from psycopg2 import sql as psycopg2_sql from psycopg2.extensions import AsIs, new_type, register_adapter, register_type from rest_framework_json_api.serializers import ValidationError -from api.db_router import ( - READ_REPLICA_ALIAS, - get_read_db_alias, - reset_read_db_alias, - set_read_db_alias, -) - logger = get_task_logger(__name__) DB_USER = settings.DATABASES["default"]["USER"] if not settings.TESTING else "test" @@ -170,7 +169,7 @@ def one_week_from_now(): """ Return a datetime object with a date one week from now. """ - return datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=7) + return datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(days=7) def generate_random_token(length: int = 14, symbols: str | None = None) -> str: @@ -405,10 +404,10 @@ def _should_create_index_on_partition( # Unknown month abbreviation, include it to be safe return True - partition_date = datetime(year, month, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc) + partition_date = datetime(year, month, 1, tzinfo=UTC) # Get current month start - now = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + now = datetime.now(UTC) current_month_start = now.replace( day=1, hour=0, minute=0, second=0, microsecond=0 ) diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/decorators.py b/api/src/backend/api/decorators.py index f9b165ef20..a055b2252f 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/decorators.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/decorators.py @@ -1,14 +1,13 @@ import uuid from functools import wraps -from django.core.exceptions import ObjectDoesNotExist -from django.db import DatabaseError, connection, transaction -from rest_framework_json_api.serializers import ValidationError - from api.db_router import READ_REPLICA_ALIAS from api.db_utils import POSTGRES_TENANT_VAR, SET_CONFIG_QUERY, rls_transaction from api.exceptions import ProviderDeletedException from api.models import Provider, Scan +from django.core.exceptions import ObjectDoesNotExist +from django.db import DatabaseError, connection, transaction +from rest_framework_json_api.serializers import ValidationError def set_tenant(func=None, *, keep_tenant=False): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/filters.py b/api/src/backend/api/filters.py index c787d714b1..740556329c 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/filters.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/filters.py @@ -1,19 +1,4 @@ -from datetime import date, datetime, timedelta, timezone - -from dateutil.parser import parse -from django.conf import settings -from django.db.models import F, Q -from django_filters.rest_framework import ( - BaseInFilter, - BooleanFilter, - CharFilter, - ChoiceFilter, - DateFilter, - FilterSet, - UUIDFilter, -) -from rest_framework_json_api.django_filters.backends import DjangoFilterBackend -from rest_framework_json_api.serializers import ValidationError +from datetime import UTC, date, datetime, timedelta from api.constants import SEVERITY_ORDER from api.db_utils import ( @@ -68,6 +53,20 @@ from api.uuid_utils import ( uuid7_start, ) from api.v1.serializers import TaskBase +from dateutil.parser import parse +from django.conf import settings +from django.db.models import F, Q +from django_filters.rest_framework import ( + BaseInFilter, + BooleanFilter, + CharFilter, + ChoiceFilter, + DateFilter, + FilterSet, + UUIDFilter, +) +from rest_framework_json_api.django_filters.backends import DjangoFilterBackend +from rest_framework_json_api.serializers import ValidationError class CustomDjangoFilterBackend(DjangoFilterBackend): @@ -102,7 +101,7 @@ class BaseProviderFilter(FilterSet): """ Abstract base filter for models with direct FK to Provider. - Provides standard provider_id and provider_type filters. + Provides standard provider_id, provider_type, and provider_groups filters. Subclasses must define Meta.model. """ @@ -116,6 +115,16 @@ class BaseProviderFilter(FilterSet): choices=Provider.ProviderChoices.choices, lookup_expr="in", ) + provider_groups = UUIDFilter( + field_name="provider__provider_groups__id", + lookup_expr="exact", + distinct=True, + ) + provider_groups__in = UUIDInFilter( + field_name="provider__provider_groups__id", + lookup_expr="in", + distinct=True, + ) class Meta: abstract = True @@ -126,7 +135,7 @@ class BaseScanProviderFilter(FilterSet): """ Abstract base filter for models with FK to Scan (and Scan has FK to Provider). - Provides standard provider_id and provider_type filters via scan relationship. + Provides standard provider_id, provider_type, and provider_groups filters via scan relationship. Subclasses must define Meta.model. """ @@ -140,6 +149,16 @@ class BaseScanProviderFilter(FilterSet): choices=Provider.ProviderChoices.choices, lookup_expr="in", ) + provider_groups = UUIDFilter( + field_name="scan__provider__provider_groups__id", + lookup_expr="exact", + distinct=True, + ) + provider_groups__in = UUIDInFilter( + field_name="scan__provider__provider_groups__id", + lookup_expr="in", + distinct=True, + ) class Meta: abstract = True @@ -160,6 +179,16 @@ class CommonFindingFilters(FilterSet): provider_type__in = ChoiceInFilter( choices=Provider.ProviderChoices.choices, field_name="scan__provider__provider" ) + provider_groups = UUIDFilter( + field_name="scan__provider__provider_groups__id", + lookup_expr="exact", + distinct=True, + ) + provider_groups__in = UUIDInFilter( + field_name="scan__provider__provider_groups__id", + lookup_expr="in", + distinct=True, + ) provider_uid = CharFilter(field_name="scan__provider__uid", lookup_expr="exact") provider_uid__in = CharInFilter(field_name="scan__provider__uid", lookup_expr="in") provider_uid__icontains = CharFilter( @@ -370,6 +399,12 @@ class ProviderFilter(FilterSet): choices=Provider.ProviderChoices.choices, lookup_expr="in", ) + provider_groups = UUIDFilter( + field_name="provider_groups__id", lookup_expr="exact", distinct=True + ) + provider_groups__in = UUIDInFilter( + field_name="provider_groups__id", lookup_expr="in", distinct=True + ) class Meta: model = Provider @@ -395,6 +430,16 @@ class ProviderRelationshipFilterSet(FilterSet): provider_type__in = ChoiceInFilter( choices=Provider.ProviderChoices.choices, field_name="provider__provider" ) + provider_groups = UUIDFilter( + field_name="provider__provider_groups__id", + lookup_expr="exact", + distinct=True, + ) + provider_groups__in = UUIDInFilter( + field_name="provider__provider_groups__id", + lookup_expr="in", + distinct=True, + ) provider_uid = CharFilter(field_name="provider__uid", lookup_expr="exact") provider_uid__in = CharInFilter(field_name="provider__uid", lookup_expr="in") provider_uid__icontains = CharFilter( @@ -552,12 +597,12 @@ class ResourceFilter(ProviderRelationshipFilterSet): gte_date = ( parse(self.data.get("updated_at__gte")).date() if self.data.get("updated_at__gte") - else datetime.now(timezone.utc).date() + else datetime.now(UTC).date() ) lte_date = ( parse(self.data.get("updated_at__lte")).date() if self.data.get("updated_at__lte") - else datetime.now(timezone.utc).date() + else datetime.now(UTC).date() ) if abs(lte_date - gte_date) > timedelta( @@ -702,9 +747,9 @@ class FindingFilter(CommonFindingFilters): lte_date = cleaned.get("inserted_at__lte") or exact_date if gte_date is None: - gte_date = datetime.now(timezone.utc).date() + gte_date = datetime.now(UTC).date() if lte_date is None: - lte_date = datetime.now(timezone.utc).date() + lte_date = datetime.now(UTC).date() if abs(lte_date - gte_date) > timedelta( days=settings.FINDINGS_MAX_DAYS_IN_RANGE @@ -798,7 +843,7 @@ class FindingFilter(CommonFindingFilters): def maybe_date_to_datetime(value): dt = value if isinstance(value, date): - dt = datetime.combine(value, datetime.min.time(), tzinfo=timezone.utc) + dt = datetime.combine(value, datetime.min.time(), tzinfo=UTC) return dt @@ -887,9 +932,9 @@ class FindingGroupFilter(CommonFindingFilters): lte_date = cleaned.get("inserted_at__lte") or exact_date if gte_date is None: - gte_date = datetime.now(timezone.utc).date() + gte_date = datetime.now(UTC).date() if lte_date is None: - lte_date = datetime.now(timezone.utc).date() + lte_date = datetime.now(UTC).date() if abs(lte_date - gte_date) > timedelta( days=settings.FINDINGS_MAX_DAYS_IN_RANGE @@ -931,7 +976,7 @@ class FindingGroupFilter(CommonFindingFilters): """Convert date to datetime if needed.""" dt = value if isinstance(value, date): - dt = datetime.combine(value, datetime.min.time(), tzinfo=timezone.utc) + dt = datetime.combine(value, datetime.min.time(), tzinfo=UTC) return dt @@ -1001,6 +1046,16 @@ class FindingGroupSummaryFilter(_CheckTitleToCheckIdMixin, FilterSet): field_name="provider__provider", choices=Provider.ProviderChoices.choices ) provider_type__in = CharInFilter(field_name="provider__provider", lookup_expr="in") + provider_groups = UUIDFilter( + field_name="provider__provider_groups__id", + lookup_expr="exact", + distinct=True, + ) + provider_groups__in = UUIDInFilter( + field_name="provider__provider_groups__id", + lookup_expr="in", + distinct=True, + ) class Meta: model = FindingGroupDailySummary @@ -1035,9 +1090,9 @@ class FindingGroupSummaryFilter(_CheckTitleToCheckIdMixin, FilterSet): lte_date = cleaned.get("inserted_at__lte") or exact_date if gte_date is None: - gte_date = datetime.now(timezone.utc).date() + gte_date = datetime.now(UTC).date() if lte_date is None: - lte_date = datetime.now(timezone.utc).date() + lte_date = datetime.now(UTC).date() if abs(lte_date - gte_date) > timedelta( days=settings.FINDINGS_MAX_DAYS_IN_RANGE @@ -1076,7 +1131,7 @@ class FindingGroupSummaryFilter(_CheckTitleToCheckIdMixin, FilterSet): def _maybe_date_to_datetime(value): dt = value if isinstance(value, date): - dt = datetime.combine(value, datetime.min.time(), tzinfo=timezone.utc) + dt = datetime.combine(value, datetime.min.time(), tzinfo=UTC) return dt @@ -1101,6 +1156,16 @@ class LatestFindingGroupSummaryFilter(_CheckTitleToCheckIdMixin, FilterSet): field_name="provider__provider", choices=Provider.ProviderChoices.choices ) provider_type__in = CharInFilter(field_name="provider__provider", lookup_expr="in") + provider_groups = UUIDFilter( + field_name="provider__provider_groups__id", + lookup_expr="exact", + distinct=True, + ) + provider_groups__in = UUIDInFilter( + field_name="provider__provider_groups__id", + lookup_expr="in", + distinct=True, + ) class Meta: model = FindingGroupDailySummary @@ -1280,12 +1345,19 @@ class RoleFilter(FilterSet): } -class ComplianceOverviewFilter(FilterSet): +class ComplianceOverviewFilter(BaseScanProviderFilter): + """ + Keep provider filters in the schema while runtime filtering resolves scans first. + + Compliance overview provider filters are applied to the latest completed scans + in the viewset, then this filterset handles the remaining compliance fields. + """ + inserted_at = DateFilter(field_name="inserted_at", lookup_expr="date") - scan_id = UUIDFilter(field_name="scan_id", required=True) + scan_id = UUIDFilter(field_name="scan_id") region = CharFilter(field_name="region") - class Meta: + class Meta(BaseScanProviderFilter.Meta): model = ComplianceRequirementOverview fields = { "inserted_at": ["date", "gte", "lte"], @@ -1306,6 +1378,16 @@ class ScanSummaryFilter(FilterSet): provider_type__in = ChoiceInFilter( field_name="scan__provider__provider", choices=Provider.ProviderChoices.choices ) + provider_groups = UUIDFilter( + field_name="scan__provider__provider_groups__id", + lookup_expr="exact", + distinct=True, + ) + provider_groups__in = UUIDInFilter( + field_name="scan__provider__provider_groups__id", + lookup_expr="in", + distinct=True, + ) region = CharFilter(field_name="region") class Meta: @@ -1329,6 +1411,16 @@ class DailySeveritySummaryFilter(FilterSet): provider_type__in = ChoiceInFilter( field_name="provider__provider", choices=Provider.ProviderChoices.choices ) + provider_groups = UUIDFilter( + field_name="provider__provider_groups__id", + lookup_expr="exact", + distinct=True, + ) + provider_groups__in = UUIDInFilter( + field_name="provider__provider_groups__id", + lookup_expr="in", + distinct=True, + ) date_from = DateFilter(method="filter_noop") date_to = DateFilter(method="filter_noop") @@ -1585,6 +1677,16 @@ class ThreatScoreSnapshotFilter(FilterSet): choices=Provider.ProviderChoices.choices, lookup_expr="in", ) + provider_groups = UUIDFilter( + field_name="provider__provider_groups__id", + lookup_expr="exact", + distinct=True, + ) + provider_groups__in = UUIDInFilter( + field_name="provider__provider_groups__id", + lookup_expr="in", + distinct=True, + ) compliance_id = CharFilter(field_name="compliance_id", lookup_expr="exact") compliance_id__in = CharInFilter(field_name="compliance_id", lookup_expr="in") @@ -1628,6 +1730,16 @@ class ResourceGroupOverviewFilter(FilterSet): choices=Provider.ProviderChoices.choices, lookup_expr="in", ) + provider_groups = UUIDFilter( + field_name="scan__provider__provider_groups__id", + lookup_expr="exact", + distinct=True, + ) + provider_groups__in = UUIDInFilter( + field_name="scan__provider__provider_groups__id", + lookup_expr="in", + distinct=True, + ) resource_group = CharFilter(field_name="resource_group", lookup_expr="exact") resource_group__in = CharInFilter(field_name="resource_group", lookup_expr="in") diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/health.py b/api/src/backend/api/health.py index 8ca3936f94..cca3bcef72 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/health.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/health.py @@ -2,8 +2,9 @@ Format (draft-inadarei-api-health-check-06). Liveness reports only process status. Readiness verifies that PostgreSQL, -Valkey and Neo4j are reachable and returns per-dependency detail when any -of them is unreachable. +Valkey and the attack-paths graph store (Neo4j or Neptune, per +``ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE``) are reachable and returns per-dependency +detail when any of them is unreachable. """ from __future__ import annotations @@ -11,8 +12,10 @@ from __future__ import annotations import logging import threading import time +from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor +from concurrent.futures import TimeoutError as FuturesTimeoutError from contextlib import suppress -from datetime import datetime, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime from typing import Any import redis @@ -37,9 +40,28 @@ STATUS_FAIL = "fail" STATUS_WARN = "warn" # Short socket timeout so a stuck Valkey cannot stall the probe. -# Neo4j inherits its driver-level ``connection_acquisition_timeout``. VALKEY_PROBE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 2 +# Probe-scoped budget for the graph database. +# ``Driver.verify_connectivity()`` takes no timeout; its only bound is the +# driver-level ``connection_acquisition_timeout`` (60s on Neptune). The +# probe needs its own budget, independent of the workload driver, so a +# graph-database outage cannot pin a worker thread (and the readiness lock) +# for a minute. +GRAPH_DB_PROBE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 5 + +# Bounded pool that enforces ``GRAPH_DB_PROBE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS``. If the +# graph database is unreachable the probe call blocks until the driver's +# own acquisition timeout fires; we abandon the future after the budget and +# report ``fail``. Orphaned tasks are capped by ``max_workers`` plus the 3s +# readiness cache plus the per-IP throttle, so they cannot pile up: worst +# case during a graph-database outage is every readiness call failing fast +# in ``GRAPH_DB_PROBE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS`` with at most 2 background threads +# stuck for <= the driver acquisition timeout. +_graph_db_probe_executor = ThreadPoolExecutor( + max_workers=2, thread_name_prefix="health-graph-db-probe" +) + # Brief cache window so high-frequency probes (ALB target groups, scrapers) # do not stampede the actual dependency checks. CACHE_CONTROL_HEADER = "max-age=3, must-revalidate" @@ -62,11 +84,7 @@ class HealthJSONRenderer(JSONRenderer): def _now_iso() -> str: - return ( - datetime.now(timezone.utc) - .isoformat(timespec="milliseconds") - .replace("+00:00", "Z") - ) + return datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(timespec="milliseconds").replace("+00:00", "Z") def _measure(name: str, check_fn) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], float]: @@ -113,11 +131,24 @@ def _probe_valkey() -> None: client.close() -def _probe_neo4j() -> None: - # Lazy import: avoids pulling attack_paths into the boot import graph. - from api.attack_paths.database import get_driver +def _graph_db_component_id() -> str: + """Return the active graph database name for the ``componentId`` field.""" + return settings.ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE.strip().lower() - get_driver().verify_connectivity() + +def _probe_graph_db() -> None: + # Lazy import: avoids pulling attack_paths into the boot import graph + from api.attack_paths.database import verify_connectivity + + future = _graph_db_probe_executor.submit(verify_connectivity) + try: + future.result(timeout=GRAPH_DB_PROBE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) + except FuturesTimeoutError as exc: + # Do not wait for the abandoned task; it ends when the driver's own acquisition timeout fires + future.cancel() + raise TimeoutError( + f"graph-db probe exceeded {GRAPH_DB_PROBE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS}s" + ) from exc def _build_check_entry( @@ -180,14 +211,18 @@ def _readiness_payload() -> tuple[dict[str, Any], int]: ): return snapshot[1], snapshot[2] + graph_db_component_id = _graph_db_component_id() + postgres_result, postgres_ms = _measure("postgres", _probe_postgres) valkey_result, valkey_ms = _measure("valkey", _probe_valkey) - neo4j_result, neo4j_ms = _measure("neo4j", _probe_neo4j) + graph_db_result, graph_db_ms = _measure(graph_db_component_id, _probe_graph_db) entries = [ _build_check_entry("postgres", "datastore", postgres_result, postgres_ms), _build_check_entry("valkey", "datastore", valkey_result, valkey_ms), - _build_check_entry("neo4j", "datastore", neo4j_result, neo4j_ms), + _build_check_entry( + graph_db_component_id, "datastore", graph_db_result, graph_db_ms + ), ] overall = _aggregate_status(entries) @@ -195,7 +230,7 @@ def _readiness_payload() -> tuple[dict[str, Any], int]: payload["checks"] = { "postgres:responseTime": [entries[0]], "valkey:responseTime": [entries[1]], - "neo4j:responseTime": [entries[2]], + "graphdb:responseTime": [entries[2]], } http_status = ( @@ -237,10 +272,10 @@ class LivenessView(APIView): class ReadinessView(APIView): """Readiness probe. - Returns 200 when PostgreSQL, Valkey and Neo4j all respond, or 503 with - per-dependency detail when any of them is unreachable. Per-IP throttle - plus the short in-process result cache cap the real dependency hits - regardless of inbound traffic shape. + Returns 200 when PostgreSQL, Valkey and the attack-paths graph store + all respond, or 503 with per-dependency detail when any of them is + unreachable. Per-IP throttle plus the short in-process result cache cap + the real dependency hits regardless of inbound traffic shape. """ authentication_classes: list = [] diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/management/commands/findings.py b/api/src/backend/api/management/commands/findings.py index e62f8f8e8e..f5348dbfc6 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/management/commands/findings.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/management/commands/findings.py @@ -1,11 +1,8 @@ import random -from datetime import datetime, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime from math import ceil from uuid import uuid4 -from django.core.management.base import BaseCommand -from tqdm import tqdm - from api.db_utils import rls_transaction from api.models import ( Finding, @@ -16,7 +13,9 @@ from api.models import ( Scan, StatusChoices, ) +from django.core.management.base import BaseCommand from prowler.lib.check.models import CheckMetadata +from tqdm import tqdm class Command(BaseCommand): @@ -116,7 +115,7 @@ class Command(BaseCommand): trigger="manual", state="executing", progress=0, - started_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + started_at=datetime.now(UTC), ) scan_state = "completed" @@ -272,10 +271,8 @@ class Command(BaseCommand): self.stdout.write(self.style.ERROR(f"Failed to populate test data: {e}")) scan_state = "failed" finally: - scan.completed_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) - scan.duration = int( - (datetime.now(timezone.utc) - scan.started_at).total_seconds() - ) + scan.completed_at = datetime.now(UTC) + scan.duration = int((datetime.now(UTC) - scan.started_at).total_seconds()) scan.progress = 100 scan.state = scan_state scan.unique_resource_count = num_resources diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/management/commands/reconcile_orphan_tasks.py b/api/src/backend/api/management/commands/reconcile_orphan_tasks.py index 8ba8f5b342..7d84e29dde 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/management/commands/reconcile_orphan_tasks.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/management/commands/reconcile_orphan_tasks.py @@ -1,5 +1,4 @@ from django.core.management.base import BaseCommand - from tasks.jobs.orphan_recovery import reconcile_orphans diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/middleware.py b/api/src/backend/api/middleware.py index 63f2fc630b..82ae8dcf67 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/middleware.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/middleware.py @@ -2,6 +2,31 @@ import logging import time from config.custom_logging import BackendLogger +from django.core.handlers.asgi import ASGIRequest +from django.db import connections + + +class CloseDBConnectionsMiddleware: + """ + Close request-scoped DB connections at the end of each ASGI request. + + Under the ASGI worker, connections opened by sync views are not released + by Django's normal request-boundary cleanup, so they accumulate idle until + Postgres runs out of slots. Only ASGI requests are handled; the sync WSGI + test client manages its own connections and must be left alone. + """ + + def __init__(self, get_response): + self.get_response = get_response + + def __call__(self, request): + try: + return self.get_response(request) + finally: + if isinstance(request, ASGIRequest): + for conn in connections.all(initialized_only=True): + if not conn.in_atomic_block: + conn.close_if_unusable_or_obsolete() def extract_auth_info(request) -> dict: diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0001_initial.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0001_initial.py index 6288cf4093..d4f931622f 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0001_initial.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0001_initial.py @@ -1,26 +1,13 @@ import uuid from functools import partial +import api.rls import django.contrib.auth.models import django.contrib.postgres.indexes import django.contrib.postgres.search import django.core.validators import django.db.models.deletion import django.utils.timezone -from django.conf import settings -from django.db import migrations, models -from psqlextra.backend.migrations.operations.add_default_partition import ( - PostgresAddDefaultPartition, -) -from psqlextra.backend.migrations.operations.create_partitioned_model import ( - PostgresCreatePartitionedModel, -) -from psqlextra.manager.manager import PostgresManager -from psqlextra.models.partitioned import PostgresPartitionedModel -from psqlextra.types import PostgresPartitioningMethod -from uuid6 import uuid7 - -import api.rls from api.db_utils import ( DB_PROWLER_PASSWORD, DB_PROWLER_USER, @@ -53,6 +40,18 @@ from api.models import ( StateChoices, StatusChoices, ) +from django.conf import settings +from django.db import migrations, models +from psqlextra.backend.migrations.operations.add_default_partition import ( + PostgresAddDefaultPartition, +) +from psqlextra.backend.migrations.operations.create_partitioned_model import ( + PostgresCreatePartitionedModel, +) +from psqlextra.manager.manager import PostgresManager +from psqlextra.models.partitioned import PostgresPartitionedModel +from psqlextra.types import PostgresPartitioningMethod +from uuid6 import uuid7 DB_NAME = settings.DATABASES["default"]["NAME"] diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0002_token_migrations.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0002_token_migrations.py index 754403c62f..c7ba732fa3 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0002_token_migrations.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0002_token_migrations.py @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ +from api.db_utils import DB_PROWLER_USER from django.conf import settings from django.db import migrations -from api.db_utils import DB_PROWLER_USER - DB_NAME = settings.DATABASES["default"]["NAME"] diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0004_rbac.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0004_rbac.py index 4453b1b588..efac385041 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0004_rbac.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0004_rbac.py @@ -2,12 +2,11 @@ import uuid +import api.rls import django.db.models.deletion from django.conf import settings from django.db import migrations, models -import api.rls - class Migration(migrations.Migration): dependencies = [ diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0005_rbac_missing_admin_roles.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0005_rbac_missing_admin_roles.py index 0392145063..5ab8978b31 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0005_rbac_missing_admin_roles.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0005_rbac_missing_admin_roles.py @@ -1,6 +1,5 @@ -from django.db import migrations - from api.db_router import MainRouter +from django.db import migrations def create_admin_role(apps, schema_editor): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0008_daily_scheduled_tasks_update.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0008_daily_scheduled_tasks_update.py index 7f059ea2b8..d6e8bb7adb 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0008_daily_scheduled_tasks_update.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0008_daily_scheduled_tasks_update.py @@ -1,12 +1,11 @@ import json -from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta import django.db.models.deletion -from django.db import migrations, models -from django_celery_beat.models import PeriodicTask - from api.db_utils import rls_transaction from api.models import Scan, StateChoices +from django.db import migrations, models +from django_celery_beat.models import PeriodicTask def migrate_daily_scheduled_scan_tasks(apps, schema_editor): @@ -17,11 +16,11 @@ def migrate_daily_scheduled_scan_tasks(apps, schema_editor): tenant_id = task_kwargs["tenant_id"] provider_id = task_kwargs["provider_id"] - current_time = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + current_time = datetime.now(UTC) scheduled_time_today = datetime.combine( current_time.date(), daily_scheduled_scan_task.start_time.time(), - tzinfo=timezone.utc, + tzinfo=UTC, ) if current_time < scheduled_time_today: diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0013_integrations_enum.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0013_integrations_enum.py index 524ecbbb3d..7f2905b844 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0013_integrations_enum.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0013_integrations_enum.py @@ -2,10 +2,9 @@ from functools import partial -from django.db import migrations - from api.db_utils import IntegrationTypeEnum, PostgresEnumMigration, register_enum from api.models import Integration +from django.db import migrations IntegrationTypeEnumMigration = PostgresEnumMigration( enum_name="integration_type", diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0014_integrations.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0014_integrations.py index 2fb3d76880..1b63c1fc8c 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0014_integrations.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0014_integrations.py @@ -2,12 +2,11 @@ import uuid -import django.db.models.deletion -from django.db import migrations, models - import api.db_utils import api.rls +import django.db.models.deletion from api.rls import RowLevelSecurityConstraint +from django.db import migrations, models class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0015_finding_muted.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0015_finding_muted.py index 3cb20f871b..5bc408cb44 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0015_finding_muted.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0015_finding_muted.py @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ # Generated by Django 5.1.5 on 2025-03-25 11:29 -from django.db import migrations, models - import api.db_utils +from django.db import migrations, models class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0017_m365_provider.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0017_m365_provider.py index 62817560c5..7e9face021 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0017_m365_provider.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0017_m365_provider.py @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ # Generated by Django 5.1.7 on 2025-04-16 08:47 -from django.db import migrations - import api.db_utils +from django.db import migrations class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0018_resource_scan_summaries.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0018_resource_scan_summaries.py index e9e2ffbe69..0e402cd7c6 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0018_resource_scan_summaries.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0018_resource_scan_summaries.py @@ -2,12 +2,11 @@ import uuid +import api.rls import django.db.models.deletion import uuid6 from django.db import migrations, models -import api.rls - class Migration(migrations.Migration): dependencies = [ diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0020_findings_new_performance_indexes_partitions.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0020_findings_new_performance_indexes_partitions.py index eef7e10b99..544d9dee01 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0020_findings_new_performance_indexes_partitions.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0020_findings_new_performance_indexes_partitions.py @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ from functools import partial -from django.db import migrations - from api.db_utils import create_index_on_partitions, drop_index_on_partitions +from django.db import migrations class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0024_findings_uid_index_partitions.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0024_findings_uid_index_partitions.py index d0e237453e..0bec532752 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0024_findings_uid_index_partitions.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0024_findings_uid_index_partitions.py @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ from functools import partial -from django.db import migrations - from api.db_utils import create_index_on_partitions, drop_index_on_partitions +from django.db import migrations class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0027_compliance_requirement_overviews.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0027_compliance_requirement_overviews.py index 82bbb136a5..831e1137d4 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0027_compliance_requirement_overviews.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0027_compliance_requirement_overviews.py @@ -2,12 +2,11 @@ import uuid -import django.db.models.deletion -from django.db import migrations, models - import api.db_utils import api.rls +import django.db.models.deletion from api.rls import RowLevelSecurityConstraint +from django.db import migrations, models class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0028_findings_check_index_partitions.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0028_findings_check_index_partitions.py index ad61f3004f..5fc1c9dc84 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0028_findings_check_index_partitions.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0028_findings_check_index_partitions.py @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ from functools import partial -from django.db import migrations - from api.db_utils import create_index_on_partitions, drop_index_on_partitions +from django.db import migrations class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0030_lighthouseconfiguration.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0030_lighthouseconfiguration.py index b12b8cac01..f00a7a9ae6 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0030_lighthouseconfiguration.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0030_lighthouseconfiguration.py @@ -2,12 +2,11 @@ import uuid +import api.rls import django.core.validators import django.db.models.deletion from django.db import migrations, models -import api.rls - class Migration(migrations.Migration): dependencies = [ diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0032_saml.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0032_saml.py index f1481e104b..7fe71179d5 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0032_saml.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0032_saml.py @@ -2,13 +2,12 @@ import uuid +import api.db_utils +import api.rls import django.db.models.deletion from django.conf import settings from django.db import migrations, models -import api.db_utils -import api.rls - class Migration(migrations.Migration): dependencies = [ diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0033_processors_enum.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0033_processors_enum.py index 7dbad72241..8a4fdef08f 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0033_processors_enum.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0033_processors_enum.py @@ -2,10 +2,9 @@ from functools import partial -from django.db import migrations - from api.db_utils import PostgresEnumMigration, ProcessorTypeEnum, register_enum from api.models import Processor +from django.db import migrations ProcessorTypeEnumMigration = PostgresEnumMigration( enum_name="processor_type", diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0034_processors.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0034_processors.py index 3df4eaf53b..00efd0a283 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0034_processors.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0034_processors.py @@ -2,12 +2,11 @@ import uuid -import django.db.models.deletion -from django.db import migrations, models - import api.db_utils import api.rls +import django.db.models.deletion from api.rls import RowLevelSecurityConstraint +from django.db import migrations, models class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0036_rfm_tenant_finding_index_partitions.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0036_rfm_tenant_finding_index_partitions.py index cd360eb7e4..e346a63bb7 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0036_rfm_tenant_finding_index_partitions.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0036_rfm_tenant_finding_index_partitions.py @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ from functools import partial -from django.db import migrations - from api.db_utils import create_index_on_partitions, drop_index_on_partitions +from django.db import migrations class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0040_rfm_tenant_resource_index_partitions.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0040_rfm_tenant_resource_index_partitions.py index 431d656376..5fd165d26c 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0040_rfm_tenant_resource_index_partitions.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0040_rfm_tenant_resource_index_partitions.py @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ from functools import partial -from django.db import migrations - from api.db_utils import create_index_on_partitions, drop_index_on_partitions +from django.db import migrations class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0043_github_provider.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0043_github_provider.py index 3607ce4af3..3a54bfbcc6 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0043_github_provider.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0043_github_provider.py @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ # Generated by Django 5.1.7 on 2025-07-09 14:44 -from django.db import migrations - import api.db_utils +from django.db import migrations class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0048_api_key.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0048_api_key.py index c3142ecda1..a66448325b 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0048_api_key.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0048_api_key.py @@ -2,15 +2,14 @@ import uuid +import api.db_utils +import api.rls import django.core.validators import django.db.models.deletion import drf_simple_apikey.models from django.conf import settings from django.db import migrations, models -import api.db_utils -import api.rls - class Migration(migrations.Migration): dependencies = [ diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0050_lighthouse_multi_llm.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0050_lighthouse_multi_llm.py index 99a9353327..c236f9efea 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0050_lighthouse_multi_llm.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0050_lighthouse_multi_llm.py @@ -4,15 +4,14 @@ import json import logging import uuid +import api.rls import django.db.models.deletion +from api.db_router import MainRouter from config.custom_logging import BackendLogger from cryptography.fernet import Fernet from django.conf import settings from django.db import migrations, models -import api.rls -from api.db_router import MainRouter - logger = logging.getLogger(BackendLogger.API) diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0051_oraclecloud_provider.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0051_oraclecloud_provider.py index 022c022ea6..5688d0a764 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0051_oraclecloud_provider.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0051_oraclecloud_provider.py @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ # Generated by Django 5.1.7 on 2025-10-14 00:00 -from django.db import migrations - import api.db_utils +from django.db import migrations class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0052_mute_rules.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0052_mute_rules.py index 56a3ff516f..358402321b 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0052_mute_rules.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0052_mute_rules.py @@ -2,14 +2,13 @@ import uuid +import api.rls import django.contrib.postgres.fields import django.core.validators import django.db.models.deletion from django.conf import settings from django.db import migrations, models -import api.rls - class Migration(migrations.Migration): dependencies = [ diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0054_iac_provider.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0054_iac_provider.py index 03c29e33b6..05350c251f 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0054_iac_provider.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0054_iac_provider.py @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ # Generated by Django 5.1.10 on 2025-09-09 09:25 -from django.db import migrations - import api.db_utils +from django.db import migrations class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0055_mongodbatlas_provider.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0055_mongodbatlas_provider.py index d250a0bffd..1703decdb4 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0055_mongodbatlas_provider.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0055_mongodbatlas_provider.py @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ # Generated by Django 5.1.13 on 2025-11-05 08:37 -from django.db import migrations - import api.db_utils +from django.db import migrations class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0057_threatscoresnapshot.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0057_threatscoresnapshot.py index ee3530a5b6..171b94c2d5 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0057_threatscoresnapshot.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0057_threatscoresnapshot.py @@ -2,11 +2,10 @@ import uuid +import api.rls import django.db.models.deletion from django.db import migrations, models -import api.rls - class Migration(migrations.Migration): dependencies = [ diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0059_compliance_overview_summary.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0059_compliance_overview_summary.py index d2d57a34ae..06873abef1 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0059_compliance_overview_summary.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0059_compliance_overview_summary.py @@ -2,11 +2,10 @@ import uuid +import api.rls import django.db.models.deletion from django.db import migrations, models -import api.rls - class Migration(migrations.Migration): dependencies = [ diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0060_attack_surface_overview.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0060_attack_surface_overview.py index 8007d49a70..a93cf5b38f 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0060_attack_surface_overview.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0060_attack_surface_overview.py @@ -2,11 +2,10 @@ import uuid +import api.rls import django.db.models.deletion from django.db import migrations, models -import api.rls - class Migration(migrations.Migration): dependencies = [ diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0061_daily_severity_summary.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0061_daily_severity_summary.py index 7e4074cf7f..3aa89133bd 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0061_daily_severity_summary.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0061_daily_severity_summary.py @@ -2,11 +2,10 @@ import uuid +import api.rls import django.db.models.deletion from django.db import migrations, models -import api.rls - class Migration(migrations.Migration): dependencies = [ diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0062_backfill_daily_severity_summaries.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0062_backfill_daily_severity_summaries.py index f893ac4305..92e53bc4ad 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0062_backfill_daily_severity_summaries.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0062_backfill_daily_severity_summaries.py @@ -1,10 +1,9 @@ # Generated by Django 5.1.14 on 2025-12-10 -from django.db import migrations -from tasks.tasks import backfill_daily_severity_summaries_task - from api.db_router import MainRouter from api.rls import Tenant +from django.db import migrations +from tasks.tasks import backfill_daily_severity_summaries_task def trigger_backfill_task(apps, schema_editor): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0063_scan_category_summary.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0063_scan_category_summary.py index 6ee67bf4db..25ca790c8d 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0063_scan_category_summary.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0063_scan_category_summary.py @@ -1,10 +1,9 @@ import uuid -import django.db.models.deletion -from django.db import migrations, models - import api.db_utils import api.rls +import django.db.models.deletion +from django.db import migrations, models class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0065_alibabacloud_provider.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0065_alibabacloud_provider.py index 6ad542b643..d9f4250304 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0065_alibabacloud_provider.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0065_alibabacloud_provider.py @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ # Generated by Django migration for Alibaba Cloud provider support -from django.db import migrations - import api.db_utils +from django.db import migrations class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0066_provider_compliance_score.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0066_provider_compliance_score.py index f9a6483e4f..2649d8fbdf 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0066_provider_compliance_score.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0066_provider_compliance_score.py @@ -1,10 +1,9 @@ import uuid -import django.db.models.deletion -from django.db import migrations, models - import api.db_utils import api.rls +import django.db.models.deletion +from django.db import migrations, models class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0067_tenant_compliance_summary.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0067_tenant_compliance_summary.py index bd753ca575..92973320bc 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0067_tenant_compliance_summary.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0067_tenant_compliance_summary.py @@ -1,10 +1,9 @@ import uuid +import api.rls import django.db.models.deletion from django.db import migrations, models -import api.rls - class Migration(migrations.Migration): dependencies = [ diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0068_finding_resource_group_scangroupsummary.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0068_finding_resource_group_scangroupsummary.py index 932a2a6c85..c13ada78e2 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0068_finding_resource_group_scangroupsummary.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0068_finding_resource_group_scangroupsummary.py @@ -1,10 +1,9 @@ import uuid -import django.db.models.deletion -from django.db import migrations, models - import api.db_utils import api.rls +import django.db.models.deletion +from django.db import migrations, models class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0070_attack_paths_scan.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0070_attack_paths_scan.py index 3e63d3353b..557b04a9ce 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0070_attack_paths_scan.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0070_attack_paths_scan.py @@ -1,12 +1,10 @@ # Generated by Django 5.1.13 on 2025-11-06 16:20 +import api.rls import django.db.models.deletion - from django.db import migrations, models from uuid6 import uuid7 -import api.rls - class Migration(migrations.Migration): dependencies = [ diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0073_findings_fail_new_index_partitions.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0073_findings_fail_new_index_partitions.py index 671fdf5ef6..06f04f2734 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0073_findings_fail_new_index_partitions.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0073_findings_fail_new_index_partitions.py @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ from functools import partial -from django.db import migrations - from api.db_utils import create_index_on_partitions, drop_index_on_partitions +from django.db import migrations class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0075_cloudflare_provider.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0075_cloudflare_provider.py index 28fdbdb2a9..dcfffe83c6 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0075_cloudflare_provider.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0075_cloudflare_provider.py @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ # Generated by Django migration for Cloudflare provider support -from django.db import migrations - import api.db_utils +from django.db import migrations class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0076_openstack_provider.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0076_openstack_provider.py index 9cc80707ea..680cc4310a 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0076_openstack_provider.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0076_openstack_provider.py @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ # Generated by Django migration for OpenStack provider support -from django.db import migrations - import api.db_utils +from django.db import migrations class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0080_backfill_attack_paths_graph_data_ready.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0080_backfill_attack_paths_graph_data_ready.py index f780059bd2..542b117a22 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0080_backfill_attack_paths_graph_data_ready.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0080_backfill_attack_paths_graph_data_ready.py @@ -2,9 +2,8 @@ # on different database connections, causing a deadlock when combined with RunPython # in the same migration. -from django.db import migrations - from api.db_router import MainRouter +from django.db import migrations def backfill_graph_data_ready(apps, schema_editor): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0081_finding_group_daily_summary.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0081_finding_group_daily_summary.py index 31c09c464f..e4685cea5f 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0081_finding_group_daily_summary.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0081_finding_group_daily_summary.py @@ -2,14 +2,13 @@ import uuid +import api.rls import django.db.models.deletion from django.contrib.postgres.indexes import GinIndex, OpClass from django.db import migrations, models from django.db.models.functions import Upper from django.utils import timezone -import api.rls - class Migration(migrations.Migration): dependencies = [ diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0082_backfill_finding_group_summaries.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0082_backfill_finding_group_summaries.py index 38cc07f43d..ef3e9c49a9 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0082_backfill_finding_group_summaries.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0082_backfill_finding_group_summaries.py @@ -1,10 +1,9 @@ # Generated by Django 5.1.14 on 2026-02-02 -from django.db import migrations -from tasks.tasks import backfill_finding_group_summaries_task - from api.db_router import MainRouter from api.rls import Tenant +from django.db import migrations +from tasks.tasks import backfill_finding_group_summaries_task def trigger_backfill_task(apps, schema_editor): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0083_image_provider.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0083_image_provider.py index 936fae2219..6f2b5a9d6b 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0083_image_provider.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0083_image_provider.py @@ -1,6 +1,5 @@ -from django.db import migrations - import api.db_utils +from django.db import migrations class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0084_googleworkspace_provider.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0084_googleworkspace_provider.py index eb704bb6b5..e7971e2568 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0084_googleworkspace_provider.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0084_googleworkspace_provider.py @@ -1,6 +1,5 @@ -from django.db import migrations - import api.db_utils +from django.db import migrations class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0086_attack_paths_cleanup_periodic_task.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0086_attack_paths_cleanup_periodic_task.py index 1c550f283a..2bf7bf2fb4 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0086_attack_paths_cleanup_periodic_task.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0086_attack_paths_cleanup_periodic_task.py @@ -1,6 +1,5 @@ from django.db import migrations - TASK_NAME = "attack-paths-cleanup-stale-scans" INTERVAL_HOURS = 1 diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0087_vercel_provider.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0087_vercel_provider.py index 84a07b3194..92063fb6da 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0087_vercel_provider.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0087_vercel_provider.py @@ -1,6 +1,5 @@ -from django.db import migrations - import api.db_utils +from django.db import migrations class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0089_backfill_finding_group_status_muted.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0089_backfill_finding_group_status_muted.py index 501fcf3cb4..3df6b4b167 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0089_backfill_finding_group_status_muted.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0089_backfill_finding_group_status_muted.py @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ -from django.db import migrations -from tasks.tasks import backfill_finding_group_summaries_task - from api.db_router import MainRouter from api.rls import Tenant +from django.db import migrations +from tasks.tasks import backfill_finding_group_summaries_task def trigger_backfill_task(apps, schema_editor): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0091_findings_arrays_gin_index_partitions.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0091_findings_arrays_gin_index_partitions.py index fc5716f828..6c4e978b28 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0091_findings_arrays_gin_index_partitions.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0091_findings_arrays_gin_index_partitions.py @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ from functools import partial -from django.db import migrations - from api.db_utils import create_index_on_partitions, drop_index_on_partitions +from django.db import migrations class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0093_okta_provider.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0093_okta_provider.py index d3e4a9e397..cc28c45fdb 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0093_okta_provider.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0093_okta_provider.py @@ -1,6 +1,5 @@ -from django.db import migrations - import api.db_utils +from django.db import migrations class Migration(migrations.Migration): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0095_reconcile_orphan_tasks_periodic_task.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0095_reconcile_orphan_tasks_periodic_task.py index 9d67404258..6ba2fa758a 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0095_reconcile_orphan_tasks_periodic_task.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0095_reconcile_orphan_tasks_periodic_task.py @@ -1,6 +1,5 @@ from django.db import migrations - TASK_NAME = "reconcile-orphan-tasks" INTERVAL_MINUTES = 2 diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0096_attack_paths_scan_is_migrated.py b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0096_attack_paths_scan_is_migrated.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..75b3e2cac7 --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/api/migrations/0096_attack_paths_scan_is_migrated.py @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +from django.db import migrations, models + + +class Migration(migrations.Migration): + dependencies = [ + ("api", "0095_reconcile_orphan_tasks_periodic_task"), + ] + + operations = [ + migrations.AddField( + model_name="attackpathsscan", + name="is_migrated", + field=models.BooleanField(default=False), + ), + migrations.AddField( + model_name="attackpathsscan", + name="sink_backend", + field=models.CharField( + choices=[("neo4j", "Neo4j"), ("neptune", "Neptune")], + default="neo4j", + max_length=16, + ), + ), + ] diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/models.py b/api/src/backend/api/models.py index 3d9a26698e..c2beba97b4 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/models.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/models.py @@ -1,37 +1,11 @@ import json import logging import re -from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta from uuid import UUID, uuid4 import defusedxml from allauth.socialaccount.models import SocialApp -from config.custom_logging import BackendLogger -from config.settings.social_login import SOCIALACCOUNT_PROVIDERS -from cryptography.fernet import Fernet, InvalidToken -from defusedxml import ElementTree as ET -from django.conf import settings -from django.contrib.auth.models import AbstractBaseUser -from django.contrib.postgres.fields import ArrayField -from django.contrib.postgres.indexes import GinIndex, OpClass -from django.contrib.postgres.search import SearchVector, SearchVectorField -from django.contrib.sites.models import Site -from django.core.exceptions import ValidationError -from django.core.validators import MinLengthValidator -from django.db import models -from django.db.models import Q -from django.db.models.functions import Upper -from django.utils import timezone as django_timezone -from django.utils.translation import gettext_lazy as _ -from django_celery_beat.models import PeriodicTask -from django_celery_results.models import TaskResult -from drf_simple_apikey.crypto import get_crypto -from drf_simple_apikey.models import AbstractAPIKey, AbstractAPIKeyManager -from psqlextra.manager import PostgresManager -from psqlextra.models import PostgresPartitionedModel -from psqlextra.types import PostgresPartitioningMethod -from uuid6 import uuid7 - from api.db_router import MainRouter from api.db_utils import ( CustomUserManager, @@ -58,7 +32,32 @@ from api.rls import ( RowLevelSecurityProtectedModel, Tenant, ) +from config.custom_logging import BackendLogger +from config.settings.social_login import SOCIALACCOUNT_PROVIDERS +from cryptography.fernet import Fernet, InvalidToken +from defusedxml import ElementTree as ET +from django.conf import settings +from django.contrib.auth.models import AbstractBaseUser +from django.contrib.postgres.fields import ArrayField +from django.contrib.postgres.indexes import GinIndex, OpClass +from django.contrib.postgres.search import SearchVector, SearchVectorField +from django.contrib.sites.models import Site +from django.core.exceptions import ValidationError +from django.core.validators import MinLengthValidator +from django.db import models +from django.db.models import Q +from django.db.models.functions import Upper +from django.utils import timezone as django_timezone +from django.utils.translation import gettext_lazy as _ +from django_celery_beat.models import PeriodicTask +from django_celery_results.models import TaskResult +from drf_simple_apikey.crypto import get_crypto +from drf_simple_apikey.models import AbstractAPIKey, AbstractAPIKeyManager from prowler.lib.check.models import Severity +from psqlextra.manager import PostgresManager +from psqlextra.models import PostgresPartitionedModel +from psqlextra.types import PostgresPartitioningMethod +from uuid6 import uuid7 fernet = Fernet(settings.SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY.encode()) @@ -758,6 +757,10 @@ class Scan(RowLevelSecurityProtectedModel): class AttackPathsScan(RowLevelSecurityProtectedModel): + class SinkBackendChoices(models.TextChoices): + NEO4J = "neo4j", "Neo4j" + NEPTUNE = "neptune", "Neptune" + objects = ActiveProviderManager() all_objects = models.Manager() @@ -806,6 +809,18 @@ class AttackPathsScan(RowLevelSecurityProtectedModel): ) ingestion_exceptions = models.JSONField(default=dict, null=True, blank=True) + # True when the scan was synced with the current schema (list-typed + # properties materialised as child item nodes). False for pre-cutover scans + # still using the previous graph shape. Query catalog selection uses this + # flag; physical read routing uses sink_backend below. + # TODO: drop after Neptune cutover + is_migrated = models.BooleanField(default=False) + sink_backend = models.CharField( + choices=SinkBackendChoices.choices, + default=SinkBackendChoices.NEO4J, + max_length=16, + ) + class Meta(RowLevelSecurityProtectedModel.Meta): db_table = "attack_paths_scans" @@ -1427,8 +1442,8 @@ class Role(RowLevelSecurityProtectedModel): @classmethod def filter_by_permission_state(cls, queryset, value): - q_all_true = Q(**{field: True for field in cls.PERMISSION_FIELDS}) - q_all_false = Q(**{field: False for field in cls.PERMISSION_FIELDS}) + q_all_true = Q(**dict.fromkeys(cls.PERMISSION_FIELDS, True)) + q_all_false = Q(**dict.fromkeys(cls.PERMISSION_FIELDS, False)) if value == PermissionChoices.UNLIMITED: return queryset.filter(q_all_true) @@ -2011,11 +2026,11 @@ class SAMLToken(models.Model): def save(self, *args, **kwargs): if not self.expires_at: - self.expires_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(seconds=15) + self.expires_at = datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(seconds=15) super().save(*args, **kwargs) def is_expired(self) -> bool: - return datetime.now(timezone.utc) >= self.expires_at + return datetime.now(UTC) >= self.expires_at class SAMLDomainIndex(models.Model): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/partitions.py b/api/src/backend/api/partitions.py index 92390ffdec..8903c4504b 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/partitions.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/partitions.py @@ -1,21 +1,20 @@ -from datetime import datetime, timezone -from typing import Generator, Optional - -from dateutil.relativedelta import relativedelta -from django.conf import settings -from psqlextra.partitioning import ( - PostgresPartitioningManager, - PostgresRangePartition, - PostgresRangePartitioningStrategy, - PostgresTimePartitionSize, - PostgresPartitioningError, -) -from psqlextra.partitioning.config import PostgresPartitioningConfig -from uuid6 import UUID +from collections.abc import Generator +from datetime import UTC, datetime from api.models import Finding, ResourceFindingMapping from api.rls import RowLevelSecurityConstraint from api.uuid_utils import datetime_to_uuid7 +from dateutil.relativedelta import relativedelta +from django.conf import settings +from psqlextra.partitioning import ( + PostgresPartitioningError, + PostgresPartitioningManager, + PostgresRangePartition, + PostgresRangePartitioningStrategy, + PostgresTimePartitionSize, +) +from psqlextra.partitioning.config import PostgresPartitioningConfig +from uuid6 import UUID class PostgresUUIDv7RangePartition(PostgresRangePartition): @@ -24,7 +23,7 @@ class PostgresUUIDv7RangePartition(PostgresRangePartition): from_values: UUID, to_values: UUID, size: PostgresTimePartitionSize, - name_format: Optional[str] = None, + name_format: str | None = None, **kwargs, ) -> None: self.from_values = from_values @@ -38,9 +37,7 @@ class PostgresUUIDv7RangePartition(PostgresRangePartition): start_timestamp_ms = self.from_values.time - self.start_datetime = datetime.fromtimestamp( - start_timestamp_ms / 1000, timezone.utc - ) + self.start_datetime = datetime.fromtimestamp(start_timestamp_ms / 1000, UTC) def name(self) -> str: if not self.name_format: @@ -82,8 +79,8 @@ class PostgresUUIDv7PartitioningStrategy(PostgresRangePartitioningStrategy): size: PostgresTimePartitionSize, count: int, start_date: datetime = None, - max_age: Optional[relativedelta] = None, - name_format: Optional[str] = None, + max_age: relativedelta | None = None, + name_format: str | None = None, **kwargs, ) -> None: self.start_date = start_date.replace( @@ -151,7 +148,7 @@ class PostgresUUIDv7PartitioningStrategy(PostgresRangePartitioningStrategy): Returns: datetime: A `datetime` object representing the start of the current month in UTC. """ - return datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace( + return datetime.now(UTC).replace( day=1, hour=0, minute=0, second=0, microsecond=0 ) @@ -171,7 +168,7 @@ manager = PostgresPartitioningManager( PostgresPartitioningConfig( model=Finding, strategy=PostgresUUIDv7PartitioningStrategy( - start_date=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + start_date=datetime.now(UTC), size=PostgresTimePartitionSize( months=settings.FINDINGS_TABLE_PARTITION_MONTHS ), @@ -187,7 +184,7 @@ manager = PostgresPartitioningManager( PostgresPartitioningConfig( model=ResourceFindingMapping, strategy=PostgresUUIDv7PartitioningStrategy( - start_date=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + start_date=datetime.now(UTC), size=PostgresTimePartitionSize( months=settings.FINDINGS_TABLE_PARTITION_MONTHS ), diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/rbac/permissions.py b/api/src/backend/api/rbac/permissions.py index cfbabf6c0b..ef0475fefb 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/rbac/permissions.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/rbac/permissions.py @@ -1,11 +1,10 @@ from enum import Enum -from django.db.models import QuerySet -from rest_framework.exceptions import PermissionDenied -from rest_framework.permissions import BasePermission - from api.db_router import MainRouter from api.models import Provider, Role, User +from django.db.models import QuerySet +from rest_framework.exceptions import PermissionDenied +from rest_framework.permissions import BasePermission class Permissions(Enum): diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/renderers.py b/api/src/backend/api/renderers.py index 77349540ce..e0fafac3c4 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/renderers.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/renderers.py @@ -1,10 +1,9 @@ from contextlib import nullcontext +from api.db_utils import rls_transaction from rest_framework.renderers import BaseRenderer from rest_framework_json_api.renderers import JSONRenderer -from api.db_utils import rls_transaction - class PlainTextRenderer(BaseRenderer): media_type = "text/plain" diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/rls.py b/api/src/backend/api/rls.py index 285b06a974..9e4754c842 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/rls.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/rls.py @@ -1,12 +1,11 @@ from typing import Any from uuid import uuid4 +from api.db_utils import DB_USER, POSTGRES_TENANT_VAR from django.core.exceptions import ValidationError from django.db import DEFAULT_DB_ALIAS, models from django.db.backends.ddl_references import Statement, Table -from api.db_utils import DB_USER, POSTGRES_TENANT_VAR - class Tenant(models.Model): """ diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/signals.py b/api/src/backend/api/signals.py index 7bca0da0a6..790779f087 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/signals.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/signals.py @@ -1,10 +1,3 @@ -from celery import states -from celery.signals import before_task_publish -from config.celery import celery_app -from django.db.models.signals import post_delete, pre_delete -from django.dispatch import receiver -from django_celery_results.backends.database import DatabaseBackend - from api.db_utils import delete_related_daily_task from api.models import ( LighthouseProviderConfiguration, @@ -14,6 +7,12 @@ from api.models import ( TenantAPIKey, User, ) +from celery import states +from celery.signals import before_task_publish +from config.celery import celery_app +from django.db.models.signals import post_delete, pre_delete +from django.dispatch import receiver +from django_celery_results.backends.database import DatabaseBackend def create_task_result_on_publish(sender=None, headers=None, **kwargs): # noqa: F841 diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/specs/v1.yaml b/api/src/backend/api/specs/v1.yaml index 18566c5c71..767a3aaf78 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/specs/v1.yaml +++ b/api/src/backend/api/specs/v1.yaml @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ openapi: 3.0.3 info: title: Prowler API - version: 1.32.0 + version: 1.33.0 description: |- Prowler API specification. diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/sse/__init__.py b/api/src/backend/api/sse/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dd31d16430 --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/api/sse/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +"""Platform Server-Sent Events (SSE) infrastructure. + +Wires `django-eventstream` into the API: a base viewset features +subclass to expose an SSE endpoint +(:class:`api.sse.base_views.BaseSSEViewSet`), the channel manager that +enforces the tenant gate (:class:`api.sse.channelmanager.SSEChannelManager`), +and the channel-name helpers (:func:`api.sse.utils.make_channel_name`). +""" + +from api.sse.base_views import BaseSSEViewSet +from api.sse.utils import make_channel_name + +__all__ = ["BaseSSEViewSet", "make_channel_name"] diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/sse/base_views.py b/api/src/backend/api/sse/base_views.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c4a24540ee --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/api/sse/base_views.py @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +"""Base view class for SSE endpoints.""" + +from api.authentication import SSEAuthentication +from api.base_views import BaseRLSViewSet +from django_eventstream.renderers import SSEEventRenderer +from django_eventstream.views import events + + +class BaseSSEViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): + """Base class for platform SSE endpoints. + + Subclasses override method `get_channels` to declare the channel + names the connection should subscribe to — the same way a regular + DRF viewset overrides method `get_queryset`. The channel manager + reads the result from `request.sse_channels`; there is no other + coupling between platform and feature. + """ + + authentication_classes = [SSEAuthentication] + # Pin the SSE renderer so content negotiation accepts the browser's + # `Accept: text/event-stream`. + renderer_classes = [SSEEventRenderer] + + def get_channels(self) -> set[str]: + """Return the channels this connection subscribes to. + + Implementations MUST raise the relevant DRF exceptions + (`NotAuthenticated`, `PermissionDenied`, `NotFound`) when + authorization fails. Returning an empty set would surface as + django-eventstream's "No channels specified" which masks the + real cause. + """ + raise NotImplementedError + + def get_queryset(self): + # Most SSE viewsets only need `get_channels` and never call + # `get_queryset` (the SSE list path bypasses serialization + # entirely). Subclasses that perform their own queryset lookup + # inside `get_channels` should override; the default raises + # the same error a missing override on a ModelViewSet would. + raise NotImplementedError + + def list(self, request, *_args, **kwargs): + """Resolve channels under the regular DRF stack and stream.""" + request.sse_channels = self.get_channels() + return events(request, **kwargs) diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/sse/channelmanager.py b/api/src/backend/api/sse/channelmanager.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9190d4ab16 --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/api/sse/channelmanager.py @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +"""Channel manager that wires `django-eventstream` to platform SSE views.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +from typing import TYPE_CHECKING +from uuid import UUID + +from api.sse.utils import tenant_id_from_channel +from django_eventstream.channelmanager import DefaultChannelManager +from rest_framework.request import Request + +if TYPE_CHECKING: + from api.models import User + + +class SSEChannelManager(DefaultChannelManager): + """Connect `django-eventstream` to the platform's SSE viewsets.""" + + def get_channels_for_request(self, request: Request, view_kwargs: dict) -> set[str]: # noqa: vulture + """Return the request's channels scoped to the active JWT tenant. + + Args: + request: The authenticated DRF request, carrying `tenant_id` + (set by `BaseRLSViewSet`) and `sse_channels` (set by + `BaseSSEViewSet.list`). + view_kwargs: URL keyword arguments from django-eventstream; + unused because channels are resolved on the request. + + Returns: + The subset of `request.sse_channels` whose embedded tenant + matches the active request tenant. + """ + try: + request_tenant_id = UUID(str(getattr(request, "tenant_id", None))) + except (TypeError, ValueError): + return set() + return { + channel + for channel in getattr(request, "sse_channels", set()) + if tenant_id_from_channel(channel) == request_tenant_id + } + + def can_read_channel(self, user: User | None, channel: str) -> bool: + """Re-verify tenant membership once the stream is established. + + Args: + user: The connection's authenticated `User`, or `None` for an + anonymous connection — django-eventstream passes `None` + rather than an `AnonymousUser`. + channel: The channel name being read, in the canonical + `::` format. + + Returns: + `True` only when `user` is authenticated and a member of the + tenant embedded in `channel`; `False` otherwise, including for + anonymous connections and malformed channel names. + """ + if user is None or not user.is_authenticated: + return False + tenant_id = tenant_id_from_channel(channel) + if tenant_id is None: + return False + return user.is_member_of_tenant(tenant_id) + + def is_channel_reliable(self, channel: str) -> bool: + """Report whether the channel keeps a server-side replay buffer. + + Args: + channel: The channel name being queried. + + Returns: + `False`, unconditionally. Replay storage is not configured + """ + return False diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/sse/utils.py b/api/src/backend/api/sse/utils.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a30ed26311 --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/api/sse/utils.py @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +"""Channel-name convention shared by SSE publishers, consumers, and the +channel manager. The format is `::`. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import uuid + +CHANNEL_SEPARATOR = ":" + + +def make_channel_name( + prefix: str, + tenant_id: str | uuid.UUID, + resource_id: str | uuid.UUID, +) -> str: + """Build the canonical channel name for a resource. + + Args: + prefix: Feature-owned prefix (e.g. `"lighthouse-session"`). + tenant_id: Tenant the resource belongs to. + resource_id: Resource identifier within the tenant. + + Raises: + ValueError: If any segment contains `CHANNEL_SEPARATOR`, which + would break the `::` contract + and let a crafted name smuggle extra segments past the parser. + """ + segments = (str(prefix), str(tenant_id), str(resource_id)) + if any(CHANNEL_SEPARATOR in segment for segment in segments): + raise ValueError( + f"Channel segments must not contain '{CHANNEL_SEPARATOR}': {segments!r}" + ) + return CHANNEL_SEPARATOR.join(segments) + + +def tenant_id_from_channel(channel: str) -> uuid.UUID | None: + """Return the tenant UUID embedded in *channel*, or `None` if + *channel* does not follow the platform convention. + + A `None` result MUST be treated by callers as "not authorized" or + a malformed channel cannot be safely read. + """ + segments = channel.split(CHANNEL_SEPARATOR) + if len(segments) != 3: + # Reject non-canonical names + return None + try: + return uuid.UUID(segments[1]) + except ValueError: + return None diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/integration/test_authentication.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/integration/test_authentication.py index 061c2efac0..4d1c40fe23 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/tests/integration/test_authentication.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/integration/test_authentication.py @@ -1,15 +1,14 @@ import time -from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta from uuid import uuid4 import pytest +from api.models import Membership, Role, TenantAPIKey, User, UserRoleRelationship from conftest import TEST_PASSWORD, get_api_tokens, get_authorization_header from django.urls import reverse from drf_simple_apikey.crypto import get_crypto from rest_framework.test import APIClient -from api.models import Membership, Role, TenantAPIKey, User, UserRoleRelationship - @pytest.mark.django_db def test_basic_authentication(): @@ -468,7 +467,7 @@ class TestAPIKeyErrors: name="Expired Key", tenant_id=tenants_fixture[0].id, entity=create_test_user, - expiry_date=datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=1), + expiry_date=datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(days=1), ) api_key_headers = get_api_key_header(raw_key) @@ -500,7 +499,7 @@ class TestAPIKeyErrors: # Create a valid-looking key with non-existent UUID crypto = get_crypto() fake_uuid = str(uuid4()) - fake_expiry = (datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=30)).timestamp() + fake_expiry = (datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(days=30)).timestamp() payload = {"_pk": fake_uuid, "_exp": fake_expiry} encrypted_payload = crypto.generate(payload) @@ -723,7 +722,7 @@ class TestAPIKeyLifecycle: assert created_data["attributes"]["revoked"] is False # Create API key with expiry - future_expiry = (datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=90)).isoformat() + future_expiry = (datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(days=90)).isoformat() create_with_expiry_response = client.post( reverse("api-key-list"), data={ @@ -927,9 +926,9 @@ class TestAPIKeyLifecycle: auth_response = client.get(reverse("provider-list"), headers=api_key_headers) # Must return 401 Unauthorized, not 500 Internal Server Error - assert ( - auth_response.status_code == 401 - ), f"Expected 401 but got {auth_response.status_code}: {auth_response.json()}" + assert auth_response.status_code == 401, ( + f"Expected 401 but got {auth_response.status_code}: {auth_response.json()}" + ) # Verify error message is present response_json = auth_response.json() @@ -1267,7 +1266,7 @@ class TestAPIKeyRLSBypass: name="Expired Test Key", tenant_id=tenant.id, entity=create_test_user, - expiry_date=datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=1), + expiry_date=datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(days=1), ) api_key_headers = get_api_key_header(raw_key) diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/integration/test_providers.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/integration/test_providers.py index 9c91ad2c07..e797160a15 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/tests/integration/test_providers.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/integration/test_providers.py @@ -1,12 +1,11 @@ from unittest.mock import Mock, patch import pytest +from api.models import Provider from conftest import get_api_tokens, get_authorization_header from django.urls import reverse from rest_framework.test import APIClient -from api.models import Provider - @patch("api.v1.views.Task.objects.get") @patch("api.v1.views.delete_provider_task.delay") diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/integration/test_rls_transaction.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/integration/test_rls_transaction.py index 6731b39d71..bd46871586 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/tests/integration/test_rls_transaction.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/integration/test_rls_transaction.py @@ -1,11 +1,10 @@ """Tests for rls_transaction retry and fallback logic.""" import pytest +from api.db_utils import rls_transaction from django.db import DEFAULT_DB_ALIAS from rest_framework_json_api.serializers import ValidationError -from api.db_utils import rls_transaction - @pytest.mark.django_db class TestRLSTransaction: diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/integration/test_tenants.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/integration/test_tenants.py index e14226164a..4d5dd8a523 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/tests/integration/test_tenants.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/integration/test_tenants.py @@ -1,10 +1,9 @@ from unittest.mock import patch import pytest +from conftest import TEST_PASSWORD, TEST_USER, get_api_tokens, get_authorization_header from django.urls import reverse -from conftest import TEST_USER, TEST_PASSWORD, get_api_tokens, get_authorization_header - @patch("api.v1.views.schedule_provider_scan") @pytest.mark.django_db diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_adapters.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_adapters.py index 22b44b3506..91d3bb054a 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_adapters.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_adapters.py @@ -1,13 +1,52 @@ +from types import SimpleNamespace from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch import pytest from allauth.socialaccount.models import SocialLogin +from api.adapters import ProwlerSocialAccountAdapter +from api.db_router import MainRouter +from api.models import SAMLConfiguration from django.contrib.auth import get_user_model -from api.adapters import ProwlerSocialAccountAdapter - User = get_user_model() +# Minimal, well-formed IdP metadata accepted by SAMLConfiguration._parse_metadata. +VALID_METADATA = """ + + + + + + FAKECERTDATA + + + + + + +""" + + +def _saml_request(rf, organization_slug): + """Build an ACS request whose resolver_match carries the organization slug, + mirroring how Django populates it after routing the SAML ACS URL.""" + request = rf.post(f"/api/v1/accounts/saml/{organization_slug}/acs/finish/") + request.resolver_match = SimpleNamespace( + kwargs={"organization_slug": organization_slug} + ) + return request + + +def _saml_sociallogin(user): + sociallogin = MagicMock(spec=SocialLogin) + sociallogin.account = MagicMock() + sociallogin.provider = MagicMock() + sociallogin.provider.id = "saml" + sociallogin.account.extra_data = {} + sociallogin.user = user + sociallogin.connect = MagicMock() + return sociallogin + @pytest.mark.django_db class TestProwlerSocialAccountAdapter: @@ -20,26 +59,99 @@ class TestProwlerSocialAccountAdapter: adapter = ProwlerSocialAccountAdapter() assert adapter.get_user_by_email("notfound@example.com") is None - def test_pre_social_login_links_existing_user(self, create_test_user, rf): + def test_pre_social_login_links_member_of_saml_tenant( + self, create_test_user, tenants_fixture, rf + ): + """A SAML login links to an existing account only when that user is + already a member of the tenant that owns the asserted email domain.""" adapter = ProwlerSocialAccountAdapter() + # create_test_user (dev@prowler.com) is a member of tenant1. + domain = create_test_user.email.rsplit("@", 1)[-1] + SAMLConfiguration.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db).create( + email_domain=domain, + metadata_xml=VALID_METADATA, + tenant=tenants_fixture[0], + ) - sociallogin = MagicMock(spec=SocialLogin) - sociallogin.account = MagicMock() - sociallogin.provider = MagicMock() - sociallogin.provider.id = "saml" - sociallogin.account.extra_data = {} - sociallogin.user = create_test_user - sociallogin.connect = MagicMock() - - adapter.pre_social_login(rf.get("/"), sociallogin) + sociallogin = _saml_sociallogin(create_test_user) + adapter.pre_social_login(_saml_request(rf, domain), sociallogin) call_args = sociallogin.connect.call_args assert call_args is not None - - called_request, called_user = call_args[0] - assert called_request.path == "/" + _, called_user = call_args[0] assert called_user.email == create_test_user.email + def test_pre_social_login_blocks_cross_tenant_takeover( + self, create_test_user, tenants_fixture, rf + ): + """GHSA-h8m9-jgf8-vwvp: an attacker tenant that claims the victim's + email domain must NOT be able to link to the victim's account, because + the victim is not a member of the attacker's tenant.""" + adapter = ProwlerSocialAccountAdapter() + domain = create_test_user.email.rsplit("@", 1)[-1] + # tenant3 is the attacker tenant; create_test_user is NOT a member of it. + attacker_tenant = tenants_fixture[2] + assert not create_test_user.is_member_of_tenant(str(attacker_tenant.id)) + SAMLConfiguration.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db).create( + email_domain=domain, + metadata_xml=VALID_METADATA, + tenant=attacker_tenant, + ) + + sociallogin = _saml_sociallogin(create_test_user) + adapter.pre_social_login(_saml_request(rf, domain), sociallogin) + + sociallogin.connect.assert_not_called() + + def test_pre_social_login_blocks_domain_slug_mismatch( + self, create_test_user, tenants_fixture, rf + ): + """The asserted email domain must match the ACS endpoint's slug, so an + assertion cannot be replayed through a different tenant's endpoint.""" + adapter = ProwlerSocialAccountAdapter() + domain = create_test_user.email.rsplit("@", 1)[-1] + SAMLConfiguration.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db).create( + email_domain=domain, + metadata_xml=VALID_METADATA, + tenant=tenants_fixture[0], + ) + + sociallogin = _saml_sociallogin(create_test_user) + # Slug points at a different domain than the asserted email. + adapter.pre_social_login(_saml_request(rf, "attacker.com"), sociallogin) + + sociallogin.connect.assert_not_called() + + def test_pre_social_login_blocks_when_no_saml_config( + self, create_test_user, tenants_fixture, rf + ): + """No SAML configuration for the domain means nothing to link against.""" + adapter = ProwlerSocialAccountAdapter() + domain = create_test_user.email.rsplit("@", 1)[-1] + + sociallogin = _saml_sociallogin(create_test_user) + adapter.pre_social_login(_saml_request(rf, domain), sociallogin) + + sociallogin.connect.assert_not_called() + + def test_pre_social_login_blocks_without_resolver_match( + self, create_test_user, tenants_fixture, rf + ): + """Fail closed: if the request has no resolver_match we cannot bind the + assertion to a tenant, so no linking happens.""" + adapter = ProwlerSocialAccountAdapter() + domain = create_test_user.email.rsplit("@", 1)[-1] + SAMLConfiguration.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db).create( + email_domain=domain, + metadata_xml=VALID_METADATA, + tenant=tenants_fixture[0], + ) + + sociallogin = _saml_sociallogin(create_test_user) + adapter.pre_social_login(rf.post("/"), sociallogin) + + sociallogin.connect.assert_not_called() + def test_pre_social_login_no_link_if_email_missing(self, rf): adapter = ProwlerSocialAccountAdapter() @@ -47,14 +159,35 @@ class TestProwlerSocialAccountAdapter: sociallogin.account = MagicMock() sociallogin.provider = MagicMock() sociallogin.user = MagicMock() + sociallogin.user.email = "" sociallogin.provider.id = "saml" sociallogin.account.extra_data = {} sociallogin.connect = MagicMock() - adapter.pre_social_login(rf.get("/"), sociallogin) + adapter.pre_social_login(_saml_request(rf, "prowler.com"), sociallogin) sociallogin.connect.assert_not_called() + def test_pre_social_login_non_saml_links_by_email(self, create_test_user, rf): + """Non-SAML providers (e.g. Google/GitHub) still link to an existing + local account by email; the tenant binding only applies to SAML.""" + adapter = ProwlerSocialAccountAdapter() + + sociallogin = MagicMock(spec=SocialLogin) + sociallogin.account = MagicMock() + sociallogin.provider = MagicMock() + sociallogin.provider.id = "google" + sociallogin.account.extra_data = {"email": create_test_user.email} + sociallogin.user = create_test_user + sociallogin.connect = MagicMock() + + adapter.pre_social_login(rf.get("/"), sociallogin) + + call_args = sociallogin.connect.call_args + assert call_args is not None + _, called_user = call_args[0] + assert called_user.email == create_test_user.email + def test_save_user_saml_sets_session_flag(self, rf): adapter = ProwlerSocialAccountAdapter() request = rf.get("/") diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_apps.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_apps.py index 2f5b55a6e2..93934df674 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_apps.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_apps.py @@ -4,11 +4,9 @@ import types from pathlib import Path from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch -import pytest -from django.conf import settings - import api import api.apps as api_apps_module +import pytest from api.apps import ( PRIVATE_KEY_FILE, PUBLIC_KEY_FILE, @@ -16,6 +14,7 @@ from api.apps import ( VERIFYING_KEY_ENV, ApiConfig, ) +from django.conf import settings @pytest.fixture(autouse=True) diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_attack_paths.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_attack_paths.py index 019b6aa1f2..77bc01d255 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_attack_paths.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_attack_paths.py @@ -1,14 +1,12 @@ from types import SimpleNamespace from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch -import pytest import neo4j import neo4j.exceptions - -from rest_framework.exceptions import APIException, PermissionDenied, ValidationError - +import pytest from api.attack_paths import database as graph_database from api.attack_paths import views_helpers +from rest_framework.exceptions import APIException, PermissionDenied, ValidationError from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import ( PROVIDER_ELEMENT_ID_PROPERTY, get_provider_label, @@ -94,7 +92,9 @@ def test_prepare_parameters_validates_cast( def test_execute_query_serializes_graph( - attack_paths_query_definition_factory, attack_paths_graph_stub_classes + attack_paths_query_definition_factory, + attack_paths_graph_stub_classes, + sink_backend_stub, ): definition = attack_paths_query_definition_factory( id="aws-rds", @@ -137,18 +137,17 @@ def test_execute_query_serializes_graph( database_name = "db-tenant-test-tenant-id" - with patch( - "api.attack_paths.views_helpers.graph_database.execute_read_query", - return_value=graph_result, - ) as mock_execute_read_query: - result = views_helpers.execute_query( - database_name, definition, parameters, provider_id=provider_id - ) + sink_backend_stub.execute_read_query.return_value = graph_result + result = views_helpers.execute_query( + database_name, + definition, + parameters, + provider_id=provider_id, + scan=MagicMock(is_migrated=False, sink_backend="neo4j"), + ) - mock_execute_read_query.assert_called_once_with( - database=database_name, - cypher=definition.cypher, - parameters=parameters, + sink_backend_stub.execute_read_query.assert_called_once_with( + database_name, definition.cypher, parameters ) assert result["nodes"][0]["id"] == "node-1" assert result["nodes"][0]["properties"]["complex"]["items"][0] == "value" @@ -157,6 +156,7 @@ def test_execute_query_serializes_graph( def test_execute_query_wraps_graph_errors( attack_paths_query_definition_factory, + sink_backend_stub, ): definition = attack_paths_query_definition_factory( id="aws-rds", @@ -169,16 +169,17 @@ def test_execute_query_wraps_graph_errors( database_name = "db-tenant-test-tenant-id" parameters = {"provider_uid": "123"} - with ( - patch( - "api.attack_paths.views_helpers.graph_database.execute_read_query", - side_effect=graph_database.GraphDatabaseQueryException("boom"), - ), - patch("api.attack_paths.views_helpers.logger") as mock_logger, - ): + sink_backend_stub.execute_read_query.side_effect = ( + graph_database.GraphDatabaseQueryException("boom") + ) + with patch("api.attack_paths.views_helpers.logger") as mock_logger: with pytest.raises(APIException): views_helpers.execute_query( - database_name, definition, parameters, provider_id="test-provider-123" + database_name, + definition, + parameters, + provider_id="test-provider-123", + scan=MagicMock(is_migrated=False, sink_backend="neo4j"), ) mock_logger.error.assert_called_once() @@ -186,6 +187,7 @@ def test_execute_query_wraps_graph_errors( def test_execute_query_raises_permission_denied_on_read_only( attack_paths_query_definition_factory, + sink_backend_stub, ): definition = attack_paths_query_definition_factory( id="aws-rds", @@ -198,17 +200,20 @@ def test_execute_query_raises_permission_denied_on_read_only( database_name = "db-tenant-test-tenant-id" parameters = {"provider_uid": "123"} - with patch( - "api.attack_paths.views_helpers.graph_database.execute_read_query", - side_effect=graph_database.WriteQueryNotAllowedException( + sink_backend_stub.execute_read_query.side_effect = ( + graph_database.WriteQueryNotAllowedException( message="Read query not allowed", code="Neo.ClientError.Statement.AccessMode", - ), - ): - with pytest.raises(PermissionDenied): - views_helpers.execute_query( - database_name, definition, parameters, provider_id="test-provider-123" - ) + ) + ) + with pytest.raises(PermissionDenied): + views_helpers.execute_query( + database_name, + definition, + parameters, + provider_id="test-provider-123", + scan=MagicMock(is_migrated=False, sink_backend="neo4j"), + ) def test_serialize_graph_filters_by_provider_label(attack_paths_graph_stub_classes): @@ -442,6 +447,7 @@ def test_normalize_custom_query_payload_passthrough_for_flat_dict(): def test_execute_custom_query_serializes_graph( attack_paths_graph_stub_classes, + sink_backend_stub, ): provider_id = "test-provider-123" plabel = get_provider_label(provider_id) @@ -455,50 +461,73 @@ def test_execute_custom_query_serializes_graph( graph_result.nodes = [node_1, node_2] graph_result.relationships = [relationship] - with patch( - "api.attack_paths.views_helpers.graph_database.execute_read_query", - return_value=graph_result, - ) as mock_execute: - result = views_helpers.execute_custom_query( - "db-tenant-test", "MATCH (n) RETURN n", provider_id - ) + sink_backend_stub.execute_read_query.return_value = graph_result + result = views_helpers.execute_custom_query( + "db-tenant-test", + "MATCH (n) RETURN n", + provider_id, + scan=MagicMock(is_migrated=False, sink_backend="neo4j"), + ) - mock_execute.assert_called_once() - call_kwargs = mock_execute.call_args[1] - assert call_kwargs["database"] == "db-tenant-test" + sink_backend_stub.execute_read_query.assert_called_once() + call_args = sink_backend_stub.execute_read_query.call_args[0] + assert call_args[0] == "db-tenant-test" # The cypher is rewritten with the provider label injection - assert plabel in call_kwargs["cypher"] + assert plabel in call_args[1] assert len(result["nodes"]) == 2 assert result["relationships"][0]["label"] == "OWNS" assert result["truncated"] is False assert result["total_nodes"] == 2 -def test_execute_custom_query_raises_permission_denied_on_write(): +def test_execute_custom_query_adds_timeout_for_neptune_scan(sink_backend_stub): + graph_result = MagicMock() + graph_result.nodes = [] + graph_result.relationships = [] + sink_backend_stub.execute_read_query.return_value = graph_result + with patch( - "api.attack_paths.views_helpers.graph_database.execute_read_query", - side_effect=graph_database.WriteQueryNotAllowedException( + "api.attack_paths.views_helpers.sink_module.get_backend_for_scan", + return_value=sink_backend_stub, + ): + views_helpers.execute_custom_query( + "db-tenant-test", + "MATCH (n) RETURN n", + "provider-1", + scan=MagicMock(is_migrated=True, sink_backend="neptune"), + ) + + cypher = sink_backend_stub.execute_read_query.call_args[0][1] + assert cypher.startswith("USING QUERY:TIMEOUTMILLISECONDS") + + +def test_execute_custom_query_raises_permission_denied_on_write(sink_backend_stub): + sink_backend_stub.execute_read_query.side_effect = ( + graph_database.WriteQueryNotAllowedException( message="Read query not allowed", code="Neo.ClientError.Statement.AccessMode", - ), - ): - with pytest.raises(PermissionDenied): - views_helpers.execute_custom_query( - "db-tenant-test", "CREATE (n) RETURN n", "provider-1" - ) + ) + ) + with pytest.raises(PermissionDenied): + views_helpers.execute_custom_query( + "db-tenant-test", + "CREATE (n) RETURN n", + "provider-1", + scan=MagicMock(is_migrated=False, sink_backend="neo4j"), + ) -def test_execute_custom_query_wraps_graph_errors(): - with ( - patch( - "api.attack_paths.views_helpers.graph_database.execute_read_query", - side_effect=graph_database.GraphDatabaseQueryException("boom"), - ), - patch("api.attack_paths.views_helpers.logger") as mock_logger, - ): +def test_execute_custom_query_wraps_graph_errors(sink_backend_stub): + sink_backend_stub.execute_read_query.side_effect = ( + graph_database.GraphDatabaseQueryException("boom") + ) + with patch("api.attack_paths.views_helpers.logger") as mock_logger: with pytest.raises(APIException): views_helpers.execute_custom_query( - "db-tenant-test", "MATCH (n) RETURN n", "provider-1" + "db-tenant-test", + "MATCH (n) RETURN n", + "provider-1", + scan=MagicMock(is_migrated=False, sink_backend="neo4j"), ) mock_logger.error.assert_called_once() @@ -563,13 +592,33 @@ def test_truncate_graph_empty_graph(): @pytest.fixture def mock_neo4j_session(): - """Mock the Neo4j driver so execute_read_query uses a fake session.""" + """Install a Neo4jSink with a mocked Bolt driver into the sink factory. + + The yielded mock is the `neo4j.Session` that the Neo4jSink will obtain via + `driver.session(...)`. Tests configure `mock_neo4j_session.execute_read` + return values / side effects to exercise the read-mode error translation + path on the real `Neo4jSink.execute_read_query` and `get_session` code. + """ + from api.attack_paths.sink import factory + from api.attack_paths.sink.neo4j import Neo4jSink + mock_session = MagicMock(spec=neo4j.Session) mock_driver = MagicMock(spec=neo4j.Driver) mock_driver.session.return_value = mock_session - with patch("api.attack_paths.database.get_driver", return_value=mock_driver): + sink = Neo4jSink() + sink._driver = mock_driver + + previous_backend = factory._backend + previous_secondary = dict(factory._secondary_backends) + factory._backend = sink + factory._secondary_backends.clear() + try: yield mock_session + finally: + factory._backend = previous_backend + factory._secondary_backends.clear() + factory._secondary_backends.update(previous_secondary) def test_execute_read_query_succeeds_with_select(mock_neo4j_session): @@ -665,16 +714,20 @@ def test_execute_read_query_rejects_apoc_real_create(mock_neo4j_session, cypher) @pytest.fixture def mock_schema_session(): - """Mock get_session for cartography schema tests.""" + """Mock the routed sink backend session for cartography schema tests.""" mock_result = MagicMock() mock_session = MagicMock() mock_session.run.return_value = mock_result + mock_backend = MagicMock() with patch( - "api.attack_paths.views_helpers.graph_database.get_session" - ) as mock_get_session: - mock_get_session.return_value.__enter__ = MagicMock(return_value=mock_session) - mock_get_session.return_value.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + "api.attack_paths.views_helpers.sink_module.get_backend_for_scan", + return_value=mock_backend, + ): + mock_backend.get_session.return_value.__enter__ = MagicMock( + return_value=mock_session + ) + mock_backend.get_session.return_value.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) yield mock_session, mock_result @@ -685,7 +738,9 @@ def test_get_cartography_schema_returns_urls(mock_schema_session): "module_version": "0.129.0", } - result = views_helpers.get_cartography_schema("db-tenant-test", "provider-123") + result = views_helpers.get_cartography_schema( + "db-tenant-test", "provider-123", MagicMock(sink_backend="neo4j") + ) mock_session.run.assert_called_once() assert result["id"] == "aws-0.129.0" @@ -701,7 +756,9 @@ def test_get_cartography_schema_returns_none_when_no_data(mock_schema_session): _, mock_result = mock_schema_session mock_result.single.return_value = None - result = views_helpers.get_cartography_schema("db-tenant-test", "provider-123") + result = views_helpers.get_cartography_schema( + "db-tenant-test", "provider-123", MagicMock(sink_backend="neo4j") + ) assert result is None @@ -723,21 +780,29 @@ def test_get_cartography_schema_extracts_provider( "module_version": "1.0.0", } - result = views_helpers.get_cartography_schema("db-tenant-test", "provider-123") + result = views_helpers.get_cartography_schema( + "db-tenant-test", "provider-123", MagicMock(sink_backend="neo4j") + ) assert result["id"] == f"{expected_provider}-1.0.0" assert result["provider"] == expected_provider def test_get_cartography_schema_wraps_database_error(): + mock_backend = MagicMock() + mock_backend.get_session.side_effect = graph_database.GraphDatabaseQueryException( + "boom" + ) with ( patch( - "api.attack_paths.views_helpers.graph_database.get_session", - side_effect=graph_database.GraphDatabaseQueryException("boom"), + "api.attack_paths.views_helpers.sink_module.get_backend_for_scan", + return_value=mock_backend, ), patch("api.attack_paths.views_helpers.logger") as mock_logger, ): with pytest.raises(APIException): - views_helpers.get_cartography_schema("db-tenant-test", "provider-123") + views_helpers.get_cartography_schema( + "db-tenant-test", "provider-123", MagicMock(sink_backend="neo4j") + ) mock_logger.error.assert_called_once() diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_attack_paths_database.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_attack_paths_database.py index 7ca8a4accb..c4aca45928 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_attack_paths_database.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_attack_paths_database.py @@ -1,625 +1,240 @@ -""" -Tests for Neo4j database lazy initialization. +"""Tests for the attack-paths database facade. -The Neo4j driver is created on first use for every process type; app startup -never contacts Neo4j. These tests validate the database module behavior itself. +After the Neptune port, `api.attack_paths.database` is a thin routing shim +over `api.attack_paths.ingest` (cartography temp DB, always Neo4j) and +`api.attack_paths.sink` (configurable Neo4j or Neptune). The facade's +contract is routing by database-name prefix and the public exception +hierarchy; sink-internal behavior is exercised in `test_sink.py`. """ -import threading - from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch -import neo4j -import neo4j.exceptions +import api.attack_paths.database as db_module import pytest -import api.attack_paths.database as db_module - -class TestLazyInitialization: - """Test that Neo4j driver is initialized lazily on first use.""" - - @pytest.fixture(autouse=True) - def reset_module_state(self): - """Reset module-level singleton state before each test.""" - original_driver = db_module._driver - - db_module._driver = None - - yield - - db_module._driver = original_driver - - def test_driver_not_initialized_at_import(self): - """Driver should be None after module import (no eager connection).""" - assert db_module._driver is None - - @patch("api.attack_paths.database.settings") - @patch("api.attack_paths.database.neo4j.GraphDatabase.driver") - def test_init_driver_creates_connection_on_first_call( - self, mock_driver_factory, mock_settings - ): - """init_driver() should create connection only when called.""" - mock_driver = MagicMock() - mock_driver_factory.return_value = mock_driver - mock_settings.DATABASES = { - "neo4j": { - "HOST": "localhost", - "PORT": 7687, - "USER": "neo4j", - "PASSWORD": "password", - } - } - - assert db_module._driver is None - - result = db_module.init_driver() - - mock_driver_factory.assert_called_once() - mock_driver.verify_connectivity.assert_called_once() - assert result is mock_driver - assert db_module._driver is mock_driver - - @patch("api.attack_paths.database.settings") - @patch("api.attack_paths.database.neo4j.GraphDatabase.driver") - def test_init_driver_leaves_driver_none_when_verify_fails( - self, mock_driver_factory, mock_settings - ): - """A failed verify_connectivity() must not publish or leak the driver.""" - mock_driver = MagicMock() - mock_driver.verify_connectivity.side_effect = ( - neo4j.exceptions.ServiceUnavailable("down") +class TestDatabaseNameHelper: + def test_tenant_name_lowercases_uuid(self): + assert ( + db_module.get_database_name("ABC-123", temporary=False) + == "db-tenant-abc-123" ) - mock_driver_factory.return_value = mock_driver - mock_settings.DATABASES = { - "neo4j": { - "HOST": "localhost", - "PORT": 7687, - "USER": "neo4j", - "PASSWORD": "password", - } - } - with pytest.raises(neo4j.exceptions.ServiceUnavailable): - db_module.init_driver() - - assert db_module._driver is None - mock_driver.close.assert_called_once() - - @patch("api.attack_paths.database.settings") - @patch("api.attack_paths.database.neo4j.GraphDatabase.driver") - def test_init_driver_returns_cached_driver_on_subsequent_calls( - self, mock_driver_factory, mock_settings - ): - """Subsequent calls should return cached driver without reconnecting.""" - mock_driver = MagicMock() - mock_driver_factory.return_value = mock_driver - mock_settings.DATABASES = { - "neo4j": { - "HOST": "localhost", - "PORT": 7687, - "USER": "neo4j", - "PASSWORD": "password", - } - } - - first_result = db_module.init_driver() - second_result = db_module.init_driver() - third_result = db_module.init_driver() - - # Only one connection attempt - assert mock_driver_factory.call_count == 1 - assert mock_driver.verify_connectivity.call_count == 1 - - # All calls return same instance - assert first_result is second_result is third_result - - @patch("api.attack_paths.database.settings") - @patch("api.attack_paths.database.neo4j.GraphDatabase.driver") - def test_get_driver_delegates_to_init_driver( - self, mock_driver_factory, mock_settings - ): - """get_driver() should use init_driver() for lazy initialization.""" - mock_driver = MagicMock() - mock_driver_factory.return_value = mock_driver - mock_settings.DATABASES = { - "neo4j": { - "HOST": "localhost", - "PORT": 7687, - "USER": "neo4j", - "PASSWORD": "password", - } - } - - result = db_module.get_driver() - - assert result is mock_driver - mock_driver_factory.assert_called_once() + def test_temporary_name_uses_tmp_scan_prefix(self): + assert ( + db_module.get_database_name("XYZ-789", temporary=True) + == "db-tmp-scan-xyz-789" + ) -class TestConnectionAcquisitionTimeout: - """Test that the connection acquisition timeout is configurable.""" +class TestExceptionHierarchy: + """`tasks/` and `api/v1/views.py` import these from the facade.""" - @pytest.fixture(autouse=True) - def reset_module_state(self): - original_driver = db_module._driver - original_acq_timeout = db_module.CONN_ACQUISITION_TIMEOUT - original_conn_timeout = db_module.CONNECTION_TIMEOUT + def test_write_query_is_graph_database_exception(self): + assert issubclass( + db_module.WriteQueryNotAllowedException, + db_module.GraphDatabaseQueryException, + ) - db_module._driver = None + def test_client_statement_is_graph_database_exception(self): + assert issubclass( + db_module.ClientStatementException, db_module.GraphDatabaseQueryException + ) - yield + def test_exception_str_includes_code_when_set(self): + exc = db_module.GraphDatabaseQueryException( + message="boom", code="Neo.ClientError.X.Y" + ) + assert str(exc) == "Neo.ClientError.X.Y: boom" - db_module._driver = original_driver - db_module.CONN_ACQUISITION_TIMEOUT = original_acq_timeout - db_module.CONNECTION_TIMEOUT = original_conn_timeout - - @patch("api.attack_paths.database.settings") - @patch("api.attack_paths.database.neo4j.GraphDatabase.driver") - def test_driver_receives_configured_timeout( - self, mock_driver_factory, mock_settings - ): - """init_driver() should pass the configured timeouts to the neo4j driver.""" - mock_driver_factory.return_value = MagicMock() - mock_settings.DATABASES = { - "neo4j": { - "HOST": "localhost", - "PORT": 7687, - "USER": "neo4j", - "PASSWORD": "password", - } - } - db_module.CONN_ACQUISITION_TIMEOUT = 42 - db_module.CONNECTION_TIMEOUT = 7 - - db_module.init_driver() - - _, kwargs = mock_driver_factory.call_args - assert kwargs["connection_acquisition_timeout"] == 42 - assert kwargs["connection_timeout"] == 7 + def test_exception_str_falls_back_to_message_without_code(self): + exc = db_module.GraphDatabaseQueryException(message="boom") + assert str(exc) == "boom" -class TestAtexitRegistration: - """Test that atexit cleanup handler is registered correctly.""" +class TestExecuteReadQueryRoutes: + def test_execute_read_query_delegates_to_sink(self, sink_backend_stub): + sink_backend_stub.execute_read_query.return_value = "graph" - @pytest.fixture(autouse=True) - def reset_module_state(self): - """Reset module-level singleton state before each test.""" - original_driver = db_module._driver + result = db_module.execute_read_query( + "db-tenant-abc", "MATCH (n) RETURN n", {"provider_uid": "123"} + ) - db_module._driver = None + sink_backend_stub.execute_read_query.assert_called_once_with( + "db-tenant-abc", "MATCH (n) RETURN n", {"provider_uid": "123"} + ) + assert result == "graph" - yield + def test_execute_read_query_defaults_parameters_to_none(self, sink_backend_stub): + db_module.execute_read_query("db-tenant-abc", "MATCH (n) RETURN n") - db_module._driver = original_driver - - @patch("api.attack_paths.database.settings") - @patch("api.attack_paths.database.atexit.register") - @patch("api.attack_paths.database.neo4j.GraphDatabase.driver") - def test_atexit_registered_on_first_init( - self, mock_driver_factory, mock_atexit_register, mock_settings - ): - """atexit.register should be called on first initialization.""" - mock_driver_factory.return_value = MagicMock() - mock_settings.DATABASES = { - "neo4j": { - "HOST": "localhost", - "PORT": 7687, - "USER": "neo4j", - "PASSWORD": "password", - } - } - - db_module.init_driver() - - mock_atexit_register.assert_called_once_with(db_module.close_driver) - - @patch("api.attack_paths.database.settings") - @patch("api.attack_paths.database.atexit.register") - @patch("api.attack_paths.database.neo4j.GraphDatabase.driver") - def test_atexit_registered_only_once( - self, mock_driver_factory, mock_atexit_register, mock_settings - ): - """atexit.register should only be called once across multiple inits. - - The double-checked locking on _driver ensures the atexit registration - block only executes once (when _driver is first created). - """ - mock_driver_factory.return_value = MagicMock() - mock_settings.DATABASES = { - "neo4j": { - "HOST": "localhost", - "PORT": 7687, - "USER": "neo4j", - "PASSWORD": "password", - } - } - - db_module.init_driver() - db_module.init_driver() - db_module.init_driver() - - # Only registered once because subsequent calls hit the fast path - assert mock_atexit_register.call_count == 1 + sink_backend_stub.execute_read_query.assert_called_once_with( + "db-tenant-abc", "MATCH (n) RETURN n", None + ) -class TestCloseDriver: - """Test driver cleanup functionality.""" +class TestScanDatabaseAvailability: + def test_verify_scan_databases_available_checks_ingest_and_sink(self): + with ( + patch("api.attack_paths.database.ingest") as mock_ingest, + patch("api.attack_paths.database.get_driver") as mock_get_driver, + ): + db_module.verify_scan_databases_available() - @pytest.fixture(autouse=True) - def reset_module_state(self): - """Reset module-level singleton state before each test.""" - original_driver = db_module._driver + mock_ingest.get_driver.return_value.verify_connectivity.assert_called_once_with() + mock_get_driver.return_value.verify_connectivity.assert_called_once_with() - db_module._driver = None - - yield - - db_module._driver = original_driver - - def test_close_driver_closes_and_clears_driver(self): - """close_driver() should close the driver and set it to None.""" - mock_driver = MagicMock() - db_module._driver = mock_driver - - db_module.close_driver() - - mock_driver.close.assert_called_once() - assert db_module._driver is None - - def test_close_driver_handles_none_driver(self): - """close_driver() should handle case where driver is None.""" - db_module._driver = None - - # Should not raise - db_module.close_driver() - - assert db_module._driver is None - - def test_close_driver_clears_driver_even_on_close_error(self): - """Driver should be cleared even if close() raises an exception.""" - mock_driver = MagicMock() - mock_driver.close.side_effect = Exception("Connection error") - db_module._driver = mock_driver - - with pytest.raises(Exception, match="Connection error"): - db_module.close_driver() - - # Driver should still be cleared - assert db_module._driver is None - - -class TestExecuteReadQuery: - """Test read query execution helper.""" - - def test_execute_read_query_calls_read_session_and_returns_result(self): - tx = MagicMock() - expected_graph = MagicMock() - run_result = MagicMock() - run_result.graph.return_value = expected_graph - tx.run.return_value = run_result - - session = MagicMock() - - def execute_read_side_effect(fn): - return fn(tx) - - session.execute_read.side_effect = execute_read_side_effect - - session_ctx = MagicMock() - session_ctx.__enter__.return_value = session - session_ctx.__exit__.return_value = False - - with patch( - "api.attack_paths.database.get_session", - return_value=session_ctx, - ) as mock_get_session: - result = db_module.execute_read_query( - "db-tenant-test-tenant-id", - "MATCH (n) RETURN n", - {"provider_uid": "123"}, + def test_verify_scan_databases_available_raises_when_ingest_is_down(self): + with ( + patch("api.attack_paths.database.ingest") as mock_ingest, + patch("api.attack_paths.database.get_driver"), + ): + mock_ingest.get_driver.return_value.verify_connectivity.side_effect = ( + RuntimeError("ingest down") ) - mock_get_session.assert_called_once_with( - "db-tenant-test-tenant-id", - default_access_mode=neo4j.READ_ACCESS, + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc: + db_module.verify_scan_databases_available() + + assert "Attack Paths graph database unavailable before scan start" in str( + exc.value ) - session.execute_read.assert_called_once() - tx.run.assert_called_once_with( - "MATCH (n) RETURN n", - {"provider_uid": "123"}, - timeout=db_module.READ_QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, - ) - run_result.graph.assert_called_once_with() - assert result is expected_graph + assert "ingest Neo4j: ingest down" in str(exc.value) - def test_execute_read_query_defaults_parameters_to_empty_dict(self): - tx = MagicMock() - run_result = MagicMock() - run_result.graph.return_value = MagicMock() - tx.run.return_value = run_result + def test_verify_scan_databases_available_raises_when_sink_is_down(self, settings): + settings.ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE = "neptune" - session = MagicMock() - session.execute_read.side_effect = lambda fn: fn(tx) - - session_ctx = MagicMock() - session_ctx.__enter__.return_value = session - session_ctx.__exit__.return_value = False - - with patch( - "api.attack_paths.database.get_session", - return_value=session_ctx, + with ( + patch("api.attack_paths.database.ingest"), + patch("api.attack_paths.database.get_driver") as mock_get_driver, ): - db_module.execute_read_query( - "db-tenant-test-tenant-id", - "MATCH (n) RETURN n", + mock_get_driver.return_value.verify_connectivity.side_effect = RuntimeError( + "writer down" ) - tx.run.assert_called_once_with( - "MATCH (n) RETURN n", - {}, - timeout=db_module.READ_QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, - ) - run_result.graph.assert_called_once_with() + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc: + db_module.verify_scan_databases_available() + assert "sink neptune: writer down" in str(exc.value) -class TestGetSessionReadOnly: - """Test that get_session translates Neo4j read-mode errors.""" + def test_verify_scan_databases_available_reports_both_failures(self, settings): + settings.ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE = "neo4j" - @pytest.fixture(autouse=True) - def reset_module_state(self): - original_driver = db_module._driver - db_module._driver = None - yield - db_module._driver = original_driver - - @pytest.mark.parametrize( - "neo4j_code", - [ - "Neo.ClientError.Statement.AccessMode", - "Neo.ClientError.Procedure.ProcedureNotFound", - ], - ) - def test_get_session_raises_write_query_not_allowed(self, neo4j_code): - """Read-mode Neo4j errors should raise `WriteQueryNotAllowedException`.""" - mock_session = MagicMock() - neo4j_error = neo4j.exceptions.Neo4jError._hydrate_neo4j( - code=neo4j_code, - message="Write operations are not allowed", - ) - mock_session.run.side_effect = neo4j_error - - mock_driver = MagicMock() - mock_driver.session.return_value = mock_session - db_module._driver = mock_driver - - with pytest.raises(db_module.WriteQueryNotAllowedException): - with db_module.get_session( - default_access_mode=neo4j.READ_ACCESS - ) as session: - session.run("CREATE (n) RETURN n") - - def test_get_session_raises_generic_exception_for_other_errors(self): - """Non-read-mode Neo4j errors should raise GraphDatabaseQueryException.""" - mock_session = MagicMock() - neo4j_error = neo4j.exceptions.Neo4jError._hydrate_neo4j( - code="Neo.ClientError.Statement.SyntaxError", - message="Invalid syntax", - ) - mock_session.run.side_effect = neo4j_error - - mock_driver = MagicMock() - mock_driver.session.return_value = mock_session - db_module._driver = mock_driver - - with pytest.raises(db_module.GraphDatabaseQueryException): - with db_module.get_session( - default_access_mode=neo4j.READ_ACCESS - ) as session: - session.run("INVALID CYPHER") - - -class TestThreadSafety: - """Test thread-safe initialization.""" - - @pytest.fixture(autouse=True) - def reset_module_state(self): - """Reset module-level singleton state before each test.""" - original_driver = db_module._driver - - db_module._driver = None - - yield - - db_module._driver = original_driver - - @patch("api.attack_paths.database.settings") - @patch("api.attack_paths.database.neo4j.GraphDatabase.driver") - def test_concurrent_init_creates_single_driver( - self, mock_driver_factory, mock_settings - ): - """Multiple threads calling init_driver() should create only one driver.""" - mock_driver = MagicMock() - mock_driver_factory.return_value = mock_driver - mock_settings.DATABASES = { - "neo4j": { - "HOST": "localhost", - "PORT": 7687, - "USER": "neo4j", - "PASSWORD": "password", - } - } - - results = [] - errors = [] - - def call_init(): - try: - result = db_module.init_driver() - results.append(result) - except Exception as e: - errors.append(e) - - threads = [threading.Thread(target=call_init) for _ in range(10)] - - for t in threads: - t.start() - for t in threads: - t.join() - - assert not errors, f"Threads raised errors: {errors}" - - # Only one driver created - assert mock_driver_factory.call_count == 1 - - # All threads got the same driver instance - assert all(r is mock_driver for r in results) - assert len(results) == 10 - - -class TestHasProviderData: - """Test has_provider_data helper for checking provider nodes in Neo4j.""" - - def test_returns_true_when_nodes_exist(self): - mock_session = MagicMock() - mock_result = MagicMock() - mock_result.single.return_value = MagicMock() # non-None record - mock_session.run.return_value = mock_result - - session_ctx = MagicMock() - session_ctx.__enter__.return_value = mock_session - session_ctx.__exit__.return_value = False - - with patch( - "api.attack_paths.database.get_session", - return_value=session_ctx, + with ( + patch("api.attack_paths.database.ingest") as mock_ingest, + patch("api.attack_paths.database.get_driver") as mock_get_driver, ): - assert db_module.has_provider_data("db-tenant-abc", "provider-123") is True - - mock_session.run.assert_called_once() - - def test_returns_false_when_no_nodes(self): - mock_session = MagicMock() - mock_result = MagicMock() - mock_result.single.return_value = None - mock_session.run.return_value = mock_result - - session_ctx = MagicMock() - session_ctx.__enter__.return_value = mock_session - session_ctx.__exit__.return_value = False - - with patch( - "api.attack_paths.database.get_session", - return_value=session_ctx, - ): - assert db_module.has_provider_data("db-tenant-abc", "provider-123") is False - - def test_returns_false_when_database_not_found(self): - session_ctx = MagicMock() - session_ctx.__enter__.side_effect = db_module.GraphDatabaseQueryException( - message="Database does not exist", - code="Neo.ClientError.Database.DatabaseNotFound", - ) - - with patch( - "api.attack_paths.database.get_session", - return_value=session_ctx, - ): - assert ( - db_module.has_provider_data("db-tenant-gone", "provider-123") is False + mock_ingest.get_driver.return_value.verify_connectivity.side_effect = ( + RuntimeError("ingest down") + ) + mock_get_driver.return_value.verify_connectivity.side_effect = RuntimeError( + "sink down" ) - def test_raises_on_other_errors(self): - session_ctx = MagicMock() - session_ctx.__enter__.side_effect = db_module.GraphDatabaseQueryException( - message="Connection refused", - code="Neo.TransientError.General.UnknownError", + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc: + db_module.verify_scan_databases_available() + + assert "ingest Neo4j: ingest down" in str(exc.value) + assert "sink neo4j: sink down" in str(exc.value) + + +class TestSinkOperationsDelegation: + def test_has_provider_data_delegates_to_sink(self, sink_backend_stub): + sink_backend_stub.has_provider_data.return_value = True + + assert db_module.has_provider_data("db-tenant-abc", "provider-123") is True + sink_backend_stub.has_provider_data.assert_called_once_with( + "db-tenant-abc", "provider-123" ) - with patch( - "api.attack_paths.database.get_session", - return_value=session_ctx, - ): - with pytest.raises(db_module.GraphDatabaseQueryException): - db_module.has_provider_data("db-tenant-abc", "provider-123") + def test_drop_subgraph_delegates_to_sink(self, sink_backend_stub): + sink_backend_stub.drop_subgraph.return_value = 42 - -class TestDropSubgraph: - """Test drop_subgraph two-phase batched deletion of a provider's graph.""" - - @staticmethod - def _result(count): - result = MagicMock() - result.single.return_value.get.return_value = count - return result - - @staticmethod - def _session_ctx(session): - ctx = MagicMock() - ctx.__enter__.return_value = session - ctx.__exit__.return_value = False - return ctx - - def test_deletes_relationships_then_nodes_in_batches(self): - session = MagicMock() - # Phase 1 (relationships): one full batch then empty. - # Phase 2 (nodes): one full batch then empty. - session.run.side_effect = [ - self._result(1000), - self._result(0), - self._result(1000), - self._result(0), - ] - - with patch( - "api.attack_paths.database.get_session", - return_value=self._session_ctx(session), - ): - deleted = db_module.drop_subgraph("db-tenant-abc", "provider-123") - - # Only phase-2 node counts contribute to the return value. - assert deleted == 1000 - assert session.run.call_count == 4 - - queries = [call.args[0] for call in session.run.call_args_list] - - # Regression guard: the memory blow-up was caused by DETACH DELETE. - assert all("DETACH DELETE" not in query for query in queries) - - rel_queries = [query for query in queries if "DELETE r" in query] - node_queries = [query for query in queries if "DELETE n" in query] - assert rel_queries and node_queries - # DISTINCT avoids double-counting relationships matched from both ends. - assert all("DISTINCT r" in query for query in rel_queries) - - # Relationships must be fully drained before nodes are deleted. - first_node = next(i for i, q in enumerate(queries) if "DELETE n" in q) - last_rel = max(i for i, q in enumerate(queries) if "DELETE r" in q) - assert last_rel < first_node - - def test_returns_zero_when_database_not_found(self): - session_ctx = MagicMock() - session_ctx.__enter__.side_effect = db_module.GraphDatabaseQueryException( - message="Database does not exist", - code="Neo.ClientError.Database.DatabaseNotFound", + assert db_module.drop_subgraph("db-tenant-abc", "provider-123") == 42 + sink_backend_stub.drop_subgraph.assert_called_once_with( + "db-tenant-abc", "provider-123" ) - with patch( - "api.attack_paths.database.get_session", - return_value=session_ctx, - ): - assert db_module.drop_subgraph("db-tenant-gone", "provider-123") == 0 - def test_raises_on_other_errors(self): - session_ctx = MagicMock() - session_ctx.__enter__.side_effect = db_module.GraphDatabaseQueryException( - message="Connection refused", - code="Neo.TransientError.General.UnknownError", - ) +class TestRoutingByDatabasePrefix: + """`db-tmp-scan-*` and `None` route to ingest; everything else to sink.""" - with patch( - "api.attack_paths.database.get_session", - return_value=session_ctx, - ): - with pytest.raises(db_module.GraphDatabaseQueryException): - db_module.drop_subgraph("db-tenant-abc", "provider-123") + def test_create_database_routes_temp_to_ingest(self, sink_backend_stub): + with patch("api.attack_paths.database.ingest") as mock_ingest: + db_module.create_database("db-tmp-scan-uuid-1") + + mock_ingest.create_database.assert_called_once_with("db-tmp-scan-uuid-1") + sink_backend_stub.create_database.assert_not_called() + + def test_create_database_routes_tenant_to_sink(self, sink_backend_stub): + with patch("api.attack_paths.database.ingest") as mock_ingest: + db_module.create_database("db-tenant-abc") + + sink_backend_stub.create_database.assert_called_once_with("db-tenant-abc") + mock_ingest.create_database.assert_not_called() + + def test_drop_database_routes_temp_to_ingest(self, sink_backend_stub): + with patch("api.attack_paths.database.ingest") as mock_ingest: + db_module.drop_database("db-tmp-scan-uuid-1") + + mock_ingest.drop_database.assert_called_once_with("db-tmp-scan-uuid-1") + sink_backend_stub.drop_database.assert_not_called() + + def test_drop_database_routes_tenant_to_sink(self, sink_backend_stub): + with patch("api.attack_paths.database.ingest") as mock_ingest: + db_module.drop_database("db-tenant-abc") + + sink_backend_stub.drop_database.assert_called_once_with("db-tenant-abc") + mock_ingest.drop_database.assert_not_called() + + def test_clear_cache_routes_temp_to_ingest(self, sink_backend_stub): + with patch("api.attack_paths.database.ingest") as mock_ingest: + db_module.clear_cache("db-tmp-scan-uuid-1") + + mock_ingest.clear_cache.assert_called_once_with("db-tmp-scan-uuid-1") + sink_backend_stub.clear_cache.assert_not_called() + + def test_clear_cache_routes_tenant_to_sink(self, sink_backend_stub): + with patch("api.attack_paths.database.ingest") as mock_ingest: + db_module.clear_cache("db-tenant-abc") + + sink_backend_stub.clear_cache.assert_called_once_with("db-tenant-abc") + mock_ingest.clear_cache.assert_not_called() + + def test_get_session_routes_temp_to_ingest(self, sink_backend_stub): + sentinel = MagicMock() + with patch("api.attack_paths.database.ingest") as mock_ingest: + mock_ingest.get_session.return_value = sentinel + + result = db_module.get_session("db-tmp-scan-uuid-1") + + assert result is sentinel + mock_ingest.get_session.assert_called_once() + sink_backend_stub.get_session.assert_not_called() + + def test_get_session_routes_none_to_ingest(self, sink_backend_stub): + sentinel = MagicMock() + with patch("api.attack_paths.database.ingest") as mock_ingest: + mock_ingest.get_session.return_value = sentinel + + result = db_module.get_session(None) + + assert result is sentinel + sink_backend_stub.get_session.assert_not_called() + + def test_get_ingest_uri_delegates_to_ingest(self, sink_backend_stub): + with patch("api.attack_paths.database.ingest") as mock_ingest: + mock_ingest.get_uri.return_value = "bolt://neo4j:7687" + + assert db_module.get_ingest_uri() == "bolt://neo4j:7687" + + mock_ingest.get_uri.assert_called_once_with() + + def test_get_session_routes_tenant_to_sink(self, sink_backend_stub): + sentinel = MagicMock() + sink_backend_stub.get_session.return_value = sentinel + with patch("api.attack_paths.database.ingest") as mock_ingest: + result = db_module.get_session("db-tenant-abc") + + assert result is sentinel + mock_ingest.get_session.assert_not_called() diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_authentication.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_authentication.py index 6745c36e91..d05a55ce5a 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_authentication.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_authentication.py @@ -1,15 +1,15 @@ import time -from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone -from unittest.mock import patch +from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch from uuid import uuid4 import pytest -from django.test import RequestFactory -from rest_framework.exceptions import AuthenticationFailed - -from api.authentication import TenantAPIKeyAuthentication +from api.authentication import SSEAuthentication, TenantAPIKeyAuthentication from api.db_router import MainRouter from api.models import TenantAPIKey +from django.db.models.query import QuerySet +from django.test import RequestFactory +from rest_framework.exceptions import AuthenticationFailed @pytest.mark.django_db @@ -65,6 +65,54 @@ class TestTenantAPIKeyAuthentication: # Verify the manager was restored assert TenantAPIKey.objects == original_manager + def test_authenticate_credentials_keeps_manager_during_lookup( + self, auth_backend, api_keys_fixture, request_factory + ): + """Authentication must not expose a QuerySet as the model manager.""" + api_key = api_keys_fixture[0] + raw_key = api_key._raw_key + _, encrypted_key = raw_key.split(TenantAPIKey.objects.separator, 1) + + original_get = QuerySet.get + manager_has_create_api_key = [] + + def observe_manager(queryset, *args, **kwargs): + manager_has_create_api_key.append( + hasattr(TenantAPIKey.objects, "create_api_key") + ) + return original_get(queryset, *args, **kwargs) + + request = request_factory.get("/") + + with patch.object(QuerySet, "get", observe_manager): + auth_backend._authenticate_credentials(request, encrypted_key) + + assert manager_has_create_api_key + assert all(manager_has_create_api_key) + + @pytest.mark.parametrize( + "payload", + [ + {"_pk": str(uuid4()), "_exp": "not-a-timestamp"}, + { + "_pk": "not-a-uuid", + "_exp": (datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(days=1)).timestamp(), + }, + {"_pk": str(uuid4()), "_exp": True}, + ], + ) + def test_authenticate_credentials_rejects_malformed_payloads( + self, auth_backend, request_factory, payload + ): + """Malformed decrypted payloads fail as authentication errors.""" + request = request_factory.get("/") + encrypted_key = auth_backend.key_crypto.generate(payload) + + with pytest.raises(AuthenticationFailed) as exc_info: + auth_backend._authenticate_credentials(request, encrypted_key) + + assert str(exc_info.value.detail) == "Invalid API Key." + def test_authenticate_credentials_restores_manager_on_exception( self, auth_backend, request_factory ): @@ -104,7 +152,7 @@ class TestTenantAPIKeyAuthentication: # Verify that last_used_at was updated api_key.refresh_from_db() assert api_key.last_used_at is not None - assert (datetime.now(timezone.utc) - api_key.last_used_at).seconds < 5 + assert (datetime.now(UTC) - api_key.last_used_at).seconds < 5 def test_authenticate_valid_api_key_uses_admin_database( self, auth_backend, api_keys_fixture, request_factory @@ -195,7 +243,7 @@ class TestTenantAPIKeyAuthentication: name="Expired API Key", tenant_id=tenant.id, entity=user, - expiry_date=datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=1), + expiry_date=datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(days=1), ) request = request_factory.get("/") @@ -217,7 +265,7 @@ class TestTenantAPIKeyAuthentication: # Manually create an encrypted key with a non-existent ID payload = { "_pk": non_existent_uuid, - "_exp": (datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=30)).timestamp(), + "_exp": (datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(days=30)).timestamp(), } encrypted_key = auth_backend.key_crypto.generate(payload) fake_key = f"{api_key.prefix}.{encrypted_key}" @@ -368,7 +416,7 @@ class TestTenantAPIKeyAuthentication: name="Short-lived API Key", tenant_id=tenant.id, entity=user, - expiry_date=datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(seconds=1), + expiry_date=datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(seconds=1), ) # Wait for the key to expire @@ -382,3 +430,62 @@ class TestTenantAPIKeyAuthentication: auth_backend.authenticate(request) assert str(exc_info.value.detail) == "API Key has already expired." + + +class TestSSEAuthentication: + """`SSEAuthentication` adds an `?access_token=` fallback for + browser `EventSource` clients while keeping the standard + `Authorization` header as the authoritative source.""" + + def test_header_present_delegates_to_super(self): + request = MagicMock() + request.headers = {"Authorization": "Bearer header-token"} + with patch.object( + SSEAuthentication.__bases__[0], "authenticate", return_value=("user", "tok") + ) as super_auth: + result = SSEAuthentication().authenticate(request) + super_auth.assert_called_once_with(request) + assert result == ("user", "tok") + + def test_no_header_no_query_token_delegates_to_super(self): + request = MagicMock() + request.headers = {} + request.query_params = {} + with patch.object( + SSEAuthentication.__bases__[0], "authenticate", return_value=None + ) as super_auth: + result = SSEAuthentication().authenticate(request) + super_auth.assert_called_once_with(request) + assert result is None + + def test_query_token_used_only_as_fallback(self): + request = MagicMock() + request.headers = {} + request.query_params = {"access_token": "query-jwt"} + + jwt_instance = MagicMock() + jwt_instance.get_validated_token.return_value = "validated" + jwt_instance.get_user.return_value = "query-user" + + with patch.object(SSEAuthentication, "jwt_auth", jwt_instance): + user, token = SSEAuthentication().authenticate(request) + + jwt_instance.get_validated_token.assert_called_once_with("query-jwt") + assert user == "query-user" + assert token == "validated" + + def test_query_token_invalid_raises_authentication_failed(self): + request = MagicMock() + request.headers = {} + request.query_params = {"access_token": "bad-token"} + + jwt_instance = MagicMock() + jwt_instance.get_validated_token.side_effect = AuthenticationFailed( + "Invalid token" + ) + + with patch.object(SSEAuthentication, "jwt_auth", jwt_instance): + with pytest.raises(AuthenticationFailed): + SSEAuthentication().authenticate(request) + + jwt_instance.get_validated_token.assert_called_once_with("bad-token") diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_celery_settings.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_celery_settings.py index d4010796ee..dcd8930edc 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_celery_settings.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_celery_settings.py @@ -41,3 +41,30 @@ class TestBuildCeleryBrokerUrl: def test_invalid_scheme_raises_error(self): with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Invalid VALKEY_SCHEME 'http'"): _build_celery_broker_url("http", "", "", "valkey", "6379", "0") + + +class TestCeleryWorkerConcurrency: + def _reimport_settings(self): + """Fresh import — importlib.reload() doesn't clear the module namespace, + so an attribute set by a prior test would leak into the unset case.""" + import sys + + sys.modules.pop("config.settings.celery", None) + import config.settings.celery as celery_settings + + return celery_settings + + def test_unset_leaves_setting_absent(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.delenv("DJANGO_CELERY_WORKER_CONCURRENCY", raising=False) + mod = self._reimport_settings() + assert not hasattr(mod, "CELERY_WORKER_CONCURRENCY") + + def test_explicit_value_applied(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("DJANGO_CELERY_WORKER_CONCURRENCY", "8") + mod = self._reimport_settings() + assert mod.CELERY_WORKER_CONCURRENCY == 8 + + def test_invalid_value_raises(self, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("DJANGO_CELERY_WORKER_CONCURRENCY", "not-a-number") + with pytest.raises(ValueError): + self._reimport_settings() diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_compliance.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_compliance.py index 99a31ea12c..d613a2538e 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_compliance.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_compliance.py @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch import pytest - from api import compliance as compliance_module from api.compliance import ( generate_compliance_overview_template, diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_cypher_sanitizer.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_cypher_sanitizer.py index a54afcd8bb..c0d4f9b7ff 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_cypher_sanitizer.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_cypher_sanitizer.py @@ -3,13 +3,12 @@ from unittest.mock import patch import pytest - -from rest_framework.exceptions import ValidationError - from api.attack_paths.cypher_sanitizer import ( + inject_label, inject_provider_label, validate_custom_query, ) +from rest_framework.exceptions import ValidationError PROVIDER_ID = "019c41ee-7df3-7dec-a684-d839f95619f8" LABEL = "_Provider_019c41ee7df37deca684d839f95619f8" @@ -23,6 +22,13 @@ def _inject(cypher: str) -> str: return inject_provider_label(cypher, PROVIDER_ID) +def test_generic_inject_label_reuses_provider_injection_pipeline(): + result = inject_label("MATCH (n:AWSRole)--(m) RETURN n, m", "_Tenant_test") + + assert "(n:AWSRole:_Tenant_test)" in result + assert "(m:_Tenant_test)" in result + + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Pass A - Labeled node patterns (all clauses) # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -202,9 +208,7 @@ class TestClauseSplitting: def test_multiple_match_clauses(self): cypher = ( - "MATCH (a:AWSAccount)--(b:AWSRole) " - "MATCH (b)--(c:AWSPolicy) " - "RETURN a, b, c" + "MATCH (a:AWSAccount)--(b:AWSRole) MATCH (b)--(c:AWSPolicy) RETURN a, b, c" ) result = _inject(cypher) assert f"(a:AWSAccount:{LABEL})" in result @@ -265,9 +269,7 @@ class TestRealWorldQueries: def test_custom_bare_query(self): cypher = ( - "MATCH (a)-[:HAS_POLICY]->(b)\n" - "WHERE a.name CONTAINS 'admin'\n" - "RETURN a, b" + "MATCH (a)-[:HAS_POLICY]->(b)\nWHERE a.name CONTAINS 'admin'\nRETURN a, b" ) result = _inject(cypher) assert f"(a:{LABEL})" in result @@ -344,9 +346,7 @@ class TestEdgeCases: assert f"(outer:AWSAccount:{LABEL})" in result def test_multiple_protected_regions(self): - cypher = ( - "MATCH (n:X {a: 'hello'}) " 'WHERE n.b = "world" ' "// comment\n" "RETURN n" - ) + cypher = "MATCH (n:X {a: 'hello'}) WHERE n.b = \"world\" // comment\nRETURN n" result = _inject(cypher) assert "'hello'" in result assert '"world"' in result diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_database.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_database.py index 46d3203414..8d328c6a91 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_database.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_database.py @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ -import pytest -from django.conf import settings -from django.db.migrations.recorder import MigrationRecorder -from django.db.utils import ConnectionRouter +from unittest.mock import patch +import pytest from api.db_router import MainRouter from api.rls import Tenant from config.django.base import DATABASE_ROUTERS as PROD_DATABASE_ROUTERS -from unittest.mock import patch +from django.conf import settings +from django.db.migrations.recorder import MigrationRecorder +from django.db.utils import ConnectionRouter @patch("api.db_router.MainRouter.admin_db", new="admin") diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_db_utils.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_db_utils.py index 18935b9a3e..06b528b44a 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_db_utils.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_db_utils.py @@ -1,14 +1,8 @@ -from datetime import datetime, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime from enum import Enum from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch import pytest -from django.conf import settings -from django.db import DEFAULT_DB_ALIAS, OperationalError -from freezegun import freeze_time -from psycopg2 import sql as psycopg2_sql -from rest_framework_json_api.serializers import ValidationError - from api.db_utils import ( POSTGRES_TENANT_VAR, PostgresEnumMigration, @@ -23,6 +17,11 @@ from api.db_utils import ( update_objects_in_batches, ) from api.models import Provider +from django.conf import settings +from django.db import DEFAULT_DB_ALIAS, OperationalError +from freezegun import freeze_time +from psycopg2 import sql as psycopg2_sql +from rest_framework_json_api.serializers import ValidationError @pytest.fixture @@ -94,18 +93,16 @@ class TestEnumToChoices: class TestOneWeekFromNow: def test_one_week_from_now(self): with patch("api.db_utils.datetime") as mock_datetime: - mock_datetime.now.return_value = datetime(2023, 1, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc) - expected_result = datetime(2023, 1, 8, tzinfo=timezone.utc) + mock_datetime.now.return_value = datetime(2023, 1, 1, tzinfo=UTC) + expected_result = datetime(2023, 1, 8, tzinfo=UTC) result = one_week_from_now() assert result == expected_result def test_one_week_from_now_with_timezone(self): with patch("api.db_utils.datetime") as mock_datetime: - mock_datetime.now.return_value = datetime( - 2023, 6, 15, 12, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc - ) - expected_result = datetime(2023, 6, 22, 12, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc) + mock_datetime.now.return_value = datetime(2023, 6, 15, 12, 0, tzinfo=UTC) + expected_result = datetime(2023, 6, 22, 12, 0, tzinfo=UTC) result = one_week_from_now() assert result == expected_result @@ -939,9 +936,9 @@ class TestPostgresEnumMigration: mock_cursor.execute.assert_called_once() query_arg = mock_cursor.execute.call_args[0][0] - assert isinstance( - query_arg, psycopg2_sql.Composable - ), "create_enum_type must pass a psycopg2.sql.Composable, not a raw string." + assert isinstance(query_arg, psycopg2_sql.Composable), ( + "create_enum_type must pass a psycopg2.sql.Composable, not a raw string." + ) # Verify the composed SQL structure: CREATE TYPE AS ENUM () parts = query_arg.seq assert parts[0] == psycopg2_sql.SQL("CREATE TYPE ") @@ -962,9 +959,9 @@ class TestPostgresEnumMigration: mock_cursor.execute.assert_called_once() query_arg = mock_cursor.execute.call_args[0][0] - assert isinstance( - query_arg, psycopg2_sql.Composable - ), "drop_enum_type must pass a psycopg2.sql.Composable, not a raw string." + assert isinstance(query_arg, psycopg2_sql.Composable), ( + "drop_enum_type must pass a psycopg2.sql.Composable, not a raw string." + ) # Verify the composed SQL structure: DROP TYPE parts = query_arg.seq assert parts[0] == psycopg2_sql.SQL("DROP TYPE ") diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_decorators.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_decorators.py index 2d09a40734..25053a2258 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_decorators.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_decorators.py @@ -2,12 +2,11 @@ import uuid from unittest.mock import call, patch import pytest -from django.core.exceptions import ObjectDoesNotExist -from django.db import DatabaseError, IntegrityError - from api.db_utils import POSTGRES_TENANT_VAR, SET_CONFIG_QUERY from api.decorators import handle_provider_deletion, set_tenant from api.exceptions import ProviderDeletedException +from django.core.exceptions import ObjectDoesNotExist +from django.db import DatabaseError, IntegrityError @pytest.mark.django_db diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_health.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_health.py index 76b72c0dc7..b7cd20f697 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_health.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_health.py @@ -7,15 +7,13 @@ Cover the IETF response envelope, status code mapping (200 / 503), the from unittest.mock import patch import pytest +from api import health from config import version as config_version from django.core.cache import cache from django.urls import reverse from rest_framework import status from rest_framework.test import APIClient -from api import health - - HEALTH_MEDIA_TYPE = "application/health+json" @@ -69,7 +67,7 @@ class TestLivenessEndpoint: with ( patch("api.health._probe_postgres") as mock_pg, patch("api.health._probe_valkey") as mock_vk, - patch("api.health._probe_neo4j") as mock_neo, + patch("api.health._probe_graph_db") as mock_neo, ): response = api_client.get(reverse("health-live")) @@ -85,14 +83,14 @@ class TestReadinessEndpoint: return ( patch("api.health._probe_postgres", return_value=None), patch("api.health._probe_valkey", return_value=None), - patch("api.health._probe_neo4j", return_value=None), + patch("api.health._probe_graph_db", return_value=None), ) def test_returns_200_and_pass_when_all_dependencies_healthy(self, api_client): with ( patch("api.health._probe_postgres"), patch("api.health._probe_valkey"), - patch("api.health._probe_neo4j"), + patch("api.health._probe_graph_db"), ): response = api_client.get(reverse("health-ready")) @@ -109,7 +107,7 @@ class TestReadinessEndpoint: assert set(body["checks"].keys()) == { "postgres:responseTime", "valkey:responseTime", - "neo4j:responseTime", + "graphdb:responseTime", } for key in body["checks"]: entries = body["checks"][key] @@ -124,6 +122,23 @@ class TestReadinessEndpoint: # `output` must not leak when the check passed. assert "output" not in entry + @pytest.mark.parametrize("sink", ["neo4j", "neptune"]) + def test_graphdb_component_id_reflects_active_sink(self, api_client, sink): + from django.test import override_settings + + with ( + override_settings(ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE=sink), + patch("api.health._probe_postgres"), + patch("api.health._probe_valkey"), + patch("api.health._probe_graph_db"), + ): + response = api_client.get(reverse("health-ready")) + + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK + entry = response.json()["checks"]["graphdb:responseTime"][0] + # Stable key, but the concrete store is named in componentId. + assert entry["componentId"] == sink + def test_returns_503_and_fail_when_postgres_is_down(self, api_client): with ( patch( @@ -131,7 +146,7 @@ class TestReadinessEndpoint: side_effect=RuntimeError("connection refused"), ), patch("api.health._probe_valkey"), - patch("api.health._probe_neo4j"), + patch("api.health._probe_graph_db"), ): response = api_client.get(reverse("health-ready")) @@ -143,13 +158,13 @@ class TestReadinessEndpoint: # Exception detail is never echoed in the response, only logged. assert "output" not in pg_entry assert body["checks"]["valkey:responseTime"][0]["status"] == "pass" - assert body["checks"]["neo4j:responseTime"][0]["status"] == "pass" + assert body["checks"]["graphdb:responseTime"][0]["status"] == "pass" def test_returns_503_and_fail_when_valkey_is_down(self, api_client): with ( patch("api.health._probe_postgres"), patch("api.health._probe_valkey", side_effect=ConnectionError("timeout")), - patch("api.health._probe_neo4j"), + patch("api.health._probe_graph_db"), ): response = api_client.get(reverse("health-ready")) @@ -160,12 +175,12 @@ class TestReadinessEndpoint: assert vk_entry["status"] == "fail" assert "output" not in vk_entry - def test_returns_503_and_fail_when_neo4j_is_down(self, api_client): + def test_returns_503_and_fail_when_graph_db_is_down(self, api_client): with ( patch("api.health._probe_postgres"), patch("api.health._probe_valkey"), patch( - "api.health._probe_neo4j", + "api.health._probe_graph_db", side_effect=RuntimeError("ServiceUnavailable"), ), ): @@ -174,15 +189,15 @@ class TestReadinessEndpoint: assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_503_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE body = response.json() assert body["status"] == "fail" - neo_entry = body["checks"]["neo4j:responseTime"][0] - assert neo_entry["status"] == "fail" - assert "output" not in neo_entry + graph_db_entry = body["checks"]["graphdb:responseTime"][0] + assert graph_db_entry["status"] == "fail" + assert "output" not in graph_db_entry def test_reports_all_failures_simultaneously(self, api_client): with ( patch("api.health._probe_postgres", side_effect=RuntimeError("pg down")), patch("api.health._probe_valkey", side_effect=RuntimeError("vk down")), - patch("api.health._probe_neo4j", side_effect=RuntimeError("neo down")), + patch("api.health._probe_graph_db", side_effect=RuntimeError("neo down")), ): response = api_client.get(reverse("health-ready")) @@ -192,7 +207,7 @@ class TestReadinessEndpoint: for key in ( "postgres:responseTime", "valkey:responseTime", - "neo4j:responseTime", + "graphdb:responseTime", ): entry = body["checks"][key][0] assert entry["status"] == "fail" @@ -211,7 +226,7 @@ class TestReadinessEndpoint: with ( patch("api.health._probe_postgres", side_effect=RuntimeError(sensitive)), patch("api.health._probe_valkey"), - patch("api.health._probe_neo4j"), + patch("api.health._probe_graph_db"), ): response = api_client.get(reverse("health-ready")) @@ -231,7 +246,7 @@ class TestReadinessEndpoint: with ( patch("api.health._probe_postgres"), patch("api.health._probe_valkey"), - patch("api.health._probe_neo4j"), + patch("api.health._probe_graph_db"), ): api_client.credentials() response = api_client.get(reverse("health-ready")) @@ -246,7 +261,7 @@ class TestReadinessCache: with ( patch("api.health._probe_postgres") as pg, patch("api.health._probe_valkey") as vk, - patch("api.health._probe_neo4j") as neo, + patch("api.health._probe_graph_db") as neo, ): r1 = api_client.get(reverse("health-ready")) r2 = api_client.get(reverse("health-ready")) @@ -264,7 +279,7 @@ class TestReadinessCache: with ( patch("api.health._probe_postgres") as pg, patch("api.health._probe_valkey"), - patch("api.health._probe_neo4j"), + patch("api.health._probe_graph_db"), ): api_client.get(reverse("health-ready")) assert pg.call_count == 1 @@ -288,7 +303,7 @@ class TestReadinessCache: with ( patch("api.health._probe_postgres", side_effect=RuntimeError("down")) as pg, patch("api.health._probe_valkey"), - patch("api.health._probe_neo4j"), + patch("api.health._probe_graph_db"), ): r1 = api_client.get(reverse("health-ready")) r2 = api_client.get(reverse("health-ready")) @@ -322,7 +337,7 @@ class TestRateLimiting: with ( patch("api.health._probe_postgres"), patch("api.health._probe_valkey"), - patch("api.health._probe_neo4j"), + patch("api.health._probe_graph_db"), patch.object(ScopedRateThrottle, "parse_rate", return_value=(2, 60)), ): statuses = [ @@ -416,19 +431,42 @@ class TestProbeImplementations: with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="bug"): health._probe_valkey() - def test_neo4j_probe_calls_verify_connectivity(self): - with patch("api.attack_paths.database.get_driver") as mock_get_driver: - mock_get_driver.return_value.verify_connectivity.return_value = None - assert health._probe_neo4j() is None - mock_get_driver.return_value.verify_connectivity.assert_called_once_with() + def test_graph_db_probe_calls_verify_connectivity(self): + with patch("api.attack_paths.database.verify_connectivity") as mock_verify: + mock_verify.return_value = None + assert health._probe_graph_db() is None + mock_verify.assert_called_once_with() - def test_neo4j_probe_propagates_driver_errors(self): - with patch("api.attack_paths.database.get_driver") as mock_get_driver: - mock_get_driver.return_value.verify_connectivity.side_effect = RuntimeError( - "unreachable" - ) + def test_graph_db_probe_propagates_errors(self): + with patch( + "api.attack_paths.database.verify_connectivity", + side_effect=RuntimeError("unreachable"), + ): with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="unreachable"): - health._probe_neo4j() + health._probe_graph_db() + + def test_graph_db_probe_times_out_when_check_exceeds_budget(self): + # A sink whose connectivity check blocks past the probe budget must + # surface as a failure fast, not pin the request thread for the + # driver's full acquisition timeout. + import time as _time + + def _hang() -> None: + _time.sleep(2) + + with ( + patch("api.health.GRAPH_DB_PROBE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", 0.2), + patch( + "api.attack_paths.database.verify_connectivity", + side_effect=_hang, + ), + ): + started = _time.perf_counter() + with pytest.raises(TimeoutError): + health._probe_graph_db() + elapsed = _time.perf_counter() - started + + assert elapsed < health.GRAPH_DB_PROBE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS + 1 class TestStatusAggregation: diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_middleware.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_middleware.py index 07165987de..08136dd68f 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_middleware.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_middleware.py @@ -1,11 +1,10 @@ from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch import pytest +from api.middleware import APILoggingMiddleware from django.http import HttpResponse from django.test import RequestFactory -from api.middleware import APILoggingMiddleware - @pytest.mark.django_db @patch("logging.getLogger") diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_mixins.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_mixins.py index 7daf9d5ff6..b90bcf4480 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_mixins.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_mixins.py @@ -2,10 +2,6 @@ import json from uuid import uuid4 import pytest -from django_celery_results.models import TaskResult -from rest_framework import status -from rest_framework.response import Response - from api.exceptions import ( TaskFailedException, TaskInProgressException, @@ -14,6 +10,9 @@ from api.exceptions import ( from api.models import Task, User from api.rls import Tenant from api.v1.mixins import PaginateByPkMixin, TaskManagementMixin +from django_celery_results.models import TaskResult +from rest_framework import status +from rest_framework.response import Response @pytest.mark.django_db diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_models.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_models.py index b8b7f61dd1..3ec823b89a 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_models.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_models.py @@ -1,10 +1,7 @@ -from datetime import datetime, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime import pytest from allauth.socialaccount.models import SocialApp -from django.core.exceptions import ValidationError -from django.db import IntegrityError - from api.db_router import MainRouter from api.models import ( ProviderComplianceScore, @@ -16,6 +13,8 @@ from api.models import ( StatusChoices, TenantComplianceSummary, ) +from django.core.exceptions import ValidationError +from django.db import IntegrityError @pytest.mark.django_db @@ -376,7 +375,7 @@ class TestProviderComplianceScoreModel: def test_create_provider_compliance_score(self, providers_fixture, scans_fixture): provider = providers_fixture[0] scan = scans_fixture[0] - scan.completed_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + scan.completed_at = datetime.now(UTC) scan.save() score = ProviderComplianceScore.objects.create( @@ -398,7 +397,7 @@ class TestProviderComplianceScoreModel: ): provider = providers_fixture[0] scan = scans_fixture[0] - scan.completed_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + scan.completed_at = datetime.now(UTC) scan.save() ProviderComplianceScore.objects.create( @@ -427,12 +426,12 @@ class TestProviderComplianceScoreModel: ): provider1, provider2, *_ = providers_fixture scan1 = scans_fixture[0] - scan1.completed_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + scan1.completed_at = datetime.now(UTC) scan1.save() scan2 = scans_fixture[2] scan2.state = StateChoices.COMPLETED - scan2.completed_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + scan2.completed_at = datetime.now(UTC) scan2.save() score1 = ProviderComplianceScore.objects.create( diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_rbac.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_rbac.py index 684a9e44b9..4f787b1f5a 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_rbac.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_rbac.py @@ -2,10 +2,6 @@ import json from unittest.mock import ANY, Mock, patch import pytest -from conftest import TEST_PASSWORD, TODAY -from django.urls import reverse -from rest_framework import status - from api.models import ( Membership, ProviderGroup, @@ -16,6 +12,9 @@ from api.models import ( UserRoleRelationship, ) from api.v1.serializers import TokenSerializer +from conftest import TEST_PASSWORD, TODAY +from django.urls import reverse +from rest_framework import status @pytest.mark.django_db diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_serializers.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_serializers.py index 5810a97b63..ea01075934 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_serializers.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_serializers.py @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ import pytest -from rest_framework.exceptions import ValidationError - from api.v1.serializer_utils.integrations import S3ConfigSerializer from api.v1.serializers import ImageProviderSecret +from rest_framework.exceptions import ValidationError class TestS3ConfigSerializer: diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_sink.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_sink.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..64c69cbed1 --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_sink.py @@ -0,0 +1,626 @@ +"""Tests for the attack-paths sink factory and Neo4j sink. + +The sink module picks a backend per ``settings.ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE``. +Neo4j is the default and preserves today's behavior; Neptune is opt-in and +builds dual writer/reader Bolt drivers. +""" + +import json +from importlib import import_module +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +import pytest + +# Prime patch-target resolution. `api.attack_paths.sink/__init__.py` doesn't +# eagerly import these submodules (they're loaded on demand inside the +# factory), so `mock.patch("api.attack_paths.sink..…")` would fail with +# AttributeError on first call. Importing here registers them as attributes +# of the package before any decorator runs. +import_module("api.attack_paths.sink.neo4j") +import_module("api.attack_paths.sink.neptune") + + +@pytest.fixture(autouse=True) +def reset_sink_state(): + """Reset the module-level backend singletons around each test. + + The cache lives in `api.attack_paths.sink.factory`, not on the package. + """ + from api.attack_paths.sink import factory + + original_backend = factory._backend + original_secondary = dict(factory._secondary_backends) + factory._backend = None + factory._secondary_backends.clear() + yield + factory._backend = original_backend + factory._secondary_backends.clear() + factory._secondary_backends.update(original_secondary) + + +class TestSinkFactory: + def test_default_resolves_to_neo4j(self, settings): + from api.attack_paths.sink import factory + + settings.ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE = "neo4j" + assert factory._resolve_setting() == "neo4j" + + def test_neptune_resolves_correctly(self, settings): + from api.attack_paths.sink import factory + + settings.ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE = "neptune" + assert factory._resolve_setting() == "neptune" + + def test_invalid_value_raises(self, settings): + from api.attack_paths.sink import factory + + settings.ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE = "foo" + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE"): + factory._resolve_setting() + + @patch("api.attack_paths.sink.neo4j.neo4j.GraphDatabase.driver") + def test_init_builds_neo4j_backend_by_default(self, mock_driver, settings): + from api.attack_paths import sink as sink_module + from api.attack_paths.sink.neo4j import Neo4jSink + + settings.ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE = "neo4j" + settings.DATABASES = { + **settings.DATABASES, + "neo4j": { + "HOST": "localhost", + "PORT": "7687", + "USER": "neo4j", + "PASSWORD": "pw", + }, + } + mock_driver.return_value = MagicMock() + + backend = sink_module.init() + + assert isinstance(backend, Neo4jSink) + mock_driver.assert_called_once() + + @patch("api.attack_paths.sink.neptune.neptune_auth_provider") + @patch("api.attack_paths.sink.neptune.neo4j.GraphDatabase.driver") + def test_init_builds_neptune_backend( + self, mock_driver, mock_auth_provider, settings + ): + from api.attack_paths import sink as sink_module + from api.attack_paths.sink.neptune import NeptuneSink + + settings.ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE = "neptune" + settings.DATABASES = { + **settings.DATABASES, + "neptune": { + "WRITER_ENDPOINT": "writer.example", + "READER_ENDPOINT": "reader.example", + "PORT": "8182", + "REGION": "eu-west-1", + }, + } + mock_driver.return_value = MagicMock() + mock_auth_provider.return_value = lambda: None + + backend = sink_module.init() + + assert isinstance(backend, NeptuneSink) + # Writer + reader endpoints both trigger driver construction + assert mock_driver.call_count == 2 + writer_uri = mock_driver.call_args_list[0][0][0] + reader_uri = mock_driver.call_args_list[1][0][0] + assert writer_uri == "bolt+s://writer.example:8182" + assert reader_uri == "bolt+s://reader.example:8182" + + @patch("api.attack_paths.sink.neptune.neptune_auth_provider") + @patch("api.attack_paths.sink.neptune.neo4j.GraphDatabase.driver") + def test_neptune_reader_falls_back_to_writer( + self, mock_driver, mock_auth_provider, settings + ): + from api.attack_paths import sink as sink_module + + settings.ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE = "neptune" + settings.DATABASES = { + **settings.DATABASES, + "neptune": { + "WRITER_ENDPOINT": "writer.example", + "READER_ENDPOINT": "", + "PORT": "8182", + "REGION": "eu-west-1", + }, + } + mock_driver.return_value = MagicMock() + mock_auth_provider.return_value = lambda: None + + sink_module.init() + + # Only one driver call — reader aliases writer + assert mock_driver.call_count == 1 + + +class TestGetBackendForScan: + """``get_backend_for_scan`` routes by the row's recorded sink backend.""" + + @patch("api.attack_paths.sink.neo4j.neo4j.GraphDatabase.driver") + def test_legacy_scan_in_neo4j_process_uses_active_backend( + self, mock_driver, settings + ): + from api.attack_paths import sink as sink_module + + settings.ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE = "neo4j" + settings.DATABASES = { + **settings.DATABASES, + "neo4j": { + "HOST": "localhost", + "PORT": "7687", + "USER": "neo4j", + "PASSWORD": "pw", + }, + } + mock_driver.return_value = MagicMock() + + scan = MagicMock(sink_backend="neo4j") + backend = sink_module.get_backend_for_scan(scan) + + assert backend is sink_module.get_backend() + + def test_neptune_scan_on_neo4j_process_uses_neptune_secondary(self, settings): + from api.attack_paths.sink import factory + + settings.ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE = "neo4j" + active_neo4j = MagicMock(name="neo4j-active") + factory._backend = active_neo4j + + secondary_neptune = MagicMock(name="neptune-secondary") + with patch.object(factory, "_build_backend", return_value=secondary_neptune): + scan = MagicMock(sink_backend="neptune") + backend = factory.get_backend_for_scan(scan) + + assert backend is secondary_neptune + assert backend is not active_neo4j + + +def _session_ctx(session: MagicMock) -> MagicMock: + ctx = MagicMock() + ctx.__enter__ = MagicMock(return_value=session) + ctx.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + return ctx + + +class TestNeo4jSinkSyncWrites: + def test_ensure_sync_indexes_runs_create_index_idempotent(self): + from api.attack_paths.sink.neo4j import Neo4jSink + + sink = Neo4jSink() + session = MagicMock() + session.run.return_value = MagicMock() + with patch.object(sink, "get_session", return_value=_session_ctx(session)): + sink.ensure_sync_indexes("db-tenant-x") + + query = session.run.call_args.args[0] + assert "CREATE INDEX" in query + assert "IF NOT EXISTS" in query + assert "`_ProviderResource`" in query + assert "`_provider_element_id`" in query + + def test_write_nodes_skips_empty_batch(self): + from api.attack_paths.sink.neo4j import Neo4jSink + + sink = Neo4jSink() + with patch.object(sink, "get_session") as get_session: + sink.write_nodes("db-tenant-x", "`AWSUser`", []) + get_session.assert_not_called() + + def test_write_nodes_merges_on_provider_resource_label(self): + from api.attack_paths.sink.neo4j import Neo4jSink + + sink = Neo4jSink() + session = MagicMock() + with patch.object(sink, "get_session", return_value=_session_ctx(session)): + sink.write_nodes( + "db-tenant-x", + "`AWSUser`:`_ProviderResource`", + [{"provider_element_id": "p:e", "props": {"k": "v"}}], + ) + + query, params = session.run.call_args.args + assert "MERGE (n:`_ProviderResource`" in query + assert "`_provider_element_id`: row.provider_element_id" in query + assert "SET n:`AWSUser`:`_ProviderResource`" in query + assert params == {"rows": [{"provider_element_id": "p:e", "props": {"k": "v"}}]} + + def test_write_relationships_scopes_endpoints_by_provider_label(self): + from api.attack_paths.sink.neo4j import Neo4jSink + + sink = Neo4jSink() + session = MagicMock() + provider_id = "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000abc" + with patch.object(sink, "get_session", return_value=_session_ctx(session)): + sink.write_relationships( + "db-tenant-x", + "RESOURCE", + provider_id, + [ + { + "start_element_id": "s", + "end_element_id": "e", + "provider_element_id": "pe", + "props": {}, + } + ], + ) + + query = session.run.call_args.args[0] + assert ":`_Provider_00000000000000000000000000000abc`" in query + assert ":RESOURCE" in query.replace("`", "") + assert "MERGE (s)-[r:`RESOURCE`" in query + + +class TestNeptuneSinkSyncWrites: + def test_ensure_sync_indexes_is_noop(self): + from api.attack_paths.sink.neptune import NeptuneSink + + sink = NeptuneSink() + with patch.object(sink, "get_session") as get_session: + sink.ensure_sync_indexes("ignored") + get_session.assert_not_called() + + def test_write_nodes_merges_on_neptune_id_with_provider_resource_label(self): + from api.attack_paths.sink.neptune import NeptuneSink + + sink = NeptuneSink() + session = MagicMock() + with patch.object(sink, "get_session", return_value=_session_ctx(session)): + sink.write_nodes( + "ignored", + "`AWSUser`", + [{"provider_element_id": "p:e", "props": {"k": "v"}}], + ) + + query = session.run.call_args.args[0] + # Neptune assigns a default `vertex` label to any unlabeled node, + # so the MERGE must pin a real label at creation time. + assert "MERGE (n:`_ProviderResource` {`~id`: row.provider_element_id})" in query + assert "SET n:`AWSUser`" in query + assert "SET n.`_provider_element_id` = row.provider_element_id" in query + + def test_write_relationships_matches_endpoints_by_id(self): + from api.attack_paths.sink.neptune import NeptuneSink + + sink = NeptuneSink() + session = MagicMock() + with patch.object(sink, "get_session", return_value=_session_ctx(session)): + sink.write_relationships( + "ignored", + "RESOURCE", + "provider-1", + [ + { + "start_element_id": "s", + "end_element_id": "e", + "provider_element_id": "pe", + "props": {}, + } + ], + ) + + query = session.run.call_args.args[0] + assert "MATCH (s) WHERE id(s) = row.start_element_id" in query + assert "MATCH (e) WHERE id(e) = row.end_element_id" in query + assert "MERGE (s)-[r:`RESOURCE`" in query + + +class TestNeptuneSinkDropSubgraph: + def test_drop_subgraph_deletes_rels_before_nodes_in_bounded_batches(self): + from api.attack_paths.sink.neptune import NeptuneSink + + sink = NeptuneSink() + session = MagicMock() + + rel_record_first = MagicMock() + rel_record_first.__getitem__ = lambda _self, key: 50 + rel_record_drain = MagicMock() + rel_record_drain.__getitem__ = lambda _self, key: 0 + node_record_first = MagicMock() + node_record_first.__getitem__ = lambda _self, key: 10 + node_record_drain = MagicMock() + node_record_drain.__getitem__ = lambda _self, key: 0 + + run_results = [ + MagicMock(single=MagicMock(return_value=rel_record_first)), + MagicMock(single=MagicMock(return_value=rel_record_drain)), + MagicMock(single=MagicMock(return_value=node_record_first)), + MagicMock(single=MagicMock(return_value=node_record_drain)), + ] + session.run.side_effect = run_results + + with patch.object(sink, "get_session", return_value=_session_ctx(session)): + deleted = sink.drop_subgraph("ignored", "provider-1") + + assert deleted == 10 + first_query = session.run.call_args_list[0].args[0] + assert "DELETE r" in first_query + assert "DETACH DELETE" not in first_query + # DISTINCT avoids double-counting relationships matched from both ends. + assert "DISTINCT r" in first_query + third_query = session.run.call_args_list[2].args[0] + assert "DELETE n" in third_query + + +class TestNeo4jSinkDropSubgraph: + """Neo4j drop deletes relationships then nodes in batches (no ``DETACH DELETE``).""" + + def test_drop_subgraph_deletes_rels_before_nodes_in_bounded_batches(self): + from api.attack_paths.sink.neo4j import Neo4jSink + + sink = Neo4jSink() + session = MagicMock() + + rel_first = MagicMock() + rel_first.get = lambda key, default=0: 50 + rel_drain = MagicMock() + rel_drain.get = lambda key, default=0: 0 + node_first = MagicMock() + node_first.get = lambda key, default=0: 10 + node_drain = MagicMock() + node_drain.get = lambda key, default=0: 0 + session.run.side_effect = [ + MagicMock(single=MagicMock(return_value=rel_first)), + MagicMock(single=MagicMock(return_value=rel_drain)), + MagicMock(single=MagicMock(return_value=node_first)), + MagicMock(single=MagicMock(return_value=node_drain)), + ] + + provider_id = "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000abc" + with patch.object(sink, "get_session", return_value=_session_ctx(session)): + deleted = sink.drop_subgraph("db-tenant-x", provider_id) + + # Only phase-2 node counts contribute to the return value. + assert deleted == 10 + assert session.run.call_count == 4 + + queries = [call.args[0] for call in session.run.call_args_list] + # Regression guard: the memory blow-up was caused by DETACH DELETE. + assert all("DETACH DELETE" not in query for query in queries) + + first_query = queries[0] + assert "DELETE r" in first_query + # DISTINCT avoids double-counting relationships matched from both ends. + assert "DISTINCT r" in first_query + assert ":`_Provider_00000000000000000000000000000abc`" in first_query + + assert "DELETE n" in queries[2] + + # Relationships must be fully drained before nodes are deleted. + first_node = next(i for i, q in enumerate(queries) if "DELETE n" in q) + last_rel = max(i for i, q in enumerate(queries) if "DELETE r" in q) + assert last_rel < first_node + + def test_drop_subgraph_returns_zero_when_database_does_not_exist(self): + from api.attack_paths.database import GraphDatabaseQueryException + from api.attack_paths.sink.neo4j import DATABASE_NOT_FOUND_CODE, Neo4jSink + + sink = Neo4jSink() + session = MagicMock() + session.run.side_effect = GraphDatabaseQueryException( + message="db missing", code=DATABASE_NOT_FOUND_CODE + ) + + with patch.object(sink, "get_session", return_value=_session_ctx(session)): + deleted = sink.drop_subgraph("db-tenant-missing", "provider-1") + + assert deleted == 0 + + +class TestSinkHasProviderData: + """``has_provider_data`` is the read-path probe used by API views.""" + + def test_neo4j_returns_true_when_provider_node_exists(self): + from api.attack_paths.sink.neo4j import Neo4jSink + + sink = Neo4jSink() + session = MagicMock() + session.run.return_value.single.return_value = MagicMock() + with patch.object(sink, "get_session", return_value=_session_ctx(session)): + present = sink.has_provider_data( + "db-tenant-x", "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000abc" + ) + + assert present is True + query = session.run.call_args.args[0] + assert ":`_Provider_00000000000000000000000000000abc`" in query + + def test_neo4j_returns_false_when_database_does_not_exist(self): + from api.attack_paths.database import GraphDatabaseQueryException + from api.attack_paths.sink.neo4j import DATABASE_NOT_FOUND_CODE, Neo4jSink + + sink = Neo4jSink() + session = MagicMock() + session.run.side_effect = GraphDatabaseQueryException( + message="db missing", code=DATABASE_NOT_FOUND_CODE + ) + + with patch.object(sink, "get_session", return_value=_session_ctx(session)): + present = sink.has_provider_data("db-tenant-missing", "provider-1") + + assert present is False + + def test_neptune_returns_true_when_provider_node_exists(self): + from api.attack_paths.sink.neptune import NeptuneSink + + sink = NeptuneSink() + session = MagicMock() + session.run.return_value.single.return_value = MagicMock() + with patch.object(sink, "get_session", return_value=_session_ctx(session)): + present = sink.has_provider_data("ignored", "provider-1") + + assert present is True + + +class TestGetBackendForScanCutover: + """``get_backend_for_scan`` keeps old-sink scans queryable after cutover.""" + + def test_legacy_scan_on_neptune_process_uses_neo4j_secondary(self, settings): + from api.attack_paths.sink import factory + + settings.ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE = "neptune" + active_neptune = MagicMock(name="neptune-active") + factory._backend = active_neptune + + secondary_neo4j = MagicMock(name="neo4j-secondary") + with patch.object(factory, "_build_backend", return_value=secondary_neo4j): + scan = MagicMock(sink_backend="neo4j") + backend = factory.get_backend_for_scan(scan) + + assert backend is secondary_neo4j + assert backend is not active_neptune + + +class TestSinkVerifyConnectivity: + """The readiness probe calls ``verify_connectivity`` through the shim. + + Neo4j checks its single driver; Neptune checks the reader (the API read + path), which on single-endpoint clusters aliases the writer. + """ + + @patch("api.attack_paths.sink.neo4j.neo4j.GraphDatabase.driver") + def test_neo4j_verifies_its_driver(self, mock_driver, settings): + from api.attack_paths.sink.neo4j import Neo4jSink + + settings.DATABASES = { + **settings.DATABASES, + "neo4j": { + "HOST": "localhost", + "PORT": "7687", + "USER": "neo4j", + "PASSWORD": "pw", + }, + } + driver = MagicMock() + mock_driver.return_value = driver + + sink = Neo4jSink() + sink.init() + driver.verify_connectivity.reset_mock() # ignore the eager init check + sink.verify_connectivity() + + driver.verify_connectivity.assert_called_once_with() + + @patch("api.attack_paths.sink.neptune.neptune_auth_provider") + @patch("api.attack_paths.sink.neptune.neo4j.GraphDatabase.driver") + def test_neptune_verifies_reader_not_writer( + self, mock_driver, mock_auth_provider, settings + ): + from api.attack_paths.sink.neptune import NeptuneSink + + settings.DATABASES = { + **settings.DATABASES, + "neptune": { + "WRITER_ENDPOINT": "writer.example", + "READER_ENDPOINT": "reader.example", + "PORT": "8182", + "REGION": "eu-west-1", + }, + } + writer, reader = MagicMock(name="writer"), MagicMock(name="reader") + mock_driver.side_effect = [writer, reader] + mock_auth_provider.return_value = lambda: None + + sink = NeptuneSink() + sink.init() + writer.verify_connectivity.reset_mock() + reader.verify_connectivity.reset_mock() + + sink.verify_connectivity() + + reader.verify_connectivity.assert_called_once_with() + writer.verify_connectivity.assert_not_called() + + +class TestSinkInitToleratesUnreachableSink: + """Init must not crash the process when the sink is down at boot. + + Same degradation model as Postgres: the driver is retained and + reconnects lazily; /health/ready surfaces the outage until it recovers. + """ + + @patch("api.attack_paths.sink.neo4j.neo4j.GraphDatabase.driver") + def test_neo4j_init_continues_when_verify_fails(self, mock_driver, settings): + from api.attack_paths.sink.neo4j import Neo4jSink + + settings.DATABASES = { + **settings.DATABASES, + "neo4j": { + "HOST": "localhost", + "PORT": "7687", + "USER": "neo4j", + "PASSWORD": "pw", + }, + } + driver = MagicMock() + driver.verify_connectivity.side_effect = RuntimeError("unreachable") + mock_driver.return_value = driver + + sink = Neo4jSink() + # Must not raise. + assert sink.init() is driver + assert sink._driver is driver + + @patch("api.attack_paths.sink.neptune.neptune_auth_provider") + @patch("api.attack_paths.sink.neptune.neo4j.GraphDatabase.driver") + def test_neptune_init_continues_when_verify_fails( + self, mock_driver, mock_auth_provider, settings + ): + from api.attack_paths.sink.neptune import NeptuneSink + + settings.DATABASES = { + **settings.DATABASES, + "neptune": { + "WRITER_ENDPOINT": "writer.example", + "READER_ENDPOINT": "reader.example", + "PORT": "8182", + "REGION": "eu-west-1", + }, + } + driver = MagicMock() + driver.verify_connectivity.side_effect = RuntimeError("unreachable") + mock_driver.return_value = driver + mock_auth_provider.return_value = lambda: None + + sink = NeptuneSink() + # Must not raise; both drivers retained. + sink.init() + assert sink._writer is not None + assert sink._reader is not None + + +class TestNeptuneAdminNoOps: + """Neptune is single-database; admin DDL has no work to do.""" + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("method", ["create_database", "drop_database"]) + def test_admin_ops_return_none_without_touching_a_session(self, method): + from api.attack_paths.sink.neptune import NeptuneSink + + sink = NeptuneSink() + with patch.object(sink, "get_session") as get_session: + assert getattr(sink, method)("ignored") is None + get_session.assert_not_called() + + +class TestNeptuneAuthToken: + """SigV4 signing for the Neptune Bolt endpoint.""" + + @patch("api.attack_paths.sink.neptune.SigV4Auth") + @patch("api.attack_paths.sink.neptune.BotoSession") + def test_host_header_includes_non_default_port(self, mock_boto, mock_sigv4): + # Neptune runs on 8182; the SigV4 canonical Host must keep the port or + # the signature is rejected. + from api.attack_paths.sink.neptune import _NeptuneAuthToken + + credentials = MagicMock() + credentials.get_frozen_credentials.return_value = MagicMock() + mock_boto.return_value.get_credentials.return_value = credentials + + token = _NeptuneAuthToken("eu-west-1", "https://writer.example:8182") + + auth_obj = json.loads(token.credentials) + assert auth_obj["Host"] == "writer.example:8182" diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_sse.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_sse.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e6fdf21130 --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_sse.py @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +"""Tests for the platform SSE infrastructure (``api.sse``). + +Cover the two security-critical platform pieces — the channel-name +convention (:mod:`api.sse.utils`) and the tenant gate enforced by +:class:`api.sse.channelmanager.SSEChannelManager`. The SSE authentication +class lives in :mod:`api.authentication` with the rest of the auth stack, +so its tests live in ``test_authentication.py``. Per-feature SSE endpoints +add their own tests on top of these. +""" + +import uuid +from unittest.mock import MagicMock + +import pytest +from api.sse.base_views import BaseSSEViewSet +from api.sse.channelmanager import SSEChannelManager +from api.sse.utils import make_channel_name, tenant_id_from_channel +from django.http import StreamingHttpResponse +from rest_framework.test import APIRequestFactory, force_authenticate + + +class TestMakeChannel: + def test_round_trips_tenant_id(self): + tenant_id = uuid.uuid4() + channel = make_channel_name("lighthouse-session", tenant_id, uuid.uuid4()) + assert tenant_id_from_channel(channel) == tenant_id + + def test_accepts_str_arguments(self): + tenant_id = uuid.uuid4() + channel = make_channel_name("lighthouse-session", str(tenant_id), "resource-1") + assert channel == f"lighthouse-session:{tenant_id}:resource-1" + + def test_prefix_with_hyphen_is_not_split(self): + # Prefixes contain hyphens but never colons, so the tenant id is + # always the second colon-separated segment. + tenant_id = uuid.uuid4() + channel = make_channel_name("a-long-hyphenated-prefix", tenant_id, "res") + assert tenant_id_from_channel(channel) == tenant_id + + @pytest.mark.parametrize( + "prefix, tenant_id, resource_id", + [ + ("evil:prefix", uuid.uuid4(), "res"), + ("prefix", uuid.uuid4(), "res:extra"), + ("prefix", "tenant:smuggled", "res"), + ], + ) + def test_rejects_separator_injection(self, prefix, tenant_id, resource_id): + # A colon in any segment would let a crafted name smuggle extra + # segments past the parser, so construction must fail loudly. + with pytest.raises(ValueError): + make_channel_name(prefix, tenant_id, resource_id) + + +class TestTenantIdFromChannel: + def test_returns_none_for_too_few_segments(self): + assert tenant_id_from_channel("prefix:only") is None + assert tenant_id_from_channel("garbage") is None + + def test_returns_none_for_too_many_segments(self): + # A valid tenant UUID in position 1 must not authorize a + # non-canonical name that carries extra segments. + tenant_id = uuid.uuid4() + assert tenant_id_from_channel(f"prefix:{tenant_id}:resource:extra") is None + + def test_returns_none_for_non_uuid_tenant_segment(self): + assert tenant_id_from_channel("prefix:not-a-uuid:resource") is None + + def test_parses_valid_channel(self): + tenant_id = uuid.uuid4() + assert tenant_id_from_channel(f"prefix:{tenant_id}:resource") == tenant_id + + +@pytest.mark.django_db +class TestSSEChannelManager: + def test_member_can_read_own_tenant_channel( + self, create_test_user, tenants_fixture + ): + tenant = tenants_fixture[0] + channel = make_channel_name("lighthouse-session", tenant.id, uuid.uuid4()) + assert SSEChannelManager().can_read_channel(create_test_user, channel) + + def test_non_member_cannot_read_other_tenant_channel( + self, create_test_user, tenants_fixture + ): + # create_test_user is a member of tenant1 and tenant2 but not tenant3. + foreign_tenant = tenants_fixture[2] + channel = make_channel_name( + "lighthouse-session", foreign_tenant.id, uuid.uuid4() + ) + assert not SSEChannelManager().can_read_channel(create_test_user, channel) + + def test_anonymous_user_is_rejected(self, tenants_fixture): + channel = make_channel_name( + "lighthouse-session", tenants_fixture[0].id, uuid.uuid4() + ) + assert not SSEChannelManager().can_read_channel(None, channel) + + anon = MagicMock(is_authenticated=False) + assert not SSEChannelManager().can_read_channel(anon, channel) + + def test_malformed_channel_is_rejected(self, create_test_user, tenants_fixture): + assert not SSEChannelManager().can_read_channel(create_test_user, "garbage") + + def test_get_channels_for_request_returns_active_tenant_channels(self): + tenant_id = uuid.uuid4() + own = make_channel_name("prefix", tenant_id, "resource") + request = MagicMock() + request.tenant_id = str(tenant_id) + request.sse_channels = {own} + assert SSEChannelManager().get_channels_for_request(request, {}) == {own} + + def test_get_channels_for_request_drops_other_tenant_channels(self): + # Fail-closed: a channel for a tenant other than the active JWT + # tenant is dropped before reaching django-eventstream, even if the + # viewset mistakenly stashed it. This is the primary tenant gate that + # binds authorization to request.tenant_id, not just membership. + active_tenant = uuid.uuid4() + own = make_channel_name("prefix", active_tenant, "resource") + foreign = make_channel_name("prefix", uuid.uuid4(), "resource") + request = MagicMock() + request.tenant_id = str(active_tenant) + request.sse_channels = {own, foreign} + assert SSEChannelManager().get_channels_for_request(request, {}) == {own} + + def test_get_channels_for_request_drops_malformed_channels(self): + request = MagicMock() + request.tenant_id = str(uuid.uuid4()) + request.sse_channels = {"garbage", "prefix:not-a-uuid:resource"} + assert SSEChannelManager().get_channels_for_request(request, {}) == set() + + def test_get_channels_for_request_without_tenant_returns_empty(self): + # No active tenant on the request (auth/RLS never ran) → fail closed, + # regardless of any channels stashed on it. + request = MagicMock(spec=[]) + assert SSEChannelManager().get_channels_for_request(request, {}) == set() + + def test_get_channels_for_request_defaults_to_empty(self): + # A request that never went through BaseSSEViewSet.list has no + # sse_channels attribute; the manager must not raise. + request = object() + assert SSEChannelManager().get_channels_for_request(request, {}) == set() + + def test_channel_is_not_reliable(self): + # v1 ships without server-side replay storage. + assert ( + SSEChannelManager().is_channel_reliable("prefix:tenant:resource") is False + ) + + +@pytest.mark.django_db +class TestBaseSSEViewSet: + """End-to-end check that the base viewset opens a stream. + + ``BaseSSEViewSet.list`` hands the DRF ``Request`` straight to + django-eventstream's ``events()``, which is written for a plain + Django request. This drives a real request through the full DRF + stack (authentication, RLS, content negotiation, channel manager) + and asserts the result is an SSE stream, so the DRF/Django request + mismatch cannot regress silently. + """ + + def test_list_opens_event_stream(self, create_test_user, tenants_fixture): + tenant = tenants_fixture[0] + channel = make_channel_name("test-sse", tenant.id, uuid.uuid4()) + seen_tenant_ids = [] + + class _StreamingSSEViewSet(BaseSSEViewSet): + def get_channels(self): + # Reached only after dispatch/initial ran, so the RLS + # tenant context is already on the request. + seen_tenant_ids.append(self.request.tenant_id) + return {channel} + + request = APIRequestFactory().get("/api/v1/test-sse/stream") + force_authenticate( + request, user=create_test_user, token={"tenant_id": str(tenant.id)} + ) + + view = _StreamingSSEViewSet.as_view({"get": "list"}) + response = view(request) + + # A StreamingHttpResponse (not the plain HttpResponse used for SSE + # error envelopes) means events() accepted the DRF request, the + # channel manager handed it a non-empty channel set, and the + # stream was opened end to end. + assert isinstance(response, StreamingHttpResponse) + assert response.status_code == 200 + assert response["Content-Type"] == "text/event-stream" + assert seen_tenant_ids == [str(tenant.id)] diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_utils.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_utils.py index 3fd9235dac..935a15c4f3 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_utils.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_utils.py @@ -1,9 +1,7 @@ -from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch import pytest -from rest_framework.exceptions import NotFound, ValidationError - from api.db_router import MainRouter from api.exceptions import InvitationTokenExpiredException from api.models import Integration, Invitation, Provider @@ -35,6 +33,7 @@ from prowler.providers.okta.okta_provider import OktaProvider from prowler.providers.openstack.openstack_provider import OpenstackProvider from prowler.providers.oraclecloud.oraclecloud_provider import OraclecloudProvider from prowler.providers.vercel.vercel_provider import VercelProvider +from rest_framework.exceptions import NotFound, ValidationError class TestMergeDicts: @@ -623,7 +622,7 @@ class TestValidateInvitation: invitation = MagicMock(spec=Invitation) invitation.token = "VALID_TOKEN" invitation.email = "user@example.com" - invitation.expires_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=1) + invitation.expires_at = datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(days=1) invitation.state = Invitation.State.PENDING invitation.tenant = MagicMock() return invitation @@ -671,7 +670,7 @@ class TestValidateInvitation: ) def test_invitation_expired(self, invitation): - expired_time = datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=1) + expired_time = datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(days=1) invitation.expires_at = expired_time with ( @@ -680,7 +679,7 @@ class TestValidateInvitation: ): mock_db = mock_using.return_value mock_db.get.return_value = invitation - mock_datetime.now.return_value = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + mock_datetime.now.return_value = datetime.now(UTC) with pytest.raises(InvitationTokenExpiredException): validate_invitation("VALID_TOKEN", "user@example.com") @@ -725,7 +724,7 @@ class TestValidateInvitation: invitation = MagicMock(spec=Invitation) invitation.token = "VALID_TOKEN" invitation.email = uppercase_email - invitation.expires_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=1) + invitation.expires_at = datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(days=1) invitation.state = Invitation.State.PENDING invitation.tenant = MagicMock() diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_uuid_utils.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_uuid_utils.py index e202d087f3..a69d71cee9 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_uuid_utils.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_uuid_utils.py @@ -1,23 +1,22 @@ -from datetime import datetime, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime from uuid import uuid4 import pytest +from api.uuid_utils import ( + datetime_from_uuid7, + datetime_to_uuid7, + transform_into_uuid7, + uuid7_end, + uuid7_range, + uuid7_start, +) from dateutil.relativedelta import relativedelta from rest_framework_json_api.serializers import ValidationError from uuid6 import UUID -from api.uuid_utils import ( - transform_into_uuid7, - datetime_to_uuid7, - datetime_from_uuid7, - uuid7_start, - uuid7_end, - uuid7_range, -) - def test_transform_into_uuid7_valid(): - uuid_v7 = datetime_to_uuid7(datetime.now(timezone.utc)) + uuid_v7 = datetime_to_uuid7(datetime.now(UTC)) transformed_uuid = transform_into_uuid7(uuid_v7) assert transformed_uuid == UUID(hex=uuid_v7.hex.upper()) assert transformed_uuid.version == 7 @@ -33,8 +32,8 @@ def test_transform_into_uuid7_invalid_version(): @pytest.mark.parametrize( "input_datetime", [ - datetime(2024, 9, 11, 7, 20, 27, tzinfo=timezone.utc), - datetime(2023, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc), + datetime(2024, 9, 11, 7, 20, 27, tzinfo=UTC), + datetime(2023, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, tzinfo=UTC), ], ) def test_datetime_to_uuid7(input_datetime): @@ -48,8 +47,8 @@ def test_datetime_to_uuid7(input_datetime): @pytest.mark.parametrize( "input_datetime", [ - datetime(2024, 9, 11, 7, 20, 27, tzinfo=timezone.utc), - datetime(2023, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc), + datetime(2024, 9, 11, 7, 20, 27, tzinfo=UTC), + datetime(2023, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, tzinfo=UTC), ], ) def test_datetime_from_uuid7(input_datetime): @@ -65,7 +64,7 @@ def test_datetime_from_uuid7_invalid(): def test_uuid7_start(): - dt = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + dt = datetime.now(UTC) uuid = datetime_to_uuid7(dt) start_uuid = uuid7_start(uuid) expected_dt = dt.replace(hour=0, minute=0, second=0, microsecond=0) @@ -76,7 +75,7 @@ def test_uuid7_start(): @pytest.mark.parametrize("months_offset", [0, 1, 10, 30, 60]) def test_uuid7_end(months_offset): - dt = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + dt = datetime.now(UTC) uuid = datetime_to_uuid7(dt) end_uuid = uuid7_end(uuid, months_offset) expected_dt = dt.replace(day=1, hour=0, minute=0, second=0, microsecond=0) @@ -87,7 +86,7 @@ def test_uuid7_end(months_offset): def test_uuid7_range(): - dt_now = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + dt_now = datetime.now(UTC) uuid_list = [ datetime_to_uuid7(dt_now), datetime_to_uuid7(dt_now.replace(year=2023)), diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_views.py b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_views.py index 410bd23e19..d0f2f3f7c3 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_views.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/tests/test_views.py @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import io import json import os import tempfile -from datetime import date, datetime, timedelta, timezone +from datetime import UTC, date, datetime, timedelta from decimal import Decimal from pathlib import Path from types import SimpleNamespace @@ -15,31 +15,6 @@ import jwt import pytest from allauth.account.models import EmailAddress from allauth.socialaccount.models import SocialAccount, SocialApp -from botocore.exceptions import ClientError, NoCredentialsError -from conftest import ( - API_JSON_CONTENT_TYPE, - TEST_PASSWORD, - TEST_USER, - TODAY, - today_after_n_days, -) -from django.conf import settings -from django.db import connection -from django.db.models import Count -from django.http import JsonResponse -from django.test import RequestFactory -from django.test.utils import CaptureQueriesContext -from django.urls import reverse -from django_celery_results.models import TaskResult -from rest_framework import status -from rest_framework.exceptions import PermissionDenied -from rest_framework.response import Response -from rest_framework_simplejwt.token_blacklist.models import ( - BlacklistedToken, - OutstandingToken, -) -from rest_framework_simplejwt.tokens import RefreshToken - from api.attack_paths import ( AttackPathsQueryDefinition, AttackPathsQueryParameterDefinition, @@ -84,8 +59,32 @@ from api.models import ( from api.rls import Tenant from api.v1.serializers import TokenSerializer from api.v1.views import ComplianceOverviewViewSet, TenantFinishACSView +from botocore.exceptions import ClientError, NoCredentialsError +from conftest import ( + API_JSON_CONTENT_TYPE, + TEST_PASSWORD, + TEST_USER, + TODAY, + today_after_n_days, +) +from django.conf import settings +from django.db import connection +from django.db.models import Count +from django.http import JsonResponse +from django.test import RequestFactory +from django.test.utils import CaptureQueriesContext +from django.urls import reverse +from django_celery_results.models import TaskResult from prowler.lib.check.models import Severity from prowler.lib.outputs.finding import Status +from rest_framework import status +from rest_framework.exceptions import PermissionDenied +from rest_framework.response import Response +from rest_framework_simplejwt.token_blacklist.models import ( + BlacklistedToken, + OutstandingToken, +) +from rest_framework_simplejwt.tokens import RefreshToken class TestViewSet: @@ -1411,6 +1410,42 @@ class TestProviderViewSet: ) assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST + def test_providers_filter_provider_groups( + self, + authenticated_client, + tenants_fixture, + providers_fixture, + provider_groups_fixture, + ): + tenant = tenants_fixture[0] + provider1, provider2, *_ = providers_fixture + group1, group2, *_ = provider_groups_fixture + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=provider1, provider_group=group1 + ) + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=provider1, provider_group=group2 + ) + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=provider2, provider_group=group2 + ) + + response = authenticated_client.get( + reverse("provider-list"), {"filter[provider_groups]": str(group1.id)} + ) + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK + data = response.json()["data"] + assert [item["id"] for item in data] == [str(provider1.id)] + + response = authenticated_client.get( + reverse("provider-list"), + {"filter[provider_groups__in]": f"{group1.id},{group2.id}"}, + ) + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK + provider_ids = {item["id"] for item in response.json()["data"]} + assert provider_ids == {str(provider1.id), str(provider2.id)} + assert len(response.json()["data"]) == 2 + def test_providers_disable_pagination( self, authenticated_client, providers_fixture, tenants_fixture ): @@ -1472,9 +1507,9 @@ class TestProviderViewSet: included_data = response.json()["included"] for expected_type in expected_resources: - assert any( - d.get("type") == expected_type for d in included_data - ), f"Expected type '{expected_type}' not found in included data" + assert any(d.get("type") == expected_type for d in included_data), ( + f"Expected type '{expected_type}' not found in included data" + ) def test_providers_retrieve(self, authenticated_client, providers_fixture): provider1, *_ = providers_fixture @@ -3715,6 +3750,41 @@ class TestScanViewSet: assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK assert len(response.json()["data"]) == expected_count + def test_scans_filter_provider_groups( + self, + authenticated_client, + tenants_fixture, + scans_fixture, + provider_groups_fixture, + ): + tenant = tenants_fixture[0] + scan1, scan2, *_ = scans_fixture + group1, group2, *_ = provider_groups_fixture + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=scan1.provider, provider_group=group1 + ) + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=scan1.provider, provider_group=group2 + ) + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=scan2.provider, provider_group=group2 + ) + + response = authenticated_client.get( + reverse("scan-list"), {"filter[provider_groups]": str(group1.id)} + ) + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK + assert {item["id"] for item in response.json()["data"]} == {str(scan1.id)} + + response = authenticated_client.get( + reverse("scan-list"), + {"filter[provider_groups__in]": f"{group1.id},{group2.id}"}, + ) + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK + scan_ids = {item["id"] for item in response.json()["data"]} + assert scan_ids == {str(scan1.id), str(scan2.id), str(scans_fixture[2].id)} + assert len(response.json()["data"]) == 3 + @pytest.mark.parametrize( "filter_name", [ @@ -4217,11 +4287,11 @@ class TestScanViewSet: "Contents": [ { "Key": old_key, - "LastModified": datetime(2024, 1, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc), + "LastModified": datetime(2024, 1, 1, tzinfo=UTC), }, { "Key": latest_key, - "LastModified": datetime(2024, 2, 2, tzinfo=timezone.utc), + "LastModified": datetime(2024, 2, 2, tzinfo=UTC), }, ] } @@ -4470,7 +4540,7 @@ class TestScanViewSet: ) # `inserted_at` is `auto_now_add`, and within the test transaction the DB # `now()` is constant, so force distinct timestamps to make order_by stable. - base = datetime(2024, 1, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc) + base = datetime(2024, 1, 1, tzinfo=UTC) Task.objects.filter(pk=old_task.pk).update(inserted_at=base) Task.objects.filter(pk=new_task.pk).update( inserted_at=base + timedelta(hours=1) @@ -4684,6 +4754,64 @@ class TestAttackPathsScanViewSet: assert first_attributes["provider_type"] == provider.provider assert first_attributes["provider_uid"] == provider.uid + def test_attack_paths_scans_list_prefers_active_sink_scan_on_rollback( + self, + authenticated_client, + providers_fixture, + scans_fixture, + create_attack_paths_scan, + settings, + ): + settings.ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE = "neo4j" + provider = providers_fixture[0] + + neo4j_scan = create_attack_paths_scan( + provider, + scan=scans_fixture[0], + state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, + graph_data_ready=True, + sink_backend="neo4j", + ) + neptune_scan = create_attack_paths_scan( + provider, + scan=scans_fixture[0], + state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, + graph_data_ready=True, + sink_backend="neptune", + ) + + response = authenticated_client.get(reverse("attack-paths-scans-list")) + + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK + ids = {item["id"] for item in response.json()["data"]} + assert str(neo4j_scan.id) in ids + assert str(neptune_scan.id) not in ids + + def test_attack_paths_scans_list_falls_back_when_active_sink_has_no_scan( + self, + authenticated_client, + providers_fixture, + scans_fixture, + create_attack_paths_scan, + settings, + ): + settings.ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE = "neptune" + provider = providers_fixture[0] + + legacy_scan = create_attack_paths_scan( + provider, + scan=scans_fixture[0], + state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, + graph_data_ready=True, + sink_backend="neo4j", + ) + + response = authenticated_client.get(reverse("attack-paths-scans-list")) + + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK + ids = {item["id"] for item in response.json()["data"]} + assert str(legacy_scan.id) in ids + def test_attack_paths_scans_list_respects_provider_group_visibility( self, authenticated_client_no_permissions_rbac, @@ -4804,7 +4932,8 @@ class TestAttackPathsScanViewSet: ) assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK - mock_get_queries.assert_called_once_with(provider.provider) + # TODO: drop the is_migrated argument after Neptune cutover + mock_get_queries.assert_called_once_with(provider.provider, is_migrated=False) payload = response.json()["data"] assert len(payload) == 1 assert payload[0]["id"] == "aws-rds" @@ -4904,7 +5033,8 @@ class TestAttackPathsScanViewSet: ) assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK - mock_get_query.assert_called_once_with("aws-rds") + # TODO: drop the is_migrated argument after Neptune cutover + mock_get_query.assert_called_once_with("aws-rds", is_migrated=False) mock_get_db_name.assert_called_once_with(attack_paths_scan.provider.tenant_id) provider_id = str(attack_paths_scan.provider_id) mock_prepare.assert_called_once_with( @@ -4918,6 +5048,7 @@ class TestAttackPathsScanViewSet: query_definition, prepared_parameters, provider_id, + scan=attack_paths_scan, ) result = response.json()["data"] attributes = result["attributes"] @@ -5269,6 +5400,7 @@ class TestAttackPathsScanViewSet: "db-test", "MATCH (n) RETURN n", str(attack_paths_scan.provider_id), + scan=attack_paths_scan, ) attributes = response.json()["data"]["attributes"] assert len(attributes["nodes"]) == 1 @@ -5714,13 +5846,13 @@ class TestAttackPathsScanViewSet: content_type=API_JSON_CONTENT_TYPE, ) if i < 10: - assert ( - response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK - ), f"Request {i + 1} should succeed with 200 OK, got {response.status_code}" + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK, ( + f"Request {i + 1} should succeed with 200 OK, got {response.status_code}" + ) else: - assert ( - response.status_code == status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS - ), f"Request {i + 1} should be throttled" + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS, ( + f"Request {i + 1} should be throttled" + ) # -- Timeout simulation ------------------------------------------------------- @@ -5805,9 +5937,10 @@ class TestAttackPathsScanViewSet: ) assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK - mock_get_schema.assert_called_once_with( - "db-test", str(attack_paths_scan.provider_id) - ) + mock_get_schema.assert_called_once() + schema_args = mock_get_schema.call_args[0] + assert schema_args[:2] == ("db-test", str(attack_paths_scan.provider_id)) + assert schema_args[2].id == attack_paths_scan.id attributes = response.json()["data"]["attributes"] assert attributes["provider"] == "aws" assert attributes["cartography_version"] == "0.129.0" @@ -5923,9 +6056,9 @@ class TestResourceViewSet: included_data = response.json()["included"] for expected_type in expected_resources: - assert any( - d.get("type") == expected_type for d in included_data - ), f"Expected type '{expected_type}' not found in included data" + assert any(d.get("type") == expected_type for d in included_data), ( + f"Expected type '{expected_type}' not found in included data" + ) @pytest.mark.parametrize( "filter_name, filter_value, expected_count", @@ -5996,6 +6129,49 @@ class TestResourceViewSet: assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK assert len(response.json()["data"]) == expected_count + def test_resource_filter_provider_groups( + self, + authenticated_client, + tenants_fixture, + resources_fixture, + provider_groups_fixture, + ): + tenant = tenants_fixture[0] + resource1, resource2, resource3, *_ = resources_fixture + group1, group2, *_ = provider_groups_fixture + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=resource1.provider, provider_group=group1 + ) + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=resource1.provider, provider_group=group2 + ) + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=resource3.provider, provider_group=group2 + ) + + response = authenticated_client.get( + reverse("resource-list"), + {"filter[updated_at]": TODAY, "filter[provider_groups]": str(group1.id)}, + ) + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK + assert len(response.json()["data"]) == 2 + assert {item["id"] for item in response.json()["data"]} == { + str(resource1.id), + str(resource2.id), + } + + response = authenticated_client.get( + reverse("resource-list"), + { + "filter[updated_at]": TODAY, + "filter[provider_groups__in]": f"{group1.id},{group2.id}", + }, + ) + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK + resource_ids = {item["id"] for item in response.json()["data"]} + assert resource_ids == {str(resource1.id), str(resource2.id), str(resource3.id)} + assert len(response.json()["data"]) == 3 + def test_resource_filter_by_scan_id( self, authenticated_client, resources_fixture, scans_fixture ): @@ -6474,9 +6650,9 @@ class TestResourceViewSet: (e for e in errors if e["source"]["parameter"] == expected_invalid_param), None, ) - assert ( - error is not None - ), f"Expected error for parameter '{expected_invalid_param}'" + assert error is not None, ( + f"Expected error for parameter '{expected_invalid_param}'" + ) assert error["code"] == "invalid" assert error["status"] == "400" # Must be string per JSON:API spec assert expected_invalid_param in error["detail"] @@ -6865,9 +7041,8 @@ class TestResourceViewSet: This ensures the endpoint follows API conventions where missing authentication returns 401 Unauthorized, not 404 Not Found. """ - from rest_framework.test import APIClient - from api.models import Resource + from rest_framework.test import APIClient aws_provider = providers_fixture[0] # AWS provider from fixture @@ -6940,9 +7115,8 @@ class TestResourceViewSet: This ensures authentication errors are properly distinguished from resource not found errors. """ - from rest_framework.test import APIClient - from api.models import Resource + from rest_framework.test import APIClient aws_provider = providers_fixture[0] @@ -6960,9 +7134,8 @@ class TestResourceViewSet: tenant = tenants_fixture[0] expired_payload = { "token_type": "access", - "exp": datetime.now(timezone.utc) - - timedelta(hours=1), # Expired 1 hour ago - "iat": datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(hours=2), + "exp": datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(hours=1), # Expired 1 hour ago + "iat": datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(hours=2), "jti": str(uuid4()), "user_id": str(uuid4()), "tenant_id": str(tenant.id), @@ -6987,9 +7160,8 @@ class TestResourceViewSet: Malformed or invalid tokens should return 401 Unauthorized, not 404 Not Found. """ - from rest_framework.test import APIClient - from api.models import Resource + from rest_framework.test import APIClient aws_provider = providers_fixture[0] @@ -7008,16 +7180,16 @@ class TestResourceViewSet: # Test with completely malformed token client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION="Bearer not.a.valid.jwt.token") response = client.get(reverse("resource-events", kwargs={"pk": resource.id})) - assert ( - response.status_code == status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED - ), f"Expected 401 for malformed token but got {response.status_code}" + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, ( + f"Expected 401 for malformed token but got {response.status_code}" + ) # Test with empty bearer token client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION="Bearer ") response = client.get(reverse("resource-events", kwargs={"pk": resource.id})) - assert ( - response.status_code == status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED - ), f"Expected 401 for empty bearer token but got {response.status_code}" + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, ( + f"Expected 401 for empty bearer token but got {response.status_code}" + ) @pytest.mark.django_db @@ -7152,9 +7324,9 @@ class TestFindingViewSet: included_data = response.json()["included"] for expected_type in expected_resources: - assert any( - d.get("type") == expected_type for d in included_data - ), f"Expected type '{expected_type}' not found in included data" + assert any(d.get("type") == expected_type for d in included_data), ( + f"Expected type '{expected_type}' not found in included data" + ) @pytest.mark.parametrize( "filter_name, filter_value, expected_count", @@ -7308,6 +7480,40 @@ class TestFindingViewSet: assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK assert len(response.json()["data"]) == 2 + def test_finding_filter_provider_groups( + self, + authenticated_client, + tenants_fixture, + findings_fixture, + provider_groups_fixture, + ): + tenant = tenants_fixture[0] + finding1, finding2, *_ = findings_fixture + group1, group2, *_ = provider_groups_fixture + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=finding1.scan.provider, provider_group=group1 + ) + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=finding1.scan.provider, provider_group=group2 + ) + + response = authenticated_client.get( + reverse("finding-list"), + {"filter[inserted_at]": TODAY, "filter[provider_groups]": str(group1.id)}, + ) + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK + assert len(response.json()["data"]) == 2 + + response = authenticated_client.get( + reverse("finding-list"), + { + "filter[inserted_at]": TODAY, + "filter[provider_groups__in]": f"{group1.id},{group2.id}", + }, + ) + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK + assert len(response.json()["data"]) == 2 + @pytest.mark.parametrize( "filter_name", ( @@ -7719,9 +7925,9 @@ class TestJWTFields: reverse("token-obtain"), data, format="json" ) - assert ( - response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK - ), f"Unexpected status code: {response.status_code}" + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK, ( + f"Unexpected status code: {response.status_code}" + ) access_token = response.data["attributes"]["access"] payload = jwt.decode(access_token, options={"verify_signature": False}) @@ -7735,28 +7941,28 @@ class TestJWTFields: # Verify expected fields for field in expected_fields: assert field in payload, f"The field '{field}' is not in the JWT" - assert ( - payload[field] == expected_fields[field] - ), f"The value of '{field}' does not match" + assert payload[field] == expected_fields[field], ( + f"The value of '{field}' does not match" + ) # Verify time fields are integers for time_field in ["exp", "iat", "nbf"]: assert time_field in payload, f"The field '{time_field}' is not in the JWT" - assert isinstance( - payload[time_field], int - ), f"The field '{time_field}' is not an integer" + assert isinstance(payload[time_field], int), ( + f"The field '{time_field}' is not an integer" + ) # Verify identification fields are non-empty strings for id_field in ["jti", "sub", "tenant_id"]: assert id_field in payload, f"The field '{id_field}' is not in the JWT" - assert ( - isinstance(payload[id_field], str) and payload[id_field] - ), f"The field '{id_field}' is not a valid string" + assert isinstance(payload[id_field], str) and payload[id_field], ( + f"The field '{id_field}' is not a valid string" + ) @pytest.mark.django_db class TestInvitationViewSet: - TOMORROW = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=1, hours=1) + TOMORROW = datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(days=1, hours=1) TOMORROW_ISO = TOMORROW.isoformat() def test_invitations_list(self, authenticated_client, invitations_fixture): @@ -7879,9 +8085,7 @@ class TestInvitationViewSet: "type": "invitations", "attributes": { "email": "thisisarandomemail@prowler.com", - "expires_at": ( - datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=23) - ).isoformat(), + "expires_at": (datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(hours=23)).isoformat(), }, } } @@ -7908,7 +8112,7 @@ class TestInvitationViewSet: invitation, *_ = invitations_fixture role1, role2, *_ = roles_fixture new_email = "new_email@prowler.com" - new_expires_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=7) + new_expires_at = datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(days=7) new_expires_at_iso = new_expires_at.isoformat() data = { "data": { @@ -7995,9 +8199,7 @@ class TestInvitationViewSet: "id": str(invitation.id), "type": "invitations", "attributes": { - "expires_at": ( - datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=23) - ).isoformat(), + "expires_at": (datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(hours=23)).isoformat(), }, } } @@ -8170,7 +8372,7 @@ class TestInvitationViewSet: self, authenticated_client, invitations_fixture ): invitation, *_ = invitations_fixture - invitation.expires_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=1) + invitation.expires_at = datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(days=1) invitation.email = TEST_USER invitation.save() @@ -8189,7 +8391,7 @@ class TestInvitationViewSet: ): new_email = "new_email@prowler.com" invitation, *_ = invitations_fixture - invitation.expires_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=1) + invitation.expires_at = datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(days=1) invitation.email = new_email invitation.save() @@ -9278,6 +9480,118 @@ class TestComplianceOverviewViewSet: with patch("api.v1.views.backfill_compliance_summaries_task.delay") as mock: yield mock + def _create_completed_scan(self, provider, name): + return Scan.objects.create( + name=name, + provider=provider, + trigger=Scan.TriggerChoices.MANUAL, + state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, + tenant_id=provider.tenant_id, + started_at=datetime.now(UTC), + completed_at=datetime.now(UTC), + ) + + def _create_requirement( + self, + scan, + requirement_id, + status_choice, + region="eu-west-1", + compliance_id="cis_1.4_aws", + ): + passed = 1 if status_choice == StatusChoices.PASS else 0 + total = 1 if status_choice != StatusChoices.MANUAL else 0 + return ComplianceRequirementOverview.objects.create( + tenant_id=scan.tenant_id, + scan=scan, + compliance_id=compliance_id, + framework="CIS-1.4-AWS", + version="1.4", + description="CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark v1.4.0", + region=region, + requirement_id=requirement_id, + requirement_status=status_choice, + passed_checks=passed, + failed_checks=0 + if status_choice in (StatusChoices.PASS, StatusChoices.MANUAL) + else 1, + total_checks=total, + passed_findings=passed, + total_findings=total, + ) + + def _create_compliance_summary( + self, + scan, + *, + passed, + failed, + manual=0, + compliance_id="cis_1.4_aws", + ): + return ComplianceOverviewSummary.objects.create( + tenant_id=scan.tenant_id, + scan=scan, + compliance_id=compliance_id, + requirements_passed=passed, + requirements_failed=failed, + requirements_manual=manual, + total_requirements=passed + failed + manual, + ) + + def _overview_attrs_by_id(self, response): + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK + return {item["id"]: item["attributes"] for item in response.json()["data"]} + + def _prepare_latest_compliance_data(self, providers_fixture): + provider1, provider2, provider3, *_ = providers_fixture + old_scan = self._create_completed_scan(provider1, "old aws compliance scan") + latest_scan1 = self._create_completed_scan( + provider1, "latest aws compliance scan 1" + ) + latest_scan2 = self._create_completed_scan( + provider2, "latest aws compliance scan 2" + ) + latest_gcp_scan = self._create_completed_scan( + provider3, "latest gcp compliance scan" + ) + + self._create_requirement(old_scan, "1.1", StatusChoices.FAIL) + self._create_requirement(old_scan, "1.2", StatusChoices.FAIL) + self._create_compliance_summary(old_scan, passed=0, failed=2) + + self._create_requirement( + latest_scan1, "1.1", StatusChoices.PASS, region="eu-west-1" + ) + self._create_requirement( + latest_scan1, "1.2", StatusChoices.PASS, region="eu-west-1" + ) + self._create_compliance_summary(latest_scan1, passed=2, failed=0) + + self._create_requirement( + latest_scan2, "1.1", StatusChoices.FAIL, region="us-east-1" + ) + self._create_requirement( + latest_scan2, "1.2", StatusChoices.PASS, region="us-east-1" + ) + self._create_compliance_summary(latest_scan2, passed=1, failed=1) + + self._create_requirement( + latest_gcp_scan, + "gcp-1.1", + StatusChoices.FAIL, + region="europe-west1", + compliance_id="cis_1.3_gcp", + ) + self._create_compliance_summary( + latest_gcp_scan, + passed=0, + failed=1, + compliance_id="cis_1.3_gcp", + ) + + return old_scan, latest_scan1, latest_scan2, latest_gcp_scan + def test_compliance_overview_list_none( self, authenticated_client, @@ -9425,6 +9739,283 @@ class TestComplianceOverviewViewSet: assert len(response.json()["data"]) >= 1 mock_backfill_task.assert_not_called() + def test_compliance_overview_provider_id_filter_uses_latest_scan( + self, + authenticated_client, + providers_fixture, + mock_backfill_task, + ): + _, latest_scan, *_ = self._prepare_latest_compliance_data(providers_fixture) + + response = authenticated_client.get( + reverse("complianceoverview-list"), + {"filter[provider_id]": str(latest_scan.provider_id)}, + ) + + attrs_by_id = self._overview_attrs_by_id(response) + assert attrs_by_id["cis_1.4_aws"]["requirements_passed"] == 2 + assert attrs_by_id["cis_1.4_aws"]["requirements_failed"] == 0 + assert "cis_1.3_gcp" not in attrs_by_id + mock_backfill_task.assert_not_called() + + def test_compliance_overview_provider_id_in_filter_aggregates_latest_scans( + self, + authenticated_client, + providers_fixture, + ): + _, latest_scan1, latest_scan2, *_ = self._prepare_latest_compliance_data( + providers_fixture + ) + + response = authenticated_client.get( + reverse("complianceoverview-list"), + { + "filter[provider_id__in]": ( + f"{latest_scan1.provider_id},{latest_scan2.provider_id}" + ) + }, + ) + + attrs_by_id = self._overview_attrs_by_id(response) + assert attrs_by_id["cis_1.4_aws"]["requirements_passed"] == 1 + assert attrs_by_id["cis_1.4_aws"]["requirements_failed"] == 1 + assert attrs_by_id["cis_1.4_aws"]["total_requirements"] == 2 + assert "cis_1.3_gcp" not in attrs_by_id + + def test_compliance_overview_provider_type_filter_uses_latest_scans( + self, + authenticated_client, + providers_fixture, + ): + self._prepare_latest_compliance_data(providers_fixture) + + response = authenticated_client.get( + reverse("complianceoverview-list"), + {"filter[provider_type]": Provider.ProviderChoices.AWS.value}, + ) + + attrs_by_id = self._overview_attrs_by_id(response) + assert attrs_by_id["cis_1.4_aws"]["requirements_passed"] == 1 + assert attrs_by_id["cis_1.4_aws"]["requirements_failed"] == 1 + assert attrs_by_id["cis_1.4_aws"]["total_requirements"] == 2 + assert "cis_1.3_gcp" not in attrs_by_id + + def test_compliance_overview_provider_groups_filters_use_latest_scans( + self, + authenticated_client, + providers_fixture, + provider_groups_fixture, + tenants_fixture, + ): + tenant = tenants_fixture[0] + provider1, provider2, *_ = providers_fixture + group1, group2, *_ = provider_groups_fixture + _, latest_scan1, latest_scan2, *_ = self._prepare_latest_compliance_data( + providers_fixture + ) + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant_id=tenant.id, + provider=provider1, + provider_group=group1, + ) + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant_id=tenant.id, + provider=provider2, + provider_group=group2, + ) + + response = authenticated_client.get( + reverse("complianceoverview-list"), + {"filter[provider_groups]": str(group1.id)}, + ) + + attrs_by_id = self._overview_attrs_by_id(response) + assert attrs_by_id["cis_1.4_aws"]["requirements_passed"] == 2 + assert attrs_by_id["cis_1.4_aws"]["requirements_failed"] == 0 + + response = authenticated_client.get( + reverse("complianceoverview-list"), + {"filter[provider_groups__in]": f"{group1.id},{group2.id}"}, + ) + + attrs_by_id = self._overview_attrs_by_id(response) + assert attrs_by_id["cis_1.4_aws"]["requirements_passed"] == 1 + assert attrs_by_id["cis_1.4_aws"]["requirements_failed"] == 1 + assert attrs_by_id["cis_1.4_aws"]["total_requirements"] == 2 + + def _assert_latest_provider_scan_task_response( + self, + authenticated_client, + endpoint, + scan, + query_params=None, + ): + query_params = {**(query_params or {})} + if not any(key.startswith("filter[provider_") for key in query_params): + query_params = { + "filter[provider_id]": str(scan.provider_id), + **query_params, + } + + with patch.object( + ComplianceOverviewViewSet, "get_task_response_if_running" + ) as mock_task_response: + mock_task_response.return_value = Response( + {"detail": "Task is running"}, status=status.HTTP_202_ACCEPTED + ) + + response = authenticated_client.get(reverse(endpoint), query_params) + + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_202_ACCEPTED + mock_task_response.assert_called_once() + _, kwargs = mock_task_response.call_args + assert kwargs["task_name"] == "scan-compliance-overviews" + assert str(kwargs["task_kwargs"]["tenant_id"]) == str(scan.tenant_id) + assert str(kwargs["task_kwargs"]["scan_id"]) == str(scan.id) + assert kwargs["raise_on_not_found"] is False + + def test_compliance_overview_provider_filter_returns_running_task_without_data( + self, + authenticated_client, + providers_fixture, + ): + scan = self._create_completed_scan( + providers_fixture[0], "latest scan without compliance data" + ) + + self._assert_latest_provider_scan_task_response( + authenticated_client, + "complianceoverview-list", + scan, + ) + + def test_compliance_overview_provider_filter_returns_running_task_for_partial_data( + self, + authenticated_client, + providers_fixture, + ): + provider_with_data, provider_without_data, *_ = providers_fixture + scan_with_data = self._create_completed_scan( + provider_with_data, "latest scan with compliance data" + ) + scan_without_data = self._create_completed_scan( + provider_without_data, "latest scan without partial compliance data" + ) + self._create_requirement(scan_with_data, "1.1", StatusChoices.PASS) + + self._assert_latest_provider_scan_task_response( + authenticated_client, + "complianceoverview-list", + scan_without_data, + { + "filter[provider_id__in]": ( + f"{provider_with_data.id},{provider_without_data.id}" + ) + }, + ) + + def test_compliance_overview_provider_filter_empty_response_uses_scan_data_presence( + self, + authenticated_client, + providers_fixture, + ): + scan = self._create_completed_scan( + providers_fixture[0], "latest scan with filtered compliance data" + ) + self._create_requirement(scan, "1.1", StatusChoices.PASS, region="eu-west-1") + + with patch.object( + ComplianceOverviewViewSet, "get_task_response_if_running" + ) as mock_task_response: + mock_task_response.return_value = Response( + {"detail": "Task is running"}, status=status.HTTP_202_ACCEPTED + ) + + response = authenticated_client.get( + reverse("complianceoverview-list"), + { + "filter[provider_id]": str(scan.provider_id), + "filter[region]": "us-east-1", + }, + ) + + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK + assert response.json()["data"] == [] + mock_task_response.assert_not_called() + + def test_compliance_overview_metadata_provider_filter_returns_running_task_without_data( + self, + authenticated_client, + providers_fixture, + ): + scan = self._create_completed_scan( + providers_fixture[0], "latest scan without compliance metadata" + ) + + self._assert_latest_provider_scan_task_response( + authenticated_client, + "complianceoverview-metadata", + scan, + ) + + def test_compliance_overview_requirements_provider_filter_returns_running_task_without_data( + self, + authenticated_client, + providers_fixture, + ): + scan = self._create_completed_scan( + providers_fixture[0], "latest scan without compliance requirements" + ) + + self._assert_latest_provider_scan_task_response( + authenticated_client, + "complianceoverview-requirements", + scan, + {"filter[compliance_id]": "cis_1.4_aws"}, + ) + + def test_compliance_overview_metadata_accepts_provider_filters( + self, + authenticated_client, + providers_fixture, + ): + _, latest_scan, *_ = self._prepare_latest_compliance_data(providers_fixture) + + response = authenticated_client.get( + reverse("complianceoverview-metadata"), + {"filter[provider_id]": str(latest_scan.provider_id)}, + ) + + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK + regions = response.json()["data"]["attributes"]["regions"] + assert regions == ["eu-west-1"] + + def test_compliance_overview_requirements_accepts_provider_filters( + self, + authenticated_client, + providers_fixture, + ): + _, latest_scan1, latest_scan2, *_ = self._prepare_latest_compliance_data( + providers_fixture + ) + + response = authenticated_client.get( + reverse("complianceoverview-requirements"), + { + "filter[provider_id__in]": ( + f"{latest_scan1.provider_id},{latest_scan2.provider_id}" + ), + "filter[compliance_id]": "cis_1.4_aws", + }, + ) + + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK + requirements_by_id = { + item["id"]: item["attributes"] for item in response.json()["data"] + } + assert requirements_by_id["1.1"]["status"] == "FAIL" + assert requirements_by_id["1.2"]["status"] == "PASS" + def test_compliance_overview_metadata( self, authenticated_client, compliance_requirements_overviews_fixture ): @@ -9585,7 +10176,7 @@ class TestComplianceOverviewViewSet: assert gcp_provider.provider == Provider.ProviderChoices.GCP.value assert azure_provider.provider == Provider.ProviderChoices.AZURE.value - now = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + now = datetime.now(UTC) gcp_scan = Scan.objects.create( name="gcp scan", provider=gcp_provider, @@ -9714,7 +10305,7 @@ class TestComplianceOverviewViewSet: provider_group=provider_group, ) - now = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + now = datetime.now(UTC) allowed_scan = Scan.objects.create( name="allowed scan", provider=allowed_provider, @@ -10031,8 +10622,42 @@ class TestOverviewViewSet: for entry in grouped_data: assert "findings" not in entry["attributes"] + def test_overview_providers_count_applies_limited_visibility( + self, + authenticated_client_no_permissions_rbac, + providers_fixture, + provider_groups_fixture, + tenants_fixture, + ): + tenant = tenants_fixture[0] + client = authenticated_client_no_permissions_rbac + allowed_provider = providers_fixture[2] + denied_provider = providers_fixture[4] + provider_group = provider_groups_fixture[0] + + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant_id=tenant.id, + provider_group=provider_group, + provider=allowed_provider, + ) + RoleProviderGroupRelationship.objects.create( + tenant_id=tenant.id, + role=client.user.roles.first(), + provider_group=provider_group, + ) + + response = client.get(reverse("overview-providers-count")) + + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK + aggregated = { + entry["id"]: entry["attributes"]["count"] + for entry in response.json()["data"] + } + assert aggregated == {allowed_provider.provider: 1} + assert denied_provider.provider not in aggregated + def _create_scan(self, tenant, provider, name, started_at=None): - scan_started = started_at or datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(hours=1) + scan_started = started_at or datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(hours=1) return Scan.objects.create( tenant=tenant, provider=provider, @@ -10175,8 +10800,8 @@ class TestOverviewViewSet: failed_findings=35, ) - older_inserted = datetime(2025, 1, 1, 12, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc) - newer_inserted = datetime(2025, 1, 2, 12, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc) + older_inserted = datetime(2025, 1, 1, 12, 0, tzinfo=UTC) + newer_inserted = datetime(2025, 1, 2, 12, 0, tzinfo=UTC) ThreatScoreSnapshot.objects.filter(id=snapshot1.id).update( inserted_at=older_inserted ) @@ -10578,6 +11203,87 @@ class TestOverviewViewSet: assert combined_attributes["muted"] == 3 assert combined_attributes["total"] == 14 + def test_overview_findings_provider_groups_filter( + self, + authenticated_client, + tenants_fixture, + providers_fixture, + provider_groups_fixture, + ): + tenant = tenants_fixture[0] + provider1, provider2, *_ = providers_fixture + group1, group2, *_ = provider_groups_fixture + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=provider1, provider_group=group1 + ) + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=provider1, provider_group=group2 + ) + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=provider2, provider_group=group2 + ) + + scan1 = Scan.objects.create( + name="scan-provider-group-one", + provider=provider1, + trigger=Scan.TriggerChoices.MANUAL, + state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, + tenant=tenant, + ) + scan2 = Scan.objects.create( + name="scan-provider-group-two", + provider=provider2, + trigger=Scan.TriggerChoices.MANUAL, + state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, + tenant=tenant, + ) + ScanSummary.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, + scan=scan1, + check_id="check-provider-group-one", + service="service-a", + severity="high", + region="region-a", + _pass=5, + fail=1, + muted=2, + total=8, + ) + ScanSummary.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, + scan=scan2, + check_id="check-provider-group-two", + service="service-b", + severity="medium", + region="region-b", + _pass=2, + fail=3, + muted=1, + total=6, + ) + + response = authenticated_client.get( + reverse("overview-findings"), + {"filter[provider_groups]": str(group1.id)}, + ) + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK + attributes = response.json()["data"]["attributes"] + assert attributes["pass"] == 5 + assert attributes["fail"] == 1 + assert attributes["muted"] == 2 + assert attributes["total"] == 8 + + response = authenticated_client.get( + reverse("overview-findings"), + {"filter[provider_groups__in]": f"{group1.id},{group2.id}"}, + ) + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK + attributes = response.json()["data"]["attributes"] + assert attributes["pass"] == 7 + assert attributes["fail"] == 4 + assert attributes["muted"] == 3 + assert attributes["total"] == 14 + def test_overview_findings_severity_provider_id_in_filter( self, authenticated_client, tenants_fixture, providers_fixture ): @@ -10714,7 +11420,7 @@ class TestOverviewViewSet: trigger=Scan.TriggerChoices.MANUAL, state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, tenant=tenant, - completed_at=datetime(2024, 1, 1, 12, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc), + completed_at=datetime(2024, 1, 1, 12, 0, 0, tzinfo=UTC), ) # Create scan for day 3 @@ -10724,7 +11430,7 @@ class TestOverviewViewSet: trigger=Scan.TriggerChoices.MANUAL, state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, tenant=tenant, - completed_at=datetime(2024, 1, 3, 12, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc), + completed_at=datetime(2024, 1, 3, 12, 0, 0, tzinfo=UTC), ) # Create DailySeveritySummary for day 1 @@ -10797,7 +11503,7 @@ class TestOverviewViewSet: trigger=Scan.TriggerChoices.MANUAL, state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, tenant=tenant, - completed_at=datetime(2024, 2, 1, 12, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc), + completed_at=datetime(2024, 2, 1, 12, 0, 0, tzinfo=UTC), ) scan2 = Scan.objects.create( name="severity-over-time-scan-p2", @@ -10805,7 +11511,7 @@ class TestOverviewViewSet: trigger=Scan.TriggerChoices.MANUAL, state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, tenant=tenant, - completed_at=datetime(2024, 2, 1, 14, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc), + completed_at=datetime(2024, 2, 1, 14, 0, 0, tzinfo=UTC), ) # Create DailySeveritySummary for provider1 @@ -10869,7 +11575,7 @@ class TestOverviewViewSet: trigger=Scan.TriggerChoices.MANUAL, state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, tenant=tenant, - completed_at=datetime(2024, 3, 1, 12, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc), + completed_at=datetime(2024, 3, 1, 12, 0, 0, tzinfo=UTC), ) scan2 = Scan.objects.create( name="severity-over-time-filter-scan-p2", @@ -10877,7 +11583,7 @@ class TestOverviewViewSet: trigger=Scan.TriggerChoices.MANUAL, state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, tenant=tenant, - completed_at=datetime(2024, 3, 1, 14, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc), + completed_at=datetime(2024, 3, 1, 14, 0, 0, tzinfo=UTC), ) # Provider 1 - critical=100 @@ -11346,9 +12052,21 @@ class TestOverviewViewSet: @pytest.mark.parametrize( "filter_key,filter_value_fn,expected_total,expected_failed", [ - ("filter[provider_id]", lambda p1, _: str(p1.id), 10, 5), + ("filter[provider_id]", lambda p1, *_: str(p1.id), 10, 5), ("filter[provider_type]", lambda *_: "aws", 10, 5), ("filter[provider_type__in]", lambda *_: "aws,gcp", 30, 20), + ( + "filter[provider_groups]", + lambda p1, _, group1, __: str(group1.id), + 10, + 5, + ), + ( + "filter[provider_groups__in]", + lambda p1, _, group1, group2: f"{group1.id},{group2.id}", + 30, + 20, + ), ], ) def test_overview_categories_filters( @@ -11356,6 +12074,7 @@ class TestOverviewViewSet: authenticated_client, tenants_fixture, providers_fixture, + provider_groups_fixture, create_scan_category_summary, filter_key, filter_value_fn, @@ -11364,6 +12083,16 @@ class TestOverviewViewSet: ): tenant = tenants_fixture[0] provider1, _, gcp_provider, *_ = providers_fixture + group1, group2, *_ = provider_groups_fixture + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=provider1, provider_group=group1 + ) + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=provider1, provider_group=group2 + ) + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=gcp_provider, provider_group=group2 + ) scan1 = Scan.objects.create( name="categories-scan-1", @@ -11389,7 +12118,7 @@ class TestOverviewViewSet: response = authenticated_client.get( reverse("overview-categories"), - {filter_key: filter_value_fn(provider1, gcp_provider)}, + {filter_key: filter_value_fn(provider1, gcp_provider, group1, group2)}, ) assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK data = response.json()["data"] @@ -11563,10 +12292,22 @@ class TestOverviewViewSet: @pytest.mark.parametrize( "filter_key,filter_value_fn,expected_total,expected_failed", [ - ("filter[provider_id]", lambda p1, p2: str(p1.id), 10, 5), - ("filter[provider_id__in]", lambda p1, p2: f"{p1.id},{p2.id}", 25, 12), - ("filter[provider_type]", lambda p1, p2: "aws", 10, 5), - ("filter[provider_type__in]", lambda p1, p2: "aws,gcp", 25, 12), + ("filter[provider_id]", lambda p1, *_: str(p1.id), 10, 5), + ("filter[provider_id__in]", lambda p1, p2, *_: f"{p1.id},{p2.id}", 25, 12), + ("filter[provider_type]", lambda *_: "aws", 10, 5), + ("filter[provider_type__in]", lambda *_: "aws,gcp", 25, 12), + ( + "filter[provider_groups]", + lambda p1, p2, group1, group2: str(group1.id), + 10, + 5, + ), + ( + "filter[provider_groups__in]", + lambda p1, p2, group1, group2: f"{group1.id},{group2.id}", + 25, + 12, + ), ], ) def test_overview_groups_provider_filters( @@ -11574,6 +12315,7 @@ class TestOverviewViewSet: authenticated_client, tenants_fixture, providers_fixture, + provider_groups_fixture, create_scan_resource_group_summary, filter_key, filter_value_fn, @@ -11583,6 +12325,16 @@ class TestOverviewViewSet: tenant = tenants_fixture[0] provider1 = providers_fixture[0] # AWS gcp_provider = providers_fixture[2] # GCP + group1, group2, *_ = provider_groups_fixture + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=provider1, provider_group=group1 + ) + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=provider1, provider_group=group2 + ) + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=gcp_provider, provider_group=group2 + ) scan1 = Scan.objects.create( name="aws-rg-scan", @@ -11608,7 +12360,7 @@ class TestOverviewViewSet: response = authenticated_client.get( reverse("overview-resource-groups"), - {filter_key: filter_value_fn(provider1, gcp_provider)}, + {filter_key: filter_value_fn(provider1, gcp_provider, group1, group2)}, ) assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK data = response.json()["data"] @@ -11783,6 +12535,49 @@ class TestOverviewViewSet: data = response.json()["data"] assert len(data) >= 1 + def test_compliance_watchlist_provider_groups_filter( + self, + authenticated_client, + provider_compliance_scores_fixture, + providers_fixture, + provider_groups_fixture, + tenants_fixture, + ): + tenant = tenants_fixture[0] + provider1, provider2, *_ = providers_fixture + group1, group2, *_ = provider_groups_fixture + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=provider1, provider_group=group1 + ) + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=provider1, provider_group=group2 + ) + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=provider2, provider_group=group2 + ) + + response = authenticated_client.get( + reverse("overview-compliance-watchlist"), + {"filter[provider_groups]": str(group1.id)}, + ) + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK + data = response.json()["data"] + by_id = {item["id"]: item["attributes"] for item in data} + assert by_id["aws_cis_2.0"]["requirements_passed"] == 1 + assert by_id["aws_cis_2.0"]["requirements_failed"] == 1 + assert by_id["aws_cis_2.0"]["requirements_manual"] == 1 + + response = authenticated_client.get( + reverse("overview-compliance-watchlist"), + {"filter[provider_groups__in]": f"{group1.id},{group2.id}"}, + ) + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK + data = response.json()["data"] + by_id = {item["id"]: item["attributes"] for item in data} + assert by_id["aws_cis_2.0"]["requirements_passed"] == 0 + assert by_id["aws_cis_2.0"]["requirements_failed"] == 2 + assert by_id["aws_cis_2.0"]["requirements_manual"] == 1 + def test_compliance_watchlist_empty_result(self, authenticated_client): response = authenticated_client.get(reverse("overview-compliance-watchlist")) assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK @@ -11917,9 +12712,9 @@ class TestIntegrationViewSet: included_data = response.json()["included"] for expected_type in expected_resources: - assert any( - d.get("type") == expected_type for d in included_data - ), f"Expected type '{expected_type}' not found in included data" + assert any(d.get("type") == expected_type for d in included_data), ( + f"Expected type '{expected_type}' not found in included data" + ) @pytest.mark.parametrize( "integration_type, configuration, credentials", @@ -12584,7 +13379,7 @@ class TestSAMLTokenValidation: saml_token = SAMLToken.objects.create( token=valid_token_data, user=user, - expires_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(seconds=10), + expires_at=datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(seconds=10), ) url = reverse("token-saml") @@ -12610,7 +13405,7 @@ class TestSAMLTokenValidation: saml_token = SAMLToken.objects.create( token=expired_token_data, user=user, - expires_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(seconds=1), + expires_at=datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(seconds=1), ) url = reverse("token-saml") @@ -12629,7 +13424,7 @@ class TestSAMLTokenValidation: saml_token = SAMLToken.objects.create( token=token_data, user=user, - expires_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(seconds=10), + expires_at=datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(seconds=10), ) url = reverse("token-saml") @@ -12840,12 +13635,14 @@ class TestTenantFinishACSView: "firstName": ["John"], "lastName": ["Doe"], "organization": ["testing_company"], - "userType": ["no_permissions"], + "userType": ["platform_team"], }, ) request = RequestFactory().get( - reverse("saml_finish_acs", kwargs={"organization_slug": "testtenant"}) + reverse( + "saml_finish_acs", kwargs={"organization_slug": saml_setup["domain"]} + ) ) request.user = user request.session = {} @@ -12865,18 +13662,23 @@ class TestTenantFinishACSView: patch("api.models.User.objects.get") as mock_user_get, ): mock_get_app_or_404.return_value = MagicMock( - provider="saml", client_id="testtenant", name="Test App", settings={} + provider="saml", + client_id=saml_setup["domain"], + name="Test App", + settings={}, ) mock_sa_get.return_value = social_account mock_socialapp_get.return_value = MagicMock(provider_id="saml") mock_saml_domain_get.return_value = SimpleNamespace( tenant_id=tenants_fixture[0].id ) - mock_saml_config_get.return_value = MagicMock() + mock_saml_config_get.return_value = SimpleNamespace( + email_domain=saml_setup["domain"], tenant=tenants_fixture[0] + ) mock_user_get.return_value = user view = TenantFinishACSView.as_view() - response = view(request, organization_slug="testtenant") + response = view(request, organization_slug=saml_setup["domain"]) assert response.status_code == 302 @@ -12895,12 +13697,21 @@ class TestTenantFinishACSView: assert user.name == "John Doe" assert user.company_name == "testing_company" - role = Role.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db).get(name="no_permissions") + role = Role.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db).get( + name="platform_team", tenant=tenants_fixture[0] + ) assert role.tenant == tenants_fixture[0] + assert not role.manage_users + assert not role.manage_account + assert not role.manage_billing + assert not role.manage_providers + assert not role.manage_integrations + assert not role.manage_scans + assert role.unlimited_visibility assert ( UserRoleRelationship.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db) - .filter(user=user, tenant_id=tenants_fixture[0].id) + .filter(user=user, role=role, tenant_id=tenants_fixture[0].id) .exists() ) @@ -12915,6 +13726,81 @@ class TestTenantFinishACSView: user.company_name = original_company user.save() + def test_dispatch_rejects_assertion_email_domain_that_differs_from_slug( + self, tenants_fixture, saml_setup, monkeypatch + ): + monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_URL", "http://localhost") + monkeypatch.setenv("SAML_SSO_CALLBACK_URL", "http://localhost/sso-complete") + victim_tenant = tenants_fixture[0] + attacker_tenant = tenants_fixture[1] + attacker_domain = "attacker.com" + + SAMLConfiguration.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db).create( + email_domain=attacker_domain, + metadata_xml=""" + + + + + + TEST + + + + + + + """, + tenant=attacker_tenant, + ) + user = User.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db).create( + email=f"intruder@{saml_setup['domain']}", name="Intruder" + ) + social_account = SocialAccount( + user=user, + provider="ATTACKER", + extra_data={ + "firstName": ["Mallory"], + "lastName": ["Example"], + }, + ) + request = RequestFactory().get( + reverse("saml_finish_acs", kwargs={"organization_slug": attacker_domain}) + ) + request.user = user + request.session = {} + + with ( + patch( + "allauth.socialaccount.providers.saml.views.get_app_or_404" + ) as mock_get_app_or_404, + patch( + "allauth.socialaccount.models.SocialAccount.objects.get" + ) as mock_sa_get, + ): + mock_get_app_or_404.return_value = MagicMock( + provider="saml", + provider_id="ATTACKER", + client_id=attacker_domain, + name="Attacker App", + settings={}, + ) + mock_sa_get.return_value = social_account + + view = TenantFinishACSView.as_view() + response = view(request, organization_slug=attacker_domain) + + assert response.status_code == 302 + assert "sso_saml_failed=true" in response.url + assert not ( + Membership.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db) + .filter(user=user, tenant=victim_tenant) + .exists() + ) + assert ( + not SAMLToken.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db).filter(user=user).exists() + ) + def test_rollback_saml_user_when_error_occurs(self, users_fixture, monkeypatch): """Test that a user is properly deleted when created during SAML flow and an error occurs""" monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_URL", "http://localhost") @@ -12953,7 +13839,7 @@ class TestTenantFinishACSView: assert response.status_code == 302 assert "sso_saml_failed=true" in response.url - def test_dispatch_skips_role_mapping_when_single_manage_account_user( + def test_dispatch_keeps_existing_roles_when_usertype_missing( self, create_test_user, tenants_fixture, @@ -12962,7 +13848,7 @@ class TestTenantFinishACSView: settings, monkeypatch, ): - """Test that role mapping is skipped when tenant has only one user with MANAGE_ACCOUNT role""" + """Test that roles are left untouched when the IdP does not send userType""" monkeypatch.setenv("SAML_SSO_CALLBACK_URL", "http://localhost/sso-complete") user = create_test_user tenant = tenants_fixture[0] @@ -12971,6 +13857,7 @@ class TestTenantFinishACSView: UserRoleRelationship.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db).create( user=user, role=admin_role, tenant_id=tenant.id ) + roles_before = Role.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db).count() social_account = SocialAccount( user=user, @@ -12979,12 +13866,13 @@ class TestTenantFinishACSView: "firstName": ["John"], "lastName": ["Doe"], "organization": ["testing_company"], - "userType": ["no_permissions"], # This should be ignored }, ) request = RequestFactory().get( - reverse("saml_finish_acs", kwargs={"organization_slug": "testtenant"}) + reverse( + "saml_finish_acs", kwargs={"organization_slug": saml_setup["domain"]} + ) ) request.user = user request.session = {} @@ -13004,37 +13892,194 @@ class TestTenantFinishACSView: patch("api.models.User.objects.get") as mock_user_get, ): mock_get_app_or_404.return_value = MagicMock( - provider="saml", client_id="testtenant", name="Test App", settings={} + provider="saml", + client_id=saml_setup["domain"], + name="Test App", + settings={}, ) mock_sa_get.return_value = social_account mock_socialapp_get.return_value = MagicMock(provider_id="saml") mock_saml_domain_get.return_value = SimpleNamespace(tenant_id=tenant.id) - mock_saml_config_get.return_value = MagicMock() + mock_saml_config_get.return_value = SimpleNamespace( + email_domain=saml_setup["domain"], tenant=tenant + ) mock_user_get.return_value = user view = TenantFinishACSView.as_view() - response = view(request, organization_slug="testtenant") + response = view(request, organization_slug=saml_setup["domain"]) assert response.status_code == 302 - # Verify the admin role is still assigned (not changed to no_permissions) + # Verify the existing role assignment was not modified assert ( UserRoleRelationship.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db) .filter(user=user, role=admin_role, tenant_id=tenant.id) .exists() ) - # Verify no_permissions role was NOT created in the database - assert ( - not Role.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db) - .filter(name="no_permissions", tenant=tenant) + # Verify no new role was created + assert Role.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db).count() == roles_before + + def test_dispatch_assigns_no_role_to_new_user_when_usertype_missing( + self, + create_test_user, + tenants_fixture, + saml_setup, + settings, + monkeypatch, + ): + """Test that a user without roles gets none assigned when userType is missing""" + monkeypatch.setenv("SAML_SSO_CALLBACK_URL", "http://localhost/sso-complete") + user = create_test_user + tenant = tenants_fixture[0] + roles_before = Role.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db).count() + + social_account = SocialAccount( + user=user, + provider="saml", + extra_data={ + "firstName": ["John"], + "lastName": ["Doe"], + "organization": ["testing_company"], + }, + ) + + request = RequestFactory().get( + reverse( + "saml_finish_acs", kwargs={"organization_slug": saml_setup["domain"]} + ) + ) + request.user = user + request.session = {} + + with ( + patch( + "allauth.socialaccount.providers.saml.views.get_app_or_404" + ) as mock_get_app_or_404, + patch( + "allauth.socialaccount.models.SocialApp.objects.get" + ) as mock_socialapp_get, + patch( + "allauth.socialaccount.models.SocialAccount.objects.get" + ) as mock_sa_get, + patch("api.models.SAMLDomainIndex.objects.get") as mock_saml_domain_get, + patch("api.models.SAMLConfiguration.objects.get") as mock_saml_config_get, + patch("api.models.User.objects.get") as mock_user_get, + ): + mock_get_app_or_404.return_value = MagicMock( + provider="saml", + client_id=saml_setup["domain"], + name="Test App", + settings={}, + ) + mock_sa_get.return_value = social_account + mock_socialapp_get.return_value = MagicMock(provider_id="saml") + mock_saml_domain_get.return_value = SimpleNamespace(tenant_id=tenant.id) + mock_saml_config_get.return_value = SimpleNamespace( + email_domain=saml_setup["domain"], tenant=tenant + ) + mock_user_get.return_value = user + + view = TenantFinishACSView.as_view() + response = view(request, organization_slug=saml_setup["domain"]) + + assert response.status_code == 302 + + # Verify no role was created or assigned + assert Role.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db).count() == roles_before + assert not ( + UserRoleRelationship.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db) + .filter(user=user, tenant_id=tenant.id) .exists() ) - # Verify no_permissions role was NOT assigned to the user - assert not ( + # Membership is still created so the user belongs to the tenant + assert ( + Membership.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db) + .filter(user=user, tenant=tenant) + .exists() + ) + + def test_dispatch_skips_role_mapping_when_last_manage_account_user_maps_to_new_role( + self, + create_test_user, + tenants_fixture, + admin_role_fixture, + saml_setup, + settings, + monkeypatch, + ): + """Test that a new read-only role is neither created nor assigned if it would remove the last MANAGE_ACCOUNT user""" + monkeypatch.setenv("SAML_SSO_CALLBACK_URL", "http://localhost/sso-complete") + user = create_test_user + tenant = tenants_fixture[0] + + admin_role = admin_role_fixture + UserRoleRelationship.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db).create( + user=user, role=admin_role, tenant_id=tenant.id + ) + + social_account = SocialAccount( + user=user, + provider="saml", + extra_data={ + "firstName": ["John"], + "lastName": ["Doe"], + "organization": ["testing_company"], + "userType": ["brand_new_role"], + }, + ) + + request = RequestFactory().get( + reverse( + "saml_finish_acs", kwargs={"organization_slug": saml_setup["domain"]} + ) + ) + request.user = user + request.session = {} + + with ( + patch( + "allauth.socialaccount.providers.saml.views.get_app_or_404" + ) as mock_get_app_or_404, + patch( + "allauth.socialaccount.models.SocialApp.objects.get" + ) as mock_socialapp_get, + patch( + "allauth.socialaccount.models.SocialAccount.objects.get" + ) as mock_sa_get, + patch("api.models.SAMLDomainIndex.objects.get") as mock_saml_domain_get, + patch("api.models.SAMLConfiguration.objects.get") as mock_saml_config_get, + patch("api.models.User.objects.get") as mock_user_get, + ): + mock_get_app_or_404.return_value = MagicMock( + provider="saml", + client_id=saml_setup["domain"], + name="Test App", + settings={}, + ) + mock_sa_get.return_value = social_account + mock_socialapp_get.return_value = MagicMock(provider_id="saml") + mock_saml_domain_get.return_value = SimpleNamespace(tenant_id=tenant.id) + mock_saml_config_get.return_value = SimpleNamespace( + email_domain=saml_setup["domain"], tenant=tenant + ) + mock_user_get.return_value = user + + view = TenantFinishACSView.as_view() + response = view(request, organization_slug=saml_setup["domain"]) + + assert response.status_code == 302 + + # The admin role is still assigned and the new role was not created + assert ( UserRoleRelationship.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db) - .filter(user=user, role__name="no_permissions", tenant_id=tenant.id) + .filter(user=user, role=admin_role, tenant_id=tenant.id) + .exists() + ) + assert ( + not Role.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db) + .filter(name="brand_new_role", tenant=tenant) .exists() ) @@ -13071,7 +14116,9 @@ class TestTenantFinishACSView: ) request = RequestFactory().get( - reverse("saml_finish_acs", kwargs={"organization_slug": "testtenant"}) + reverse( + "saml_finish_acs", kwargs={"organization_slug": saml_setup["domain"]} + ) ) request.user = user request.session = {} @@ -13091,16 +14138,21 @@ class TestTenantFinishACSView: patch("api.models.User.objects.get") as mock_user_get, ): mock_get_app_or_404.return_value = MagicMock( - provider="saml", client_id="testtenant", name="Test App", settings={} + provider="saml", + client_id=saml_setup["domain"], + name="Test App", + settings={}, ) mock_sa_get.return_value = social_account mock_socialapp_get.return_value = MagicMock(provider_id="saml") mock_saml_domain_get.return_value = SimpleNamespace(tenant_id=tenant.id) - mock_saml_config_get.return_value = MagicMock() + mock_saml_config_get.return_value = SimpleNamespace( + email_domain=saml_setup["domain"], tenant=tenant + ) mock_user_get.return_value = user view = TenantFinishACSView.as_view() - response = view(request, organization_slug="testtenant") + response = view(request, organization_slug=saml_setup["domain"]) assert response.status_code == 302 @@ -13155,7 +14207,9 @@ class TestTenantFinishACSView: ) request = RequestFactory().get( - reverse("saml_finish_acs", kwargs={"organization_slug": "testtenant"}) + reverse( + "saml_finish_acs", kwargs={"organization_slug": saml_setup["domain"]} + ) ) request.user = user request.session = {} @@ -13175,16 +14229,21 @@ class TestTenantFinishACSView: patch("api.models.User.objects.get") as mock_user_get, ): mock_get_app_or_404.return_value = MagicMock( - provider="saml", client_id="testtenant", name="Test App", settings={} + provider="saml", + client_id=saml_setup["domain"], + name="Test App", + settings={}, ) mock_sa_get.return_value = social_account mock_socialapp_get.return_value = MagicMock(provider_id="saml") mock_saml_domain_get.return_value = SimpleNamespace(tenant_id=tenant.id) - mock_saml_config_get.return_value = MagicMock() + mock_saml_config_get.return_value = SimpleNamespace( + email_domain=saml_setup["domain"], tenant=tenant + ) mock_user_get.return_value = user view = TenantFinishACSView.as_view() - response = view(request, organization_slug="testtenant") + response = view(request, organization_slug=saml_setup["domain"]) assert response.status_code == 302 @@ -13238,7 +14297,9 @@ class TestTenantFinishACSView: ) request = RequestFactory().get( - reverse("saml_finish_acs", kwargs={"organization_slug": "testtenant"}) + reverse( + "saml_finish_acs", kwargs={"organization_slug": saml_setup["domain"]} + ) ) request.user = non_admin_user request.session = {} @@ -13258,16 +14319,21 @@ class TestTenantFinishACSView: patch("api.models.User.objects.get") as mock_user_get, ): mock_get_app_or_404.return_value = MagicMock( - provider="saml", client_id="testtenant", name="Test App", settings={} + provider="saml", + client_id=saml_setup["domain"], + name="Test App", + settings={}, ) mock_sa_get.return_value = social_account mock_socialapp_get.return_value = MagicMock(provider_id="saml") mock_saml_domain_get.return_value = SimpleNamespace(tenant_id=tenant.id) - mock_saml_config_get.return_value = MagicMock() + mock_saml_config_get.return_value = SimpleNamespace( + email_domain=saml_setup["domain"], tenant=tenant + ) mock_user_get.return_value = non_admin_user view = TenantFinishACSView.as_view() - response = view(request, organization_slug="testtenant") + response = view(request, organization_slug=saml_setup["domain"]) assert response.status_code == 302 @@ -13356,9 +14422,9 @@ class TestLighthouseConfigViewSet: ) # Check that API key is masked with asterisks only masked_api_key = data["attributes"]["api_key"] - assert all( - c == "*" for c in masked_api_key - ), "API key should contain only asterisks" + assert all(c == "*" for c in masked_api_key), ( + "API key should contain only asterisks" + ) @pytest.mark.parametrize( "field_name, invalid_value", @@ -16935,6 +18001,44 @@ class TestFindingGroupViewSet: # All fixture findings are from AWS provider assert len(response.json()["data"]) == 5 + def test_finding_groups_provider_groups_filter( + self, + authenticated_client, + tenants_fixture, + finding_groups_fixture, + providers_fixture, + provider_groups_fixture, + ): + tenant = tenants_fixture[0] + provider1, provider2, *_ = providers_fixture + group1, group2, *_ = provider_groups_fixture + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=provider1, provider_group=group1 + ) + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=provider1, provider_group=group2 + ) + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=provider2, provider_group=group2 + ) + + response = authenticated_client.get( + reverse("finding-group-list"), + {"filter[inserted_at]": TODAY, "filter[provider_groups]": str(group1.id)}, + ) + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK + assert len(response.json()["data"]) == 4 + + response = authenticated_client.get( + reverse("finding-group-list"), + { + "filter[inserted_at]": TODAY, + "filter[provider_groups__in]": f"{group1.id},{group2.id}", + }, + ) + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK + assert len(response.json()["data"]) == 5 + def test_finding_groups_check_id_filter( self, authenticated_client, finding_groups_fixture ): @@ -17109,9 +18213,9 @@ class TestFindingGroupViewSet: assert len(data) == 2 for item in data: resource = item["attributes"]["resource"] - assert ( - resource["resource_group"] == "storage" - ), "resource_group must be 'storage'" + assert resource["resource_group"] == "storage", ( + "resource_group must be 'storage'" + ) def test_resources_name_icontains( self, authenticated_client, finding_groups_fixture @@ -17425,12 +18529,12 @@ class TestFindingGroupViewSet: assert response_p1.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK p1_check_ids = {item["id"] for item in response_p1.json()["data"]} # Provider1 has scan1 with 4 checks - assert ( - len(p1_check_ids) == 4 - ), f"Provider1 should have 4 checks, got {len(p1_check_ids)}" - assert ( - "cloudtrail_enabled" not in p1_check_ids - ), "cloudtrail_enabled should NOT be in provider1" + assert len(p1_check_ids) == 4, ( + f"Provider1 should have 4 checks, got {len(p1_check_ids)}" + ) + assert "cloudtrail_enabled" not in p1_check_ids, ( + "cloudtrail_enabled should NOT be in provider1" + ) # Get finding groups for provider2 only response_p2 = authenticated_client.get( @@ -17440,12 +18544,12 @@ class TestFindingGroupViewSet: assert response_p2.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK p2_check_ids = {item["id"] for item in response_p2.json()["data"]} # Provider2 has scan2 with 1 check - assert ( - len(p2_check_ids) == 1 - ), f"Provider2 should have 1 check, got {len(p2_check_ids)}" - assert ( - "cloudtrail_enabled" in p2_check_ids - ), "cloudtrail_enabled should be in provider2" + assert len(p2_check_ids) == 1, ( + f"Provider2 should have 1 check, got {len(p2_check_ids)}" + ) + assert "cloudtrail_enabled" in p2_check_ids, ( + "cloudtrail_enabled should be in provider2" + ) # Test provider_type filter actually filters data def test_finding_groups_provider_type_filter_actually_filters( @@ -17468,9 +18572,9 @@ class TestFindingGroupViewSet: {"filter[inserted_at]": TODAY, "filter[provider_type]": "gcp"}, ) assert response_gcp.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK - assert ( - len(response_gcp.json()["data"]) == 0 - ), "GCP filter should return 0 results" + assert len(response_gcp.json()["data"]) == 0, ( + "GCP filter should return 0 results" + ) def test_finding_groups_pagination( self, authenticated_client, finding_groups_fixture @@ -17736,7 +18840,7 @@ class TestFindingGroupViewSet: provider=provider1, state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, trigger=Scan.TriggerChoices.MANUAL, - completed_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + completed_at=datetime.now(UTC), ) latest_scan_provider2 = Scan.objects.create( @@ -17744,7 +18848,7 @@ class TestFindingGroupViewSet: provider=provider2, state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, trigger=Scan.TriggerChoices.MANUAL, - completed_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + completed_at=datetime.now(UTC), ) older_scan_provider1 = Scan.objects.create( @@ -17752,7 +18856,7 @@ class TestFindingGroupViewSet: provider=provider1, state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, trigger=Scan.TriggerChoices.MANUAL, - completed_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=1), + completed_at=datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(days=1), ) # Older scan — these should be excluded from /latest @@ -17766,7 +18870,7 @@ class TestFindingGroupViewSet: impact="high", check_id=check_id, check_metadata={"CheckId": check_id, "checktitle": "Cross provider check"}, - first_seen_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=2), + first_seen_at=datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(days=2), muted=False, ) @@ -17781,7 +18885,7 @@ class TestFindingGroupViewSet: impact="high", check_id=check_id, check_metadata={"CheckId": check_id, "checktitle": "Cross provider check"}, - first_seen_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(hours=1), + first_seen_at=datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(hours=1), muted=False, ) latest_p1_pass.add_resources([resource1]) @@ -17796,7 +18900,7 @@ class TestFindingGroupViewSet: impact="high", check_id=check_id, check_metadata={"CheckId": check_id, "checktitle": "Cross provider check"}, - first_seen_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(hours=1), + first_seen_at=datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(hours=1), muted=False, ) latest_p1_fail.add_resources([resource2]) @@ -17812,7 +18916,7 @@ class TestFindingGroupViewSet: impact="high", check_id=check_id, check_metadata={"CheckId": check_id, "checktitle": "Cross provider check"}, - first_seen_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(hours=1), + first_seen_at=datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(hours=1), muted=False, ) latest_p2.add_resources([resource3]) @@ -17845,6 +18949,41 @@ class TestFindingGroupViewSet: # All providers in fixture are AWS assert len(data) == 5 + def test_finding_groups_latest_provider_groups_filter( + self, + authenticated_client, + tenants_fixture, + finding_groups_fixture, + providers_fixture, + provider_groups_fixture, + ): + tenant = tenants_fixture[0] + provider1, provider2, *_ = providers_fixture + group1, group2, *_ = provider_groups_fixture + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=provider1, provider_group=group1 + ) + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=provider1, provider_group=group2 + ) + ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create( + tenant=tenant, provider=provider2, provider_group=group2 + ) + + response = authenticated_client.get( + reverse("finding-group-latest"), + {"filter[provider_groups]": str(group1.id)}, + ) + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK + assert len(response.json()["data"]) == 4 + + response = authenticated_client.get( + reverse("finding-group-latest"), + {"filter[provider_groups__in]": f"{group1.id},{group2.id}"}, + ) + assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK + assert len(response.json()["data"]) == 5 + def test_finding_groups_latest_check_id_filter( self, authenticated_client, finding_groups_fixture ): @@ -18311,7 +19450,7 @@ class TestFindingGroupViewSet: resource = resources_fixture[0] check_id = "overlap_regression_check" - t0 = datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(hours=5) + t0 = datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(hours=5) t1 = t0 + timedelta(hours=1) t1_end = t1 + timedelta(minutes=30) t2 = t0 + timedelta(hours=4) diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/utils.py b/api/src/backend/api/utils.py index 678ed24772..ce1dc0f10d 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/utils.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/utils.py @@ -1,22 +1,21 @@ from __future__ import annotations -from datetime import datetime, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime from typing import TYPE_CHECKING from allauth.socialaccount.providers.oauth2.client import OAuth2Client -from django.contrib.postgres.aggregates import ArrayAgg -from django.db.models import Subquery -from rest_framework.exceptions import NotFound, ValidationError - from api.db_router import MainRouter from api.db_utils import rls_transaction from api.exceptions import InvitationTokenExpiredException from api.models import Integration, Invitation, Processor, Provider, Resource from api.v1.serializers import FindingMetadataSerializer +from django.contrib.postgres.aggregates import ArrayAgg +from django.db.models import Subquery from prowler.lib.outputs.jira.jira import Jira, JiraBasicAuthError from prowler.providers.aws.lib.s3.s3 import S3 from prowler.providers.aws.lib.security_hub.security_hub import SecurityHub from prowler.providers.common.models import Connection +from rest_framework.exceptions import NotFound, ValidationError if TYPE_CHECKING: from prowler.providers.alibabacloud.alibabacloud_provider import ( @@ -442,8 +441,8 @@ def prowler_integration_connection_test(integration: Integration) -> Connection: # Only save regions if connection is successful if connection.is_connected: - regions_status = {r: True for r in connection.enabled_regions} - regions_status.update({r: False for r in connection.disabled_regions}) + regions_status = dict.fromkeys(connection.enabled_regions, True) + regions_status.update(dict.fromkeys(connection.disabled_regions, False)) # Save regions information in the integration configuration integration.configuration["regions"] = regions_status @@ -525,7 +524,7 @@ def validate_invitation( raise ValidationError({"invitation_token": "Invalid invitation code."}) # Check if the invitation has expired - if invitation.expires_at < datetime.now(timezone.utc): + if invitation.expires_at < datetime.now(UTC): invitation.state = Invitation.State.EXPIRED invitation.save(using=MainRouter.admin_db) raise InvitationTokenExpiredException() @@ -596,6 +595,6 @@ def initialize_prowler_integration(integration: Integration) -> Jira: with rls_transaction(str(integration.tenant_id)): integration.configuration["projects"] = {} integration.connected = False - integration.connection_last_checked_at = datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) + integration.connection_last_checked_at = datetime.now(tz=UTC) integration.save() raise jira_auth_error diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/uuid_utils.py b/api/src/backend/api/uuid_utils.py index b1f33432ff..4b2c01d8b0 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/uuid_utils.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/uuid_utils.py @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -from datetime import datetime, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime from random import getrandbits from dateutil.relativedelta import relativedelta @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ def datetime_from_uuid7(uuid7: UUID) -> datetime: A datetime object representing the timestamp encoded in the UUIDv7. """ timestamp_ms = uuid7.time - return datetime.fromtimestamp(timestamp_ms / 1000, tz=timezone.utc) + return datetime.fromtimestamp(timestamp_ms / 1000, tz=UTC) def uuid7_start(uuid_obj: UUID) -> UUID: diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/v1/mixins.py b/api/src/backend/api/v1/mixins.py index e1a5d3470f..7645c92f4c 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/v1/mixins.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/v1/mixins.py @@ -1,15 +1,18 @@ -from django.urls import reverse -from django_celery_results.models import TaskResult -from rest_framework import status -from rest_framework.response import Response +import uuid from api.exceptions import ( TaskFailedException, TaskInProgressException, TaskNotFoundException, ) -from api.models import StateChoices, Task +from api.models import Provider, StateChoices, Task from api.v1.serializers import TaskSerializer +from django.http import QueryDict +from django.urls import reverse +from django_celery_results.models import TaskResult +from rest_framework import status +from rest_framework.exceptions import ValidationError +from rest_framework.response import Response class DisablePaginationMixin: @@ -74,6 +77,162 @@ class PaginateByPkMixin: return self.get_paginated_response(serialized) +class JsonApiFilterMixin: + """Shared helpers for manually applying django-filter to JSON:API params.""" + + jsonapi_filter_replace_dots = False + + def _normalize_jsonapi_params( + self, + query_params, + exclude_keys=None, + replace_dots=None, + ): + exclude_keys = exclude_keys or set() + if replace_dots is None: + replace_dots = self.jsonapi_filter_replace_dots + + normalized = QueryDict(mutable=True) + for key, values in query_params.lists(): + normalized_key = ( + key[7:-1] if key.startswith("filter[") and key.endswith("]") else key + ) + if replace_dots: + normalized_key = normalized_key.replace(".", "__") + if normalized_key not in exclude_keys: + normalized.setlist(normalized_key, values) + return normalized + + def _apply_filterset( + self, + queryset, + filterset_class, + exclude_keys=None, + replace_dots=None, + ): + normalized_params = self._normalize_jsonapi_params( + self.request.query_params, + exclude_keys=set(exclude_keys or []), + replace_dots=replace_dots, + ) + filterset = filterset_class(normalized_params, queryset=queryset) + if not filterset.is_valid(): + raise ValidationError(filterset.errors) + return filterset.qs + + +class ProviderFilterParamsMixin(JsonApiFilterMixin): + """Shared extraction of provider filters from JSON:API query params.""" + + PROVIDER_FILTER_KEYS = frozenset( + { + "provider_id", + "provider_id__in", + "provider_type", + "provider_type__in", + "provider_groups", + "provider_groups__in", + } + ) + PROVIDER_FILTER_DOT_ALIAS_KEYS = frozenset( + { + "provider_id.in", + "provider_type.in", + "provider_groups.in", + } + ) + PROVIDER_FILTER_QUERY_KEYS = PROVIDER_FILTER_KEYS | PROVIDER_FILTER_DOT_ALIAS_KEYS + + def _csv_filter_values(self, value): + return [item.strip() for item in value.split(",") if item.strip()] + + def _validate_uuid_filter_values(self, field_name, values): + try: + for value in values: + uuid.UUID(str(value)) + except (TypeError, ValueError, AttributeError): + raise ValidationError({field_name: ["Enter a valid UUID."]}) + + def _has_provider_filters(self, include_dot_aliases=False): + provider_filter_keys = ( + self.PROVIDER_FILTER_QUERY_KEYS + if include_dot_aliases + else self.PROVIDER_FILTER_KEYS + ) + return any( + self.request.query_params.get(f"filter[{key}]") + for key in provider_filter_keys + ) + + def _extract_provider_filters_from_params( + self, + *, + validate_uuids=False, + include_dot_aliases=False, + ): + params = self.request.query_params + filters = {} + valid_provider_types = { + choice[0] for choice in Provider.ProviderChoices.choices + } + + provider_id = params.get("filter[provider_id]") + if provider_id: + if validate_uuids: + self._validate_uuid_filter_values("provider_id", [provider_id]) + filters["provider_id"] = provider_id + + provider_id_in = params.get("filter[provider_id__in]") + if include_dot_aliases: + provider_id_in = provider_id_in or params.get("filter[provider_id.in]") + if provider_id_in: + values = self._csv_filter_values(provider_id_in) + if validate_uuids: + self._validate_uuid_filter_values("provider_id__in", values) + filters["provider_id__in"] = values + + provider_type = params.get("filter[provider_type]") + if provider_type: + if provider_type not in valid_provider_types: + raise ValidationError( + {"provider_type": f"Invalid choice: {provider_type}"} + ) + filters["provider__provider"] = provider_type + + provider_type_in = params.get("filter[provider_type__in]") + if include_dot_aliases: + provider_type_in = provider_type_in or params.get( + "filter[provider_type.in]" + ) + if provider_type_in: + values = self._csv_filter_values(provider_type_in) + invalid = [value for value in values if value not in valid_provider_types] + if invalid: + raise ValidationError( + {"provider_type__in": f"Invalid choices: {', '.join(invalid)}"} + ) + filters["provider__provider__in"] = values + + provider_groups = params.get("filter[provider_groups]") + if provider_groups: + if validate_uuids: + self._validate_uuid_filter_values("provider_groups", [provider_groups]) + filters["provider__provider_groups__id"] = provider_groups + + provider_groups_in = params.get("filter[provider_groups__in]") + if include_dot_aliases: + provider_groups_in = provider_groups_in or params.get( + "filter[provider_groups.in]" + ) + if provider_groups_in: + values = self._csv_filter_values(provider_groups_in) + if validate_uuids: + self._validate_uuid_filter_values("provider_groups__in", values) + filters["provider__provider_groups__id__in"] = values + + return filters + + class TaskManagementMixin: """ Mixin to manage task status checking. diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/v1/serializer_utils/integrations.py b/api/src/backend/api/v1/serializer_utils/integrations.py index aaa0f4aa31..a77de9c237 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/v1/serializer_utils/integrations.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/v1/serializer_utils/integrations.py @@ -1,11 +1,10 @@ import os import re +from api.v1.serializer_utils.base import BaseValidateSerializer from drf_spectacular.utils import extend_schema_field from rest_framework_json_api import serializers -from api.v1.serializer_utils.base import BaseValidateSerializer - class S3ConfigSerializer(BaseValidateSerializer): bucket_name = serializers.CharField() diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/v1/serializer_utils/processors.py b/api/src/backend/api/v1/serializer_utils/processors.py index 4022f3f2bc..ee53aa8ccf 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/v1/serializer_utils/processors.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/v1/serializer_utils/processors.py @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ -from drf_spectacular.utils import extend_schema_field - from api.v1.serializer_utils.base import YamlOrJsonField - +from drf_spectacular.utils import extend_schema_field from prowler.lib.mutelist.mutelist import mutelist_schema diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/v1/serializers.py b/api/src/backend/api/v1/serializers.py index 03d2fecad2..1d160b4048 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/v1/serializers.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/v1/serializers.py @@ -1,23 +1,6 @@ import base64 import json -from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone - -from django.conf import settings -from django.contrib.auth import authenticate -from django.contrib.auth.models import update_last_login -from django.contrib.auth.password_validation import validate_password -from django.core.exceptions import ValidationError as DjangoValidationError -from django.db import IntegrityError -from drf_spectacular.utils import extend_schema_field -from jwt.exceptions import InvalidKeyError -from rest_framework.reverse import reverse -from rest_framework.validators import UniqueTogetherValidator -from rest_framework_json_api import serializers -from rest_framework_json_api.relations import SerializerMethodResourceRelatedField -from rest_framework_json_api.serializers import ValidationError -from rest_framework_simplejwt.exceptions import TokenError -from rest_framework_simplejwt.serializers import TokenObtainPairSerializer -from rest_framework_simplejwt.tokens import RefreshToken +from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta from api.db_router import MainRouter from api.exceptions import ConflictException @@ -72,7 +55,23 @@ from api.v1.serializer_utils.lighthouse import ( ) from api.v1.serializer_utils.processors import ProcessorConfigField from api.v1.serializer_utils.providers import ProviderSecretField +from django.conf import settings +from django.contrib.auth import authenticate +from django.contrib.auth.models import update_last_login +from django.contrib.auth.password_validation import validate_password +from django.core.exceptions import ValidationError as DjangoValidationError +from django.db import IntegrityError +from drf_spectacular.utils import extend_schema_field +from jwt.exceptions import InvalidKeyError from prowler.lib.mutelist.mutelist import Mutelist +from rest_framework.reverse import reverse +from rest_framework.validators import UniqueTogetherValidator +from rest_framework_json_api import serializers +from rest_framework_json_api.relations import SerializerMethodResourceRelatedField +from rest_framework_json_api.serializers import ValidationError +from rest_framework_simplejwt.exceptions import TokenError +from rest_framework_simplejwt.serializers import TokenObtainPairSerializer +from rest_framework_simplejwt.tokens import RefreshToken # Base @@ -1981,7 +1980,7 @@ class InvitationBaseWriteSerializer(BaseWriteSerializer): return value def validate_expires_at(self, value): - now = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + now = datetime.now(UTC) if value and value < now + timedelta(hours=24): raise ValidationError( "Expiry date must be at least 24 hours in the future." diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/v1/urls.py b/api/src/backend/api/v1/urls.py index 533106d0e4..b53fe1c817 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/v1/urls.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/v1/urls.py @@ -1,10 +1,4 @@ from allauth.socialaccount.providers.saml.views import ACSView, MetadataView, SLSView -from django.http import JsonResponse -from django.urls import include, path -from django.views.decorators.csrf import csrf_exempt -from drf_spectacular.views import SpectacularRedocView -from rest_framework_nested import routers - from api.v1.views import ( AttackPathsScanViewSet, ComplianceOverviewViewSet, @@ -49,6 +43,11 @@ from api.v1.views import ( UserRoleRelationshipView, UserViewSet, ) +from django.http import JsonResponse +from django.urls import include, path +from django.views.decorators.csrf import csrf_exempt +from drf_spectacular.views import SpectacularRedocView +from rest_framework_nested import routers # This helper view is used to block any endpoints that should not be available diff --git a/api/src/backend/api/v1/views.py b/api/src/backend/api/v1/views.py index 0942adc8e1..b488525a0a 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/api/v1/views.py +++ b/api/src/backend/api/v1/views.py @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import time import uuid from collections import defaultdict from copy import deepcopy -from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta from decimal import ROUND_HALF_UP, Decimal, InvalidOperation from urllib.parse import urljoin @@ -16,100 +16,6 @@ from allauth.socialaccount.models import SocialAccount, SocialApp from allauth.socialaccount.providers.github.views import GitHubOAuth2Adapter from allauth.socialaccount.providers.google.views import GoogleOAuth2Adapter from allauth.socialaccount.providers.saml.views import FinishACSView, LoginView -from botocore.exceptions import ClientError, NoCredentialsError, ParamValidationError -from celery import chain, states -from celery.result import AsyncResult -from config.custom_logging import BackendLogger -from config.env import env -from config.version import RELEASE_ID -from config.settings.social_login import ( - GITHUB_OAUTH_CALLBACK_URL, - GOOGLE_OAUTH_CALLBACK_URL, -) -from dj_rest_auth.registration.views import SocialLoginView -from django.conf import settings as django_settings -from django.contrib.postgres.aggregates import ArrayAgg, BoolAnd, StringAgg -from django.contrib.postgres.search import SearchQuery -from django.core.exceptions import ValidationError as DjangoValidationError -from django.db import transaction -from django.db.models import ( - BooleanField, - Case, - CharField, - Count, - DecimalField, - Exists, - ExpressionWrapper, - F, - IntegerField, - Max, - Min, - OuterRef, - Prefetch, - Q, - QuerySet, - Subquery, - Sum, - Value, - When, - Window, -) -from django.db.models.fields.json import KeyTextTransform -from django.db.models.functions import Cast, Coalesce, RowNumber -from django.http import HttpResponse, HttpResponseBase, HttpResponseRedirect, QueryDict -from django.shortcuts import redirect -from django.urls import reverse -from django.utils.dateparse import parse_date -from django.utils.decorators import method_decorator -from django.views.decorators.cache import cache_control -from django_celery_beat.models import PeriodicTask -from django_celery_results.models import TaskResult -from drf_spectacular.settings import spectacular_settings -from drf_spectacular.types import OpenApiTypes -from drf_spectacular.utils import ( - OpenApiParameter, - OpenApiResponse, - extend_schema, - extend_schema_view, -) -from drf_spectacular.views import SpectacularAPIView -from drf_spectacular_jsonapi.schemas.openapi import JsonApiAutoSchema -from rest_framework import permissions, status -from rest_framework.decorators import action -from rest_framework.exceptions import ( - MethodNotAllowed, - NotFound, - PermissionDenied, - ValidationError, -) -from rest_framework.generics import GenericAPIView, get_object_or_404 -from rest_framework.permissions import SAFE_METHODS -from rest_framework_json_api import filters as jsonapi_filters -from rest_framework_json_api.views import RelationshipView, Response -from rest_framework_simplejwt.exceptions import InvalidToken, TokenError -from rest_framework_simplejwt.token_blacklist.models import ( - BlacklistedToken, - OutstandingToken, -) -from tasks.beat import schedule_provider_scan -from tasks.jobs.attack_paths import db_utils as attack_paths_db_utils -from tasks.jobs.export import get_s3_client -from tasks.tasks import ( - backfill_compliance_summaries_task, - backfill_scan_resource_summaries_task, - check_integration_connection_task, - check_lighthouse_connection_task, - check_lighthouse_provider_connection_task, - check_provider_connection_task, - delete_provider_task, - delete_tenant_task, - jira_integration_task, - mute_historical_findings_task, - perform_scan_task, - reaggregate_all_finding_group_summaries_task, - refresh_lighthouse_provider_models_task, -) - from api.attack_paths import database as graph_database from api.attack_paths import get_queries_for_provider, get_query_by_id from api.attack_paths import views_helpers as attack_paths_views_helpers @@ -228,7 +134,13 @@ from api.utils import ( validate_invitation, ) from api.uuid_utils import datetime_to_uuid7, uuid7_start -from api.v1.mixins import DisablePaginationMixin, PaginateByPkMixin, TaskManagementMixin +from api.v1.mixins import ( + DisablePaginationMixin, + JsonApiFilterMixin, + PaginateByPkMixin, + ProviderFilterParamsMixin, + TaskManagementMixin, +) from api.v1.serializers import ( AttackPathsCartographySchemaSerializer, AttackPathsCustomQueryRunRequestSerializer, @@ -322,6 +234,64 @@ from api.v1.serializers import ( UserSerializer, UserUpdateSerializer, ) +from botocore.exceptions import ClientError, NoCredentialsError, ParamValidationError +from celery import chain, states +from celery.result import AsyncResult +from config.custom_logging import BackendLogger +from config.env import env +from config.settings.social_login import ( + GITHUB_OAUTH_CALLBACK_URL, + GOOGLE_OAUTH_CALLBACK_URL, +) +from config.version import RELEASE_ID +from dj_rest_auth.registration.views import SocialLoginView +from django.conf import settings as django_settings +from django.contrib.postgres.aggregates import ArrayAgg, BoolAnd, StringAgg +from django.contrib.postgres.search import SearchQuery +from django.core.exceptions import ValidationError as DjangoValidationError +from django.db import transaction +from django.db.models import ( + BooleanField, + Case, + CharField, + Count, + DecimalField, + Exists, + ExpressionWrapper, + F, + IntegerField, + Max, + Min, + OuterRef, + Prefetch, + Q, + QuerySet, + Subquery, + Sum, + Value, + When, + Window, +) +from django.db.models.fields.json import KeyTextTransform +from django.db.models.functions import Cast, Coalesce, RowNumber +from django.http import HttpResponse, HttpResponseBase, HttpResponseRedirect, QueryDict +from django.shortcuts import redirect +from django.urls import reverse +from django.utils.dateparse import parse_date +from django.utils.decorators import method_decorator +from django.views.decorators.cache import cache_control +from django_celery_beat.models import PeriodicTask +from django_celery_results.models import TaskResult +from drf_spectacular.settings import spectacular_settings +from drf_spectacular.types import OpenApiTypes +from drf_spectacular.utils import ( + OpenApiParameter, + OpenApiResponse, + extend_schema, + extend_schema_view, +) +from drf_spectacular.views import SpectacularAPIView +from drf_spectacular_jsonapi.schemas.openapi import JsonApiAutoSchema from prowler.providers.aws.exceptions.exceptions import ( AWSAssumeRoleError, AWSCredentialsError, @@ -329,6 +299,41 @@ from prowler.providers.aws.exceptions.exceptions import ( from prowler.providers.aws.lib.cloudtrail_timeline.cloudtrail_timeline import ( CloudTrailTimeline, ) +from rest_framework import permissions, status +from rest_framework.decorators import action +from rest_framework.exceptions import ( + MethodNotAllowed, + NotFound, + PermissionDenied, + ValidationError, +) +from rest_framework.generics import GenericAPIView, get_object_or_404 +from rest_framework.permissions import SAFE_METHODS +from rest_framework_json_api import filters as jsonapi_filters +from rest_framework_json_api.views import RelationshipView, Response +from rest_framework_simplejwt.exceptions import InvalidToken, TokenError +from rest_framework_simplejwt.token_blacklist.models import ( + BlacklistedToken, + OutstandingToken, +) +from tasks.beat import schedule_provider_scan +from tasks.jobs.attack_paths import db_utils as attack_paths_db_utils +from tasks.jobs.export import get_s3_client +from tasks.tasks import ( + backfill_compliance_summaries_task, + backfill_scan_resource_summaries_task, + check_integration_connection_task, + check_lighthouse_connection_task, + check_lighthouse_provider_connection_task, + check_provider_connection_task, + delete_provider_task, + delete_tenant_task, + jira_integration_task, + mute_historical_findings_task, + perform_scan_task, + reaggregate_all_finding_group_summaries_task, + refresh_lighthouse_provider_models_task, +) logger = logging.getLogger(BackendLogger.API) @@ -761,7 +766,10 @@ class TenantFinishACSView(FinishACSView): try: check = SAMLDomainIndex.objects.get(email_domain=organization_slug) with rls_transaction(str(check.tenant_id)): - SAMLConfiguration.objects.get(tenant_id=str(check.tenant_id)) + saml_config = SAMLConfiguration.objects.select_related("tenant").get( + tenant_id=str(check.tenant_id) + ) + tenant = saml_config.tenant social_app = SocialApp.objects.get( provider="saml", client_id=organization_slug ) @@ -781,6 +789,15 @@ class TenantFinishACSView(FinishACSView): callback_url = env.str("AUTH_URL") return redirect(f"{callback_url}?sso_saml_failed=true") + requested_domain = organization_slug.lower() + configured_domain = saml_config.email_domain.lower() + email_domain = user.email.rsplit("@", 1)[-1].lower() + if configured_domain != requested_domain or email_domain != configured_domain: + logger.error("SAML email domain does not match requested organization") + self._rollback_saml_user(request) + callback_url = env.str("AUTH_URL") + return redirect(f"{callback_url}?sso_saml_failed=true") + extra = social_account.extra_data user.first_name = ( extra.get("firstName", [""])[0] if extra.get("firstName") else "" @@ -794,67 +811,70 @@ class TenantFinishACSView(FinishACSView): user.name = "N/A" user.save() - email_domain = user.email.split("@")[-1] - tenant = ( - SAMLConfiguration.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db) - .get(email_domain=email_domain) - .tenant - ) - + # Only remap roles when the IdP provides a userType attribute. + # Without it, the user's current roles are left untouched. role_name = ( - extra.get("userType", ["no_permissions"])[0].strip() - if extra.get("userType") - else "no_permissions" + extra.get("userType", [""])[0].strip() if extra.get("userType") else "" ) - role = ( - Role.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db) - .filter(name=role_name, tenant=tenant) - .first() - ) - - # Only skip mapping if it would remove the last MANAGE_ACCOUNT user - remaining_manage_account_users = ( - UserRoleRelationship.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db) - .filter(role__manage_account=True, tenant_id=tenant.id) - .exclude(user_id=user_id) - .values("user") - .distinct() - .count() - ) - user_has_manage_account = ( - UserRoleRelationship.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db) - .filter(role__manage_account=True, tenant_id=tenant.id, user_id=user_id) - .exists() - ) - role_manage_account = role.manage_account if role else False - would_remove_last_manage_account = ( - user_has_manage_account - and remaining_manage_account_users == 0 - and not role_manage_account - ) - - if not would_remove_last_manage_account: - if role is None: - role = Role.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db).create( - name=role_name, - tenant=tenant, - manage_users=False, - manage_account=False, - manage_billing=False, - manage_providers=False, - manage_integrations=False, - manage_scans=False, - unlimited_visibility=False, + if role_name: + with transaction.atomic(using=MainRouter.admin_db): + role = ( + Role.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db) + .filter(name=role_name, tenant=tenant) + .first() ) - UserRoleRelationship.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db).filter( - user=user, - tenant_id=tenant.id, - ).delete() - UserRoleRelationship.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db).create( - user=user, - role=role, - tenant_id=tenant.id, - ) + + # Only skip mapping if it would remove the last MANAGE_ACCOUNT user + remaining_manage_account_users = ( + UserRoleRelationship.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db) + .filter(role__manage_account=True, tenant_id=tenant.id) + .exclude(user_id=user_id) + .values("user") + .distinct() + .count() + ) + user_has_manage_account = ( + UserRoleRelationship.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db) + .filter( + role__manage_account=True, + tenant_id=tenant.id, + user_id=user_id, + ) + .exists() + ) + role_manage_account = role.manage_account if role else False + would_remove_last_manage_account = ( + user_has_manage_account + and remaining_manage_account_users == 0 + and not role_manage_account + ) + + if not would_remove_last_manage_account: + if role is None: + # Roles auto-created from userType get read-only access: + # visibility over all providers, no management permissions + role, _ = Role.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db).get_or_create( + name=role_name, + tenant=tenant, + defaults={ + "manage_users": False, + "manage_account": False, + "manage_billing": False, + "manage_providers": False, + "manage_integrations": False, + "manage_scans": False, + "unlimited_visibility": True, + }, + ) + UserRoleRelationship.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db).filter( + user=user, + tenant_id=tenant.id, + ).delete() + UserRoleRelationship.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db).create( + user=user, + role=role, + tenant_id=tenant.id, + ) membership, _ = Membership.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db).get_or_create( user=user, tenant=tenant, @@ -1868,8 +1888,8 @@ class ProviderViewSet(DisablePaginationMixin, BaseRLSViewSet): description=( "Download a specific compliance report as an OCSF JSON file. " "Only universal frameworks that declare an output configuration " - "produce this artifact (currently 'dora' and 'csa_ccm_4.0'); any " - "other framework returns 404." + "produce this artifact (currently 'dora_2022_2554', 'csa_ccm_4.0' " + "and 'cis_controls_8.1'); any other framework returns 404." ), parameters=[ OpenApiParameter( @@ -1877,7 +1897,7 @@ class ProviderViewSet(DisablePaginationMixin, BaseRLSViewSet): type=str, location=OpenApiParameter.PATH, required=True, - description="The compliance report name, like 'dora'", + description="The compliance report name, like 'dora_2022_2554'", ), ], responses={ @@ -2856,13 +2876,22 @@ class AttackPathsScanViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): def list(self, request, *args, **kwargs): queryset = self.filter_queryset(self.get_queryset()) + active_sink_backend = django_settings.ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE latest_per_provider = queryset.annotate( + active_sink_rank=Case( + When(sink_backend=active_sink_backend, then=Value(0)), + default=Value(1), + output_field=IntegerField(), + ), latest_scan_rank=Window( expression=RowNumber(), partition_by=[F("provider_id")], - order_by=[F("inserted_at").desc()], - ) + order_by=[ + F("active_sink_rank").asc(), + F("inserted_at").desc(), + ], + ), ).filter(latest_scan_rank=1) page = self.paginate_queryset(latest_per_provider) @@ -2889,7 +2918,11 @@ class AttackPathsScanViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): ) def attack_paths_queries(self, request, pk=None): attack_paths_scan = self.get_object() - queries = get_queries_for_provider(attack_paths_scan.provider.provider) + # TODO: drop the is_migrated argument after Neptune cutover + queries = get_queries_for_provider( + attack_paths_scan.provider.provider, + is_migrated=attack_paths_scan.is_migrated, + ) if not queries: return Response( @@ -2922,7 +2955,11 @@ class AttackPathsScanViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): serializer = AttackPathsQueryRunRequestSerializer(data=payload) serializer.is_valid(raise_exception=True) - query_definition = get_query_by_id(serializer.validated_data["id"]) + # TODO: drop the is_migrated argument after Neptune cutover + query_definition = get_query_by_id( + serializer.validated_data["id"], + is_migrated=attack_paths_scan.is_migrated, + ) if ( query_definition is None or query_definition.provider != attack_paths_scan.provider.provider @@ -2948,6 +2985,7 @@ class AttackPathsScanViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): query_definition, parameters, provider_id, + scan=attack_paths_scan, ) query_duration = time.monotonic() - start @@ -3015,6 +3053,7 @@ class AttackPathsScanViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): database_name, serializer.validated_data["query"], provider_id, + scan=attack_paths_scan, ) query_duration = time.monotonic() - start @@ -3071,7 +3110,7 @@ class AttackPathsScanViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): provider_id = str(attack_paths_scan.provider_id) schema = attack_paths_views_helpers.get_cartography_schema( - database_name, provider_id + database_name, provider_id, attack_paths_scan ) if not schema: return Response( @@ -3329,9 +3368,7 @@ class ResourceViewSet(PaginateByPkMixin, BaseRLSViewSet): date_filters = {} if exact: date = parse_date(exact) - datetime_start = datetime.combine( - date, datetime.min.time(), tzinfo=timezone.utc - ) + datetime_start = datetime.combine(date, datetime.min.time(), tzinfo=UTC) datetime_end = datetime_start + timedelta(days=1) date_filters["scan_id__gte"] = uuid7_start( datetime_to_uuid7(datetime_start) @@ -3343,7 +3380,7 @@ class ResourceViewSet(PaginateByPkMixin, BaseRLSViewSet): if gte: date_start = parse_date(gte) datetime_start = datetime.combine( - date_start, datetime.min.time(), tzinfo=timezone.utc + date_start, datetime.min.time(), tzinfo=UTC ) date_filters["scan_id__gte"] = uuid7_start( datetime_to_uuid7(datetime_start) @@ -3353,7 +3390,7 @@ class ResourceViewSet(PaginateByPkMixin, BaseRLSViewSet): datetime_end = datetime.combine( date_end + timedelta(days=1), datetime.min.time(), - tzinfo=timezone.utc, + tzinfo=UTC, ) date_filters["scan_id__lt"] = uuid7_start( datetime_to_uuid7(datetime_end) @@ -3397,7 +3434,7 @@ class ResourceViewSet(PaginateByPkMixin, BaseRLSViewSet): groups__isnull=False, ).values_list("groups", flat=True) groups = sorted( - set(g for groups_list in all_groups if groups_list for g in groups_list) + {g for groups_list in all_groups if groups_list for g in groups_list} ) result = { @@ -3467,7 +3504,7 @@ class ResourceViewSet(PaginateByPkMixin, BaseRLSViewSet): groups__isnull=False, ).values_list("groups", flat=True) groups = sorted( - set(g for groups_list in all_groups if groups_list for g in groups_list) + {g for groups_list in all_groups if groups_list for g in groups_list} ) result = { @@ -3894,9 +3931,7 @@ class FindingViewSet(PaginateByPkMixin, BaseRLSViewSet): date_filters = {} if exact: date = parse_date(exact) - datetime_start = datetime.combine( - date, datetime.min.time(), tzinfo=timezone.utc - ) + datetime_start = datetime.combine(date, datetime.min.time(), tzinfo=UTC) datetime_end = datetime_start + timedelta(days=1) date_filters["scan_id__gte"] = uuid7_start( datetime_to_uuid7(datetime_start) @@ -3908,7 +3943,7 @@ class FindingViewSet(PaginateByPkMixin, BaseRLSViewSet): if gte: date_start = parse_date(gte) datetime_start = datetime.combine( - date_start, datetime.min.time(), tzinfo=timezone.utc + date_start, datetime.min.time(), tzinfo=UTC ) date_filters["scan_id__gte"] = uuid7_start( datetime_to_uuid7(datetime_start) @@ -3918,7 +3953,7 @@ class FindingViewSet(PaginateByPkMixin, BaseRLSViewSet): datetime_end = datetime.combine( date_end + timedelta(days=1), datetime.min.time(), - tzinfo=timezone.utc, + tzinfo=UTC, ) date_filters["scan_id__lt"] = uuid7_start( datetime_to_uuid7(datetime_end) @@ -4546,15 +4581,19 @@ class RoleProviderGroupRelationshipView(RelationshipView, BaseRLSViewSet): @extend_schema_view( list=extend_schema( tags=["Compliance Overview"], - summary="List compliance overviews for a scan", - description="Retrieve an overview of all the compliance in a given scan.", + summary="List compliance overviews", + description=( + "Retrieve compliance overview data for a scan. When provider filters " + "are provided, the endpoint uses the latest completed scan for each " + "matching provider." + ), parameters=[ OpenApiParameter( name="filter[scan_id]", - required=True, + required=False, type=OpenApiTypes.UUID, location=OpenApiParameter.QUERY, - description="Related scan ID.", + description="Related scan ID. Required unless a provider filter is provided.", ), ], responses={ @@ -4569,19 +4608,23 @@ class RoleProviderGroupRelationshipView(RelationshipView, BaseRLSViewSet): description="Compliance overviews generation task failed" ), }, + filters=True, ), metadata=extend_schema( tags=["Compliance Overview"], summary="Retrieve metadata values from compliance overviews", - description="Fetch unique metadata values from a set of compliance overviews. This is useful for dynamic " - "filtering.", + description=( + "Fetch unique metadata values from compliance overviews. This is useful " + "for dynamic filtering. When provider filters are provided, metadata is " + "computed from the latest completed scan for each matching provider." + ), parameters=[ OpenApiParameter( name="filter[scan_id]", - required=True, + required=False, type=OpenApiTypes.UUID, location=OpenApiParameter.QUERY, - description="Related scan ID.", + description="Related scan ID. Required unless a provider filter is provided.", ), ], responses={ @@ -4596,19 +4639,24 @@ class RoleProviderGroupRelationshipView(RelationshipView, BaseRLSViewSet): description="Compliance overviews generation task failed" ), }, + filters=True, ), requirements=extend_schema( tags=["Compliance Overview"], - summary="List compliance requirements overview for a scan", - description="Retrieve a detailed overview of compliance requirements in a given scan, grouped by compliance " - "framework. This endpoint provides requirement-level details and aggregates status across regions.", + summary="List compliance requirements overview", + description=( + "Retrieve a detailed overview of compliance requirements, grouped by " + "compliance framework. This endpoint provides requirement-level details " + "and aggregates status across regions. When provider filters are provided, " + "the endpoint uses the latest completed scan for each matching provider." + ), parameters=[ OpenApiParameter( name="filter[scan_id]", - required=True, + required=False, type=OpenApiTypes.UUID, location=OpenApiParameter.QUERY, - description="Related scan ID.", + description="Related scan ID. Required unless a provider filter is provided.", ), OpenApiParameter( name="filter[compliance_id]", @@ -4667,7 +4715,10 @@ class RoleProviderGroupRelationshipView(RelationshipView, BaseRLSViewSet): @method_decorator(CACHE_DECORATOR, name="list") @method_decorator(CACHE_DECORATOR, name="requirements") @method_decorator(CACHE_DECORATOR, name="attributes") -class ComplianceOverviewViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet, TaskManagementMixin): +class ComplianceOverviewViewSet( + ProviderFilterParamsMixin, BaseRLSViewSet, TaskManagementMixin +): + jsonapi_filter_replace_dots = True pagination_class = ComplianceOverviewPagination queryset = ComplianceRequirementOverview.objects.all() serializer_class = ComplianceOverviewSerializer @@ -4681,28 +4732,22 @@ class ComplianceOverviewViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet, TaskManagementMixin): required_permissions = [] def get_queryset(self): + if getattr(self, "swagger_fake_view", False): + return ComplianceRequirementOverview.objects.none() + role = get_role(self.request.user, self.request.tenant_id) unlimited_visibility = getattr( role, Permissions.UNLIMITED_VISIBILITY.value, False ) - if unlimited_visibility: - base_queryset = self.filter_queryset( - ComplianceRequirementOverview.objects.filter( - tenant_id=self.request.tenant_id - ) - ) - else: - providers = Provider.objects.filter( - provider_groups__in=role.provider_groups.all() - ).distinct() - base_queryset = self.filter_queryset( - ComplianceRequirementOverview.objects.filter( - tenant_id=self.request.tenant_id, scan__provider__in=providers - ) - ) + base_queryset = ComplianceRequirementOverview.objects.filter( + tenant_id=self.request.tenant_id + ) - return base_queryset + if unlimited_visibility: + return base_queryset + + return base_queryset.filter(scan__provider__in=get_providers(role)) def get_serializer_class(self): if hasattr(self, "response_serializer_class"): @@ -4740,6 +4785,72 @@ class ComplianceOverviewViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet, TaskManagementMixin): return summaries + def _validate_scan_selection(self, scan_id, has_provider_filters): + if scan_id and has_provider_filters: + raise ValidationError( + [ + { + "detail": "Use either filter[scan_id] or provider filters.", + "status": 400, + "source": {"pointer": "filter[scan_id]"}, + "code": "invalid", + } + ] + ) + + if scan_id: + self._validate_uuid_filter_values("scan_id", [scan_id]) + return + + if has_provider_filters: + return + + raise ValidationError( + [ + { + "detail": "This query parameter is required unless a provider filter is provided.", + "status": 400, + "source": {"pointer": "filter[scan_id]"}, + "code": "required", + } + ] + ) + + def _latest_scan_ids_for_provider_filters(self): + role = get_role(self.request.user, self.request.tenant_id) + scans = Scan.all_objects.filter( + tenant_id=self.request.tenant_id, + state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, + ) + + if not getattr(role, Permissions.UNLIMITED_VISIBILITY.value, False): + scans = scans.filter(provider__in=get_providers(role)) + + provider_filters = self._extract_provider_filters_from_params( + validate_uuids=True, + include_dot_aliases=True, + ) + if provider_filters: + scans = scans.filter(**provider_filters) + + return list( + scans.order_by("provider_id", "-inserted_at") + .distinct("provider_id") + .values_list("id", flat=True) + ) + + def _filtered_queryset_for_latest_provider_scans(self, latest_scan_ids=None): + if latest_scan_ids is None: + latest_scan_ids = self._latest_scan_ids_for_provider_filters() + queryset = self.get_queryset().filter(scan_id__in=latest_scan_ids) + # Provider filters stay on the filterset for OpenAPI docs, but runtime + # filtering happens on Scan first so compliance queries use scan IDs. + return self._apply_filterset( + queryset, + self.filterset_class, + exclude_keys=self.PROVIDER_FILTER_KEYS | {"scan_id"}, + ) + def _get_compliance_template(self, *, provider=None, scan_id=None): """Return the compliance template for the given provider or scan.""" if provider is None and scan_id is not None: @@ -4855,6 +4966,36 @@ class ComplianceOverviewViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet, TaskManagementMixin): status=status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, ) + def _task_response_for_latest_provider_scans(self, latest_scan_ids): + for scan_id in latest_scan_ids: + task_response = self._task_response_if_running(str(scan_id)) + if task_response: + return task_response + return None + + def _latest_provider_scan_ids_without_data(self, latest_scan_ids): + data_presence_queryset = self.get_queryset().filter(scan_id__in=latest_scan_ids) + scan_ids_with_data = { + str(scan_id) + for scan_id in data_presence_queryset.values_list( + "scan_id", flat=True + ).distinct() + } + return [ + scan_id + for scan_id in latest_scan_ids + if str(scan_id) not in scan_ids_with_data + ] + + def _task_response_for_latest_provider_scans_without_data( + self, + latest_scan_ids, + ): + scan_ids_to_check = self._latest_provider_scan_ids_without_data( + latest_scan_ids, + ) + return self._task_response_for_latest_provider_scans(scan_ids_to_check) + def _list_with_region_filter(self, scan_id, region_filter): """ Fall back to detailed ComplianceRequirementOverview query when region filter is applied. @@ -4895,8 +5036,25 @@ class ComplianceOverviewViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet, TaskManagementMixin): return Response(data) + def _list_with_latest_provider_filters(self): + latest_scan_ids = self._latest_scan_ids_for_provider_filters() + queryset = self._filtered_queryset_for_latest_provider_scans(latest_scan_ids) + data = self._aggregate_compliance_overview(queryset) + task_response = self._task_response_for_latest_provider_scans_without_data( + latest_scan_ids, + ) + if task_response: + return task_response + + return Response(data) + def list(self, request, *args, **kwargs): scan_id = request.query_params.get("filter[scan_id]") + has_provider_filters = self._has_provider_filters(include_dot_aliases=True) + self._validate_scan_selection(scan_id, has_provider_filters) + + if has_provider_filters: + return self._list_with_latest_provider_filters() # Specific scan requested - use optimized summaries with region support region_filter = request.query_params.get( @@ -4942,33 +5100,34 @@ class ComplianceOverviewViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet, TaskManagementMixin): @action(detail=False, methods=["get"], url_name="metadata") def metadata(self, request): scan_id = request.query_params.get("filter[scan_id]") - if not scan_id: - raise ValidationError( - [ - { - "detail": "This query parameter is required.", - "status": 400, - "source": {"pointer": "filter[scan_id]"}, - "code": "required", - } - ] + has_provider_filters = self._has_provider_filters(include_dot_aliases=True) + self._validate_scan_selection(scan_id, has_provider_filters) + + latest_scan_ids = None + if has_provider_filters: + latest_scan_ids = self._latest_scan_ids_for_provider_filters() + queryset = self._filtered_queryset_for_latest_provider_scans( + latest_scan_ids ) + else: + queryset = self._apply_filterset(self.get_queryset(), self.filterset_class) + regions = list( - self.get_queryset() - .filter(scan_id=scan_id) - .values_list("region", flat=True) - .order_by("region") - .distinct() + queryset.values_list("region", flat=True).order_by("region").distinct() ) result = {"regions": regions} - if regions: - serializer = self.get_serializer(data=result) - serializer.is_valid(raise_exception=True) - return Response(serializer.data, status=status.HTTP_200_OK) + task_response = None + if has_provider_filters: + task_response = self._task_response_for_latest_provider_scans_without_data( + latest_scan_ids, + ) + elif not regions: + task_response = self._task_response_if_running(scan_id) + if task_response: + return task_response - task_response = self._task_response_if_running(scan_id) - if task_response: + if has_provider_filters and task_response: return task_response serializer = self.get_serializer(data=result) @@ -4978,19 +5137,10 @@ class ComplianceOverviewViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet, TaskManagementMixin): @action(detail=False, methods=["get"], url_name="requirements") def requirements(self, request): scan_id = request.query_params.get("filter[scan_id]") + has_provider_filters = self._has_provider_filters(include_dot_aliases=True) compliance_id = request.query_params.get("filter[compliance_id]") - if not scan_id: - raise ValidationError( - [ - { - "detail": "This query parameter is required.", - "status": 400, - "source": {"pointer": "filter[scan_id]"}, - "code": "required", - } - ] - ) + self._validate_scan_selection(scan_id, has_provider_filters) if not compliance_id: raise ValidationError( @@ -5003,7 +5153,16 @@ class ComplianceOverviewViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet, TaskManagementMixin): } ] ) - filtered_queryset = self.filter_queryset(self.get_queryset()) + latest_scan_ids = None + if has_provider_filters: + latest_scan_ids = self._latest_scan_ids_for_provider_filters() + filtered_queryset = self._filtered_queryset_for_latest_provider_scans( + latest_scan_ids + ) + else: + filtered_queryset = self._apply_filterset( + self.get_queryset(), self.filterset_class + ) all_requirements = filtered_queryset.values( "requirement_id", @@ -5062,13 +5221,22 @@ class ComplianceOverviewViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet, TaskManagementMixin): requirements_summary, many=True ) + task_response = None + if has_provider_filters: + task_response = self._task_response_for_latest_provider_scans_without_data( + latest_scan_ids, + ) + elif not requirements_summary: + task_response = self._task_response_if_running(scan_id) + if task_response: + return task_response + + if has_provider_filters and task_response: + return task_response + if requirements_summary: return Response(serializer.data, status=status.HTTP_200_OK) - task_response = self._task_response_if_running(scan_id) - if task_response: - return task_response - return Response(serializer.data, status=status.HTTP_200_OK) @action(detail=False, methods=["get"], url_name="attributes") @@ -5307,7 +5475,7 @@ class ComplianceOverviewViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet, TaskManagementMixin): ), ) @method_decorator(CACHE_DECORATOR, name="list") -class OverviewViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): +class OverviewViewSet(ProviderFilterParamsMixin, BaseRLSViewSet): queryset = ScanSummary.objects.all() http_method_names = ["get"] ordering = ["-inserted_at"] @@ -5424,18 +5592,6 @@ class OverviewViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): tenant_id=tenant_id, scan_id__in=latest_scan_ids ) - def _normalize_jsonapi_params(self, query_params, exclude_keys=None): - """Convert JSON:API filter params (filter[X]) to flat params (X).""" - exclude_keys = exclude_keys or set() - normalized = QueryDict(mutable=True) - for key, values in query_params.lists(): - normalized_key = ( - key[7:-1] if key.startswith("filter[") and key.endswith("]") else key - ) - if normalized_key not in exclude_keys: - normalized.setlist(normalized_key, values) - return normalized - def _ensure_allowed_providers(self): """Populate allowed providers for RBAC-aware queries once per request.""" if getattr(self, "_providers_initialized", False): @@ -5455,15 +5611,6 @@ class OverviewViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): return queryset.filter(**provider_filter) return queryset - def _apply_filterset(self, queryset, filterset_class, exclude_keys=None): - normalized_params = self._normalize_jsonapi_params( - self.request.query_params, exclude_keys=set(exclude_keys or []) - ) - filterset = filterset_class(normalized_params, queryset=queryset) - if not filterset.is_valid(): - raise ValidationError(filterset.errors) - return filterset.qs - def _latest_scan_ids_for_allowed_providers(self, tenant_id, provider_filters=None): provider_filter = self._get_provider_filter() queryset = Scan.all_objects.filter( @@ -5477,40 +5624,6 @@ class OverviewViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): .values_list("id", flat=True) ) - def _extract_provider_filters_from_params(self): - """Extract and validate provider filters from query params.""" - params = self.request.query_params - filters = {} - valid_provider_types = {c[0] for c in Provider.ProviderChoices.choices} - - provider_id = params.get("filter[provider_id]") - if provider_id: - filters["provider_id"] = provider_id - - provider_id_in = params.get("filter[provider_id__in]") - if provider_id_in: - filters["provider_id__in"] = provider_id_in.split(",") - - provider_type = params.get("filter[provider_type]") - if provider_type: - if provider_type not in valid_provider_types: - raise ValidationError( - {"provider_type": f"Invalid choice: {provider_type}"} - ) - filters["provider__provider"] = provider_type - - provider_type_in = params.get("filter[provider_type__in]") - if provider_type_in: - types = provider_type_in.split(",") - invalid = [t for t in types if t not in valid_provider_types] - if invalid: - raise ValidationError( - {"provider_type__in": f"Invalid choices: {', '.join(invalid)}"} - ) - filters["provider__provider__in"] = types - - return filters - @action(detail=False, methods=["get"], url_name="providers") def providers(self, request): tenant_id = self.request.tenant_id @@ -5581,15 +5694,11 @@ class OverviewViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): tenant_id = self.request.tenant_id providers_qs = Provider.objects.filter(tenant_id=tenant_id) + self._ensure_allowed_providers() if hasattr(self, "allowed_providers"): - allowed_ids = list(self.allowed_providers.values_list("id", flat=True)) - if not allowed_ids: - overview = [] - return Response( - self.get_serializer(overview, many=True).data, - status=status.HTTP_200_OK, - ) - providers_qs = providers_qs.filter(id__in=allowed_ids) + providers_qs = providers_qs.filter( + id__in=self.allowed_providers.values("id") + ) overview = ( providers_qs.values("provider") @@ -5805,29 +5914,41 @@ class OverviewViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): description="Retrieve a specific snapshot by ID. If not provided, returns latest snapshots.", ), OpenApiParameter( - name="provider_id", + name="filter[provider_id]", type=OpenApiTypes.UUID, location=OpenApiParameter.QUERY, description="Filter by specific provider ID", ), OpenApiParameter( - name="provider_id__in", + name="filter[provider_id__in]", type=OpenApiTypes.STR, location=OpenApiParameter.QUERY, description="Filter by multiple provider IDs (comma-separated UUIDs)", ), OpenApiParameter( - name="provider_type", + name="filter[provider_type]", type=OpenApiTypes.STR, location=OpenApiParameter.QUERY, description="Filter by provider type (aws, azure, gcp, etc.)", ), OpenApiParameter( - name="provider_type__in", + name="filter[provider_type__in]", type=OpenApiTypes.STR, location=OpenApiParameter.QUERY, description="Filter by multiple provider types (comma-separated)", ), + OpenApiParameter( + name="filter[provider_groups]", + type=OpenApiTypes.UUID, + location=OpenApiParameter.QUERY, + description="Filter by provider group ID", + ), + OpenApiParameter( + name="filter[provider_groups__in]", + type=OpenApiTypes.STR, + location=OpenApiParameter.QUERY, + description="Filter by multiple provider group IDs (comma-separated UUIDs)", + ), ], ) @action(detail=False, methods=["get"], url_name="threatscore") @@ -6169,6 +6290,8 @@ class OverviewViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): "provider_id__in", "provider_type", "provider_type__in", + "provider_groups", + "provider_groups__in", } filtered_queryset = self._apply_filterset( base_queryset, CategoryOverviewFilter, exclude_keys=provider_filter_keys @@ -6238,6 +6361,8 @@ class OverviewViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): "provider_id__in", "provider_type", "provider_type__in", + "provider_groups", + "provider_groups__in", } filtered_queryset = self._apply_filterset( base_queryset, @@ -7288,7 +7413,7 @@ SEVERITY_ORDER_REVERSE = {v: k for k, v in SEVERITY_ORDER.items()} ), retrieve=extend_schema(exclude=True), ) -class FindingGroupViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): +class FindingGroupViewSet(JsonApiFilterMixin, BaseRLSViewSet): """ ViewSet for Finding Groups - aggregates findings by check_id. @@ -7304,6 +7429,7 @@ class FindingGroupViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): queryset = FindingGroupDailySummary.objects.all() serializer_class = FindingGroupSerializer filterset_class = FindingGroupFilter + jsonapi_filter_replace_dots = True filter_backends = [ jsonapi_filters.QueryParameterValidationFilter, jsonapi_filters.OrderingFilter, @@ -7354,18 +7480,6 @@ class FindingGroupViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): return queryset - def _normalize_jsonapi_params(self, query_params): - """Convert JSON:API filter params (filter[X]) to flat params (X).""" - normalized = QueryDict(mutable=True) - for key, values in query_params.lists(): - normalized_key = ( - key[7:-1] if key.startswith("filter[") and key.endswith("]") else key - ) - # Convert JSON:API dot notation to Django double underscore - normalized_key = normalized_key.replace(".", "__") - normalized.setlist(normalized_key, values) - return normalized - @extend_schema(exclude=True) def retrieve(self, request, *args, **kwargs): raise MethodNotAllowed(method="GET") @@ -8484,9 +8598,10 @@ class FindingGroupViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet): This endpoint returns finding groups without requiring date filters, automatically using the latest available data per check_id. - All other filters (provider_id, provider_type, check_id) are still supported. + Provider, provider group, check, and computed filters are still supported. """, tags=["Finding Groups"], + filters=True, ) @action(detail=False, methods=["get"], url_name="latest") def latest(self, request): diff --git a/api/src/backend/config/celery.py b/api/src/backend/config/celery.py index 5d246395a5..1a35a1a753 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/config/celery.py +++ b/api/src/backend/config/celery.py @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ import warnings from celery import Celery, Task - from config.env import env # Suppress specific warnings from django-rest-auth: https://github.com/iMerica/dj-rest-auth/issues/684 @@ -96,9 +95,8 @@ class RLSTask(Task): shadow=None, **options, ): - from django_celery_results.models import TaskResult - from api.models import Task as APITask + from django_celery_results.models import TaskResult result = super().apply_async( args=args, diff --git a/api/src/backend/config/custom_logging.py b/api/src/backend/config/custom_logging.py index fe2a090ca6..a601c8e2cd 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/config/custom_logging.py +++ b/api/src/backend/config/custom_logging.py @@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ import json import logging from enum import StrEnum - from config.env import env from django_guid.log_filters import CorrelationId diff --git a/api/src/backend/config/django/base.py b/api/src/backend/config/django/base.py index 38cf047ac2..75d5e6112e 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/config/django/base.py +++ b/api/src/backend/config/django/base.py @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ from datetime import timedelta from config.custom_logging import LOGGING # noqa from config.env import BASE_DIR, env # noqa from config.settings.celery import * # noqa +from config.settings.eventstream import * # noqa from config.settings.partitions import * # noqa from config.settings.sentry import * # noqa from config.settings.social_login import * # noqa @@ -44,9 +45,11 @@ INSTALLED_APPS = [ "dj_rest_auth.registration", "rest_framework.authtoken", "drf_simple_apikey", + "django_eventstream", ] MIDDLEWARE = [ + "api.middleware.CloseDBConnectionsMiddleware", "django_guid.middleware.guid_middleware", "django.middleware.security.SecurityMiddleware", "django.contrib.sessions.middleware.SessionMiddleware", @@ -136,6 +139,7 @@ SPECTACULAR_SETTINGS = { } WSGI_APPLICATION = "config.wsgi.application" +ASGI_APPLICATION = "config.asgi.application" DJANGO_GUID = { "GUID_HEADER_NAME": "Transaction-ID", @@ -307,6 +311,11 @@ ATTACK_PATHS_SCAN_STALE_THRESHOLD_MINUTES = env.int( "ATTACK_PATHS_SCAN_STALE_THRESHOLD_MINUTES", 2880 ) # 48h +# Selects where the persistent attack-paths graph is stored. The scan +# temporary database is always Neo4j; only the sink is configurable. +# Valid values: "neo4j" (default, OSS and local dev), "neptune" (hosted). +ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE = env.str("ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE", default="neo4j") + # Orphan task recovery feature flags. The master switch is OFF by default, so task # recovery is opt-in; enable it with DJANGO_TASK_RECOVERY_ENABLED=true. The per-group # toggles default to enabled, so once the master is on every group recovers unless a diff --git a/api/src/backend/config/django/devel.py b/api/src/backend/config/django/devel.py index 6921790ca3..5b3871aa8b 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/config/django/devel.py +++ b/api/src/backend/config/django/devel.py @@ -50,6 +50,12 @@ DATABASES = { "USER": env.str("NEO4J_USER", "neo4j"), "PASSWORD": env.str("NEO4J_PASSWORD", "neo4j_password"), }, + "neptune": { + "WRITER_ENDPOINT": env.str("NEPTUNE_WRITER_ENDPOINT", ""), + "READER_ENDPOINT": env.str("NEPTUNE_READER_ENDPOINT", ""), + "PORT": env.str("NEPTUNE_PORT", "8182"), + "REGION": env.str("AWS_REGION", ""), + }, } DATABASES["default"] = DATABASES["prowler_user"] diff --git a/api/src/backend/config/django/production.py b/api/src/backend/config/django/production.py index cb651f6e76..79d8993b10 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/config/django/production.py +++ b/api/src/backend/config/django/production.py @@ -49,12 +49,19 @@ DATABASES = { "HOST": env("POSTGRES_REPLICA_HOST", default=default_db_host), "PORT": env("POSTGRES_REPLICA_PORT", default=default_db_port), }, + # TODO: drop after Neptune cutover just loosen defaults to `""` "neo4j": { "HOST": env.str("NEO4J_HOST"), "PORT": env.str("NEO4J_PORT"), "USER": env.str("NEO4J_USER"), "PASSWORD": env.str("NEO4J_PASSWORD"), }, + "neptune": { + "WRITER_ENDPOINT": env.str("NEPTUNE_WRITER_ENDPOINT", default=""), + "READER_ENDPOINT": env.str("NEPTUNE_READER_ENDPOINT", default=""), + "PORT": env.str("NEPTUNE_PORT", default="8182"), + "REGION": env.str("AWS_REGION", default=""), + }, } DATABASES["default"] = DATABASES["prowler_user"] diff --git a/api/src/backend/config/django/testing.py b/api/src/backend/config/django/testing.py index a1e5c29fb3..9951478bfd 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/config/django/testing.py +++ b/api/src/backend/config/django/testing.py @@ -39,3 +39,7 @@ SIMPLE_JWT["ALGORITHM"] = "HS256" # noqa: F405 SIMPLE_JWT["SIGNING_KEY"] = env.str( # noqa: F405 "DJANGO_TOKEN_SIGNING_KEY", "insecure-testing-jwt-signing-key-do-not-use-in-prod" ) + +# Tests don't need secure password hashing; PBKDF2 (~hundreds of ms per call) +# dominates fixture setup time across every create_user()/check_password(). +PASSWORD_HASHERS = ["django.contrib.auth.hashers.MD5PasswordHasher"] diff --git a/api/src/backend/config/guniconf.py b/api/src/backend/config/guniconf.py index a16c8de9a0..8b17ad669d 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/config/guniconf.py +++ b/api/src/backend/config/guniconf.py @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import os import threading from config.env import env +from uvicorn_worker import UvicornWorker # Ensure the environment variable for Django settings is set os.environ.setdefault("DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE", "config.django.production") @@ -12,19 +13,46 @@ os.environ.setdefault("DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE", "config.django.production") import django # noqa: E402 django.setup() + from api.compliance import warm_compliance_caches # noqa: E402 -from config.django.production import LOGGING as DJANGO_LOGGERS, DEBUG # noqa: E402 from config.custom_logging import BackendLogger # noqa: E402 +from config.django.production import DEBUG # noqa: E402 +from config.django.production import LOGGING as DJANGO_LOGGERS # noqa: E402 BIND_ADDRESS = env("DJANGO_BIND_ADDRESS", default="127.0.0.1") PORT = env("DJANGO_PORT", default=8080) + +class ProwlerUvicornWorker(UvicornWorker): + CONFIG_KWARGS = { + # Keep-alive idle timeout. Must exceed the load balancer idle timeout. + "timeout_keep_alive": env.int("GUNICORN_KEEPALIVE", default=75), + "loop": "uvloop", + "lifespan": "off", # Django ASGIHandler doesn't handle lifespan scopes + } + + +# Required so SSE endpoints can keep the event loop alive while waiting for events +worker_class = env( + "DJANGO_WORKER_CLASS", + default="config.guniconf.ProwlerUvicornWorker", +) + # Server settings bind = f"{BIND_ADDRESS}:{PORT}" workers = env.int("DJANGO_WORKERS", default=multiprocessing.cpu_count() * 2 + 1) reload = DEBUG +# Preload the application before forking workers in production: the app is +# imported once in the master and workers fork from it. In development, disable +# preload so the server restarts on code changes. +preload_app = not DEBUG + +# Worker timeout in seconds. Increased from the default 30s to handle requests +# that may take longer, such as complex API operations. +timeout = env.int("GUNICORN_TIMEOUT", default=120) + # Logging logconfig_dict = DJANGO_LOGGERS gunicorn_logger = logging.getLogger(BackendLogger.GUNICORN) @@ -55,12 +83,32 @@ def _warm_compliance_caches_in_background(): def post_fork(_server, worker): - """Warm compliance caches after each worker fork. + """Re-initialize attack-paths drivers and warm compliance caches per worker. - Warm compliance caches in a background thread so the worker becomes ready - immediately. A request for a not-yet-warmed provider lazily loads just that - provider, which stays well under the worker timeout. + Neo4j / Neptune drivers spawn background IO threads that do not survive + ``fork()``. When the gunicorn master runs with ``preload_app=True``, the + child inherits driver objects whose pool references dead threads and + hangs on the first ``pool.acquire`` call until the watchdog kills the + worker. Re-initializing per worker guarantees each child owns its own + live threads. See GUNICORN_WORKER_TIMEOUTS_ANALYSIS.md for detail. + + Compliance caches are then warmed in a background thread so the worker + becomes ready immediately. A request for a not-yet-warmed provider lazily + loads just that provider, which stays well under the worker timeout. """ + from api.attack_paths import database as graph_database + + try: + graph_database.close_driver() + except Exception: # pragma: no cover - best-effort cleanup + gunicorn_logger.debug( + "Failed to close inherited Neo4j driver in post_fork for worker pid=%s", + worker.pid, + exc_info=True, + ) + graph_database.init_driver() + gunicorn_logger.info(f"Attack-paths drivers initialized for worker {worker.pid}") + threading.Thread( target=_warm_compliance_caches_in_background, name="warm-compliance-caches", diff --git a/api/src/backend/config/settings/celery.py b/api/src/backend/config/settings/celery.py index b7030ebea4..b7105a548c 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/config/settings/celery.py +++ b/api/src/backend/config/settings/celery.py @@ -53,3 +53,8 @@ CELERY_TASK_TRACK_STARTED = True CELERY_BROKER_CONNECTION_RETRY_ON_STARTUP = True CELERY_DEADLOCK_ATTEMPTS = env.int("DJANGO_CELERY_DEADLOCK_ATTEMPTS", default=5) + +# Opt-in override for Celery's prefork pool size. When unset, Celery falls back +# to its default (os.cpu_count()). +if "DJANGO_CELERY_WORKER_CONCURRENCY" in env.ENVIRON: + CELERY_WORKER_CONCURRENCY = env.int("DJANGO_CELERY_WORKER_CONCURRENCY") diff --git a/api/src/backend/config/settings/eventstream.py b/api/src/backend/config/settings/eventstream.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..470062050b --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/config/settings/eventstream.py @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +"""Server-Sent Events (SSE) configuration. + +Wires django-eventstream into the platform: Valkey Pub/Sub backend on a +dedicated DB (separate from the Celery broker), the platform channel +manager, and headers that match the existing CORS allowlist. +""" + +from config.env import env +from config.settings.celery import ( + VALKEY_HOST, + VALKEY_PASSWORD, + VALKEY_PORT, + VALKEY_SCHEME, + VALKEY_USERNAME, +) + +# Dedicated Valkey DB for the SSE Pub/Sub bus. Kept distinct from the +# Celery broker DB so a noisy broker can't shoulder out streaming +# traffic on the same keyspace. +EVENTSTREAM_VALKEY_DB = env.int("EVENTSTREAM_VALKEY_DB", default=2) + +EVENTSTREAM_REDIS: dict = { + "host": VALKEY_HOST, + "port": int(VALKEY_PORT), + "db": EVENTSTREAM_VALKEY_DB, +} +if VALKEY_PASSWORD: + EVENTSTREAM_REDIS["password"] = VALKEY_PASSWORD +if VALKEY_USERNAME: + EVENTSTREAM_REDIS["username"] = VALKEY_USERNAME +if VALKEY_SCHEME == "rediss": + EVENTSTREAM_REDIS["ssl"] = True + +# Platform channel manager — performs the per-feature authorization and +# rewrites the placeholder channel from the URL into the canonical +# tenant-scoped channel name. See ``api.sse.channelmanager``. +EVENTSTREAM_CHANNELMANAGER_CLASS = "api.sse.channelmanager.SSEChannelManager" + +# Headers a browser EventSource may legitimately send. Keep tight; the +# stream itself reads no body, so no permissive defaults. +EVENTSTREAM_ALLOW_HEADERS = "Cache-Control, Last-Event-ID" diff --git a/api/src/backend/config/settings/sentry.py b/api/src/backend/config/settings/sentry.py index 580821f7b2..5fd6e39cc9 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/config/settings/sentry.py +++ b/api/src/backend/config/settings/sentry.py @@ -1,5 +1,4 @@ import sentry_sdk - from config.env import env IGNORED_EXCEPTIONS = [ @@ -76,6 +75,8 @@ IGNORED_EXCEPTIONS = [ # PowerShell Errors in User Authentication "Microsoft Teams User Auth connection failed: Please check your permissions and try again.", "Exchange Online User Auth connection failed: Please check your permissions and try again.", + # ASGI: Client disconnected before the response finished (health-check probes on /health/live) + "RequestAborted", ] diff --git a/api/src/backend/config/urls.py b/api/src/backend/config/urls.py index 113f8bf5fc..4e7a46e31c 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/config/urls.py +++ b/api/src/backend/config/urls.py @@ -1,6 +1,5 @@ -from django.urls import include, path - from api.health import LivenessView, ReadinessView +from django.urls import include, path urlpatterns = [ path("api/v1/", include("api.v1.urls")), diff --git a/api/src/backend/conftest.py b/api/src/backend/conftest.py index eb73b0c51f..b9154ddb51 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/conftest.py +++ b/api/src/backend/conftest.py @@ -1,23 +1,10 @@ import logging -from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta from types import SimpleNamespace from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch import pytest from allauth.socialaccount.models import SocialLogin -from django.conf import settings -from django.db import connection as django_connection -from django.db import connections as django_connections -from django.urls import reverse -from django_celery_results.models import TaskResult -from rest_framework import status -from rest_framework.test import APIClient -from tasks.jobs.backfill import ( - backfill_resource_scan_summaries, - aggregate_scan_category_summaries, - aggregate_scan_resource_group_summaries, -) - from api.attack_paths import ( AttackPathsQueryDefinition, AttackPathsQueryParameterDefinition, @@ -60,8 +47,20 @@ from api.models import ( ) from api.rls import Tenant from api.v1.serializers import TokenSerializer +from django.conf import settings +from django.db import connection as django_connection +from django.db import connections as django_connections +from django.urls import reverse +from django_celery_results.models import TaskResult from prowler.lib.check.models import Severity from prowler.lib.outputs.finding import Status +from rest_framework import status +from rest_framework.test import APIClient +from tasks.jobs.backfill import ( + aggregate_scan_category_summaries, + aggregate_scan_resource_group_summaries, + backfill_resource_scan_summaries, +) TODAY = str(datetime.today().date()) API_JSON_CONTENT_TYPE = "application/vnd.api+json" @@ -70,6 +69,107 @@ TEST_USER = "dev@prowler.com" TEST_PASSWORD = "testing_psswd" +def _install_compliance_catalog_test_cache() -> None: + """Memoize the heavy SDK catalog loaders for the whole test session. + + ``get_bulk_compliance_frameworks_universal`` re-reads and Pydantic-validates + ~100 compliance JSONs (≈20 MB) and ``CheckMetadata.get_bulk`` re-reads ~1k + check metadata files on *every* call. Production amortizes this through the + per-process lazy caches (``PROWLER_CHECKS`` / ``PROWLER_COMPLIANCE_OVERVIEW_TEMPLATE``) + and ``warm_compliance_caches``, but the test suite parametrizes over every + provider and deliberately resets the API-level caches, so the same catalogs + were re-parsed dozens of times across the suite (≈3s/call locally, ≈19s under + coverage in CI). + + The catalog files are immutable during a run and callers treat the parsed + objects as read-only, so caching the result per provider is safe. This is the + test-only equivalent of an ``lru_cache`` on the SDK functions, without + changing SDK behavior in production. + + A second, lower-level cache memoizes ``load_compliance_framework_universal`` + **per file path**. ``get_bulk_compliance_frameworks_universal`` parses *every* + compliance JSON and only then filters by provider, so a per-provider cache + still re-parses all ~100 files on the first load of each provider. The + per-path cache makes the first provider parse the files once and every other + provider/test reuse the already-parsed ``ComplianceFramework`` objects (only + the cheap ``listdir`` + filtering re-runs). ``_load_jsons_from_dir`` calls + ``load_compliance_framework_universal`` as a module global, so patching the + attribute is picked up without touching the SDK. + + Installed at conftest import time (before test modules are collected) so that + even ``from ... import get_bulk_compliance_frameworks_universal`` bindings in + the test modules resolve to the cached wrapper. + """ + import prowler.lib.check.compliance_models as compliance_models + from prowler.lib.check.models import CheckMetadata + + original_bulk_frameworks = ( + compliance_models.get_bulk_compliance_frameworks_universal + ) + original_get_bulk = CheckMetadata.get_bulk + original_load = compliance_models.load_compliance_framework_universal + + def cached_bulk_frameworks(provider): + if provider not in _COMPLIANCE_FRAMEWORK_CACHE: + _COMPLIANCE_FRAMEWORK_CACHE[provider] = original_bulk_frameworks(provider) + return _COMPLIANCE_FRAMEWORK_CACHE[provider] + + def cached_get_bulk(provider): + if provider not in _COMPLIANCE_CHECKS_CACHE: + _COMPLIANCE_CHECKS_CACHE[provider] = original_get_bulk(provider) + return _COMPLIANCE_CHECKS_CACHE[provider] + + def cached_load(path): + if path not in _COMPLIANCE_PATH_CACHE: + _COMPLIANCE_PATH_CACHE[path] = original_load(path) + return _COMPLIANCE_PATH_CACHE[path] + + compliance_models.get_bulk_compliance_frameworks_universal = cached_bulk_frameworks + compliance_models.load_compliance_framework_universal = cached_load + CheckMetadata.get_bulk = staticmethod(cached_get_bulk) + + # ``api.compliance`` does ``from ... import get_bulk_compliance_frameworks_universal`` + # so it holds its own binding; patch it too in case it was imported first. + import api.compliance as api_compliance + + api_compliance.get_bulk_compliance_frameworks_universal = cached_bulk_frameworks + + +# Module-scoped so the ``_compliance_cache_guard`` fixture below can reset them. +# Keeping them out of ``_install_compliance_catalog_test_cache``'s local scope is +# what makes the caches resettable between tests; the wrappers above close over +# these names, and the original loaders stay referenced so patched behaviour is +# still honoured. +_COMPLIANCE_FRAMEWORK_CACHE: dict[str, dict] = {} +_COMPLIANCE_CHECKS_CACHE: dict[str, dict] = {} +_COMPLIANCE_PATH_CACHE: dict[str, object] = {} + + +_install_compliance_catalog_test_cache() + + +@pytest.fixture(autouse=True) +def _compliance_cache_guard(request): + """Reset the compliance catalog caches after any test that used ``monkeypatch``. + + The session-wide caches in ``_install_compliance_catalog_test_cache`` let the + read-only, parametrized compliance tests parse the ~100 catalog JSONs once + instead of dozens of times. A test that swaps a loader (or mutates a returned + object) could otherwise leak that state into later tests through the shared + dicts. Using ``monkeypatch`` as the opt-in signal keeps the full speed-up for + catalog-reading tests while giving patching tests a clean slate afterwards; + the next test simply repopulates the caches from disk. + """ + yield + if "monkeypatch" in request.fixturenames: + _COMPLIANCE_FRAMEWORK_CACHE.clear() + _COMPLIANCE_CHECKS_CACHE.clear() + _COMPLIANCE_PATH_CACHE.clear() + import api.compliance as api_compliance + + api_compliance.AVAILABLE_COMPLIANCE_FRAMEWORKS.clear() + + def today_after_n_days(n_days: int) -> str: return datetime.strftime( datetime.today().date() + timedelta(days=n_days), "%Y-%m-%d" @@ -468,7 +568,7 @@ def invitations_fixture(create_test_user, tenants_fixture): email="testing@prowler.com", state=Invitation.State.EXPIRED, token="TESTING1234568", - expires_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=1), + expires_at=datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(days=1), inviter=user, tenant=tenant, ) @@ -715,7 +815,7 @@ def scans_fixture(tenants_fixture, providers_fixture): tenant, *_ = tenants_fixture provider, provider2, *_ = providers_fixture - now = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + now = datetime.now(UTC) scan1 = Scan.objects.create( name="Scan 1", @@ -1608,7 +1708,7 @@ def api_keys_fixture(tenants_fixture, create_test_user): name="Test API Key 2", tenant_id=tenant.id, entity=user, - expiry_date=datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=60), + expiry_date=datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(days=60), ) # Revoked API key @@ -1721,6 +1821,36 @@ def attack_paths_query_definition_factory(): return _create +@pytest.fixture +def sink_backend_stub(): + """Install a stub `SinkDatabase` into the sink factory for the test's duration. + + The sink factory caches a process-wide backend and lazily initializes it + against `settings.DATABASES["neo4j"]` / `["neptune"]`. Tests that don't + want to stand up a real Bolt driver can yield this fixture's mock and + configure its return values directly: + + sink_backend_stub.execute_read_query.return_value = some_graph + + Both the active backend and the secondary-backend cache are restored on + teardown so tests stay isolated. + """ + from api.attack_paths.sink import factory + from api.attack_paths.sink.base import SinkDatabase + + stub = MagicMock(spec=SinkDatabase) + previous_backend = factory._backend + previous_secondary = dict(factory._secondary_backends) + factory._backend = stub + factory._secondary_backends.clear() + try: + yield stub + finally: + factory._backend = previous_backend + factory._secondary_backends.clear() + factory._secondary_backends.update(previous_secondary) + + @pytest.fixture def attack_paths_graph_stub_classes(): """Provide lightweight graph element stubs for Attack Paths serialization tests.""" @@ -1902,10 +2032,10 @@ def provider_compliance_scores_fixture( provider1, provider2, *_ = providers_fixture scan1, _, scan3 = scans_fixture - scan1.completed_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(hours=1) + scan1.completed_at = datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(hours=1) scan1.save() scan3.state = StateChoices.COMPLETED - scan3.completed_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + scan3.completed_at = datetime.now(UTC) scan3.save() scores = [ diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/beat.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/beat.py index e9eb9c9309..017bec844a 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/beat.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/beat.py @@ -1,13 +1,12 @@ import json -from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone - -from django_celery_beat.models import IntervalSchedule, PeriodicTask -from tasks.tasks import perform_scheduled_scan_task +from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta from api.db_utils import rls_transaction from api.exceptions import ConflictException from api.models import Provider, Scan, StateChoices +from django_celery_beat.models import IntervalSchedule, PeriodicTask from tasks.jobs.attack_paths import db_utils as attack_paths_db_utils +from tasks.tasks import perform_scheduled_scan_task def schedule_provider_scan(provider_instance: Provider): @@ -37,7 +36,7 @@ def schedule_provider_scan(provider_instance: Provider): provider_id=provider_id, trigger=Scan.TriggerChoices.SCHEDULED, state=StateChoices.AVAILABLE, - scheduled_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + scheduled_at=datetime.now(UTC), ) attack_paths_db_utils.create_attack_paths_scan( @@ -58,7 +57,7 @@ def schedule_provider_scan(provider_instance: Provider): } ), one_off=False, - start_time=datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=24), + start_time=datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(hours=24), ) scheduled_scan.scheduler_task_id = periodic_task_instance.id scheduled_scan.save() diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/aws.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/aws.py index 692eee61cd..15ecd86a19 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/aws.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/aws.py @@ -2,21 +2,21 @@ # (https://github.com/cartography-cncf/cartography), which is licensed under the Apache 2.0 License. import time - from typing import Any import aioboto3 import boto3 +import botocore import neo4j - +from api.models import ( + AttackPathsScan as ProwlerAPIAttackPathsScan, +) +from api.models import ( + Provider as ProwlerAPIProvider, +) from cartography.config import Config as CartographyConfig from cartography.intel import aws as cartography_aws from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger - -from api.models import ( - AttackPathsScan as ProwlerAPIAttackPathsScan, - Provider as ProwlerAPIProvider, -) from prowler.providers.common.provider import Provider as ProwlerSDKProvider from tasks.jobs.attack_paths import db_utils, utils @@ -74,13 +74,28 @@ def start_aws_ingestion( # Adding an extra field common_job_parameters["AWS_ID"] = prowler_api_provider.uid - cartography_aws._autodiscover_accounts( - neo4j_session, - boto3_session, - prowler_api_provider.uid, - cartography_config.update_tag, - common_job_parameters, - ) + # AWS Organizations account autodiscovery. Inlined from Cartography's removed + # `_autodiscover_accounts` (deleted in `0.137.0`), as `load_aws_accounts` is still public. + try: + org_client = boto3_session.client("organizations") + paginator = org_client.get_paginator("list_accounts") + discovered = [] + for page in paginator.paginate(): + discovered.extend(page["Accounts"]) + active_accounts = { + a["Name"]: a["Id"] for a in discovered if a["Status"] == "ACTIVE" + } + cartography_aws.organizations.load_aws_accounts( + neo4j_session, + active_accounts, + cartography_config.update_tag, + common_job_parameters, + ) + except botocore.exceptions.ClientError: + logger.warning( + f"Account {prowler_api_provider.uid} lacks permissions for AWS " + "Organizations autodiscovery." + ) db_utils.update_attack_paths_scan_progress(attack_paths_scan, 4) failed_syncs = sync_aws_account( @@ -278,7 +293,7 @@ def sync_aws_account( sync_args: dict[str, Any], attack_paths_scan: ProwlerAPIAttackPathsScan, ) -> dict[str, str]: - current_progress = 4 # `cartography_aws._autodiscover_accounts` + current_progress = 4 # AWS Organizations account autodiscovery max_progress = ( 87 # `cartography_aws.RESOURCE_FUNCTIONS["permission_relationships"]` - 1 ) diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/cleanup.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/cleanup.py index fa7670afaa..83192f18d0 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/cleanup.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/cleanup.py @@ -1,19 +1,18 @@ -from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone - -from celery import states -from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger -from config.django.base import ATTACK_PATHS_SCAN_STALE_THRESHOLD_MINUTES -from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.db_utils import ( - _mark_scan_finished, - recover_graph_data_ready, -) -from tasks.jobs.orphan_recovery import is_worker_alive as _is_worker_alive -from tasks.jobs.orphan_recovery import revoke_task as _revoke_task +from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta from api.attack_paths import database as graph_database from api.db_router import MainRouter from api.db_utils import rls_transaction from api.models import AttackPathsScan, StateChoices +from celery import states +from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger +from config.django.base import ATTACK_PATHS_SCAN_STALE_THRESHOLD_MINUTES +from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.db_utils import ( + mark_scan_finished, + recover_graph_data_ready, +) +from tasks.jobs.orphan_recovery import is_worker_alive as _is_worker_alive +from tasks.jobs.orphan_recovery import revoke_task as _revoke_task logger = get_task_logger(__name__) @@ -30,7 +29,7 @@ def cleanup_stale_attack_paths_scans() -> dict: age plus the parent `Scan` no longer being in flight. """ threshold = timedelta(minutes=ATTACK_PATHS_SCAN_STALE_THRESHOLD_MINUTES) - now = datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) + now = datetime.now(tz=UTC) cutoff = now - threshold cleaned_up: list[str] = [] @@ -88,7 +87,7 @@ def _cleanup_stale_executing_scans(cutoff: datetime) -> list[str]: else: reason = "Worker dead — cleaned up by periodic task" else: - # No worker recorded — time-based heuristic only + # No worker recorded, time-based heuristic only if scan.started_at and scan.started_at >= cutoff: continue reason = ( @@ -161,7 +160,7 @@ def _cleanup_scan(scan, task_result, reason: str) -> bool: """ scan_id_str = str(scan.id) - # 1. Drop temp Neo4j database + # Drop temp Neo4j database tmp_db_name = graph_database.get_database_name(scan.id, temporary=True) try: graph_database.drop_database(tmp_db_name) @@ -175,7 +174,7 @@ def _cleanup_scan(scan, task_result, reason: str) -> bool: # Mark `TaskResult` as `FAILURE` (not RLS-protected, outside lock) if task_result: task_result.status = states.FAILURE - task_result.date_done = datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) + task_result.date_done = datetime.now(tz=UTC) task_result.save(update_fields=["status", "date_done"]) recover_graph_data_ready(fresh_scan) @@ -201,7 +200,7 @@ def _cleanup_scheduled_scan(scan, task_result, reason: str) -> bool: if task_result: task_result.status = states.FAILURE - task_result.date_done = datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) + task_result.date_done = datetime.now(tz=UTC) task_result.save(update_fields=["status", "date_done"]) logger.info(f"Cleaned up scheduled scan {scan_id_str}: {reason}") @@ -226,6 +225,6 @@ def _finalize_failed_scan(scan, expected_state: str, reason: str): logger.info(f"Scan {scan_id_str} is now {fresh_scan.state}, skipping") return None - _mark_scan_finished(fresh_scan, StateChoices.FAILED, {"global_error": reason}) + mark_scan_finished(fresh_scan, StateChoices.FAILED, {"global_error": reason}) return fresh_scan diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/config.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/config.py index 0816626b67..d8ed63a8fc 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/config.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/config.py @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ -from dataclasses import dataclass -from typing import Callable +from collections.abc import Callable from uuid import UUID from config.env import env -from tasks.jobs.attack_paths import aws +from tasks.jobs.attack_paths import provider_config as _provider_config + +# Re-export provider config objects so existing imports keep working. +AWS_CONFIG = _provider_config.AWS_CONFIG +NormalizedList = _provider_config.NormalizedList +PROVIDER_CONFIGS = _provider_config.PROVIDER_CONFIGS +ProviderConfig = _provider_config.ProviderConfig # Batch size for Neo4j write operations (resource labeling, cleanup) BATCH_SIZE = env.int("ATTACK_PATHS_BATCH_SIZE", 1000) @@ -21,42 +26,12 @@ PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL = "ProwlerFinding" PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL = "_ProviderResource" # Dynamic isolation labels that contain entity UUIDs and are added to every synced node during sync -# Format: _Tenant_{uuid_no_hyphens}, _Provider_{uuid_no_hyphens} +# Format: `_Tenant_{uuid_no_hyphens}`, `_Provider_{uuid_no_hyphens}` TENANT_LABEL_PREFIX = "_Tenant_" PROVIDER_LABEL_PREFIX = "_Provider_" DYNAMIC_ISOLATION_PREFIXES = [TENANT_LABEL_PREFIX, PROVIDER_LABEL_PREFIX] -@dataclass(frozen=True) -class ProviderConfig: - """Configuration for a cloud provider's Attack Paths integration.""" - - name: str - root_node_label: str # e.g., "AWSAccount" - uid_field: str # e.g., "arn" - # Label for resources connected to the account node, enabling indexed finding lookups. - resource_label: str # e.g., "_AWSResource" - ingestion_function: Callable - # Maps a Postgres resource UID (e.g. full ARN) to the short-id form Cartography stores on some node types (e.g. `i-xxx` for EC2Instance). - short_uid_extractor: Callable[[str], str] - - -# Provider Configurations -# ----------------------- - -AWS_CONFIG = ProviderConfig( - name="aws", - root_node_label="AWSAccount", - uid_field="arn", - resource_label="_AWSResource", - ingestion_function=aws.start_aws_ingestion, - short_uid_extractor=aws.extract_short_uid, -) - -PROVIDER_CONFIGS: dict[str, ProviderConfig] = { - "aws": AWS_CONFIG, -} - # Labels added by Prowler that should be filtered from API responses # Derived from provider configs + common internal labels INTERNAL_LABELS: list[str] = [ @@ -87,7 +62,6 @@ INTERNAL_PROPERTIES: list[str] = [ # Provider Config Accessors -# ------------------------- def is_provider_available(provider_type: str) -> bool: @@ -135,7 +109,6 @@ def get_short_uid_extractor(provider_type: str) -> Callable[[str], str]: # Dynamic Isolation Label Helpers -# -------------------------------- def _normalize_uuid(value: str | UUID) -> str: diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/db_utils.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/db_utils.py index a6e7da7f87..c444a62602 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/db_utils.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/db_utils.py @@ -1,15 +1,16 @@ -from datetime import datetime, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime from typing import Any -from cartography.config import Config as CartographyConfig -from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger -from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import is_provider_available - from api.attack_paths import database as graph_database from api.db_utils import rls_transaction from api.models import AttackPathsScan as ProwlerAPIAttackPathsScan from api.models import Provider as ProwlerAPIProvider from api.models import StateChoices +from cartography.config import Config as CartographyConfig +from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger +from django.conf import settings +from django.db.models import Case, IntegerField, Value, When +from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import is_provider_available logger = get_task_logger(__name__) @@ -30,21 +31,43 @@ def create_attack_paths_scan( return None with rls_transaction(tenant_id): - # Inherit graph_data_ready from the previous scan for this provider, - # so queries remain available while the new scan runs. - previous_data_ready = ProwlerAPIAttackPathsScan.objects.filter( - tenant_id=tenant_id, - provider_id=provider_id, - graph_data_ready=True, - ).exists() + # Inherit metadata from the previous ready scan for this provider so + # queries remain available while the new scan runs. The new row only + # flips to the target sink after its own graph sync succeeds. + active_sink_backend = settings.ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE + previous_ready = ( + ProwlerAPIAttackPathsScan.objects.filter( + tenant_id=tenant_id, + provider_id=provider_id, + graph_data_ready=True, + ) + .annotate( + active_sink_rank=Case( + When(sink_backend=active_sink_backend, then=Value(0)), + default=Value(1), + output_field=IntegerField(), + ) + ) + .order_by("active_sink_rank", "-inserted_at") + .first() + ) + previous_data_ready = previous_ready is not None + inherited_is_migrated = previous_ready.is_migrated if previous_ready else False + inherited_sink_backend = ( + previous_ready.sink_backend + if previous_ready + else ProwlerAPIAttackPathsScan.SinkBackendChoices.NEO4J + ) attack_paths_scan = ProwlerAPIAttackPathsScan.objects.create( tenant_id=tenant_id, provider_id=provider_id, scan_id=scan_id, state=StateChoices.SCHEDULED, - started_at=datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc), + started_at=datetime.now(tz=UTC), graph_data_ready=previous_data_ready, + is_migrated=inherited_is_migrated, + sink_backend=inherited_sink_backend, ) attack_paths_scan.save() @@ -104,7 +127,7 @@ def starting_attack_paths_scan( return False locked.state = StateChoices.EXECUTING - locked.started_at = datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) + locked.started_at = datetime.now(tz=UTC) locked.update_tag = cartography_config.update_tag locked.save(update_fields=["state", "started_at", "update_tag"]) @@ -115,13 +138,13 @@ def starting_attack_paths_scan( return True -def _mark_scan_finished( +def mark_scan_finished( attack_paths_scan: ProwlerAPIAttackPathsScan, state: StateChoices, ingestion_exceptions: dict[str, Any], ) -> None: """Set terminal fields on a scan. Caller must be inside a transaction.""" - now = datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) + now = datetime.now(tz=UTC) duration = ( int((now - attack_paths_scan.started_at).total_seconds()) if attack_paths_scan.started_at @@ -149,7 +172,7 @@ def finish_attack_paths_scan( ingestion_exceptions: dict[str, Any], ) -> None: with rls_transaction(attack_paths_scan.tenant_id): - _mark_scan_finished(attack_paths_scan, state, ingestion_exceptions) + mark_scan_finished(attack_paths_scan, state, ingestion_exceptions) def update_attack_paths_scan_progress( @@ -170,19 +193,45 @@ def set_graph_data_ready( attack_paths_scan.save(update_fields=["graph_data_ready"]) +def set_scan_migrated( + attack_paths_scan: ProwlerAPIAttackPathsScan, + migrated: bool, + sink_backend: str | None = None, +) -> None: + """Mark the scan as written with the current (migrated) schema. + + Called after a successful sync so the read catalog and sink backend only + switch once the new graph is actually live. + + # TODO: drop after Neptune cutover + """ + with rls_transaction(attack_paths_scan.tenant_id): + attack_paths_scan.is_migrated = migrated + update_fields = ["is_migrated"] + if sink_backend is not None: + attack_paths_scan.sink_backend = sink_backend + update_fields.append("sink_backend") + attack_paths_scan.save(update_fields=update_fields) + + def set_provider_graph_data_ready( attack_paths_scan: ProwlerAPIAttackPathsScan, ready: bool, + sink_backend: str | None = None, ) -> None: """ - Set `graph_data_ready` for ALL scans of the same provider. + Set `graph_data_ready` for scans of the same provider in one sink. - Used before drop/sync so that older scan IDs cannot bypass the query gate while the graph is being replaced. + Used before drop/sync so that older scan IDs in the target sink cannot + bypass the query gate while that sink's graph is being replaced. Scans + preserved in another sink stay queryable for rollback. """ + target_sink_backend = sink_backend or attack_paths_scan.sink_backend with rls_transaction(attack_paths_scan.tenant_id): ProwlerAPIAttackPathsScan.objects.filter( tenant_id=attack_paths_scan.tenant_id, provider_id=attack_paths_scan.provider_id, + sink_backend=target_sink_backend, ).update(graph_data_ready=ready) attack_paths_scan.refresh_from_db(fields=["graph_data_ready"]) @@ -203,10 +252,15 @@ def recover_graph_data_ready( next successful scan) is a worse outcome for the user. """ try: + from api.attack_paths import sink as sink_module + tenant_db = graph_database.get_database_name(attack_paths_scan.tenant_id) - if graph_database.has_provider_data( - tenant_db, str(attack_paths_scan.provider_id) - ): + # TODO: drop after Neptune cutover + # Check the backend that actually holds this scan's data, not the + # currently configured sink, a stale `EXECUTING` scan from before a + # backend switch must still be recoverable + backend = sink_module.get_backend_for_scan(attack_paths_scan) + if backend.has_provider_data(tenant_db, str(attack_paths_scan.provider_id)): set_provider_graph_data_ready(attack_paths_scan, True) logger.info( f"Recovered `graph_data_ready` for provider {attack_paths_scan.provider_id}" @@ -248,6 +302,6 @@ def fail_attack_paths_scan( return if fresh.state in (StateChoices.COMPLETED, StateChoices.FAILED): return - _mark_scan_finished(fresh, StateChoices.FAILED, {"global_error": error}) + mark_scan_finished(fresh, StateChoices.FAILED, {"global_error": error}) recover_graph_data_ready(fresh) diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/findings.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/findings.py index 3581f0ca0f..6cc7ddb2e0 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/findings.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/findings.py @@ -8,13 +8,18 @@ This module handles: """ from collections import defaultdict -from typing import Any, Callable, Generator +from collections.abc import Callable, Generator +from typing import Any from uuid import UUID import neo4j - +from api.db_router import READ_REPLICA_ALIAS +from api.db_utils import rls_transaction +from api.models import Finding as FindingModel +from api.models import Provider, ResourceFindingMapping from cartography.config import Config as CartographyConfig from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger +from prowler.config import config as ProwlerConfig from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import ( BATCH_SIZE, FINDINGS_BATCH_SIZE, @@ -29,12 +34,6 @@ from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.queries import ( render_cypher_template, ) -from api.db_router import READ_REPLICA_ALIAS -from api.db_utils import rls_transaction -from api.models import Finding as FindingModel -from api.models import Provider, ResourceFindingMapping -from prowler.config import config as ProwlerConfig - logger = get_task_logger(__name__) @@ -83,7 +82,6 @@ def _to_neo4j_dict( # Public API -# ---------- def analysis( @@ -197,7 +195,6 @@ def load_findings( # Findings Streaming (Generator-based) -# ------------------------------------- def stream_findings_with_resources( @@ -276,7 +273,6 @@ def _fetch_findings_batch( # Batch Enrichment -# ----------------- def _enrich_batch_with_resources( diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/indexes.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/indexes.py index 0de94a162e..50e8a12bcd 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/indexes.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/indexes.py @@ -1,13 +1,12 @@ import neo4j - from cartography.client.core.tx import run_write_query +from cartography.intel import create_indexes as cartography_create_indexes from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger - from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import ( INTERNET_NODE_LABEL, - PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL, PROVIDER_ELEMENT_ID_PROPERTY, PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL, + PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL, ) logger = get_task_logger(__name__) @@ -32,14 +31,34 @@ SYNC_INDEX_STATEMENTS = [ def create_findings_indexes(neo4j_session: neo4j.Session) -> None: - """Create indexes for Prowler findings and resource lookups.""" + """Create indexes for Prowler findings and resource lookups. + + Runs `CREATE INDEX`, so the caller must only invoke this against a Neo4j + session (the temp ingest DB or a Neo4j sink). Neptune auto-manages indexes + and rejects `CREATE INDEX`, so callers skip it for the Neptune sink. + """ logger.info("Creating indexes for Prowler Findings node types") for statement in FINDINGS_INDEX_STATEMENTS: run_write_query(neo4j_session, statement) +def create_cartography_indexes(neo4j_session: neo4j.Session, config) -> None: + """Create Cartography's standard indexes for the session's database. + + Runs `CREATE INDEX`, so the caller must only invoke this against a Neo4j + session (the temp ingest DB or a Neo4j sink). Neptune auto-manages indexes + and rejects `CREATE INDEX`, so callers skip it for the Neptune sink. + """ + cartography_create_indexes.run(neo4j_session, config) + + def create_sync_indexes(neo4j_session: neo4j.Session) -> None: - """Create indexes for provider resource sync operations.""" + """Create indexes for provider resource sync operations. + + Runs `CREATE INDEX`, so the caller must only invoke this against a Neo4j + session (the temp ingest DB or a Neo4j sink). Neptune auto-manages indexes + and rejects `CREATE INDEX`, so callers skip it for the Neptune sink. + """ logger.info("Ensuring ProviderResource indexes exist") for statement in SYNC_INDEX_STATEMENTS: neo4j_session.run(statement) diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/internet.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/internet.py index 83517bc903..4c7a61bd20 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/internet.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/internet.py @@ -7,11 +7,9 @@ in the temporary scan database before sync. """ import neo4j - +from api.models import Provider from cartography.config import Config as CartographyConfig from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger - -from api.models import Provider from prowler.config import config as ProwlerConfig from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import get_root_node_label from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.queries import ( diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/provider_config.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/provider_config.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7d834e6aff --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/provider_config.py @@ -0,0 +1,431 @@ +""" +Provider-level Attack Paths configuration. + +Each `ProviderConfig` carries the cloud provider's ingestion entry point and +the catalog of list-typed node properties (`normalized_lists`). The sync +layer reads this catalog and materialises each list element as a child node +connected to the parent by a typed edge, so queries traverse the graph +instead of working on serialised list values. Both Neo4j and Neptune sinks +write the same shape and queries are portable across them. +""" + +from collections.abc import Callable +from dataclasses import dataclass, field + +from tasks.jobs.attack_paths import aws + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class NormalizedList: + """Catalog entry for a list-typed node property. + + Describes how the sync layer materialises a parent node's list-typed + property as a set of child item nodes connected by a typed edge. + + Conventions (mechanical, do not invent): + - `child_label`: `Item` + e.g. AWSPolicyStatement.resource -> AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem + - `rel_type`: `HAS_` + e.g. resource -> HAS_RESOURCE + - child node property: + * `field_map = []` (scalar list, ~95% case) -> child stores `value: str` + * `field_map = [(src_key, child_field), ...]` (list of dicts, rare) + -> child stores those fields + """ + + source_label: str + source_property: str + child_label: str + rel_type: str + field_map: list[tuple[str, str]] = field(default_factory=list) + + def __post_init__(self) -> None: + if self.field_map: + child_fields = [dst for _, dst in self.field_map] + if "value" in child_fields: + raise ValueError( + f"NormalizedList {self.source_label}.{self.source_property}: " + "`value` is reserved for scalar mode; do not map a source key to it" + ) + src_keys = [src for src, _ in self.field_map] + if len(set(src_keys)) != len(src_keys): + raise ValueError( + f"NormalizedList {self.source_label}.{self.source_property}: " + "duplicate source key in field_map" + ) + if len(set(child_fields)) != len(child_fields): + raise ValueError( + f"NormalizedList {self.source_label}.{self.source_property}: " + "duplicate child field in field_map" + ) + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class ProviderConfig: + """Configuration for a cloud provider's Attack Paths integration.""" + + name: str + root_node_label: str # e.g., "AWSAccount" + uid_field: str # e.g., "arn" + # Label for resources connected to the account node, enabling indexed finding lookups + resource_label: str # e.g., "_AWSResource" + ingestion_function: Callable + # Maps a Postgres resource UID (e.g. full ARN) to the short-id form Cartography stores on some node types (e.g. `i-xxx` for EC2Instance) + short_uid_extractor: Callable[[str], str] + # List-typed properties to materialise as child nodes + edges at sync time. + # Mandatory (may be []). Without an entry here, a list-typed property falls + # back to comma-string flatten and emits a one-time warning. + normalized_lists: list[NormalizedList] + + +# AWS list-typed property catalog. +# One entry per Cartography node property whose runtime value is a list. The +# sync layer materialises each element as a `` node and links it +# to the parent with a `` edge; see the `NormalizedList` docstring +# above for the naming conventions. +AWS_NORMALIZED_LISTS: list[NormalizedList] = [ + # AWSPolicyStatement - the hot path driving the 53-query perf fix. + NormalizedList( + "AWSPolicyStatement", "action", "AWSPolicyStatementActionItem", "HAS_ACTION" + ), + NormalizedList( + "AWSPolicyStatement", + "notaction", + "AWSPolicyStatementNotactionItem", + "HAS_NOTACTION", + ), + NormalizedList( + "AWSPolicyStatement", + "resource", + "AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem", + "HAS_RESOURCE", + ), + NormalizedList( + "AWSPolicyStatement", + "notresource", + "AWSPolicyStatementNotresourceItem", + "HAS_NOTRESOURCE", + ), + # S3PolicyStatement - same shape as IAM policies; AWS allows list or string. + NormalizedList( + "S3PolicyStatement", "action", "S3PolicyStatementActionItem", "HAS_ACTION" + ), + NormalizedList( + "S3PolicyStatement", "resource", "S3PolicyStatementResourceItem", "HAS_RESOURCE" + ), + # IAM / Cognito / KMS / Secrets + NormalizedList( + "CognitoIdentityPool", "roles", "CognitoIdentityPoolRolesItem", "HAS_ROLES" + ), + NormalizedList( + "KMSKey", + "encryption_algorithms", + "KMSKeyEncryptionAlgorithmsItem", + "HAS_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHMS", + ), + NormalizedList( + "KMSKey", + "signing_algorithms", + "KMSKeySigningAlgorithmsItem", + "HAS_SIGNING_ALGORITHMS", + ), + NormalizedList( + "KMSKey", + "anonymous_actions", + "KMSKeyAnonymousActionsItem", + "HAS_ANONYMOUS_ACTIONS", + ), + NormalizedList( + "KMSGrant", "operations", "KMSGrantOperationsItem", "HAS_OPERATIONS" + ), + NormalizedList( + "SecretsManagerSecretVersion", + "version_stages", + "SecretsManagerSecretVersionVersionStagesItem", + "HAS_VERSION_STAGES", + ), + NormalizedList( + "SecretsManagerSecretVersion", + "kms_key_ids", + "SecretsManagerSecretVersionKmsKeyIdsItem", + "HAS_KMS_KEY_IDS", + ), + NormalizedList( + "SecretsManagerSecretVersion", + "tags", + "SecretsManagerSecretVersionTagsItem", + "HAS_TAGS", + field_map=[("Key", "key"), ("Value", "value_")], + # `value` is reserved for scalar mode; map `Value` to `value_` to keep dict shape. + ), + # Lambda / Compute + NormalizedList( + "AWSLambda", "architectures", "AWSLambdaArchitecturesItem", "HAS_ARCHITECTURES" + ), + NormalizedList( + "AWSLambda", + "anonymous_actions", + "AWSLambdaAnonymousActionsItem", + "HAS_ANONYMOUS_ACTIONS", + ), + NormalizedList( + "CodeBuildProject", + "environment_variables", + "CodeBuildProjectEnvironmentVariablesItem", + "HAS_ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLES", + ), + # ECS family + NormalizedList( + "ECSCluster", + "capacity_providers", + "ECSClusterCapacityProvidersItem", + "HAS_CAPACITY_PROVIDERS", + ), + NormalizedList( + "ECSTaskDefinition", + "compatibilities", + "ECSTaskDefinitionCompatibilitiesItem", + "HAS_COMPATIBILITIES", + ), + NormalizedList( + "ECSTaskDefinition", + "requires_compatibilities", + "ECSTaskDefinitionRequiresCompatibilitiesItem", + "HAS_REQUIRES_COMPATIBILITIES", + ), + NormalizedList( + "ECSContainerDefinition", + "links", + "ECSContainerDefinitionLinksItem", + "HAS_LINKS", + ), + NormalizedList( + "ECSContainerDefinition", + "entry_point", + "ECSContainerDefinitionEntryPointItem", + "HAS_ENTRY_POINT", + ), + NormalizedList( + "ECSContainerDefinition", + "command", + "ECSContainerDefinitionCommandItem", + "HAS_COMMAND", + ), + NormalizedList( + "ECSContainerDefinition", + "dns_servers", + "ECSContainerDefinitionDnsServersItem", + "HAS_DNS_SERVERS", + ), + NormalizedList( + "ECSContainerDefinition", + "dns_search_domains", + "ECSContainerDefinitionDnsSearchDomainsItem", + "HAS_DNS_SEARCH_DOMAINS", + ), + NormalizedList( + "ECSContainerDefinition", + "docker_security_options", + "ECSContainerDefinitionDockerSecurityOptionsItem", + "HAS_DOCKER_SECURITY_OPTIONS", + ), + NormalizedList("ECSContainer", "gpu_ids", "ECSContainerGpuIdsItem", "HAS_GPU_IDS"), + # ECR + NormalizedList( + "ECRImage", "layer_diff_ids", "ECRImageLayerDiffIdsItem", "HAS_LAYER_DIFF_IDS" + ), + NormalizedList( + "ECRImage", + "child_image_digests", + "ECRImageChildImageDigestsItem", + "HAS_CHILD_IMAGE_DIGESTS", + ), + # EC2 / Networking + NormalizedList( + "EC2Instance", + "exposed_internet_type", + "EC2InstanceExposedInternetTypeItem", + "HAS_EXPOSED_INTERNET_TYPE", + ), + NormalizedList( + "AutoScalingGroup", + "exposed_internet_type", + "AutoScalingGroupExposedInternetTypeItem", + "HAS_EXPOSED_INTERNET_TYPE", + ), + NormalizedList( + "LaunchConfiguration", + "security_groups", + "LaunchConfigurationSecurityGroupsItem", + "HAS_SECURITY_GROUPS", + ), + NormalizedList( + "LaunchTemplateVersion", + "security_group_ids", + "LaunchTemplateVersionSecurityGroupIdsItem", + "HAS_SECURITY_GROUP_IDS", + ), + NormalizedList( + "LaunchTemplateVersion", + "security_groups", + "LaunchTemplateVersionSecurityGroupsItem", + "HAS_SECURITY_GROUPS", + ), + NormalizedList( + "AWSVpcEndpoint", + "route_table_ids", + "AWSVpcEndpointRouteTableIdsItem", + "HAS_ROUTE_TABLE_IDS", + ), + NormalizedList( + "AWSVpcEndpoint", + "network_interface_ids", + "AWSVpcEndpointNetworkInterfaceIdsItem", + "HAS_NETWORK_INTERFACE_IDS", + ), + NormalizedList( + "AWSVpcEndpoint", + "subnet_ids", + "AWSVpcEndpointSubnetIdsItem", + "HAS_SUBNET_IDS", + ), + NormalizedList( + "ELBListener", "policy_names", "ELBListenerPolicyNamesItem", "HAS_POLICY_NAMES" + ), + # CloudFront / Route53 / CloudWatch / CloudTrail + NormalizedList( + "CloudFrontDistribution", + "aliases", + "CloudFrontDistributionAliasesItem", + "HAS_ALIASES", + ), + NormalizedList( + "CloudFrontDistribution", + "geo_restriction_locations", + "CloudFrontDistributionGeoRestrictionLocationsItem", + "HAS_GEO_RESTRICTION_LOCATIONS", + ), + NormalizedList( + "CloudWatchLogGroup", + "inherited_properties", + "CloudWatchLogGroupInheritedPropertiesItem", + "HAS_INHERITED_PROPERTIES", + ), + # RDS / Storage + NormalizedList( + "RDSCluster", + "availability_zones", + "RDSClusterAvailabilityZonesItem", + "HAS_AVAILABILITY_ZONES", + ), + NormalizedList( + "RDSEventSubscription", + "event_categories", + "RDSEventSubscriptionEventCategoriesItem", + "HAS_EVENT_CATEGORIES", + ), + NormalizedList( + "RDSEventSubscription", + "source_ids", + "RDSEventSubscriptionSourceIdsItem", + "HAS_SOURCE_IDS", + ), + NormalizedList( + "S3Bucket", + "anonymous_actions", + "S3BucketAnonymousActionsItem", + "HAS_ANONYMOUS_ACTIONS", + ), + # Inspector / Config / SSM / ACM / APIGateway / Glue / SageMaker / Bedrock + NormalizedList( + "AWSInspectorFinding", + "referenceurls", + "AWSInspectorFindingReferenceurlsItem", + "HAS_REFERENCEURLS", + ), + NormalizedList( + "AWSInspectorFinding", + "relatedvulnerabilities", + "AWSInspectorFindingRelatedvulnerabilitiesItem", + "HAS_RELATEDVULNERABILITIES", + ), + NormalizedList( + "AWSInspectorFinding", + "vulnerablepackageids", + "AWSInspectorFindingVulnerablepackageidsItem", + "HAS_VULNERABLEPACKAGEIDS", + ), + NormalizedList( + "AWSConfigurationRecorder", + "recording_group_resource_types", + "AWSConfigurationRecorderRecordingGroupResourceTypesItem", + "HAS_RECORDING_GROUP_RESOURCE_TYPES", + ), + NormalizedList( + "AWSConfigRule", + "scope_compliance_resource_types", + "AWSConfigRuleScopeComplianceResourceTypesItem", + "HAS_SCOPE_COMPLIANCE_RESOURCE_TYPES", + ), + NormalizedList( + "AWSConfigRule", + "source_details", + "AWSConfigRuleSourceDetailsItem", + "HAS_SOURCE_DETAILS", + ), + NormalizedList( + "SSMInstancePatch", "cve_ids", "SSMInstancePatchCveIdsItem", "HAS_CVE_IDS" + ), + NormalizedList( + "ACMCertificate", "in_use_by", "ACMCertificateInUseByItem", "HAS_IN_USE_BY" + ), + NormalizedList( + "APIGatewayRestAPI", + "anonymous_actions", + "APIGatewayRestAPIAnonymousActionsItem", + "HAS_ANONYMOUS_ACTIONS", + ), + NormalizedList( + "GlueJob", "connections", "GlueJobConnectionsItem", "HAS_CONNECTIONS" + ), + NormalizedList( + "AWSBedrockFoundationModel", + "input_modalities", + "AWSBedrockFoundationModelInputModalitiesItem", + "HAS_INPUT_MODALITIES", + ), + NormalizedList( + "AWSBedrockFoundationModel", + "output_modalities", + "AWSBedrockFoundationModelOutputModalitiesItem", + "HAS_OUTPUT_MODALITIES", + ), + NormalizedList( + "AWSBedrockFoundationModel", + "customizations_supported", + "AWSBedrockFoundationModelCustomizationsSupportedItem", + "HAS_CUSTOMIZATIONS_SUPPORTED", + ), + NormalizedList( + "AWSBedrockFoundationModel", + "inference_types_supported", + "AWSBedrockFoundationModelInferenceTypesSupportedItem", + "HAS_INFERENCE_TYPES_SUPPORTED", + ), +] + + +AWS_CONFIG = ProviderConfig( + name="aws", + root_node_label="AWSAccount", + uid_field="arn", + resource_label="_AWSResource", + ingestion_function=aws.start_aws_ingestion, + short_uid_extractor=aws.extract_short_uid, + normalized_lists=AWS_NORMALIZED_LISTS, +) + + +PROVIDER_CONFIGS: dict[str, ProviderConfig] = { + "aws": AWS_CONFIG, +} diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/queries.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/queries.py index eb1d82a96e..1166de17ed 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/queries.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/queries.py @@ -2,8 +2,6 @@ from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import ( INTERNET_NODE_LABEL, PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL, - PROVIDER_ELEMENT_ID_PROPERTY, - PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL, ) @@ -21,7 +19,6 @@ def render_cypher_template(template: str, replacements: dict[str, str]) -> str: # Findings queries (used by findings.py) -# --------------------------------------- ADD_RESOURCE_LABEL_TEMPLATE = """ MATCH (account:__ROOT_LABEL__ {id: $provider_uid})-->(r) @@ -88,7 +85,6 @@ INSERT_FINDING_TEMPLATE = f""" """ # Internet queries (used by internet.py) -# --------------------------------------- CREATE_INTERNET_NODE = f""" MERGE (internet:{INTERNET_NODE_LABEL} {{id: 'Internet'}}) @@ -118,8 +114,8 @@ CREATE_CAN_ACCESS_RELATIONSHIPS_TEMPLATE = f""" RETURN COUNT(r) AS relationships_merged """ -# Sync queries (used by sync.py) -# ------------------------------- +# Sync queries (used by sync.py to fetch from the cartography temp Neo4j DB) +# The write side of sync lives in each sink (`api/attack_paths/sink/`). NODE_FETCH_QUERY = """ MATCH (n) @@ -143,17 +139,3 @@ RELATIONSHIPS_FETCH_QUERY = """ ORDER BY internal_id LIMIT $batch_size """ - -NODE_SYNC_TEMPLATE = f""" - UNWIND $rows AS row - MERGE (n:__NODE_LABELS__ {{{PROVIDER_ELEMENT_ID_PROPERTY}: row.provider_element_id}}) - SET n += row.props -""" - -RELATIONSHIP_SYNC_TEMPLATE = f""" - UNWIND $rows AS row - MATCH (s:{PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL} {{{PROVIDER_ELEMENT_ID_PROPERTY}: row.start_element_id}}) - MATCH (t:{PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL} {{{PROVIDER_ELEMENT_ID_PROPERTY}: row.end_element_id}}) - MERGE (s)-[r:__REL_TYPE__ {{{PROVIDER_ELEMENT_ID_PROPERTY}: row.provider_element_id}}]->(t) - SET r += row.props -""" diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/scan.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/scan.py index 452dae00d0..32337c6832 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/scan.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/scan.py @@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ Pipeline steps: 7. Sync the temp database into the tenant database: - Drop the old provider subgraph (matched by dynamic _Provider_{uuid} label). - graph_data_ready is set to False for all scans of this provider while - the swap happens so the API doesn't serve partial data. + graph_data_ready is set to False for scans of this provider in the + target sink while the swap happens so the API doesn't serve partial data. - Copy nodes and relationships in batches. Every synced node gets a _ProviderResource label and dynamic _Tenant_{uuid} / _Provider_{uuid} isolation labels, plus a _provider_element_id property for MERGE keys. @@ -55,22 +55,27 @@ exception propagates to Celery. import logging import time - from typing import Any -from cartography.config import Config as CartographyConfig -from cartography.intel import analysis as cartography_analysis -from cartography.intel import create_indexes as cartography_create_indexes -from cartography.intel import ontology as cartography_ontology -from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger -from tasks.jobs.attack_paths import db_utils, findings, indexes, internet, sync, utils -from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import get_cartography_ingestion_function - from api.attack_paths import database as graph_database from api.db_utils import rls_transaction from api.models import Provider as ProwlerAPIProvider from api.models import StateChoices from api.utils import initialize_prowler_provider +from cartography.config import Config as CartographyConfig +from cartography.intel import analysis as cartography_analysis +from cartography.intel import ontology as cartography_ontology +from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger +from django.conf import settings +from tasks.jobs.attack_paths import ( + db_utils, + findings, + indexes, + internet, + sync, + utils, +) +from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import get_cartography_ingestion_function # Without this Celery goes crazy with Cartography logging logging.getLogger("cartography").setLevel(logging.ERROR) @@ -98,7 +103,7 @@ def run(tenant_id: str, scan_id: str, task_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]: attack_paths_scan = db_utils.retrieve_attack_paths_scan(tenant_id, scan_id) # Idempotency guard: cleanup may have flipped this row to a terminal state - # while the message was still in flight. Bail out before touching state. + # while the message was still in flight. Bail out before touching state if attack_paths_scan and attack_paths_scan.state in ( StateChoices.FAILED, StateChoices.COMPLETED, @@ -127,7 +132,7 @@ def run(tenant_id: str, scan_id: str, task_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]: else: if not attack_paths_scan: - # Safety net for in-flight messages or direct task invocations; dispatcher normally pre-creates the row. + # Safety net for in-flight messages or direct task invocations; dispatcher normally pre-creates the row logger.warning( f"No Attack Paths Scan found for scan {scan_id} and tenant {tenant_id}, let's create it then" ) @@ -145,10 +150,18 @@ def run(tenant_id: str, scan_id: str, task_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]: tenant_database_name = graph_database.get_database_name( prowler_api_provider.tenant_id ) + target_sink_backend = settings.ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE + target_description = ( + f"tenant Neo4j database {tenant_database_name}" + if target_sink_backend == "neo4j" + else f"{target_sink_backend} sink" + ) # While creating the Cartography configuration, attributes `neo4j_user` and `neo4j_password` are not really needed in this config object tmp_cartography_config = CartographyConfig( - neo4j_uri=graph_database.get_uri(), + # The temp ingest database is always Neo4j, so use the ingest URI here + # rather than the sink URI (which points at Neptune when configured). + neo4j_uri=graph_database.get_ingest_uri(), neo4j_database=tmp_database_name, update_tag=int(time.time()), ) @@ -158,6 +171,8 @@ def run(tenant_id: str, scan_id: str, task_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]: update_tag=tmp_cartography_config.update_tag, ) + graph_database.verify_scan_databases_available() + # Starting the Attack Paths scan if not db_utils.starting_attack_paths_scan( attack_paths_scan, tenant_cartography_config @@ -170,7 +185,8 @@ def run(tenant_id: str, scan_id: str, task_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]: scan_t0 = time.perf_counter() logger.info( f"Starting Attack Paths scan ({attack_paths_scan.id}) for " - f"{prowler_api_provider.provider.upper()} provider {prowler_api_provider.id}" + f"{prowler_api_provider.provider.upper()} provider {prowler_api_provider.id} " + f"(staging=Neo4j database {tmp_database_name}, target={target_description})" ) subgraph_dropped = False @@ -179,7 +195,8 @@ def run(tenant_id: str, scan_id: str, task_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]: try: logger.info( - f"Creating Neo4j database {tmp_cartography_config.neo4j_database} for tenant {prowler_api_provider.tenant_id}" + f"Creating staging Neo4j database {tmp_cartography_config.neo4j_database} " + f"for tenant {prowler_api_provider.tenant_id}" ) graph_database.create_database(tmp_cartography_config.neo4j_database) @@ -193,7 +210,9 @@ def run(tenant_id: str, scan_id: str, task_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]: tmp_cartography_config.neo4j_database ) as tmp_neo4j_session: # Indexes creation - cartography_create_indexes.run(tmp_neo4j_session, tmp_cartography_config) + indexes.create_cartography_indexes( + tmp_neo4j_session, tmp_cartography_config + ) indexes.create_findings_indexes(tmp_neo4j_session) db_utils.update_attack_paths_scan_progress(attack_paths_scan, 2) @@ -225,7 +244,7 @@ def run(tenant_id: str, scan_id: str, task_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]: cartography_analysis.run(tmp_neo4j_session, tmp_cartography_config) db_utils.update_attack_paths_scan_progress(attack_paths_scan, 95) - # Creating Internet node and CAN_ACCESS relationships + # Creating Internet node and `CAN_ACCESS` relationships logger.info( f"Creating Internet graph for AWS account {prowler_api_provider.uid}" ) @@ -249,23 +268,41 @@ def run(tenant_id: str, scan_id: str, task_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]: db_utils.update_attack_paths_scan_progress(attack_paths_scan, 97) logger.info( - f"Clearing Neo4j cache for database {tmp_cartography_config.neo4j_database}" + f"Clearing Neo4j cache for staging database {tmp_cartography_config.neo4j_database}" ) graph_database.clear_cache(tmp_cartography_config.neo4j_database) + t0 = time.perf_counter() logger.info( - f"Ensuring tenant database {tenant_database_name}, and its indexes, exists for tenant {prowler_api_provider.tenant_id}" + f"Preparing target {target_description} for tenant {prowler_api_provider.tenant_id}" ) graph_database.create_database(tenant_database_name) - with graph_database.get_session(tenant_database_name) as tenant_neo4j_session: - cartography_create_indexes.run( - tenant_neo4j_session, tenant_cartography_config - ) - indexes.create_findings_indexes(tenant_neo4j_session) - indexes.create_sync_indexes(tenant_neo4j_session) + # Sink-side index creation: Neptune auto-manages indexes and rejects + # `CREATE INDEX`, so only run it when the sink is Neo4j + # The temp ingest DB is always Neo4j and is always indexed above + if target_sink_backend != "neptune": + logger.info(f"Ensuring indexes exist for {target_description}") + with graph_database.get_session( + tenant_database_name + ) as tenant_neo4j_session: + indexes.create_cartography_indexes( + tenant_neo4j_session, tenant_cartography_config + ) + indexes.create_findings_indexes(tenant_neo4j_session) + indexes.create_sync_indexes(tenant_neo4j_session) + else: + logger.info("Skipping tenant database indexes for neptune sink") + logger.info( + f"Prepared target {target_description} in {time.perf_counter() - t0:.3f}s" + ) - logger.info(f"Deleting existing provider graph in {tenant_database_name}") - db_utils.set_provider_graph_data_ready(attack_paths_scan, False) + logger.info( + f"Deleting existing provider graph from {target_description} " + f"(tenant={prowler_api_provider.tenant_id}, provider={prowler_api_provider.id})" + ) + db_utils.set_provider_graph_data_ready( + attack_paths_scan, False, target_sink_backend + ) provider_gated = True t0 = time.perf_counter() @@ -274,14 +311,17 @@ def run(tenant_id: str, scan_id: str, task_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]: provider_id=str(prowler_api_provider.id), ) logger.info( - f"Deleted existing provider graph in {time.perf_counter() - t0:.3f}s " - f"(deleted_nodes={deleted_nodes})" + f"Deleted existing provider graph from {target_description} " + f"in {time.perf_counter() - t0:.3f}s (deleted_nodes={deleted_nodes})" ) subgraph_dropped = True db_utils.update_attack_paths_scan_progress(attack_paths_scan, 98) logger.info( - f"Syncing graph from {tmp_database_name} into {tenant_database_name}" + f"Syncing staging graph {tmp_database_name} into {target_description} " + f"for provider {prowler_api_provider.id} " + f"(tenant {prowler_api_provider.tenant_id}, " + f"type {prowler_api_provider.provider})" ) t0 = time.perf_counter() sync_result = sync.sync_graph( @@ -289,17 +329,34 @@ def run(tenant_id: str, scan_id: str, task_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]: target_database=tenant_database_name, tenant_id=str(prowler_api_provider.tenant_id), provider_id=str(prowler_api_provider.id), + provider_type=prowler_api_provider.provider, ) + elapsed = time.perf_counter() - t0 + total_nodes = sync_result["nodes"] + sync_result["child_nodes"] + elements = total_nodes + sync_result["relationships"] + rate = elements / elapsed if elapsed else 0 logger.info( - f"Synced graph in {time.perf_counter() - t0:.3f}s " - f"(nodes={sync_result['nodes']}, relationships={sync_result['relationships']})" + f"Synced staging graph into {target_description} in {elapsed:.3f}s - " + f"nodes={total_nodes} (source={sync_result['nodes']}, " + f"items={sync_result['child_nodes']}), " + f"relationships={sync_result['relationships']} " + f"(structural={sync_result['structural_relationships']}, " + f"items={sync_result['item_relationships']}), " + f"~{rate:.0f} elem/s" ) sync_completed = True + # Flip metadata only now: the new schema is live in the target sink, so + # reads can switch to the current catalog/backend. The target-sink gate + # is already closed, so the switch is atomic from the API's view. + db_utils.set_scan_migrated(attack_paths_scan, True, target_sink_backend) db_utils.set_graph_data_ready(attack_paths_scan, True) db_utils.update_attack_paths_scan_progress(attack_paths_scan, 99) - logger.info(f"Clearing Neo4j cache for database {tenant_database_name}") - graph_database.clear_cache(tenant_database_name) + if target_sink_backend == "neptune": + logger.info("Skipping cache clear for neptune sink") + else: + logger.info(f"Clearing Neo4j cache for target {target_description}") + graph_database.clear_cache(tenant_database_name) logger.info(f"Dropping temporary Neo4j database {tmp_database_name}") graph_database.drop_database(tmp_database_name) @@ -318,14 +375,16 @@ def run(tenant_id: str, scan_id: str, task_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]: logger.exception(exception_message) ingestion_exceptions["global_error"] = exception_message - # Recover graph_data_ready based on how far the swap got. - # Partial drop (mid-batch failure) may leave `subgraph_dropped=False` - # with data partially deleted, so we prefer that over permanently blocked queries. + # Recover `graph_data_ready` based on how far the swap got + # Partial drop (mid-batch failure) may leave `subgraph_dropped=False` with data partially deleted, + # so we prefer that over permanently blocked queries try: if sync_completed: db_utils.set_graph_data_ready(attack_paths_scan, True) elif provider_gated and not subgraph_dropped: - db_utils.set_provider_graph_data_ready(attack_paths_scan, True) + db_utils.set_provider_graph_data_ready( + attack_paths_scan, True, target_sink_backend + ) except Exception: logger.error( diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/sync.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/sync.py index f720a12e82..7b73fa21e2 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/sync.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/sync.py @@ -1,42 +1,58 @@ """ Graph sync operations for Attack Paths. -This module handles syncing graph data from temporary scan databases -to the tenant database, adding provider isolation labels and properties. +Reads nodes and relationships out of the cartography temp database (always +Neo4j) and hands them to the configured sink (Neo4j or Neptune) in batches. +Backend-specific Cypher (MERGE shape, ID strategy, indexes) lives in each +sink; this module owns the source read loop, per-batch grouping, and the +list-property materialisation policy (see `NormalizedList`). + +Each list-typed node property that appears in the provider's +`normalized_lists` catalog becomes a set of child item nodes connected to +the parent by a typed edge. A list-typed property that is not in the +catalog is serialised to a comma-delimited string and emits a one-time +warning per (label, property), surfacing Cartography fields that should be +added to the catalog. """ +import json import time - from collections import defaultdict +from collections.abc import Iterator from typing import Any import neo4j +from api.attack_paths import database as graph_database +from api.attack_paths import sink as sink_module from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import ( + PROVIDER_CONFIGS, PROVIDER_ISOLATION_PROPERTIES, PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL, SYNC_BATCH_SIZE, + NormalizedList, get_provider_label, get_tenant_label, ) from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.queries import ( NODE_FETCH_QUERY, - NODE_SYNC_TEMPLATE, - RELATIONSHIP_SYNC_TEMPLATE, RELATIONSHIPS_FETCH_QUERY, - render_cypher_template, ) -from api.attack_paths import database as graph_database - logger = get_task_logger(__name__) +# (label, property) tuples for which we've already emitted the +# "unnormalised list" warning. Module-level so the warning fires once per +# process, not once per node. +_WARNED_UNNORMALIZED: set[tuple[str, str]] = set() + def sync_graph( source_database: str, target_database: str, tenant_id: str, provider_id: str, + provider_type: str, ) -> dict[str, int]: """ Sync all nodes and relationships from source to target database. @@ -46,25 +62,38 @@ def sync_graph( `target_database`: The tenant database `tenant_id`: The tenant ID for isolation `provider_id`: The provider ID for isolation + `provider_type`: Provider type key (e.g. "aws"), used to resolve the + `NormalizedList` catalog from `PROVIDER_CONFIGS`. Returns: - Dict with counts of synced nodes and relationships + Dict with counts of synced nodes, child item nodes, and relationships. """ - nodes_synced = sync_nodes( + sink = sink_module.get_backend() + sink.ensure_sync_indexes(target_database) + + normalized_lists = _resolve_normalized_lists(provider_type) + + node_result = sync_nodes( source_database, target_database, tenant_id, provider_id, + sink, + normalized_lists, ) relationships_synced = sync_relationships( source_database, target_database, provider_id, + sink, ) return { - "nodes": nodes_synced, - "relationships": relationships_synced, + "nodes": node_result["parents"], + "child_nodes": node_result["children"], + "relationships": relationships_synced + node_result["parent_child_rels"], + "structural_relationships": relationships_synced, + "item_relationships": node_result["parent_child_rels"], } @@ -73,22 +102,35 @@ def sync_nodes( target_database: str, tenant_id: str, provider_id: str, -) -> int: + sink: Any, + normalized_lists: list[NormalizedList], +) -> dict[str, int]: """ - Sync nodes from source to target database. + Sync nodes from source to target database, exploding catalogued list + properties into child nodes + parent->child edges. Adds `_ProviderResource` label and dynamic `_Tenant_{id}` and `_Provider_{id}` - isolation labels to all nodes. + isolation labels to all nodes (parents and children alike). Source and target sessions are opened sequentially per batch to avoid holding two Bolt connections simultaneously for the entire sync duration. """ t0 = time.perf_counter() last_id = -1 - total_synced = 0 + parents_synced = 0 + children_synced = 0 + parent_child_rels = 0 + + catalog = _build_catalog_index(normalized_lists) + extra_labels = _build_extra_labels(tenant_id, provider_id) while True: - grouped: dict[tuple[str, ...], list[dict[str, Any]]] = defaultdict(list) + tb = time.perf_counter() + prev_children = children_synced + prev_rels = parent_child_rels + parent_groups: dict[tuple[str, ...], list[dict[str, Any]]] = defaultdict(list) + child_groups: dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]] = defaultdict(list) + rel_groups: dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]] = defaultdict(list) batch_count = 0 with graph_database.get_session(source_database) as source_session: @@ -99,43 +141,66 @@ def sync_nodes( for record in result: batch_count += 1 last_id = record["internal_id"] - key, value = _node_to_sync_dict(record, provider_id) - grouped[key].append(value) + key, parent_dict, children, rels = _node_to_sync_dict( + record, provider_id, catalog + ) + parent_groups[key].append(parent_dict) + for child in children: + child_groups[child["_child_label"]].append(child["row"]) + for rel in rels: + rel_groups[rel["rel_type"]].append(rel["row"]) if batch_count == 0: break - with graph_database.get_session(target_database) as target_session: - for labels, batch in grouped.items(): - label_set = set(labels) - label_set.add(PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL) - label_set.add(get_tenant_label(tenant_id)) - label_set.add(get_provider_label(provider_id)) - node_labels = ":".join(f"`{label}`" for label in sorted(label_set)) + for labels, batch in parent_groups.items(): + rendered_labels = _render_labels(labels, extra_labels) + for sink_batch in _iter_sink_batches(batch): + sink.write_nodes(target_database, rendered_labels, sink_batch) - query = render_cypher_template( - NODE_SYNC_TEMPLATE, {"__NODE_LABELS__": node_labels} + for child_label, batch in child_groups.items(): + rendered_labels = _render_labels((child_label,), extra_labels) + for sink_batch in _iter_sink_batches(batch): + sink.write_nodes(target_database, rendered_labels, sink_batch) + children_synced += len(batch) + + for rel_type, batch in rel_groups.items(): + for sink_batch in _iter_sink_batches(batch): + sink.write_relationships( + target_database, rel_type, provider_id, sink_batch ) - target_session.run(query, {"rows": batch}) + parent_child_rels += len(batch) - total_synced += batch_count + parents_synced += batch_count + batch_dt = time.perf_counter() - tb + batch_elements = ( + batch_count + + (children_synced - prev_children) + + (parent_child_rels - prev_rels) + ) + rate = batch_elements / batch_dt if batch_dt else 0 logger.info( - f"Synced {total_synced} nodes from {source_database} to {target_database} in {time.perf_counter() - t0:.3f}s" + f"[sync nodes] {parents_synced} source (+{children_synced} items, " + f"+{parent_child_rels} item rels) · batch {batch_dt:.1f}s · " + f"elapsed {time.perf_counter() - t0:.1f}s · ~{rate:.0f} elem/s" ) - return total_synced + return { + "parents": parents_synced, + "children": children_synced, + "parent_child_rels": parent_child_rels, + } def sync_relationships( source_database: str, target_database: str, provider_id: str, + sink: Any, ) -> int: """ Sync relationships from source to target database. - Matches source and target nodes by `_provider_element_id` in the tenant database. - Source and target sessions are opened sequentially per batch to avoid holding two Bolt connections simultaneously for the entire sync duration. """ @@ -144,6 +209,7 @@ def sync_relationships( total_synced = 0 while True: + tb = time.perf_counter() grouped: dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]] = defaultdict(list) batch_count = 0 @@ -161,32 +227,213 @@ def sync_relationships( if batch_count == 0: break - with graph_database.get_session(target_database) as target_session: - for rel_type, batch in grouped.items(): - query = render_cypher_template( - RELATIONSHIP_SYNC_TEMPLATE, {"__REL_TYPE__": rel_type} + for rel_type, batch in grouped.items(): + for sink_batch in _iter_sink_batches(batch): + sink.write_relationships( + target_database, rel_type, provider_id, sink_batch ) - target_session.run(query, {"rows": batch}) total_synced += batch_count + batch_dt = time.perf_counter() - tb + rate = batch_count / batch_dt if batch_dt else 0 logger.info( - f"Synced {total_synced} relationships from {source_database} to {target_database} in {time.perf_counter() - t0:.3f}s" + f"[sync rels] {total_synced} structural · batch {batch_dt:.1f}s · " + f"elapsed {time.perf_counter() - t0:.1f}s · ~{rate:.0f}/s" ) return total_synced +def _iter_sink_batches( + rows: list[dict[str, Any]], + batch_size: int | None = None, +) -> Iterator[list[dict[str, Any]]]: + """Yield final sink write batches after source rows have been transformed.""" + batch_size = SYNC_BATCH_SIZE if batch_size is None else batch_size + if batch_size <= 0: + raise ValueError("Sink batch size must be greater than zero") + + for index in range(0, len(rows), batch_size): + yield rows[index : index + batch_size] + + def _node_to_sync_dict( - record: neo4j.Record, provider_id: str -) -> tuple[tuple[str, ...], dict[str, Any]]: - """Transform a source node record into a (grouping_key, sync_dict) pair.""" + record: neo4j.Record, + provider_id: str, + catalog: dict[tuple[str, str], NormalizedList], +) -> tuple[ + tuple[str, ...], + dict[str, Any], + list[dict[str, Any]], + list[dict[str, Any]], +]: + """Transform a source node record into a (grouping_key, sync_dict, children, rels) tuple. + + Catalogued list properties are popped from `props` and emitted as child + nodes + parent->child relationships. + """ props = dict(record["props"] or {}) _strip_internal_properties(props) labels = tuple(sorted(set(record["labels"] or []))) - return labels, { - "provider_element_id": f"{provider_id}:{record['element_id']}", + parent_element_id = f"{provider_id}:{record['element_id']}" + + children, rels = _explode_catalogued_lists( + labels, props, catalog, provider_id, parent_element_id + ) + + _normalize_sink_properties(props, labels) + + parent = { + "provider_element_id": parent_element_id, "props": props, } + return labels, parent, children, rels + + +def _explode_catalogued_lists( + labels: tuple[str, ...], + props: dict[str, Any], + catalog: dict[tuple[str, str], NormalizedList], + provider_id: str, + parent_element_id: str, +) -> tuple[list[dict[str, Any]], list[dict[str, Any]]]: + """Pop catalogued list properties from `props` and produce child + rel emits. + + A node may carry multiple labels (e.g. `AWSPolicyStatement` plus + `_AWSResource`); we check each label for catalog matches independently. + Returns: + - children: list of {"_child_label": str, "row": } dicts. + - rels: list of {"rel_type": str, "row": } dicts. + """ + children: list[dict[str, Any]] = [] + rels: list[dict[str, Any]] = [] + + for label in labels: + for key in list(props.keys()): + spec = catalog.get((label, key)) + if spec is None: + continue + value = props.pop(key) + if value is None: + continue + if not isinstance(value, list): + # Catalogued but not actually a list this scan - fall back to + # the generic normaliser so we don't lose the value. + props[key] = value + continue + for item in value: + child_value_key, child_props = _build_child_props(spec, item) + if child_value_key is None: + continue + child_element_id = _build_child_id( + provider_id, spec.child_label, child_value_key + ) + children.append( + { + "_child_label": spec.child_label, + "row": { + "provider_element_id": child_element_id, + "props": child_props, + }, + } + ) + rels.append( + { + "rel_type": spec.rel_type, + "row": { + "start_element_id": parent_element_id, + "end_element_id": child_element_id, + "provider_element_id": ( + f"{parent_element_id}::{spec.rel_type}::" + f"{child_element_id}" + ), + "props": {}, + }, + } + ) + + return children, rels + + +def _build_child_props( + spec: NormalizedList, item: Any +) -> tuple[str | None, dict[str, Any]]: + """Translate one list element into a child node's prop dict. + + Returns (dedup_key, props). The dedup_key is what makes two child nodes + equal within (tenant, provider) - used to build `_provider_element_id`. + For scalar mode, the dedup key is the value itself. For dict mode it is + a stable concatenation of the mapped fields in `field_map` order. + """ + if not spec.field_map: + if isinstance(item, (dict, list)): + # Defensive: caller marked this list as scalar but elements are + # structured. Convert to a stable string so the value survives. + value_str = json.dumps(item, sort_keys=True, default=str) + else: + value_str = str(item) + return value_str, {"value": value_str} + + if not isinstance(item, dict): + # Catalogued as dict-shape but got a scalar. Skip - caller will see + # the value go missing and can fix the field_map. + return None, {} + + props: dict[str, Any] = {} + dedup_parts: list[str] = [] + for src_key, child_field in spec.field_map: + raw = item.get(src_key) + value_str = _to_sink_property_value(raw) if raw is not None else "" + props[child_field] = value_str + dedup_parts.append(f"{child_field}={value_str}") + return "::".join(dedup_parts), props + + +def _build_child_id(provider_id: str, child_label: str, value_key: str) -> str: + """Deterministic `_provider_element_id` for a list-item child node. + + Dedupes within (tenant, provider): multiple parents referencing the same + value share one child node via the existing MERGE-on-_provider_element_id + index in both sinks. + """ + return f"{provider_id}::{child_label}::{value_key}" + + +def _build_catalog_index( + normalized_lists: list[NormalizedList], +) -> dict[tuple[str, str], NormalizedList]: + """Index the catalog by (source_label, source_property) for O(1) lookup.""" + return { + (spec.source_label, spec.source_property): spec for spec in normalized_lists + } + + +def _build_extra_labels(tenant_id: str, provider_id: str) -> tuple[str, ...]: + return ( + PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL, + get_tenant_label(tenant_id), + get_provider_label(provider_id), + ) + + +def _render_labels(base_labels: tuple[str, ...], extra_labels: tuple[str, ...]) -> str: + """Render the Cypher label string for a node-write batch.""" + label_set = set(base_labels) | set(extra_labels) + return ":".join(f"`{label}`" for label in sorted(label_set)) + + +def _resolve_normalized_lists(provider_type: str) -> list[NormalizedList]: + config = PROVIDER_CONFIGS.get(provider_type) + if config is None: + # Unknown provider: empty catalog. Any list-typed property will be + # serialised to a comma-delimited string with one warning per + # (label, property). + logger.warning( + "Provider type %s not in PROVIDER_CONFIGS; no normalized_lists active", + provider_type, + ) + return [] + return config.normalized_lists def _rel_to_sync_dict( @@ -195,7 +442,11 @@ def _rel_to_sync_dict( """Transform a source relationship record into a (grouping_key, sync_dict) pair.""" props = dict(record["props"] or {}) _strip_internal_properties(props) + # Relationship properties go through the same primitive coercion as + # nodes; catalog-driven materialisation applies to node properties only. + _normalize_sink_properties(props, labels=None) rel_type = record["rel_type"] + return rel_type, { "start_element_id": f"{provider_id}:{record['start_element_id']}", "end_element_id": f"{provider_id}:{record['end_element_id']}", @@ -208,3 +459,80 @@ def _strip_internal_properties(props: dict[str, Any]) -> None: """Remove provider isolation properties before the += spread in sync templates.""" for key in PROVIDER_ISOLATION_PROPERTIES: props.pop(key, None) + + +def _normalize_sink_properties( + props: dict[str, Any], labels: tuple[str, ...] | None +) -> None: + """Normalize property values to primitive Cypher literals for either sink. + + Attack-paths node and relationship properties are written as primitive + scalars regardless of the active sink (Neo4j or Neptune). The convention + is driven by Neptune's openCypher type restrictions, which reject list, + map, temporal and spatial property values, but it is applied uniformly + so that custom and predefined queries are portable across sinks without + runtime rewriting. + + Concretely: + - Temporal values (neo4j.time.{DateTime,Date,Time,Duration}) become + their ISO-8601 string representation. + - Spatial values (neo4j.spatial.Point and subclasses) become their + WKT-style string representation. + - Maps / dicts become a JSON-encoded string, read back with `CONTAINS` + substring checks inside queries. + - Lists become a comma-delimited string. Catalogued list properties + are materialised as child item nodes upstream in + `_explode_catalogued_lists` and never reach this point; any list + seen here is uncatalogued, so we log a one-time warning per + (label, property) to surface Cartography fields that should be + added to the catalog. + + `labels` is only used for the warning message; pass `None` for + relationship props (no label context). + """ + for key, value in list(props.items()): + if isinstance(value, list) and labels is not None: + _warn_unnormalized_list(labels, key) + props[key] = _to_sink_property_value(value) + + +def _warn_unnormalized_list(labels: tuple[str, ...], key: str) -> None: + """Warn once per (label, property), on the real label(s) only. + + Every synced node also carries internal isolation labels (`_AWSResource`, + `_ProviderResource`, `_Tenant_*`, `_Provider_*`); warning on those just + doubles the noise, so skip them and point at the actionable Cartography + label. Falls back to all labels if only internal ones are present. + """ + real_labels = [label for label in labels if not label.startswith("_")] + for label in real_labels or labels: + token = (label, key) + if token in _WARNED_UNNORMALIZED: + continue + _WARNED_UNNORMALIZED.add(token) + logger.warning( + "Unnormalized list property %s.%s reached sink as comma-string; " + "add a NormalizedList entry to the provider catalog to explode it", + label, + key, + ) + + +def _to_sink_property_value(value: Any) -> Any: + if hasattr(value, "iso_format") and callable(value.iso_format): + return value.iso_format() + + if type(value).__module__.startswith("neo4j.spatial"): + return str(value) + + if isinstance(value, dict): + # openCypher `SET` rejects map property values: encode as JSON so the structured payload + # survives the round-trip and is queryable with `CONTAINS` substring checks + return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, default=str) + + if isinstance(value, list): + # openCypher `SET` rejects list/array property values: encode as a + # delimited string read back with split() inside queries + return ",".join(str(_to_sink_property_value(v)) for v in value) + + return value diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/utils.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/utils.py index eef5670782..50d670bfd3 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/utils.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/utils.py @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ import asyncio import traceback - -from datetime import datetime, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger @@ -10,7 +9,7 @@ logger = get_task_logger(__name__) def stringify_exception(exception: Exception, context: str) -> str: """Format an exception with timestamp and traceback for logging.""" - timestamp = datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) + timestamp = datetime.now(tz=UTC) exception_traceback = traceback.TracebackException.from_exception(exception) traceback_string = "".join(exception_traceback.format()) return f"{timestamp} - {context}\n{traceback_string}" diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/backfill.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/backfill.py index 825dcb7ca8..56cb626786 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/backfill.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/backfill.py @@ -1,19 +1,6 @@ from collections import defaultdict from datetime import timedelta -from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger -from django.db.models import OuterRef, Subquery, Sum -from django.utils import timezone -from tasks.jobs.queries import ( - COMPLIANCE_UPSERT_PROVIDER_SCORE_SQL, - COMPLIANCE_UPSERT_TENANT_SUMMARY_ALL_SQL, -) -from tasks.jobs.scan import ( - aggregate_category_counts, - aggregate_finding_group_summaries, - aggregate_resource_group_counts, -) - from api.db_router import READ_REPLICA_ALIAS, MainRouter from api.db_utils import ( POSTGRES_TENANT_VAR, @@ -36,6 +23,18 @@ from api.models import ( ScanSummary, StateChoices, ) +from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger +from django.db.models import OuterRef, Subquery, Sum +from django.utils import timezone +from tasks.jobs.queries import ( + COMPLIANCE_UPSERT_PROVIDER_SCORE_SQL, + COMPLIANCE_UPSERT_TENANT_SUMMARY_ALL_SQL, +) +from tasks.jobs.scan import ( + aggregate_category_counts, + aggregate_finding_group_summaries, + aggregate_resource_group_counts, +) logger = get_task_logger(__name__) diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/connection.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/connection.py index d7068ebf3b..3ae20c96a0 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/connection.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/connection.py @@ -1,13 +1,12 @@ -from datetime import datetime, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime import openai -from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger - from api.models import Integration, LighthouseConfiguration, Provider from api.utils import ( prowler_integration_connection_test, prowler_provider_connection_test, ) +from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger logger = get_task_logger(__name__) @@ -38,7 +37,7 @@ def check_provider_connection(provider_id: str): raise e provider_instance.connected = connection_result.is_connected - provider_instance.connection_last_checked_at = datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) + provider_instance.connection_last_checked_at = datetime.now(tz=UTC) provider_instance.save() connection_error = f"{connection_result.error}" if connection_result.error else None @@ -111,7 +110,7 @@ def check_integration_connection(integration_id: str): # Update integration connection status integration.connected = result.is_connected - integration.connection_last_checked_at = datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) + integration.connection_last_checked_at = datetime.now(tz=UTC) integration.save() return { diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/deletion.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/deletion.py index f9ead01897..91e64610f7 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/deletion.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/deletion.py @@ -1,11 +1,5 @@ -from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger -from django.db import DatabaseError -from tasks.jobs.queries import ( - COMPLIANCE_DELETE_EMPTY_TENANT_SUMMARY_SQL, - COMPLIANCE_UPSERT_TENANT_SUMMARY_SQL, -) - from api.attack_paths import database as graph_database +from api.attack_paths import sink as sink_module from api.db_router import MainRouter from api.db_utils import batch_delete, rls_transaction from api.models import ( @@ -18,6 +12,12 @@ from api.models import ( ScanSummary, Tenant, ) +from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger +from django.db import DatabaseError +from tasks.jobs.queries import ( + COMPLIANCE_DELETE_EMPTY_TENANT_SUMMARY_SQL, + COMPLIANCE_UPSERT_TENANT_SUMMARY_SQL, +) logger = get_task_logger(__name__) @@ -77,6 +77,12 @@ def delete_provider(tenant_id: str, pk: str): "id", flat=True ) ) + attack_paths_sink_backends = list( + AttackPathsScan.all_objects.filter(provider=instance) + .values_list("sink_backend", flat=True) + .distinct() + .order_by("sink_backend") + ) deletion_steps = [ ("Scan Summaries", ScanSummary.all_objects.filter(scan__provider=instance)), @@ -98,7 +104,13 @@ def delete_provider(tenant_id: str, pk: str): # Delete the Attack Paths' graph data related to the provider from the tenant database tenant_database_name = graph_database.get_database_name(tenant_id) try: - graph_database.drop_subgraph(tenant_database_name, str(pk)) + if attack_paths_sink_backends: + for sink_backend in attack_paths_sink_backends: + sink_module.get_backend_for_name(sink_backend).drop_subgraph( + tenant_database_name, str(pk) + ) + else: + graph_database.drop_subgraph(tenant_database_name, str(pk)) except graph_database.GraphDatabaseQueryException as gdb_error: logger.error(f"Error deleting Provider graph data: {gdb_error}") diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/export.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/export.py index 96bd03ee6c..e658d6018c 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/export.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/export.py @@ -4,12 +4,11 @@ import zipfile import boto3 import config.django.base as base +from api.db_utils import rls_transaction +from api.models import Scan from botocore.exceptions import ClientError, NoCredentialsError, ParamValidationError from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger from django.conf import settings - -from api.db_utils import rls_transaction -from api.models import Scan from prowler.config.config import ( csv_file_suffix, html_file_suffix, @@ -18,6 +17,9 @@ from prowler.config.config import ( set_output_timestamp, ) from prowler.lib.outputs.asff.asff import ASFF +from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.asd_essential_eight.asd_essential_eight_aws import ( + ASDEssentialEightAWS, +) from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.aws_well_architected.aws_well_architected import ( AWSWellArchitected, ) @@ -42,9 +44,6 @@ from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.cisa_scuba.cisa_scuba_googleworkspace import from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.ens.ens_aws import AWSENS from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.ens.ens_azure import AzureENS from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.ens.ens_gcp import GCPENS -from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.asd_essential_eight.asd_essential_eight_aws import ( - ASDEssentialEightAWS, -) from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.iso27001.iso27001_aws import AWSISO27001 from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.iso27001.iso27001_azure import AzureISO27001 from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.iso27001.iso27001_gcp import GCPISO27001 diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/integrations.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/integrations.py index 5ca94057da..25722686cc 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/integrations.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/integrations.py @@ -2,15 +2,13 @@ import os import time from glob import glob -from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger -from config.django.base import DJANGO_FINDINGS_BATCH_SIZE -from django.db import OperationalError -from tasks.utils import batched - from api.db_router import READ_REPLICA_ALIAS, MainRouter from api.db_utils import REPLICA_MAX_ATTEMPTS, REPLICA_RETRY_BASE_DELAY, rls_transaction from api.models import Finding, Integration, Provider from api.utils import initialize_prowler_integration, initialize_prowler_provider +from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger +from config.django.base import DJANGO_FINDINGS_BATCH_SIZE +from django.db import OperationalError from prowler.lib.outputs.asff.asff import ASFF from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.generic.generic import GenericCompliance from prowler.lib.outputs.csv.csv import CSV @@ -24,6 +22,7 @@ from prowler.providers.aws.lib.security_hub.exceptions.exceptions import ( ) from prowler.providers.aws.lib.security_hub.security_hub import SecurityHub from prowler.providers.common.models import Connection +from tasks.utils import batched logger = get_task_logger(__name__) diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/lighthouse_providers.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/lighthouse_providers.py index 29e36e5e57..0f28725e01 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/lighthouse_providers.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/lighthouse_providers.py @@ -1,14 +1,11 @@ -from typing import Dict - import boto3 import openai +from api.models import LighthouseProviderConfiguration, LighthouseProviderModels from botocore import UNSIGNED from botocore.config import Config from botocore.exceptions import BotoCoreError, ClientError from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger -from api.models import LighthouseProviderConfiguration, LighthouseProviderModels - logger = get_task_logger(__name__) # OpenAI model prefixes to exclude from Lighthouse model selection. @@ -104,7 +101,7 @@ def _extract_openai_api_key( def _extract_openai_compatible_params( provider_cfg: LighthouseProviderConfiguration, -) -> Dict[str, str] | None: +) -> dict[str, str] | None: """ Extract base_url and api_key for OpenAI-compatible providers. """ @@ -122,7 +119,7 @@ def _extract_openai_compatible_params( def _extract_bedrock_credentials( provider_cfg: LighthouseProviderConfiguration, -) -> Dict[str, str] | None: +) -> dict[str, str] | None: """ Safely extract AWS Bedrock credentials from a provider configuration. @@ -177,7 +174,7 @@ def _extract_bedrock_credentials( def _create_bedrock_client( - bedrock_creds: Dict[str, str], service_name: str = "bedrock" + bedrock_creds: dict[str, str], service_name: str = "bedrock" ): """ Create a boto3 Bedrock client with the appropriate authentication method. @@ -221,7 +218,7 @@ def _create_bedrock_client( ) -def check_lighthouse_provider_connection(provider_config_id: str) -> Dict: +def check_lighthouse_provider_connection(provider_config_id: str) -> dict: """ Validate a Lighthouse provider configuration by calling the provider API and toggle its active state accordingly. @@ -314,7 +311,7 @@ def check_lighthouse_provider_connection(provider_config_id: str) -> Dict: return {"connected": False, "error": error_message} -def _fetch_openai_models(api_key: str) -> Dict[str, str]: +def _fetch_openai_models(api_key: str) -> dict[str, str]: """ Fetch available models from OpenAI API. @@ -355,7 +352,7 @@ def _fetch_openai_models(api_key: str) -> Dict[str, str]: return filtered_models -def _fetch_openai_compatible_models(base_url: str, api_key: str) -> Dict[str, str]: +def _fetch_openai_compatible_models(base_url: str, api_key: str) -> dict[str, str]: """ Fetch available models from an OpenAI-compatible API using the OpenAI SDK. @@ -367,7 +364,7 @@ def _fetch_openai_compatible_models(base_url: str, api_key: str) -> Dict[str, st client = openai.OpenAI(api_key=api_key, base_url=base_url) models = client.models.list() - available_models: Dict[str, str] = {} + available_models: dict[str, str] = {} for model in models.data: model_id = model.id # Prefer provider-supplied human-friendly name when available @@ -462,7 +459,7 @@ def _extract_foundation_model_ids(profile_models: list) -> list[str]: def _build_inference_profile_map( bedrock_client, region: str -) -> Dict[str, tuple[str, str]]: +) -> dict[str, tuple[str, str]]: """ Build map of foundation_model_id -> best inference profile. @@ -472,7 +469,7 @@ def _build_inference_profile_map( Prefers region-matched profiles over others """ region_prefix = _get_region_prefix(region) - model_to_profile: Dict[str, tuple[str, str]] = {} + model_to_profile: dict[str, tuple[str, str]] = {} try: response = bedrock_client.list_inference_profiles() @@ -533,7 +530,7 @@ def _check_on_demand_availability(bedrock_client, model_id: str) -> bool: return False -def _fetch_bedrock_models(bedrock_creds: Dict[str, str]) -> Dict[str, str]: +def _fetch_bedrock_models(bedrock_creds: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, str]: """ Fetch available models from AWS Bedrock, preferring inference profiles over ON_DEMAND. @@ -560,7 +557,7 @@ def _fetch_bedrock_models(bedrock_creds: Dict[str, str]) -> Dict[str, str]: foundation_response = bedrock_client.list_foundation_models() model_summaries = foundation_response.get("modelSummaries", []) - models_to_return: Dict[str, str] = {} + models_to_return: dict[str, str] = {} on_demand_models: set[str] = set() for model in model_summaries: @@ -585,7 +582,7 @@ def _fetch_bedrock_models(bedrock_creds: Dict[str, str]) -> Dict[str, str]: models_to_return[model_id] = model_name on_demand_models.add(model_id) - available_models: Dict[str, str] = {} + available_models: dict[str, str] = {} for model_id, model_name in models_to_return.items(): if model_id in on_demand_models: @@ -597,7 +594,7 @@ def _fetch_bedrock_models(bedrock_creds: Dict[str, str]) -> Dict[str, str]: return available_models -def refresh_lighthouse_provider_models(provider_config_id: str) -> Dict: +def refresh_lighthouse_provider_models(provider_config_id: str) -> dict: """ Refresh the catalog of models for a Lighthouse provider configuration. @@ -619,7 +616,7 @@ def refresh_lighthouse_provider_models(provider_config_id: str) -> Dict: LighthouseProviderConfiguration.DoesNotExist: If no configuration exists with the given ID. """ provider_cfg = LighthouseProviderConfiguration.objects.get(pk=provider_config_id) - fetched_models: Dict[str, str] = {} + fetched_models: dict[str, str] = {} try: if ( diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/muting.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/muting.py index 6ef4d127f5..12a32ac574 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/muting.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/muting.py @@ -1,10 +1,9 @@ +from api.db_utils import rls_transaction +from api.models import Finding, MuteRule from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger from config.django.base import DJANGO_FINDINGS_BATCH_SIZE from tasks.utils import batched -from api.db_utils import rls_transaction -from api.models import Finding, MuteRule - logger = get_task_logger(__name__) diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/orphan_recovery.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/orphan_recovery.py index 1bf5c95df2..7211f1a1d5 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/orphan_recovery.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/orphan_recovery.py @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ This is the shared engine behind both the periodic Beat watchdog and the import ast import json from contextlib import contextmanager -from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta from uuid import uuid4 from celery import current_app, states @@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ def _reconcile_task_results( ) -> dict: from django_celery_results.models import TaskResult - cutoff = datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) - timedelta(minutes=grace_minutes) + cutoff = datetime.now(tz=UTC) - timedelta(minutes=grace_minutes) candidates = list( TaskResult.objects.filter(status__in=IN_FLIGHT_STATES, date_created__lt=cutoff) .exclude(worker__isnull=True) @@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ def _recover_task(task_result, max_attempts: int, window_hours: int) -> str: name = task_result.task_name args_repr = task_result.task_args kwargs_repr = task_result.task_kwargs - now = datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) + now = datetime.now(tz=UTC) # Drop any future broker redelivery of the stale message. revoke_task(task_result, terminate=False) diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/report.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/report.py index 36e47829c5..b40516dadf 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/report.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/report.py @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +import fcntl import gc import os import re @@ -7,9 +8,17 @@ from pathlib import Path from shutil import rmtree from uuid import UUID -import fcntl +from api.db_router import READ_REPLICA_ALIAS, MainRouter +from api.db_utils import rls_transaction +from api.models import Provider, Scan, ScanSummary, StateChoices, ThreatScoreSnapshot +from api.utils import initialize_prowler_provider from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger from config.django.base import DJANGO_TMP_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import ( + Compliance, + get_bulk_compliance_frameworks_universal, +) +from prowler.lib.outputs.finding import Finding as FindingOutput from tasks.jobs.export import _generate_compliance_output_directory, _upload_to_s3 from tasks.jobs.reports import ( FRAMEWORK_REGISTRY, @@ -25,16 +34,6 @@ from tasks.jobs.threatscore_utils import ( _get_compliance_check_ids, ) -from api.db_router import READ_REPLICA_ALIAS, MainRouter -from api.db_utils import rls_transaction -from api.models import Provider, Scan, ScanSummary, StateChoices, ThreatScoreSnapshot -from api.utils import initialize_prowler_provider -from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import ( - Compliance, - get_bulk_compliance_frameworks_universal, -) -from prowler.lib.outputs.finding import Finding as FindingOutput - logger = get_task_logger(__name__) STALE_TMP_OUTPUT_MAX_AGE_HOURS = 48 STALE_TMP_OUTPUT_MAX_DELETIONS_PER_RUN = 50 diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/base.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/base.py index 27d1defff4..f51319a846 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/base.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/base.py @@ -8,7 +8,16 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass, field from types import SimpleNamespace from typing import Any +from api.db_router import READ_REPLICA_ALIAS +from api.db_utils import rls_transaction +from api.models import Provider, StatusChoices +from api.utils import initialize_prowler_provider from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import ( + Compliance, + get_bulk_compliance_frameworks_universal, +) +from prowler.lib.outputs.finding import Finding as FindingOutput from reportlab.lib.enums import TA_CENTER from reportlab.lib.pagesizes import letter from reportlab.lib.styles import ParagraphStyle, getSampleStyleSheet @@ -23,16 +32,6 @@ from tasks.jobs.threatscore_utils import ( _load_findings_for_requirement_checks, ) -from api.db_router import READ_REPLICA_ALIAS -from api.db_utils import rls_transaction -from api.models import Provider, StatusChoices -from api.utils import initialize_prowler_provider -from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import ( - Compliance, - get_bulk_compliance_frameworks_universal, -) -from prowler.lib.outputs.finding import Finding as FindingOutput - from .components import ( ColumnConfig, create_data_table, diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/charts.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/charts.py index da3f5aae10..7e9ad7ef20 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/charts.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/charts.py @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import gc import io import math import time -from typing import Callable +from collections.abc import Callable import matplotlib from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/cis.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/cis.py index 0fbb416a17..8a1cfb6eba 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/cis.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/cis.py @@ -3,11 +3,10 @@ import re from collections import defaultdict from typing import Any +from api.models import StatusChoices from reportlab.lib.units import inch from reportlab.platypus import Image, PageBreak, Paragraph, Spacer, Table, TableStyle -from api.models import StatusChoices - from .base import ( BaseComplianceReportGenerator, ComplianceData, diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/components.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/components.py index 31b808ec5c..0c15acb4cb 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/components.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/components.py @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ +from collections.abc import Callable from dataclasses import dataclass -from typing import Any, Callable +from typing import Any from reportlab.lib import colors from reportlab.lib.styles import ParagraphStyle diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/csa.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/csa.py index c55ed198de..0a53c17cdf 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/csa.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/csa.py @@ -1,11 +1,10 @@ from collections import defaultdict +from api.models import StatusChoices from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger from reportlab.lib.units import inch from reportlab.platypus import Image, PageBreak, Paragraph, Spacer, Table, TableStyle -from api.models import StatusChoices - from .base import ( BaseComplianceReportGenerator, ComplianceData, diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/ens.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/ens.py index 617d4ea59f..44c874bfc1 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/ens.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/ens.py @@ -1,13 +1,12 @@ import os from collections import defaultdict +from api.models import StatusChoices from reportlab.lib import colors from reportlab.lib.styles import ParagraphStyle from reportlab.lib.units import inch from reportlab.platypus import Image, PageBreak, Paragraph, Spacer, Table, TableStyle -from api.models import StatusChoices - from .base import ( BaseComplianceReportGenerator, ComplianceData, diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/nis2.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/nis2.py index 4ac5fa3d15..ed936f9571 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/nis2.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/nis2.py @@ -1,11 +1,10 @@ import os from collections import defaultdict +from api.models import StatusChoices from reportlab.lib.units import inch from reportlab.platypus import Image, PageBreak, Paragraph, Spacer, Table, TableStyle -from api.models import StatusChoices - from .base import ( BaseComplianceReportGenerator, ComplianceData, diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/threatscore.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/threatscore.py index e23085b1c3..a71ebde536 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/threatscore.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/reports/threatscore.py @@ -1,12 +1,11 @@ import gc +from api.models import StatusChoices from reportlab.lib import colors from reportlab.lib.styles import ParagraphStyle from reportlab.lib.units import inch from reportlab.platypus import Image, PageBreak, Paragraph, Spacer, Table, TableStyle -from api.models import StatusChoices - from .base import ( BaseComplianceReportGenerator, ComplianceData, diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/scan.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/scan.py index ded3ee57dc..d69e0c8941 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/scan.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/scan.py @@ -5,35 +5,11 @@ import re import time import uuid from collections import defaultdict -from datetime import datetime, timezone +from collections.abc import Iterable +from datetime import UTC, datetime from typing import Any import sentry_sdk -from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger -from config.django.base import DJANGO_FINDINGS_BATCH_SIZE -from config.env import env -from config.settings.celery import CELERY_DEADLOCK_ATTEMPTS -from django.db import IntegrityError, OperationalError -from django.db.models import ( - Case, - Count, - Exists, - IntegerField, - Max, - Min, - OuterRef, - Prefetch, - Q, - Sum, - When, -) -from django.utils import timezone as django_timezone -from tasks.jobs.queries import ( - COMPLIANCE_UPSERT_PROVIDER_SCORE_SQL, - COMPLIANCE_UPSERT_TENANT_SUMMARY_SQL, -) -from tasks.utils import CustomEncoder, batched - from api.compliance import PROWLER_COMPLIANCE_OVERVIEW_TEMPLATE from api.constants import SEVERITY_ORDER from api.db_router import READ_REPLICA_ALIAS, MainRouter @@ -43,7 +19,7 @@ from api.db_utils import ( psycopg_connection, rls_transaction, ) -from api.exceptions import ProviderConnectionError +from api.exceptions import ProviderConnectionError, ProviderDeletedException from api.models import ( AttackSurfaceOverview, ComplianceOverviewSummary, @@ -68,9 +44,32 @@ from api.models import ( from api.models import StatusChoices as FindingStatus from api.utils import initialize_prowler_provider, return_prowler_provider from api.v1.serializers import ScanTaskSerializer +from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger +from config.django.base import DJANGO_FINDINGS_BATCH_SIZE +from config.env import env +from config.settings.celery import CELERY_DEADLOCK_ATTEMPTS +from django.db import DatabaseError, IntegrityError, OperationalError, transaction +from django.db.models import ( + Case, + Count, + Exists, + IntegerField, + Max, + Min, + OuterRef, + Q, + Sum, + When, +) +from django.utils import timezone as django_timezone from prowler.lib.check.models import CheckMetadata from prowler.lib.outputs.finding import Finding as ProwlerFinding from prowler.lib.scan.scan import Scan as ProwlerScan +from tasks.jobs.queries import ( + COMPLIANCE_UPSERT_PROVIDER_SCORE_SQL, + COMPLIANCE_UPSERT_TENANT_SUMMARY_SQL, +) +from tasks.utils import CustomEncoder, batched logger = get_task_logger(__name__) @@ -118,6 +117,20 @@ ATTACK_SURFACE_PROVIDER_COMPATIBILITY = { _ATTACK_SURFACE_MAPPING_CACHE: dict[str, dict] = {} +def _save_scan_instance( + scan_instance: Scan, provider_id: str, update_fields: list[str] +) -> None: + try: + with transaction.atomic(): # Savepoint for not killing the `rls_transaction` + scan_instance.save(update_fields=update_fields) + except DatabaseError: + if Scan.objects.filter(pk=scan_instance.id).exists(): + raise + raise ProviderDeletedException( + f"Provider '{provider_id}' for scan '{scan_instance.id}' was deleted during the scan" + ) from None + + def aggregate_category_counts( categories: list[str], severity: str, @@ -311,7 +324,7 @@ def _copy_compliance_requirement_rows( csv_buffer = io.StringIO() writer = csv.writer(csv_buffer) - datetime_now = datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) + datetime_now = datetime.now(tz=UTC) for row in rows: writer.writerow( [ @@ -357,68 +370,71 @@ def _copy_compliance_requirement_rows( def _persist_compliance_requirement_rows( - tenant_id: str, rows: list[dict[str, Any]], batch_size: int = 10000 -) -> None: + tenant_id: str, rows: Iterable[dict[str, Any]], batch_size: int = 10000 +) -> int: """Persist compliance requirement rows using batched COPY with ORM fallback. - Splits large row sets into batches to reduce lock duration and improve concurrency. + ``rows`` is consumed lazily in batches, so peak memory stays at ~``batch_size`` + rows instead of the full set. A batch that fails COPY falls back to an ORM + ``bulk_create`` of just that batch. Args: tenant_id: Target tenant UUID. - rows: Precomputed row dictionaries that reflect the compliance - overview state for a scan. + rows: Iterable of row dictionaries reflecting the compliance overview + state for a scan. batch_size: Number of rows per COPY batch (default: 10000). + + Returns: + int: total number of rows persisted. """ - if not rows: - return - - total_rows = len(rows) - total_batches = (total_rows + batch_size - 1) // batch_size - - try: - # Process rows in batches to reduce lock duration - for batch_num in range(total_batches): - start_idx = batch_num * batch_size - end_idx = min(start_idx + batch_size, total_rows) - batch = rows[start_idx:end_idx] + total_rows = 0 + batch_num = 0 + for batch, _is_last in batched(rows, batch_size): + if not batch: + continue + batch_num += 1 + try: _copy_compliance_requirement_rows(tenant_id, batch) + except Exception as error: + logger.exception( + f"COPY bulk insert for compliance requirements batch {batch_num} " + "failed; falling back to ORM bulk_create for this batch", + exc_info=error, + ) + fallback_objects = [ + ComplianceRequirementOverview( + id=row["id"], + tenant_id=row["tenant_id"], + inserted_at=row["inserted_at"], + compliance_id=row["compliance_id"], + framework=row["framework"], + version=row["version"], + description=row["description"], + region=row["region"], + requirement_id=row["requirement_id"], + requirement_status=row["requirement_status"], + passed_checks=row["passed_checks"], + failed_checks=row["failed_checks"], + total_checks=row["total_checks"], + passed_findings=row.get("passed_findings", 0), + total_findings=row.get("total_findings", 0), + scan_id=row["scan_id"], + ) + for row in batch + ] + with rls_transaction(tenant_id): + ComplianceRequirementOverview.objects.bulk_create( + fallback_objects, batch_size=500 + ) - logger.info( - f"Compliance COPY batch {batch_num + 1}/{total_batches}: " - f"inserted {len(batch)} rows ({start_idx + len(batch)}/{total_rows} total)" - ) - except Exception as error: - logger.exception( - "COPY bulk insert for compliance requirements failed; falling back to ORM bulk_create", - exc_info=error, + total_rows += len(batch) + logger.info( + f"Compliance COPY batch {batch_num}: inserted {len(batch)} rows " + f"({total_rows} total)" ) - # Fallback: use ORM bulk_create for all remaining rows - fallback_objects = [ - ComplianceRequirementOverview( - id=row["id"], - tenant_id=row["tenant_id"], - inserted_at=row["inserted_at"], - compliance_id=row["compliance_id"], - framework=row["framework"], - version=row["version"], - description=row["description"], - region=row["region"], - requirement_id=row["requirement_id"], - requirement_status=row["requirement_status"], - passed_checks=row["passed_checks"], - failed_checks=row["failed_checks"], - total_checks=row["total_checks"], - passed_findings=row.get("passed_findings", 0), - total_findings=row.get("total_findings", 0), - scan_id=row["scan_id"], - ) - for row in rows - ] - with rls_transaction(tenant_id): - ComplianceRequirementOverview.objects.bulk_create( - fallback_objects, batch_size=500 - ) + + return total_rows def _create_compliance_summaries( @@ -780,7 +796,7 @@ def _process_finding_micro_batch( delta = _create_finding_delta(last_status, status) if not last_first_seen_at: - last_first_seen_at = datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) + last_first_seen_at = datetime.now(tz=UTC) # Determine if finding should be muted and why # Priority: mutelist processor (highest) > manual mute rules @@ -811,7 +827,7 @@ def _process_finding_micro_batch( scan=scan_instance, first_seen_at=last_first_seen_at, muted=is_muted, - muted_at=datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) if is_muted else None, + muted_at=datetime.now(tz=UTC) if is_muted else None, muted_reason=muted_reason, compliance=finding.compliance, categories=check_metadata.get("categories", []) or [], @@ -938,7 +954,7 @@ def _process_finding_micro_batch( set(dirty_resources.keys()) | resources_with_new_tag_mappings ) if all_resource_uids_to_touch: - now_utc = datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) + now_utc = datetime.now(tz=UTC) resources_to_bulk_update = [] for uid in all_resource_uids_to_touch: # Use the instance from dirty_resources if present (has mutated @@ -1027,13 +1043,18 @@ def perform_prowler_scan( group_resources_cache: dict[str, set] = {} start_time = time.time() exc = None + skip_final_scan_update = False with rls_transaction(tenant_id): provider_instance = Provider.objects.get(pk=provider_id) scan_instance = Scan.objects.get(pk=scan_id) scan_instance.state = StateChoices.EXECUTING - scan_instance.started_at = datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) - scan_instance.save(update_fields=["state", "started_at", "updated_at"]) + scan_instance.started_at = datetime.now(tz=UTC) + _save_scan_instance( + scan_instance, + provider_id, + ["state", "started_at", "updated_at"], + ) # Find the mutelist processor if it exists with rls_transaction(tenant_id, using=READ_REPLICA_ALIAS): @@ -1075,9 +1096,7 @@ def perform_prowler_scan( f"Provider {provider_instance.provider} is not connected: {e}" ) finally: - provider_instance.connection_last_checked_at = datetime.now( - tz=timezone.utc - ) + provider_instance.connection_last_checked_at = datetime.now(tz=UTC) provider_instance.save( update_fields=[ "connected", @@ -1101,7 +1120,7 @@ def perform_prowler_scan( # Throttle scan_instance progress writes to avoid hammering the writer: # only persist when progress moves by at least `PROGRESS_THROTTLE_DELTA` - # OR `PROGRESS_THROTTLE_SECONDS` have elapsed. The final progress (1.0) + # OR `PROGRESS_THROTTLE_SECONDS` have elapsed. The final progress (100) # always persists in the `finally` block below. last_persisted_progress = -1.0 last_persisted_progress_at = 0.0 @@ -1143,7 +1162,11 @@ def perform_prowler_scan( ): with rls_transaction(tenant_id): scan_instance.progress = progress - scan_instance.save(update_fields=["progress", "updated_at"]) + _save_scan_instance( + scan_instance, + provider_id, + ["progress", "updated_at"], + ) last_persisted_progress = progress last_persisted_progress_at = now @@ -1170,26 +1193,39 @@ def perform_prowler_scan( batch_size=SCAN_DB_BATCH_SIZE, ) + except ProviderDeletedException as e: + logger.warning(str(e)) + exception = e + skip_final_scan_update = True except Exception as e: logger.error(f"Error performing scan {scan_id}: {e}") exception = e scan_instance.state = StateChoices.FAILED finally: - with rls_transaction(tenant_id): - scan_instance.duration = time.time() - start_time - scan_instance.completed_at = datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) - scan_instance.unique_resource_count = len(unique_resources) - scan_instance.save( - update_fields=[ - "state", - "duration", - "completed_at", - "unique_resource_count", - "progress", - "updated_at", - ] - ) + if not skip_final_scan_update: + try: + with rls_transaction(tenant_id): + scan_instance.duration = time.time() - start_time + scan_instance.completed_at = datetime.now(tz=UTC) + scan_instance.unique_resource_count = len(unique_resources) + if exception is None: + scan_instance.progress = 100 + _save_scan_instance( + scan_instance, + provider_id, + [ + "state", + "duration", + "completed_at", + "unique_resource_count", + "progress", + "updated_at", + ], + ) + except ProviderDeletedException as e: + logger.warning(str(e)) + exception = e if exception is not None: raise exception @@ -1445,9 +1481,13 @@ def _aggregate_findings_by_region( tenant_id: str, scan_id: str, modeled_threatscore_compliance_id: str ) -> tuple[dict, dict]: """ - Aggregate findings by region using optimized ORM queries. + Aggregate findings by region using streaming, column-scoped ORM reads. - Replaces nested Python loops with efficient queries and aggregation. + Reads only the consumed columns as tuples via ``values_list`` and streams + them with ``.iterator()``, using the denormalized ``resource_regions`` array + instead of ``prefetch_related("resources")``. ``resource_regions`` mirrors the + regions of a finding's related resources, so it yields the same per-region + tally without joining the resource table. Args: tenant_id: Tenant UUID @@ -1459,12 +1499,12 @@ def _aggregate_findings_by_region( - check_status_by_region: {region: {check_id: status}} - findings_count_by_compliance: {region: {normalized_id: {requirement_id: {total, pass}}}} """ - check_status_by_region = {} - findings_count_by_compliance = {} + check_status_by_region: dict = {} + findings_count_by_compliance: dict = {} + + normalized_id = re.sub(r"[^a-z0-9]", "", modeled_threatscore_compliance_id.lower()) with rls_transaction(tenant_id, using=READ_REPLICA_ALIAS): - # Fetch only PASS/FAIL findings (optimized query reduces data transfer) - # Other statuses are not needed for check_status or ThreatScore calculation findings = ( Finding.all_objects.filter( tenant_id=tenant_id, @@ -1472,42 +1512,28 @@ def _aggregate_findings_by_region( muted=False, status__in=["PASS", "FAIL"], ) - .only("id", "check_id", "status", "compliance") - .prefetch_related( - Prefetch( - "resources", - queryset=Resource.objects.only("id", "region"), - to_attr="small_resources", - ) + .values_list("check_id", "status", "resource_regions", "compliance") + .iterator(chunk_size=DJANGO_FINDINGS_BATCH_SIZE) + ) + + for check_id, status, resource_regions, compliance in findings: + threatscore_requirements = (compliance or {}).get( + modeled_threatscore_compliance_id ) - ) - # Process findings in a single pass (more efficient than original nested loops) - normalized_id = re.sub( - r"[^a-z0-9]", "", modeled_threatscore_compliance_id.lower() - ) - - for finding in findings: - status = finding.status - - for resource in finding.small_resources: - region = resource.region - - # Aggregate check status by region - current_status = check_status_by_region.setdefault(region, {}) + for region in resource_regions or (): # Priority: FAIL > any other status - if current_status.get(finding.check_id) != "FAIL": - current_status[finding.check_id] = status + current_status = check_status_by_region.setdefault(region, {}) + if current_status.get(check_id) != "FAIL": + current_status[check_id] = status # Aggregate ThreatScore compliance counts - if modeled_threatscore_compliance_id in (finding.compliance or {}): + if threatscore_requirements: compliance_key = findings_count_by_compliance.setdefault( region, {} ).setdefault(normalized_id, {}) - for requirement_id in finding.compliance[ - modeled_threatscore_compliance_id - ]: + for requirement_id in threatscore_requirements: requirement_stats = compliance_key.setdefault( requirement_id, {"total": 0, "pass": 0} ) @@ -1554,8 +1580,8 @@ def create_compliance_requirements(tenant_id: str, scan_id: str): (compliance_id, requirement_id) ) - compliance_requirement_rows: list[dict[str, Any]] = [] regions = [] + requirements_created = 0 requirement_statuses = defaultdict( lambda: {"fail_count": 0, "pass_count": 0, "total_count": 0} ) @@ -1595,44 +1621,93 @@ def create_compliance_requirements(tenant_id: str, scan_id: str): else: requirement_stats["failed_checks"] += 1 - # Prepare compliance requirement rows and compute summaries in single pass - utc_datetime_now = datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) - - # Pre-compute shared strings (optimization: reduces string conversions) + utc_datetime_now = datetime.now(tz=UTC) tenant_id_str = str(tenant_id) scan_id_str = str(scan_instance.id) - for region in regions: - region_stats = region_requirement_stats.get(region, {}) - for compliance_id, compliance in compliance_template.items(): - modeled_compliance_id = _normalized_compliance_key( - compliance["framework"], compliance["version"] + # Per-framework constants that don't depend on the region. + compliance_plan = [] + for compliance_id, compliance in compliance_template.items(): + modeled_compliance_id = _normalized_compliance_key( + compliance["framework"], compliance["version"] + ) + framework = compliance["framework"] + version = compliance["version"] or "" + requirements = [ + ( + requirement_id, + requirement.get("description") or "", + len(requirement["checks"]), ) - compliance_stats = region_stats.get(compliance_id, {}) - # Create an overview record for each requirement within each compliance framework for requirement_id, requirement in compliance[ "requirements" - ].items(): - stats = compliance_stats.get(requirement_id) - passed_checks = stats["passed_checks"] if stats else 0 - failed_checks = stats["failed_checks"] if stats else 0 - total_checks = len(requirement["checks"]) - if total_checks == 0: - requirement_status = "MANUAL" - elif failed_checks > 0: - requirement_status = "FAIL" - else: - requirement_status = "PASS" + ].items() + ] + compliance_plan.append( + ( + compliance_id, + framework, + version, + modeled_compliance_id, + requirements, + ) + ) - compliance_requirement_rows.append( - { + # Yield rows lazily (consumed batch-by-batch by COPY) so peak memory + # stays bounded; tally requirement_statuses in the same pass. + def _iter_compliance_requirement_rows(): + for region in regions: + region_stats = region_requirement_stats.get(region, {}) + region_findings = findings_count_by_compliance.get(region, {}) + for ( + compliance_id, + framework, + version, + modeled_compliance_id, + requirements, + ) in compliance_plan: + compliance_stats = region_stats.get(compliance_id, {}) + compliance_findings = region_findings.get( + modeled_compliance_id, {} + ) + for requirement_id, description, total_checks in requirements: + stats = compliance_stats.get(requirement_id) + if stats: + passed_checks = stats["passed_checks"] + failed_checks = stats["failed_checks"] + else: + passed_checks = 0 + failed_checks = 0 + if total_checks == 0: + requirement_status = "MANUAL" + elif failed_checks > 0: + requirement_status = "FAIL" + else: + requirement_status = "PASS" + + finding_counts = compliance_findings.get(requirement_id) + if finding_counts: + passed_findings = finding_counts.get("pass", 0) + total_findings = finding_counts.get("total", 0) + else: + passed_findings = 0 + total_findings = 0 + + key = (compliance_id, requirement_id) + requirement_statuses[key]["total_count"] += 1 + if requirement_status == "FAIL": + requirement_statuses[key]["fail_count"] += 1 + elif requirement_status == "PASS": + requirement_statuses[key]["pass_count"] += 1 + + yield { "id": uuid.uuid4(), "tenant_id": tenant_id_str, "inserted_at": utc_datetime_now, "compliance_id": compliance_id, - "framework": compliance["framework"], - "version": compliance["version"] or "", - "description": requirement.get("description") or "", + "framework": framework, + "version": version, + "description": description, "region": region, "requirement_id": requirement_id, "requirement_status": requirement_status, @@ -1640,41 +1715,23 @@ def create_compliance_requirements(tenant_id: str, scan_id: str): "failed_checks": failed_checks, "total_checks": total_checks, "scan_id": scan_id_str, - "passed_findings": findings_count_by_compliance.get( - region, {} - ) - .get(modeled_compliance_id, {}) - .get(requirement_id, {}) - .get("pass", 0), - "total_findings": findings_count_by_compliance.get( - region, {} - ) - .get(modeled_compliance_id, {}) - .get(requirement_id, {}) - .get("total", 0), + "passed_findings": passed_findings, + "total_findings": total_findings, } - ) - # Update summary tracking (single-pass optimization) - key = (compliance_id, requirement_id) - requirement_statuses[key]["total_count"] += 1 - if requirement_status == "FAIL": - requirement_statuses[key]["fail_count"] += 1 - elif requirement_status == "PASS": - requirement_statuses[key]["pass_count"] += 1 - - # Idempotent re-run: COPY can't ON CONFLICT, so clear this scan's rows first. + # Idempotent re-run: clear this scan's rows before re-inserting. with rls_transaction(tenant_id): ComplianceRequirementOverview.objects.filter(scan_id=scan_id).delete() - # Bulk create requirement records using PostgreSQL COPY - _persist_compliance_requirement_rows(tenant_id, compliance_requirement_rows) + requirements_created = _persist_compliance_requirement_rows( + tenant_id, _iter_compliance_requirement_rows() + ) # Create pre-aggregated summaries for fast compliance overview lookups _create_compliance_summaries(tenant_id, scan_id, requirement_statuses) return { - "requirements_created": len(compliance_requirement_rows), + "requirements_created": requirements_created, "regions_processed": list(regions), "compliance_frameworks": ( list(compliance_template.keys()) if regions else [] @@ -2049,9 +2106,7 @@ def aggregate_finding_group_summaries(tenant_id: str, scan_id: str): summary_timestamp = scan.completed_at if django_timezone.is_naive(summary_timestamp): - summary_timestamp = django_timezone.make_aware( - summary_timestamp, timezone.utc - ) + summary_timestamp = django_timezone.make_aware(summary_timestamp, UTC) summary_timestamp = summary_timestamp.replace( hour=0, minute=0, second=0, microsecond=0 ) diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/threatscore.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/threatscore.py index a9a7516e55..663c179ea2 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/threatscore.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/threatscore.py @@ -1,14 +1,13 @@ +from api.db_router import READ_REPLICA_ALIAS +from api.db_utils import rls_transaction +from api.models import Provider, StatusChoices from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from tasks.jobs.threatscore_utils import ( _aggregate_requirement_statistics_from_database, _calculate_requirements_data_from_statistics, ) -from api.db_router import READ_REPLICA_ALIAS -from api.db_utils import rls_transaction -from api.models import Provider, StatusChoices -from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance - logger = get_task_logger(__name__) diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/threatscore_utils.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/threatscore_utils.py index 35fb0faeb3..2e2fb87ba5 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/threatscore_utils.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/threatscore_utils.py @@ -1,13 +1,12 @@ +from api.db_router import READ_REPLICA_ALIAS +from api.db_utils import rls_transaction +from api.models import Finding, Scan, StatusChoices from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger from config.django.base import DJANGO_FINDINGS_BATCH_SIZE from django.db.models import Count, F, Q, Window from django.db.models.functions import RowNumber -from tasks.jobs.reports.config import MAX_FINDINGS_PER_CHECK - -from api.db_router import READ_REPLICA_ALIAS -from api.db_utils import rls_transaction -from api.models import Finding, Scan, StatusChoices from prowler.lib.outputs.finding import Finding as FindingOutput +from tasks.jobs.reports.config import MAX_FINDINGS_PER_CHECK logger = get_task_logger(__name__) diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/tasks.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/tasks.py index e617339973..e7bb0982cd 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/tasks.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/tasks.py @@ -1,13 +1,29 @@ import os -from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta from pathlib import Path from shutil import rmtree +from api.compliance import ( + get_compliance_frameworks, + get_prowler_provider_compliance, +) +from api.db_router import READ_REPLICA_ALIAS +from api.db_utils import delete_related_daily_task, rls_transaction +from api.decorators import handle_provider_deletion, set_tenant +from api.models import Finding, Integration, Provider, Scan, ScanSummary, StateChoices +from api.utils import initialize_prowler_provider +from api.v1.serializers import ScanTaskSerializer from celery import chain, group, shared_task from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger from config.celery import RLSTask from config.django.base import DJANGO_FINDINGS_BATCH_SIZE, DJANGO_TMP_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY from django_celery_beat.models import PeriodicTask +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance +from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance import ( + process_universal_compliance_frameworks, +) +from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.generic.generic import GenericCompliance +from prowler.lib.outputs.finding import Finding as FindingOutput from tasks.jobs.attack_paths import ( attack_paths_scan, can_provider_run_attack_paths_scan, @@ -15,13 +31,13 @@ from tasks.jobs.attack_paths import ( from tasks.jobs.attack_paths import db_utils as attack_paths_db_utils from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.cleanup import cleanup_stale_attack_paths_scans from tasks.jobs.backfill import ( + aggregate_scan_category_summaries, + aggregate_scan_resource_group_summaries, backfill_compliance_summaries, backfill_daily_severity_summaries, backfill_finding_group_summaries, backfill_provider_compliance_scores, backfill_resource_scan_summaries, - aggregate_scan_category_summaries, - aggregate_scan_resource_group_summaries, ) from tasks.jobs.connection import ( check_integration_connection, @@ -68,24 +84,6 @@ from tasks.utils import ( get_next_execution_datetime, ) -from api.compliance import ( - get_compliance_frameworks, - get_prowler_provider_compliance, -) -from api.db_router import READ_REPLICA_ALIAS -from api.db_utils import delete_related_daily_task, rls_transaction -from api.decorators import handle_provider_deletion, set_tenant -from api.models import Finding, Integration, Provider, Scan, ScanSummary, StateChoices -from api.utils import initialize_prowler_provider -from api.v1.serializers import ScanTaskSerializer -from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance -from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance import ( - process_universal_compliance_frameworks, -) -from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.generic.generic import GenericCompliance -from prowler.lib.outputs.finding import Finding as FindingOutput - - logger = get_task_logger(__name__) @@ -407,7 +405,7 @@ def perform_scheduled_scan_task(self, tenant_id: str, provider_id: str): ) finally: with rls_transaction(tenant_id): - now = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + now = datetime.now(UTC) if next_scan_datetime <= now: interval_delta = timedelta(**{interval.period: interval.every}) while next_scan_datetime <= now: @@ -560,7 +558,7 @@ def generate_outputs_task(scan_id: str, provider_id: str, tenant_id: str): # Per-framework exporters in `COMPLIANCE_CLASS_MAP` consume the legacy bulk. frameworks_bulk = Compliance.get_bulk(provider_type) - # Universal-only frameworks (top-level JSONs like `dora.json`) are emitted + # Universal-only frameworks (top-level JSONs like `dora_2022_2554.json`) are emitted # via `process_universal_compliance_frameworks` below. universal_bulk = get_prowler_provider_compliance(provider_type) universal_only_names = { @@ -650,7 +648,7 @@ def generate_outputs_task(scan_id: str, provider_id: str, tenant_id: str): writer.batch_write_data_to_file(**extra) writer._data.clear() - # Universal-only frameworks (e.g. `dora.json`). + # Universal-only frameworks (e.g. `dora_2022_2554.json`). if universal_only_names: process_universal_compliance_frameworks( input_compliance_frameworks=universal_only_names, diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_attack_paths_provider_config.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_attack_paths_provider_config.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..41ec2847d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_attack_paths_provider_config.py @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.provider_config import AWS_NORMALIZED_LISTS +from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync import _build_catalog_index, _node_to_sync_dict + + +def test_aws_vpc_endpoint_id_lists_are_normalized(): + catalog = _build_catalog_index(AWS_NORMALIZED_LISTS) + record = { + "element_id": "node-1", + "labels": ["AWSVpcEndpoint"], + "props": { + "id": "vpce-123", + "route_table_ids": ["rtb-1"], + "network_interface_ids": ["eni-1"], + "subnet_ids": ["subnet-1"], + }, + } + + _, parent, children, rels = _node_to_sync_dict(record, "provider-id", catalog) + + assert parent["props"] == {"id": "vpce-123"} + assert {child["_child_label"] for child in children} == { + "AWSVpcEndpointRouteTableIdsItem", + "AWSVpcEndpointNetworkInterfaceIdsItem", + "AWSVpcEndpointSubnetIdsItem", + } + assert {rel["rel_type"] for rel in rels} == { + "HAS_ROUTE_TABLE_IDS", + "HAS_NETWORK_INTERFACE_IDS", + "HAS_SUBNET_IDS", + } diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_attack_paths_scan.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_attack_paths_scan.py index 918e54ff6c..01c50c9522 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_attack_paths_scan.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_attack_paths_scan.py @@ -1,16 +1,9 @@ from contextlib import nullcontext -from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta from types import SimpleNamespace from unittest.mock import MagicMock, call, patch import pytest -from django_celery_results.models import TaskResult -from tasks.jobs.attack_paths import findings as findings_module -from tasks.jobs.attack_paths import indexes as indexes_module -from tasks.jobs.attack_paths import internet as internet_module -from tasks.jobs.attack_paths import sync as sync_module -from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan import run as attack_paths_run - from api.models import ( AttackPathsScan, Finding, @@ -22,17 +15,39 @@ from api.models import ( StatusChoices, Task, ) +from django_celery_results.models import TaskResult from prowler.lib.check.models import Severity +from tasks.jobs.attack_paths import findings as findings_module +from tasks.jobs.attack_paths import indexes as indexes_module +from tasks.jobs.attack_paths import internet as internet_module +from tasks.jobs.attack_paths import sync as sync_module +from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan import run as attack_paths_run + +SYNC_RESULT_EMPTY = { + "nodes": 0, + "child_nodes": 0, + "relationships": 0, + "structural_relationships": 0, + "item_relationships": 0, +} @pytest.mark.django_db class TestAttackPathsRun: + @pytest.fixture(autouse=True) + def mock_graph_database_preflight(self): + with patch( + "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.verify_scan_databases_available" + ) as mock_preflight: + yield mock_preflight + # Patching with decorators as we got a `SyntaxError: too many statically nested blocks` error if we use context managers @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.drop_database") @patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.utils.call_within_event_loop", side_effect=lambda fn, *a, **kw: fn(*a, **kw), ) + @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.db_utils.set_scan_migrated") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.db_utils.set_graph_data_ready") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.db_utils.set_provider_graph_data_ready") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.db_utils.finish_attack_paths_scan") @@ -40,7 +55,7 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.db_utils.starting_attack_paths_scan") @patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.sync.sync_graph", - return_value={"nodes": 0, "relationships": 0}, + return_value=SYNC_RESULT_EMPTY, ) @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.drop_subgraph", return_value=0) @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.indexes.create_sync_indexes") @@ -49,11 +64,11 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.indexes.create_findings_indexes") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.cartography_ontology.run") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.cartography_analysis.run") - @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.cartography_create_indexes.run") + @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.indexes.cartography_create_indexes.run") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.clear_cache") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.create_database") @patch( - "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.get_uri", + "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.get_ingest_uri", return_value="bolt://neo4j", ) @patch( @@ -67,7 +82,7 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: def test_run_success_flow( self, mock_init_provider, - mock_get_uri, + mock_get_ingest_uri, mock_create_db, mock_clear_cache, mock_cartography_indexes, @@ -84,6 +99,7 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: mock_finish, mock_set_provider_graph_data_ready, mock_set_graph_data_ready, + mock_set_scan_migrated, mock_event_loop, mock_drop_db, tenants_fixture, @@ -160,6 +176,7 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: target_database="tenant-db", tenant_id=str(provider.tenant_id), provider_id=str(provider.id), + provider_type="aws", ) mock_get_ingestion.assert_called_once_with(provider.provider) mock_event_loop.assert_called_once() @@ -173,9 +190,70 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: attack_paths_scan, StateChoices.COMPLETED, ingestion_result ) mock_set_provider_graph_data_ready.assert_called_once_with( - attack_paths_scan, False + attack_paths_scan, False, "neo4j" ) mock_set_graph_data_ready.assert_called_once_with(attack_paths_scan, True) + # is_migrated is flipped to True only after the sync succeeds, so reads + # don't switch to the new catalog/sink before the graph is live. + mock_set_scan_migrated.assert_called_once_with(attack_paths_scan, True, "neo4j") + + def test_run_preflight_failure_does_not_start_scan( + self, + mock_graph_database_preflight, + tenants_fixture, + providers_fixture, + scans_fixture, + ): + tenant = tenants_fixture[0] + provider = providers_fixture[0] + provider.provider = Provider.ProviderChoices.AWS + provider.save() + scan = scans_fixture[0] + scan.provider = provider + scan.save() + + attack_paths_scan = AttackPathsScan.objects.create( + tenant_id=tenant.id, + provider=provider, + scan=scan, + state=StateChoices.SCHEDULED, + ) + mock_graph_database_preflight.side_effect = RuntimeError("graph unavailable") + + with ( + patch( + "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.rls_transaction", + new=lambda *args, **kwargs: nullcontext(), + ), + patch( + "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.initialize_prowler_provider", + return_value=MagicMock(_enabled_regions=["us-east-1"]), + ), + patch( + "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.get_ingest_uri", + return_value="bolt://neo4j", + ), + patch( + "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.db_utils.retrieve_attack_paths_scan", + return_value=attack_paths_scan, + ), + patch( + "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.get_cartography_ingestion_function", + return_value=MagicMock(return_value={}), + ), + patch( + "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.db_utils.starting_attack_paths_scan" + ) as mock_starting, + patch( + "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.create_database" + ) as mock_create_db, + ): + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="graph unavailable"): + attack_paths_run(str(tenant.id), str(scan.id), "task-123") + + mock_graph_database_preflight.assert_called_once_with() + mock_starting.assert_not_called() + mock_create_db.assert_not_called() @patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.utils.stringify_exception", @@ -195,13 +273,13 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.internet.analysis") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.indexes.create_findings_indexes") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.cartography_analysis.run") - @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.cartography_create_indexes.run") + @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.indexes.cartography_create_indexes.run") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.create_database") @patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.get_database_name", return_value="db-scan-id", ) - @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.get_uri") + @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.get_ingest_uri") @patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.initialize_prowler_provider", return_value=MagicMock(_enabled_regions=["us-east-1"]), @@ -213,7 +291,7 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: def test_run_failure_marks_scan_failed( self, mock_init_provider, - mock_get_uri, + mock_get_ingest_uri, mock_get_db_name, mock_create_db, mock_cartography_indexes, @@ -294,13 +372,13 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.internet.analysis") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.indexes.create_findings_indexes") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.cartography_analysis.run") - @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.cartography_create_indexes.run") + @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.indexes.cartography_create_indexes.run") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.create_database") @patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.get_database_name", return_value="db-scan-id", ) - @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.get_uri") + @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.get_ingest_uri") @patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.initialize_prowler_provider", return_value=MagicMock(_enabled_regions=["us-east-1"]), @@ -312,7 +390,7 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: def test_failure_before_gate_does_not_flip_graph_data_ready_true( self, mock_init_provider, - mock_get_uri, + mock_get_ingest_uri, mock_get_db_name, mock_create_db, mock_cartography_indexes, @@ -397,13 +475,13 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.internet.analysis") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.indexes.create_findings_indexes") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.cartography_analysis.run") - @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.cartography_create_indexes.run") + @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.indexes.cartography_create_indexes.run") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.create_database") @patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.get_database_name", return_value="db-scan-id", ) - @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.get_uri") + @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.get_ingest_uri") @patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.initialize_prowler_provider", return_value=MagicMock(_enabled_regions=["us-east-1"]), @@ -415,7 +493,7 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: def test_run_failure_marks_scan_failed_even_when_drop_database_fails( self, mock_init_provider, - mock_get_uri, + mock_get_ingest_uri, mock_get_db_name, mock_create_db, mock_cartography_indexes, @@ -494,7 +572,7 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.db_utils.starting_attack_paths_scan") @patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.sync.sync_graph", - return_value={"nodes": 0, "relationships": 0}, + return_value=SYNC_RESULT_EMPTY, ) @patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.drop_subgraph", @@ -506,11 +584,11 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.indexes.create_findings_indexes") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.cartography_ontology.run") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.cartography_analysis.run") - @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.cartography_create_indexes.run") + @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.indexes.cartography_create_indexes.run") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.clear_cache") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.create_database") @patch( - "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.get_uri", + "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.get_ingest_uri", return_value="bolt://neo4j", ) @patch( @@ -524,7 +602,7 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: def test_failure_after_gate_before_drop_restores_graph_data_ready( self, mock_init_provider, - mock_get_uri, + mock_get_ingest_uri, mock_create_db, mock_clear_cache, mock_cartography_indexes, @@ -590,8 +668,8 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: attack_paths_run(str(tenant.id), str(scan.id), "task-456") assert mock_set_provider_graph_data_ready.call_args_list == [ - call(attack_paths_scan, False), - call(attack_paths_scan, True), + call(attack_paths_scan, False, "neo4j"), + call(attack_paths_scan, True, "neo4j"), ] @patch( @@ -619,11 +697,11 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.indexes.create_findings_indexes") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.cartography_ontology.run") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.cartography_analysis.run") - @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.cartography_create_indexes.run") + @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.indexes.cartography_create_indexes.run") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.clear_cache") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.create_database") @patch( - "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.get_uri", + "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.get_ingest_uri", return_value="bolt://neo4j", ) @patch( @@ -637,7 +715,7 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: def test_failure_after_drop_before_sync_leaves_graph_data_ready_false( self, mock_init_provider, - mock_get_uri, + mock_get_ingest_uri, mock_create_db, mock_clear_cache, mock_cartography_indexes, @@ -704,7 +782,7 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: # Only called with False (gate), never with True (no recovery for partial data) mock_set_provider_graph_data_ready.assert_called_once_with( - attack_paths_scan, False + attack_paths_scan, False, "neo4j" ) @patch( @@ -717,6 +795,7 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: ) @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.drop_database") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.db_utils.finish_attack_paths_scan") + @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.db_utils.set_scan_migrated") @patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.db_utils.set_graph_data_ready", side_effect=[RuntimeError("flag failed"), None], @@ -726,7 +805,7 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.db_utils.starting_attack_paths_scan") @patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.sync.sync_graph", - return_value={"nodes": 0, "relationships": 0}, + return_value=SYNC_RESULT_EMPTY, ) @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.drop_subgraph") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.indexes.create_sync_indexes") @@ -735,11 +814,11 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.indexes.create_findings_indexes") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.cartography_ontology.run") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.cartography_analysis.run") - @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.cartography_create_indexes.run") + @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.indexes.cartography_create_indexes.run") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.clear_cache") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.create_database") @patch( - "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.get_uri", + "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.get_ingest_uri", return_value="bolt://neo4j", ) @patch( @@ -753,7 +832,7 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: def test_failure_after_sync_restores_graph_data_ready( self, mock_init_provider, - mock_get_uri, + mock_get_ingest_uri, mock_create_db, mock_clear_cache, mock_cartography_indexes, @@ -769,6 +848,7 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: mock_update_progress, mock_set_provider_graph_data_ready, mock_set_graph_data_ready, + mock_set_scan_migrated, mock_finish, mock_drop_db, mock_event_loop, @@ -825,8 +905,11 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: ] # set_provider_graph_data_ready only called once with False (the gate) mock_set_provider_graph_data_ready.assert_called_once_with( - attack_paths_scan, False + attack_paths_scan, False, "neo4j" ) + # is_migrated is flipped once after the sync and is not touched again by + # the failure-recovery branch + mock_set_scan_migrated.assert_called_once_with(attack_paths_scan, True, "neo4j") @patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.utils.stringify_exception", @@ -844,7 +927,7 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.db_utils.starting_attack_paths_scan") @patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.sync.sync_graph", - return_value={"nodes": 0, "relationships": 0}, + return_value=SYNC_RESULT_EMPTY, ) @patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.drop_subgraph", @@ -856,11 +939,11 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.indexes.create_findings_indexes") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.cartography_ontology.run") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.cartography_analysis.run") - @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.cartography_create_indexes.run") + @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.indexes.cartography_create_indexes.run") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.clear_cache") @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.create_database") @patch( - "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.get_uri", + "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.graph_database.get_ingest_uri", return_value="bolt://neo4j", ) @patch( @@ -874,7 +957,7 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun: def test_recovery_failure_does_not_suppress_original_exception( self, mock_init_provider, - mock_get_uri, + mock_get_ingest_uri, mock_create_db, mock_clear_cache, mock_cartography_indexes, @@ -1117,7 +1200,7 @@ class TestFailAttackPathsScan: fail_attack_paths_scan(str(tenant.id), "nonexistent", "setup exploded") def test_fail_recovers_graph_data_ready_when_data_exists( - self, tenants_fixture, providers_fixture, scans_fixture + self, tenants_fixture, providers_fixture, scans_fixture, sink_backend_stub ): from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.db_utils import fail_attack_paths_scan @@ -1136,16 +1219,18 @@ class TestFailAttackPathsScan: state=StateChoices.EXECUTING, ) + # `recover_graph_data_ready` routes `has_provider_data` through + # `sink_module.get_backend_for_scan(scan)`. With `is_migrated=False` + # and the default `ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE=neo4j`, the factory + # returns the active backend, which `sink_backend_stub` replaces. + sink_backend_stub.has_provider_data.return_value = True + with ( patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.db_utils.retrieve_attack_paths_scan", return_value=attack_paths_scan, ), patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.db_utils.graph_database.drop_database"), - patch( - "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.db_utils.graph_database.has_provider_data", - return_value=True, - ), patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.db_utils.set_provider_graph_data_ready" ) as mock_set_ready, @@ -1155,7 +1240,7 @@ class TestFailAttackPathsScan: mock_set_ready.assert_called_once_with(attack_paths_scan, True) def test_fail_leaves_graph_data_ready_false_when_no_data( - self, tenants_fixture, providers_fixture, scans_fixture + self, tenants_fixture, providers_fixture, scans_fixture, sink_backend_stub ): from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.db_utils import fail_attack_paths_scan @@ -1174,16 +1259,14 @@ class TestFailAttackPathsScan: state=StateChoices.EXECUTING, ) + sink_backend_stub.has_provider_data.return_value = False + with ( patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.db_utils.retrieve_attack_paths_scan", return_value=attack_paths_scan, ), patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.db_utils.graph_database.drop_database"), - patch( - "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.db_utils.graph_database.has_provider_data", - return_value=False, - ), patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.db_utils.set_provider_graph_data_ready" ) as mock_set_ready, @@ -1272,6 +1355,20 @@ class TestAttackPathsFindingsHelpers: [call(mock_session, stmt) for stmt in FINDINGS_INDEX_STATEMENTS] ) + def test_create_findings_indexes_runs_even_when_sink_is_neptune(self, settings): + # The index helpers run against the temp ingest DB, which is always + # Neo4j regardless of the configured sink. A Neptune sink must not + # suppress index creation on that DB (regression for the dropped + # in-helper sink gate). + settings.ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE = "neptune" + mock_session = MagicMock() + with patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.indexes.run_write_query") as mock_run_write: + indexes_module.create_findings_indexes(mock_session) + + from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.indexes import FINDINGS_INDEX_STATEMENTS + + assert mock_run_write.call_count == len(FINDINGS_INDEX_STATEMENTS) + def test_load_findings_batches_requests(self, providers_fixture): provider = providers_fixture[0] provider.provider = Provider.ProviderChoices.AWS @@ -1803,7 +1900,13 @@ def _make_session_ctx(session, call_order=None, name=None): class TestSyncNodes: - def test_sync_nodes_adds_private_label(self): + def test_iter_sink_batches_rejects_zero_batch_size(self): + with pytest.raises( + ValueError, match="Sink batch size must be greater than zero" + ): + list(sync_module._iter_sink_batches([], batch_size=0)) + + def test_sync_nodes_passes_isolation_labels_to_sink(self): row = { "internal_id": 1, "element_id": "elem-1", @@ -1813,29 +1916,32 @@ class TestSyncNodes: mock_source_1 = MagicMock() mock_source_1.run.return_value = [row] - mock_target = MagicMock() mock_source_2 = MagicMock() mock_source_2.run.return_value = [] + sink = MagicMock() with patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.graph_database.get_session", side_effect=[ _make_session_ctx(mock_source_1), - _make_session_ctx(mock_target), _make_session_ctx(mock_source_2), ], ): - total = sync_module.sync_nodes( - "source-db", "target-db", "tenant-1", "prov-1" + result = sync_module.sync_nodes( + "source-db", "target-db", "tenant-1", "prov-1", sink, [] ) - assert total == 1 - query = mock_target.run.call_args.args[0] - assert "_ProviderResource" in query - assert "_Tenant_tenant1" in query - assert "_Provider_prov1" in query + assert result["parents"] == 1 + sink.write_nodes.assert_called_once() + target_db, labels, batch = sink.write_nodes.call_args.args + assert target_db == "target-db" + assert "_ProviderResource" in labels + assert "_Tenant_tenant1" in labels + assert "_Provider_prov1" in labels + assert batch[0]["provider_element_id"] == "prov-1:elem-1" + assert batch[0]["props"] == {"key": "value"} - def test_sync_nodes_source_closes_before_target_opens(self): + def test_sync_nodes_writes_after_source_session_closes(self): row = { "internal_id": 1, "element_id": "elem-1", @@ -1847,21 +1953,23 @@ class TestSyncNodes: src_1 = MagicMock() src_1.run.return_value = [row] - tgt = MagicMock() src_2 = MagicMock() src_2.run.return_value = [] + sink = MagicMock() + sink.write_nodes.side_effect = lambda *_a, **_kw: call_order.append( + "sink:write" + ) with patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.graph_database.get_session", side_effect=[ _make_session_ctx(src_1, call_order, "source1"), - _make_session_ctx(tgt, call_order, "target"), _make_session_ctx(src_2, call_order, "source2"), ], ): - sync_module.sync_nodes("src-db", "tgt-db", "t-1", "p-1") + sync_module.sync_nodes("src-db", "tgt-db", "t-1", "p-1", sink, []) - assert call_order.index("source1:exit") < call_order.index("target:enter") + assert call_order.index("source1:exit") < call_order.index("sink:write") def test_sync_nodes_pagination_with_batch_size_1(self): row_a = { @@ -1883,44 +1991,89 @@ class TestSyncNodes: src_2.run.return_value = [row_b] src_3 = MagicMock() src_3.run.return_value = [] - tgt_1 = MagicMock() - tgt_2 = MagicMock() + sink = MagicMock() with ( patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.graph_database.get_session", side_effect=[ _make_session_ctx(src_1), - _make_session_ctx(tgt_1), _make_session_ctx(src_2), - _make_session_ctx(tgt_2), _make_session_ctx(src_3), ], ), patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.SYNC_BATCH_SIZE", 1), ): - total = sync_module.sync_nodes("src", "tgt", "t-1", "p-1") + result = sync_module.sync_nodes("src", "tgt", "t-1", "p-1", sink, []) - assert total == 2 + assert result["parents"] == 2 + assert sink.write_nodes.call_count == 2 assert src_1.run.call_args.args[1]["last_id"] == -1 assert src_2.run.call_args.args[1]["last_id"] == 1 + def test_sync_nodes_chunks_expanded_list_rows_before_sink_write(self): + row = { + "internal_id": 1, + "element_id": "elem-1", + "labels": ["SomeLabel"], + "props": {"values": ["a", "b", "c", "d", "e"]}, + } + normalized_lists = [ + sync_module.NormalizedList( + "SomeLabel", + "values", + "SomeLabelValuesItem", + "HAS_VALUES", + ) + ] + + src_1 = MagicMock() + src_1.run.return_value = [row] + src_2 = MagicMock() + src_2.run.return_value = [] + sink = MagicMock() + + with ( + patch( + "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.graph_database.get_session", + side_effect=[ + _make_session_ctx(src_1), + _make_session_ctx(src_2), + ], + ), + patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.SYNC_BATCH_SIZE", 2), + ): + result = sync_module.sync_nodes( + "src", "tgt", "t-1", "p-1", sink, normalized_lists + ) + + assert result == {"parents": 1, "children": 5, "parent_child_rels": 5} + assert [ + len(call_args.args[2]) for call_args in sink.write_nodes.call_args_list[1:] + ] == [2, 2, 1] + assert [ + len(call_args.args[3]) + for call_args in sink.write_relationships.call_args_list + ] == [2, 2, 1] + def test_sync_nodes_empty_source_returns_zero(self): src = MagicMock() src.run.return_value = [] + sink = MagicMock() with patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.graph_database.get_session", side_effect=[_make_session_ctx(src)], ) as mock_get_session: - total = sync_module.sync_nodes("src", "tgt", "t-1", "p-1") + result = sync_module.sync_nodes("src", "tgt", "t-1", "p-1", sink, []) - assert total == 0 + assert result["parents"] == 0 assert mock_get_session.call_count == 1 + sink.write_nodes.assert_not_called() class TestSyncRelationships: - def test_sync_relationships_source_closes_before_target_opens(self): + def test_sync_relationships_writes_after_source_session_closes(self): row = { "internal_id": 1, "rel_type": "HAS", @@ -1933,21 +2086,23 @@ class TestSyncRelationships: src_1 = MagicMock() src_1.run.return_value = [row] - tgt = MagicMock() src_2 = MagicMock() src_2.run.return_value = [] + sink = MagicMock() + sink.write_relationships.side_effect = lambda *_a, **_kw: call_order.append( + "sink:write" + ) with patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.graph_database.get_session", side_effect=[ _make_session_ctx(src_1, call_order, "source1"), - _make_session_ctx(tgt, call_order, "target"), _make_session_ctx(src_2, call_order, "source2"), ], ): - sync_module.sync_relationships("src", "tgt", "p-1") + sync_module.sync_relationships("src", "tgt", "p-1", sink) - assert call_order.index("source1:exit") < call_order.index("target:enter") + assert call_order.index("source1:exit") < call_order.index("sink:write") def test_sync_relationships_pagination_with_batch_size_1(self): row_a = { @@ -1971,40 +2126,76 @@ class TestSyncRelationships: src_2.run.return_value = [row_b] src_3 = MagicMock() src_3.run.return_value = [] - tgt_1 = MagicMock() - tgt_2 = MagicMock() + sink = MagicMock() with ( patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.graph_database.get_session", side_effect=[ _make_session_ctx(src_1), - _make_session_ctx(tgt_1), _make_session_ctx(src_2), - _make_session_ctx(tgt_2), _make_session_ctx(src_3), ], ), patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.SYNC_BATCH_SIZE", 1), ): - total = sync_module.sync_relationships("src", "tgt", "p-1") + total = sync_module.sync_relationships("src", "tgt", "p-1", sink) assert total == 2 + assert sink.write_relationships.call_count == 2 assert src_1.run.call_args.args[1]["last_id"] == -1 assert src_2.run.call_args.args[1]["last_id"] == 1 + def test_sync_relationships_chunks_grouped_rows_before_sink_write(self): + rows = [ + { + "internal_id": idx, + "rel_type": "HAS", + "start_element_id": f"s-{idx}", + "end_element_id": f"e-{idx}", + "props": {}, + } + for idx in range(1, 6) + ] + + src_1 = MagicMock() + src_1.run.return_value = rows + src_2 = MagicMock() + src_2.run.return_value = [] + sink = MagicMock() + + with ( + patch( + "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.graph_database.get_session", + side_effect=[ + _make_session_ctx(src_1), + _make_session_ctx(src_2), + ], + ), + patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.SYNC_BATCH_SIZE", 2), + ): + total = sync_module.sync_relationships("src", "tgt", "p-1", sink) + + assert total == 5 + assert [ + len(call_args.args[3]) + for call_args in sink.write_relationships.call_args_list + ] == [2, 2, 1] + def test_sync_relationships_empty_source_returns_zero(self): src = MagicMock() src.run.return_value = [] + sink = MagicMock() with patch( "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.graph_database.get_session", side_effect=[_make_session_ctx(src)], ) as mock_get_session: - total = sync_module.sync_relationships("src", "tgt", "p-1") + total = sync_module.sync_relationships("src", "tgt", "p-1", sink) assert total == 0 assert mock_get_session.call_count == 1 + sink.write_relationships.assert_not_called() class TestInternetAnalysis: @@ -2076,6 +2267,8 @@ class TestAttackPathsDbUtilsGraphDataReady: assert attack_paths_scan is not None assert attack_paths_scan.graph_data_ready is False + assert attack_paths_scan.is_migrated is False + assert attack_paths_scan.sink_backend == "neo4j" def test_create_attack_paths_scan_inherits_true_from_previous( self, tenants_fixture, providers_fixture, scans_fixture @@ -2096,6 +2289,8 @@ class TestAttackPathsDbUtilsGraphDataReady: scan=scan, state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, graph_data_ready=True, + is_migrated=True, + sink_backend="neptune", ) new_scan = Scan.objects.create( @@ -2116,6 +2311,109 @@ class TestAttackPathsDbUtilsGraphDataReady: assert attack_paths_scan is not None assert attack_paths_scan.graph_data_ready is True + # is_migrated tracks the data being served: inherited from the ready scan + assert attack_paths_scan.is_migrated is True + assert attack_paths_scan.sink_backend == "neptune" + + def test_create_attack_paths_scan_prefers_active_sink_ready_scan( + self, tenants_fixture, providers_fixture, scans_fixture, settings + ): + from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.db_utils import create_attack_paths_scan + + settings.ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE = "neo4j" + tenant = tenants_fixture[0] + provider = providers_fixture[0] + provider.provider = Provider.ProviderChoices.AWS + provider.save() + scan = scans_fixture[0] + scan.provider = provider + scan.save() + + AttackPathsScan.objects.create( + tenant_id=tenant.id, + provider=provider, + scan=scan, + state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, + graph_data_ready=True, + is_migrated=False, + sink_backend="neo4j", + ) + AttackPathsScan.objects.create( + tenant_id=tenant.id, + provider=provider, + scan=scan, + state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, + graph_data_ready=True, + is_migrated=True, + sink_backend="neptune", + ) + + new_scan = Scan.objects.create( + name="New Scan", + provider=provider, + trigger=Scan.TriggerChoices.MANUAL, + state=StateChoices.AVAILABLE, + tenant_id=tenant.id, + ) + + with patch( + "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.db_utils.rls_transaction", + new=lambda *args, **kwargs: nullcontext(), + ): + attack_paths_scan = create_attack_paths_scan( + str(tenant.id), str(new_scan.id), provider.id + ) + + assert attack_paths_scan is not None + assert attack_paths_scan.graph_data_ready is True + assert attack_paths_scan.is_migrated is False + assert attack_paths_scan.sink_backend == "neo4j" + + def test_create_attack_paths_scan_inherits_is_migrated_false_from_legacy_ready( + self, tenants_fixture, providers_fixture, scans_fixture + ): + from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.db_utils import create_attack_paths_scan + + tenant = tenants_fixture[0] + provider = providers_fixture[0] + provider.provider = Provider.ProviderChoices.AWS + provider.save() + scan = scans_fixture[0] + scan.provider = provider + scan.save() + + # Previous scan is ready but pre-cutover (legacy Neo4j graph shape) + AttackPathsScan.objects.create( + tenant_id=tenant.id, + provider=provider, + scan=scan, + state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, + graph_data_ready=True, + is_migrated=False, + sink_backend="neo4j", + ) + + new_scan = Scan.objects.create( + name="New Scan", + provider=provider, + trigger=Scan.TriggerChoices.MANUAL, + state=StateChoices.AVAILABLE, + tenant_id=tenant.id, + ) + + with patch( + "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.db_utils.rls_transaction", + new=lambda *args, **kwargs: nullcontext(), + ): + attack_paths_scan = create_attack_paths_scan( + str(tenant.id), str(new_scan.id), provider.id + ) + + assert attack_paths_scan is not None + assert attack_paths_scan.graph_data_ready is True + # Reads stay on the legacy catalog/backend until this scan's own sync + assert attack_paths_scan.is_migrated is False + assert attack_paths_scan.sink_backend == "neo4j" def test_create_attack_paths_scan_inherits_false_when_no_previous_ready( self, tenants_fixture, providers_fixture, scans_fixture @@ -2136,6 +2434,7 @@ class TestAttackPathsDbUtilsGraphDataReady: scan=scan, state=StateChoices.FAILED, graph_data_ready=False, + sink_backend="neptune", ) new_scan = Scan.objects.create( @@ -2156,6 +2455,8 @@ class TestAttackPathsDbUtilsGraphDataReady: assert attack_paths_scan is not None assert attack_paths_scan.graph_data_ready is False + assert attack_paths_scan.is_migrated is False + assert attack_paths_scan.sink_backend == "neo4j" def test_set_graph_data_ready_updates_field( self, tenants_fixture, providers_fixture, scans_fixture @@ -2262,7 +2563,7 @@ class TestAttackPathsDbUtilsGraphDataReady: assert attack_paths_scan.state == StateChoices.FAILED assert attack_paths_scan.graph_data_ready is True - def test_set_provider_graph_data_ready_updates_all_scans_for_provider( + def test_set_provider_graph_data_ready_updates_all_scans_for_provider_sink( self, tenants_fixture, providers_fixture, scans_fixture ): from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.db_utils import set_provider_graph_data_ready @@ -2290,6 +2591,7 @@ class TestAttackPathsDbUtilsGraphDataReady: scan=scan_a, state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, graph_data_ready=True, + sink_backend="neptune", ) new_ap_scan = AttackPathsScan.objects.create( tenant_id=tenant.id, @@ -2297,6 +2599,7 @@ class TestAttackPathsDbUtilsGraphDataReady: scan=scan_b, state=StateChoices.EXECUTING, graph_data_ready=True, + sink_backend="neptune", ) with patch( @@ -2310,6 +2613,48 @@ class TestAttackPathsDbUtilsGraphDataReady: assert old_ap_scan.graph_data_ready is False assert new_ap_scan.graph_data_ready is False + def test_set_provider_graph_data_ready_preserves_other_sink_scans( + self, tenants_fixture, providers_fixture, scans_fixture + ): + from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.db_utils import set_provider_graph_data_ready + + tenant = tenants_fixture[0] + provider = providers_fixture[0] + provider.provider = Provider.ProviderChoices.AWS + provider.save() + + scan = scans_fixture[0] + scan.provider = provider + scan.save() + + legacy_scan = AttackPathsScan.objects.create( + tenant_id=tenant.id, + provider=provider, + scan=scan, + state=StateChoices.COMPLETED, + graph_data_ready=True, + sink_backend="neo4j", + ) + neptune_scan = AttackPathsScan.objects.create( + tenant_id=tenant.id, + provider=provider, + scan=scan, + state=StateChoices.EXECUTING, + graph_data_ready=True, + sink_backend="neptune", + ) + + with patch( + "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.db_utils.rls_transaction", + new=lambda *args, **kwargs: nullcontext(), + ): + set_provider_graph_data_ready(neptune_scan, False) + + legacy_scan.refresh_from_db() + neptune_scan.refresh_from_db() + assert legacy_scan.graph_data_ready is True + assert neptune_scan.graph_data_ready is False + def test_set_provider_graph_data_ready_does_not_affect_other_providers( self, tenants_fixture, providers_fixture, scans_fixture ): @@ -2374,7 +2719,7 @@ class TestCleanupStaleAttackPathsScans: provider=provider, scan=scan, state=StateChoices.EXECUTING, - started_at=started_at or datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc), + started_at=started_at or datetime.now(tz=UTC), ) task_result = None @@ -2467,7 +2812,7 @@ class TestCleanupStaleAttackPathsScans: provider.provider = Provider.ProviderChoices.AWS provider.save() - old_start = datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) - timedelta(hours=49) + old_start = datetime.now(tz=UTC) - timedelta(hours=49) ap_scan, task_result = self._create_executing_scan( tenant, provider, started_at=old_start, worker="live-worker@host" ) @@ -2685,7 +3030,7 @@ class TestCleanupStaleAttackPathsScans: provider.save() # Old scan with no Task/TaskResult - old_start = datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) - timedelta(hours=49) + old_start = datetime.now(tz=UTC) - timedelta(hours=49) ap_scan = AttackPathsScan.objects.create( tenant_id=tenant.id, provider=provider, @@ -2761,7 +3106,7 @@ class TestCleanupStaleAttackPathsScans: provider=provider, scan=parent_scan, state=StateChoices.SCHEDULED, - started_at=datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) - timedelta(minutes=age_minutes), + started_at=datetime.now(tz=UTC) - timedelta(minutes=age_minutes), ) task_result = None @@ -2872,3 +3217,57 @@ class TestCleanupStaleAttackPathsScans: ap_scan.refresh_from_db() assert ap_scan.state == StateChoices.SCHEDULED mock_revoke.assert_not_called() + + +class TestNormalizeSinkProperties: + """Coerce Cartography-emitted property values into sink-portable primitives. + + Lists become comma-strings, dicts become JSON strings, temporals become + ISO strings, spatials become their stringified form. The same coercion + runs regardless of the active sink so queries are portable. + """ + + @pytest.mark.parametrize( + "raw, expected", + [ + ( + {"a": "x", "b": 1, "c": 1.5, "d": True, "e": None}, + {"a": "x", "b": 1, "c": 1.5, "d": True, "e": None}, + ), + ( + {"actions": ["s3:GetObject", "s3:PutObject"], "tags": []}, + {"actions": "s3:GetObject,s3:PutObject", "tags": ""}, + ), + ( + {"condition": {"StringEquals": {"aws:SourceAccount": "123456789012"}}}, + { + "condition": '{"StringEquals": {"aws:SourceAccount": "123456789012"}}' + }, + ), + ], + ) + def test_primitive_list_and_dict_branches(self, raw, expected): + sync_module._normalize_sink_properties(raw, labels=None) + assert raw == expected + + def test_temporal_and_spatial_become_strings(self): + class FakeDateTime: + def iso_format(self) -> str: + return "2026-05-13T10:00:00+00:00" + + class FakeSpatialPoint: + def __str__(self) -> str: + return "POINT(1.0 2.0)" + + # The spatial branch is detected by module prefix, not by base class. + FakeSpatialPoint.__module__ = "neo4j.spatial.fake" + + props = { + "created_at": FakeDateTime(), + "location": FakeSpatialPoint(), + } + sync_module._normalize_sink_properties(props, labels=None) + assert props == { + "created_at": "2026-05-13T10:00:00+00:00", + "location": "POINT(1.0 2.0)", + } diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_backfill.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_backfill.py index 3ab49a15e6..8ae39905fc 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_backfill.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_backfill.py @@ -1,16 +1,8 @@ -from datetime import datetime, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch from uuid import uuid4 import pytest -from tasks.jobs.backfill import ( - backfill_compliance_summaries, - backfill_provider_compliance_scores, - backfill_resource_scan_summaries, - aggregate_scan_category_summaries, - aggregate_scan_resource_group_summaries, -) - from api.models import ( ComplianceOverviewSummary, Finding, @@ -24,6 +16,13 @@ from api.models import ( ) from prowler.lib.check.models import Severity from prowler.lib.outputs.finding import Status +from tasks.jobs.backfill import ( + aggregate_scan_category_summaries, + aggregate_scan_resource_group_summaries, + backfill_compliance_summaries, + backfill_provider_compliance_scores, + backfill_resource_scan_summaries, +) @pytest.fixture(scope="function") @@ -536,7 +535,7 @@ class TestBackfillProviderComplianceScores: scan2 = scans_fixture[1] # Set completed_at to make the scan eligible for backfill - scan.completed_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + scan.completed_at = datetime.now(UTC) scan.save() scan2.state = StateChoices.AVAILABLE scan2.completed_at = None diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_beat.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_beat.py index 5c25e97340..8679872164 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_beat.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_beat.py @@ -2,11 +2,10 @@ import json from unittest.mock import patch import pytest -from django_celery_beat.models import IntervalSchedule, PeriodicTask -from tasks.beat import schedule_provider_scan - from api.exceptions import ConflictException from api.models import Scan +from django_celery_beat.models import IntervalSchedule, PeriodicTask +from tasks.beat import schedule_provider_scan @pytest.mark.django_db diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_connection.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_connection.py index e5e39d8778..e8b27e0b00 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_connection.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_connection.py @@ -1,16 +1,15 @@ import uuid -from datetime import datetime, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch import pytest +from api.models import Integration, LighthouseConfiguration, Provider from tasks.jobs.connection import ( check_integration_connection, check_lighthouse_connection, check_provider_connection, ) -from api.models import Integration, LighthouseConfiguration, Provider - @pytest.mark.parametrize( "provider_data", @@ -38,7 +37,7 @@ def test_check_provider_connection( mock_provider_connection_test.assert_called_once() assert provider.connected is True assert provider.connection_last_checked_at is not None - assert provider.connection_last_checked_at <= datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) + assert provider.connection_last_checked_at <= datetime.now(tz=UTC) @patch("tasks.jobs.connection.Provider.objects.get") diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_deletion.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_deletion.py index 0ed8c5ddb2..c6e2cd408c 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_deletion.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_deletion.py @@ -1,11 +1,10 @@ -from unittest.mock import call, patch +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, call, patch import pytest -from django.core.exceptions import ObjectDoesNotExist -from tasks.jobs.deletion import delete_provider, delete_tenant - from api.attack_paths import database as graph_database from api.models import Provider, Tenant, TenantComplianceSummary +from django.core.exceptions import ObjectDoesNotExist +from tasks.jobs.deletion import delete_provider, delete_tenant @pytest.mark.django_db @@ -61,10 +60,12 @@ class TestDeleteProvider: aps1 = create_attack_paths_scan(instance) aps2 = create_attack_paths_scan(instance) + backend = MagicMock() with ( patch( - "tasks.jobs.deletion.graph_database.drop_subgraph", + "tasks.jobs.deletion.sink_module.get_backend_for_name", + return_value=backend, ), patch( "tasks.jobs.deletion.graph_database.drop_database", @@ -73,12 +74,55 @@ class TestDeleteProvider: result = delete_provider(tenant_id, instance.id) assert result + backend.drop_subgraph.assert_called_once_with( + graph_database.get_database_name(tenant_id), str(instance.id) + ) expected_tmp_calls = [ call(f"db-tmp-scan-{str(aps1.id).lower()}"), call(f"db-tmp-scan-{str(aps2.id).lower()}"), ] mock_drop_database.assert_has_calls(expected_tmp_calls, any_order=True) + def test_delete_provider_drops_graph_data_from_all_recorded_sinks( + self, providers_fixture, create_attack_paths_scan + ): + instance = providers_fixture[0] + tenant_id = str(instance.tenant_id) + create_attack_paths_scan(instance, sink_backend="neo4j") + create_attack_paths_scan(instance, sink_backend="neptune") + neo4j_backend = MagicMock() + neptune_backend = MagicMock() + + def get_backend_for_name(name): + return { + "neo4j": neo4j_backend, + "neptune": neptune_backend, + }[name] + + with ( + patch( + "tasks.jobs.deletion.graph_database.get_database_name", + return_value="tenant-db", + ), + patch( + "tasks.jobs.deletion.sink_module.get_backend_for_name", + side_effect=get_backend_for_name, + ) as mock_get_backend_for_name, + patch("tasks.jobs.deletion.graph_database.drop_database"), + ): + result = delete_provider(tenant_id, instance.id) + + assert result + mock_get_backend_for_name.assert_has_calls( + [call("neo4j"), call("neptune")], any_order=True + ) + neo4j_backend.drop_subgraph.assert_called_once_with( + "tenant-db", str(instance.id) + ) + neptune_backend.drop_subgraph.assert_called_once_with( + "tenant-db", str(instance.id) + ) + def test_delete_provider_continues_when_temp_db_drop_fails( self, providers_fixture, create_attack_paths_scan ): @@ -86,10 +130,12 @@ class TestDeleteProvider: tenant_id = str(instance.tenant_id) create_attack_paths_scan(instance) + backend = MagicMock() with ( patch( - "tasks.jobs.deletion.graph_database.drop_subgraph", + "tasks.jobs.deletion.sink_module.get_backend_for_name", + return_value=backend, ), patch( "tasks.jobs.deletion.graph_database.drop_database", diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_integrations.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_integrations.py index e246405cdd..9cb727e8d0 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_integrations.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_integrations.py @@ -1,7 +1,12 @@ from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch import pytest +from api.db_router import READ_REPLICA_ALIAS, MainRouter +from api.models import Integration +from api.utils import prowler_integration_connection_test from django.db import OperationalError +from prowler.providers.aws.lib.security_hub.security_hub import SecurityHubConnection +from prowler.providers.common.models import Connection from tasks.jobs.integrations import ( get_s3_client_from_integration, get_security_hub_client_from_integration, @@ -10,12 +15,6 @@ from tasks.jobs.integrations import ( upload_security_hub_integration, ) -from api.db_router import READ_REPLICA_ALIAS, MainRouter -from api.models import Integration -from api.utils import prowler_integration_connection_test -from prowler.providers.aws.lib.security_hub.security_hub import SecurityHubConnection -from prowler.providers.common.models import Connection - @pytest.mark.django_db class TestS3IntegrationUploads: @@ -264,10 +263,9 @@ class TestS3IntegrationUploads: def test_s3_integration_rejects_invalid_output_directory_characters(self): """Test that S3 integration validation rejects invalid characters.""" - from rest_framework.exceptions import ValidationError - from api.models import Integration from api.v1.serializers import BaseWriteIntegrationSerializer + from rest_framework.exceptions import ValidationError integration_type = Integration.IntegrationChoices.AMAZON_S3 providers = [] @@ -290,10 +288,9 @@ class TestS3IntegrationUploads: def test_s3_integration_rejects_empty_output_directory(self): """Test that S3 integration validation rejects empty directories.""" - from rest_framework.exceptions import ValidationError - from api.models import Integration from api.v1.serializers import BaseWriteIntegrationSerializer + from rest_framework.exceptions import ValidationError integration_type = Integration.IntegrationChoices.AMAZON_S3 providers = [] diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_muting.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_muting.py index d8ae310f2e..2e542980bf 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_muting.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_muting.py @@ -1,13 +1,12 @@ -from datetime import datetime, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime from uuid import uuid4 import pytest -from django.core.exceptions import ObjectDoesNotExist -from tasks.jobs.muting import mute_historical_findings - from api.models import Finding, MuteRule +from django.core.exceptions import ObjectDoesNotExist from prowler.lib.check.models import Severity from prowler.lib.outputs.finding import Status +from tasks.jobs.muting import mute_historical_findings @pytest.mark.django_db @@ -162,7 +161,7 @@ class TestMuteHistoricalFindings: "Description": f"Muted description {i}", }, muted=True, - muted_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + muted_at=datetime.now(UTC), muted_reason="Already muted", ) muted_uids.append(finding.uid) diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_orphan_recovery.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_orphan_recovery.py index abfa920b8e..b78aca4e63 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_orphan_recovery.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_orphan_recovery.py @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch from uuid import uuid4 @@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import pytest from celery import states from django.test import override_settings from django_celery_results.models import TaskResult - from tasks.jobs.orphan_recovery import ( _decode_celery_field, _reconcile_task_results, @@ -29,8 +28,7 @@ def _orphan_result(*, name, kwargs, worker, created_minutes_ago, status=states.S task_args=repr([]), ) TaskResult.objects.filter(pk=tr.pk).update( - date_created=datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) - - timedelta(minutes=created_minutes_ago) + date_created=datetime.now(tz=UTC) - timedelta(minutes=created_minutes_ago) ) tr.refresh_from_db() return tr diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_reports.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_reports.py index ad8a2ff29e..c290e6fe1d 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_reports.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_reports.py @@ -5,10 +5,20 @@ from unittest.mock import Mock, patch import matplotlib import pytest +from api.models import ( + Finding, + Resource, + ResourceFindingMapping, + ResourceTag, + ResourceTagMapping, + StateChoices, + StatusChoices, +) +from prowler.lib.check.models import Severity from reportlab.lib import colors from tasks.jobs.report import ( - STALE_TMP_OUTPUT_MAX_AGE_HOURS, STALE_TMP_OUTPUT_LOCK_FILE_NAME, + STALE_TMP_OUTPUT_MAX_AGE_HOURS, _cleanup_stale_tmp_output_directories, _is_scan_directory_protected, _pick_latest_cis_variant, @@ -40,17 +50,6 @@ from tasks.jobs.threatscore_utils import ( _load_findings_for_requirement_checks, ) -from api.models import ( - Finding, - Resource, - ResourceFindingMapping, - ResourceTag, - ResourceTagMapping, - StateChoices, - StatusChoices, -) -from prowler.lib.check.models import Severity - matplotlib.use("Agg") # Use non-interactive backend for tests @@ -377,8 +376,8 @@ class TestLoadFindingsForChecks: finding. Without ``prefetch_related`` that's 2N additional queries; with prefetch it collapses to a small constant per iterator chunk. """ - from django.test.utils import CaptureQueriesContext from django.db import connections + from django.test.utils import CaptureQueriesContext tenant = tenants_fixture[0] scan = scans_fixture[0] @@ -539,12 +538,12 @@ class TestLoadFindingsForChecks: total_counts_out=totals, ) - assert ( - len(result[check_id]) == 5 - ), f"cap=5 should yield exactly 5 loaded findings, got {len(result[check_id])}" - assert ( - totals[check_id] == 12 - ), f"total_counts_out should report the pre-cap total (12), got {totals[check_id]}" + assert len(result[check_id]) == 5, ( + f"cap=5 should yield exactly 5 loaded findings, got {len(result[check_id])}" + ) + assert totals[check_id] == 12, ( + f"total_counts_out should report the pre-cap total (12), got {totals[check_id]}" + ) def test_only_failed_findings_pushes_down_to_sql( self, tenants_fixture, scans_fixture @@ -616,13 +615,13 @@ class TestLoadFindingsForChecks: loaded = result[check_id] assert len(loaded) == 3, f"expected 3 FAIL findings, got {len(loaded)}" statuses = {getattr(f, "status", None) for f in loaded} - assert statuses == { - StatusChoices.FAIL - }, f"expected all loaded findings to be FAIL; got statuses {statuses}" + assert statuses == {StatusChoices.FAIL}, ( + f"expected all loaded findings to be FAIL; got statuses {statuses}" + ) # total_counts must reflect the FAIL-only total, not the global total. - assert ( - totals[check_id] == 3 - ), f"total_counts should be FAIL-only (3), got {totals[check_id]}" + assert totals[check_id] == 3, ( + f"total_counts should be FAIL-only (3), got {totals[check_id]}" + ) def test_max_findings_per_check_disabled(self, tenants_fixture, scans_fixture): """``MAX_FINDINGS_PER_CHECK=0`` disables the cap; load all rows.""" @@ -1205,6 +1204,7 @@ class TestGenerateComplianceReportsOptimized: ThreatScore finishes, before ENS runs. """ from types import SimpleNamespace + from tasks.jobs import report as report_mod mock_scan_summary_filter.return_value.exists.return_value = True @@ -1259,12 +1259,12 @@ class TestGenerateComplianceReportsOptimized: # ``tsc_only`` was exclusive to ThreatScore → evicted before ENS ran. # ``shared`` is still pending for ENS → must remain. - assert ( - "tsc_only" not in observed_state["cache_keys_when_ens_runs"] - ), "tsc_only should have been evicted before ENS ran" - assert ( - "shared" in observed_state["cache_keys_when_ens_runs"] - ), "shared must remain in cache because ENS still needs it" + assert "tsc_only" not in observed_state["cache_keys_when_ens_runs"], ( + "tsc_only should have been evicted before ENS ran" + ) + assert "shared" in observed_state["cache_keys_when_ens_runs"], ( + "shared must remain in cache because ENS still needs it" + ) @patch("tasks.jobs.report.initialize_prowler_provider") @patch("tasks.jobs.report.rmtree") diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_reports_cis.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_reports_cis.py index 2d4528c82d..31e5a5495f 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_reports_cis.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_reports_cis.py @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ from unittest.mock import Mock, patch import pytest +from api.models import StatusChoices from reportlab.platypus import Image, LongTable, Paragraph, Table from tasks.jobs.reports import FRAMEWORK_REGISTRY, ComplianceData, RequirementData from tasks.jobs.reports.cis import ( @@ -9,8 +10,6 @@ from tasks.jobs.reports.cis import ( _profile_badge_text, ) -from api.models import StatusChoices - # ============================================================================= # Fixtures # ============================================================================= diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_reports_threatscore.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_reports_threatscore.py index c79c0b16e9..07dd654a05 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_reports_threatscore.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_reports_threatscore.py @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import io from unittest.mock import Mock import pytest +from api.models import StatusChoices from reportlab.platypus import Image, PageBreak, Paragraph, Table from tasks.jobs.reports import ( FRAMEWORK_REGISTRY, @@ -10,8 +11,6 @@ from tasks.jobs.reports import ( ThreatScoreReportGenerator, ) -from api.models import StatusChoices - # ============================================================================= # Fixtures # ============================================================================= diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_scan.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_scan.py index 6961659acf..2d251b247f 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_scan.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_scan.py @@ -3,11 +3,26 @@ import json import re import uuid from contextlib import contextmanager -from datetime import datetime, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime from io import StringIO from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch import pytest +from api.db_router import MainRouter +from api.exceptions import ProviderConnectionError, ProviderDeletedException +from api.models import ( + Finding, + MuteRule, + Provider, + Resource, + ResourceScanSummary, + Scan, + ScanSummary, + StateChoices, + StatusChoices, +) +from prowler.lib.check.models import Severity +from prowler.lib.outputs.finding import Status from tasks.jobs.scan import ( _ATTACK_SURFACE_MAPPING_CACHE, _aggregate_findings_by_region, @@ -29,22 +44,6 @@ from tasks.jobs.scan import ( ) from tasks.utils import CustomEncoder -from api.db_router import MainRouter -from api.exceptions import ProviderConnectionError -from api.models import ( - Finding, - MuteRule, - Provider, - Resource, - ResourceScanSummary, - Scan, - ScanSummary, - StateChoices, - StatusChoices, -) -from prowler.lib.check.models import Severity -from prowler.lib.outputs.finding import Status - @contextmanager def noop_rls_transaction(*args, **kwargs): @@ -263,6 +262,75 @@ class TestPerformScan: assert provider.connected is False assert isinstance(provider.connection_last_checked_at, datetime) + def test_perform_prowler_scan_provider_deleted_during_progress_update( + self, + tenants_fixture, + scans_fixture, + providers_fixture, + ): + tenant = tenants_fixture[0] + scan = scans_fixture[0] + provider = providers_fixture[0] + + tenant_id = str(tenant.id) + scan_id = str(scan.id) + provider_id = str(provider.id) + + def scan_results(): + Provider.objects.filter(pk=provider_id).delete() + yield 50, [] + + with ( + patch( + "tasks.jobs.scan.initialize_prowler_provider", + return_value=MagicMock(), + ), + patch("tasks.jobs.scan.ProwlerScan") as mock_prowler_scan_class, + patch("tasks.jobs.scan.logger.error") as mock_logger_error, + ): + mock_prowler_scan_instance = MagicMock() + mock_prowler_scan_instance.scan.return_value = scan_results() + mock_prowler_scan_class.return_value = mock_prowler_scan_instance + + with pytest.raises(ProviderDeletedException): + perform_prowler_scan(tenant_id, scan_id, provider_id, []) + + mock_logger_error.assert_not_called() + assert not Scan.objects.filter(pk=scan_id).exists() + + def test_perform_prowler_scan_sets_final_progress_when_progress_updates_are_throttled( + self, + tenants_fixture, + scans_fixture, + providers_fixture, + ): + tenant = tenants_fixture[0] + scan = scans_fixture[0] + provider = providers_fixture[0] + + tenant_id = str(tenant.id) + scan_id = str(scan.id) + provider_id = str(provider.id) + + with ( + patch( + "tasks.jobs.scan.initialize_prowler_provider", + return_value=MagicMock(), + ), + patch("tasks.jobs.scan.ProwlerScan") as mock_prowler_scan_class, + patch("tasks.jobs.scan.PROGRESS_THROTTLE_DELTA", 200), + patch("tasks.jobs.scan.PROGRESS_THROTTLE_SECONDS", 3600), + ): + mock_prowler_scan_instance = MagicMock() + mock_prowler_scan_instance.scan.return_value = [(99, []), (100, [])] + mock_prowler_scan_class.return_value = mock_prowler_scan_instance + + perform_prowler_scan(tenant_id, scan_id, provider_id, []) + + scan.refresh_from_db() + assert scan.state == StateChoices.COMPLETED + assert scan.progress == 100 + @pytest.mark.parametrize( "last_status, new_status, expected_delta", [ @@ -1335,9 +1403,9 @@ class TestPerformScan: ) # Capture time before and after scan - before_scan = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + before_scan = datetime.now(UTC) perform_prowler_scan(tenant_id, scan_id, provider_id, []) - after_scan = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + after_scan = datetime.now(UTC) # Verify muted_at is within the scan time window finding_db = Finding.objects.get(uid=finding_uid) @@ -1473,7 +1541,7 @@ class TestProcessFindingMicroBatch: partition="aws-old", ) - previous_first_seen = datetime(2024, 1, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc) + previous_first_seen = datetime(2024, 1, 1, tzinfo=UTC) finding = FakeFinding( uid="finding-muted", @@ -2123,7 +2191,7 @@ class TestCreateComplianceRequirements: tags={}, check_id=existing_finding.check_id, check_metadata={"CheckId": existing_finding.check_id}, - first_seen_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + first_seen_at=datetime.now(UTC), muted=False, ) resource = existing_finding.resources.first() @@ -2313,7 +2381,7 @@ class TestComplianceRequirementCopy: def test_persist_compliance_requirement_rows_fallback( self, mock_copy, mock_rls_transaction, mock_bulk_create ): - inserted_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + inserted_at = datetime.now(UTC) row = { "id": uuid.uuid4(), "tenant_id": str(uuid.uuid4()), @@ -2394,7 +2462,7 @@ class TestComplianceRequirementCopy: tenant_id = str(uuid.uuid4()) scan_id = uuid.uuid4() - inserted_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + inserted_at = datetime.now(UTC) rows = [ { @@ -2644,10 +2712,10 @@ class TestComplianceRequirementCopy: # Note: inserted_at is intentionally missing } - before_call = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + before_call = datetime.now(UTC) with patch.object(MainRouter, "admin_db", "admin"): _copy_compliance_requirement_rows(str(row["tenant_id"]), [row]) - after_call = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + after_call = datetime.now(UTC) csv_rows = list(csv.reader(StringIO(captured["data"]))) assert len(csv_rows) == 1 @@ -2811,7 +2879,7 @@ class TestComplianceRequirementCopy: { "id": uuid.uuid4(), "tenant_id": tenant_id, - "inserted_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc), + "inserted_at": datetime.now(UTC), "compliance_id": "test", "framework": "Test", "version": "1.0", @@ -2846,7 +2914,7 @@ class TestComplianceRequirementCopy: row = { "id": uuid.uuid4(), "tenant_id": tenant_id, - "inserted_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc), + "inserted_at": datetime.now(UTC), "compliance_id": "test", "framework": "Test", "version": "1.0", @@ -2886,7 +2954,7 @@ class TestComplianceRequirementCopy: """Test ORM fallback with multiple rows.""" tenant_id = str(uuid.uuid4()) scan_id = uuid.uuid4() - inserted_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + inserted_at = datetime.now(UTC) rows = [ { @@ -2968,7 +3036,7 @@ class TestComplianceRequirementCopy: tenant_id = str(uuid.uuid4()) row_id = uuid.uuid4() scan_id = uuid.uuid4() - inserted_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + inserted_at = datetime.now(UTC) row = { "id": row_id, @@ -3674,19 +3742,19 @@ class TestAggregateFindingsByRegion: scan_id = str(uuid.uuid4()) modeled_threatscore_compliance_id = "ProwlerThreatScore-1.0" - # Mock findings with resources - mock_finding1 = MagicMock() - mock_finding1.check_id = "check1" - mock_finding1.status = "FAIL" - mock_finding1.compliance = {modeled_threatscore_compliance_id: ["req1", "req2"]} - - mock_resource1 = MagicMock() - mock_resource1.region = "us-east-1" - mock_finding1.small_resources = [mock_resource1] + # (check_id, status, resource_regions, compliance) tuples + finding_rows = [ + ( + "check1", + "FAIL", + ["us-east-1"], + {modeled_threatscore_compliance_id: ["req1", "req2"]}, + ) + ] mock_queryset = MagicMock() - mock_queryset.only.return_value = mock_queryset - mock_queryset.prefetch_related.return_value = [mock_finding1] + mock_queryset.values_list.return_value = mock_queryset + mock_queryset.iterator.return_value = finding_rows ctx = MagicMock() ctx.__enter__.return_value = None @@ -3700,6 +3768,12 @@ class TestAggregateFindingsByRegion: ) ) + # Streaming query contract: column-scoped values_list + iterator + mock_queryset.values_list.assert_called_once_with( + "check_id", "status", "resource_regions", "compliance" + ) + mock_queryset.iterator.assert_called_once() + # Verify structure of check_status_by_region assert isinstance(check_status_by_region, dict) assert "us-east-1" in check_status_by_region @@ -3719,27 +3793,15 @@ class TestAggregateFindingsByRegion: scan_id = str(uuid.uuid4()) modeled_threatscore_compliance_id = "ProwlerThreatScore-1.0" - # First finding with PASS status - mock_finding1 = MagicMock() - mock_finding1.check_id = "check1" - mock_finding1.status = "PASS" - mock_finding1.compliance = {} - mock_resource1 = MagicMock() - mock_resource1.region = "us-east-1" - mock_finding1.small_resources = [mock_resource1] - - # Second finding with FAIL status for same check/region - mock_finding2 = MagicMock() - mock_finding2.check_id = "check1" - mock_finding2.status = "FAIL" - mock_finding2.compliance = {} - mock_resource2 = MagicMock() - mock_resource2.region = "us-east-1" - mock_finding2.small_resources = [mock_resource2] + # Same check/region: PASS first, then FAIL — FAIL must win + finding_rows = [ + ("check1", "PASS", ["us-east-1"], {}), + ("check1", "FAIL", ["us-east-1"], {}), + ] mock_queryset = MagicMock() - mock_queryset.only.return_value = mock_queryset - mock_queryset.prefetch_related.return_value = [mock_finding1, mock_finding2] + mock_queryset.values_list.return_value = mock_queryset + mock_queryset.iterator.return_value = finding_rows ctx = MagicMock() ctx.__enter__.return_value = None @@ -3751,6 +3813,12 @@ class TestAggregateFindingsByRegion: tenant_id, scan_id, modeled_threatscore_compliance_id ) + # Streaming query contract: column-scoped values_list + iterator + mock_queryset.values_list.assert_called_once_with( + "check_id", "status", "resource_regions", "compliance" + ) + mock_queryset.iterator.assert_called_once() + # FAIL should override PASS assert check_status_by_region["us-east-1"]["check1"] == "FAIL" @@ -3765,8 +3833,8 @@ class TestAggregateFindingsByRegion: modeled_threatscore_compliance_id = "ProwlerThreatScore-1.0" mock_queryset = MagicMock() - mock_queryset.only.return_value = mock_queryset - mock_queryset.prefetch_related.return_value = [] + mock_queryset.values_list.return_value = mock_queryset + mock_queryset.iterator.return_value = [] ctx = MagicMock() ctx.__enter__.return_value = None @@ -3778,6 +3846,12 @@ class TestAggregateFindingsByRegion: tenant_id, scan_id, modeled_threatscore_compliance_id ) + # Streaming query contract: column-scoped values_list + iterator + mock_queryset.values_list.assert_called_once_with( + "check_id", "status", "resource_regions", "compliance" + ) + mock_queryset.iterator.assert_called_once() + # Verify filter was called with muted=False mock_findings_filter.assert_called_once_with( tenant_id=tenant_id, @@ -3796,27 +3870,25 @@ class TestAggregateFindingsByRegion: scan_id = str(uuid.uuid4()) modeled_threatscore_compliance_id = "ProwlerThreatScore-1.0" - # Finding with PASS status - mock_finding1 = MagicMock() - mock_finding1.check_id = "check1" - mock_finding1.status = "PASS" - mock_finding1.compliance = {modeled_threatscore_compliance_id: ["req1"]} - mock_resource1 = MagicMock() - mock_resource1.region = "us-east-1" - mock_finding1.small_resources = [mock_resource1] - - # Finding with FAIL status - mock_finding2 = MagicMock() - mock_finding2.check_id = "check2" - mock_finding2.status = "FAIL" - mock_finding2.compliance = {modeled_threatscore_compliance_id: ["req1"]} - mock_resource2 = MagicMock() - mock_resource2.region = "us-east-1" - mock_finding2.small_resources = [mock_resource2] + # PASS and FAIL findings mapped to the same ThreatScore requirement + finding_rows = [ + ( + "check1", + "PASS", + ["us-east-1"], + {modeled_threatscore_compliance_id: ["req1"]}, + ), + ( + "check2", + "FAIL", + ["us-east-1"], + {modeled_threatscore_compliance_id: ["req1"]}, + ), + ] mock_queryset = MagicMock() - mock_queryset.only.return_value = mock_queryset - mock_queryset.prefetch_related.return_value = [mock_finding1, mock_finding2] + mock_queryset.values_list.return_value = mock_queryset + mock_queryset.iterator.return_value = finding_rows ctx = MagicMock() ctx.__enter__.return_value = None @@ -3828,6 +3900,12 @@ class TestAggregateFindingsByRegion: tenant_id, scan_id, modeled_threatscore_compliance_id ) + # Streaming query contract: column-scoped values_list + iterator + mock_queryset.values_list.assert_called_once_with( + "check_id", "status", "resource_regions", "compliance" + ) + mock_queryset.iterator.assert_called_once() + # Verify compliance counts normalized_id = re.sub( r"[^a-z0-9]", "", modeled_threatscore_compliance_id.lower() @@ -3850,27 +3928,15 @@ class TestAggregateFindingsByRegion: scan_id = str(uuid.uuid4()) modeled_threatscore_compliance_id = "ProwlerThreatScore-1.0" - # Finding in us-east-1 - mock_finding1 = MagicMock() - mock_finding1.check_id = "check1" - mock_finding1.status = "FAIL" - mock_finding1.compliance = {} - mock_resource1 = MagicMock() - mock_resource1.region = "us-east-1" - mock_finding1.small_resources = [mock_resource1] - - # Finding in us-west-2 - mock_finding2 = MagicMock() - mock_finding2.check_id = "check1" - mock_finding2.status = "PASS" - mock_finding2.compliance = {} - mock_resource2 = MagicMock() - mock_resource2.region = "us-west-2" - mock_finding2.small_resources = [mock_resource2] + # One finding per region + finding_rows = [ + ("check1", "FAIL", ["us-east-1"], {}), + ("check1", "PASS", ["us-west-2"], {}), + ] mock_queryset = MagicMock() - mock_queryset.only.return_value = mock_queryset - mock_queryset.prefetch_related.return_value = [mock_finding1, mock_finding2] + mock_queryset.values_list.return_value = mock_queryset + mock_queryset.iterator.return_value = finding_rows ctx = MagicMock() ctx.__enter__.return_value = None @@ -3882,6 +3948,12 @@ class TestAggregateFindingsByRegion: tenant_id, scan_id, modeled_threatscore_compliance_id ) + # Streaming query contract: column-scoped values_list + iterator + mock_queryset.values_list.assert_called_once_with( + "check_id", "status", "resource_regions", "compliance" + ) + mock_queryset.iterator.assert_called_once() + # Verify both regions are present with correct statuses assert "us-east-1" in check_status_by_region assert "us-west-2" in check_status_by_region @@ -3890,17 +3962,26 @@ class TestAggregateFindingsByRegion: @patch("tasks.jobs.scan.Finding.all_objects.filter") @patch("tasks.jobs.scan.rls_transaction") - def test_aggregate_findings_by_region_empty_findings( + def test_aggregate_findings_by_region_multi_region_finding( self, mock_rls_transaction, mock_findings_filter ): - """Test with no findings - should return empty dicts.""" + """A finding with multiple resource_regions is tallied in every region.""" tenant_id = str(uuid.uuid4()) scan_id = str(uuid.uuid4()) modeled_threatscore_compliance_id = "ProwlerThreatScore-1.0" + finding_rows = [ + ( + "check1", + "FAIL", + ["us-east-1", "eu-west-1"], + {modeled_threatscore_compliance_id: ["req1"]}, + ) + ] + mock_queryset = MagicMock() - mock_queryset.only.return_value = mock_queryset - mock_queryset.prefetch_related.return_value = [] + mock_queryset.values_list.return_value = mock_queryset + mock_queryset.iterator.return_value = finding_rows ctx = MagicMock() ctx.__enter__.return_value = None @@ -3914,6 +3995,92 @@ class TestAggregateFindingsByRegion: ) ) + # Streaming query contract: column-scoped values_list + iterator + mock_queryset.values_list.assert_called_once_with( + "check_id", "status", "resource_regions", "compliance" + ) + mock_queryset.iterator.assert_called_once() + + normalized_id = re.sub( + r"[^a-z0-9]", "", modeled_threatscore_compliance_id.lower() + ) + for region in ("us-east-1", "eu-west-1"): + assert check_status_by_region[region]["check1"] == "FAIL" + req_stats = findings_count_by_compliance[region][normalized_id]["req1"] + assert req_stats == {"total": 1, "pass": 0} + + @patch("tasks.jobs.scan.Finding.all_objects.filter") + @patch("tasks.jobs.scan.rls_transaction") + def test_aggregate_findings_by_region_skips_empty_regions( + self, mock_rls_transaction, mock_findings_filter + ): + """A finding with no denormalized regions contributes nothing.""" + tenant_id = str(uuid.uuid4()) + scan_id = str(uuid.uuid4()) + modeled_threatscore_compliance_id = "ProwlerThreatScore-1.0" + + finding_rows = [ + ("check1", "FAIL", [], {modeled_threatscore_compliance_id: ["req1"]}), + ("check2", "PASS", None, {}), + ] + + mock_queryset = MagicMock() + mock_queryset.values_list.return_value = mock_queryset + mock_queryset.iterator.return_value = finding_rows + + ctx = MagicMock() + ctx.__enter__.return_value = None + ctx.__exit__.return_value = False + mock_rls_transaction.return_value = ctx + mock_findings_filter.return_value = mock_queryset + + check_status_by_region, findings_count_by_compliance = ( + _aggregate_findings_by_region( + tenant_id, scan_id, modeled_threatscore_compliance_id + ) + ) + + # Streaming query contract: column-scoped values_list + iterator + mock_queryset.values_list.assert_called_once_with( + "check_id", "status", "resource_regions", "compliance" + ) + mock_queryset.iterator.assert_called_once() + + assert check_status_by_region == {} + assert findings_count_by_compliance == {} + + @patch("tasks.jobs.scan.Finding.all_objects.filter") + @patch("tasks.jobs.scan.rls_transaction") + def test_aggregate_findings_by_region_empty_findings( + self, mock_rls_transaction, mock_findings_filter + ): + """Test with no findings - should return empty dicts.""" + tenant_id = str(uuid.uuid4()) + scan_id = str(uuid.uuid4()) + modeled_threatscore_compliance_id = "ProwlerThreatScore-1.0" + + mock_queryset = MagicMock() + mock_queryset.values_list.return_value = mock_queryset + mock_queryset.iterator.return_value = [] + + ctx = MagicMock() + ctx.__enter__.return_value = None + ctx.__exit__.return_value = False + mock_rls_transaction.return_value = ctx + mock_findings_filter.return_value = mock_queryset + + check_status_by_region, findings_count_by_compliance = ( + _aggregate_findings_by_region( + tenant_id, scan_id, modeled_threatscore_compliance_id + ) + ) + + # Streaming query contract: column-scoped values_list + iterator + mock_queryset.values_list.assert_called_once_with( + "check_id", "status", "resource_regions", "compliance" + ) + mock_queryset.iterator.assert_called_once() + assert check_status_by_region == {} assert findings_count_by_compliance == {} @@ -4362,7 +4529,7 @@ class TestUpdateProviderComplianceScores: scan_id = str(scan.id) scan.state = StateChoices.COMPLETED - scan.completed_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + scan.completed_at = datetime.now(UTC) scan.save() connection = MagicMock() @@ -4439,7 +4606,7 @@ class TestUpdateProviderComplianceScores: scan_id = str(scan.id) scan.state = StateChoices.COMPLETED - scan.completed_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + scan.completed_at = datetime.now(UTC) scan.save() connection = MagicMock() @@ -4492,9 +4659,10 @@ class TestScanIsFullScope: # If the SDK adds a new filter, this test still passes via the # introspection-driven derivation; if it adds a non-filter kwarg # (e.g. provider-like), keep the exclusion list in sync in models.py. - from prowler.lib.scan.scan import Scan as ProwlerScan import inspect + from prowler.lib.scan.scan import Scan as ProwlerScan + expected = tuple( name for name in inspect.signature(ProwlerScan.__init__).parameters diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_tasks.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_tasks.py index 67d2c64555..95634e8a95 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_tasks.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_tasks.py @@ -1,10 +1,18 @@ import uuid from contextlib import contextmanager -from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch import openai import pytest +from api.models import ( + Integration, + LighthouseProviderConfiguration, + LighthouseProviderModels, + Scan, + StateChoices, + Task, +) from botocore.exceptions import ClientError from django_celery_beat.models import IntervalSchedule, PeriodicTask from django_celery_results.models import TaskResult @@ -31,15 +39,6 @@ from tasks.tasks import ( security_hub_integration_task, ) -from api.models import ( - Integration, - LighthouseProviderConfiguration, - LighthouseProviderModels, - Scan, - StateChoices, - Task, -) - @pytest.mark.django_db class TestExtractBedrockCredentials: @@ -1478,9 +1477,9 @@ class TestCheckIntegrationsTask: ) # Verify ASFF was NOT created for non-AWS provider - assert ( - "asff" not in created_writers - ), "ASFF writer should NOT be created for non-AWS providers" + assert "asff" not in created_writers, ( + "ASFF writer should NOT be created for non-AWS providers" + ) assert "csv" in created_writers, "CSV writer should be created" assert "ocsf" in created_writers, "OCSF writer should be created" @@ -2328,7 +2327,7 @@ class TestPerformScheduledScanTask: task_id=task_id, task_name="scan-perform-scheduled", status="STARTED", - date_created=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + date_created=datetime.now(UTC), ) Task.objects.create( id=task_id, task_runner_task=task_result, tenant_id=tenant_id @@ -2416,7 +2415,7 @@ class TestPerformScheduledScanTask: state=StateChoices.SCHEDULED, ) assert scheduled_scans.count() == 1 - assert scheduled_scans.first().scheduled_at > datetime.now(timezone.utc) + assert scheduled_scans.first().scheduled_at > datetime.now(UTC) assert ( Scan.objects.filter( tenant_id=tenant.id, @@ -2452,7 +2451,7 @@ class TestPerformScheduledScanTask: name="Daily scheduled scan", trigger=Scan.TriggerChoices.SCHEDULED, state=StateChoices.SCHEDULED, - scheduled_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + scheduled_at=datetime.now(UTC), scheduler_task_id=periodic_task.id, ) duplicate_scan = Scan.objects.create( @@ -2582,7 +2581,7 @@ class TestReaggregateAllFindingGroupSummaries: scan_id_today_p1 = uuid.uuid4() scan_id_yesterday_p1 = uuid.uuid4() scan_id_today_p2 = uuid.uuid4() - today = datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) + today = datetime.now(tz=UTC) yesterday = today - timedelta(days=1) mock_outer_group_result = MagicMock() @@ -2663,7 +2662,7 @@ class TestReaggregateAllFindingGroupSummaries: provider_id = uuid.uuid4() latest_scan_today = uuid.uuid4() earlier_scan_today = uuid.uuid4() - today_late = datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) + today_late = datetime.now(tz=UTC) today_early = today_late - timedelta(hours=4) mock_outer_group_result = MagicMock() diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_utils.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_utils.py index cc7b7f188b..e6b5544a1c 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_utils.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_utils.py @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta from unittest.mock import patch import pytest @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ class TestGetNextExecutionDatetime: task_id="abc123", task_name="scan-perform-scheduled", status="SUCCESS", - date_created=datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(hours=1), + date_created=datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(hours=1), result="Success", ) return task_result diff --git a/api/src/backend/tasks/utils.py b/api/src/backend/tasks/utils.py index eded5bfb9a..26bc031d7b 100644 --- a/api/src/backend/tasks/utils.py +++ b/api/src/backend/tasks/utils.py @@ -1,12 +1,11 @@ import json -from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone +from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta from enum import Enum +from api.models import Scan, StateChoices from django_celery_beat.models import PeriodicTask from django_celery_results.models import TaskResult -from api.models import Scan, StateChoices - SCHEDULED_SCAN_NAME = "Daily scheduled scan" @@ -45,9 +44,9 @@ def get_next_execution_datetime(task_id: int, provider_id: str) -> datetime: interval = periodic_task_instance.interval current_scheduled_time = datetime.combine( - datetime.now(timezone.utc).date(), + datetime.now(UTC).date(), task_instance.date_created.time(), - tzinfo=timezone.utc, + tzinfo=UTC, ) return current_scheduled_time + timedelta(**{interval.period: interval.every}) diff --git a/api/tests/performance/scenarios/compliance.py b/api/tests/performance/scenarios/compliance.py index ae4e030a59..9692c3aac2 100644 --- a/api/tests/performance/scenarios/compliance.py +++ b/api/tests/performance/scenarios/compliance.py @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ class APIUser(APIUserBase): def compliance_overviews_default(self): provider_type, scan_info = _get_random_scan() name = f"/compliance-overviews ({provider_type})" - endpoint = f"/compliance-overviews?" f"filter[scan_id]={scan_info['scan_id']}" + endpoint = f"/compliance-overviews?filter[scan_id]={scan_info['scan_id']}" self.client.get(endpoint, headers=get_auth_headers(self.token), name=name) @task(2) @@ -122,7 +122,6 @@ class APIUser(APIUserBase): compliance_id = _get_random_compliance_id(provider_type) name = f"/compliance-overviews/attributes ({compliance_id})" endpoint = ( - f"/compliance-overviews/attributes" - f"?filter[compliance_id]={compliance_id}" + f"/compliance-overviews/attributes?filter[compliance_id]={compliance_id}" ) self.client.get(endpoint, headers=get_auth_headers(self.token), name=name) diff --git a/api/tests/performance/scenarios/findings.py b/api/tests/performance/scenarios/findings.py index acd32f2497..7741d1df4c 100644 --- a/api/tests/performance/scenarios/findings.py +++ b/api/tests/performance/scenarios/findings.py @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ class APIUser(APIUserBase): @task(3) def findings_metadata(self): - endpoint = f"/findings/metadata?" f"filter[inserted_at]={TARGET_INSERTED_AT}" + endpoint = f"/findings/metadata?filter[inserted_at]={TARGET_INSERTED_AT}" self.client.get( endpoint, headers=get_auth_headers(self.token), name="/findings/metadata" ) @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ class APIUser(APIUserBase): @task def findings_metadata_scan_small(self): - endpoint = f"/findings/metadata?" f"&filter[scan]={self.s_scan_id}" + endpoint = f"/findings/metadata?&filter[scan]={self.s_scan_id}" self.client.get( endpoint, headers=get_auth_headers(self.token), @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ class APIUser(APIUserBase): @task def findings_metadata_scan_medium(self): - endpoint = f"/findings/metadata?" f"&filter[scan]={self.m_scan_id}" + endpoint = f"/findings/metadata?&filter[scan]={self.m_scan_id}" self.client.get( endpoint, headers=get_auth_headers(self.token), @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ class APIUser(APIUserBase): @task def findings_metadata_scan_large(self): - endpoint = f"/findings/metadata?" f"&filter[scan]={self.l_scan_id}" + endpoint = f"/findings/metadata?&filter[scan]={self.l_scan_id}" self.client.get( endpoint, headers=get_auth_headers(self.token), diff --git a/api/tests/performance/scenarios/resources.py b/api/tests/performance/scenarios/resources.py index dabf99c3f2..43e13fad92 100644 --- a/api/tests/performance/scenarios/resources.py +++ b/api/tests/performance/scenarios/resources.py @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ class APIUser(APIUserBase): name = "/resources?filter[scan_id] - 50k" page_number = self._next_page(name) endpoint = ( - f"/resources?page[number]={page_number}" f"&filter[scan]={self.s_scan_id}" + f"/resources?page[number]={page_number}&filter[scan]={self.s_scan_id}" ) self.client.get(endpoint, headers=get_auth_headers(self.token), name=name) @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ class APIUser(APIUserBase): name = "/resources?filter[scan_id] - 250k" page_number = self._next_page(name) endpoint = ( - f"/resources?page[number]={page_number}" f"&filter[scan]={self.m_scan_id}" + f"/resources?page[number]={page_number}&filter[scan]={self.m_scan_id}" ) self.client.get(endpoint, headers=get_auth_headers(self.token), name=name) @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ class APIUser(APIUserBase): name = "/resources?filter[scan_id] - 500k" page_number = self._next_page(name) endpoint = ( - f"/resources?page[number]={page_number}" f"&filter[scan]={self.l_scan_id}" + f"/resources?page[number]={page_number}&filter[scan]={self.l_scan_id}" ) self.client.get(endpoint, headers=get_auth_headers(self.token), name=name) diff --git a/api/tests/performance/utils/helpers.py b/api/tests/performance/utils/helpers.py index 08144a5c4b..29ce2a47fc 100644 --- a/api/tests/performance/utils/helpers.py +++ b/api/tests/performance/utils/helpers.py @@ -153,9 +153,9 @@ def get_dynamic_filters_pairs( f"{host}/{endpoint}/metadata?{metadata_filters}", headers=get_auth_headers(token), ) - assert ( - response.status_code == 200 - ), f"Failed to get resource filters values: {response.text}" + assert response.status_code == 200, ( + f"Failed to get resource filters values: {response.text}" + ) attributes = response.json()["data"]["attributes"] return { diff --git a/api/uv.lock b/api/uv.lock index d36993b516..80b16aeac8 100644 --- a/api/uv.lock +++ b/api/uv.lock @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ constraints = [ { name = "aiobotocore", specifier = "==2.25.1" }, { name = "aiofiles", specifier = "==24.1.0" }, { name = "aiohappyeyeballs", specifier = "==2.6.1" }, - { name = "aiohttp", specifier = "==3.13.5" }, + { name = "aiohttp", specifier = "==3.14.0" }, { name = "aioitertools", specifier = "==0.13.0" }, { name = "aiosignal", specifier = "==1.4.0" }, { name = "alibabacloud-actiontrail20200706", specifier = "==2.4.1" }, @@ -61,9 +61,8 @@ constraints = [ { name = "astroid", specifier = "==3.2.4" }, { name = "async-timeout", specifier = "==5.0.1" }, { name = "attrs", specifier = "==25.4.0" }, - { name = "authlib", specifier = "==1.6.9" }, + { name = "authlib", specifier = "==1.6.12" }, { name = 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a/contrib/inventory-graph/lib/inventory_output.py +++ b/contrib/inventory-graph/lib/inventory_output.py @@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ from typing import Optional from prowler.lib.logger import logger from lib.models import ConnectivityGraph - # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # JSON output # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/contrib/k8s/helm/prowler-api/values.yaml b/contrib/k8s/helm/prowler-api/values.yaml index 81eda5f690..a6074c7852 100644 --- a/contrib/k8s/helm/prowler-api/values.yaml +++ b/contrib/k8s/helm/prowler-api/values.yaml @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ containers: image: repository: prowlercloud/prowler-api pullPolicy: IfNotPresent - command: ["../docker-entrypoint.sh", "beat"] + command: ["/home/prowler/docker-entrypoint.sh", "beat"] secrets: POSTGRES_HOST: @@ -438,6 +438,34 @@ mainConfig: # Minimum number of Availability Zones that an ELBv2 must be in elbv2_min_azs: 2 + # AWS Post-Quantum TLS Configuration + # aws.acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm + acmpca_pqc_key_algorithms: + - "ML_DSA_44" + - "ML_DSA_65" + - "ML_DSA_87" + # aws.cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled + cloudfront_pqc_min_protocol_versions: + - "TLSv1.3_2025" + # aws.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled + apigateway_pqc_tls_allowed_policies: + - "SecurityPolicy_TLS13_1_2_FIPS_PFS_PQ_2025_09" + - "SecurityPolicy_TLS13_1_2_PFS_PQ_2025_09" + - "SecurityPolicy_TLS13_1_2_PQ_2025_09" + + # AWS Post-Quantum SSH Key Exchange Configuration + # aws.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled + transfer_pqc_ssh_allowed_policies: + - "TransferSecurityPolicy-2025-03" + - "TransferSecurityPolicy-FIPS-2025-03" + - "TransferSecurityPolicy-AS2Restricted-2025-07" + + + # aws.rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki + rolesanywhere_pqc_pca_key_algorithms: + - "ML_DSA_44" + - "ML_DSA_65" + - "ML_DSA_87" # AWS Secrets Configuration # Patterns to ignore in the secrets checks diff --git a/contrib/k8s/helm/prowler-app/templates/ui/configmap.yaml b/contrib/k8s/helm/prowler-app/templates/ui/configmap.yaml index 38d6e65ee3..856770722a 100644 --- a/contrib/k8s/helm/prowler-app/templates/ui/configmap.yaml +++ b/contrib/k8s/helm/prowler-app/templates/ui/configmap.yaml @@ -11,8 +11,7 @@ data: {{- else }} AUTH_URL: {{ .Values.ui.authUrl | quote }} {{- end }} - API_BASE_URL: "http://{{ include "prowler.fullname" . }}-api:{{ .Values.api.service.port }}/api/v1" - NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL: "http://{{ include "prowler.fullname" . }}-api:{{ .Values.api.service.port }}/api/v1" - NEXT_PUBLIC_API_DOCS_URL: "http://{{ include "prowler.fullname" . }}-api:{{ .Values.api.service.port }}/api/v1/docs" + UI_API_BASE_URL: "http://{{ include "prowler.fullname" . }}-api:{{ .Values.api.service.port }}/api/v1" + UI_API_DOCS_URL: "http://{{ include "prowler.fullname" . }}-api:{{ .Values.api.service.port }}/api/v1/docs" AUTH_TRUST_HOST: "true" UI_PORT: {{ .Values.ui.service.port | quote }} diff --git a/contrib/k8s/helm/prowler-app/values.yaml b/contrib/k8s/helm/prowler-app/values.yaml index 9acca09f2a..ed390af29e 100644 --- a/contrib/k8s/helm/prowler-app/values.yaml +++ b/contrib/k8s/helm/prowler-app/values.yaml @@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ worker_beat: tag: "" command: - - ../docker-entrypoint.sh + - /home/prowler/docker-entrypoint.sh args: - beat diff --git a/contrib/k8s/helm/prowler-ui/values.yaml b/contrib/k8s/helm/prowler-ui/values.yaml index d4f2dbe137..aca0178b3a 100644 --- a/contrib/k8s/helm/prowler-ui/values.yaml +++ b/contrib/k8s/helm/prowler-ui/values.yaml @@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ fullnameOverride: "" secrets: SITE_URL: http://localhost:3000 - API_BASE_URL: http://prowler-api:8080/api/v1 - NEXT_PUBLIC_API_DOCS_URL: http://prowler-api:8080/api/v1/docs + UI_API_BASE_URL: http://prowler-api:8080/api/v1 + UI_API_DOCS_URL: http://prowler-api:8080/api/v1/docs AUTH_TRUST_HOST: True UI_PORT: 3000 # openssl rand -base64 32 diff --git a/contrib/reverse-proxy/docker-compose.reverse-proxy.yml b/contrib/reverse-proxy/docker-compose.reverse-proxy.yml index 08c52f3558..b8f8edec30 100644 --- a/contrib/reverse-proxy/docker-compose.reverse-proxy.yml +++ b/contrib/reverse-proxy/docker-compose.reverse-proxy.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ services: nginx: - image: nginx:alpine + image: nginx:alpine@sha256:8b1e78743a03dbb2c95171cc58639fef29abc8816598e27fb910ed2e621e589a container_name: prowler-nginx restart: unless-stopped ports: diff --git a/dashboard/compliance/cis_2_0_1_kubernetes.py b/dashboard/compliance/cis_2_0_1_kubernetes.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..94558f33ad --- /dev/null +++ b/dashboard/compliance/cis_2_0_1_kubernetes.py @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +import warnings + +from dashboard.common_methods import get_section_containers_cis + +warnings.filterwarnings("ignore") + + +def get_table(data): + aux = data[ + [ + "REQUIREMENTS_ID", + "REQUIREMENTS_DESCRIPTION", + "REQUIREMENTS_ATTRIBUTES_SECTION", + "CHECKID", + "STATUS", + "REGION", + "ACCOUNTID", + "RESOURCEID", + ] + ].copy() + + return get_section_containers_cis( + aux, "REQUIREMENTS_ID", "REQUIREMENTS_ATTRIBUTES_SECTION" + ) diff --git a/dashboard/compliance/cis_5_0_gcp.py b/dashboard/compliance/cis_5_0_gcp.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..94558f33ad --- /dev/null +++ b/dashboard/compliance/cis_5_0_gcp.py @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +import warnings + +from dashboard.common_methods import get_section_containers_cis + +warnings.filterwarnings("ignore") + + +def get_table(data): + aux = data[ + [ + "REQUIREMENTS_ID", + "REQUIREMENTS_DESCRIPTION", + "REQUIREMENTS_ATTRIBUTES_SECTION", + "CHECKID", + "STATUS", + "REGION", + "ACCOUNTID", + "RESOURCEID", + ] + ].copy() + + return get_section_containers_cis( + aux, "REQUIREMENTS_ID", "REQUIREMENTS_ATTRIBUTES_SECTION" + ) diff --git a/dashboard/compliance/cis_6_0_azure.py b/dashboard/compliance/cis_6_0_azure.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9d33cc67a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/dashboard/compliance/cis_6_0_azure.py @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +import warnings + +from dashboard.common_methods import get_section_containers_cis + +warnings.filterwarnings("ignore") + + +def get_table(data): + + aux = data[ + [ + "REQUIREMENTS_ID", + "REQUIREMENTS_DESCRIPTION", + "REQUIREMENTS_ATTRIBUTES_SECTION", + "CHECKID", + "STATUS", + "REGION", + "ACCOUNTID", + "RESOURCEID", + ] + ].copy() + + return get_section_containers_cis( + aux, "REQUIREMENTS_ID", "REQUIREMENTS_ATTRIBUTES_SECTION" + ) diff --git a/dashboard/compliance/cis_7_0_aws.py b/dashboard/compliance/cis_7_0_aws.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..94558f33ad --- /dev/null +++ b/dashboard/compliance/cis_7_0_aws.py @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +import warnings + +from dashboard.common_methods import get_section_containers_cis + +warnings.filterwarnings("ignore") + + +def get_table(data): + aux = data[ + [ + "REQUIREMENTS_ID", + "REQUIREMENTS_DESCRIPTION", + "REQUIREMENTS_ATTRIBUTES_SECTION", + "CHECKID", + "STATUS", + "REGION", + "ACCOUNTID", + "RESOURCEID", + ] + ].copy() + + return get_section_containers_cis( + aux, "REQUIREMENTS_ID", "REQUIREMENTS_ATTRIBUTES_SECTION" + ) diff --git a/dashboard/compliance/cis_7_0_m365.py b/dashboard/compliance/cis_7_0_m365.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..94558f33ad --- /dev/null +++ b/dashboard/compliance/cis_7_0_m365.py @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +import warnings + +from dashboard.common_methods import get_section_containers_cis + +warnings.filterwarnings("ignore") + + +def get_table(data): + aux = data[ + [ + "REQUIREMENTS_ID", + "REQUIREMENTS_DESCRIPTION", + "REQUIREMENTS_ATTRIBUTES_SECTION", + "CHECKID", + "STATUS", + "REGION", + "ACCOUNTID", + "RESOURCEID", + ] + ].copy() + + return get_section_containers_cis( + aux, "REQUIREMENTS_ID", "REQUIREMENTS_ATTRIBUTES_SECTION" + ) diff --git a/docker-compose-dev.yml b/docker-compose-dev.yml index 522aaf5413..d737298183 100644 --- a/docker-compose-dev.yml +++ b/docker-compose-dev.yml @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ services: api-dev-init: - image: busybox:1.37.0 + image: busybox:1.37.0@sha256:9532d8c39891ca2ecde4d30d7710e01fb739c87a8b9299685c63704296b16028 volumes: - ./_data/api:/data command: ["sh", "-c", "chown -R 1000:1000 /data"] @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ services: condition: service_healthy postgres: - image: postgres:16.3-alpine3.20 + image: postgres:16.3-alpine3.20@sha256:36ed71227ae36305d26382657c0b96cbaf298427b3f1eaeb10d77a6dea3eec41 hostname: "postgres-db" volumes: - ./_data/postgres:/var/lib/postgresql/data @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ services: retries: 5 valkey: - image: valkey/valkey:7-alpine3.19 + image: valkey/valkey:7-alpine3.19@sha256:4054fe7fc607b9326ac7c4691ed26e9670d2ff17a9fb28c2577adecf928acbcc hostname: "valkey" volumes: - ./_data/valkey:/data @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ services: retries: 3 neo4j: - image: graphstack/dozerdb:5.26.3.0 + image: graphstack/dozerdb:5.26.3.0@sha256:a77526ea3918fdc46d1fff70c4aea7d71d3874a26ecec059179d6775845b1247 hostname: "neo4j" volumes: - ./_data/neo4j:/data @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ services: soft: 65536 hard: 65536 entrypoint: - - "../docker-entrypoint.sh" + - "/home/prowler/docker-entrypoint.sh" - "beat" mcp-server: diff --git a/docker-compose.yml b/docker-compose.yml index 1519946afd..6cb5ac237d 100644 --- a/docker-compose.yml +++ b/docker-compose.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ # services: api-init: - image: busybox:1.37.0 + image: busybox:1.37.0@sha256:9532d8c39891ca2ecde4d30d7710e01fb739c87a8b9299685c63704296b16028 volumes: - ./_data/api:/data command: ["sh", "-c", "chown -R 1000:1000 /data"] @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ services: start_period: 60s postgres: - image: postgres:16.3-alpine3.20 + image: postgres:16.3-alpine3.20@sha256:36ed71227ae36305d26382657c0b96cbaf298427b3f1eaeb10d77a6dea3eec41 hostname: "postgres-db" volumes: - ./_data/postgres:/var/lib/postgresql/data @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ services: retries: 5 valkey: - image: valkey/valkey:7-alpine3.19 + image: valkey/valkey:7-alpine3.19@sha256:4054fe7fc607b9326ac7c4691ed26e9670d2ff17a9fb28c2577adecf928acbcc hostname: "valkey" volumes: - ./_data/valkey:/data @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ services: retries: 3 neo4j: - image: graphstack/dozerdb:5.26.3.0 + image: graphstack/dozerdb:5.26.3.0@sha256:a77526ea3918fdc46d1fff70c4aea7d71d3874a26ecec059179d6775845b1247 hostname: "neo4j" volumes: - ./_data/neo4j:/data @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ services: soft: 65536 hard: 65536 entrypoint: - - "../docker-entrypoint.sh" + - "/home/prowler/docker-entrypoint.sh" - "beat" mcp-server: diff --git a/docs/developer-guide/checks.mdx b/docs/developer-guide/checks.mdx index 2f0f45cd96..5334799d36 100644 --- a/docs/developer-guide/checks.mdx +++ b/docs/developer-guide/checks.mdx @@ -445,3 +445,5 @@ The metadata structure is enforced in code using a Pydantic model. For reference ## Specific Check Patterns Details for specific providers can be found in documentation pages named using the pattern `-details`. + +Checks that scan resources for plaintext secrets follow a dedicated batched structure. Refer to [Secret-Scanning Checks](/developer-guide/secret-scanning-checks) before creating or updating one. diff --git a/docs/developer-guide/configurable-checks.mdx b/docs/developer-guide/configurable-checks.mdx index 76b339601d..7349b6ff86 100644 --- a/docs/developer-guide/configurable-checks.mdx +++ b/docs/developer-guide/configurable-checks.mdx @@ -40,9 +40,184 @@ When adding a new configurable check to Prowler, update the following files: # aws.awslambda_function_vpc_multi_az lambda_min_azs: 2 ``` +- **Provider Schema:** Add the typed field to the provider's Pydantic schema in `prowler/config/schema/.py`. This is required: the loader validates user configs against these schemas and the shipped `config.yaml` must round-trip with zero warnings. See [Adding a Parameter to the Provider Schema](#adding-a-parameter-to-the-provider-schema) below. - **Test Fixtures:** If tests depend on this configuration, add the variable to `tests/config/fixtures/config.yaml`. - **Documentation:** Document the new variable in the list of configurable checks in `docs/tutorials/configuration_file.md`. For a complete list of checks that already support configuration, see the [Configuration File Tutorial](/user-guide/cli/tutorials/configuration_file). + +Because a configurable check's verdict depends on the `audit_config` value it reads, a compliance requirement can lose meaning if the scan ran with a looser threshold than the control demands. Compliance frameworks can guard against this with **configuration guardrails**: a requirement declares the strictest configuration it tolerates and is forced to FAIL when the scan's config falls short. See [Configuration Guardrails for Requirements](/developer-guide/security-compliance-framework#configuration-guardrails-for-requirements). + + +## Adding a Parameter to the Provider Schema + +Most providers have a typed Pydantic schema in `prowler/config/schema/`, registered in `prowler/config/schema/registry.py`. When a config is loaded and the provider has a registered schema, `validate_provider_config` checks each user-supplied key against it, logs a warning, and drops any field that fails validation. The consumer's `.get(key, default)` then falls back to the built-in default. Providers without a registered schema are passed through unchanged. + +This catches typos in a value (for example, `0.2` typed as `20`, or `"medium"` for an enum that expects `"MEDIUM"`). It does NOT catch typos in a key name: `disalowed_regions` (one `l` missing) is treated as an unknown key and passes through untouched, because third-party check plugins legitimately rely on unknown keys being preserved. Reviewers should still check that any new key the YAML adds is named exactly the same as the field on the schema. + +### Where to Add the Field + +1. Open `prowler/config/schema/.py` (for example, `aws.py`). +2. Add a field on the provider's schema class. Always make it `Optional[...] = None` so the absence of the key is valid. +3. Apply the tightest type the value allows. Examples below. + +If you are introducing an entirely new provider rather than a new parameter, also add an entry mapping the provider name to its schema class in `prowler/config/schema/registry.py`. The loader uses that registry to find the schema for the provider it is loading. + +### Choosing the Right Type + +| Value kind | Field declaration | +|---|---| +| Boolean toggle | `Optional[bool] = None` | +| Strictly positive integer (days, counts) | `Optional[int] = Field(default=None, gt=0)` | +| Fraction in 0..1 (threshold) | `Optional[float] = Field(default=None, ge=0.0, le=1.0)` | +| Closed set of strings | `Optional[Literal["A", "B", "C"]] = None` | +| Free-form string | `Optional[str] = None` | +| List of strings or ints | `Optional[list[str]] = None` | + +Prefer `Literal[...]` over `str` whenever the value is one of a known set. Prefer `Field(gt=0)` over `int` whenever zero or negative would be nonsensical. The point of the schema is to catch real-world mistakes that previously passed silently. + +### Custom Validators (Only When Needed) + +If the value has structural rules beyond type and range, add a `field_validator`. Examples already in `aws.py`: + +- `_validate_port_range` rejects ports outside `0..65535`. +- `_validate_account_ids` rejects anything that isn't a 12-digit AWS account ID. +- `_validate_trusted_ips` rejects entries that aren't a valid IP or CIDR. + +Raise `ValueError` from the validator. The framework converts the error into a warning and drops the offending key. + +### Example: Adding a New Parameter + +Say a new check needs `max_iam_role_session_hours`, a strictly positive integer that defaults to 12 in code. + +1. **Schema** (`prowler/config/schema/aws.py`): + ```python + # IAM + max_iam_role_session_hours: Optional[int] = Field(default=None, gt=0) + ``` +2. **Shipped config** (`prowler/config/config.yaml`): + ```yaml + # aws.iam_role_session_duration_within_limit + max_iam_role_session_hours: 12 + ``` +3. **Consumer** (the check): + ```python + max_hours = iam_client.audit_config.get("max_iam_role_session_hours", 12) + ``` +4. **Tests** in `tests/config/schema/aws_schema_test.py`: + - one test for a valid value that round-trips, + - one test for an invalid value (zero, negative, wrong type) that is dropped. + +### What the Loader Guarantees + +- **Unknown keys pass through.** Third-party check plugins can introduce arbitrary keys without schema edits; they will not be filtered. +- **Invalid values never crash the run.** They produce a single warning per field and the key is dropped. +- **Coerced values are normalized.** A YAML-quoted `"180"` for an `int` field arrives downstream as the integer `180`. +- **The shipped `config.yaml` must round-trip cleanly.** The integration test `test_shipped_default_config_loads_without_warnings` will fail if a key is added to the YAML without a matching schema field, so the two stay in sync. + +## Configuration Value Limits + +Configurable thresholds enforce hard limits. A value outside the documented range is **dropped with a warning** and the check falls back to its built-in default (the same as if the key were absent). These bounds are intentionally conservative: they are not the absolute service maxima but the range that still produces a meaningful security check. + +Use this section as the reference when upgrading an existing config: if a value you set is being rejected, it is outside the range below. + +Only fields with a numeric range, a fixed value set, or a length cap are listed. Fields typed as free-form strings or lists (for example `disallowed_regions`, `secrets_ignore_patterns`, `trusted_account_ids`) have no range limit — they are validated for shape only (a 12-digit account ID, a valid IP/CIDR, a dotted version string), not for magnitude. + +### AWS + +| Key | Allowed range | Notes | +|---|---|---| +| `max_unused_access_keys_days` | `30..180` days | CIS AWS 1.13 recommends 45; NIST IA-5 ≤90 | +| `max_console_access_days` | `30..180` days | CIS AWS 1.12 recommends 45 | +| `max_unused_sagemaker_access_days` | `7..180` days | | +| `max_security_group_rules` | `1..1000` | AWS hard limit is 1000 rules per security group | +| `max_ec2_instance_age_in_days` | `1..1095` days | 3 years | +| `ec2_high_risk_ports` | each port `1..65535` | port 0 is reserved | +| `max_idle_disconnect_timeout_in_seconds` | `60..1800` s | NIST AC-12: cap at 30 min | +| `max_disconnect_timeout_in_seconds` | `60..3600` s | | +| `max_session_duration_seconds` | `600..86400` s | 10 min .. 24 h (AppStream per-session hard limit) | +| `lambda_min_azs` | `1..6` | | +| `recommended_cdk_bootstrap_version` | `1..100` | | +| `log_group_retention_days` | one of `1, 3, 5, 7, 14, 30, 60, 90, 120, 150, 180, 365, 400, 545, 731, 1096, 1827, 2192, 2557, 2922, 3288, 3653` | only the CloudWatch Logs API-accepted retention values | +| `threat_detection_privilege_escalation_threshold` | `0.0..1.0` | fraction of suspicious actions | +| `threat_detection_privilege_escalation_minutes` | `5..43200` min | under 5 min the signal is mostly false positives | +| `threat_detection_enumeration_threshold` | `0.0..1.0` | | +| `threat_detection_enumeration_minutes` | `5..43200` min | | +| `threat_detection_llm_jacking_threshold` | `0.0..1.0` | | +| `threat_detection_llm_jacking_minutes` | `5..43200` min | | +| `days_to_expire_threshold` (ACM) | `7..365` days | PCI-DSS 4.2.1.1: alert ≥30 days before expiry | +| `elb_min_azs` | `1..6` | | +| `elbv2_min_azs` | `1..6` | | +| `minimum_snapshot_retention_period` | `1..35` days | ElastiCache service hard limit | +| `max_days_secret_unused` | `7..365` days | | +| `max_days_secret_unrotated` | `1..180` days | NIST IA-5: rotate quarterly; CIS ≤90 | +| `min_kinesis_stream_retention_hours` | `24..8760` h | 1 day .. 1 year | +| `shodan_api_key` | ≤512 chars | | + +### Azure + +| Key | Allowed range | Notes | +|---|---|---| +| `vm_backup_min_daily_retention_days` | `7..9999` days | Azure Backup hard limit; under 7 days defeats DR/ransomware recovery | +| `apim_threat_detection_llm_jacking_threshold` | `0.0..1.0` | fraction of suspicious actions | +| `apim_threat_detection_llm_jacking_minutes` | `5..43200` min | under 5 min the signal is mostly false positives | +| `shodan_api_key` | ≤512 chars | | + +### GCP + +| Key | Allowed range | Notes | +|---|---|---| +| `mig_min_zones` | `1..5` | | +| `max_snapshot_age_days` | `1..1095` days | 3 years | +| `max_unused_account_days` | `30..365` days | | +| `storage_min_retention_days` | `1..3650` days | | +| `shodan_api_key` | ≤512 chars | | + +### Kubernetes + +| Key | Allowed range | Notes | +|---|---|---| +| `audit_log_maxbackup` | `2..1000` | CIS Kubernetes 1.2.18 recommends ≥10 | +| `audit_log_maxsize` | `10..10000` MB | CIS Kubernetes 1.2.19 recommends ≥100 MB | +| `audit_log_maxage` | `7..3650` days | CIS Kubernetes 1.2.17 recommends ≥30 days | + +### M365 + +| Key | Allowed range | Notes | +|---|---|---| +| `sign_in_frequency` | `1..168` h | 1 h .. 7 days; Conditional Access baseline for admins ≤24 h | +| `recommended_mailtips_large_audience_threshold` | `5..10000` | Microsoft default 25 | +| `audit_log_age` | `30..3650` days | M365 E3 default 90 days; SEC/FINRA require ≥7 years | + +### GitHub + +| Key | Allowed range | Notes | +|---|---|---| +| `inactive_not_archived_days_threshold` | `30..3650` days | CIS GitHub recommends 180 | + +### Cloudflare + +| Key | Allowed range | Notes | +|---|---|---| +| `max_retries` | `0..10` | 0 disables retries | + +### MongoDB Atlas + +| Key | Allowed range | Notes | +|---|---|---| +| `max_service_account_secret_validity_hours` | `1..720` h | 1 h .. 30 days | + +### Vercel + +| Key | Allowed range | Notes | +|---|---|---| +| `days_to_expire_threshold` | `7..365` days | PCI-DSS 4.2.1.1: alert ≥30 days before expiry | +| `stale_token_threshold_days` | `30..3650` days | NIST AC-2(3) typical window 30..90 days | +| `stale_invitation_threshold_days` | `7..365` days | | +| `max_owner_percentage` | `1..50` % | guidance recommends ≤25% | +| `max_owners` | `1..1000` | absolute cap, overrides percentage for large teams | + +These bounds live in the provider schemas under `prowler/config/schema/`; each field's `Field(ge=..., le=...)` (or `field_validator`) is the source of truth and the descriptions there carry the full rationale. + This approach ensures that checks are easily configurable, making Prowler highly adaptable to different environments and requirements. diff --git a/docs/developer-guide/end2end-testing.mdx b/docs/developer-guide/end2end-testing.mdx index 0a62251531..9013a32245 100644 --- a/docs/developer-guide/end2end-testing.mdx +++ b/docs/developer-guide/end2end-testing.mdx @@ -221,9 +221,9 @@ Before running E2E tests: ``` - **Ensure Prowler API is available** - - By default, Playwright uses `NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL=http://localhost:8080/api/v1` (configured in `playwright.config.ts`). + - By default, Playwright uses `UI_API_BASE_URL=http://localhost:8080/api/v1` (configured in `playwright.config.ts`). - Start Prowler API so it is reachable on that URL (for example, via `docker-compose-dev.yml` or the development orchestration used locally). - - If a different API URL is required, set `NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL` accordingly before running the tests. + - If a different API URL is required, set `UI_API_BASE_URL` accordingly before running the tests. - **Ensure Prowler App UI is available** - Playwright automatically starts the Next.js server through the `webServer` block in `playwright.config.ts` (`pnpm run dev` by default). diff --git a/docs/developer-guide/environment-variables.mdx b/docs/developer-guide/environment-variables.mdx new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1f4d17ee2e --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/developer-guide/environment-variables.mdx @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +--- +title: 'Environment Variable Naming Convention' +--- + +Prowler is a monorepo composed of several runtime components — Prowler App (the web user interface), Prowler API (the backend), Prowler SDK, and Prowler MCP Server (Model Context Protocol) — that frequently share a single `.env` file. To keep that shared configuration unambiguous, each component namespaces its environment variables with a component-specific prefix. + +## Component Prefixes + +Each component owns a dedicated prefix for the environment variables it reads: + +| Component | Prefix | Status | +|-----------|--------|--------| +| Prowler App (web UI) | `UI_` | Adopted | +| Prowler API (backend) | `API_` | Planned | +| Prowler SDK | `SDK_` | Planned | +| Prowler MCP Server | `MCP_` | Planned | + +## Why Component Prefixes Matter + +Component prefixes solve three concrete problems in a shared configuration file: + +- **Collisions in a shared `.env`:** Several components historically read identically named variables. The API base URL, for example, is consumed by more than one component, so a single unprefixed name is ambiguous. A component prefix removes that ambiguity. +- **Explicit ownership:** A prefix states, at a glance, which component consumes a variable. +- **Reduced accidental exposure:** For Prowler App, scoping browser-facing configuration under one intentional prefix prevents server-only values from leaking into the client bundle. + +## Prowler App + +Prowler App has adopted the `UI_` prefix. Its public configuration is resolved from the container environment at runtime rather than inlined at build time, so a single pre-built image serves any deployment. For the operational details on changing these values without rebuilding the image, see [Troubleshooting](/troubleshooting). + +The former build-time variables map to the new runtime variables as follows: + +| Former variable | New variable | +|-----------------|--------------| +| `NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL` | `UI_API_BASE_URL` | +| `NEXT_PUBLIC_API_DOCS_URL` | `UI_API_DOCS_URL` | +| `NEXT_PUBLIC_GOOGLE_TAG_MANAGER_ID` | `UI_GOOGLE_TAG_MANAGER_ID` | +| `NEXT_PUBLIC_SENTRY_DSN`, `SENTRY_DSN` | `UI_SENTRY_DSN` | +| `NEXT_PUBLIC_SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT`, `SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT` | `UI_SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT` | + +The build-time-only Sentry variables used for source-map upload — `SENTRY_ORG`, `SENTRY_PROJECT`, `SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN`, and `SENTRY_RELEASE` — keep their names, as they are not part of the App's runtime configuration. + +## Upcoming Breaking Change + + +Adopting the `API_`, `SDK_`, and `MCP_` prefixes for Prowler API, Prowler SDK, and Prowler MCP Server is a planned breaking change in a future release. Migrate environment configuration to the new names when upgrading. + + +Prowler API, Prowler SDK, and Prowler MCP Server have not yet adopted the convention. In a future release, the variables each of these components reads will be namespaced under `API_`, `SDK_`, and `MCP_` respectively. The per-component mapping from current to prefixed names will be documented when each change is released. + +## Deprecated Names + +- **Prowler App:** The bare server-side `SENTRY_DSN` and `SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT` are no longer read; the server and edge runtimes now read `UI_SENTRY_DSN` and `UI_SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT`. The former `NEXT_PUBLIC_*` build-time variables are deprecated but still read at runtime as a fallback when the matching `UI_*` variable is unset. This fallback will be removed in a future release, so set the `UI_*` runtime variables on the running container. +- **Prowler API, Prowler SDK, and Prowler MCP Server:** The current, unprefixed variable names are deprecated. They continue to work today and will be removed once the prefixed convention is adopted for each component, as described in [Upcoming Breaking Change](#upcoming-breaking-change). diff --git a/docs/developer-guide/introduction.mdx b/docs/developer-guide/introduction.mdx index 117640c669..1d434912ef 100644 --- a/docs/developer-guide/introduction.mdx +++ b/docs/developer-guide/introduction.mdx @@ -108,6 +108,39 @@ uv sync source .venv/bin/activate ``` +### Running the Local API Development Stack + +For API development, Prowler provides a Makefile-based local stack in addition to the manual and Docker Compose workflows documented in the API README. PostgreSQL, Valkey, and Neo4j run with Docker Compose, while Django and the Celery worker run natively through `uv`. + +Before using this method, ensure `docker compose`, `tmux`, and `uv` are installed. + +This workflow is designed for macOS and should also work on Linux when Docker, `tmux`, and `uv` are available. Windows requires script changes before it can be supported. + +To start the local API stack, run: + +```shell +make dev +``` + +This command starts the required services, creates a `tmux` session with panes for the API, worker, and PostgreSQL logs, waits until the API responds, and prints the API URL and log file paths. The API is available at: + +```text +http://localhost:8080/api/v1 +``` + +Use these commands to manage the stack: + +```shell +make dev-setup # Bootstrap dependencies, migrations, and fixtures +make dev-attach # Attach to the tmux session +make dev-launch # Start the stack on fixed ports and attach +make dev-stop # Stop the tmux session and containers +make dev-clean # Remove stopped development containers +make dev-wipe # Stop everything and delete local development data +make dev-status # Show development container status +``` + +The UI is not started by this workflow. Start it separately by following the UI development instructions in the `ui/` directory. ### Pre-Commit Hooks diff --git a/docs/developer-guide/secret-scanning-checks.mdx b/docs/developer-guide/secret-scanning-checks.mdx new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5044366b7e --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/developer-guide/secret-scanning-checks.mdx @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +--- +title: 'Secret-Scanning Checks' +--- + +import { VersionBadge } from "/snippets/version-badge.mdx" + + + +Prowler scans audited resources for plaintext secrets using [Kingfisher](https://github.com/mongodb/kingfisher), an open-source secret-scanning engine that Prowler invokes as a subprocess. This guide explains the structure every secret-scanning check must follow to keep scanning correct and efficient on large accounts. + + +Since Prowler 5.32.0 the secret-scanning checks scan with Kingfisher. Earlier versions used the `detect-secrets` library. + + +## Overview + +Secret detection runs through a single helper in `prowler/lib/utils/utils.py`: + +- **`detect_secrets_scan_batch(payloads, excluded_secrets=..., validate=...)`** scans many payloads in chunked subprocess invocations and returns a `{key: [findings]}` dictionary. To scan a single payload, pass a one-entry mapping (for example, `{0: data}`). + +Every Kingfisher invocation carries a fixed process-startup cost (around 100 ms). Scanning once per resource would spawn thousands of subprocesses on large accounts (for example, thousands of CloudWatch log groups). `detect_secrets_scan_batch` amortizes that cost: it writes each payload to a temporary file as it consumes them, runs one subprocess per chunk (500 payloads by default), and maps the findings back to each payload by key. + +## The Batched Structure + +Every secret-scanning check follows three phases. + +### Phase 1: Collect + +Define a generator that yields `(key, payload)` for each scannable unit. The generator builds payload strings only — it does not call Kingfisher. Lazy yielding keeps memory and temporary-disk usage bounded to a single chunk, which matters when an account holds thousands of resources. + +### Phase 2: Batch + +Call `detect_secrets_scan_batch` once with the generator. The helper consumes it in chunks, runs Kingfisher per chunk, and returns the keys that produced findings mapped to their finding lists. + +### Phase 3: Report + +Iterate the resources, look up the findings by key, and build one report per resource. Emit a finding for **every** iterated resource — never drop one silently. When a resource's payload cannot be prepared for scanning (for example, user data that fails to base64-decode or decompress), report it as `MANUAL` with a status explaining the scan could not inspect it, rather than omitting it or claiming `PASS`. + +```python +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_AWS +from prowler.lib.utils.utils import ( + annotate_verified_secrets, + detect_secrets_scan_batch, +) +from prowler.providers.aws.services.example.example_client import example_client + + +class example_resource_no_secrets(Check): + def execute(self): + findings = [] + excluded = example_client.audit_config.get("secrets_ignore_patterns", []) + validate = example_client.audit_config.get("secrets_validate", False) + resources = list(example_client.resources) + + # Phase 1: collect — builds strings only, no scan. + def payloads(): + for index, resource in enumerate(resources): + if resource.scannable_data: + yield index, serialize(resource) + + # Phase 2: batch — one call, chunked subprocesses. + batch_results = detect_secrets_scan_batch( + payloads(), excluded_secrets=excluded, validate=validate + ) + + # Phase 3: report — look up findings by key. + for index, resource in enumerate(resources): + report = Check_Report_AWS(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=resource) + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"No secrets found in {resource.name}." + detect_secrets_output = batch_results.get(index) + if detect_secrets_output: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Potential secret found in {resource.name} -> ..." + ) + annotate_verified_secrets(report, detect_secrets_output) + findings.append(report) + + return findings +``` + +## Choosing the Key + +The key maps each finding back to its source. Two shapes cover every check: + +- **One payload per resource:** use the resource index. This fits checks that serialize a single payload per resource, such as launch configurations, CloudFormation outputs, SSM documents, Step Functions definitions, and OpenStack metadata. +- **Several payloads per resource:** use a `(resource_index, fragment)` tuple, where the fragment identifies the variable, log stream, container, file, or version. Phase 3 groups the per-fragment findings to build the resource report. This fits CloudWatch log streams, ECS containers, CodeBuild variables, Glue arguments, and Lambda code files. + +Derive the indices from the same `list(...)` of resources in both Phase 1 and Phase 3 so the order stays stable and the keys align. + +## Preserving Per-Payload Results + +`detect_secrets_scan_batch` runs Kingfisher with `--no-dedup`, so a secret that appears in more than one payload is reported for each one. This reproduces the result of scanning each payload individually. Build payload strings exactly as a single scan would: serialize the same data and keep line ordering, because messages often map a finding's `line_number` back to a variable name or metadata key. + +## Validation and Severity + +`detect_secrets_scan_batch` accepts `validate`, read from `secrets_validate` in the provider configuration or the `--scan-secrets-validate` flag. When enabled, Kingfisher confirms whether each secret is live, and confirmed secrets carry `is_verified: True`. + +After marking a report as `FAIL`, pass the findings to `annotate_verified_secrets(report, findings)`. When any secret is verified, the helper escalates the finding to critical severity and appends a note that the secret was confirmed live. Validation stays off by default because it sends the discovered secret to the provider API. + +## Excluded Secrets + +`detect_secrets_scan_batch` applies `secrets_ignore_patterns` — regular expressions from the provider configuration — against each finding's source line and drops the matches, mirroring single-scan behavior. + +## Testing + +To assert on the verified-secret path, mock `detect_secrets_scan_batch` in the check module and return the keyed dictionary. For a single resource scanned at index `0`: + +```python +mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.example.example_resource_no_secrets.example_resource_no_secrets.detect_secrets_scan_batch", + return_value={ + 0: [{"type": "...", "line_number": 1, "is_verified": True}] + }, +) +``` + +Most tests need no mock at all: they seed resources that contain example secrets and assert on the `FAIL` status and message, which exercises the real batched path. Refer to the [Testing](/developer-guide/unit-testing) documentation for the general structure. diff --git a/docs/developer-guide/security-compliance-framework.mdx b/docs/developer-guide/security-compliance-framework.mdx index 030d876aab..75392ed3a7 100644 --- a/docs/developer-guide/security-compliance-framework.mdx +++ b/docs/developer-guide/security-compliance-framework.mdx @@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ title: 'Creating a New Security Compliance Framework in Prowler' --- +import { VersionBadge } from "/snippets/version-badge.mdx" + This guide explains how to add a new security compliance framework to Prowler, end to end. It covers directory layout, the two supported JSON schemas (universal and legacy), the Pydantic models that validate each framework, check mapping conventions, output formatting, local validation, testing, and the pull request process. ## Introduction @@ -23,7 +25,7 @@ Requirement coverage feeds the compliance percentage calculations and the metada | **Universal (recommended for new frameworks)** | Multi-provider frameworks, or single-provider frameworks that benefit from declarative table/PDF rendering | `prowler/compliance/.json` (top-level) | Available for **every** provider whose key appears in any `requirement.checks` dict | | **Legacy provider-specific** | Single-provider frameworks with framework-specific attribute classes already declared in the codebase (CIS, ENS, ISO 27001, etc.) | `prowler/compliance//__.json` | Available only under that provider | -Auto-discovery happens in `get_bulk_compliance_frameworks_universal(provider)` (`prowler/lib/check/compliance_models.py:915`), which scans **both** the top-level `prowler/compliance/` directory and every per-provider sub-directory. Legacy frameworks are transparently converted to the universal `ComplianceFramework` model via `adapt_legacy_to_universal()` before being returned, so the rest of Prowler — CLI table rendering, CSV/OCSF outputs, PDF generation — works the same regardless of the source schema. +Auto-discovery happens in `get_bulk_compliance_frameworks_universal(provider)` (`prowler/lib/check/compliance_models.py`), which scans **both** the top-level `prowler/compliance/` directory and every per-provider sub-directory. Legacy frameworks are transparently converted to the universal `ComplianceFramework` model via `adapt_legacy_to_universal()` before being returned, so the rest of Prowler — CLI table rendering, CSV/OCSF outputs, PDF generation — works the same regardless of the source schema. > The legacy entry-point `Compliance.get_bulk(provider)` (used by older code paths) only scans per-provider sub-directories. Universal top-level files are picked up exclusively via the universal loader; this matters if you are wiring a new code path against the legacy API. @@ -38,7 +40,7 @@ Before adding a new framework, complete the following checks: - **Verify the framework is not already supported.** Inspect `prowler/compliance/` and every `prowler/compliance//` for an existing JSON file matching the name and version. - **Confirm the required checks exist.** Every requirement that can be automated must point to one or more existing Prowler checks. For each missing check, implement it first by following the [Prowler Checks](/developer-guide/checks) guide. - **Review a reference framework.** Use an existing framework with a similar structure as your template: - - Universal: `prowler/compliance/dora.json`, `prowler/compliance/csa_ccm_4.0.json`. + - Universal: `prowler/compliance/dora_2022_2554.json`, `prowler/compliance/csa_ccm_4.0.json`. - Legacy: `prowler/compliance/aws/cis_2.0_aws.json` (canonical CIS shape), `prowler/compliance/aws/ccc_aws.json`, `prowler/compliance/aws/ens_rd2022_aws.json`, `prowler/compliance/aws/nist_800_53_revision_5_aws.json`. ## Universal Compliance Framework @@ -51,9 +53,9 @@ Place the file at the top level of the compliance directory: prowler/compliance/.json ``` -Examples in the repository: `prowler/compliance/csa_ccm_4.0.json`, `prowler/compliance/dora.json`. +Examples in the repository: `prowler/compliance/csa_ccm_4.0.json`, `prowler/compliance/dora_2022_2554.json`. -The file is auto-discovered — there is **no** need to register it in any `__init__.py`, modify `prowler/lib/outputs/`, or update any other Python module. The framework key Prowler CLI accepts via `--compliance` is the basename of the JSON file without `.json` (`dora.json` → `dora`). +The file is auto-discovered — there is **no** need to register it in any `__init__.py`, modify `prowler/lib/outputs/`, or update any other Python module. The framework key Prowler CLI accepts via `--compliance` is the basename of the JSON file without `.json` (`dora_2022_2554.json` → `dora_2022_2554`). ### Top-level structure @@ -70,13 +72,13 @@ The file is auto-discovered — there is **no** need to register it in any `__in } ``` -A `provider` field at the top level is **optional**. The framework's effective provider list is derived by `ComplianceFramework.get_providers()` (`compliance_models.py:739`) from the union of all keys appearing in `requirement.checks` across all requirements; the explicit `provider` field is used **only as a fallback** when no requirement carries any `checks` key. This is what enables a single file (e.g. `dora.json`) to cover AWS today and add Azure / GCP / etc. tomorrow without restructuring. +A `provider` field at the top level is **optional**. The framework's effective provider list is derived by `ComplianceFramework.get_providers()` (`compliance_models.py`) from the union of all keys appearing in `requirement.checks` across all requirements; the explicit `provider` field is used **only as a fallback** when no requirement carries any `checks` key. This is what enables a single file (e.g. `dora_2022_2554.json`) to cover AWS today and add Azure / GCP / etc. tomorrow without restructuring. Provider keys inside `requirement.checks` must match the directory names under `prowler/providers/`. The valid keys at present are: `aws`, `azure`, `gcp`, `m365`, `kubernetes`, `iac`, `github`, `googleworkspace`, `alibabacloud`, `cloudflare`, `mongodbatlas`, `nhn`, `openstack`, `oraclecloud`, `llm`. Comparison in `supports_provider()` is case-insensitive, but lowercase is the convention used everywhere in the repository. ### `attributes_metadata` -Declares the shape of the per-requirement `attributes` dict. When this field is present, the root validator `validate_attributes_against_metadata` (`compliance_models.py:669`) enforces the schema at load time and rejects: +Declares the shape of the per-requirement `attributes` dict. When this field is present, the root validator `validate_attributes_against_metadata` (`compliance_models.py`) enforces the schema at load time and rejects: - Missing keys marked `required: true`. - Keys present in `attributes` but not declared in `attributes_metadata` (typo / drift guard). @@ -192,6 +194,7 @@ Per requirement: - `name`: short title shown alongside the id. - `attributes`: flat dict; keys must conform to `attributes_metadata`. - `checks`: dict keyed by provider name (the same lowercase keys listed in the previous section). Each value is a list of Prowler check names that evidence this requirement for that provider. The list **may be empty** and the dict itself defaults to `{}` if omitted; either way the requirement is still loaded and listed by `--list-compliance-requirements`, it just has zero checks to execute. Note: there is **no automatic check-existence validation** at load time — referencing a non-existent check name will silently produce a requirement with no findings. Validate this yourself (see "Validating Your Framework" below). +- `config_requirements`: optional list of configuration guardrails. Each entry asserts that a configurable check referenced by this requirement ran with a configuration strict enough to actually satisfy the requirement; otherwise the requirement is forced to FAIL. See [Configuration Guardrails for Requirements](#configuration-guardrails-for-requirements) for the full schema and semantics. In the universal schema the field name is lowercase (`config_requirements`); legacy files use `ConfigRequirements`. For MITRE-style frameworks, additional optional fields are available on the requirement: `tactics`, `sub_techniques`, `platforms`, `technique_url` (these are populated automatically when adapting a legacy MITRE JSON to the universal model). @@ -258,7 +261,7 @@ prowler/lib/outputs/compliance// ### JSON schema reference -Every legacy compliance file is a JSON document with the following top-level keys. `Framework`, `Name` and `Provider` are validated non-empty by the root validator `framework_and_provider_must_not_be_empty` (`compliance_models.py:329`). +Every legacy compliance file is a JSON document with the following top-level keys. `Framework`, `Name` and `Provider` are validated non-empty by the root validator `framework_and_provider_must_not_be_empty` (`compliance_models.py`). | Field | Type | Required | Description | |---|---|---|---| @@ -280,10 +283,11 @@ Each entry in `Requirements` describes one control or requirement. | `Description` | string | Yes | Verbatim description from the source framework. | | `Attributes` | array | Yes | List of [attribute objects](#attribute-objects). The shape depends on the framework. | | `Checks` | array of strings | Yes | Prowler check identifiers that automate the requirement. Leave the list empty when the control cannot be automated. | +| `ConfigRequirements` | array of objects | No | Optional [configuration guardrails](#configuration-guardrails-for-requirements). Each entry asserts that a configurable check ran with a configuration strict enough to satisfy the requirement; when it did not, the requirement is forced to FAIL. | #### Attribute Objects -`Attributes` is parsed against the union declared in `Compliance_Requirement.Attributes` (`compliance_models.py:293`). Pydantic v1 tries each member of the union in declaration order and falls back to `Generic_Compliance_Requirement_Attribute` (the last entry) when nothing else matches — so a brand-new shape that doesn't match any existing class will silently be accepted as Generic, losing its specific fields. +`Attributes` is parsed against the union declared in `Compliance_Requirement.Attributes` (`compliance_models.py`). Pydantic v1 tries each member of the union in declaration order and falls back to `Generic_Compliance_Requirement_Attribute` (the last entry) when nothing else matches — so a brand-new shape that doesn't match any existing class will silently be accepted as Generic, losing its specific fields. As of today, the registered attribute classes are: `CIS_Requirement_Attribute`, `ENS_Requirement_Attribute`, `ASDEssentialEight_Requirement_Attribute`, `ISO27001_2013_Requirement_Attribute`, `AWS_Well_Architected_Requirement_Attribute`, `KISA_ISMSP_Requirement_Attribute`, `Prowler_ThreatScore_Requirement_Attribute`, `CCC_Requirement_Attribute`, `C5Germany_Requirement_Attribute`, `CSA_CCM_Requirement_Attribute`, and `Generic_Compliance_Requirement_Attribute` (fallback). MITRE-style frameworks use the separate `Mitre_Requirement` model with `Tactics` / `SubTechniques` / `Platforms` / `TechniqueURL` at the requirement top level. The most common shapes are summarized below. @@ -472,13 +476,188 @@ For NIST-style catalogs that use `Generic_Compliance_Requirement_Attribute`, no ### Legacy-to-universal adapter -At load time, every legacy file is transparently adapted to a `ComplianceFramework` via `adapt_legacy_to_universal()` (`compliance_models.py:819`), which: (a) flattens the first element of `Attributes` into a flat `attributes` dict, (b) wraps `Checks` as `{provider_lower: [...]}`, (c) infers `attributes_metadata` from the matched Pydantic class via `_infer_attribute_metadata()`. The rest of Prowler (CSV/OCSF/PDF output, CLI table) then treats both formats identically. +At load time, every legacy file is transparently adapted to a `ComplianceFramework` via `adapt_legacy_to_universal()` (`compliance_models.py`), which: (a) flattens the first element of `Attributes` into a flat `attributes` dict, (b) wraps `Checks` as `{provider_lower: [...]}`, (c) infers `attributes_metadata` from the matched Pydantic class via `_infer_attribute_metadata()`. The rest of Prowler (CSV/OCSF/PDF output, CLI table) then treats both formats identically. Loader-error behaviour differs between the two entry points: -- `load_compliance_framework()` (legacy) is **fail-fast**: it calls `sys.exit(1)` on any `ValidationError` (`compliance_models.py:464`). +- `load_compliance_framework()` (legacy) is **fail-fast**: it calls `sys.exit(1)` on any `ValidationError` (`compliance_models.py`). - `load_compliance_framework_universal()` is more lenient — it logs the error and returns `None`, so `get_bulk_compliance_frameworks_universal()` simply skips the broken file and keeps loading the rest. +## Configuration Guardrails for Requirements + + + +Some requirements are only truly satisfied when the configurable checks behind them ran with a configuration strict enough to meet the control. A [configurable check](/developer-guide/configurable-checks) reads thresholds from the scan's `audit_config`, so loosening a value can make the check PASS while the requirement it backs is, in fact, not satisfied. + +A worked example: CIS AWS 6.0 requirement 2.11 ("credentials unused for 45 days or more are disabled") maps to `iam_user_accesskey_unused`, which is driven by the `max_unused_access_keys_days` config key. If a user raises that value to `120`, the check passes for a key unused for 90 days — yet the requirement explicitly demands a 45-day threshold, so the PASS is misleading. + +Configuration guardrails close that gap. A requirement declares the configuration it expects, and when the scan ran with a configuration too loose to honor it, the requirement is forced to **FAIL** in every compliance output, with the reason surfaced in the finding's extended status. + + +Guardrails are an **optional** safety net for configurable checks. A requirement that maps only to non-configurable checks does not need them. When the field is absent, behavior is unchanged. + + +### Where guardrails are declared + +The field is attached to each requirement and exists in both schemas: + +- **Legacy** (`prowler/compliance//...`): `ConfigRequirements`, a list of objects, validated against the `Compliance_Requirement_ConfigConstraint` Pydantic model (`prowler/lib/check/compliance_models.py`). +- **Universal** (`prowler/compliance/...`): `config_requirements`, the same list of objects as plain dicts on `UniversalComplianceRequirement`. + +When a legacy file is adapted to the universal model, `adapt_legacy_to_universal()` copies `ConfigRequirements` into `config_requirements` (`compliance_models.py`), so downstream code only ever reads one shape. + +### Constraint schema + +Each entry in the list is a single constraint with the following fields: + +| Field | Type | Required | Description | +|---|---|---|---| +| `Check` | string | Yes | The configurable check this constraint guards. Should be one of the requirement's `Checks`. Used only to build a human-readable reason. | +| `ConfigKey` | string | Yes | The `audit_config` key the check reads (for example `max_unused_access_keys_days`). | +| `Operator` | enum | Yes | How to compare the applied value against `Value`. One of `lte`, `gte`, `eq`, `in`, `subset`, `superset`. | +| `Value` | bool, int, float, string, or list | Yes | The strictest configuration the requirement tolerates. The accepted Python type depends on the operator (see below). | +| `Provider` | string | No | The provider this constraint applies to (e.g. `aws`). **Required for universal (multi-provider) frameworks**, where the same requirement maps checks across providers — the constraint is only evaluated when the scanned provider matches. Single-provider (legacy) frameworks omit it. | + +### Operators + +| Operator | Applied value satisfies the guardrail when… | Typical use | +|---|---|---| +| `lte` | `applied <= Value` | Maximum-age / maximum-count thresholds (e.g. `max_unused_access_keys_days <= 45`). | +| `gte` | `applied >= Value` | Minimum-retention / minimum-count thresholds. | +| `eq` | `applied == Value` | Boolean toggles or an exact required value (e.g. `mute_non_default_regions == false`). | +| `in` | `applied` is one of `Value` (a list) | The applied scalar must belong to an allowed set. | +| `subset` | `set(applied) <= set(Value)` | **Allowlist** configs — every applied value must already be permitted. Widening the allowlist with a weaker value (e.g. adding TLS `1.0` to `recommended_minimal_tls_versions`) breaks the guardrail. | +| `superset` | `set(applied) >= set(Value)` | **Denylist** configs — every forbidden value must remain forbidden. Removing an entry from a denylist (e.g. dropping a weak algorithm from `insecure_key_algorithms`) breaks the guardrail. | + + +`subset` / `superset` require both the applied value and `Value` to be lists; any other type is treated as not satisfied. For `eq` against a boolean, declare `Value` as a JSON boolean (`false`, not `0`) — the model keeps booleans distinct from integers. + + +### How guardrails are evaluated + +All evaluation lives in one shared module, `prowler/lib/check/compliance_config_eval.py`, consumed by every compliance output (CSV, OCSF, and the CLI tables) and reused by the Prowler App backend so the rule is defined exactly once. + +1. The applied configuration is the scan-global `audit_config` (the same mapping for every resource and region), resolved via `get_scan_audit_config()`. +2. For each requirement that declares constraints, `evaluate_config_constraints()` walks the list and returns `(is_compliant, reason)`. The requirement is compliant when **every** explicitly-set key satisfies its constraint. +3. A constraint tagged with a `Provider` that does **not** match the provider being scanned (resolved via `get_scan_provider_type()`) is **skipped**. This scopes a universal framework's constraints to the right provider, so a guardrail authored for an AWS check never affects a GCP or Azure scan of the same requirement. Untagged constraints (legacy single-provider frameworks) always apply. +4. A constraint whose `ConfigKey` is **not present** in `audit_config` is **skipped** — the check's built-in default is assumed to already match what the requirement expects. This is why nothing changes for the default configuration. +5. When a constraint is violated, the finding's status is overridden to `FAIL` and a plain-language explanation is prepended to `status_extended` (via `apply_config_status()`). The message opens with `Configuration not valid for this requirement.` and names the check, the value the scan applied, what the requirement needs and how to fix it. For the table generators, `get_effective_status()` applies the same FAIL roll-up so per-section counts stay consistent. + + +Guardrails only ever make a result **stricter** (they can turn PASS into FAIL); they never relax a real FAIL into PASS. A requirement with no constraints, or whose keys all use defaults, is reported exactly as before. + + +### Example: legacy framework + +From `prowler/compliance/aws/cis_6.0_aws.json`, requirement 2.11 declares two guardrails — one per configurable check it maps to: + +```json title="prowler/compliance/aws/cis_6.0_aws.json" +{ + "Id": "2.11", + "Description": "Ensure credentials unused for 45 days or more are disabled.", + "Checks": [ + "iam_user_accesskey_unused", + "iam_user_console_access_unused" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "iam_user_accesskey_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_access_keys_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_user_console_access_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_console_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45 + } + ], + "Attributes": [ /* ... */ ] +} +``` + +A boolean guardrail from the same file: requirement 2.5 (IAM Access Analyzer) only holds when regions are not muted, so a scan with `mute_non_default_regions: true` cannot be trusted for it: + +```json +"ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } +] +``` + +### Example: universal framework + +The universal schema uses the lowercase `config_requirements` key with the identical object shape: + +```json +{ + "id": "MF-2.1", + "name": "Restrict TLS to modern versions", + "description": "Endpoints must negotiate only TLS 1.2 or higher.", + "checks": { + "aws": ["elbv2_listener_ssl_listeners"] + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "elbv2_listener_ssl_listeners", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_minimal_tls_versions", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": ["TLS 1.2", "TLS 1.3"] + } + ] +} +``` + +Each constraint declares the `Provider` it targets so the guardrail is only evaluated on scans of that provider — essential for universal frameworks like CSA CCM and DORA, where one requirement maps checks across `aws`, `azure`, `gcp` and more. Because the operator is `subset`, adding `"TLS 1.0"` to `recommended_minimal_tls_versions` widens the allowlist beyond `["TLS 1.2", "TLS 1.3"]` and the requirement is forced to FAIL. + +### What the user sees + +With a loosened config, the affected requirement's findings report: + +```text +Status: FAIL +StatusExtended: Configuration not valid for this requirement. The check + iam_user_accesskey_unused has max_unused_access_keys_days set + to 120, but the requirement needs a value of 45 or lower. + Update it to 45 or lower. +``` + +The same `Configuration not valid for this requirement.` message appears identically across the CSV, OCSF, and console-table outputs. + +### Authoring guidelines + +- Declare a guardrail only for keys whose value actually changes whether the requirement is met. Most configurable checks do not need one. +- Set `Value` to the **strictest** configuration the control tolerates — the same number the control text cites (CIS 45 days, NIST ≤90, and so on). +- Keep `ConfigKey` spelled exactly as the check reads it from `audit_config`; an unknown key is never present in the config and the constraint is silently skipped. +- In a **universal (multi-provider) framework**, always set `Provider` to the provider that owns `Check` — otherwise the guardrail would leak onto scans of the other providers the requirement maps. Legacy single-provider files omit it. +- Pick the operator from the value's role: a max threshold is `lte`, a min threshold is `gte`, a toggle is `eq`, an allowlist is `subset`, a denylist is `superset`. +- An unrecognized operator does **not** block the requirement — a malformed constraint is treated as satisfied rather than failing the whole framework. Validate your JSON with the tests below. + +### Testing guardrails + +The shared evaluator and the per-output integration are covered by: + +- `tests/lib/check/compliance_config_eval_test.py` — operator semantics, skipped-key behavior, and the FAIL override. +- `tests/lib/check/compliance_config_constraint_model_test.py` — model validation (types, operator enum, bool-vs-int). +- `tests/lib/check/compliance_config_requirements_data_test.py` — sanity-checks the guardrails shipped in the JSON catalog. +- Per-output tests under `tests/lib/outputs/compliance/` (CIS AWS/Azure, ENS AWS, OCSF, universal table) confirm the override reaches each format. + +Run them with: + +```bash +uv run pytest -n auto \ + tests/lib/check/compliance_config_eval_test.py \ + tests/lib/check/compliance_config_constraint_model_test.py \ + tests/lib/check/compliance_config_requirements_data_test.py \ + tests/lib/outputs/compliance/ +``` + ## Version handling Prowler matches frameworks by concatenating `Framework` and `Version`. A missing or empty `Version` collapses several frameworks to the same key and breaks CLI filtering with `--compliance`. @@ -493,7 +672,7 @@ Before opening a PR, validate the JSON loads cleanly against the model and that ### 1. Schema validation -For **universal** frameworks, load the file and inspect what was parsed. The framework key inside `bulk` is the **basename of the JSON file** (without `.json`); for `prowler/compliance/dora.json` that key is `dora`, for `prowler/compliance/aws/cis_5.0_aws.json` it is `cis_5.0_aws`. +For **universal** frameworks, load the file and inspect what was parsed. The framework key inside `bulk` is the **basename of the JSON file** (without `.json`); for `prowler/compliance/dora_2022_2554.json` that key is `dora_2022_2554`, for `prowler/compliance/aws/cis_5.0_aws.json` it is `cis_5.0_aws`. ```python from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import ( @@ -609,7 +788,7 @@ The following issues are the most common when contributing a compliance framewor - **`ValidationError: field required` during scan (legacy).** The JSON is missing a required attribute field. Re-check the matching Pydantic model in `prowler/lib/check/compliance_models.py`. - **All attributes collapse to `Generic_Compliance_Requirement_Attribute` values (legacy).** The Pydantic `Union` is ordered incorrectly, or the JSON matches only the generic shape. Keep the generic model in the last Union position and ensure every required field is present in the JSON. -- **`attributes_metadata validation failed` (universal).** The root validator in `compliance_models.py:669` rejected the file. The error message lists each offending requirement; common causes are unknown attribute keys (typo or missing entry in `attributes_metadata`), enum violations, or missing required keys. +- **`attributes_metadata validation failed` (universal).** The root validator in `compliance_models.py` rejected the file. The error message lists each offending requirement; common causes are unknown attribute keys (typo or missing entry in `attributes_metadata`), enum violations, or missing required keys. - **`--compliance` filter does not find the framework.** For legacy: the filename does not match `__.json`, the version is empty, or the file lives outside `prowler/compliance//`. For universal: the file is not at the top level of `prowler/compliance/` or it loaded as `None` (check logs for the validation error). - **CLI summary table is empty but the CSV is populated (legacy).** The dispatcher branch in `prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/compliance.py` is missing or its substring match does not catch the framework key. - **CSV file is missing after the scan (legacy).** The transformer class is not registered in `prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/compliance_output.py`, or `transform()` raises silently. Run the scan with `--log-level DEBUG`. @@ -619,7 +798,7 @@ The following issues are the most common when contributing a compliance framewor Use the following files as templates when modeling a new contribution. -- `prowler/compliance/dora.json` — universal schema, single-provider populated (AWS), ready to extend with more providers. +- `prowler/compliance/dora_2022_2554.json` — universal schema, single-provider populated (AWS), ready to extend with more providers. - `prowler/compliance/csa_ccm_4.0.json` — universal schema, multi-provider populated (AWS, Azure, GCP, AlibabaCloud, OracleCloud). - `prowler/compliance/aws/cis_2.0_aws.json` — legacy CIS attribute shape. - `prowler/compliance/aws/nist_800_53_revision_5_aws.json` — legacy generic attribute shape. diff --git a/docs/developer-guide/server-sent-events.mdx b/docs/developer-guide/server-sent-events.mdx new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c91f27227f --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/developer-guide/server-sent-events.mdx @@ -0,0 +1,241 @@ +--- +title: 'Server-Sent Events (SSE)' +--- + +import { VersionBadge } from "/snippets/version-badge.mdx" + + + +This guide explains how to add a **Server-Sent Events (SSE)** endpoint to the Prowler API. SSE lets the backend push a one-way stream of events to a client over a single long-lived HTTP connection — ideal for live progress, token-by-token LLM output, or any "the server has news for you" use case where the client should not poll. + + +The platform ships the SSE **infrastructure** (`api.sse`) and wiring. No feature endpoint streams over SSE out of the box — this guide shows how to build one on top of the shared base. + + +## When to use SSE + +| Need | Use | +|------|-----| +| Server pushes incremental updates, client only reads | **SSE** | +| Bidirectional, low-latency messaging (chat both ways, games) | WebSocket | +| Client asks, server answers once | Plain REST | + +SSE is the right tool when the **client only consumes**: scan progress, long-running job checkpoints, streamed LLM tokens, cross-client resource-sync notifications. It rides on plain HTTP, reconnects automatically in the browser via the native [`EventSource`](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/EventSource) API, and needs no extra protocol. + +## How it works + +SSE is wired through [`django-eventstream`](https://github.com/fanout/django_eventstream) and a small platform layer in `api/src/backend/api/sse/`: + +| Piece | File | Responsibility | +|-------|------|----------------| +| `BaseSSEViewSet` | `api/sse/base_views.py` | Base DRF viewset a feature subclasses. The feature implements `get_channels`; the base handles auth, the tenant transaction, and delegates streaming to `django-eventstream`. | +| `SSEChannelManager` | `api/sse/channelmanager.py` | Registered in `settings.EVENTSTREAM_CHANNELMANAGER_CLASS`. Reads the channel set off the request and enforces the platform-wide tenant gate. | +| `SSEAuthentication` | `api/authentication.py` | Same JWT/API-key stack as the rest of the API, plus an `?access_token=` fallback for browser `EventSource` clients. Lives with the other authentication classes, not in the `sse` package. | +| `make_channel_name` / `tenant_id_from_channel` | `api/sse/utils.py` | Single source of truth for the channel-name format, so publishers and the channel manager agree byte-for-byte. | +| Settings | `config/settings/eventstream.py` | Valkey Pub/Sub backend (dedicated DB), channel manager, allowed headers. | + +### Transport: the server runs on ASGI + +SSE connections are long-lived. Holding one open per synchronous worker would exhaust the worker pool, so the API runs under Gunicorn's native **`asgi` worker** (`config.asgi:application`). Streams are parked on the event loop while ordinary CRUD endpoints keep their synchronous execution (Django runs sync views in a thread-sensitive executor under ASGI). This is configured in `config/guniconf.py` and used by both the dev and production entrypoints — no separate server process is needed. + +### The data flow + +``` +publisher (Celery task / view) subscriber (browser, CLI) + │ │ + │ send_event(channel, "scan.progress", …) │ GET …/event-stream + ▼ ▼ + Valkey Pub/Sub ◄────────────────────► BaseSSEViewSet.list + (EVENTSTREAM_VALKEY_DB) → get_channels() (RLS-scoped) + → SSEChannelManager (tenant gate) + → StreamingHttpResponse (text/event-stream) +``` + +A publisher anywhere in the system (most often a Celery task) calls `send_event(channel, event_type, payload)`. `django-eventstream` fans it out over Valkey Pub/Sub to every connection subscribed to that channel. + +## Adding an SSE endpoint to your feature + +The example below streams progress for a long-running **scan**. Adapt the resource, prefix, and event names to your feature. + + + + + +Channels follow the format `::`, built only through `make_channel_name`. The prefix is owned by your feature and may contain hyphens but **never colons** (the parser splits on `:`). + +```python +CHANNEL_PREFIX = "scan-progress" +``` + +The tenant id is baked into every channel name. That is what lets the platform enforce cross-tenant isolation without knowing anything about your feature. + + + + + +Create the viewset for the SSE sub-resource. The only required method is `get_channels`; it runs inside the tenant transaction set up by the base class, so any database lookup inside it is automatically RLS-scoped. + +```python +# scans/event_streams.py +from api.sse import BaseSSEViewSet, make_channel_name +from django.shortcuts import get_object_or_404 +from scans.models import Scan + +CHANNEL_PREFIX = "scan-progress" + + +class ScanEventStreamViewSet(BaseSSEViewSet): + def get_queryset(self): + # RLS already scopes to the tenant; narrow further as needed + # (e.g. only scans the requesting user may see). + return Scan.objects.filter(tenant_id=self.request.tenant_id) + + def get_channels(self) -> set[str]: + scan = get_object_or_404(self.get_queryset(), pk=self.kwargs["scan_pk"]) + return {make_channel_name(CHANNEL_PREFIX, scan.tenant_id, scan.id)} +``` + + +`get_channels` **must raise** the relevant DRF exception (`NotFound`, `PermissionDenied`, `NotAuthenticated`) when authorization fails — `get_object_or_404` does this for you. Returning an empty set surfaces as django-eventstream's confusing "No channels specified" error instead of the real cause. + + + + + + +Mount the endpoint as an `event-stream` sub-resource. Keep it **outside the DRF router**, which would force the URL into a list/detail convention. Route the `get` method to the viewset's `list` action. + +```python +# scans/urls.py +path( + "scans//event-stream", + ScanEventStreamViewSet.as_view({"get": "list"}), + name="scan-event-stream", +), +``` + + + + + +A feature owns its event types in `//events.py`: one `publish_` function per event type, each body a **single** `send_event` call so the wire-level string lives in exactly one place. + +```python +# scans/events.py +from django_eventstream import send_event + + +def publish_progress(channel: str, checked: int, total: int) -> None: + send_event(channel, "scan.progress", {"checked": checked, "total": total}) + + +def publish_end(channel: str, scan_id: str) -> None: + # Terminal event carries the canonical id so reconnecting clients + # can refetch the persisted resource over REST. + send_event(channel, "scan.end", {"scan_id": scan_id}) + + +def publish_error(channel: str, code: str, detail: str) -> None: + send_event(channel, "scan.error", {"code": code, "detail": detail}) +``` + +There is no platform-side enum, registry, or dispatch table — **the naming convention is the contract** (see below). + + + + + +Wherever the work happens — usually a Celery task — build the channel the same way and publish: + +```python +from api.sse import make_channel_name +from scans.events import publish_progress, publish_end + +channel = make_channel_name("scan-progress", scan.tenant_id, scan.id) +publish_progress(channel, checked=42, total=100) +... +publish_end(channel, scan_id=str(scan.id)) +``` + + + + + +## Event naming convention + +Every event uses an event type of the form **`.`** (lowercased, dot-separated). The verb comes from this platform-wide vocabulary — if you need a verb that is not listed, document the addition in this guide so the catalog stays discoverable. + +| Verb | When to use | +|------|-------------| +| `delta` | An incremental piece of a stream the client concatenates (LLM text tokens, audio chunks). Standard term across OpenAI / Anthropic / LiteLLM / Vercel AI SDK. | +| `start` | Begin marker for a compound operation (e.g. a tool call whose execution will be reported by a matching `end`). | +| `end` | Terminal marker. Carries the canonical resource id so reconnecting clients can refetch persisted state via REST. | +| `progress` | Periodic checkpoint with quantifiable completion, e.g. `{"checked": 42, "total": 100}`. | +| `created` / `updated` / `deleted` | Resource-lifecycle events for cross-client sync streams. | +| `error` | Terminal failure. Carries a stable `code` for client switching and a human-readable `detail`. | + + +Payloads are **flat JSON**. The wire-level `event:` field already names the event type, so do **not** wrap the payload in `{"type": ..., "data": ...}`. Include the canonical resource UUID on terminal events so reconnecting clients can reconcile via REST. + + +## Authentication + +SSE endpoints use the same authentication stack as the rest of the API. Non-browser clients (CLI, programmatic) send the standard `Authorization` header — JWT or API key. + +Browser `EventSource` is the only widely available SSE client API and it **cannot set custom headers**. For that case only, the endpoint accepts a JWT via the `?access_token=` query parameter. The header always wins when present — a header is intentional, while a query parameter can leak into referers and logs, so it is consulted only as a fallback. + +```javascript +// Browser +const es = new EventSource( + `/api/v1/scans/${scanId}/event-stream?access_token=${jwt}` +); +``` + +```bash +# CLI / programmatic — header, exactly like every other endpoint +curl -N -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" \ + https:///api/v1/scans/$SCAN_ID/event-stream +``` + +## Tenant isolation & security model + +Authorization is enforced at two layers: + +1. **At connect**, `get_channels` runs under the regular DRF stack inside the tenant transaction (`rls_transaction`). Resource lookups are RLS-scoped, so a user cannot even resolve a channel for a resource they cannot see. Narrow the queryset further (e.g. `created_by=request.user`) when a resource is per-user within a tenant. +2. **After connect**, `SSEChannelManager.can_read_channel` re-verifies tenant membership by parsing the tenant id embedded in the channel name. Cross-tenant subscription is rejected even if a URL-level check ever has a bug. A malformed channel name is treated as "not authorized". + +Because the tenant id lives inside the channel name, this gate works for any feature without the platform knowing anything about it. + +## Reconnect & state recovery + +The platform deliberately ships **without server-side replay** (`is_channel_reliable` returns `False`). When a client reconnects, it does **not** receive missed events. Instead: + +- Terminal events (`*.end`) carry the canonical resource **UUID**. +- On reconnect, the client refetches the authoritative state from the normal REST endpoint using that id. + +Design your event payloads accordingly: deltas are ephemeral and concatenated in-flight; the durable truth always lives behind a REST resource. + +## Local development + +- The dev and production entrypoints both launch Gunicorn with the `asgi` worker (`config.asgi:application`). In dev, `DJANGO_DEBUG=True` enables hot reload; `preload_app` is automatically disabled under debug so edited code is picked up. +- SSE uses a **dedicated Valkey database** (`EVENTSTREAM_VALKEY_DB`, default `2`) kept separate from the Celery broker so a noisy broker cannot crowd out streaming traffic. It reuses the same `VALKEY_*` connection settings as the rest of the platform. + +| Env var | Default | Purpose | +|---------|---------|---------| +| `EVENTSTREAM_VALKEY_DB` | `2` | Valkey DB index for the SSE Pub/Sub bus | +| `DJANGO_WORKER_CLASS` | `asgi` | Gunicorn worker class | + +Test the stream end to end with `curl -N` (disable buffering) and an auth header: + +```bash +curl -N -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" \ + http://localhost:8080/api/v1/scans/$SCAN_ID/event-stream +``` + +## Testing + +The platform basis is covered by `api/tests/test_sse.py` (channel parsing, the tenant gate, and auth precedence). For a feature endpoint, test: + +- `get_channels` returns the expected channel for an authorized resource and raises `NotFound`/`PermissionDenied` otherwise. +- Each `publish_` helper emits the correct event type and flat payload (mock `send_event`). +- The producer builds the channel with `make_channel_name` using the resource's own `tenant_id`. diff --git a/docs/docs.json b/docs/docs.json index e31575878e..cf98bbf0db 100644 --- a/docs/docs.json +++ b/docs/docs.json @@ -125,7 +125,9 @@ "user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-multi-tenant", "user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-api-keys", "user-guide/tutorials/prowler-import-findings", + "user-guide/tutorials/prowler-scan-scheduling", "user-guide/tutorials/prowler-alerts", + "user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-scan-configuration", { "group": "Mutelist", "expanded": true, @@ -359,6 +361,13 @@ "user-guide/providers/okta/getting-started-okta", "user-guide/providers/okta/authentication" ] + }, + { + "group": "Linode", + "pages": [ + "user-guide/providers/linode/getting-started-linode", + "user-guide/providers/linode/authentication" + ] } ] }, @@ -389,13 +398,15 @@ "developer-guide/provider", "developer-guide/services", "developer-guide/checks", + "developer-guide/secret-scanning-checks", "developer-guide/outputs", "developer-guide/integrations", "developer-guide/security-compliance-framework", "developer-guide/lighthouse-architecture", "developer-guide/mcp-server", "developer-guide/ai-skills", - "developer-guide/prowler-studio" + "developer-guide/prowler-studio", + "developer-guide/server-sent-events" ] }, { @@ -416,6 +427,7 @@ "group": "Miscellaneous", "pages": [ "developer-guide/documentation", + "developer-guide/environment-variables", { "group": "Testing", "pages": [ diff --git a/docs/getting-started/installation/prowler-app.mdx b/docs/getting-started/installation/prowler-app.mdx index eea9075cda..598b2ac44a 100644 --- a/docs/getting-started/installation/prowler-app.mdx +++ b/docs/getting-started/installation/prowler-app.mdx @@ -128,8 +128,8 @@ To update the environment file: Edit the `.env` file and change version values: ```env -PROWLER_UI_VERSION="5.30.0" -PROWLER_API_VERSION="5.30.0" +PROWLER_UI_VERSION="5.31.0" +PROWLER_API_VERSION="5.31.0" ``` diff --git a/docs/getting-started/installation/prowler-cli.mdx b/docs/getting-started/installation/prowler-cli.mdx index f87653dcfe..eae3d54ab1 100644 --- a/docs/getting-started/installation/prowler-cli.mdx +++ b/docs/getting-started/installation/prowler-cli.mdx @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ title: 'Installation' ## Installation -To install Prowler as a Python package, use `Python >= 3.10, <= 3.12`. Prowler is available as a project in [PyPI](https://pypi.org/project/prowler/): +To install Prowler as a Python package, use `Python >= 3.10, <= 3.13`. Prowler is available as a project in [PyPI](https://pypi.org/project/prowler/): @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ To install Prowler as a Python package, use `Python >= 3.10, <= 3.12`. Prowler i _Requirements_: - * `Python >= 3.10, <= 3.12` + * `Python >= 3.10, <= 3.13` * `pipx` installed: [pipx installation](https://pipx.pypa.io/stable/installation/). * AWS, GCP, Azure and/or Kubernetes credentials @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ To install Prowler as a Python package, use `Python >= 3.10, <= 3.12`. Prowler i _Requirements_: - * `Python >= 3.10, <= 3.12` + * `Python >= 3.10, <= 3.13` * `Python pip >= 21.0.0` * AWS, GCP, Azure, M365 and/or Kubernetes credentials @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ To install Prowler as a Python package, use `Python >= 3.10, <= 3.12`. Prowler i _Requirements_: - * `Python >= 3.10, <= 3.12` + * `Python >= 3.10, <= 3.13` * AWS, GCP, Azure and/or Kubernetes credentials _Commands_: @@ -96,8 +96,8 @@ To install Prowler as a Python package, use `Python >= 3.10, <= 3.12`. Prowler i _Requirements_: - * `Ubuntu 23.04` or above. For older Ubuntu versions, check [pipx installation](https://docs.prowler.com/projects/prowler-open-source/en/latest/#__tabbed_1_1) and ensure `Python >= 3.10, <= 3.12` is installed. - * `Python >= 3.10, <= 3.12` + * `Ubuntu 23.04` or above. For older Ubuntu versions, check [pipx installation](https://docs.prowler.com/projects/prowler-open-source/en/latest/#__tabbed_1_1) and ensure `Python >= 3.10, <= 3.13` is installed. + * `Python >= 3.10, <= 3.13` * AWS, GCP, Azure and/or Kubernetes credentials _Commands_: diff --git a/docs/images/prowler-app/scan-scheduling/edit-scan-schedule.png b/docs/images/prowler-app/scan-scheduling/edit-scan-schedule.png new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e76809b810 Binary files /dev/null and b/docs/images/prowler-app/scan-scheduling/edit-scan-schedule.png differ diff --git a/docs/images/prowler-app/scan-scheduling/launch-scan-schedule.png b/docs/images/prowler-app/scan-scheduling/launch-scan-schedule.png new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..980b16bf7f Binary files /dev/null and b/docs/images/prowler-app/scan-scheduling/launch-scan-schedule.png differ diff --git a/docs/images/prowler-app/scan-scheduling/providers-scan-schedule.png b/docs/images/prowler-app/scan-scheduling/providers-scan-schedule.png new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a7dab3310c Binary files /dev/null and b/docs/images/prowler-app/scan-scheduling/providers-scan-schedule.png differ diff --git a/docs/images/prowler-app/scan-scheduling/scheduled-scans-tab.png b/docs/images/prowler-app/scan-scheduling/scheduled-scans-tab.png new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..26b4b160ec Binary files /dev/null and b/docs/images/prowler-app/scan-scheduling/scheduled-scans-tab.png differ diff --git a/docs/introduction.mdx b/docs/introduction.mdx index fe530e4a4f..51a27eb555 100644 --- a/docs/introduction.mdx +++ b/docs/introduction.mdx @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ Prowler supports a wide range of providers organized by category: | [Azure](/user-guide/providers/azure/getting-started-azure) | Official | Subscriptions | UI, API, CLI | | [Cloudflare](/user-guide/providers/cloudflare/getting-started-cloudflare) | Official | Accounts | UI, API, CLI | | [Google Cloud](/user-guide/providers/gcp/getting-started-gcp) | Official | Projects | UI, API, CLI | +| [Linode](/user-guide/providers/linode/getting-started-linode) | [Contact us](https://prowler.com/contact) | Accounts | CLI | | **NHN** | [Contact us](https://prowler.com/contact) | Tenants | CLI | | [OpenStack](/user-guide/providers/openstack/getting-started-openstack) | Official | Projects | UI, API, CLI | | [Oracle Cloud](/user-guide/providers/oci/getting-started-oci) | Official | Tenancies / Compartments | UI, API, CLI | diff --git a/docs/troubleshooting.mdx b/docs/troubleshooting.mdx index 9d60c57321..3125d74ef5 100644 --- a/docs/troubleshooting.mdx +++ b/docs/troubleshooting.mdx @@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ title: 'Troubleshooting' --- +import { VersionBadge } from "/snippets/version-badge.mdx" + ## Running `prowler` I get `[File: utils.py:15] [Module: utils] CRITICAL: path/redacted: OSError[13]` That is an error related to file descriptors or opened files allowed by your operating system. @@ -81,6 +83,39 @@ docker compose down docker compose up -d ``` +### Worker Uses Too Much Memory on Hosts with Many CPUs + + + +When Prowler App runs self-hosted on a machine or Kubernetes node with many CPUs, +the Celery worker may create one prefork process per detected CPU if concurrency +is not configured explicitly. Each process loads the SDK runtime and cloud +provider clients, so idle memory can be high and worker containers can be +terminated by their memory limit. + +Set `DJANGO_CELERY_WORKER_CONCURRENCY` in the worker runtime environment to cap +the number of prefork processes: + +```yaml +services: + worker: + environment: + DJANGO_CELERY_WORKER_CONCURRENCY: "4" +``` + +For Kubernetes deployments, set the same variable on the worker Deployment: + +```yaml +env: + - name: DJANGO_CELERY_WORKER_CONCURRENCY + value: "4" +``` + +Lower values reduce idle memory and the number of tasks a worker can run in +parallel. Increase the value only when the worker has enough memory for the +expected scan workload. Leaving the variable unset preserves Celery's default +CPU-based concurrency. + ### API Container Fails to Start with JWT Key Permission Error See [GitHub Issue #8897](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/issues/8897) for more details. @@ -201,35 +236,29 @@ When running Prowler behind a reverse proxy (nginx, Traefik, etc.) or load balan **Root Cause:** -Next.js environment variables prefixed with `NEXT_PUBLIC_` are **bundled at build time**, not runtime. The pre-built Docker images from Docker Hub (`prowlercloud/prowler-ui:stable`) are built with default internal URLs. Simply setting `NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL` in your `.env` file or environment variables and restarting the container will **NOT** work because these values are already compiled into the JavaScript bundle. +The API base and docs URLs are resolved from the container environment **at runtime**. A single pre-built Docker image (`prowlercloud/prowler-ui:stable`) therefore serves any environment: point the URLs at your external domain and restart the container — no rebuild is required. **Solution:** -You must **rebuild** the UI Docker image with your external URL: - -```bash -# Clone the repository (if you haven't already) -git clone https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler.git -cd prowler/ui - -# Build with your external URL as a build argument -docker build \ - --build-arg NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL=https://prowler.example.com/api/v1 \ - --build-arg NEXT_PUBLIC_API_DOCS_URL=https://prowler.example.com/api/v1/docs \ - -t prowler-ui-custom:latest \ - --target prod \ - . -``` - -Then update your `docker-compose.yml` to use your custom image instead of the pre-built one: +Set the runtime environment variables to your external URL and restart the UI container: ```yaml services: ui: - image: prowler-ui-custom:latest # Use your custom-built image + image: prowlercloud/prowler-ui:stable + environment: + UI_API_BASE_URL: https://prowler.example.com/api/v1 + UI_API_DOCS_URL: https://prowler.example.com/api/v1/docs # ... rest of configuration ``` +The same values can be supplied through your `.env` file: + +```bash +UI_API_BASE_URL=https://prowler.example.com/api/v1 +UI_API_DOCS_URL=https://prowler.example.com/api/v1/docs +``` + -The `NEXT_PUBLIC_` prefix is a Next.js convention that exposes environment variables to the browser. Since the browser bundle is compiled during `docker build`, these variables must be provided as build arguments, not runtime environment variables. +Earlier releases inlined these values into the JavaScript bundle at build time (via the `NEXT_PUBLIC_` prefix) and required a rebuild with `--build-arg`. That is no longer necessary: `UI_API_BASE_URL` and `UI_API_DOCS_URL` are read at container start, so updating them and restarting is sufficient. diff --git a/docs/user-guide/cli/tutorials/configuration_file.mdx b/docs/user-guide/cli/tutorials/configuration_file.mdx index caf8853a1b..a0c920a59b 100644 --- a/docs/user-guide/cli/tutorials/configuration_file.mdx +++ b/docs/user-guide/cli/tutorials/configuration_file.mdx @@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ title: "Configuration File" --- +import { VersionBadge } from "/snippets/version-badge.mdx" + Several Prowler's checks have user configurable variables that can be modified in a common **configuration file**. This file can be found in the following [path](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/blob/master/prowler/config/config.yaml): ``` @@ -10,14 +12,20 @@ prowler/config/config.yaml Additionally, you can input a custom configuration file using the `--config-file` argument. + +Numeric thresholds enforce hard limits. A value outside the accepted range is dropped with a warning and the check falls back to its built-in default. See [Configuration Value Limits](/developer-guide/configurable-checks#configuration-value-limits) for the exact range of every bounded option (max-days caps, percentages, counts, etc.). + + ## AWS ### Configurable Checks + The following list includes all the AWS checks with configurable variables that can be changed in the configuration yaml file: | Check Name | Value | Type | |---------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-----------------| | `acm_certificates_expiration_check` | `days_to_expire_threshold` | Integer | +| `acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm` | `acmpca_pqc_key_algorithms` | List of Strings | | `appstream_fleet_maximum_session_duration` | `max_session_duration_seconds` | Integer | | `appstream_fleet_session_disconnect_timeout` | `max_disconnect_timeout_in_seconds` | Integer | | `appstream_fleet_session_idle_disconnect_timeout` | `max_idle_disconnect_timeout_in_seconds` | Integer | @@ -55,6 +63,9 @@ The following list includes all the AWS checks with configurable variables that | `elasticache_redis_cluster_backup_enabled` | `minimum_snapshot_retention_period` | Integer | | `elb_is_in_multiple_az` | `elb_min_azs` | Integer | | `elbv2_is_in_multiple_az` | `elbv2_min_azs` | Integer | +| `rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki` | `rolesanywhere_pqc_pca_key_algorithms` | List of Strings | +| `cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled` | `cloudfront_pqc_min_protocol_versions` | List of Strings | +| `apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled` | `apigateway_pqc_tls_allowed_policies` | List of Strings | | `guardduty_is_enabled` | `mute_non_default_regions` | Boolean | | `iam_user_access_not_stale_to_sagemaker` | `max_unused_sagemaker_access_days` | Integer | | `iam_user_accesskey_unused` | `max_unused_access_keys_days` | Integer | @@ -67,6 +78,7 @@ The following list includes all the AWS checks with configurable variables that | `secretsmanager_secret_rotated_periodically` | `max_days_secret_unrotated` | Integer | | `ssm_document_secrets` | `secrets_ignore_patterns` | List of Strings | | `trustedadvisor_premium_support_plan_subscribed` | `verify_premium_support_plans` | Boolean | +| `transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled` | `transfer_pqc_ssh_allowed_policies` | List of Strings | | `dynamodb_table_cross_account_access` | `trusted_account_ids` | List of Strings | | `eventbridge_bus_cross_account_access` | `trusted_account_ids` | List of Strings | | `eventbridge_schema_registry_cross_account_access` | `trusted_account_ids` | List of Strings | @@ -76,6 +88,91 @@ The following list includes all the AWS checks with configurable variables that | `vpc_endpoint_services_allowed_principals_trust_boundaries` | `trusted_account_ids` | List of Strings | | `opensearch_service_domains_not_publicly_accessible` | `trusted_ips` | List of Strings | +### Resource Scan Limit + + + +Some AWS services accumulate large numbers of resources (EBS snapshots, backup recovery points, CloudWatch log groups, Lambda functions, ECS task definitions, and CodeArtifact packages). Scanning every resource increases scan time, cost, API throttling, and finding volume. By default, Prowler scans every resource. Configure a positive resource scan limit to cap how many resources Prowler analyzes for these high-volume AWS resource paths. + +The global default applies to the supported resources below and is overridable per resource. The default global value is `0`, which disables the limit and scans every resource. A global `null` value is also unlimited. For per-resource values, `null` means inherit the global default; set `0` or a negative value to disable that resource limit explicitly. Positive values enable limits. + + +When positive resource scan limits are configured, compliance results are based only on the selected resources, not on the full set of matching resources in the account. Treat compliance summaries and percentages as partial evidence, because unselected resources are not analyzed and can change the real compliance posture. + + +#### Global Behavior + +Resource scan limits select resources for analysis. They do not cap, prioritize, or reorder findings. + +* **`0`, negative, or global `null` values:** Disable the limit and keep the legacy behavior for that resource path. Prowler analyzes every discovered matching resource. +* **Positive values:** Select at most that many resources for the affected resource path. A selected resource can produce zero, one, or many findings. +* **No PASS/FAIL prioritization:** Prowler does not inspect the compliance result before selecting resources. Limits do not prefer failed resources, passed resources, or resources with more findings. +* **Latest-first where possible:** When AWS exposes timestamps or useful ordering, Prowler selects the newest resources first. When AWS only exposes API order, Prowler preserves that API order and documents the behavior as best effort. +* **Findings are downstream:** Checks only evaluate the resources exposed by the service client after selection. Findings from unselected resources are not produced because those resources are not analyzed. + +Exact list API call reduction depends on each AWS API's ordering and pagination capabilities. When Prowler must enumerate candidates locally to select the latest resources, list calls may still read candidates, but expensive per-resource enrichment calls are bounded to the selected resources for the supported paths below. + +#### Full Collections Versus Limited Analysis Sets + +Some checks need lightweight evidence from a complete resource collection to avoid incorrect cross-service conclusions, while other checks perform primary analysis on a limited resource set. + +Prowler keeps full lightweight collections where they are needed for cross-service evidence. For example: + +* **Lambda security groups and regions:** Prowler records security groups used by all discovered Lambda functions and the regions where functions exist before it limits Lambda functions for primary Lambda checks. This helps Amazon EC2 and Amazon Inspector checks avoid false positives such as treating Lambda security groups as unused or assuming a region has no Lambda functions. +* **CloudWatch `all_log_groups`:** Prowler records all discovered CloudWatch log groups in `all_log_groups` before limiting the primary `log_groups` analysis set. Other services can still resolve log group evidence, while CloudWatch log group checks only analyze the selected log groups. + +This split is intentional. It reduces expensive per-resource analysis calls without discarding lightweight context that other services need for accurate results. + +#### Supported AWS Resource Limits + +| Value | Scope | Type | +|-------|-------|------| +| `max_scanned_resources_per_service` | Global default for all supported high-volume AWS resources (default `0`, disabled/unlimited) | Integer | +| `max_ebs_snapshots` | EBS snapshots (`ec2_ebs_*` checks) | Integer | +| `max_backup_recovery_points` | Backup recovery points (`backup_recovery_point_*`) | Integer | +| `max_cloudwatch_log_groups` | CloudWatch log groups (`cloudwatch_log_group_*`) | Integer | +| `max_lambda_functions` | Lambda functions (`awslambda_function_*`) | Integer | +| `max_ecs_task_definitions` | ECS task definitions (`ecs_task_definitions_*`) | Integer | +| `max_codeartifact_packages` | CodeArtifact packages (`codeartifact_packages_*`) | Integer | + +#### Resource Limit Behavior By Resource Path + +| Resource Path | What Prowler Discovers | What A Positive Limit Selects For Analysis | Ordering And Latest Behavior | AWS Calls Reduced | Drawbacks And Consequences | +|---------------|------------------------|--------------------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------| +| EBS snapshots (`max_ebs_snapshots`) | Prowler lists self-owned snapshots and keeps lightweight evidence that volumes and regions have snapshots. | The selected EBS snapshots exposed to `ec2_ebs_*` checks. | Prowler sorts discovered snapshots by `StartTime` newest first, then applies the limit. Snapshots without a timestamp sort last. | Bounds expensive per-snapshot public attribute checks to selected snapshots. Snapshot listing still runs so Prowler can choose the newest snapshots and keep volume/region evidence. | Older unselected snapshots are not analyzed by snapshot checks. A public, unencrypted, or otherwise noncompliant older snapshot can be missed when the limit is lower than the number of snapshots. | +| Backup recovery points (`max_backup_recovery_points`) | Prowler lists backup vaults, plans, selections, and recovery point candidates in discovered vaults. | The selected recovery points exposed to `backup_recovery_point_*` checks and tag hydration. | Prowler sorts discovered recovery points by `CreationDate` newest first across vaults, then applies the limit. Recovery points without a timestamp sort last. | Bounds recovery point tag calls to selected recovery points. Vault and recovery point list calls still run so Prowler can choose the newest points. | Older unselected recovery points are not analyzed. A nonencrypted or otherwise noncompliant older recovery point can be missed. | +| CloudWatch log groups (`max_cloudwatch_log_groups`) | Prowler lists log groups into both `all_log_groups` and the primary `log_groups` collection. `all_log_groups` remains available as lightweight cross-service evidence. | The selected log groups exposed to `cloudwatch_log_group_*` checks, tag hydration, and log event retrieval for checks that need log contents. | Prowler sorts discovered log groups by `creationTime` newest first, then applies the limit. Log groups without a creation time sort last. | Bounds tag calls and log event retrieval to selected log groups. Log group listing still runs to build `all_log_groups` and choose newest log groups. | Older unselected log groups are not analyzed by CloudWatch log group checks. Retention, encryption, or secrets-in-logs issues in older log groups can be missed, although cross-service evidence can still use `all_log_groups`. | +| Lambda functions (`max_lambda_functions`) | Prowler lists Lambda functions and records lightweight security group and region evidence for all discovered functions. | The selected Lambda functions exposed to `awslambda_function_*` checks and per-function enrichment such as tags, policies, function URLs, and event source mappings. | Prowler sorts discovered functions by `LastModified` newest first, then applies the limit. Functions without `LastModified` sort last. | Bounds per-function enrichment calls to selected functions. Function listing still runs to choose newest functions and keep security group/region evidence. | Older unselected functions are not analyzed by Lambda checks. Runtime, policy, URL, environment secret, or dead-letter queue issues in older functions can be missed. Cross-service checks can still use full Lambda security group and region evidence to avoid false positives. | +| ECS task definitions (`max_ecs_task_definitions`) | Prowler lists ECS task definition ARN candidates in each region. Candidate ARNs can remain visible and discoverable through AWS list operations, even when not all are described. | The selected task definitions that Prowler describes and exposes to `ecs_task_definitions_*` checks. | Selection is not random. Prowler calls `ListTaskDefinitions` with `sort=DESC`, which asks AWS to return task definition ARNs in descending family and revision order. Prowler then interleaves regional candidate lists to avoid starving later regions before applying the limit. This selects the latest task definition revisions according to the ARN order AWS provides, while preserving regional fairness. | Bounds `DescribeTaskDefinition` calls to selected task definitions. Prowler may still list candidates so it can select the bounded set and keep discovery deterministic. | Unselected task definitions are not described or analyzed. Issues in older task definition revisions, or in lower-priority families outside the selected AWS `sort=DESC` order, can be missed. Because ECS ordering is family/revision based rather than a registration timestamp sort across every family, this is latest-first according to AWS task definition ARN ordering, not a global newest-by-time guarantee. | +| CodeArtifact packages (`max_codeartifact_packages`) | Prowler lists CodeArtifact repositories and lazily lists packages inside them. | The selected packages exposed to `codeartifact_packages_*` checks, including latest-version metadata for those packages. | AWS `ListPackages` does not provide a newest-package timestamp ordering in this path. Prowler preserves repository order and package API order, then applies the limit. Latest package version metadata is retrieved for selected packages with `sortBy=PUBLISHED_TIME` and `maxResults=1`. | Bounds `ListPackageVersions` calls to selected packages and can stop package listing once the limit is reached. Repository listing still runs. | Package selection is best effort by API order, not newest package order. Packages outside the selected repository/API order are not analyzed, so origin restriction or latest-version issues can be missed. | + +Use limits when scan duration, API throttling, or cost are more important than exhaustive coverage for these high-volume resources. Keep limits disabled when you need complete evidence for every resource in the affected checks. + +### Validating Discovered Secrets + + + +By default, the secret-scanning checks run fully offline: secrets are detected but never sent anywhere. Setting `secrets_validate` to `True` additionally confirms whether each discovered secret is live by authenticating with it against the corresponding provider API. The discovered secret itself serves as the credential, so Prowler requires no additional permissions to validate it. + +`secrets_validate` applies to every AWS secret-scanning check listed above (those that accept `secrets_ignore_patterns`). The `--scan-secrets-validate` CLI flag is provider-wide: it also enables validation for the secret-scanning checks of other providers, such as the OpenStack metadata checks. + +To enable validation through the configuration file, set the value under the `aws` section: + +```yaml +aws: + secrets_validate: True +``` + +To enable validation for a single scan (any provider), use Prowler CLI: + +``` +prowler aws --scan-secrets-validate +``` + + +Secret validation makes outbound network calls that authenticate with each discovered secret. The credential is exercised against the provider, so the call appears in the audited account's logs and can trigger its monitoring (for example, AWS CloudTrail records the validation request). Validation stays disabled by default so that scans remain fully offline. + + ## Azure @@ -181,6 +278,19 @@ aws: # AWS Global Configuration # aws.mute_non_default_regions --> Set to True to muted failed findings in non-default regions for AccessAnalyzer, GuardDuty, SecurityHub, DRS and Config mute_non_default_regions: False + + # AWS Resource Scan Limit Configuration + # Disabled by default: scan every resource unless a positive limit is configured. + # Findings are not capped. Set to 0 (or a negative value) to disable the limit. + # aws.max_scanned_resources_per_service --> global default for all services below + max_scanned_resources_per_service: 0 + # Per-service overrides. Leave as null to fall back to the global default. + max_ebs_snapshots: null + max_backup_recovery_points: null + max_cloudwatch_log_groups: null + max_lambda_functions: null + max_ecs_task_definitions: null + max_codeartifact_packages: null # If you want to mute failed findings only in specific regions, create a file with the following syntax and run it with `prowler aws -w mutelist.yaml`: # Mutelist: # Accounts: diff --git a/docs/user-guide/cli/tutorials/pentesting.mdx b/docs/user-guide/cli/tutorials/pentesting.mdx index 0ad5313611..35d5b72be7 100644 --- a/docs/user-guide/cli/tutorials/pentesting.mdx +++ b/docs/user-guide/cli/tutorials/pentesting.mdx @@ -6,20 +6,33 @@ Prowler has some checks that analyse pentesting risks (Secrets, Internet Exposed ## Detect Secrets -Prowler uses `detect-secrets` library to search for any secrets that are stores in plaintext within your environment. +Prowler scans for secrets stored in plaintext within the audited environment using [Kingfisher](https://github.com/mongodb/kingfisher), an open-source secret-scanning engine. By default these scans run fully offline, so no data leaves the audited environment. Discovered secrets can optionally be validated against the provider APIs to confirm whether they are live — see [Validating Discovered Secrets](/user-guide/cli/tutorials/configuration_file#validating-discovered-secrets). -The actual checks that have this functionality are the following: +The checks with this functionality are the following. + +AWS: - autoscaling\_find\_secrets\_ec2\_launch\_configuration - awslambda\_function\_no\_secrets\_in\_code - awslambda\_function\_no\_secrets\_in\_variables - cloudformation\_stack\_outputs\_find\_secrets +- cloudwatch\_log\_group\_no\_secrets\_in\_logs +- codebuild\_project\_no\_secrets\_in\_variables - ec2\_instance\_secrets\_user\_data - ec2\_launch\_template\_no\_secrets - ecs\_task\_definitions\_no\_environment\_secrets +- glue\_etl\_jobs\_no\_secrets\_in\_arguments - ssm\_document\_secrets +- stepfunctions\_statemachine\_no\_secrets\_in\_definition -To execute detect-secrets related checks, you can run the following command: +OpenStack: + +- compute\_instance\_metadata\_sensitive\_data +- blockstorage\_volume\_metadata\_sensitive\_data +- blockstorage\_snapshot\_metadata\_sensitive\_data +- objectstorage\_container\_metadata\_sensitive\_data + +To execute the secret-scanning checks, run the following command: ```console prowler --categories secrets diff --git a/docs/user-guide/cookbooks/cicd-pipeline.mdx b/docs/user-guide/cookbooks/cicd-pipeline.mdx index a88513d901..11295b1f29 100644 --- a/docs/user-guide/cookbooks/cicd-pipeline.mdx +++ b/docs/user-guide/cookbooks/cicd-pipeline.mdx @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ Add the following to `.gitlab-ci.yml`: ```yaml prowler-scan: - image: python:3.12-slim + image: python:3.13-slim stage: test script: - pip install prowler @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ stages: - security .prowler-base: - image: python:3.12-slim + image: python:3.13-slim stage: security before_script: - pip install prowler diff --git a/docs/user-guide/providers/gcp/authentication.mdx b/docs/user-guide/providers/gcp/authentication.mdx index 9447d73a20..ec53445c84 100644 --- a/docs/user-guide/providers/gcp/authentication.mdx +++ b/docs/user-guide/providers/gcp/authentication.mdx @@ -138,6 +138,10 @@ To keep permissions focused: 4. Continue through the wizard and finish. No principals need to be granted access in step 3 unless you want other identities to impersonate this account. + +To use this service account with `--organization-id`, additionally grant `roles/cloudasset.viewer` at the organization node and enable the Cloud Asset API in the service account's host project. See [Scanning a Specific GCP Organization](./organization). Without these, organization-wide scans silently fall back to listing only the projects accessible to the service account. + + ### Step 3: Generate a JSON Key 1. Open the newly created service account, move to the **Keys** tab, and choose **Add key > Create new key**. diff --git a/docs/user-guide/providers/gcp/organization.mdx b/docs/user-guide/providers/gcp/organization.mdx index 6f4f7658e5..6790be5827 100644 --- a/docs/user-guide/providers/gcp/organization.mdx +++ b/docs/user-guide/providers/gcp/organization.mdx @@ -11,8 +11,19 @@ prowler gcp --organization-id organization-id ``` -Ensure the credentials used have one of the following roles at the organization level: -Cloud Asset Viewer (`roles/cloudasset.viewer`), or Cloud Asset Owner (`roles/cloudasset.owner`). +Ensure the credentials used have one of the following roles bound **at the organization node** (not at a project): Cloud Asset Viewer (`roles/cloudasset.viewer`) or Cloud Asset Owner (`roles/cloudasset.owner`). The role must be bound directly on the organization so the Cloud Asset API can enumerate projects across the whole hierarchy. + +```bash +gcloud organizations add-iam-policy-binding \ + --member="serviceAccount:" \ + --role="roles/cloudasset.viewer" +``` + +The Cloud Asset API (`cloudasset.googleapis.com`) must also be enabled in the project that owns the credentials (the service account's host project, or the quota project for user credentials): + +```bash +gcloud services enable cloudasset.googleapis.com --project +``` diff --git a/docs/user-guide/providers/linode/authentication.mdx b/docs/user-guide/providers/linode/authentication.mdx new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..feac121f40 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/user-guide/providers/linode/authentication.mdx @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +--- +title: "Linode Authentication in Prowler" +--- + +import { VersionBadge } from "/snippets/version-badge.mdx" + + + +Prowler for Linode uses a **Personal Access Token** (PAT) for authentication. Prowler reads the token **exclusively** from the `LINODE_TOKEN` environment variable, so the secret is never exposed in shell history or process listings. There are no credential CLI flags. + +## Required Permissions + +Prowler requires read-only access to your Linode account. The following OAuth scopes are needed on the Personal Access Token: + +| Scope | Access | Description | +|-------|--------|-------------| +| `account` | `Read Only` | Required to list users and verify account identity | +| `linodes` | `Read Only` | Required to list instances and their configurations | +| `firewall` | `Read Only` | Required to list firewalls and their rules | + + +Ensure the token has all required scopes. Missing permissions will cause some checks to fail or return incomplete results. + + +--- + +## Personal Access Token + +### Step 1: Create a Personal Access Token + +1. Log into the [Linode Cloud Manager](https://cloud.linode.com). +2. Click on your username in the top-right corner, then select **API Tokens** under the "My Profile" section. +3. Click **Create a Personal Access Token**. +4. Configure the token: + - **Label:** A descriptive name (e.g., "Prowler Security Scanner") + - **Expiry:** Set an appropriate expiration (e.g., 6 months) + - **Permissions:** Set the following scopes to **Read Only**: + - Account + - Linodes + - Firewall + - All other scopes can be set to **No Access** +5. Click **Create Token**. +6. Copy the token immediately — it will not be shown again. + +### Step 2: Configure Authentication + +Set the `LINODE_TOKEN` environment variable: + +```bash +export LINODE_TOKEN="your-personal-access-token" +``` + +Then run Prowler: + +```bash +prowler linode +``` + +--- + +## Verifying Authentication + +To verify that Prowler can connect to your Linode account, run: + +```bash +prowler linode --list-checks +``` + +If authentication succeeds, you will see a list of available checks. If it fails, Prowler will display an error message indicating the credentials issue. + +--- + +## CI/CD Integration + +For automated pipelines, set the token as a secret environment variable: + +**GitHub Actions:** + +```yaml +env: + LINODE_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.LINODE_TOKEN }} + +steps: + - name: Run Prowler + run: prowler linode +``` + +**GitLab CI:** + +```yaml +variables: + LINODE_TOKEN: $LINODE_TOKEN + +prowler_scan: + script: + - prowler linode +``` diff --git a/docs/user-guide/providers/linode/getting-started-linode.mdx b/docs/user-guide/providers/linode/getting-started-linode.mdx new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..128fdf1c90 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/user-guide/providers/linode/getting-started-linode.mdx @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +--- +title: 'Getting Started With Linode on Prowler' +--- + +import { VersionBadge } from "/snippets/version-badge.mdx" + + + +Prowler for Linode scans your Linode infrastructure for security misconfigurations, including compute settings, networking rules, user account security, and more. + + +Linode support in Prowler is community-maintained. For commercial support or to request additional service coverage, [contact us](https://prowler.com/contact). + + +## Prerequisites + +Set up authentication for Linode with the [Linode Authentication](/user-guide/providers/linode/authentication) guide before starting: + +- Create a Linode Personal Access Token with read-only permissions +- The token requires at minimum: `account:read_only`, `linodes:read_only`, and `firewall:read_only` scopes + +## Prowler CLI + +### Run Prowler for Linode + +Once authenticated with a Personal Access Token, set the `LINODE_TOKEN` environment variable and run Prowler for Linode. Prowler reads the token exclusively from the environment variable, so the secret is never exposed in shell history or process listings: + +```bash +export LINODE_TOKEN="your-personal-access-token" +prowler linode +``` + +### Run Specific Checks + +```bash +prowler linode --checks compute_instance_backups_enabled compute_instance_watchdog_enabled +``` + +### Run a Specific Service + +```bash +prowler linode --services networking +``` + +### Scan Specific Regions + +Use `--region` (alias `--filter-region` / `-f`) to limit the scan to one or more Linode regions. Region-less resources (account administration and Cloud Firewalls) are always scanned; only regional resources such as instances are filtered. When the flag is omitted, all regions are scanned. + +```bash +prowler linode --region eu-central us-east +``` + +## Available Services + +Prowler for Linode currently supports the following services: + +| Service | Description | +|---------|-------------| +| `administration` | Account administration includes users and access controls such as two-factor authentication | +| `compute` | Compute includes Linode instances and their workload configuration | +| `networking` | Networking includes Cloud Firewalls and their stateful network rules | diff --git a/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-alerts.mdx b/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-alerts.mdx index 3fa49f84ff..e4475849ae 100644 --- a/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-alerts.mdx +++ b/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-alerts.mdx @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import { VersionBadge } from "/snippets/version-badge.mdx" Alerts notify recipients by email when security findings match saved filter conditions. Use Alerts to track high-priority findings, monitor specific providers or services, and keep teams informed about scan results that match defined criteria. -This feature is available exclusively in **Prowler Cloud** and **Prowler Enterprise** with a [paid subscription](https://prowler.com/pricing). +This feature is available exclusively in **Prowler Cloud** and **Prowler Enterprise** with a [subscription](https://prowler.com/pricing). ## Prerequisites diff --git a/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-attack-paths.mdx b/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-attack-paths.mdx index 23d8b8d5a2..c463e3144b 100644 --- a/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-attack-paths.mdx +++ b/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-attack-paths.mdx @@ -3,13 +3,13 @@ title: "Attack Paths" description: "Identify privilege escalation chains and security misconfigurations across cloud environments using graph-based analysis." --- -import { VersionBadge } from "/snippets/version-badge.mdx" +import { VersionBadge } from "/snippets/version-badge.mdx"; Attack Paths analyzes relationships between cloud resources, permissions, and security findings to detect how privileges can be escalated and how misconfigurations can be exploited by threat actors. -By mapping these relationships as a graph, Attack Paths reveals risks that individual security checks cannot detect on their own — such as an IAM role that can escalate its own permissions, or a chain of policies that grants unintended access to sensitive resources. +By mapping these relationships as a graph, Attack Paths reveals risks that individual security checks cannot detect on their own, such as an IAM role that can escalate its own permissions, or a chain of policies that grants unintended access to sensitive resources. Attack Paths is currently available for **AWS** providers. Support for @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ By mapping these relationships as a graph, Attack Paths reveals risks that indiv The following prerequisites are required for Attack Paths: - **An AWS provider is configured** with valid credentials in Prowler App. For setup instructions, see [Getting Started with AWS](/user-guide/providers/aws/getting-started-aws). -- **At least one scan has completed** on the configured AWS provider. Attack Paths scans run automatically alongside regular security scans — no separate configuration is required. +- **At least one scan has completed** on the configured AWS provider. Attack Paths scans run automatically alongside regular security scans, no separate configuration is required. ## How Attack Paths Scans Work @@ -145,11 +145,10 @@ LIMIT 25 **IAM principals with wildcard Allow statements:** ```cypher -MATCH (principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) -WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND ANY(action IN stmt.action WHERE action = '*') -RETURN principal.arn AS principal, policy.arn AS policy, - stmt.action AS actions, stmt.resource AS resources +MATCH (principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {effect: 'Allow'}) +MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(a:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) +WHERE a.value = '*' +RETURN DISTINCT principal.arn AS principal, policy.arn AS policy LIMIT 25 ``` @@ -173,218 +172,89 @@ RETURN r.name AS role_name, r.arn AS role_arn, p.arn AS trusted_service LIMIT 25 ``` -### Advanced Attack Path Scenarios +### Working with List-Typed Properties -The following scenarios show how to compose graph traversals into real attack-path stories. Each query can be pasted directly into the custom query box: the API auto-scopes them to the selected provider and injects tenant/provider isolation, so there is no need to include account identifiers or `$provider_uid` in the text. All queries are openCypher v9 (Neo4j and Neptune compatible). +Some Cartography node properties carry a list of values, such as `action`, `resource`, `notaction`, and `notresource` on `AWSPolicyStatement` nodes, the algorithms on `KMSKey`, the container-definition lists on `ECSContainerDefinition`, and many others. The Attack Paths graph models each such property as a set of child item nodes connected to the parent by a typed edge. To read the values, traverse the edge; the parent does not carry the list as a single field. -#### 1. Live attacker on the box that owns the keys +The naming convention for any list-typed property on a parent label is: -**Query story:** Finds an internet-exposed EC2 under an active GuardDuty SSH brute-force whose instance role can assume a higher-privileged role that can read a sensitive S3 bucket. +- **Child label:** `Item`. Example: `AWSPolicyStatement.resource` resolves to `AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem`. +- **Edge type:** `HAS_`. Example: `resource` resolves to `HAS_RESOURCE`. +- **Child property:** `value` for scalar lists (one string per list element). List-of-dict properties (rare; for example `SecretsManagerSecretVersion.tags`) carry the original dict keys as named fields on the child node. + +To express "at least one item in the list satisfies a predicate", traverse the `HAS_*` edge in its own `MATCH` clause and apply the predicate in the attached `WHERE`. `RETURN DISTINCT` collapses duplicate parent rows produced when multiple child items satisfy the filter: ```cypher -MATCH path_ec2 = (acct:AWSAccount)--(ec2:EC2Instance) -WHERE ec2.exposed_internet = true -MATCH p0 = (gd:GuardDutyFinding)-[:AFFECTS]->(ec2) -MATCH p1 = (ec2)-[:INSTANCE_PROFILE]->(prof:AWSInstanceProfile)-[:ASSOCIATED_WITH]->(low:AWSRole) -MATCH p2 = (low)-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]-(high:AWSRole) -MATCH p3 = (high)--(pol:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) -OPTIONAL MATCH path_net = (internet:Internet)-[:CAN_ACCESS]->(ec2) -MATCH path_s3 = (acct)--(s3:S3Bucket) -WHERE high <> low - AND stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND size([a IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(a) STARTS WITH 's3:getobject' - OR toLower(a) STARTS WITH 's3:listbucket' - OR toLower(a) IN ['s3:*'] - ]) > 0 - AND size([r IN stmt.resource WHERE - r CONTAINS s3.name - ]) > 0 -RETURN path_net, path_ec2, p0, p1, p2, p3, path_s3 -``` - -**How it's built:** - -- `path_ec2` anchors the graph on the account node and its internet-exposed EC2 instance, via a real account-to-resource edge. This is the visible spine that keeps everything connected. -- `p0` ties a `GuardDutyFinding` to that instance through the `AFFECTS` edge (the live SSH brute-force alert). -- `p1` walks the real graph edges from the instance to its instance profile to the role it runs as. -- `p2` follows the `STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW` edge to the higher-privileged role the low role can assume. It is undirected so it works regardless of how the assume edge was ingested. `high <> low` stops a role matching itself. -- `p3` walks that role into its policy and policy statement. -- `path_net` is the optional `Internet -[:CAN_ACCESS]-> instance` edge. It makes "from the internet" literal on screen. Optional so a missing `Internet` node never breaks the query live. -- `path_s3` connects the sensitive bucket to the same account node, so it draws connected instead of floating. There is no physical edge from a role to a bucket; the grant is logical, enforced in the `WHERE`: the statement must allow an S3 read action (list comprehension over the `action` array) and its resource must cover the bucket (`CONTAINS s3.name`). The account is the shared hub; the bucket hanging off it next to the role chain is the teaching moment — the access exists only in IAM. - -#### 2. Who can read the crown jewels - -**Query story:** The sensitive bucket from the previous scenario seen from the data side: every role whose IAM policy can read it, regardless of how the role is reached. - -```cypher -MATCH (s3:S3Bucket) -WHERE toLower(s3.name) CONTAINS 'sensitive' -MATCH (role:AWSRole)--(pol:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) -WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND size([a IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(a) STARTS WITH 's3:get' - OR toLower(a) STARTS WITH 's3:list' - OR toLower(a) IN ['s3:*'] - ]) > 0 - AND size([r IN stmt.resource WHERE - r CONTAINS s3.name - ]) > 0 -WITH DISTINCT s3, role +MATCH (stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {effect: 'Allow'}) +MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(a:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) +WHERE toLower(a.value) STARTS WITH 's3:get' + OR toLower(a.value) STARTS WITH 's3:list' +RETURN DISTINCT stmt LIMIT 25 -MATCH path_s3 = (acct:AWSAccount)--(s3) -MATCH path_role = (acct)--(role) -RETURN path_s3, path_role ``` -**How it's built:** data-centric, not attacker-centric — the same bucket the previous kill chain exfiltrates, approached from the other direction. - -- The `S3Bucket` is bound first by name (one node), so everything else filters against it. -- `(role:AWSRole)--(pol:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement)` reaches statements only *through a role*, never via a global statement scan. A blanket `AWSPolicyStatement` scan also hits resource-policy statements whose shape differs and makes the list comprehension fail outright. -- The `WHERE` filters in place: an S3 read action plus a resource that names that bucket. -- `WITH DISTINCT s3, role LIMIT 25` collapses undirected-traversal duplicates and hard-caps the result. -- `path_s3` and `path_role` attach the account hubs only after the cap, against at most 25 rows, so the bucket and role(s) draw connected through the account instead of floating. -- No internet or EC2 here; this answers "who has the keys" instead of "how would an attacker get in." - -#### 3. Lateral reach from an internet-exposed instance - -**Query story:** The wide-angle view of the live-attacker scenario: every internet-exposed EC2, the role it runs as, and every role that role can assume. The first scenario is one specific exfiltration path inside this reach, under live attack. +To check whether every item in the list satisfies a predicate, count the counter-examples and require zero, together with a guard that ensures at least one item is attached. This is the one case where the pattern-comprehension form is the right tool: ```cypher -MATCH path_ec2 = (acct:AWSAccount)--(ec2:EC2Instance) -WHERE ec2.exposed_internet = true -MATCH p1 = (ec2)-[:INSTANCE_PROFILE]->(prof:AWSInstanceProfile)-[:ASSOCIATED_WITH]->(low:AWSRole) -MATCH p2 = (low)-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]-(high:AWSRole) -OPTIONAL MATCH path_net = (internet:Internet)-[:CAN_ACCESS]->(ec2) -WHERE high <> low -RETURN path_net, path_ec2, p1, p2 +MATCH (stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) +WHERE size([ + (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(a:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE NOT toLower(a.value) STARTS WITH 's3:' + | a + ]) = 0 + AND size([(stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(a:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) | a]) > 0 +RETURN stmt +LIMIT 25 ``` -**How it's built:** widens the lens instead of filtering down. It stops at the assume-role hop and shows every role reachable from any internet-exposed instance, without filtering down to a specific S3 leg. - -- `path_ec2` is the account-to-instance spine. -- `p1` walks to the instance role. -- `p2` fans out to every role that role can assume. -- `path_net` adds the optional `Internet -[:CAN_ACCESS]->` edge. -- The first scenario is the specific exfiltration path under live attack; this is the broader privilege reach an attacker inherits the moment they land on the box. - -#### 4. Role-chain privilege escalation - -**Query story:** A pure-IAM escalation, no compromised instance: a role that can assume a second role whose policy lets it assume a third, admin-level role. +For the "is any item of this list a substring of a dynamic value" case, such as "does any resource pattern in this policy match a target role ARN", add the `HAS_*` traversal as its own `MATCH` and check the substring relationship between the item value and the dynamic node in `WHERE`: ```cypher -MATCH path_root = (acct:AWSAccount)--(r1:AWSRole) -MATCH p1 = (r1)-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]-(r2:AWSRole) -MATCH p2 = (r2)--(pol:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) -MATCH path_admin = (acct)--(admin:AWSRole) -WHERE r1 <> r2 AND r1 <> admin AND r2 <> admin - AND stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND size([a IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(a) IN ['sts:*', 'sts:assumerole'] - ]) > 0 - AND size([res IN stmt.resource WHERE - res CONTAINS admin.name - ]) > 0 -RETURN path_root, p1, p2, path_admin +MATCH (role:AWSRole) +WHERE role.name = 'Admin' +MATCH (principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {effect: 'Allow'}) +MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(r:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) +WHERE r.value = '*' + OR r.value CONTAINS role.name + OR role.arn CONTAINS r.value +RETURN DISTINCT principal.arn AS principal, stmt, role +LIMIT 25 ``` -**How it's built:** - -- `path_root` anchors role 1 to the account node, the spine that keeps the picture connected. -- `p1` is the one real assume edge in the chain (role 1 to role 2). -- `p2` walks role 2 into its policy and statement. -- `path_admin` connects the target admin role to the same account node so it draws connected. The third hop is not a graph edge: it exists only as `sts:AssumeRole` on that role's ARN inside the statement. The query proves it the same way the first scenario proves S3 access — the statement action must include an assume-role action and its resource list must reference the admin role's name. -- The three `<>` guards stop a role matching itself at any position. - -#### 5. External identity trust map - -**Query story:** Finds external identity providers (SSO, GitHub, GitLab, Terraform Cloud) and the AWS roles they are trusted to assume. +To return the list of values directly, collect them from the child items: ```cypher -MATCH p = (role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]-(idp:AWSPrincipal) -WHERE idp.arn CONTAINS 'saml-provider' - OR idp.arn CONTAINS 'oidc-provider' -MATCH path_role = (acct:AWSAccount)--(role) -RETURN p, path_role +MATCH (stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {effect: 'Allow'}) +OPTIONAL MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(a:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) +RETURN stmt, collect(a.value) AS actions +LIMIT 25 ``` -**How it's built:** federated principals are stored as `AWSPrincipal` nodes whose ARN contains `saml-provider` (SSO) or `oidc-provider` (GitHub, GitLab, Terraform Cloud). +### Working with JSON-Encoded Properties -- `p` matches the trust edge undirected. It is written `(AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(AWSPrincipal)`, role to principal, so a directed `principal -> role` match returns nothing; undirected matches regardless of ingest direction. -- The `WHERE` keeps only SAML or OIDC providers, drawing a fan-out from each external identity provider to every role it can assume (including reserved SSO admin roles). -- `path_role` ties every trusted role to the account node so the provider stars share one spine instead of drawing as separate islands. +Some Cartography properties represent nested objects, most notably `condition` on `AWSPolicyStatement` and `S3PolicyStatement` nodes. In the Attack Paths graph, object-typed properties are stored as JSON-encoded strings to keep the schema portable across graph backends. The value looks like: -#### 6. Federated SSO roles flagged as admin or privesc +``` +'{"StringEquals":{"aws:SourceAccount":"123456789012"}}' +``` -**Query story:** The dangerous subset of the trust map above — externally-federated SSO roles that Prowler also flags for AdministratorAccess or privilege escalation. +There is no JSON parser available at query time, so use `CONTAINS` for substring checks against keys or known values: ```cypher -MATCH (idp:AWSPrincipal)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]-(role:AWSRole) -WHERE idp.arn CONTAINS 'saml-provider' - OR idp.arn CONTAINS 'oidc-provider' -MATCH (role)-[:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:ProwlerFinding) -WHERE pf.status = 'FAIL' - AND pf.check_id IN [ - 'iam_inline_policy_allows_privilege_escalation', - 'iam_role_administratoraccess_policy', - 'iam_inline_policy_no_administrative_privileges', - 'iam_user_administrator_access_policy' - ] -WITH DISTINCT idp, role, pf -LIMIT 60 -MATCH path_root = (acct:AWSAccount)--(role) -MATCH p_trust = (idp)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]-(role) -MATCH p_find = (role)-[:HAS_FINDING]-(pf) -RETURN path_root, p_trust, p_find +MATCH (stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) +WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' + AND stmt.condition CONTAINS '"aws:SourceAccount"' +RETURN stmt +LIMIT 25 ``` -**How it's built:** a plain "list every flagged identity" query is a wide fan that draws as a column, and `ProwlerFinding` nodes accumulate across scans with no scan filter available in custom queries. - -- The first MATCH plus `WHERE` keeps only roles trusted by a SAML or OIDC provider (trust edge undirected, so direction does not matter). -- The second MATCH plus `check_id IN [...]` keeps only those carrying one of the four privilege-escalation or admin checks. -- `WITH DISTINCT ... LIMIT 60` collapses duplicate finding nodes and hard-caps the result. -- `p_trust`, `p_find`, and `path_root` draw it connected three ways: provider to role through the trust edge, role to its finding, and role to the account. -- The previous scenario shows who can walk in; this shows which of those roles Prowler already flags as over-privileged. - -#### 7. World-readable S3 buckets - -**Query story:** Unlike the IAM-gated sensitive bucket in scenarios 1 and 2, these buckets are open to anyone on the internet with no credentials at all. - -```cypher -MATCH path_s3 = (acct:AWSAccount)--(s3:S3Bucket) -WHERE s3.anonymous_access = true -OPTIONAL MATCH p = (s3)--(stmt:S3PolicyStatement) -RETURN path_s3, p -``` - -**How it's built:** the counterpoint to scenarios 1 and 2 — there the sensitive bucket is reachable only through an IAM role chain; here the bucket needs no role at all. - -- `path_s3` connects each public bucket to its account node so they draw connected. Cartography sets `anonymous_access = true` when a bucket's policy or ACL allows public access. -- `p` is an optional match that pulls in the `S3PolicyStatement` granting the access where one exists, so the public grant is visible next to the bucket. Buckets that are public via ACL only still show, connected to the account. - -#### 8. Internet exposure surface - -**Query story:** The raw external attack surface behind scenarios 1 and 3: every internet-exposed EC2 instance with its security groups and the exact inbound ports left open. - -```cypher -MATCH path_ec2 = (acct:AWSAccount)--(ec2:EC2Instance) -WHERE ec2.exposed_internet = true -MATCH p1 = (ec2)--(sg:EC2SecurityGroup)--(rule:IpPermissionInbound) -OPTIONAL MATCH path_net = (internet:Internet)-[:CAN_ACCESS]->(ec2) -OPTIONAL MATCH p2 = (ec2)-[:INSTANCE_PROFILE]->(:AWSInstanceProfile)-[:ASSOCIATED_WITH]->(:AWSRole) -RETURN path_net, path_ec2, p1, p2 -``` - -**How it's built:** `exposed_internet = true` is Cartography's computed reachability flag. - -- `path_ec2` hubs all exposed instances on the account node so they draw as one picture. -- `p1` joins each instance to its security groups and inbound rules so the open ports are on screen. -- `path_net` adds the optional `Internet -[:CAN_ACCESS]->` edge so the external reachability is explicit. -- `p2` optionally adds the instance role, which connects this surface view back to the kill chains in scenarios 1 and 3. +When a query needs to inspect the structured members of a condition (for example, evaluate every operator and key), fetch the rows first and parse the JSON in application code. Cypher cannot navigate JSON object keys or values. ### Tips for Writing Queries - Start small with `LIMIT` to inspect the shape of the data before broadening the pattern. +- Traverse `HAS_*` edges to reach list-typed property values (for example `action`, `resource`). The parent node does not carry the list as a single field; see [Working with List-Typed Properties](#working-with-list-typed-properties) for the patterns. +- On large scans, avoid broad disconnected patterns such as `MATCH (a:Label), (b:OtherLabel)`. Bind one side with a selective predicate first, and use `WITH DISTINCT` between expanding traversals when duplicates are possible. - Use `RETURN` projections (`RETURN n.name, n.region`) instead of returning whole nodes to keep responses compact. - Combine resource nodes with `ProwlerFinding` nodes via `HAS_FINDING` to correlate misconfigurations with the affected resources. - When a query times out or returns no rows, simplify the pattern step by step until the first variant runs successfully, then add constraints back. @@ -401,6 +271,8 @@ In addition to the upstream schema, Prowler enriches the graph with: - **`ProwlerFinding`** nodes representing Prowler check results, linked to affected resources via `HAS_FINDING` relationships. - **`Internet`** nodes used to model exposure paths from the public internet to internal resources. +- **List-typed properties** such as `action` or `resource` on `AWSPolicyStatement`, the algorithm lists on `KMSKey`, and similar lists on other node types are modeled as child item nodes linked by typed `HAS_*` edges. See [Working with List-Typed Properties](#working-with-list-typed-properties) for the read pattern. +- **Object-typed properties** such as `condition` on `AWSPolicyStatement` are stored as JSON-encoded strings. See [Working with JSON-Encoded Properties](#working-with-json-encoded-properties) for the read pattern. AI assistants connected through Prowler MCP Server can fetch the exact @@ -539,105 +411,106 @@ Attack Paths currently supports the following built-in queries for AWS: #### Custom Attack Path Queries -| Query | Description | -|---|---| +| Query | Description | +| ------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | **Internet-Exposed EC2 with Sensitive S3 Access** | Find SSH-exposed EC2 instances that can assume roles to read tagged sensitive S3 buckets | #### Basic Resource Queries -| Query | Description | -|---|---| -| **RDS Instances Inventory** | List all provisioned RDS database instances in the account | -| **Unencrypted RDS Instances** | Find RDS instances with storage encryption disabled | -| **S3 Buckets with Anonymous Access** | Find S3 buckets that allow anonymous access | -| **IAM Statements Allowing All Actions** | Find IAM policy statements that allow all actions via wildcard (\*) | -| **IAM Statements Allowing Policy Deletion** | Find IAM policy statements that allow iam:DeletePolicy | -| **IAM Statements Allowing Create Actions** | Find IAM policy statements that allow any create action | +| Query | Description | +| ------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| **RDS Instances Inventory** | List all provisioned RDS database instances in the account | +| **Unencrypted RDS Instances** | Find RDS instances with storage encryption disabled | +| **S3 Buckets with Anonymous Access** | Find S3 buckets that allow anonymous access | +| **IAM Statements Allowing All Actions** | Find IAM policy statements that allow all actions via wildcard (\*) | +| **IAM Statements Allowing Policy Deletion** | Find IAM policy statements that allow iam:DeletePolicy | +| **IAM Statements Allowing Create Actions** | Find IAM policy statements that allow any create action | #### Network Exposure Queries -| Query | Description | -|---|---| -| **Internet-Exposed EC2 Instances** | Find EC2 instances flagged as exposed to the internet | +| Query | Description | +| ----------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| **Internet-Exposed EC2 Instances** | Find EC2 instances flagged as exposed to the internet | | **Open Security Groups on Internet-Facing Resources** | Find internet-facing resources with security groups allowing inbound from 0.0.0.0/0 | -| **Internet-Exposed Classic Load Balancers** | Find Classic Load Balancers exposed to the internet with their listeners | -| **Internet-Exposed ALB/NLB Load Balancers** | Find ELBv2 (ALB/NLB) load balancers exposed to the internet with their listeners | -| **Resource Lookup by Public IP** | Find the AWS resource associated with a given public IP address | +| **Internet-Exposed Classic Load Balancers** | Find Classic Load Balancers exposed to the internet with their listeners | +| **Internet-Exposed ALB/NLB Load Balancers** | Find ELBv2 (ALB/NLB) load balancers exposed to the internet with their listeners | +| **Resource Lookup by Public IP** | Find the AWS resource associated with a given public IP address | #### Privilege Escalation Queries These queries are based on research from [pathfinding.cloud](https://pathfinding.cloud) by Datadog. -| Query | Description | -|---|---| -| **App Runner Service Creation with Privileged Role (APPRUNNER-001)** | Create an App Runner service with a privileged IAM role to gain its permissions | -| **App Runner Service Update for Role Access (APPRUNNER-002)** | Update an existing App Runner service to leverage its already-attached privileged role | -| **Bedrock Code Interpreter with Privileged Role (BEDROCK-001)** | Create a Bedrock AgentCore Code Interpreter with a privileged role attached | -| **Bedrock Code Interpreter Session Hijacking (BEDROCK-002)** | Start a session on an existing Bedrock code interpreter to exfiltrate its privileged role credentials | -| **CloudFormation Stack Creation with Privileged Role (CLOUDFORMATION-001)** | Create a CloudFormation stack with a privileged role to provision arbitrary AWS resources | -| **CloudFormation Stack Update for Role Access (CLOUDFORMATION-002)** | Update an existing CloudFormation stack to leverage its already-attached privileged service role | -| **CloudFormation StackSet Creation with Privileged Role (CLOUDFORMATION-003)** | Create a CloudFormation StackSet with a privileged execution role to provision arbitrary resources across accounts | -| **CloudFormation StackSet Update with Privileged Role (CLOUDFORMATION-004)** | Update an existing CloudFormation StackSet to inject malicious resources using a privileged execution role | -| **CloudFormation Change Set Privilege Escalation (CLOUDFORMATION-005)** | Create and execute a change set on an existing stack to leverage its privileged service role | -| **CodeBuild Project Creation with Privileged Role (CODEBUILD-001)** | Create a CodeBuild project with a privileged role to execute arbitrary code via a malicious buildspec | -| **CodeBuild Buildspec Override for Role Access (CODEBUILD-002)** | Start a build on an existing CodeBuild project with a buildspec override to execute code with its privileged role | -| **CodeBuild Batch Buildspec Override for Role Access (CODEBUILD-003)** | Start a batch build on an existing CodeBuild project with a buildspec override to execute code with its privileged role | -| **CodeBuild Batch Project Creation with Privileged Role (CODEBUILD-004)** | Create a CodeBuild project configured for batch builds with a privileged role to execute arbitrary code via a malicious buildspec | -| **Data Pipeline Creation with Privileged Role (DATAPIPELINE-001)** | Create a Data Pipeline with a privileged role to execute arbitrary commands on provisioned infrastructure | -| **EC2 Instance Launch with Privileged Role (EC2-001)** | Launch EC2 instances with privileged IAM roles to gain their permissions via IMDS | -| **EC2 Role Hijacking via UserData Injection (EC2-002)** | Inject malicious scripts into EC2 instance userData to gain the attached role's permissions | -| **Spot Instance Launch with Privileged Role (EC2-003)** | Launch EC2 Spot Instances with privileged IAM roles to gain their permissions via IMDS | -| **Launch Template Poisoning for Role Access (EC2-004)** | Inject malicious userData into launch templates that reference privileged roles, no PassRole needed | -| **EC2 Instance Connect SSH Access for Role Credentials (EC2INSTANCECONNECT-003)** | Push a temporary SSH key to an EC2 instance via Instance Connect to access its attached role credentials through IMDS | -| **ECS Service Creation with Privileged Role (ECS-001 - New Cluster)** | Create an ECS cluster and service with a privileged Fargate task role to execute arbitrary code | -| **ECS Task Execution with Privileged Role (ECS-002 - New Cluster)** | Create an ECS cluster and run a one-off Fargate task with a privileged role to execute arbitrary code | -| **ECS Service Creation with Privileged Role (ECS-003 - Existing Cluster)** | Deploy a Fargate service with a privileged role on an existing ECS cluster | -| **ECS Task Execution with Privileged Role (ECS-004 - Existing Cluster)** | Run a one-off Fargate task with a privileged role on an existing ECS cluster | -| **ECS Task Start with Privileged Role on EC2 (ECS-005 - Existing Cluster)** | Register a task definition with a privileged role and start it on an EC2 container instance to execute arbitrary code | -| **ECS Exec Container Hijacking for Role Credentials (ECS-006)** | Shell into a running ECS container via ECS Exec to steal the attached task role's credentials | -| **Glue Dev Endpoint with Privileged Role (GLUE-001)** | Create a Glue development endpoint with a privileged role attached to gain its permissions | -| **Glue Dev Endpoint SSH Hijacking via Update (GLUE-002)** | Update an existing Glue development endpoint to inject an SSH public key and access its attached role credentials | -| **Glue Job Creation with Privileged Role (GLUE-003)** | Create a Glue job with a privileged role and start it to execute arbitrary code with that role's permissions | -| **Glue Job Creation with Scheduled Trigger and Privileged Role (GLUE-004)** | Create a Glue job with a privileged role and a scheduled trigger to persistently execute arbitrary code | -| **Glue Job Hijacking via Update with Privileged Role (GLUE-005)** | Update an existing Glue job to attach a privileged role and inject malicious code, then start it to gain that role's permissions | -| **Glue Job Hijacking with Scheduled Trigger and Privileged Role (GLUE-006)** | Update an existing Glue job to attach a privileged role and inject malicious code, then create a scheduled trigger for persistent automated execution | -| **Policy Version Override for Self-Escalation (IAM-001)** | Create a new version of an attached policy with administrative permissions, instantly escalating the principal's own privileges | -| **Access Key Creation for Lateral Movement (IAM-002)** | Create access keys for other IAM users to gain their permissions and move laterally across the account | -| **Access Key Rotation Attack for Lateral Movement (IAM-003)** | Delete and recreate access keys for other IAM users to bypass the two-key limit and gain their permissions | -| **Console Login Profile Creation for Lateral Movement (IAM-004)** | Create console login profiles for other IAM users to access the AWS Console with their permissions | -| **Inline Policy Injection for Self-Escalation (IAM-005)** | Attach an inline policy with administrative permissions to your own role, instantly escalating privileges | -| **Console Password Override for Lateral Movement (IAM-006)** | Change the console password of other IAM users to log in as them and gain their permissions | -| **Inline Policy Injection on User for Self-Escalation (IAM-007)** | Attach an inline policy with administrative permissions to your own IAM user, instantly escalating privileges | -| **Managed Policy Attachment on User for Self-Escalation (IAM-008)** | Attach existing managed policies with administrative permissions to your own IAM user, instantly escalating privileges | -| **Managed Policy Attachment on Role for Self-Escalation (IAM-009)** | Attach existing managed policies with administrative permissions to your own IAM role, instantly escalating privileges | -| **Managed Policy Attachment on Group for Self-Escalation (IAM-010)** | Attach existing managed policies with administrative permissions to a group you belong to, escalating privileges for all group members | -| **Inline Policy Injection on Group for Self-Escalation (IAM-011)** | Attach an inline policy with administrative permissions to a group you belong to, escalating privileges for all group members | -| **Trust Policy Hijacking for Role Assumption (IAM-012)** | Modify a role's trust policy to allow yourself to assume it, gaining the role's permissions | -| **Group Membership Hijacking for Privilege Escalation (IAM-013)** | Add yourself to a privileged IAM group to inherit its permissions, gaining access to all policies attached to the group | -| **Managed Policy Attachment with Role Assumption for Lateral Movement (IAM-014)** | Attach administrative managed policies to another role you can assume, then assume it to gain elevated privileges | -| **Managed Policy Attachment with Access Key Creation for Lateral Movement (IAM-015)** | Attach administrative managed policies to another IAM user and create access keys for them to gain programmatic access with elevated privileges | -| **Policy Version Override with Role Assumption for Lateral Movement (IAM-016)** | Create a new version of a customer-managed policy attached to another role with administrative permissions, then assume that role to gain elevated access | -| **Inline Policy Injection with Role Assumption for Lateral Movement (IAM-017)** | Attach an inline policy with administrative permissions to another role you can assume, then assume it to gain elevated privileges | -| **Inline Policy Injection with Access Key Creation for Lateral Movement (IAM-018)** | Attach an inline policy with administrative permissions to another IAM user and create access keys for them to gain programmatic access with elevated privileges | -| **Managed Policy Attachment with Trust Policy Hijacking for Privilege Escalation (IAM-019)** | Attach administrative managed policies to a role and modify its trust policy to allow yourself to assume it, gaining elevated privileges without prior assume-role access | -| **Policy Version Override with Trust Policy Hijacking for Privilege Escalation (IAM-020)** | Create a new version of a customer-managed policy attached to a role with administrative permissions and modify its trust policy to assume it, without prior assume-role access | -| **Inline Policy Injection with Trust Policy Hijacking for Privilege Escalation (IAM-021)** | Add an inline policy with administrative permissions to a role and modify its trust policy to allow yourself to assume it, gaining elevated privileges without prior assume-role access | -| **Lambda Function Creation with Privileged Role (LAMBDA-001)** | Create a Lambda function with a privileged IAM role and invoke it to execute code with that role's permissions | -| **Lambda Function Creation with Event Source Trigger (LAMBDA-002)** | Create a Lambda function with a privileged IAM role and an event source mapping to trigger it automatically, executing code with the role's permissions | -| **Lambda Function Code Injection (LAMBDA-003)** | Modify the code of an existing Lambda function to execute arbitrary commands with the function's execution role permissions | -| **Lambda Function Code Injection with Direct Invocation (LAMBDA-004)** | Modify the code of an existing Lambda function and invoke it directly to execute arbitrary commands with the function's execution role permissions | -| **Lambda Function Code Injection with Resource Policy Grant (LAMBDA-005)** | Modify the code of an existing Lambda function and grant yourself invocation permission via its resource-based policy to execute code with the function's execution role | -| **Lambda Function Creation with Resource Policy Invocation (LAMBDA-006)** | Create a Lambda function with a privileged IAM role and grant yourself invocation permission via its resource-based policy to execute code with the role's permissions | -| **SageMaker Notebook Creation with Privileged Role (SAGEMAKER-001)** | Create a SageMaker notebook instance with a privileged IAM role to execute arbitrary code with the role's permissions via the Jupyter environment | -| **SageMaker Training Job Creation with Privileged Role (SAGEMAKER-002)** | Create a SageMaker training job with a privileged IAM role to execute arbitrary container code with the role's permissions | -| **SageMaker Processing Job Creation with Privileged Role (SAGEMAKER-003)** | Create a SageMaker processing job with a privileged IAM role to execute arbitrary container code with the role's permissions | -| **SageMaker Presigned Notebook URL for Privilege Escalation (SAGEMAKER-004)** | Generate a presigned URL to access an existing SageMaker notebook instance and execute code with its execution role's permissions | -| **SageMaker Notebook Lifecycle Config Injection (SAGEMAKER-005)** | Inject a malicious lifecycle configuration into an existing SageMaker notebook to execute code with the notebook's execution role during startup | -| **SSM Session Access for EC2 Role Credentials (SSM-001)** | Start an SSM session on an EC2 instance to access its attached role credentials through IMDS | -| **SSM Send Command for EC2 Role Credentials (SSM-002)** | Execute commands on an EC2 instance via SSM Run Command to access its attached role credentials through IMDS | -| **Role Assumption for Privilege Escalation (STS-001)** | Assume IAM roles with elevated permissions by exploiting bidirectional trust between the starting principal and the target role | +| Query | Description | +| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| **App Runner Service Creation with Privileged Role (APPRUNNER-001)** | Create an App Runner service with a privileged IAM role to gain its permissions | +| **App Runner Service Update for Role Access (APPRUNNER-002)** | Update an existing App Runner service to leverage its already-attached privileged role | +| **Bedrock Code Interpreter with Privileged Role (BEDROCK-001)** | Create a Bedrock AgentCore Code Interpreter with a privileged role attached | +| **Bedrock Code Interpreter Session Hijacking (BEDROCK-002)** | Start a session on an existing Bedrock code interpreter to exfiltrate its privileged role credentials | +| **CloudFormation Stack Creation with Privileged Role (CLOUDFORMATION-001)** | Create a CloudFormation stack with a privileged role to provision arbitrary AWS resources | +| **CloudFormation Stack Update for Role Access (CLOUDFORMATION-002)** | Update an existing CloudFormation stack to leverage its already-attached privileged service role | +| **CloudFormation StackSet Creation with Privileged Role (CLOUDFORMATION-003)** | Create a CloudFormation StackSet with a privileged execution role to provision arbitrary resources across accounts | +| **CloudFormation StackSet Update with Privileged Role (CLOUDFORMATION-004)** | Update an existing CloudFormation StackSet to inject malicious resources using a privileged execution role | +| **CloudFormation Change Set Privilege Escalation (CLOUDFORMATION-005)** | Create and execute a change set on an existing stack to leverage its privileged service role | +| **CodeBuild Project Creation with Privileged Role (CODEBUILD-001)** | Create a CodeBuild project with a privileged role to execute arbitrary code via a malicious buildspec | +| **CodeBuild Buildspec Override for Role Access (CODEBUILD-002)** | Start a build on an existing CodeBuild project with a buildspec override to execute code with its privileged role | +| **CodeBuild Batch Buildspec Override for Role Access (CODEBUILD-003)** | Start a batch build on an existing CodeBuild project with a buildspec override to execute code with its privileged role | +| **CodeBuild Batch Project Creation with Privileged Role (CODEBUILD-004)** | Create a CodeBuild project configured for batch builds with a privileged role to execute arbitrary code via a malicious buildspec | +| **Data Pipeline Creation with Privileged Role (DATAPIPELINE-001)** | Create a Data Pipeline with a privileged role to execute arbitrary commands on provisioned infrastructure | +| **EC2 Instance Launch with Privileged Role (EC2-001)** | Launch EC2 instances with privileged IAM roles to gain their permissions via IMDS | +| **EC2 Role Hijacking via UserData Injection (EC2-002)** | Inject malicious scripts into EC2 instance userData to gain the attached role's permissions | +| **Spot Instance Launch with Privileged Role (EC2-003)** | Launch EC2 Spot Instances with privileged IAM roles to gain their permissions via IMDS | +| **Launch Template Poisoning for Role Access (EC2-004)** | Inject malicious userData into launch templates that reference privileged roles, no PassRole needed | +| **EC2 Instance Connect SSH Access for Role Credentials (EC2INSTANCECONNECT-003)** | Push a temporary SSH key to an EC2 instance via Instance Connect to access its attached role credentials through IMDS | +| **ECS Service Creation with Privileged Role (ECS-001 - New Cluster)** | Create an ECS cluster and service with a privileged Fargate task role to execute arbitrary code | +| **ECS Task Execution with Privileged Role (ECS-002 - New Cluster)** | Create an ECS cluster and run a one-off Fargate task with a privileged role to execute arbitrary code | +| **ECS Service Creation with Privileged Role (ECS-003 - Existing Cluster)** | Deploy a Fargate service with a privileged role on an existing ECS cluster | +| **ECS Task Execution with Privileged Role (ECS-004 - Existing Cluster)** | Run a one-off Fargate task with a privileged role on an existing ECS cluster | +| **ECS Task Start with Privileged Role on EC2 (ECS-005 - Existing Cluster)** | Register a task definition with a privileged role and start it on an EC2 container instance to execute arbitrary code | +| **ECS Exec Container Hijacking for Role Credentials (ECS-006)** | Shell into a running ECS container via ECS Exec to steal the attached task role's credentials | +| **Glue Dev Endpoint with Privileged Role (GLUE-001)** | Create a Glue development endpoint with a privileged role attached to gain its permissions | +| **Glue Dev Endpoint SSH Hijacking via Update (GLUE-002)** | Update an existing Glue development endpoint to inject an SSH public key and access its attached role credentials | +| **Glue Job Creation with Privileged Role (GLUE-003)** | Create a Glue job with a privileged role and start it to execute arbitrary code with that role's permissions | +| **Glue Job Creation with Scheduled Trigger and Privileged Role (GLUE-004)** | Create a Glue job with a privileged role and a scheduled trigger to persistently execute arbitrary code | +| **Glue Job Hijacking via Update with Privileged Role (GLUE-005)** | Update an existing Glue job to attach a privileged role and inject malicious code, then start it to gain that role's permissions | +| **Glue Job Hijacking with Scheduled Trigger and Privileged Role (GLUE-006)** | Update an existing Glue job to attach a privileged role and inject malicious code, then create a scheduled trigger for persistent automated execution | +| **Policy Version Override for Self-Escalation (IAM-001)** | Create a new version of an attached policy with administrative permissions, instantly escalating the principal's own privileges | +| **Access Key Creation for Lateral Movement (IAM-002)** | Create access keys for other IAM users to gain their permissions and move laterally across the account | +| **Access Key Rotation Attack for Lateral Movement (IAM-003)** | Delete and recreate access keys for other IAM users to bypass the two-key limit and gain their permissions | +| **Console Login Profile Creation for Lateral Movement (IAM-004)** | Create console login profiles for other IAM users to access the AWS Console with their permissions | +| **Inline Policy Injection for Self-Escalation (IAM-005)** | Attach an inline policy with administrative permissions to your own role, instantly escalating privileges | +| **Console Password Override for Lateral Movement (IAM-006)** | Change the console password of other IAM users to log in as them and gain their permissions | +| **Inline Policy Injection on User for Self-Escalation (IAM-007)** | Attach an inline policy with administrative permissions to your own IAM user, instantly escalating privileges | +| **Managed Policy Attachment on User for Self-Escalation (IAM-008)** | Attach existing managed policies with administrative permissions to your own IAM user, instantly escalating privileges | +| **Managed Policy Attachment on Role for Self-Escalation (IAM-009)** | Attach existing managed policies with administrative permissions to your own IAM role, instantly escalating privileges | +| **Managed Policy Attachment on Group for Self-Escalation (IAM-010)** | Attach existing managed policies with administrative permissions to a group you belong to, escalating privileges for all group members | +| **Inline Policy Injection on Group for Self-Escalation (IAM-011)** | Attach an inline policy with administrative permissions to a group you belong to, escalating privileges for all group members | +| **Trust Policy Hijacking for Role Assumption (IAM-012)** | Modify a role's trust policy to allow yourself to assume it, gaining the role's permissions | +| **Group Membership Hijacking for Privilege Escalation (IAM-013)** | Add yourself to a privileged IAM group to inherit its permissions, gaining access to all policies attached to the group | +| **Managed Policy Attachment with Role Assumption for Lateral Movement (IAM-014)** | Attach administrative managed policies to another role you can assume, then assume it to gain elevated privileges | +| **Managed Policy Attachment with Access Key Creation for Lateral Movement (IAM-015)** | Attach administrative managed policies to another IAM user and create access keys for them to gain programmatic access with elevated privileges | +| **Policy Version Override with Role Assumption for Lateral Movement (IAM-016)** | Create a new version of a customer-managed policy attached to another role with administrative permissions, then assume that role to gain elevated access | +| **Inline Policy Injection with Role Assumption for Lateral Movement (IAM-017)** | Attach an inline policy with administrative permissions to another role you can assume, then assume it to gain elevated privileges | +| **Inline Policy Injection with Access Key Creation for Lateral Movement (IAM-018)** | Attach an inline policy with administrative permissions to another IAM user and create access keys for them to gain programmatic access with elevated privileges | +| **Managed Policy Attachment with Trust Policy Hijacking for Privilege Escalation (IAM-019)** | Attach administrative managed policies to a role and modify its trust policy to allow yourself to assume it, gaining elevated privileges without prior assume-role access | +| **Policy Version Override with Trust Policy Hijacking for Privilege Escalation (IAM-020)** | Create a new version of a customer-managed policy attached to a role with administrative permissions and modify its trust policy to assume it, without prior assume-role access | +| **Inline Policy Injection with Trust Policy Hijacking for Privilege Escalation (IAM-021)** | Add an inline policy with administrative permissions to a role and modify its trust policy to allow yourself to assume it, gaining elevated privileges without prior assume-role access | +| **Lambda Function Creation with Privileged Role (LAMBDA-001)** | Create a Lambda function with a privileged IAM role and invoke it to execute code with that role's permissions | +| **Lambda Function Creation with Event Source Trigger (LAMBDA-002)** | Create a Lambda function with a privileged IAM role and an event source mapping to trigger it automatically, executing code with the role's permissions | +| **Lambda Function Code Injection (LAMBDA-003)** | Modify the code of an existing Lambda function to execute arbitrary commands with the function's execution role permissions | +| **Lambda Function Code Injection with Direct Invocation (LAMBDA-004)** | Modify the code of an existing Lambda function and invoke it directly to execute arbitrary commands with the function's execution role permissions | +| **Lambda Function Code Injection with Resource Policy Grant (LAMBDA-005)** | Modify the code of an existing Lambda function and grant yourself invocation permission via its resource-based policy to execute code with the function's execution role | +| **Lambda Function Creation with Resource Policy Invocation (LAMBDA-006)** | Create a Lambda function with a privileged IAM role and grant yourself invocation permission via its resource-based policy to execute code with the role's permissions | +| **SageMaker Notebook Creation with Privileged Role (SAGEMAKER-001)** | Create a SageMaker notebook instance with a privileged IAM role to execute arbitrary code with the role's permissions via the Jupyter environment | +| **SageMaker Training Job Creation with Privileged Role (SAGEMAKER-002)** | Create a SageMaker training job with a privileged IAM role to execute arbitrary container code with the role's permissions | +| **SageMaker Processing Job Creation with Privileged Role (SAGEMAKER-003)** | Create a SageMaker processing job with a privileged IAM role to execute arbitrary container code with the role's permissions | +| **SageMaker Presigned Notebook URL for Privilege Escalation (SAGEMAKER-004)** | Generate a presigned URL to access an existing SageMaker notebook instance and execute code with its execution role's permissions | +| **SageMaker Notebook Lifecycle Config Injection (SAGEMAKER-005)** | Inject a malicious lifecycle configuration into an existing SageMaker notebook to execute code with the notebook's execution role during startup | +| **SSM Session Access for EC2 Role Credentials (SSM-001)** | Start an SSM session on an EC2 instance to access its attached role credentials through IMDS | +| **SSM Send Command for EC2 Role Credentials (SSM-002)** | Execute commands on an EC2 instance via SSM Run Command to access its attached role credentials through IMDS | +| **Role Assumption for Privilege Escalation (STS-001)** | Assume IAM roles with elevated permissions by exploiting bidirectional trust between the starting principal and the target role | These tools enable workflows such as: + - Asking an AI assistant to identify privilege escalation paths in a specific AWS account - Automating attack path analysis across multiple scans - Combining attack path data with findings and compliance information for comprehensive security reports diff --git a/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-scan-configuration.mdx b/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-scan-configuration.mdx new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..451fdc6d99 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-scan-configuration.mdx @@ -0,0 +1,208 @@ +--- +title: 'Scan Configuration' +--- + +import { VersionBadge } from "/snippets/version-badge.mdx" + + + +Scan Configuration lets you override Prowler's built-in scan defaults per tenant and per provider, directly from Prowler App — without editing files or redeploying. Each configuration is a small YAML document that changes how specific checks behave (thresholds, allowed values, retention windows, and so on), and you attach it to the cloud providers that should use it on their next scan. + + +Scan Configuration is a **Prowler Cloud-only** feature. The open-source API does not expose the `scan-configurations` endpoints, so the menu item and provider actions described here only appear in Prowler Cloud. + + +## What Is a Scan Configuration? + +Every Prowler scan reads a set of tunable values documented in [`prowler/config/config.yaml`](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/blob/master/prowler/config/config.yaml) — for example, how many days an access key can stay unused before it's flagged, or the minimum retention period for a storage bucket. A Scan Configuration is a **partial override** of those defaults: + +- You include **only** the keys you want to change. Everything else falls back to Prowler's built-in defaults. +- It is stored per tenant and applied to the **providers you attach** to it. +- A provider can be attached to **at most one** Scan Configuration at a time. +- Changes take effect on the provider's **next scan** — they do not re-run past scans. + +This is different from the [Mutelist](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-mute-findings), which hides findings. A Scan Configuration changes how the checks themselves evaluate your resources. + +## Where to Find It + +In Prowler Cloud, open **Configuration → Scan** in the sidebar, or go directly to `/scans/config`. The page lists every Scan Configuration in your tenant, with search by name and a filter by provider. + +## Creating a Scan Configuration + + + + On the **Scan** page, click **New Scan Configuration**. + + + Give the configuration a descriptive **Name** (3–100 characters), e.g. `stricter-iam-aws`. Names must be unique within your tenant. + + + In the **Configuration (YAML)** field, add only the keys you want to override, grouped by provider. The editor is pre-filled with a representative default placeholder you can use as a starting point. + + + Under **Attach to providers**, pick the providers that should use this configuration. This is optional — you can save without any provider and attach them later. + + + Click **Save**. The server validates the configuration values and, if everything is valid, stores it and attaches the selected providers. + + + +### YAML Structure + +The YAML follows the structure of `config.yaml`: a mapping keyed by provider, with each provider section holding the keys you want to override. + +```yaml +aws: + max_unused_access_keys_days: 30 + max_console_access_days: 30 + max_security_group_rules: 25 + +azure: + defender_attack_path_minimal_risk_level: "Critical" + +gcp: + storage_min_retention_days: 30 +``` + +Scan Configuration works for **every provider Prowler scans** — you key your overrides by provider using the same section names as `config.yaml`. Each provider below ships a configuration schema, so its values are checked on save (ranges, enums, and types): + +| Provider | Section key | +| --- | --- | +| AWS | `aws` | +| Azure | `azure` | +| Google Cloud | `gcp` | +| Kubernetes | `kubernetes` | +| Microsoft 365 | `m365` | +| GitHub | `github` | +| MongoDB Atlas | `mongodbatlas` | +| Cloudflare | `cloudflare` | +| Vercel | `vercel` | +| Okta | `okta` | +| Alibaba Cloud | `alibabacloud` | +| OpenStack | `openstack` | + +Sections that aren't listed here — those contributed by third-party check plugins, or providers that don't yet ship tunable defaults — are **accepted as-is** and applied without server-side value validation. + + +You don't need to fill in every provider — include only the sections and keys you actually want to change. The placeholder shown in the editor is just an example; if you leave the field with only the placeholder (greyed-out) text, nothing is saved. + + +## How Validation Works + +Validation happens in two layers, mirroring the Advanced Mutelist editor: + +1. **Client-side (live): YAML syntax only.** As you type, the editor checks that the text parses to a valid YAML mapping. If it doesn't, you'll see an `Invalid YAML format` message and the **Save** button is disabled. When the syntax is valid, it shows **Valid YAML format**. +2. **Server-side (on save): configuration values.** When you click Save (or Update), the API validates the actual values — ranges, enums, and types — against Prowler's schema. Any problems are returned and shown **inline beneath the field**, for both create and edit. + +For example, `azure.defender_attack_path_minimal_risk_level` only accepts `Low`, `Medium`, `High`, or `Critical`. Saving any other value returns an inline error like: + +``` +azure.defender_attack_path_minimal_risk_level: Input should be 'Low', 'Medium', 'High' or 'Critical' +``` + + +"Valid YAML format" confirms only that the document is **syntactically** correct — it does **not** mean the values are valid. Value validation (ranges and enums) is performed by the server when you save. + +Be careful with indentation. A line like `azure: defender_attack_path_minimal_risk_level: Critical` (no newline/indent after `azure:`) is *valid YAML*, but it parses to a single top-level key named `azure:defender_attack_path_minimal_risk_level` instead of the nested `azure` section — so the value is never applied. Always nest provider keys: + +```yaml +azure: + defender_attack_path_minimal_risk_level: "Critical" +``` + + + +Unknown top-level sections and unknown keys inside a known provider section are **tolerated** (accepted without error) for backward compatibility with third-party check plugins. This means typos in section or key names won't be rejected on save — double-check your structure against `config.yaml`. + + +## Attaching Providers + +A Scan Configuration only has an effect once it's attached to one or more providers. There are two ways to manage attachments. + +### From the Scan Config Editor + +In the **Attach to providers** field, select the providers that should use this configuration. Providers already attached to **another** configuration are hidden from the selector, since each provider can belong to only one configuration at a time. + +### From the Provider's Row Menu + +You can also manage a provider's configuration from **Providers**: + + + + On the **Providers** page, open the **⋮** menu on a provider row. + + + Click **Edit Scan Configuration**. + + + In the dialog, choose an existing configuration from the dropdown to associate it, pick a different one to move the provider, or select **Default** to detach it. **Default** means the provider uses Prowler's built-in scan defaults from the SDK (no custom configuration), and it's always available — even if no custom configurations exist yet. Then click **Save**. + + + + +This dialog only **associates or disassociates** an existing configuration. To create or edit the configuration's YAML, use the **Scan Config** view (a link is provided in the dialog). + + + +Because a provider can belong to only one configuration, associating a provider that is already attached elsewhere **moves** it to the new configuration automatically — it is removed from the previous one. + + +## Editing and Deleting + +On the **Scan Config** page, open the **⋮** menu on a configuration row: + +- **Edit:** Choose **Edit** to open the editor, change its name, YAML, or attached providers, and click **Update**. Editing the YAML always happens here, never from the provider row. +- **Delete:** Choose **Delete** (in the danger zone) and confirm. Providers that were attached fall back to Prowler's built-in scan defaults on their next scan. + +## How It's Applied + +When a scan runs for a provider: + +1. If the provider is attached to a Scan Configuration, Prowler applies that configuration's overrides on top of the built-in defaults. +2. If it isn't attached to any, the built-in defaults from `config.yaml` are used. + +Overrides are merged key by key: any value you don't set keeps its default. + +## Common Examples + +**Stricter IAM hygiene for AWS:** + +```yaml +aws: + max_unused_access_keys_days: 30 + max_console_access_days: 30 + max_unused_sagemaker_access_days: 45 +``` + +**Raise Azure Defender attack-path sensitivity:** + +```yaml +azure: + defender_attack_path_minimal_risk_level: "Critical" +``` + +**Tighten GCP storage retention and key rotation:** + +```yaml +gcp: + storage_min_retention_days: 30 + secretmanager_max_rotation_days: 30 +``` + +## Troubleshooting + + +**Save is disabled.** The YAML has a syntax error (or the field is empty). Fix the `Invalid YAML format` message shown beneath the editor. + + + +**An inline error appears after saving.** The server rejected a value (out of range or not an allowed enum). The message names the exact path, e.g. `aws.max_unused_access_keys_days: ...`. Correct the value and save again. + + + +**A provider doesn't appear in the selector.** It's already attached to another Scan Configuration. Detach it there first, or use the provider row menu to move it. + + + +**My override doesn't seem to apply.** Check indentation (provider keys must be nested under their section) and key spelling — unknown keys are silently accepted. Compare against [`config.yaml`](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/blob/master/prowler/config/config.yaml). + diff --git a/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-sso-google-workspace.mdx b/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-sso-google-workspace.mdx index 2a349c0204..2f10d443ae 100644 --- a/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-sso-google-workspace.mdx +++ b/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-sso-google-workspace.mdx @@ -108,10 +108,10 @@ Prowler App updates user attributes each time a user logs in. Any changes made i The `userType` attribute controls which Prowler role is assigned to the user: - If `userType` matches an existing Prowler role name, the user receives that role automatically. -- If `userType` does not match any existing role, Prowler App creates a new role with that name **without permissions**. -- If `userType` is not set, the user receives the `no_permissions` role. +- If `userType` does not match any existing role, Prowler App creates a new role with that name **with read-only access** (visibility over all providers, no management permissions). A Prowler administrator can adjust its permissions afterward through the [RBAC Management](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-rbac) tab. +- If `userType` is not set, the user's existing roles are left unchanged. -In all cases where the resulting role has no permissions, a Prowler administrator must configure the appropriate permissions through the [RBAC Management](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-rbac) tab. The `userType` value is **case-sensitive** - for example, `Backend` and `backend` are treated as different roles. +The `userType` value is **case-sensitive** - for example, `Backend` and `backend` are treated as different roles. @@ -223,9 +223,9 @@ To test the `userType` → role mapping, set the **Department** attribute in the After a successful SSO login, the user profile in Prowler App reflects the attributes sent by Google Workspace: - **Name**: Populated from the `firstName` and `lastName` attributes. -- **Role**: Created automatically from the `userType` attribute (e.g., `Backend`). If the role did not exist previously, it is created with no permissions by default. -- **Permissions**: In the screenshot below, the user has no permissions because the `Backend` role did not exist prior to login and was created automatically without any permissions. To resolve this, a Prowler administrator can either: - - Assign the appropriate permissions to the new role via the [RBAC Management](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-rbac) tab. +- **Role**: Created automatically from the `userType` attribute (e.g., `Backend`). If the role did not exist previously, it is created with read-only access by default. +- **Permissions**: If the assigned permissions need to be adjusted, a Prowler administrator can either: + - Edit the permissions of the new role via the [RBAC Management](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-rbac) tab. - Set the `userType` attribute in the IdP to match an existing Prowler role that already has the desired permissions. The updated role is applied on the next SAML login. For more details on role assignment behavior and attribute mapping, refer to the [SAML SSO Configuration](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-sso#configure-attribute-mapping-in-the-idp) page. diff --git a/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-sso.mdx b/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-sso.mdx index d4d2c18d11..1e61ec1060 100644 --- a/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-sso.mdx +++ b/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-sso.mdx @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ Choose a Method: |----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------| | `firstName` | The user's first name. | Yes | | `lastName` | The user's last name. | Yes | - | `userType` | Determines which Prowler role the user receives (e.g., `admin`, `auditor`). If a role with that name already exists, the user receives it automatically; if it does not exist, Prowler App creates a new role with that name without permissions. If `userType` is not defined, the user is assigned the `no_permissions` role. Role permissions can be edited in the [RBAC Management tab](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-rbac). | No | + | `userType` | Determines which Prowler role the user receives (e.g., `admin`, `auditor`). If a role with that name already exists, the user receives it automatically; if it does not exist, Prowler App creates a new role with that name with read-only access (visibility over all providers, no management permissions). If `userType` is not defined, the user's existing roles are left unchanged. Role permissions can be edited in the [RBAC Management tab](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-rbac). | No | | `organization` | The user's company name. | No | @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ Choose a Method: ![Okta User Profile — First Name and Last Name](/images/prowler-app/saml/okta-user-profile-name.png) * **Organization** (`organization`): Maps to the company name displayed in Prowler App. This attribute is optional. - * **User type** (`userType`): Determines the Prowler role assigned to the user. This attribute is **case-sensitive** and must match the exact name of an existing role in Prowler App. + * **User type** (`userType`): Determines the Prowler role assigned to the user. This attribute is **case-sensitive**: if it matches the exact name of an existing role in Prowler App the user receives that role; if no role with that name exists, a new one is created with read-only access. ![Okta User Profile — User Type and Organization](/images/prowler-app/saml/okta-user-profile-attributes.png) @@ -152,14 +152,10 @@ Choose a Method: The `userType` attribute controls which Prowler role is assigned to the user: * If a role with the specified name already exists in Prowler App, the user automatically receives that role. - * If the role does not exist, Prowler App creates a new role with that exact name but without any permissions, preventing the user from performing any actions. - * If `userType` is not defined in the user's Okta profile, the user is assigned the `no_permissions` role. + * If the role does not exist, Prowler App creates a new role with that exact name with read-only access: the user can see all providers and their findings but cannot manage anything. A Prowler administrator (a user whose role includes the "Manage Account" permission) can adjust its permissions afterward through the [RBAC Management tab](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-rbac). + * If `userType` is not defined in the user's Okta profile, the user's existing roles in Prowler App are left unchanged. - In all cases where the resulting role has no permissions, a Prowler administrator (a user whose role includes the "Manage Account" permission) must configure the appropriate permissions through the [RBAC Management tab](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-rbac). - - This behavior is intentional: by defaulting to no permissions, Prowler App ensures that a misconfiguration in Okta cannot inadvertently grant elevated access. - - **Example:** To assign the `IT` role to a user, set the `userType` value to `IT` in Okta. If a role named `IT` already exists in Prowler App, the user receives it automatically upon login. If it does not exist, Prowler App creates a new role called `IT` without permissions, and a Prowler administrator must configure the desired permissions for it. + **Example:** To assign the `IT` role to a user, set the `userType` value to `IT` in Okta. If a role named `IT` already exists in Prowler App, the user receives it automatically upon login. If it does not exist, Prowler App creates a new role called `IT` with read-only access, and a Prowler administrator can adjust its permissions as needed. diff --git a/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-cloud-aws-organizations.mdx b/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-cloud-aws-organizations.mdx index d9c17aaa5f..d0c71c7e40 100644 --- a/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-cloud-aws-organizations.mdx +++ b/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-cloud-aws-organizations.mdx @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import { VersionBadge } from "/snippets/version-badge.mdx" Prowler Cloud enables you to onboard all AWS accounts in your Organization through a single guided wizard. Instead of connecting accounts one by one, you can discover every account in your AWS Organization, select the ones you want to monitor, test connectivity, and launch scans — all from the Prowler Cloud UI. -This feature is **exclusively available in Prowler Cloud**. For CLI-based multi-account scanning, see [AWS Organizations in Prowler CLI](/user-guide/providers/aws/organizations). +This feature is available exclusively in **Prowler Cloud** and **Prowler Enterprise** with a [subscription](https://prowler.com/pricing). For CLI-based multi-account scanning, see [AWS Organizations in Prowler CLI](/user-guide/providers/aws/organizations). ## Overview @@ -22,9 +22,9 @@ This feature is **exclusively available in Prowler Cloud**. For CLI-based multi- | **Individual accounts** | A few AWS accounts | Connect each account one by one with its own IAM role. | | **AWS Organizations** | 10+ accounts, or any org-managed environment | Connect once to your management account, discover all member accounts automatically, and scan them in bulk. | -### How it works +### How It Works -Before using the AWS Organizations wizard, you need to deploy **two IAM roles** in your AWS environment. The onboarding follows this sequence: +Before using the AWS Organizations wizard, you need to deploy **two Identity and Access Management (IAM) roles** in your AWS environment. The onboarding follows this sequence: Onboarding flow: 1. Create Management Account Role (Quick Create or Manual), 2. Deploy StackSet, 3. Run the Wizard, 4. Launch Scans @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Before using the AWS Organizations wizard, you need to deploy **two IAM roles** ## Key Concepts -### What is an External ID? +### What Is an External ID? An **External ID** is a security token that Prowler generates unique to your tenant. When Prowler assumes the IAM role in your AWS account, it presents this External ID to prove its identity. @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ Prowler requires **two separate IAM roles** deployed in different places, each w **Same name, different permissions.** Both roles are named `ProwlerScan` — Prowler expects a consistent role name across all accounts. The management account role has the same scanning permissions as member accounts, plus additional Organizations discovery permissions (see [Step 1](#step-1-create-the-management-account-role) for the full list). -### What is a CloudFormation StackSet? +### What Is a CloudFormation StackSet? A [CloudFormation StackSet](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSCloudFormation/latest/UserGuide/what-is-cfnstacksets.html) lets you deploy the same CloudFormation template across multiple AWS accounts in a single operation. Prowler uses a StackSet to deploy the **ProwlerScan** IAM role into every member account of your organization, so you don't have to create the role manually in each account. @@ -437,14 +437,11 @@ If connection tests fail, here's how to fix common issues: ### Choose Scan Schedule -| Schedule Option | Description | -|-----------------|-------------| -| **Scan Daily (every 24 hours)** | Creates a recurring daily scan for all connected accounts (default). | -| **Run a single scan (no recurring schedule)** | Launches a one-time scan. | +The Organizations wizard uses the same schedule controls described in [Scan Scheduling](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-scan-scheduling#schedule-options). ### Launch -Click **Launch scan**. A toast notification confirms: *"Scan Launched — Daily scan scheduled for X accounts"* with a link to the Scans page. You will be redirected to the **Providers** page. +Click **Save**, **Save and launch scan**, or **Launch scan**, depending on the selected schedule option. A toast notification confirms whether the schedule was saved, scans were launched, or both. The toast includes a link to the **Scans** page. Prowler redirects to the **Providers** page. Scans are only launched for accounts that are accessible (passed connection testing) and were selected. diff --git a/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-import-findings.mdx b/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-import-findings.mdx index d4c8f8a74d..6a3276e403 100644 --- a/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-import-findings.mdx +++ b/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-import-findings.mdx @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import { VersionBadge } from "/snippets/version-badge.mdx" Findings Ingestion enables uploading OCSF (Open Cybersecurity Schema Framework) scan results to Prowler Cloud. This feature supports importing findings from Prowler CLI output files that use the [Detection Finding](https://schema.ocsf.io/classes/detection_finding) class. -This feature is available exclusively in **Prowler Cloud** and **Prowler Enterprise** with a [paid subscription](https://prowler.com/pricing). +This feature is available exclusively in **Prowler Cloud** and **Prowler Enterprise** with a [subscription](https://prowler.com/pricing). ## OCSF Detection Finding format diff --git a/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-scan-scheduling.mdx b/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-scan-scheduling.mdx new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7b9173de05 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-scan-scheduling.mdx @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +--- +title: 'Scan Scheduling' +description: 'Create, edit, and monitor recurring scans in Prowler Cloud and Enterprise.' +--- + +import { VersionBadge } from "/snippets/version-badge.mdx" + + + +Scan Scheduling lets Prowler run recurring scans for connected providers. Use it to keep findings, compliance results, and resource inventory up to date without launching every scan manually. + + +This feature is available exclusively in **Prowler Cloud** and **Prowler Enterprise** with a [subscription](https://prowler.com/pricing). + + +## Prerequisites + +Before creating or editing scan schedules, ensure that: + +* At least one provider is connected. +* The user role includes the **Manage Scans** permission, configured through Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). See [RBAC Administrative Permissions](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-rbac#rbac-administrative-permissions) for details. + +## Schedule Options + +A Prowler Cloud or Enterprise subscription supports the following custom recurring schedule options. Prowler self-hosted runs a daily scan automatically and does not expose custom cadence controls. + +| Schedule Option | Description | Cloud & Enterprise | Self-Hosted | +|-----------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------| +| Daily | Runs one scan every day at the selected time. | Yes | Yes | +| Every 48 hours | Runs one scan every 48 hours, anchored to the selected time. | Yes | — | +| Weekly | Runs one scan every week on the selected day and time. | Yes | — | +| Monthly | Runs one scan every month on the selected day, from day 1 to day 28. | Yes | — | + +The scan time is always selected on the hour (for example, 14:00); minutes cannot be set. The schedule time uses the browser timezone when the schedule is saved. Prowler displays the next scheduled scan in that timezone. + +## Create a Schedule From Scans + +To create a schedule from the **Scans** page: + +1. Navigate to **Scans**. +2. Click **Launch Scan**. +3. Select a connected provider. +4. Select **On a schedule**. +5. Choose the **Scan Time** and **Repeats** values. +6. Optional: select **Launch an initial scan now for immediate findings** to run a scan immediately after saving the recurring schedule. +7. Click **Save Schedule**. + + + Launch A Scan modal showing On a schedule mode, weekly schedule controls, and Save Schedule button + + +After the schedule is saved, Prowler shows a confirmation toast with a link to the **Scheduled** tab. + +## Edit Schedules From Providers + +The **Providers** page shows each provider's current schedule in the **Scan Schedule** column. Providers without a recurring schedule show **None**. + + + Providers table showing the Scan Schedule column with Daily and None schedule states + + +To edit a provider schedule: + +1. Navigate to **Providers**. +2. Open the provider row actions menu. +3. Click **Edit Scan Schedule**. +4. Update the schedule fields. +5. Click **Save**. + + + Edit Scan Schedule modal showing a weekly provider schedule and Remove Scan Schedule action + + +To stop automatic scans for a provider, click **Remove Scan Schedule** in the edit modal. Removing a schedule stops future automatic scans; existing completed scan results remain available. + +## Bulk Edit Schedules + +Use bulk schedule editing when several providers need the same recurring cadence. + +To bulk edit provider schedules: + +1. Navigate to **Providers**. +2. Select the provider rows that should receive the same schedule. +3. Open the selected-row actions menu. +4. Click **Edit Scan Schedule (N)**, where **N** is the number of selected providers. +5. Save the schedule. + +For AWS Organizations and Organizational Unit rows, **Edit Scan Schedule** applies the schedule to the connected child providers in that group. + + +Bulk schedule edits apply one schedule to every selected provider. If the wrong providers are selected, Prowler applies the same cadence to unintended providers. To recover, reopen bulk edit with the correct selection or update affected provider schedules individually. + + +## Review Scheduled Scans + +To review upcoming scheduled scans: + +1. Navigate to **Scans**. +2. Click the **Scheduled** tab. + +The **Scheduled** tab shows configured schedules, next scan time, and last scan time. Pending rows represent configured schedules that have not started their next scan yet. + + + Scans Scheduled tab showing pending scheduled scans, schedule cadence, next scan, and last scan columns + + +To edit a schedule from this tab, open the row actions menu and click **Edit Scan Schedule**. diff --git a/mcp_server/Dockerfile b/mcp_server/Dockerfile index d8377a1762..c2759b20de 100644 --- a/mcp_server/Dockerfile +++ b/mcp_server/Dockerfile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # ============================================================================= # Build stage - Install dependencies and build the application # ============================================================================= -FROM ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:python3.13-alpine@sha256:8f53782bb232ab0b5558f3071e86e2bbfde884e18815f2b19cc57f2d336e9ee2 AS builder +FROM ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:0.11.21-python3.13-alpine3.23@sha256:f09cc61ffc001f202701fdeae14dbdd50f6ca4cfcf248f41fd3234a302c8534f AS builder WORKDIR /app @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/uv \ # ============================================================================= # Final stage - Minimal runtime environment # ============================================================================= -FROM python:3.13-alpine@sha256:bb1f2fdb1065c85468775c9d680dcd344f6442a2d1181ef7916b60a623f11d40 +FROM python:3.13.14-alpine3.23@sha256:b0513989fa9be54569cac73f48a60320b74bb0f9ffa886568eea7e48a2432c04 LABEL maintainer="https://github.com/prowler-cloud" diff --git a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/attack_paths.py b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/attack_paths.py index cfd704eeca..bbe2eb7401 100644 --- a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/attack_paths.py +++ b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/attack_paths.py @@ -12,9 +12,10 @@ for optimal LLM token usage. from typing import Any, Literal -from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.models.base import MinimalSerializerMixin from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field +from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.models.base import MinimalSerializerMixin + class AttackPathScan(MinimalSerializerMixin, BaseModel): """Simplified attack paths scan representation for list operations. diff --git a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/compliance.py b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/compliance.py index 4dfe5c4839..c68bd0df85 100644 --- a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/compliance.py +++ b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/compliance.py @@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ from typing import Any, Literal -from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.models.base import MinimalSerializerMixin from pydantic import ( BaseModel, ConfigDict, @@ -11,6 +10,8 @@ from pydantic import ( model_serializer, ) +from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.models.base import MinimalSerializerMixin + class ComplianceRequirementAttribute(MinimalSerializerMixin, BaseModel): """Requirement attributes including associated check IDs. diff --git a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/finding_groups.py b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/finding_groups.py index 9ff9822977..ae8431ba63 100644 --- a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/finding_groups.py +++ b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/finding_groups.py @@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ from pydantic import Field from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.models.base import MinimalSerializerMixin - FindingStatus = Literal["FAIL", "PASS", "MANUAL"] FindingSeverity = Literal["critical", "high", "medium", "low", "informational"] FindingDelta = Literal["new", "changed"] @@ -76,9 +75,7 @@ class SimplifiedFindingGroup(MinimalSerializerMixin): ) muted_count: int = Field(description="Total muted findings in this group", ge=0) new_count: int = Field(description="Number of new non-muted findings", ge=0) - changed_count: int = Field( - description="Number of changed non-muted findings", ge=0 - ) + changed_count: int = Field(description="Number of changed non-muted findings", ge=0) first_seen_at: str | None = Field( default=None, description="First time this group was detected" ) @@ -109,18 +106,12 @@ class DetailedFindingGroup(SimplifiedFindingGroup): new_pass_count: int = Field(description="New non-muted PASS findings", ge=0) new_pass_muted_count: int = Field(description="New muted PASS findings", ge=0) new_manual_count: int = Field(description="New non-muted MANUAL findings", ge=0) - new_manual_muted_count: int = Field( - description="New muted MANUAL findings", ge=0 - ) - changed_fail_count: int = Field( - description="Changed non-muted FAIL findings", ge=0 - ) + new_manual_muted_count: int = Field(description="New muted MANUAL findings", ge=0) + changed_fail_count: int = Field(description="Changed non-muted FAIL findings", ge=0) changed_fail_muted_count: int = Field( description="Changed muted FAIL findings", ge=0 ) - changed_pass_count: int = Field( - description="Changed non-muted PASS findings", ge=0 - ) + changed_pass_count: int = Field(description="Changed non-muted PASS findings", ge=0) changed_pass_muted_count: int = Field( description="Changed muted PASS findings", ge=0 ) diff --git a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/findings.py b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/findings.py index 5ef8702ce4..1373e36294 100644 --- a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/findings.py +++ b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/findings.py @@ -2,9 +2,10 @@ from typing import Literal -from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.models.base import MinimalSerializerMixin from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field +from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.models.base import MinimalSerializerMixin + class CheckRemediation(MinimalSerializerMixin, BaseModel): """Remediation information for a security check.""" diff --git a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/muting.py b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/muting.py index 779acdde5e..e50a150d20 100644 --- a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/muting.py +++ b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/muting.py @@ -2,9 +2,10 @@ from typing import Any -from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.models.base import MinimalSerializerMixin from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field +from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.models.base import MinimalSerializerMixin + class MutelistResponse(MinimalSerializerMixin, BaseModel): """Simplified mutelist response with Prowler configuration. diff --git a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/providers.py b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/providers.py index 07f3be1d37..af9509a963 100644 --- a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/providers.py +++ b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/providers.py @@ -2,9 +2,10 @@ from typing import Any, Literal -from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.models.base import MinimalSerializerMixin from pydantic import BaseModel +from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.models.base import MinimalSerializerMixin + class SimplifiedProvider(MinimalSerializerMixin, BaseModel): """Simplified provider for list/search operations.""" diff --git a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/resources.py b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/resources.py index 823134794f..13cb1ed4dd 100644 --- a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/resources.py +++ b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/resources.py @@ -1,8 +1,9 @@ """Pydantic models for simplified resources responses.""" -from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.models.base import MinimalSerializerMixin from pydantic import BaseModel +from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.models.base import MinimalSerializerMixin + class SimplifiedResource(MinimalSerializerMixin, BaseModel): """Simplified resource with only LLM-relevant information for list operations.""" diff --git a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/scans.py b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/scans.py index 696ac7837d..f8eef988ce 100644 --- a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/scans.py +++ b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/models/scans.py @@ -11,9 +11,10 @@ for optimal LLM token usage. from typing import Any, Literal -from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.models.base import MinimalSerializerMixin from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field +from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.models.base import MinimalSerializerMixin + class SimplifiedScan(MinimalSerializerMixin, BaseModel): """Simplified scan representation for list operations. diff --git a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/server.py b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/server.py index 39b22d095c..e8e854144f 100644 --- a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/server.py +++ b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/server.py @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ from fastmcp import FastMCP + from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.utils.tool_loader import load_all_tools # Initialize MCP server diff --git a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/tools/attack_paths.py b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/tools/attack_paths.py index ff9b8045a4..b08bbfe01f 100644 --- a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/tools/attack_paths.py +++ b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/tools/attack_paths.py @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ through cloud infrastructure relationships. from typing import Any, Literal +from pydantic import Field + from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.models.attack_paths import ( AttackPathCartographySchema, AttackPathQuery, @@ -14,7 +16,6 @@ from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.models.attack_paths import ( AttackPathScansListResponse, ) from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.tools.base import BaseTool -from pydantic import Field class AttackPathsTools(BaseTool): diff --git a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/tools/compliance.py b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/tools/compliance.py index 81f16a83e9..360dd5510d 100644 --- a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/tools/compliance.py +++ b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/tools/compliance.py @@ -6,13 +6,14 @@ across all cloud providers. from typing import Any +from pydantic import Field + from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.models.compliance import ( ComplianceFrameworksListResponse, ComplianceRequirementAttributesListResponse, ComplianceRequirementsListResponse, ) from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.tools.base import BaseTool -from pydantic import Field class ComplianceTools(BaseTool): diff --git a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/tools/finding_groups.py b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/tools/finding_groups.py index 363e45d970..905a352740 100644 --- a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/tools/finding_groups.py +++ b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/tools/finding_groups.py @@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.models.finding_groups import ( ) from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.tools.base import BaseTool - StatusFilter = Literal["FAIL", "PASS", "MANUAL"] SeverityFilter = Literal["critical", "high", "medium", "low", "informational"] DeltaFilter = Literal["new", "changed"] @@ -464,9 +463,7 @@ class FindingGroupsTools(BaseTool): clean_params = self.api_client.build_filter_params(params) api_response = await self.api_client.get(endpoint, params=clean_params) - response = FindingGroupResourcesListResponse.from_api_response( - api_response - ) + response = FindingGroupResourcesListResponse.from_api_response(api_response) return response.model_dump() except Exception as e: self.logger.error(f"Error listing finding group resources: {e}") diff --git a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/tools/resources.py b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/tools/resources.py index 042232e6a5..011e013b91 100644 --- a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/tools/resources.py +++ b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/tools/resources.py @@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ across all providers. from typing import Any +from pydantic import Field + from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.models.resources import ( DetailedResource, ResourceEventsResponse, @@ -13,7 +15,6 @@ from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.models.resources import ( ResourcesMetadataResponse, ) from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.tools.base import BaseTool -from pydantic import Field class ResourcesTools(BaseTool): diff --git a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/utils/api_client.py b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/utils/api_client.py index 4b6d0e77f5..a6aacc3ce1 100644 --- a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/utils/api_client.py +++ b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/utils/api_client.py @@ -2,11 +2,12 @@ import asyncio from datetime import datetime, timedelta -from enum import Enum -from typing import Any, Dict +from enum import StrEnum +from typing import Any from urllib.parse import urlparse import httpx + from prowler_mcp_server import __version__ from prowler_mcp_server.lib.logger import logger from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.utils.auth import ProwlerAppAuth @@ -14,7 +15,7 @@ from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.utils.auth import ProwlerAppAuth ALLOWED_EXTERNAL_DOMAINS: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"raw.githubusercontent.com"}) -class HTTPMethod(str, Enum): +class HTTPMethod(StrEnum): """HTTP methods enum.""" GET = "GET" @@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ class SingletonMeta(type): All calls to the constructor return the same instance. """ - _instances: Dict[type, Any] = {} + _instances: dict[type, Any] = {} def __call__(cls, *args, **kwargs): """Control instance creation to ensure singleton behavior.""" diff --git a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/utils/auth.py b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/utils/auth.py index 48535fb10a..72c06000df 100644 --- a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/utils/auth.py +++ b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/utils/auth.py @@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ import base64 import json import os from datetime import datetime -from typing import Dict, Optional from fastmcp.server.dependencies import get_http_headers @@ -21,8 +20,8 @@ class ProwlerAppAuth: self.base_url = base_url.rstrip("/") logger.info(f"Using Prowler App API base URL: {self.base_url}") self.mode = mode - self.access_token: Optional[str] = None - self.api_key: Optional[str] = None + self.access_token: str | None = None + self.api_key: str | None = None if mode == "stdio": # STDIO mode self.api_key = os.getenv("PROWLER_APP_API_KEY") @@ -33,7 +32,7 @@ class ProwlerAppAuth: if not self.api_key.startswith("pk_"): raise ValueError("Prowler App API key format is incorrect") - def _parse_jwt(self, token: str) -> Optional[Dict]: + def _parse_jwt(self, token: str) -> dict | None: """Parse JWT token and return payload Args: @@ -110,7 +109,7 @@ class ProwlerAppAuth: else: return await self.authenticate() - def get_headers(self, token: str) -> Dict[str, str]: + def get_headers(self, token: str) -> dict[str, str]: """Get headers for API requests with authentication.""" if token.startswith("pk_"): authorization_header = f"Api-Key {token}" diff --git a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/utils/tool_loader.py b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/utils/tool_loader.py index 834bcaef7f..b85c13af35 100644 --- a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/utils/tool_loader.py +++ b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/utils/tool_loader.py @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import importlib import pkgutil from fastmcp import FastMCP + from prowler_mcp_server.lib.logger import logger from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.tools.base import BaseTool diff --git a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_documentation/search_engine.py b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_documentation/search_engine.py index a366c39c30..ba6f2a12e7 100644 --- a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_documentation/search_engine.py +++ b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_documentation/search_engine.py @@ -1,7 +1,8 @@ import httpx -from prowler_mcp_server import __version__ from pydantic import BaseModel, Field +from prowler_mcp_server import __version__ + class SearchResult(BaseModel): """Search result model.""" diff --git a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/server.py b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/server.py index 20b7966b45..7c85641dee 100644 --- a/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/server.py +++ b/mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/server.py @@ -1,7 +1,8 @@ from fastmcp import FastMCP +from starlette.responses import 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cleanup, so it is left out of the shared +# baseline for now. +extend-select = [ + "I", # isort — import ordering + "UP", # pyupgrade — modern syntax for the min supported Python + "C4" # flake8-comprehensions +] + [tool.uv] package = true diff --git a/mcp_server/uv.lock b/mcp_server/uv.lock index fd0a9349f9..3258767442 100644 --- a/mcp_server/uv.lock +++ b/mcp_server/uv.lock @@ -687,6 +687,7 @@ dependencies = [ dev = [ { name = "bandit" }, { name = "pytest" }, + { name = "ruff" }, { name = "vulture" }, ] @@ -700,6 +701,7 @@ requires-dist = [ dev = [ { name = "bandit", specifier = "==1.8.3" }, { name = "pytest", specifier = "==9.0.3" }, + { name = "ruff", specifier = "==0.15.11" }, { name = "vulture", specifier = "==2.14" }, ] @@ -857,11 +859,11 @@ wheels = [ [[package]] name = "pyjwt" -version = "2.12.1" +version = "2.13.0" source = { registry = "https://pypi.org/simple" } -sdist = { url = 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"arn:*:apigateway:*::/domainnames/*" ], "Sid": "AllowAPIGatewayReadOnly" } diff --git a/permissions/templates/cloudformation/prowler-scan-role.yml b/permissions/templates/cloudformation/prowler-scan-role.yml index 395fed6424..a7d91b0071 100644 --- a/permissions/templates/cloudformation/prowler-scan-role.yml +++ b/permissions/templates/cloudformation/prowler-scan-role.yml @@ -129,6 +129,8 @@ Resources: - "lightsail:GetRelationalDatabases" - "macie2:GetMacieSession" - "macie2:GetAutomatedDiscoveryConfiguration" + - "rolesanywhere:ListTagsForResource" + - "rolesanywhere:ListTrustAnchors" - "s3:GetAccountPublicAccessBlock" - "shield:DescribeProtection" - "shield:GetSubscriptionState" @@ -150,6 +152,8 @@ Resources: Resource: - "arn:*:apigateway:*::/restapis/*" - "arn:*:apigateway:*::/apis/*" + - "arn:*:apigateway:*::/domainnames" + - "arn:*:apigateway:*::/domainnames/*" - !If - OrganizationsEnabled - PolicyName: ProwlerOrganizations diff --git a/prowler/CHANGELOG.md b/prowler/CHANGELOG.md index b14ef2de8f..11e694d9ba 100644 --- a/prowler/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/prowler/CHANGELOG.md @@ -2,15 +2,143 @@ All notable changes to the **Prowler SDK** are documented in this file. -## [5.31.0] (Prowler UNRELEASED) +## [5.32.0] (Prowler UNRELEASED) ### 🚀 Added +- Per-requirement configuration validation for compliance frameworks via `ConfigRequirements`, so a requirement is reported as FAIL when its configurable checks ran with a configuration too loose to satisfy it (applied across all compliance outputs: CSV, OCSF, and console tables) [(#11669)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11669) +- `entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops` check for M365 provider, verifying at least one enabled Conditional Access policy explicitly includes the Azure DevOps cloud application instead of relying on a broad "All cloud apps" policy [(#11182)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11182) +- `entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps` check for M365 provider, verifying every user, group, role, or application excluded from an enabled Conditional Access policy stays in scope of another enabled policy [(#11577)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11577) +- `stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk` check for AWS provider, verifying that each Step Functions state machine uses a customer-managed KMS key for encryption at rest rather than the default AWS-owned key [(#11538)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11538) +- CIS Controls v8.1 universal compliance framework mapping existing checks across 18 providers (AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes, M365, GitHub, AlibabaCloud, OracleCloud, GoogleWorkspace, Okta, Cloudflare, Vercel, MongoDB Atlas, OpenStack, Linode, StackIT, NHN, and Scaleway) to the 18 CIS Critical Security Controls and their Safeguards [(#11700)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11700) +- CIS Microsoft 365 Foundations Benchmark v7.0.0 compliance framework for the M365 provider [(#11699)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11699) +- `waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled` check for AWS provider, verifying that each AWS WAF Classic Regional Web ACL has logging enabled to a Kinesis Data Firehose stream [(#11539)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11539) +- `sdk_only` provider property (default `true`) and `Provider.get_app_providers()`, so a provider (built-in or external) stays CLI/SDK-only and hidden from the app unless it declares `sdk_only = False` [(#11427)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11427) +- `Provider.get_scan_arguments()`, `Provider.get_connection_arguments()` and `Provider.get_credentials_schema()` contract methods, so a provider persisted as a stored uid plus a secret dict can be constructed and validated programmatically (to be consumed by the API in a later change) [(#11578)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11578) +- CIS Amazon Web Services Foundations Benchmark v7.0.0 compliance framework for the AWS provider, adding the new Organizations section (2.1.1-2.1.6), resource policy (2.21), web front-end access logging (4.10), and VPC Endpoints (6.8) recommendations [(#11707)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11707) +- CIS Microsoft Azure Foundations Benchmark v6.0.0 compliance framework for the Azure provider [(#11708)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11708) +- CIS Google Cloud Platform Foundation Benchmark v5.0.0 compliance framework for the GCP provider [(#11714)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11714) +- CIS Kubernetes Benchmark v2.0.1 compliance framework for the Kubernetes provider [(#11722)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11722) +- CIS GitHub Benchmark v1.2.0 compliance framework for the GitHub provider [(#11719)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11719) +- `--scan-secrets-validate` flag and `aws.secrets_validate` configuration option to optionally validate the secrets discovered by the secret-scanning checks against the provider APIs; secrets confirmed to be live are reported as critical [(#11694)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11694) + +### 🔄 Changed + +- Replaced the `detect-secrets` library with [Kingfisher](https://github.com/mongodb/kingfisher) as the engine for the secret-scanning checks; scans run fully offline by default and obvious placeholder values are no longer reported as findings [(#11694)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11694) +- Removed the `detect_secrets_plugins` configuration option, which is no longer used by the new secret-scanning engine [(#11694)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11694) + +### 🐞 Fixed + +- Report secret-scanning checks as `MANUAL` instead of `PASS` when the scanner fails (non-zero exit, timeout, unparseable output or missing binary), so a scanner failure is no longer indistinguishable from "no secrets found" [(#11694)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11694) +- Avoid a false `FAIL` in `cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs` when a multiline event's secrets are all removed by `secrets_ignore_patterns` during the rescan [(#11694)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11694) +- Key the `cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs` secret scan by log group ARN instead of name, so same-named log groups and streams in different regions no longer collide and reuse each other's findings [(#11694)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11694) +- Compliance frameworks contributed by several external packages under the same provider are now merged instead of overwritten, so every entry-point directory a provider contributes is discovered [(#11578)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11578) +- Azure PostgreSQL flexible server collection no longer drops the remaining servers in a subscription when one server fails to collect; the `connection_throttle.enable` parameter (removed in PostgreSQL 16+) is treated as absent only when the Azure SDK reports it as not found, so unexpected lookup failures are not silently reported as throttling disabled [(#11595)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11595) +- Azure `keyvault_logging_enabled` now accepts Key Vault diagnostic settings that enable the explicit `AuditEvent` category, avoiding false failures when Azure returns category-based logs without category groups [(#11660)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11660) +- GitHub default branch protection checks now evaluate repository rulesets in addition to classic branch protection, avoiding false positives for repositories that enforce protection through rulesets [(#11723)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11723) +- Okta, Alibaba Cloud and OpenStack scan-config sections are now validated against a registered schema instead of being silently accepted, so their configurable thresholds (session/idle timeouts, retention days, image-sharing and secret-scanning settings) log a warning and fall back to the built-in default whenever a value is out of range [(#11725)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11725) + +### 🔄 Changed + +- AWS scans for EBS snapshots, Backup recovery points, CloudWatch log groups, Lambda functions, ECS task definitions, and CodeArtifact packages now support configurable resource analysis limits via `aws.max_scanned_resources_per_service`; limits are disabled by default and only positive values cap analyzed resources [(#11228)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11228) + +--- + +## [5.31.1] (Prowler v5.31.1) + +### 🐞 Fixed + +- Alibaba Cloud `ram_password_policy_number` and `cs_kubernetes_cluster_check_weekly` checks not being loaded due to missing implementation and package files [(#11683)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11683) + +--- + +## [5.31.0] (Prowler v5.31.0) + +### 🚀 Added + +- Support for Python 3.13 [(#9293)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/9293) - `securityhub_delegated_admin_enabled_all_regions` check for AWS provider, verifying that Security Hub has a delegated administrator, is active in all opted-in regions, and has organization auto-enable on [(#11259)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11259) - `config_delegated_admin_and_org_aggregator_all_regions` check for AWS provider, verifying that AWS Config has a delegated administrator and an organization aggregator covering all AWS regions [(#11259)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11259) - `sagemaker_clarify_exists` check for AWS provider [(#11211)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11211) - `cloudsql_instance_high_availability_enabled` check for GCP provider, verifying Cloud SQL primary instances use `REGIONAL` availability for automatic zone failover [(#11024)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11024) +- `cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc` check for GCP provider, verifying Cloud Functions have a Serverless VPC Access connector for private egress [(#11021)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11021) +- `cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible` check for GCP provider, detecting Cloud Functions with `allUsers` or `allAuthenticatedUsers` IAM invocation bindings [(#11022)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11022) +- `secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible` check for GCP provider, detecting Secret Manager secrets with public IAM bindings [(#11025)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11025) +- `secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled` check for GCP provider, verifying Secret Manager secrets have automatic rotation configured within 90 days [(#11026)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11026) - `identity_storage_service_level_admins_scoped` check for OCI provider CIS 3.1 control 1.15, ensuring storage service-level administrators exclude delete permissions [(#11523)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11523) +- `cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled` check for Azure provider [(#11031)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11031) +- `cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous` check for Azure provider [(#11032)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11032) +- `cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version` check for Azure provider, verifying Cosmos DB accounts enforce TLS 1.2 or higher for client connections [(#11033)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11033) +- `cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled` check for Azure provider, verifying Cosmos DB accounts have public network access disabled so connectivity is restricted to private endpoints or VNet service endpoints [(#11034)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11034) +- `databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled` check for Azure provider, verifying Databricks workspaces have public network access disabled so connectivity is restricted to Azure Private Link private endpoints [(#11035)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11035) +- `databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled` check for Azure provider, verifying Databricks workspaces use secure cluster connectivity (no public IP) so compute nodes are not assigned public IP addresses [(#11036)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11036) +- `defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on` check for Azure provider, verifying Microsoft Defender Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM) is enabled on the Standard tier [(#11037)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11037) +- `mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled` check for Azure provider, verifying MySQL Flexible Servers have geo-redundant backup enabled so backups are replicated to the paired region [(#11041)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11041) +- `mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled` check for Azure provider, verifying MySQL Flexible Servers have high availability enabled for automatic failover to a standby replica [(#11042)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11042) +- `postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled` check for Azure provider, verifying PostgreSQL Flexible Servers have geo-redundant backup enabled so backups are replicated to the paired region [(#11045)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11045) +- `postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled` check for Azure provider, verifying PostgreSQL Flexible Servers have high availability enabled for automatic failover to a standby replica [(#11046)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11046) +- `aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled` check for Azure provider, verifying AKS clusters have Azure Monitor (Container Insights) enabled for metrics, logs, and alerting [(#11029)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11029) +- `aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled` check for Azure provider, verifying AKS clusters have local accounts disabled so authentication is forced through Microsoft Entra ID [(#11030)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11030) +- `network_subnet_nsg_associated` check for Azure provider, verifying virtual network subnets have a network security group associated to enforce traffic filtering [(#11043)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11043) +- `network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled` check for Azure provider, verifying virtual networks have Azure DDoS Network Protection enabled [(#11044)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11044) +- `entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired` check for Azure provider, verifying Entra ID app registration secrets and certificates are not expired, expiring within 30 days, or without an expiration date [(#11038)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11038) +- `entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced` check for Azure provider, verifying the Entra ID authentication methods policy enforces MFA registration and enables at least one strong method (Microsoft Authenticator, FIDO2, or X.509 certificate) [(#11039)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11039) +- `entra_user_with_recent_sign_in` check for Azure provider, detecting stale enabled accounts that have not signed in within the last 90 days (requires Entra ID P1/P2 licensing for sign-in activity) [(#11040)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11040) +- `aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled` check for Azure provider [(#11027)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11027) +- Public `Provider.get_class()` method that resolves a provider class by name for both built-in and external (entry-point) providers [(#11398)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11398) +- Jira timeout preventing the calls from hanging indefinitely when the Jira endpoint is unreachable or slow [(#11602)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11602) +- TLS certificate verification in the `codepipeline_project_repo_private` check, which previously used an unverified SSL context, leaving the repository-visibility probe open to MITM tampering [(#11603)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11603) +- Support for Linode cloud provider, with compute, networking and administration services [(#11633)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11633) +- DORA (Digital Operational Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) compliance coverage for the Azure provider, mapping existing Azure checks across the five DORA pillars [(#11551)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11551) +- Rename DORA to DORA_2022_2554 to follow the naming _ in compliance frameworks [(#11551)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11551) +- `entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked` check for the M365 provider, verifying that hybrid Entra tenants block cloud object takeover through both soft-match and hard-match directory synchronization [(#11098)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11098) +- `entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references` check for M365 provider [(#11236)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11236) +- `aks_cluster_defender_enabled` check for Azure provider, verifying that AKS clusters have Microsoft Defender security monitoring enabled [(#11028)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11028) +- `recovery_vault_has_protected_items` check for Azure provider, verifying that Recovery Services vaults have at least one protected backup item [(#11048)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11048) +- DORA (Digital Operational Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) compliance coverage for the GCP provider, mapping existing GCP checks across the five DORA pillars [(#11642)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11642) +- DORA (Digital Operational Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) compliance coverage for the Cloudflare provider, mapping existing Cloudflare edge/network checks across the applicable DORA pillars [(#11645)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11645) +- DORA (Digital Operational Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) compliance coverage for the AlibabaCloud provider, mapping existing AlibabaCloud checks across the applicable DORA pillars [(#11646)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11646) +- `cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled` check for AWS provider to verify CloudFront distributions enforce a post-quantum TLS 1.3 security policy [(#11317)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11317) +- `apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled` check for AWS provider to verify API Gateway custom domain names use a post-quantum TLS security policy [(#11316)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11316) +- `transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled` check for AWS provider to verify Transfer Family servers use a post-quantum hybrid SSH key exchange security policy [(#11315)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11315) +- `acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm` check and new `acmpca` service for AWS provider to verify AWS Private CA certificate authorities use a post-quantum (ML-DSA) key algorithm [(#11318)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11318) +- `rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki` check and new `rolesanywhere` service for AWS provider to verify IAM Roles Anywhere trust anchors are backed by a post-quantum (ML-DSA) PKI [(#11319)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11319) +- Kubernetes core checks for container CPU limits, CPU requests, memory limits, memory requests, fixed image tags, liveness probes, and readiness probes [(#11373)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11373) +- `recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate` check for Azure provider, verifying Recovery Services backup policies retain daily backups for at least 30 days [(#11047)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11047) + +### 🔄 Changed + +- Replaced the unmaintained `awsipranges` dependency with a small standard-library helper for the `route53_dangling_ip_subdomain_takeover` check [(#9293)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/9293) + +### 🐞 Fixed + +- Azure PostgreSQL flexible server inventory no longer aborts the whole subscription when the `connection_throttle.enable` parameter is missing (e.g. PostgreSQL v18), and logs the expected "Entra ID authentication not enabled" case as a warning instead of an error, so servers are still scanned [(#11045)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11045) +- `iam_policy_allows_privilege_escalation` now includes the `privilege-escalation` category [(#11648)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11648) + +### 🔐 Security + +- `pytest` from 8.3.5 to 9.0.3, patching a known vulnerability in the SDK test dependency [(#11291)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11291) +- `black` from 25.1.0 to 26.3.1, patching a known vulnerability in the SDK formatter dependency [(#11290)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11290) +- `microsoft-kiota-*` to 1.9.9 and `aiohttp` to 3.14.0, patching known CVEs [(#11596)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11596) +- Container base image bumped to `python:3.12.13-slim-bookworm` (patches `libgnutls30` CVE-2026-33845 and CVE-2026-42010) and `trivy` bumped to 0.71.0 (patches embedded `golang.org/x/crypto` and Go stdlib CVEs); `.trivyignore` documents remaining bookworm criticals with no-fix or not-affected rationale [(#11592)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11592) + +--- + +## [5.30.3] (Prowler v5.30.3) + +### 🐞 Fixed + +- CLI compliance summary tables no longer undercount findings mapped to multiple sections nor double-count a single finding mapped to several requirements within the same group/split, and the Provider column no longer leaks a value from another framework [(#11567)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11567) + +--- + +## [5.30.2] (Prowler v5.30.2) + +### 🐞 Fixed + +- GCP `logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_*` checks now credit org-level aggregated sinks filtered to the Admin Activity audit stream [(#11575)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11575) +- A broken built-in provider no longer aborts the CLI when a different provider was invoked [(#11618)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11618) +- GCP organization scans with `--organization-id` no longer silently fall back to the credentials' host project when the Cloud Asset API call fails [(#11280)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11280) --- @@ -145,6 +273,7 @@ All notable changes to the **Prowler SDK** are documented in this file. - `entra_service_principal_no_secrets_for_permanent_tier0_roles` check for M365 provider [(#10788)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/10788) - `iam_user_access_not_stale_to_sagemaker` check for AWS provider with configurable `max_unused_sagemaker_access_days` (default 90) [(#11000)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11000) - `cloudtrail_bedrock_logging_enabled` check for AWS provider [(#10858)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/10858) +- Per-provider scan configuration schema with bounds validation that drops out-of-range values with a warning on config load [(#11518)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11518) - Okta provider with OAuth 2.0 authentication and `signon_global_session_idle_timeout_15min` check [(#11079)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11079) - `sagemaker_domain_sso_configured` check for AWS provider [(#11094)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11094) - Scaleway provider with `iam_api_keys_no_root_owned` check [(#11166)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11166) diff --git a/prowler/__main__.py b/prowler/__main__.py index 533a704359..d4c925f74f 100644 --- a/prowler/__main__.py +++ b/prowler/__main__.py @@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ from prowler.providers.iac.models import IACOutputOptions from prowler.providers.image.exceptions.exceptions import ImageBaseException from prowler.providers.image.models import ImageOutputOptions from prowler.providers.kubernetes.models import KubernetesOutputOptions +from prowler.providers.linode.models import LinodeOutputOptions from prowler.providers.llm.models import LLMOutputOptions from prowler.providers.m365.models import M365OutputOptions from prowler.providers.mongodbatlas.models import MongoDBAtlasOutputOptions @@ -439,6 +440,10 @@ def prowler(): output_options = ScalewayOutputOptions( args, bulk_checks_metadata, global_provider.identity ) + elif provider == "linode": + output_options = LinodeOutputOptions( + args, bulk_checks_metadata, global_provider.identity + ) else: # Dynamic fallback: any external/custom provider try: diff --git a/prowler/compliance/alibabacloud/cis_2.0_alibabacloud.json b/prowler/compliance/alibabacloud/cis_2.0_alibabacloud.json index 7cda08efbb..9a05c1997f 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/alibabacloud/cis_2.0_alibabacloud.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/alibabacloud/cis_2.0_alibabacloud.json @@ -109,6 +109,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "ram_user_console_access_unused" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "ram_user_console_access_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_console_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + } ] }, { @@ -841,6 +849,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "sls_logstore_retention_period" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "sls_logstore_retention_period", + "ConfigKey": "min_log_retention_days", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 365 + } ] }, { @@ -1353,6 +1369,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "rds_instance_sql_audit_retention" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "rds_instance_sql_audit_retention", + "ConfigKey": "min_rds_audit_retention_days", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 180 + } ] }, { @@ -1551,6 +1575,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "cs_kubernetes_cluster_check_recent" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "cs_kubernetes_cluster_check_recent", + "ConfigKey": "max_cluster_check_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 7 + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/alibabacloud/prowler_threatscore_alibabacloud.json b/prowler/compliance/alibabacloud/prowler_threatscore_alibabacloud.json index ca7a030dc2..0bfd47df7e 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/alibabacloud/prowler_threatscore_alibabacloud.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/alibabacloud/prowler_threatscore_alibabacloud.json @@ -47,6 +47,14 @@ "Checks": [ "ram_user_console_access_unused" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "ram_user_console_access_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_console_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Title": "Inactive users disabled for console access", @@ -399,6 +407,14 @@ "LevelOfRisk": 3, "Weight": 10 } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "cs_kubernetes_cluster_check_weekly", + "ConfigKey": "max_cluster_check_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 7 + } ] }, { @@ -695,6 +711,14 @@ "Checks": [ "rds_instance_sql_audit_retention" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "rds_instance_sql_audit_retention", + "ConfigKey": "min_rds_audit_retention_days", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 180 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Title": "RDS SQL audit retention configured", diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/asd_essential_eight_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/asd_essential_eight_aws.json index 00b39817e3..dd39c44268 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/asd_essential_eight_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/asd_essential_eight_aws.json @@ -13,6 +13,14 @@ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", "inspector2_is_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "1 Patch applications", @@ -260,6 +268,14 @@ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", "inspector2_is_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "2 Patch operating systems", @@ -742,6 +758,14 @@ "accessanalyzer_enabled", "accessanalyzer_enabled_without_findings" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "4 Restrict administrative privileges", diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/aws_account_security_onboarding_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/aws_account_security_onboarding_aws.json index 1d038537f0..1910bac223 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/aws_account_security_onboarding_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/aws_account_security_onboarding_aws.json @@ -37,6 +37,26 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "accessanalyzer_enabled", "macie_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -259,6 +279,20 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -514,6 +548,14 @@ "Checks": [ "accessanalyzer_enabled", "accessanalyzer_enabled_without_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -530,6 +572,20 @@ "securityhub_enabled", "accessanalyzer_enabled", "accessanalyzer_enabled_without_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -666,6 +722,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -680,6 +744,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -694,6 +766,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -708,6 +788,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -722,6 +810,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -736,6 +832,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -762,6 +866,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -777,6 +889,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_centrally_managed" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -792,6 +912,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -807,6 +935,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -822,6 +958,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -837,6 +981,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -852,6 +1004,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -867,6 +1027,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -882,6 +1050,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -897,6 +1073,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -912,6 +1096,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/aws_ai_security_framework_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/aws_ai_security_framework_aws.json index c6a0a8504b..9b87f7464d 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/aws_ai_security_framework_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/aws_ai_security_framework_aws.json @@ -404,6 +404,14 @@ "Checks": [ "accessanalyzer_enabled", "accessanalyzer_enabled_without_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -860,6 +868,20 @@ "guardduty_lambda_protection_enabled", "guardduty_rds_protection_enabled", "guardduty_ec2_malware_protection_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "guardduty_delegated_admin_enabled_all_regions", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -894,6 +916,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -964,6 +994,14 @@ "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", "config_recorder_using_aws_service_role" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1157,4 +1195,4 @@ "Checks": [] } ] -} \ No newline at end of file +} diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/aws_foundational_security_best_practices_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/aws_foundational_security_best_practices_aws.json index cea7ad1655..b58a74bcaa 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/aws_foundational_security_best_practices_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/aws_foundational_security_best_practices_aws.json @@ -20,6 +20,14 @@ "SectionDescription": "This section contains recommendations for configuring ACM resources.", "Service": "ACM" } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_expiration_check", + "ConfigKey": "days_to_expire_threshold", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 30 + } ] }, { @@ -29,6 +37,17 @@ "Checks": [ "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "RSA-1024", + "P-192" + ] + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "ItemId": "ACM.2", @@ -777,6 +796,14 @@ "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "ItemId": "Config.1", @@ -892,6 +919,14 @@ "Checks": [ "documentdb_cluster_backup_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "documentdb_cluster_backup_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "minimum_backup_retention_period", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 7 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "ItemId": "DocumentDB.2", @@ -1959,6 +1994,14 @@ "SectionDescription": "This section contains recommendations for configuring ELB resources.", "Service": "ELB" } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "elb_is_in_multiple_az", + "ConfigKey": "elb_min_azs", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 2 + } ] }, { @@ -1993,6 +2036,14 @@ "SectionDescription": "This section contains recommendations for configuring ELB resources.", "Service": "ELB" } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "elbv2_is_in_multiple_az", + "ConfigKey": "elbv2_min_azs", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 2 + } ] }, { @@ -2370,6 +2421,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "ItemId": "GuardDuty.1", @@ -2547,6 +2606,20 @@ "iam_user_accesskey_unused", "iam_user_console_access_unused" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "iam_user_accesskey_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_access_keys_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_user_console_access_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_console_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "ItemId": "IAM.8", @@ -2635,6 +2708,20 @@ "iam_user_accesskey_unused", "iam_user_console_access_unused" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "iam_user_accesskey_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_access_keys_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_user_console_access_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_console_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "ItemId": "IAM.22", @@ -2791,6 +2878,40 @@ "SectionDescription": "This section contains recommendations for configuring Lambda resources.", "Service": "Lambda" } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "awslambda_function_using_supported_runtimes", + "ConfigKey": "obsolete_lambda_runtimes", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "java8", + "go1.x", + "provided", + "python3.6", + "python2.7", + "python3.7", + "python3.8", + "nodejs4.3", + "nodejs4.3-edge", + "nodejs6.10", + "nodejs", + "nodejs8.10", + "nodejs10.x", + "nodejs12.x", + "nodejs14.x", + "nodejs16.x", + "dotnet5.0", + "dotnet6", + "dotnet7", + "dotnetcore1.0", + "dotnetcore2.0", + "dotnetcore2.1", + "dotnetcore3.1", + "ruby2.5", + "ruby2.7" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -2951,6 +3072,14 @@ "Checks": [ "neptune_cluster_backup_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "neptune_cluster_backup_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "minimum_backup_retention_period", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 7 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "ItemId": "Neptune.5", diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/aws_foundational_technical_review_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/aws_foundational_technical_review_aws.json index 691a8ba7f1..9d8e3cfdc8 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/aws_foundational_technical_review_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/aws_foundational_technical_review_aws.json @@ -176,6 +176,14 @@ "iam_user_with_temporary_credentials", "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/aws_well_architected_framework_security_pillar_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/aws_well_architected_framework_security_pillar_aws.json index 94c50eb68a..a025bb3a3c 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/aws_well_architected_framework_security_pillar_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/aws_well_architected_framework_security_pillar_aws.json @@ -585,6 +585,14 @@ "cloudtrail_multi_region_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled", "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -646,6 +654,20 @@ "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", "macie_is_enabled", "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -778,6 +800,14 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled", "apigateway_restapi_authorizers_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1151,6 +1181,9 @@ "elb_insecure_ssl_ciphers", "elb_ssl_listeners", "elbv2_insecure_ssl_ciphers", + "cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled", + "apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled", + "transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled", "elbv2_ssl_listeners", "s3_bucket_secure_transport_policy" ] diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/c5_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/c5_aws.json index 8847469154..269a5ce308 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/c5_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/c5_aws.json @@ -382,6 +382,14 @@ "cloudtrail_multi_region_enabled", "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", "s3_multi_region_access_point_public_access_block" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -2234,6 +2242,14 @@ "vpc_different_regions", "autoscaling_group_multiple_az", "storagegateway_gateway_fault_tolerant" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -2261,6 +2277,14 @@ "organizations_scp_check_deny_regions", "s3_multi_region_access_point_public_access_block", "vpc_different_regions" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -2308,6 +2332,14 @@ "organizations_scp_check_deny_regions", "s3_multi_region_access_point_public_access_block", "vpc_different_regions" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -2978,6 +3010,14 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "athena_workgroup_enforce_configuration", "shield_advanced_protection_in_global_accelerators" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -3481,6 +3521,14 @@ "cloudtrail_cloudwatch_logging_enabled", "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -4299,6 +4347,14 @@ "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", "guardduty_rds_protection_enabled", "guardduty_s3_protection_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -4920,6 +4976,17 @@ "elbv2_nlb_tls_termination_enabled", "transfer_server_in_transit_encryption_enabled", "kafka_cluster_mutual_tls_authentication_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "RSA-1024", + "P-192" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -4946,6 +5013,17 @@ "elbv2_nlb_tls_termination_enabled", "transfer_server_in_transit_encryption_enabled", "kafka_cluster_mutual_tls_authentication_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "RSA-1024", + "P-192" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -5220,6 +5298,14 @@ "rds_instance_default_admin", "accessanalyzer_enabled", "efs_access_point_enforce_user_identity" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -5737,6 +5823,14 @@ "Checks": [ "accessanalyzer_enabled", "accessanalyzer_enabled_without_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -6100,6 +6194,17 @@ "cloudfront_distributions_origin_traffic_encrypted", "glue_development_endpoints_job_bookmark_encryption_enabled", "cloudtrail_kms_encryption_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "RSA-1024", + "P-192" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -6196,6 +6301,17 @@ "elb_ssl_listeners_use_acm_certificate", "iam_no_expired_server_certificates_stored", "rds_instance_certificate_expiration" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "RSA-1024", + "P-192" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -6307,6 +6423,17 @@ "elb_ssl_listeners_use_acm_certificate", "iam_no_expired_server_certificates_stored", "rds_instance_certificate_expiration" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "RSA-1024", + "P-192" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -6393,6 +6520,14 @@ "sns_topics_not_publicly_accessible", "sqs_queues_not_publicly_accessible", "vpc_peering_routing_tables_with_least_privilege" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -6412,6 +6547,14 @@ "ec2_instance_profile_attached", "accessanalyzer_enabled", "accessanalyzer_enabled_without_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -6587,6 +6730,17 @@ "kms_cmk_not_multi_region", "kms_key_not_publicly_accessible", "ec2_ebs_volume_encryption" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "RSA-1024", + "P-192" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -6809,6 +6963,17 @@ "secretsmanager_not_publicly_accessible", "secretsmanager_secret_rotated_periodically", "secretsmanager_secret_unused" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "RSA-1024", + "P-192" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -6842,6 +7007,17 @@ ], "Checks": [ "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "RSA-1024", + "P-192" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -6915,6 +7091,17 @@ "secretsmanager_secret_rotated_periodically", "secretsmanager_secret_unused", "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "RSA-1024", + "P-192" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -6937,6 +7124,17 @@ "secretsmanager_secret_rotated_periodically", "secretsmanager_secret_unused", "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "RSA-1024", + "P-192" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -8042,6 +8240,14 @@ "cloudtrail_multi_region_enabled", "cloudtrail_multi_region_enabled_logging_management_events", "cloudtrail_log_file_validation_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -8810,6 +9016,14 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "cloudtrail_log_file_validation_enabled", "ssmincidents_enabled_with_plans" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -9732,6 +9946,14 @@ "accessanalyzer_enabled_without_findings", "cloudfront_distributions_s3_origin_access_control", "cloudtrail_logs_s3_bucket_access_logging_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -10367,6 +10589,14 @@ "Checks": [ "accessanalyzer_enabled", "accessanalyzer_enabled_without_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -10457,6 +10687,14 @@ "ec2_instance_profile_attached", "iam_role_cross_account_readonlyaccess_policy", "iam_securityaudit_role_created" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/ccc_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/ccc_aws.json index d1a20ee3d0..7935424193 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/ccc_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/ccc_aws.json @@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ "elb_insecure_ssl_ciphers", "elb_ssl_listeners", "elbv2_insecure_ssl_ciphers", + "cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled", + "apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled", + "transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled", "elbv2_ssl_listeners", "elbv2_nlb_tls_termination_enabled", "s3_bucket_secure_transport_policy", @@ -272,6 +275,17 @@ "acm_certificates_expiration_check", "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", "acm_certificates_transparency_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "RSA-1024", + "P-192" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -791,6 +805,17 @@ ], "Checks": [ "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "RSA-1024", + "P-192" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -1501,6 +1526,14 @@ "iam_policy_no_full_access_to_kms", "iam_policy_no_full_access_to_cloudtrail", "iam_policy_attached_only_to_group_or_roles" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1663,6 +1696,14 @@ "cloudwatch_changes_to_network_route_tables_alarm_configured", "cloudwatch_changes_to_vpcs_alarm_configured", "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1788,6 +1829,14 @@ "cloudtrail_threat_detection_enumeration", "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -4308,6 +4357,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "acm_certificates_expiration_check" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_expiration_check", + "ConfigKey": "days_to_expire_threshold", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 30 + } ] }, { @@ -6173,6 +6230,20 @@ "Checks": [ "iam_user_accesskey_unused", "iam_user_console_access_unused" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "iam_user_accesskey_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_access_keys_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_user_console_access_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_console_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + } ] }, { @@ -6269,6 +6340,14 @@ "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_root_usage", "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_sign_in_without_mfa", "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -6371,6 +6450,14 @@ "Checks": [ "accessanalyzer_enabled", "accessanalyzer_enabled_without_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_1.4_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_1.4_aws.json index 3efc29fd5b..b373a04665 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_1.4_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_1.4_aws.json @@ -75,6 +75,20 @@ "iam_user_accesskey_unused", "iam_user_console_access_unused" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "iam_user_accesskey_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_access_keys_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_user_console_access_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_console_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", @@ -265,6 +279,14 @@ "Checks": [ "accessanalyzer_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", @@ -736,6 +758,14 @@ "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "3 Logging", diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_1.5_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_1.5_aws.json index f7307bb7f4..6a60d786a2 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_1.5_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_1.5_aws.json @@ -75,6 +75,20 @@ "iam_user_accesskey_unused", "iam_user_console_access_unused" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "iam_user_accesskey_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_access_keys_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_user_console_access_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_console_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", @@ -265,6 +279,14 @@ "Checks": [ "accessanalyzer_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", @@ -802,6 +824,14 @@ "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "3 Logging", @@ -1054,6 +1084,14 @@ "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "4 Monitoring", diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_2.0_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_2.0_aws.json index 4f8c4b2c23..e255bd43e1 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_2.0_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_2.0_aws.json @@ -75,6 +75,20 @@ "iam_user_accesskey_unused", "iam_user_console_access_unused" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "iam_user_accesskey_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_access_keys_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_user_console_access_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_console_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", @@ -265,6 +279,14 @@ "Checks": [ "accessanalyzer_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", @@ -802,6 +824,14 @@ "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "3 Logging", @@ -1054,6 +1084,14 @@ "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "4 Monitoring", diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_3.0_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_3.0_aws.json index dd4c75a2f7..5540bc40cf 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_3.0_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_3.0_aws.json @@ -75,6 +75,20 @@ "iam_user_accesskey_unused", "iam_user_console_access_unused" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "iam_user_accesskey_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_access_keys_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_user_console_access_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_console_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", @@ -265,6 +279,14 @@ "Checks": [ "accessanalyzer_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", @@ -756,6 +778,14 @@ "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "3 Logging", @@ -1008,6 +1038,14 @@ "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "4 Monitoring", diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_4.0_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_4.0_aws.json index 0c40f8ac09..c8787ef409 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_4.0_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_4.0_aws.json @@ -254,6 +254,20 @@ "iam_user_accesskey_unused", "iam_user_console_access_unused" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "iam_user_accesskey_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_access_keys_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_user_console_access_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_console_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", @@ -431,6 +445,14 @@ "Checks": [ "accessanalyzer_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", @@ -750,6 +772,14 @@ "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "3 Logging", @@ -1234,6 +1264,14 @@ "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "4 Monitoring", diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_5.0_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_5.0_aws.json index e870878c6b..0c8d46e170 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_5.0_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_5.0_aws.json @@ -232,6 +232,20 @@ "iam_user_accesskey_unused", "iam_user_console_access_unused" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "iam_user_accesskey_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_access_keys_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_user_console_access_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_console_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", @@ -409,6 +423,14 @@ "Checks": [ "accessanalyzer_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", @@ -728,6 +750,14 @@ "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "3 Logging", @@ -1212,6 +1242,14 @@ "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "4 Monitoring", diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_6.0_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_6.0_aws.json index 643c192b7b..7ad62a4b65 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_6.0_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_6.0_aws.json @@ -232,6 +232,20 @@ "iam_user_accesskey_unused", "iam_user_console_access_unused" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "iam_user_accesskey_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_access_keys_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_user_console_access_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_console_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", @@ -409,6 +423,14 @@ "Checks": [ "accessanalyzer_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", @@ -728,6 +750,14 @@ "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "4 Logging", @@ -1212,6 +1242,14 @@ "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "5 Monitoring", diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_7.0_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_7.0_aws.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f4f7fedff8 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/cis_7.0_aws.json @@ -0,0 +1,1610 @@ +{ + "Framework": "CIS", + "Name": "CIS Amazon Web Services Foundations Benchmark v7.0.0", + "Version": "7.0", + "Provider": "AWS", + "Description": "The CIS Amazon Web Services Foundations Benchmark provides prescriptive guidance for configuring security options for a subset of Amazon Web Services with an emphasis on foundational, testable, and architecture agnostic settings.", + "Requirements": [ + { + "Id": "2.1.1", + "Description": "Ensure centralized root access in AWS Organizations", + "Checks": [ + "iam_root_credentials_management_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure centralized root access management is enabled to manage and secure root user credentials for member accounts in AWS Organizations. This allows the management account and an optional delegated administrator account to centrally delete, prevent recovery of, and if necessary, perform short-lived, scoped root-required actions in member accounts without maintaining long-term root user credentials in each account.", + "RationaleStatement": "The AWS account root user is a powerful, default administrative identity that is difficult to manage safely across many accounts. When each member account manages its own root credentials, organizations often end up with numerous long-lived root passwords, access keys, and MFA devices that are hard to inventory, rotate, and protect. Centralized root access management lets security teams remove or avoid creating root user credentials in member accounts, centrally review and manage any remaining root credentials, and perform necessary root-only tasks via short-term, task-scoped root sessions. This significantly reduces privileged credential sprawl, supports least privilege and dedicated administrator models, and improves visibility and auditability of root-level activity across the organization.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling centralized root access management changes how root user access is obtained and used in member accounts, but it does not automatically remove existing root credentials. Organizations must plan when and how to delete or disable any existing root passwords, access keys, signing certificates, and MFA devices in member accounts and update any workflows that still rely on direct root sign-in. Security and operations teams will need to use centrally initiated, short-lived root sessions for exceptional tasks that truly require root. This may require procedural changes and additional training, but it significantly reduces long-lived privileged credential sprawl across the organization.", + "RemediationProcedure": "1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console with the management account. 2. In the console search bar, type Organizations and open AWS Organizations. - On the Overview page, confirm that an Organization exists and that this account is listed as the Management account. 3. In AWS Organizations, choose Services. Locate AWS Identity and Access Management in the list and, if it is not already enabled, choose Enable trusted access and confirm. - This allows IAM to integrate with AWS Organizations to manage root access centrally. 4. In the console search bar, type IAM and open IAM. In the left navigation pane, choose Root access management. If you see Root access management is disabled, choose Enable. - In the enable dialog, confirm that you want to - \"Root credentials management\" and if desired - \"Privileged root actions in member accounts\" - In the Delegated administrator field, enter the account ID of the account that will manage root user access and take privileged actions on member accounts. AWS recommends using an account intended for security or management purposes, not a general workload account. - When you enable centralized root access in the console, IAM also enables trusted access for IAM in AWS Organizations if it isn't already enabled. - Choose Enable to save the configuration.", + "AuditProcedure": "1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console with the management account. 2. In the console search bar, type Organizations and open AWS Organizations. - On the Overview page, confirm that an Organization exists and that this account is listed as the Management account. 3. In AWS Organizations, choose Services. - Confirm that AWS Identity and Access Management appears in the list of services with trusted access enabled. 4. In the console search bar, type IAM and open IAM. In the left navigation pane, choose Root access management. Check the status banner. - If you see that Root access management is enabled and the feature card shows that root credentials management is turned on for member accounts, the organization has centralized root access management enabled. - If you see Root access management is disabled with an option to Enable, centralized root access is not yet enabled. 5. (Optional) On the same Root access management page, review the Delegated administrator information (if shown). - Confirm that the delegated account (if present) is a security or management-focused account, not a general workload account.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.2", + "Description": "Ensure authorization guardrails for all AWS Organization accounts", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that one or more baseline authorization policies such as Service Control Policies (SCPs) and/or Resource Control Policies (RCPs) are attached to all member accounts in AWS Organizations in accordance with organizational security requirements. Authorization policies act as preventive permission guardrails: SCPs define the maximum available permissions for IAM principals within accounts, while RCPs define the maximum available permissions for resources within accounts. These policies can enforce security invariants such as preventing disabling of key security services, restricting use of unapproved AWS Regions, or blocking external access to sensitive resources.", + "RationaleStatement": "Authorization policies do not grant permissions but instead set organization-wide limits on what actions principals can perform (SCPs) and what access can be granted to resources (RCPs), regardless of local IAM or resource-based policies. Without baseline guardrail authorization policies, each account can grant excessive or inconsistent permissions that disable logging, weaken security services, allow use of unapproved Regions and services, or permit unintended external access to resources. Attaching standard authorization policies to all member accounts enforces preventive, centralized control over high-risk actions and access patterns, supports least-privilege and role-based access control at scale, and helps ensure that all accounts and resources operate within the organization's defined security baseline.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enforcing baseline authorization policies for all member accounts can initially block some existing patterns, such as use of unapproved Regions, disabling security services, or granting broader permissions than the guardrails allow. Teams may need to adjust IAM policies, deployment pipelines, and exception processes so legitimate use cases remain possible within the new guardrails. This can introduce short-term operational overhead and require careful testing, especially when attaching new policies at the root or OU level.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Design or confirm baseline guardrail SCPs. 1. From the AWS Organizations console, go to Policies → Service control policies. - If you already have standard guardrail SCPs that implement your security baseline, note their names. - If you do not have such policies, choose Create policy and create at least one baseline guardrail SCP that encodes non-negotiable security requirements. 2. Do the same step as above but for RCPs if needed. From the AWS Organizations console, go to Policies → Resource control policies. 3. Attach guardrail authorization policies to the root and/or OUs. In AWS Organizations, choose AWS accounts, then select the Root of the organization. - Go to the Policies tab, then within section for Service control policies, choose Attach, and select the baseline guardrail SCP(s) you identified or created in step 1. - If using RCPs, then within section for Resource control policies, choose Attach, and select the baseline guardrail RCP(s) you identified or created in step 2. - If your design uses different guardrails per OU (for example, stricter policies for production OU), select each OU in turn and attach the appropriate guardrail SCPs and RCPs to those OUs. - AWS recommends testing authorization policies in a staging OU before attaching them broadly to the root to avoid unintended service disruption.", + "AuditProcedure": "Pre-requisite: you must run these CLI commands in the management account for the AWS Organization. 1. Before auditing, document or confirm your organization's baseline guardrail requirements. Common examples include: - Prevent disabling CloudTrail, AWS Config, GuardDuty, or Security Hub - Restrict usage to approved AWS Regions only - Protect central security or logging roles from modification - Deny external principal access to sensitive resources 2. List all SCPs and RCPs in the organization: ``` aws organizations list-policies --filter SERVICE_CONTROL_POLICY aws organizations list-policies --filter RESOURCE_CONTROL_POLICY ``` This returns a list of SCP/RCP policy IDs and names. 3. For each SCP/RCP, retrieve and review the policy document to determine if it implements your baseline guardrail requirements: ``` aws organizations describe-policy --policy-id ``` Review the `Content` field in the output to confirm the policy enforces organizational security requirements. If no SCPs/RCPs exist that implement your documented baseline guardrail requirements, note this as a gap and proceed to remediation. 4. List all accounts in the organization and note the account IDs: ``` aws organizations list-accounts --query 'Accounts[?Status==`ACTIVE`].[Id,Name]' --output table ``` 5. For each baseline guardrail Authorization policy identified in Step 2, list the accounts and OUs to which it is attached: ``` aws organizations list-targets-for-policy --policy-id ``` The output shows `TargetId` values representing accounts, OUs, or the root. 6. Compare the list of attached targets to your full account list. - If the policy is attached to the root, all accounts in the organization inherit it and this policy passes for coverage. - If the policy is attached to specific OUs, verify that all active member accounts belong to those OUs. - If the policy is attached to individual accounts, verify that all active member accounts are included. The environment passes this recommendation if: - All baseline guardrail authorization policies required by organizational security requirements exist. - Each baseline guardrail authorization policy is attached to all active member accounts either directly or via OU/root inheritance.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.3", + "Description": "Ensure Organizations management account is not used for workloads", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that the AWS Organizations management account is used only for organizational governance tasks and does not host production workloads, applications, or business data. The management account is the most privileged account in an AWS Organization and performs sensitive administrative functions such as creating and managing member accounts, applying service control policies (SCPs), and managing consolidated billing. Workloads, applications, and associated data should be deployed in dedicated member accounts, not in the management account.", + "RationaleStatement": "The management account has unique privileges that cannot be restricted by SCPs, making it the highest-risk account in an organization. Deploying workloads or storing business data in the management account increases the attack surface and blast radius of a compromise. If a workload vulnerability or misconfiguration occurs in the management account, it could grant attackers access to organization-wide administrative capabilities.", + "ImpactStatement": "Restricting the management account to governance-only use may require creating new member accounts, redesigning existing account boundaries, and migrating workloads and data out of the management account. This can introduce short-term complexity and operational overhead. However, it reduces the blast radius of a compromise, simplifies security controls in the most privileged account, and aligns the environment with AWS multi-account and workload-isolation best practices.", + "RemediationProcedure": "1. Inventory all workload resources currently in the management account (compute, storage, databases, application services). 2. For each class of workload resource (for example, production, non-production, shared services), create or confirm dedicated member accounts within the organization and place them into the appropriate OUs. 3. For each workload resource, design a migration plan to the appropriate member account. - Execute the migrations in phases, starting with lower-risk environments (for example, development/test) before production. 4. Review and adjust IAM roles and permissions in the management account so that only personnel responsible for organization governance and security have access 5. Update architecture diagrams, runbooks, and onboarding processes to state that new workloads must be deployed only into designated workload accounts, not the management account.", + "AuditProcedure": "1. Confirm which AWS account is the management account for the organization (for example, via AWS Organizations \"Overview\" page or organizational documentation). 2. Ensure you have read-only access to review resources in this account. 3. Use your organization's standard discovery methods (for example, AWS Config, CMDB/asset inventory, or CSPM) to obtain a list of services and resources running in the management account. - At a minimum, identify compute, storage, database, and application services (for example, EC2, Lambda, ECS, S3, RDS, DynamoDB, API Gateway, load balancers). 4. For each identified resource, determine whether it is: - Governance/security: resources that support centralized management, logging, audit, or security (for example, org-wide CloudTrail, Config aggregator, Security Hub or GuardDuty delegated admin, billing/cost tooling). - Workload/business: resources that support business applications, production or non-production workloads, or customer-facing systems. 5. If any workload/business resources are present in the management account, record this as a gap and document the affected services and resource types", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.4", + "Description": "Ensure Organizational Units are structured by environment and sensitivity", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that AWS Organizations Organizational Units (OUs) are structured primarily by environment (for example, production, non-production, sandbox) and sensitivity (for example, security, logging, shared services, regulated workloads), rather than mirroring the corporate org chart. OUs should group accounts that share similar security requirements and controls so that appropriate authorization policies and other guardrails can be applied consistently at the OU level.", + "RationaleStatement": "A clear OU structure based on environment and sensitivity makes it easier to apply consistent guardrails and centralized security controls to accounts that have similar risk profiles and compliance needs. Poorly defined or ad-hoc OU structures complicate policy management, increase the chance of misapplied controls, and can lead to mixing workloads with different data sensitivities under the same set of controls.", + "ImpactStatement": "Restructuring OUs by environment and sensitivity can require moving accounts, changing inherited policies, and updating automation that assumes existing OU paths. This may introduce short-term operational overhead, including policy revalidation, testing of workloads under new guardrails, and coordination with application and platform teams to avoid unintended service disruption.", + "RemediationProcedure": "1. Work with security, platform, and application teams to agree on a small set of top-level OUs such as: - Security / Management - Shared Services / Infrastructure - Prod - Non-Prod (dev, test, staging) - You may also define dedicated OUs for highly regulated workloads. 2. In the AWS Organizations console (management account), navigate to AWS Accounts. Under the root, create the agreed top-level OUs. If needed, create child OUs under these. 3. Export or list all existing accounts and their current OUs. Create a simple mapping from each account to its target OU based on environment and sensitivity. 4. In the AWS Organizations console (management account), navigate to AWS Accounts. Move accounts into the new environment/sensitivity-based OUs according to your mapping. - Start with low-risk accounts (for example, sandbox and non-production) to validate effects of inherited policies and guardrails before moving production and high-sensitivity accounts. 5. After accounts have been moved, remove old OUs that no longer reflect the target structure. - Ensure no active accounts remain directly under the root unless explicitly justified and documented. 6. Update architecture docs, onboarding runbooks, and account request processes to require new accounts to be created in the correct OU based on environment and sensitivity.", + "AuditProcedure": "1. From the management account, use AWS Organizations console to obtain: - The full OU hierarchy (root, top-level and child OUs). - The list of accounts in each OU. 2. Review top-level and key OUs and determine whether they are clearly aligned to: - Environment (for example, production, non-production, sandbox). - Sensitivity/function (for example, security, logging, shared services, regulated). - Note any OUs whose purpose is unclear or that appear to be organized mainly by department or owner rather than environment/sensitivity. 3. For each environment/sensitivity OU, select a sample of accounts and verify that their primary workloads match the OU's stated purpose. - Note any accounts that mix production and non-production workloads in the same OU when separate OUs are defined. - Note any accounts that place highly sensitive or regulated workloads in OUs that are intended for lower-sensitivity use.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.5", + "Description": "Ensure delegated admin manages AWS Organizations policies", + "Checks": [ + "organizations_delegated_administrators" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that a dedicated member account is configured as a delegated administrator for AWS Organizations to manage organization policies (SCPs, RCPs, tag policies, backup policies, AI opt-out policies) and other Organizations features, instead of performing these tasks directly from the management account. The delegated administrator for AWS Organizations is configured via a resource-based delegation policy in the management account, which grants specific member accounts limited permissions to perform Organizations policy and account management actions across the organization. This allows policy management, OU operations, and other governance tasks to be handled from purpose-built accounts without requiring broad access to the management account.", + "RationaleStatement": "The management account has unique and high privileges to manage AWS Organizations (for example, creating/deleting accounts, managing org structures) and is not subject to guardrails like SCPs. Without a delegated administrator for Organizations, all policy management, OU changes, and account governance must be performed directly from the management account. This results in concentrating operational activity in the most powerful account. Configuring a dedicated member account as a delegated administrator for Organizations policy management distributes these tasks to a purpose-built AWS account that can be protected by SCPs and other controls, reduces the number of users and roles that need management-account access, and supports separation of duties while maintaining centralized control over organization-wide features.", + "ImpactStatement": "Configuring a delegated administrator for AWS Organizations requires creating or identifying a dedicated member account for policy management and granting it specific permissions via a resource-based delegation policy. Existing workflows, automation, and user access patterns that currently perform Organizations policy tasks directly from the management account must be updated to use the delegated account instead. This introduces short-term operational overhead and testing to ensure policy creation, attachment, and management continue to function correctly from the new account.", + "RemediationProcedure": "1. Identify a dedicated member account for governance/policy management (for example, create a new \"Policy Management\" account or use an existing Security account) 2. You must be in the management account with permissions to manage Organizations resource policies. Navigate to AWS Organizations console, then click on Settings and browse to \"Delegated administrator for AWS Organizations\" section. 3. If no policy exists, click on Delegate. If a policy exists, choose Edit policy. - In the policy editor, paste or construct a delegation policy statement mentioning the Principal as the AWS account Root which is being delegated access to, and the Actions with the list of least-privileged permissions that could be performed by the delegated AWS account. - Save and validate the delegation policy. 4. Sign in to the delegated administrator account and open the AWS Organizations console. - Confirm that policy management (Policies, Attach/Detach, etc.) is accessible and that users/roles in this account can perform Organizations tasks without management-account access. 5. Grant IAM roles/users in the delegated admin account only the permissions needed for Organizations policy management. 6. Update procedures so that routine Organizations policy tasks are performed from the delegated account, reserving the management account for tasks that only it can perform", + "AuditProcedure": "1. Sign in to the AWS Organizations console. From the AWS Accounts section, verify that this is the management account for the organization. 2. In the AWS Organizations console, navigate to Settings. Scroll to the Delegated administrator for AWS Organizations section 3. Review the delegation policy status: - If a delegation policy is configured and shows one or more member accounts registered to manage Organizations policies, proceed to step 4. - If no delegation policy is configured or the section shows No delegated administrator (or equivalent), the audit fails because Organizations management is performed directly from the management account. 4. In the Delegated administrator section, note the account IDs registered for Organizations policy management. Confirm that the delegated accounts are purpose-built governance, security, or policy management accounts, not general workload, sandbox, or development accounts. 5. View the delegation policy details to confirm it grants appropriate least-privilege permissions for policy types (for example, SCPs, tag policies, backup policies) and actions (CreatePolicy, AttachPolicy, UpdatePolicy, etc.).", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.6", + "Description": "Ensure delegated admins manage AWS Organizations-integrated services", + "Checks": [ + "organizations_delegated_administrators" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that AWS services (such as AWS CloudTrail) which integrate with AWS Organizations and support delegated administration are managed through delegated administrator member accounts instead of directly from the Organizations management account. For each such service, the management account should enable trusted access and register a purpose-built member account as the delegated administrator, so that this account can perform service-level administration across all organization accounts.", + "RationaleStatement": "The management account has unique and high privileges to manage AWS Organizations (for example, creating/deleting accounts, managing org structures) and is not subject to guardrails like SCPs. Without delegated administrators, organization-wide security, logging, and management services must be operated directly from the management account, concentrating operational activity and credentials in the most privileged account in the organization. Registering member accounts as delegated administrators for AWS services distributes service-specific administration to dedicated security, logging, or operations accounts that can be restricted by SCPs, monitored like other workload accounts, and aligned with team responsibilities, while reducing day-to-day use of the management account.", + "ImpactStatement": "Configuring a delegated administrator for AWS Services that integrate with AWS Organizations requires creating or identifying a dedicated member account for policy management and granting it specific permissions. Existing workflows, automation, and user access patterns that currently perform tasks directly from the management account must be updated to use the delegated account instead. This introduces short-term operational overhead and testing to ensure policy creation, attachment, and management continue to function correctly from the new account.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Note: This remediation section uses AWS CloudTrail as a concrete example. You must perform similar procedure for all other AWS services that integrate with AWS Organizations and support delegated administration that are in use in your environment. 1. In the management account, verify that trusted access for CloudTrail is enabled in AWS Organizations (AWS Organizations → Services). 2. In the management account CloudTrail console, choose Settings in the left navigation pane. Scroll to Organization delegated administrators. 3. Click on \"Register administrator\" - Enter the account ID of the designated Logging or Security account. - Click on Register administrator. CloudTrail will automatically create the necessary service-linked roles and register the account. 4. In the delegated administrator account, open the CloudTrail console and confirm that the organization trail is visible and administrative actions are accessible. 5. Update operational runbooks so that routine CloudTrail administration is performed from the delegated admin account, not the management account.", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: This audit uses AWS CloudTrail as a concrete example. You must perform similar audits for all other AWS services that integrate with AWS Organizations and support delegated administration that are in use in your environment. 1. Sign in to the management account and open the CloudTrail console. 2. In the left navigation pane, choose Trails. - Verify that there is at least one organization trail (trail with Apply trail to all accounts in my organization or equivalent setting enabled) - If CloudTrail is only configured as single-account trails and no organization trail is in use, note that delegated admin for CloudTrail is not in scope and this recommendation is not applicable for CloudTrail in this environment. 3. In the same management account CloudTrail console, choose Settings in the left navigation pane, and scroll to the Organization delegated administrators section. 4. Verify the configuration for Organization delegated administrators: - Verify that at least one member account ID (not the management account) is listed as a delegated administrator for CloudTrail. - Verify that the account(s) are appropriate for security/logging operations (for example, a named Security or Logging account, not a sandbox or general workload account). - If the section shows \"No delegated administrators\" when an organization trail is in use, CloudTrail is effectively administered from the management account and this is a gap.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.2", + "Description": "Maintain current AWS account contact details", + "Checks": [ + "account_maintain_current_contact_details" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure contact email and telephone details for AWS accounts are current and map to more than one individual in your organization. An AWS account supports a number of contact details, and AWS will use these to contact the account owner if activity judged to be in breach of the Acceptable Use Policy or indicative of a likely security compromise is observed by the AWS Abuse team. Contact details should not be for a single individual, as circumstances may arise where that individual is unavailable. Email contact details should point to a mail alias which forwards email to multiple individuals within the organization; where feasible, phone contact details should point to a PABX hunt group or other call-forwarding system.", + "RationaleStatement": "If an AWS account is observed to be behaving in a prohibited or suspicious manner, AWS will attempt to contact the account owner by email and phone using the contact details listed. If this is unsuccessful and the account behavior needs urgent mitigation, proactive measures may be taken, including throttling of traffic between the account exhibiting suspicious behavior and the AWS API endpoints and the Internet. This will result in impaired service to and from the account in question, so it is in both the customers' and AWS's best interests that prompt contact can be established. This is best achieved by setting AWS account contact details to point to resources which have multiple individuals as recipients, such as email aliases and PABX hunt groups.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "This activity can only be performed via the AWS Console, with a user who has permission to read and write Billing information (aws-portal:\\*Billing). **From Console:** 1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and open the `Billing and Cost Management` console at https://console.aws.amazon.com/billing/home#/. 2. On the navigation bar, choose your account name, and then choose `Account`. 3. On the `Account Settings` page, next to `Account Settings`, choose `Edit`. 4. Next to the field that you need to update, choose `Edit`. 5. After you have entered your changes, choose `Save changes`. 6. After you have made your changes, choose `Done`. 7. To edit your contact information, under `Contact Information`, choose `Edit`. 8. For the fields that you want to change, type your updated information, and then choose `Update`. **From Command Line:** 1. Run the following command: ``` aws account put-contact-information --contact-information '{\"AddressLine1\": \"\", \"AddressLine2\": \"\", \"City\": \"\", \"CompanyName\": \"\", \"CountryCode\": \"\", \"FullName\": \"\", \"PhoneNumber\": \"\", \"PostalCode\": \"\", \"StateOrRegion\": \"\"}' ```", + "AuditProcedure": "This activity can only be performed via the AWS Console, with a user who has permission to read and write Billing information (aws-portal:\\*Billing). 1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and open the `Billing and Cost Management` console at https://console.aws.amazon.com/billing/home#/. 2. On the navigation bar, choose your account name, and then choose `Account`. 3. On the `Account Settings` page, review and verify the current details. 4. Under `Contact Information`, review and verify the current details.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awsaccountbilling/latest/aboutv2/manage-account-payment.html#contact-info", + "DefaultValue": "By default, AWS account contact information (email and telephone) is set to the values provided at account creation. These usually reference a single individual rather than a shared alias or group contact." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.3", + "Description": "Ensure security contact information is registered", + "Checks": [ + "account_security_contact_information_is_registered" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "AWS provides customers with the option of specifying the contact information for account's security team. It is recommended that this information be provided.", + "RationaleStatement": "Specifying security-specific contact information will help ensure that security advisories sent by AWS reach the team in your organization that is best equipped to respond to them.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Perform the following to establish security contact information: **From Console:** 1. Click on your account name at the top right corner of the console. 2. From the drop-down menu Click `My Account` 3. Scroll down to the `Alternate Contacts` section 4. Enter contact information in the `Security` section **From Command Line:** Run the following command with the following input parameters: --email-address, --name, and --phone-number. ``` aws account put-alternate-contact --alternate-contact-type SECURITY ``` **Note:** Consider specifying an internal email distribution list to ensure emails are regularly monitored by more than one individual.", + "AuditProcedure": "Perform the following to determine if security contact information is present: **From Console:** 1. Click on your account name at the top right corner of the console 2. From the drop-down menu Click `My Account` 3. Scroll down to the `Alternate Contacts` section 4. Ensure contact information is specified in the `Security` section **From Command Line:** 1. Run the following command: ``` aws account get-alternate-contact --alternate-contact-type SECURITY ``` 2. Ensure proper contact information is specified for the `Security` contact.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.4", + "Description": "Ensure no 'root' user account access key exists", + "Checks": [ + "iam_no_root_access_key" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The 'root' user account is the most privileged user in an AWS account. AWS Access Keys provide programmatic access to a given AWS account. It is recommended that all access keys associated with the 'root' user account be deleted.", + "RationaleStatement": "Deleting access keys associated with the 'root' user account limits vectors by which the account can be compromised. Additionally, deleting the 'root' access keys encourages the creation and use of role based accounts that are least privileged.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Perform the following to delete active 'root' user access keys. **From Console:** 1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console as 'root' and open the IAM console at [https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam/](https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam/). 2. Click on `` at the top right and select `My Security Credentials` from the drop down list. 3. On the pop out screen Click on `Continue to Security Credentials`. 4. Click on `Access Keys` (Access Key ID and Secret Access Key). 5. If there are active keys, under `Status`, click `Delete` (Note: Deleted keys cannot be recovered). Note: While a key can be made inactive, this inactive key will still show up in the CLI command from the audit procedure, and may lead to the root user being falsely flagged as being non-compliant.", + "AuditProcedure": "Perform the following to determine if the 'root' user account has access keys: **From Console:** 1. Login to the AWS Management Console. 2. Click `Services`. 3. Click `IAM`. 4. Click on `Credential Report`. 5. This will download a `.csv` file which contains credential usage for all IAM users within an AWS Account - open this file. 6. For the `` user, ensure the `access_key_1_active` and `access_key_2_active` fields are set to `FALSE`. **From Command Line:** Run the following command: ``` aws iam get-account-summary | grep AccountAccessKeysPresent ``` If no 'root' access keys exist the output will show `AccountAccessKeysPresent: 0,`. If the output shows a 1, then 'root' keys exist and should be deleted.", + "AdditionalInformation": "- IAM User account root for us-gov cloud regions is not enabled by default. However, on request to AWS support enables 'root' access only through access-keys (CLI, API methods) for us-gov cloud region. - Implement regular checks and alerts for any creation of new root access keys to promptly address any unauthorized or accidental creation.", + "References": "http://docs.aws.amazon.com/general/latest/gr/aws-access-keys-best-practices.html:http://docs.aws.amazon.com/general/latest/gr/managing-aws-access-keys.html:http://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_GetAccountSummary.html:https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/an-easier-way-to-determine-the-presence-of-aws-account-access-keys/", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.5", + "Description": "Ensure MFA is enabled for the 'root' user account", + "Checks": [ + "iam_root_mfa_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The 'root' user account is the most privileged user in an AWS account. Multi-factor Authentication (MFA) adds an extra layer of protection on top of a username and password. With MFA enabled, when a user signs in to an AWS website, they will be prompted for their username and password as well as for an authentication code from their AWS MFA device. **Note:** When virtual MFA is used for 'root' accounts, it is recommended that the device used is NOT a personal device, but rather a dedicated mobile device (tablet or phone) that is kept charged and secured, independent of any individual personal devices (non-personal virtual MFA). This lessens the risks of losing access to the MFA due to device loss, device trade-in, or if the individual owning the device is no longer employed at the company. Where an AWS Organization is using centralized root access, root credentials can be removed from member accounts. In that case it is neither possible nor necessary to configure root MFA in the member account.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling MFA provides increased security for console access as it requires the authenticating principal to possess a device that emits a time-sensitive key and have knowledge of a credential.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Note:** To manage MFA devices for the 'root' AWS account, you must use your 'root' account credentials to sign in to AWS. You cannot manage MFA devices for the 'root' account using other credentials. Perform the following to establish MFA for the 'root' user account: 1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and open the IAM console at [https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam/](https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam/). 2. Choose `Dashboard` , and under `Security Status` , expand `Activate MFA` on your root account. 3. Choose `Activate MFA` 4. In the wizard, choose `A virtual MFA` device and then choose `Next Step` . 5. IAM generates and displays configuration information for the virtual MFA device, including a QR code graphic. The graphic is a representation of the 'secret configuration key' that is available for manual entry on devices that do not support QR codes. 6. Open your virtual MFA application. (For a list of apps that you can use for hosting virtual MFA devices, see [Virtual MFA Applications](http://aws.amazon.com/iam/details/mfa/#Virtual_MFA_Applications).) If the virtual MFA application supports multiple accounts (multiple virtual MFA devices), choose the option to create a new account (a new virtual MFA device). 7. Determine whether the MFA app supports QR codes, and then do one of the following: - Use the app to scan the QR code. For example, you might choose the camera icon or choose an option similar to Scan code, and then use the device's camera to scan the code. - In the Manage MFA Device wizard, choose Show secret key for manual configuration, and then type the secret configuration key into your MFA application. When you are finished, the virtual MFA device starts generating one-time passwords. In the Manage MFA Device wizard, in the Authentication Code 1 box, type the one-time password that currently appears in the virtual MFA device. Wait up to 30 seconds for the device to generate a new one-time password. Then type the second one-time password into the Authentication Code 2 box. Choose Assign Virtual MFA.", + "AuditProcedure": "Perform the following to determine if the 'root' user account is enabled and has MFA setup: **From Console:** 1. Login to the AWS Management Console 2. Click `Services` 3. Click `IAM` 4. Click on `Credential Report` 5. This will download a `.csv` file which contains credential usage for all IAM users within an AWS Account - open this file 6. For the `` user, ensure the `mfa_active` field is set to `TRUE` or the `password_enabled` field is set to `FALSE` **From Command Line:** 1. Run the following command: ``` aws iam get-account-summary | grep AccountMFAEnabled aws iam get-account-summary | grep AccountPasswordPresent ``` 2. Ensure the AccountMFAEnabled property is set to 1 or the AccountPasswordPresent property is set to 0", + "AdditionalInformation": "IAM User account root for us-gov cloud regions does not have console access. This recommendation is not applicable for us-gov cloud regions.", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html#id_root-user_manage_mfa:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_mfa_enable_virtual.html#enable-virt-mfa-for-root:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-enable-root-access.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.6", + "Description": "Ensure hardware MFA is enabled for the 'root' user account", + "Checks": [ + "iam_root_hardware_mfa_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "The 'root' user account is the most privileged user in an AWS account. MFA adds an extra layer of protection on top of a user name and password. With MFA enabled, when a user signs in to an AWS website, they will be prompted for their user name and password as well as for an authentication code from their AWS MFA device. For Level 2, it is recommended that the 'root' user account be protected with a hardware MFA. Where an AWS Organization is using centralized root access, root credentials can be removed from member accounts. In that case it is neither possible nor necessary to configure root MFA in the member account.", + "RationaleStatement": "A hardware MFA has a smaller attack surface than a virtual MFA. For example, a hardware MFA does not suffer the attack surface introduced by the mobile smartphone on which a virtual MFA resides. **Note**: Using hardware MFA for numerous AWS accounts may create a logistical device management issue. If this is the case, consider implementing this Level 2 recommendation selectively for the highest security AWS accounts, while applying the Level 1 recommendation to the remaining accounts.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Note:** To manage MFA devices for the AWS 'root' user account, you must use your 'root' account credentials to sign in to AWS. You cannot manage MFA devices for the 'root' account using other credentials. Perform the following to establish a hardware MFA for the 'root' user account: 1. Open the AWS Management Console and sign in using your root user credentials. 2. On the right side of the navigation bar, choose your account name, and choose Security credentials. 3. In the Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) section, choose Assign MFA device. 4. In the wizard, type a Device name, choose Authenticator app, and then choose Next. IAM generates and displays configuration information for the virtual MFA device, including a QR code graphic. The graphic is a representation of the secret configuration key that is available for manual entry on devices that do not support QR codes. 5. Open the virtual MFA app on the device. If the virtual MFA app supports multiple virtual MFA devices or accounts, choose the option to create a new virtual MFA device or account. 6. The easiest way to configure the app is to use the app to scan the QR code. If you cannot scan the code, you can type the configuration information manually. The QR code and secret configuration key generated by IAM are tied to your AWS account. To use the QR code to configure the virtual MFA device, from the wizard, choose Show QR code. Then follow the app instructions for scanning the code. For example, you might need to choose the camera icon or choose a command like Scan account barcode, and then use the device's camera to scan the QR code. To manual entry secret key on devices, in the Set up device wizard, choose Show secret key, and then type the secret key into your MFA app. 7. In the wizard, in the MFA code 1 box, type the one-time password that currently appears in the virtual MFA device. Wait up to 30 seconds for the device to generate a new one-time password. Then type the second one-time password into the MFA code 2 box. Choose Add MFA. Remediation for this recommendation is not available through AWS CLI.", + "AuditProcedure": "Perform the following to determine if the 'root' user account has a hardware MFA setup: 1. Run the following command to determine if the 'root' account has MFA setup: ``` aws iam get-account-summary | grep \"AccountMFAEnabled\" aws iam get-account-summary | grep \"AccountPasswordPresent\" ``` The `AccountMFAEnabled` property is set to `1` will ensure that the 'root' user account has MFA (Virtual or Hardware) Enabled. `AccountPasswordPresent` set to `0` indicates that the `root` console credential has been removed. If `AccountMFAEnabled` property is set to `0` and `AccountPasswordPresent` is set to `1` the account is not compliant with this recommendation. 2. If `AccountMFAEnabled` property is set to `1`, determine 'root' account has Hardware MFA enabled. Run the following command to list all virtual MFA devices: ``` aws iam list-virtual-mfa-devices ``` If the output contains one MFA with the following Serial Number, it means the MFA is virtual, not hardware and the account is not compliant with this recommendation: `SerialNumber: arn:aws:iam::__:mfa/root-account-mfa-device`", + "AdditionalInformation": "IAM User account 'root' for us-gov cloud regions does not have console access. This control is not applicable for us-gov cloud regions.", + "References": "CCE-78911-5:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_mfa_enable_virtual.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_mfa_enable_physical.html#enable-hw-mfa-for-root:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-enable-root-access.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/enable-virt-mfa-for-root.html", + "DefaultValue": "By default, the AWS root user does not have a hardware MFA device assigned. MFA must be explicitly configured, and if enabled by default it will be virtual (software-based), not hardware." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.7", + "Description": "Eliminate use of the 'root' user for administrative and daily tasks", + "Checks": [ + "iam_avoid_root_usage" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "With the creation of an AWS account, a 'root user' is created that cannot be disabled or deleted. That user has unrestricted access to and control over all resources in the AWS account. It is highly recommended that the use of this account be avoided for everyday tasks.", + "RationaleStatement": "The 'root user' has unrestricted access to and control over all account resources. Use of it is inconsistent with the principles of least privilege and separation of duties, and can lead to unnecessary harm due to error or account compromise.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "If you find that the 'root' user account is being used for daily activities, including administrative tasks that do not require the 'root' user: 1. Change the 'root' user password. 2. Deactivate or delete any access keys associated with the 'root' user. Remember, anyone who has 'root' user credentials for your AWS account has unrestricted access to and control of all the resources in your account, including billing information.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Login to the AWS Management Console at `https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam/`. 2. In the left pane, click `Credential Report`. 3. Click on `Download Report`. 4. Open or Save the file locally. 5. Locate the `` under the user column. 6. Review `password_last_used, access_key_1_last_used_date, access_key_2_last_used_date` to determine when the 'root user' was last used. **From Command Line:** Run the following CLI commands to provide a credential report for determining the last time the 'root user' was used: ``` aws iam generate-credential-report ``` ``` aws iam get-credential-report --query 'Content' --output text | base64 -d | cut -d, -f1,5,11,16 | grep -B1 '' ``` Review `password_last_used`, `access_key_1_last_used_date`, `access_key_2_last_used_date` to determine when the _root user_ was last used. **Note:** There are a few conditions under which the use of the 'root' user account is required. Please see the reference links for all of the tasks that require use of the 'root' user.", + "AdditionalInformation": "The 'root' user for us-gov cloud regions is not enabled by default. However, on request to AWS support, they can enable the 'root' user and grant access only through access-keys (CLI, API methods) for us-gov cloud region. If the 'root' user for us-gov cloud regions is enabled, this recommendation is applicable. Monitoring usage of the 'root' user can be accomplished by implementing recommendation 3.3 Ensure a log metric filter and alarm exist for usage of the 'root' user.", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/best-practices.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/general/latest/gr/aws_tasks-that-require-root.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.8", + "Description": "Ensure IAM password policy requires minimum length of 14 or greater", + "Checks": [ + "iam_password_policy_minimum_length_14" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Password policies are, in part, used to enforce password complexity requirements. IAM password policies can be used to ensure passwords are at least a given length. It is recommended that the password policy require a minimum password length 14.", + "RationaleStatement": "Setting a password complexity policy increases account resiliency against brute force login attempts.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enforcing a minimum password length of 14 characters enhances security by making passwords more resistant to brute force attacks. However, it may require users to create longer and potentially more complex passwords, which could impact user convenience.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Perform the following to set the password policy as prescribed: **From Console:** 1. Login to AWS Console (with appropriate permissions to View Identity Access Management Account Settings) 2. Go to IAM Service on the AWS Console 3. Click on Account Settings on the Left Pane 4. Set Minimum password length to `14` or greater. 5. Click Apply password policy **From Command Line:** ``` aws iam update-account-password-policy --minimum-password-length 14 ``` Note: All commands starting with aws iam update-account-password-policy can be combined into a single command.", + "AuditProcedure": "Perform the following to ensure the password policy is configured as prescribed: **From Console:** 1. Login to AWS Console (with appropriate permissions to View Identity Access Management Account Settings) 2. Go to IAM Service on the AWS Console 3. Click on Account Settings on the Left Pane 4. Ensure Minimum password length is set to 14 or greater. **From Command Line:** ``` aws iam get-account-password-policy ``` Ensure the output of the above command includes MinimumPasswordLength: 14 (or higher)", + "AdditionalInformation": "Ensure the password policy also includes requirements for password complexity, such as the inclusion of uppercase letters, lowercase letters, numbers, and special characters: ``` aws iam update-account-password-policy --require-uppercase-characters --require-lowercase-characters --require-numbers --require-symbols ```", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_passwords_account-policy.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/best-practices.html#configure-strong-password-policy", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.9", + "Description": "Ensure IAM password policy prevents password reuse", + "Checks": [ + "iam_password_policy_reuse_24" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "IAM password policies can prevent the reuse of a given password by the same user. It is recommended that the password policy prevent the reuse of passwords.", + "RationaleStatement": "Preventing password reuse increases account resiliency against brute force login attempts.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Perform the following to set the password policy as prescribed: **From Console:** 1. Login to AWS Console (with appropriate permissions to View Identity Access Management Account Settings) 2. Go to IAM Service on the AWS Console 3. Click on Account Settings on the Left Pane 4. Check Prevent password reuse 5. Set Number of passwords to remember is set to `24` **From Command Line:** ``` aws iam update-account-password-policy --password-reuse-prevention 24 ``` Note: All commands starting with aws iam update-account-password-policy can be combined into a single command.", + "AuditProcedure": "Perform the following to ensure the password policy is configured as prescribed: **From Console:** 1. Login to AWS Console (with appropriate permissions to View Identity Access Management Account Settings) 2. Go to IAM Service on the AWS Console 3. Click on Account Settings on the Left Pane 4. Ensure Prevent password reuse is checked 5. Ensure Number of passwords to remember is set to 24 **From Command Line:** ``` aws iam get-account-password-policy ``` Ensure the output of the above command includes PasswordReusePrevention: 24", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_passwords_account-policy.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/best-practices.html#configure-strong-password-policy", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.10", + "Description": "Ensure multi-factor authentication (MFA) is enabled for all IAM users that have a console password", + "Checks": [ + "iam_user_mfa_enabled_console_access" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) adds an extra layer of authentication assurance beyond traditional credentials. With MFA enabled, when a user signs in to the AWS Console, they will be prompted for their user name and password as well as for an authentication code from their physical or virtual MFA token. It is recommended that MFA be enabled for all accounts that have a console password.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling MFA provides increased security for console access as it requires the authenticating principal to possess a device that displays a time-sensitive key and have knowledge of a credential.", + "ImpactStatement": "AWS will soon end support for SMS multi-factor authentication (MFA). New customers are not allowed to use this feature. We recommend that existing customers switch to an alternative method of MFA.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Perform the following to enable MFA: **From Console:** 1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and open the IAM console at 'https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam/' 2. In the left pane, select `Users`. 3. In the `User Name` list, choose the name of the intended MFA user. 4. Choose the `Security Credentials` tab, and then choose `Manage MFA Device`. 5. In the `Manage MFA Device wizard`, choose `Virtual MFA` device, and then choose `Continue`. IAM generates and displays configuration information for the virtual MFA device, including a QR code graphic. The graphic is a representation of the 'secret configuration key' that is available for manual entry on devices that do not support QR codes. 6. Open your virtual MFA application. (For a list of apps that you can use for hosting virtual MFA devices, see Virtual MFA Applications at https://aws.amazon.com/iam/details/mfa/#Virtual_MFA_Applications). If the virtual MFA application supports multiple accounts (multiple virtual MFA devices), choose the option to create a new account (a new virtual MFA device). 7. Determine whether the MFA app supports QR codes, and then do one of the following: - Use the app to scan the QR code. For example, you might choose the camera icon or choose an option similar to Scan code, and then use the device's camera to scan the code. - In the Manage MFA Device wizard, choose Show secret key for manual configuration, and then type the secret configuration key into your MFA application. When you are finished, the virtual MFA device starts generating one-time passwords. 8. In the `Manage MFA Device wizard`, in the `MFA Code 1 box`, type the `one-time password` that currently appears in the virtual MFA device. Wait up to 30 seconds for the device to generate a new one-time password. Then type the second `one-time password` into the `MFA Code 2 box`. 9. Click `Assign MFA`.", + "AuditProcedure": "Perform the following to determine if a MFA device is enabled for all IAM users having a console password: **From Console:** 1. Open the IAM console at [https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam/](https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam/). 2. In the left pane, select `Users` 3. If the `MFA` or `Password age` columns are not visible in the table, click the gear icon at the upper right corner of the table and ensure a checkmark is next to both, then click `Close`. 4. Ensure that for each user where the `Password age` column shows a password age, the `MFA` column shows `Virtual`, `U2F Security Key`, or `Hardware`. **From Command Line:** 1. Run the following command (OSX/Linux/UNIX) to generate a list of all IAM users along with their password and MFA status: ``` aws iam generate-credential-report ``` ``` aws iam get-credential-report --query 'Content' --output text | base64 -d | cut -d, -f1,4,8 ``` 2. The output of this command will produce a table similar to the following: ``` user,password_enabled,mfa_active elise,false,false brandon,true,true rakesh,false,false helene,false,false paras,true,true anitha,false,false ``` 3. For any column having `password_enabled` set to `true` , ensure `mfa_active` is also set to `true.`", + "AdditionalInformation": "**Forced IAM User Self-Service Remediation** Amazon has published a pattern that requires users to set up MFA through self-service before they gain access to their complete set of permissions. Until they complete this step, they cannot access their full permissions. This pattern can be used for new AWS accounts. It can also be applied to existing accounts; it is recommended that users receive instructions and a grace period to complete MFA enrollment before active enforcement on existing AWS accounts.", + "References": "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6238:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_mfa.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/best-practices.html#enable-mfa-for-privileged-users:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_mfa_enable_virtual.html:https://blogs.aws.amazon.com/security/post/Tx2SJJYE082KBUK/How-to-Delegate-Management-of-Multi-Factor-Authentication-to-AWS-IAM-Users", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.11", + "Description": "Ensure credentials unused for 45 days or more are disabled", + "Checks": [ + "iam_user_accesskey_unused", + "iam_user_console_access_unused" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "iam_user_accesskey_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_access_keys_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_user_console_access_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_console_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45 + } + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "AWS IAM users can access AWS resources using different types of credentials, such as passwords or access keys. It is recommended that all credentials that have been unused for 45 days or more be deactivated or removed.", + "RationaleStatement": "Disabling or removing unnecessary credentials will reduce the window of opportunity for credentials associated with a compromised or abandoned account to be used.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Console:** Perform the following to manage Unused Password (IAM user console access) 1. Login to the AWS Management Console: 2. Click `Services` 3. Click `IAM` 4. Click on `Users` 5. Click on `Security Credentials` 6. Select user whose `Console last sign-in` is greater than 45 days 7. Click `Security credentials` 8. In section `Sign-in credentials`, `Console password` click `Manage` 9. Under Console Access select `Disable` 10. Click `Apply` Perform the following to deactivate Access Keys: 1. Login to the AWS Management Console: 2. Click `Services` 3. Click `IAM` 4. Click on `Users` 5. Click on `Security Credentials` 6. Select any access keys that are over 45 days old and that have been used and - Click on `Make Inactive` 7. Select any access keys that are over 45 days old and that have not been used and - Click the X to `Delete`", + "AuditProcedure": "Perform the following to determine if unused credentials exist: **From Console:** 1. Login to the AWS Management Console 2. Click `Services` 3. Click `IAM` 4. Click on `Users` 5. Click the `Settings` (gear) icon. 6. Select `Console last sign-in`, `Access key last used`, and `Access Key Id` 7. Click on `Close` 8. Check and ensure that `Console last sign-in` is less than 45 days ago. **Note** - `Never` means the user has never logged in. 9. Check and ensure that `Access key age` is less than 45 days and that `Access key last used` does not say `None` If the user hasn't signed into the Console in the last 45 days or Access keys are over 45 days old refer to the remediation. **From Command Line:** **Download Credential Report:** 1. Run the following commands: ``` aws iam generate-credential-report aws iam get-credential-report --query 'Content' --output text | base64 -d | cut -d, -f1,4,5,6,9,10,11,14,15,16 | grep -v '^' ``` **Ensure unused credentials do not exist:** 2. For each user having `password_enabled` set to `TRUE` , ensure `password_last_used_date` is less than `45` days ago. - When `password_enabled` is set to `TRUE` and `password_last_used` is set to `No_Information` , ensure `password_last_changed` is less than 45 days ago. 3. For each user having an `access_key_1_active` or `access_key_2_active` to `TRUE` , ensure the corresponding `access_key_n_last_used_date` is less than `45` days ago. - When a user having an `access_key_x_active` (where x is 1 or 2) to `TRUE` and corresponding access_key_x_last_used_date is set to `N/A`, ensure `access_key_x_last_rotated` is less than 45 days ago.", + "AdditionalInformation": " is excluded in the audit since the root account should not be used for day-to-day business and would likely be unused for more than 45 days.", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/best-practices.html#remove-credentials:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_finding-unused.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_passwords_admin-change-user.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_access-keys.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.12", + "Description": "Ensure access keys are rotated every 90 days or less", + "Checks": [ + "iam_rotate_access_key_90_days" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Access keys consist of an access key ID and secret access key, which are used to sign programmatic requests that you make to AWS. AWS users need their own access keys to make programmatic calls to AWS from the AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI), Tools for Windows PowerShell, the AWS SDKs, or direct HTTP calls using the APIs for individual AWS services. It is recommended that all access keys be rotated regularly.", + "RationaleStatement": "Rotating access keys will reduce the window of opportunity for an access key that is associated with a compromised or terminated account to be used. Access keys should be rotated to ensure that data cannot be accessed with an old key which might have been lost, cracked, or stolen.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Perform the following to rotate access keys: **From Console:** 1. Go to the Management Console (https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam) 2. Click on `Users` 3. Click on `Security Credentials` 4. As an Administrator - Click on `Make Inactive` for keys that have not been rotated in `90` Days 5. As an IAM User - Click on `Make Inactive` or `Delete` for keys which have not been rotated or used in `90` Days 6. Click on `Create Access Key` 7. Update programmatic calls with new Access Key credentials **From Command Line:** 1. While the first access key is still active, create a second access key, which is active by default. Run the following command: ``` aws iam create-access-key --user-name ``` At this point, the user has two active access keys. 2. Update all applications and tools to use the new access key. 3. Determine whether the first access key is still in use by using this command: ``` aws iam get-access-key-last-used --access-key-id ``` 4. One approach is to wait several days and then check the old access key for any use before proceeding. Even if step 3 indicates no use of the old key, it is recommended that you do not immediately delete the first access key. Instead, change the state of the first access key to Inactive using this command: ``` aws iam update-access-key --user-name --access-key-id --status Inactive ``` 5. Use only the new access key to confirm that your applications are working. Any applications and tools that still use the original access key will stop working at this point because they no longer have access to AWS resources. If you find such an application or tool, you can switch its state back to Active to reenable the first access key. Then return to step 2 and update this application to use the new key. 6. After you wait some period of time to ensure that all applications and tools have been updated, you can delete the first access key with this command: ``` aws iam delete-access-key --user-name --access-key-id ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Perform the following to determine if access keys are rotated as prescribed: **From Console:** 1. Go to the Management Console (https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam) 2. Click on `Users` 3. For each user, go to `Security Credentials` 4. Review each key under `Access Keys` 5. For each key that shows `Active` for status, ensure that `Created` is less than or equal to `90 days ago`. **From Command Line:** ``` aws iam generate-credential-report aws iam get-credential-report --query 'Content' --output text | base64 -d ``` The `access_key_1_last_rotated` and the `access_key_2_last_rotated` fields in this file notes the date and time, in ISO 8601 date-time format, when the user's access key was created or last changed. If the user does not have an active access key, the value in this field is N/A (not applicable).", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "CCE-78902-4:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/best-practices.html#rotate-credentials:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_finding-unused.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/general/latest/gr/managing-aws-access-keys.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_access-keys.html", + "DefaultValue": "By default, AWS does not enforce access key rotation. Access keys remain valid until they are manually deactivated or deleted." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.13", + "Description": "Ensure IAM users receive permissions only through groups", + "Checks": [ + "iam_policy_attached_only_to_group_or_roles" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "IAM users are granted access to services, functions, and data through IAM policies. There are four ways to define policies for a user: 1) Edit the user policy directly, also known as an inline or user policy; 2) attach a policy directly to a user; 3) add the user to an IAM group that has an attached policy; 4) add the user to an IAM group that has an inline policy. Only the third implementation is recommended.", + "RationaleStatement": "Assigning IAM policies solely through groups unifies permissions management into a single, flexible layer that is consistent with organizational functional roles. By unifying permissions management, the likelihood of excessive permissions is reduced.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Console:** Perform the following to create an IAM group and assign a policy to it: 1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and open the IAM console at https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam/. 2. In the navigation pane, click `Groups` and then click `Create New Group`. 3. In the `Group Name` box, type the name of the group and then click `Next Step`. 4. In the list of policies, select the check box for each policy that you want to apply to all members of the group. Then click `Next Step`. 5. Click `Create Group`. Perform the following to add a user to a given group: 1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and open the IAM console at https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam/. 2. In the navigation pane, click `Groups`. 3. Select the group to add a user to. 4. Click `Add Users To Group`. 5. Select the users to be added to the group. 6. Click `Add Users`. Perform the following to remove a direct association between a user and policy: 1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and open the IAM console at https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam/. 2. In the left navigation pane, click on Users. 3. For each user: - Select the user - Click on the `Permissions` tab - Expand `Permissions policies` - Click `X` for each policy; then click Detach or Remove (depending on policy type) **From Command Line:** 1. Create the IAM user group: ``` aws iam create-group --group-name ``` 2. Attach the policy to the IAM user group: ``` aws iam attach-group-policy --group-name --policy-arn ``` 3. Perform the following to add a user to a given group: ``` aws iam add-user-to-group --user-name --group-name ``` 4. Perform the following to remove a direct association between a user and policy: ``` aws iam detach-user-policy --user-name --policy-arn ``` 5. Delete an inline policy from an IAM user: ``` aws iam delete-user-policy --user-name --policy-name ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Perform the following to determine if an inline policy is set or a policy is directly attached to users: 1. Run the following to get a list of IAM users: ``` aws iam list-users --query 'Users[*].UserName' --output text ``` 2. For each user returned, run the following command to determine if any policies are attached to them: ``` aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name aws iam list-user-policies --user-name ``` 3. If any policies are returned, the user has an inline policy or direct policy attachment.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "http://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/best-practices.html:http://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_managed-vs-inline.html:CCE-78912-3", + "DefaultValue": "By default, AWS allows IAM policies to be attached directly to users, groups, or roles. There is no restriction preventing direct user policies unless explicitly enforced by organizational standards." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.14", + "Description": "Ensure IAM policies that allow full \"*:*\" administrative privileges are not attached", + "Checks": [ + "iam_aws_attached_policy_no_administrative_privileges", + "iam_customer_attached_policy_no_administrative_privileges" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "IAM policies are the means by which privileges are granted to users, groups, or roles. It is recommended and considered standard security advice to grant least privilege—that is, granting only the permissions required to perform a task. Determine what users need to do, and then craft policies for them that allow the users to perform only those tasks, instead of granting full administrative privileges.", + "RationaleStatement": "It's more secure to start with a minimum set of permissions and grant additional permissions as necessary, rather than starting with permissions that are too lenient and then attempting to tighten them later. Providing full administrative privileges instead of restricting access to the minimum set of permissions required for the user exposes resources to potentially unwanted actions. IAM policies that contain a statement with `Effect: Allow` and `Action: *` over `Resource: *` should be removed.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Console:** Perform the following to detach the policy that has full administrative privileges: 1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and open the IAM console at [https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam/](https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam/). 2. In the navigation pane, click Policies and then search for the policy name found in the audit step. 3. Select the policy that needs to be deleted. 4. In the policy action menu, select `Detach`. 5. Select all Users, Groups, Roles that have this policy attached. 6. Click `Detach Policy`. 7. Select the newly detached policy and select `Delete`. **From Command Line:** Perform the following to detach the policy that has full administrative privileges as found in the audit step: 1. Lists all IAM users, groups, and roles that the specified managed policy is attached to. ``` aws iam list-entities-for-policy --policy-arn ``` 2. Detach the policy from all IAM Users: ``` aws iam detach-user-policy --user-name --policy-arn ``` 3. Detach the policy from all IAM Groups: ``` aws iam detach-group-policy --group-name --policy-arn ``` 4. Detach the policy from all IAM Roles: ``` aws iam detach-role-policy --role-name --policy-arn ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Perform the following to determine existing policies: **From Command Line:** 1. Run the following to get a list of IAM policies: ``` aws iam list-policies --only-attached --output text ``` 2. For each policy returned, run the following command to determine if any policy is allowing full administrative privileges on the account: ``` aws iam get-policy-version --policy-arn --version-id ``` 3. In the output, the policy should not contain any Statement block with `Effect: Allow` and `Action` set to `*` and `Resource` set to `*`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/best-practices.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_managed-vs-inline.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/index.html#cli-aws-iam", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.15", + "Description": "Ensure a support role has been created to manage incidents with AWS Support", + "Checks": [ + "iam_support_role_created" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "AWS provides a support center that can be used for incident notification and response, as well as technical support and customer services. Create an IAM Role, with the appropriate policy assigned, to allow authorized users to manage incidents with AWS Support.", + "RationaleStatement": "By implementing least privilege for access control, an IAM Role will require an appropriate IAM Policy to allow Support Center Access in order to manage Incidents with AWS Support.", + "ImpactStatement": "All AWS Support plans include an unlimited number of account and billing support cases, with no long-term contracts. Support billing calculations are performed on a per-account basis for all plans. Enterprise Support plan customers have the option to include multiple enabled accounts in an aggregated monthly billing calculation. Monthly charges for the Business and Enterprise support plans are based on each month's AWS usage charges, subject to a monthly minimum, billed in advance. When assigning rights, keep in mind that other policies may grant access to Support as well. This may include AdministratorAccess and other policies including customer managed policies. Utilizing the AWS managed 'AWSSupportAccess' role is one simple way of ensuring that this permission is properly granted. To better support the principle of separation of duties, it would be best to only attach this role where necessary.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Command Line:** 1. Create an IAM role for managing incidents with AWS: - Create a trust relationship policy document that allows to manage AWS incidents, and save it locally as /tmp/TrustPolicy.json: ``` { Version: 2012-10-17, Statement: [ { Effect: Allow, Principal: { AWS: }, Action: sts:AssumeRole } ] } ``` 2. Create the IAM role using the above trust policy: ``` aws iam create-role --role-name --assume-role-policy-document file:///tmp/TrustPolicy.json ``` 3. Attach 'AWSSupportAccess' managed policy to the created IAM role: ``` aws iam attach-role-policy --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AWSSupportAccess --role-name ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Command Line:** 1. List IAM policies, filter for the 'AWSSupportAccess' managed policy, and note the Arn element value: ``` aws iam list-policies --query Policies[?PolicyName == 'AWSSupportAccess'] ``` 2. Check if the 'AWSSupportAccess' policy is attached to any role: ``` aws iam list-entities-for-policy --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AWSSupportAccess ``` 3. In the output, ensure `PolicyRoles` does not return empty. 'Example: Example: PolicyRoles: [ ]' If it returns empty refer to the remediation below.", + "AdditionalInformation": "AWSSupportAccess policy is a global AWS resource. It has same ARN as `arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AWSSupportAccess` for every account.", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_managed-vs-inline.html:https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/pricing/:https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/iam/list-policies.html:https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/iam/attach-role-policy.html:https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/iam/list-entities-for-policy.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.16", + "Description": "Ensure IAM instance roles are used for AWS resource access from instances", + "Checks": [ + "ec2_instance_profile_attached" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "AWS access from within AWS instances can be done by either encoding AWS keys into AWS API calls or by assigning the instance to a role which has an appropriate permissions policy for the required access. AWS Access means accessing the APIs of AWS in order to access AWS resources or manage AWS account resources.", + "RationaleStatement": "AWS IAM roles reduce the risks associated with sharing and rotating credentials that can be used outside of AWS itself. Compromised credentials can be used from outside the AWS account to which they provide access. In contrast, to leverage role permissions, an attacker would need to gain and maintain access to a specific instance to use the privileges associated with it. Additionally, if credentials are encoded into compiled applications or other hard-to-change mechanisms, they are even less likely to be properly rotated due to the risks of service disruption. As time passes, credentials that cannot be rotated are more likely to be known by an increasing number of individuals who no longer work for the organization that owns the credentials.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and navigate to the EC2 dashboard at `https://console.aws.amazon.com/ec2/`. 2. In the left navigation panel, choose `Instances`. 3. Select the EC2 instance you want to modify. 4. Click `Actions`. 5. Click `Security`. 6. Click `Modify IAM role`. 7. Click `Create new IAM role` if a new IAM role is required. 8. Select the IAM role you want to attach to your instance in the `IAM role` dropdown. 9. Click `Update IAM role`. 10. Repeat steps 3 to 9 for each EC2 instance in your AWS account that requires an IAM role to be attached. **From Command Line:** 1. Run the `describe-instances` command to list all EC2 instance IDs in the selected AWS region: ``` aws ec2 describe-instances --region --query 'Reservations[*].Instances[*].InstanceId' ``` 2. Run the `associate-iam-instance-profile` command to attach an instance profile (which is attached to an IAM role) to the EC2 instance: ``` aws ec2 associate-iam-instance-profile --region --instance-id --iam-instance-profile Name=Instance-Profile-Name ``` 3. Run the `describe-instances` command again for the recently modified EC2 instance. The command output should return the instance profile ARN and ID: ``` aws ec2 describe-instances --region --instance-id --query 'Reservations[*].Instances[*].IamInstanceProfile' ``` 4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 for each EC2 instance in your AWS account that requires an IAM role to be attached.", + "AuditProcedure": "First, check if the instance has any API secrets stored using Secret Scanning. Currently, AWS does not have a solution for this. You can use open-source tools like TruffleHog to scan for secrets in the EC2 instance. If a secret is found, then assign the role to the instance. **From Console:** 1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and navigate to the EC2 dashboard at `https://console.aws.amazon.com/ec2/`. 2. In the left navigation panel, choose `Instances`. 3. Select the EC2 instance you want to examine. 4. Select `Actions`. 5. Select `View details`. 6. Select `Security` in the lower panel. - If the value for **Instance profile arn** is an instance profile ARN, then an instance profile (that contains an IAM role) is attached. - If the value for **IAM Role** is blank, no role is attached. - If the value for **IAM Role** contains a role, a role is attached. - If the value for **IAM Role** is No roles attached to instance profile: , then an instance profile is attached to the instance, but it does not contain an IAM role. 7. Repeat steps 3 to 6 for each EC2 instance in your AWS account. **From Command Line:** 1. Run the `describe-instances` command to list all EC2 instance IDs in the selected AWS region: ``` aws ec2 describe-instances --region --query 'Reservations[*].Instances[*].InstanceId' ``` 2. Run the `describe-instances` command again for each EC2 instance using the `IamInstanceProfile` identifier in the query filter to check if an IAM role is attached: ``` aws ec2 describe-instances --region --instance-id --query 'Reservations[*].Instances[*].IamInstanceProfile' ``` 3. If an IAM role is attached, the command output will show the IAM instance profile ARN and ID. 4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 for each EC2 instance in your AWS account.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_use_switch-role-ec2.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/iam-roles-for-amazon-ec2.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.17", + "Description": "Ensure that all expired SSL/TLS certificates stored in AWS IAM are removed", + "Checks": [ + "iam_no_expired_server_certificates_stored" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "To enable HTTPS connections to your website or application in AWS, you need an SSL/TLS server certificate. You can use AWS Certificate Manager (ACM) or IAM to store and deploy server certificates. Use IAM as a certificate manager only when you must support HTTPS connections in a region that is not supported by ACM. IAM securely encrypts your private keys and stores the encrypted version in IAM SSL certificate storage. IAM supports deploying server certificates in all regions, but you must obtain your certificate from an external provider for use with AWS. You cannot upload an ACM certificate to IAM. Additionally, you cannot manage your certificates from the IAM Console.", + "RationaleStatement": "Removing expired SSL/TLS certificates eliminates the risk that an invalid certificate will be deployed accidentally to a resource such as AWS Elastic Load Balancer (ELB), which can damage the credibility of the application/website behind the ELB. As a best practice, it is recommended to delete expired certificates.", + "ImpactStatement": "Deleting the certificate could have implications for your application if you are using an expired server certificate with Elastic Load Balancing, CloudFront, etc. You must make configurations in the respective services to ensure there is no interruption in application functionality.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Console:** Removing expired certificates via AWS Management Console is not currently supported. To delete SSL/TLS certificates stored in IAM through the AWS API, use the Command Line Interface (CLI). **From Command Line:** To delete an expired certificate, run the following command by replacing with the name of the certificate to delete: ``` aws iam delete-server-certificate --server-certificate-name ``` When the preceding command is successful, it does not return any output.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Console:** Getting the certificate expiration information via the AWS Management Console is not currently supported. To request information about the SSL/TLS certificates stored in IAM through the AWS API, use the Command Line Interface (CLI). **From Command Line:** Run the `list-server-certificates` command to list all the IAM-stored server certificates: ``` aws iam list-server-certificates ``` The command output should return an array that contains all the SSL/TLS certificates currently stored in IAM and their metadata (name, ID, expiration date, etc): ``` { ServerCertificateMetadataList: [ { ServerCertificateId: EHDGFRW7EJFYTE88D, ServerCertificateName: MyServerCertificate, Expiration: 2018-07-10T23:59:59Z, Path: /, Arn: arn:aws:iam::012345678910:server-certificate/MySSLCertificate, UploadDate: 2018-06-10T11:56:08Z } ] } ``` Verify the `ServerCertificateName` and `Expiration` parameter value (expiration date) for each SSL/TLS certificate returned by the list-server-certificates command and determine if there are any expired server certificates currently stored in AWS IAM. If so, use the AWS API to remove them. If this command returns: ``` { { ServerCertificateMetadataList: [] } ``` This means that there are no expired certificates; it **does not** mean that no certificates exist.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_server-certs.html:https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/iam/delete-server-certificate.html", + "DefaultValue": "By default, expired certificates will not be deleted." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.18", + "Description": "Ensure that IAM External Access Analyzer is enabled for all regions", + "Checks": [ + "accessanalyzer_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Enable the IAM External Access Analyzer regarding all resources in each active AWS region. IAM Access Analyzer is a technology introduced at AWS reinvent 2019. After the Analyzer is enabled in IAM, scan results are displayed on the console showing the accessible resources. Scans show resources that other accounts and federated users can access, such as KMS keys and IAM roles. The results allow you to determine whether an unintended user is permitted, making it easier for administrators to monitor least privilege access. Access Analyzer analyzes only the policies that are applied to resources in the same AWS Region.", + "RationaleStatement": "AWS IAM External Access Analyzer helps you identify the resources in your organization and accounts, such as Amazon S3 buckets or IAM roles, that are shared with external entities. This allows you to identify unintended access to your resources and data. Access Analyzer identifies resources that are shared with external principals by using logic-based reasoning to analyze the resource-based policies in your AWS environment. IAM External Access Analyzer continuously monitors all policies for S3 buckets, IAM roles, KMS (Key Management Service) keys, AWS Lambda functions, Amazon SQS (Simple Queue Service) queues and more", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Console:** Perform the following to enable IAM Access Analyzer for IAM policies: 1. Open the IAM console at `https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam/.` 2. Choose `Access analyzer`. 3. Choose `Create external access analyzer`. 4. On the `Create analyzer` page, confirm that the `Region` displayed is the Region where you want to enable Access Analyzer. 5. Optionally enter a name for the analyzer. 6. Optionally add any tags that you want to apply to the analyzer. 7. Choose `Create Analyzer`. 8. Repeat these step for each active region. **From Command Line:** Run the following command: ``` aws accessanalyzer list-analyzers --type ORGANIZATION ``` Repeat this command for each active region. **Note:** The IAM Access Analyzer is successfully configured only when the account you use has the necessary permissions.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Open the IAM console at `https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam/` 2. Under `Access analyzer` choose `Analyzer Settings` 3. On the `Analyzer Settings` page, there will be a list of analyzers. 4. Look for analyzers where the `Finding type` is `External Access`. **From Command Line:** 1. Run the following command: ``` aws accessanalyzer list-analyzers --type ORGANIZATION | grep status ``` 2. Ensure that at least one Analyzer's `status` is set to `ACTIVE`. 3. Repeat the steps above for each active region. If an Access Analyzer is not listed for each region or the status is not set to active refer to the remediation procedure below.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-getting-started.html:https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/accessanalyzer/get-analyzer.html:https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/accessanalyzer/create-analyzer.html", + "DefaultValue": "By default, IAM External Access Analyzer is not enabled in any region. An analyzer must be explicitly created and activated for each region where monitoring is required." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.19", + "Description": "Ensure IAM users are managed centrally via identity federation or AWS Organizations for multi-account environments", + "Checks": [ + "iam_check_saml_providers_sts" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "In multi-account environments, IAM user centralization facilitates greater user control. User access beyond the initial account is then provided via role assumption. Centralization of users can be accomplished through federation with an external identity provider or through the use of AWS Organizations.", + "RationaleStatement": "Centralizing IAM user management to a single identity store reduces complexity and thus the likelihood of access management errors.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "The remediation procedure will vary based on each individual organization's implementation of identity federation and/or AWS Organizations, with the acceptance criteria that no non-service IAM users and non-root accounts are present outside the account providing centralized IAM user management.", + "AuditProcedure": "For multi-account AWS environments with an external identity provider: 1. Determine the master account for identity federation or IAM user management 2. Login to that account through the AWS Management Console 3. Click `Services` 4. Click `IAM` 5. Click `Identity providers` 6. Verify the configuration For multi-account AWS environments with an external identity provider, as well as for those implementing AWS Organizations without an external identity provider: 1. Determine all accounts that should not have local users present 2. Log into the AWS Management Console 3. Switch role into each identified account 4. Click `Services` 5. Click `IAM` 6. Click `Users` 7. Confirm that no IAM users representing individuals are present", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.20", + "Description": "Ensure access to AWSCloudShellFullAccess is restricted", + "Checks": [ + "iam_policy_cloudshell_admin_not_attached" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "AWS CloudShell is a convenient way of running CLI commands against AWS services; a managed IAM policy ('AWSCloudShellFullAccess') provides full access to CloudShell, which allows file upload and download capability between a user's local system and the CloudShell environment. Within the CloudShell environment, a user has sudo permissions and can access the internet. Therefore, it is feasible to install file transfer software, for example, and move data from CloudShell to external internet servers.", + "RationaleStatement": "Access to this policy should be restricted, as it presents a potential channel for data exfiltration by malicious cloud admins who are given full permissions to the service. AWS documentation describes how to create a more restrictive IAM policy that denies file transfer permissions.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Console** 1. Open the IAM console at https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam/ 2. In the left pane, select Policies 3. Search for and select AWSCloudShellFullAccess 4. On the Entities attached tab, for each item, check the box and select Detach", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Console** 1. Open the IAM console at https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam/ 2. In the left pane, select Policies 3. Search for and select AWSCloudShellFullAccess 4. On the Entities attached tab, ensure that there are no entities using this policy **From Command Line** 1. List IAM policies, filter for the 'AWSCloudShellFullAccess' managed policy, and note the Arn element value: ``` aws iam list-policies --query Policies[?PolicyName == 'AWSCloudShellFullAccess'] ``` 2. Check if the 'AWSCloudShellFullAccess' policy is attached to any role: ``` aws iam list-entities-for-policy --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AWSCloudShellFullAccess ``` 3. In the output, ensure PolicyRoles returns empty. 'Example: Example: PolicyRoles: [ ]' If it does not return empty, refer to the remediation below. **Note:** Keep in mind that other policies may grant access.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cloudshell/latest/userguide/sec-auth-with-identities.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.21", + "Description": "Ensure AWS resource policies do not allow unrestricted access using 'Principal': '*'", + "Checks": [ + "s3_bucket_policy_public_write_access", + "sqs_queues_not_publicly_accessible", + "sns_topics_not_publicly_accessible", + "awslambda_function_not_publicly_accessible", + "kms_key_not_publicly_accessible", + "glacier_vaults_policy_public_access", + "secretsmanager_not_publicly_accessible", + "eventbridge_bus_exposed" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure AWS resource-based policies, such as Amazon S3 bucket policies, Amazon SQS queue policies, Amazon SNS topic policies, and AWS Lambda resource policies, do not grant unrestricted access using \"Principal\": \"*\" with \"Effect\": \"Allow\" unless the policy includes restrictive conditions that limit access to specific trusted identities, accounts, services, or network boundaries.", + "RationaleStatement": "Resource-based policies are evaluated alongside identity-based IAM policies during authorization decisions. When a policy statement specifies \"Principal\": \"*\" with \"Effect\": \"Allow\", it grants the specified permissions to any AWS principal unless additional conditions restrict the request. This may unintentionally allow access from users, roles, or services in any AWS account. Such broad access significantly increases the risk of unauthorized data access, resource abuse, or data exfiltration.", + "ImpactStatement": "Unrestricted resource-based policies may expose data or services to unauthorized access, potentially leading to data breaches, service misuse, or unintended public exposure.", + "RemediationProcedure": "If a resource policy contains `\"Principal\": \"*\"` with `\"Effect\": \"Allow\"` and lacks sufficient restrictions, modify the policy to limit access. **OPTION 1 - Restrict the Principal:** Replace the wildcard principal (`\"Principal\": \"*\"`) with a specific account, role, user, or service. Example Non-Compliant Policy: ``` {\"Version\": \"2012-10-17\", \"Statement\": [{\"Sid\": \"AllowPublicAccess\", \"Effect\": \"Allow\", \"Principal\": \"*\", \"Action\": \"sqs:SendMessage\", \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:sqs:us-east-1:123456789012:my-queue\"}]} ``` Steps: 1. Retrieve the current policy: ``` aws sqs get-queue-attributes --queue-url https://sqs.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/123456789012/my-queue --attribute-names Policy --query 'Attributes.Policy' ``` 2. Update the policy with a specific principal: ``` aws sqs set-queue-attributes --queue-url https://sqs.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/123456789012/my-queue --attributes '{\"Policy\": \"{\\\"Version\\\":\\\"2012-10-17\\\",\\\"Statement\\\":[{\\\"Sid\\\":\\\"AllowSpecificAccount\\\",\\\"Effect\\\":\\\"Allow\\\",\\\"Principal\\\":{\\\"AWS\\\":\\\"arn:aws:iam::345678901234:root\\\"},\\\"Action\\\":\\\"sqs:SendMessage\\\",\\\"Resource\\\":\\\"arn:aws:sqs:us-east-1:123456789012:my-queue\\\"}]}\"}' ``` Resulting Compliant Policy: ``` {\"Version\": \"2012-10-17\", \"Statement\": [{\"Sid\": \"AllowSpecificAccount\", \"Effect\": \"Allow\", \"Principal\": {\"AWS\": \"arn:aws:iam::345678901234:root\"}, \"Action\": \"sqs:SendMessage\", \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:sqs:us-east-1:123456789012:my-queue\"}]} ``` **OPTION 2 - Restrict Using Conditions:** If a wildcard principal is required, add restrictive conditions. Example compliant policy: ``` {\"Version\": \"2012-10-17\", \"Statement\": [{\"Sid\": \"AllowServiceIntegration\", \"Effect\": \"Allow\", \"Principal\": \"*\", \"Action\": \"sqs:SendMessage\", \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:sqs:us-east-1:123456789012:my-queue\", \"Condition\": {\"StringEquals\": {\"aws:SourceAccount\": \"345678901234\"}}}]} ```", + "AuditProcedure": "1. Identify resources that support resource-based policies within the AWS account, such as S3 buckets, SQS queues, SNS topics, and Lambda functions. 2. Retrieve the resource policies for each resource. Example CLI commands: SQS Queue Policies: ``` aws sqs get-queue-attributes --queue-url https://sqs.region.amazonaws.com/account/QUEUE --attribute-names Policy ``` S3 Bucket Policies: ``` aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket YOUR-BUCKET-NAME ``` SNS Topic Policies: ``` aws sns get-topic-attributes --topic-arn TOPIC-ARN --query \"Attributes.Policy\" --output text ``` 3. Inspect the retrieved policies and identify statements containing: - `\"Effect\": \"Allow\"` AND `\"Principal\": \"*\"` OR - `\"Principal\": {\"AWS\": \"*\"}` 4. Evaluate whether the statement includes restrictive conditions such as: - `aws:SourceArn` - `aws:SourceAccount` - `aws:PrincipalArn` - Other service-specific condition keys 5. Determine audit status: - Compliant: Wildcard principals are present only when restrictive conditions limit access to trusted principals or services - Non-Compliant: Wildcard principals are used without sufficient restrictions", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "By default, AWS does not prevent the use of \"Principal\": \"*\" in resource-based policies. Policies may allow unrestricted access unless explicitly restricted through policy definitions or organizational controls. It is the responsibility of the customer to ensure that resource policies are properly scoped and do not grant unintended public or cross-account access." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.1.1", + "Description": "Ensure S3 Bucket Policy is set to deny HTTP requests", + "Checks": [ + "s3_bucket_secure_transport_policy" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Storage", + "SubSection": "3.1 Simple Storage Service (S3)", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "At the Amazon S3 bucket level, you can configure permissions through a bucket policy, making the objects accessible only through HTTPS.", + "RationaleStatement": "By default, Amazon S3 allows both HTTP and HTTPS requests. To ensure that access to Amazon S3 objects is only permitted through HTTPS, you must explicitly deny HTTP requests. Bucket policies that allow HTTPS requests without explicitly denying HTTP requests will not comply with this recommendation.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Login to the AWS Management Console and open the Amazon S3 console using https://console.aws.amazon.com/s3/. 2. Select the check box next to the Bucket. 3. Click on 'Permissions'. 4. Click 'Bucket Policy'. 5. Add either of the following to the existing policy, filling in the required information: ``` { Sid: , Effect: Deny, Principal: *, Action: s3:*, Resource: arn:aws:s3:::/*, Condition: { Bool: { aws:SecureTransport: false } } } ``` or ``` { Sid: , Effect: Deny, Principal: *, Action: s3:*, Resource: [ arn:aws:s3:::, arn:aws:s3:::/* ], Condition: { NumericLessThan: { s3:TlsVersion: 1.2 } } } ``` 6. Save 7. Repeat for all the buckets in your AWS account that contain sensitive data. **From Console** Using AWS Policy Generator: 1. Repeat steps 1-4 above. 2. Click on `Policy Generator` at the bottom of the Bucket Policy Editor. 3. Select Policy Type `S3 Bucket Policy`. 4. Add Statements: - `Effect` = Deny - `Principal` = * - `AWS Service` = Amazon S3 - `Actions` = * - `Amazon Resource Name` = 5. Generate Policy. 6. Copy the text and add it to the Bucket Policy. **From Command Line:** 1. Export the bucket policy to a json file: ``` aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket --query Policy --output text > policy.json ``` 2. Modify the policy.json file by adding either of the following: ``` { Sid: , Effect: Deny, Principal: *, Action: s3:*, Resource: arn:aws:s3:::/*, Condition: { Bool: { aws:SecureTransport: false } } } ``` or ``` { Sid: , Effect: Deny, Principal: *, Action: s3:*, Resource: [ arn:aws:s3:::, arn:aws:s3:::/* ], Condition: { NumericLessThan: { s3:TlsVersion: 1.2 } } } ``` 3. Apply this modified policy back to the S3 bucket: ``` aws s3api put-bucket-policy --bucket --policy file://policy.json ```", + "AuditProcedure": "To allow access to HTTPS, you can use a bucket policy with the effect `allow` and a condition that checks for the key `aws:SecureTransport: true`. This means that HTTPS requests are allowed, but it does not deny HTTP requests. To explicitly deny HTTP access, ensure that there is also a bucket policy with the effect `deny` that contains the key `aws:SecureTransport: false`. You may also require TLS by setting a policy to deny any version lower than the one you wish to require, using the condition `NumericLessThan` and the key `s3:TlsVersion: 1.2`. **From Console:** 1. Login to the AWS Management Console and open the Amazon S3 console using https://console.aws.amazon.com/s3/. 2. Select the check box next to the Bucket. 3. Click on 'Permissions', then click on `Bucket Policy`. 4. Ensure that a policy is listed that matches either: ``` { Sid: , Effect: Deny, Principal: *, Action: s3:*, Resource: arn:aws:s3:::/*, Condition: { Bool: { aws:SecureTransport: false } } } ``` or ``` { Sid: , Effect: Deny, Principal: *, Action: s3:*, Resource: [ arn:aws:s3:::, arn:aws:s3:::/* ], Condition: { NumericLessThan: { s3:TlsVersion: 1.2 } } } ``` `` and `` will be specific to your account, and TLS version will be site/policy specific to your organisation. 5. Repeat for all the buckets in your AWS account. **From Command Line:** 1. List all of the S3 Buckets ``` aws s3 ls ``` 2. Using the list of buckets, run this command on each of them: ``` aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket | grep aws:SecureTransport ``` or ``` aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket | grep s3:TlsVersion ``` NOTE : If an error is thrown by the CLI, it means no policy has been configured for the specified S3 bucket, and that by default it is allowing both HTTP and HTTPS requests. 3. Confirm that `aws:SecureTransport` is set to false (such as `aws:SecureTransport:false`) or that `s3:TlsVersion` has a site-specific value. 4. Confirm that the policy line has Effect set to Deny 'Effect:Deny'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/s3-bucket-policy-for-config-rule/:https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-use-bucket-policies-and-apply-defense-in-depth-to-help-secure-your-amazon-s3-data/:https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/s3api/get-bucket-policy.html", + "DefaultValue": "Both HTTP and HTTPS requests are allowed." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.1.2", + "Description": "Ensure MFA Delete is enabled on S3 buckets", + "Checks": [ + "s3_bucket_no_mfa_delete" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Storage", + "SubSection": "3.1 Simple Storage Service (S3)", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Once MFA Delete is enabled on your sensitive and classified S3 bucket, it requires the user to provide two forms of authentication.", + "RationaleStatement": "Adding MFA delete to an S3 bucket requires additional authentication when you change the version state of your bucket or delete an object version, adding another layer of security in the event your security credentials are compromised or unauthorized access is granted.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling MFA delete on an S3 bucket could require additional administrator oversight. Enabling MFA delete may impact other services that automate the creation and/or deletion of S3 buckets.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Perform the steps below to enable MFA delete on an S3 bucket: **Note:** - You cannot enable MFA Delete using the AWS Management Console; you must use the AWS CLI or API. - You must use your 'root' account to enable MFA Delete on S3 buckets. **From Command line:** 1. Run the s3api `put-bucket-versioning` command: ``` aws s3api put-bucket-versioning --profile my-root-profile --bucket Bucket_Name --versioning-configuration Status=Enabled,MFADelete=Enabled --mfa “arn:aws:iam::aws_account_id:mfa/root-account-mfa-device passcode” ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Perform the steps below to confirm that MFA delete is configured on an S3 bucket: **From Console:** 1. Login to the S3 console at `https://console.aws.amazon.com/s3/`. 2. Click the `check` box next to the name of the bucket you want to confirm. 3. In the window under `Properties`: - Confirm that Versioning is `Enabled` - Confirm that MFA Delete is `Enabled` **From Command Line:** 1. Run the `get-bucket-versioning` command: ``` aws s3api get-bucket-versioning --bucket my-bucket ``` Example output: ``` Enabled Enabled ``` If the console or CLI output does not show that Versioning and MFA Delete are `enabled`, please refer to the remediation below.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/dev/Versioning.html#MultiFactorAuthenticationDelete:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/dev/UsingMFADelete.html:https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/securing-access-to-aws-using-mfa-part-3/:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_mfa_lost-or-broken.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.1.3", + "Description": "Ensure all data in Amazon S3 has been discovered, classified, and secured when necessary", + "Checks": [ + "macie_is_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Storage", + "SubSection": "3.1 Simple Storage Service (S3)", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Amazon S3 buckets can contain sensitive data that, for security purposes, should be discovered, monitored, classified, and protected. Macie, along with other third-party tools, can automatically provide an inventory of Amazon S3 buckets.", + "RationaleStatement": "Using a cloud service or third-party software to continuously monitor and automate the process of data discovery and classification for S3 buckets through machine learning and pattern matching is a strong defense in protecting that information. Amazon Macie is a fully managed data security and privacy service that uses machine learning and pattern matching to discover and protect your sensitive data in AWS.", + "ImpactStatement": "There is a cost associated with using Amazon Macie, and there is typically a cost associated with third-party tools that perform similar processes and provide protection.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Perform the steps below to enable and configure Amazon Macie: **From Console:** 1. Log on to the Macie console at `https://console.aws.amazon.com/macie/`. 2. Click `Get started`. 3. Click `Enable Macie`. Set up a repository for sensitive data discovery results: 1. In the left pane, under Settings, click `Discovery results`. 2. Make sure `Create bucket` is selected. 3. Create a bucket and enter a name for it. The name must be unique across all S3 buckets, and it must start with a lowercase letter or a number. 4. Click `Advanced`. 5. For block all public access, make sure `Yes` is selected. 6. For KMS encryption, specify the AWS KMS key that you want to use to encrypt the results. The key must be a symmetric customer master key (CMK) that is in the same region as the S3 bucket. 7. Click `Save`. Create a job to discover sensitive data: 1. In the left pane, click `S3 buckets`. Macie displays a list of all the S3 buckets for your account. 2. Check the box for each bucket that you want Macie to analyze as part of the job. 3. Click `Create job`. 4. Click `Quick create`. 5. For the Name and Description step, enter a name and, optionally, a description of the job. 6. Click `Next`. 7. For the Review and create step, click `Submit`. Review your findings: 1. In the left pane, click `Findings`. 2. To view the details of a specific finding, choose any field other than the check box for the finding. If you are using a third-party tool to manage and protect your S3 data, follow the vendor documentation for implementing and configuring that tool.", + "AuditProcedure": "Perform the following steps to determine if Macie is running: **From Console:** 1. Login to the Macie console at https://console.aws.amazon.com/macie/. 2. In the left hand pane, click on `By job` under findings. 3. Confirm that you have a job set up for your S3 buckets. When you log into the Macie console, if you are not taken to the summary page and do not have a job set up and running, then refer to the remediation procedure below. If you are using a third-party tool to manage and protect your S3 data, you meet this recommendation.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://aws.amazon.com/macie/getting-started/:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/workspaces/latest/adminguide/data-protection.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/macie/latest/user/data-classification.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.1.4", + "Description": "Ensure that S3 is configured with 'Block Public Access' enabled", + "Checks": [ + "s3_bucket_level_public_access_block", + "s3_account_level_public_access_blocks" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Storage", + "SubSection": "3.1 Simple Storage Service (S3)", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Amazon S3 provides `Block public access (bucket settings)` and `Block public access (account settings)` to help you manage public access to Amazon S3 resources. By default, S3 buckets and objects are created with public access disabled. However, an IAM principal with sufficient S3 permissions can enable public access at the bucket and/or object level. While enabled, `Block public access (bucket settings)` prevents an individual bucket and its contained objects from becoming publicly accessible. Similarly, `Block public access (account settings)` prevents all buckets and their contained objects from becoming publicly accessible across the entire account.", + "RationaleStatement": "Amazon S3 `Block public access (bucket settings)` prevents the accidental or malicious public exposure of data contained within the respective bucket(s). Amazon S3 `Block public access (account settings)` prevents the accidental or malicious public exposure of data contained within all buckets of the respective AWS account. Whether to block public access to all or some buckets is an organizational decision that should be based on data sensitivity, least privilege, and use case.", + "ImpactStatement": "When you apply Block Public Access settings to an account, the settings apply to all AWS regions globally. The settings may not take effect in all regions immediately or simultaneously, but they will eventually propagate to all regions.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**If utilizing Block Public Access (bucket settings)** **From Console:** 1. Login to the AWS Management Console and open the Amazon S3 console using https://console.aws.amazon.com/s3/. 2. Select the check box next to a bucket. 3. Click 'Edit public access settings'. 4. Click 'Block all public access' 5. Repeat for all the buckets in your AWS account that contain sensitive data. **From Command Line:** 1. List all of the S3 buckets: ``` aws s3 ls ``` 2. Enable Block Public Access on a specific bucket: ``` aws s3api put-public-access-block --bucket --public-access-block-configuration BlockPublicAcls=true,IgnorePublicAcls=true,BlockPublicPolicy=true,RestrictPublicBuckets=true ``` **If utilizing Block Public Access (account settings)** **From Console:** If the output reads `true` for the separate configuration settings, then Block Public Access is enabled on the account. 1. Login to the AWS Management Console and open the Amazon S3 console using https://console.aws.amazon.com/s3/. 2. Click `Block Public Access (account settings)`. 3. Click `Edit` to change the block public access settings for all the buckets in your AWS account. 4. Update the settings and click `Save`. For details about each setting, pause on the `i` icons. 5. When you're asked for confirmation, enter `confirm`. Then click `Confirm` to save your changes. **From Command Line:** To enable Block Public Access for this account, run the following command: ``` aws s3control put-public-access-block --public-access-block-configuration BlockPublicAcls=true, IgnorePublicAcls=true, BlockPublicPolicy=true, RestrictPublicBuckets=true --account-id ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**If utilizing Block Public Access (bucket settings)** **From Console:** 1. Login to the AWS Management Console and open the Amazon S3 console using https://console.aws.amazon.com/s3/. 2. Select the check box next to a bucket. 3. Click on 'Edit public access settings'. 4. Ensure that the block public access settings are configured appropriately for this bucket. 5. Repeat for all the buckets in your AWS account. **From Command Line:** 1. List all of the S3 buckets: ``` aws s3 ls ``` 2. Find the public access settings for a specific bucket: ``` aws s3api get-public-access-block --bucket ``` Output if Block Public Access is enabled: ``` { PublicAccessBlockConfiguration: { BlockPublicAcls: true, IgnorePublicAcls: true, BlockPublicPolicy: true, RestrictPublicBuckets: true } } ``` If the output reads `false` for the separate configuration settings, then proceed with the remediation. **If utilizing Block Public Access (account settings)** **From Console:** 1. Login to the AWS Management Console and open the Amazon S3 console using https://console.aws.amazon.com/s3/. 2. Choose `Block public access (account settings)`. 3. Ensure that the block public access settings are configured appropriately for your AWS account. **From Command Line:** To check the block public access settings for this account, run the following command: `aws s3control get-public-access-block --account-id --region ` Output if Block Public Access is enabled: ``` { PublicAccessBlockConfiguration: { IgnorePublicAcls: true, BlockPublicPolicy: true, BlockPublicAcls: true, RestrictPublicBuckets: true } } ``` If the output reads `false` for the separate configuration settings, then proceed with the remediation.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/user-guide/block-public-access-account.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.2.1", + "Description": "Ensure that encryption-at-rest is enabled for RDS instances", + "Checks": [ + "rds_instance_storage_encrypted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Storage", + "SubSection": "3.2 Relational Database Service (RDS)", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Amazon RDS encrypted DB instances use the industry-standard AES-256 encryption algorithm to encrypt your data on the server that hosts your Amazon RDS DB instances. After your data is encrypted, Amazon RDS handles the authentication of access and the decryption of your data transparently, with minimal impact on performance.", + "RationaleStatement": "Databases are likely to hold sensitive and critical data; therefore, it is highly recommended to implement encryption to protect your data from unauthorized access or disclosure. With RDS encryption enabled, the data stored on the instance's underlying storage, the automated backups, read replicas, and snapshots are all encrypted.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Login to the AWS Management Console and open the RDS dashboard at https://console.aws.amazon.com/rds/. 2. In the left navigation panel, click on `Databases`. 3. Select the Database instance that needs to be encrypted. 4. Click the `Actions` button placed at the top right and select `Take Snapshot`. 5. On the Take Snapshot page, enter the name of the database for which you want to take a snapshot in the `Snapshot Name` field and click on `Take Snapshot`. 6. Select the newly created snapshot, click the `Action` button placed at the top right, and select `Copy snapshot` from the Action menu. 7. On the Make Copy of DB Snapshot page, perform the following: - In the `New DB Snapshot Identifier` field, enter a name for the new snapshot. - Check `Copy Tags`. The new snapshot must have the same tags as the source snapshot. - Select `Yes` from the `Enable Encryption` dropdown list to enable encryption. You can choose to use the AWS default encryption key or a custom key from the Master Key dropdown list. 8. Click `Copy Snapshot` to create an encrypted copy of the selected instance's snapshot. 9. Select the new Snapshot Encrypted Copy and click the `Action` button located at the top right. Then, select the `Restore Snapshot` option from the Action menu. This will restore the encrypted snapshot to a new database instance. 10. On the Restore DB Instance page, enter a unique name for the new database instance in the DB Instance Identifier field. 11. Review the instance configuration details and click `Restore DB Instance`. 12. As the new instance provisioning process is completed, you can update the application configuration to refer to the endpoint of the new encrypted database instance. Once the database endpoint is changed at the application level, you can remove the unencrypted instance. **From Command Line:** 1. Run the `describe-db-instances` command to list the names of all RDS database instances in the selected AWS region. The command output should return database instance identifiers: ``` aws rds describe-db-instances --query 'DBInstances[*].DBInstanceIdentifier' ``` 2. Check if the specified RDS instance is encrypted. If it shows false, it means it is not yet encrypted: ``` aws rds describe-db-instances --region --db-instance-identifier --query 'DBInstances[*].StorageEncrypted' ``` 3. Run the `create-db-snapshot` command to create a snapshot for a selected database instance. The command output will return the `new snapshot` with name DB Snapshot Name: ``` aws rds create-db-snapshot --region --db-snapshot-identifier --db-instance-identifier ``` 4. Now run the `list-aliases` command to list the KMS key aliases available in a specified region. The command output should return each `key alias currently available`. For our RDS encryption activation process, locate the ID of the AWS default KMS key: ``` aws kms list-aliases --region ``` 5. Run the `copy-db-snapshot` command using the default KMS key ID for the RDS instances returned earlier to create an encrypted copy of the database instance snapshot. The command output will return the `encrypted instance snapshot configuration`: ``` aws rds copy-db-snapshot --region --source-db-snapshot-identifier --target-db-snapshot-identifier --copy-tags --kms-key-id ``` 6. Run the `restore-db-instance-from-db-snapshot` command to restore the encrypted snapshot created in the previous step to a new database instance. If successful, the command output should return the configuration of the new encrypted database instance. If using the default VPC for the database network: ``` aws rds restore-db-instance-from-db-snapshot --region --db-instance-identifier --db-snapshot-identifier ``` If you created your own VPC and Subnets, you need to create a DB subnet group: ``` aws rds create-db-subnet-group --db-subnet-group-name --db-subnet-group-description --subnet-ids '[\"\",\"\",\"\"]' ``` Restore the encrypted snapshot to an RDS database instance using the specified DB subnet group. The new instance will be encrypted using the KMS key specified during the snapshot copy: ``` aws rds restore-db-instance-from-db-snapshot --region --db-subnet-group-name --db-instance-identifier --db-snapshot-identifier ``` 7. Run the `describe-db-instances` command to list all RDS database names available in the selected AWS region. The output will return the database instance identifier names. Select the encrypted database name that we just created, `db-name-encrypted`: ``` aws rds describe-db-instances --region --query 'DBInstances[*].DBInstanceIdentifier' ``` 8. Run the `describe-db-instances` command again using the RDS instance identifier returned earlier to determine if the selected database instance is encrypted. The command output should indicate that the encryption status is `True`: ``` aws rds describe-db-instances --region --db-instance-identifier --query 'DBInstances[*].StorageEncrypted' ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Login to the AWS Management Console and open the RDS dashboard at https://console.aws.amazon.com/rds/. 2. In the navigation pane, under RDS dashboard, click `Databases`. 3. Select the RDS instance that you want to examine. 4. Click `Instance Name` to see details, then select the `Configuration` tab. 5. Under Configuration Details, in the Storage pane, search for the `Encryption Enabled` status. 6. If the current status is set to `Disabled`, encryption is not enabled for the selected RDS database instance. 7. Repeat steps 2 to 6 to verify the encryption status of other RDS instances in the same region. 8. Change the region from the top of the navigation bar, and repeat the audit steps for other regions. **From Command Line:** 1. Run the `describe-db-instances` command to list all the RDS database instance names available in the selected AWS region. The output will return each database instance identifier (name): ``` aws rds describe-db-instances --region --query 'DBInstances[*].DBInstanceIdentifier' ``` 2. Run the `describe-db-instances` command again, using an RDS instance identifier returned from step 1, to determine if the selected database instance is encrypted. The output should return the encryption status `True` or `False`: ``` aws rds describe-db-instances --region --db-instance-identifier --query 'DBInstances[*].StorageEncrypted' ``` 3. If the StorageEncrypted parameter value is `False`, encryption is not enabled for the selected RDS database instance. 4. Repeat steps 1 to 3 to audit each RDS instance, and change the region to verify RDS instances in other regions.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/UserGuide/Overview.Encryption.html:https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/database/selecting-the-right-encryption-options-for-amazon-rds-and-amazon-aurora-database-engines/#:~:text=With%20RDS%2Dencrypted%20resources%2C%20data,transparent%20to%20your%20database%20engine.:https://aws.amazon.com/rds/features/security/:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/rds/create-db-subnet-group.html", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Amazon RDS instances are created without encryption at rest. Encryption must be explicitly enabled at instance creation or by restoring from an encrypted snapshot." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.2.2", + "Description": "Ensure the Auto Minor Version Upgrade feature is enabled for RDS instances", + "Checks": [ + "rds_instance_minor_version_upgrade_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Storage", + "SubSection": "3.2 Relational Database Service (RDS)", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that RDS database instances have the Auto Minor Version Upgrade flag enabled to automatically receive minor engine upgrades during the specified maintenance window. This way, RDS instances can obtain new features, bug fixes, and security patches for their database engines.", + "RationaleStatement": "AWS RDS will occasionally deprecate minor engine versions and provide new ones for upgrades. When the last version number within a release is replaced, the changed version is considered minor. With the Auto Minor Version Upgrade feature enabled, version upgrades will occur automatically during the specified maintenance window, allowing your RDS instances to receive new features, bug fixes, and security patches for their database engines.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Log in to the AWS management console and navigate to the RDS dashboard at https://console.aws.amazon.com/rds/. 2. In the left navigation panel, click `Databases`. 3. Select the RDS instance that you want to update. 4. Click on the `Modify` button located at the top right side. 5. On the `Modify DB Instance: ` page, In the `Maintenance` section, select `Auto minor version upgrade` and click the `Yes` radio button. 6. At the bottom of the page, click `Continue`, and check `Apply Immediately` to apply the changes immediately, or select `Apply during the next scheduled maintenance window` to avoid any downtime. 7. Review the changes and click `Modify DB Instance`. The instance status should change from available to modifying and back to available. Once the feature is enabled, the `Auto Minor Version Upgrade` status should change to `Yes`. **From Command Line:** 1. Run the `describe-db-instances` command to list all RDS database instance names available in the selected AWS region: ``` aws rds describe-db-instances --region --query 'DBInstances[*].DBInstanceIdentifier' ``` 2. The command output should return each database instance identifier. 3. Run the `modify-db-instance` command to modify the configuration of a selected RDS instance. This command will apply the changes immediately. Remove `--apply-immediately` to apply changes during the next scheduled maintenance window and avoid any downtime: ``` aws rds modify-db-instance --region --db-instance-identifier --auto-minor-version-upgrade --apply-immediately ``` 4. The command output should reveal the new configuration metadata for the RDS instance, including the `AutoMinorVersionUpgrade` parameter value. 5. Run the `describe-db-instances` command to check if the Auto Minor Version Upgrade feature has been successfully enabled: ``` aws rds describe-db-instances --region --db-instance-identifier --query 'DBInstances[*].AutoMinorVersionUpgrade' ``` 6. The command output should return the feature's current status set to `true`, indicating that the feature is `enabled`, and that the minor engine upgrades will be applied to the selected RDS instance.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Log in to the AWS management console and navigate to the RDS dashboard at https://console.aws.amazon.com/rds/. 2. In the left navigation panel, click `Databases`. 3. Select the RDS instance that you want to examine. 4. Click on the `Maintenance and backups` panel. 5. Under the `Maintenance` section, search for the Auto Minor Version Upgrade status. - If the current status is `Disabled`, it means that the feature is not enabled, and the minor engine upgrades released will not be applied to the selected RDS instance. **From Command Line:** 1. Run the `describe-db-instances` command to list all RDS database names available in the selected AWS region: ``` aws rds describe-db-instances --region --query 'DBInstances[*].DBInstanceIdentifier' ``` 2. The command output should return each database instance identifier. 3. Run the `describe-db-instances` command again using a RDS instance identifier returned earlier to determine the Auto Minor Version Upgrade status for the selected instance: ``` aws rds describe-db-instances --region --db-instance-identifier --query 'DBInstances[*].AutoMinorVersionUpgrade' ``` 4. The command output should return the current status of the feature. If the current status is set to `true`, the feature is enabled and the minor engine upgrades will be applied to the selected RDS instance.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/UserGuide/CHAP_RDS_Managing.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/UserGuide/USER_UpgradeDBInstance.Upgrading.html:https://aws.amazon.com/rds/faqs/", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.2.3", + "Description": "Ensure that RDS instances are not publicly accessible", + "Checks": [ + "rds_instance_no_public_access" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Storage", + "SubSection": "3.2 Relational Database Service (RDS)", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure and verify that the RDS database instances provisioned in your AWS account restrict unauthorized access in order to minimize security risks. To restrict access to any RDS database instance, you must disable the Publicly Accessible flag for the database and update the VPC security group associated with the instance.", + "RationaleStatement": "Ensure that no public-facing RDS database instances are provisioned in your AWS account, and restrict unauthorized access in order to minimize security risks. When the RDS instance allows unrestricted access (0.0.0.0/0), anyone and anything on the Internet can establish a connection to your database, which can increase the opportunity for malicious activities such as brute force attacks, PostgreSQL injections, or DoS/DDoS attacks.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Log in to the AWS management console and navigate to the RDS dashboard at https://console.aws.amazon.com/rds/. 2. Under the navigation panel, on the RDS dashboard, click `Databases`. 3. Select the RDS instance that you want to update. 4. Click `Modify` from the dashboard top menu. 5. On the Modify DB Instance panel, under the `Connectivity` section, click on `Additional connectivity configuration` and update the value for `Publicly Accessible` to `Not publicly accessible` to restrict public access. 6. Follow the below steps to update subnet configurations: - Select the `Connectivity and security` tab, and click the VPC attribute value inside the `Networking` section. - Select the `Details` tab from the VPC dashboard's bottom panel and click the Route table configuration attribute value. - On the Route table details page, select the Routes tab from the dashboard's bottom panel and click `Edit routes`. - On the Edit routes page, update the Destination of Target which is set to `igw-xxxxx` and click `Save` routes. 7. On the Modify DB Instance panel, click `Continue`, and in the Scheduling of modifications section, perform one of the following actions based on your requirements: - Select `Apply during the next scheduled maintenance window` to apply the changes automatically during the next scheduled maintenance window. - Select `Apply immediately` to apply the changes right away. With this option, any pending modifications will be asynchronously applied as soon as possible, regardless of the maintenance window setting for this RDS database instance. Note that any changes available in the pending modifications queue are also applied. If any of the pending modifications require downtime, choosing this option can cause unexpected downtime for the application. 8. Repeat steps 3-7 for each RDS instance in the current region. 9. Change the AWS region from the navigation bar to repeat the process for other regions. **From Command Line:** 1. Run the `describe-db-instances` command to list all available RDS database identifiers in the selected AWS region: ``` aws rds describe-db-instances --region --query 'DBInstances[*].DBInstanceIdentifier' ``` 2. The command output should return each database instance identifier. 3. Run the `modify-db-instance` command to modify the configuration of a selected RDS instance, disabling the `Publicly Accessible` flag for that instance. This command uses the `apply-immediately` flag. If you want to avoid any downtime, the `--no-apply-immediately` flag can be used: ``` aws rds modify-db-instance --region --db-instance-identifier --no-publicly-accessible --apply-immediately ``` 4. The command output should reveal the `PubliclyAccessible` configuration under pending values, to be applied at the specified time. 5. Updating the Internet Gateway destination via the AWS CLI is not currently supported. To update information about the Internet Gateway, please use the AWS Console procedure. 6. Repeat steps 1-5 for each RDS instance provisioned in the current region. 7. Change the AWS region by using the --region filter to repeat the process for other regions.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Log in to the AWS management console and navigate to the RDS dashboard at https://console.aws.amazon.com/rds/. 2. Under the navigation panel, on the RDS dashboard, click `Databases`. 3. Select the RDS instance that you want to examine. 4. Click `Instance Name` from the dashboard, under `Connectivity and Security`. 5. In the `Security` section, check if the Publicly Accessible flag status is set to `Yes`. 6. Follow the steps below to check database subnet access: - In the `networking` section, click the subnet link under `Subnets`. - The link will redirect you to the VPC Subnets page. - Select the subnet listed on the page and click the `Route Table` tab from the dashboard bottom panel. - If the route table contains any entries with the destination CIDR block set to `0.0.0.0/0` and an `Internet Gateway` attached, the selected RDS database instance was provisioned inside a public subnet; therefore, it is not running within a logically isolated environment and can be accessed from the Internet. 7. Repeat steps 3-6 to determine the configuration of other RDS database instances provisioned in the current region. 8. Change the AWS region from the navigation bar and repeat the audit process for other regions. **From Command Line:** 1. Run the `describe-db-instances` command to list all available RDS database names in the selected AWS region: ``` aws rds describe-db-instances --region --query 'DBInstances[*].DBInstanceIdentifier' ``` 2. The command output should return each database instance `identifier`. 3. Run the `describe-db-instances` command again, using the `PubliclyAccessible` parameter as a query filter to reveal the status of the database instance's Publicly Accessible flag: ``` aws rds describe-db-instances --region --db-instance-identifier --query 'DBInstances[*].PubliclyAccessible' ``` 4. Check the Publicly Accessible parameter status. If the Publicly Accessible flag is set to `Yes`, then the selected RDS database instance is publicly accessible and insecure. Follow the steps mentioned below to check database subnet access. 5. Run the `describe-db-instances` command again using the RDS database instance identifier that you want to check, along with the appropriate filtering to describe the VPC subnet(s) associated with the selected instance: ``` aws rds describe-db-instances --region --db-instance-identifier --query 'DBInstances[*].DBSubnetGroup.Subnets[]' ``` - The command output should list the subnets available in the selected database subnet group. 6. Run the `describe-route-tables` command using the ID of the subnet returned in the previous step to describe the routes of the VPC route table associated with the selected subnet: ``` aws ec2 describe-route-tables --region --filters Name=association.subnet-id,Values= --query 'RouteTables[*].Routes[]' ``` - If the command returns the route table associated with the database instance subnet ID, check the values of the `GatewayId` and `DestinationCidrBlock` attributes returned in the output. If the route table contains any entries with the `GatewayId` value set to `igw-xxxxxxxx` and the `DestinationCidrBlock` value set to `0.0.0.0/0`, the selected RDS database instance was provisioned within a public subnet. - Or, if the command returns empty results, the route table is implicitly associated with the subnet; therefore, the audit process continues with the next step. 7. Run the `describe-db-instances` command again using the RDS database instance identifier that you want to check, along with the appropriate filtering to describe the VPC ID associated with the selected instance: ``` aws rds describe-db-instances --region --db-instance-identifier --query 'DBInstances[*].DBSubnetGroup.VpcId' ``` - The command output should show the VPC ID in the selected database subnet group. 8. Now run the `describe-route-tables` command using the ID of the VPC returned in the previous step to describe the routes of the VPC's main route table that is implicitly associated with the selected subnet: ``` aws ec2 describe-route-tables --region --filters Name=vpc-id,Values= Name=association.main,Values=true --query 'RouteTables[*].Routes[]' ``` - The command output returns the VPC main route table implicitly associated with the database instance subnet ID. Check the values of the `GatewayId` and `DestinationCidrBlock` attributes returned in the output. If the route table contains any entries with the `GatewayId` value set to `igw-xxxxxxxx` and the `DestinationCidrBlock` value set to `0.0.0.0/0`, the selected RDS database instance was provisioned inside a public subnet; therefore, it is not running within a logically isolated environment and does not adhere to AWS security best practices.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/UserGuide/UsingWithRDS.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/VPC_Scenario2.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/UserGuide/USER_VPC.WorkingWithRDSInstanceinaVPC.html:https://aws.amazon.com/rds/faqs/", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.2.4", + "Description": "Ensure Multi-AZ deployments are used for enhanced availability in Amazon RDS", + "Checks": [ + "rds_cluster_multi_az", + "rds_instance_multi_az" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Storage", + "SubSection": "3.2 Relational Database Service (RDS)", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Amazon RDS offers Multi-AZ deployments that provide enhanced availability and durability for your databases, using synchronous replication to replicate data to a standby instance in a different Availability Zone (AZ). In the event of an infrastructure failure, Amazon RDS automatically fails over to the standby to minimize downtime and ensure business continuity.", + "RationaleStatement": "Database availability is crucial for maintaining service uptime, particularly for applications that are critical to the business. Implementing Multi-AZ deployments with Amazon RDS ensures that your databases are protected against unplanned outages due to hardware failures, network issues, or other disruptions. This configuration enhances both the availability and durability of your database, making it a highly recommended practice for production environments.", + "ImpactStatement": "Multi-AZ deployments may increase costs due to the additional resources required to maintain a standby instance; however, the benefits of increased availability and reduced risk of downtime outweigh these costs for critical applications.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Login to the AWS Management Console and open the RDS dashboard at [AWS RDS Console](https://console.aws.amazon.com/rds/). 2. In the left navigation pane, click on `Databases`. 3. Select the database instance that needs Multi-AZ deployment to be enabled. 4. Click the `Modify` button at the top right. 5. Scroll down to the `Availability & Durability` section. 6. Under `Multi-AZ deployment`, select `Yes` to enable. 7. Review the changes and click `Continue`. 8. On the `Review` page, choose `Apply immediately` to make the change without waiting for the next maintenance window, or `Apply during the next scheduled maintenance window`. 9. Click `Modify DB Instance` to apply the changes. **From Command Line:** 1. Run the following command to modify the RDS instance and enable Multi-AZ: ``` aws rds modify-db-instance --region --db-instance-identifier --multi-az --apply-immediately ``` 2. Confirm that the Multi-AZ deployment is enabled by running the following command: ``` aws rds describe-db-instances --region --db-instance-identifier --query 'DBInstances[*].MultiAZ' ``` - The output should return `True`, indicating that Multi-AZ is enabled. 3. Repeat the procedure for other instances as necessary.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Login to the AWS Management Console and open the RDS dashboard at [AWS RDS Console](https://console.aws.amazon.com/rds/). 2. In the navigation pane, under `Databases`, select the RDS instance you want to examine. 3. Click the `Instance Name` to see details, then navigate to the `Configuration` tab. 4. Under the `Availability & Durability` section, check the `Multi-AZ` status. - If Multi-AZ deployment is enabled, it will display `Yes`. - If it is disabled, the status will display `No`. 5. Repeat steps 2-4 to verify the Multi-AZ status of other RDS instances in the same region. 6. Change the region from the top of the navigation bar and repeat the audit for other regions. **From Command Line:** 1. Run the following command to list all RDS instances in the selected AWS region: ``` aws rds describe-db-instances --region --query 'DBInstances[*].DBInstanceIdentifier' ``` 2. Run the following command using the instance identifier returned earlier to check the Multi-AZ status: ``` aws rds describe-db-instances --region --db-instance-identifier --query 'DBInstances[*].MultiAZ' ``` - If the output is `True`, Multi-AZ is enabled. - If the output is `False`, Multi-AZ is not enabled. 3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 to audit each RDS instance, and change regions to verify in other regions.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.3.1", + "Description": "Ensure that encryption is enabled for EFS file systems", + "Checks": [ + "efs_encryption_at_rest_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Storage", + "SubSection": "3.3 Elastic File System (EFS)", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "EFS data should be encrypted at rest using AWS KMS (Key Management Service).", + "RationaleStatement": "Data should be encrypted at rest to reduce the risk of a data breach via direct access to the storage device.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**It is important to note that EFS file system data-at-rest encryption must be turned on when creating the file system. If an EFS file system has been created without data-at-rest encryption enabled, then you must create another EFS file system with the correct configuration and transfer the data.** **Steps to create an EFS file system with data encrypted at rest:** **From Console:** 1. Login to the AWS Management Console and Navigate to the `Elastic File System (EFS)` dashboard. 2. Select `File Systems` from the left navigation panel. 3. Click the `Create File System` button from the dashboard top menu to start the file system setup process. 4. On the `Configure file system access` configuration page, perform the following actions: - Choose an appropriate VPC from the VPC dropdown list. - Within the `Create mount targets` section, check the boxes for all of the Availability Zones (AZs) within the selected VPC. These will be your mount targets. - Click `Next step` to continue. 5. Perform the following on the `Configure optional settings` page: - Create `tags` to describe your new file system. - Choose `performance mode` based on your requirements. - Check the `Enable encryption` box and choose `aws/elasticfilesystem` from the `Select KMS master key` dropdown list to enable encryption for the new file system, using the default master key provided and managed by AWS KMS. - Click `Next step` to continue. 6. Review the file system configuration details on the `review and create` page and then click `Create File System` to create your new AWS EFS file system. 7. Copy the data from the old unencrypted EFS file system onto the newly created encrypted file system. 8. Remove the unencrypted file system as soon as your data migration to the newly created encrypted file system is completed. 9. Change the AWS region from the navigation bar and repeat the entire process for the other AWS regions. **From CLI:** 1. Run the `describe-file-systems` command to view the configuration information for the selected unencrypted file system identified in the Audit steps: ``` aws efs describe-file-systems --region --file-system-id ``` 2. The command output should return the configuration information. 3. To provision a new AWS EFS file system, you need to generate a universally unique identifier (UUID) to create the token required by the `create-file-system` command. To create the required token, you can use a randomly generated UUID from https://www.uuidgenerator.net. 4. Run the `create-file-system` command using the unique token created at the previous step: ``` aws efs create-file-system --region --creation-token --performance-mode generalPurpose --encrypted ``` 5. The command output should return the new file system configuration metadata. 6. Run the `create-mount-target` command using the EFS file system ID returned from step 4 as the identifier and the ID of the Availability Zone (AZ) that will represent the mount target: ``` aws efs create-mount-target --region --file-system-id --subnet-id ``` 7. The command output should return the new mount target metadata. 8. Now you can mount your file system from an EC2 instance. 9. Copy the data from the old unencrypted EFS file system to the newly created encrypted file system. 10. Remove the unencrypted file system as soon as your data migration to the newly created encrypted file system is completed: ``` aws efs delete-file-system --region --file-system-id ``` 11. Change the AWS region by updating the --region and repeat the entire process for the other AWS regions.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Login to the AWS Management Console and Navigate to the Elastic File System (EFS) dashboard. 2. Select `File Systems` from the left navigation panel. 3. Each item on the list has a visible Encrypted field that displays data at rest encryption status. 4. Validate that this field reads `Encrypted` for all EFS file systems in all AWS regions. **From CLI:** 1. Run the `describe-file-systems` command using custom query filters to list the identifiers of all AWS EFS file systems currently available within the selected region: ``` aws efs describe-file-systems --region --output table --query 'FileSystems[*].FileSystemId' ``` 2. The command output should return a table with the requested file system IDs. 3. Run the `describe-file-systems` command using the ID of the file system that you want to examine as `file-system-id` and the necessary query filters: ``` aws efs describe-file-systems --region --file-system-id --query 'FileSystems[*].Encrypted' ``` 4. The command output should return the file system encryption status as `true` or `false`. If the returned value is `false`, the selected AWS EFS file system is not encrypted and if the returned value is `true`, the selected AWS EFS file system is encrypted.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/efs/latest/ug/encryption-at-rest.html:https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/efs/index.html#efs", + "DefaultValue": "EFS file system data is encrypted at rest by default when creating a file system through the Console. However, encryption at rest is not enabled by default when creating a new file system using the AWS CLI, API, or SDKs." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.1", + "Description": "Ensure CloudTrail is enabled in all regions", + "Checks": [ + "cloudtrail_multi_region_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Logging", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "AWS CloudTrail is a web service that records AWS API calls for your account and delivers log files to you. The recorded information includes the identity of the API caller, the time of the API call, the source IP address of the API caller, the request parameters, and the response elements returned by the AWS service. CloudTrail provides a history of AWS API calls for an account, including API calls made via the Management Console, SDKs, command line tools, and higher-level AWS services (such as CloudFormation).", + "RationaleStatement": "The AWS API call history produced by CloudTrail enables security analysis, resource change tracking, and compliance auditing. Additionally, - ensuring that a multi-region trail exists will help detect unexpected activity occurring in otherwise unused regions - ensuring that a multi-region trail exists will ensure that `Global Service Logging` is enabled for a trail by default to capture recordings of events generated on AWS global services - for a multi-region trail, ensuring that management events are configured for all types of Read/Writes ensures the recording of management operations that are performed on all resources in an AWS account", + "ImpactStatement": "S3 lifecycle features can be used to manage the accumulation and management of logs over time. See the following AWS resource for more information on these features: 1. https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/dev/object-lifecycle-mgmt.html", + "RemediationProcedure": "Perform the following to enable global (Multi-region) CloudTrail logging: **From Console:** 1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and open the IAM console at [https://console.aws.amazon.com/cloudtrail](https://console.aws.amazon.com/cloudtrail). 2. Click on `Trails` in the left navigation pane. 3. Click `Get Started Now` if it is presented, then: - Click `Add new trail`. - Enter a trail name in the `Trail name` box. - A trail created in the console is a multi-region trail by default. - Specify an S3 bucket name in the `S3 bucket` box. - Specify the AWS KMS alias under the `Log file SSE-KMS encryption` section, or create a new key. - Click `Next`. 4. Ensure the `Management events` check box is selected. 5. Ensure both `Read` and `Write` are checked under API activity. 6. Click `Next`. 7. Review your trail settings and click `Create trail`. **From Command Line:** Create a multi-region trail: ``` aws cloudtrail create-trail --name --bucket-name --is-multi-region-trail ``` Enable multi-region on an existing trail: ``` aws cloudtrail update-trail --name --is-multi-region-trail ``` **Note:** Creating a CloudTrail trail via the CLI without providing any overriding options configures all `read` and `write` `Management Events` to be logged by default.", + "AuditProcedure": "Perform the following to determine if CloudTrail is enabled for all regions: **From Console:** 1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and open the CloudTrail console at [https://console.aws.amazon.com/cloudtrail](https://console.aws.amazon.com/cloudtrail) 2. Click on `Trails` in the left navigation pane - You will be presented with a list of trails across all regions 3. Ensure that at least one Trail has `Yes` specified in the `Multi-region trail` column 4. Click on a trail via the link in the `Name` column 5. Ensure `Logging` is set to `ON` 6. Ensure `Multi-region trail` is set to `Yes` 7. In the section `Management Events`, ensure that `API activity` set to `ALL` **From Command Line:** 1. List all trails: ``` aws cloudtrail describe-trails ``` 2. Ensure `IsMultiRegionTrail` is set to `true`: ``` aws cloudtrail get-trail-status --name ``` 3. Ensure `IsLogging` is set to `true`: ``` aws cloudtrail get-event-selectors --trail-name ``` 4. Ensure there is at least one `fieldSelector` for a trail that equals `Management`: - This should NOT output any results for Field: readOnly. If either `true` or `false` is returned, one of the checkboxes (`read` or `write`) is not selected. Example of correct output: ``` TrailARN: , AdvancedEventSelectors: [ { Name: Management events selector, FieldSelectors: [ { Field: eventCategory, Equals: [ Management ] ```", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-concepts.html#cloudtrail-concepts-management-events:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/logging-management-and-data-events-with-cloudtrail.html?icmpid=docs_cloudtrail_console#logging-management-events:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-supported-services.html#cloud-trail-supported-services-data-events", + "DefaultValue": "Not Enabled" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.2", + "Description": "Ensure CloudTrail log file validation is enabled", + "Checks": [ + "cloudtrail_log_file_validation_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Logging", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "CloudTrail log file validation creates a digitally signed digest file containing a hash of each log that CloudTrail writes to S3. These digest files can be used to determine whether a log file was changed, deleted, or remained unchanged after CloudTrail delivered the log. It is recommended that file validation be enabled for all CloudTrails.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling log file validation will provide additional integrity checks for CloudTrail logs.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Perform the following to enable log file validation on a given trail: **From Console:** 1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and open the IAM console at [https://console.aws.amazon.com/cloudtrail](https://console.aws.amazon.com/cloudtrail). 2. Click on `Trails` in the left navigation pane. 3. Click on the target trail. 4. Within the `General details` section, click `edit`. 5. Under `Advanced settings`, check the `enable` box under `Log file validation`. 6. Click `Save changes`. **From Command Line:** Enable log file validation on a trail: ``` aws cloudtrail update-trail --name --enable-log-file-validation ``` Note that periodic validation of logs using these digests can be carried out by running the following command: ``` aws cloudtrail validate-logs --trail-arn --start-time --end-time ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Perform the following on each trail to determine if log file validation is enabled: **From Console:** 1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and open the IAM console at [https://console.aws.amazon.com/cloudtrail](https://console.aws.amazon.com/cloudtrail). 2. Click on `Trails` in the left navigation pane. 3. For every trail: - Click on a trail via the link in the `Name` column. - Under the `General details` section, ensure `Log file validation` is set to `Enabled`. **From Command Line:** List all trails: ``` aws cloudtrail describe-trails ``` Ensure `LogFileValidationEnabled` is set to `true` for each trail.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-log-file-validation-enabling.html", + "DefaultValue": "Not Enabled" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.3", + "Description": "Ensure AWS Config is enabled in all regions", + "Checks": [ + "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Logging", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "AWS Config is a web service that performs configuration management of supported AWS resources within your account and delivers log files to you. The recorded information includes the configuration items (AWS resources), relationships between configuration items (AWS resources), and any configuration changes between resources. It is recommended that AWS Config be enabled in all regions.", + "RationaleStatement": "The AWS configuration item history captured by AWS Config enables security analysis, resource change tracking, and compliance auditing.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling AWS Config in all regions provides comprehensive visibility into resource configurations, enhancing security and compliance monitoring. However, this may incur additional costs and require proper configuration management.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To implement AWS Config configuration: **From Console:** 1. Select the region you want to focus on in the top right of the console. 2. Click `Services`. 3. Click `Config`. 4. If a Config Recorder is enabled in this region, navigate to the Settings page from the navigation menu on the left-hand side. If a Config Recorder is not yet enabled in this region, select Get Started. 5. Select Record all resources supported in this region. 6. Choose to include global resources (IAM resources). 7. Specify an S3 bucket in the same account or in another managed AWS account. 8. Create an SNS Topic from the same AWS account or another managed AWS account. **From Command Line:** 1. Ensure there is an appropriate S3 bucket, SNS topic, and IAM role per the [AWS Config Service prerequisites](http://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/developerguide/gs-cli-prereq.html). 2. Run this command to create a new configuration recorder: ``` aws configservice put-configuration-recorder --configuration-recorder name=,roleARN=arn:aws:iam:::role/ --recording-group allSupported=true,includeGlobalResourceTypes=true ``` 3. Create a delivery channel configuration file locally which specifies the channel attributes, populated from the prerequisites set up previously: ``` { name: , s3BucketName: , snsTopicARN: arn:aws:sns:::, configSnapshotDeliveryProperties: { deliveryFrequency: Twelve_Hours } } ``` 4. Run this command to create a new delivery channel, referencing the json configuration file made in the previous step: ``` aws configservice put-delivery-channel --delivery-channel file://.json ``` 5. Start the configuration recorder by running the following command: ``` aws configservice start-configuration-recorder --configuration-recorder-name ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Process to evaluate AWS Config configuration per region: **From Console:** 1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and open the AWS Config console at [https://console.aws.amazon.com/config/](https://console.aws.amazon.com/config/). 1. On the top right of the console select the target region. 1. If a Config Recorder is enabled in this region, you should navigate to the Settings page from the navigation menu on the left-hand side. If a Config Recorder is not yet enabled in this region, proceed to the remediation steps. 1. Ensure Record all resources supported in this region is checked. 1. Ensure Include global resources (e.g., AWS IAM resources) is checked, unless it is enabled in another region (this is only required in one region). 1. Ensure the correct S3 bucket has been defined. 1. Ensure the correct SNS topic has been defined. 1. Repeat steps 2 to 7 for each region. **From Command Line:** 1. Run this command to show all AWS Config Recorders and their properties: ``` aws configservice describe-configuration-recorders ``` 2. Evaluate the output to ensure that all recorders have a `recordingGroup` object which includes `allSupported: true`. Additionally, ensure that at least one recorder has `includeGlobalResourceTypes: true`. **Note:** There is one more parameter, ResourceTypes, in the recordingGroup object. We don't need to check it, as whenever we set allSupported to true, AWS enforces the resource types to be empty (ResourceTypes: []). Sample output: ``` { ConfigurationRecorders: [ { recordingGroup: { allSupported: true, resourceTypes: [], includeGlobalResourceTypes: true }, roleARN: arn:aws:iam:::role/service-role/, name: default } ] } ``` 3. Run this command to show the status for all AWS Config Recorders: ``` aws configservice describe-configuration-recorder-status ``` 4. In the output, find recorders with `name` key matching the recorders that were evaluated in step 2. Ensure that they include `recording: true` and `lastStatus: SUCCESS`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/configservice/describe-configuration-recorder-status.html:https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/configservice/describe-configuration-recorders.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/developerguide/gs-cli-prereq.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.4", + "Description": "Ensure that server access logging is enabled on the CloudTrail S3 bucket", + "Checks": [ + "cloudtrail_logs_s3_bucket_access_logging_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Logging", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Server access logging generates a log that contains access records for each request made to your S3 bucket. An access log record contains details about the request, such as the request type, the resources specified in the request worked, and the time and date the request was processed. It is recommended that server access logging be enabled on the CloudTrail S3 bucket.", + "RationaleStatement": "By enabling server access logging on target S3 buckets, it is possible to capture all events that may affect objects within any target bucket. Configuring the logs to be placed in a separate bucket allows access to log information that can be useful in security and incident response workflows.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Perform the following to enable server access logging: **From Console:** 1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and open the S3 console at [https://console.aws.amazon.com/s3](https://console.aws.amazon.com/s3). 2. Under `All Buckets` click on the target S3 bucket. 3. Click on `Properties` in the top right of the console. 4. Under `Bucket: `, click `Logging`. 5. Configure bucket logging: - Check the `Enabled` box. - Select a Target Bucket from the list. - Enter a Target Prefix. 6. Click `Save`. **From Command Line:** 1. Get the name of the S3 bucket that CloudTrail is logging to: ``` aws cloudtrail describe-trails --region --query trailList[*].S3BucketName ``` 2. Copy and add the target bucket name at ``, the prefix for the log file at ``, and optionally add an email address in the following template, then save it as `.json`: ``` { LoggingEnabled: { TargetBucket: , TargetPrefix: , TargetGrants: [ { Grantee: { Type: AmazonCustomerByEmail, EmailAddress: }, Permission: FULL_CONTROL } ] } } ``` 3. Run the `put-bucket-logging` command with bucket name and `.json` as input; for more information, refer to [put-bucket-logging](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/s3api/put-bucket-logging.html): ``` aws s3api put-bucket-logging --bucket --bucket-logging-status file://.json ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Perform the following ensure that the CloudTrail S3 bucket has access logging is enabled: **From Console:** 1. Go to the Amazon CloudTrail console at [https://console.aws.amazon.com/cloudtrail/home](https://console.aws.amazon.com/cloudtrail/home). 2. In the API activity history pane on the left, click `Trails`. 3. In the Trails pane, note the bucket names in the S3 bucket column. 4. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and open the S3 console at [https://console.aws.amazon.com/s3](https://console.aws.amazon.com/s3). 5. Under `All Buckets` click on a target S3 bucket. 6. Click on `Properties` in the top right of the console. 7. Under `Bucket: `, click `Logging`. 8. Ensure `Enabled` is checked. **From Command Line:** 1. Get the name of the S3 bucket that CloudTrail is logging to: ``` aws cloudtrail describe-trails --query 'trailList[*].S3BucketName' ``` 2. Ensure logging is enabled on the bucket: ``` aws s3api get-bucket-logging --bucket ``` Ensure the command does not return an empty output. Sample output for a bucket with logging enabled: ``` { LoggingEnabled: { TargetPrefix: , TargetBucket: } } ```", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/dev/ServerLogs.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/enable-server-access-logging.html", + "DefaultValue": "Logging is disabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.5", + "Description": "Ensure CloudTrail logs are encrypted at rest using KMS CMKs", + "Checks": [ + "cloudtrail_kms_encryption_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Logging", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "AWS CloudTrail is a web service that records AWS API calls for an account and makes those logs available to users and resources in accordance with IAM policies. AWS Key Management Service (KMS) is a managed service that helps create and control the encryption keys used to encrypt account data, and uses Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) to protect the security of encryption keys. CloudTrail logs can be configured to leverage server side encryption (SSE) and KMS customer-created master keys (CMK) to further protect CloudTrail logs. It is recommended that CloudTrail be configured to use SSE-KMS.", + "RationaleStatement": "Configuring CloudTrail to use SSE-KMS provides additional confidentiality controls on log data, as a given user must have S3 read permission on the corresponding log bucket and must be granted decrypt permission by the CMK policy.", + "ImpactStatement": "Customer-created keys incur an additional cost. See https://aws.amazon.com/kms/pricing/ for more information.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Perform the following to configure CloudTrail to use SSE-KMS: **From Console:** 1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and open the CloudTrail console at [https://console.aws.amazon.com/cloudtrail](https://console.aws.amazon.com/cloudtrail). 2. In the left navigation pane, choose `Trails`. 3. Click on a trail. 4. Under the `S3` section, click the edit button (pencil icon). 5. Click `Advanced`. 6. Select an existing CMK from the `KMS key Id` drop-down menu. - **Note:** Ensure the CMK is located in the same region as the S3 bucket. - **Note:** You will need to apply a KMS key policy on the selected CMK in order for CloudTrail, as a service, to encrypt and decrypt log files using the CMK provided. View the AWS documentation for [editing the selected CMK Key policy](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/create-kms-key-policy-for-cloudtrail.html). 7. Click `Save`. 8. You will see a notification message stating that you need to have decryption permissions on the specified KMS key to decrypt log files. 9. Click `Yes`. **From Command Line:** Run the following command to specify a KMS key ID to use with a trail: ``` aws cloudtrail update-trail --name --kms-key-id ``` Run the following command to attach a key policy to a specified KMS key: ``` aws kms put-key-policy --key-id --policy ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Perform the following to determine if CloudTrail is configured to use SSE-KMS: **From Console:** 1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and open the CloudTrail console at [https://console.aws.amazon.com/cloudtrail](https://console.aws.amazon.com/cloudtrail). 2. In the left navigation pane, choose `Trails`. 3. Select a trail. 4. In the `General details` section, select `Edit` to edit the trail configuration. 5. Ensure the box at `Log file SSE-KMS encryption` is checked and that a valid `AWS KMS alias` of a KMS key is entered in the respective text box. **From Command Line:** 1. Run the following command: ``` aws cloudtrail describe-trails ``` 2. For each trail listed, SSE-KMS is enabled if the trail has a `KmsKeyId` property defined.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Three statements that need to be added to the CMK policy: 1. Enable CloudTrail to describe CMK properties: ``` { \"Sid\": \"Allow CloudTrail access\", \"Effect\": \"Allow\", \"Principal\": { \"Service\": \"cloudtrail.amazonaws.com\" }, \"Action\": \"kms:DescribeKey\", \"Resource\": \"*\" } ``` 2. Granting encrypt permissions: ``` { \"Sid\": \"Allow CloudTrail to encrypt logs\", \"Effect\": \"Allow\", \"Principal\": { \"Service\": \"cloudtrail.amazonaws.com\" }, \"Action\": \"kms:GenerateDataKey*\", \"Resource\": \"*\", \"Condition\": { \"StringLike\": { \"kms:EncryptionContext:aws:cloudtrail:arn\": [ \"arn:aws:cloudtrail:*:aws-account-id:trail/*\" ] } } } ``` 3. Granting decrypt permissions: ``` { \"Sid\": \"Enable CloudTrail log decrypt permissions\", \"Effect\": \"Allow\", \"Principal\": { \"AWS\": \"arn:aws:iam::aws-account-id:user/username\" }, \"Action\": \"kms:Decrypt\", \"Resource\": \"*\", \"Condition\": { \"Null\": { \"kms:EncryptionContext:aws:cloudtrail:arn\": \"false\" } } } ```", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/encrypting-cloudtrail-log-files-with-aws-kms.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/create-keys.html:CCE-78919-8:https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/cloudtrail/update-trail.html:https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/kms/put-key-policy.html", + "DefaultValue": "By default, CloudTrail logs are not encrypted with a KMS CMK. Logs may be encrypted with SSE-S3, but this does not provide the same level of control or auditing as KMS CMKs." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.6", + "Description": "Ensure rotation for customer-created symmetric CMKs is enabled", + "Checks": [ + "kms_cmk_rotation_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Logging", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "AWS Key Management Service (KMS) allows customers to rotate the backing key, which is key material stored within the KMS that is tied to the key ID of the customer-created customer master key (CMK). The backing key is used to perform cryptographic operations such as encryption and decryption. Automated key rotation currently retains all prior backing keys so that decryption of encrypted data can occur transparently. It is recommended that CMK key rotation be enabled for symmetric keys. Key rotation cannot be enabled for any asymmetric CMK.", + "RationaleStatement": "Rotating encryption keys helps reduce the potential impact of a compromised key, as data encrypted with a new key cannot be accessed with a previous key that may have been exposed. Keys should be rotated every year or upon an event that could result in the compromise of that key.", + "ImpactStatement": "Creation, management, and storage of CMKs may require additional time from an administrator.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and open the KMS console at: [https://console.aws.amazon.com/kms](https://console.aws.amazon.com/kms). 2. In the left navigation pane, click `Customer-managed keys`. 3. Select a key with `Key spec = SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT` that does not have automatic rotation enabled. 4. Select the `Key rotation` tab. 5. Check the `Automatically rotate this KMS key every year` box. 6. Click `Save`. 7. Repeat steps 3–6 for all customer-managed CMKs that do not have automatic rotation enabled. **From Command Line:** 1. Run the following command to enable key rotation: ``` aws kms enable-key-rotation --key-id ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and open the KMS console at: [https://console.aws.amazon.com/kms](https://console.aws.amazon.com/kms). 2. In the left navigation pane, click `Customer-managed keys`. 3. Select a customer-managed CMK where `Key spec = SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT`. 4. Select the `Key rotation` tab. 5. Ensure the `Automatically rotate this KMS key every year` box is checked. 6. Repeat steps 3–5 for all customer-managed CMKs where `Key spec = SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT`. **From Command Line:** 1. Run the following command to get a list of all keys and their associated `KeyIds`: ``` aws kms list-keys ``` 2. For each key, note the KeyId and run the following command: ``` describe-key --key-id ``` 3. If the response contains `KeySpec = SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT`, run the following command: ``` aws kms get-key-rotation-status --key-id ``` 4. Ensure `KeyRotationEnabled` is set to `true`. 5. Repeat steps 2–4 for all remaining CMKs.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://aws.amazon.com/kms/pricing/:https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-57-part-1/rev-5/final", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.7", + "Description": "Ensure VPC flow logging is enabled in all VPCs", + "Checks": [ + "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Logging", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "VPC Flow Logs is a feature that enables you to capture information about the IP traffic going to and from network interfaces in your VPC. After you've created a flow log, you can view and retrieve its data in Amazon CloudWatch Logs. It is recommended that VPC Flow Logs be enabled for packet Rejects for VPCs.", + "RationaleStatement": "VPC Flow Logs provide visibility into network traffic that traverses the VPC and can be used to detect anomalous traffic or gain insights during security workflows.", + "ImpactStatement": "By default, CloudWatch Logs will store logs indefinitely unless a specific retention period is defined for the log group. When choosing the number of days to retain, keep in mind that the average time it takes for an organization to realize they have been breached is 210 days (at the time of this writing). Since additional time is required to research a breach, a minimum retention policy of 365 days allows for detection and investigation. You may also wish to archive the logs to a cheaper storage service rather than simply deleting them. See the following AWS resource to manage CloudWatch Logs retention periods: 1. https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudWatch/latest/DeveloperGuide/SettingLogRetention.html", + "RemediationProcedure": "Perform the following to enable VPC Flow Logs: **From Console:** 1. Sign into the management console. 2. Select `Services`, then select `VPC`. 3. In the left navigation pane, select `Your VPCs`. 4. Select a VPC. 5. In the right pane, select the `Flow Logs` tab. 6. If no Flow Log exists, click `Create Flow Log`. 7. For Filter, select `Reject`. 8. Enter a `Role` and `Destination Log Group`. 9. Click `Create Log Flow`. 10. Click on `CloudWatch Logs Group`. **Note:** Setting the filter to Reject will dramatically reduce the accumulation of logging data for this recommendation and provide sufficient information for the purposes of breach detection, research, and remediation. However, during periods of least privilege security group engineering, setting the filter to All can be very helpful in discovering existing traffic flows required for the proper operation of an already running environment. **From Command Line:** 1. Create a policy document, name it `role_policy_document.json`, and paste the following content: ``` { Version: 2012-10-17, Statement: [ { Sid: test, Effect: Allow, Principal: { Service: ec2.amazonaws.com }, Action: sts:AssumeRole } ] } ``` 2. Create another policy document, name it `iam_policy.json`, and paste the following content: ``` { Version: 2012-10-17, Statement: [ { Effect: Allow, Action:[ logs:CreateLogGroup, logs:CreateLogStream, logs:DescribeLogGroups, logs:DescribeLogStreams, logs:PutLogEvents, logs:GetLogEvents, logs:FilterLogEvents ], Resource: * } ] } ``` 3. Run the following command to create an IAM role: ``` aws iam create-role --role-name --assume-role-policy-document file://role_policy_document.json ``` 4. Run the following command to create an IAM policy: ``` aws iam create-policy --policy-name --policy-document file://iam-policy.json ``` 5. Run the `attach-group-policy` command, using the IAM policy ARN returned from the previous step to attach the policy to the IAM role: ``` aws iam attach-group-policy --policy-arn arn:aws:iam:::policy/ --group-name ``` - If the command succeeds, no output is returned. 6. Run the `describe-vpcs` command to get a list of VPCs in the selected region: ``` aws ec2 describe-vpcs --region ``` - The command output should return a list of VPCs in the selected region. 7. Run the `create-flow-logs` command to create a flow log for a VPC: ``` aws ec2 create-flow-logs --resource-type VPC --resource-ids --traffic-type REJECT --log-group-name --deliver-logs-permission-arn ``` 8. Repeat step 7 for other VPCs in the selected region. 9. Change the region by updating --region, and repeat the remediation procedure for each region.", + "AuditProcedure": "Perform the following to determine if VPC Flow logs are enabled: **From Console:** 1. Sign into the management console. 2. Select `Services`, then select `VPC`. 3. In the left navigation pane, select `Your VPCs`. 4. Select a VPC. 5. In the right pane, select the `Flow Logs` tab. 6. Ensure a Log Flow exists that has `Active` in the `Status` column. **From Command Line:** 1. Run the `describe-vpcs` command (OSX/Linux/UNIX) to list the VPC networks available in the current AWS region: ``` aws ec2 describe-vpcs --region --query Vpcs[].VpcId ``` 2. The command output returns the `VpcId` of VPCs available in the selected region. 3. Run the `describe-flow-logs` command (OSX/Linux/UNIX) using the VPC ID to determine if the selected virtual network has the Flow Logs feature enabled: ``` aws ec2 describe-flow-logs --filter Name=resource-id,Values= ``` - If there are no Flow Logs created for the selected VPC, the command output will return an empty list `[]`. 4. Repeat step 3 for other VPCs in the same region. 5. Change the region by updating `--region`, and repeat steps 1-4 for each region.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/flow-logs.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.8", + "Description": "Ensure that object-level logging for write events is enabled for S3 buckets", + "Checks": [ + "cloudtrail_s3_dataevents_write_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Logging", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "S3 object-level API operations, such as GetObject, DeleteObject, and PutObject, are referred to as data events. By default, CloudTrail trails do not log data events, so it is recommended to enable object-level logging for S3 buckets.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling object-level logging will help you meet data compliance requirements within your organization, perform comprehensive security analyses, monitor specific patterns of user behavior in your AWS account, or take immediate actions on any object-level API activity within your S3 buckets using Amazon CloudWatch Events.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling logging for these object-level events may significantly increase the number of events logged and may incur additional costs.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Login to the AWS Management Console and navigate to the S3 dashboard at `https://console.aws.amazon.com/s3/`. 2. In the left navigation panel, click `buckets`, and then click the name of the S3 bucket you want to examine. 3. Click the `Properties` tab to see the bucket configuration in detail. 4. In the `AWS CloudTrail data events` section, select the trail name for recording activity. You can choose an existing trail or create a new one by clicking the `Configure in CloudTrail` button or navigating to the [CloudTrail console](https://console.aws.amazon.com/cloudtrail/). 5. Once the trail is selected, select the `Data Events` check box. 6. Select `S3` from the `Data event type` drop-down. 7. Select `Log all events` from the `Log selector template` drop-down. 8. Repeat steps 2-7 to enable object-level logging of write events for other S3 buckets. **From Command Line:** 1. To enable `object-level` data events logging for S3 buckets within your AWS account, run the `put-event-selectors` command using the name of the trail that you want to reconfigure as identifier: ``` aws cloudtrail put-event-selectors --region --trail-name --event-selectors '[{ ReadWriteType: WriteOnly, IncludeManagementEvents:true, DataResources: [{ Type: AWS::S3::Object, Values: [arn:aws:s3:::/] }] }]' ``` 2. The command output will be `object-level` event trail configuration. 3. If you want to enable it for all buckets at once, change the Values parameter to `[arn:aws:s3]` in the previous command. 4. Repeat step 1 for each s3 bucket to update `object-level` logging of write events. 5. Change the AWS region by updating the `--region` command parameter, and perform the process for the other regions.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Login to the AWS Management Console and navigate to the CloudTrail dashboard at `https://console.aws.amazon.com/cloudtrail/`. 2. In the left panel, click `Trails`, and then click the name of the trail that you want to examine. 3. Review `General details`. 4. Confirm that `Multi-region trail` is set to `Yes`. 5. Scroll down to `Data events` and confirm the configuration: - If `advanced event selectors` is being used, it should read: ``` Data Events: S3 Log selector template Log all events ``` - If `basic event selectors` is being used, it should read: ``` Data events: S3 Bucket Name: All current and future S3 buckets Write: Enabled ``` 6. Repeat steps 2-5 to verify that each trail has multi-region enabled and is configured to log data events. If a trail does not have multi-region enabled and data event logging configured, refer to the remediation steps. **From Command Line:** 1. Run the `list-trails` command to list all trails: ``` aws cloudtrail list-trails ``` 2. The command output will be a list of trails: ``` TrailARN: arn:aws:cloudtrail:::trail/, Name: , HomeRegion: ``` 3. Run the `get-trail` command to determine whether a trail is a multi-region trail: ``` aws cloudtrail get-trail --name --region ``` 4. The command output should include: `IsMultiRegionTrail: true`. 5. Run the `get-event-selectors` command, using the `Name` of the trail and the `region` returned in step 2, to determine if data event logging is configured: ``` aws cloudtrail get-event-selectors --region --trail-name --query EventSelectors[*].DataResources[] ``` 6. The command output should be an array that includes the S3 bucket defined for data event logging: ``` Type: AWS::S3::Object, Values: [ arn:aws:s3 ``` 7. If the `get-event-selectors` command returns an empty array, data events are not included in the trail's logging configuration; therefore, object-level API operations performed on S3 buckets within your AWS account are not being recorded. 8. Repeat steps 1-7 to verify that each trail has multi-region enabled and is configured to log data events. If a trail does not have multi-region enabled and data event logging configured, refer to the remediation steps.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/user-guide/enable-cloudtrail-events.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.9", + "Description": "Ensure that object-level logging for read events is enabled for S3 buckets", + "Checks": [ + "cloudtrail_s3_dataevents_read_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Logging", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "S3 object-level API operations, such as GetObject, DeleteObject, and PutObject, are referred to as data events. By default, CloudTrail trails do not log data events, so it is recommended to enable object-level logging for S3 buckets.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling object-level logging will help you meet data compliance requirements within your organization, perform comprehensive security analyses, monitor specific patterns of user behavior in your AWS account, or take immediate actions on any object-level API activity within your S3 buckets using Amazon CloudWatch Events.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling logging for these object-level events may significantly increase the number of events logged and may incur additional costs.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Login to the AWS Management Console and navigate to S3 dashboard at `https://console.aws.amazon.com/s3/`. 2. In the left navigation panel, click `buckets` and then click the name of the S3 bucket that you want to examine. 3. Click the `Properties` tab to see the bucket configuration in detail. 4. In the `AWS Cloud Trail data events` section, select the trail name for recording activity. You can choose an existing trail or create a new one by clicking the `Configure in CloudTrail` button or navigating to the [CloudTrail console](https://console.aws.amazon.com/cloudtrail/). 5. Once the trail is selected, select the `Data Events` check box. 6. Select `S3` from the `Data event type` drop-down. 7. Select `Log all events` from the `Log selector template` drop-down. 8. Repeat steps 2-7 to enable object-level logging of read events for other S3 buckets. **From Command Line:** 1. To enable `object-level` data events logging for S3 buckets within your AWS account, run the `put-event-selectors` command using the name of the trail that you want to reconfigure as identifier: ``` aws cloudtrail put-event-selectors --region --trail-name --event-selectors '[{ ReadWriteType: ReadOnly, IncludeManagementEvents:true, DataResources: [{ Type: AWS::S3::Object, Values: [arn:aws:s3:::/] }] }]' ``` 2. The command output will be `object-level` event trail configuration. 3. If you want to enable it for all buckets at once, change the Values parameter to `[arn:aws:s3]` in the previous command. 4. Repeat step 1 for each s3 bucket to update `object-level` logging of read events. 5. Change the AWS region by updating the `--region` command parameter, and perform the process for the other regions.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Login to the AWS Management Console and navigate to the CloudTrail dashboard at `https://console.aws.amazon.com/cloudtrail/`. 2. In the left panel, click `Trails`, and then click the name of the trail that you want to examine. 3. Review `General details`. 4. Confirm that `Multi-region trail` is set to `Yes` 5. Scroll down to `Data events` 5. Scroll down to `Data events` and confirm the configuration: - If `advanced event selectors` is being used, it should read: ``` Data Events: S3 Log selector template Log all events ``` - If `basic event selectors` is being used, it should read: ``` Data events: S3 Bucket Name: All current and future S3 buckets Read: Enabled ``` 6. Repeat steps 2-5 to verify that each trail has multi-region enabled and is configured to log data events. If a trail does not have multi-region enabled and data event logging configured, refer to the remediation steps. **From Command Line:** 1. Run the `describe-trails` command to list all trail names: ``` aws cloudtrail describe-trails --region --output table --query trailList[*].Name ``` 2. The command output will be table of the trail names. 3. Run the `get-event-selectors` command using the name of a trail returned at the previous step and custom query filters to determine if data event logging is configured: ``` aws cloudtrail get-event-selectors --region --trail-name --query EventSelectors[*].DataResources[] ``` 4. The command output should be an array that includes the S3 bucket defined for data event logging. 5. If the `get-event-selectors` command returns an empty array, data events are not included in the trail's logging configuration; therefore, object-level API operations performed on S3 buckets within your AWS account are not being recorded. 6. Repeat steps 1-5 to verify the configuration of each trail. 7. Change the AWS region by updating the `--region` command parameter, and perform the audit process for other regions.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/user-guide/enable-cloudtrail-events.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.10", + "Description": "Ensure all AWS-managed web front-end services have access logging enabled", + "Checks": [ + "cloudfront_distributions_logging_enabled", + "elbv2_logging_enabled", + "apigateway_restapi_logging_enabled", + "apigatewayv2_api_access_logging_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Logging", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that access logging is enabled for all AWS-managed web front-end services that terminate or front HTTP(S) traffic, including Amazon CloudFront distributions, Application Load Balancers (ALB), Network Load Balancers (NLB), and Amazon API Gateway REST/HTTP API stages with public endpoints. Access logs must be enabled with delivery to a designated S3 bucket or CloudWatch Logs destination that is protected with appropriate access controls. This control requires logging of request details such as client IP address, timestamp, HTTP method, requested URI, response status code, bytes transferred, and user agent for every request processed by these services. CloudTrail provides management event logging for these resources, but access logs are required to capture the actual HTTP request/response activity at the network edge layers.", + "RationaleStatement": "AWS-managed web front-end services (CloudFront, ALB/NLB, API Gateway) represent the primary HTTP(S) ingress points into AWS accounts and are the first line of defense against web attacks, reconnaissance, and abuse attempts. CloudTrail logs management actions (create/update/delete) and data events but does not capture the content of HTTP requests/responses or client activity, leaving a critical visibility gap for security monitoring and incident response. Access logs from these services enable reconstruction of all web traffic, detection of anomalous patterns, forensic analysis of incidents, and compliance proof that internet-facing entry points were monitored. Without these logs, security teams cannot distinguish legitimate traffic from attacks or prove access patterns during audits.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling access logging incurs additional storage costs for log delivery and retention, as well as minor configuration overhead for creating dedicated logging buckets, IAM roles, and retention policies. Costs can be managed through lifecycle policies, log sampling, and tiered storage classes.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Following instructions enable standard access logging for CloudFront distributions using the AWS Management Console. 1. Open the CloudFront console from the AWS Management Console. 2. Click Distributions in the left navigation and click on the Distribution ID needing remediation. 3. Go to the \"Logging\" tab and click on \"Create access log delivery\" - Select \"Deliver to\" for your preferred location: S3 or CloudWatch log group - Select the ARN of your log destination resource - Click on Submit 4. Confirm if you see the access log destination in the logging tab", + "AuditProcedure": "As an example with CloudFront, verify following the below steps if access logging is enabled: 1. Open the CloudFront console from the AWS Management Console. 2. Click Distributions in the left navigation. 3. For each Distribution ID (e.g., E123ABC...), click the Distribution ID and go to the \"Logging\" tab 4. Check if one or more \"Access log destinations\" are present with a destination type of S3 or CloudWatch log group.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1", + "Description": "Ensure unauthorized API calls are monitored", + "Checks": [ + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_unauthorized_api_calls" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Real-time monitoring of API calls can be achieved by directing CloudTrail Logs to CloudWatch Logs or an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment, and establishing corresponding metric filters and alarms. It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established for unauthorized API calls.", + "RationaleStatement": "CloudWatch is an AWS native service that allows you to observe and monitor resources and applications. CloudTrail logs can also be sent to an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment for monitoring and alerting. Monitoring unauthorized API calls will help reduce the time it takes to detect malicious activity and can alert you to potential security incidents.", + "ImpactStatement": "This alert may be triggered by normal read-only console activities that attempt to opportunistically gather optional information but gracefully fail if they lack the necessary permissions. If an excessive number of alerts are generated, then an organization may wish to consider adding read access to the limited IAM user permissions solely to reduce the number of alerts. In some cases, doing this may allow users to actually view some areas of the system; any additional access granted should be reviewed for alignment with the original limited IAM user intent.", + "RemediationProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following steps to set up the metric filter, alarm, SNS topic, and subscription: 1. Create a metric filter based on the provided filter pattern that checks for unauthorized API calls and uses the `` taken from audit step 1: ``` aws logs put-metric-filter --log-group-name --filter-name --metric-transformations metricName=unauthorized_api_calls_metric,metricNamespace=CISBenchmark,metricValue=1 --filter-pattern { ($.errorCode =*UnauthorizedOperation) || ($.errorCode =AccessDenied*) && ($.sourceIPAddress!=delivery.logs.amazonaws.com) && ($.eventName!=HeadBucket) } ``` **Note**: You can choose your own `metricName` and `metricNamespace` strings. Using the same `metricNamespace` for all Foundations Benchmark metrics will group them together. 2. Create an SNS topic that the alarm will notify: ``` aws sns create-topic --name ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same topic for all monitoring alarms. **Note**: Capture the `TopicArn` that is displayed when creating the SNS topic in step 2. 3. Create an SNS subscription for the topic created in step 2: ``` aws sns subscribe --topic-arn --protocol --notification-endpoint ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same subscription for all monitoring alarms. 4. Create an alarm that is associated with the CloudWatch Logs metric filter created in step 1 and the SNS topic created in step 2: ``` aws cloudwatch put-metric-alarm --alarm-name unauthorized_api_calls_alarm --metric-name unauthorized_api_calls_metric --statistic Sum --period 300 --threshold 1 --comparison-operator GreaterThanOrEqualToThreshold --evaluation-periods 1 --namespace CISBenchmark --alarm-actions ```", + "AuditProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following to ensure that there is at least one active multi-region CloudTrail trail with the prescribed metric filters and alarms configured: 1. Identify the log group name that is configured for use with the active multi-region CloudTrail trail: - List all CloudTrail trails: `aws cloudtrail describe-trails` - Identify multi-region CloudTrail trails: `Trails with IsMultiRegionTrail set to true` - Note the value associated with Name:`` - Note the `` within the value associated with CloudWatchLogsLogGroupArn - Example: `arn:aws:logs:::log-group::*` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail is active: - `aws cloudtrail get-trail-status --name ` - Ensure `IsLogging` is set to `TRUE` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail captures all management events: - `aws cloudtrail get-event-selectors --trail-name ` - Ensure there is at least one `event selector` for a trail with `IncludeManagementEvents` set to `true` and `ReadWriteType` set to `All` 2. Get a list of all associated metric filters for the `` captured in step 1: ``` aws logs describe-metric-filters --log-group-name ``` 3. Ensure the output from the above command contains the following: ``` filterPattern: { ($.errorCode =*UnauthorizedOperation) || ($.errorCode =AccessDenied*) && ($.sourceIPAddress!=delivery.logs.amazonaws.com) && ($.eventName!=HeadBucket) }, ``` 4. Note the `` value associated with the `filterPattern` from step 3. 5. Get a list of CloudWatch alarms, and filter on the `` captured in step 4: ``` aws cloudwatch describe-alarms --query MetricAlarms[?MetricName == ] ``` 6. Note the `AlarmActions` value; this will provide the SNS topic ARN value. 7. Ensure there is at least one active subscriber to the SNS topic: ``` aws sns list-subscriptions-by-topic --topic-arn ``` - At least one subscription should have SubscriptionArn with a valid AWS ARN. - Example of valid SubscriptionArn: `arn:aws:sns::::`", + "AdditionalInformation": "Configuring a log metric filter and alarm on a multi-region (global) CloudTrail trail: - ensures that activities from all regions (both used and unused) are monitored - ensures that activities on all supported global services are monitored - ensures that all management events across all regions are monitored", + "References": "https://aws.amazon.com/sns/:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/receive-cloudtrail-log-files-from-multiple-regions.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudwatch-alarms-for-cloudtrail.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/dg/SubscribeTopic.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2", + "Description": "Ensure management console sign-in without MFA is monitored", + "Checks": [ + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_sign_in_without_mfa" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Real-time monitoring of API calls can be achieved by directing CloudTrail Logs to CloudWatch Logs or an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment, and establishing corresponding metric filters and alarms. It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established for console logins that are not protected by multi-factor authentication (MFA).", + "RationaleStatement": "CloudWatch is an AWS native service that allows you to observe and monitor resources and applications. CloudTrail logs can also be sent to an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment for monitoring and alerting. Monitoring for single-factor console logins will increase visibility into accounts that are not protected by MFA. These type of accounts are more susceptible to compromise and unauthorized access.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following steps to set up the metric filter, alarm, SNS topic, and subscription: 1. Create a metric filter based on the provided filter pattern that checks for AWS Management Console sign-ins without MFA and uses the `` taken from audit step 1. ``` aws logs put-metric-filter --log-group-name --filter-name `` --metric-transformations metricName= ``,metricNamespace='CISBenchmark',metricValue=1 --filter-pattern '{ ($.eventName = ConsoleLogin) && ($.additionalEventData.MFAUsed != Yes) }' ``` Or, to reduce false positives in case Single Sign-On (SSO) is used in the organization: ``` aws logs put-metric-filter --log-group-name --filter-name `` --metric-transformations metricName= ``,metricNamespace='CISBenchmark',metricValue=1 --filter-pattern '{ ($.eventName = ConsoleLogin) && ($.additionalEventData.MFAUsed != Yes) && ($.userIdentity.type = IAMUser) && ($.responseElements.ConsoleLogin = Success) }' ``` **Note**: You can choose your own `metricName` and `metricNamespace` strings. Using the same `metricNamespace` for all Foundations Benchmark metrics will group them together. 2. Create an SNS topic that the alarm will notify: ``` aws sns create-topic --name ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same topic for all monitoring alarms. **Note**: Capture the `TopicArn` that is displayed when creating the SNS topic in step 2. 3. Create an SNS subscription for the topic created in step 2: ``` aws sns subscribe --topic-arn --protocol --notification-endpoint ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same subscription for all monitoring alarms. 4. Create an alarm that is associated with the CloudWatch Logs metric filter created in step 1 and the SNS topic created in step 2: ``` aws cloudwatch put-metric-alarm --alarm-name `` --metric-name `` --statistic Sum --period 300 --threshold 1 --comparison-operator GreaterThanOrEqualToThreshold --evaluation-periods 1 --namespace 'CISBenchmark' --alarm-actions ```", + "AuditProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following to ensure that there is at least one active multi-region CloudTrail trail with the prescribed metric filters and alarms configured: 1. Identify the log group name that is configured for use with the active multi-region CloudTrail trail: - List all CloudTrail trails: ``` aws cloudtrail describe-trails ``` - Identify multi-region CloudTrail trails: `Trails with IsMultiRegionTrail set to true` - Note the value associated with Name:`` - Note the `` within the value associated with CloudWatchLogsLogGroupArn - Example: `arn:aws:logs:::log-group::*` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail is active: ``` aws cloudtrail get-trail-status --name ``` - ensure `IsLogging` is set to `TRUE` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail captures all management events: ``` aws cloudtrail get-event-selectors --trail-name ``` - Ensure there is at least one `event selector` for a trail with `IncludeManagementEvents` set to `true` and `ReadWriteType` set to `All` 2. Get a list of all associated metric filters for the `` captured in step 1: ``` aws logs describe-metric-filters --log-group-name ``` 3. Ensure the output from the above command contains the following: ``` filterPattern: { ($.eventName = ConsoleLogin) && ($.additionalEventData.MFAUsed != Yes) } ``` Or, to reduce false positives in case Single Sign-On (SSO) is used in the organization: ``` filterPattern: { ($.eventName = ConsoleLogin) && ($.additionalEventData.MFAUsed != Yes) && ($.userIdentity.type = IAMUser) && ($.responseElements.ConsoleLogin = Success) } ``` 4. Note the `` value associated with the `filterPattern` from step 3. 5. Get a list of CloudWatch alarms, and filter on the `` captured in step 4. ``` aws cloudwatch describe-alarms --query 'MetricAlarms[?MetricName== ]' ``` 6. Note the `AlarmActions` value; this will provide the SNS topic ARN value. 7. Ensure there is at least one active subscriber to the SNS topic: ``` aws sns list-subscriptions-by-topic --topic-arn ``` - At least one subscription should have SubscriptionArn with a valid AWS ARN. - Example of valid SubscriptionArn: `arn:aws:sns::::`", + "AdditionalInformation": "Configuring a log metric filter and alarm on a multi-region (global) CloudTrail trail: - ensures that activities from all regions (both used and unused) are monitored - ensures that activities on all supported global services are monitored - ensures that all management events across all regions are monitored Filter pattern set to `{ ($.eventName = ConsoleLogin) && ($.additionalEventData.MFAUsed != Yes) && ($.userIdentity.type = IAMUser) && ($.responseElements.ConsoleLogin = Success}`: - reduces false alarms raised when a user logs in via SSO", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudWatch/latest/DeveloperGuide/viewing_metrics_with_cloudwatch.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/receive-cloudtrail-log-files-from-multiple-regions.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudwatch-alarms-for-cloudtrail.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/dg/SubscribeTopic.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.3", + "Description": "Ensure usage of the 'root' account is monitored", + "Checks": [ + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_root_usage" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Real-time monitoring of API calls can be achieved by directing CloudTrail Logs to CloudWatch Logs or an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment, and establishing corresponding metric filters and alarms. It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established for 'root' login attempts to detect unauthorized use or attempts to use the root account.", + "RationaleStatement": "CloudWatch is an AWS native service that allows you to observe and monitor resources and applications. CloudTrail logs can also be sent to an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment for monitoring and alerting. Monitoring 'root' account logins will provide visibility into the use of a fully privileged account and the opportunity to reduce its usage.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following steps to set up the metric filter, alarm, SNS topic, and subscription: 1. Create a metric filter based on the provided filter pattern that checks for 'root' account usage and uses the `` taken from audit step 1: ``` aws logs put-metric-filter --log-group-name `` --filter-name `` --metric-transformations metricName= `` ,metricNamespace='CISBenchmark',metricValue=1 --filter-pattern '{ $.userIdentity.type = Root && $.userIdentity.invokedBy NOT EXISTS && $.eventType != AwsServiceEvent }' ``` **Note**: You can choose your own `metricName` and `metricNamespace` strings. Using the same `metricNamespace` for all Foundations Benchmark metrics will group them together. 2. Create an SNS topic that the alarm will notify: ``` aws sns create-topic --name ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same topic for all monitoring alarms. **Note**: Capture the `TopicArn` that is displayed when creating the SNS topic in step 2. 3. Create an SNS subscription for the topic created in step 2: ``` aws sns subscribe --topic-arn --protocol --notification-endpoint ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same subscription for all monitoring alarms. 4. Create an alarm that is associated with the CloudWatch Logs metric filter created in step 1 and the SNS topic created in step 2: ``` aws cloudwatch put-metric-alarm --alarm-name `` --metric-name `` --statistic Sum --period 300 --threshold 1 --comparison-operator GreaterThanOrEqualToThreshold --evaluation-periods 1 --namespace 'CISBenchmark' --alarm-actions ```", + "AuditProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following to ensure that there is at least one active multi-region CloudTrail trail with the prescribed metric filters and alarms configured: 1. Identify the log group name that is configured for use with the active multi-region CloudTrail trail: - List all CloudTrail trails: ``` aws cloudtrail describe-trails ``` - Identify multi-region CloudTrail trails: `Trails with IsMultiRegionTrail set to true` - Note the value associated with Name:`` - Note the `` within the value associated with CloudWatchLogsLogGroupArn - Example: `arn:aws:logs:::log-group::*` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail is active: ``` aws cloudtrail get-trail-status --name ``` - Ensure `IsLogging` is set to `TRUE` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail captures all management events: ``` aws cloudtrail get-event-selectors --trail-name ``` - Ensure there is at least one `event selector` for a trail with `IncludeManagementEvents` set to `true` and `ReadWriteType` set to `All` 2. Get a list of all associated metric filters for the `` captured in step 1: ``` aws logs describe-metric-filters --log-group-name ``` 3. Ensure the output from the above command contains the following: ``` filterPattern: { $.userIdentity.type = Root && $.userIdentity.invokedBy NOT EXISTS && $.eventType != AwsServiceEvent } ``` 4. Note the `` value associated with the `filterPattern` from step 3. 5. Get a list of CloudWatch alarms, and filter on the `` captured in step 4: ``` aws cloudwatch describe-alarms --query 'MetricAlarms[?MetricName==]' ``` 6. Note the `AlarmActions` value; this will provide the SNS topic ARN value. 7. Ensure there is at least one active subscriber to the SNS topic: ``` aws sns list-subscriptions-by-topic --topic-arn ``` - At least one subscription should have SubscriptionArn with a valid AWS ARN. - Example of valid SubscriptionArn: `arn:aws:sns::::`", + "AdditionalInformation": "Configuring a log metric filter and alarm on a multi-region (global) CloudTrail trail: - ensures that activities from all regions (both used and unused) are monitored - ensures that activities on all supported global services are monitored - ensures that all management events across all regions are monitored", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/receive-cloudtrail-log-files-from-multiple-regions.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudwatch-alarms-for-cloudtrail.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/dg/SubscribeTopic.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.4", + "Description": "Ensure IAM policy changes are monitored", + "Checks": [ + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_policy_changes" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Real-time monitoring of API calls can be achieved by directing CloudTrail Logs to CloudWatch Logs or an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment, and establishing corresponding metric filters and alarms. It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established for changes made to Identity and Access Management (IAM) policies.", + "RationaleStatement": "CloudWatch is an AWS native service that allows you to observe and monitor resources and applications. CloudTrail logs can also be sent to an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment for monitoring and alerting. Monitoring changes to IAM policies will help ensure authentication and authorization controls remain intact.", + "ImpactStatement": "Monitoring these changes may result in a number of false positives, especially in larger environments. This alert may require more tuning than others to eliminate some of those erroneous notifications.", + "RemediationProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following steps to set up the metric filter, alarm, SNS topic, and subscription: 1. Create a metric filter based on the provided filter pattern that checks for IAM policy changes and the `` taken from audit step 1: ``` aws logs put-metric-filter --log-group-name `` --filter-name `` --metric-transformations metricName= ``,metricNamespace='CISBenchmark',metricValue=1 --filter-pattern '{($.eventName=DeleteGroupPolicy)||($.eventName=DeleteRolePolicy)||($.eventName=DeleteUserPolicy)||($.eventName=PutGroupPolicy)||($.eventName=PutRolePolicy)||($.eventName=PutUserPolicy)||($.eventName=CreatePolicy)||($.eventName=DeletePolicy)||($.eventName=CreatePolicyVersion)||($.eventName=DeletePolicyVersion)||($.eventName=AttachRolePolicy)||($.eventName=DetachRolePolicy)||($.eventName=AttachUserPolicy)||($.eventName=DetachUserPolicy)||($.eventName=AttachGroupPolicy)||($.eventName=DetachGroupPolicy)}' ``` **Note**: You can choose your own `metricName` and `metricNamespace` strings. Using the same `metricNamespace` for all Foundations Benchmark metrics will group them together. 2. Create an SNS topic that the alarm will notify: ``` aws sns create-topic --name ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same topic for all monitoring alarms. **Note**: Capture the `TopicArn` that is displayed when creating the SNS topic in step 2. 3. Create an SNS subscription for the topic created in step 2: ``` aws sns subscribe --topic-arn --protocol --notification-endpoint ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same subscription for all monitoring alarms. 4. Create an alarm that is associated with the CloudWatch Logs metric filter created in step 1 and the SNS topic created in step 2: ``` aws cloudwatch put-metric-alarm --alarm-name `` --metric-name `` --statistic Sum --period 300 --threshold 1 --comparison-operator GreaterThanOrEqualToThreshold --evaluation-periods 1 --namespace 'CISBenchmark' --alarm-actions ```", + "AuditProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following to ensure that there is at least one active multi-region CloudTrail trail with the prescribed metric filters and alarms configured: 1. Identify the log group name that is configured for use with the active multi-region CloudTrail trail: - List all CloudTrails: ``` aws cloudtrail describe-trails ``` - Identify multi-region CloudTrail trails: `Trails with IsMultiRegionTrail set to true` - Note the value associated with Name:`` - Note the `` within the value associated with CloudWatchLogsLogGroupArn - Example: `arn:aws:logs:::log-group::*` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail is active: ``` aws cloudtrail get-trail-status --name ``` - Ensure `IsLogging` is set to `TRUE` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail captures all management events: ``` aws cloudtrail get-event-selectors --trail-name ``` - Ensure there is at least one `event selector` for a trail with `IncludeManagementEvents` set to `true` and `ReadWriteType` set to `All` 2. Get a list of all associated metric filters for the `` captured in step 1: ``` aws logs describe-metric-filters --log-group-name ``` 3. Ensure the output from the above command contains the following: ``` filterPattern: {($.eventName=DeleteGroupPolicy)||($.eventName=DeleteRolePolicy)||($.eventName=DeleteUserPolicy)||($.eventName=PutGroupPolicy)||($.eventName=PutRolePolicy)||($.eventName=PutUserPolicy)||($.eventName=CreatePolicy)||($.eventName=DeletePolicy)||($.eventName=CreatePolicyVersion)||($.eventName=DeletePolicyVersion)||($.eventName=AttachRolePolicy)||($.eventName=DetachRolePolicy)||($.eventName=AttachUserPolicy)||($.eventName=DetachUserPolicy)||($.eventName=AttachGroupPolicy)||($.eventName=DetachGroupPolicy)} ``` 4. Note the `` value associated with the `filterPattern` from step 3. 5. Get a list of CloudWatch alarms, and filter on the `` captured in step 4: ``` aws cloudwatch describe-alarms --query 'MetricAlarms[?MetricName==]' ``` 6. Note the `AlarmActions` value; this will provide the SNS topic ARN value. 7. Ensure there is at least one active subscriber to the SNS topic: ``` aws sns list-subscriptions-by-topic --topic-arn ``` - At least one subscription should have SubscriptionArn with a valid AWS ARN. - Example of valid SubscriptionArn: `arn:aws:sns::::`", + "AdditionalInformation": "Configuring a log metric filter and alarm on a multi-region (global) CloudTrail trail: - ensures that activities from all regions (both used and unused) are monitored - ensures that activities on all supported global services are monitored - ensures that all management events across all regions are monitored", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/receive-cloudtrail-log-files-from-multiple-regions.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudwatch-alarms-for-cloudtrail.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/dg/SubscribeTopic.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.5", + "Description": "Ensure CloudTrail configuration changes are monitored", + "Checks": [ + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_and_alarm_for_cloudtrail_configuration_changes_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Real-time monitoring of API calls can be achieved by directing CloudTrail Logs to CloudWatch Logs or an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment, and establishing corresponding metric filters and alarms. It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be used to detect changes to CloudTrail's configurations.", + "RationaleStatement": "CloudWatch is an AWS native service that allows you to observe and monitor resources and applications. CloudTrail logs can also be sent to an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment for monitoring and alerting. Monitoring changes to CloudTrail's configuration will help ensure sustained visibility into the activities performed in the AWS account.", + "ImpactStatement": "Ensuring that changes to CloudTrail configurations are monitored enhances security by maintaining the integrity of logging mechanisms. Automated monitoring can provide real-time alerts; however, it may require additional setup and resources to configure and manage these alerts effectively. These steps can be performed manually within a company's existing SIEM platform in cases where CloudTrail logs are monitored outside of the AWS monitoring tools in CloudWatch.", + "RemediationProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following steps to set up the metric filter, alarm, SNS topic, and subscription: 1. Create a metric filter based on the provided filter pattern that checks for CloudTrail configuration changes and the `` taken from audit step 1: ``` aws logs put-metric-filter --log-group-name --filter-name --metric-transformations metricName=,metricNamespace='CISBenchmark',metricValue=1 --filter-pattern '{ ($.eventName = CreateTrail) || ($.eventName = UpdateTrail) || ($.eventName = DeleteTrail) || ($.eventName = StartLogging) || ($.eventName = StopLogging) }' ``` **Note**: You can choose your own `metricName` and `metricNamespace` strings. Using the same `metricNamespace` for all Foundations Benchmark metrics will group them together. 2. Create an SNS topic that the alarm will notify: ``` aws sns create-topic --name ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same topic for all monitoring alarms. **Note**: Capture the `TopicArn` that is displayed when creating the SNS topic in step 2. 3. Create an SNS subscription for the topic created in step 2: ``` aws sns subscribe --topic-arn --protocol --notification-endpoint ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same subscription for all monitoring alarms. 4. Create an alarm that is associated with the CloudWatch Logs metric filter created in step 1 and the SNS topic created in step 2: ``` aws cloudwatch put-metric-alarm --alarm-name --metric-name --statistic Sum --period 300 --threshold 1 --comparison-operator GreaterThanOrEqualToThreshold --evaluation-periods 1 --namespace 'CISBenchmark' --alarm-actions ```", + "AuditProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following to ensure that there is at least one active multi-region CloudTrail trail with the prescribed metric filters and alarms configured: 1. Identify the log group name that is configured for use with the active multi-region CloudTrail trail: - List all CloudTrail trails: `aws cloudtrail describe-trails` - Identify multi-region CloudTrail trails: `Trails with IsMultiRegionTrail set to true` - Note the value associated with Name:`` - Note the `` within the value associated with CloudWatchLogsLogGroupArn - Example: `arn:aws:logs:::log-group::*` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail is active: - `aws cloudtrail get-trail-status --name ` - Ensure `IsLogging` is set to `TRUE` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail captures all management events: - `aws cloudtrail get-event-selectors --trail-name ` - Ensure there is at least one `event selector` for a trail with `IncludeManagementEvents` set to `true` and `ReadWriteType` set to `All` 2. Get a list of all associated metric filters for the `` captured in step 1: ``` aws logs describe-metric-filters --log-group-name ``` 3. Ensure the output from the above command contains the following: ``` filterPattern: { ($.eventName = CreateTrail) || ($.eventName = UpdateTrail) || ($.eventName = DeleteTrail) || ($.eventName = StartLogging) || ($.eventName = StopLogging) } ``` 4. Note the `` value associated with the `filterPattern` from step 3. 5. Get a list of CloudWatch alarms, and filter on the `` captured in step 4: ``` aws cloudwatch describe-alarms --query 'MetricAlarms[?MetricName==]' ``` 6. Note the `AlarmActions` value; this will provide the SNS topic ARN value. 7. Ensure there is at least one active subscriber to the SNS topic: ``` aws sns list-subscriptions-by-topic --topic-arn ``` - At least one subscription should have SubscriptionArn with a valid AWS ARN. - Example of valid SubscriptionArn: `arn:aws:sns::::`", + "AdditionalInformation": "Configuring a log metric filter and alarm on a multi-region (global) CloudTrail trail: - ensures that activities from all regions (both used and unused) are monitored - ensures that activities on all supported global services are monitored - ensures that all management events across all regions are monitored", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/receive-cloudtrail-log-files-from-multiple-regions.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudwatch-alarms-for-cloudtrail.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/dg/SubscribeTopic.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.6", + "Description": "Ensure AWS Management Console authentication failures are monitored", + "Checks": [ + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_authentication_failures" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Real-time monitoring of API calls can be achieved by directing CloudTrail Logs to CloudWatch Logs or an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment, and establishing corresponding metric filters and alarms. It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established for failed console authentication attempts.", + "RationaleStatement": "CloudWatch is an AWS native service that allows you to observe and monitor resources and applications. CloudTrail logs can also be sent to an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment for monitoring and alerting. Monitoring failed console logins may decrease the lead time to detect an attempt to brute-force a credential, which may provide an indicator, such as the source IP address, that can be used in other event correlations.", + "ImpactStatement": "Monitoring for these failures may generate a large number of alerts, especially in larger environments.", + "RemediationProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following steps to set up the metric filter, alarm, SNS topic, and subscription: 1. Create a metric filter based on the provided filter pattern that checks for AWS management Console login failures and uses the `` taken from audit step 1: ``` aws logs put-metric-filter --log-group-name --filter-name --metric-transformations metricName=,metricNamespace='CISBenchmark',metricValue=1 --filter-pattern '{ ($.eventName = ConsoleLogin) && ($.errorMessage = Failed authentication) }' ``` **Note**: You can choose your own `metricName` and `metricNamespace` strings. Using the same `metricNamespace` for all Foundations Benchmark metrics will group them together. 2. Create an SNS topic that the alarm will notify: ``` aws sns create-topic --name ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same topic for all monitoring alarms. **Note**: Capture the `TopicArn` that is displayed when creating the SNS topic in step 2. 3. Create an SNS subscription for the topic created in step 2: ``` aws sns subscribe --topic-arn --protocol --notification-endpoint ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same subscription for all monitoring alarms. 4. Create an alarm that is associated with the CloudWatch Logs metric filter created in step 1 and the SNS topic created in step 2: ``` aws cloudwatch put-metric-alarm --alarm-name --metric-name --statistic Sum --period 300 --threshold 1 --comparison-operator GreaterThanOrEqualToThreshold --evaluation-periods 1 --namespace 'CISBenchmark' --alarm-actions ```", + "AuditProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following to ensure that there is at least one active multi-region CloudTrail trail with the prescribed metric filters and alarms configured: 1. Identify the log group name that is configured for use with the active multi-region CloudTrail trail: - List all CloudTrail trails: `aws cloudtrail describe-trails` - Identify multi-region CloudTrail trails: `Trails with IsMultiRegionTrail set to true` - Note the value associated with Name:`` - Note the `` within the value associated with CloudWatchLogsLogGroupArn - Example: `arn:aws:logs:::log-group::*` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail is active: - `aws cloudtrail get-trail-status --name ` - Ensure `IsLogging` is set to `TRUE` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail captures all management events: - `aws cloudtrail get-event-selectors --trail-name ` - Ensure there is at least one `event selector` for a trail with `IncludeManagementEvents` set to `true` and `ReadWriteType` set to `All` 2. Get a list of all associated metric filters for the `` captured in step 1: ``` aws logs describe-metric-filters --log-group-name ``` 3. Ensure the output from the above command contains the following: ``` filterPattern: { ($.eventName = ConsoleLogin) && ($.errorMessage = Failed authentication) } ``` 4. Note the `` value associated with the `filterPattern` from step 3. 5. Get a list of CloudWatch alarms, and filter on the `` captured in step 4: ``` aws cloudwatch describe-alarms --query 'MetricAlarms[?MetricName==]' ``` 6. Note the `AlarmActions` value; this will provide the SNS topic ARN value. 7. Ensure there is at least one active subscriber to the SNS topic: ``` aws sns list-subscriptions-by-topic --topic-arn ``` - At least one subscription should have SubscriptionArn with a valid AWS ARN. - Example of valid SubscriptionArn: `arn:aws:sns::::`", + "AdditionalInformation": "Configuring a log metric filter and alarm on a multi-region (global) CloudTrail trail: - ensures that activities from all regions (both used and unused) are monitored - ensures that activities on all supported global services are monitored - ensures that all management events across all regions are monitored", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/receive-cloudtrail-log-files-from-multiple-regions.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudwatch-alarms-for-cloudtrail.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/dg/SubscribeTopic.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.7", + "Description": "Ensure disabling or scheduled deletion of customer created CMKs is monitored", + "Checks": [ + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_disable_or_scheduled_deletion_of_kms_cmk" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Real-time monitoring of API calls can be achieved by directing CloudTrail Logs to CloudWatch Logs or an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment, and establishing corresponding metric filters and alarms. It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established for customer-created CMKs that have changed state to disabled or are scheduled for deletion.", + "RationaleStatement": "CloudWatch is an AWS native service that allows you to observe and monitor resources and applications. CloudTrail logs can also be sent to an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment for monitoring and alerting. Data encrypted with disabled or deleted keys will no longer be accessible. Changes in the state of a CMK should be monitored to ensure that the change is intentional.", + "ImpactStatement": "Creation, storage, and management of CMK may require additional labor compared to the use of AWS-managed keys.", + "RemediationProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following steps to set up the metric filter, alarm, SNS topic, and subscription: 1. Create a metric filter based on the provided filter pattern that checks for CMKs that have been disabled or scheduled for deletion and uses the `` taken from audit step 1: ``` aws logs put-metric-filter --log-group-name --filter-name --metric-transformations metricName=,metricNamespace='CISBenchmark',metricValue=1 --filter-pattern '{($.eventSource = kms.amazonaws.com) && (($.eventName=DisableKey)||($.eventName=ScheduleKeyDeletion)) }' ``` **Note**: You can choose your own `metricName` and `metricNamespace` strings. Using the same `metricNamespace` for all Foundations Benchmark metrics will group them together. 2. Create an SNS topic that the alarm will notify: ``` aws sns create-topic --name ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same topic for all monitoring alarms. **Note**: Capture the `TopicArn` that is displayed when creating the SNS topic in step 2. 3. Create an SNS subscription for the topic created in step 2: ``` aws sns subscribe --topic-arn --protocol --notification-endpoint ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same subscription for all monitoring alarms. 4. Create an alarm that is associated with the CloudWatch Logs metric filter created in step 1 and the SNS topic created in step 2: ``` aws cloudwatch put-metric-alarm --alarm-name --metric-name --statistic Sum --period 300 --threshold 1 --comparison-operator GreaterThanOrEqualToThreshold --evaluation-periods 1 --namespace 'CISBenchmark' --alarm-actions ```", + "AuditProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following to ensure that there is at least one active multi-region CloudTrail trail with the prescribed metric filters and alarms configured: 1. Identify the log group name that is configured for use with the active multi-region CloudTrail trail: - List all CloudTrail trails: `aws cloudtrail describe-trails` - Identify multi-region CloudTrail trails: `Trails with IsMultiRegionTrail set to true` - Note the value associated with Name:`` - Note the `` within the value associated with CloudWatchLogsLogGroupArn - Example: `arn:aws:logs:::log-group::*` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail is active: - `aws cloudtrail get-trail-status --name ` - Ensure `IsLogging` is set to `TRUE` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail captures all management events: - `aws cloudtrail get-event-selectors --trail-name ` - Ensure there is at least one `event selector` for a trail with `IncludeManagementEvents` set to `true` and `ReadWriteType` set to `All` 2. Get a list of all associated metric filters for the `` captured in step 1: ``` aws logs describe-metric-filters --log-group-name ``` 3. Ensure the output from the above command contains the following: ``` filterPattern: {($.eventSource = kms.amazonaws.com) && (($.eventName=DisableKey)||($.eventName=ScheduleKeyDeletion)) } ``` 4. Note the `` value associated with the `filterPattern` from step 3. 5. Get a list of CloudWatch alarms, and filter on the `` captured in step 4: ``` aws cloudwatch describe-alarms --query 'MetricAlarms[?MetricName==]' ``` 6. Note the `AlarmActions` value; this will provide the SNS topic ARN value. 7. Ensure there is at least one active subscriber to the SNS topic: ``` aws sns list-subscriptions-by-topic --topic-arn ``` - At least one subscription should have SubscriptionArn with a valid AWS ARN. - Example of valid SubscriptionArn: `arn:aws:sns::::`", + "AdditionalInformation": "Configuring a log metric filter and alarm on a multi-region (global) CloudTrail trail: - ensures that activities from all regions (both used and unused) are monitored - ensures that activities on all supported global services are monitored - ensures that all management events across all regions are monitored", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudwatch-alarms-for-cloudtrail.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/receive-cloudtrail-log-files-from-multiple-regions.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/dg/SubscribeTopic.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.8", + "Description": "Ensure S3 bucket policy changes are monitored", + "Checks": [ + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_for_s3_bucket_policy_changes" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Real-time monitoring of API calls can be achieved by directing CloudTrail Logs to CloudWatch Logs or an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment, and establishing corresponding metric filters and alarms. It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established for changes to S3 bucket policies.", + "RationaleStatement": "CloudWatch is an AWS native service that allows you to observe and monitor resources and applications. CloudTrail logs can also be sent to an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment for monitoring and alerting. Monitoring changes to S3 bucket policies may reduce the time it takes to detect and correct permissive policies on sensitive S3 buckets.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following steps to set up the metric filter, alarm, SNS topic, and subscription: 1. Create a metric filter based on the provided filter pattern that checks for changes to S3 bucket policies and uses the `` taken from audit step 1: ``` aws logs put-metric-filter --log-group-name --filter-name --metric-transformations metricName=,metricNamespace='CISBenchmark',metricValue=1 --filter-pattern '{ ($.eventSource = s3.amazonaws.com) && (($.eventName = PutBucketAcl) || ($.eventName = PutBucketPolicy) || ($.eventName = PutBucketCors) || ($.eventName = PutBucketLifecycle) || ($.eventName = PutBucketReplication) || ($.eventName = DeleteBucketPolicy) || ($.eventName = DeleteBucketCors) || ($.eventName = DeleteBucketLifecycle) || ($.eventName = DeleteBucketReplication)) }' ``` **Note**: You can choose your own `metricName` and `metricNamespace` strings. Using the same `metricNamespace` for all Foundations Benchmark metrics will group them together. 2. Create an SNS topic that the alarm will notify: ``` aws sns create-topic --name ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same topic for all monitoring alarms. **Note**: Capture the `TopicArn` that is displayed when creating the SNS topic in step 2. 3. Create an SNS subscription for the topic created in step 2: ``` aws sns subscribe --topic-arn --protocol --notification-endpoint ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same subscription for all monitoring alarms. 4. Create an alarm that is associated with the CloudWatch Logs metric filter created in step 1 and the SNS topic created in step 2: ``` aws cloudwatch put-metric-alarm --alarm-name --metric-name --statistic Sum --period 300 --threshold 1 --comparison-operator GreaterThanOrEqualToThreshold --evaluation-periods 1 --namespace 'CISBenchmark' --alarm-actions ```", + "AuditProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following to ensure that there is at least one active multi-region CloudTrail trail with the prescribed metric filters and alarms configured: 1. Identify the log group name that is configured for use with the active multi-region CloudTrail trail: - List all CloudTrail trails: `aws cloudtrail describe-trails` - Identify multi-region CloudTrail trails: `Trails with IsMultiRegionTrail set to true` - Note the value associated with Name:`` - Note the `` within the value associated with CloudWatchLogsLogGroupArn - Example: `arn:aws:logs:::log-group::*` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail is active: - `aws cloudtrail get-trail-status --name ` - Ensure `IsLogging` is set to `TRUE` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail captures all management events: - `aws cloudtrail get-event-selectors --trail-name ` - Ensure there is at least one `event selector` for a trail with `IncludeManagementEvents` set to `true` and `ReadWriteType` set to `All` 2. Get a list of all associated metric filters for the `` captured in step 1: ``` aws logs describe-metric-filters --log-group-name ``` 3. Ensure the output from the above command contains the following: ``` filterPattern: { ($.eventSource = s3.amazonaws.com) && (($.eventName = PutBucketAcl) || ($.eventName = PutBucketPolicy) || ($.eventName = PutBucketCors) || ($.eventName = PutBucketLifecycle) || ($.eventName = PutBucketReplication) || ($.eventName = DeleteBucketPolicy) || ($.eventName = DeleteBucketCors) || ($.eventName = DeleteBucketLifecycle) || ($.eventName = DeleteBucketReplication)) } ``` 4. Note the `` value associated with the `filterPattern` from step 3. 5. Get a list of CloudWatch alarms, and filter on the `` captured in step 4: ``` aws cloudwatch describe-alarms --query 'MetricAlarms[?MetricName==]' ``` 6. Note the `AlarmActions` value; this will provide the SNS topic ARN value. 7. Ensure there is at least one active subscriber to the SNS topic: ``` aws sns list-subscriptions-by-topic --topic-arn ``` - At least one subscription should have SubscriptionArn with a valid AWS ARN. - Example of valid SubscriptionArn: `arn:aws:sns::::`", + "AdditionalInformation": "Configuring a log metric filter and alarm on a multi-region (global) CloudTrail trail: - ensures that activities from all regions (both used and unused) are monitored - ensures that activities on all supported global services are monitored - ensures that all management events across all regions are monitored", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudwatch-alarms-for-cloudtrail.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/receive-cloudtrail-log-files-from-multiple-regions.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/dg/SubscribeTopic.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.9", + "Description": "Ensure AWS Config configuration changes are monitored", + "Checks": [ + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_and_alarm_for_aws_config_configuration_changes_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Real-time monitoring of API calls can be achieved by directing CloudTrail Logs to CloudWatch Logs or an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment, and establishing corresponding metric filters and alarms. It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established for detecting changes to AWS Config's configurations.", + "RationaleStatement": "CloudWatch is an AWS native service that allows you to observe and monitor resources and applications. CloudTrail logs can also be sent to an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment for monitoring and alerting. Monitoring changes to the AWS Config configuration will help ensure sustained visibility of the configuration items within the AWS account.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following steps to set up the metric filter, alarm, SNS topic, and subscription: 1. Create a metric filter based on the provided filter pattern that checks for AWS Configuration changes and uses the `` taken from audit step 1: ``` aws logs put-metric-filter --log-group-name --filter-name --metric-transformations metricName=,metricNamespace='CISBenchmark',metricValue=1 --filter-pattern '{ ($.eventSource = config.amazonaws.com) && (($.eventName=StopConfigurationRecorder)||($.eventName=DeleteDeliveryChannel)||($.eventName=PutDeliveryChannel)||($.eventName=PutConfigurationRecorder)) }' ``` **Note**: You can choose your own `metricName` and `metricNamespace` strings. Using the same `metricNamespace` for all Foundations Benchmark metrics will group them together. 2. Create an SNS topic that the alarm will notify: ``` aws sns create-topic --name ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same topic for all monitoring alarms. **Note**: Capture the `TopicArn` that is displayed when creating the SNS topic in step 2. 3. Create an SNS subscription for the topic created in step 2: ``` aws sns subscribe --topic-arn --protocol --notification-endpoint ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same subscription for all monitoring alarms. 4. Create an alarm that is associated with the CloudWatch Logs metric filter created in step 1 and the SNS topic created in step 2: ``` aws cloudwatch put-metric-alarm --alarm-name --metric-name --statistic Sum --period 300 --threshold 1 --comparison-operator GreaterThanOrEqualToThreshold --evaluation-periods 1 --namespace 'CISBenchmark' --alarm-actions ```", + "AuditProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following to ensure that there is at least one active multi-region CloudTrail trail with the prescribed metric filters and alarms configured: 1. Identify the log group name that is configured for use with the active multi-region CloudTrail trail: - List all CloudTrail trails: `aws cloudtrail describe-trails` - Identify multi-region CloudTrail trails: `Trails with IsMultiRegionTrail set to true` - Note the value associated with Name:`` - Note the `` within the value associated with CloudWatchLogsLogGroupArn - Example: `arn:aws:logs:::log-group::*` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail is active: - `aws cloudtrail get-trail-status --name ` - Ensure `IsLogging` is set to `TRUE` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail captures all management events: - `aws cloudtrail get-event-selectors --trail-name ` - Ensure there is at least one `event selector` for a trail with `IncludeManagementEvents` set to `true` and `ReadWriteType` set to `All` 2. Get a list of all associated metric filters for the `` captured in step 1: ``` aws logs describe-metric-filters --log-group-name ``` 3. Ensure the output from the above command contains the following: ``` filterPattern: { ($.eventSource = config.amazonaws.com) && (($.eventName=StopConfigurationRecorder)||($.eventName=DeleteDeliveryChannel)||($.eventName=PutDeliveryChannel)||($.eventName=PutConfigurationRecorder)) } ``` 4. Note the `` value associated with the `filterPattern` from step 3. 5. Get a list of CloudWatch alarms, and filter on the `` captured in step 4: ``` aws cloudwatch describe-alarms --query 'MetricAlarms[?MetricName==]' ``` 6. Note the `AlarmActions` value; this will provide the SNS topic ARN value. 7. Ensure there is at least one active subscriber to the SNS topic: ``` aws sns list-subscriptions-by-topic --topic-arn ``` - At least one subscription should have SubscriptionArn with a valid AWS ARN. - Example of valid SubscriptionArn: `arn:aws:sns::::`", + "AdditionalInformation": "Configuring a log metric filter and alarm on a multi-region (global) CloudTrail trail: - ensures that activities from all regions (both used and unused) are monitored - ensures that activities on all supported global services are monitored - ensures that all management events across all regions are monitored", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudwatch-alarms-for-cloudtrail.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/receive-cloudtrail-log-files-from-multiple-regions.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/dg/SubscribeTopic.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.10", + "Description": "Ensure security group changes are monitored", + "Checks": [ + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_security_group_changes" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Real-time monitoring of API calls can be achieved by directing CloudTrail Logs to CloudWatch Logs or an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment, and establishing corresponding metric filters and alarms. Security groups are stateful packet filters that control ingress and egress traffic within a VPC. It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established to detect changes to security groups.", + "RationaleStatement": "CloudWatch is an AWS native service that allows you to observe and monitor resources and applications. CloudTrail logs can also be sent to an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment for monitoring and alerting. Monitoring changes to security groups will help ensure that resources and services are not unintentionally exposed.", + "ImpactStatement": "This may require additional 'tuning' to eliminate false positives and filter out expected activity so that anomalies are easier to detect.", + "RemediationProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following steps to set up the metric filter, alarm, SNS topic, and subscription: 1. Create a metric filter based on the provided filter pattern that checks for security groups changes and uses the `` taken from audit step 1: ``` aws logs put-metric-filter --log-group-name --filter-name --metric-transformations metricName=,metricNamespace=CISBenchmark,metricValue=1 --filter-pattern { ($.eventName = AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress) || ($.eventName = AuthorizeSecurityGroupEgress) || ($.eventName = RevokeSecurityGroupIngress) || ($.eventName = RevokeSecurityGroupEgress) || ($.eventName = CreateSecurityGroup) || ($.eventName = DeleteSecurityGroup) || ($.eventName = ModifySecurityGroupRules) } ``` **Note**: You can choose your own `metricName` and `metricNamespace` strings. Using the same `metricNamespace` for all Foundations Benchmark metrics will group them together. 2. Create an SNS topic that the alarm will notify: ``` aws sns create-topic --name ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same topic for all monitoring alarms. **Note**: Capture the `TopicArn` that is displayed when creating the SNS topic in step 2. 3. Create an SNS subscription for the topic created in step 2: ``` aws sns subscribe --topic-arn --protocol --notification-endpoint ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same subscription for all monitoring alarms. 4. Create an alarm that is associated with the CloudWatch Logs metric filter created in step 1 and the SNS topic created in step 2: ``` aws cloudwatch put-metric-alarm --alarm-name --metric-name --statistic Sum --period 300 --threshold 1 --comparison-operator GreaterThanOrEqualToThreshold --evaluation-periods 1 --namespace CISBenchmark --alarm-actions ```", + "AuditProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following to ensure that there is at least one active multi-region CloudTrail trail with the prescribed metric filters and alarms configured: 1. Identify the log group name that is configured for use with the active multi-region CloudTrail trail: - List all CloudTrail trails: `aws cloudtrail describe-trails` - Identify multi-region CloudTrail trails: `Trails with IsMultiRegionTrail set to true` - Note the value associated with Name:`` - Note the `` within the value associated with CloudWatchLogsLogGroupArn - Example: `arn:aws:logs:::log-group::*` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail is active: - `aws cloudtrail get-trail-status --name ` - Ensure `IsLogging` is set to `TRUE` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail captures all management events: - `aws cloudtrail get-event-selectors --trail-name ` - Ensure there is at least one `event selector` for a trail with `IncludeManagementEvents` set to `true` and `ReadWriteType` set to `All` 2. Get a list of all associated metric filters for the `` captured in step 1: ``` aws logs describe-metric-filters --log-group-name ``` 3. Ensure the output from the above command contains the following: ``` filterPattern: { ($.eventName = AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress) || ($.eventName = AuthorizeSecurityGroupEgress) || ($.eventName = RevokeSecurityGroupIngress) || ($.eventName = RevokeSecurityGroupEgress) || ($.eventName = CreateSecurityGroup) || ($.eventName = DeleteSecurityGroup) || ($.eventName = ModifySecurityGroupRules) } ``` 4. Note the `` value associated with the `filterPattern` from step 3. 5. Get a list of CloudWatch alarms, and filter on the `` captured in step 4: ``` aws cloudwatch describe-alarms --query MetricAlarms[?MetricName==] ``` 6. Note the `AlarmActions` value; this will provide the SNS topic ARN value. 7. Ensure there is at least one active subscriber to the SNS topic: ``` aws sns list-subscriptions-by-topic --topic-arn ``` - At least one subscription should have SubscriptionArn with a valid AWS ARN. - Example of valid SubscriptionArn: `arn:aws:sns::::`", + "AdditionalInformation": "Configuring a log metric filter and alarm on a multi-region (global) CloudTrail trail: - ensures that activities from all regions (both used and unused) are monitored - ensures that activities on all supported global services are monitored - ensures that all management events across all regions are monitored AWS has recently introduced a new API, ModifySecurityGroupRules, which modifies the rules of a security group.", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/receive-cloudtrail-log-files-from-multiple-regions.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudwatch-alarms-for-cloudtrail.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/dg/SubscribeTopic.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_ModifySecurityGroupRules.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.11", + "Description": "Ensure Network Access Control List (NACL) changes are monitored", + "Checks": [ + "cloudwatch_changes_to_network_acls_alarm_configured" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Real-time monitoring of API calls can be achieved by directing CloudTrail Logs to CloudWatch Logs or an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment, and establishing corresponding metric filters and alarms. NACLs are used as a stateless packet filter to control ingress and egress traffic for subnets within a VPC. It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established for any changes made to NACLs.", + "RationaleStatement": "CloudWatch is an AWS native service that allows you to observe and monitor resources and applications. CloudTrail logs can also be sent to an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment for monitoring and alerting. Monitoring changes to NACLs will help ensure that AWS resources and services are not unintentionally exposed.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following steps to set up the metric filter, alarm, SNS topic, and subscription: 1. Create a metric filter based on the provided filter pattern that checks for NACL changes and uses the `` taken from audit step 1: ``` aws logs put-metric-filter --log-group-name --filter-name --metric-transformations metricName=,metricNamespace='CISBenchmark',metricValue=1 --filter-pattern '{ ($.eventName = CreateNetworkAcl) || ($.eventName = CreateNetworkAclEntry) || ($.eventName = DeleteNetworkAcl) || ($.eventName = DeleteNetworkAclEntry) || ($.eventName = ReplaceNetworkAclEntry) || ($.eventName = ReplaceNetworkAclAssociation) }' ``` **Note**: You can choose your own `metricName` and `metricNamespace` strings. Using the same `metricNamespace` for all Foundations Benchmark metrics will group them together. 2. Create an SNS topic that the alarm will notify: ``` aws sns create-topic --name ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same topic for all monitoring alarms. **Note**: Capture the `TopicArn` that is displayed when creating the SNS topic in step 2. 3. Create an SNS subscription for the topic created in step 2: ``` aws sns subscribe --topic-arn --protocol --notification-endpoint ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same subscription for all monitoring alarms. 4. Create an alarm that is associated with the CloudWatch Logs metric filter created in step 1 and the SNS topic created in step 2: ``` aws cloudwatch put-metric-alarm --alarm-name --metric-name --statistic Sum --period 300 --threshold 1 --comparison-operator GreaterThanOrEqualToThreshold --evaluation-periods 1 --namespace 'CISBenchmark' --alarm-actions ```", + "AuditProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following to ensure that there is at least one active multi-region CloudTrail trail with the prescribed metric filters and alarms configured: 1. Identify the log group name that is configured for use with the active multi-region CloudTrail trail: - List all CloudTrail trails: `aws cloudtrail describe-trails` - Identify multi-region CloudTrail trails: `Trails with IsMultiRegionTrail set to true` - Note the value associated with Name:`` - Note the `` within the value associated with CloudWatchLogsLogGroupArn - Example: `arn:aws:logs:::log-group::*` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail is active: - `aws cloudtrail get-trail-status --name ` - Ensure `IsLogging` is set to `TRUE` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail captures all management events: - `aws cloudtrail get-event-selectors --trail-name ` - Ensure there is at least one `event selector` for a trail with `IncludeManagementEvents` set to `true` and `ReadWriteType` set to `All` 2. Get a list of all associated metric filters for the `` captured in step 1: ``` aws logs describe-metric-filters --log-group-name ``` 3. Ensure the output from the above command contains the following: ``` filterPattern: { ($.eventName = CreateNetworkAcl) || ($.eventName = CreateNetworkAclEntry) || ($.eventName = DeleteNetworkAcl) || ($.eventName = DeleteNetworkAclEntry) || ($.eventName = ReplaceNetworkAclEntry) || ($.eventName = ReplaceNetworkAclAssociation) } ``` 4. Note the `` value associated with the `filterPattern` from step 3. 5. Get a list of CloudWatch alarms, and filter on the `` captured in step 4: ``` aws cloudwatch describe-alarms --query 'MetricAlarms[?MetricName==]' ``` 6. Note the `AlarmActions` value; this will provide the SNS topic ARN value. 7. Ensure there is at least one active subscriber to the SNS topic: ``` aws sns list-subscriptions-by-topic --topic-arn ``` - At least one subscription should have SubscriptionArn with a valid AWS ARN. - Example of valid SubscriptionArn: `arn:aws:sns::::`", + "AdditionalInformation": "Configuring a log metric filter and alarm on a multi-region (global) CloudTrail trail: - ensures that activities from all regions (both used and unused) are monitored - ensures that activities on all supported global services are monitored - ensures that all management events across all regions are monitored", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/receive-cloudtrail-log-files-from-multiple-regions.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudwatch-alarms-for-cloudtrail.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/dg/SubscribeTopic.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.12", + "Description": "Ensure changes to network gateways are monitored", + "Checks": [ + "cloudwatch_changes_to_network_gateways_alarm_configured" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Real-time monitoring of API calls can be achieved by directing CloudTrail Logs to CloudWatch Logs or an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment, and establishing corresponding metric filters and alarms. Network gateways are required to send and receive traffic to a destination outside of a VPC. It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established for changes to network gateways.", + "RationaleStatement": "CloudWatch is an AWS native service that allows you to observe and monitor resources and applications. CloudTrail logs can also be sent to an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment for monitoring and alerting. Monitoring changes to network gateways will help ensure that all ingress/egress traffic traverses the VPC border via a controlled path.", + "ImpactStatement": "Monitoring changes to network gateways helps detect unauthorized modifications that could compromise network security. Implementing automated monitoring and alerts can improve incident response times, but it may require additional configuration and maintenance efforts.", + "RemediationProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following steps to set up the metric filter, alarm, SNS topic, and subscription: 1. Create a metric filter based on the provided filter pattern that checks for network gateways changes and uses the `` taken from audit step 1: ``` aws logs put-metric-filter --log-group-name --filter-name --metric-transformations metricName=,metricNamespace='CISBenchmark',metricValue=1 --filter-pattern '{ ($.eventName = CreateCustomerGateway) || ($.eventName = DeleteCustomerGateway) || ($.eventName = AttachInternetGateway) || ($.eventName = CreateInternetGateway) || ($.eventName = DeleteInternetGateway) || ($.eventName = DetachInternetGateway) }' ``` **Note**: You can choose your own `metricName` and `metricNamespace` strings. Using the same `metricNamespace` for all Foundations Benchmark metrics will group them together. 2. Create an SNS topic that the alarm will notify: ``` aws sns create-topic --name ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same topic for all monitoring alarms. **Note**: Capture the `TopicArn` that is displayed when creating the SNS topic in step 2. 3. Create an SNS subscription for the topic created in step 2: ``` aws sns subscribe --topic-arn --protocol --notification-endpoint ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same subscription for all monitoring alarms. 4. Create an alarm that is associated with the CloudWatch Logs metric filter created in step 1 and the SNS topic created in step 2: ``` aws cloudwatch put-metric-alarm --alarm-name --metric-name --statistic Sum --period 300 --threshold 1 --comparison-operator GreaterThanOrEqualToThreshold --evaluation-periods 1 --namespace 'CISBenchmark' --alarm-actions ``` 5. Implement logging and alerting mechanisms: ``` aws sns create-topic --name NetworkGatewayChangesAlerts ```` ``` aws sns subscribe --topic-arn --protocol email --notification-endpoint ``` ``` aws cloudwatch put-metric-alarm --alarm-name NetworkGatewayChangesAlarm --metric-name GatewayChanges --namespace AWS/EC2 --statistic Sum --period 300 --threshold 1 --comparison-operator GreaterThanOrEqualToThreshold --evaluation-periods 1 --alarm-actions ```", + "AuditProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following to ensure that there is at least one active multi-region CloudTrail trail with the prescribed metric filters and alarms configured: 1. Identify the log group name that is configured for use with the active multi-region CloudTrail trail: - List all CloudTrail trails: `aws cloudtrail describe-trails` - Identify multi-region CloudTrail trails: `Trails with IsMultiRegionTrail set to true` - Note the value associated with Name:`` - Note the `` within the value associated with CloudWatchLogsLogGroupArn - Example: `arn:aws:logs:::log-group::*` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail is active: - `aws cloudtrail get-trail-status --name ` - Ensure `IsLogging` is set to `TRUE` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail captures all management events: - `aws cloudtrail get-event-selectors --trail-name ` - Ensure there is at least one `event selector` for a trail with `IncludeManagementEvents` set to `true` and `ReadWriteType` set to `All` 2. Get a list of all associated metric filters for the `` captured in step 1: ``` aws logs describe-metric-filters --log-group-name ``` 3. Ensure the output from the above command contains the following: ``` filterPattern: { ($.eventName = CreateCustomerGateway) || ($.eventName = DeleteCustomerGateway) || ($.eventName = AttachInternetGateway) || ($.eventName = CreateInternetGateway) || ($.eventName = DeleteInternetGateway) || ($.eventName = DetachInternetGateway) } ``` 4. Note the `` value associated with the `filterPattern` from step 3. 5. Get a list of CloudWatch alarms, and filter on the `` captured in step 4: ``` aws cloudwatch describe-alarms --query 'MetricAlarms[?MetricName==]' ``` 6. Note the `AlarmActions` value; this will provide the SNS topic ARN value. 7. Ensure there is at least one active subscriber to the SNS topic: ``` aws sns list-subscriptions-by-topic --topic-arn ``` - At least one subscription should have SubscriptionArn with a valid AWS ARN. - Example of valid SubscriptionArn: `arn:aws:sns::::` 8. Ensure automated monitoring is enabled: ``` aws cloudwatch put-metric-alarm --alarm-name NetworkGatewayChanges --metric-name GatewayChanges --namespace AWS/EC2 --statistic Sum --period 300 --threshold 1 --comparison-operator GreaterThanOrEqualToThreshold --evaluation-periods 1 --alarm-actions ```", + "AdditionalInformation": "Configuring a log metric filter and alarm on a multi-region (global) CloudTrail trail: - ensures that activities from all regions (both used and unused) are monitored - ensures that activities on all supported global services are monitored - ensures that all management events across all regions are monitored", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/receive-cloudtrail-log-files-from-multiple-regions.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudwatch-alarms-for-cloudtrail.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/dg/SubscribeTopic.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.13", + "Description": "Ensure route table changes are monitored", + "Checks": [ + "cloudwatch_changes_to_network_route_tables_alarm_configured" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Real-time monitoring of API calls can be achieved by directing CloudTrail Logs to CloudWatch Logs or an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment, and establishing corresponding metric filters and alarms. Routing tables are used to route network traffic between subnets and to network gateways. It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established for changes to route tables.", + "RationaleStatement": "CloudWatch is an AWS native service that allows you to observe and monitor resources and applications. CloudTrail logs can also be sent to an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment for monitoring and alerting. Monitoring changes to route tables will help ensure that all VPC traffic flows through the expected path and prevent any accidental or intentional modifications that may lead to uncontrolled network traffic. An alarm should be triggered every time an AWS API call is performed to create, replace, delete, or disassociate a route table.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following steps to set up the metric filter, alarm, SNS topic, and subscription: 1. Create a metric filter based on the provided filter pattern that checks for route table changes and uses the `` taken from audit step 1: ``` aws logs put-metric-filter --log-group-name --filter-pattern '{ ($.eventName = CreateRoute) || ($.eventName = CreateRouteTable) || ($.eventName = ReplaceRoute) || ($.eventName = ReplaceRouteTableAssociation) || ($.eventName = DeleteRouteTable) || ($.eventName = DeleteRoute) || ($.eventName = DisassociateRouteTable) }' ``` **Note**: You can choose your own `metricName` and `metricNamespace` strings. Using the same `metricNamespace` for all Foundations Benchmark metrics will group them together. 2. Create an SNS topic that the alarm will notify: ``` aws sns create-topic --name ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same topic for all monitoring alarms. **Note**: Capture the `TopicArn` that is displayed when creating the SNS topic in step 2. 3. Create an SNS subscription for the topic created in step 2: ``` aws sns subscribe --topic-arn --protocol --notification-endpoint ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same subscription for all monitoring alarms. 4. Create an alarm that is associated with the CloudWatch Logs metric filter created in step 1 and the SNS topic created in step 2: ``` aws cloudwatch put-metric-alarm --alarm-name --metric-name --statistic Sum --period 300 --threshold 1 --comparison-operator GreaterThanOrEqualToThreshold --evaluation-periods 1 --namespace 'CISBenchmark' --alarm-actions ```", + "AuditProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following to ensure that there is at least one active multi-region CloudTrail trail with the prescribed metric filters and alarms configured: 1. Identify the log group name that is configured for use with the active multi-region CloudTrail trail: - List all CloudTrail trails: `aws cloudtrail describe-trails` - Identify multi-region CloudTrail trails: `Trails with IsMultiRegionTrail set to true` - Note the value associated with Name:`` - Note the `` within the value associated with CloudWatchLogsLogGroupArn - Example: `arn:aws:logs:::log-group::*` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail is active: - `aws cloudtrail get-trail-status --name ` - Ensure `IsLogging` is set to `TRUE` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail captures all management events: - `aws cloudtrail get-event-selectors --trail-name ` - Ensure there is at least one `event selector` for a trail with `IncludeManagementEvents` set to `true` and `ReadWriteType` set to `All` 2. Get a list of all associated metric filters for the `` captured in step 1: ``` aws logs describe-metric-filters --log-group-name ``` 3. Ensure the output from the above command contains the following: ``` filterPattern: {($.eventSource = ec2.amazonaws.com) && ($.eventName = CreateRoute) || ($.eventName = CreateRouteTable) || ($.eventName = ReplaceRoute) || ($.eventName = ReplaceRouteTableAssociation) || ($.eventName = DeleteRouteTable) || ($.eventName = DeleteRoute) || ($.eventName = DisassociateRouteTable) } ``` 4. Note the `` value associated with the `filterPattern` from step 3. 5. Get a list of CloudWatch alarms, and filter on the `` captured in step 4: ``` aws cloudwatch describe-alarms --query 'MetricAlarms[?MetricName==]' ``` 6. Note the `AlarmActions` value; this will provide the SNS topic ARN value. 7. Ensure there is at least one active subscriber to the SNS topic: ``` aws sns list-subscriptions-by-topic --topic-arn ``` - At least one subscription should have SubscriptionArn with a valid AWS ARN. - Example of valid SubscriptionArn: `arn:aws:sns::::`", + "AdditionalInformation": "Configuring a log metric filter and alarm on a multi-region (global) CloudTrail trail: - ensures that activities from all regions (both used and unused) are monitored - ensures that activities on all supported global services are monitored - ensures that all management events across all regions are monitored", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/receive-cloudtrail-log-files-from-multiple-regions.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudwatch-alarms-for-cloudtrail.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/dg/SubscribeTopic.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.14", + "Description": "Ensure VPC changes are monitored", + "Checks": [ + "cloudwatch_changes_to_vpcs_alarm_configured" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Real-time monitoring of API calls can be achieved by directing CloudTrail Logs to CloudWatch Logs or an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment, and establishing corresponding metric filters and alarms. It is possible to have more than one VPC within an account; additionally, it is also possible to create a peer connection between two VPCs, enabling network traffic to route between them. It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established for changes made to VPCs.", + "RationaleStatement": "CloudWatch is an AWS native service that allows you to observe and monitor resources and applications. CloudTrail logs can also be sent to an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment for monitoring and alerting. VPCs in AWS are logically isolated virtual networks that can be used to launch AWS resources. Monitoring changes to VPC configurations will help ensure that VPC traffic flow is not negatively impacted. Changes to VPCs can affect network accessibility from the public internet and additionally impact VPC traffic flow to and from the resources launched in the VPC.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following steps to set up the metric filter, alarm, SNS topic, and subscription: 1. Create a metric filter based on the provided filter pattern that checks for VPC changes and uses the `` taken from audit step 1: ``` aws logs put-metric-filter --log-group-name --filter-name --metric-transformations metricName=,metricNamespace='CISBenchmark',metricValue=1 --filter-pattern '{ ($.eventName = CreateVpc) || ($.eventName = DeleteVpc) || ($.eventName = ModifyVpcAttribute) || ($.eventName = AcceptVpcPeeringConnection) || ($.eventName = CreateVpcPeeringConnection) || ($.eventName = DeleteVpcPeeringConnection) || ($.eventName = RejectVpcPeeringConnection) || ($.eventName = AttachClassicLinkVpc) || ($.eventName = DetachClassicLinkVpc) || ($.eventName = DisableVpcClassicLink) || ($.eventName = EnableVpcClassicLink) }' ``` **Note**: You can choose your own `metricName` and `metricNamespace` strings. Using the same `metricNamespace` for all Foundations Benchmark metrics will group them together. 2. Create an SNS topic that the alarm will notify: ``` aws sns create-topic --name ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same topic for all monitoring alarms. **Note**: Capture the `TopicArn` that is displayed when creating the SNS topic in step 2. 3. Create an SNS subscription for the topic created in step 2: ``` aws sns subscribe --topic-arn --protocol --notification-endpoint ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same subscription for all monitoring alarms. 4. Create an alarm that is associated with the CloudWatch Logs metric filter created in step 1 and the SNS topic created in step 2: ``` aws cloudwatch put-metric-alarm --alarm-name --metric-name --statistic Sum --period 300 --threshold 1 --comparison-operator GreaterThanOrEqualToThreshold --evaluation-periods 1 --namespace 'CISBenchmark' --alarm-actions ```", + "AuditProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following to ensure that there is at least one active multi-region CloudTrail trail with the prescribed metric filters and alarms configured: 1. Identify the log group name that is configured for use with the active multi-region CloudTrail trail: - List all CloudTrail trails: `aws cloudtrail describe-trails` - Identify multi-region CloudTrail trails: `Trails with IsMultiRegionTrail set to true` - Note the value associated with Name:`` - Note the `` within the value associated with CloudWatchLogsLogGroupArn - Example: `arn:aws:logs:::log-group::*` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail is active: - `aws cloudtrail get-trail-status --name ` - Ensure `IsLogging` is set to `TRUE` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail captures all management events: - `aws cloudtrail get-event-selectors --trail-name ` - Ensure there is at least one `event selector` for a trail with `IncludeManagementEvents` set to `true` and `ReadWriteType` set to `All` 2. Get a list of all associated metric filters for the `` captured in step 1: ``` aws logs describe-metric-filters --log-group-name ``` 3. Ensure the output from the above command contains the following: ``` filterPattern: { ($.eventName = CreateVpc) || ($.eventName = DeleteVpc) || ($.eventName = ModifyVpcAttribute) || ($.eventName = AcceptVpcPeeringConnection) || ($.eventName = CreateVpcPeeringConnection) || ($.eventName = DeleteVpcPeeringConnection) || ($.eventName = RejectVpcPeeringConnection) || ($.eventName = AttachClassicLinkVpc) || ($.eventName = DetachClassicLinkVpc) || ($.eventName = DisableVpcClassicLink) || ($.eventName = EnableVpcClassicLink) } ``` 4. Note the `` value associated with the `filterPattern` from step 3. 5. Get a list of CloudWatch alarms, and filter on the `` captured in step 4: ``` aws cloudwatch describe-alarms --query 'MetricAlarms[?MetricName==]' ``` 6. Note the `AlarmActions` value; this will provide the SNS topic ARN value. 7. Ensure there is at least one active subscriber to the SNS topic: ``` aws sns list-subscriptions-by-topic --topic-arn ``` - At least one subscription should have SubscriptionArn with a valid AWS ARN. - Example of valid SubscriptionArn: `arn:aws:sns::::`", + "AdditionalInformation": "Configuring a log metric filter and alarm on a multi-region (global) CloudTrail trail: - ensures that activities from all regions (both used and unused) are monitored - ensures that activities on all supported global services are monitored - ensures that all management events across all regions are monitored", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/receive-cloudtrail-log-files-from-multiple-regions.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudwatch-alarms-for-cloudtrail.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/dg/SubscribeTopic.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.15", + "Description": "Ensure AWS Organizations changes are monitored", + "Checks": [ + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_aws_organizations_changes" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Real-time monitoring of API calls can be achieved by directing CloudTrail Logs to CloudWatch Logs or an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment, and establishing corresponding metric filters and alarms. It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established for changes made to AWS Organizations in the master AWS account.", + "RationaleStatement": "CloudWatch is an AWS native service that allows you to observe and monitor resources and applications. CloudTrail logs can also be sent to an external Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) environment for monitoring and alerting. Monitoring AWS Organizations changes can help you prevent unwanted, accidental, or intentional modifications that may lead to unauthorized access or other security breaches. This monitoring technique helps ensure that any unexpected changes made within your AWS Organizations can be investigated and that any unwanted changes can be rolled back.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following steps to set up the metric filter, alarm, SNS topic, and subscription: 1. Create a metric filter based on the provided filter pattern that checks for AWS Organizations changes and uses the `` taken from audit step 1: ``` aws logs put-metric-filter --log-group-name --filter-name --metric-transformations metricName=,metricNamespace='CISBenchmark',metricValue=1 --filter-pattern '{ ($.eventSource = organizations.amazonaws.com) && (($.eventName = AcceptHandshake) || ($.eventName = AttachPolicy) || ($.eventName = CreateAccount) || ($.eventName = CreateOrganizationalUnit) || ($.eventName = CreatePolicy) || ($.eventName = DeclineHandshake) || ($.eventName = DeleteOrganization) || ($.eventName = DeleteOrganizationalUnit) || ($.eventName = DeletePolicy) || ($.eventName = DetachPolicy) || ($.eventName = DisablePolicyType) || ($.eventName = EnablePolicyType) || ($.eventName = InviteAccountToOrganization) || ($.eventName = LeaveOrganization) || ($.eventName = MoveAccount) || ($.eventName = RemoveAccountFromOrganization) || ($.eventName = UpdatePolicy) || ($.eventName = UpdateOrganizationalUnit)) }' ``` **Note**: You can choose your own `metricName` and `metricNamespace` strings. Using the same `metricNamespace` for all Foundations Benchmark metrics will group them together. 2. Create an SNS topic that the alarm will notify: ``` aws sns create-topic --name ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same topic for all monitoring alarms. **Note**: Capture the `TopicArn` that is displayed when creating the SNS topic in step 2. 3. Create an SNS subscription for the topic created in step 2: ``` aws sns subscribe --topic-arn --protocol --notification-endpoint ``` **Note**: You can execute this command once and then reuse the same subscription for all monitoring alarms. 4. Create an alarm that is associated with the CloudWatch Logs metric filter created in step 1 and the SNS topic created in step 2: ``` aws cloudwatch put-metric-alarm --alarm-name --metric-name --statistic Sum --period 300 --threshold 1 --comparison-operator GreaterThanOrEqualToThreshold --evaluation-periods 1 --namespace 'CISBenchmark' --alarm-actions ```", + "AuditProcedure": "If you are using CloudTrail trails and CloudWatch, perform the following to ensure that there is at least one active multi-region CloudTrail trail with the prescribed metric filters and alarms configured: 1. Identify the log group name that is configured for use with the active multi-region CloudTrail trail: - List all CloudTrail trails: `aws cloudtrail describe-trails` - Identify multi-region CloudTrail trails: `Trails with IsMultiRegionTrail set to true` - Note the value associated with Name:`` - Note the `` within the value associated with CloudWatchLogsLogGroupArn - Example: `arn:aws:logs:::log-group::*` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail is active: - `aws cloudtrail get-trail-status --name ` - Ensure `IsLogging` is set to `TRUE` - Ensure the identified multi-region CloudTrail trail captures all management events: - `aws cloudtrail get-event-selectors --trail-name ` - Ensure there is at least one `event selector` for a trail with `IncludeManagementEvents` set to `true` and `ReadWriteType` set to `All` 2. Get a list of all associated metric filters for the `` captured in step 1: ``` aws logs describe-metric-filters --log-group-name ``` 3. Ensure the output from the above command contains the following: ``` filterPattern: { ($.eventSource = organizations.amazonaws.com) && (($.eventName = AcceptHandshake) || ($.eventName = AttachPolicy) || ($.eventName = CreateAccount) || ($.eventName = CreateOrganizationalUnit) || ($.eventName = CreatePolicy) || ($.eventName = DeclineHandshake) || ($.eventName = DeleteOrganization) || ($.eventName = DeleteOrganizationalUnit) || ($.eventName = DeletePolicy) || ($.eventName = DetachPolicy) || ($.eventName = DisablePolicyType) || ($.eventName = EnablePolicyType) || ($.eventName = InviteAccountToOrganization) || ($.eventName = LeaveOrganization) || ($.eventName = MoveAccount) || ($.eventName = RemoveAccountFromOrganization) || ($.eventName = UpdatePolicy) || ($.eventName = UpdateOrganizationalUnit)) } ``` 4. Note the `` value associated with the `filterPattern` from step 3. 5. Get a list of CloudWatch alarms, and filter on the `` captured in step 4: ``` aws cloudwatch describe-alarms --query 'MetricAlarms[?MetricName==]' ``` 6. Note the `AlarmActions` value; this will provide the SNS topic ARN value. 7. Ensure there is at least one active subscriber to the SNS topic: ``` aws sns list-subscriptions-by-topic --topic-arn ``` - At least one subscription should have SubscriptionArn with a valid AWS ARN. - Example of valid SubscriptionArn: `arn:aws:sns::::`", + "AdditionalInformation": "Configuring a log metric filter and alarm on a multi-region (global) CloudTrail trail: - ensures that activities from all regions (both used and unused) are monitored - ensures that activities on all supported global services are monitored - ensures that all management events across all regions are monitored", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudwatch-alarms-for-cloudtrail.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_security_incident-response.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.16", + "Description": "Ensure AWS Security Hub is enabled", + "Checks": [ + "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Security Hub collects security data from various AWS accounts, services, and supported third-party partner products, helping you analyze your security trends and identify the highest-priority security issues. When you enable Security Hub, it begins to consume, aggregate, organize, and prioritize findings from the AWS services that you have enabled, such as Amazon GuardDuty, Amazon Inspector, and Amazon Macie. You can also enable integrations with AWS partner security products.", + "RationaleStatement": "AWS Security Hub provides you with a comprehensive view of your security state in AWS and helps you check your environment against security industry standards and best practices, enabling you to quickly assess the security posture across your AWS accounts.", + "ImpactStatement": "It is recommended that AWS Security Hub be enabled in all regions. AWS Security Hub requires that AWS Config be enabled.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To grant the permissions required to enable Security Hub, attach the Security Hub managed policy `AWSSecurityHubFullAccess` to an IAM user, group, or role. Enabling Security Hub: **From Console:** 1. Use the credentials of the IAM identity to sign in to the Security Hub console. 2. When you open the Security Hub console for the first time, choose `Go to Security Hub`. 3. The `Security standards` section on the welcome page lists supported security standards. Check the box for a standard to enable it. 3. Choose `Enable Security Hub`. **From Command Line:** 1. Run the `enable-security-hub` command, including `--enable-default-standards` to enable the default standards: ``` aws securityhub enable-security-hub --enable-default-standards ``` 2. To enable Security Hub without the default standards, include `--no-enable-default-standards`: ``` aws securityhub enable-security-hub --no-enable-default-standards ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Follow this process to evaluate AWS Security Hub configuration per region: **From Console:** 1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and open the AWS Security Hub console at https://console.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/. 2. On the top right of the console, select the target Region. 3. If the Security Hub > Summary page is displayed, then Security Hub is set up for the selected region. 4. If presented with Setup Security Hub or Get Started With Security Hub, refer to the remediation steps. 5. Repeat steps 2 to 4 for each region. **From Command Line:** Run the following command to verify the Security Hub status: ``` aws securityhub describe-hub ``` This will list the Security Hub status by region. Check for a 'SubscribedAt' value. Example output: ``` { HubArn: , SubscribedAt: 2022-08-19T17:06:42.398Z, AutoEnableControls: true } ``` An error will be returned if Security Hub is not enabled. Example error: ``` An error occurred (InvalidAccessException) when calling the DescribeHub operation: Account is not subscribed to AWS Security Hub ```", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/latest/userguide/securityhub-get-started.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/latest/userguide/securityhub-enable.html#securityhub-enable-api:https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/securityhub/enable-security-hub.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.1", + "Description": "Ensure EBS volume encryption is enabled in all regions", + "Checks": [ + "ec2_ebs_default_encryption" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Networking", + "SubSection": "6.1 Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2)", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) supports encryption at rest when using the Elastic Block Store (EBS) service. While disabled by default, forcing encryption at EBS volume creation is supported.", + "RationaleStatement": "Encrypting data at rest reduces the likelihood of unintentional exposure and can nullify the impact of disclosure if the encryption remains unbroken.", + "ImpactStatement": "Losing access to or removing the KMS key used by the EBS volumes will result in the inability to access the volumes.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Login to the AWS Management Console and open the Amazon EC2 console using https://console.aws.amazon.com/ec2/. 2. Under `Account attributes`, click `EBS encryption`. 3. Click `Manage`. 4. Check the `Enable` box. 5. Click `Update EBS encryption`. 6. Repeat for each region in which EBS volume encryption is not enabled by default. **Note:** EBS volume encryption is configured per region. **From Command Line:** 1. Run the following command: ``` aws --region ec2 enable-ebs-encryption-by-default ``` 2. Verify that `EbsEncryptionByDefault: true` is displayed. 3. Repeat for each region in which EBS volume encryption is not enabled by default. **Note:** EBS volume encryption is configured per region.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Login to the AWS Management Console and open the Amazon EC2 console using https://console.aws.amazon.com/ec2/. 2. Under `Settings`, click `EBS encryption`. 3. Verify `Always encrypt new EBS volumes` displays `Enabled`. 4. Repeat for each region in use. **Note:** EBS volume encryption is configured per region. **From Command Line:** 1. Run the following command: ``` aws --region ec2 get-ebs-encryption-by-default ``` 2. Verify that `EbsEncryptionByDefault: true` is displayed. 3. Repeat for each region in use. **Note:** EBS volume encryption is configured per region.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Default EBS volume encryption only applies to newly created EBS volumes; existing EBS volumes are **not** converted automatically.", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/EBSEncryption.html:https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/new-opt-in-to-default-encryption-for-new-ebs-volumes/", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.2", + "Description": "Ensure CIFS access is restricted to trusted networks to prevent unauthorized access", + "Checks": [ + "ec2_instance_port_cifs_exposed_to_internet" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Networking", + "SubSection": "6.1 Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2)", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Common Internet File System (CIFS) is a network file-sharing protocol that allows systems to share files over a network. However, unrestricted CIFS access can expose your data to unauthorized users, leading to potential security risks. It is important to restrict CIFS access to only trusted networks and users to prevent unauthorized access and data breaches.", + "RationaleStatement": "Allowing unrestricted CIFS access can lead to significant security vulnerabilities, as it may allow unauthorized users to access sensitive files and data. By restricting CIFS access to known and trusted networks, you can minimize the risk of unauthorized access and protect sensitive data from exposure to potential attackers. Implementing proper network access controls and permissions is essential for maintaining the security and integrity of your file-sharing systems.", + "ImpactStatement": "Restricting CIFS access may require additional configuration and management effort. However, the benefits of enhanced security and reduced risk of unauthorized access to sensitive data far outweigh the potential challenges.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Login to the AWS Management Console. 2. Navigate to the EC2 Dashboard and select the Security Groups section under `Network & Security`. 3. Identify the security group that allows unrestricted ingress on port 445. 4. Select the security group and click the `Edit Inbound Rules` button. 5. Locate the rule allowing unrestricted access on port 445 (typically listed as `0.0.0.0/0` or `::/0`). 6. Modify the rule to restrict access to specific IP ranges or trusted networks only. 7. Save the changes to the security group. **From Command Line:** 1. Run the following command to remove or modify the unrestricted rule for CIFS access: ``` aws ec2 revoke-security-group-ingress --region --group-id --protocol tcp --port 445 --cidr 0.0.0.0/0 ``` - Optionally, run the `authorise-security-group-ingress` command to create a new rule, specifying a trusted CIDR range instead of `0.0.0.0/0`. 2. Confirm the changes by describing the security group again and ensuring the unrestricted access rule has been removed or appropriately restricted: ``` aws ec2 describe-security-groups --region --group-ids --query 'SecurityGroups[*].IpPermissions[?ToPort==`445`].{CIDR:IpRanges[*].CidrIp,Port:ToPort}' ``` 3. Repeat the remediation for other security groups and regions as necessary.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Login to the AWS Management Console. 2. Navigate to the EC2 Dashboard and select the Security Groups section under `Network & Security`. 3. Identify the security groups associated with instances or resources that may be using CIFS. 4. Review the inbound rules of each security group to check for rules that allow unrestricted access on port 445 (the port used by CIFS). - Specifically, look for inbound rules that allow access from `0.0.0.0/0` or `::/0` on port 445. 5. Document any instances where unrestricted access is allowed and verify whether it is necessary for the specific use case. **From Command Line:** 1. Run the following command to list all security groups and identify those associated with CIFS: ``` aws ec2 describe-security-groups --region --query 'SecurityGroups[*].GroupId' ``` 2. Check for any inbound rules that allow unrestricted access on port 445 using the following command: ``` aws ec2 describe-security-groups --region --group-ids --query 'SecurityGroups[*].IpPermissions[?ToPort==`445`].{CIDR:IpRanges[*].CidrIp,Port:ToPort}' ``` - Look for `0.0.0.0/0` or `::/0` in the output, which indicates unrestricted access. 3. Repeat the audit for other regions and security groups as necessary.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.2", + "Description": "Ensure no Network ACLs allow ingress from 0.0.0.0/0 to remote server administration ports", + "Checks": [ + "ec2_networkacl_allow_ingress_any_port", + "ec2_networkacl_allow_ingress_tcp_port_22", + "ec2_networkacl_allow_ingress_tcp_port_3389" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Networking", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The Network Access Control List (NACL) function provides stateless filtering of ingress and egress network traffic to AWS resources. It is recommended that no NACL allows unrestricted ingress access to remote server administration ports, such as SSH on port `22` and RDP on port `3389`, using either the TCP (6), UDP (17), or ALL (-1) protocols.", + "RationaleStatement": "Public access to remote server administration ports, such as 22 (when used for SSH, not SFTP) and 3389, increases the attack surface of resources and unnecessarily raises the risk of resource compromise.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Console:** Perform the following steps to remediate a network ACL: 1. Login to the AWS VPC Console at https://console.aws.amazon.com/vpc/home. 2. In the left pane, click `Network ACLs`. 3. For each network ACL that needs remediation, perform the following: - Select the network ACL. - Click the `Inbound Rules` tab. - Click `Edit inbound rules`. - Either A) update the Source field to a range other than 0.0.0.0/0, or B) click `Delete` to remove the offending inbound rule. - Click `Save`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Console:** Perform the following steps to determine if the account is configured as prescribed: 1. Login to the AWS VPC Console at https://console.aws.amazon.com/vpc/home. 2. In the left pane, click `Network ACLs`. 3. For each network ACL, perform the following: - Select the network ACL. - Click the `Inbound Rules` tab. - Ensure that no rule exists which has a port range that includes port `22` or `3389`, uses the protocols TCP (6), UDP (17), or ALL (-1), or other remote server administration ports for your environment, has a `Source` of `0.0.0.0/0`, and shows `ALLOW`. **Note:** A port value of `ALL` or a port range such as `0-3389` includes port `22`, `3389`, and potentially other remote server administration ports.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/vpc-network-acls.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/VPC_Security.html#VPC_Security_Comparison", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.3", + "Description": "Ensure no security groups allow ingress from 0.0.0.0/0 to remote server administration ports", + "Checks": [ + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_all_ports", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_22", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_3389" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Networking", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Security groups provide stateful filtering of ingress and egress network traffic to AWS resources. It is recommended that no security group allows unrestricted ingress access to remote server administration ports, such as SSH on port `22` and RDP on port `3389`, using either the TCP (6), UDP (17), or ALL (-1) protocols.", + "RationaleStatement": "Public access to remote server administration ports, such as 22 (when used for SSH, not SFTP) and 3389, increases the attack surface of resources and unnecessarily raises the risk of resource compromise.", + "ImpactStatement": "When updating an existing environment, ensure that administrators have access to remote server administration ports through another mechanism before removing access by deleting the 0.0.0.0/0 inbound rule.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Perform the following to implement the prescribed state: 1. Login to the AWS VPC Console at [https://console.aws.amazon.com/vpc/home](https://console.aws.amazon.com/vpc/home). 2. In the left pane, click `Security Groups`. 3. For each security group, perform the following: - Select the security group. - Click the `Inbound Rules` tab. - Click the `Edit inbound rules` button. - Identify the rules to be edited or removed. - Either A) update the Source field to a range other than 0.0.0.0/0, or B) click `Delete` to remove the offending inbound rule. - Click `Save rules`.", + "AuditProcedure": "Perform the following to determine if the account is configured as prescribed: 1. Login to the AWS VPC Console at [https://console.aws.amazon.com/vpc/home](https://console.aws.amazon.com/vpc/home). 2. In the left pane, click `Security Groups`. 3. For each security group, perform the following: - Select the security group. - Click the `Inbound Rules` tab. - Ensure that no rule exists which has a port range including port `22` or `3389`, uses the protocols TCP (6), UDP (17), or ALL (-1), or other remote server administration ports for your environment, and has a `Source` of `0.0.0.0/0`. **Note:** A port value of `ALL` or a port range such as `0-3389` includes port `22`, `3389`, and potentially other remote server administration ports.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-security-groups.html#deleting-security-group-rule", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.4", + "Description": "Ensure no security groups allow ingress from ::/0 to remote server administration ports", + "Checks": [ + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_all_ports", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_22", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_3389" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Networking", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Security groups provide stateful filtering of ingress and egress network traffic to AWS resources. It is recommended that no security group allows unrestricted ingress access to remote server administration ports, such as SSH on port `22` and RDP on port `3389`.", + "RationaleStatement": "Public access to remote server administration ports, such as 22 (when used for SSH, not SFTP) and 3389, increases attack surface of resources and unnecessarily raises the risk of resource compromise.", + "ImpactStatement": "When updating an existing environment, ensure that administrators have access to remote server administration ports through another mechanism before removing access by deleting the ::/0 inbound rule.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Perform the following to implement the prescribed state: 1. Login to the AWS VPC Console at [https://console.aws.amazon.com/vpc/home](https://console.aws.amazon.com/vpc/home). 2. In the left pane, click `Security Groups`. 3. For each security group, perform the following: - Select the security group. - Click the `Inbound Rules` tab. - Click the `Edit inbound rules` button. - Identify the rules to be edited or removed. - Either A) update the Source field to a range other than ::/0, or B) Click `Delete` to remove the offending inbound rule. - Click `Save rules`.", + "AuditProcedure": "Perform the following to determine if the account is configured as prescribed: 1. Login to the AWS VPC Console at [https://console.aws.amazon.com/vpc/home](https://console.aws.amazon.com/vpc/home). 2. In the left pane, click `Security Groups`. 3. For each security group, perform the following: - Select the security group. - Click the `Inbound Rules` tab. - Ensure that no rule exists which has a port range including port `22`, `3389`, or other remote server administration ports for your environment, and has a `Source` of `::/0`. **Note:** A port value of `ALL` or a port range such as `0-3389` includes port `22`, `3389`, and potentially other remote server administration ports.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-security-groups.html#deleting-security-group-rule", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.5", + "Description": "Ensure the default security group of every VPC restricts all traffic", + "Checks": [ + "ec2_securitygroup_default_restrict_traffic" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Networking", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "A VPC comes with a default security group whose initial settings deny all inbound traffic, allow all outbound traffic, and allow all traffic between instances assigned to the security group. If a security group is not specified when an instance is launched, it is automatically assigned to this default security group. Security groups provide stateful filtering of ingress/egress network traffic to AWS resources. It is recommended that the default security group restrict all traffic, both inbound and outbound. The default VPC in every region should have its default security group updated to comply with the following: - No inbound rules. - No outbound rules. Any newly created VPCs will automatically contain a default security group that will need remediation to comply with this recommendation. **Note:** When implementing this recommendation, VPC flow logging is invaluable in determining the least privilege port access required by systems to work properly, as it can log all packet acceptances and rejections occurring under the current security groups. This dramatically reduces the primary barrier to least privilege engineering by discovering the minimum ports required by systems in the environment. Even if the VPC flow logging recommendation in this benchmark is not adopted as a permanent security measure, it should be used during any period of discovery and engineering for least privileged security groups.", + "RationaleStatement": "Configuring all VPC default security groups to restrict all traffic will encourage the development of least privilege security groups and promote the mindful placement of AWS resources into security groups, which will, in turn, reduce the exposure of those resources.", + "ImpactStatement": "Implementing this recommendation in an existing VPC that contains operating resources requires extremely careful migration planning, as the default security groups are likely enabling many ports that are unknown. Enabling VPC flow logging (for accepted connections) in an existing environment that is known to be breach-free will reveal the current pattern of ports being used for each instance to communicate successfully. The migration process should include: - Analyzing VPC flow logs to understand current traffic patterns. - Creating least privilege security groups based on the analyzed data. - Testing the new security group rules in a staging environment before applying them to production.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Perform the following to implement the prescribed state: **Security Group Members** 1. Identify AWS resources that exist within the default security group. 2. Create a set of least-privilege security groups for those resources. 3. Place the resources in those security groups, removing the resources noted in step 1 from the default security group. **Security Group State** 1. Login to the AWS VPC Console at [https://console.aws.amazon.com/vpc/home](https://console.aws.amazon.com/vpc/home). 2. Repeat the following steps for all VPCs, including the default VPC in each AWS region: 3. In the left pane, click `Security Groups`. 4. For each default security group, perform the following: - Select the `default` security group. - Click the `Inbound Rules` tab. - Remove any inbound rules. - Click the `Outbound Rules` tab. - Remove any Outbound rules. **Recommended** IAM groups allow you to edit the name field. After remediating default group rules for all VPCs in all regions, edit this field to add text similar to DO NOT USE. DO NOT ADD RULES.", + "AuditProcedure": "Perform the following to determine if the account is configured as prescribed: **Security Group State** 1. Login to the AWS VPC Console at [https://console.aws.amazon.com/vpc/home](https://console.aws.amazon.com/vpc/home). 2. Repeat the following steps for all VPCs, including the default VPC in each AWS region: 3. In the left pane, click `Security Groups`. 4. For each default security group, perform the following: - Select the `default` security group. - Click the `Inbound Rules` tab and ensure no rules exist. - Click the `Outbound Rules` tab and ensure no rules exist. **Security Group Members** 1. Login to the AWS VPC Console at [https://console.aws.amazon.com/vpc/home](https://console.aws.amazon.com/vpc/home). 2. Repeat the following steps for all default groups in all VPCs, including the default VPC in each AWS region: 3. In the left pane, click `Security Groups`. 4. Copy the ID of the default security group. 5. Change to the EC2 Management Console at https://console.aws.amazon.com/ec2/v2/home. 6. In the filter column type `Security Group ID : `.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/using-network-security.html:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-security-groups.html#default-security-group", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.6", + "Description": "Ensure routing tables for VPC peering are \"least access\"", + "Checks": [ + "vpc_peering_routing_tables_with_least_privilege" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Networking", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Once a VPC peering connection is established, routing tables must be updated to enable any connections between the peered VPCs. These routes can be as specific as desired, even allowing for the peering of a VPC to only a single host on the other side of the connection.", + "RationaleStatement": "Being highly selective in peering routing tables is a very effective way to minimize the impact of a breach, as resources outside of these routes are inaccessible to the peered VPC.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Remove and add route table entries to ensure that the least number of subnets or hosts required to accomplish the purpose of peering are routable. **From Command Line:** 1. For each `` that contains routes that are non-compliant with your routing policy (granting more access than desired), delete the non-compliant route: ``` aws ec2 delete-route --route-table-id --destination-cidr-block ``` 2. Create a new compliant route: ``` aws ec2 create-route --route-table-id --destination-cidr-block --vpc-peering-connection-id ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Review the routing tables of peered VPCs to determine whether they route all subnets of each VPC and whether this is necessary to accomplish the intended purposes of peering the VPCs. **From Command Line:** 1. List all the route tables from a VPC and check if the GatewayId is pointing to a `` (e.g., pcx-1a2b3c4d) and if the DestinationCidrBlock is as specific as desired: ``` aws ec2 describe-route-tables --filter Name=vpc-id,Values= --query RouteTables[*].{RouteTableId:RouteTableId, VpcId:VpcId, Routes:Routes, AssociatedSubnets:Associations[*].SubnetId} ```", + "AdditionalInformation": "If an organization has an AWS Transit Gateway implemented in its VPC architecture, it should look to apply the recommendation above for a least access routing architecture at the AWS Transit Gateway level, in combination with what must be implemented at the standard VPC route table. More specifically, to route traffic between two or more VPCs via a Transit Gateway, VPCs must have an attachment to a Transit Gateway route table as well as a route. Therefore, to avoid routing traffic between VPCs, an attachment to the Transit Gateway route table should only be added where there is an intention to route traffic between the VPCs. As Transit Gateways are capable of hosting multiple route tables, it is possible to group VPCs by attaching them to a common route table.", + "References": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/PeeringGuide/peering-configurations-partial-access.html:https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/ec2/create-vpc-peering-connection.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.7", + "Description": "Ensure that the EC2 Metadata Service only allows IMDSv2", + "Checks": [ + "ec2_instance_imdsv2_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Networking", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "When enabling the Metadata Service on AWS EC2 instances, users have the option of using either Instance Metadata Service Version 1 (IMDSv1; a request/response method) or Instance Metadata Service Version 2 (IMDSv2; a session-oriented method).", + "RationaleStatement": "Instance metadata is data about your instance that you can use to configure or manage the running instance. Instance metadata is divided into [categories](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-metadata.html), such as host name, events, and security groups. When enabling the Metadata Service on AWS EC2 instances, users have the option of using either Instance Metadata Service Version 1 (IMDSv1; a request/response method) or Instance Metadata Service Version 2 (IMDSv2; a session-oriented method). With IMDSv2, every request is now protected by session authentication. A session begins and ends a series of requests that software running on an EC2 instance uses to access the locally stored EC2 instance metadata and credentials. Allowing Version 1 of the service may open EC2 instances to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks, so Amazon recommends utilizing Version 2 for better instance security.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "From Console: 1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and navigate to the EC2 dashboard at [https://console.aws.amazon.com/ec2/](https://console.aws.amazon.com/ec2/). 2. In the left navigation panel, under the `INSTANCES` section, choose `Instances`. 3. Select the EC2 instance that you want to examine. 4. Choose `Actions > Instance Settings > Modify instance metadata options`. 5. Set `Instance metadata service` to `Enable`. 6. Set `IMDSv2` to `Required`. 7. Repeat steps 1-6 to perform the remediation process for other EC2 instances in all applicable AWS region(s). From Command Line: 1. Run the `describe-instances` command, applying the appropriate filters to list the IDs of all existing EC2 instances currently available in the selected region: ``` aws ec2 describe-instances --region --output table --query Reservations[*].Instances[*].InstanceId ``` 2. The command output should return a table with the requested instance IDs. 3. Run the `modify-instance-metadata-options` command with an instance ID obtained from the previous step to update the Instance Metadata Version: ``` aws ec2 modify-instance-metadata-options --instance-id --http-tokens required --region ``` 4. Repeat steps 1-3 to perform the remediation process for other EC2 instances in the same AWS region. 5. Change the region by updating `--region` and repeat the process for other regions.", + "AuditProcedure": "From Console: 1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and navigate to the EC2 dashboard at https://console.aws.amazon.com/ec2/. 2. In the left navigation panel, under the `INSTANCES` section, choose `Instances`. 3. Select the EC2 instance that you want to examine. 4. Check the `IMDSv2` status, and ensure that it is set to `Required`. From Command Line: 1. Run the `describe-instances` command using appropriate filters to list the IDs of all existing EC2 instances currently available in the selected region: ``` aws ec2 describe-instances --region --output table --query Reservations[*].Instances[*].InstanceId ``` 2. The command output should return a table with the requested instance IDs. 3. Run the `describe-instances` command using the instance ID returned in the previous step and apply custom filtering to determine whether the selected instance is using IMDSv2: ``` aws ec2 describe-instances --region --instance-ids --query Reservations[*].Instances[*].MetadataOptions --output table ``` 4. Ensure that for all EC2 instances, `HttpTokens` is set to `required` and `State` is set to `applied`. 5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 to verify the other EC2 instances provisioned within the current region. 6. Repeat steps 1–5 to perform the audit process for other AWS regions.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/defense-in-depth-open-firewalls-reverse-proxies-ssrf-vulnerabilities-ec2-instance-metadata-service/:https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ec2/describe-instances.html", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.8", + "Description": "Ensure VPC Endpoints are used for access to AWS Services", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Networking", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that Amazon VPCs use VPC endpoints (gateway or interface endpoints) for access to AWS services such as Amazon S3 and DynamoDB, so that traffic from workloads to AWS services stays on the Amazon private network instead of traversing the public internet. VPC endpoints provide private connectivity between VPCs and supported AWS services without requiring an internet gateway, NAT gateway, or public IP addresses.", + "RationaleStatement": "Accessing AWS services over the public internet increases exposure to network-level threats, relies on internet routing, and makes it harder to tightly control egress paths. Using VPC endpoints allows workloads to reach AWS services over the Amazon private network, which reduces reliance on internet gateways and NAT gateways, simplifies egress filtering, and helps enforce data-perimeter and \"private-only\" patterns for sensitive workloads.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enforcing the use of VPC endpoints may require changes to existing network architectures, including creating and managing endpoints in each VPC, updating route tables, adjusting security groups, and potentially removing or tightening some internet/NAT gateway paths. This can introduce additional operational overhead and cost (per-endpoint charges for interface endpoints) and may require updates to IaC templates and deployment pipelines.", + "RemediationProcedure": "In this example, we are going to add S3 gateway endpoint and SQS interface endpoint to a VPC. You can follow similar remediation instructions for other services. 1. Create S3 Gateway Endpoint ``` aws ec2 create-vpc-endpoint --region REGION --route-table-ids ROUTE_TABLE_ID --vpc-id VPC_ID --service-name com.amazonaws.REGION.s3 --vpc-endpoint-type Gateway --query \"VpcEndpoint.VpcEndpointId\" --output text ``` - Provide values for REGION, ROUTE_TABLE_ID, VPC_ID - AWS automatically creates the routes for the AWS service in the route table provided as part of above command. 2. Verify that the gateway routes have been adequately created ``` aws ec2 describe-route-tables --region REGION --route-table-ids ROUTE_TABLE_ID --query \"RouteTables[0].Routes[?DestinationPrefixListId=='pl-xxxxxxxx']\" ``` - Provide values for REGION, ROUTE_TABLE_ID - pl-xxxxxxxx: replace with the specific prefix list for S3 in that region 3. Create an SQS Interface Endpoint ``` aws ec2 create-vpc-endpoint --vpc-id VPC_ID --service-name com.amazonaws.REGION.sqs --vpc-endpoint-type Interface --subnet-ids PRIVATE_SUBNET_1_ID PRIVATE_SUBNET_2_ID --security-group-ids SECURITY_GROUP_ID --vpc-endpoint-policy VPC_ENDPOINT_POLICY --query \"VpcEndpoint.VpcEndpointId\" --output text ``` - SECURITY_GROUP_ID: Update security groups for interface endpoint. Ensure the interface endpoint security group allows inbound traffic from your workloads. - VPC_ENDPOINT_POLICY: Create a restrictive Endpoint policy to ensure only certain AWS services could be reached and only specific actions can be performed. - AWS automatically creates Elastic Network Interfaces (ENIs) for the interface endpoint which allows any traffic from PRIVATE_SUBNET_1_ID PRIVATE_SUBNET_2_ID intended for SQS to be routed through the Interface Gateway. 4. Test and validate endpoint connectivity from an EC2 instance in a private subnet: - Test S3 (gateway endpoint) ``` aws s3 ls s3://your-test-bucket --region REGION ``` - Test SQS (interface endpoint) ``` aws sqs list-queues --region REGION ```", + "AuditProcedure": "1. Identify in-scope VPCs and services. - Determine which VPCs host production or sensitive workloads that should access AWS services securely via endpoints. - For those VPCs, identify the AWS services they depend on (for example, S3 for data storage, DynamoDB for database, etc.). 2. For each in-scope VPC, check for existing VPC endpoints. ``` aws ec2 describe-vpc-endpoints --region REGION --filters \"Name=vpc-id,Values=VPC_ID\" --query \"VpcEndpoints[*].[VpcEndpointId,VpcEndpointType,ServiceName,State]\" --output table ``` - Provide the REGION and VPC_ID - `VpcEndpointType` tells you whether the endpoint is Gateway or Interface. - `ServiceName` shows which AWS service the endpoint is for (for example, com.amazonaws.us-east-1.s3, com.amazonaws.us-east-1.dynamodb, com.amazonaws.us-east-1.ssm). 3. For each interface endpoint, verify subnet attachment across relevant AZs/subnets. ``` aws ec2 describe-vpc-endpoints --region REGION --vpc-endpoint-ids INTERFACE_ENDPOINT_ID --query \"VpcEndpoints[*].[VpcEndpointId,ServiceName,SubnetIds,State]\" --output json ``` - Provide the REGION and INTERFACE_ENDPOINT_ID 4. For each gateway endpoint, verify that the route tables for the relevant subnets send traffic to the endpoint (via the AWS-managed prefix list), not via internet/NAT gateways. - Identify relevant subnets in the VPC that need to have a route to gateway endpoint: ``` aws ec2 describe-subnets --region REGION --filters \"Name=vpc-id,Values=,VPC_ID\" --query \"Subnets[*].[SubnetId,AvailabilityZone,MapPublicIpOnLaunch,CidrBlock]\" --output table ``` - Provide the REGION and VPC_ID - For each relevant subnet, identify the route table associated with it: ``` aws ec2 describe-route-tables --region REGION --filters \"Name=association.subnet-id,Values=SUBNET_ID\" --query \"RouteTables[*].RouteTableId\" --output text ``` - Provide the REGION and SUBNET_ID - For each route table associated with relevant subnets, inspect routes: ``` aws ec2 describe-route-tables --region REGION --route-table-ids ROUTE_TABLE_ID --query \"RouteTables[0].Routes[*].[DestinationPrefixListId,GatewayId,NatGatewayId,State]\" --output table ``` - Provide the REGION and ROUTE_TABLE_ID For S3/DynamoDB gateway endpoints, you should see a `DestinationPrefixListId` (for example, pl-xxxxxxxx) with `GatewayId` equal to the endpoint (vpce-xxxx). If S3/DynamoDB are used by workloads in those subnets but traffic is only routed via igw-xxxx or nat-xxxx (and no prefix-list/endpoint route exists), then VPC endpoints are not being used for securing network traffic for these services.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/cisa_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/cisa_aws.json index fa8e27a061..27b06a1ea4 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/cisa_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/cisa_aws.json @@ -136,6 +136,20 @@ "ec2_securitygroup_default_restrict_traffic", "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_22", "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_all_ports" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -367,6 +381,20 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/ens_rd2022_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/ens_rd2022_aws.json index f6c574daef..144437ce52 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/ens_rd2022_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/ens_rd2022_aws.json @@ -598,6 +598,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -624,6 +632,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -755,6 +771,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -781,6 +805,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -913,6 +945,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -940,6 +980,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -966,6 +1014,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1743,6 +1799,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1821,6 +1885,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1873,6 +1945,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1925,6 +2005,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1951,6 +2039,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1977,6 +2073,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -2003,6 +2107,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -2056,6 +2168,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -2082,6 +2202,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -2366,7 +2494,10 @@ } ], "Checks": [ - "elbv2_insecure_ssl_ciphers" + "elbv2_insecure_ssl_ciphers", + "cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled", + "apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled", + "transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled" ] }, { @@ -2389,7 +2520,10 @@ } ], "Checks": [ - "elbv2_insecure_ssl_ciphers" + "elbv2_insecure_ssl_ciphers", + "cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled", + "apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled", + "transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled" ] }, { @@ -4304,6 +4438,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "drs_job_exist" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "drs_job_exist", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/fedramp_20x_ksi_low_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/fedramp_20x_ksi_low_aws.json index 6c6c500582..15763ef48e 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/fedramp_20x_ksi_low_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/fedramp_20x_ksi_low_aws.json @@ -37,6 +37,14 @@ "ssm_managed_compliant_patching", "ssm_managed_instance_compliance_association_compliant", "ssm_managed_instance_compliance_patch_compliant" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -146,6 +154,20 @@ "inspector2_active_findings_exist", "securityhub_enabled", "sns_topics_kms_encryption_at_rest_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -205,6 +227,14 @@ "resourceexplorer_indexes_found", "ssm_managed_instance_compliance_association_compliant", "trustedadvisor_premium_support_plan_subscribed" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -349,6 +379,14 @@ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", "inspector2_is_enabled", "resourceexplorer_indexes_found" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] } ] diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/fedramp_low_revision_4_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/fedramp_low_revision_4_aws.json index 9824798552..059de69675 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/fedramp_low_revision_4_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/fedramp_low_revision_4_aws.json @@ -46,6 +46,20 @@ "redshift_cluster_audit_logging", "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -115,6 +129,20 @@ "ec2_networkacl_allow_ingress_any_port", "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_22", "ec2_networkacl_allow_ingress_any_port" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -173,6 +201,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "cloudwatch_log_group_retention_policy_specific_days_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "cloudwatch_log_group_retention_policy_specific_days_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "log_group_retention_days", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 90 + } ] }, { @@ -198,6 +234,20 @@ "rds_instance_enhanced_monitoring_enabled", "redshift_cluster_audit_logging", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -251,6 +301,14 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "ssm_managed_compliant_patching", "ssm_managed_compliant_patching" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -336,6 +394,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -373,6 +445,14 @@ "rds_instance_multi_az", "redshift_cluster_automated_snapshot", "s3_bucket_object_versioning" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/fedramp_moderate_revision_4_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/fedramp_moderate_revision_4_aws.json index c914a58b2c..eaa3ea25dc 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/fedramp_moderate_revision_4_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/fedramp_moderate_revision_4_aws.json @@ -36,6 +36,20 @@ "iam_user_accesskey_unused", "iam_user_console_access_unused", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -65,6 +79,20 @@ "redshift_cluster_audit_logging", "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -82,6 +110,20 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -140,6 +182,20 @@ "redshift_cluster_audit_logging", "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -191,6 +247,38 @@ "iam_user_access_not_stale_to_sagemaker", "iam_user_accesskey_unused", "iam_user_console_access_unused" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "iam_user_accesskey_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_access_keys_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_user_console_access_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_console_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_user_access_not_stale_to_bedrock", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_bedrock_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_role_access_not_stale_to_bedrock", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_bedrock_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_user_access_not_stale_to_sagemaker", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_sagemaker_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + } ] }, { @@ -371,6 +459,20 @@ "ec2_networkacl_allow_ingress_any_port", "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_22", "ec2_networkacl_allow_ingress_any_port" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -507,6 +609,20 @@ "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -575,6 +691,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "cloudwatch_log_group_retention_policy_specific_days_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "cloudwatch_log_group_retention_policy_specific_days_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "log_group_retention_days", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 90 + } ] }, { @@ -631,6 +755,20 @@ "rds_instance_enhanced_monitoring_enabled", "redshift_cluster_audit_logging", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -720,6 +858,14 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "ssm_managed_compliant_patching", "ssm_managed_compliant_patching" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -887,6 +1033,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -909,6 +1069,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -927,6 +1101,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -945,6 +1133,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -961,6 +1163,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -995,6 +1205,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1061,6 +1285,14 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "rds_instance_multi_az", "s3_bucket_object_versioning" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1145,6 +1377,9 @@ "Checks": [ "apigateway_restapi_client_certificate_enabled", "elbv2_insecure_ssl_ciphers", + "cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled", + "apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled", + "transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled", "elb_ssl_listeners", "opensearch_service_domains_node_to_node_encryption_enabled", "s3_bucket_secure_transport_policy" @@ -1164,6 +1399,9 @@ "Checks": [ "apigateway_restapi_client_certificate_enabled", "elbv2_insecure_ssl_ciphers", + "cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled", + "apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled", + "transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled", "elb_ssl_listeners", "opensearch_service_domains_node_to_node_encryption_enabled", "s3_bucket_secure_transport_policy" @@ -1279,6 +1517,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1301,6 +1547,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "redshift_cluster_audit_logging", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1328,6 +1588,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "redshift_cluster_audit_logging", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1355,6 +1629,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "redshift_cluster_audit_logging", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1382,6 +1670,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "redshift_cluster_audit_logging", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1408,6 +1710,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/ffiec_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/ffiec_aws.json index 23ab8953b6..8a50b79925 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/ffiec_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/ffiec_aws.json @@ -37,6 +37,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -74,6 +82,20 @@ "cloudtrail_cloudwatch_logging_enabled", "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -148,6 +170,20 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -166,6 +202,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "ssm_managed_compliant_patching" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -183,6 +233,20 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -237,6 +301,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -254,6 +332,20 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -367,6 +459,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -386,6 +486,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -404,6 +518,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "ssm_managed_compliant_patching" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -487,6 +615,9 @@ "Checks": [ "apigateway_restapi_client_certificate_enabled", "elbv2_insecure_ssl_ciphers", + "cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled", + "apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled", + "transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled", "elb_ssl_listeners", "s3_bucket_secure_transport_policy" ] @@ -823,6 +954,20 @@ "cloudwatch_changes_to_vpcs_alarm_configured", "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -868,6 +1013,20 @@ "redshift_cluster_audit_logging", "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/gdpr_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/gdpr_aws.json index 930af1db58..a97a11e3dc 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/gdpr_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/gdpr_aws.json @@ -59,6 +59,14 @@ "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_security_group_changes", "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_unauthorized_api_calls", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -85,6 +93,14 @@ "kms_cmk_rotation_enabled", "redshift_cluster_audit_logging", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/gxp_21_cfr_part_11_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/gxp_21_cfr_part_11_aws.json index 39534c4fdc..871af9e726 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/gxp_21_cfr_part_11_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/gxp_21_cfr_part_11_aws.json @@ -266,6 +266,9 @@ "ec2_ebs_default_encryption", "efs_encryption_at_rest_enabled", "elbv2_insecure_ssl_ciphers", + "cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled", + "apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled", + "transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled", "elb_ssl_listeners", "opensearch_service_domains_encryption_at_rest_enabled", "opensearch_service_domains_node_to_node_encryption_enabled", @@ -347,6 +350,20 @@ "cloudtrail_cloudwatch_logging_enabled", "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] } ] diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/gxp_eu_annex_11_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/gxp_eu_annex_11_aws.json index 1ceb3f817b..fdca6d1747 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/gxp_eu_annex_11_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/gxp_eu_annex_11_aws.json @@ -19,6 +19,14 @@ "Checks": [ "cloudtrail_multi_region_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -146,6 +154,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -238,6 +254,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -253,6 +277,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/hipaa_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/hipaa_aws.json index 036489d712..9eb243e6cc 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/hipaa_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/hipaa_aws.json @@ -19,6 +19,20 @@ "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -102,6 +116,20 @@ "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -161,6 +189,20 @@ "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -328,6 +370,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_authentication_failures", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -373,6 +429,20 @@ "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_authentication_failures", "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_root_usage", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -402,6 +472,20 @@ "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -514,6 +598,20 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -649,6 +747,20 @@ "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -756,6 +868,20 @@ "s3_bucket_secure_transport_policy", "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/iso27001_2013_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/iso27001_2013_aws.json index ad31ea0af4..1de8c23db8 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/iso27001_2013_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/iso27001_2013_aws.json @@ -35,7 +35,10 @@ ], "Checks": [ "elb_insecure_ssl_ciphers", - "elbv2_insecure_ssl_ciphers" + "elbv2_insecure_ssl_ciphers", + "cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled", + "apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled", + "transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled" ] }, { @@ -308,6 +311,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -872,6 +883,38 @@ "iam_user_access_not_stale_to_sagemaker", "iam_user_accesskey_unused", "iam_user_console_access_unused" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "iam_user_accesskey_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_access_keys_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_user_console_access_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_console_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_user_access_not_stale_to_bedrock", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_bedrock_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_role_access_not_stale_to_bedrock", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_bedrock_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_user_access_not_stale_to_sagemaker", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_sagemaker_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + } ] }, { @@ -1049,6 +1092,20 @@ "Checks": [ "iam_user_accesskey_unused", "iam_user_console_access_unused" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "iam_user_accesskey_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_access_keys_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_user_console_access_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_console_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + } ] }, { @@ -1258,6 +1315,20 @@ "Checks": [ "iam_user_accesskey_unused", "iam_user_console_access_unused" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "iam_user_accesskey_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_access_keys_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_user_console_access_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_console_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/iso27001_2022_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/iso27001_2022_aws.json index d47bfcf1d1..563b856317 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/iso27001_2022_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/iso27001_2022_aws.json @@ -20,6 +20,14 @@ "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled", "wellarchitected_workload_no_high_or_medium_risks" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -277,6 +285,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -331,6 +347,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -362,6 +386,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -378,6 +410,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -424,6 +464,14 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", "guardduty_centrally_managed" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -472,6 +520,14 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", "guardduty_centrally_managed" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -490,6 +546,14 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", "guardduty_centrally_managed" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1004,6 +1068,14 @@ "organizations_account_part_of_organizations", "accessanalyzer_enabled", "accessanalyzer_enabled_without_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1080,6 +1152,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1111,6 +1191,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1749,6 +1837,14 @@ "vpc_default_security_group_closed", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/kisa_isms_p_2023_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/kisa_isms_p_2023_aws.json index d172e615dd..7b0446ac3f 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/kisa_isms_p_2023_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/kisa_isms_p_2023_aws.json @@ -1211,6 +1211,14 @@ "rds_instance_default_admin", "redshift_cluster_non_default_database_name" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Domain": "2. Control Measures Requirements", @@ -1416,6 +1424,14 @@ "iam_user_administrator_access_policy", "organizations_delegated_administrators" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Domain": "2. Control Measures Requirements", @@ -1486,6 +1502,14 @@ "ssm_documents_set_as_public", "vpc_endpoint_services_allowed_principals_trust_boundaries" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Domain": "2. Control Measures Requirements", @@ -2040,6 +2064,9 @@ "elb_ssl_listeners", "elb_ssl_listeners_use_acm_certificate", "elbv2_insecure_ssl_ciphers", + "cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled", + "apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled", + "transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled", "elbv2_nlb_tls_termination_enabled", "elbv2_ssl_listeners", "glue_data_catalogs_connection_passwords_encryption_enabled", @@ -2079,6 +2106,17 @@ "transfer_server_in_transit_encryption_enabled", "workspaces_volume_encryption_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "RSA-1024", + "P-192" + ] + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Domain": "2. Control Measures Requirements", @@ -2816,6 +2854,20 @@ "wafv2_webacl_rule_logging_enabled", "wafv2_webacl_with_rules" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Domain": "2. Control Measures Requirements", @@ -3090,6 +3142,9 @@ "elb_ssl_listeners_use_acm_certificate", "elbv2_desync_mitigation_mode", "elbv2_insecure_ssl_ciphers", + "cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled", + "apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled", + "transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled", "elbv2_internet_facing", "elbv2_listeners_underneath", "elbv2_logging_enabled", @@ -3313,6 +3368,47 @@ "workspaces_volume_encryption_enabled", "workspaces_vpc_2private_1public_subnets_nat" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "drs_job_exist", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "RSA-1024", + "P-192" + ] + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Domain": "2. Control Measures Requirements", @@ -3705,6 +3801,14 @@ "s3_bucket_event_notifications_enabled", "trustedadvisor_errors_and_warnings" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Domain": "2. Control Measures Requirements", @@ -3823,6 +3927,14 @@ "s3_bucket_object_lock", "s3_bucket_object_versioning" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "drs_job_exist", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Domain": "2. Control Measures Requirements", @@ -3860,6 +3972,14 @@ "Checks": [ "drs_job_exist" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "drs_job_exist", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Domain": "2. Control Measures Requirements", diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/kisa_isms_p_2023_korean_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/kisa_isms_p_2023_korean_aws.json index 1748d96442..40b338ce41 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/kisa_isms_p_2023_korean_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/kisa_isms_p_2023_korean_aws.json @@ -1211,6 +1211,14 @@ "rds_instance_default_admin", "redshift_cluster_non_default_database_name" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Domain": "2. 보호대책 요구사항", @@ -1416,6 +1424,14 @@ "iam_user_administrator_access_policy", "organizations_delegated_administrators" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Domain": "2. 보호대책 요구사항", @@ -1485,6 +1501,14 @@ "ssm_documents_set_as_public", "vpc_endpoint_services_allowed_principals_trust_boundaries" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Domain": "2. 보호대책 요구사항", @@ -2042,6 +2066,9 @@ "elb_ssl_listeners", "elb_ssl_listeners_use_acm_certificate", "elbv2_insecure_ssl_ciphers", + "cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled", + "apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled", + "transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled", "elbv2_nlb_tls_termination_enabled", "elbv2_ssl_listeners", "glue_data_catalogs_connection_passwords_encryption_enabled", @@ -2081,6 +2108,17 @@ "transfer_server_in_transit_encryption_enabled", "workspaces_volume_encryption_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "RSA-1024", + "P-192" + ] + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Domain": "2. 보호대책 요구사항", @@ -2819,6 +2857,20 @@ "wafv2_webacl_rule_logging_enabled", "wafv2_webacl_with_rules" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Domain": "2. 보호대책 요구사항", @@ -3093,6 +3145,9 @@ "elb_ssl_listeners_use_acm_certificate", "elbv2_desync_mitigation_mode", "elbv2_insecure_ssl_ciphers", + "cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled", + "apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled", + "transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled", "elbv2_internet_facing", "elbv2_listeners_underneath", "elbv2_logging_enabled", @@ -3316,6 +3371,47 @@ "workspaces_volume_encryption_enabled", "workspaces_vpc_2private_1public_subnets_nat" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "drs_job_exist", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "RSA-1024", + "P-192" + ] + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Domain": "2. 보호대책 요구사항", @@ -3708,6 +3804,14 @@ "s3_bucket_event_notifications_enabled", "trustedadvisor_errors_and_warnings" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Domain": "2. 보호대책 요구사항", @@ -3826,6 +3930,14 @@ "s3_bucket_object_lock", "s3_bucket_object_versioning" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "drs_job_exist", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Domain": "2. 보호대책 요구사항", @@ -3863,6 +3975,14 @@ "Checks": [ "drs_job_exist" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "drs_job_exist", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Domain": "2. 보호대책 요구사항", diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/mitre_attack_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/mitre_attack_aws.json index 3d1d5fd378..3ac8cf0432 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/mitre_attack_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/mitre_attack_aws.json @@ -35,6 +35,32 @@ "awslambda_function_not_publicly_accessible", "ec2_instance_public_ip" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "drs_job_exist", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "AWSService": "AWS CloudEndure Disaster Recovery", @@ -200,6 +226,26 @@ "organizations_scp_check_deny_regions", "securityhub_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "AWSService": "Amazon GuardDuty", @@ -348,6 +394,14 @@ "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "AWSService": "AWS Config", @@ -393,6 +447,26 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "AWSService": "AWS Config", @@ -444,6 +518,14 @@ "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "AWSService": "AWS Config", @@ -557,6 +639,14 @@ "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "AWSService": "AWS Config", @@ -634,6 +724,26 @@ "inspector2_is_enabled", "inspector2_active_findings_exist" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "AWSService": "AWS Config", @@ -821,6 +931,26 @@ "inspector2_is_enabled", "inspector2_active_findings_exist" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "AWSService": "AWS Config", @@ -984,6 +1114,14 @@ "cloudfront_distributions_https_enabled", "s3_bucket_secure_transport_policy" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "AWSService": "AWS CloudWatch", @@ -1057,6 +1195,14 @@ "ssm_document_secrets", "secretsmanager_automatic_rotation_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "AWSService": "AWS CloudHSM", @@ -1143,6 +1289,14 @@ "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_sql_server_1433_1434", "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_telnet_23" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "AWSService": "AWS Network Firewall", @@ -1218,6 +1372,14 @@ "s3_bucket_default_encryption", "rds_instance_storage_encrypted" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "AWSService": "AWS Config", @@ -1264,6 +1426,20 @@ "securityhub_enabled", "macie_is_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "AWSService": "AWS Config", @@ -1441,6 +1617,20 @@ "s3_bucket_object_versioning", "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "drs_job_exist", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "AWSService": "AWS CloudEndure Disaster Recovery", @@ -1518,6 +1708,20 @@ "efs_have_backup_enabled", "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "drs_job_exist", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "AWSService": "AWS CloudEndure Disaster Recovery", @@ -1566,6 +1770,20 @@ "drs_job_exist", "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "drs_job_exist", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "AWSService": "AWS CloudEndure Disaster Recovery", @@ -1639,6 +1857,14 @@ "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_sql_server_1433_1434", "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_telnet_23" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "AWSService": "AWS Shield", @@ -1686,6 +1912,14 @@ "drs_job_exist", "rds_instance_backup_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "drs_job_exist", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "AWSService": "AWS CloudEndure Disaster Recovery", @@ -1743,6 +1977,20 @@ "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_sign_in_without_mfa", "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_unauthorized_api_calls" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "AWSService": "AWS CloudWatch", @@ -1819,6 +2067,20 @@ "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_sql_server_1433_1434", "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_telnet_23" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "AWSService": "AWS Config", @@ -1910,6 +2172,20 @@ "iam_policy_no_full_access_to_cloudtrail", "iam_policy_no_full_access_to_kms" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "AWSService": "AWS Organizations", @@ -1993,6 +2269,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "AWSService": "Amazon GuardDuty", @@ -2071,6 +2355,14 @@ "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_sql_server_1433_1434", "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_telnet_23" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "AWSService": "AWS IoT Device Defender", diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/nis2_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/nis2_aws.json index d7f193c6c0..3a4d567d25 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/nis2_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/nis2_aws.json @@ -597,6 +597,14 @@ "accessanalyzer_enabled", "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_root_usage" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "3 INCIDENT HANDLING (ARTICLE 21(2), POINT (B), OF DIRECTIVE (EU) 2022/2555)", @@ -1511,6 +1519,17 @@ "Checks": [ "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "RSA-1024", + "P-192" + ] + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "9 CRYPTOGRAPHY (ARTICLE 21(2), POINT (H), OF DIRECTIVE (EU) 2022/2555)", @@ -1528,6 +1547,17 @@ "route53_domains_privacy_protection_enabled", "iam_no_expired_server_certificates_stored" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "RSA-1024", + "P-192" + ] + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "9 CRYPTOGRAPHY (ARTICLE 21(2), POINT (H), OF DIRECTIVE (EU) 2022/2555)", @@ -1645,6 +1675,14 @@ "efs_access_point_enforce_user_identity", "efs_not_publicly_accessible" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "11 ACCESS CONTROL (ARTICLE 21(2), POINTS (I) AND (J), OF DIRECTIVE (EU) 2022/2555)", @@ -1676,6 +1714,14 @@ "Checks": [ "accessanalyzer_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "11 ACCESS CONTROL (ARTICLE 21(2), POINTS (I) AND (J), OF DIRECTIVE (EU) 2022/2555)", @@ -1726,6 +1772,14 @@ "Checks": [ "accessanalyzer_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "11 ACCESS CONTROL (ARTICLE 21(2), POINTS (I) AND (J), OF DIRECTIVE (EU) 2022/2555)", diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/nist_800_171_revision_2_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/nist_800_171_revision_2_aws.json index 8e28ee383d..921bd33a53 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/nist_800_171_revision_2_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/nist_800_171_revision_2_aws.json @@ -230,6 +230,20 @@ "rds_instance_integration_cloudwatch_logs", "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -321,6 +335,20 @@ "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -344,6 +372,14 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "rds_instance_integration_cloudwatch_logs", "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -383,6 +419,20 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -400,6 +450,20 @@ "cloudtrail_cloudwatch_logging_enabled", "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -653,6 +717,9 @@ "apigateway_restapi_client_certificate_enabled", "ec2_ebs_volume_encryption", "elbv2_insecure_ssl_ciphers", + "cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled", + "apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled", + "transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled", "opensearch_service_domains_node_to_node_encryption_enabled", "s3_bucket_default_encryption", "s3_bucket_secure_transport_policy" @@ -684,6 +751,20 @@ "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -712,6 +793,20 @@ "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -729,6 +824,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -746,6 +855,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -769,6 +892,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "rds_instance_enhanced_monitoring_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -806,6 +943,20 @@ "ec2_networkacl_allow_ingress_any_port", "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_22", "ec2_networkacl_allow_ingress_any_port" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1025,6 +1176,20 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1044,6 +1209,20 @@ "securityhub_enabled", "ssm_managed_compliant_patching", "ssm_managed_compliant_patching" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1061,6 +1240,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "ssm_managed_compliant_patching" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1076,6 +1269,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1102,6 +1303,20 @@ "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1128,6 +1343,20 @@ "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] } ] diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/nist_800_53_revision_4_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/nist_800_53_revision_4_aws.json index deb2a3cc25..8bd36a3910 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/nist_800_53_revision_4_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/nist_800_53_revision_4_aws.json @@ -27,6 +27,20 @@ "iam_user_accesskey_unused", "iam_user_console_access_unused", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -47,6 +61,38 @@ "iam_user_access_not_stale_to_sagemaker", "iam_user_accesskey_unused", "iam_user_console_access_unused" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "iam_user_accesskey_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_access_keys_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_user_console_access_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_console_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_user_access_not_stale_to_bedrock", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_bedrock_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_role_access_not_stale_to_bedrock", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_bedrock_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_user_access_not_stale_to_sagemaker", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_sagemaker_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + } ] }, { @@ -73,6 +119,20 @@ "rds_instance_integration_cloudwatch_logs", "redshift_cluster_audit_logging", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -90,6 +150,20 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -125,6 +199,20 @@ "redshift_cluster_audit_logging", "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -270,6 +358,20 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -399,6 +501,20 @@ "cloudwatch_changes_to_vpcs_alarm_configured", "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -421,6 +537,20 @@ "cloudwatch_changes_to_vpcs_alarm_configured", "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -534,6 +664,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "rds_instance_enhanced_monitoring_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -827,6 +971,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -860,6 +1012,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1110,6 +1276,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1133,6 +1307,20 @@ "ec2_instance_imdsv2_enabled", "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1155,6 +1343,20 @@ "cloudwatch_changes_to_vpcs_alarm_configured", "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1177,6 +1379,20 @@ "cloudwatch_changes_to_vpcs_alarm_configured", "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1194,6 +1410,20 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1218,6 +1448,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/nist_800_53_revision_5_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/nist_800_53_revision_5_aws.json index 858df01fd9..e0ef936229 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/nist_800_53_revision_5_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/nist_800_53_revision_5_aws.json @@ -220,6 +220,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -944,6 +952,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1629,6 +1645,14 @@ "Checks": [ "cloudtrail_multi_region_enabled", "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1828,6 +1852,20 @@ "cloudwatch_changes_to_vpcs_alarm_configured", "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1906,6 +1944,20 @@ "cloudwatch_changes_to_vpcs_alarm_configured", "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -2290,6 +2342,20 @@ "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -2352,6 +2418,20 @@ "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -2387,6 +2467,20 @@ "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -2466,6 +2560,20 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -2487,6 +2595,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "rds_instance_enhanced_monitoring_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -2522,6 +2644,20 @@ "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -2904,6 +3040,14 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "ssm_managed_compliant_patching", "ssm_managed_compliant_patching" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -4079,6 +4223,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -4095,6 +4247,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -4149,6 +4309,20 @@ "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -4184,6 +4358,20 @@ "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -4199,6 +4387,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -4270,6 +4466,20 @@ "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -4286,6 +4496,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -4303,6 +4521,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -4320,6 +4546,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -4336,6 +4570,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -4353,6 +4595,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "ssm_managed_compliant_patching" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -4369,6 +4619,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -4385,6 +4643,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -4401,6 +4667,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -4418,6 +4692,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -4435,6 +4717,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -4516,6 +4806,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -4558,6 +4856,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -4575,6 +4881,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -4591,6 +4905,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -4607,6 +4929,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -5262,6 +5592,9 @@ "Checks": [ "apigateway_restapi_client_certificate_enabled", "elbv2_insecure_ssl_ciphers", + "cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled", + "apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled", + "transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled", "elb_ssl_listeners", "opensearch_service_domains_node_to_node_encryption_enabled", "s3_bucket_secure_transport_policy" @@ -5549,6 +5882,9 @@ ], "Checks": [ "elbv2_insecure_ssl_ciphers", + "cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled", + "apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled", + "transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled", "elb_ssl_listeners" ] }, @@ -5677,6 +6013,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -5844,6 +6188,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -5884,6 +6236,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -5901,6 +6261,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -5918,6 +6286,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -5934,6 +6310,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -5950,6 +6334,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -5982,6 +6374,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -6006,6 +6406,14 @@ "rds_instance_integration_cloudwatch_logs", "redshift_cluster_audit_logging", "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -6022,6 +6430,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -6039,6 +6455,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -6056,6 +6480,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -6072,6 +6504,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -6108,6 +6548,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -6124,6 +6572,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -6191,6 +6647,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -6207,6 +6671,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -6227,6 +6699,14 @@ "cloudwatch_changes_to_network_route_tables_alarm_configured", "cloudwatch_changes_to_vpcs_alarm_configured", "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -6247,6 +6727,14 @@ "cloudwatch_changes_to_network_route_tables_alarm_configured", "cloudwatch_changes_to_vpcs_alarm_configured", "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/nist_csf_1.1_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/nist_csf_1.1_aws.json index a55097e70c..9921efce56 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/nist_csf_1.1_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/nist_csf_1.1_aws.json @@ -48,6 +48,20 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -99,6 +113,20 @@ "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -144,6 +172,20 @@ "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -179,6 +221,26 @@ "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_unauthorized_api_calls", "rds_instance_enhanced_monitoring_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -201,6 +263,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -218,6 +294,20 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -243,6 +333,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -265,6 +369,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -291,6 +409,20 @@ "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -316,6 +448,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -349,6 +495,14 @@ "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", "ec2_instance_managed_by_ssm" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -454,6 +608,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "ssm_managed_compliant_patching" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -471,6 +639,20 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -488,6 +670,20 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -523,6 +719,26 @@ "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_unauthorized_api_calls", "rds_instance_enhanced_monitoring_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -554,6 +770,26 @@ "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_unauthorized_api_calls", "rds_instance_enhanced_monitoring_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -827,6 +1063,20 @@ "sagemaker_notebook_instance_without_direct_internet_access_configured", "securityhub_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -881,6 +1131,14 @@ "Checks": [ "ec2_instance_managed_by_ssm", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1035,6 +1293,14 @@ "ec2_instance_managed_by_ssm", "ssm_managed_compliant_patching", "ssm_managed_compliant_patching" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/nist_csf_2.0_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/nist_csf_2.0_aws.json index e890b08573..c06eeec11d 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/nist_csf_2.0_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/nist_csf_2.0_aws.json @@ -72,6 +72,20 @@ "securityhub_enabled", "wellarchitected_workload_no_high_or_medium_risks", "servicecatalog_portfolio_shared_within_organization_only" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -322,6 +336,26 @@ "wellarchitected_workload_no_high_or_medium_risks", "organizations_delegated_administrators", "organizations_tags_policies_enabled_and_attached" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -352,6 +386,26 @@ "vpc_flow_logs_enabled", "iam_root_mfa_enabled", "iam_root_credentials_management_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -408,6 +462,20 @@ "accessanalyzer_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", "trustedadvisor_errors_and_warnings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -442,6 +510,26 @@ "organizations_scp_check_deny_regions", "organizations_tags_policies_enabled_and_attached", "organizations_delegated_administrators" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -574,6 +662,14 @@ "opensearch_service_domains_encryption_at_rest_enabled", "redshift_cluster_encrypted_at_rest", "sns_topics_kms_encryption_at_rest_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "drs_job_exist", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -610,6 +706,17 @@ "iam_inline_policy_allows_privilege_escalation", "ssm_documents_set_as_public", "s3_bucket_shadow_resource_vulnerability" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "RSA-1024", + "P-192" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -726,6 +833,14 @@ "iam_role_administratoraccess_policy", "iam_policy_no_full_access_to_cloudtrail", "iam_policy_no_full_access_to_kms" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -853,6 +968,14 @@ "iam_customer_unattached_policy_no_administrative_privileges", "accessanalyzer_enabled", "cognito_user_pool_password_policy_symbol" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1224,6 +1347,14 @@ "inspector2_active_findings_exist", "secretsmanager_automatic_rotation_enabled", "secretsmanager_secret_rotated_periodically" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1265,6 +1396,14 @@ "Checks": [ "ssmincidents_enabled_with_plans", "drs_job_exist" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "drs_job_exist", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1283,6 +1422,14 @@ "inspector2_is_enabled", "guardduty_is_enabled", "inspector2_active_findings_exist" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1329,6 +1476,14 @@ "vpc_flow_logs_enabled", "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", "config_recorder_using_aws_service_role" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1540,6 +1695,14 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "inspector2_is_enabled", "accessanalyzer_enabled_without_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1662,6 +1825,14 @@ "guardduty_rds_protection_enabled", "guardduty_lambda_protection_enabled", "guardduty_eks_runtime_monitoring_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/pci_3.2.1_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/pci_3.2.1_aws.json index c240548f6a..ca8e968bf9 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/pci_3.2.1_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/pci_3.2.1_aws.json @@ -628,6 +628,14 @@ "ssm_managed_compliant_patching", "ec2_elastic_ip_unassigned" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "ItemId": "2.4", @@ -643,6 +651,14 @@ "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "ItemId": "2.4.a", @@ -2413,6 +2429,14 @@ "cloudtrail_log_file_validation_enabled", "s3_bucket_cross_region_replication" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "ItemId": "10.5", @@ -2430,6 +2454,14 @@ "s3_bucket_object_versioning", "cloudtrail_log_file_validation_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "ItemId": "10.5.2", @@ -2616,6 +2648,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "ItemId": "11.4", @@ -2631,6 +2671,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "ItemId": "11.4.a", @@ -2646,6 +2694,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "ItemId": "11.4.b", @@ -2661,6 +2717,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "ItemId": "11.4.c", @@ -2676,6 +2740,14 @@ "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "ItemId": "11.5", @@ -2691,6 +2763,14 @@ "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "ItemId": "11.5.a", @@ -2706,6 +2786,14 @@ "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "ItemId": "11.5.b", diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/pci_4.0_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/pci_4.0_aws.json index dc8fab9140..e21b543556 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/pci_4.0_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/pci_4.0_aws.json @@ -4403,6 +4403,14 @@ "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "10.2.1.1: Audit logs are implemented to support the detection of anomalies and suspicious activity, and the forensic analysis of events. ", @@ -9281,6 +9289,14 @@ "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "10.4.1.1: Audit logs are reviewed to identify anomalies or suspicious activity. ", @@ -9363,6 +9379,14 @@ "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "10.4.1: Audit logs are reviewed to identify anomalies or suspicious activity. ", @@ -9459,6 +9483,14 @@ "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "10.4.2: Audit logs are reviewed to identify anomalies or suspicious activity. ", @@ -9551,6 +9583,14 @@ "Checks": [ "cloudwatch_log_group_retention_policy_specific_days_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "cloudwatch_log_group_retention_policy_specific_days_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "log_group_retention_days", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 365 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "10.5.1: Audit log history is retained and available for analysis. ", @@ -10179,6 +10219,14 @@ "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "10.6.3: Time-synchronization mechanisms support consistent time settings across all systems. ", @@ -10343,6 +10391,14 @@ "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "10.7.1: Failures of critical security control systems are detected, reported, and responded to promptly. ", @@ -10451,6 +10507,14 @@ "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "10.7.2: Failures of critical security control systems are detected, reported, and responded to promptly. ", @@ -10625,6 +10689,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "11.5.1.1: Network intrusions and unexpected file changes are detected and responded to. ", @@ -10653,6 +10725,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "11.5.1: Network intrusions and unexpected file changes are detected and responded to. ", @@ -11445,6 +11525,14 @@ "Checks": [ "cloudwatch_log_group_retention_policy_specific_days_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "cloudwatch_log_group_retention_policy_specific_days_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "log_group_retention_days", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 365 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "3.2.1: Storage of account data is kept to a minimum. ", @@ -11567,6 +11655,14 @@ "Checks": [ "cloudwatch_log_group_retention_policy_specific_days_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "cloudwatch_log_group_retention_policy_specific_days_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "log_group_retention_days", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 365 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "3.3.1.1: Sensitive authentication data (SAD) is not stored after authorization. ", @@ -11689,6 +11785,14 @@ "Checks": [ "cloudwatch_log_group_retention_policy_specific_days_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "cloudwatch_log_group_retention_policy_specific_days_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "log_group_retention_days", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 365 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "3.3.1.3: Sensitive authentication data (SAD) is not stored after authorization. ", @@ -11811,6 +11915,14 @@ "Checks": [ "cloudwatch_log_group_retention_policy_specific_days_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "cloudwatch_log_group_retention_policy_specific_days_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "log_group_retention_days", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 365 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "3.3.2: Sensitive authentication data (SAD) is not stored after authorization. ", @@ -11933,6 +12045,14 @@ "Checks": [ "cloudwatch_log_group_retention_policy_specific_days_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "cloudwatch_log_group_retention_policy_specific_days_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "log_group_retention_days", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 365 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "3.3.3: Sensitive authentication data (SAD) is not stored after authorization. ", @@ -13573,6 +13693,17 @@ "Checks": [ "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "RSA-1024", + "P-192" + ] + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "3.7.1: Where cryptography is used to protect stored account data, key management processes and procedures covering all aspects of the key lifecycle are defined and implemented. ", @@ -15001,6 +15132,14 @@ "Checks": [ "cloudwatch_log_group_retention_policy_specific_days_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "cloudwatch_log_group_retention_policy_specific_days_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "log_group_retention_days", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 365 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "5.3.4: Anti-malware mechanisms and processes are active, maintained, and monitored. ", @@ -22504,6 +22643,14 @@ "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "A3.3.1: PCI DSS is incorporated into business-as-usual (BAU) activities. ", @@ -23000,6 +23147,14 @@ "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "A3.5.1: Suspicious events are identified and responded to. ", diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/prowler_threatscore_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/prowler_threatscore_aws.json index 902beb8abd..c8c093907a 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/prowler_threatscore_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/prowler_threatscore_aws.json @@ -174,6 +174,20 @@ "iam_user_accesskey_unused", "iam_user_console_access_unused" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "iam_user_accesskey_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_access_keys_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_user_console_access_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_console_access_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Title": "IAM credentials unused disabled", @@ -336,6 +350,14 @@ "Checks": [ "accessanalyzer_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Title": "Access Analyzer enabled", @@ -1541,6 +1563,14 @@ "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Title": "AWS Config is enabled", @@ -1829,6 +1859,14 @@ "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Title": "Security Hub enabled", diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/rbi_cyber_security_framework_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/rbi_cyber_security_framework_aws.json index b4566a8929..5de1f5ca8a 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/rbi_cyber_security_framework_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/rbi_cyber_security_framework_aws.json @@ -40,6 +40,9 @@ "ec2_instance_public_ip", "efs_encryption_at_rest_enabled", "elbv2_insecure_ssl_ciphers", + "cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled", + "apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled", + "transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled", "elb_ssl_listeners", "ec2_ebs_default_encryption", "emr_cluster_master_nodes_no_public_ip", @@ -182,6 +185,14 @@ "securityhub_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled", "opensearch_service_domains_audit_logging_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/secnumcloud_3.2_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/secnumcloud_3.2_aws.json index 1e157b47c7..701f931b05 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/secnumcloud_3.2_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/secnumcloud_3.2_aws.json @@ -202,6 +202,14 @@ "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", "ec2_instance_managed_by_ssm" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -323,6 +331,14 @@ "iam_role_administratoraccess_policy", "iam_user_administrator_access_policy", "iam_user_two_active_access_key" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -474,6 +490,9 @@ "elbv2_ssl_listeners", "elb_insecure_ssl_ciphers", "elbv2_insecure_ssl_ciphers", + "cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled", + "apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled", + "transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled", "redshift_cluster_in_transit_encryption_enabled", "elasticache_redis_cluster_in_transit_encryption_enabled", "dynamodb_accelerator_cluster_in_transit_encryption_enabled", @@ -560,6 +579,17 @@ "Checks": [ "acm_certificates_expiration_check", "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "RSA-1024", + "P-192" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -732,6 +762,14 @@ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", "cloudtrail_multi_region_enabled", "cloudtrail_multi_region_enabled_logging_management_events" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -771,6 +809,14 @@ "guardduty_lambda_protection_enabled", "guardduty_eks_audit_log_enabled", "guardduty_eks_runtime_monitoring_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -908,6 +954,20 @@ "cloudwatch_changes_to_network_gateways_alarm_configured", "cloudwatch_changes_to_network_route_tables_alarm_configured", "cloudwatch_changes_to_vpcs_alarm_configured" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1011,6 +1071,14 @@ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", "config_recorder_using_aws_service_role", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1057,6 +1125,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1088,6 +1164,14 @@ "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", "cloudtrail_multi_region_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1265,6 +1349,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "cloudwatch_alarm_actions_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1415,6 +1513,14 @@ "Checks": [ "backup_plans_exist", "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1478,6 +1584,20 @@ "Checks": [ "securityhub_enabled", "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -1495,6 +1615,14 @@ "Checks": [ "inspector2_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/aws/soc2_aws.json b/prowler/compliance/aws/soc2_aws.json index 5a027d0416..c0041a9dae 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/aws/soc2_aws.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/aws/soc2_aws.json @@ -43,6 +43,14 @@ "cloudtrail_s3_dataevents_write_enabled", "cloudtrail_multi_region_enabled", "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -61,6 +69,26 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled", "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -80,6 +108,14 @@ "ssm_managed_compliant_patching", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -116,6 +152,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -133,6 +177,14 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -312,6 +364,20 @@ "Checks": [ "guardduty_is_enabled", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -331,6 +397,20 @@ "securityhub_enabled", "ec2_instance_managed_by_ssm", "ssm_managed_compliant_patching" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -367,6 +447,20 @@ "guardduty_is_enabled", "apigateway_restapi_logging_enabled", "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_22" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -399,6 +493,20 @@ "cloudwatch_log_group_retention_policy_specific_days_enabled", "vpc_flow_logs_enabled", "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -426,6 +534,20 @@ "redshift_cluster_automated_snapshot", "s3_bucket_object_versioning", "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -463,6 +585,14 @@ ], "Checks": [ "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { @@ -600,6 +730,14 @@ "rds_cluster_integration_cloudwatch_logs", "glue_etl_jobs_logging_enabled", "stepfunctions_statemachine_logging_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/azure/c5_azure.json b/prowler/compliance/azure/c5_azure.json index 4ac3b4dd53..6fff7a3691 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/azure/c5_azure.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/azure/c5_azure.json @@ -2681,6 +2681,17 @@ "app_function_latest_runtime_version", "mysql_flexible_server_minimum_tls_version_12", "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_minimal_tls_versions", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "1.2", + "1.3" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -2705,6 +2716,17 @@ "app_function_latest_runtime_version", "mysql_flexible_server_minimum_tls_version_12", "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_minimal_tls_versions", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "1.2", + "1.3" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -3903,6 +3925,17 @@ "app_ensure_php_version_is_latest", "storage_ensure_minimum_tls_version_12", "storage_smb_protocol_version_is_latest" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_minimal_tls_versions", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "1.2", + "1.3" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -4352,6 +4385,17 @@ "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", "sqlserver_tde_encrypted_with_cmk", "sqlserver_tde_encryption_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_minimal_tls_versions", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "1.2", + "1.3" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -5743,6 +5787,17 @@ "storage_ensure_minimum_tls_version_12", "sqlserver_tde_encrypted_with_cmk", "sqlserver_tde_encryption_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_minimal_tls_versions", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "1.2", + "1.3" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -5770,6 +5825,17 @@ "storage_ensure_minimum_tls_version_12", "sqlserver_tde_encrypted_with_cmk", "sqlserver_tde_encryption_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_minimal_tls_versions", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "1.2", + "1.3" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -6513,6 +6579,17 @@ "mysql_flexible_server_minimum_tls_version_12", "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", "storage_ensure_minimum_tls_version_12" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_minimal_tls_versions", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "1.2", + "1.3" + ] + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/azure/ccc_azure.json b/prowler/compliance/azure/ccc_azure.json index cb87346d13..661d38302f 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/azure/ccc_azure.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/azure/ccc_azure.json @@ -56,6 +56,25 @@ "app_ensure_using_http20", "app_ftp_deployment_disabled", "app_function_ftps_deployment_disabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_minimal_tls_versions", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "1.2", + "1.3" + ] + }, + { + "Check": "storage_smb_channel_encryption_with_secure_algorithm", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_smb_channel_encryption_algorithms", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "AES-256-GCM" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -726,6 +745,16 @@ ], "Checks": [ "storage_smb_channel_encryption_with_secure_algorithm" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "storage_smb_channel_encryption_with_secure_algorithm", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_smb_channel_encryption_algorithms", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "AES-256-GCM" + ] + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/azure/cis_2.0_azure.json b/prowler/compliance/azure/cis_2.0_azure.json index 73f4dc3611..59bd153352 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/azure/cis_2.0_azure.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/azure/cis_2.0_azure.json @@ -2714,7 +2714,8 @@ "Id": "6.6", "Description": "Ensure that Network Watcher is 'Enabled'", "Checks": [ - "network_watcher_enabled" + "network_watcher_enabled", + "network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled" ], "Attributes": [ { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/azure/cis_4.0_azure.json b/prowler/compliance/azure/cis_4.0_azure.json index c075ff4047..5f3e4502f1 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/azure/cis_4.0_azure.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/azure/cis_4.0_azure.json @@ -253,6 +253,18 @@ "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/configure-email-notifications:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/how-to-manage-attack-path:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path", "DefaultValue": "" } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "defender_attack_path_notifications_properly_configured", + "ConfigKey": "defender_attack_path_minimal_risk_level", + "Operator": "in", + "Value": [ + "Low", + "Medium", + "High" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -375,6 +387,16 @@ "Checks": [ "storage_smb_channel_encryption_with_secure_algorithm" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "storage_smb_channel_encryption_with_secure_algorithm", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_smb_channel_encryption_algorithms", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "AES-256-GCM" + ] + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "10 Storage Services", diff --git a/prowler/compliance/azure/cis_5.0_azure.json b/prowler/compliance/azure/cis_5.0_azure.json index 21785d92b6..71e43aeee9 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/azure/cis_5.0_azure.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/azure/cis_5.0_azure.json @@ -1974,7 +1974,9 @@ { "Id": "7.11", "Description": "Ensure subnets are associated with network security groups", - "Checks": [], + "Checks": [ + "network_subnet_nsg_associated" + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "7 Networking Services", @@ -2094,7 +2096,9 @@ { "Id": "8.1.1.1", "Description": "Ensure Microsoft Defender CSPM is set to 'On'", - "Checks": [], + "Checks": [ + "defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on" + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "8 Security Services", @@ -2610,6 +2614,18 @@ "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/configure-email-notifications:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/how-to-manage-attack-path:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path", "DefaultValue": "" } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "defender_attack_path_notifications_properly_configured", + "ConfigKey": "defender_attack_path_minimal_risk_level", + "Operator": "in", + "Value": [ + "Low", + "Medium", + "High" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -2931,7 +2947,9 @@ { "Id": "8.5", "Description": "Ensure Azure DDoS Network Protection is enabled on virtual networks", - "Checks": [], + "Checks": [ + "network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled" + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "8 Security Services", @@ -3000,6 +3018,16 @@ "Checks": [ "storage_smb_channel_encryption_with_secure_algorithm" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "storage_smb_channel_encryption_with_secure_algorithm", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_smb_channel_encryption_algorithms", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "AES-256-GCM" + ] + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "9 Storage Services", diff --git a/prowler/compliance/azure/cis_6.0_azure.json b/prowler/compliance/azure/cis_6.0_azure.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..625a0c18fa --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/compliance/azure/cis_6.0_azure.json @@ -0,0 +1,2863 @@ +{ + "Framework": "CIS", + "Name": "CIS Microsoft Azure Foundations Benchmark v6.0.0", + "Version": "6.0", + "Provider": "Azure", + "Description": "The CIS Azure Foundations Benchmark provides prescriptive guidance for configuring security options for a subset of Azure with an emphasis on foundational, testable, and architecture agnostic settings.", + "Requirements": [ + { + "Id": "2.1.1", + "Description": "Ensure that Azure Databricks is deployed in a customer-managed virtual network (VNet)", + "Checks": [ + "databricks_workspace_vnet_injection_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Analytics Services", + "SubSection": "2.1 Azure Databricks", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that Azure Databricks is deployed in a customer-managed virtual network (VNet)", + "RationaleStatement": "Using a customer-managed VNet ensures better control over network security and aligns with zero-trust architecture principles. It allows for: - Restricted outbound internet access to prevent unauthorized data exfiltration. - Integration with on-premises networks via VPN or ExpressRoute for hybrid connectivity. - Fine-grained NSG policies to restrict access at the subnet level. - Private Link for secure API access, avoiding public internet exposure.", + "ImpactStatement": "- Requires additional configuration during Databricks workspace deployment. - Might increase operational overhead for network maintenance. - May impact connectivity if misconfigured (e.g., restrictive NSG rules or missing routes).", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Delete the existing Databricks workspace (migration required). 1. Create a new Databricks workspace with VNet Injection: 1. Go to Azure Portal Create Databricks Workspace. 1. Select Advanced Networking. 1. Choose Deploy into your own Virtual Network. 1. Specify a customer-managed VNet and associated subnets. 1. Enable Private Link for secure API access. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Deploy a new Databricks workspace in a custom VNet: ``` az databricks workspace create --name \\ --resource-group \\ --location \\ --managed-resource-group \\ --enable-no-public-ip true \\ --network-security-group-rule NoAzureServices \\ --public-network-access Disabled \\ --custom-virtual-network-id /subscriptions//resourceGroups//providers/Microsoft.Network/virtualNetworks/ ``` Ensure NSG Rules are correctly configured: ``` az network nsg rule create --resource-group \\ --nsg-name \\ --name DenyAllOutbound \\ --direction Outbound \\ --access Deny \\ --priority 4096 ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** ``` New-AzDatabricksWorkspace -ResourceGroupName -Name -Location -ManagedResourceGroupName -CustomVirtualNetworkId /subscriptions//resourceGroups//providers/Microsoft.Network/virtualNetworks/ ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to Azure Portal Search for Databricks Workspaces. 1. Select the Databricks Workspace to audit. 1. Under Networking, check if the workspace is deployed in a Customer-Managed VNet. 1. If the Virtual Network field shows Databricks-Managed VNet, it is non-compliant. 1. Verify NSG rules and Private Endpoints for fine-grained access control. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to check if Databricks is using a customer-managed VNet: ``` az network vnet show --resource-group --name ``` Ensure that Databricks subnets are present in the VNet configuration. Validate NSG rules attached to the Databricks subnets. **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Get-AzDatabricksWorkspace -ResourceGroupName -Name | Select-Object VirtualNetworkId ``` If VirtualNetworkId is null or shows a Databricks-Managed VNet, it is non-compliant. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [9c25c9e4-ee12-4882-afd2-11fb9d87893f](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%9c25c9e4-ee12-4882-afd2-11fb9d87893f) **- Name:** 'Azure Databricks Workspaces should be in a virtual network'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Azure Databricks uses a Databricks-Managed VNet." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.2", + "Description": "Ensure that Network Security Groups are Configured for Databricks Subnets", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Analytics Services", + "SubSection": "2.1 Azure Databricks", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that Network Security Groups are Configured for Databricks Subnets", + "RationaleStatement": "Using NSGs with both explicit allow and deny rules provides clear documentation and control over permitted and prohibited traffic. While Azure NSGs implicitly deny all traffic not explicitly allowed, defining explicit deny rules for known malicious or unnecessary sources enhances clarity, simplifies troubleshooting, and supports compliance audits.", + "ImpactStatement": "* NSGs require periodic maintenance to ensure rule accuracy. * Misconfigured NSGs could inadvertently block required traffic.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Assign NSG to Databricks subnets under Networking > NSG Settings.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to Virtual Networks > Subnets, and review NSG assignments. **Audit from Azure CLI** ``` az network nsg list --query [].{Name:name, Rules:securityRules} ``` **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Get-AzNetworkSecurityGroup -ResourceGroupName ```", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/baselines/azure-databricks-security-baseline:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/databricks/security/network/classic/vnet-inject#network-security-group-rules", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Databricks subnets do not have NSGs assigned." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.3", + "Description": "Ensure that Traffic is Encrypted Between Cluster Worker Nodes", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Analytics Services", + "SubSection": "2.1 Azure Databricks", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that Traffic is Encrypted Between Cluster Worker Nodes", + "RationaleStatement": "* Protects sensitive data during transit between cluster nodes, mitigating risks of data interception or unauthorized access. * Aligns with organizational security policies and compliance requirements that mandate encryption of data in transit. * Enhances overall security posture by ensuring that all inter-node communications within the cluster are encrypted.", + "ImpactStatement": "* Enabling encryption may introduce a performance penalty due to the computational overhead associated with encrypting and decrypting traffic. This can result in longer query execution times, especially for data-intensive operations. * Implementing encryption requires creating and managing init scripts, which adds complexity to cluster configuration and maintenance. * The shared encryption secret is derived from the hash of the keystore stored in DBFS. If the keystore is updated or rotated, all running clusters must be restarted to prevent authentication failures between Spark workers and drivers.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Create a JKS keystore: 1. Generate a Java KeyStore (JKS) file that will be used for SSL/TLS encryption. 2. Upload the keystore file to a secure directory in DBFS (e.g. /dbfs//jetty_ssl_driver_keystore.jks). Develop an init script: 3. Create an init script that performs the following tasks: - Retrieves the JKS keystore file and password. - Derives a shared encryption secret from the keystore. - Configures Spark driver and executor settings to enable encryption. 4. Example init script: ``` #!/bin/bash set -euo pipefail keystore_dbfs_file=/dbfs//jetty_ssl_driver_keystore.jks max_attempts=30 while [ ! -f ${keystore_dbfs_file} ]; do if [ $max_attempts == 0 ]; then echo ERROR: Unable to find the file : $keystore_dbfs_file. Failing the script. exit 1 fi sleep 2s ((max_attempts--)) done sasl_secret=$(sha256sum $keystore_dbfs_file | cut -d' ' -f1) if [ -z ${sasl_secret} ]; then echo ERROR: Unable to derive the secret. Failing the script. exit 1 fi local_keystore_file=$DB_HOME/keys/jetty_ssl_driver_keystore.jks local_keystore_password=gb1gQqZ9ZIHS if [[ $DB_IS_DRIVER = TRUE ]]; then driver_conf=${DB_HOME}/driver/conf/spark-branch.conf echo Configuring driver conf at $driver_conf if [ ! -e $driver_conf ]; then echo spark.authenticate true >> $driver_conf echo spark.authenticate.secret $sasl_secret >> $driver_conf echo spark.authenticate.enableSaslEncryption true >> $driver_conf echo spark.network.crypto.enabled true >> $driver_conf echo spark.network.crypto.keyLength 256 >> $driver_conf echo spark.network.crypto.keyFactoryAlgorithm PBKDF2WithHmacSHA1 >> $driver_conf echo spark.io.encryption.enabled true >> $driver_conf echo spark.ssl.enabled true >> $driver_conf echo spark.ssl.keyPassword $local_keystore_password >> $driver_conf echo spark.ssl.keyStore $local_keystore_file >> $driver_conf echo spark.ssl.keyStorePassword $local_keystore_password >> $driver_conf echo spark.ssl.protocol TLSv1.3 >> $driver_conf fi fi executor_conf=${DB_HOME}/conf/spark.executor.extraJavaOptions echo Configuring executor conf at $executor_conf if [ ! -e $executor_conf ]; then echo -Dspark.authenticate=true >> $executor_conf echo -Dspark.authenticate.secret=$sasl_secret >> $executor_conf echo -Dspark.authenticate.enableSaslEncryption=true >> $executor_conf echo -Dspark.network.crypto.enabled=true >> $executor_conf echo -Dspark.network.crypto.keyLength=256 >> $executor_conf echo -Dspark.network.crypto.keyFactoryAlgorithm=PBKDF2WithHmacSHA1 >> $executor_conf echo -Dspark.io.encryption.enabled=true >> $executor_conf echo -Dspark.ssl.enabled=true >> $executor_conf echo -Dspark.ssl.keyPassword=$local_keystore_password >> $executor_conf echo -Dspark.ssl.keyStore=$local_keystore_file >> $executor_conf echo -Dspark.ssl.keyStorePassword=$local_keystore_password >> $executor_conf echo -Dspark.ssl.protocol=TLSv1.3 >> $executor_conf fi ``` 5. Save.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** Review cluster init scripts: 1. Navigate to your Azure Databricks workspace, go to the Clusters section, select a cluster, and check the Advanced Options for any init scripts that configure encryption settings. Verify spark configuration: 2. Ensure that the following Spark configurations are set: ``` spark.authenticate true spark.authenticate.enableSaslEncryption true spark.network.crypto.enabled true spark.network.crypto.keyLength 256 spark.network.crypto.keyFactoryAlgorithm PBKDF2WithHmacSHA1 spark.io.encryption.enabled true ``` These settings can be found in the cluster's Spark configuration properties. Check keystone management: 3. Verify that the Java KeyStore (JKS) file is securely stored in DBFS and that its integrity is maintained. 4. Ensure that the keystore password is securely managed and not hardcoded in scripts.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/databricks/security/keys/encrypt-otw", + "DefaultValue": "By default, traffic is not encrypted between cluster worker nodes." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.4", + "Description": "Ensure that Users and Groups are Synced from Microsoft Entra ID to Azure Databricks", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Analytics Services", + "SubSection": "2.1 Azure Databricks", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that Users and Groups are Synced from Microsoft Entra ID to Azure Databricks", + "RationaleStatement": "Syncing users and groups from Microsoft Entra ID centralizes access control, enforces the least privilege principle by automatically revoking unnecessary access, reduces administrative overhead by eliminating manual user management, and ensures auditability and compliance with industry regulations.", + "ImpactStatement": "SCIM provisioning requires role mapping to avoid misconfigured user privileges.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** Enable provisioning in Azure Portal: 1. Go to `Microsoft Entra ID`. 1. Under `Manage`, click `Enterprise applications`. 1. Click the name of the Azure Databricks SCIM application. 1. Under `Provisioning`, select `Automatic` and enter the SCIM endpoint and API token from Databricks. Enable provisioning in Databricks: 5. Navigate to `Admin Console` > `Identity and Access Management`. 6. Enable SCIM provisioning and generate an API token. Configure role assignments: 7. Ensure groups from Entra ID are mapped to appropriate Databricks roles. 8. Restrict administrative privileges to designated security groups. Regularly monitor sync logs: 9. Periodically review sync logs in Microsoft Entra ID and Databricks Admin Console. 10. Configure Azure Monitor alerts for provisioning failures. Disable manual user creation in Databricks: 11. Ensure that all user management is controlled via SCIM sync from Entra ID. 12. Disable personal access token usage for authentication. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Enable SCIM User and Group Provisioning in Azure Databricks: ``` az ad app update --id --set provisioning.provisioningMode=Automatic ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** Verify SCIM provisioning is enabled: 1. Go to `Microsoft Entra ID`. 1. Under `Manage`, click `Enterprise applications`. 1. Click the name of the Azure Databricks SCIM application. 1. Under `Provisioning`, confirm that SCIM provisioning is enabled and running. Check user sync status in Azure Portal: 5. Under `Provisioning Logs`, verify the last successful sync and any failed entries. Check user sync status in Databricks: 6. Go to `Admin Console` > `Identity and Access Management`. 7. Confirm that Users and Groups match those assigned in Microsoft Entra ID. Ensure role-based access control (RBAC) mapping is correct: 8. Verify that users are assigned appropriate Databricks roles (e.g. Admin, User, Contributor). 9. Confirm that groups are mapped to workspace access roles.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/databricks/administration-guide/users-groups/scim/aad", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Azure Databricks does not sync users and groups from Microsoft Entra ID." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.5", + "Description": "Ensure that Unity Catalog is Configured for Azure Databricks", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Analytics Services", + "SubSection": "2.1 Azure Databricks", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that Unity Catalog is Configured for Azure Databricks", + "RationaleStatement": "* Enforces centralized access control policies and reduces data security risks. * Enables identity-based authentication via Microsoft Entra ID. * Improves compliance with industry regulations (e.g. GDPR, HIPAA, SOC 2) by providing audit logs and access visibility. * Prevents unauthorized data access through table-, row-, and column-level security (RLS & CLS).", + "ImpactStatement": "* Improperly configured permissions may lead to data exfiltration or unauthorized access. * Unity Catalog requires structured governance policies to be effective and prevent overly permissive access.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Use the remediation procedure written in this article: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/databricks/data-governance/unity-catalog/get-started.", + "AuditProcedure": "Method 1: Verify unity catalog deployment: 1. As an Azure Databricks account admin, log into the account console. 1. Click Workspaces. 1. Find your workspace and check the Metastore column. If a metastore name is present, your workspace is attached to a Unity Catalog metastore and therefore enabled for Unity Catalog. Method 2: Run a SQL query to confirm Unity Catalog enablement Run the following SQL query in the SQL query editor or a notebook that is attached to a Unity Catalog-enabled compute resource. No admin role is required. ``` SELECT CURRENT_METASTORE(); ``` If the query returns a metastore ID like the following, then your workspace is attached to a Unity Catalog metastore and therefore enabled for Unity Catalog.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/databricks/data-governance/unity-catalog/:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/databricks/admin/users-groups/:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/databricks/data-governance/unity-catalog/enable-workspaces", + "DefaultValue": "New workspaces have Unity Catalog enabled by default. Existing workspaces may require manual enablement." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.6", + "Description": "Ensure that Usage is Restricted and Expiry is Enforced for Databricks Personal Access Tokens", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Analytics Services", + "SubSection": "2.1 Azure Databricks", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that Usage is Restricted and Expiry is Enforced for Databricks Personal Access Tokens", + "RationaleStatement": "Restricting usage and enforcing expiry for personal access tokens reduces exposure to long-lived tokens, minimizes the risk of API abuse if compromised, and aligns with security best practices through controlled issuance and enforced expiry.", + "ImpactStatement": "If revoked improperly, applications relying on these tokens may fail, requiring a remediation plan for token rotation. Increased administrative effort is required to track and manage API tokens effectively.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** Disable personal access tokens: If your workspace does not require PATs, you can disable them entirely to prevent their use.", + "AuditProcedure": "Azure Databricks administrators can monitor and revoke personal access tokens within their workspace. Detailed instructions are available in the Monitor and Revoke Personal Access Tokens section of the Microsoft documentation: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/databricks/admin/access-control/tokens. To evaluate the usage of personal access tokens in your Azure Databricks account, you can utilize the provided notebook that lists all PATs not rotated or updated in the last 90 days, allowing you to identify tokens that may require revocation. This process is detailed here: https://docs.azure.cn/en-us/databricks/security/auth/oauth-pat-usage. Implementing diagnostic logging provides a comprehensive reference of audit log services and events, enabling you to track activities related to personal access tokens. More information can be found in the diagnostic log reference section: https://docs.azure.cn/en-us/databricks/security/auth/oauth-pat-usage.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/databricks/administration-guide/access-control/tokens:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/databricks/dev-tools/auth/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, personal access tokens are enabled and users can create the Personal access token and their expiry time." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.7", + "Description": "Ensure that Diagnostic Log Delivery is Configured for Azure Databricks", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Analytics Services", + "SubSection": "2.1 Azure Databricks", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that Diagnostic Log Delivery is Configured for Azure Databricks", + "RationaleStatement": "Diagnostic logging provides visibility into security and operational activities within Databricks workspaces while maintaining an audit trail for forensic investigations, and it supports compliance with regulatory standards that require logging and monitoring.", + "ImpactStatement": "Logs consume storage and may require additional monitoring tools, leading to increased operational overhead and costs. Incomplete log configurations may result in missing critical events, reducing monitoring effectiveness.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** Enable diagnostic logging for Azure Databricks: 1. Navigate to your Azure Databricks workspace. 1. In the left-hand menu, select `Monitoring` > `Diagnostic settings`. 1. Click `+ Add diagnostic setting`. 1. Under `Category details`, select the log categories you wish to capture, such as AuditLogs, Clusters, Notebooks, and Jobs. 1. Choose a destination for the logs: - `Log Analytics workspace`: For advanced querying and monitoring. - `Storage account`: For long-term retention. - `Event Hub`: For integration with third-party systems. 1. Provide a `Name` for the diagnostic setting. 1. Click `Save`. Implement log retention policies: 1. Navigate to your Log Analytics workspace. 1. Under `General`, select `Usage and estimated costs`. 1. Click `Data Retention`. 1. Adjust the retention period slider to the desired number of days (up to 730 days). 1. Click `OK`. Monitor logs for anomalies: 1. Navigate to `Azure Monitor`. 1. Select `Alerts` > `+ New alert rule`. 1. Under `Scope`, specify the Databricks resource. 1. Define `Condition` based on log queries that identify anomalies (e.g. unauthorized access attempts). 1. Configure `Actions` to notify stakeholders or trigger automated responses. 1. Provide an Alert rule `name` and `description`. 1. Click `Create alert rule`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Enable diagnostic logging for Azure Databricks: ``` az monitor diagnostic-settings create --name DatabricksLogging --resource --logs '[{category: AuditLogs, enabled: true}, {category: Clusters, enabled: true}, {category: Notebooks, enabled: true}, {category: Jobs, enabled: true}]' --workspace ``` Implement log retention policies: ``` az monitor log-analytics workspace update --resource-group --name --retention-time 365 ``` Monitor logs for anomalies: ``` az monitor activity-log alert create --name DatabricksAnomalyAlert --resource-group --scopes --condition contains 'UnauthorizedAccess' ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** Check if diagnostic logging is enabled for the Databricks workspace: 1. Go to `Azure Databricks`. 1. Select a workspace. 1. In the left-hand menu, select `Monitoring` > `Diagnostic settings`. 1. Verify if a diagnostic setting is configured. If not, diagnostic logging is not enabled. Ensure that logging is enabled for the following categories:", + "AdditionalInformation": "* Ensure that the Azure Databricks workspace is on the Premium plan to utilize diagnostic logging features. * Regularly review and update alert rules to adapt to evolving security threats and operational requirements.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/databricks/admin/account-settings/audit-log-delivery:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/azure/azure-monitor/log-analytics/billing/configure-data-retention", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.8", + "Description": "Ensure Critical Data in Azure Databricks is Encrypted with Customer-managed Keys (CMK)", + "Checks": [ + "databricks_workspace_cmk_encryption_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Analytics Services", + "SubSection": "2.1 Azure Databricks", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure Critical Data in Azure Databricks is Encrypted with Customer-managed Keys (CMK)", + "RationaleStatement": "By default in Azure, data at rest tends to be encrypted using Microsoft Managed Keys. If your organization wants to control and manage encryption keys for compliance and defense-in-depth, Customer Managed Keys can be established. While it is possible to automate the assessment of this recommendation, the assessment status for this recommendation remains 'Manual' due to ideally limited scope. The scope of application - which workloads CMK is applied to - should be carefully considered to account for organizational capacity and targeted to workloads with specific need for CMK.", + "ImpactStatement": "If the key expires due to setting the 'activation date' and 'expiration date', the key must be rotated manually. Using Customer Managed Keys may also incur additional man-hour requirements to create, store, manage, and protect the keys as needed.", + "RemediationProcedure": "NOTE: These remediations assume that an Azure KeyVault already exists in the subscription. Remediate from Azure CLI 1. Create a dedicated key: az keyvault key create --vault-name --name -protection 2. Assign permissions to Databricks: az keyvault set-policy --name --resource-group --spn --key-permissions get wrapKey unwrapKey 3. Enable encryption with CMK: az databricks workspace update --name --resourcegroup --key-source Microsoft.KeyVault --key-name --keyvault-uri Remediate from PowerShell $Key = Add-AzKeyVaultKey -VaultName -Name Destination Set-AzDatabricksWorkspace -ResourceGroupName WorkspaceName -EncryptionKeySource Microsoft.KeyVault -KeyVaultUri $Key.Id", + "AuditProcedure": "Audit: Audit from Azure Portal 1. Go to Azure Portal → Databricks Workspaces. 2. Select a Databricks Workspace and go to Encryption settings. 3. Check if customer-managed keys (CMK) are enabled under Managed Disk Encryption .4. If CMK is not enabled, the workspace is non-compliant. Audit from Azure CLI Run the following command to check encryption settings for Databricks workspace: az databricks workspace show --name --resourcegroup --query encryption Ensure that keySource is set to Microsoft.KeyVault. Audit from PowerShell Get-AzDatabricksWorkspace -ResourceGroupName -Name | Select-Object Encryption Verify that encryption is set to Customer-Managed Keys (CMK). Audit from Databricks CLI databricks workspace get-metadata --workspace-id Ensure that encryption settings reflect a CMK setup.", + "AdditionalInformation": "This recommendation is based on the Common Reference Recommendation Ensure critical data is encrypted with customer-managed keys (CMK).", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/data-encryption-best-practices#protect-data-at-rest:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-data-protection#dp-5-use-customer-managed-key-option-in-data-at-rest-encryption-when-required", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Encryption type is set to Microsoft Managed Keys." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.9", + "Description": "Ensure 'No Public IP' is Set to 'Enabled'", + "Checks": [ + "databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Analytics Services", + "SubSection": "2.1 Azure Databricks", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure 'No Public IP' is Set to 'Enabled'", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling secure cluster connectivity limits exposure to the public internet, improving security and reducing the risk of external attacks.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling secure cluster connectivity requires careful network configuration. Before secure cluster connectivity can be enabled, Azure Databricks workspaces must be deployed in a customer-managed virtual network (VNet injection).", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Azure Databricks`. 2. Click the name of a workspace. 3. Under `Settings`, click `Networking`. 4. Under `Network access`, next to `Deploy Azure Databricks workspace with Secure Cluster Connectivity (No Public IP)`, click the radio button next to `Enabled`. 5. Click `Save`. 6. Repeat steps 1-5 for each workspace requiring remediation. **Remediate from Azure CLI** For each workspace requiring remediation, run the following command to set enableNoPublicIp to true: ``` az databricks workspace update --resource-group --name --enable-no-public-ip true ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** For each workspace requiring remediation, run the following command to set EnableNoPublicIP to True: ``` Update-AzDatabricksWorkspace -ResourceGroupName -Name -EnableNoPublicIP ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Azure Databricks`. 2. Click the name of a workspace. 3. Under `Settings`, click `Networking`. 4. Under `Network access`, ensure that `Deploy Azure Databricks workspace with Secure Cluster Connectivity (No Public IP)` is set to `Enabled`. 5. Repeat steps 1-4 for each workspace. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list workspaces: ``` az databricks workspace list ``` For each workspace, run the following command to get the enableNoPublicIp setting: ``` az databricks workspace show --resource-group --name --query parameters.enableNoPublicIp.value ``` Ensure that `true` is returned. **Audit from PowerShell** Run the following command to list workspaces: ``` Get-AzDatabricksWorkspace ``` Run the following command to get the workspace in a resource group with a given name: ``` $workspace = Get-AzDatabricksWorkspace -ResourceGroupName -Name ``` Run the following command to get the EnableNoPublicIp setting: ``` $workspace.EnableNoPublicIP ``` Ensure that `True` is returned. **Audit from Azure Policy** - **Policy ID:** [51c1490f-3319-459c-bbbc-7f391bbed753] **- Name:** 'Azure Databricks Clusters should disable public IP'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/databricks/security/network/classic/secure-cluster-connectivity:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/databricks/workspace:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.databricks", + "DefaultValue": "No Public IP is set to Enabled by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.10", + "Description": "Ensure 'Allow Public Network Access' is set to 'Disabled'", + "Checks": [ + "databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Analytics Services", + "SubSection": "2.1 Azure Databricks", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure 'Allow Public Network Access' is set to 'Disabled'", + "RationaleStatement": "Disabling public network access improves security by ensuring that Azure Databricks workspaces are not exposed on the public internet.", + "ImpactStatement": "Prior to disabling public network access, it is strongly recommended that virtual network integration is completed or private endpoints/links are set up. Disabling public network access restricts access to the service and will require the configuration of a virtual network and/or private endpoints for any services or users needing access within trusted networks.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Azure Databricks`. 2. Click the name of a workspace. 3. Under `Settings` click `Networking`. 4. Under `Network access`, next to `Allow Public Network Access`, click the radio button next to `Disabled`. 5. Click `Save`. 6. Repeat steps 1-5 for each workspace requiring remediation. **Remediate from Azure CLI** For each workspace requiring remediation, run the following command to set publicNetworkAccess to Disabled: ``` az databricks workspace update --resource-group --name --public-network-access Disabled ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** For each workspace requiring remediation, run the following command to set PublicNetworkAccess to Disabled: ``` Update-AzDatabricksWorkspace -ResourceGroupName -Name -PublicNetworkAccess Disabled ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Azure Databricks`. 2. Click the name of a workspace. 3. Under `Settings` click `Networking`. 4. Under `Network access`, ensure `Allow Public Network Access` is set to `Disabled`. 5. Repeat steps 1-4 for each workspace. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list workspaces: ``` az databricks workspace list ``` For each workspace, run the following command to get the publicNetworkAccess setting: ``` az databricks workspace show --resource-group --name --query publicNetworkAccess ``` Ensure that `Disabled` is returned. **Audit from PowerShell** Run the following command to list workspaces: ``` Get-AzDatabricksWorkspace ``` Run the following command to get the PublicNetworkAccess setting: ``` $workspace = Get-AzDatabricksWorkspace -ResourceGroupName -Name $workspace.PublicNetworkAccess ``` Ensure that `Disabled` is returned. **Audit from Azure Policy** - **Policy ID:** [0e7849de-b939-4c50-ab48-fc6b0f5eeba2] **- Name:** 'Azure Databricks Workspaces should disable public network access'", + "AdditionalInformation": "This recommendation is based on the Common Reference Recommendation Ensure public network access is Disabled.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/databricks/workspace:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.databricks", + "DefaultValue": "Allow Public Network Access is set to Enabled by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.11", + "Description": "Ensure Private Endpoints are used to access Azure Databricks workspaces", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Analytics Services", + "SubSection": "2.1 Azure Databricks", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure Private Endpoints are used to access Azure Databricks workspaces", + "RationaleStatement": "Using private endpoints for Azure Databricks workspaces ensures that all communication between clients, services, and data sources occurs over a secure, private IP space within an Azure Virtual Network (VNet). This approach eliminates exposure to the public internet, significantly reducing the attack surface and aligning with Zero Trust principles.", + "ImpactStatement": "If an Azure Virtual Network is not implemented correctly, this may result in the loss of critical network traffic. Private endpoints are charged per hour of use. Before a private endpoint can be configured, Azure Databricks workspaces must be deployed in a customer-managed virtual network, must have secure cluster connectivity enabled, and must be on the Premium pricing tier.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Azure Databricks`. 2. Click the name of a workspace. 3. Under `Settings`, click `Networking`. 4. Click `Private endpoint connections`. 5. Click `+ Private endpoint`. 6. Under `Project details`, select a Subscription and a Resource group. 7. Under `Instance details`, provide a Name, Network Interface Name, and select a Region. 8. Click `Next : Resource >`. 9. Select a Target sub-resource. 10. Click `Next : Virtual Network >`. 11. Under `Networking`, select a Virtual network and a Subnet. 12. Optionally, configure Private IP configuration and Application security group. 13. Click `Next : DNS >`. 14. Optionally, configure Private DNS integration. 15. Click `Next : Tags >`. 16. Optionally, configure tags. 17. Click `Next : Review + create >`. 18. Click `Create`. 19. Repeat steps 1-18 for each workspace requiring remediation. **Remediate from Azure CLI** For each workspace requiring remediation, run the following command to create a private endpoint connection: ``` az network private-endpoint create --resource-group --name --location --vnet-name --subnet --private-connection-resource-id --connection-name --group-id ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Azure Databricks`. 2. Click the name of a workspace. 3. Under `Settings`, click `Networking`. 4. Click `Private endpoint connections`. 5. Ensure a private endpoint connection exists with a connection state of `Approved`. 6. Repeat steps 1-5 for each workspace. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list workspaces: ``` az databricks workspace list ``` For each workspace, run the following command to get the privateEndpointConnections configuration: ``` az databricks workspace show --resource-group --name --query privateEndpointConnections ``` Ensure a private endpoint connection is returned with a privateLinkServiceConnectionState status of `Approved`. **Audit from PowerShell** Run the following command to list workspaces: ``` Get-AzDatabricksWorkspace ``` Run the following command to get the PrivateEndpointConnection configuration: ``` $workspace = Get-AzDatabricksWorkspace -ResourceGroupName -Name $workspace.PrivateEndpointConnection | Select-Object -Property Id,PrivateLinkServiceConnectionStateStatus ``` Ensure a private endpoint connection is returned with a PrivateLinkServiceConnectionStateStatus of `Approved`. **Audit from Azure Policy** - **Policy ID:** [258823f2-4595-4b52-b333-cc96192710d8] **- Name:** 'Azure Databricks Workspaces should use private link'", + "AdditionalInformation": "This recommendation is based on the Common Reference Recommendation Ensure Private Endpoints are used to access {service}.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/databricks/security/network/classic/private-link:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/databricks/workspace:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.databricks", + "DefaultValue": "Private endpoints are not configured for Azure Databricks workspaces by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.12", + "Description": "Ensure Azure Databricks groups are reviewed periodically", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Analytics Services", + "SubSection": "2.1 Azure Databricks", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure Azure Databricks groups are reviewed periodically", + "RationaleStatement": "To ensure accurate privileges for your Azure Databricks implementation, your organization should review all users and permission assignments on a regular interval.", + "ImpactStatement": "Administrative overhead of user management.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select `Azure Databricks`. 1. Select the Databricks implementation you wish to audit. 1. Select `Access control (IAM)`. 1. Scroll down and select `Add role assignment`. 1. Search for the role you wish to add. Then select `Next`. 1. Select the group members you wish to add. Then select `Next`. 1. Review the info you have chosen, then select `Review + assign`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select `Azure Databricks`. 1. Select the Databricks implementation you wish to audit. 1. Select `Access control (IAM)`. 1. In the horizontal menu select `Role assignments`. 1. Audit the list for each role and its assignment to each user.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/baselines/azure-databricks-security-baseline:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/databricks/security/auth/", + "DefaultValue": "By default Azure Databricks only has the Owner user and role assigned." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.1.1", + "Description": "Ensure only MFA Enabled Identities can Access Privileged Virtual Machine", + "Checks": [ + "entra_user_with_vm_access_has_mfa" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Compute Services", + "SubSection": "3.1 Virtual Machines", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure only MFA Enabled Identities can Access Privileged Virtual Machine", + "RationaleStatement": "Integrating multi-factor authentication (MFA) as part of the organizational policy can greatly reduce the risk of an identity gaining control of valid credentials that may be used for additional tactics such as initial access, lateral movement, and collecting information. MFA can also be used to restrict access to cloud resources and APIs. An Adversary may log into accessible cloud services within a compromised environment using Valid Accounts that are synchronized to move laterally and perform actions with the virtual machine's managed identity. The adversary may then perform management actions or access cloud-hosted resources as the logged-on managed identity.", + "ImpactStatement": "This recommendation requires the Entra ID P2 license to implement. Ensure that identities provisioned to a virtual machine utilize an RBAC/ABAC group and are allocated a role using Azure PIM, and that the role settings require MFA or use another third-party PAM solution for accessing virtual machines.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Log in to the Azure portal. 2. This can be remediated by enabling MFA for user, Removing user access or Reducing access of managed identities attached to virtual machines. - Case I : Enable MFA for users having access on virtual machines. 1. Go to `Microsoft Entra ID`. 1. For `Per-user MFA`: 1. Under `Manage`, click `Users`. 1. Click `Per-user MFA`. 1. For each user requiring remediation, check the box next to their name. 1. Click `Enable MFA`. 1. Click `Enable`. 1. For `Conditional Access`: 1. Under `Manage`, click `Security`. 1. Under `Protect`, click `Conditional Access`. 1. Update the Conditional Access policy requiring MFA for all users, removing each user requiring remediation from the `Exclude` list. - Case II : Removing user access on a virtual machine. 1. Select the `Subscription`, then click on `Access control (IAM)`. 2. Select `Role assignments` and search for `Virtual Machine Administrator Login` or `Virtual Machine User Login` or any role that provides access to log into virtual machines. 3. Click on `Role Name`, Select `Assignments`, and remove identities with no MFA configured. - Case III : Reducing access of managed identities attached to virtual machines. 1. Select the `Subscription`, then click on `Access control (IAM)`. 2. Select `Role Assignments` from the top menu and apply filters on `Assignment type` as `Privileged administrator roles` and `Type` as `Virtual Machines`. 3. Click on `Role Name`, Select `Assignments`, and remove identities access make sure this follows the least privileges principal.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Log in to the Azure portal. 1. Select the `Subscription`, then click on `Access control (IAM)`. 1. Click `Role : All` and click `All` to display the drop-down menu. 1. Type `Virtual Machine Administrator Login` and select `Virtual Machine Administrator Login`. 1. Review the list of identities that have been assigned the `Virtual Machine Administrator Login` role. 1. Go to `Microsoft Entra ID`. 1. For `Per-user MFA`: 1. Under `Manage`, click `Users`. 1. Click `Per-user MFA`. 1. Ensure that none of the identities assigned the `Virtual Machine Administrator Login` role from step 4 have `Status` set to `disabled`. 1. For `Conditional Access`: 1. Under `Manage`, click `Security`. 1. Under `Protect`, click `Conditional Access`. 1. Ensure that none of the identities assigned the `Virtual Machine Administrator Login` role from step 4 are exempt from a Conditional Access policy requiring MFA for all users.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.1", + "Description": "Ensure that 'security defaults' is Enabled in Microsoft Entra ID", + "Checks": [ + "entra_security_defaults_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Identity Services", + "SubSection": "5.1 Security Defaults (Per-User MFA)", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that 'security defaults' is Enabled in Microsoft Entra ID", + "RationaleStatement": "Security defaults provide secure default settings that we manage on behalf of organizations to keep customers safe until they are ready to manage their own identity security settings. For example, doing the following: - Requiring all users and admins to register for MFA. - Challenging users with MFA - when necessary, based on factors such as location, device, role, and task. - Disabling authentication from legacy authentication clients, which cant do MFA.", + "ImpactStatement": "This recommendation should be implemented initially and then may be overridden by other service/product specific CIS Benchmarks. Administrators should also be aware that certain configurations in Microsoft Entra ID may impact other Microsoft services such as Microsoft 365.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** To enable security defaults in your directory: 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu. 1. Browse to `Microsoft Entra ID` > `Properties`. 1. Select `Manage security defaults`. 1. Under `Security defaults`, select `Enabled (recommended)`. 1. Select `Save`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** To ensure security defaults is enabled in your directory: 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu. 2. Browse to `Microsoft Entra ID` > `Properties`. 3. Select `Manage security defaults`. 4. Under `Security defaults`, verify that `Enabled (recommended)` is selected.", + "AdditionalInformation": "This recommendation differs from the [Microsoft 365 Benchmark](https://workbench.cisecurity.org/benchmarks/5741). This is because the potential impact associated with disabling Security Defaults is dependent upon the security settings implemented in the environment. It is recommended that organizations disabling Security Defaults implement appropriate security settings to replace the settings configured by Security Defaults.", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/concept-fundamentals-security-defaults:https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/azure-active-directory-identity/introducing-security-defaults/ba-p/1061414:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-identity-management#im-2-protect-identity-and-authentication-systems", + "DefaultValue": "If your tenant was created on or after October 22, 2019, security defaults may already be enabled in your tenant." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.2", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Require Multifactor Authentication to register or join devices with Microsoft Entra' is set to 'Yes'", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Identity Services", + "SubSection": "5.1 Security Defaults (Per-User MFA)", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Require Multifactor Authentication to register or join devices with Microsoft Entra' is set to 'Yes'", + "RationaleStatement": "Multi-factor authentication is recommended when adding devices to Microsoft Entra ID. When set to `Yes`, users who are adding devices from the internet must first use the second method of authentication before their device is successfully added to the directory. This ensures that rogue devices are not added to the domain using a compromised user account.", + "ImpactStatement": "A slight impact of additional overhead, as Administrators will now have to approve every access to the domain.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu 1. Select `Microsoft Entra ID` 1. Under `Manage`, select `Devices` 1. Under `Manage`, select `Device settings` 1. Under `Microsoft Entra join and registration settings`, set `Require Multifactor Authentication to register or join devices with Microsoft Entra` to `Yes` 1. Click `Save`", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu 1. Select `Microsoft Entra ID` 1. Under `Manage`, select `Devices` 1. Under `Manage`, select `Device settings` 1. Under `Microsoft Entra join and registration settings`, ensure that `Require Multifactor Authentication to register or join devices with Microsoft Entra` is set to `Yes`", + "AdditionalInformation": "If Conditional Access is available, this recommendation should be bypassed in favor of the Conditional Access implementation of requiring Multifactor Authentication to register or join devices with Microsoft Entra. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/how-to-policy-mfa-device-register-join", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/how-to-policy-mfa-device-register-join:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-identity-management#im-6-use-strong-authentication-controls", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `Require Multifactor Authentication to register or join devices with Microsoft Entra` is set to `No`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.3", + "Description": "Ensure that 'multifactor authentication' is 'enabled' For All Users", + "Checks": [ + "entra_privileged_user_has_mfa", + "entra_non_privileged_user_has_mfa" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Identity Services", + "SubSection": "5.1 Security Defaults (Per-User MFA)", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that 'multifactor authentication' is 'enabled' For All Users", + "RationaleStatement": "Multifactor authentication requires an individual to present a minimum of two separate forms of authentication before access is granted. Multifactor authentication provides additional assurance that the individual attempting to gain access is who they claim to be. With multifactor authentication, an attacker would need to compromise at least two different authentication mechanisms, increasing the difficulty of compromise and thus reducing the risk.", + "ImpactStatement": "Users would require two forms of authentication before any access is granted. Additional administrative time will be required for managing dual forms of authentication when enabling multifactor authentication.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Entra ID`. 1. Under `Manage`, click `Users`. 1. Click `Per-user MFA` from the top menu. 1. Click the box next to a user with `Status` `disabled`. 1. Click `Enable MFA`. 1. Click `Enable`. 1. Repeat steps 1-6 for each user requiring remediation. **Other options within Azure Portal** - [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/authentication/tutorial-enable-azure-mfa](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/authentication/tutorial-enable-azure-mfa) - [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/authentication/howto-mfa-mfasettings](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/authentication/howto-mfa-mfasettings) - [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/conditional-access/howto-conditional-access-policy-admin-mfa](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/conditional-access/howto-conditional-access-policy-admin-mfa) - [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/authentication/howto-mfa-getstarted#enable-multi-factor-authentication-with-conditional-access](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/authentication/howto-mfa-getstarted#enable-multi-factor-authentication-with-conditional-access)", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Entra ID`. 1. Under `Manage`, click `Users`. 1. Click `Per-user MFA` from the top menu. 1. Ensure that `Status` is `enabled` for all users. **Audit from REST API** Run the following Graph PowerShell command: ``` get-mguser -All | where {$_.StrongAuthenticationMethods.Count -eq 0} | Select-Object -Property UserPrincipalName ``` If the output contains any `UserPrincipalName`, then this recommendation is non-compliant.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/multi-factor-authentication/multi-factor-authentication:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-mandatory-multifactor-authentication:https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/blog/announcing-mandatory-multi-factor-authentication-for-azure-sign-in/:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-identity-management#im-4-authenticate-server-and-services", + "DefaultValue": "Multifactor authentication is not enabled for all users by default. Starting in 2024, multifactor authentication is enabled for administrative accounts by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.4", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Allow users to remember multifactor authentication on devices they trust' is Disabled", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Identity Services", + "SubSection": "5.1 Security Defaults (Per-User MFA)", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Allow users to remember multifactor authentication on devices they trust' is Disabled", + "RationaleStatement": "Remembering Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for devices and browsers allows users to have the option to bypass MFA for a set number of days after performing a successful sign-in using MFA. This can enhance usability by minimizing the number of times a user may need to perform two-step verification on the same device. However, if an account or device is compromised, remembering MFA for trusted devices may affect security. Hence, it is recommended that users not be allowed to bypass MFA.", + "ImpactStatement": "For every login attempt, the user will be required to perform multi-factor authentication.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu 1. Select `Microsoft Entra ID` 1. Under `Manage`, click `Users` 1. Click the `Per-user MFA` button on the top bar 1. Click on `Service settings` 1. Uncheck the box next to `Allow users to remember multi-factor authentication on devices they trust` 1. Click `Save`", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu 1. Select `Microsoft Entra ID` 1. Under `Manage`, click `Users` 1. Click the `Per-user MFA` button on the top bar 1. Click on `Service settings` 1. Ensure that `Allow users to remember multi-factor authentication on devices they trust` is not enabled", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-mfa-mfasettings#remember-multi-factor-authentication-for-devices-that-users-trust:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/security-controls-v3-identity-management#im-4-use-strong-authentication-controls-for-all-azure-active-directory-based-access:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-identity-management#im-6-use-strong-authentication-controls", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `Allow users to remember multi-factor authentication on devices they trust` is disabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.3.1", + "Description": "Ensure that Azure Admin Accounts Are Not Used for Daily Operations", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Identity Services", + "SubSection": "5.3 Periodic Identity Reviews", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that Azure Admin Accounts Are Not Used for Daily Operations", + "RationaleStatement": "Using admin accounts for daily operations increases the risk of accidental misconfigurations and security breaches.", + "ImpactStatement": "Minor administrative overhead includes managing separate accounts, enforcing stricter access controls, and potential licensing costs for advanced security features.", + "RemediationProcedure": "If admin accounts are being used for daily operations, consider the following: - Monitor and alert on unusual activity. - Enforce the principle of least privilege. - Revoke any unnecessary administrative access. - Use Conditional Access to limit access to resources. - Ensure that administrators have separate admin and user accounts. - Use Microsoft Entra ID Protection helps organizations detect, investigate, and remediate identity-based risks. - Use Privileged Identity Management (PIM) in Microsoft Entra ID to limit standing administrator access to privileged roles, discover who has access, and review privileged access.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** Monitor: 1. Go to `Monitor`. 1. Click `Activity log`. 1. Review the activity log and ensure that admin accounts are not being used for daily operations. Microsoft Entra ID: 1. Go to `Microsoft Entra ID`. 1. Under `Monitoring`, click `Sign-in logs`. 1. Review the sign-in logs and ensure that admin accounts are not being accessed more frequently than necessary.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/privileged-access-workstations/critical-impact-accounts", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.3.2", + "Description": "Ensure that Guest Users are Reviewed on a Regular Basis", + "Checks": [ + "entra_policy_guest_users_access_restrictions" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Identity Services", + "SubSection": "5.3 Periodic Identity Reviews", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that Guest Users are Reviewed on a Regular Basis", + "RationaleStatement": "Guest users are typically added outside your employee on-boarding/off-boarding process and could potentially be overlooked indefinitely. To prevent this, guest users should be reviewed on a regular basis. During this audit, guest users should also be determined to not have administrative privileges.", + "ImpactStatement": "Before removing guest users, determine their use and scope. Like removing any user, there may be unforeseen consequences to systems if an account is removed without careful consideration.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu 1. Select `Microsoft Entra ID` 1. Under `Manage`, select `Users` 1. Click on `Add filter` 1. Select `User type` 1. Select `Guest` from the Value dropdown 1. Click `Apply` 1. Check the box next to all `Guest` users that are no longer required or are inactive 1. Click `Delete` 1. Click `OK` **Remediate from Azure CLI** Before deleting the user, set it to inactive using the ID from the Audit Procedure to determine if there are any dependent systems. ``` az ad user update --id --account-enabled {false} ``` After determining that there are no dependent systems, delete the user. ``` Remove-AzureADUser -ObjectId ``` **Remediate from Azure PowerShell** Before deleting the user, set it to inactive using the ID from the Audit Procedure to determine if there are any dependent systems. ``` Set-AzureADUser -ObjectId -AccountEnabled false ``` After determining that there are no dependent systems, delete the user. ``` PS C:\\>Remove-AzureADUser -ObjectId ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu 1. Select `Microsoft Entra ID` 1. Under `Manage`, select `Users` 1. Click on `Add filter` 1. Select `User type` 1. Select `Guest` from the Value dropdown 1. Click `Apply` 1. Audit the listed guest users **Audit from Azure CLI** ``` az ad user list --query [?userType=='Guest'] ``` Ensure all users listed are still required and not inactive. **Audit from Azure PowerShell** ``` Get-AzureADUser |Where-Object {$_.UserType -like Guest} |Select-Object DisplayName, UserPrincipalName, UserType -Unique ``` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [e9ac8f8e-ce22-4355-8f04-99b911d6be52](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fe9ac8f8e-ce22-4355-8f04-99b911d6be52) **- Name:** 'Guest accounts with read permissions on Azure resources should be removed' - **Policy ID:** [94e1c2ac-cbbe-4cac-a2b5-389c812dee87](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F94e1c2ac-cbbe-4cac-a2b5-389c812dee87) **- Name:** 'Guest accounts with write permissions on Azure resources should be removed' - **Policy ID:** [339353f6-2387-4a45-abe4-7f529d121046](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F339353f6-2387-4a45-abe4-7f529d121046) **- Name:** 'Guest accounts with owner permissions on Azure resources should be removed'", + "AdditionalInformation": "It is good practice to use a dynamic security group to manage guest users. To create the dynamic security group: 1. Navigate to the 'Microsoft Entra ID' blade in the Azure Portal 2. Select the 'Groups' item 3. Create new 4. Type of 'dynamic' 5. Use the following dynamic selection rule. (user.userType -eq Guest) 6. Once the group has been created, select access reviews option and create a new access review with a period of monthly and send to relevant administrators for review.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/external-id/user-properties:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/how-to-create-delete-users#delete-a-user:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-privileged-access#pa-4-review-and-reconcile-user-access-regularly:https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/business/identity-access-management/azure-ad-pricing:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/howto-manage-inactive-user-accounts:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/users-restore", + "DefaultValue": "By default no guest users are created." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.3.3", + "Description": "Ensure That Use of the 'User Access Administrator' Role is Restricted", + "Checks": [ + "iam_role_user_access_admin_restricted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Identity Services", + "SubSection": "5.3 Periodic Identity Reviews", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure That Use of the 'User Access Administrator' Role is Restricted", + "RationaleStatement": "The User Access Administrator role provides extensive access control privileges. Unnecessary assignments heighten the risk of privilege escalation and unauthorized access. Removing the role immediately after use minimizes security exposure.", + "ImpactStatement": "Increased administrative effort to manage and remove role assignments appropriately.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu. 1. Select `Subscriptions`. 1. Select a subscription. 1. Select `Access control (IAM)`. 1. Look for the following banner at the top of the page: `Action required: X users have elevated access in your tenant. You should take immediate action and remove all role assignments with elevated access.` 1. Click `View role assignments`. 1. Click `Remove`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Run the following command: ``` az role assignment delete --role User Access Administrator --scope / ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu. 1. Select `Subscriptions`. 1. Select a subscription. 1. Select `Access control (IAM)`. 1. Look for the following banner at the top of the page: `Action required: X users have elevated access in your tenant. You should take immediate action and remove all role assignments with elevated access.` If the banner is displayed, the `User Access Administrator` is assigned. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command: ``` az role assignment list --role User Access Administrator --scope / ``` Ensure that the command does not return any `User Access Administrator` role assignment information.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/built-in-roles:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/elevate-access-global-admin", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.3.4", + "Description": "Ensure that All 'Privileged' Role Assignments are Periodically Reviewed", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Identity Services", + "SubSection": "5.3 Periodic Identity Reviews", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that All 'Privileged' Role Assignments are Periodically Reviewed", + "RationaleStatement": "Privileged roles are crown jewel assets that can be used by malicious insiders, threat actors, and even through mistake to significantly damage an organization. These roles should be periodically reviewed to identify lingering permissions assignment and detect lateral movement through privilege escalation.", + "ImpactStatement": "Increased administrative effort to manage and remove role assignments appropriately.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Review privileged role assignments and remove any that are no longer necessary or appropriate. Use Azure PIM (Privileged Identity Management) to implement just-in-time access for privileged roles.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu. 2. Select `Subscriptions`. 3. Select a subscription. 4. Select `Access control (IAM)`. 5. Look for the number under the word `Privileged` accompanied by a link titled `View Assignments`. Click the `View assignments` link. 6. For each privileged role listed, evaluate whether the assignment is appropriate and current for each User, Group, or App assigned to each privileged role. NOTE: Determining 'appropriate' assignments requires a clear understanding of your organization's personnel, systems, policy, and security requirements.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/built-in-roles", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.3.5", + "Description": "Ensure Disabled User Accounts do not Have Read, Write, or Owner Permissions", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Identity Services", + "SubSection": "5.3 Periodic Identity Reviews", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure Disabled User Accounts do not Have Read, Write, or Owner Permissions", + "RationaleStatement": "Disabled accounts should not retain access to resources, as this poses a security risk. Removing role assignments mitigates potential unauthorized access and enforces the principle of least privilege.", + "ImpactStatement": "Ensure disabled accounts are not relied on for break glass or automated processes before removing roles to avoid service disruption.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Entra ID`. 2. Under `Manage`, click `Users`. 3. Click `Add filter`. 4. Click `Account enabled`. 5. Click the toggle switch to set the value to `No`. 6. Click `Apply`. 7. Click the `Display name` of a disabled user account with read, write, or owner roles assigned. 8. Click `Azure role assignments`. 9. Click the name of a read, write, or owner role. 10. Click `Assignments`. 11. Click `Remove` in the row for the disabled user account. 12. Click `Yes`. 13. Repeat steps 7-12 for disabled user accounts requiring remediation. **Remediate from PowerShell** ``` Remove-AzRoleAssignment -ObjectId $user.ObjectId -RoleDefinitionName ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Entra ID`. 2. Under `Manage`, click `Users`. 3. Click `Add filter`. 4. Click `Account enabled`. 5. Click the toggle switch to set the value to `No`. 6. Click `Apply`. 7. Click the `Display name` of a disabled user account. 8. Click `Azure role assignments`. 9. Ensure that no read, write, or owner roles are assigned to the user account. 10. Repeat steps 7-9 for each disabled user account. **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Connect-AzureAD Get-AzureADUser $user = Get-AzureADUser -ObjectId $user.AccountEnabled ``` If AccountEnabled is False, run: ``` Get-AzRoleAssignment -ObjectId $user.ObjectId ``` **Audit from Azure Policy** - **Policy ID:** [0cfea604-3201-4e14-88fc-fae4c427a6c5] - Name: 'Blocked accounts with owner permissions on Azure resources should be removed' - **Policy ID:** [8d7e1fde-fe26-4b5f-8108-f8e432cbc2be] - Name: 'Blocked accounts with read and write permissions on Azure resources should be removed'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.resources/get-azaduser:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.resources/get-azroleassignment:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.resources/remove-azroleassignment", + "DefaultValue": "Disabled user accounts retain their prior role assignments." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.3.6", + "Description": "Ensure 'Tenant Creator' Role Assignments are Periodically Reviewed", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Identity Services", + "SubSection": "5.3 Periodic Identity Reviews", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure 'Tenant Creator' Role Assignments are Periodically Reviewed", + "RationaleStatement": "Unnecessary assignments increase the risk of privilege escalation and unauthorized access. This recommendation should be applied alongside the recommendation 'Ensure that Restrict non-admin users from creating tenants is set to Yes'.", + "ImpactStatement": "Verify that the Tenant Creator role is no longer required by any assignments before removal to avoid disruption of critical functions.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Entra ID`. 2. Under `Manage`, click `Roles and administrators`. 3. In the search bar, type `Tenant Creator`. 4. Click the role. 5. Click the name of an assignment. 6. Check the box next to the `Tenant Creator` role. 7. Click `X Remove assignments`. 8. Click `Yes`. 9. Repeat steps 1-8 for each assignment requiring remediation.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Entra ID`. 2. Under `Manage`, click `Roles and administrators`. 3. In the search bar, type `Tenant Creator`. 4. Click the role. 5. Review the assignments and ensure that they are appropriate.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory-b2c/tenant-management-check-tenant-creation-permission:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference#tenant-creator", + "DefaultValue": "The Tenant Creator role is not assigned by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.3.7", + "Description": "Ensure All Non-privileged Role Assignments are Periodically Reviewed", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Identity Services", + "SubSection": "5.3 Periodic Identity Reviews", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure All Non-privileged Role Assignments are Periodically Reviewed", + "RationaleStatement": "To ensure the principle of least privilege is followed, non-privileged role assignments should be reviewed periodically to confirm that users are granted only the minimum level of permissions they need to perform their tasks.", + "ImpactStatement": "Increased administrative effort to manage and remove role assignments appropriately.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Subscriptions`. 2. Click the name of a subscription. 3. Click `Access control (IAM)`. 4. Click `Role assignments`. 5. Click `Job function roles`. 6. Check the box next to any inappropriate assignments. 7. Click `Delete`. 8. Click `Yes`. 9. Repeat steps 1-8 for each subscription.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Subscriptions`. 2. Click the name of a subscription. 3. Click `Access control (IAM)`. 4. Click `Role assignments`. 5. Click `Job function roles`. 6. For each role, ensure the assignments are appropriate. 7. Repeat steps 1-6 for each subscription.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/role-assignments", + "DefaultValue": "Users do not have non-privileged roles assigned to them by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.4", + "Description": "Ensure that No Custom Subscription Administrator Roles Exist", + "Checks": [ + "iam_subscription_roles_owner_custom_not_created" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Identity Services", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that No Custom Subscription Administrator Roles Exist", + "RationaleStatement": "Custom roles in Azure with administrative access can obfuscate the permissions granted and introduce complexity and blind spots to the management of privileged identities. For less mature security programs without regular identity audits, the creation of Custom roles should be avoided entirely. For more mature security programs with regular identity audits, Custom Roles should be audited for use and assignment, used minimally, and the principle of least privilege should be observed when granting permissions", + "ImpactStatement": "Subscriptions will need to be handled by Administrators with permissions.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu. 1. Select `Subscriptions`. 1. Select a subscription. 1. Select `Access control (IAM)`. 1. Select `Roles`. 1. Click `Type` and select `Custom role` from the drop-down menu. 1. Check the box next to each role which grants subscription administrator privileges. 1. Select `Delete`. 1. Select `Yes`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** List custom roles: ``` az role definition list --custom-role-only True ``` Check for entries with `assignableScope` of the `subscription`, and an action of `*`. To remove a violating role: ``` az role definition delete --name ``` Note that any role assignments must be removed before a custom role can be deleted. Ensure impact is assessed before deleting a custom role granting subscription administrator privileges.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu. 1. Select `Subscriptions`. 1. Select a subscription. 1. Select `Access control (IAM)`. 1. Select `Roles`. 1. Click `Type` and select `Custom role` from the drop-down menu. 1. Select `View` next to a role. 1. Select `JSON`. 1. Check for `assignableScopes` set to the subscription, and `actions` set to `*`. 1. Repeat steps 7-9 for each custom role. **Audit from Azure CLI** List custom roles: ``` az role definition list --custom-role-only True ``` Check for entries with `assignableScope` of the `subscription`, and an action of `*` **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Connect-AzAccount Get-AzRoleDefinition |Where-Object {($_.IsCustom -eq $true) -and ($_.Actions.contains('*'))} ``` Check the output for `AssignableScopes` value set to the subscription. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [a451c1ef-c6ca-483d-87ed-f49761e3ffb5](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fa451c1ef-c6ca-483d-87ed-f49761e3ffb5) **- Name:** 'Audit usage of custom RBAC roles'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/billing/billing-add-change-azure-subscription-administrator:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-privileged-access#pa-1-separate-and-limit-highly-privilegedadministrative-users:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-privileged-access#pa-3-manage-lifecycle-of-identities-and-entitlements:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-governance-strategy#gs-2-define-and-implement-enterprise-segmentationseparation-of-duties-strategy:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-governance-strategy#gs-6-define-and-implement-identity-and-privileged-access-strategy:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-privileged-access#pa-7-follow-just-enough-administration-least-privilege-principle", + "DefaultValue": "By default, no custom owner roles are created." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.5", + "Description": "Ensure that a Custom Role is Assigned Permissions for Administering Resource Locks", + "Checks": [ + "iam_custom_role_has_permissions_to_administer_resource_locks" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Identity Services", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that a Custom Role is Assigned Permissions for Administering Resource Locks", + "RationaleStatement": "Given that the resource lock functionality is outside of standard Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), it would be prudent to create a resource lock administrator role to prevent inadvertent unlocking of resources.", + "ImpactStatement": "By adding this role, specific permissions may be granted for managing only resource locks rather than needing to provide the broad Owner or User Access Administrator role, reducing the risk of the user being able to cause unintentional damage.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. In the Azure portal, navigate to a subscription or resource group. 1. Click `Access control (IAM)`. 1. Click `+ Add`. 1. Click `Add custom role`. 1. In the `Custom role name` field enter `Resource Lock Administrator`. 1. In the `Description` field enter `Can Administer Resource Locks`. 1. For `Baseline permissions` select `Start from scratch`. 1. Click `Next`. 1. Click `Add permissions`. 1. In the `Search for a permission` box, type `Microsoft.Authorization/locks`. 1. Click the result. 1. Check the box next to `Permission`. 1. Click `Add`. 1. Click `Review + create`. 1. Click `Create`. 1. Click `OK`. 1. Click `+ Add`. 1. Click `Add role assignment`. 1. In the `Search by role name, description, permission, or ID` box, type `Resource Lock Administrator`. 1. Select the role. 1. Click `Next`. 1. Click `+ Select members`. 1. Select appropriate members. 1. Click `Select`. 1. Click `Review + assign`. 1. Click `Review + assign` again. 1. Repeat steps 1-26 for each subscription or resource group requiring remediation. **Remediate from PowerShell:** Below is a PowerShell definition for a resource lock administrator role created at an Azure Management group level ``` Import-Module Az.Accounts Connect-AzAccount $role = Get-AzRoleDefinition User Access Administrator $role.Id = $null $role.Name = Resource Lock Administrator $role.Description = Can Administer Resource Locks $role.Actions.Clear() $role.Actions.Add(Microsoft.Authorization/locks/*) $role.AssignableScopes.Clear() * Scope at the Management group level Management group $role.AssignableScopes.Add(/providers/Microsoft.Management/managementGroups/MG-Name) New-AzRoleDefinition -Role $role Get-AzureRmRoleDefinition Resource Lock Administrator ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. In the Azure portal, navigate to a subscription or resource group. 1. Click `Access control (IAM)`. 1. Click `Roles`. 1. Click `Type : All`. 1. Click to view the drop-down menu. 1. Select `Custom role`. 1. Click `View` in the `Details` column of a custom role. 1. Review the role permissions. 1. Click `Assignments` and review the assignments. 1. Click the `X` to exit the custom role details page. 1. Repeat steps 7-10. Ensure that at least one custom role exists that assigns the `Microsoft.Authorization/locks` permission to appropriate members. 1. Repeat steps 1-11 for each subscription or resource group.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/custom-roles:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/check-access:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-privileged-access#pa-1-separate-and-limit-highly-privilegedadministrative-users:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-privileged-access#pa-7-follow-just-enough-administration-least-privilege-principle:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-privileged-access#pa-3-manage-lifecycle-of-identities-and-entitlements:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-governance-strategy#gs-2-define-and-implement-enterprise-segmentationseparation-of-duties-strategy:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-governance-strategy#gs-6-define-and-implement-identity-and-privileged-access-strategy", + "DefaultValue": "A role for administering resource locks does not exist by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.6", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Subscription leaving Microsoft Entra tenant' and 'Subscription entering Microsoft Entra tenant' is set to 'Permit no one'", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Identity Services", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Subscription leaving Microsoft Entra tenant' and 'Subscription entering Microsoft Entra tenant' is set to 'Permit no one'", + "RationaleStatement": "Permissions to move subscriptions in and out of a Microsoft Entra tenant must only be given to appropriate administrative personnel. A subscription that is moved into a Microsoft Entra tenant may be within a folder to which other users have elevated permissions. This prevents loss of data or unapproved changes of the objects within by potential bad actors.", + "ImpactStatement": "Subscriptions will need to have these settings turned off to be moved.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. From the Azure Portal Home select the portal menu 1. Select `Subscriptions` 1. In the `Advanced options` drop-down menu, select `Manage Policies` 1. Set `Subscription leaving Microsoft Entra tenant` and `Subscription entering Microsoft Entra tenant` to `Permit no one` 1. Click `Save changes`", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. From the Azure Portal Home select the portal menu 1. Select `Subscriptions` 1. In the `Advanced options` drop-down menu, select `Manage Policies` 1. Ensure `Subscription leaving Microsoft Entra tenant` and `Subscription entering Microsoft Entra tenant` are set to `Permit no one`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cost-management-billing/manage/manage-azure-subscription-policy:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/how-subscriptions-associated-directory:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-identity-management#im-2-protect-identity-and-authentication-systems", + "DefaultValue": "By default `Subscription leaving Microsoft Entra tenant` and `Subscription entering Microsoft Entra tenant` are set to `Allow everyone (default)`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.7", + "Description": "Ensure there are between 2 and 3 Subscription Owners", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Identity Services", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure there are between 2 and 3 Subscription Owners", + "RationaleStatement": "If groups are used, ensure their membership is tightly controlled and regularly reviewed to avoid privilege sprawl. This includes user accounts, Entra ID groups, service principals, and managed identities.", + "ImpactStatement": "Implementation may require changes in administrative workflows or the redistribution of roles and responsibilities.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Subscriptions`. 2. Click the name of a subscription. 3. Click `Access Controls (IAM)`. 4. Click `Role assignments`. 5. Click `Role : All`. 6. Click `Owner`. 7. Check the box next to members from whom the owner role should be removed. 8. Click `Delete`. 9. Click `Yes`. 10. Repeat for each subscription requiring remediation. **Remediate from Azure CLI** ``` az role assignment delete --ids ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Subscriptions`. 2. Click the name of a subscription. 3. Click `Access Controls (IAM)`. 4. Click `Role assignments`. 5. Click `Role : All`. 6. Click the arrow next to `All`. 7. Click `Owner`. 8. Ensure a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 3 members are returned. 9. Repeat steps 1-8 for each subscription. **Audit from Azure CLI** ``` az role assignment list --role Owner --scope /subscriptions/ --query \"[].{PrincipalName:principalName, Type:principalType}\" ``` Ensure a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 3 members are returned. **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Get-AzRoleAssignment -RoleDefinitionName Owner -Scope /subscriptions/ ``` **Audit from Azure Policy** - **Policy ID:** [09024ccc-0c5f-475e-9457-b7c0d9ed487b] - Name: 'There should be more than one owner assigned to your subscription' - **Policy ID:** [4f11b553-d42e-4e3a-89be-32ca364cad4c] - Name: 'A maximum of 3 owners should be designated for your subscription'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/role/assignment:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.resources/get-azroleassignment:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/built-in-roles/privileged#owner", + "DefaultValue": "A subscription has 1 owner by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.1.1", + "Description": "Ensure that a 'Diagnostic Setting' Exists for Subscription Activity Logs", + "Checks": [ + "monitor_diagnostic_settings_exists" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Management and Governance Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that a 'Diagnostic Setting' Exists for Subscription Activity Logs", + "RationaleStatement": "A diagnostic setting controls how a diagnostic log is exported. By default, logs are retained only for 90 days. Diagnostic settings should be defined so that logs can be exported and stored for a longer duration to analyze security activities within an Azure subscription.", + "ImpactStatement": "Diagnostic settings incur costs based on the amount of data collected and the destination.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** To enable Diagnostic Settings on a Subscription: 1. Go to `Monitor` 2. Click on `Activity log` 3. Click on `Export Activity Logs` 4. Click `+ Add diagnostic setting` 5. Enter a `Diagnostic setting name` 6. Select `Categories` for the diagnostic setting 7. Select the appropriate `Destination details` (this may be Log Analytics, Storage Account, Event Hub, or Partner solution) 8. Click `Save` To enable Diagnostic Settings on a specific resource: 1. Go to `Monitoring` 1. Click `Diagnostic settings` 1. Select `Add diagnostic setting` 1. Enter a `Diagnostic setting name` 1. Select the appropriate log, metric, and destination (this may be Log Analytics, Storage Account, Event Hub, or Partner solution) 1. Click `Save` Repeat these step for all resources as needed. **Remediate from Azure CLI** To configure Diagnostic Settings on a Subscription: ``` az monitor diagnostic-settings subscription create --subscription --name --location <[--event-hub --event-hub-auth-rule ] [--storage-account ] [--workspace ] --logs (e.g. [{category:Security,enabled:true},{category:Administrative,enabled:true},{category:Alert,enabled:true},{category:Policy,enabled:true}]) ``` To configure Diagnostic Settings on a specific resource: ``` az monitor diagnostic-settings create --subscription --resource --name <[--event-hub --event-hub-rule ] [--storage-account ] [--workspace ] --logs --metrics ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** To configure Diagnostic Settings on a subscription: ``` $logCategories = @(); $logCategories += New-AzDiagnosticSettingSubscriptionLogSettingsObject -Category Administrative -Enabled $true $logCategories += New-AzDiagnosticSettingSubscriptionLogSettingsObject -Category Security -Enabled $true $logCategories += New-AzDiagnosticSettingSubscriptionLogSettingsObject -Category ServiceHealth -Enabled $true $logCategories += New-AzDiagnosticSettingSubscriptionLogSettingsObject -Category Alert -Enabled $true $logCategories += New-AzDiagnosticSettingSubscriptionLogSettingsObject -Category Recommendation -Enabled $true $logCategories += New-AzDiagnosticSettingSubscriptionLogSettingsObject -Category Policy -Enabled $true $logCategories += New-AzDiagnosticSettingSubscriptionLogSettingsObject -Category Autoscale -Enabled $true $logCategories += New-AzDiagnosticSettingSubscriptionLogSettingsObject -Category ResourceHealth -Enabled $true New-AzSubscriptionDiagnosticSetting -SubscriptionId -Name <[-EventHubAuthorizationRule -EventHubName ] [-StorageAccountId ] [-WorkSpaceId ] [-MarketplacePartner ID ]> -Log $logCategories ``` To configure Diagnostic Settings on a specific resource: ``` $logCategories = @() $logCategories += New-AzDiagnosticSettingLogSettingsObject -Category -Enabled $true Repeat command and variable assignment for each Log category specific to the resource where this Diagnostic Setting will get configured. $metricCategories = @() $metricCategories += New-AzDiagnosticSettingMetricSettingsObject -Enabled $true [-Category ] [-RetentionPolicyDay ] [-RetentionPolicyEnabled $true] Repeat command and variable assignment for each Metric category or use the 'AllMetrics' category. New-AzDiagnosticSetting -ResourceId -Name -Log $logCategories -Metric $metricCategories [-EventHubAuthorizationRuleId -EventHubName ] [-StorageAccountId ] [-WorkspaceId ] [-MarketplacePartnerId ]>", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** To identify Diagnostic Settings on a subscription: 1. Go to `Monitor` 2. Click `Activity Log` 3. Click `Export Activity Logs` 4. Select a `Subscription` 5. Ensure a `Diagnostic setting` exists for the selected Subscription To identify Diagnostic Settings on specific resources: 1. Go to `Monitoring` 2. Click `Diagnostic settings` 3. Ensure a `Diagnostic setting` exists for all appropriate resources. **Audit from Azure CLI** To identify Diagnostic Settings on a subscription: ``` az monitor diagnostic-settings subscription list --subscription ``` To identify Diagnostic Settings on a resource ``` az monitor diagnostic-settings list --resource ``` **Audit from PowerShell** To identify Diagnostic Settings on a Subscription: ``` Get-AzDiagnosticSetting -SubscriptionId ``` To identify Diagnostic Settings on a specific resource: ``` Get-AzDiagnosticSetting -ResourceId ```", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/monitoring-and-diagnostics/monitoring-overview-activity-logs#export-the-activity-log-with-a-log-profile:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/monitor/diagnostic-settings?view=azure-cli-latest:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-3-enable-logging-for-security-investigation", + "DefaultValue": "By default, diagnostic setting is not set." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.1.2", + "Description": "Ensure Diagnostic Setting Captures Appropriate Categories", + "Checks": [ + "monitor_diagnostic_setting_with_appropriate_categories" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Management and Governance Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure Diagnostic Setting Captures Appropriate Categories", + "RationaleStatement": "A diagnostic setting controls how the diagnostic log is exported. Capturing the diagnostic setting categories for appropriate control/management plane activities allows proper alerting.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling additional categories may increase storage costs.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Monitor`. 1. Click `Activity log`. 1. Click on `Export Activity Logs`. 1. Select the `Subscription` from the drop down menu. 1. Click `Edit setting` next to a diagnostic setting. 1. Check the following categories: `Administrative, Alert, Policy, and Security`. 1. Choose the destination details according to your organization's needs. 1. Click `Save`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** ``` az monitor diagnostic-settings subscription create --subscription --name --location <[--event-hub --event-hub-auth-rule ] [--storage-account ] [--workspace ] --logs [{category:Security,enabled:true},{category:Administrative,enabled:true},{category:Alert,enabled:true},{category:Policy,enabled:true}] ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** ``` $logCategories = @(); $logCategories += New-AzDiagnosticSettingSubscriptionLogSettingsObject -Category Administrative -Enabled $true $logCategories += New-AzDiagnosticSettingSubscriptionLogSettingsObject -Category Security -Enabled $true $logCategories += New-AzDiagnosticSettingSubscriptionLogSettingsObject -Category Alert -Enabled $true $logCategories += New-AzDiagnosticSettingSubscriptionLogSettingsObject -Category Policy -Enabled $true New-AzSubscriptionDiagnosticSetting -SubscriptionId -Name <[-EventHubAuthorizationRule -EventHubName ] [-StorageAccountId ] [-WorkSpaceId ] [-MarketplacePartner ID ]> -Log $logCategories ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Monitor`. 1. Click `Activity log`. 1. Click on `Export Activity Logs`. 1. Select the appropriate `Subscription`. 1. Click `Edit setting` next to a diagnostic setting. 1. Ensure that the following categories are checked: `Administrative, Alert, Policy, and Security`. **Audit from Azure CLI** Ensure the categories `'Administrative', 'Alert', 'Policy', and 'Security'` set to: 'enabled: true' ``` az monitor diagnostic-settings subscription list --subscription ``` **Audit from PowerShell** Ensure the categories Administrative, Alert, Policy, and Security are set to Enabled:True ``` Get-AzSubscriptionDiagnosticSetting -Subscription ``` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [3b980d31-7904-4bb7-8575-5665739a8052](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F3b980d31-7904-4bb7-8575-5665739a8052) **- Name:** 'An activity log alert should exist for specific Security operations' - **Policy ID:** [b954148f-4c11-4c38-8221-be76711e194a](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fb954148f-4c11-4c38-8221-be76711e194a) **- Name:** 'An activity log alert should exist for specific Administrative operations' - **Policy ID:** [c5447c04-a4d7-4ba8-a263-c9ee321a6858](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fc5447c04-a4d7-4ba8-a263-c9ee321a6858) **- Name:** 'An activity log alert should exist for specific Policy operations'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/platform/diagnostic-settings:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/samples/resource-manager-diagnostic-settings:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-3-enable-logging-for-security-investigation:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/monitor/diagnostic-settings?view=azure-cli-latest:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.monitor/new-azsubscriptiondiagnosticsetting?view=azps-9.2.0", + "DefaultValue": "When the diagnostic setting is created using Azure Portal, by default no categories are selected." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.1.3", + "Description": "Ensure the Storage Account Containing the Container with Activity Logs is Encrypted with Customer-managed Key (CMK)", + "Checks": [ + "monitor_storage_account_with_activity_logs_cmk_encrypted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Management and Governance Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure the Storage Account Containing the Container with Activity Logs is Encrypted with Customer-managed Key (CMK)", + "RationaleStatement": "Configuring the storage account with the activity log export container to use CMKs provides additional confidentiality controls on log data, as a given user must have read permission on the corresponding storage account and must be granted decrypt permission by the CMK.", + "ImpactStatement": "**NOTE:** You must have your key vault setup to utilize this. All Audit Logs will be encrypted with a key you provide. You will need to set up customer managed keys separately, and you will select which key to use via the instructions here. You will be responsible for the lifecycle of the keys, and will need to manually replace them at your own determined intervals to keep the data secure.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Monitor`. 1. Select `Activity log`. 1. Select `Export Activity Logs`. 1. Select a `Subscription`. 1. Note the name of the `Storage Account` for the diagnostic setting. 1. Navigate to `Storage accounts`. 1. Click on the storage account. 1. Under `Security + networking`, click `Encryption`. 1. Next to `Encryption type`, select `Customer-managed keys`. 1. Complete the steps to configure a customer-managed key for encryption of the storage account. **Remediate from Azure CLI** ``` az storage account update --name --resource-group --encryption-key-source=Microsoft.Keyvault --encryption-key-vault --encryption-key-name --encryption-key-version ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** ``` Set-AzStorageAccount -ResourceGroupName -Name -KeyvaultEncryption -KeyVaultUri -KeyName ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Monitor`. 1. Select `Activity log`. 1. Select `Export Activity Logs`. 1. Select a `Subscription`. 1. Note the name of the `Storage Account` for the diagnostic setting. 1. Navigate to `Storage accounts`. 1. Click on the storage account name noted in Step 5. 1. Under `Security + networking`, click `Encryption`. 1. Ensure `Customer-managed keys` is selected and a key is set. **Audit from Azure CLI** 1. Get storage account id configured with log profile: ``` az monitor diagnostic-settings subscription list --subscription --query 'value[*].storageAccountId' ``` 2. Ensure the storage account is encrypted with CMK: ``` az storage account list --query [?name==''] ``` In command output ensure `keySource` is set to `Microsoft.Keyvault` and `keyVaultProperties` is not set to `null` **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Get-AzStorageAccount -ResourceGroupName -Name |select-object -ExpandProperty encryption|format-list ``` Ensure the value of `KeyVaultProperties` is not `null` or empty, and ensure `KeySource` is not set to `Microsoft.Storage`. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [fbb99e8e-e444-4da0-9ff1-75c92f5a85b2](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Ffbb99e8e-e444-4da0-9ff1-75c92f5a85b2) **- Name:** 'Storage account containing the container with activity logs must be encrypted with BYOK'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-data-protection#dp-5-use-customer-managed-key-option-in-data-at-rest-encryption-when-required:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/essentials/activity-log?tabs=cli#managing-legacy-log-profiles", + "DefaultValue": "By default, for a storage account `keySource` is set to `Microsoft.Storage` allowing encryption with vendor Managed key and not a Customer Managed Key." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.1.4", + "Description": "Ensure that Logging for Azure Key Vault is 'Enabled'", + "Checks": [ + "keyvault_logging_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Management and Governance Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that Logging for Azure Key Vault is 'Enabled'", + "RationaleStatement": "Monitoring how and when key vaults are accessed, and by whom, enables an audit trail of interactions with confidential information, keys, and certificates managed by Azure Key Vault. Enabling logging for Key Vault saves information in a user provided destination of either an Azure storage account or Log Analytics workspace. The same destination can be used for collecting logs for multiple Key Vaults.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling logging incurs costs based on the volume of logs generated.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Key vaults`. 2. Select a Key vault. 3. Under `Monitoring`, select `Diagnostic settings`. 4. Click `Edit setting` to update an existing diagnostic setting, or `Add diagnostic setting` to create a new one. 5. If creating a new diagnostic setting, provide a name. 6. Configure an appropriate destination. 7. Under `Category groups`, check `audit` and `allLogs`. 8. Click `Save`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** To update an existing `Diagnostic Settings` ``` az monitor diagnostic-settings update --name --resource ``` To create a new `Diagnostic Settings` ``` az monitor diagnostic-settings create --name --resource --logs [{category:audit,enabled:true},{category:allLogs,enabled:true}] --metrics [{category:AllMetrics,enabled:true}] <[--event-hub --event-hub-rule | --storage-account |--workspace | --marketplace-partner-id ]> ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Create the `Log` settings object ``` $logSettings = @() $logSettings += New-AzDiagnosticSettingLogSettingsObject -Enabled $true -Category audit $logSettings += New-AzDiagnosticSettingLogSettingsObject -Enabled $true -Category allLogs ``` Create the `Metric` settings object ``` $metricSettings = @() $metricSettings += New-AzDiagnosticSettingMetricSettingsObject -Enabled $true -Category AllMetrics ``` Create the `Diagnostic Settings` for each `Key Vault` ``` New-AzDiagnosticSetting -Name -ResourceId -Log $logSettings -Metric $metricSettings [-StorageAccountId | -EventHubName -EventHubAuthorizationRuleId | -WorkSpaceId | -MarketPlacePartnerId ] ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Key vaults`. 1. For each Key vault, under `Monitoring`, go to `Diagnostic settings`. 1. Click `Edit setting` next to a diagnostic setting. 1. Ensure that a destination is configured. 1. Under `Category groups`, ensure that `audit` and `allLogs` are checked. **Audit from Azure CLI** List all key vaults ``` az keyvault list ``` For each keyvault `id` ``` az monitor diagnostic-settings list --resource ``` Ensure that `storageAccountId` reflects your desired destination and that `categoryGroup` and `enabled` are set as follows in the sample outputs below. ``` logs: [ { categoryGroup: audit, enabled: true, }, { categoryGroup: allLogs, enabled: true, } ``` **Audit from PowerShell** List the key vault(s) in the subscription ``` Get-AzKeyVault ``` For each key vault, run the following: ``` Get-AzDiagnosticSetting -ResourceId ``` Ensure that `StorageAccountId`, `ServiceBusRuleId`, `MarketplacePartnerId`, or `WorkspaceId` is set as appropriate. Also, ensure that `enabled` is set to `true`, and that `categoryGroup` reflects both `audit` and `allLogs` category groups. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [cf820ca0-f99e-4f3e-84fb-66e913812d21](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fcf820ca0-f99e-4f3e-84fb-66e913812d21) **- Name:** 'Resource logs in Key Vault should be enabled'", + "AdditionalInformation": "**DEPRECATION WARNING** Retention rules for Key Vault logging is being migrated to Azure Storage Lifecycle Management. Retention rules should be set based on the needs of your organization and security or compliance frameworks. Please visit [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/essentials/migrate-to-azure-storage-lifecycle-policy?tabs=portal](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/essentials/migrate-to-azure-storage-lifecycle-policy?tabs=portal) for detail on migrating your retention rules. Microsoft has provided the following deprecation timeline: March 31, 2023 – The Diagnostic Settings Storage Retention feature will no longer be available to configure new retention rules for log data. This includes using the portal, CLI PowerShell, and ARM and Bicep templates. If you have configured retention settings, you'll still be able to see and change them in the portal. March 31, 2024 – You will no longer be able to use the API (CLI, Powershell, or templates), or Azure portal to configure retention setting unless you're changing them to 0. Existing retention rules will still be respected. September 30, 2025 – All retention functionality for the Diagnostic Settings Storage Retention feature will be disabled across all environments.", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/howto-logging:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-data-protection#dp-8-ensure-security-of-key-and-certificate-repository:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-3-enable-logging-for-security-investigation", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Diagnostic AuditEvent logging is not enabled for Key Vault instances." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.1.5", + "Description": "Ensure that Network Security Group Flow Logs are Captured and Sent to Log Analytics", + "Checks": [ + "network_flow_log_captured_sent" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Management and Governance Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that Network Security Group Flow Logs are Captured and Sent to Log Analytics", + "RationaleStatement": "Network Flow Logs provide valuable insight into the flow of traffic around your network and feed into both Azure Monitor and Azure Sentinel (if in use), permitting the generation of visual flow diagrams to aid with analyzing for lateral movement, etc.", + "ImpactStatement": "The impact of configuring NSG Flow logs is primarily one of cost and configuration. If deployed, it will create storage accounts that hold minimal amounts of data on a 5-day lifecycle before feeding to Log Analytics Workspace. This will increase the amount of data stored and used by Azure Monitor.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** Existing NSG flow logs can still be reviewed under `Network Watcher` > `Flow logs`. If you already have NSG flow logs configured, ensure they remain enabled and that `Traffic Analytics` sends data to a `Log Analytics Workspace` until migration is complete. Azure no longer allows creation of new NSG flow logs after June 30, 2025. For new or migrated deployments, create `Virtual network` flow logs instead: 1. Navigate to `Network Watcher`. 1. Under `Logs`, select `Flow logs`. 1. Select `+ Create`. 1. Select the desired Subscription. 1. For `Flow log type`, select `Virtual network`. 1. Select `+ Select target resource`. 1. Select `Virtual network`. 1. Select a virtual network. 1. Click `Confirm selection`. 1. Select or create a new Storage Account. 1. If using a v2 storage account, input the retention in days to retain the log. 1. Click `Next`. 1. Under `Analytics`, for `Flow log version`, select `Version 2`. 1. Check the box next to `Enable traffic analytics`. 1. Select a processing interval. 1. Select a `Log Analytics Workspace`. 1. Select `Next`. 1. Optionally add Tags. 1. Select `Review + create`. 1. Select `Create`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to `Network Watcher`. 1. Under `Logs`, select `Flow logs`. 1. Click `Add filter`. 1. From the `Filter` drop-down, select `Flow log type`. 1. Review existing `Network security group` flow logs, if any remain, to ensure they are enabled and configured to send logs to a `Log Analytics Workspace`. 1. Review `Virtual network` flow logs for new or migrated coverage. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [27960feb-a23c-4577-8d36-ef8b5f35e0be](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F27960feb-a23c-4577-8d36-ef8b5f35e0be) **- Name:** 'All flow log resources should be in enabled state' - **Policy ID:** [c251913d-7d24-4958-af87-478ed3b9ba41](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fc251913d-7d24-4958-af87-478ed3b9ba41) **- Name:** 'Flow logs should be configured for every network security group' - **Policy ID:** [4c3c6c5f-0d47-4402-99b8-aa543dd8bcee](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F4c3c6c5f-0d47-4402-99b8-aa543dd8bcee) **- Name:** 'Flow logs should be configured for every virtual network'", + "AdditionalInformation": "On September 30, 2027, NSG flow logs will be retired, and creating new NSG flow logs has not been possible since June 30, 2025. Azure recommends migrating to virtual network flow logs, which address NSG flow log limitations. After retirement, traffic analytics using NSG flow logs will no longer be supported, and existing NSG flow log resources will be deleted. Previously collected NSG flow log records will remain available per their retention policies. For details, see the official announcement: https://azure.microsoft.com/en-gb/updates?id=Azure-NSG-flow-logs-Retirement.", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/network-watcher/network-watcher-nsg-flow-logging-portal:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-4-enable-network-logging-for-security-investigation", + "DefaultValue": "By default Network Security Group logs are not sent to Log Analytics." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.1.6", + "Description": "Ensure that Virtual Network Flow Logs are Captured and Sent to Log Analytics", + "Checks": [ + "network_flow_log_captured_sent" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Management and Governance Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that Virtual Network Flow Logs are Captured and Sent to Log Analytics", + "RationaleStatement": "Virtual network flow logs provide critical visibility into traffic patterns. Sending logs to a Log Analytics workspace enables centralized analysis, correlation, and alerting for faster threat detection and response.", + "ImpactStatement": "* Virtual network flow logs are charged per gigabyte of network flow logs collected and come with a free tier of 5 GB/month per subscription. * If traffic analytics is enabled with virtual network flow logs, traffic analytics pricing applies at per gigabyte processing rates. * The storage of logs is charged separately.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Network Watcher`. 1. Under `Logs`, click `Flow logs`. 1. Click `+ Create`. 1. Select a subscription. 1. Next to `Flow log type`, select `Virtual network`. 1. Click `+ Select target resource`. 1. Select `Virtual network`. 1. Select a virtual network. 1. Click `Confirm selection`. 1. Select a storage account, or create a new storage account. 1. Set the retention in days for the storage account. 1. Click `Next`. 1. Under `Analytics`, for `Flow logs version`, select `Version 2`. 1. Check the box next to `Enable traffic analytics`. 1. Select a processing interval. 1. Select a `Log Analytics Workspace`. 1. Click `Next`. 1. Optionally, add `Tags`. 1. Click `Review + create`. 1. Click `Create`. 1. Repeat steps 1-20 for each subscription or virtual network requiring remediation.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Network Watcher`. 1. Under `Logs`, select `Flow logs`. 1. Click `Add filter`. 1. From the `Filter` drop-down menu, select `Flow log type`. 1. From the `Value` drop-down menu, check `Virtual network` only. 1. Click `Apply`. 1. Ensure that at least one virtual network flow log is listed and is configured to send logs to a `Log Analytics Workspace`. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [2f080164-9f4d-497e-9db6-416dc9f7b48a](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F2f080164-9f4d-497e-9db6-416dc9f7b48a) **- Name:** 'Network Watcher flow logs should have traffic analytics enabled' - **Policy ID:** [4c3c6c5f-0d47-4402-99b8-aa543dd8bcee](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F4c3c6c5f-0d47-4402-99b8-aa543dd8bcee) **- Name:** 'Audit flow logs configuration for every virtual network'", + "AdditionalInformation": "On September 30, 2027, NSG flow logs will be retired, and creating new NSG flow logs will no longer be possible after June 30, 2025. Azure recommends migrating to virtual network flow logs, which address NSG flow log limitations. After retirement, traffic analytics using NSG flow logs will no longer be supported, and existing NSG flow log resources will be deleted. Previously collected NSG flow log records will remain available per their retention policies. For details, see the official announcement: https://azure.microsoft.com/en-gb/updates?id=Azure-NSG-flow-logs-Retirement.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/network-watcher/vnet-flow-logs-overview:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/network-watcher/vnet-flow-logs-cli", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.1.7", + "Description": "Ensure that a Microsoft Entra Diagnostic Setting Exists to Send Microsoft Graph Activity Logs to an Appropriate Destination", + "Checks": [ + "monitor_diagnostic_settings_exists" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Management and Governance Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that a Microsoft Entra Diagnostic Setting Exists to Send Microsoft Graph Activity Logs to an Appropriate Destination", + "RationaleStatement": "Microsoft Graph activity logs provide visibility into HTTP requests made to the Microsoft Graph service, helping detect unauthorized access, suspicious activity, and security threats. Configuring diagnostic settings in Microsoft Entra ensures these logs are collected and sent to an appropriate destination for monitoring, analysis, and retention.", + "ImpactStatement": "A Microsoft Entra ID P1 or P2 tenant license is required to access the Microsoft Graph activity logs. The amount of data logged and, thus, the cost incurred can vary significantly depending on the tenant size and the applications in your tenant that interact with the Microsoft Graph APIs. See the following pricing calculations for respective services: - Log Analytics: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/logs/cost-logs#pricing-model. - Azure Storage: https://azure.microsoft.com/en-gb/pricing/details/storage/blobs/. - Event Hubs: https://azure.microsoft.com/en-gb/pricing/details/event-hubs/", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Entra ID`. 1. Under `Monitoring`, click `Diagnostic settings`. 1. Click `+ Add diagnostic setting`. 1. Provide a `Diagnostic setting name`. 1. Under `Logs > Categories`, check the box next to `MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs`. 1. Configure an appropriate destination for the logs. 1. Click `Save`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Entra ID`. 1. Under `Monitoring`, click `Diagnostic settings`. 1. Next to each diagnostic setting, click `Edit setting`, and review the selected log categories and destination details. 1. Ensure that at least one diagnostic setting is configured to send `MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs` to an appropriate destination.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/howto-configure-diagnostic-settings:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/microsoft-graph-activity-logs-overview:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/logs/cost-logs#pricing-model:https://azure.microsoft.com/en-gb/pricing/details/storage/blobs/:https://azure.microsoft.com/en-gb/pricing/details/event-hubs/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Microsoft Entra diagnostic settings do not exist." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.1.8", + "Description": "Ensure that a Microsoft Entra Diagnostic Setting Exists to Send Microsoft Entra Activity Logs to an Appropriate Destination", + "Checks": [ + "monitor_diagnostic_settings_exists" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Management and Governance Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that a Microsoft Entra Diagnostic Setting Exists to Send Microsoft Entra Activity Logs to an Appropriate Destination", + "RationaleStatement": "Microsoft Entra activity logs enables you to assess many aspects of your Microsoft Entra tenant. Configuring diagnostic settings in Microsoft Entra ensures these logs are collected and sent to an appropriate destination for monitoring, analysis, and retention.", + "ImpactStatement": "To export sign-in data, your organization needs an Azure AD P1 or P2 license. The amount of data logged and, thus, the cost incurred can vary significantly depending on the tenant size. See the following pricing calculations for respective services: - Log Analytics: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/logs/cost-logs#pricing-model. - Azure Storage: https://azure.microsoft.com/en-gb/pricing/details/storage/blobs/. - Event Hubs: https://azure.microsoft.com/en-gb/pricing/details/event-hubs/", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Entra ID`. 1. Under `Monitoring`, click `Diagnostic settings`. 1. Click `+ Add diagnostic setting`. 1. Provide a `Diagnostic setting name`. 1. Under `Logs > Categories`, check the box next to each of the following logs: - `AuditLogs` - `SignInLogs` - `NonInteractiveUserSignInLogs` - `ServicePrincipalSignInLogs` - `ManagedIdentitySignInLogs` - `ProvisioningLogs` - `ADFSSignInLogs` - `RiskyUsers` - `UserRiskEvents` - `NetworkAccessTrafficLogs` - `RiskyServicePrincipals` - `ServicePrincipalRiskEvents` - `EnrichedOffice365AuditLogs` - `MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs` - `RemoteNetworkHealthLogs` - `NetworkAccessAlerts` 1. Configure an appropriate destination for the logs. 1. Click `Save`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Entra ID`. 1. Under `Monitoring`, click `Diagnostic settings`. 1. Next to each diagnostic setting, click `Edit setting`, and review the selected log categories and destination details. 1. Ensure that at least one diagnostic setting is configured to send the following logs to an appropriate destination: - `AuditLogs` - `SignInLogs` - `NonInteractiveUserSignInLogs` - `ServicePrincipalSignInLogs` - `ManagedIdentitySignInLogs` - `ProvisioningLogs` - `ADFSSignInLogs` - `RiskyUsers` - `UserRiskEvents` - `NetworkAccessTrafficLogs` - `RiskyServicePrincipals` - `ServicePrincipalRiskEvents` - `EnrichedOffice365AuditLogs` - `MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs` - `RemoteNetworkHealthLogs` - `NetworkAccessAlerts`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/howto-configure-diagnostic-settings:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/howto-access-activity-logs?tabs=microsoft-entra-activity-logs%2Carchive-activity-logs-to-a-storage-account", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Microsoft Entra diagnostic settings do not exist." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.1.9", + "Description": "Ensure that Intune Logs are Captured and Sent to Log Analytics", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Management and Governance Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that Intune Logs are Captured and Sent to Log Analytics", + "RationaleStatement": "Intune includes built-in logs that provide information about your environments. Sending logs to a Log Analytics workspace enables centralized analysis, correlation, and alerting for faster threat detection and response.", + "ImpactStatement": "A Microsoft Intune plan is required to access Intune: https://www.microsoft.com/en-gb/security/business/microsoft-intune-pricing. The amount of data logged and, thus, the cost incurred can vary significantly depending on the tenant size. For information on Log Analytics workspace costs, visit: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/logs/cost-logs.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Intune`. 1. Click `Reports`. 1. Under `Azure monitor`, click `Diagnostic settings`. 1. Click `+ Add diagnostic setting`. 1. Provide a `Diagnostic setting name`. 1. Under `Logs > Categories`, check the box next to each of the following logs: - `AuditLogs` - `OperationalLogs` - `DeviceComplianceOrg` - `Devices` - `Windows365AuditLogs` 1. Under `Destination details`, check the box next to `Send to Log Analytics workspace`. 1. Select a `Subscription`. 1. Select a `Log Analytics workspace`. 1. Click `Save`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Intune`. 1. Click `Reports`. 1. Under `Azure monitor`, click `Diagnostic settings`. 1. Next to each diagnostic setting, click `Edit setting`, and review the selected log categories and destination details. 1. Ensure that at least one diagnostic setting is configured to send the following logs to a Log Analytics workspace: - `AuditLogs` - `OperationalLogs` - `DeviceComplianceOrg` - `Devices` - `Windows365AuditLogs`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/fundamentals/review-logs-using-azure-monitor:https://www.microsoft.com/en-gb/security/business/microsoft-intune-pricing:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/logs/cost-logs", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Intune diagnostic settings do not exist." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.2.1", + "Description": "Ensure that Activity Log Alert Exists for Create Policy Assignment", + "Checks": [ + "monitor_alert_create_policy_assignment" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Management and Governance Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that Activity Log Alert Exists for Create Policy Assignment", + "RationaleStatement": "Monitoring for create policy assignment events gives insight into changes done in Azure policy - assignments and can reduce the time it takes to detect unsolicited changes.", + "ImpactStatement": "Alert rules incur minimal costs.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the `Monitor` blade. 1. Select `Alerts`. 1. Select `Create`. 1. Select `Alert rule`. 1. Choose a subscription. 1. Select `Apply`. 1. Select the `Condition` tab. 1. Click `See all signals`. 1. Select `Create policy assignment (Policy assignment)`. 1. Click `Apply`. 1. Select the `Actions` tab. 1. Click `Select action groups` to select an existing action group, or `Create action group` to create a new action group. 1. Follow the prompts to choose or create an action group. 1. Select the `Details` tab. 1. Select a `Resource group`, provide an `Alert rule name` and an optional `Alert rule description`. 1. Click `Review + create`. 1. Click `Create`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** ``` az monitor activity-log alert create --resource-group --condition category=Administrative and operationName=Microsoft.Authorization/policyAssignments/write and level= --scope /subscriptions/ --name --subscription --action-group ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Create the `conditions` object. ``` $conditions = @() $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Administrative -Field category $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Microsoft.Authorization/policyAssignments/write -Field operationName $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Verbose -Field level ``` Get the `Action Group` information and store it in a variable, then create a new `Action` object. ``` $actionGroup = Get-AzActionGroup -ResourceGroupName -Name $actionObject = New-AzActivityLogAlertActionGroupObject -Id $actionGroup.Id ``` Create the `Scope` variable. ``` $scope = /subscriptions/ ``` Create the `Activity Log Alert Rule` for `Microsoft.Authorization/policyAssignments/write` ``` New-AzActivityLogAlert -Name -ResourceGroupName -Condition $conditions -Scope $scope -Location global -Action $actionObject -Subscription -Enabled $true ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the `Monitor` blade. 1. Click on `Alerts`. 1. In the Alerts window, click on `Alert rules`. 1. Ensure an alert rule exists where the Condition column contains `Operation name=Microsoft.Authorization/policyAssignments/write`. 1. Click on the Alert `Name` associated with the previous step. 1. Ensure the `Condition` panel displays the text `Whenever the Activity Log has an event with Category='Administrative', Operation name='Create policy assignment'` and does not filter on `Level`, `Status` or `Caller`. 1. Ensure the `Actions` panel displays an Action group is assigned to notify the appropriate personnel in your organization. **Audit from Azure CLI** ``` az monitor activity-log alert list --subscription --query [].{Name:name,Enabled:enabled,Condition:condition.allOf,Actions:actions} ``` Look for `Microsoft.Authorization/policyAssignments/write` in the output. If it's missing, generate a finding. **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Get-AzActivityLogAlert -SubscriptionId |where-object {$_.ConditionAllOf.Equal -match Microsoft.Authorization/policyAssignments/write}|select-object Location,Name,Enabled,ResourceGroupName,ConditionAllOf ``` If the output is empty, an `alert rule` for `Create Policy Assignments` is not configured. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [c5447c04-a4d7-4ba8-a263-c9ee321a6858](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fc5447c04-a4d7-4ba8-a263-c9ee321a6858) **- Name:** 'An activity log alert should exist for specific Policy operations'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/updates/classic-alerting-monitoring-retirement:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/azure/azure-monitor/platform/alerts-activity-log:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/rest/api/monitor/activitylogalerts/createorupdate:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/rest/api/monitor/activitylogalerts/listbysubscriptionid:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-3-enable-logging-for-security-investigation:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/rest/api/policy/policy-assignments:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/alerts/alerts-log", + "DefaultValue": "By default, no monitoring alerts are created." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.2.2", + "Description": "Ensure that Activity Log Alert exists for Delete Policy Assignment", + "Checks": [ + "monitor_alert_delete_policy_assignment" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Management and Governance Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that Activity Log Alert exists for Delete Policy Assignment", + "RationaleStatement": "Monitoring for delete policy assignment events gives insight into changes done in azure policy - assignments and can reduce the time it takes to detect unsolicited changes.", + "ImpactStatement": "Alert rules incur minimal costs.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the `Monitor` blade. 1. Select `Alerts`. 1. Select `Create`. 1. Select `Alert rule`. 1. Choose a subscription. 1. Select `Apply`. 1. Select the `Condition` tab. 1. Click `See all signals`. 1. Select `Delete policy assignment (Policy assignment)`. 1. Click `Apply`. 1. Select the `Actions` tab. 1. Click `Select action groups` to select an existing action group, or `Create action group` to create a new action group. 1. Follow the prompts to choose or create an action group. 1. Select the `Details` tab. 1. Select a `Resource group`, provide an `Alert rule name` and an optional `Alert rule description`. 1. Click `Review + create`. 1. Click `Create`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** ``` az monitor activity-log alert create --resource-group --condition category=Administrative and operationName=Microsoft.Authorization/policyAssignments/delete and level= --scope /subscriptions/ --name --subscription --action-group ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Create the conditions object ``` $conditions = @() $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Administrative -Field category $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Microsoft.Authorization/policyAssignments/delete -Field operationName $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Verbose -Field level ``` Retrieve the `Action Group` information and store in a variable, then create the `Action` object. ``` $actionGroup = Get-AzActionGroup -ResourceGroupName -Name $actionObject = New-AzActivityLogAlertActionGroupObject -Id $actionGroup.Id ``` Create the `Scope` variable. ``` $scope = /subscriptions/ ``` Create the `Activity Log Alert Rule` for `Microsoft.Authorization/policyAssignments/delete`. ``` New-AzActivityLogAlert -Name -ResourceGroupName -Condition $conditions -Scope $scope -Location global -Action $actionObject -Subscription -Enabled $true ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the `Monitor` blade. 1. Click on `Alerts`. 1. In the Alerts window, click on `Alert rules`. 1. Ensure an alert rule exists where the Condition column contains `Operation name=Microsoft.Authorization/policyAssignments/delete`. 1. Click on the Alert `Name` associated with the previous step. 1. Ensure the `Condition` panel displays the text `Whenever the Activity Log has an event with Category='Administrative', Operation name='Delete policy assignment'` and does not filter on `Level`, `Status` or `Caller`. 1. Ensure the `Actions` panel displays an Action group is assigned to notify the appropriate personnel in your organization. **Audit from Azure CLI** ``` az monitor activity-log alert list --subscription --query [].{Name:name,Enabled:enabled,Condition:condition.allOf,Actions:actions} ``` Look for `Microsoft.Authorization/policyAssignments/delete` in the output **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Get-AzActivityLogAlert -SubscriptionId |where-object {$_.ConditionAllOf.Equal -match Microsoft.Authorization/policyAssignments/delete}|select-object Location,Name,Enabled,ResourceGroupName,ConditionAllOf ``` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [c5447c04-a4d7-4ba8-a263-c9ee321a6858](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fc5447c04-a4d7-4ba8-a263-c9ee321a6858) **- Name:** 'An activity log alert should exist for specific Policy operations'", + "AdditionalInformation": "This log alert also applies for Azure Blueprints.", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/azure/azure-monitor/platform/alerts-activity-log:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/rest/api/monitor/activitylogalerts/createorupdate:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/rest/api/monitor/activitylogalerts/listbysubscriptionid:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-3-enable-logging-for-security-investigation:https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/blueprints/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, no monitoring alerts are created." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.2.3", + "Description": "Ensure that Activity Log Alert Exists for Create or Update Network Security Group", + "Checks": [ + "monitor_alert_create_update_nsg" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Management and Governance Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that Activity Log Alert Exists for Create or Update Network Security Group", + "RationaleStatement": "Monitoring for Create or Update Network Security Group events gives insight into network access changes and may reduce the time it takes to detect suspicious activity.", + "ImpactStatement": "Alert rules incur minimal costs.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the `Monitor` blade. 1. Select `Alerts`. 1. Select `Create`. 1. Select `Alert rule`. 1. Choose a subscription. 1. Select `Apply`. 1. Select the `Condition` tab. 1. Click `See all signals`. 1. Select `Create or Update Network Security Group (Network Security Group)`. 1. Click `Apply`. 1. Select the `Actions` tab. 1. Click `Select action groups` to select an existing action group, or `Create action group` to create a new action group. 1. Follow the prompts to choose or create an action group. 1. Select the `Details` tab. 1. Select a `Resource group`, provide an `Alert rule name` and an optional `Alert rule description`. 1. Click `Review + create`. 1. Click `Create`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** ``` az monitor activity-log alert create --resource-group --condition category=Administrative and operationName=Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/write and level=verbose --scope /subscriptions/ --name --subscription --action-group ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Create the `Conditions` object. ``` $conditions = @() $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Administrative -Field category $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/write -Field operationName $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Verbose -Field level ``` Retrieve the `Action Group` information and store in a variable, then create the `Actions` object. ``` $actionGroup = Get-AzActionGroup -ResourceGroupName -Name $actionObject = New-AzActivityLogAlertActionGroupObject -Id $actionGroup.Id ``` Create the `Scope` object ``` $scope = /subscriptions/ ``` Create the `Activity Log Alert Rule` for `Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/write` ``` New-AzActivityLogAlert -Name -ResourceGroupName -Condition $conditions -Scope $scope -Location global -Action $actionObject -Subscription -Enabled $true ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the `Monitor` blade. 1. Click on `Alerts`. 1. In the Alerts window, click on `Alert rules`. 1. Ensure an alert rule exists where the Condition column contains `Operation name=Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/write`. 1. Click on the Alert `Name` associated with the previous step. 1. Ensure the `Condition` panel displays the text `Whenever the Activity Log has an event with Category='Administrative', Operation name='Create or Update Network Security Group'` and does not filter on `Level`, `Status` or `Caller`. 1. Ensure the `Actions` panel displays an Action group is assigned to notify the appropriate personnel in your organization. **Audit from Azure CLI** ``` az monitor activity-log alert list --subscription --query [].{Name:name,Enabled:enabled,Condition:condition.allOf,Actions:actions} ``` Look for `Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/write` in the output **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Get-AzActivityLogAlert -SubscriptionId |where-object {$_.ConditionAllOf.Equal -match Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/write}|select-object Location,Name,Enabled,ResourceGroupName,ConditionAllOf ``` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [b954148f-4c11-4c38-8221-be76711e194a](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fb954148f-4c11-4c38-8221-be76711e194a) **- Name:** 'An activity log alert should exist for specific Administrative operations'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/updates/classic-alerting-monitoring-retirement:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/azure/azure-monitor/platform/alerts-activity-log:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/rest/api/monitor/activitylogalerts/createorupdate:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/rest/api/monitor/activitylogalerts/listbysubscriptionid:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-3-enable-logging-for-security-investigation", + "DefaultValue": "By default, no monitoring alerts are created." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.2.4", + "Description": "Ensure that Activity Log Alert Exists for Delete Network Security Group", + "Checks": [ + "monitor_alert_delete_nsg" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Management and Governance Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that Activity Log Alert Exists for Delete Network Security Group", + "RationaleStatement": "Monitoring for Delete Network Security Group events gives insight into network access changes and may reduce the time it takes to detect suspicious activity.", + "ImpactStatement": "Alert rules incur minimal costs.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the `Monitor` blade. 1. Select `Alerts`. 1. Select `Create`. 1. Select `Alert rule`. 1. Choose a subscription. 1. Select `Apply`. 1. Select the `Condition` tab. 1. Click `See all signals`. 1. Select `Delete Network Security Group (Network Security Group)`. 1. Click `Apply`. 1. Select the `Actions` tab. 1. Click `Select action groups` to select an existing action group, or `Create action group` to create a new action group. 1. Follow the prompts to choose or create an action group. 1. Select the `Details` tab. 1. Select a `Resource group`, provide an `Alert rule name` and an optional `Alert rule description`. 1. Click `Review + create`. 1. Click `Create`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** ``` az monitor activity-log alert create --resource-group --condition category=Administrative and operationName=Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/delete and level= --scope /subscriptions/ --name --subscription --action-group ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Create the `Conditions` object. ``` $conditions = @() $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Administrative -Field category $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/delete -Field operationName $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Verbose -Field level ``` Retrieve the `Action Group` information and store in a variable, then create the `Actions` object. ``` $actionGroup = Get-AzActionGroup -ResourceGroupName -Name $actionObject = New-AzActivityLogAlertActionGroupObject -Id $actionGroup.Id ``` Create the `Scope` object ``` $scope = /subscriptions/ ``` Create the `Activity Log Alert Rule` for `Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/delete` ``` New-AzActivityLogAlert -Name -ResourceGroupName -Condition $conditions -Scope $scope -Location global -Action $actionObject -Subscription -Enabled $true ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the `Monitor` blade. 1. Click on `Alerts`. 1. In the Alerts window, click on `Alert rules`. 1. Ensure an alert rule exists where the Condition column contains `Operation name=Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/delete`. 1. Click on the Alert `Name` associated with the previous step. 1. Ensure the `Condition` panel displays the text `Whenever the Activity Log has an event with Category='Administrative', Operation name='Delete Network Security Group'` and does not filter on `Level`, `Status` or `Caller`. 1. Ensure the `Actions` panel displays an Action group is assigned to notify the appropriate personnel in your organization. **Audit from Azure CLI** ``` az monitor activity-log alert list --subscription --query [].{Name:name,Enabled:enabled,Condition:condition.allOf,Actions:actions} ``` Look for `Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/delete` in the output **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Get-AzActivityLogAlert -SubscriptionId |where-object {$_.ConditionAllOf.Equal -match Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/delete}|select-object Location,Name,Enabled,ResourceGroupName,ConditionAllOf ``` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [b954148f-4c11-4c38-8221-be76711e194a](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fb954148f-4c11-4c38-8221-be76711e194a) **- Name:** 'An activity log alert should exist for specific Administrative operations'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/updates/classic-alerting-monitoring-retirement:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/azure/azure-monitor/platform/alerts-activity-log:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/rest/api/monitor/activitylogalerts/createorupdate:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/rest/api/monitor/activitylogalerts/listbysubscriptionid:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-3-enable-logging-for-security-investigation", + "DefaultValue": "By default, no monitoring alerts are created." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.2.5", + "Description": "Ensure that Activity Log Alert Exists for Create or Update Security Solution", + "Checks": [ + "monitor_alert_create_update_security_solution" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Management and Governance Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that Activity Log Alert Exists for Create or Update Security Solution", + "RationaleStatement": "Monitoring for Create or Update Security Solution events gives insight into changes to the active security solutions and may reduce the time it takes to detect suspicious activity.", + "ImpactStatement": "Alert rules incur minimal costs.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the `Monitor` blade. 1. Select `Alerts`. 1. Select `Create`. 1. Select `Alert rule`. 1. Choose a subscription. 1. Select `Apply`. 1. Select the `Condition` tab. 1. Click `See all signals`. 1. Select `Create or Update Security Solutions (Security Solutions)`. 1. Click `Apply`. 1. Select the `Actions` tab. 1. Click `Select action groups` to select an existing action group, or `Create action group` to create a new action group. 1. Follow the prompts to choose or create an action group. 1. Select the `Details` tab. 1. Select a `Resource group`, provide an `Alert rule name` and an optional `Alert rule description`. 1. Click `Review + create`. 1. Click `Create`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** ``` az monitor activity-log alert create --resource-group --condition category=Administrative and operationName=Microsoft.Security/securitySolutions/write and level= --scope /subscriptions/ --name --subscription --action-group ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Create the `Conditions` object. ``` $conditions = @() $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Administrative -Field category $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Microsoft.Security/securitySolutions/write -Field operationName $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Verbose -Field level ``` Retrieve the `Action Group` information and store in a variable, then create the `Actions` object. ``` $actionGroup = Get-AzActionGroup -ResourceGroupName -Name $actionObject = New-AzActivityLogAlertActionGroupObject -Id $actionGroup.Id ``` Create the `Scope` object ``` $scope = /subscriptions/ ``` Create the `Activity Log Alert Rule` for `Microsoft.Security/securitySolutions/write` ``` New-AzActivityLogAlert -Name -ResourceGroupName -Condition $conditions -Scope $scope -Location global -Action $actionObject -Subscription -Enabled $true ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the `Monitor` blade. 1. Click on `Alerts`. 1. In the Alerts window, click on `Alert rules`. 1. Ensure an alert rule exists where the Condition column contains `Operation name=Microsoft.Security/securitySolutions/write`. 1. Click on the Alert `Name` associated with the previous step. 1. Ensure the `Condition` panel displays the text `Whenever the Activity Log has an event with Category='Administrative', Operation name='Create or Update Security Solutions'` and does not filter on `Level`, `Status` or `Caller`. 1. Ensure the `Actions` panel displays an Action group is assigned to notify the appropriate personnel in your organization. **Audit from Azure CLI** ``` az monitor activity-log alert list --subscription --query [].{Name:name,Enabled:enabled,Condition:condition.allOf,Actions:actions} ``` Look for `Microsoft.Security/securitySolutions/write` in the output **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Get-AzActivityLogAlert -SubscriptionId |where-object {$_.ConditionAllOf.Equal -match Microsoft.Security/securitySolutions/write}|select-object Location,Name,Enabled,ResourceGroupName,ConditionAllOf ``` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [b954148f-4c11-4c38-8221-be76711e194a](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fb954148f-4c11-4c38-8221-be76711e194a) **- Name:** 'An activity log alert should exist for specific Administrative operations'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/updates/classic-alerting-monitoring-retirement:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/azure/azure-monitor/platform/alerts-activity-log:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/rest/api/monitor/activitylogalerts/createorupdate:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/rest/api/monitor/activitylogalerts/listbysubscriptionid:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-3-enable-logging-for-security-investigation", + "DefaultValue": "By default, no monitoring alerts are created." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.2.6", + "Description": "Ensure that Activity Log Alert Exists for Delete Security Solution", + "Checks": [ + "monitor_alert_delete_security_solution" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Management and Governance Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that Activity Log Alert Exists for Delete Security Solution", + "RationaleStatement": "Monitoring for Delete Security Solution events gives insight into changes to the active security solutions and may reduce the time it takes to detect suspicious activity.", + "ImpactStatement": "Alert rules incur minimal costs.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the `Monitor` blade. 1. Select `Alerts`. 1. Select `Create`. 1. Select `Alert rule`. 1. Choose a subscription. 1. Select `Apply`. 1. Select the `Condition` tab. 1. Click `See all signals`. 1. Select `Delete Security Solutions (Security Solutions)`. 1. Click `Apply`. 1. Select the `Actions` tab. 1. Click `Select action groups` to select an existing action group, or `Create action group` to create a new action group. 1. Follow the prompts to choose or create an action group. 1. Select the `Details` tab. 1. Select a `Resource group`, provide an `Alert rule name` and an optional `Alert rule description`. 1. Click `Review + create`. 1. Click `Create`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** ``` az monitor activity-log alert create --resource-group --condition category=Administrative and operationName=Microsoft.Security/securitySolutions/delete and level= --scope /subscriptions/ --name --subscription --action-group ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Create the `Conditions` object. ``` $conditions = @() $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Administrative -Field category $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Microsoft.Security/securitySolutions/delete -Field operationName $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Verbose -Field level ``` Retrieve the `Action Group` information and store in a variable, then create the `Actions` object. ``` $actionGroup = Get-AzActionGroup -ResourceGroupName -Name $actionObject = New-AzActivityLogAlertActionGroupObject -Id $actionGroup.Id ``` Create the `Scope` object ``` $scope = /subscriptions/ ``` Create the `Activity Log Alert Rule` for `Microsoft.Security/securitySolutions/delete` ``` New-AzActivityLogAlert -Name -ResourceGroupName -Condition $conditions -Scope $scope -Location global -Action $actionObject -Subscription -Enabled $true ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the `Monitor` blade. 1. Click on `Alerts`. 1. In the Alerts window, click on `Alert rules`. 1. Ensure an alert rule exists where the Condition column contains `Operation name=Microsoft.Security/securitySolutions/delete`. 1. Click on the Alert `Name` associated with the previous step. 1. Ensure the `Condition` panel displays the text `Whenever the Activity Log has an event with Category='Administrative', Operation name='Delete Security Solutions'` and does not filter on `Level`, `Status` or `Caller`. 1. Ensure the `Actions` panel displays an Action group is assigned to notify the appropriate personnel in your organization. **Audit from Azure CLI** ``` az monitor activity-log alert list --subscription --query [].{Name:name,Enabled:enabled,Condition:condition.allOf,Actions:actions} ``` Look for `Microsoft.Security/securitySolutions/delete` in the output **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Get-AzActivityLogAlert -SubscriptionId |where-object {$_.ConditionAllOf.Equal -match Microsoft.Security/securitySolutions/delete}|select-object Location,Name,Enabled,ResourceGroupName,ConditionAllOf ``` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [b954148f-4c11-4c38-8221-be76711e194a](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fb954148f-4c11-4c38-8221-be76711e194a) **- Name:** 'An activity log alert should exist for specific Administrative operations'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/updates/classic-alerting-monitoring-retirement:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/azure/azure-monitor/platform/alerts-activity-log:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/rest/api/monitor/activitylogalerts/createorupdate:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/rest/api/monitor/activitylogalerts/listbysubscriptionid:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-3-enable-logging-for-security-investigation", + "DefaultValue": "By default, no monitoring alerts are created." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.2.7", + "Description": "Ensure that Activity Log Alert Exists for Create or Update SQL Server Firewall Rule", + "Checks": [ + "monitor_alert_create_update_sqlserver_fr" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Management and Governance Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that Activity Log Alert Exists for Create or Update SQL Server Firewall Rule", + "RationaleStatement": "Monitoring for Create or Update SQL Server Firewall Rule events gives insight into network access changes and may reduce the time it takes to detect suspicious activity.", + "ImpactStatement": "There will be a substantial increase in log size if there are a large number of administrative actions on a server.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the `Monitor` blade. 1. Select `Alerts`. 1. Select `Create`. 1. Select `Alert rule`. 1. Choose a subscription. 1. Select `Apply`. 1. Select the `Condition` tab. 1. Click `See all signals`. 1. Select `Create/Update server firewall rule (Server Firewall Rule)`. 1. Click `Apply`. 1. Select the `Actions` tab. 1. Click `Select action groups` to select an existing action group, or `Create action group` to create a new action group. 1. Follow the prompts to choose or create an action group. 1. Select the `Details` tab. 1. Select a `Resource group`, provide an `Alert rule name` and an optional `Alert rule description`. 1. Click `Review + create`. 1. Click `Create`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** ``` az monitor activity-log alert create --resource-group --condition category=Administrative and operationName=Microsoft.Sql/servers/firewallRules/write and level= --scope /subscriptions/ --name --subscription --action-group ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Create the `Conditions` object. ``` $conditions = @() $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Administrative -Field category $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Microsoft.Sql/servers/firewallRules/write -Field operationName $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Verbose -Field level ``` Retrieve the `Action Group` information and store in a variable, then create the `Actions` object. ``` $actionGroup = Get-AzActionGroup -ResourceGroupName -Name $actionObject = New-AzActivityLogAlertActionGroupObject -Id $actionGroup.Id ``` Create the `Scope` object ``` $scope = /subscriptions/ ``` Create the `Activity Log Alert Rule` for `Microsoft.Sql/servers/firewallRules/write` ``` New-AzActivityLogAlert -Name -ResourceGroupName -Condition $conditions -Scope $scope -Location global -Action $actionObject -Subscription -Enabled $true ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the `Monitor` blade. 1. Click on `Alerts`. 1. In the Alerts window, click on `Alert rules`. 1. Ensure an alert rule exists where the Condition column contains `Operation name=Microsoft.Sql/servers/firewallRules/write`. 1. Click on the Alert `Name` associated with the previous step. 1. Ensure the `Condition` panel displays the text `Whenever the Activity Log has an event with Category='Administrative', Operation name='Create/Update server firewall rule'` and does not filter on `Level`, `Status` or `Caller`. 1. Ensure the `Actions` panel displays an Action group is assigned to notify the appropriate personnel in your organization. **Audit from Azure CLI** ``` az monitor activity-log alert list --subscription --query [].{Name:name,Enabled:enabled,Condition:condition.allOf,Actions:actions} ``` Look for `Microsoft.Sql/servers/firewallRules/write` in the output **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Get-AzActivityLogAlert -SubscriptionId |where-object {$_.ConditionAllOf.Equal -match Microsoft.Sql/servers/firewallRules/write}|select-object Location,Name,Enabled,ResourceGroupName,ConditionAllOf ``` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [b954148f-4c11-4c38-8221-be76711e194a](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fb954148f-4c11-4c38-8221-be76711e194a) **- Name:** 'An activity log alert should exist for specific Administrative operations'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/updates/classic-alerting-monitoring-retirement:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/azure/azure-monitor/platform/alerts-activity-log:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/rest/api/monitor/activitylogalerts/createorupdate:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/rest/api/monitor/activitylogalerts/listbysubscriptionid:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-3-enable-logging-for-security-investigation", + "DefaultValue": "By default, no monitoring alerts are created." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.2.8", + "Description": "Ensure that Activity Log Alert Exists for Delete SQL Server Firewall Rule", + "Checks": [ + "monitor_alert_delete_sqlserver_fr" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Management and Governance Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that Activity Log Alert Exists for Delete SQL Server Firewall Rule", + "RationaleStatement": "Monitoring for Delete SQL Server Firewall Rule events gives insight into SQL network access changes and may reduce the time it takes to detect suspicious activity.", + "ImpactStatement": "There will be a substantial increase in log size if there are a large number of administrative actions on a server.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the `Monitor` blade. 1. Select `Alerts`. 1. Select `Create`. 1. Select `Alert rule`. 1. Choose a subscription. 1. Select `Apply`. 1. Select the `Condition` tab. 1. Click `See all signals`. 1. Select `Delete server firewall rule (Server Firewall Rule)`. 1. Click `Apply`. 1. Select the `Actions` tab. 1. Click `Select action groups` to select an existing action group, or `Create action group` to create a new action group. 1. Follow the prompts to choose or create an action group. 1. Select the `Details` tab. 1. Select a `Resource group`, provide an `Alert rule name` and an optional `Alert rule description`. 1. Click `Review + create`. 1. Click `Create`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** ``` az monitor activity-log alert create --resource-group --condition category=Administrative and operationName=Microsoft.Sql/servers/firewallRules/delete and level= --scope /subscriptions/ --name --subscription --action-group ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Create the `Conditions` object. ``` $conditions = @() $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Administrative -Field category $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Microsoft.Sql/servers/firewallRules/delete -Field operationName $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Verbose -Field level ``` Retrieve the `Action Group` information and store in a variable, then create the `Actions` object. ``` $actionGroup = Get-AzActionGroup -ResourceGroupName -Name $actionObject = New-AzActivityLogAlertActionGroupObject -Id $actionGroup.Id ``` Create the `Scope` object ``` $scope = /subscriptions/ ``` Create the `Activity Log Alert Rule` for `Microsoft.Sql/servers/firewallRules/delete` ``` New-AzActivityLogAlert -Name -ResourceGroupName -Condition $conditions -Scope $scope -Location global -Action $actionObject -Subscription -Enabled $true ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the `Monitor` blade. 1. Click on `Alerts`. 1. In the Alerts window, click on `Alert rules`. 1. Ensure an alert rule exists where the Condition column contains `Operation name=Microsoft.Sql/servers/firewallRules/delete`. 1. Click on the Alert `Name` associated with the previous step. 1. Ensure the `Condition` panel displays the text `Whenever the Activity Log has an event with Category='Administrative', Operation name='Delete server firewall rule'` and does not filter on `Level`, `Status` or `Caller`. 1. Ensure the `Actions` panel displays an Action group is assigned to notify the appropriate personnel in your organization. **Audit from Azure CLI** ``` az monitor activity-log alert list --subscription --query [].{Name:name,Enabled:enabled,Condition:condition.allOf,Actions:actions} ``` Look for `Microsoft.Sql/servers/firewallRules/delete` in the output **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Get-AzActivityLogAlert -SubscriptionId |where-object {$_.ConditionAllOf.Equal -match Microsoft.Sql/servers/firewallRules/delete}|select-object Location,Name,Enabled,ResourceGroupName,ConditionAllOf ``` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [b954148f-4c11-4c38-8221-be76711e194a](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fb954148f-4c11-4c38-8221-be76711e194a) **- Name:** 'An activity log alert should exist for specific Administrative operations'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/updates/classic-alerting-monitoring-retirement:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/azure/azure-monitor/platform/alerts-activity-log:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/rest/api/monitor/activitylogalerts/createorupdate:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/rest/api/monitor/activitylogalerts/listbysubscriptionid:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-3-enable-logging-for-security-investigation", + "DefaultValue": "By default, no monitoring alerts are created." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.2.9", + "Description": "Ensure that Activity Log Alert Exists for Create or Update Public IP Address rule", + "Checks": [ + "monitor_alert_create_update_public_ip_address_rule" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Management and Governance Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that Activity Log Alert Exists for Create or Update Public IP Address rule", + "RationaleStatement": "Monitoring for Create or Update Public IP Address events gives insight into network access changes and may reduce the time it takes to detect suspicious activity.", + "ImpactStatement": "There will be a substantial increase in log size if there are a large number of administrative actions on a server.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the `Monitor` blade. 1. Select `Alerts`. 1. Select `Create`. 1. Select `Alert rule`. 1. Choose a subscription. 1. Select `Apply`. 1. Select the `Condition` tab. 1. Click `See all signals`. 1. Select `Create or Update Public Ip Address (Public Ip Address)`. 1. Click `Apply`. 1. Select the `Actions` tab. 1. Click `Select action groups` to select an existing action group, or `Create action group` to create a new action group. 1. Follow the prompts to choose or create an action group. 1. Select the `Details` tab. 1. Select a `Resource group`, provide an `Alert rule name` and an optional `Alert rule description`. 1. Click `Review + create`. 1. Click `Create`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** ``` az monitor activity-log alert create --resource-group --condition category=Administrative and operationName=Microsoft.Network/publicIPAddresses/write and level= --scope /subscriptions/ --name --subscription --action-group ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Create the `Conditions` object. ``` $conditions = @() $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Administrative -Field category $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Microsoft.Network/publicIPAddresses/write -Field operationName $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Verbose -Field level ``` Retrieve the `Action Group` information and store in a variable, then create the `Actions` object. ``` $actionGroup = Get-AzActionGroup -ResourceGroupName -Name $actionObject = New-AzActivityLogAlertActionGroupObject -Id $actionGroup.Id ``` Create the `Scope` object ``` $scope = /subscriptions/ ``` Create the `Activity Log Alert Rule` for `Microsoft.Network/publicIPAddresses/write` ``` New-AzActivityLogAlert -Name -ResourceGroupName -Condition $conditions -Scope $scope -Location global -Action $actionObject -Subscription -Enabled $true ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the `Monitor` blade. 1. Click on `Alerts`. 1. In the Alerts window, click on `Alert rules`. 1. Ensure an alert rule exists where the Condition column contains `Operation name=Microsoft.Network/publicIPAddresses/write`. 1. Click on the Alert `Name` associated with the previous step. 1. Ensure the `Condition` panel displays the text `Whenever the Activity Log has an event with Category='Administrative', Operation name='Create or Update Public Ip Address'` and does not filter on `Level`, `Status` or `Caller`. 1. Ensure the `Actions` panel displays an Action group is assigned to notify the appropriate personnel in your organization. **Audit from Azure CLI** ``` az monitor activity-log alert list --subscription --query [].{Name:name,Enabled:enabled,Condition:condition.allOf,Actions:actions} ``` Look for `Microsoft.Network/publicIPAddresses/write` in the output **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Get-AzActivityLogAlert -SubscriptionId |where-object {$_.ConditionAllOf.Equal -match Microsoft.Network/publicIPAddresses/write}|select-object Location,Name,Enabled,ResourceGroupName,ConditionAllOf ``` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [1513498c-3091-461a-b321-e9b433218d28](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F1513498c-3091-461a-b321-e9b433218d28) **- Name:** 'Enable logging by category group for Public IP addresses (microsoft.network/publicipaddresses) to Log Analytics'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/updates/classic-alerting-monitoring-retirement:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/azure/azure-monitor/platform/alerts-activity-log:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/rest/api/monitor/activitylogalerts/createorupdate:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/rest/api/monitor/activitylogalerts/listbysubscriptionid:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-3-enable-logging-for-security-investigation", + "DefaultValue": "By default, no monitoring alerts are created." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.2.10", + "Description": "Ensure that Activity Log Alert Exists for Delete Public IP Address rule", + "Checks": [ + "monitor_alert_delete_public_ip_address_rule" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Management and Governance Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that Activity Log Alert Exists for Delete Public IP Address rule", + "RationaleStatement": "Monitoring for Delete Public IP Address events gives insight into network access changes and may reduce the time it takes to detect suspicious activity.", + "ImpactStatement": "There will be a substantial increase in log size if there are a large number of administrative actions on a server.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the `Monitor` blade. 1. Select `Alerts`. 1. Select `Create`. 1. Select `Alert rule`. 1. Choose a subscription. 1. Select `Apply`. 1. Select the `Condition` tab. 1. Click `See all signals`. 1. Select `Delete Public Ip Address (Public Ip Address)`. 1. Click `Apply`. 1. Select the `Actions` tab. 1. Click `Select action groups` to select an existing action group, or `Create action group` to create a new action group. 1. Follow the prompts to choose or create an action group. 1. Select the `Details` tab. 1. Select a `Resource group`, provide an `Alert rule name` and an optional `Alert rule description`. 1. Click `Review + create`. 1. Click `Create`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** ``` az monitor activity-log alert create --resource-group --condition category=Administrative and operationName=Microsoft.Network/publicIPAddresses/delete and level= --scope /subscriptions/ --name --subscription --action-group ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Create the `Conditions` object. ``` $conditions = @() $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Administrative -Field category $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Microsoft.Network/publicIPAddresses/delete -Field operationName $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Equal Verbose -Field level ``` Retrieve the `Action Group` information and store in a variable, then create the `Actions` object. ``` $actionGroup = Get-AzActionGroup -ResourceGroupName -Name $actionObject = New-AzActivityLogAlertActionGroupObject -Id $actionGroup.Id ``` Create the `Scope` object ``` $scope = /subscriptions/ ``` Create the `Activity Log Alert Rule` for `Microsoft.Network/publicIPAddresses/delete` ``` New-AzActivityLogAlert -Name -ResourceGroupName -Condition $conditions -Scope $scope -Location global -Action $actionObject -Subscription -Enabled $true ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the `Monitor` blade. 1. Click on `Alerts`. 1. In the Alerts window, click on `Alert rules`. 1. Ensure an alert rule exists where the Condition column contains `Operation name=Microsoft.Network/publicIPAddresses/delete`. 1. Click on the Alert `Name` associated with the previous step. 1. Ensure the `Condition` panel displays the text `Whenever the Activity Log has an event with Category='Administrative', Operation name='Delete Public Ip Address'` and does not filter on `Level`, `Status` or `Caller`. 1. Ensure the `Actions` panel displays an Action group is assigned to notify the appropriate personnel in your organization. **Audit from Azure CLI** ``` az monitor activity-log alert list --subscription --query [].{Name:name,Enabled:enabled,Condition:condition.allOf,Actions:actions} ``` Look for `Microsoft.Network/publicIPAddresses/delete` in the output **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Get-AzActivityLogAlert -SubscriptionId |where-object {$_.ConditionAllOf.Equal -match Microsoft.Network/publicIPAddresses/delete}|select-object Location,Name,Enabled,ResourceGroupName,ConditionAllOf ``` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [1513498c-3091-461a-b321-e9b433218d28](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F1513498c-3091-461a-b321-e9b433218d28) **- Name:** 'Enable logging by category group for Public IP addresses (microsoft.network/publicipaddresses) to Log Analytics'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/updates/classic-alerting-monitoring-retirement:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/azure/azure-monitor/platform/alerts-activity-log:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/rest/api/monitor/activitylogalerts/createorupdate:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/rest/api/monitor/activitylogalerts/listbysubscriptionid:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-3-enable-logging-for-security-investigation", + "DefaultValue": "By default, no monitoring alerts are created." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.2.11", + "Description": "Ensure that an Activity Log Alert Exists for Service Health", + "Checks": [ + "monitor_alert_service_health_exists" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Management and Governance Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that an Activity Log Alert Exists for Service Health", + "RationaleStatement": "Monitoring for Service Health events provides insight into service issues, planned maintenance, security advisories, and other changes that may affect the Azure services and regions in use.", + "ImpactStatement": "There is no charge for creating activity log alert rules.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Monitor`. 1. Click `Alerts`. 1. Click `+ Create`. 1. Select `Alert rule` from the drop-down menu. 1. Choose a subscription. 1. Click `Apply`. 1. Select the `Condition` tab. 1. Click `See all signals`. 1. Select `Service health`. 1. Click `Apply`. 1. Open the drop-down menu next to `Event types`. 1. Check the box next to `Select all`. 1. Select the `Actions` tab. 1. Click `Select action groups` to select an existing action group, or `Create action group` to create a new action group. 1. Follow the prompts to choose or create an action group. 1. Select the `Details` tab. 1. Select a `Resource group`, provide an `Alert rule name` and an optional `Alert rule description`. 1. Click `Review + create`. 1. Click `Create`. 1. Repeat steps 1-19 for each subscription requiring remediation. **Remediate from Azure CLI** For each subscription requiring remediation, run the following command to create a `ServiceHealth` alert rule for a subscription: ``` az monitor activity-log alert create --subscription --resource-group --name --condition category=ServiceHealth and properties.incidentType=Incident --scope /subscriptions/ --action-group ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Create the `Conditions` object: ``` $conditions = @() $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Field category -Equal ServiceHealth $conditions += New-AzActivityLogAlertAlertRuleAnyOfOrLeafConditionObject -Field properties.incidentType -Equal Incident ``` Retrieve the `Action Group` information and store in a variable: ``` $actionGroup = Get-AzActionGroup -ResourceGroupName -Name ``` Create the `Actions` object: ``` $actionObject = New-AzActivityLogAlertActionGroupObject -Id $actionGroup.Id ``` Create the `Scope` object: ``` $scope = /subscriptions/ ``` Create the activity log alert rule: ``` New-AzActivityLogAlert -Name -ResourceGroupName -Condition $conditions -Scope $scope -Location global -Action $actionObject -Subscription -Enabled $true ``` Repeat for each subscription requiring remediation.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Monitor`. 1. Click `Alerts`. 1. Click `Alert rules`. 1. Ensure an alert rule exists for a subscription with `Condition` set to `Service names=All, Event types=All` and `Target resource type` set to `Subscription`. 1. If an alert rule is found for step 4, click the name of the alert rule. 1. Ensure the `Actions` panel displays an action group configured to notify appropriate personnel. 1. Repeat steps 1-6 for each subscription. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list activity log alerts: ``` az monitor activity-log alert list --subscription ``` For each activity log alert, run the following command: ``` az monitor activity-log alert show --subscription --resource-group --activity-log-alert-name ``` Ensure an alert exists for `ServiceHealth` with `scopes` set to a subscription ID. Repeat for each subscription. **Audit from PowerShell** Run the following command to locate `ServiceHealth` alert rules for a subscription: ``` Get-AzActivityLogAlert -SubscriptionId | where-object {$_.ConditionAllOf.Equal -match ServiceHealth} | select-object Location,Name,Enabled,ResourceGroupName,ConditionAllOf ``` Ensure that at least one `ServiceHealth` alert rule is returned. Repeat for each subscription.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/service-health/overview:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/service-health/alerts-activity-log-service-notifications-portal:https://azure.microsoft.com/en-gb/pricing/details/monitor/#faq:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/monitor/activity-log/alert:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.monitor/get-azactivitylogalert:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.monitor/new-azactivitylogalert", + "DefaultValue": "By default, no monitoring alerts are created." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.3.1", + "Description": "Ensure Application Insights are Configured", + "Checks": [ + "appinsights_ensure_is_configured" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Management and Governance Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure Application Insights are Configured", + "RationaleStatement": "Configuring Application Insights provides additional data not found elsewhere within Azure as part of a much larger logging and monitoring program within an organization's Information Security practice. The types and contents of these logs will act as both a potential cost saving measure (application performance) and a means to potentially confirm the source of a potential incident (trace logging). Metrics and Telemetry data provide organizations with a proactive approach to cost savings by monitoring an application's performance, while the trace logging data provides necessary details in a reactive incident response scenario by helping organizations identify the potential source of an incident within their application.", + "ImpactStatement": "Because Application Insights relies on a Log Analytics Workspace, an organization will incur additional expenses when using this service.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to `Application Insights`. 2. Under the `Basics` tab within the `PROJECT DETAILS` section, select the `Subscription`. 3. Select the `Resource group`. 4. Within the `INSTANCE DETAILS`, enter a `Name`. 5. Select a `Region`. 6. Next to `Resource Mode`, select `Workspace-based`. 7. Within the `WORKSPACE DETAILS`, select the `Subscription` for the log analytics workspace. 8. Select the appropriate `Log Analytics Workspace`. 9. Click `Next:Tags >`. 10. Enter the appropriate `Tags` as `Name`, `Value` pairs. 11. Click `Next:Review+Create`. 12. Click `Create`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** ``` az monitor app-insights component create --app --resource-group --location --kind web --retention-time --workspace --subscription ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** ``` New-AzApplicationInsights -Kind web -ResourceGroupName -Name -location -RetentionInDays -SubscriptionID -WorkspaceResourceId ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to `Application Insights`. 2. Ensure an `Application Insights` service is configured and exists. **Audit from Azure CLI** ``` az monitor app-insights component show --query [].{ID:appId, Name:name, Tenant:tenantId, Location:location, Provisioning_State:provisioningState} ``` Ensure the above command produces output, otherwise `Application Insights` has not been configured. **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Get-AzApplicationInsights|select location,name,appid,provisioningState,tenantid ```", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/app/app-insights-overview", + "DefaultValue": "Application Insights are not enabled by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.4", + "Description": "Ensure that Azure Monitor Resource Logging is Enabled for All Services that Support it", + "Checks": [ + "monitor_diagnostic_settings_exists" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Management and Governance Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that Azure Monitor Resource Logging is Enabled for All Services that Support it", + "RationaleStatement": "A lack of monitoring reduces the visibility into the data plane, and therefore an organization's ability to detect reconnaissance, authorization attempts or other malicious activity. Unlike Activity Logs, Resource Logs are not enabled by default. Specifically, without monitoring it would be impossible to tell which entities had accessed a data store that was breached. In addition, alerts for failed attempts to access APIs for Web Services or Databases are only possible when logging is enabled.", + "ImpactStatement": "Costs for monitoring varies with Log Volume. Not every resource needs to have logging enabled. It is important to determine the security classification of the data being processed by the given resource and adjust the logging based on which events need to be tracked. This is typically determined by governance and compliance requirements.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Azure Subscriptions should log every access and operation for all resources. Logs should be sent to Storage and a Log Analytics Workspace or equivalent third-party system. Logs should be kept in readily-accessible storage for a minimum of one year, and then moved to inexpensive cold storage for a duration of time as necessary. If retention policies are set but storing logs in a Storage Account is disabled (for example, if only Event Hubs or Log Analytics options are selected), the retention policies have no effect. Enable all monitoring at first, and then be more aggressive moving data to cold storage if the volume of data becomes a cost concern. **Remediate from Azure Portal** The specific steps for configuring resources within the Azure console vary depending on resource, but typically the steps are: 1. Go to the resource 2. Click on Diagnostic settings 3. In the blade that appears, click Add diagnostic setting 4. Configure the diagnostic settings 5. Click on Save **Remediate from Azure CLI** For each `resource`, run the following making sure to use a `resource` appropriate JSON encoded `category` for the `--logs` option. ``` az monitor diagnostic-settings create --name --resource --logs [{category:,enabled:true,rentention-policy:{enabled:true,days:180}}] --metrics [{category:AllMetrics,enabled:true,retention-policy:{enabled:true,days:180}}] <[--event-hub --event-hub-rule | --storage-account |--workspace | --marketplace-partner-id ]> ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Create the `log` settings object ``` $logSettings = @() $logSettings += New-AzDiagnosticSettingLogSettingsObject -Enabled $true -RetentionPolicyDay 180 -RetentionPolicyEnabled $true -Category $logSettings += New-AzDiagnosticSettingLogSettingsObject -Enabled $true -RetentionPolicyDay 180 -RetentionPolicyEnabled $true -Category ``` Create the `metric` settings object ``` $metricSettings = @() $metricSettings += New-AzDiagnosticSettingMetricSettingsObject -Enabled $true -RetentionPolicyDay 180 -RetentionPolicyEnabled $true -Category AllMetrics ``` Create the diagnostic setting for a specific resource ``` New-AzDiagnosticSetting -Name -ResourceId -Log $logSettings -Metric $metricSettings ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** The specific steps for configuring resources within the Azure console vary depending on resource, but typically the steps are: 1. Go to the resource 2. Click on Diagnostic settings 3. In the blade that appears, click Add diagnostic setting 4. Configure the diagnostic settings 5. Click on Save **Audit from Azure CLI** List all `resources` for a `subscription` ``` az resource list --subscription ``` For each `resource` run the following ``` az monitor diagnostic-settings list --resource ``` An empty result means a `diagnostic settings` is not configured for that resource. An error message means a `diagnostic settings` is not supported for that resource. **Audit from PowerShell** Get a list of `resources` in a `subscription` context and store in a variable ``` $resources = Get-AzResource ``` Loop through each `resource` to determine if a diagnostic setting is configured or not. ``` foreach ($resource in $resources) {$diagnosticSetting = Get-AzDiagnosticSetting -ResourceId $resource.id -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue; if ([string]::IsNullOrEmpty($diagnosticSetting)) {$message = Diagnostic Settings not configured for resource: + $resource.Name;Write-Output $message}else{$diagnosticSetting}} ``` A result of `Diagnostic Settings not configured for resource: ` means a `diagnostic settings` is not configured for that resource. Otherwise, the output of the above command will show configured `Diagnostic Settings` for a resource. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [cf820ca0-f99e-4f3e-84fb-66e913812d21](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fcf820ca0-f99e-4f3e-84fb-66e913812d21) **- Name:** 'Resource logs in Key Vault should be enabled' - **Policy ID:** [91a78b24-f231-4a8a-8da9-02c35b2b6510](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F91a78b24-f231-4a8a-8da9-02c35b2b6510) **- Name:** 'App Service apps should have resource logs enabled' - **Policy ID:** [428256e6-1fac-4f48-a757-df34c2b3336d](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F428256e6-1fac-4f48-a757-df34c2b3336d) **- Name:** 'Resource logs in Batch accounts should be enabled' - **Policy ID:** [057ef27e-665e-4328-8ea3-04b3122bd9fb](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F057ef27e-665e-4328-8ea3-04b3122bd9fb) **- Name:** 'Resource logs in Azure Data Lake Store should be enabled' - **Policy ID:** [c95c74d9-38fe-4f0d-af86-0c7d626a315c](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fc95c74d9-38fe-4f0d-af86-0c7d626a315c) **- Name:** 'Resource logs in Data Lake Analytics should be enabled' - **Policy ID:** [83a214f7-d01a-484b-91a9-ed54470c9a6a](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F83a214f7-d01a-484b-91a9-ed54470c9a6a) **- Name:** 'Resource logs in Event Hub should be enabled' - **Policy ID:** [383856f8-de7f-44a2-81fc-e5135b5c2aa4](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F383856f8-de7f-44a2-81fc-e5135b5c2aa4) **- Name:** 'Resource logs in IoT Hub should be enabled' - **Policy ID:** [34f95f76-5386-4de7-b824-0d8478470c9d](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F34f95f76-5386-4de7-b824-0d8478470c9d) **- Name:** 'Resource logs in Logic Apps should be enabled' - **Policy ID:** [b4330a05-a843-4bc8-bf9a-cacce50c67f4](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fb4330a05-a843-4bc8-bf9a-cacce50c67f4) **- Name:** 'Resource logs in Search services should be enabled' - **Policy ID:** [f8d36e2f-389b-4ee4-898d-21aeb69a0f45](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Ff8d36e2f-389b-4ee4-898d-21aeb69a0f45) **- Name:** 'Resource logs in Service Bus should be enabled' - **Policy ID:** [f9be5368-9bf5-4b84-9e0a-7850da98bb46](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Ff9be5368-9bf5-4b84-9e0a-7850da98bb46) **- Name:** 'Resource logs in Azure Stream Analytics should be enabled'", + "AdditionalInformation": "For an up-to-date list of Azure resources which support Azure Monitor, refer to the Supported Log Categories reference.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-3-enable-logging-for-security-investigation:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-5-centralize-security-log-management-and-analysis:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/essentials/monitor-azure-resource:Supported Log Categories: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/essentials/resource-logs-categories:Logs and Audit - Fundamentals: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/log-audit:Collecting Logs: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/platform/collect-activity-logs:Key Vault Logging: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/key-vault-logging:Monitor Diagnostic Settings: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/monitor/diagnostic-settings?view=azure-cli-latest:Overview of Diagnostic Logs: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/platform/diagnostic-logs-overview:Supported Services for Diagnostic Logs: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/platform/diagnostic-logs-schema:Diagnostic Logs for CDNs: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cdn/cdn-azure-diagnostic-logs", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Azure Monitor Resource Logs are 'Disabled' for all resources." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.5", + "Description": "Ensure Basic, Free, and Consumption SKUs are not used on Production artifacts requiring monitoring and SLA", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Management and Governance Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure Basic, Free, and Consumption SKUs are not used on Production artifacts requiring monitoring and SLA", + "RationaleStatement": "Typically, production workloads need to be monitored and should have an SLA with Microsoft, using Basic SKUs for any deployed product will mean that that these capabilities do not exist. The following resource types should use standard SKUs as a minimum. - Public IP Addresses - Network Load Balancers - REDIS Cache - SQL PaaS Databases - VPN Gateways", + "ImpactStatement": "The impact of enforcing Standard SKU's is twofold 1) There will be a cost increase 2) The monitoring and service level agreements will be available and will support the production service. All resources should be either tagged or in separate Management Groups/Subscriptions", + "RemediationProcedure": "Each resource has its own process for upgrading from basic to standard SKUs that should be followed if required. - Public IP Address: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/ip-services/public-ip-upgrade. - Basic Load Balancer: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/load-balancer/load-balancer-basic-upgrade-guidance. - Azure Cache for Redis: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-cache-for-redis/cache-how-to-scale. - Azure SQL Database: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-sql/database/scale-resources. - VPN Gateway: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/vpn-gateway/gateway-sku-resize.", + "AuditProcedure": "This needs to be audited by Azure Policy (one for each resource type) and denied for each artifact that is production. **Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Open `Azure Resource Graph Explorer` 1. Click `New query` 1. Paste the following into the query window: ``` Resources | where sku contains 'Basic' or sku contains 'consumption' | order by type ``` 4. Click `Run query` then evaluate the results in the results window. 5. Ensure that no production artifacts are returned. **Audit from Azure CLI** ``` az graph query -q Resources | where sku contains 'Basic' or sku contains 'consumption' | order by type ``` Alternatively, to filter on a specific resource group: ``` az graph query -q Resources | where resourceGroup == '' | where sku contains 'Basic' or sku contains 'consumption' | order by type ``` Ensure that no production artifacts are returned. **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Get-AzResource | ?{ $_.Sku -EQ Basic} ``` Ensure that no production artifacts are returned.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/support/plans:https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/support/plans/response/:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/ip-services/public-ip-upgrade:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/load-balancer/load-balancer-basic-upgrade-guidance:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-cache-for-redis/cache-how-to-scale:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-sql/database/scale-resources:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/vpn-gateway/gateway-sku-resize", + "DefaultValue": "Policy should enforce standard SKUs for the following artifacts: - Public IP Addresses - Network Load Balancers - REDIS Cache - SQL PaaS Databases - VPN Gateways" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.2", + "Description": "Ensure that Resource Locks are set for Mission-Critical Azure Resources", + "Checks": [ + "iam_custom_role_has_permissions_to_administer_resource_locks" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Management and Governance Services", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that Resource Locks are set for Mission-Critical Azure Resources", + "RationaleStatement": "As an administrator, it may be necessary to lock a subscription, resource group, or resource to prevent other users in the organization from accidentally deleting or modifying critical resources. The lock level can be set to to `CanNotDelete` or `ReadOnly` to achieve this purpose. - `CanNotDelete` means authorized users can still read and modify a resource, but they cannot delete the resource. - `ReadOnly` means authorized users can read a resource, but they cannot delete or update the resource. Applying this lock is similar to restricting all authorized users to the permissions granted by the Reader role.", + "ImpactStatement": "There can be unintended outcomes of locking a resource. Applying a lock to a parent service will cause it to be inherited by all resources within. Conversely, applying a lock to a resource may not apply to connected storage, leaving it unlocked. Please see the documentation for further information.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the specific Azure Resource or Resource Group. 2. For each mission critical resource, click on `Locks`. 3. Click `Add`. 4. Give the lock a name and a description, then select the type, `Read-only` or `Delete` as appropriate. 5. Click OK. **Remediate from Azure CLI** To lock a resource, provide the name of the resource, its resource type, and its resource group name. ``` az lock create --name --lock-type --resource-group --resource-name --resource-type ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** ``` Get-AzResourceLock -ResourceName -ResourceType -ResourceGroupName -Locktype ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the specific Azure Resource or Resource Group. 2. Click on `Locks`. 3. Ensure the lock is defined with name and description, with type `Read-only` or `Delete` as appropriate. **Audit from Azure CLI** Review the list of all locks set currently: ``` az lock list --resource-group --resource-name --namespace --resource-type --parent ``` **Audit from PowerShell** Run the following command to list all resources. ``` Get-AzResource ``` For each resource, run the following command to check for Resource Locks. ``` Get-AzResourceLock -ResourceName -ResourceType -ResourceGroupName ``` Review the output of the `Properties` setting. Compliant settings will have the `CanNotDelete` or `ReadOnly` value.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/resource-group-lock-resources:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/resource-manager-subscription-governance#azure-resource-locks:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/governance/blueprints/concepts/resource-locking:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-asset-management#am-4-limit-access-to-asset-management", + "DefaultValue": "By default, no locks are set." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.1", + "Description": "Ensure that RDP Access from the Internet is Evaluated and Restricted", + "Checks": [ + "network_rdp_internet_access_restricted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 Networking Services", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that RDP Access from the Internet is Evaluated and Restricted", + "RationaleStatement": "The potential security problem with using RDP over the Internet is that attackers can use various brute force techniques to gain access to Azure Virtual Machines. Once the attackers gain access, they can use a virtual machine as a launch point for compromising other machines on an Azure Virtual Network or even attack networked devices outside of Azure.", + "ImpactStatement": "Restricting RDP access may require alternative methods for remote administration such as VPN or Azure Bastion.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Network security groups`. 1. Under `Settings`, click `Inbound security rules`. 1. Check the box next to any inbound security rule matching: - Port: `3389` or range including 3389 - Protocol: `TCP` or `Any` - Source: `0.0.0.0/0`, `Internet`, or `Any` - Action: `Allow` 1. Click `Delete`. 1. Click `Yes`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** For each network security group rule requiring remediation, run the following command to delete a rule: ``` az network nsg rule delete --resource-group --nsg-name --name ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Network security groups`. 1. Under `Settings`, click `Inbound security rules`. 1. Ensure that no inbound security rule exists that matches the following: - Port: `3389` or range including 3389 - Protocol: `TCP` or `Any` - Source: `0.0.0.0/0`, `Internet`, or `Any` - Action: `Allow` 1. Repeat steps 1-3 for each network security group. To audit from Azure Resource Graph: 1. Go to `Resource Graph Explorer`. 1. Click `New query`. 1. Paste the following into the query window: ``` resources | where type =~ microsoft.network/networksecuritygroups | project id, name, securityRule = properties.securityRules | mv-expand securityRule | extend access = securityRule.properties.access, direction = securityRule.properties.direction, protocol = securityRule.properties.protocol, destinationPort = case(isempty(securityRule.properties.destinationPortRange), securityRule.properties.destinationPortRanges, securityRule.properties.destinationPortRange), sourceAddress = case(isempty(securityRule.properties.sourceAddressPrefix), securityRule.properties.sourceAddressPrefixes, securityRule.properties.sourceAddressPrefix) | where access =~ Allow and direction =~ Inbound and protocol in~ (tcp, ) | mv-expand destinationPort | mv-expand sourceAddress | extend destinationPortMin = toint(split(destinationPort, -)[0]), destinationPortMax = toint(split(destinationPort, -)[-1]) | where (destinationPortMin <= 3389 and destinationPortMax >= 3389) or destinationPort == | where sourceAddress in~ (*, 0.0.0.0, internet, any) or sourceAddress endswith /0 ``` 1. Click `Run query`. 1. Ensure that no results are returned. **Audit from Azure CLI** List network security groups with non-default security rules: ``` az network nsg list --query [*].[name,securityRules] ``` Ensure that no network security group has an inbound security rule that matches the following: ``` access : Allow destinationPortRange : 3389, *, or direction : Inbound protocol : TCP or * sourceAddressPrefix : 0.0.0.0/0, Internet, or * ``` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [22730e10-96f6-4aac-ad84-9383d35b5917](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F22730e10-96f6-4aac-ad84-9383d35b5917) **- Name:** 'Management ports should be closed on your virtual machines'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/azure-security-network-security-best-practices#disable-rdpssh-access-to-azure-virtual-machines:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-network-security#ns-1-establish-network-segmentation-boundaries:Express Route: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/expressroute/:Site-to-Site VPN: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/vpn-gateway/vpn-gateway-howto-site-to-site-resource-manager-portal:Point-to-Site VPN: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/vpn-gateway/vpn-gateway-howto-point-to-site-resource-manager-portal", + "DefaultValue": "By default, RDP access from internet is not `enabled`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.2", + "Description": "Ensure that SSH Access from the Internet is Evaluated and Restricted", + "Checks": [ + "network_ssh_internet_access_restricted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 Networking Services", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that SSH Access from the Internet is Evaluated and Restricted", + "RationaleStatement": "The potential security problem with using SSH over the Internet is that attackers can use various brute force techniques to gain access to Azure Virtual Machines. Once the attackers gain access, they can use a virtual machine as a launch point for compromising other machines on the Azure Virtual Network or even attack networked devices outside of Azure.", + "ImpactStatement": "Restricting SSH access may require alternative methods for remote administration such as VPN or Azure Bastion.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Where SSH is not explicitly required and narrowly configured for resources attached to the Network Security Group, Internet-level access to your Azure resources should be restricted or eliminated. For internal access to relevant resources, configure an encrypted network tunnel such as: [ExpressRoute](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/expressroute/) [Site-to-site VPN](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/vpn-gateway/vpn-gateway-howto-site-to-site-resource-manager-portal) [Point-to-site VPN](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/vpn-gateway/vpn-gateway-howto-point-to-site-resource-manager-portal)", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Open the `Networking` blade for the specific Virtual machine in Azure portal 2. Verify that the `INBOUND PORT RULES` **does not** have a rule for SSH such as - port = `22`, - protocol = `TCP` OR `ANY`, - Source = `Any` OR `Internet` **Audit from Azure CLI** List Network security groups with corresponding non-default Security rules: ``` az network nsg list --query [*].[name,securityRules] ``` Ensure that none of the NSGs have security rule as below ``` access : Allow destinationPortRange : 22 or * or [port range containing 22] direction : Inbound protocol : TCP or * sourceAddressPrefix : * or 0.0.0.0 or /0 or /0 or internet or any ``` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [22730e10-96f6-4aac-ad84-9383d35b5917](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F22730e10-96f6-4aac-ad84-9383d35b5917) **- Name:** 'Management ports should be closed on your virtual machines'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/azure-security-network-security-best-practices#disable-rdpssh-access-to-azure-virtual-machines:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-network-security#ns-1-establish-network-segmentation-boundaries:Express Route: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/expressroute/:Site-to-Site VPN: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/vpn-gateway/vpn-gateway-howto-site-to-site-resource-manager-portal:Point-to-Site VPN: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/vpn-gateway/vpn-gateway-howto-point-to-site-resource-manager-portal", + "DefaultValue": "By default, SSH access from internet is not `enabled`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.3", + "Description": "Ensure that UDP Port Access from the Internet is Evaluated and Restricted", + "Checks": [ + "network_udp_internet_access_restricted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 Networking Services", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that UDP Port Access from the Internet is Evaluated and Restricted", + "RationaleStatement": "The potential security problem with broadly exposing UDP services over the Internet is that attackers can use DDoS amplification techniques to reflect spoofed UDP traffic from Azure Virtual Machines. The most common types of these attacks use exposed DNS, NTP, SSDP, SNMP, CLDAP and other UDP-based services as amplification sources for disrupting services of other machines on the Azure Virtual Network or even attack networked devices outside of Azure.", + "ImpactStatement": "Restricting UDP access may impact services that legitimately require UDP traffic.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Where UDP is not explicitly required and narrowly configured for resources attached to the Network Security Group, Internet-level access to your Azure resources should be restricted or eliminated. For internal access to relevant resources, configure an encrypted network tunnel such as: [ExpressRoute](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/expressroute/) [Site-to-site VPN](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/vpn-gateway/vpn-gateway-howto-site-to-site-resource-manager-portal) [Point-to-site VPN](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/vpn-gateway/vpn-gateway-howto-point-to-site-resource-manager-portal)", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Open the `Networking` blade for the specific Virtual machine in Azure portal 2. Verify that the `INBOUND PORT RULES` **does not** have a rule for UDP such as - protocol = `UDP`, - Source = `Any` OR `Internet` **Audit from Azure CLI** List Network security groups with corresponding non-default Security rules: ``` az network nsg list --query [*].[name,securityRules] ``` Ensure that none of the NSGs have security rule as below ``` access : Allow destinationPortRange : * or [port range containing 53, 123, 161, 389, 1900, or other vulnerable UDP-based services] direction : Inbound protocol : UDP sourceAddressPrefix : * or 0.0.0.0 or /0 or /0 or internet or any ```", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/network-best-practices#secure-your-critical-azure-service-resources-to-only-your-virtual-networks:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/ddos-best-practices:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-network-security#ns-1-establish-network-segmentation-boundaries:ExpressRoute: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/expressroute/:Site-to-site VPN: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/vpn-gateway/vpn-gateway-howto-site-to-site-resource-manager-portal:Point-to-site VPN: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/vpn-gateway/vpn-gateway-howto-point-to-site-resource-manager-portal", + "DefaultValue": "By default, UDP access from internet is not `enabled`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.4", + "Description": "Ensure that HTTP(S) Access from the Internet is Evaluated and Restricted", + "Checks": [ + "network_http_internet_access_restricted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 Networking Services", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that HTTP(S) Access from the Internet is Evaluated and Restricted", + "RationaleStatement": "The potential security problem with using HTTP(S) over the Internet is that attackers can use various brute force techniques to gain access to Azure resources. Once the attackers gain access, they can use the resource as a launch point for compromising other resources within the Azure tenant.", + "ImpactStatement": "Restricting HTTP(S) access may require proper configuration of web application firewalls and load balancers.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Virtual machines`. 2. For each VM, open the `Networking` blade. 3. Click on `Inbound port rules`. 4. Delete the rule with: * Port = 80/443 OR \\[port range containing 80/443\\] * Protocol = TCP OR Any * Source = Any (\\*) OR IP Addresses(0.0.0.0/0) OR Service Tag(Internet) * Action = Allow **Remediate from Azure CLI** 1. Run below command to list network security groups: ``` az network nsg list --subscription --output table ``` 2. For each network security group, run below command to list the rules associated with the specified port: ``` az network nsg rule list --resource-group --nsg-name --query [?destinationPortRange=='80 or 443'] ``` 3. Run the below command to delete the rule with: * Port = 80/443 OR \\[port range containing 80/443\\] * Protocol = TCP OR * * Source = Any (\\*) OR IP Addresses(0.0.0.0/0) OR Service Tag(Internet) * Action = Allow ``` az network nsg rule delete --resource-group --nsg-name --name ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. For each VM, open the Networking blade 2. Verify that the INBOUND PORT RULES does not have a rule for HTTP(S) such as - port = `80`/ `443`, - protocol = `TCP`, - Source = `Any` OR `Internet` **Audit from Azure CLI** List Network security groups with corresponding non-default Security rules: ``` az network nsg list --query [*].[name,securityRules] ``` Ensure that none of the NSGs have security rule as below ``` access : Allow destinationPortRange : 80/443 or * or [port range containing 80/443] direction : Inbound protocol : TCP sourceAddressPrefix : * or 0.0.0.0 or /0 or /0 or internet or any ```", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "Express Route: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/expressroute/:Site-to-Site VPN: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/vpn-gateway/vpn-gateway-howto-site-to-site-resource-manager-portal:Point-to-Site VPN: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/vpn-gateway/vpn-gateway-howto-point-to-site-resource-manager-portal:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-network-security#ns-1-establish-network-segmentation-boundaries", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.5", + "Description": "Ensure that Network Security Group Flow Log Retention Days is Set to Greater than or equal to 90", + "Checks": [ + "network_flow_log_more_than_90_days" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 Networking Services", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that Network Security Group Flow Log Retention Days is Set to Greater than or equal to 90", + "RationaleStatement": "Virtual network flow logs provide critical visibility into traffic patterns. Logs can be used to check for anomalies and give insight into suspected breaches.", + "ImpactStatement": "* Virtual network flow logs are charged per gigabyte of network flow logs collected and come with a free tier of 5 GB/month per subscription. * If traffic analytics is enabled with virtual network flow logs, traffic analytics pricing applies at per gigabyte processing rates. * The storage of logs is charged separately, and the cost will depend on the amount of logs and the retention period.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Network Watcher`. 1. Under `Logs`, select `Flow logs`. 1. Click `Add filter`. 1. From the `Filter` drop-down menu, select `Flow log type`. 1. From the `Value` drop-down menu, check `Virtual network` only. 1. Click `Apply`. 1. Click the name of a virtual network flow log. 1. Under `Storage Account`, set `Retention days` to `0`, `90`, or a number greater than 90. If `Retention days` is set to `0`, the logs are retained indefinitely with no retention policy. 1. Repeat steps 7 and 8 for each virtual network flow log requiring remediation. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Run the following command update the retention policy for a flow log in a network watcher, setting `retention` to `0`, `90`, or a number greater than 90: ``` az network watcher flow-log update --location --name --retention ``` Repeat for each virtual network flow log requiring remediation.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Network Watcher`. 1. Under `Logs`, select `Flow logs`. 1. Click `Add filter`. 1. From the `Filter` drop-down menu, select `Flow log type`. 1. From the `Value` drop-down menu, check `Virtual network` only. 1. Click `Apply`. 1. Click the name of a virtual network flow log. 1. Under `Storage Account`, ensure that `Retention days` is set to `0`, `90`, or a number greater than 90. If `Retention days` is set to `0`, the logs are retained indefinitely with no retention policy. 1. Repeat steps 7 and 8 for each virtual network flow log. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list network watchers: ``` az network watcher list ``` Run the following command to list the name and retention policy of flow logs in a network watcher: ``` az network watcher flow-log list --location --query [*].[name,retentionPolicy] ``` For each flow log, ensure that `days` is set to `0`, `90`, or a number greater than 90. If `days` is set to `0`, the logs are retained indefinitely with no retention policy. Repeat for each network watcher.", + "AdditionalInformation": "As network security group flow logs are on the retirement path, Azure recommends migrating to virtual network flow logs.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/network-watcher/vnet-flow-logs-portal:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/network/watcher/flow-log", + "DefaultValue": "When a virtual network flow log is created using the Azure CLI, retention days is set to 0 by default. When creating via the Azure Portal, retention days must be specified by the creator." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.6", + "Description": "Ensure that Network Watcher is 'Enabled' for Azure Regions That are in Use", + "Checks": [ + "network_watcher_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 Networking Services", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that Network Watcher is 'Enabled' for Azure Regions That are in Use", + "RationaleStatement": "Network diagnostic and visualization tools available with Network Watcher help users understand, diagnose, and gain insights to the network in Azure.", + "ImpactStatement": "There are additional costs per transaction to run and store network data. For high-volume networks these charges will add up quickly.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Opting out of Network Watcher automatic enablement is a permanent change. Once you opt-out you cannot opt-in without contacting support. To manually enable Network Watcher in each region where you want to use Network Watcher capabilities, follow the steps below. **Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Use the Search bar to search for and click on the `Network Watcher` service. 1. Click `Create`. 1. Select a `Region` from the drop-down menu. 1. Click `Add`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** ``` az network watcher configure --locations --enabled true --resource-group ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Use the Search bar to search for and click on the `Network Watcher` service. 1. From the Overview menu item, review each Network Watcher listed, and ensure that a network watcher is listed for each region in use by the subscription. **Audit from Azure CLI** ``` az network watcher list --query [].{Location:location,State:provisioningState} -o table ``` This will list all network watchers and their provisioning state. Ensure `provisioningState` is `Succeeded` for each network watcher. ``` az account list-locations --query [?metadata.regionType=='Physical'].{Name:name,DisplayName:regionalDisplayName} -o table ``` This will list all physical regions that exist in the subscription. Compare this list to the previous one to ensure that for each region in use, a network watcher exists with `provisioningState` set to `Succeeded`. **Audit from PowerShell** Get a list of Network Watchers ``` Get-AzNetworkWatcher ``` Make sure each watcher is set with the `ProvisioningState` setting set to `Succeeded` and all `Locations` that are in use by the subscription are using a watcher. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [b6e2945c-0b7b-40f5-9233-7a5323b5cdc6](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fb6e2945c-0b7b-40f5-9233-7a5323b5cdc6) **- Name:** 'Network Watcher should be enabled'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/network-watcher/network-watcher-monitoring-overview:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/network/watcher?view=azure-cli-latest:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/network/watcher?view=azure-cli-latest#az-network-watcher-configure:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/network-watcher/network-watcher-create:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-4-enable-network-logging-for-security-investigation:https://azure.microsoft.com/en-ca/pricing/details/network-watcher/", + "DefaultValue": "Network Watcher is automatically enabled. When you create or update a virtual network in your subscription, Network Watcher will be enabled automatically in your Virtual Network's region. There is no impact to your resources or associated charge for automatically enabling Network Watcher." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.7", + "Description": "Ensure that Public IP Addresses are Evaluated on a Periodic Basis", + "Checks": [ + "network_public_ip_shodan" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 Networking Services", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that Public IP Addresses are Evaluated on a Periodic Basis", + "RationaleStatement": "Public IP Addresses allocated to the tenant should be periodically reviewed for necessity. Public IP Addresses that are not intentionally assigned and controlled present a publicly facing vector for threat actors and significant risk to the tenant.", + "ImpactStatement": "Regular reviews require administrative effort.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Remediation will vary significantly depending on your organization's security requirements for the resources attached to each individual Public IP address.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Open the `All Resources` blade 2. Click on `Add Filter` 3. In the Add Filter window, select the following: Filter: `Type` Operator: `Equals` Value: `Public IP address` 4. Click the `Apply` button 5. For each Public IP address in the list, use Overview (or Properties) to review the `Associated to:` field and determine if the associated resource is still relevant to your tenant environment. If the associated resource is relevant, ensure that additional controls exist to mitigate risk (e.g. Firewalls, VPNs, Traffic Filtering, Virtual Gateway Appliances, Web Application Firewalls, etc.) on all subsequently attached resources. **Audit from Azure CLI** List all Public IP addresses: ``` az network public-ip list ``` For each Public IP address in the output, review the `name` property and determine if the associated resource is still relevant to your tenant environment. If the associated resource is relevant, ensure that additional controls exist to mitigate risk (e.g. Firewalls, VPNs, Traffic Filtering, Virtual Gateway Appliances, Web Application Firewalls, etc.) on all subsequently attached resources.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/network/public-ip?view=azure-cli-latest:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-network-security", + "DefaultValue": "During Virtual Machine and Application creation, a setting may create and attach a public IP." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.8", + "Description": "Ensure that Virtual Network Flow Log Retention Days is Set to Greater than or Equal to 90", + "Checks": [ + "network_flow_log_more_than_90_days" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 Networking Services", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that Virtual Network Flow Log Retention Days is Set to Greater than or Equal to 90", + "RationaleStatement": "Virtual network flow logs provide critical visibility into traffic patterns. Logs can be used to check for anomalies and give insight into suspected breaches.", + "ImpactStatement": "* Virtual network flow logs are charged per gigabyte of network flow logs collected and come with a free tier of 5 GB/month per subscription. * If traffic analytics is enabled with virtual network flow logs, traffic analytics pricing applies at per gigabyte processing rates. * The storage of logs is charged separately, and the cost will depend on the amount of logs and the retention period.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Network Watcher`. 1. Under `Logs`, select `Flow logs`. 1. Click `Add filter`. 1. From the `Filter` drop-down menu, select `Flow log type`. 1. From the `Value` drop-down menu, check `Virtual network` only. 1. Click `Apply`. 1. Click the name of a virtual network flow log. 1. Under `Storage Account`, set `Retention days` to `0`, `90`, or a number greater than 90. If `Retention days` is set to `0`, the logs are retained indefinitely with no retention policy. 1. Repeat steps 7 and 8 for each virtual network flow log requiring remediation. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Run the following command update the retention policy for a flow log in a network watcher, setting `retention` to `0`, `90`, or a number greater than 90: ``` az network watcher flow-log update --location --name --retention ``` Repeat for each virtual network flow log requiring remediation.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Network Watcher`. 1. Under `Logs`, select `Flow logs`. 1. Click `Add filter`. 1. From the `Filter` drop-down menu, select `Flow log type`. 1. From the `Value` drop-down menu, check `Virtual network` only. 1. Click `Apply`. 1. Click the name of a virtual network flow log. 1. Under `Storage Account`, ensure that `Retention days` is set to `0`, `90`, or a number greater than 90. If `Retention days` is set to `0`, the logs are retained indefinitely with no retention policy. 1. Repeat steps 7 and 8 for each virtual network flow log. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list network watchers: ``` az network watcher list ``` Run the following command to list the name and retention policy of flow logs in a network watcher: ``` az network watcher flow-log list --location --query [*].[name,retentionPolicy] ``` For each flow log, ensure that `days` is set to `0`, `90`, or a number greater than 90. If `days` is set to `0`, the logs are retained indefinitely with no retention policy. Repeat for each network watcher.", + "AdditionalInformation": "As network security group flow logs are on the retirement path, Azure recommends migrating to virtual network flow logs.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/network-watcher/vnet-flow-logs-portal:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/network/watcher/flow-log", + "DefaultValue": "When a virtual network flow log is created using the Azure CLI, retention days is set to 0 by default. When creating via the Azure Portal, retention days must be specified by the creator." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.9", + "Description": "Ensure 'Authentication type' is Set to 'Azure Active Directory' only for Azure VPN Gateway Point-to-Site Configuration", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 Networking Services", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure 'Authentication type' is Set to 'Azure Active Directory' only for Azure VPN Gateway Point-to-Site Configuration", + "RationaleStatement": "Microsoft Entra ID authentication provides strong security and centralized identity management, and reduces risks associated with static credentials and certificate management.", + "ImpactStatement": "Azure VPN Gateways incur hourly charges, with additional costs for point-to-site connections and data transfer. Pricing varies by SKU and usage. Refer to https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/details/vpn-gateway/ for details.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Virtual network gateways`. 2. Under `VPN gateway`, click `VPN gateways`. 3. Click the name of a VPN gateway. 4. Under `Settings`, click `Point-to-site configuration`. 5. Ensure `Authentication type` click to expand the drop-down menu. 6. Check the box next to `Azure Active Directory`, and uncheck the boxes next to `Azure certificate` and `RADIUS authentication`. 7. Provide a `Tenant`, `Audience`, and `Issuer` for the Azure Active Directory configuration. 8. Click `Save`. 9. Repeat steps 1-8 for each VPN gateway requiring remediation.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Virtual network gateways`. 2. Under `VPN gateway`, click `VPN gateways`. 3. Click the name of a VPN gateway. 4. Under `Settings`, click `Point-to-site configuration`. 5. Ensure `Authentication type` is set to `Azure Active Directory` only. 6. Repeat steps 1-5 for each VPN gateway. **Audit from Azure Policy** - **Policy ID:** 21a6bc25-125e-4d13-b82d-2e19b7208ab7 - **Name:** 'VPN gateways should use only Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) authentication for point-to-site users'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/vpn-gateway/vpn-gateway-about-vpngateways:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/vpn-gateway/point-to-site-entra-gateway:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/vpn-gateway/openvpn-azure-ad-tenant", + "DefaultValue": "'Authentication type' is selected during creation of point-to-site configuration." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.10", + "Description": "Ensure Azure Web Application Firewall (WAF) is Enabled on Azure Application Gateway", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 Networking Services", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure Azure Web Application Firewall (WAF) is Enabled on Azure Application Gateway", + "RationaleStatement": "Using Azure Web Application Firewall with Azure Application Gateway reduces exposure to external threats by mitigating attacks on public facing applications.", + "ImpactStatement": "The WAF V2 tier for Azure Application Gateways costs more than the Basic and Standard V2 tiers. Pricing includes a fixed hourly charge plus a charge per capacity-unit hour. Refer to https://azure.microsoft.com/en-gb/pricing/details/application-gateway/ for details.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Note:** Basic tier application gateways cannot be upgraded to the WAF V2 tier. Create a new WAF V2 tier application gateway to replace a Basic tier application gateway. **Remediate from Azure Portal** To remediate a Standard V2 tier application gateway: 1. Go to `Application gateways`. 2. Click `Add filter`. 3. From the `Filter` drop-down menu, select `SKU size`. 4. Check the box next to `Standard_v2` only. 5. Click `Apply`. 6. Click the name of an application gateway. 7. Under `Settings`, click `Web application firewall`. 8. Under `Configure`, next to `Tier`, click `WAF V2`. 9. Select an existing or create a new WAF policy. 10. Click `Save`. 11. Repeat steps 1-10 for each Standard V2 tier application gateway requiring remediation.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Application gateways`. 2. Click the name of an application gateway. 3. In the `Overview`, under `Essentials`, ensure `Tier` is set to `WAF V2`. 4. Repeat steps 1-3 for each application gateway. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list application gateways: ``` az network application-gateway list ``` For each application gateway, run the following command to get the firewall policy id: ``` az network application-gateway show --resource-group --name --query firewallPolicy.id ``` Ensure a firewall policy id is returned. **Audit from Azure Policy** - **Policy ID:** 564feb30-bf6a-4854-b4bb-0d2d2d1e6c66 - **Name:** 'Web Application Firewall (WAF) should be enabled for Application Gateway'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/application-gateway/features:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/network/application-gateway:https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/details/application-gateway", + "DefaultValue": "Azure Web Application Firewall is enabled by default for the WAF V2 tier of Azure Application Gateway. It is not available in the Basic tier. Application gateways deployed using the Standard V2 tier can be upgraded to the WAF V2 tier to enable Azure Web Application Firewall." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.11", + "Description": "Ensure Subnets Are Associated with Network Security Groups", + "Checks": [ + "network_subnet_nsg_associated" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 Networking Services", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure Subnets Are Associated with Network Security Groups", + "RationaleStatement": "Unprotected subnets can expose resources to unauthorized access.", + "ImpactStatement": "Minor administrative effort is required to ensure subnets are associated with network security groups. There is no cost to create or use network security groups.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Virtual networks`. 2. Click the name of a virtual network. 3. Under `Settings`, click `Subnets`. 4. Click the name of a subnet. 5. Under `Security`, next to `Network security group`, click `None` to display the drop-down menu. 6. Select a network security group. 7. Click `Save`. 8. Repeat steps 1-7 for each virtual network and subnet requiring remediation. **Remediate from Azure CLI** For each subnet requiring remediation, run the following command to associate it with a network security group: ``` az network vnet subnet update --resource-group --vnet-name --name --network-security-group ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Virtual networks`. 2. Click the name of a virtual network. 3. Under `Settings`, click `Subnets`. 4. Click the name of a subnet. 5. Under `Security`, ensure `Network security group` is not set to `None`. 6. Repeat steps 1-5 for each virtual network and subnet. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list virtual networks: ``` az network vnet list ``` For each virtual network, run the following command to list subnets: ``` az network vnet show --resource-group --name --query subnets ``` For each subnet, run the following command to get the network security group id: ``` az network vnet subnet show --resource-group --vnet-name --name --query networkSecurityGroup.id ``` Ensure a network security group id is returned. **Audit from Azure Policy** - **Policy ID:** e71308d3-144b-4262-b144-efdc3cc90517 - **Name:** 'Subnets should be associated with a Network Security Group'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/network-security-groups-overview:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/network/vnet", + "DefaultValue": "By default, a subnet is not associated with a network security group." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.12", + "Description": "Ensure the SSL Policy's 'Min protocol version' is Set to 'TLSv1_2' or Higher on Azure Application Gateway", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 Networking Services", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure the SSL Policy's 'Min protocol version' is Set to 'TLSv1_2' or Higher on Azure Application Gateway", + "RationaleStatement": "TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are outdated and vulnerable to security risks. Since TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 provide enhanced security and improved performance, it is highly recommended to use TLS 1.2 or higher whenever possible.", + "ImpactStatement": "Using the latest TLS version may affect compatibility with clients and backend services.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Application gateways`. 2. Click the name of an application gateway. 3. Under `Settings`, click `Listeners`. 4. Under `SSL Policy`, next to the Selected SSL Policy name, click `change`. 5. Select an appropriate SSL policy with a `Min protocol version` of `TLSv1_2` or higher. 6. Click `Save`. 7. Repeat steps 1-6 for each application gateway requiring remediation. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list available SSL policy options: ``` az network application-gateway ssl-policy list-options ``` Run the following command to list available predefined SSL policies: ``` az network application-gateway ssl-policy predefined list ``` For each application gateway requiring remediation, run the following command to set a predefined SSL policy: ``` az network application-gateway ssl-policy set --resource-group --gateway-name --name --policy-type Predefined ``` Alternatively, run the following command to set a custom SSL policy: ``` az network application-gateway ssl-policy set --resource-group --gateway-name --policy-type Custom --min-protocol-version --cipher-suites ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Application gateways`. 2. Click the name of an application gateway. 3. Under `Settings`, click `Listeners`. 4. Under `SSL Policy`, ensure `Min protocol version` is set to `TLSv1_2` or higher. 5. Repeat steps 1-4 for each application gateway. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list application gateways: ``` az network application-gateway list ``` For each application gateway, run the following command to get the SSL policy: ``` az network application-gateway ssl-policy show --resource-group --gateway-name ``` For each SSL policy, run the following command to get the minProtocolVersion: ``` az network application-gateway ssl-policy predefined show --name --query minProtocolVersion ``` Ensure `TLSv1_2` or higher is returned.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/application-gateway/application-gateway-ssl-policy-overview:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/network/application-gateway", + "DefaultValue": "Min protocol version is set to TLSv1_2 by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.13", + "Description": "Ensure 'HTTP2' is Set to 'Enabled' on Azure Application Gateway", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 Networking Services", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure 'HTTP2' is Set to 'Enabled' on Azure Application Gateway", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling HTTP/2 supports use of modern encrypted connections.", + "ImpactStatement": "Clients and backend services that do not support HTTP/2 will fall back to HTTP/1.1.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Application gateways`. 2. Click the name of an application gateway. 3. Under `Settings`, click `Configuration`. 4. Under `HTTP2`, click `Enabled`. 5. Click `Save`. 6. Repeat steps 1-5 for each application gateway requiring remediation. **Remediate from Azure CLI** For each application gateway requiring remediation, run the following command to enable HTTP2: ``` az network application-gateway update --resource-group --name --http2 Enabled ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Run the following command to get the application gateway in a resource group with a given name: ``` $gateway = Get-AzApplicationGateway -ResourceGroupName -Name ``` Run the following command to enable HTTP2: ``` $gateway.EnableHttp2 = $true ``` Run the following command to apply the update: ``` Set-AzApplicationGateway -ApplicationGateway $gateway ``` Repeat for each application gateway requiring remediation.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Application gateways`. 2. Click the name of an application gateway. 3. Under `Settings`, click `Configuration`. 4. Ensure `HTTP2` is set to `Enabled`. 5. Repeat steps 1-4 for each application gateway. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list application gateways: ``` az network application-gateway list ``` For each application gateway, run the following command to get the HTTP2 setting: ``` az network application-gateway show --resource-group --name --query enableHttp2 ``` Ensure `true` is returned. **Audit from PowerShell** Run the following command to list application gateways: ``` Get-AzApplicationGateway ``` Run the following command to get the application gateway in a resource group with a given name: ``` $gateway = Get-AzApplicationGateway -ResourceGroupName -Name ``` Run the following command to get the HTTP2 setting: ``` $gateway.EnableHttp2 ``` Ensure that `True` is returned. Repeat for each application gateway.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/application-gateway/features#websocket-and-http2-traffic:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/network/application-gateway:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.network/get-azapplicationgateway:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.network/set-azapplicationgateway", + "DefaultValue": "HTTP2 is enabled by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.14", + "Description": "Ensure Request Body Inspection is Enabled in Azure Web Application Firewall policy on Azure Application Gateway", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 Networking Services", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure Request Body Inspection is Enabled in Azure Web Application Firewall policy on Azure Application Gateway", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling request body inspection strengthens security by allowing the Web Application Firewall to detect common attacks, such as SQL injection and cross-site scripting.", + "ImpactStatement": "Minor performance impact on the Web Application Firewall. Additional effort may be required to monitor findings.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Application gateways`. 2. Click the name of an application gateway. 3. Under `Settings`, click `Web application firewall`. 4. Under `Associated web application firewall policy`, click the policy name. 5. Under `Settings`, click `Policy settings`. 6. Check the box next to `Enforce request body inspection`. 7. Click `Save`. 8. Repeat steps 1-7 for each application gateway and firewall policy requiring remediation. **Remediate from Azure CLI** For each firewall policy requiring remediation, run the following command to enable request body inspection: ``` az network application-gateway waf-policy update --ids --policy-settings request-body-check=true ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Application gateways`. 2. Click the name of an application gateway. 3. Under `Settings`, click `Web application firewall`. 4. Under `Associated web application firewall policy`, click the policy name. 5. Under `Settings`, click `Policy settings`. 6. Ensure the box next to `Enforce request body inspection` is checked. 7. Repeat steps 1-6 for each application gateway. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list application gateways: ``` az network application-gateway list ``` For each application gateway, run the following command to get the firewall policy id: ``` az network application-gateway show --resource-group --name --query firewallPolicy.id ``` For each firewall policy, run the following command to get the request body inspection setting: ``` az network application-gateway waf-policy show --ids --query policySettings.requestBodyCheck ``` Ensure `true` is returned. **Audit from Azure Policy** - **Policy ID:** ca85ef9a-741d-461d-8b7a-18c2da82c666 - **Name:** 'Azure Web Application Firewall on Azure Application Gateway should have request body inspection enabled'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/azure/web-application-firewall/ag/application-gateway-waf-request-size-limits#request-body-inspection:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/network/application-gateway:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/network/application-gateway/waf-policy", + "DefaultValue": "Request body inspection is enabled by default on Azure Application Gateways with Web Application Firewall." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.15", + "Description": "Ensure Bot Protection is Enabled in Azure Web Application Firewall Policy on Azure Application Gateway", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 Networking Services", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure Bot Protection is Enabled in Azure Web Application Firewall Policy on Azure Application Gateway", + "RationaleStatement": "Internet traffic from bots can scrape, scan, and search for application vulnerabilities. Enabling bot protection stops requests from known malicious IP addresses and enhances the overall security of your application by reducing exposure to automated attacks.", + "ImpactStatement": "May require monitoring to identify false positives.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Application gateways`. 2. Click the name of an application gateway. 3. Under `Settings`, click `Web application firewall`. 4. Under `Associated web application firewall policy`, click the policy name. 5. Under `Settings`, click `Managed rules`. 6. Click `Assign`. 7. Under `Bot Management ruleset`, click to display the drop-down menu. 8. Select a `Microsoft_BotManagerRuleSet`. 9. Click `Save`. 10. Click `X` to close the panel. 11. Repeat steps 1-10 for each application gateway and firewall policy requiring remediation. **Remediate from Azure CLI** For each firewall policy requiring remediation, run the following command to enable bot protection: ``` az network application-gateway waf-policy managed-rule rule-set add --resource-group --policy-name --type Microsoft_BotManagerRuleSet --version <0.1|1.0|1.1> ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Application gateways`. 2. Click the name of an application gateway. 3. Under `Settings`, click `Web application firewall`. 4. Under `Associated web application firewall policy`, click the policy name. 5. Under `Settings`, click `Managed rules`. 6. Ensure a `Rule Id` containing `Microsoft_BotManagerRuleSet` is listed. 7. Click the `>` to expand the row. 8. Ensure the `Status` for `Malicious Bots` is set to `Enabled`. 9. Repeat steps 1-8 for each application gateway. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list application gateways: ``` az network application-gateway list ``` For each application gateway, run the following command to get the firewall policy id: ``` az network application-gateway show --resource-group --name --query firewallPolicy.id ``` For each firewall policy, run the following command to get the managed rule sets: ``` az network application-gateway waf-policy show --ids --query managedRules.managedRuleSets ``` Ensure a managed rule set with `ruleSetType` of `Microsoft_BotManagerRuleSet` is returned, and that no `ruleGroupOverrides` for `ruleGroupName` `KnownBadBots` with `state` `Disabled` are returned. **Audit from Azure Policy** - **Policy ID:** ebea0d86-7fbd-42e3-8a46-27e7568c2525 - **Name:** 'Bot Protection should be enabled for Azure Application Gateway WAF'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/web-application-firewall/ag/bot-protection-overview:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/web-application-firewall/ag/bot-protection:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/network/application-gateway:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/network/application-gateway/waf-policy:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/network/application-gateway/waf-policy/managed-rule/rule-set", + "DefaultValue": "Bot protection is disabled by default on Azure Application Gateways with Web Application Firewall." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.16", + "Description": "Ensure Azure Network Security Perimeter is Used to Secure Azure Platform-as-a-service Resources", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 Networking Services", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure Azure Network Security Perimeter is Used to Secure Azure Platform-as-a-service Resources", + "RationaleStatement": "Network security perimeter denies public access to PaaS resources, reducing exposure and mitigating data exfiltration risks.", + "ImpactStatement": "Implementation requires administrative effort to configure and maintain network security perimeter profiles and resource assignments. Azure does not list any additional charges for using network security perimeters.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** Create and associate PaaS resources with a new network security perimeter: 1. Go to `Network Security Perimeters`. 2. Click `+ Create`. 3. Select a `Subscription` and `Resource group`, provide a `Name`, select a `Region`, and provide a `Profile name`. 4. Click `Next`. 5. Click `+ Add`. 6. Check the box next to a PaaS resource to associate it with the network security perimeter. 7. Click `Select`. 8. Click `Next`. 9. Configure appropriate `Inbound access rules` for your organization. 10. Click `Next`. 11. Configure appropriate `Outbound access rules` for your organization. 12. Click `Review + create`. 13. Click `Create`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Use `az network perimeter profile list` or `az network perimeter profile create` to list existing or create a new network security perimeter profile. For each PaaS resource requiring association with a network security perimeter, run the following command: ``` az network perimeter association create --resource-group --perimeter-name --association-name --private-link-resource \"{id:}\" --profile \"{}\" ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Resource groups`. 2. Click the name of a resource group. 3. Take note of PaaS resources. 4. Go to `Network Security Perimeters`. 5. Click the name of a network security perimeter. 6. Under `Settings`, click `Associated resources`. 7. Take note of the associated resources. 8. Repeat steps 1-7 and ensure each PaaS resource is associated with a network security perimeter. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list resource groups: ``` az group list ``` For each resource group, run the following command to list resources: ``` az resource list --resource-group ``` Take note of PaaS resources. For each resource group, run the following command to list network security perimeters: ``` az network perimeter list --resource-group ``` For each network security perimeter, run the following command to list resources: ``` az network perimeter association list --resource-group --perimeter-name ``` Ensure each PaaS resource is associated with a network security perimeter.", + "AdditionalInformation": "The current list of resources that can be associated with a network security perimeter are as follows: Azure Monitor, Azure AI Search, Cosmos DB, Event Hubs, Key Vault, SQL DB, Storage, Azure OpenAI Service. While network security perimeter is generally available, Cosmos DB, SQL DB, and Azure OpenAI Service are in public preview.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/private-link/network-security-perimeter-concepts:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/private-link/create-network-security-perimeter-portal:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/group:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/resource:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/network/perimeter", + "DefaultValue": "PaaS resources are not associated with a network security perimeter by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.1.1", + "Description": "Ensure Microsoft Defender CSPM is Set to 'On'", + "Checks": [ + "defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.1 Microsoft Defender for Cloud", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure Microsoft Defender CSPM is Set to 'On'", + "RationaleStatement": "Microsoft Defender CSPM provides detailed visibility into the security state of assets and workloads and offers hardening guidance to help improve security posture.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling Microsoft Defender CSPM incurs hourly charges for each billable compute, database, and storage resource. This can lead to significant costs in larger environments. Careful planning and cost analysis are recommended before enabling the service. Refer to https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/details/defender-for-cloud/#pricing for pricing information.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 2. Under `Management`, click `Environment settings`. 3. Click the name of a subscription. 4. Select the `Defender plans` blade. 5. Under `Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM)`, in the row for `Defender CSPM`, set the toggle switch for `Status` to `On`. 6. Click `Save`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Run the following command to enable Defender CSPM: ``` az security pricing create --name CloudPosture --tier Standard --extensions name=ApiPosture isEnabled=true ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Run the following command to enable Defender CSPM: ``` Set-AzSecurityPricing -Name CloudPosture -PricingTier Standard -Extension '[{\"name\":\"ApiPosture\",\"isEnabled\":\"True\"}]' ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 2. Under `Management`, click `Environment settings`. 3. Click the name of a subscription. 4. Select the `Defender plans` blade. 5. Under `Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM)`, in the row for `Defender CSPM`, ensure `Status` is set to `On`. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to get the CloudPosture plan pricing tier: ``` az security pricing show --name CloudPosture --query pricingTier ``` Ensure `Standard` is returned. **Audit from PowerShell** Run the following command to get the CloudPosture plan pricing tier: ``` Get-AzSecurityPricing -Name CloudPosture | Select-Object PricingTier ``` Ensure `Standard` is returned. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [1f90fc71-a595-4066-8974-d4d0802e8ef0](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F1f90fc71-a595-4066-8974-d4d0802e8ef0) **- Name:** 'Microsoft Defender CSPM should be enabled'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-cloud-security-posture-management:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/tutorial-enable-cspm-plan:https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/details/defender-for-cloud/#pricing:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/security/pricing:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.security/get-azsecuritypricing:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.security/set-azsecuritypricing", + "DefaultValue": "Defender CSPM is disabled by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.2.1", + "Description": "Ensure Microsoft Defender for APIs is Set to 'On'", + "Checks": [ + "defender_ensure_defender_for_app_services_is_on" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.1 Microsoft Defender for Cloud", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure Microsoft Defender for APIs is Set to 'On'", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling Microsoft Defender for App Service allows for greater defense-in-depth, with threat detection provided by the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC).", + "ImpactStatement": "Turning on Microsoft Defender for App Service incurs an additional cost per resource.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud` 2. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings` 3. Click on the subscription name 4. Select `Defender plans` 5. Set `App Service` Status to `On` 6. Select `Save` **Remediate from Azure CLI** Run the following command: ``` az security pricing create -n Appservices --tier 'standard' ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Run the following command: ``` Set-AzSecurityPricing -Name AppServices -PricingTier Standard ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud` 2. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings` 3. Click on the subscription name 4. Select `Defender plans` 5. Ensure Status is `On` for `App Service` **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command: ``` az security pricing show -n AppServices ``` Ensure `-PricingTier` is set to `Standard` **Audit from PowerShell** Run the following command: ``` Get-AzSecurityPricing -Name 'AppServices' |Select-Object Name,PricingTier ``` Ensure the `-PricingTier` is set to `Standard` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [2913021d-f2fd-4f3d-b958-22354e2bdbcb](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F2913021d-f2fd-4f3d-b958-22354e2bdbcb) **- Name:** 'Azure Defender for App Service should be enabled'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security-center/security-center-detection-capabilities:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/securitycenter/pricings/list:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/securitycenter/pricings/update:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.security/get-azsecuritypricing:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-1-enable-threat-detection-capabilities", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Microsoft Defender plan is off." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.3.1", + "Description": "Ensure that Defender for Servers is Set to 'On'", + "Checks": [ + "defender_ensure_defender_for_server_is_on" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.1 Microsoft Defender for Cloud", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that Defender for Servers is Set to 'On'", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling Defender for Servers allows for greater defense-in-depth, with threat detection provided by the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC).", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling Defender for Servers in Microsoft Defender for Cloud incurs an additional cost per resource. Refer to https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/details/defender-for-cloud/ and https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/calculator/ to estimate potential costs. - Plan 1: Subscription only - Plan 2: Subscription and workspace", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 1. Under `Management`, select `Environment settings`. 1. Click on a subscription name. 1. Click `Defender plans` in the left pane. 1. Under `Cloud Workload Protection (CWP)`, locate `Servers` in the Plan column, set Status to `On`. 1. Select `Save`. 1. Repeat steps 1-6 for each subscription requiring remediation. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Run the following command: ``` az security pricing create -n VirtualMachines --tier 'standard' ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Run the following command: ``` Set-AzSecurityPricing -Name 'VirtualMachines' -PricingTier 'Standard' ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 1. Under `Management`, select `Environment settings`. 1. Click on a subscription name. 1. Select `Defender plans` in the left pane. 1. Under `Cloud Workload Protection (CWP)`, locate `Servers` in the Plan column, ensure Status is set to `On`. 1. Repeat steps 1-5 for each subscription. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command: ``` az security pricing show -n VirtualMachines --query pricingTier ``` If the tenant is licensed and enabled, the output will indicate `Standard`. **Audit from PowerShell** Run the following command: ``` Get-AzSecurityPricing -Name 'VirtualMachines' |Select-Object Name,PricingTier ``` If the tenant is licensed and enabled, the `-PricingTier` parameter will indicate `Standard`. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [4da35fc9-c9e7-4960-aec9-797fe7d9051d](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F4da35fc9-c9e7-4960-aec9-797fe7d9051d) **- Name:** 'Azure Defender for servers should be enabled'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-servers-overview:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/plan-defender-for-servers:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/defenderforcloud/pricings/list:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/defenderforcloud/pricings/update:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.security/get-azsecuritypricing:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.security/set-azsecuritypricing:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-endpoint-security#es-1-use-endpoint-detection-and-response-edr", + "DefaultValue": "By default, the Defender for Servers plan is disabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.3.2", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Vulnerability assessment for machines' Component Status is set to 'On'", + "Checks": [ + "defender_auto_provisioning_vulnerabilty_assessments_machines_on" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.1 Microsoft Defender for Cloud", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Vulnerability assessment for machines' Component Status is set to 'On'", + "RationaleStatement": "Vulnerability assessment for machines scans for various security-related configurations and events such as system updates, OS vulnerabilities, and endpoint protection, then produces alerts on threat and vulnerability findings.", + "ImpactStatement": "Microsoft Defender for Servers plan 2 licensing is required, and configuration of Azure Arc introduces complexity beyond this recommendation.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu 1. Select `Microsoft Defender for Cloud` 1. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings` 1. Select a subscription 1. Click on `Settings & Monitoring` 1. Set the `Status` of `Vulnerability assessment for machines` to `On` 1. Click `Continue` Repeat the above for any additional subscriptions.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu 1. Select `Microsoft Defender for Cloud` 1. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings` 1. Select a subscription 1. Click on `Settings & monitoring` 1. Ensure that `Vulnerability assessment for machines` is set to `On` Repeat the above for any additional subscriptions.", + "AdditionalInformation": "While this feature is generally available as of publication, it is not yet available for Azure Government tenants.", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/enable-data-collection?tabs=autoprovision-va:https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/mt704062.aspx:https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/mt704063.aspx:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/securitycenter/autoprovisioningsettings/list:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/securitycenter/autoprovisioningsettings/create:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-posture-vulnerability-management#pv-5-perform-vulnerability-assessments", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `Automatic provisioning of monitoring agent` is set to `Off`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.3.3", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Endpoint protection' Component Status is set to 'On'", + "Checks": [ + "defender_assessments_vm_endpoint_protection_installed" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.1 Microsoft Defender for Cloud", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Endpoint protection' Component Status is set to 'On'", + "RationaleStatement": "Microsoft Defender for Endpoint integration brings comprehensive Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) capabilities within Microsoft Defender for Cloud. This integration helps to spot abnormalities, as well as detect and respond to advanced attacks on endpoints monitored by Microsoft Defender for Cloud. MDE works only with Standard Tier subscriptions.", + "ImpactStatement": "Endpoint protection requires licensing and is included in these plans: - Defender for Servers plan 1 - Defender for Servers plan 2", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu. 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 1. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings`. 1. Click on the subscription name. 1. Click `Settings & monitoring`. 1. Set the `Status` for `Endpoint protection` to `On`. 1. Click `Continue`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Use the below command to enable Standard pricing tier for Storage Accounts ``` az account get-access-token --query {subscription:subscription,accessToken:accessToken} --out tsv | xargs -L1 bash -c 'curl -X PUT -H Authorization: Bearer $1 -H Content-Type: application/json https://management.azure.com/subscriptions//providers/Microsoft.Security/settings/WDATP?api-version=2021-06-01 -d@input.json' ``` Where input.json contains the Request body json data as mentioned below. ``` { id: /subscriptions//providers/Microsoft.Security/settings/WDATP, kind: DataExportSettings, type: Microsoft.Security/settings, properties: { enabled: true } } ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu. 1. Select `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 1. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings`. 1. Click on the subscription name. 1. Click `Settings & monitoring`. 1. Ensure the `Status` for `Endpoint protection` is set to `On`. **Audit from Azure CLI** Ensure the output of the below command is `True` ``` az account get-access-token --query {subscription:subscription,accessToken:accessToken} --out tsv | xargs -L1 bash -c 'curl -X GET -H Authorization: Bearer $1 -H Content-Type: application/json https://management.azure.com/subscriptions//providers/Microsoft.Security/settings?api-version=2021-06-01' | jq '.|.value[] | select(.name==WDATP)'|jq '.properties.enabled' ``` **Audit from PowerShell** Run the following commands to login and audit this check ``` Connect-AzAccount Set-AzContext -Subscription Get-AzSecuritySetting | Select-Object name,enabled |where-object {$_.name -eq WDATP} ``` **PowerShell Output - Non-Compliant** ``` Name Enabled ---- ------- WDATP False ``` **PowerShell Output - Compliant** ``` Name Enabled ---- ------- WDATP True ```", + "AdditionalInformation": "**IMPORTANT:** When enabling integration between DfE & DfC it needs to be taken into account that this will have some side effects that may be undesirable. 1. For server 2019 & above if defender is installed (default for these server SKUs) this will trigger a deployment of the new unified agent and link to any of the extended configuration in the Defender portal. 1. If the new unified agent is required for server SKUs of Win 2016 or Linux and lower there is additional integration that needs to be switched on and agents need to be aligned. NOTE: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) was formerly known as Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (WDATP). There are a number of places (e.g. Azure CLI) where the WDATP acronym is still used within Azure.", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-in/azure/defender-for-cloud/integration-defender-for-endpoint?tabs=windows:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/securitycenter/settings/list:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/securitycenter/settings/update:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-endpoint-security#es-1-use-endpoint-detection-and-response-edr:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-endpoint-security#es-2-use-modern-anti-malware-software", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Endpoint protection is `off`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.3.4", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Agentless scanning for machines' Component Status is Set to 'On'", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.1 Microsoft Defender for Cloud", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Agentless scanning for machines' Component Status is Set to 'On'", + "RationaleStatement": "The Microsoft Defender for Cloud agentless machine scanner provides threat detection, vulnerability detection, and discovery of sensitive information.", + "ImpactStatement": "Agentless scanning for machines requires licensing and is included in these plans: - Defender CSPM - Defender for Servers plan 2", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. From the Azure Portal `Home` page, select `Microsoft Defender for Cloud` 1. Under `Management` select `Environment Settings` 1. Select a subscription 1. Under `Settings` > `Defender Plans`, click `Settings & monitoring` 1. Under the Component column, locate the row for `Agentless scanning for machines` 1. Select `On` 1. Click `Continue` in the top left Repeat the above for any additional subscriptions.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. From the Azure Portal `Home` page, select `Microsoft Defender for Cloud` 1. Under `Management` select `Environment Settings` 1. Select a subscription 1. Under `Settings` > `Defender Plans`, click `Settings & monitoring` 1. Under the Component column, locate the row for `Agentless scanning for machines` 1. Ensure that `On` is selected Repeat the above for any additional subscriptions.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-agentless-data-collection:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-incident-response#ir-2-preparation---setup-incident-notification:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/enable-agentless-scanning-vms", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Agentless scanning for machines is `off`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.3.5", + "Description": "Ensure that 'File Integrity Monitoring' Component Status is Set to 'On'", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.1 Microsoft Defender for Cloud", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that 'File Integrity Monitoring' Component Status is Set to 'On'", + "RationaleStatement": "FIM provides a detection mechanism for compromised files. When FIM is enabled, critical system files are monitored for changes that might indicate a threat actor is attempting to modify system files for lateral compromise within a host operating system.", + "ImpactStatement": "File Integrity Monitoring requires licensing and is included in these plans: - Defender for Servers plan 2", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. From the Azure Portal `Home` page, select `Microsoft Defender for Cloud` 1. Under `Management` select `Environment Settings` 1. Select a subscription 1. Under `Settings` > `Defender Plans`, click `Settings & monitoring` 1. Under the Component column, locate the row for `File Integrity Monitoring` 1. Select `On` 1. Click `Continue` in the top left Repeat the above for any additional subscriptions.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. From the Azure Portal `Home` page, select `Microsoft Defender for Cloud` 1. Under `Management` select `Environment Settings` 1. Select a subscription 1. Under `Settings` > `Defender Plans`, click `Settings & monitoring` 1. Under the Component column, locate the row for `File Integrity Monitoring` 1. Ensure that `On` is selected Repeat the above for any additional subscriptions.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/file-integrity-monitoring-overview:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-incident-response#ir-2-preparation---setup-incident-notification:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/file-integrity-monitoring-enable-defender-endpoint", + "DefaultValue": "By default, File Integrity Monitoring is `Off`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.4.1", + "Description": "Ensure That Microsoft Defender for Containers Is Set To 'On'", + "Checks": [ + "defender_ensure_defender_for_containers_is_on" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.1 Microsoft Defender for Cloud", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure That Microsoft Defender for Containers Is Set To 'On'", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling Microsoft Defender for Containers enhances defense-in-depth by providing advanced threat detection, vulnerability assessment, and security monitoring for containerized environments, leveraging insights from the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC).", + "ImpactStatement": "Microsoft Defender for Containers incurs a charge per vCore. Refer to https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/details/defender-for-cloud/ and https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/calculator/ to estimate potential costs.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 1. Under `Management`, click `Environment settings`. 1. Click the name of a subscription. 1. Under `Settings`, click `Defender plans`. 1. Under `Cloud Workload Protection (CWP)`, in the row for `Containers`, click `On` in the `Status` column. 1. If `Monitoring coverage` displays `Partial`, click `Settings` under `Partial`. 1. Set the status of each of the components to `On`. 1. Click `Continue`. 1. Click `Save`. 1. Repeat steps 1-9 for each subscription. **Remediate from Azure CLI** **Note:** Microsoft Defender for Container Registries ('ContainerRegistry') is deprecated and has been replaced by Microsoft Defender for Containers ('Containers'). Run the below command to enable the Microsoft Defender for Containers plan and its components: ``` az security pricing create -n 'Containers' --tier 'standard' --extensions name=ContainerRegistriesVulnerabilityAssessments isEnabled=True --extensions name=AgentlessDiscoveryForKubernetes isEnabled=True --extensions name=AgentlessVmScanning isEnabled=True --extensions name=ContainerSensor isEnabled=True ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** **Note:** Microsoft Defender for Container Registries ('ContainerRegistry') is deprecated and has been replaced by Microsoft Defender for Containers ('Containers'). Run the below command to enable the Microsoft Defender for Containers plan and its components: ``` Set-AzSecurityPricing -Name 'Containers' -PricingTier 'Standard' -Extension '[{name:ContainerRegistriesVulnerabilityAssessments,isEnabled:True},{name:AgentlessDiscoveryForKubernetes,isEnabled:True},{name:AgentlessVmScanning,isEnabled:True},{name:ContainerSensor,isEnabled:True}]' ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 1. Under `Management`, click `Environment settings`. 1. Click the name of a subscription. 1. Under `Settings`, click `Defender plans`. 1. Under `Cloud Workload Protection (CWP)`, in the row for `Containers`, ensure that the `Status` is set to `On` and `Monitoring coverage` displays `Full`. 1. Repeat steps 1-5 for each subscription. **Audit from Azure CLI** For Microsoft Defender for Container Registries (deprecated), run the following command: ``` az security pricing show --name ContainerRegistry --query pricingTier ``` Ensure that the command returns `Standard`. For Microsoft Defender for Containers, run the following command: ``` az security pricing show --name Containers --query [pricingTier,extensions[*].[name,isEnabled]] ``` Ensure that the command returns `Standard`, and that each of the extensions (ContainerRegistriesVulnerabilityAssessments, AgentlessDiscoveryForKubernetes, AgentlessVmScanning, ContainerSensor) returns `True`. Repeat for each subscription. **Audit from PowerShell** For Microsoft Defender for Container Registries (deprecated), run the following command: ``` Get-AzSecurityPricing -Name 'ContainerRegistry' | Select-Object Name,PricingTier ``` Ensure the command returns `PricingTier` `Standard`. For Microsoft Defender for Containers, run the following command: ``` Get-AzSecurityPricing -Name 'Containers' ``` Ensure that `PricingTier` is set to `Standard`, and that each of the extensions (ContainerRegistriesVulnerabilityAssessments, AgentlessDiscoveryForKubernetes, AgentlessVmScanning, ContainerSensor) has `isEnabled` set to `True`. Repeat for each subscription. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [1c988dd6-ade4-430f-a608-2a3e5b0a6d38](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F1c988dd6-ade4-430f-a608-2a3e5b0a6d38) **- Name:** 'Microsoft Defender for Containers should be enabled'", + "AdditionalInformation": "The Azure Policy 'Microsoft Defender for Containers should be enabled' checks only that the `pricingTier` for `Containers` is set to `Standard`. It does not check the status of the plan's components.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/security/pricing:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.security/get-azsecuritypricing:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.security/set-azsecuritypricing:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-containers-introduction:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/tutorial-enable-containers-azure:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-1-enable-threat-detection-capabilities", + "DefaultValue": "The Microsoft Defender for Containers plan is disabled by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.5.1", + "Description": "Ensure That Microsoft Defender for Storage Is Set To 'On'", + "Checks": [ + "defender_ensure_defender_for_storage_is_on" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.1 Microsoft Defender for Cloud", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure That Microsoft Defender for Storage Is Set To 'On'", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling Microsoft Defender for Storage allows for greater defense-in-depth, with threat detection provided by the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC).", + "ImpactStatement": "Turning on Microsoft Defender for Storage incurs an additional cost per resource.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 2. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings`. 3. Click on the subscription name. 4. Select the `Defender plans` blade. 5. Set `Status` to `On` for `Storage`. 6. Select `Save`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Ensure the output of the below command is Standard ``` az security pricing create -n StorageAccounts --tier 'standard' ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** ``` Set-AzSecurityPricing -Name 'StorageAccounts' -PricingTier 'Standard' ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 2. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings`. 3. Click on the subscription name. 4. Select the `Defender plans` blade. 5. Ensure `Status` is set to `On` for `Storage`. **Audit from Azure CLI** Ensure the output of the below command is Standard ``` az security pricing show -n StorageAccounts ``` **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Get-AzSecurityPricing -Name 'StorageAccounts' | Select-Object Name,PricingTier ``` Ensure output for `Name PricingTier` is `StorageAccounts Standard` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [640d2586-54d2-465f-877f-9ffc1d2109f4](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F640d2586-54d2-465f-877f-9ffc1d2109f4) **- Name:** 'Microsoft Defender for Storage should be enabled'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security-center/security-center-detection-capabilities:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/securitycenter/pricings/list:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/securitycenter/pricings/update:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.security/get-azsecuritypricing:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-1-enable-threat-detection-capabilities", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Microsoft Defender plan is off." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.5.2", + "Description": "Ensure Advanced Threat Protection Alerts for Storage Accounts Are Monitored", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.1 Microsoft Defender for Cloud", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure Advanced Threat Protection Alerts for Storage Accounts Are Monitored", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling Microsoft Defender for Storage without a monitoring process limits its value. Continuous monitoring and alert triage ensure that detected threats are acted upon quickly, reducing risk exposure.", + "ImpactStatement": "Requires integration effort with SIEM or alerting tools and a defined incident response process. The amount of data logged and, thus, the cost incurred can vary significantly depending on the tenant size and the applications in your tenant that interact with the Microsoft Graph APIs. See pricing: Log Analytics (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/logs/cost-logs#pricing-model), Azure Storage (https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/details/storage/blobs/), Event Hubs (https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/details/event-hubs/).", + "RemediationProcedure": "Connect Microsoft Defender for Cloud to a SIEM such as Microsoft Sentinel or another log analytics solution. **Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 2. Under `Management`, click `Environment Settings`. 3. Expand the Tenant Root Group(s) to reveal subscriptions. For each subscription listed: 1. Click the subscription name to open the Defender Plans settings 2. In the settings on the left, click `Continuous Export` 3. Select either `Event Hub`, `Log Analytics Workspace`, or both depending on your environment. 4. Set `Export enabled` to `On` 5. Under `Exported data types`, ensure that at least `Security Alerts (Medium and High)` is checked. 6. Under `Export target`, set the target Event Hub or Log Analytics Workspace which is tied to a SIEM that is configured to monitor and alert for security alerts. Ensure security alerts are included in the security operations workflow and incident response plan.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 2. Under `Management`, click `Environment Settings`. 3. Expand the Tenant Root Group(s) to reveal subscriptions. For each subscription listed: 1. Click the subscription name to open the Defender Plans settings 2. In the settings on the left, click `Continuous Export` Ensure that `Export enabled` is set to `On` and delivering at least `Security Alerts (Medium and High)` to an Event Hub or Log Analytics Workspace which is tied to a SIEM that is configured to monitor and alert for security alerts.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/defender-for-cloud/alerts-overview:https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/connect-defender-for-cloud:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/continuous-export", + "DefaultValue": "By default, continuous export is off." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.6.1", + "Description": "Ensure That Microsoft Defender for App Services Is Set To 'On'", + "Checks": [ + "defender_ensure_defender_for_app_services_is_on" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.1 Microsoft Defender for Cloud", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure That Microsoft Defender for App Services Is Set To 'On'", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling Microsoft Defender for App Service allows for greater defense-in-depth, with threat detection provided by the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC).", + "ImpactStatement": "Turning on Microsoft Defender for App Service incurs an additional cost per resource.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud` 2. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings` 3. Click on the subscription name 4. Select `Defender plans` 5. Set `App Service` Status to `On` 6. Select `Save` **Remediate from Azure CLI** Run the following command: ``` az security pricing create -n Appservices --tier 'standard' ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Run the following command: ``` Set-AzSecurityPricing -Name AppServices -PricingTier Standard ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud` 2. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings` 3. Click on the subscription name 4. Select `Defender plans` 5. Ensure Status is `On` for `App Service` **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command: ``` az security pricing show -n AppServices ``` Ensure `-PricingTier` is set to `Standard` **Audit from PowerShell** Run the following command: ``` Get-AzSecurityPricing -Name 'AppServices' |Select-Object Name,PricingTier ``` Ensure the `-PricingTier` is set to `Standard` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [2913021d-f2fd-4f3d-b958-22354e2bdbcb](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F2913021d-f2fd-4f3d-b958-22354e2bdbcb) **- Name:** 'Azure Defender for App Service should be enabled'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security-center/security-center-detection-capabilities:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/securitycenter/pricings/list:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/securitycenter/pricings/update:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.security/get-azsecuritypricing:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-1-enable-threat-detection-capabilities", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Microsoft Defender plan is off." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.7.1", + "Description": "Ensure That Microsoft Defender for Azure Cosmos DB Is Set To 'On'", + "Checks": [ + "defender_ensure_defender_for_cosmosdb_is_on" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.1 Microsoft Defender for Cloud", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure That Microsoft Defender for Azure Cosmos DB Is Set To 'On'", + "RationaleStatement": "In scanning Azure Cosmos DB requests within a subscription, requests are compared to a heuristic list of potential security threats. These threats could be a result of a security breach within your services, thus scanning for them could prevent a potential security threat from being introduced.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling Microsoft Defender for Azure Cosmos DB requires enabling Microsoft Defender for your subscription. Both will incur additional charges.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 2. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings`. 3. Click on the subscription name. 4. Select the `Defender plans` blade. 5. On the `Database` row click on `Select types >`. 6. Set the toggle switch next to `Azure Cosmos DB` to `On`. 7. Click `Continue`. 8. Click `Save`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Run the following command: ``` az security pricing create -n 'CosmosDbs' --tier 'standard' ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Use the below command to enable Standard pricing tier for Azure Cosmos DB ``` Set-AzSecurityPricing -Name 'CosmosDbs' -PricingTier 'Standard ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 2. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings`. 3. Click on the subscription name. 4. Select the `Defender plans` blade. 5. On the `Database` row click on `Select types >`. 6. Ensure the toggle switch next to `Azure Cosmos DB` is set to `On`. **Audit from Azure CLI** Ensure the output of the below command is Standard ``` az security pricing show -n CosmosDbs --query pricingTier ``` **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Get-AzSecurityPricing -Name 'CosmosDbs' | Select-Object Name,PricingTier ``` Ensure output of `-PricingTier` is `Standard` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [adbe85b5-83e6-4350-ab58-bf3a4f736e5e](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fadbe85b5-83e6-4350-ab58-bf3a4f736e5e) **- Name:** 'Microsoft Defender for Azure Cosmos DB should be enabled'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/details/defender-for-cloud/:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/enable-enhanced-security:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/alerts-overview:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/baselines/cosmos-db-security-baseline:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/quickstart-enable-database-protections:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-1-enable-threat-detection-capabilities", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Microsoft Defender for Azure Cosmos DB is not enabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.7.2", + "Description": "Ensure That Microsoft Defender for Open-Source Relational Databases Is Set To 'On'", + "Checks": [ + "defender_ensure_defender_for_os_relational_databases_is_on" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.1 Microsoft Defender for Cloud", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure That Microsoft Defender for Open-Source Relational Databases Is Set To 'On'", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling Microsoft Defender for Open-source relational databases allows for greater defense-in-depth, with threat detection provided by the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC).", + "ImpactStatement": "Turning on Microsoft Defender for Open-source relational databases incurs an additional cost per resource.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 2. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings`. 3. Click on the subscription name. 4. Select the `Defender plans` blade. 5. Click `Select types >` in the row for `Databases`. 6. Set the toggle switch next to `Open-source relational databases` to `On`. 7. Select `Continue`. 8. Select `Save`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Run the following command: ``` az security pricing create -n 'OpenSourceRelationalDatabases' --tier 'standard' ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Use the below command to enable Standard pricing tier for Open-source relational databases ``` set-azsecuritypricing -name OpenSourceRelationalDatabases -pricingtier Standard ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 1. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings`. 1. Click on the subscription name. 1. Select the `Defender plans` blade. 1. Click `Select types >` in the row for `Databases`. 1. Ensure the toggle switch next to `Open-source relational databases` is set to `On`. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command: ``` az security pricing show -n OpenSourceRelationalDatabases --query pricingTier ``` **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Get-AzSecurityPricing | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq 'OpenSourceRelationalDatabases'} | Select-Object Name, PricingTier ``` Ensure output for `Name PricingTier` is `OpenSourceRelationalDatabases Standard` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [0a9fbe0d-c5c4-4da8-87d8-f4fd77338835](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F0a9fbe0d-c5c4-4da8-87d8-f4fd77338835) **- Name:** 'Azure Defender for open-source relational databases should be enabled'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security-center/security-center-detection-capabilities:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/securitycenter/pricings/update:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.security/get-azsecuritypricing:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-data-protection#dp-2-monitor-anomalies-and-threats-targeting-sensitive-data:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-1-enable-threat-detection-capabilities", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Microsoft Defender plan is off." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.7.3", + "Description": "Ensure That Microsoft Defender for (Managed Instance) Azure SQL Databases Is Set To 'On'", + "Checks": [ + "defender_ensure_defender_for_azure_sql_databases_is_on" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.1 Microsoft Defender for Cloud", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure That Microsoft Defender for (Managed Instance) Azure SQL Databases Is Set To 'On'", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling Microsoft Defender for Azure SQL Databases allows for greater defense-in-depth, includes functionality for discovering and classifying sensitive data, surfacing and mitigating potential database vulnerabilities, and detecting anomalous activities that could indicate a threat to your database.", + "ImpactStatement": "Turning on Microsoft Defender for Azure SQL Databases incurs an additional cost per resource.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 2. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings`. 3. Click on the subscription name. 4. Select the `Defender plans` blade. 5. Click `Select types >` in the row for `Databases`. 6. Set the toggle switch next to `Azure SQL Databases` to `On`. 7. Select `Continue`. 8. Select `Save`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Run the following command: ``` az security pricing create -n SqlServers --tier 'standard' ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Run the following command: ``` Set-AzSecurityPricing -Name 'SqlServers' -PricingTier 'Standard' ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 2. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings`. 3. Click on the subscription name. 4. Select the `Defender plans` blade. 5. Click `Select types >` in the row for `Databases`. 6. Ensure the toggle switch next to `Azure SQL Databases` is set to `On`. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command: ``` az security pricing show -n SqlServers ``` Ensure `-PricingTier` is set to `Standard` **Audit from PowerShell** Run the following command: ``` Get-AzSecurityPricing -Name 'SqlServers' | Select-Object Name,PricingTier ``` Ensure the `-PricingTier` is set to `Standard` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [7fe3b40f-802b-4cdd-8bd4-fd799c948cc2](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F7fe3b40f-802b-4cdd-8bd4-fd799c948cc2) **- Name:** 'Azure Defender for Azure SQL Database servers should be enabled' - **Policy ID:** [abfb7388-5bf4-4ad7-ba99-2cd2f41cebb9](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fabfb7388-5bf4-4ad7-ba99-2cd2f41cebb9) **- Name:** 'Azure Defender for SQL should be enabled for unprotected SQL Managed Instances'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security-center/security-center-detection-capabilities:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/securitycenter/pricings/list:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/securitycenter/pricings/update:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.security/get-azsecuritypricing:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-data-protection#dp-2-monitor-anomalies-and-threats-targeting-sensitive-data:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-1-enable-threat-detection-capabilities", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Microsoft Defender plan is off." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.7.4", + "Description": "Ensure That Microsoft Defender for SQL Servers on Machines Is Set To 'On'", + "Checks": [ + "defender_ensure_defender_for_sql_servers_is_on" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.1 Microsoft Defender for Cloud", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure That Microsoft Defender for SQL Servers on Machines Is Set To 'On'", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling Microsoft Defender for SQL servers on machines allows for greater defense-in-depth, functionality for discovering and classifying sensitive data, surfacing and mitigating potential database vulnerabilities, and detecting anomalous activities that could indicate a threat to your database.", + "ImpactStatement": "Turning on Microsoft Defender for SQL servers on machines incurs an additional cost per resource.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 2. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings`. 3. Click on the subscription name. 4. Select the `Defender plans` blade. 5. Click `Select types >` in the row for `Databases`. 6. Set the toggle switch next to `SQL servers on machines` to `On`. 7. Select `Continue`. 8. Select `Save`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Run the following command: ``` az security pricing create -n SqlServerVirtualMachines --tier 'standard' ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Run the following command: ``` Set-AzSecurityPricing -Name 'SqlServerVirtualMachines' -PricingTier 'Standard' ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 2. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings`. 3. Click on the subscription name. 4. Select the `Defender plans` blade. 5. Click `Select types >` in the row for `Databases`. 6. Ensure the toggle switch next to `SQL servers on machines` is set to `On`. **Audit from Azure CLI** Ensure Defender for SQL is licensed with the following command: ``` az security pricing show -n SqlServerVirtualMachines ``` Ensure the 'PricingTier' is set to 'Standard' **Audit from PowerShell** Run the following command: ``` Get-AzSecurityPricing -Name 'SqlServerVirtualMachines' | Select-Object Name,PricingTier ``` Ensure the 'PricingTier' is set to 'Standard' **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [6581d072-105e-4418-827f-bd446d56421b](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F6581d072-105e-4418-827f-bd446d56421b) **- Name:** 'Azure Defender for SQL servers on machines should be enabled' - **Policy ID:** [abfb4388-5bf4-4ad7-ba82-2cd2f41ceae9](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fabfb4388-5bf4-4ad7-ba82-2cd2f41ceae9) **- Name:** 'Azure Defender for SQL should be enabled for unprotected Azure SQL servers'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security-center/defender-for-sql-usage:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security-center/security-center-detection-capabilities:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/securitycenter/pricings/update:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.security/get-azsecuritypricing:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-data-protection#dp-2-monitor-anomalies-and-threats-targeting-sensitive-data:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-1-enable-threat-detection-capabilities", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Microsoft Defender plan is off." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.8.1", + "Description": "Ensure That Microsoft Defender for Key Vault Is Set To 'On'", + "Checks": [ + "defender_ensure_defender_for_keyvault_is_on" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.1 Microsoft Defender for Cloud", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure That Microsoft Defender for Key Vault Is Set To 'On'", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling Microsoft Defender for Key Vault allows for greater defense-in-depth, with threat detection provided by the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC).", + "ImpactStatement": "Turning on Microsoft Defender for Key Vault incurs an additional cost per resource.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 2. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings`. 3. Click on the subscription name. 4. Select the `Defender plans` blade. 5. Select `On` under `Status` for `Key Vault`. 6. Select `Save`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Enable Standard pricing tier for Key Vault: ``` az security pricing create -n 'KeyVaults' --tier 'Standard' ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Enable Standard pricing tier for Key Vault: ``` Set-AzSecurityPricing -Name 'KeyVaults' -PricingTier 'Standard' ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 2. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings`. 3. Click on the subscription name. 4. Select the `Defender plans` blade. 5. Ensure `Status` is set to `On` for `Key Vault`. **Audit from Azure CLI** Ensure the output of the below command is Standard ``` az security pricing show -n 'KeyVaults' --query 'pricingTier' ``` **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Get-AzSecurityPricing -Name 'KeyVaults' | Select-Object Name,PricingTier ``` Ensure output for `PricingTier` is `Standard` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [0e6763cc-5078-4e64-889d-ff4d9a839047](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F0e6763cc-5078-4e64-889d-ff4d9a839047) **- Name:** 'Azure Defender for Key Vault should be enabled'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security-center/security-center-detection-capabilities:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/securitycenter/pricings/list:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/securitycenter/pricings/update:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.security/get-azsecuritypricing:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-1-enable-threat-detection-capabilities", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Microsoft Defender plan is off." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.9.1", + "Description": "Ensure That Microsoft Defender for Resource Manager Is Set To 'On'", + "Checks": [ + "defender_ensure_defender_for_arm_is_on" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.1 Microsoft Defender for Cloud", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure That Microsoft Defender for Resource Manager Is Set To 'On'", + "RationaleStatement": "Scanning resource requests lets you be alerted every time there is suspicious activity in order to prevent a security threat from being introduced.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling Microsoft Defender for Resource Manager requires enabling Microsoft Defender for your subscription. Both will incur additional charges.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 2. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings`. 3. Click on the subscription name. 4. Select the `Defender plans` blade. 5. Select `On` under `Status` for `Resource Manager`. 6. Select `Save. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Use the below command to enable Standard pricing tier for Defender for Resource Manager ``` az security pricing create -n 'Arm' --tier 'Standard' ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Use the below command to enable Standard pricing tier for Defender for Resource Manager ``` Set-AzSecurityPricing -Name 'Arm' -PricingTier 'Standard' ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 2. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings`. 3. Click on the subscription name. 4. Select the `Defender plans` blade. 5. Ensure `Status` is set to `On` for `Resource Manager`. **Audit from Azure CLI** Ensure the output of the below command is Standard ``` az security pricing show -n 'Arm' --query 'pricingTier' ``` **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Get-AzSecurityPricing -Name 'Arm' | Select-Object Name,PricingTier ``` Ensure the output of `PricingTier` is `Standard` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [c3d20c29-b36d-48fe-808b-99a87530ad99](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fc3d20c29-b36d-48fe-808b-99a87530ad99) **- Name:** 'Azure Defender for Resource Manager should be enabled'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/enable-enhanced-security:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-resource-manager-introduction:https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/details/defender-for-cloud/:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/alerts-overview:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-1-enable-threat-detection-capabilities", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Microsoft Defender for Resource Manager is not enabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.10", + "Description": "Ensure that Microsoft Defender for Cloud is Configured to Check VM Operating Systems for Updates", + "Checks": [ + "defender_ensure_system_updates_are_applied" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.1 Microsoft Defender for Cloud", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that Microsoft Defender for Cloud is Configured to Check VM Operating Systems for Updates", + "RationaleStatement": "Windows and Linux virtual machines should be kept updated to: - Address a specific bug or flaw - Improve an OS or applications general stability - Fix a security vulnerability Microsoft Defender for Cloud retrieves a list of available security and critical updates from Windows Update or Windows Server Update Services (WSUS), depending on which service is configured on a Windows VM. The security center also checks for the latest updates in Linux systems. If a VM is missing a system update, the security center will recommend system updates be applied.", + "ImpactStatement": "Running Microsoft Defender for Cloud incurs additional charges for each resource monitored. Please see attached reference for exact charges per hour.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Follow Microsoft Azure documentation to apply security patches from the security center. Alternatively, you can employ your own patch assessment and management tool to periodically assess, report, and install the required security patches for your OS.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu 1. Select `Microsoft Defender for Cloud` 1. Then the `Recommendations` blade 1. Ensure that there are no recommendations for `System updates should be installed on your machines (powered by Update Center)` Alternatively, you can employ your own patch assessment and management tool to periodically assess, report and install the required security patches for your OS. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [f85bf3e0-d513-442e-89c3-1784ad63382b](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Ff85bf3e0-d513-442e-89c3-1784ad63382b) **- Name:** 'System updates should be installed on your machines (powered by Update Center)' - **Policy ID:** [bd876905-5b84-4f73-ab2d-2e7a7c4568d9](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fbd876905-5b84-4f73-ab2d-2e7a7c4568d9) **- Name:** 'Machines should be configured to periodically check for missing system updates'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-posture-vulnerability-management#pv-6-rapidly-and-automatically-remediate-vulnerabilities:https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/details/defender-for-cloud/:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/deploy-vulnerability-assessment-vm", + "DefaultValue": "By default, patches are not automatically deployed." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.11", + "Description": "Ensure that non-deprecated Microsoft Cloud Security Benchmark policies are not set to 'Disabled'", + "Checks": [ + "policy_ensure_asc_enforcement_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.1 Microsoft Defender for Cloud", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that non-deprecated Microsoft Cloud Security Benchmark policies are not set to 'Disabled'", + "RationaleStatement": "A security policy defines the desired configuration of resources in your environment and helps ensure compliance with company or regulatory security requirements. The MCSB Policy Initiative a set of security recommendations based on best practices and is associated with every subscription by default. When a policy Effect is set to `Audit`, policies in the MCSB ensure that Defender for Cloud evaluates relevant resources for supported recommendations. To ensure that policies within the MCSB are not being missed when the Policy Initiative is evaluated, none of the policies should have an Effect of `Disabled`.", + "ImpactStatement": "Policies within the MCSB default to an effect of `Audit` and will evaluate—but not enforce—policy recommendations. Ensuring these policies are set to `Audit` simply ensures that the evaluation occurs to allow administrators to understand where an improvement may be possible. Administrators will need to determine if the recommendations are relevant and desirable for their environment, then manually take action to resolve the status if desired.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu. 1. Select `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 1. Under `Management`, select `Environment settings`. 1. Click on the appropriate Management Group or Subscription. 1. Click on `Security policies` in the left column. 1. Click on `Microsoft cloud security benchmark` 1. Click `Add Filter` and select `Effect` 1. Check the `Disabled` box to search for all disabled policies 1. Click `Apply` 1. Click the blue ellipsis `...` to the right of a policy name. 1. Click `Manage effect and parameters`. 1. Under `Policy effect`, select the radio button next to `Audit`. 1. Click `Save`. 1. Click `Refresh`. 1. Repeat steps 10-14 until all disabled policies are updated. 1. Repeat steps 1-15 for each Management Group or Subscription requiring remediation.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu. 1. Select `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 1. Under `Management`, select `Environment settings`. 1. Click on the appropriate Management Group or Subscription. 1. Click on `Security policies` in the left column. 1. Click on `Microsoft cloud security benchmark`. 1. Click `Add filter` and select `Effect`. 1. Check the `Disabled` box to search for all disabled policies. 1. Click `Apply`. 1. Ensure that no policies are displayed, signifying that there are no disabled policies. 1. Repeat steps 1-10 for each Management Group or Subscription.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-in/azure/defender-for-cloud/security-policy-concept:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security-center/security-center-policies:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/implement-security-recommendations:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/policy/policy-assignments/get:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/policy/policy-assignments/create:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-governance-strategy#gs-7-define-and-implement-logging-threat-detection-and-incident-response-strategy", + "DefaultValue": "By default, the MCSB policy initiative is assigned on all subscriptions, and **most** policies will have an effect of `Audit`. Some policies will have a default effect of `Disabled`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.12", + "Description": "Ensure That 'All users with the following roles' is Set to 'Owner'", + "Checks": [ + "defender_ensure_notify_emails_to_owners" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.1 Microsoft Defender for Cloud", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure That 'All users with the following roles' is Set to 'Owner'", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling security alert emails to subscription owners ensures that they receive security alert emails from Microsoft. This ensures that they are aware of any potential security issues and can mitigate the risk in a timely fashion.", + "ImpactStatement": "Owners will receive email notifications for security alerts.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu 1. Select `Microsoft Defender for Cloud` 1. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings` 1. Click on the appropriate Management Group, Subscription, or Workspace 1. Click on `Email notifications` 1. In the drop down of the `All users with the following roles` field select `Owner` 1. Click `Save` **Remediate from Azure CLI** Use the below command to set `Send email also to subscription owners` to `On`. ``` az account get-access-token --query {subscription:subscription,accessToken:accessToken} --out tsv | xargs -L1 bash -c 'curl -X PUT -H Authorization: Bearer $1 -H Content-Type: application/json https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$0/providers/Microsoft.Security/securityContacts/default1?api-version=2017-08-01-preview -d@input.json' ``` Where `input.json` contains the data below, replacing `validEmailAddress` with a single email address or multiple comma-separated email addresses: ``` { id: /subscriptions//providers/Microsoft.Security/securityContacts/default1, name: default1, type: Microsoft.Security/securityContacts, properties: { email: , alertNotifications: On, alertsToAdmins: On, notificationsByRole: Owner } } ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu 1. Select `Microsoft Defender for Cloud` 1. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings` 1. Click on the appropriate Management Group, Subscription, or Workspace 1. Click on `Email notifications` 1. Ensure that `All users with the following roles` is set to `Owner` **Audit from Azure CLI** Ensure the command below returns state of `On` and that `Owner` appears in roles. ``` az account get-access-token --query {subscription:subscription,accessToken:accessToken} --out tsv | xargs -L1 bash -c 'curl -X GET -H Authorization: Bearer $1 -H Content-Type: application/json https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$0/providers/Microsoft.Security/securityContacts?api-version=2020-01-01-preview'| jq '.[] | select(.name==default).properties.notificationsByRole' ```", + "AdditionalInformation": "Excluding any entries in the input.json properties block disables the specific setting by default.", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security-center/security-center-provide-security-contact-details:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/securitycenter/securitycontacts/list:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/securitycenter/security-contacts:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-incident-response#ir-2-preparation---setup-incident-notification", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `Owner` is selected" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.13", + "Description": "Ensure 'Additional email addresses' is Configured with a Security Contact Email", + "Checks": [ + "defender_additional_email_configured_with_a_security_contact" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.1 Microsoft Defender for Cloud", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure 'Additional email addresses' is Configured with a Security Contact Email", + "RationaleStatement": "Microsoft Defender for Cloud emails the Subscription Owner to notify them about security alerts. Adding your Security Contact's email address to the 'Additional email addresses' field ensures that your organization's Security Team is included in these alerts. This ensures that the proper people are aware of any potential compromise in order to mitigate the risk in a timely fashion.", + "ImpactStatement": "Security contacts will receive email notifications.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu. 1. Select `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 1. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings`. 1. Click on the appropriate Management Group, Subscription, or Workspace. 1. Click on `Email notifications`. 1. Enter a valid security contact email address (or multiple addresses separated by commas) in the `Additional email addresses` field. 1. Click `Save`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Use the below command to set `Security contact emails` to `On`. ``` az account get-access-token --query {subscription:subscription,accessToken:accessToken} --out tsv | xargs -L1 bash -c 'curl -X PUT -H Authorization: Bearer $1 -H Content-Type: application/json https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$0/providers/Microsoft.Security/securityContacts/default?api-version=2020-01-01-preview -d@input.json' ``` Where `input.json` contains the data below, replacing `validEmailAddress` with a single email address or multiple comma-separated email addresses: ``` { id: /subscriptions//providers/Microsoft.Security/securityContacts/default, name: default, type: Microsoft.Security/securityContacts, properties: { email: , alertNotifications: On, alertsToAdmins: On } } ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu. 1. Select `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 1. Under `Management`, select `Environment Settings`. 1. Click on the appropriate Management Group, Subscription, or Workspace. 1. Click on `Email notifications`. 1. Ensure that a valid security contact email address is listed in the `Additional email addresses` field. **Audit from Azure CLI** Ensure the output of the below command is not empty and is set with appropriate email ids: ``` az account get-access-token --query {subscription:subscription,accessToken:accessToken} --out tsv | xargs -L1 bash -c 'curl -X GET -H Authorization: Bearer $1 -H Content-Type: application/json https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$0/providers/Microsoft.Security/securityContacts?api-version=2020-01-01-preview' | jq '.|.[] | select(.name==default)'|jq '.properties.emails' ``` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [4f4f78b8-e367-4b10-a341-d9a4ad5cf1c7](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F4f4f78b8-e367-4b10-a341-d9a4ad5cf1c7) **- Name:** 'Subscriptions should have a contact email address for security issues'", + "AdditionalInformation": "Excluding any entries in the input.json properties block disables the specific setting by default.", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security-center/security-center-provide-security-contact-details:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/securitycenter/securitycontacts/list:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/securitycenter/security-contacts:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-incident-response#ir-2-preparation---setup-incident-notification", + "DefaultValue": "By default, there are no additional email addresses entered." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.14", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Notify about alerts with the following severity (or higher)' is Enabled", + "Checks": [ + "defender_ensure_notify_alerts_severity_is_high" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.1 Microsoft Defender for Cloud", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Notify about alerts with the following severity (or higher)' is Enabled", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling security alert emails ensures that security alert emails are sent by Microsoft. This ensures that the right people are aware of any potential security issues and can mitigate the risk.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling security alert emails can cause alert fatigue, increasing the risk of missing important alerts. Select an appropriate severity level to manage notifications. Azure aims to reduce alert fatigue by limiting the daily email volume per severity level. Learn more: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/configure-email-notifications#email-frequency.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu. 1. Select `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 1. Under `Management`, select `Environment settings`. 1. Click on the appropriate Subscription. 1. Click on `Email notifications`. 1. Under `Notification types`, check box next to `Notify about alerts with the following severity (or higher)` and select an appropriate severity level from the drop-down menu. 1. Click `Save`. 1. Repeat steps 1-7 for each Subscription requiring remediation. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Use the below command to enable `Send email notification for high severity alerts`: ``` az account get-access-token --query {subscription:subscription,accessToken:accessToken} --out tsv | xargs -L1 bash -c 'curl -X PUT -H Authorization: Bearer $1 -H Content-Type: application/json https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<$0>/providers/Microsoft.Security/securityContacts/default1?api-version=2017-08-01-preview -d@input.json' ``` Where `input.json` contains the data below, replacing `validEmailAddress` with a single email address or multiple comma-separated email addresses: ``` { id: /subscriptions//providers/Microsoft.Security/securityContacts/default, name: default, type: Microsoft.Security/securityContacts, properties: { email: , alertNotifications: On, alertsToAdmins: On } } ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu. 1. Select `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 1. Under `Management`, select `Environment settings`. 1. Click on the appropriate Subscription. 1. Click on `Email notifications`. 1. Under `Notification types`, ensure that the box next to `Notify about alerts with the following severity (or higher)` is checked, and an appropriate severity level is selected. 1. Repeat steps 1-6 for each Subscription. **Audit from Azure CLI** Including a Subscription ID at the `$0` in `/subscriptions/$0/providers`, ensure the below command returns `state: On`, and that `minimalSeverity` is set to an appropriate severity level: ``` az account get-access-token --query {subscription:subscription,accessToken:accessToken} --out tsv | xargs -L1 bash -c 'curl -X GET -H Authorization: Bearer $1 -H Content-Type: application/json https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$0/providers/Microsoft.Security/securityContacts?api-version=2020-01-01-preview' | jq '.|.[] | select(.name==default)'|jq '.properties.alertNotifications' ``` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [6e2593d9-add6-4083-9c9b-4b7d2188c899](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F6e2593d9-add6-4083-9c9b-4b7d2188c899) **- Name:** 'Email notification for high severity alerts should be enabled'", + "AdditionalInformation": "Excluding any entries in the `input.json` properties block disables the specific setting by default. This recommendation has been updated to reflect recent changes to Microsoft REST APIs for getting and updating security contact information.", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security-center/security-center-provide-security-contact-details:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/securitycenter/security-contacts:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/securitycenter/securitycontacts/list:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-incident-response#ir-2-preparation---setup-incident-notification", + "DefaultValue": "By default, subscription owners receive email notifications for high-severity alerts." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.15", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Notify about attack paths with the following risk level (or higher)' is Enabled", + "Checks": [ + "defender_attack_path_notifications_properly_configured" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.1 Microsoft Defender for Cloud", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Notify about attack paths with the following risk level (or higher)' is Enabled", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling attack path emails ensures that attack path emails are sent by Microsoft. This ensures that the right people are aware of any potential security issues and can mitigate the risk.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling attack path emails can cause alert fatigue, increasing the risk of missing important alerts. Select an appropriate risk level to manage notifications. Azure aims to reduce alert fatigue by limiting the daily email volume per risk level. Learn more: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/configure-email-notifications#email-frequency.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu. 1. Select `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 1. Under `Management`, select `Environment settings`. 1. Click on the appropriate Subscription. 1. Click on `Email notifications`. 1. Under Notification types, check the box next to `Notify about attack paths with the following risk level (or higher)`, and select an appropriate risk level from the drop-down menu. 1. Repeat steps 1-6 for each Subscription.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home select the Portal Menu. 1. Select `Microsoft Defender for Cloud`. 1. Under `Management`, select `Environment settings`. 1. Click on the appropriate Subscription. 1. Click on `Email notifications`. 1. Under Notification types, ensure that the box next to `Notify about attack paths with the following risk level (or higher)` is checked, and an appropriate risk level is selected. 1. Repeat steps 1-6 for each Subscription. **Audit from Azure CLI** Including a Subscription ID at the `$0` in `/subscriptions/$0/providers`, ensure the below command returns `sourceType: AttackPath`, and that `minimalRiskLevel` is set to an appropriate risk level: ``` az account get-access-token --query {subscription:subscription,accessToken:accessToken} --out tsv | xargs -L1 bash -c 'curl -X GET -H Authorization: Bearer $1 -H Content-Type: application/json https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$0/providers/Microsoft.Security/securityContacts?api-version=2023-12-01-preview' | jq '.|.[]' ```", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/configure-email-notifications:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/how-to-manage-attack-path:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "defender_attack_path_notifications_properly_configured", + "ConfigKey": "defender_attack_path_minimal_risk_level", + "Operator": "in", + "Value": [ + "Low", + "Medium", + "High" + ] + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.16", + "Description": "Ensure that Microsoft Defender External Attack Surface Monitoring (EASM) is Enabled", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.1 Microsoft Defender for Cloud", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that Microsoft Defender External Attack Surface Monitoring (EASM) is Enabled", + "RationaleStatement": "This tool can monitor the externally exposed resources of an organization, provide valuable insights, and export these findings in a variety of formats (including CSV) for use in vulnerability management operations and red/purple team exercises.", + "ImpactStatement": "Microsoft Defender EASM workspaces are currently available as Azure Resources with a 30-day free trial period but can quickly accrue significant charges. The costs are calculated daily as (Number of billable inventory items) x (item cost per day; approximately: $0.017). Estimated cost is not provided within the tool, and users are strongly advised to contact their Microsoft sales representative for pricing and set a calendar reminder for the end of the trial period. For an EASM workspace having an Inventory of 5k-10k billable items (IP addresses, hostnames, SSL certificates, etc) a typical cost might be approximately $85-170 per day or $2500-5000 USD/month at the time of publication. If the workspace is deleted by the last day of a free trial period, no charges are billed.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender EASM`. 1. Click `+ Create`. 1. Under `Project details`, select a subscription. 1. Select or create a resource group. 1. Under `Instance details`, enter a name for the workspace. 1. Select a region. 1. Click `Review + create`. 1. Click `Create`. 1. Once the deployment has completed, go to `Microsoft Defender EASM`. 1. Click the workspace name. 1. Configure the workspace appropriately for your environment and organization.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Microsoft Defender EASM`. 1. Ensure that at least one Microsoft Defender EASM workspace is listed. 1. Click the name of a workspace. 1. Ensure the workspace is configured appropriately for your environment and organization. 1. Repeat steps 3-4 for each workspace.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Microsoft added its Defender for External Attack Surface management (EASM) offering to Azure following its 2022 acquisition of EASM SaaS tool company RiskIQ.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/external-attack-surface-management/:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/external-attack-surface-management/deploying-the-defender-easm-azure-resource:https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/08/02/microsoft-announces-new-solutions-for-threat-intelligence-and-attack-surface-management/", + "DefaultValue": "Microsoft Defender EASM is an optional, paid Azure Resource that must be created and configured inside a Subscription and Resource Group." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.2.1", + "Description": "Ensure That Microsoft Defender for IoT Hub Is Set To 'On'", + "Checks": [ + "defender_ensure_iot_hub_defender_is_on" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.2 Microsoft Defender for IoT", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure That Microsoft Defender for IoT Hub Is Set To 'On'", + "RationaleStatement": "IoT devices are very rarely patched and can be potential attack vectors for enterprise networks. Updating their network configuration to use a central security hub allows for detection of these breaches.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling Microsoft Defender for IoT will incur additional charges dependent on the level of usage.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `IoT Hub`. 2. Select an `IoT Hub` to validate. 3. Select `Overview` in `Defender for IoT`. 4. Click on `Secure your IoT solution`, and complete the onboarding.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `IoT Hub`. 2. Select an `IoT Hub` to validate. 3. Select `Overview` in `Defender for IoT`. 4. The Threat prevention and Threat detection screen will appear, if `Defender for IoT` is Enabled.", + "AdditionalInformation": "There are additional configurations for Microsoft Defender for IoT that allow for types of deployments called hybrid or local. Both run on your physical infrastructure. These are complicated setups and are primarily outside of the scope of a purely Azure benchmark. Please see the references to consider these options for your organization.", + "References": "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/iot-defender/#overview:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-iot/:https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/details/iot-defender/:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/baselines/defender-for-iot-security-baseline:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/iot?view=azure-cli-latest:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-logging-threat-detection#lt-1-enable-threat-detection-capabilities:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-iot/device-builders/quickstart-onboard-iot-hub", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Microsoft Defender for IoT is not enabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.3.1", + "Description": "Ensure that the Expiration Date is Set for all Keys in Key Vaults using RBAC", + "Checks": [ + "keyvault_rbac_key_expiration_set" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.3 Key Vault", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that the Expiration Date is Set for all Keys in Key Vaults using RBAC", + "RationaleStatement": "Azure Key Vault enables users to store and use cryptographic keys within the Microsoft Azure environment. The `exp` (expiration date) attribute identifies the expiration date on or after which the key MUST NOT be used for encryption of new data, wrapping of new keys, and signing. By default, keys never expire. It is thus recommended that keys be rotated in the key vault and set an explicit expiration date for all keys to help enforce the key rotation. This ensures that the keys cannot be used beyond their assigned lifetimes.", + "ImpactStatement": "Keys cannot be used beyond their assigned expiration dates respectively. Keys need to be rotated periodically wherever they are used.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Key vaults`. 2. For each Key vault, click on `Keys`. 3. In the main pane, ensure that an appropriate `Expiration date` is set for any keys that are `Enabled`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Update the `Expiration date` for the key using the below command: ``` az keyvault key set-attributes --name --vault-name --expires Y-m-d'T'H:M:S'Z' ``` **Note:** To view the expiration date on all keys in a Key Vault using Microsoft API, the List Key permission is required. To update the expiration date for the keys: 1. Go to the Key vault, click on Access Control (IAM). 2. Click on Add role assignment and assign the role of Key Vault Crypto Officer to the appropriate user. **Remediate from PowerShell** ``` Set-AzKeyVaultKeyAttribute -VaultName -Name -Expires ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Key vaults`. 2. For each Key vault, click on `Keys`. 3. In the main pane, ensure that an appropriate `Expiration date` is set for any keys that are `Enabled`. **Audit from Azure CLI** Get a list of all the key vaults in your Azure environment by running the following command: ``` az keyvault list ``` Then for each key vault listed ensure that the output of the below command contains Key ID (kid), enabled status as `true` and Expiration date (expires) is not empty or null: ``` az keyvault key list --vault-name --query '[*].{kid:kid,enabled:attributes.enabled,expires:attributes.expires}' ``` **Audit from PowerShell** Retrieve a list of Azure Key vaults: ``` Get-AzKeyVault ``` For each Key vault run the following command to determine which vaults are configured to use RBAC. ``` Get-AzKeyVault -VaultName ``` For each Key vault with the `EnableRbacAuthorizatoin` setting set to `True`, run the following command. ``` Get-AzKeyVaultKey -VaultName ``` Make sure the `Expires` setting is configured with a value as appropriate wherever the `Enabled` setting is set to `True`. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [152b15f7-8e1f-4c1f-ab71-8c010ba5dbc0](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F152b15f7-8e1f-4c1f-ab71-8c010ba5dbc0) **- Name:** 'Key Vault keys should have an expiration date'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/key-vault-whatis:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/keyvault/about-keys--secrets-and-certificates#key-vault-keys:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-data-protection#dp-6-use-a-secure-key-management-process:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.keyvault/set-azkeyvaultkeyattribute?view=azps-0.10.0", + "DefaultValue": "By default, keys do not expire." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.3.2", + "Description": "Ensure that the Expiration Date is set for All Keys in Key Vaults using access policies (legacy)", + "Checks": [ + "keyvault_key_expiration_set_in_non_rbac" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.3 Key Vault", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that the Expiration Date is set for All Keys in Key Vaults using access policies (legacy)", + "RationaleStatement": "Azure Key Vault enables users to store and use cryptographic keys within the Microsoft Azure environment. The `exp` (expiration date) attribute identifies the expiration date on or after which the key MUST NOT be used for a cryptographic operation. By default, keys never expire. It is thus recommended that keys be rotated in the key vault and set an explicit expiration date for all keys. This ensures that the keys cannot be used beyond their assigned lifetimes.", + "ImpactStatement": "Keys cannot be used beyond their assigned expiration dates respectively. Keys need to be rotated periodically wherever they are used.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Key vaults`. 2. For each Key vault, click on `Keys`. 3. In the main pane, ensure that the status of the key is `Enabled`. 4. For each enabled key, ensure that an appropriate `Expiration date` is set. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Update the `Expiration date` for the key using the below command: ``` az keyvault key set-attributes --name --vault-name --expires Y-m-d'T'H:M:S'Z' ``` **Note:** To view the expiration date on all keys in a Key Vault using Microsoft API, the List Key permission is required. To update the expiration date for the keys: 1. Go to Key vault, click on `Access policies`. 2. Click on `Create` and add an access policy with the `Update` permission (in the Key Permissions - Key Management Operations section). **Remediate from PowerShell** ``` Set-AzKeyVaultKeyAttribute -VaultName -Name -Expires ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Key vaults`. 2. For each Key vault, click on `Keys`. 3. In the main pane, ensure that the status of the key is `Enabled`. 4. For each enabled key, ensure that an appropriate `Expiration date` is set. **Audit from Azure CLI** Get a list of all the key vaults in your Azure environment by running the following command: ``` az keyvault list ``` For each key vault, ensure that the output of the below command contains Key ID (kid), enabled status as `true` and Expiration date (expires) is not empty or null: ``` az keyvault key list --vault-name --query '[*].{kid:kid,enabled:attributes.enabled,expires:attributes.expires}' ``` **Audit from PowerShell** Retrieve a list of Azure Key vaults: ``` Get-AzKeyVault ``` For each Key vault, run the following command to determine which vaults are configured to not use RBAC: ``` Get-AzKeyVault -VaultName ``` For each Key vault with the `EnableRbacAuthorizatoin` setting set to `False` or empty, run the following command. ``` Get-AzKeyVaultKey -VaultName ``` Make sure the `Expires` setting is configured with a value as appropriate wherever the `Enabled` setting is set to `True`. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [152b15f7-8e1f-4c1f-ab71-8c010ba5dbc0](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F152b15f7-8e1f-4c1f-ab71-8c010ba5dbc0) **- Name:** 'Key Vault keys should have an expiration date'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/key-vault-whatis:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/keyvault/about-keys--secrets-and-certificates#key-vault-keys:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-data-protection#dp-6-use-a-secure-key-management-process:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.keyvault/set-azkeyvaultkeyattribute?view=azps-0.10.0", + "DefaultValue": "By default, keys do not expire." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.3.3", + "Description": "Ensure that the Expiration Date is set for All Secrets in Key Vaults using RBAC", + "Checks": [ + "keyvault_rbac_secret_expiration_set" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.3 Key Vault", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that the Expiration Date is set for All Secrets in Key Vaults using RBAC", + "RationaleStatement": "The Azure Key Vault enables users to store and keep secrets within the Microsoft Azure environment. Secrets in the Azure Key Vault are octet sequences with a maximum size of 25k bytes each. The `exp` (expiration date) attribute identifies the expiration date on or after which the secret MUST NOT be used. By default, secrets never expire. It is thus recommended to rotate secrets in the key vault and set an explicit expiration date for all secrets. This ensures that the secrets cannot be used beyond their assigned lifetimes.", + "ImpactStatement": "Secrets cannot be used beyond their assigned expiry date respectively. Secrets need to be rotated periodically wherever they are used.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Key vaults`. 2. For each Key vault, click on `Secrets`. 3. In the main pane, ensure that the status of the secret is `Enabled`. 4. For each enabled secret, ensure that an appropriate `Expiration date` is set. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Update the Expiration date for the secret using the below command: ``` az keyvault secret set-attributes --name --vault-name --expires Y-m-d'T'H:M:S'Z' ``` Note: To view the expiration date on all secrets in a Key Vault using Microsoft API, the `List Secret` permission is required. To update the expiration date for the secrets: 1. Go to the Key vault, click on `Access Control (IAM)`. 2. Click on `Add role assignment` and assign the role of `Key Vault Secrets Officer` to the appropriate user. **Remediate from PowerShell** ``` Set-AzKeyVaultSecretAttribute -VaultName -Name -Expires ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Key vaults`. 2. For each Key vault, click on `Secrets`. 3. In the main pane, ensure that the status of the secret is `Enabled`. 4. For each enabled secret, ensure that an appropriate `Expiration date` is set. **Audit from Azure CLI** Ensure that the output of the below command contains ID (id), enabled status as `true` and Expiration date (expires) is not empty or null: ``` az keyvault secret list --vault-name --query '[*].{kid:kid,enabled:attributes.enabled,expires:attributes.expires}' ``` **Audit from PowerShell** Retrieve a list of Key vaults: ``` Get-AzKeyVault ``` For each Key vault, run the following command to determine which vaults are configured to use RBAC: ``` Get-AzKeyVault -VaultName ``` For each Key vault with the `EnableRbacAuthorization` setting set to `True`, run the following command: ``` Get-AzKeyVaultSecret -VaultName ``` Make sure the `Expires` setting is configured with a value as appropriate wherever the `Enabled` setting is set to `True`. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [98728c90-32c7-4049-8429-847dc0f4fe37](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F98728c90-32c7-4049-8429-847dc0f4fe37) **- Name:** 'Key Vault secrets should have an expiration date'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/key-vault-whatis:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/keyvault/about-keys--secrets-and-certificates#key-vault-secrets:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-data-protection#dp-6-use-a-secure-key-management-process:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.keyvault/set-azkeyvaultsecretattribute?view=azps-0.10.0", + "DefaultValue": "By default, secrets do not expire." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.3.4", + "Description": "Ensure that the Expiration Date is set for All Secrets in Key Vaults using access policies (legacy)", + "Checks": [ + "keyvault_non_rbac_secret_expiration_set" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.3 Key Vault", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that the Expiration Date is set for All Secrets in Key Vaults using access policies (legacy)", + "RationaleStatement": "The Azure Key Vault enables users to store and keep secrets within the Microsoft Azure environment. Secrets in the Azure Key Vault are octet sequences with a maximum size of 25k bytes each. The `exp` (expiration date) attribute identifies the expiration date on or after which the secret MUST NOT be used. By default, secrets never expire. It is thus recommended to rotate secrets in the key vault and set an explicit expiration date for all secrets. This ensures that the secrets cannot be used beyond their assigned lifetimes.", + "ImpactStatement": "Secrets cannot be used beyond their assigned expiry date respectively. Secrets need to be rotated periodically wherever they are used.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Key vaults`. 2. For each Key vault, click on `Secrets`. 3. In the main pane, ensure that the status of the secret is `Enabled`. 4. Set an appropriate `Expiration date` on all secrets. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Update the `Expiration date` for the secret using the below command: ``` az keyvault secret set-attributes --name --vault-name --expires Y-m-d'T'H:M:S'Z' ``` Note: To view the expiration date on all secrets in a Key Vault using Microsoft API, the `List` Secret permission is required. To update the expiration date for the secrets: 1. Go to Key vault, click on `Access policies`. 2. Click on `Create` and add an access policy with the `Update` permission (in the Secret Permissions - Secret Management Operations section). **Remediate from PowerShell** For each Key vault with the `EnableRbacAuthorization` setting set to `False` or empty, run the following command. ``` Set-AzKeyVaultSecret -VaultName -Name -Expires ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Key vaults`. 2. For each Key vault, click on `Secrets`. 3. In the main pane, ensure that the status of the secret is `Enabled`. 4. Set an appropriate `Expiration date` on all secrets. **Audit from Azure CLI** Get a list of all the key vaults in your Azure environment by running the following command: ``` az keyvault list ``` For each key vault, ensure that the output of the below command contains ID (id), enabled status as `true` and Expiration date (expires) is not empty or null: ``` az keyvault secret list --vault-name --query '[*].{kid:kid,enabled:attributes.enabled,expires:attributes.expires}' ``` **Audit from PowerShell** Retrieve a list of Key vaults: ``` Get-AzKeyVault ``` For each Key vault run the following command to determine which vaults are configured to use RBAC: ``` Get-AzKeyVault -VaultName ``` For each Key Vault with the `EnableRbacAuthorization` setting set to `False` or empty, run the following command. ``` Get-AzKeyVaultSecret -VaultName ``` Make sure the `Expires` setting is configured with a value as appropriate wherever the `Enabled` setting is set to `True`. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [98728c90-32c7-4049-8429-847dc0f4fe37](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F98728c90-32c7-4049-8429-847dc0f4fe37) **- Name:** 'Key Vault secrets should have an expiration date'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/key-vault-whatis:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/keyvault/about-keys--secrets-and-certificates#key-vault-secrets:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-data-protection#dp-6-use-a-secure-key-management-process:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.keyvault/set-azkeyvaultsecret?view=azps-7.4.0", + "DefaultValue": "By default, secrets do not expire." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.3.5", + "Description": "Ensure 'Purge protection' is Set to 'Enabled'", + "Checks": [ + "keyvault_recoverable" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.3 Key Vault", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure 'Purge protection' is Set to 'Enabled'", + "RationaleStatement": "Users may accidentally run delete/purge commands on a key vault, or an attacker or malicious user may do so deliberately in order to cause disruption. Deleting or purging a key vault leads to immediate data loss, as keys encrypting data and secrets/certificates allowing access/services will become inaccessible. Enabling purge protection ensures that even if a key vault is deleted, the key vault and its objects remain recoverable during the configurable retention period. If no action is taken, the key vault and its objects will be purged once the retention period elapses.", + "ImpactStatement": "Once purge protection is enabled for a key vault, it cannot be disabled.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Note:** Once enabled, purge protection cannot be disabled. **Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Key Vaults`. 2. Click the name of a key vault. 3. Under `Settings`, click `Properties`. 4. Select the radio button next to `Enable purge protection (enforce a mandatory retention period for deleted vaults and vault objects)`. 5. Click `Save`. 6. Repeat steps 1-5 for each key vault requiring remediation. **Remediate from Azure CLI** For each key vault requiring remediation, run the following command to enable purge protection: ``` az resource update --resource-group --name --resource-type \"Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults\" --set properties.enablePurgeProtection=true ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** For each key vault requiring remediation, run the following command to enable purge protection: ``` Update-AzKeyVault -ResourceGroupName -VaultName -EnablePurgeProtection ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Key Vaults`. 2. Click the name of a key vault. 3. Under `Settings`, click `Properties`. 4. Next to `Purge protection`, ensure that `Enable purge protection (enforce a mandatory retention period for deleted vaults and vault objects)` is selected. 5. Repeat steps 1-4 for each key vault. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list key vaults: ``` az resource list --query \"[?type=='Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults']\" ``` For each key vault, run the following command to get the purge protection setting: ``` az resource show --resource-group --name --resource-type \"Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults\" --query properties.enablePurgeProtection ``` Ensure that `true` is returned. **Audit from PowerShell** Run the following command to list key vaults: ``` Get-AzKeyVault ``` For each key vault, run the following command to get the key vault details: ``` Get-AzKeyVault -ResourceGroupName -VaultName ``` Ensure `Purge Protection Enabled?` is set to `True`. **Audit from Azure Policy** - **Policy ID:** 0b60c0b2-2dc2-4e1c-b5c9-abbed971de53 - **Name:** 'Key vaults should have deletion protection enabled'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/key-vault-recovery:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-governance-strategy#gs-8-define-and-implement-backup-and-recovery-strategy:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-data-protection#dp-8-ensure-security-of-key-and-certificate-repository", + "DefaultValue": "Purge protection is disabled by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.3.6", + "Description": "Ensure that Role Based Access Control for Azure Key Vault is Enabled", + "Checks": [ + "keyvault_rbac_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.3 Key Vault", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that Role Based Access Control for Azure Key Vault is Enabled", + "RationaleStatement": "The new RBAC permissions model for Key Vaults enables a much finer grained access control for key vault secrets, keys, certificates, etc., than the vault access policy. This in turn will permit the use of privileged identity management over these roles, thus securing the key vaults with JIT Access management.", + "ImpactStatement": "Implementation needs to be properly designed from the ground up, as this is a fundamental change to the way key vaults are accessed/managed. Changing permissions to key vaults will result in loss of service as permissions are re-applied. For the least amount of downtime, map your current groups and users to their corresponding permission needs.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** Key Vaults can be configured to use `Azure role-based access control` on creation. For existing Key Vaults: 1. From Azure Home open the Portal Menu in the top left corner 2. Select `Key Vaults` 3. Select a Key Vault to audit 4. Select `Access configuration` 5. Set the Permission model radio button to `Azure role-based access control`, taking note of the warning message 6. Click `Save` 7. Select `Access Control (IAM)` 8. Select the `Role Assignments` tab 9. Reapply permissions as needed to groups or users **Remediate from Azure CLI** To enable RBAC Authorization for each Key Vault, run the following Azure CLI command: ``` az keyvault update --resource-group --name --enable-rbac-authorization true ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** To enable RBAC authorization on each Key Vault, run the following PowerShell command: ``` Update-AzKeyVault -ResourceGroupName -VaultName -EnableRbacAuthorization $True ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home open the Portal Menu in the top left corner 2. Select Key Vaults 3. Select a Key Vault to audit 4. Select Access configuration 5. Ensure the Permission Model radio button is set to `Azure role-based access control` **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command for each Key Vault in each Resource Group: ``` az keyvault show --resource-group --name ``` Ensure the `enableRbacAuthorization` setting is set to `true` within the output of the above command. **Audit from PowerShell** Run the following PowerShell command: ``` Get-AzKeyVault -Vaultname -ResourceGroupName ``` Ensure the `Enabled For RBAC Authorization` setting is set to `True` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [12d4fa5e-1f9f-4c21-97a9-b99b3c6611b5](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F12d4fa5e-1f9f-4c21-97a9-b99b3c6611b5) **- Name:** 'Azure Key Vault should use RBAC permission model'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/azure/key-vault/general/rbac-migration#vault-access-policy-to-azure-rbac-migration-steps:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/azure/role-based-access-control/role-assignments-portal?tabs=current:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/azure/role-based-access-control/overview:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-data-protection#dp-8-ensure-security-of-key-and-certificate-repository", + "DefaultValue": "The default value for Access control in Key Vaults is Vault Policy." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.3.7", + "Description": "Ensure Public Network Access is Disabled", + "Checks": [ + "keyvault_private_endpoints" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.3 Key Vault", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure Public Network Access is Disabled", + "RationaleStatement": "Disabling public network access improves security by ensuring that a service is not exposed on the public internet. Removing a point of interconnection from the internet edge to your key vault can strengthen the network security boundary of your system and reduce the risk of exposing the control plane or vault objects to untrusted clients. Although Azure resources are never truly isolated from the public internet, disabling the public endpoint removes a line of sight from the public internet and increases the effort required for an attack.", + "ImpactStatement": "NOTE: Prior to disabling public network access, it is strongly recommended that, for each key vault, either: virtual network integration is completed OR private endpoints/links are set up as described in 'Ensure Private Endpoints are used to access Azure Key Vault.' Disabling public network access restricts access to the service. This enhances security but will require the configuration of a virtual network and/or private endpoints for any services or users needing access within trusted networks.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Key vaults`. 2. Click the name of a key vault. 3. Under `Settings`, click `Networking`. 4. Under `Firewalls and virtual networks`, next to `Allow access from:`, click the radio button next to `Disable public access`. 5. Click `Apply`. 6. Repeat steps 1-5 for each key vault requiring remediation. **Remediate from Azure CLI** For each key vault requiring remediation, run the following command to disable public network access: ``` az keyvault update --resource-group --name --public-network-access Disabled ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** For each key vault requiring remediation, run the following command to disable public network access: ``` Update-AzKeyVault -ResourceGroupName -VaultName -PublicNetworkAccess \"Disabled\" ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Key vaults`. 2. Click the name of a key vault. 3. Under `Settings`, click `Networking`. 4. Under `Firewalls and virtual networks`, ensure that `Allow access from:` is set to `Disable public access`. 5. Repeat steps 1-4 for each key vault. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list key vaults: ``` az keyvault list ``` For each key vault, run the following command to get the public network access setting: ``` az keyvault show --resource-group --name --query properties.publicNetworkAccess ``` Ensure that `Disabled` is returned. **Audit from PowerShell** Run the following command to list key vaults: ``` Get-AzKeyVault ``` Run the following command to get the key vault in a resource group with a given name: ``` $vault = Get-AzKeyVault -ResourceGroupName -Name ``` Run the following command to get the public network access setting for the key vault: ``` $vault.PublicNetworkAccess ``` Ensure that `Disabled` is returned. Repeat for each key vault. **Audit from Azure Policy** - **Policy ID:** 405c5871-3e91-4644-8a63-58e19d68ff5b - **Name:** 'Azure Key Vault should disable public network access'", + "AdditionalInformation": "This Common Reference Recommendation is referenced in the following Service Recommendations: - Storage Services > Storage Accounts > Networking > **Ensure that 'Public Network Access' is 'Disabled' for storage accounts**", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/network-security:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/private-link-service", + "DefaultValue": "Public network access is enabled by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.3.8", + "Description": "Ensure Private Endpoints are Used to Access Azure Key Vault", + "Checks": [ + "keyvault_private_endpoints" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.3 Key Vault", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure Private Endpoints are Used to Access Azure Key Vault", + "RationaleStatement": "Private endpoints will keep network requests to Azure Key Vault limited to the endpoints attached to the resources that are whitelisted to communicate with each other. Assigning the Key Vault to a network without an endpoint will allow other resources on that network to view all traffic from the Key Vault to its destination. In spite of the complexity in configuration, this is recommended for high security secrets.", + "ImpactStatement": "Incorrect or poorly-timed changing of network configuration could result in service interruption. There are also additional costs tiers for running a private endpoint per petabyte or more of networking traffic.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Please see the additional information about the requirements needed before starting this remediation procedure.** **Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home open the Portal Menu in the top left. 2. Select Key Vaults. 3. Select a Key Vault to audit. 4. Select `Networking` in the left column. 5. Select `Private endpoint connections` from the top row. 6. Select `+ Create`. 7. Select the subscription the Key Vault is within, and other desired configuration. 8. Select `Next`. 9. For resource type select `Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults`. 10. Select the Key Vault to associate the Private Endpoint with. 11. Select `Next`. 12. In the `Virtual Networking` field, select the network to assign the Endpoint. 13. Select other configuration options as desired, including an existing or new application security group. 14. Select `Next`. 15. Select the private DNS the Private Endpoints will use. 16. Select `Next`. 17. Optionally add `Tags`. 18. Select `Next : Review + Create`. 19. Review the information and select `Create`. Follow the Audit Procedure to determine if it has successfully applied. 20. Repeat steps 3-19 for each Key Vault. **Remediate from Azure CLI** 1. To create an endpoint, run the following command: ``` az network private-endpoint create --resource-group --subnet --name --private-connection-resource-id /subscriptions//resourceGroups//providers/Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/ --group-ids vault --connection-name --location --manual-request ``` 2. To manually approve the endpoint request, run the following command: ``` az keyvault private-endpoint-connection approve --resource-group --vault-name –name ``` 3. Determine the Private Endpoint's IP address to connect the Key Vault to the Private DNS you have previously created: 4. Look for the property networkInterfaces then id; the value must be placed in the variable within step 7. ``` az network private-endpoint show -g -n ``` 5. Look for the property networkInterfaces then id; the value must be placed on in step 7. ``` az network nic show --ids ``` 6. Create a Private DNS record within the DNS Zone you created for the Private Endpoint: ``` az network private-dns record-set a add-record -g -z privatelink.vaultcore.azure.net -n -a ``` 7. nslookup the private endpoint to determine if the DNS record is correct: ``` nslookup .vault.azure.net nslookup .privatelink.vaultcore.azure.n ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. From Azure Home open the Portal Menu in the top left. 2. Select Key Vaults. 3. Select a Key Vault to audit. 4. Select `Networking` in the left column. 5. Select `Private endpoint connections` from the top row. 6. View if there is an endpoint attached. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command within a subscription for each Key Vault you wish to audit. ``` az keyvault show --name ``` Ensure that `privateEndpointConnections` is not `null`. **Audit from PowerShell** Run the following command within a subscription for each Key Vault you wish to audit. ``` Get-AzPrivateEndpointConnection -PrivateLinkResourceId '/subscriptions//resourceGroups//providers/Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults//' ``` Ensure that the response contains details of a private endpoint. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [a6abeaec-4d90-4a02-805f-6b26c4d3fbe9](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fa6abeaec-4d90-4a02-805f-6b26c4d3fbe9) **- Name:** 'Azure Key Vaults should use private link'", + "AdditionalInformation": "This recommendation assumes that you have created a Resource Group containing a Virtual Network that the services are already associated with and configured private DNS. A Bastion on the virtual network is also required, and the service to which you are connecting must already have a Private Endpoint. For information concerning the installation of these services, please see the attached documentation. Microsoft's own documentation lists the requirements as: A Key Vault. An Azure virtual network. A subnet in the virtual network. Owner or contributor permissions for both the Key Vault and the virtual network.", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/private-link/private-endpoint-overview:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-private-endpoints:https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/details/private-link/:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/private-link-service?tabs=portal:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/quick-create-portal:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/private-link/tutorial-private-endpoint-storage-portal:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/bastion/bastion-overview:https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/dns/private-dns-getstarted-cli#create-an-additional-dns-record:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-data-protection#dp-8-ensure-security-of-key-and-certificate-repository", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Private Endpoints are not enabled for any services within Azure." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.3.9", + "Description": "Ensure Automatic Key Rotation is Enabled within Azure Key Vault", + "Checks": [ + "keyvault_key_rotation_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.3 Key Vault", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure Automatic Key Rotation is Enabled within Azure Key Vault", + "RationaleStatement": "Automatic key rotation reduces risk by ensuring that keys are rotated without manual intervention. Azure and NIST recommend that keys be rotated every two years or less. Refer to 'Table 1: Suggested cryptoperiods for key types' on page 46 of the following document for more information: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5.pdf.", + "ImpactStatement": "There is an additional cost for each scheduled key rotation.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Note:** Azure CLI and PowerShell use the ISO8601 duration format for time spans. The format is `P(Y,M,D)`. The leading P is required and is referred to as `period`. The `(Y,M,D)` are for the duration of Year, Month, and Day, respectively. A time frame of 2 years, 2 months, 2 days would be `P2Y2M2D`. For Azure CLI and PowerShell, it is easiest to supply the policy flags in a `.json file`, for example: ``` { lifetimeActions: [ { trigger: { timeAfterCreate: P(Y,M,D), timeBeforeExpiry : null }, action: { type: Rotate } }, { trigger: { timeBeforeExpiry : P(Y,M,D) }, action: { type: Notify } } ], attributes: { expiryTime: P(Y,M,D) } } ``` **Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Key Vaults`. 1. Select a Key Vault. 1. Under `Objects`, select `Keys`. 1. Select a key. 1. From the top row, select `Rotation policy`. 1. Select an appropriate `Expiry time`. 1. Set `Enable auto rotation` to `Enabled`. 1. Set an appropriate `Rotation option` and `Rotation time`. 1. Optionally, set a `Notification time`. 1. Click `Save`. 1. Repeat steps 1-10 for each Key Vault and Key. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Run the following command for each key to enable automatic rotation: ``` az keyvault key rotation-policy update --vault-name --name --value ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Run the following command for each key to enable automatic rotation: ``` Set-AzKeyVaultKeyRotationPolicy -VaultName -Name -PolicyPath ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Key Vaults`. 1. Select a Key Vault. 1. Under `Objects`, select `Keys`. 1. Select a key. 1. From the top row, select `Rotation policy`. 1. Ensure `Enable auto rotation` is set to `Enabled`. 1. Ensure the `Rotation time` is set to an appropriate value. 1. Repeat steps 1-7 for each Key Vault and Key. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command: ``` az keyvault key rotation-policy show --vault-name --name ``` Ensure that the response contains a `lifetimeAction` of `Rotate` and that `timeAfterCreate` is set to an appropriate value. **Audit from PowerShell** Run the following command: ``` Get-AzKeyVaultKeyRotationPolicy -VaultName -Name ``` Ensure that the response contains a `LifetimeAction` of `Rotate` and that `TimeAfterCreate` is set to an appropriate value. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [d8cf8476-a2ec-4916-896e-992351803c44](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fd8cf8476-a2ec-4916-896e-992351803c44) **- Name:** 'Keys should have a rotation policy ensuring that their rotation is scheduled within the specified number of days after creation.'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/keys/how-to-configure-key-rotation:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/customer-managed-keys-overview#update-the-key-version:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/windows/disks-enable-customer-managed-keys-powershell#set-up-an-azure-key-vault-and-diskencryptionset-optionally-with-automatic-key-rotation:https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/updates/public-preview-automatic-key-rotation-of-customermanaged-keys-for-encrypting-azure-managed-disks/:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/keyvault/key/rotation-policy?view=azure-cli-latest#az-keyvault-key-rotation-policy-update:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.keyvault/set-azkeyvaultkeyrotationpolicy?view=azps-8.1.0:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/data-explorer/kusto/query/scalar-data-types/timespan:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-data-protection#dp-6-use-a-secure-key-management-process:https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5.pdf", + "DefaultValue": "By default, automatic key rotation is not enabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.3.10", + "Description": "Ensure that Azure Key Vault Managed HSM is Used when Required", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.3 Key Vault", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that Azure Key Vault Managed HSM is Used when Required", + "RationaleStatement": "Managed HSM is a fully managed, highly available, single-tenant service that ensures FIPS 140-2 Level 3 compliance. It provides centralized key management, isolated access control, and private endpoints for secure access. Integrated with Azure services, it supports migration from Key Vault, ensures data residency, and offers monitoring and auditing for enhanced security.", + "ImpactStatement": "Managed HSM incurs a cost of $0.40 to $5 per month for each actively used HSM-protected key, depending on the key type and quantity. Each key version is billed separately. Additionally, there is an hourly usage fee of $3.20 per Managed HSM pool.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure CLI** Run the following command to set `oid` to be the `OID` of the signed-in user: ``` $oid = az ad signed-in-user show --query id -o tsv ``` Alternatively, prepare a space-separated list of OIDs to be provided as the `administrators` of the HSM. Run the following command to create a Managed HSM: ``` az keyvault create --resource-group --hsm-name --retention-days --administrators $oid ``` The command can take several minutes to complete. After the HSM has been created, it must be activated before it can be used. Activation requires providing a minimum of three and a maximum of ten RSA key pairs, as well as the minimum number of keys required to decrypt the security domain (called a quorum). OpenSSL can be used to generate the self-signed certificates, for example: ``` openssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout cert_1.key -x509 -days 365 -out cert_1.cer ``` Run the following command to download the security domain and activate the Managed HSM: ``` az keyvault security-domain download --hsm-name --sd-wrapping-keys --sd-quorum --security-domain-file .json ``` Store the security domain file and the RSA key pairs securely. They will be required for disaster recovery or for creating another Managed HSM that shares the same security domain so that the two can share keys. The Managed HSM will now be in an active state and ready for use.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list key vaults: ``` az keyvault list --query [*].[name,type] ``` Ensure that at least one key vault with type `Microsoft.KeyVault/managedHSMs` exists.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/key-management-choose:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/managed-hsm/overview:https://azure.microsoft.com/en-gb/pricing/details/key-vault/:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/managed-hsm/quick-create-cli:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/keyvault", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.3.11", + "Description": "Ensure Certificate 'Validity Period (in months)' is Less Than or Equal to '12'", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.3 Key Vault", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure Certificate 'Validity Period (in months)' is Less Than or Equal to '12'", + "RationaleStatement": "Limiting certificate validity reduces the risk of misuse if compromised and helps ensure timely renewal, improving security and reliability.", + "ImpactStatement": "Minor administrative effort required to ensure certificate renewal and lifecycle management.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Key vaults`. 2. Click the name of a key vault. 3. Under `Objects`, click `Certificates`. 4. Click the name of a certificate. 5. Click `Issuance Policy`. 6. Set `Validity Period (in months)` to an integer between 1 and 12, inclusive. 7. Click `Save`. 8. Repeat steps 1-7 for each key vault and certificate requiring remediation. **Remediate from PowerShell** For each certificate requiring remediation, run the following command to set ValidityInMonths to an integer between 1 and 12, inclusive: ``` Set-AzKeyVaultCertificatePolicy -VaultName $vault.VaultName -Name -ValidityInMonths ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Key vaults`. 2. Click the name of a key vault. 3. Under `Objects`, click `Certificates`. 4. Click the name of a certificate. 5. Click `Issuance Policy`. 6. Ensure that `Validity Period (in months)` is set to 12 or less. 7. Repeat steps 1-6 for each key vault and certificate. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list key vaults: ``` az keyvault list ``` For each key vault, run the following command to list certificates: ``` az keyvault certificate list --vault-name ``` For each certificate, run the following command to get the certificate policy's validityInMonths setting: ``` az keyvault certificate show --id --query policy.x509CertificateProperties.validityInMonths ``` Ensure that 12 or less is returned. **Audit from PowerShell** Run the following command to list key vaults: ``` Get-AzKeyVault ``` Run the following command to get the key vault with a given name: ``` $vault = Get-AzKeyVault -Name ``` Run the following command to list certificates in the key vault: ``` Get-AzKeyVaultCertificate -VaultName $vault.VaultName ``` Run the following command to get the policy of a certificate with a given name: ``` $certificate = Get-AzKeyVaultCertificatePolicy -VaultName $vault.VaultName -Name ``` Run the following command to get the certificate policy's ValidityInMonths setting: ``` $certificate.ValidityInMonths ``` Ensure that 12 or less is returned. Repeat for each key vault and certificate. **Audit from Azure Policy** - **Policy ID:** 0a075868-4c26-42ef-914c-5bc007359560 - **Name:** 'Certificates should have the specified maximum validity period'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/certificates/about-certificates:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/keyvault:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.keyvault", + "DefaultValue": "Validity Period (in months) is set to 12 by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.4.1", + "Description": "Ensure an Azure Bastion Host Exists", + "Checks": [ + "network_bastion_host_exists" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "SubSection": "8.4 Azure Bastion", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure an Azure Bastion Host Exists", + "RationaleStatement": "The Azure Bastion service allows organizations a more secure means of accessing Azure Virtual Machines over the Internet without assigning public IP addresses to those Virtual Machines. The Azure Bastion service provides Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) and Secure Shell (SSH) access to Virtual Machines using TLS within a web browser, thus preventing organizations from opening up 3389/TCP and 22/TCP to the Internet on Azure Virtual Machines. Additional benefits of the Bastion service includes Multi-Factor Authentication, Conditional Access Policies, and any other hardening measures configured within Azure Active Directory using a central point of access.", + "ImpactStatement": "The Azure Bastion service incurs additional costs and requires a specific virtual network configuration. The `Standard` tier offers additional configuration options compared to the `Basic` tier and may incur additional costs for those added features.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Click on `Bastions` 2. Select the `Subscription` 3. Select the `Resource group` 4. Type a `Name` for the new Bastion host 5. Select a `Region` 6. Choose `Standard` next to `Tier` 7. Use the slider to set the `Instance count` 8. Select the `Virtual network` or `Create new` 9. Select the `Subnet` named `AzureBastionSubnet`. Create a `Subnet` named `AzureBastionSubnet` using a `/26` CIDR range if it doesn't already exist. 10. Select the appropriate `Public IP address` option. 11. If `Create new` is selected for the `Public IP address` option, provide a `Public IP address name`. 12. If `Use existing` is selected for `Public IP address` option, select an IP address from `Choose public IP address` 13. Click `Next: Tags >` 14. Configure the appropriate `Tags` 15. Click `Next: Advanced >` 16. Select the appropriate `Advanced` options 17. Click `Next: Review + create >` 18. Click `Create` **Remediate from Azure CLI** ``` az network bastion create --location --name --public-ip-address --resource-group --vnet-name --scale-units --sku Standard [--disable-copy-paste true|false] [--enable-ip-connect true|false] [--enable-tunneling true|false] ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Create the appropriate `Virtual network` settings and `Public IP Address` settings. ``` $subnetName = AzureBastionSubnet $subnet = New-AzVirtualNetworkSubnetConfig -Name $subnetName -AddressPrefix $virtualNet = New-AzVirtualNetwork -Name -ResourceGroupName -Location -AddressPrefix -Subnet $subnet $publicip = New-AzPublicIpAddress -ResourceGroupName -Name -Location -AllocationMethod Dynamic -Sku Standard ``` Create the `Azure Bastion` service using the information within the created variables from above. ``` New-AzBastion -ResourceGroupName -Name -PublicIpAddress $publicip -VirtualNetwork $virtualNet -Sku Standard -ScaleUnit ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Click on `Bastions` 2. Ensure there is at least one `Bastion` host listed under the `Name` column **Audit from Azure CLI** **Note:** The Azure CLI `network bastion` module is in `Preview` as of this writing ``` az network bastion list --subscription ``` Ensure the output of the above command is not empty. **Audit from PowerShell** Retrieve the `Bastion` host(s) information for a specific `Resource Group` ``` Get-AzBastion -ResourceGroupName ``` Ensure the output of the above command is not empty.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/bastion/bastion-overview#sku:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.network/get-azbastion?view=azps-9.2.0:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/network/bastion?view=azure-cli-latest", + "DefaultValue": "By default, the Azure Bastion service is not configured." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.5", + "Description": "Ensure Azure DDoS Network Protection is Enabled on Virtual Networks", + "Checks": [ + "network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Security Services", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure Azure DDoS Network Protection is Enabled on Virtual Networks", + "RationaleStatement": "Virtual networks and resources are protected against attacks, helping to ensure reliability and availability for critical workloads.", + "ImpactStatement": "Azure DDoS Network Protection incurs a significant fixed monthly charge, with additional charges if more than 100 public IP resources are protected. Careful consideration and analysis should be applied before enabling DDoS protection. Refer to https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/details/ddos-protection for detailed pricing information.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Virtual networks`. 2. Click the name of a virtual network. 3. Under `Settings`, click `DDoS protection`. 4. Next to `DDoS Network Protection`, click `Enable`. 5. Provide a DDoS protection plan resource ID, or select a DDoS protection plan from the drop-down menu. 6. Click `Save`. 7. Repeat steps 1-6 for each virtual network requiring remediation. **Remediate from Azure CLI** For each virtual network requiring remediation, run the following command to enable DDoS protection: ``` az network vnet update --resource-group --name --ddos-protection true --ddos-protection-plan ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Virtual networks`. 2. Click the name of a virtual network. 3. Under `Settings`, click `DDoS protection`. 4. Ensure `DDoS Network Protection` is set to `Enable`. 5. Repeat steps 1-4 for each virtual network. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list virtual networks: ``` az network vnet list ``` For each virtual network, run the following command to get the DDoS protection setting: ``` az network vnet show --resource-group --name --query enableDdosProtection ``` Ensure `true` is returned. **Audit from Azure Policy** - **Policy ID:** a7aca53f-2ed4-4466-a25e-0b45ade68efd - **Name:** 'Azure DDoS Protection should be enabled'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ddos-protection/ddos-protection-overview:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ddos-protection/manage-ddos-protection:https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/details/ddos-protection:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/network/vnet", + "DefaultValue": "DDoS protection is disabled by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.1", + "Description": "Ensure Soft Delete for Azure File Shares is Enabled", + "Checks": [ + "storage_ensure_file_shares_soft_delete_is_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Storage Services", + "SubSection": "9.1 Azure Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure Soft Delete for Azure File Shares is Enabled", + "RationaleStatement": "Important data could be accidentally deleted or removed by a malicious actor. With soft delete enabled, the data is retained for the defined retention period before permanent deletion, allowing for recovery of the data.", + "ImpactStatement": "When a file share is soft-deleted, the used portion of the storage is charged for the indicated soft-deleted period. All other meters are not charged unless the share is restored.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage Accounts`. 1. For each storage account with file shares, under `Data storage`, click `File shares`. 1. Under `File share settings`, click the value next to `Soft delete`. 1. Under `Soft delete for all file shares`, click the toggle to set it to `Enabled`. 1. Under `Retention policies`, set an appropriate number of days to retain soft deleted data between 1 and 365, inclusive. 1. Click `Save`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** For each storage account requiring remediation, run the following command to enable soft delete for file shares and set an appropriate number of days for deleted data to be retained, between 1 and 365, inclusive: ``` az storage account file-service-properties update --account-name --enable-delete-retention true --delete-retention-days ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** For each storage account requiring remediation, run the following command to enable soft delete for file shares and set an appropriate number of days for deleted data to be retained, between 1 and 365, inclusive: ``` Update-AzStorageFileServiceProperty -ResourceGroupName -AccountName -EnableShareDeleteRetentionPolicy $true -ShareRetentionDays ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage Accounts`. 1. For each storage account with file shares, under `Data storage`, click on `File shares`. 1. Under `File share settings`, ensure the value for `Soft delete` shows a number of days between 1 and 365, inclusive. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list storage accounts: ``` az storage account list ``` Run the following command to determine if a storage account has file shares: ``` az storage share list --account-name ``` For each storage account with file shares, run the following command: ``` az storage account file-service-properties show --resource-group --account-name ``` Ensure that under `shareDeleteRetentionPolicy`, `enabled` is set to `true`, and `days` is set to an appropriate value between 1 and 365, inclusive. **Audit from PowerShell** Run the following command to list storage accounts: ``` Get-AzStorageAccount -ResourceGroupName ``` With a storage account context set, run the following command to determine if a storage account has file shares: ``` Get-AzStorageShare ``` For each storage account with file shares, run the following command: ``` Get-AzStorageFileServiceProperty -ResourceGroupName -AccountName ``` Ensure that `ShareDeleteRetentionPolicy.Enabled` is set to `True` and `ShareDeleteRetentionPolicy.Days` is set to an appropriate value between 1 and 365, inclusive.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/files/storage-files-enable-soft-delete:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/storage/account/file-service-properties:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.storage/get-azstoragefileserviceproperty:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.storage/update-azstoragefileserviceproperty:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/files/storage-files-prevent-file-share-deletion", + "DefaultValue": "Soft delete is enabled by default at the storage account file share setting level." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.2", + "Description": "Ensure 'SMB protocol version' is Set to 'SMB 3.1.1' or Higher for SMB file shares", + "Checks": [ + "storage_smb_protocol_version_is_latest" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Storage Services", + "SubSection": "9.1 Azure Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure 'SMB protocol version' is Set to 'SMB 3.1.1' or Higher for SMB file shares", + "RationaleStatement": "Using the latest supported SMB protocol version enhances the security of SMB file shares by preventing the exploitation of known vulnerabilities in outdated SMB versions.", + "ImpactStatement": "Using the latest SMB protocol version may impact client compatibility.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage accounts`. 1. Click the name of a storage account. 1. Under `Data storage`, click `File shares`. 1. Under `File share settings`, click the link next to `Security`. 1. If `Profile` is set to `Maximum compatibility`, click the drop-down menu and select `Maximum security` or `Custom`. 1. If selecting `Custom`, under `SMB protocol versions`, uncheck the boxes next to `SMB 2.1` and `SMB 3.0`. 1. Click `Save`. 1. Repeat steps 1-7 for each storage account requiring remediation. **Remediate from Azure CLI** For each storage account requiring remediation, run the following command to set the SMB protocol version: ``` az storage account file-service-properties update --resource-group --account-name --versions SMB3.1.1 ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** For each storage account requiring remediation, run the following command to set the SMB protocol version: ``` Update-AzStorageFileServiceProperty -ResourceGroupName -StorageAccountName -SmbProtocolVersion SMB3.1.1 ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage accounts`. 1. Click the name of a storage account. 1. Under `Data storage`, click `File shares`. 1. Under `File share settings`, click the link next to `Security`. 1. Under `SMB protocol versions`, ensure that `SMB3.1.1` is the only checked protocol version. 1. Repeat steps 1-5 for each storage account. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list storage accounts: ``` az storage account list ``` For each storage account, run the following command: ``` az storage account file-service-properties show --resource-group --account-name ``` Ensure that under `protocolSettings` > `smb`, `versions` is set to `SMB3.1.1;` only. **Audit from PowerShell** Run the following command to list storage accounts: ``` Get-AzStorageAccount ``` Run the following command to get the file service properties for a storage account in a resource group with a given name: ``` $storageaccountfileservice = Get-AzStorageFileServiceProperty -ResourceGroupName -AccountName ``` Run the following command to get the SMB protocol version setting: ``` $storageaccountfileservice.ProtocolSettings.Smb.Versions ``` Ensure that the command returns `SMB3.1.1` only. Repeat for each storage account.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/well-architected/service-guides/azure-files#recommendations-for-smb-file-shares:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/files/files-smb-protocol#smb-security-settings:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/storage/account/file-service-properties:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.storage/get-azstoragefileserviceproperty:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.storage/update-azstoragefileserviceproperty", + "DefaultValue": "By default, all SMB versions are allowed." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.3", + "Description": "Ensure 'SMB channel encryption' is Set to 'AES-256-GCM' or Higher for SMB file shares", + "Checks": [ + "storage_smb_channel_encryption_with_secure_algorithm" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Storage Services", + "SubSection": "9.1 Azure Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure 'SMB channel encryption' is Set to 'AES-256-GCM' or Higher for SMB file shares", + "RationaleStatement": "AES-256-GCM encryption enhances the security of data transmitted over SMB channels by safeguarding it from unauthorized interception and tampering.", + "ImpactStatement": "Using the AES-256-GCM SMB channel encryption may impact client compatibility.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage accounts`. 1. Click the name of a storage account. 1. Under `Data storage`, click `File shares`. 1. Under `File share settings`, click the link next to `Security`. 1. If `Profile` is set to `Maximum compatibility`, click the drop-down menu and select `Maximum security` or `Custom`. 1. If selecting `Custom`, under `SMB channel encryption`, uncheck the boxes next to `AES-128-CCM` and `AES-128-GCM`. 1. Click `Save`. 1. Repeat steps 1-7 for each storage account requiring remediation. **Remediate from Azure CLI** For each storage account requiring remediation, run the following command to set the SMB channel encryption: ``` az storage account file-service-properties update --resource-group --account-name --channel-encryption AES-256-GCM ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** For each storage account requiring remediation, run the following command to set the SMB channel encryption: ``` Update-AzStorageFileServiceProperty -ResourceGroupName -StorageAccountName -SmbChannelEncryption AES-256-GCM ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage accounts`. 1. Click the name of a storage account. 1. Under `Data storage`, click `File shares`. 1. Under `File share settings`, click the link next to `Security`. 1. Under `SMB channel encryption`, ensure that `AES-256-GCM`, or higher, is the only checked SMB channel encryption setting. 1. Repeat steps 1-5 for each storage account. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list storage accounts: ``` az storage account list ``` For each storage account, run the following command: ``` az storage account file-service-properties show --resource-group --account-name ``` Ensure that under `protocolSettings` > `smb`, `channelEncryption` is set to `AES-256-GCM;`, or higher, only. **Audit from PowerShell** Run the following command to list storage accounts: ``` Get-AzStorageAccount ``` Run the following command to get the file service properties for a storage account in a resource group with a given name: ``` $storageaccountfileservice = Get-AzStorageFileServiceProperty -ResourceGroupName -AccountName ``` Run the following command to get the SMB channel encryption setting: ``` $storageaccountfileservice.ProtocolSettings.Smb.ChannelEncryption ``` Ensure that the command returns `AES-256-GCM`, or higher, only. Repeat for each storage account.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/well-architected/service-guides/azure-files#recommendations-for-smb-file-shares:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/files/files-smb-protocol?tabs=azure-portal#smb-security-settings:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/storage/account/file-service-properties:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.storage/get-azstoragefileserviceproperty:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.storage/update-azstoragefileserviceproperty", + "DefaultValue": "By default, the following SMB channel encryption algorithms are allowed: - AES-128-CCM - AES-128-GCM - AES-256-GCM" + } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "storage_smb_channel_encryption_with_secure_algorithm", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_smb_channel_encryption_algorithms", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "AES-256-GCM" + ] + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.2.1", + "Description": "Ensure That Soft Delete for Blobs on Azure Blob Storage Storage Accounts is Enabled", + "Checks": [ + "storage_ensure_soft_delete_is_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Storage Services", + "SubSection": "9.2 Azure Blob Storage", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure That Soft Delete for Blobs on Azure Blob Storage Storage Accounts is Enabled", + "RationaleStatement": "Blobs can be deleted incorrectly. An attacker or malicious user may do this deliberately in order to cause disruption. Deleting an Azure storage blob results in immediate data loss. Enabling this configuration for Azure storage accounts ensures that even if blobs are deleted from the storage account, the blobs are recoverable for a specific period of time, which is defined in the Retention policies, ranging from 7 to 365 days.", + "ImpactStatement": "All soft-deleted data is billed at the same rate as active data. Additional costs may be incurred for deleted blobs until the soft delete period ends and the data is permanently removed.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage Accounts`. 1. For each Storage Account with blob storage, under `Data management`, go to `Data protection`. 1. Check the box next to `Enable soft delete for blobs`. 1. Set the retention period to a sufficient length for your organization. 1. Click `Save`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** For each storage account requiring remediation, run the following command to enable soft delete for blobs: ``` az storage blob service-properties delete-policy update --days-retained --account-name --enable true ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage Accounts`. 1. For each Storage Account with blob storage, under `Data management`, go to `Data protection`. 1. Ensure that `Enable soft delete for blobs` is checked. 1. Ensure that the retention period is a sufficient length for your organization. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list storage accounts: ``` az storage account list ``` Run the following command to determine if a storage account has containers: ``` az storage container list --account-name ``` For each storage account with containers, ensure that the output of the below command contains `enabled: true` and `days` is not `null`: ``` az storage blob service-properties delete-policy show --account-name ```", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/soft-delete-blob-overview", + "DefaultValue": "Soft delete for blob storage is **enabled** by default on storage accounts created via the Azure Portal, and **disabled** by default on storage accounts created via Azure CLI or PowerShell." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.2.2", + "Description": "Ensure that Soft Delete for Containers on Azure Blob Storage Storage Accounts is Enabled", + "Checks": [ + "storage_ensure_soft_delete_is_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Storage Services", + "SubSection": "9.2 Azure Blob Storage", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that Soft Delete for Containers on Azure Blob Storage Storage Accounts is Enabled", + "RationaleStatement": "Blobs can be deleted incorrectly. An attacker or malicious user may do this deliberately in order to cause disruption. Deleting an Azure storage blob results in immediate data loss. Enabling this configuration for Azure storage accounts ensures that even if blobs are deleted from the storage account, the blobs are recoverable for a specific period of time, which is defined in the Retention policies, ranging from 7 to 365 days.", + "ImpactStatement": "All soft-deleted data is billed at the same rate as active data. Additional costs may be incurred for deleted blobs until the soft delete period ends and the data is permanently removed.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage Accounts`. 1. For each Storage Account with blob storage, under `Data management`, go to `Data protection`. 1. Check the box next to `Enable soft delete for blobs`. 1. Set the retention period to a sufficient length for your organization. 1. Click `Save`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** For each storage account requiring remediation, run the following command to enable soft delete for blobs: ``` az storage blob service-properties delete-policy update --days-retained --account-name --enable true ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage Accounts`. 1. For each Storage Account with blob storage, under `Data management`, go to `Data protection`. 1. Ensure that `Enable soft delete for blobs` is checked. 1. Ensure that the retention period is a sufficient length for your organization. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list storage accounts: ``` az storage account list ``` Run the following command to determine if a storage account has containers: ``` az storage container list --account-name ``` For each storage account with containers, ensure that the output of the below command contains `enabled: true` and `days` is not `null`: ``` az storage blob service-properties delete-policy show --account-name ```", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/soft-delete-blob-overview", + "DefaultValue": "Soft delete for blob storage is **enabled** by default on storage accounts created via the Azure Portal, and **disabled** by default on storage accounts created via Azure CLI or PowerShell." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.2.3", + "Description": "Ensure 'Versioning' is Set to 'Enabled' on Azure Blob Storage Storage Accounts", + "Checks": [ + "storage_blob_versioning_is_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Storage Services", + "SubSection": "9.2 Azure Blob Storage", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure 'Versioning' is Set to 'Enabled' on Azure Blob Storage Storage Accounts", + "RationaleStatement": "Blob versioning safeguards data integrity and enables recovery by retaining previous versions of stored objects, facilitating quick restoration from accidental deletion, modification, or malicious activity.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling blob versioning for a storage account creates a new version with each write operation to a blob, which can increase storage costs. To control these costs, a lifecycle management policy can be applied to automatically delete older versions.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage accounts`. 1. Click the name of a storage account with blob storage. 1. In the `Overview` page, on the `Properties` tab, under `Blob service`, click `Disabled` next to `Versioning`. 1. Under `Tracking`, check the box next to `Enable versioning for blobs`. 1. Select the radio button next to `Keep all versions` or `Delete versions after (in days)`. 1. If selecting to delete versions, enter a number of in the box after which to delete blob versions. 1. Click `Save`. 1. Repeat steps 1-7 for each storage account with blob storage. **Remediate from Azure CLI** For each storage account requiring remediation, run the following command to enable blob versioning: ``` az storage account blob-service-properties update --account-name --enable-versioning true ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** For each storage account requiring remediation, run the following command to enable blob versioning: ``` Update-AzStorageBlobServiceProperty -ResourceGroupName -StorageAccountName -IsVersioningEnabled $true ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage accounts`. 1. Click the name of a storage account with blob storage. 1. In the `Overview` page, on the `Properties` tab, under `Blob service`, ensure `Versioning` is set to `Enabled`. 1. Repeat steps 1-3 for each storage account with blob storage. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list storage accounts: ``` az storage account list ``` Run the following command to determine if a storage account has containers: ``` az storage container list --account-name ``` For each storage account with containers, ensure that the output of the below command contains `isVersioningEnabled: true`: ``` az storage account blob-service-properties show --account-name ``` **Audit from PowerShell** Run the following command to list storage accounts: ``` Get-AzStorageAccount ``` Run the following command to create an Azure Storage context for a storage account: ``` $context = New-AzStorageContext -StorageAccountName ``` Run the following command to list containers for the storage account: ``` Get-AzStorageContainer -Context $context ``` If the storage account has containers, run the following command to get the blob service properties of the storage account: ``` $account = Get-AzStorageBlobServiceProperty -ResourceGroupName -AccountName ``` Run the following command to get the blob versioning setting for the storage account: ``` $account.IsVersioningEnabled ``` Ensure that the command returns `True`. Repeat for each storage account. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [c36a325b-ae04-4863-ad4f-19c6678f8e08](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fc36a325b-ae04-4863-ad4f-19c6678f8e08) **- Name:** 'Configure your Storage account to enable blob versioning'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/storage/account:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/storage/account/blob-service-properties:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.storage/get-azstorageaccount:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.storage/new-azstoragecontext:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.storage/get-azstoragecontainer:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.storage/get-azstorageblobserviceproperty:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.storage/update-azstorageblobserviceproperty:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/versioning-overview:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/lifecycle-management-overview", + "DefaultValue": "Blob versioning is disabled by default on storage accounts." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.3.1.1", + "Description": "Ensure That 'Enable key rotation reminders' is Enabled for Each Storage Account", + "Checks": [ + "storage_infrastructure_encryption_is_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Storage Services", + "SubSection": "9.3 Storage Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure That 'Enable key rotation reminders' is Enabled for Each Storage Account", + "RationaleStatement": "Reminders such as those generated by this recommendation will help maintain a regular and healthy cadence for activities which improve the overall efficacy of a security program. Cryptographic key rotation periods will vary depending on your organization's security requirements and the type of data which is being stored in the Storage Account. For example, PCI DSS mandates that cryptographic keys be replaced or rotated 'regularly,' and advises that keys for static data stores be rotated every 'few months.' For the purposes of this recommendation, 90 days will be prescribed for the reminder. Review and adjustment of the 90 day period is recommended, and may even be necessary. Your organization's security requirements should dictate the appropriate setting.", + "ImpactStatement": "This recommendation only creates a periodic reminder to regenerate access keys. Regenerating access keys can affect services in Azure as well as the organization's applications that are dependent on the storage account. All clients that use the access key to access the storage account must be updated to use the new key.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage Accounts` 1. For each Storage Account that is not compliant, under `Security + networking`, go to `Access keys` 1. Click `Set rotation reminder` 1. Check `Enable key rotation reminders` 1. In the `Send reminders` field select `Custom`, then set the `Remind me every` field to `90` and the period drop down to `Days` 1. Click `Save` **Remediate from Powershell** ``` $rgName = $accountName = $account = Get-AzStorageAccount -ResourceGroupName $rgName -Name $accountName if ($account.KeyCreationTime.Key1 -eq $null -or $account.KeyCreationTime.Key2 -eq $null){ Write-output (You must regenerate both keys at least once before setting expiration policy) } else { $account = Set-AzStorageAccount -ResourceGroupName $rgName -Name $accountName -KeyExpirationPeriodInDay 90 } $account.KeyPolicy.KeyExpirationPeriodInDays ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage Accounts` 2. For each Storage Account, under `Security + networking`, go to `Access keys` 3. If the button `Edit rotation reminder` is displayed, the Storage Account is compliant. Click `Edit rotation reminder` and review the `Remind me every` field for a desirable periodic setting that fits your security program's needs. If the button `Set rotation reminder` is displayed, the Storage Account is not compliant. **Audit from Powershell** ``` $rgName = $accountName = $account = Get-AzStorageAccount -ResourceGroupName $rgName -Name $accountName Write-Output $accountName -> Write-Output Expiration Reminder set to: $($account.KeyPolicy.KeyExpirationPeriodInDays) Days Write-Output Key1 Last Rotated: $($account.KeyCreationTime.Key1.ToShortDateString()) Write-Output Key2 Last Rotated: $($account.KeyCreationTime.Key2.ToShortDateString()) ``` Key rotation is recommended if the creation date for any key is empty. If the reminder is set, the period in days will be returned. The recommended period is 90 days. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [044985bb-afe1-42cd-8a36-9d5d42424537](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F044985bb-afe1-42cd-8a36-9d5d42424537) **- Name:** 'Storage account keys should not be expired'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-create-storage-account#regenerate-storage-access-keys:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-privileged-access#pa-1-separate-and-limit-highly-privilegedadministrative-users:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-identity-management#im-3-manage-application-identities-securely-and-automatically:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-governance-strategy#gs-6-define-and-implement-identity-and-privileged-access-strategy:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-identity-management#im-8-restrict-the-exposure-of-credentials-and-secrets:https://www.pcidssguide.com/pci-dss-key-rotation-requirements/:https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5.pdf", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Key rotation reminders are not configured." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.3.1.2", + "Description": "Ensure That Storage Account Access keys are Periodically Regenerated", + "Checks": [ + "storage_key_rotation_90_days" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Storage Services", + "SubSection": "9.3 Storage Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure That Storage Account Access keys are Periodically Regenerated", + "RationaleStatement": "When a storage account is created, Azure generates two 512-bit storage access keys which are used for authentication when the storage account is accessed. Rotating these keys periodically ensures that any inadvertent access or exposure does not result from the compromise of these keys. Cryptographic key rotation periods will vary depending on your organization's security requirements and the type of data which is being stored in the Storage Account. For example, PCI DSS mandates that cryptographic keys be replaced or rotated 'regularly,' and advises that keys for static data stores be rotated every 'few months.' For the purposes of this recommendation, 90 days will be prescribed for the reminder. Review and adjustment of the 90 day period is recommended, and may even be necessary. Your organization's security requirements should dictate the appropriate setting.", + "ImpactStatement": "Regenerating access keys can affect services in Azure as well as the organization's applications that are dependent on the storage account. All clients who use the access key to access the storage account must be updated to use the new key.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage Accounts`. 2. For each Storage Account with outdated keys, under `Security + networking`, go to `Access keys`. 3. Click `Rotate key` next to the outdated key, then click `Yes` to the prompt confirming that you want to regenerate the access key. After Azure regenerates the Access Key, you can confirm that `Access keys` reflects a `Last rotated` date of `(0 days ago)`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage Accounts`. 2. For each Storage Account, under `Security + networking`, go to `Access keys`. 3. Review the date and days in the `Last rotated` field for **each** key. If the `Last rotated` field indicates a number or days greater than 90 [or greater than your organization's period of validity], the key should be rotated. **Audit from Azure CLI** 1. Get a list of storage accounts ``` az storage account list --subscription ``` Make a note of `id`, `name` and `resourceGroup`. 2. For every storage account make sure that key is regenerated in the past 90 days. ``` az monitor activity-log list --namespace Microsoft.Storage --offset 90d --query [?contains(authorization.action, 'regenerateKey')] --resource-id ``` The output should contain ``` authorization/scope: AND authorization/action: Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/regeneratekey/action AND status/localizedValue: Succeeded status/Value: Succeeded ``` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [044985bb-afe1-42cd-8a36-9d5d42424537](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F044985bb-afe1-42cd-8a36-9d5d42424537) **- Name:** 'Storage account keys should not be expired'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-create-storage-account#regenerate-storage-access-keys:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-privileged-access#pa-1-separate-and-limit-highly-privilegedadministrative-users:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-identity-management#im-2-protect-identity-and-authentication-systems:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-governance-strategy#gs-6-define-and-implement-identity-and-privileged-access-strategy:https://www.pcidssguide.com/pci-dss-key-rotation-requirements/:https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5.pdf", + "DefaultValue": "By default, access keys are not regenerated periodically." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.3.1.3", + "Description": "Ensure 'Allow storage account key access' for Azure Storage Accounts is 'Disabled'", + "Checks": [ + "storage_account_key_access_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Storage Services", + "SubSection": "9.3 Storage Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure 'Allow storage account key access' for Azure Storage Accounts is 'Disabled'", + "RationaleStatement": "Microsoft Entra ID provides superior security and ease of use compared to Shared Key and is recommended by Microsoft. To require clients to use Microsoft Entra ID for authorizing requests, you can disallow requests to the storage account that are authorized with Shared Key.", + "ImpactStatement": "When you disallow Shared Key authorization for a storage account, any requests to the account that are authorized with Shared Key, including shared access signatures (SAS), will be denied. Client applications that currently access the storage account using the Shared Key will no longer function.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage accounts`. 1. Click on a storage account. 1. Under `Settings`, click `Configuration`. 1. Under `Allow storage account key access`, click the radio button next to `Disabled`. 1. Click `Save`. 1. Repeat steps 1-5 for each storage account requiring remediation. **Remediate from Azure CLI** For each storage account requiring remediation, run the following command to disallow shared key authorization: ``` az storage account update --resource-group --name --allow-shared-key-access false ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** For each storage account requiring remediation, run the following command to disallow shared key authorization: ``` Set-AzStorageAccount -ResourceGroupName -Name -AllowSharedKeyAccess $false ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage accounts`. 1. Click on a storage account. 1. Under `Settings`, click `Configuration`. 1. Under `Allow storage account key access`, ensure that the radio button next to `Disabled` is selected. 1. Repeat steps 1-4 for each storage account. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list storage accounts: ``` az storage account list ``` For each storage account, run the following command: ``` az storage account show --resource-group --name ``` Ensure that `allowSharedKeyAccess` is set to `false`. **Audit from PowerShell** Run the following command to list storage accounts: ``` Get-AzStorageAccount ``` Run the following command to get the storage account in a resource group with a given name: ``` $storageAccount = Get-AzStorageAccount -ResourceGroupName -Name ``` Run the following command to get the shared key access setting for the storage account: ``` $storageAccount.allowSharedKeyAccess ``` Ensure that the command returns `False`. Repeat for each storage account. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [8c6a50c6-9ffd-4ae7-986f-5fa6111f9a54](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F8c6a50c6-9ffd-4ae7-986f-5fa6111f9a54) **- Name:** 'Storage accounts should prevent shared key access'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/shared-key-authorization-prevent:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/storage/account:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.storage/get-azstorageaccount:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.storage/set-azstorageaccount", + "DefaultValue": "The AllowSharedKeyAccess property of a storage account is not set by default and does not return a value until you explicitly set it. The storage account permits requests that are authorized with the Shared Key when the property value is **null** or when it is **true**." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.3.2.1", + "Description": "Ensure Private Endpoints are Used to Access Storage Accounts", + "Checks": [ + "storage_ensure_private_endpoints_in_storage_accounts" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Storage Services", + "SubSection": "9.3 Storage Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure Private Endpoints are Used to Access Storage Accounts", + "RationaleStatement": "Securing traffic between services through encryption protects the data from easy interception and reading.", + "ImpactStatement": "If an Azure Virtual Network is not implemented correctly, this may result in the loss of critical network traffic. Private endpoints are charged per hour of use. Refer to https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/details/private-link/ and https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/calculator/ to estimate potential costs.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Open the `Storage Accounts` blade 1. For each listed Storage Account, perform the following: 1. Under the `Security + networking` heading, click on `Networking` 1. Click on the `Private endpoint connections` tab at the top of the networking window 1. Click the `+ Private endpoint` button 1. In the `1 - Basics` tab/step: - `Enter a name` that will be easily recognizable as associated with the Storage Account (*Note*: The Network Interface Name will be automatically completed, but you can customize it if needed.) - Ensure that the `Region` matches the region of the Storage Account - Click `Next` 1. In the `2 - Resource` tab/step: - Select the `target sub-resource` based on what type of storage resource is being made available - Click `Next` 1. In the `3 - Virtual Network` tab/step: - Select the `Virtual network` that your Storage Account will be connecting to - Select the `Subnet` that your Storage Account will be connecting to - (Optional) Select other network settings as appropriate for your environment - Click `Next` 1. In the `4 - DNS` tab/step: - (Optional) Select other DNS settings as appropriate for your environment - Click `Next` 1. In the `5 - Tags` tab/step: - (Optional) Set any tags that are relevant to your organization - Click `Next` 1. In the `6 - Review + create` tab/step: - A validation attempt will be made and after a few moments it should indicate `Validation Passed` - if it does not pass, double-check your settings before beginning more in depth troubleshooting. - If validation has passed, click `Create` then wait for a few minutes for the scripted deployment to complete. Repeat the above procedure for each Private Endpoint required within every Storage Account. **Remediate from PowerShell** ``` $storageAccount = Get-AzStorageAccount -ResourceGroupName '' -Name '' $privateEndpointConnection = @{ Name = 'connectionName' PrivateLinkServiceId = $storageAccount.Id GroupID = blob|blob_secondary|file|file_secondary|table|table_secondary|queue|queue_secondary|web|web_secondary|dfs|dfs_secondary } $privateLinkServiceConnection = New-AzPrivateLinkServiceConnection @privateEndpointConnection $virtualNetDetails = Get-AzVirtualNetwork -ResourceGroupName '' -Name '' $privateEndpoint = @{ ResourceGroupName = '' Name = '' Location = '' Subnet = $virtualNetDetails.Subnets[0] PrivateLinkServiceConnection = $privateLinkServiceConnection } New-AzPrivateEndpoint @privateEndpoint ``` **Remediate from Azure CLI** ``` az network private-endpoint create --resource-group --name --vnet-name --subnet --private-connection-resource-id --connection-name --group-id ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Open the `Storage Accounts` blade. 1. For each listed Storage Account, perform the following check: 1. Under the `Security + networking` heading, click on `Networking`. 1. Click on the `Private endpoint connections` tab at the top of the networking window. 1. Ensure that for each VNet that the Storage Account must be accessed from, a unique Private Endpoint is deployed and the `Connection state` for each Private Endpoint is `Approved`. Repeat the procedure for each Storage Account. **Audit from PowerShell** ``` $storageAccount = Get-AzStorageAccount -ResourceGroup '' -Name '' Get-AzPrivateEndpoint -ResourceGroup ''|Where-Object {$_.PrivateLinkServiceConnectionsText -match $storageAccount.id} ``` If the results of the second command returns information, the Storage Account is using a Private Endpoint and complies with this Benchmark, otherwise if the results of the second command are empty, the Storage Account generates a finding. **Audit from Azure CLI** ``` az storage account show --name '' --query privateEndpointConnections[0].id ``` If the above command returns data, the Storage Account complies with this Benchmark, otherwise if the results are empty, the Storage Account generates a finding. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [6edd7eda-6dd8-40f7-810d-67160c639cd9](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F6edd7eda-6dd8-40f7-810d-67160c639cd9) **- Name:** 'Storage accounts should use private link'", + "AdditionalInformation": "A NAT gateway is the recommended solution for outbound internet access. This recommendation is based on the Common Reference Recommendation `Ensure Private Endpoints are used to access {service}`, from the `Common Reference Recommendations > Networking > Private Endpoints` section.", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-private-endpoints:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-networks-overview:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/private-link/create-private-endpoint-portal:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/private-link/create-private-endpoint-cli?tabs=dynamic-ip:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/private-link/create-private-endpoint-powershell?tabs=dynamic-ip:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/private-link/tutorial-private-endpoint-storage-portal:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-network-security#ns-2-secure-cloud-native-services-with-network-controls", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Private Endpoints are not created for Storage Accounts." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.3.2.2", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Public Network Access' is 'Disabled' for Storage Accounts", + "Checks": [ + "storage_account_public_network_access_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Storage Services", + "SubSection": "9.3 Storage Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Public Network Access' is 'Disabled' for Storage Accounts", + "RationaleStatement": "The default network configuration for a storage account permits a user with appropriate permissions to configure public network access to containers and blobs in a storage account. Keep in mind that public access to a container is always turned off by default and must be explicitly configured to permit anonymous requests. It grants read-only access to these resources without sharing the account key, and without requiring a shared access signature. It is recommended not to provide public network access to storage accounts until, and unless, it is strongly desired. A shared access signature token or Azure AD RBAC should be used for providing controlled and timed access to blob containers.", + "ImpactStatement": "Access will have to be managed using shared access signatures or via Azure AD RBAC. For classic storage accounts (to be retired on August 31, 2024), each container in the account must be configured to block anonymous access. Either configure all containers or to configure at the storage account level, migrate to the Azure Resource Manager deployment model.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** First, follow Microsoft documentation and create shared access signature tokens for your blob containers. Then, 1. Go to `Storage Accounts`. 1. For each storage account, under the `Security + networking` section, click `Networking`. 1. Set `Public network access` to `Disabled`. 1. Click `Save`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Set 'Public Network Access' to `Disabled` on the storage account ``` az storage account update --name --resource-group --public-network-access Disabled ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** For each Storage Account, run the following to set the `PublicNetworkAccess` setting to `Disabled` ``` Set-AzStorageAccount -ResourceGroupName -Name -PublicNetworkAccess Disabled ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage Accounts`. 2. For each storage account, under the `Security + networking` section, click `Networking`. 3. Ensure the `Public network access` setting is set to `Disabled`. **Audit from Azure CLI** Ensure `publicNetworkAccess` is `Disabled` ``` az storage account show --name --resource-group --query {publicNetworkAccess:publicNetworkAccess} ``` **Audit from PowerShell** For each Storage Account, ensure `PublicNetworkAccess` is `Disabled` ``` Get-AzStorageAccount -Name -ResourceGroupName |select PublicNetworkAccess ``` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [b2982f36-99f2-4db5-8eff-283140c09693](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fb2982f36-99f2-4db5-8eff-283140c09693) **- Name:** 'Storage accounts should disable public network access'", + "AdditionalInformation": "This recommendation is based on the Common Reference Recommendation `Ensure public network access is Disabled`, from the `Common Reference Recommendations > Networking > Virtual Networks (VNets)` section.", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/storage-manage-access-to-resources:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-governance-strategy#gs-2-define-and-implement-enterprise-segmentationseparation-of-duties-strategy:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-network-security#ns-2-secure-cloud-native-services-with-network-controls:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/assign-azure-role-data-access:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-network-security?tabs=azure-portal", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `Public Network Access` is set to `Enabled from all networks` for the Storage Account." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.3.2.3", + "Description": "Ensure Default Network Access Rule for Storage Accounts is Set to Deny", + "Checks": [ + "storage_default_network_access_rule_is_denied" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Storage Services", + "SubSection": "9.3 Storage Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure Default Network Access Rule for Storage Accounts is Set to Deny", + "RationaleStatement": "Storage accounts should be configured to deny access to traffic from all networks (including internet traffic). Access can be granted to traffic from specific Azure Virtual networks, allowing a secure network boundary for specific applications to be built. Access can also be granted to public internet IP address ranges to enable connections from specific internet or on-premises clients. When network rules are configured, only applications from allowed networks can access a storage account. When calling from an allowed network, applications continue to require proper authorization (a valid access key or SAS token) to access the storage account.", + "ImpactStatement": "All allowed networks will need to be whitelisted on each specific network, creating administrative overhead. This may result in loss of network connectivity, so do not turn on for critical resources during business hours.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage Accounts`. 1. For each storage account, under `Security + networking`, click `Networking`. 1. Click the `Firewalls and virtual networks` heading. 1. Set `Public network access` to `Enabled from selected virtual networks and IP addresses`. 1. Add rules to allow traffic from specific networks and IP addresses. 1. Click `Save`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Use the below command to update `default-action` to `Deny`. ``` az storage account update --name --resource-group --default-action Deny ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to Storage Accounts. 2. For each storage account, under `Security + networking`, click `Networking`. 4. Click the `Firewalls and virtual networks` heading. 3. Ensure that `Public network access` is not set to `Enabled from all networks`. **Audit from Azure CLI** Ensure `defaultAction` is not set to ` Allow`. ``` az storage account list --query '[*].networkRuleSet' ``` **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Connect-AzAccount Set-AzContext -Subscription Get-AzStorageAccountNetworkRuleset -ResourceGroupName -Name |Select-Object DefaultAction ``` PowerShell Result - Non-Compliant ``` DefaultAction : Allow ``` PowerShell Result - Compliant ``` DefaultAction : Deny ``` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [34c877ad-507e-4c82-993e-3452a6e0ad3c](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F34c877ad-507e-4c82-993e-3452a6e0ad3c) **- Name:** 'Storage accounts should restrict network access' - **Policy ID:** [2a1a9cdf-e04d-429a-8416-3bfb72a1b26f](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F2a1a9cdf-e04d-429a-8416-3bfb72a1b26f) **- Name:** 'Storage accounts should restrict network access using virtual network rules'", + "AdditionalInformation": "This recommendation is based on the Common Reference Recommendation `Ensure Network Access Rules are set to Deny-by-default`, from the `Common Reference Recommendations > Networking > Virtual Networks (VNets)` section.", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-network-security:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-governance-strategy#gs-2-define-and-implement-enterprise-segmentationseparation-of-duties-strategy:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-network-security#ns-2-secure-cloud-native-services-with-network-controls", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Storage Accounts will accept connections from clients on any network." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.3.3.1", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Default to Microsoft Entra authorization in the Azure portal' is Set to 'Enabled'", + "Checks": [ + "storage_default_to_entra_authorization_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Storage Services", + "SubSection": "9.3 Storage Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Default to Microsoft Entra authorization in the Azure portal' is Set to 'Enabled'", + "RationaleStatement": "Microsoft Entra ID provides superior security and ease of use over Shared Key.", + "ImpactStatement": "Users will need appropriate RBAC permissions to access storage data.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage accounts`. 1. Click the name of a storage account. 1. Under `Settings`, click `Configuration`. 1. Under `Default to Microsoft Entra authorization in the Azure portal`, click the radio button next to `Enabled`. 1. Click `Save`. 1. Repeat steps 1-5 for each storage account requiring remediation. **Remediate from Azure CLI** For each storage account requiring remediation, run the following command to enable `defaultToOAuthAuthentication`: ``` az storage account update --resource-group --name --set defaultToOAuthAuthentication=true ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage accounts`. 1. Click the name of a storage account. 1. Under `Settings`, click `Configuration`. 1. Ensure that `Default to Microsoft Entra authorization in the Azure portal` is set to `Enabled`. 1. Repeat steps 1-4 for each storage account. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to get the `name` and `defaultToOAuthAuthentication` setting for each storage account: ``` az storage account list --query [*].[name,defaultToOAuthAuthentication] ``` Ensure that `true` is returned for each storage account.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/authorize-data-operations-portal#default-to-microsoft-entra-authorization-in-the-azure-portal:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/storage/account?view=azure-cli-latest", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `defaultToOAuthAuthentication` is disabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.3.4", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Secure transfer required' is Set to 'Enabled'", + "Checks": [ + "storage_secure_transfer_required_is_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Storage Services", + "SubSection": "9.3 Storage Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Secure transfer required' is Set to 'Enabled'", + "RationaleStatement": "The secure transfer option enhances the security of a storage account by only allowing requests to the storage account by a secure connection. For example, when calling REST APIs to access storage accounts, the connection must use HTTPS. Any requests using HTTP will be rejected when 'secure transfer required' is enabled. When using the Azure files service, connection without encryption will fail, including scenarios using SMB 2.1, SMB 3.0 without encryption, and some flavors of the Linux SMB client. Because Azure storage doesnt support HTTPS for custom domain names, this option is not applied when using a custom domain name.", + "ImpactStatement": "Applications using HTTP will need to be updated to use HTTPS.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage Accounts`. 1. For each storage account, under `Settings`, click `Configuration`. 1. Set `Secure transfer required` to `Enabled`. 1. Click `Save`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Use the below command to enable `Secure transfer required` for a `Storage Account` ``` az storage account update --name --resource-group --https-only true ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage Accounts`. 1. For each storage account, under `Settings`, click `Configuration`. 1. Ensure that `Secure transfer required` is set to `Enabled`. **Audit from Azure CLI** Use the below command to ensure the `Secure transfer required` is enabled for all the `Storage Accounts` by ensuring the output contains `true` for each of the `Storage Accounts`. ``` az storage account list --query [*].[name,enableHttpsTrafficOnly] ``` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [404c3081-a854-4457-ae30-26a93ef643f9](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F404c3081-a854-4457-ae30-26a93ef643f9) **- Name:** 'Secure transfer to storage accounts should be enabled'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/security-recommendations#encryption-in-transit:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/storage/account?view=azure-cli-latest#az_storage_account_list:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/storage/account?view=azure-cli-latest#az_storage_account_update:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-data-protection#dp-3-encrypt-sensitive-data-in-transit", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `Secure transfer required` is set to `Disabled`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.3.5", + "Description": "Ensure 'Allow trusted Microsoft services to access this resource' is Enabled for Storage Account Access", + "Checks": [ + "storage_ensure_azure_services_are_trusted_to_access_is_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Storage Services", + "SubSection": "9.3 Storage Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure 'Allow trusted Microsoft services to access this resource' is Enabled for Storage Account Access", + "RationaleStatement": "Turning on firewall rules for a storage account will block access to incoming requests for data, including from other Azure services. We can re-enable this functionality by allowing access to `trusted Azure services` through networking exceptions.", + "ImpactStatement": "This creates authentication credentials for services that need access to storage resources so that services will no longer need to communicate via network request. There may be a temporary loss of communication as you set each Storage Account. It is recommended to not do this on mission-critical resources during business hours.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage Accounts`. 1. For each storage account, under `Security + networking`, click `Networking`. 1. Click on the `Firewalls and virtual networks` heading. 1. Under `Exceptions`, check the box next to `Allow Azure services on the trusted services list to access this storage account`. 1. Click `Save`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Use the below command to update `bypass` to `Azure services`. ``` az storage account update --name --resource-group --bypass AzureServices ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage Accounts`. 1. For each storage account, under `Security + networking`, click `Networking`. 1. Click on the `Firewalls and virtual networks` heading. 1. Under `Exceptions`, ensure that `Allow Azure services on the trusted services list to access this storage account` is checked. **Audit from Azure CLI** Ensure `bypass` contains `AzureServices` ``` az storage account list --query '[*].networkRuleSet' ``` **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Connect-AzAccount Set-AzContext -Subscription Get-AzStorageAccountNetworkRuleset -ResourceGroupName -Name |Select-Object Bypass ``` If the response from the above command is `None`, the storage account configuration is out of compliance with this check. If the response is `AzureServices`, the storage account configuration is in compliance with this check. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [c9d007d0-c057-4772-b18c-01e546713bcd](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fc9d007d0-c057-4772-b18c-01e546713bcd) **- Name:** 'Storage accounts should allow access from trusted Microsoft services'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-network-security:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-network-security#ns-2-secure-cloud-native-services-with-network-controls", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Storage Accounts will accept connections from clients on any network." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.3.6", + "Description": "Ensure the 'Minimum TLS version' for Storage Accounts is Set to 'Version 1.2'", + "Checks": [ + "storage_ensure_minimum_tls_version_12" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Storage Services", + "SubSection": "9.3 Storage Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure the 'Minimum TLS version' for Storage Accounts is Set to 'Version 1.2'", + "RationaleStatement": "TLS 1.0 has known vulnerabilities and has been replaced by later versions of the TLS protocol. Continued use of this legacy protocol affects the security of data in transit.", + "ImpactStatement": "When set to TLS 1.2 all requests must leverage this version of the protocol. Applications leveraging legacy versions of the protocol will fail.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage Accounts`. 1. For each storage account, under `Settings`, click `Configuration`. 1. Set the `Minimum TLS version` to `Version 1.2`. 1. Click `Save`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** ``` az storage account update \\ --name \\ --resource-group \\ --min-tls-version TLS1_2 ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** To set the minimum TLS version, run the following command: ``` Set-AzStorageAccount -AccountName ` -ResourceGroupName ` -MinimumTlsVersion TLS1_2 ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage Accounts`. 1. For each storage account, under `Settings`, click `Configuration`. 1. Ensure that the `Minimum TLS version` is set to `Version 1.2`. **Audit from Azure CLI** Get a list of all storage accounts and their resource groups ``` az storage account list | jq '.[] | {name, resourceGroup}' ``` Then query the minimumTLSVersion field ``` az storage account show \\ --name \\ --resource-group \\ --query minimumTlsVersion \\ --output tsv ``` **Audit from PowerShell** To get the minimum TLS version, run the following command: ``` (Get-AzStorageAccount -Name -ResourceGroupName ).MinimumTlsVersion ``` **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [fe83a0eb-a853-422d-aac2-1bffd182c5d0](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Ffe83a0eb-a853-422d-aac2-1bffd182c5d0) **- Name:** 'Storage accounts should have the specified minimum TLS version'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/transport-layer-security-configure-minimum-version?tabs=portal:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-data-protection#dp-3-encrypt-sensitive-data-in-transit", + "DefaultValue": "If a storage account is created through the portal, the MinimumTlsVersion property for that storage account will be set to TLS 1.2. If a storage account is created through PowerShell or CLI, the MinimumTlsVersion property for that storage account will not be set, and defaults to TLS 1.0." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.3.7", + "Description": "Ensure 'Cross Tenant Replication' is Not Enabled", + "Checks": [ + "storage_cross_tenant_replication_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Storage Services", + "SubSection": "9.3 Storage Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure 'Cross Tenant Replication' is Not Enabled", + "RationaleStatement": "Disabling Cross Tenant Replication minimizes the risk of unauthorized data access and ensures that data governance policies are strictly adhered to. This control is especially critical for organizations with stringent data security and privacy requirements, as it prevents the accidental sharing of sensitive information.", + "ImpactStatement": "Disabling Cross Tenant Replication may affect data availability and sharing across different Azure tenants. Ensure that this change aligns with your organizational data sharing and availability requirements.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage Accounts`. 1. For each storage account, under `Data management`, click `Object replication`. 1. Click `Advanced settings`. 1. Uncheck `Allow cross-tenant replication`. 1. Click `OK`. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Replace the information within <> with appropriate values: ``` az storage account update --name --resource-group --allow-cross-tenant-replication false ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage Accounts`. 1. For each storage account, under `Data management`, click `Object replication`. 1. Click `Advanced settings`. 1. Ensure `Allow cross-tenant replication` is not checked. **Audit from Azure CLI** ``` az storage account list --query [*].[name,allowCrossTenantReplication] ``` The value of `false` should be returned for each storage account listed. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [92a89a79-6c52-4a7e-a03f-61306fc49312](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F92a89a79-6c52-4a7e-a03f-61306fc49312) **- Name:** 'Storage accounts should prevent cross tenant object replication'", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/object-replication-prevent-cross-tenant-policies?tabs=portal", + "DefaultValue": "For new storage accounts created after Dec 15, 2023 cross tenant replication is not enabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.3.8", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Allow Blob Anonymous Access' is Set to 'Disabled'", + "Checks": [ + "storage_blob_public_access_level_is_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Storage Services", + "SubSection": "9.3 Storage Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that 'Allow Blob Anonymous Access' is Set to 'Disabled'", + "RationaleStatement": "If Allow Blob Anonymous Access is enabled, blobs can be accessed by adding the blob name to the URL to see the contents. An attacker can enumerate a blob using methods, such as brute force, and access them. Exfiltration of data by brute force enumeration of items from a storage account may occur if this setting is set to 'Enabled'.", + "ImpactStatement": "Additional consideration may be required for exceptional circumstances where elements of a storage account require public accessibility. In these circumstances, it is highly recommended that all data stored in the public facing storage account be reviewed for sensitive or potentially compromising data, and that sensitive or compromising data is never stored in these storage accounts.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage Accounts`. 1. For each storage account, under `Settings`, click `Configuration`. 1. Set `Allow Blob Anonymous Access` to `Disabled`. 1. Click `Save`. **Remediate from Powershell** For every storage account in scope, run the following: ``` $storageAccount = Get-AzStorageAccount -ResourceGroupName -Name $storageAccount.AllowBlobPublicAccess = $false Set-AzStorageAccount -InputObject $storageAccount ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage Accounts`. 1. For each storage account, under `Settings`, click `Configuration`. 1. Ensure `Allow Blob Anonymous Access` is set to `Disabled`. **Audit from Azure CLI** For every storage account in scope: ``` az storage account show --name --query allowBlobPublicAccess ``` Ensure that every storage account in scope returns `false` for the allowBlobPublicAccess setting. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [4fa4b6c0-31ca-4c0d-b10d-24b96f62a751](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2F4fa4b6c0-31ca-4c0d-b10d-24b96f62a751) **- Name:** 'Storage account public access should be disallowed'", + "AdditionalInformation": "Azure Storage accounts that use the classic deployment model will be retired on August 31, 2024.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/anonymous-read-access-prevent?tabs=portal:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/anonymous-read-access-prevent?source=recommendations&tabs=portal:Classic Storage Accounts: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/anonymous-read-access-prevent-classic?tabs=portal", + "DefaultValue": "Disabled" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.3.9", + "Description": "Ensure Azure Resource Manager Delete Locks are Applied to Azure Storage Accounts", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Storage Services", + "SubSection": "9.3 Storage Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure Azure Resource Manager Delete Locks are Applied to Azure Storage Accounts", + "RationaleStatement": "Applying a _Delete_ lock on storage accounts protects the availability of data by preventing the accidental or unauthorized deletion of the entire storage account. It is a fundamental protective control that can prevent data loss", + "ImpactStatement": "- Prevents the deletion of the Storage account Resource entirely. - Prevents the deletion of the parent Resource Group containing the locked Storage account resource. - Does not prevent other control plane operations, including modification of configurations, network settings, containers, and access. - Does not prevent deletion of containers or other objects within the storage account.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the storage account in the Azure portal. 1. Under the `Settings` section, select `Locks`. 1. Select `Add`. 1. Provide a Name, and choose `Delete` for the type of lock. 1. Add a note about the lock if desired. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Replace the information within <> with appropriate values: ``` az lock create --name \\ --resource-group \\ --resource \\ --lock-type CanNotDelete \\ --resource-type Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Replace the information within <> with appropriate values: ``` New-AzResourceLock -LockLevel CanNotDelete ` -LockName ` -ResourceName ` -ResourceType Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts ` -ResourceGroupName ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the storage account in the Azure portal. 1. For each storage account, under `Settings`, click `Locks`. 1. Ensure that a `Delete` lock exists on the storage account. **Audit from Azure CLI** ``` az lock list --resource-group \\ --resource-name \\ --resource-type Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts ``` **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Get-AzResourceLock -ResourceGroupName ` -ResourceName ` -ResourceType Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts ``` **Audit from Azure Policy** There is currently no built-in Microsoft policy to audit resource locks on storage accounts. Custom and community policy definitions can check for the existence of a “Microsoft.Authorization/locks” resource with an AuditIfNotExists effect.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/lock-account-resource:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/lock-resources", + "DefaultValue": "By default, no locks are applied to Azure resources, including storage accounts. Locks must be manually configured after resource creation." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.3.10", + "Description": "Ensure Azure Resource Manager ReadOnly Locks are Considered for Azure Storage Accounts", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Storage Services", + "SubSection": "9.3 Storage Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure Azure Resource Manager ReadOnly Locks are Considered for Azure Storage Accounts", + "RationaleStatement": "Applying a `ReadOnly` lock on storage accounts protects the confidentiality and availability of data by preventing the accidental or unauthorized deletion of the entire storage account and modification of the account, container properties, or access permissions. It can offer enhanced protection for blob and queue workloads with tradeoffs in usability and compatibility for clients using account shared access keys.", + "ImpactStatement": "- Prevents the deletion of the Storage account Resource entirely. - Prevents the deletion of the parent Resource Group containing the locked Storage account resource. - Prevents clients from obtaining the storage account shared access keys using a `listKeys` operation. - Requires Entra credentials to access blob and queue data in the Portal. - Data in Azure Files or the Table service may be inaccessible to clients using the account shared access keys. - Prevents modification of account properties, network settings, containers, and RBAC assignments. - Does not prevent access using existing account shared access keys issued to clients. - Does not prevent deletion of containers or other objects within the storage account.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the storage account in the Azure portal. 1. Under the `Settings` section, select `Locks`. 1. Select `Add`. 1. Provide a Name, and choose `ReadOnly` for the type of lock. 1. Add a note about the lock if desired. **Remediate from Azure CLI** Replace the information within <> with appropriate values: ``` az lock create --name \\ --resource-group \\ --resource \\ --lock-type ReadOnly \\ --resource-type Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** Replace the information within <> with appropriate values: ``` New-AzResourceLock -LockLevel ReadOnly ` -LockName ` -ResourceName ` -ResourceType Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts ` -ResourceGroupName ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Navigate to the storage account in the Azure portal. 1. For each storage account, under `Settings`, click `Locks`. 1. Ensure that a `ReadOnly` lock exists on the storage account. **Audit from Azure CLI** ``` az lock list --resource-group \\ --resource-name \\ --resource-type Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts ``` **Audit from PowerShell** ``` Get-AzResourceLock -ResourceGroupName ` -ResourceName ` -ResourceType Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts ``` **Audit from Azure Policy** There is currently no built-in Microsoft policy to audit resource locks on storage accounts. Custom and community policy definitions can check for the existence of a “Microsoft.Authorization/locks” resource with an AuditIfNotExists effect.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/lock-account-resource:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/lock-resources:https://github.com/Azure/azure-rest-api-specs/tree/main/specification/storage", + "DefaultValue": "By default, no locks are applied to Azure resources, including storage accounts. Locks must be manually configured after resource creation." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.3.11", + "Description": "Ensure Redundancy is Set to 'geo-redundant storage (GRS)' on Critical Azure Storage Accounts", + "Checks": [ + "storage_geo_redundant_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Storage Services", + "SubSection": "9.3 Storage Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure Redundancy is Set to 'geo-redundant storage (GRS)' on Critical Azure Storage Accounts", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling GRS protects critical data from regional failures by maintaining a copy in a geographically separate location. This significantly reduces the risk of data loss, supports business continuity, and meets high availability requirements for disaster recovery.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling geo-redundant storage on Azure storage accounts increases costs due to cross-region data replication.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Remediate from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage accounts`. 1. Click on a storage account. 1. Under `Data management`, click `Redundancy`. 1. From the `Redundancy` drop-down menu, select `Geo-redundant storage (GRS)`. 1. Click `Save`. 1. Repeat steps 1-5 for each storage account requiring remediation. **Remediate from Azure CLI** For each storage account requiring remediation, run the following command to enable geo-redundant storage: ``` az storage account update --resource-group --name --sku Standard_GRS ``` **Remediate from PowerShell** For each storage account requiring remediation, run the following command to enable geo-redundant storage: ``` Set-AzStorageAccount -ResourceGroupName -Name -SkuName Standard_GRS ```", + "AuditProcedure": "**Audit from Azure Portal** 1. Go to `Storage accounts`. 1. Click on a storage account. 1. Under `Data management`, click `Redundancy`. 1. Ensure that `Redundancy` is set to `Geo-redundant storage (GRS)`. 1. Repeat steps 1-4 for each storage account. **Audit from Azure CLI** Run the following command to list storage accounts: ``` az storage account list ``` For each storage account, run the following command: ``` az storage account show --resource-group --name ``` Under `sku`, ensure that `name` is set to `Standard_GRS`. **Audit from PowerShell** Run the following command to list storage accounts: ``` Get-AzStorageAccount ``` Run the following command to get the storage account in a resource group with a given name: ``` $storageAccount = Get-AzStorageAccount -ResourceGroupName -Name ``` Run the following command to get the redundancy setting for the storage account: ``` $storageAccount.SKU.Name ``` Ensure that the command returns `Standard_GRS`. Repeat for each storage account. **Audit from Azure Policy** If referencing a digital copy of this Benchmark, clicking a Policy ID will open a link to the associated Policy definition in Azure. If referencing a printed copy, you can search Policy IDs from this URL: https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyMenuBlade/~/Definitions - **Policy ID:** [bf045164-79ba-4215-8f95-f8048dc1780b](https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_Azure_Policy/PolicyDetailBlade/definitionId/%2Fproviders%2FMicrosoft.Authorization%2FpolicyDefinitions%2Fbf045164-79ba-4215-8f95-f8048dc1780b) **- Name:** 'Geo-redundant storage should be enabled for Storage Accounts'", + "AdditionalInformation": "When choosing the best redundancy option, weigh the trade-offs between lower costs and higher availability. Key factors to consider include: - The method of data replication within the primary region. - The replication of data from a primary to a geographically distant secondary region for protection against regional disasters (geo-replication). - The necessity for read access to replicated data in the secondary region during an outage in the primary region (geo-replication with read access).", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-redundancy:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/redundancy-migration:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/storage/account?view=azure-cli-latest#az-storage-account-update:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/az.storage/set-azstorageaccount?view=azps-12.4.0:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-disaster-recovery-guidance", + "DefaultValue": "When creating a storage account in the Azure Portal, the default redundancy setting is geo-redundant storage (GRS). Using the Azure CLI, the default is read-access geo-redundant storage (RA-GRS). In PowerShell, a redundancy level must be explicitly specified during account creation." + } + ] + } + ] +} diff --git a/prowler/compliance/azure/fedramp_20x_ksi_low_azure.json b/prowler/compliance/azure/fedramp_20x_ksi_low_azure.json index c845f75f60..655f649abe 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/azure/fedramp_20x_ksi_low_azure.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/azure/fedramp_20x_ksi_low_azure.json @@ -328,6 +328,7 @@ "Checks": [ "entra_non_privileged_user_has_mfa", "entra_privileged_user_has_mfa", + "entra_user_with_recent_sign_in", "entra_user_with_vm_access_has_mfa", "iam_custom_role_has_permissions_to_administer_resource_locks", "iam_role_user_access_admin_restricted", diff --git a/prowler/compliance/azure/hipaa_azure.json b/prowler/compliance/azure/hipaa_azure.json index 332d081590..62ffe2fdad 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/azure/hipaa_azure.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/azure/hipaa_azure.json @@ -182,6 +182,7 @@ } ], "Checks": [ + "entra_user_with_recent_sign_in", "storage_key_rotation_90_days", "keyvault_key_rotation_enabled", "keyvault_rbac_key_expiration_set", @@ -430,6 +431,7 @@ } ], "Checks": [ + "recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate", "vm_backup_enabled", "vm_sufficient_daily_backup_retention_period", "storage_blob_versioning_is_enabled", @@ -438,7 +440,10 @@ "storage_geo_redundant_enabled", "keyvault_recoverable", "sqlserver_auditing_retention_90_days", - "postgresql_flexible_server_log_retention_days_greater_3" + "postgresql_flexible_server_log_retention_days_greater_3", + "cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous", + "mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled", + "postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled" ] }, { @@ -762,6 +767,17 @@ "mysql_flexible_server_minimum_tls_version_12", "mysql_flexible_server_ssl_connection_enabled", "postgresql_flexible_server_enforce_ssl_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_minimal_tls_versions", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "1.2", + "1.3" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -814,6 +830,17 @@ "mysql_flexible_server_ssl_connection_enabled", "postgresql_flexible_server_enforce_ssl_enabled", "databricks_workspace_cmk_encryption_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_minimal_tls_versions", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "1.2", + "1.3" + ] + } ] } ] diff --git a/prowler/compliance/azure/iso27001_2022_azure.json b/prowler/compliance/azure/iso27001_2022_azure.json index 0051795890..23392533de 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/azure/iso27001_2022_azure.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/azure/iso27001_2022_azure.json @@ -271,6 +271,7 @@ } ], "Checks": [ + "aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled", "defender_ensure_defender_for_containers_is_on", "defender_ensure_defender_for_cosmosdb_is_on", "defender_ensure_defender_for_databases_is_on", @@ -284,6 +285,7 @@ "defender_ensure_notify_alerts_severity_is_high", "entra_policy_guest_users_access_restrictions", "entra_policy_restricts_user_consent_for_apps", + "entra_user_with_recent_sign_in", "entra_users_cannot_create_microsoft_365_groups", "iam_custom_role_has_permissions_to_administer_resource_locks", "monitor_alert_create_update_security_solution", @@ -332,7 +334,8 @@ "entra_policy_guest_invite_only_for_admin_roles", "entra_policy_guest_users_access_restrictions", "entra_policy_restricts_user_consent_for_apps", - "entra_policy_user_consent_for_verified_apps" + "entra_policy_user_consent_for_verified_apps", + "entra_user_with_recent_sign_in" ] }, { @@ -1102,6 +1105,7 @@ } ], "Checks": [ + "entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced", "entra_conditional_access_policy_require_mfa_for_management_app", "entra_non_privileged_user_has_mfa entra_privileged_user_has_mfa", "entra_user_with_vm_access_has_mfa", @@ -1266,7 +1270,12 @@ "Check_Summary": "Backup copies of information, software and systems should be maintained and regularly tested in accordance with the agreed topic-specific policy on backup." } ], - "Checks": [] + "Checks": [ + "cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous", + "mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled", + "postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled", + "recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate" + ] }, { "Id": "A.8.14", @@ -1293,7 +1302,12 @@ "storage_ensure_private_endpoints_in_storage_accounts", "storage_secure_transfer_required_is_enabled", "vm_ensure_using_managed_disks", - "vm_trusted_launch_enabled" + "vm_trusted_launch_enabled", + "cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled", + "mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled", + "mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled", + "postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled", + "postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled" ] }, { @@ -1337,6 +1351,8 @@ } ], "Checks": [ + "aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled", + "defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on", "monitor_alert_create_policy_assignment", "monitor_alert_create_update_nsg", "monitor_alert_create_update_public_ip_address_rule", @@ -1407,6 +1423,9 @@ "aks_network_policy_enabled", "containerregistry_not_publicly_accessible", "cosmosdb_account_firewall_use_selected_networks", + "cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled", + "databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled", + "databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled", "network_bastion_host_exists", "network_flow_log_captured_sent", "network_flow_log_more_than_90_days", @@ -1414,7 +1433,9 @@ "network_public_ip_shodan", "network_rdp_internet_access_restricted", "network_ssh_internet_access_restricted", + "network_subnet_nsg_associated", "network_udp_internet_access_restricted", + "network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled", "network_watcher_enabled" ] }, @@ -1468,6 +1489,7 @@ "network_public_ip_shodan", "network_rdp_internet_access_restricted", "network_ssh_internet_access_restricted", + "network_subnet_nsg_associated", "network_udp_internet_access_restricted", "network_watcher_enabled" ] @@ -1500,6 +1522,8 @@ ], "Checks": [ "app_minimum_tls_version_12", + "cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version", + "entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired", "monitor_storage_account_with_activity_logs_cmk_encrypted", "sqlserver_tde_encrypted_with_cmk", "sqlserver_tde_encryption_enabled", diff --git a/prowler/compliance/azure/mitre_attack_azure.json b/prowler/compliance/azure/mitre_attack_azure.json index 92ddd72713..8b338da534 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/azure/mitre_attack_azure.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/azure/mitre_attack_azure.json @@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ "Description": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop.[1] Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.", "TechniqueURL": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/", "Checks": [ + "entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired", "entra_conditional_access_policy_require_mfa_for_management_api", "entra_global_admin_in_less_than_five_users", "entra_non_privileged_user_has_mfa", diff --git a/prowler/compliance/azure/nis2_azure.json b/prowler/compliance/azure/nis2_azure.json index 5c48c22f6b..0ae814fad7 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/azure/nis2_azure.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/azure/nis2_azure.json @@ -1133,6 +1133,17 @@ "defender_ensure_defender_for_dns_is_on", "sqlserver_tde_encryption_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_minimal_tls_versions", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "1.2", + "1.3" + ] + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "6 SECURITY IN NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS ACQUISITION, DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE (ARTICLE 21(2), POINT (E), OF DIRECTIVE (EU) 2022/2555)", @@ -1164,6 +1175,17 @@ "network_udp_internet_access_restricted", "network_watcher_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_minimal_tls_versions", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "1.2", + "1.3" + ] + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "6 SECURITY IN NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS ACQUISITION, DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE (ARTICLE 21(2), POINT (E), OF DIRECTIVE (EU) 2022/2555)", @@ -1887,6 +1909,17 @@ "sqlserver_tde_encrypted_with_cmk", "sqlserver_tde_encryption_enabled" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_minimal_tls_versions", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "1.2", + "1.3" + ] + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "12 ASSET MANAGEMENT (ARTICLE 21(2), POINT (I), OF DIRECTIVE (EU) 2022/2555)", diff --git a/prowler/compliance/azure/secnumcloud_3.2_azure.json b/prowler/compliance/azure/secnumcloud_3.2_azure.json index ef8c94113e..3f2e8c7603 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/azure/secnumcloud_3.2_azure.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/azure/secnumcloud_3.2_azure.json @@ -339,6 +339,7 @@ } ], "Checks": [ + "entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced", "entra_non_privileged_user_has_mfa", "entra_privileged_user_has_mfa", "entra_security_defaults_enabled" @@ -439,6 +440,25 @@ "postgresql_flexible_server_enforce_ssl_enabled", "mysql_flexible_server_ssl_connection_enabled", "mysql_flexible_server_minimum_tls_version_12" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_minimal_tls_versions", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "1.2", + "1.3" + ] + }, + { + "Check": "storage_smb_channel_encryption_with_secure_algorithm", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_smb_channel_encryption_algorithms", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "AES-256-GCM" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -493,7 +513,8 @@ "keyvault_non_rbac_secret_expiration_set", "keyvault_logging_enabled", "keyvault_private_endpoints", - "keyvault_access_only_through_private_endpoints" + "keyvault_access_only_through_private_endpoints", + "entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired" ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/azure/soc2_azure.json b/prowler/compliance/azure/soc2_azure.json index d8936f5485..c3b4db6e39 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/azure/soc2_azure.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/azure/soc2_azure.json @@ -241,7 +241,8 @@ "app_function_not_publicly_accessible", "containerregistry_not_publicly_accessible", "network_public_ip_shodan", - "storage_blob_public_access_level_is_disabled" + "storage_blob_public_access_level_is_disabled", + "entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired" ] }, { @@ -265,6 +266,17 @@ "sqlserver_tde_encryption_enabled", "sqlserver_unrestricted_inbound_access", "storage_secure_transfer_required_is_enabled" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_minimal_tls_versions", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "1.2", + "1.3" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -307,7 +319,19 @@ "app_minimum_tls_version_12", "mysql_flexible_server_minimum_tls_version_12", "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", - "storage_ensure_minimum_tls_version_12" + "storage_ensure_minimum_tls_version_12", + "network_subnet_nsg_associated" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_minimal_tls_versions", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "1.2", + "1.3" + ] + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/cis_controls_8.1.json b/prowler/compliance/cis_controls_8.1.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c03d9e806b --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/compliance/cis_controls_8.1.json @@ -0,0 +1,4554 @@ +{ + "framework": "CIS-Controls", + "name": "CIS Controls v8.1", + "version": "8.1", + "description": "The CIS Critical Security Controls (CIS Controls) v8.1 are a prioritized set of Safeguards to mitigate the most prevalent cyber-attacks against systems and networks. They are organized into 18 top-level Controls and mapped to three Implementation Groups (IG1, IG2, IG3). This is a cross-provider mapping of Prowler checks to the CIS Controls Safeguards that can be assessed automatically against cloud and platform configurations.", + "icon": "cisecurity", + "attributes_metadata": [ + { + "key": "Section", + "label": "CIS Control", + "type": "str", + "required": true, + "enum": [ + "1. Inventory and Control of Enterprise Assets", + "2. Inventory and Control of Software Assets", + "3. Data Protection", + "4. Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software", + "5. Account Management", + "6. Access Control Management", + "7. Continuous Vulnerability Management", + "8. Audit Log Management", + "9. Email and Web Browser Protections", + "10. Malware Defenses", + "11. Data Recovery", + "12. Network Infrastructure Management", + "13. Network Monitoring and Defense", + "14. Security Awareness and Skills Training", + "15. Service Provider Management", + "16. Application Software Security", + "17. Incident Response Management", + "18. Penetration Testing" + ], + "output_formats": { + "csv": true, + "ocsf": true + } + }, + { + "key": "Function", + "label": "Security Function", + "type": "str", + "required": false, + "enum": [ + "Identify", + "Protect", + "Detect", + "Respond", + "Recover", + "Govern" + ], + "output_formats": { + "csv": true, + "ocsf": true + } + }, + { + "key": "AssetType", + "label": "Asset Type", + "type": "str", + "required": false, + "enum": [ + "Data", + "Devices", + "Documentation", + "Network", + "Software", + "Users" + ], + "output_formats": { + "csv": true, + "ocsf": true + } + }, + { + "key": "ImplementationGroups", + "label": "Implementation Groups", + "type": "list_str", + "required": false, + "output_formats": { + "csv": true, + "ocsf": true + } + } + ], + "outputs": { + "table_config": { + "group_by": "Section" + }, + "pdf_config": { + "language": "en", + "primary_color": "#cc0000", + "secondary_color": "#7a1f1f", + "bg_color": "#FAF0F0", + "group_by_field": "Section", + "sections": [ + "1. Inventory and Control of Enterprise Assets", + "2. Inventory and Control of Software Assets", + "3. Data Protection", + "4. Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software", + "5. Account Management", + "6. Access Control Management", + "7. Continuous Vulnerability Management", + "8. Audit Log Management", + "9. Email and Web Browser Protections", + "10. Malware Defenses", + "11. Data Recovery", + "12. Network Infrastructure Management", + "13. Network Monitoring and Defense", + "14. Security Awareness and Skills Training", + "15. Service Provider Management", + "16. Application Software Security", + "17. Incident Response Management", + "18. Penetration Testing" + ], + "section_short_names": { + "1. Inventory and Control of Enterprise Assets": "CIS 1", + "2. Inventory and Control of Software Assets": "CIS 2", + "3. Data Protection": "CIS 3", + "4. Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software": "CIS 4", + "5. Account Management": "CIS 5", + "6. Access Control Management": "CIS 6", + "7. Continuous Vulnerability Management": "CIS 7", + "8. Audit Log Management": "CIS 8", + "9. Email and Web Browser Protections": "CIS 9", + "10. Malware Defenses": "CIS 10", + "11. Data Recovery": "CIS 11", + "12. Network Infrastructure Management": "CIS 12", + "13. Network Monitoring and Defense": "CIS 13", + "14. Security Awareness and Skills Training": "CIS 14", + "15. Service Provider Management": "CIS 15", + "16. Application Software Security": "CIS 16", + "17. Incident Response Management": "CIS 17", + "18. Penetration Testing": "CIS 18" + }, + "charts": [ + { + "id": "section_compliance", + "type": "horizontal_bar", + "group_by": "Section", + "title": "Compliance Score by CIS Control", + "y_label": "CIS Control", + "x_label": "Compliance %", + "value_source": "compliance_percent", + "color_mode": "by_value" + } + ], + "filter": { + "only_failed": true, + "include_manual": false + } + } + }, + "requirements": [ + { + "id": "1.1", + "name": "Establish and Maintain Detailed Enterprise Asset Inventory", + "description": "Establish and maintain an accurate, detailed, and up-to-date inventory of all enterprise assets with the potential to store or process data, to include: end-user devices (including portable and mobile), network devices, non-computing/IoT devices, and servers. Ensure the inventory records the network address (if static), hardware address, machine name, enterprise asset owner, department for each asset, and whether the asset has been approved to connect to the network. For mobile end-user devices, MDM type tools can support this process, where appropriate. This inventory includes assets connected to the infrastructure physically, virtually, remotely, and those within cloud environments. Additionally, it includes assets that are regularly connected to the enterprise's network infrastructure, even if they are not under control of the enterprise. Review and update the inventory of all enterprise assets bi-annually, or more frequently.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "1. Inventory and Control of Enterprise Assets", + "Function": "Identify", + "AssetType": "Devices", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "resourceexplorer2_indexes_found" + ], + "gcp": [ + "iam_cloud_asset_inventory_enabled" + ] + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] + }, + { + "id": "1.2", + "name": "Address Unauthorized Assets", + "description": "Ensure that a process exists to address unauthorized assets on a weekly basis. The enterprise may choose to remove the asset from the network, deny the asset from connecting remotely to the network, or quarantine the asset.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "1. Inventory and Control of Enterprise Assets", + "Function": "Respond", + "AssetType": "Devices", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "1.3", + "name": "Utilize an Active Discovery Tool", + "description": "Utilize an active discovery tool to identify assets connected to the enterprise's network. Configure the active discovery tool to execute daily, or more frequently.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "1. Inventory and Control of Enterprise Assets", + "Function": "Detect", + "AssetType": "Devices", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "1.4", + "name": "Use Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Logging to Update Enterprise Asset Inventory", + "description": "Use DHCP logging on all DHCP servers or Internet Protocol (IP) address management tools to update the enterprise's asset inventory. Review and use logs to update the enterprise's asset inventory weekly, or more frequently.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "1. Inventory and Control of Enterprise Assets", + "Function": "Identify", + "AssetType": "Devices", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "1.5", + "name": "Use a Passive Asset Discovery Tool", + "description": "Use a passive discovery tool to identify assets connected to the enterprise's network. Review and use scans to update the enterprise's asset inventory at least weekly, or more frequently.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "1. Inventory and Control of Enterprise Assets", + "Function": "Detect", + "AssetType": "Devices", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "2.1", + "name": "Establish and Maintain a Software Inventory", + "description": "Establish and maintain a detailed inventory of all licensed software installed on enterprise assets. The software inventory must document the title, publisher, initial install/use date, and business purpose for each entry; where appropriate, include the Uniform Resource Locator (URL), app store(s), version(s), deployment mechanism, decommission date, and number of licenses. Review and update the software inventory bi-annually, or more frequently.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "2. Inventory and Control of Software Assets", + "Function": "Identify", + "AssetType": "Software", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "2.2", + "name": "Ensure Authorized Software is Currently Supported", + "description": "Ensure that only currently supported software is designated as authorized in the software inventory for enterprise assets. If software is unsupported, yet necessary for the fulfillment of the enterprise's mission, document an exception detailing mitigating controls and residual risk acceptance. For any unsupported software without an exception documentation, designate as unauthorized. Review the software list to verify software support at least monthly, or more frequently.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "2. Inventory and Control of Software Assets", + "Function": "Identify", + "AssetType": "Software", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "awslambda_function_using_supported_runtimes", + "ec2_instance_with_outdated_ami", + "eks_cluster_uses_a_supported_version", + "kafka_cluster_uses_latest_version", + "rds_instance_deprecated_engine_version" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "2.3", + "name": "Address Unauthorized Software", + "description": "Ensure that unauthorized software is either removed from use on enterprise assets or receives a documented exception. Review monthly, or more frequently.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "2. Inventory and Control of Software Assets", + "Function": "Respond", + "AssetType": "Software", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "2.4", + "name": "Utilize Automated Software Inventory Tools", + "description": "Utilize software inventory tools, when possible, throughout the enterprise to automate the discovery and documentation of installed software.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "2. Inventory and Control of Software Assets", + "Function": "Detect", + "AssetType": "Software", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "2.5", + "name": "Allowlist Authorized Software", + "description": "Use technical controls, such as application allowlisting, to ensure that only authorized software can execute or be accessed. Reassess bi-annually, or more frequently.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "2. Inventory and Control of Software Assets", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Software", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "googleworkspace": [ + "chat_apps_installation_disabled", + "marketplace_apps_access_restricted", + "security_app_access_restricted" + ], + "m365": [ + "entra_admin_consent_workflow_enabled", + "entra_policy_restricts_user_consent_for_apps", + "entra_thirdparty_integrated_apps_not_allowed" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "2.6", + "name": "Allowlist Authorized Libraries", + "description": "Use technical controls to ensure that only authorized software libraries, such as specific .dll, .ocx, and .so files, are allowed to load into a system process. Block unauthorized libraries from loading into a system process. Reassess bi-annually, or more frequently.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "2. Inventory and Control of Software Assets", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Software", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "2.7", + "name": "Allowlist Authorized Scripts", + "description": "Use technical controls, such as digital signatures and version control, to ensure that only authorized scripts, such as specific .ps1, and .py files are allowed to execute. Block unauthorized scripts from executing. Reassess bi-annually, or more frequently.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "2. Inventory and Control of Software Assets", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Software", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "3.1", + "name": "Establish and Maintain a Data Management Process", + "description": "Establish and maintain a documented data management process. In the process, address data sensitivity, data owner, handling of data, data retention limits, and disposal requirements, based on sensitivity and retention standards for the enterprise. Review and update documentation annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "3. Data Protection", + "Function": "Govern", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "3.2", + "name": "Establish and Maintain a Data Inventory", + "description": "Establish and maintain a data inventory based on the enterprise's data management process. Inventory sensitive data, at a minimum. Review and update inventory annually, at a minimum, with a priority on sensitive data.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "3. Data Protection", + "Function": "Identify", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "macie_automated_sensitive_data_discovery_enabled", + "macie_is_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "3.3", + "name": "Configure Data Access Control Lists", + "description": "Configure data access control lists based on a user's need to know. Apply data access control lists, also known as access permissions, to local and remote file systems, databases, and applications.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "3. Data Protection", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "actiontrail_oss_bucket_not_publicly_accessible", + "oss_bucket_not_publicly_accessible", + "rds_instance_no_public_access_whitelist" + ], + "aws": [ + "awslambda_function_not_publicly_accessible", + "cloudtrail_logs_s3_bucket_is_not_publicly_accessible", + "cloudwatch_log_group_not_publicly_accessible", + "codebuild_project_not_publicly_accessible", + "dynamodb_table_cross_account_access", + "ec2_ami_public", + "ecr_repositories_not_publicly_accessible", + "efs_access_point_enforce_root_directory", + "efs_access_point_enforce_user_identity", + "efs_mount_target_not_publicly_accessible", + "efs_not_publicly_accessible", + "eventbridge_bus_cross_account_access", + "eventbridge_bus_exposed", + "glacier_vaults_policy_public_access", + "glue_data_catalogs_not_publicly_accessible", + "kms_key_not_publicly_accessible", + "s3_access_point_public_access_block", + "s3_account_level_public_access_blocks", + "s3_bucket_acl_prohibited", + "s3_bucket_cross_account_access", + "s3_bucket_level_public_access_block", + "s3_bucket_policy_public_write_access", + "s3_bucket_public_access", + "s3_bucket_public_list_acl", + "s3_bucket_public_write_acl", + "s3_multi_region_access_point_public_access_block", + "secretsmanager_has_restrictive_resource_policy", + "secretsmanager_not_publicly_accessible", + "ses_identity_not_publicly_accessible", + "sns_topics_not_publicly_accessible", + "sqs_queues_not_publicly_accessible", + "ssm_documents_set_as_public" + ], + "azure": [ + "cosmosdb_account_firewall_use_selected_networks", + "cosmosdb_account_use_aad_and_rbac", + "keyvault_rbac_enabled", + "sqlserver_unrestricted_inbound_access", + "storage_account_key_access_disabled", + "storage_account_public_network_access_disabled", + "storage_blob_public_access_level_is_disabled", + "storage_default_network_access_rule_is_denied" + ], + "gcp": [ + "bigquery_dataset_public_access", + "cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible", + "cloudsql_instance_public_access", + "cloudstorage_bucket_public_access", + "cloudstorage_bucket_uniform_bucket_level_access", + "compute_image_not_publicly_shared", + "kms_key_not_publicly_accessible", + "secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible" + ], + "github": [ + "organization_default_repository_permission_strict" + ], + "googleworkspace": [ + "calendar_external_sharing_primary_calendar", + "calendar_external_sharing_secondary_calendar", + "chat_external_file_sharing_disabled", + "chat_external_messaging_restricted", + "chat_external_spaces_restricted", + "chat_internal_file_sharing_disabled", + "drive_access_checker_recipients_only", + "drive_internal_users_distribute_content", + "drive_publishing_files_disabled", + "drive_shared_drive_disable_download_print_copy", + "drive_shared_drive_managers_cannot_override", + "drive_shared_drive_members_only_access", + "drive_sharing_allowlisted_domains", + "gmail_auto_forwarding_disabled", + "gmail_mail_delegation_disabled", + "groups_external_access_restricted", + "groups_view_conversations_restricted" + ], + "kubernetes": [ + "core_no_secrets_envs", + "rbac_minimize_secret_access" + ], + "m365": [ + "admincenter_external_calendar_sharing_disabled", + "admincenter_groups_not_public_visibility", + "admincenter_organization_customer_lockbox_enabled", + "sharepoint_external_sharing_managed", + "sharepoint_external_sharing_restricted", + "sharepoint_guest_sharing_restricted", + "teams_external_domains_restricted", + "teams_external_file_sharing_restricted", + "teams_external_users_cannot_start_conversations", + "teams_unmanaged_communication_disabled" + ], + "mongodbatlas": [ + "clusters_authentication_enabled" + ], + "openstack": [ + "image_not_publicly_visible", + "image_not_shared_with_multiple_projects", + "objectstorage_container_acl_not_globally_shared", + "objectstorage_container_listing_disabled", + "objectstorage_container_public_read_acl_disabled", + "objectstorage_container_write_acl_restricted" + ], + "oraclecloud": [ + "analytics_instance_access_restricted", + "database_autonomous_database_access_restricted", + "integration_instance_access_restricted", + "objectstorage_bucket_not_publicly_accessible" + ], + "vercel": [ + "project_deployment_protection_enabled", + "project_password_protection_enabled", + "project_production_deployment_protection_enabled", + "team_member_role_least_privilege" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "3.4", + "name": "Enforce Data Retention", + "description": "Retain data according to the enterprise's documented data management process. Data retention must include both minimum and maximum timelines.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "3. Data Protection", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "cloudwatch_log_group_retention_policy_specific_days_enabled", + "ecr_repositories_lifecycle_policy_enabled", + "kinesis_stream_data_retention_period", + "s3_bucket_lifecycle_enabled" + ], + "gcp": [ + "cloudstorage_bucket_lifecycle_management_enabled", + "cloudstorage_bucket_sufficient_retention_period" + ], + "stackit": [ + "objectstorage_bucket_object_lock_enabled", + "objectstorage_bucket_retention_policy" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "3.5", + "name": "Securely Dispose of Data", + "description": "Securely dispose of data as outlined in the enterprise's documented data management process. Ensure the disposal process and method are commensurate with the data sensitivity.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "3. Data Protection", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "3.6", + "name": "Encrypt Data on End-User Devices", + "description": "Encrypt data on end-user devices containing sensitive data. Example implementations can include: Windows BitLocker®, Apple FileVault®, Linux® dm-crypt.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "3. Data Protection", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "3.7", + "name": "Establish and Maintain a Data Classification Scheme", + "description": "Establish and maintain an overall data classification scheme for the enterprise. Enterprises may use labels, such as \"Sensitive,\" \"Confidential,\" and \"Public,\" and classify their data according to those labels. Review and update the classification scheme annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "3. Data Protection", + "Function": "Identify", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "3.8", + "name": "Document Data Flows", + "description": "Document data flows. Data flow documentation includes service provider data flows and should be based on the enterprise's data management process. Review and update documentation annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "3. Data Protection", + "Function": "Identify", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "3.9", + "name": "Encrypt Data on Removable Media", + "description": "Encrypt data on removable media.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "3. Data Protection", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "3.10", + "name": "Encrypt Sensitive Data in Transit", + "description": "Encrypt sensitive data in transit. Example implementations can include: Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Open Secure Shell (OpenSSH).", + "attributes": { + "Section": "3. Data Protection", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "oss_bucket_secure_transport_enabled", + "rds_instance_ssl_enabled" + ], + "aws": [ + "cloudfront_distributions_https_enabled", + "cloudfront_distributions_origin_traffic_encrypted", + "cloudfront_distributions_using_deprecated_ssl_protocols", + "dms_endpoint_redis_in_transit_encryption_enabled", + "dms_endpoint_ssl_enabled", + "dynamodb_accelerator_cluster_in_transit_encryption_enabled", + "elasticache_redis_cluster_in_transit_encryption_enabled", + "elb_insecure_ssl_ciphers", + "elb_ssl_listeners", + "elb_ssl_listeners_use_acm_certificate", + "elbv2_insecure_ssl_ciphers", + "elbv2_nlb_tls_termination_enabled", + "elbv2_ssl_listeners", + "glue_database_connections_ssl_enabled", + "kafka_cluster_in_transit_encryption_enabled", + "kafka_connector_in_transit_encryption_enabled", + "opensearch_service_domains_https_communications_enforced", + "opensearch_service_domains_node_to_node_encryption_enabled", + "rds_instance_transport_encrypted", + "redshift_cluster_in_transit_encryption_enabled", + "s3_bucket_secure_transport_policy", + "sagemaker_training_jobs_intercontainer_encryption_enabled", + "sns_subscription_not_using_http_endpoints", + "transfer_server_in_transit_encryption_enabled" + ], + "azure": [ + "app_ensure_http_is_redirected_to_https", + "app_minimum_tls_version_12", + "cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version", + "mysql_flexible_server_minimum_tls_version_12", + "mysql_flexible_server_ssl_connection_enabled", + "postgresql_flexible_server_enforce_ssl_enabled", + "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", + "storage_ensure_minimum_tls_version_12", + "storage_secure_transfer_required_is_enabled", + "storage_smb_channel_encryption_with_secure_algorithm" + ], + "cloudflare": [ + "zone_automatic_https_rewrites_enabled", + "zone_hsts_enabled", + "zone_https_redirect_enabled", + "zone_min_tls_version_secure", + "zone_ssl_strict", + "zone_tls_1_3_enabled", + "zone_universal_ssl_enabled" + ], + "gcp": [ + "cloudsql_instance_ssl_connections" + ], + "kubernetes": [ + "apiserver_etcd_cafile_set", + "apiserver_etcd_tls_config", + "apiserver_kubelet_cert_auth", + "apiserver_kubelet_tls_auth", + "apiserver_strong_ciphers_only", + "apiserver_tls_config", + "etcd_no_auto_tls", + "etcd_no_peer_auto_tls", + "etcd_peer_tls_config", + "etcd_tls_encryption", + "kubelet_strong_ciphers_only", + "kubelet_tls_cert_and_key" + ], + "mongodbatlas": [ + "clusters_tls_enabled" + ], + "oraclecloud": [ + "compute_instance_in_transit_encryption_enabled" + ], + "vercel": [ + "domain_ssl_certificate_valid" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "3.11", + "name": "Encrypt Sensitive Data at Rest", + "description": "Encrypt sensitive data at rest on servers, applications, and databases. Storage-layer encryption, also known as server-side encryption, meets the minimum requirement of this Safeguard. Additional encryption methods may include application-layer encryption, also known as client-side encryption, where access to the data storage device(s) does not permit access to the plain-text data.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "3. Data Protection", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "ecs_attached_disk_encrypted", + "ecs_unattached_disk_encrypted", + "rds_instance_tde_enabled", + "rds_instance_tde_key_custom" + ], + "aws": [ + "apigateway_restapi_cache_encrypted", + "athena_workgroup_encryption", + "awslambda_function_env_vars_not_encrypted_with_cmk", + "backup_recovery_point_encrypted", + "backup_vaults_encrypted", + "bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled", + "bedrock_prompt_encrypted_with_cmk", + "cloudtrail_kms_encryption_enabled", + "cloudwatch_log_group_kms_encryption_enabled", + "codebuild_project_s3_logs_encrypted", + "codebuild_report_group_export_encrypted", + "documentdb_cluster_storage_encrypted", + "dynamodb_accelerator_cluster_encryption_enabled", + "dynamodb_tables_kms_cmk_encryption_enabled", + "ec2_ebs_default_encryption", + "ec2_ebs_snapshots_encrypted", + "ec2_ebs_volume_encryption", + "efs_encryption_at_rest_enabled", + "eks_cluster_kms_cmk_encryption_in_secrets_enabled", + "elasticache_redis_cluster_rest_encryption_enabled", + "firehose_stream_encrypted_at_rest", + "glue_data_catalogs_connection_passwords_encryption_enabled", + "glue_data_catalogs_metadata_encryption_enabled", + "glue_development_endpoints_s3_encryption_enabled", + "glue_etl_jobs_amazon_s3_encryption_enabled", + "glue_etl_jobs_cloudwatch_logs_encryption_enabled", + "glue_ml_transform_encrypted_at_rest", + "kafka_cluster_encryption_at_rest_uses_cmk", + "kinesis_stream_encrypted_at_rest", + "neptune_cluster_snapshot_encrypted", + "neptune_cluster_storage_encrypted", + "opensearch_service_domains_encryption_at_rest_enabled", + "rds_cluster_storage_encrypted", + "rds_instance_storage_encrypted", + "rds_snapshots_encrypted", + "redshift_cluster_encrypted_at_rest", + "s3_bucket_default_encryption", + "s3_bucket_kms_encryption", + "sagemaker_notebook_instance_encryption_enabled", + "sagemaker_training_jobs_volume_and_output_encryption_enabled", + "sns_topics_kms_encryption_at_rest_enabled", + "sqs_queues_server_side_encryption_enabled", + "stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk", + "storagegateway_fileshare_encryption_enabled", + "workspaces_volume_encryption_enabled" + ], + "azure": [ + "databricks_workspace_cmk_encryption_enabled", + "monitor_storage_account_with_activity_logs_cmk_encrypted", + "sqlserver_tde_encrypted_with_cmk", + "sqlserver_tde_encryption_enabled", + "storage_ensure_encryption_with_customer_managed_keys", + "storage_infrastructure_encryption_is_enabled", + "vm_ensure_attached_disks_encrypted_with_cmk", + "vm_ensure_unattached_disks_encrypted_with_cmk" + ], + "gcp": [ + "bigquery_dataset_cmk_encryption", + "bigquery_table_cmk_encryption", + "cloudsql_instance_cmek_encryption_enabled", + "compute_instance_encryption_with_csek_enabled", + "dataproc_encrypted_with_cmks_disabled" + ], + "kubernetes": [ + "apiserver_encryption_provider_config_set" + ], + "linode": [ + "compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled" + ], + "mongodbatlas": [ + "clusters_encryption_at_rest_enabled" + ], + "openstack": [ + "blockstorage_volume_encryption_enabled" + ], + "oraclecloud": [ + "blockstorage_block_volume_encrypted_with_cmk", + "blockstorage_boot_volume_encrypted_with_cmk", + "filestorage_file_system_encrypted_with_cmk", + "objectstorage_bucket_encrypted_with_cmk" + ], + "vercel": [ + "project_environment_no_secrets_in_plain_type" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "3.12", + "name": "Segment Data Processing and Storage Based on Sensitivity", + "description": "Segment data processing and storage based on the sensitivity of the data. Do not process sensitive data on enterprise assets intended for lower sensitivity data.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "3. Data Protection", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "3.13", + "name": "Deploy a Data Loss Prevention Solution", + "description": "Implement an automated tool, such as a host-based Data Loss Prevention (DLP) tool to identify all sensitive data stored, processed, or transmitted through enterprise assets, including those located onsite or at a remote service provider, and update the enterprise's data inventory.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "3. Data Protection", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "macie_automated_sensitive_data_discovery_enabled", + "macie_is_enabled" + ], + "googleworkspace": [ + "security_dlp_drive_rules_configured" + ], + "openstack": [ + "blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data", + "blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data", + "compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data", + "objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "3.14", + "name": "Log Sensitive Data Access", + "description": "Log sensitive data access, including modification and disposal.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "3. Data Protection", + "Function": "Detect", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "oss_bucket_logging_enabled", + "rds_instance_sql_audit_enabled" + ], + "aws": [ + "cloudtrail_s3_dataevents_read_enabled", + "cloudtrail_s3_dataevents_write_enabled", + "opensearch_service_domains_audit_logging_enabled" + ], + "azure": [ + "keyvault_logging_enabled", + "mysql_flexible_server_audit_log_enabled", + "sqlserver_auditing_enabled" + ], + "gcp": [ + "cloudstorage_audit_logs_enabled" + ], + "m365": [ + "exchange_organization_mailbox_auditing_enabled", + "exchange_user_mailbox_auditing_enabled", + "purview_audit_log_search_enabled" + ], + "mongodbatlas": [ + "projects_auditing_enabled" + ], + "oraclecloud": [ + "objectstorage_bucket_logging_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "4.1", + "name": "Establish and Maintain a Secure Configuration Process", + "description": "Establish and maintain a documented secure configuration process for enterprise assets (end-user devices, including portable and mobile, non-computing/IoT devices, and servers) and software (operating systems and applications). Review and update documentation annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "4. Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software", + "Function": "Govern", + "AssetType": "Documentation", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "azure": [ + "policy_ensure_asc_enforcement_enabled" + ], + "kubernetes": [ + "apiserver_request_timeout_set", + "controllermanager_garbage_collection", + "kubelet_conf_file_ownership", + "kubelet_conf_file_permissions", + "kubelet_config_yaml_ownership", + "kubelet_config_yaml_permissions", + "kubelet_event_record_qps", + "kubelet_service_file_ownership_root", + "kubelet_service_file_permissions", + "kubelet_streaming_connection_timeout" + ], + "openstack": [ + "compute_instance_config_drive_enabled", + "compute_instance_locked_status_enabled", + "compute_instance_trusted_image_certificates", + "image_secure_boot_enabled", + "image_signature_verification_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "4.2", + "name": "Establish and Maintain a Secure Configuration Process for Network Infrastructure", + "description": "Establish and maintain a documented secure configuration process for network devices. Review and update documentation annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "4. Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software", + "Function": "Govern", + "AssetType": "Documentation", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "4.3", + "name": "Configure Automatic Session Locking on Enterprise Assets", + "description": "Configure automatic session locking on enterprise assets after a defined period of inactivity. For general purpose operating systems, the period must not exceed 15 minutes. For mobile end-user devices, the period must not exceed 2 minutes.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "4. Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Devices", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "appstream_fleet_maximum_session_duration", + "appstream_fleet_session_disconnect_timeout", + "appstream_fleet_session_idle_disconnect_timeout" + ], + "googleworkspace": [ + "security_session_duration_limited" + ], + "m365": [ + "entra_admin_users_sign_in_frequency_enabled", + "entra_conditional_access_policy_corporate_device_sign_in_frequency_enforced", + "entra_intune_enrollment_sign_in_frequency_every_time" + ], + "okta": [ + "application_admin_console_session_idle_timeout_15min", + "signon_global_session_cookies_not_persistent", + "signon_global_session_idle_timeout_15min", + "signon_global_session_lifetime_18h" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "4.4", + "name": "Implement and Manage a Firewall on Servers", + "description": "Implement and manage a firewall on servers, where supported. Example implementations include a virtual firewall, operating system firewall, or a third-party firewall agent.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "4. Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Devices", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "ecs_securitygroup_restrict_rdp_internet", + "ecs_securitygroup_restrict_ssh_internet" + ], + "aws": [ + "ec2_instance_port_cassandra_exposed_to_internet", + "ec2_instance_port_cifs_exposed_to_internet", + "ec2_instance_port_elasticsearch_kibana_exposed_to_internet", + "ec2_instance_port_ftp_exposed_to_internet", + "ec2_instance_port_kafka_exposed_to_internet", + "ec2_instance_port_kerberos_exposed_to_internet", + "ec2_instance_port_ldap_exposed_to_internet", + "ec2_instance_port_memcached_exposed_to_internet", + "ec2_instance_port_mongodb_exposed_to_internet", + "ec2_instance_port_mysql_exposed_to_internet", + "ec2_instance_port_oracle_exposed_to_internet", + "ec2_instance_port_postgresql_exposed_to_internet", + "ec2_instance_port_rdp_exposed_to_internet", + "ec2_instance_port_redis_exposed_to_internet", + "ec2_instance_port_sqlserver_exposed_to_internet", + "ec2_instance_port_ssh_exposed_to_internet", + "ec2_instance_port_telnet_exposed_to_internet", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_all_ports", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_any_port", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_any_port_from_ip", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_high_risk_tcp_ports", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_22", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_3389", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_cassandra_7199_9160_8888", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_elasticsearch_kibana_9200_9300_5601", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_ftp_20_21", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_kafka_9092", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_memcached_11211", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_mongodb_27017_27018", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_mysql_3306", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_oracle_1521_2483", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_postgres_5432", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_redis_6379", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_sql_server_1433_1434", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_telnet_23", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_wide_open_public_ipv4", + "ec2_securitygroup_default_restrict_traffic", + "ec2_securitygroup_with_many_ingress_egress_rules" + ], + "azure": [ + "network_subnet_nsg_associated", + "network_rdp_internet_access_restricted", + "network_ssh_internet_access_restricted" + ], + "gcp": [ + "compute_firewall_rdp_access_from_the_internet_allowed", + "compute_firewall_ssh_access_from_the_internet_allowed" + ], + "kubernetes": [ + "kubelet_manage_iptables" + ], + "linode": [ + "networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices", + "networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop", + "networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop", + "networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured", + "networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured", + "networking_firewall_status_enabled" + ], + "mongodbatlas": [ + "organizations_api_access_list_required", + "projects_network_access_list_exposed_to_internet" + ], + "nhn": [ + "compute_instance_security_groups" + ], + "openstack": [ + "compute_instance_security_groups_attached", + "networking_port_security_disabled", + "networking_security_group_allows_all_ingress_from_internet", + "networking_security_group_allows_rdp_from_internet", + "networking_security_group_allows_ssh_from_internet" + ], + "oraclecloud": [ + "network_default_security_list_restricts_traffic", + "network_security_group_ingress_from_internet_to_rdp_port", + "network_security_group_ingress_from_internet_to_ssh_port", + "network_security_list_ingress_from_internet_to_rdp_port", + "network_security_list_ingress_from_internet_to_ssh_port" + ], + "stackit": [ + "iaas_security_group_all_traffic_unrestricted", + "iaas_security_group_database_unrestricted", + "iaas_security_group_rdp_unrestricted", + "iaas_security_group_ssh_unrestricted" + ], + "vercel": [ + "security_custom_rules_configured", + "security_ip_blocking_rules_configured", + "security_waf_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "4.5", + "name": "Implement and Manage a Firewall on End-User Devices", + "description": "Implement and manage a host-based firewall or port-filtering tool on end-user devices, with a default-deny rule that drops all traffic except those services and ports that are explicitly allowed.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "4. Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Devices", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "4.6", + "name": "Securely Manage Enterprise Assets and Software", + "description": "Securely manage enterprise assets and software. Example implementations include managing configuration through version-controlled Infrastructure-as-Code (IaC) and accessing administrative interfaces over secure network protocols, such as Secure Shell (SSH) and Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS). Do not use insecure management protocols, such as Telnet (Teletype Network) and HTTP, unless operationally essential.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "4. Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Devices", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "oss_bucket_secure_transport_enabled", + "rds_instance_ssl_enabled" + ], + "aws": [ + "autoscaling_group_launch_configuration_requires_imdsv2", + "ec2_instance_account_imdsv2_enabled", + "ec2_instance_imdsv2_enabled", + "ec2_instance_managed_by_ssm", + "ec2_launch_template_imdsv2_required" + ], + "azure": [ + "app_client_certificates_on", + "app_ensure_http_is_redirected_to_https", + "storage_secure_transfer_required_is_enabled", + "vm_linux_enforce_ssh_authentication" + ], + "cloudflare": [ + "zone_automatic_https_rewrites_enabled", + "zone_https_redirect_enabled", + "zone_min_tls_version_secure", + "zone_ssl_strict" + ], + "gcp": [ + "compute_instance_block_project_wide_ssh_keys_disabled", + "compute_project_os_login_enabled" + ], + "kubernetes": [ + "controllermanager_bind_address", + "scheduler_bind_address" + ], + "mongodbatlas": [ + "clusters_tls_enabled" + ], + "openstack": [ + "compute_instance_key_based_authentication" + ], + "oraclecloud": [ + "compute_instance_legacy_metadata_endpoint_disabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "4.7", + "name": "Manage Default Accounts on Enterprise Assets and Software", + "description": "Manage default accounts on enterprise assets and software, such as root, administrator, and other pre-configured vendor accounts. Example implementations can include: disabling default accounts or making them unusable.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "4. Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "ram_no_root_access_key" + ], + "aws": [ + "iam_avoid_root_usage", + "iam_no_root_access_key", + "iam_root_credentials_management_enabled", + "rds_cluster_default_admin", + "rds_instance_default_admin", + "redshift_cluster_non_default_username" + ], + "azure": [ + "aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled", + "containerregistry_admin_user_disabled", + "cosmosdb_account_use_aad_and_rbac", + "storage_account_key_access_disabled" + ], + "gcp": [ + "compute_instance_default_service_account_in_use", + "compute_instance_default_service_account_in_use_with_full_api_access", + "gke_cluster_no_default_service_account" + ], + "kubernetes": [ + "apiserver_anonymous_requests", + "kubelet_disable_anonymous_auth" + ], + "m365": [ + "exchange_shared_mailbox_sign_in_disabled" + ], + "nhn": [ + "compute_instance_login_user" + ], + "oraclecloud": [ + "identity_tenancy_admin_users_no_api_keys" + ], + "scaleway": [ + "iam_api_keys_no_root_owned" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "4.8", + "name": "Uninstall or Disable Unnecessary Services on Enterprise Assets and Software", + "description": "Uninstall or disable unnecessary services on enterprise assets and software, such as an unused file sharing service, web application module, or service function.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "4. Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Devices", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "cs_kubernetes_dashboard_disabled" + ], + "azure": [ + "app_ftp_deployment_disabled", + "app_function_ftps_deployment_disabled" + ], + "gcp": [ + "compute_instance_ip_forwarding_is_enabled", + "compute_instance_serial_ports_in_use" + ], + "googleworkspace": [ + "chat_incoming_webhooks_disabled", + "drive_desktop_access_disabled", + "gmail_per_user_outbound_gateway_disabled", + "gmail_pop_imap_access_disabled", + "security_less_secure_apps_disabled", + "sites_service_disabled" + ], + "kubernetes": [ + "apiserver_disable_profiling", + "controllermanager_disable_profiling", + "kubelet_disable_read_only_port", + "scheduler_profiling" + ], + "m365": [ + "exchange_transport_config_smtp_auth_disabled", + "teams_email_sending_to_channel_disabled" + ], + "oraclecloud": [ + "compute_instance_legacy_metadata_endpoint_disabled" + ], + "vercel": [ + "project_auto_expose_system_env_disabled", + "project_directory_listing_disabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "4.9", + "name": "Configure Trusted DNS Servers on Enterprise Assets", + "description": "Configure trusted DNS servers on network infrastructure. Example implementations include configuring network devices to use enterprise-controlled DNS servers and/or reputable externally accessible DNS servers.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "4. Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Devices", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "cloudflare": [ + "zone_dnssec_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "4.10", + "name": "Enforce Automatic Device Lockout on Portable End-User Devices", + "description": "Enforce automatic device lockout following a predetermined threshold of local failed authentication attempts on portable end-user devices, where supported. For laptops, do not allow more than 20 failed authentication attempts; for tablets and smartphones, no more than 10 failed authentication attempts. Example implementations include Microsoft® InTune Device Lock and Apple® Configuration Profile maxFailedAttempts.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "4. Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Devices", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "4.11", + "name": "Enforce Remote Wipe Capability on Portable End-User Devices", + "description": "Remotely wipe enterprise data from enterprise-owned portable end-user devices when deemed appropriate such as lost or stolen devices, or when an individual no longer supports the enterprise.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "4. Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "4.12", + "name": "Separate Enterprise Workspaces on Mobile End-User Devices", + "description": "Ensure separate enterprise workspaces are used on mobile end-user devices, where supported. Example implementations include using an Apple® Configuration Profile or Android™ Work Profile to separate enterprise applications and data from personal applications and data.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "4. Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "5.1", + "name": "Establish and Maintain an Inventory of Accounts", + "description": "Establish and maintain an inventory of all accounts managed in the enterprise. The inventory must at a minimum include user, administrator, and service accounts. The inventory, at a minimum, should contain the person's name, username, start/stop dates, and department. Validate that all active accounts are authorized, on a recurring schedule at a minimum quarterly, or more frequently.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "5. Account Management", + "Function": "Identify", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "5.2", + "name": "Use Unique Passwords", + "description": "Use unique passwords for all enterprise assets. Best practice implementation includes, at a minimum, an 8-character password for accounts using Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) and a 14-character password for accounts not using MFA.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "5. Account Management", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "ram_password_policy_lowercase", + "ram_password_policy_minimum_length", + "ram_password_policy_number", + "ram_password_policy_password_reuse_prevention", + "ram_password_policy_symbol", + "ram_password_policy_uppercase" + ], + "aws": [ + "cognito_user_pool_password_policy_lowercase", + "cognito_user_pool_password_policy_minimum_length_14", + "cognito_user_pool_password_policy_number", + "cognito_user_pool_password_policy_symbol", + "cognito_user_pool_password_policy_uppercase", + "iam_password_policy_lowercase", + "iam_password_policy_minimum_length_14", + "iam_password_policy_number", + "iam_password_policy_reuse_24", + "iam_password_policy_symbol", + "iam_password_policy_uppercase" + ], + "googleworkspace": [ + "security_password_policy_strong" + ], + "okta": [ + "authenticator_password_common_password_check", + "authenticator_password_complexity_lowercase", + "authenticator_password_complexity_number", + "authenticator_password_complexity_symbol", + "authenticator_password_complexity_uppercase", + "authenticator_password_history_5", + "authenticator_password_minimum_length_15" + ], + "oraclecloud": [ + "identity_password_policy_minimum_length_14", + "identity_password_policy_prevents_reuse" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "5.3", + "name": "Disable Dormant Accounts", + "description": "Delete or disable any dormant accounts after a period of 45 days of inactivity, where supported.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "5. Account Management", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "ram_user_console_access_unused" + ], + "aws": [ + "iam_user_accesskey_unused", + "iam_user_console_access_unused" + ], + "azure": [ + "entra_user_with_recent_sign_in" + ], + "gcp": [ + "iam_sa_user_managed_key_unused", + "iam_service_account_unused" + ], + "okta": [ + "user_inactivity_automation_35d_enabled" + ], + "vercel": [ + "authentication_no_stale_tokens" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "5.4", + "name": "Restrict Administrator Privileges to Dedicated Administrator Accounts", + "description": "Restrict administrator privileges to dedicated administrator accounts on enterprise assets. Conduct general computing activities, such as internet browsing, email, and productivity suite use, from the user's primary, non-privileged account.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "5. Account Management", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "ram_policy_no_administrative_privileges" + ], + "aws": [ + "iam_aws_attached_policy_no_administrative_privileges", + "iam_customer_attached_policy_no_administrative_privileges", + "iam_group_administrator_access_policy", + "iam_inline_policy_no_administrative_privileges", + "iam_role_administratoraccess_policy", + "iam_user_administrator_access_policy" + ], + "azure": [ + "app_function_identity_without_admin_privileges", + "entra_global_admin_in_less_than_five_users", + "iam_role_user_access_admin_restricted", + "iam_subscription_roles_owner_custom_not_created" + ], + "gcp": [ + "iam_sa_no_administrative_privileges" + ], + "googleworkspace": [ + "directory_super_admin_count", + "directory_super_admin_only_admin_roles" + ], + "kubernetes": [ + "rbac_cluster_admin_usage" + ], + "m365": [ + "admincenter_users_admins_reduced_license_footprint", + "admincenter_users_between_two_and_four_global_admins", + "entra_admin_portals_access_restriction", + "entra_admin_users_cloud_only" + ], + "okta": [ + "apitoken_not_super_admin" + ], + "oraclecloud": [ + "identity_iam_admins_cannot_update_tenancy_admins", + "identity_service_level_admins_exist", + "identity_tenancy_admin_permissions_limited", + "identity_tenancy_admin_users_no_api_keys" + ], + "scaleway": [ + "iam_api_keys_no_root_owned" + ], + "vercel": [ + "team_member_role_least_privilege" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "5.5", + "name": "Establish and Maintain an Inventory of Service Accounts", + "description": "Establish and maintain an inventory of service accounts. The inventory, at a minimum, must contain department owner, review date, and purpose. Perform service account reviews to validate that all active accounts are authorized, on a recurring schedule at a minimum quarterly, or more frequently.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "5. Account Management", + "Function": "Identify", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "5.6", + "name": "Centralize Account Management", + "description": "Centralize account management through a directory or identity service.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "5. Account Management", + "Function": "Govern", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "iam_check_saml_providers_sts" + ], + "azure": [ + "cosmosdb_account_use_aad_and_rbac", + "postgresql_flexible_server_entra_id_authentication_enabled", + "sqlserver_azuread_administrator_enabled", + "storage_default_to_entra_authorization_enabled" + ], + "vercel": [ + "team_directory_sync_enabled", + "team_saml_sso_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "6.1", + "name": "Establish an Access Granting Process", + "description": "Establish and follow a documented process, preferably automated, for granting access to enterprise assets upon new hire or role change of a user.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "6. Access Control Management", + "Function": "Govern", + "AssetType": "Documentation", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "vercel": [ + "team_directory_sync_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "6.2", + "name": "Establish an Access Revoking Process", + "description": "Establish and follow a process, preferably automated, for revoking access to enterprise assets, through disabling accounts immediately upon termination, rights revocation, or role change of a user. Disabling accounts, instead of deleting accounts, may be necessary to preserve audit trails.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "6. Access Control Management", + "Function": "Govern", + "AssetType": "Documentation", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "vercel": [ + "team_directory_sync_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "6.3", + "name": "Require MFA for Externally-Exposed Applications", + "description": "Require all externally-exposed enterprise or third-party applications to enforce MFA, where supported. Enforcing MFA through a directory service or SSO provider is a satisfactory implementation of this Safeguard.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "6. Access Control Management", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "ram_user_mfa_enabled_console_access" + ], + "aws": [ + "cognito_user_pool_mfa_enabled", + "iam_user_hardware_mfa_enabled", + "iam_user_mfa_enabled_console_access" + ], + "azure": [ + "entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced", + "entra_non_privileged_user_has_mfa", + "entra_security_defaults_enabled" + ], + "github": [ + "organization_members_mfa_required" + ], + "googleworkspace": [ + "security_2sv_enforced", + "security_advanced_protection_configured" + ], + "linode": [ + "administration_user_2fa_enabled" + ], + "m365": [ + "entra_conditional_access_policy_mfa_enforced_for_guest_users", + "entra_users_mfa_capable", + "entra_users_mfa_enabled" + ], + "mongodbatlas": [ + "organizations_mfa_required" + ], + "okta": [ + "application_dashboard_mfa_required", + "application_dashboard_phishing_resistant_authentication" + ], + "oraclecloud": [ + "identity_user_mfa_enabled_console_access" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "6.4", + "name": "Require MFA for Remote Network Access", + "description": "Require MFA for remote network access.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "6. Access Control Management", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "directoryservice_radius_server_security_protocol", + "directoryservice_supported_mfa_radius_enabled" + ], + "azure": [ + "entra_user_with_vm_access_has_mfa", + "entra_security_defaults_enabled", + "entra_non_privileged_user_has_mfa" + ], + "gcp": [ + "compute_project_os_login_2fa_enabled" + ], + "github": [ + "organization_members_mfa_required" + ], + "linode": [ + "administration_user_2fa_enabled" + ], + "m365": [ + "entra_users_mfa_enabled", + "entra_legacy_authentication_blocked" + ], + "mongodbatlas": [ + "organizations_mfa_required" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "6.5", + "name": "Require MFA for Administrative Access", + "description": "Require MFA for all administrative access accounts, where supported, on all enterprise assets, whether managed on-site or through a service provider.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "6. Access Control Management", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "ram_user_mfa_enabled_console_access" + ], + "aws": [ + "iam_administrator_access_with_mfa", + "iam_root_hardware_mfa_enabled", + "iam_root_mfa_enabled" + ], + "azure": [ + "entra_conditional_access_policy_require_mfa_for_admin_portals", + "entra_conditional_access_policy_require_mfa_for_management_api", + "entra_privileged_user_has_mfa", + "entra_user_with_vm_access_has_mfa" + ], + "github": [ + "organization_members_mfa_required" + ], + "googleworkspace": [ + "security_2sv_hardware_keys_admins" + ], + "linode": [ + "administration_user_2fa_enabled" + ], + "m365": [ + "entra_admin_users_mfa_enabled", + "entra_admin_users_phishing_resistant_mfa_enabled", + "entra_break_glass_account_fido2_security_key_registered" + ], + "mongodbatlas": [ + "organizations_mfa_required" + ], + "okta": [ + "application_admin_console_mfa_required", + "application_admin_console_phishing_resistant_authentication" + ], + "vercel": [ + "team_saml_sso_enforced", + "team_saml_sso_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "6.6", + "name": "Establish and Maintain an Inventory of Authentication and Authorization Systems", + "description": "Establish and maintain an inventory of the enterprise's authentication and authorization systems, including those hosted on-site or at a remote service provider. Review and update the inventory, at a minimum, annually, or more frequently.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "6. Access Control Management", + "Function": "Identify", + "AssetType": "Software", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "6.7", + "name": "Centralize Access Control", + "description": "Centralize access control for all enterprise assets through a directory service or SSO provider, where supported.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "6. Access Control Management", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "dms_endpoint_neptune_iam_authorization_enabled", + "iam_check_saml_providers_sts", + "neptune_cluster_iam_authentication_enabled", + "opensearch_service_domains_use_cognito_authentication_for_kibana", + "rds_cluster_iam_authentication_enabled", + "rds_instance_iam_authentication_enabled", + "sagemaker_domain_sso_configured" + ], + "azure": [ + "aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled", + "cosmosdb_account_use_aad_and_rbac", + "postgresql_flexible_server_entra_id_authentication_enabled", + "sqlserver_azuread_administrator_enabled" + ], + "m365": [ + "entra_all_apps_conditional_access_coverage", + "entra_conditional_access_policy_all_apps_all_users", + "entra_password_hash_sync_enabled" + ], + "vercel": [ + "team_directory_sync_enabled", + "team_saml_sso_enabled", + "team_saml_sso_enforced" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "6.8", + "name": "Define and Maintain Role-Based Access Control", + "description": "Define and maintain role-based access control, through determining and documenting the access rights necessary for each role within the enterprise to successfully carry out its assigned duties. Perform access control reviews of enterprise assets to validate that all privileges are authorized, on a recurring schedule at a minimum annually, or more frequently.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "6. Access Control Management", + "Function": "Govern", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "cs_kubernetes_rbac_enabled", + "ram_policy_attached_only_to_group_or_roles", + "ram_policy_no_administrative_privileges" + ], + "aws": [ + "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "accessanalyzer_enabled_without_findings", + "bedrock_agent_role_least_privilege", + "bedrock_api_key_no_administrative_privileges", + "ec2_instance_profile_attached", + "iam_inline_policy_allows_privilege_escalation", + "iam_inline_policy_no_full_access_to_cloudtrail", + "iam_inline_policy_no_full_access_to_kms", + "iam_inline_policy_no_wildcard_marketplace_subscribe", + "iam_no_custom_policy_permissive_role_assumption", + "iam_policy_allows_privilege_escalation", + "iam_policy_no_full_access_to_cloudtrail", + "iam_policy_no_full_access_to_kms", + "iam_policy_no_wildcard_marketplace_subscribe", + "iam_role_cross_account_readonlyaccess_policy", + "iam_role_cross_service_confused_deputy_prevention", + "iam_user_with_temporary_credentials" + ], + "azure": [ + "aks_cluster_rbac_enabled", + "cosmosdb_account_use_aad_and_rbac", + "entra_policy_default_users_cannot_create_security_groups", + "entra_policy_ensure_default_user_cannot_create_apps", + "iam_role_user_access_admin_restricted", + "iam_subscription_roles_owner_custom_not_created", + "keyvault_rbac_enabled" + ], + "gcp": [ + "iam_account_access_approval_enabled", + "iam_no_service_roles_at_project_level", + "iam_role_kms_enforce_separation_of_duties", + "iam_role_sa_enforce_separation_of_duties", + "iam_sa_no_administrative_privileges" + ], + "github": [ + "organization_default_repository_permission_strict", + "organization_repository_creation_limited", + "organization_repository_deletion_limited" + ], + "kubernetes": [ + "apiserver_auth_mode_include_node", + "apiserver_auth_mode_include_rbac", + "apiserver_auth_mode_not_always_allow", + "controllermanager_service_account_credentials", + "kubelet_authorization_mode", + "rbac_minimize_csr_approval_access", + "rbac_minimize_node_proxy_subresource_access", + "rbac_minimize_pod_creation_access", + "rbac_minimize_pv_creation_access", + "rbac_minimize_service_account_token_creation", + "rbac_minimize_webhook_config_access", + "rbac_minimize_wildcard_use_roles" + ], + "m365": [ + "entra_admin_portals_access_restriction", + "entra_app_registration_no_unused_privileged_permissions", + "entra_policy_guest_users_access_restrictions", + "entra_service_principal_privileged_role_no_owners" + ], + "oraclecloud": [ + "identity_no_resources_in_root_compartment", + "identity_non_root_compartment_exists", + "identity_service_level_admins_exist", + "identity_storage_service_level_admins_scoped", + "identity_tenancy_admin_permissions_limited" + ], + "vercel": [ + "team_member_role_least_privilege" + ] + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] + }, + { + "id": "7.1", + "name": "Establish and Maintain a Vulnerability Management Process", + "description": "Establish and maintain a documented vulnerability management process for enterprise assets. Review and update documentation annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "7. Continuous Vulnerability Management", + "Function": "Govern", + "AssetType": "Documentation", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "7.2", + "name": "Establish and Maintain a Remediation Process", + "description": "Establish and maintain a risk-based remediation strategy documented in a remediation process, with monthly, or more frequent, reviews.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "7. Continuous Vulnerability Management", + "Function": "Govern", + "AssetType": "Documentation", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "7.3", + "name": "Perform Automated Operating System Patch Management", + "description": "Perform operating system updates on enterprise assets through automated patch management on a monthly, or more frequent, basis.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "7. Continuous Vulnerability Management", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Software", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "ecs_instance_latest_os_patches_applied" + ], + "aws": [ + "ssm_managed_compliant_patching" + ], + "azure": [ + "aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled", + "defender_ensure_system_updates_are_applied" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "7.4", + "name": "Perform Automated Application Patch Management", + "description": "Perform application updates on enterprise assets through automated patch management on a monthly, or more frequent, basis.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "7. Continuous Vulnerability Management", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Software", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "dms_instance_minor_version_upgrade_enabled", + "elasticache_redis_cluster_auto_minor_version_upgrades", + "elasticbeanstalk_environment_managed_updates_enabled", + "memorydb_cluster_auto_minor_version_upgrades", + "mq_broker_auto_minor_version_upgrades", + "rds_cluster_minor_version_upgrade_enabled", + "rds_instance_minor_version_upgrade_enabled", + "redshift_cluster_automatic_upgrades" + ], + "azure": [ + "app_ensure_java_version_is_latest", + "app_ensure_php_version_is_latest", + "app_ensure_python_version_is_latest", + "app_function_latest_runtime_version" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "7.5", + "name": "Perform Automated Vulnerability Scans of Internal Enterprise Assets", + "description": "Perform automated vulnerability scans of internal enterprise assets on a quarterly, or more frequent, basis. Conduct both authenticated and unauthenticated scans.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "7. Continuous Vulnerability Management", + "Function": "Identify", + "AssetType": "Software", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "securitycenter_vulnerability_scan_enabled" + ], + "aws": [ + "ecr_registry_scan_images_on_push_enabled", + "ecr_repositories_scan_images_on_push_enabled", + "ecr_repositories_scan_vulnerabilities_in_latest_image", + "inspector2_is_enabled" + ], + "azure": [ + "defender_auto_provisioning_vulnerabilty_assessments_machines_on", + "defender_container_images_scan_enabled", + "sqlserver_va_emails_notifications_admins_enabled", + "sqlserver_va_periodic_recurring_scans_enabled", + "sqlserver_va_scan_reports_configured", + "sqlserver_vulnerability_assessment_enabled" + ], + "gcp": [ + "artifacts_container_analysis_enabled", + "gcr_container_scanning_enabled" + ], + "github": [ + "repository_dependency_scanning_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "7.6", + "name": "Perform Automated Vulnerability Scans of Externally-Exposed Enterprise Assets", + "description": "Perform automated vulnerability scans of externally-exposed enterprise assets. Perform scans on a monthly, or more frequent, basis.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "7. Continuous Vulnerability Management", + "Function": "Identify", + "AssetType": "Software", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "inspector2_is_enabled" + ], + "azure": [ + "network_public_ip_shodan" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "7.7", + "name": "Remediate Detected Vulnerabilities", + "description": "Remediate detected vulnerabilities in software through processes and tooling on a monthly, or more frequent, basis, based on the remediation process.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "7. Continuous Vulnerability Management", + "Function": "Respond", + "AssetType": "Software", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "inspector2_active_findings_exist" + ], + "azure": [ + "defender_container_images_resolved_vulnerabilities" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "8.1", + "name": "Establish and Maintain an Audit Log Management Process", + "description": "Establish and maintain a documented audit log management process that defines the enterprise's logging requirements. At a minimum, address the collection, review, and retention of audit logs for enterprise assets. Review and update documentation annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "8. Audit Log Management", + "Function": "Govern", + "AssetType": "Documentation", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "8.2", + "name": "Collect Audit Logs", + "description": "Collect audit logs. Ensure that logging, per the enterprise's audit log management process, has been enabled across enterprise assets.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "8. Audit Log Management", + "Function": "Detect", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "actiontrail_multi_region_enabled", + "cs_kubernetes_log_service_enabled", + "oss_bucket_logging_enabled", + "rds_instance_sql_audit_enabled", + "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "aws": [ + "apigateway_restapi_logging_enabled", + "apigatewayv2_api_access_logging_enabled", + "appsync_field_level_logging_enabled", + "athena_workgroup_logging_enabled", + "awslambda_function_invoke_api_operations_cloudtrail_logging_enabled", + "bedrock_model_invocation_logging_enabled", + "cloudfront_distributions_logging_enabled", + "cloudtrail_bedrock_logging_enabled", + "cloudtrail_cloudwatch_logging_enabled", + "cloudtrail_logs_s3_bucket_access_logging_enabled", + "cloudtrail_multi_region_enabled", + "cloudtrail_multi_region_enabled_logging_management_events", + "codebuild_project_logging_enabled", + "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "datasync_task_logging_enabled", + "directoryservice_directory_log_forwarding_enabled", + "dms_replication_task_source_logging_enabled", + "dms_replication_task_target_logging_enabled", + "documentdb_cluster_cloudwatch_log_export", + "ec2_client_vpn_endpoint_connection_logging_enabled", + "ecs_task_definitions_logging_enabled", + "eks_control_plane_logging_all_types_enabled", + "elasticbeanstalk_environment_cloudwatch_logging_enabled", + "elb_logging_enabled", + "elbv2_logging_enabled", + "mq_broker_logging_enabled", + "neptune_cluster_integration_cloudwatch_logs", + "networkfirewall_logging_enabled", + "opensearch_service_domains_cloudwatch_logging_enabled", + "rds_cluster_integration_cloudwatch_logs", + "rds_instance_integration_cloudwatch_logs", + "redshift_cluster_audit_logging", + "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled", + "stepfunctions_statemachine_logging_enabled", + "vpc_flow_logs_enabled", + "waf_global_webacl_logging_enabled", + "wafv2_webacl_logging_enabled" + ], + "azure": [ + "app_function_application_insights_enabled", + "app_http_logs_enabled", + "appinsights_ensure_is_configured", + "defender_auto_provisioning_log_analytics_agent_vms_on", + "keyvault_logging_enabled", + "monitor_diagnostic_settings_exists", + "mysql_flexible_server_audit_log_enabled", + "network_flow_log_captured_sent", + "postgresql_flexible_server_log_checkpoints_on", + "postgresql_flexible_server_log_connections_on", + "sqlserver_auditing_enabled" + ], + "gcp": [ + "cloudstorage_audit_logs_enabled", + "cloudstorage_bucket_logging_enabled", + "compute_loadbalancer_logging_enabled", + "iam_audit_logs_enabled", + "logging_sink_created" + ], + "googleworkspace": [ + "gmail_comprehensive_mail_storage_enabled" + ], + "kubernetes": [ + "apiserver_audit_log_path_set" + ], + "m365": [ + "exchange_mailbox_audit_bypass_disabled", + "exchange_organization_mailbox_auditing_enabled", + "exchange_user_mailbox_auditing_enabled", + "purview_audit_log_search_enabled" + ], + "mongodbatlas": [ + "projects_auditing_enabled" + ], + "okta": [ + "systemlog_streaming_enabled" + ], + "oraclecloud": [ + "network_vcn_subnet_flow_logs_enabled", + "objectstorage_bucket_logging_enabled" + ] + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] + }, + { + "id": "8.3", + "name": "Ensure Adequate Audit Log Storage", + "description": "Ensure that logging destinations maintain adequate storage to comply with the enterprise's audit log management process.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "8. Audit Log Management", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "kubernetes": [ + "apiserver_audit_log_maxbackup_set", + "apiserver_audit_log_maxsize_set" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "8.4", + "name": "Standardize Time Synchronization", + "description": "Standardize time synchronization. Configure at least two synchronized time sources across enterprise assets, where supported.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "8. Audit Log Management", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Network", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "8.5", + "name": "Collect Detailed Audit Logs", + "description": "Configure detailed audit logging for enterprise assets containing sensitive data. Include event source, date, username, timestamp, source addresses, destination addresses, and other useful elements that could assist in a forensic investigation.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "8. Audit Log Management", + "Function": "Detect", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "rds_instance_postgresql_log_connections_enabled", + "rds_instance_postgresql_log_disconnections_enabled", + "rds_instance_postgresql_log_duration_enabled" + ], + "aws": [ + "cloudtrail_s3_dataevents_read_enabled", + "cloudtrail_s3_dataevents_write_enabled", + "opensearch_service_domains_audit_logging_enabled" + ], + "azure": [ + "monitor_diagnostic_setting_with_appropriate_categories", + "mysql_flexible_server_audit_log_connection_activated", + "postgresql_flexible_server_log_connections_on", + "postgresql_flexible_server_log_disconnections_on" + ], + "gcp": [ + "cloudsql_instance_postgres_enable_pgaudit_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_postgres_log_connections_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_postgres_log_disconnections_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_postgres_log_error_verbosity_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_postgres_log_min_duration_statement_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_postgres_log_min_error_statement_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_postgres_log_min_messages_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_postgres_log_statement_flag" + ], + "m365": [ + "exchange_user_mailbox_auditing_enabled" + ], + "mongodbatlas": [ + "projects_auditing_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "8.6", + "name": "Collect DNS Query Audit Logs", + "description": "Collect DNS query audit logs on enterprise assets, where appropriate and supported.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "8. Audit Log Management", + "Function": "Detect", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "route53_public_hosted_zones_cloudwatch_logging_enabled" + ], + "gcp": [ + "compute_network_dns_logging_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "8.7", + "name": "Collect URL Request Audit Logs", + "description": "Collect URL request audit logs on enterprise assets, where appropriate and supported.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "8. Audit Log Management", + "Function": "Detect", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "azure": [ + "app_http_logs_enabled" + ], + "gcp": [ + "compute_loadbalancer_logging_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "8.8", + "name": "Collect Command-Line Audit Logs", + "description": "Collect command-line audit logs. Example implementations include collecting audit logs from PowerShell®, BASH™, and remote administrative terminals.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "8. Audit Log Management", + "Function": "Detect", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "8.9", + "name": "Centralize Audit Logs", + "description": "Centralize, to the extent possible, audit log collection and retention across enterprise assets in accordance with the documented audit log management process. Example implementations primarily include leveraging a SIEM tool to centralize multiple log sources.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "8. Audit Log Management", + "Function": "Detect", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "cloudtrail_cloudwatch_logging_enabled", + "config_delegated_admin_and_org_aggregator_all_regions" + ], + "azure": [ + "defender_auto_provisioning_log_analytics_agent_vms_on", + "network_flow_log_captured_sent" + ], + "gcp": [ + "logging_sink_created" + ], + "m365": [ + "purview_audit_log_search_enabled" + ], + "okta": [ + "systemlog_streaming_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "8.10", + "name": "Retain Audit Logs", + "description": "Retain audit logs across enterprise assets for a minimum of 90 days.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "8. Audit Log Management", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "rds_instance_sql_audit_retention", + "sls_logstore_retention_period" + ], + "aws": [ + "cloudwatch_log_group_retention_policy_specific_days_enabled" + ], + "azure": [ + "network_flow_log_more_than_90_days", + "postgresql_flexible_server_log_retention_days_greater_3", + "sqlserver_auditing_retention_90_days" + ], + "gcp": [ + "cloudstorage_bucket_log_retention_policy_lock" + ], + "kubernetes": [ + "apiserver_audit_log_maxage_set" + ], + "m365": [ + "exchange_user_mailbox_auditing_enabled" + ], + "oraclecloud": [ + "audit_log_retention_period_365_days" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "8.11", + "name": "Conduct Audit Log Reviews", + "description": "Conduct reviews of audit logs to detect anomalies or abnormal events that could indicate a potential threat. Conduct reviews on a weekly, or more frequent, basis.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "8. Audit Log Management", + "Function": "Detect", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "sls_cloud_firewall_changes_alert_enabled", + "sls_customer_created_cmk_changes_alert_enabled", + "sls_management_console_authentication_failures_alert_enabled", + "sls_management_console_signin_without_mfa_alert_enabled", + "sls_oss_bucket_policy_changes_alert_enabled", + "sls_oss_permission_changes_alert_enabled", + "sls_ram_role_changes_alert_enabled", + "sls_rds_instance_configuration_changes_alert_enabled", + "sls_root_account_usage_alert_enabled", + "sls_security_group_changes_alert_enabled", + "sls_unauthorized_api_calls_alert_enabled", + "sls_vpc_changes_alert_enabled", + "sls_vpc_network_route_changes_alert_enabled" + ], + "aws": [ + "cloudtrail_insights_exist", + "cloudwatch_changes_to_network_acls_alarm_configured", + "cloudwatch_changes_to_network_gateways_alarm_configured", + "cloudwatch_changes_to_network_route_tables_alarm_configured", + "cloudwatch_changes_to_vpcs_alarm_configured", + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_and_alarm_for_aws_config_configuration_changes_enabled", + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_and_alarm_for_cloudtrail_configuration_changes_enabled", + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_authentication_failures", + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_aws_organizations_changes", + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_disable_or_scheduled_deletion_of_kms_cmk", + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_for_s3_bucket_policy_changes", + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_policy_changes", + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_root_usage", + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_security_group_changes", + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_sign_in_without_mfa", + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_unauthorized_api_calls" + ], + "azure": [ + "monitor_alert_create_policy_assignment", + "monitor_alert_create_update_nsg", + "monitor_alert_create_update_public_ip_address_rule", + "monitor_alert_create_update_security_solution", + "monitor_alert_create_update_sqlserver_fr", + "monitor_alert_delete_nsg", + "monitor_alert_delete_policy_assignment", + "monitor_alert_delete_public_ip_address_rule", + "monitor_alert_delete_security_solution", + "monitor_alert_delete_sqlserver_fr", + "monitor_alert_service_health_exists" + ], + "gcp": [ + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_audit_configuration_changes_enabled", + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_bucket_permission_changes_enabled", + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_compute_configuration_changes_enabled", + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_custom_role_changes_enabled", + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_project_ownership_changes_enabled", + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_sql_instance_configuration_changes_enabled", + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_vpc_firewall_rule_changes_enabled", + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_vpc_network_changes_enabled", + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_vpc_network_route_changes_enabled" + ], + "googleworkspace": [ + "rules_admin_privilege_granted_alert_configured", + "rules_gmail_employee_spoofing_alert_configured", + "rules_government_backed_attacks_alert_configured", + "rules_leaked_password_alert_configured", + "rules_password_changed_alert_configured", + "rules_suspicious_activity_suspension_alert_configured", + "rules_suspicious_login_alert_configured", + "rules_suspicious_programmatic_login_alert_configured" + ], + "oraclecloud": [ + "events_rule_cloudguard_problems", + "events_rule_iam_group_changes", + "events_rule_iam_policy_changes", + "events_rule_identity_provider_changes", + "events_rule_idp_group_mapping_changes", + "events_rule_local_user_authentication", + "events_rule_network_gateway_changes", + "events_rule_network_security_group_changes", + "events_rule_route_table_changes", + "events_rule_security_list_changes", + "events_rule_user_changes", + "events_rule_vcn_changes" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "8.12", + "name": "Collect Service Provider Logs", + "description": "Collect service provider logs, where supported. Example implementations include collecting authentication and authorization events, data creation and disposal events, and user management events.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "8. Audit Log Management", + "Function": "Detect", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "actiontrail_multi_region_enabled" + ], + "aws": [ + "cloudtrail_multi_region_enabled", + "cloudtrail_multi_region_enabled_logging_management_events" + ], + "azure": [ + "monitor_diagnostic_settings_exists" + ], + "gcp": [ + "iam_audit_logs_enabled" + ], + "m365": [ + "purview_audit_log_search_enabled" + ], + "okta": [ + "systemlog_streaming_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "9.1", + "name": "Ensure Use of Only Fully Supported Browsers and Email Clients", + "description": "Ensure only fully supported browsers and email clients are allowed to execute in the enterprise, only using the latest version of browsers and email clients provided through the vendor.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "9. Email and Web Browser Protections", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Software", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "9.2", + "name": "Use DNS Filtering Services", + "description": "Use DNS filtering services on all end-user devices, including remote and on-premises assets, to block access to known malicious domains.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "9. Email and Web Browser Protections", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Devices", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "9.3", + "name": "Maintain and Enforce Network-Based URL Filters", + "description": "Enforce and update network-based URL filters to limit an enterprise asset from connecting to potentially malicious or unapproved websites. Example implementations include category-based filtering, reputation-based filtering, or through the use of block lists. Enforce filters for all enterprise assets.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "9. Email and Web Browser Protections", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Network", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "googleworkspace": [ + "gmail_shortener_scanning_enabled", + "gmail_untrusted_link_warnings_enabled" + ], + "m365": [ + "defender_safelinks_policy_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "9.4", + "name": "Restrict Unnecessary or Unauthorized Browser and Email Client Extensions", + "description": "Restrict, either through uninstalling or disabling, any unauthorized or unnecessary browser or email client plugins, extensions, and add-on applications.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "9. Email and Web Browser Protections", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Software", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "m365": [ + "exchange_mailbox_policy_additional_storage_restricted", + "exchange_roles_assignment_policy_addins_disabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "9.5", + "name": "Implement DMARC", + "description": "To lower the chance of spoofed or modified emails from valid domains, implement DMARC policy and verification, starting with implementing the Sender Policy Framework (SPF) and the DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) standards.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "9. Email and Web Browser Protections", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Network", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "ses_identity_dkim_enabled" + ], + "cloudflare": [ + "zone_record_dkim_exists", + "zone_record_dmarc_exists", + "zone_record_spf_exists" + ], + "googleworkspace": [ + "gmail_groups_spoofing_protection_enabled", + "gmail_inbound_domain_spoofing_protection_enabled", + "gmail_unauthenticated_email_protection_enabled" + ], + "m365": [ + "defender_antiphishing_policy_configured", + "defender_domain_dkim_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "9.6", + "name": "Block Unnecessary File Types", + "description": "Block unnecessary file types attempting to enter the enterprise's email gateway.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "9. Email and Web Browser Protections", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Network", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "googleworkspace": [ + "gmail_anomalous_attachment_protection_enabled", + "gmail_script_attachment_protection_enabled" + ], + "m365": [ + "defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled", + "defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "9.7", + "name": "Deploy and Maintain Email Server Anti-Malware Protections", + "description": "Deploy and maintain email server anti-malware protections, such as attachment scanning and/or sandboxing.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "9. Email and Web Browser Protections", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Network", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "googleworkspace": [ + "gmail_encrypted_attachment_protection_enabled", + "gmail_enhanced_pre_delivery_scanning_enabled", + "gmail_external_image_scanning_enabled" + ], + "m365": [ + "defender_atp_safe_attachments_and_docs_configured", + "defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled", + "defender_safe_attachments_policy_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "10.1", + "name": "Deploy and Maintain Anti-Malware Software", + "description": "Deploy and maintain anti-malware software on all enterprise assets.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "10. Malware Defenses", + "Function": "Detect", + "AssetType": "Devices", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "ecs_instance_endpoint_protection_installed", + "securitycenter_all_assets_agent_installed" + ], + "aws": [ + "guardduty_ec2_malware_protection_enabled" + ], + "azure": [ + "defender_assessments_vm_endpoint_protection_installed", + "defender_ensure_defender_for_server_is_on" + ], + "m365": [ + "defender_atp_safe_attachments_and_docs_configured", + "defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled", + "defender_safe_attachments_policy_enabled", + "defender_zap_for_teams_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "10.2", + "name": "Configure Automatic Anti-Malware Signature Updates", + "description": "Configure automatic updates for anti-malware signature files on all enterprise assets.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "10. Malware Defenses", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Devices", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "10.3", + "name": "Disable Autorun and Autoplay for Removable Media", + "description": "Disable autorun and autoplay auto-execute functionality for removable media.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "10. Malware Defenses", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Devices", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "10.4", + "name": "Configure Automatic Anti-Malware Scanning of Removable Media", + "description": "Configure anti-malware software to automatically scan removable media.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "10. Malware Defenses", + "Function": "Detect", + "AssetType": "Devices", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "10.5", + "name": "Enable Anti-Exploitation Features", + "description": "Enable anti-exploitation features on enterprise assets and software, where possible, such as Microsoft® Data Execution Prevention (DEP), Windows® Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG), or Apple® System Integrity Protection (SIP) and Gatekeeper™.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "10. Malware Defenses", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Devices", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "azure": [ + "vm_trusted_launch_enabled" + ], + "openstack": [ + "image_secure_boot_enabled" + ], + "oraclecloud": [ + "compute_instance_secure_boot_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "10.6", + "name": "Centrally Manage Anti-Malware Software", + "description": "Centrally manage anti-malware software.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "10. Malware Defenses", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Devices", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "securitycenter_advanced_or_enterprise_edition", + "securitycenter_all_assets_agent_installed" + ], + "aws": [ + "guardduty_centrally_managed", + "guardduty_delegated_admin_enabled_all_regions" + ], + "azure": [ + "aks_cluster_defender_enabled", + "defender_ensure_defender_for_containers_is_on", + "defender_ensure_defender_for_storage_is_on" + ] + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_delegated_admin_enabled_all_regions", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] + }, + { + "id": "10.7", + "name": "Use Behavior-Based Anti-Malware Software", + "description": "Use behavior-based anti-malware software.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "10. Malware Defenses", + "Function": "Detect", + "AssetType": "Devices", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "cloudtrail_threat_detection_enumeration", + "cloudtrail_threat_detection_llm_jacking", + "cloudtrail_threat_detection_privilege_escalation", + "guardduty_eks_runtime_monitoring_enabled", + "guardduty_is_enabled", + "guardduty_lambda_protection_enabled", + "guardduty_rds_protection_enabled", + "guardduty_s3_protection_enabled" + ], + "azure": [ + "defender_ensure_mcas_is_enabled", + "defender_ensure_wdatp_is_enabled" + ], + "m365": [ + "defender_atp_safe_attachments_and_docs_configured", + "defender_safe_attachments_policy_enabled", + "defender_zap_for_teams_enabled" + ] + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] + }, + { + "id": "11.1", + "name": "Establish and Maintain a Data Recovery Process", + "description": "Establish and maintain a documented data recovery process that includes detailed backup procedures. In the process, address the scope of data recovery activities, recovery prioritization, and the security of backup data. Review and update documentation annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "11. Data Recovery", + "Function": "Govern", + "AssetType": "Documentation", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "11.2", + "name": "Perform Automated Backups", + "description": "Perform automated backups of in-scope enterprise assets. Run backups weekly, or more frequently, based on the sensitivity of the data.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "11. Data Recovery", + "Function": "Recover", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "backup_plans_exist", + "backup_vaults_exist", + "dlm_ebs_snapshot_lifecycle_policy_exists", + "documentdb_cluster_backup_enabled", + "drs_job_exist", + "dynamodb_table_protected_by_backup_plan", + "dynamodb_tables_pitr_enabled", + "ec2_ebs_volume_protected_by_backup_plan", + "ec2_ebs_volume_snapshots_exists", + "efs_have_backup_enabled", + "elasticache_redis_cluster_backup_enabled", + "lightsail_instance_automated_snapshots", + "neptune_cluster_backup_enabled", + "rds_cluster_backtrack_enabled", + "rds_cluster_protected_by_backup_plan", + "rds_instance_backup_enabled", + "rds_instance_protected_by_backup_plan", + "redshift_cluster_automated_snapshot", + "s3_bucket_object_versioning" + ], + "azure": [ + "cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous", + "mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled", + "postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled", + "recovery_vault_has_protected_items", + "vm_backup_enabled", + "vm_sufficient_daily_backup_retention_period" + ], + "gcp": [ + "cloudsql_instance_automated_backups", + "cloudstorage_bucket_soft_delete_enabled", + "cloudstorage_bucket_versioning_enabled" + ], + "linode": [ + "compute_instance_backups_enabled" + ], + "mongodbatlas": [ + "clusters_backup_enabled" + ], + "openstack": [ + "blockstorage_volume_backup_exists", + "objectstorage_container_versioning_enabled" + ], + "oraclecloud": [ + "objectstorage_bucket_versioning_enabled" + ] + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "drs_job_exist", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] + }, + { + "id": "11.3", + "name": "Protect Recovery Data", + "description": "Protect recovery data with equivalent controls to the original data. Reference encryption or data separation, based on requirements.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "11. Data Recovery", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "backup_recovery_point_encrypted", + "backup_vaults_encrypted", + "documentdb_cluster_public_snapshot", + "ec2_ebs_public_snapshot", + "ec2_ebs_snapshot_account_block_public_access", + "ec2_ebs_snapshots_encrypted", + "neptune_cluster_public_snapshot", + "neptune_cluster_snapshot_encrypted", + "rds_snapshots_encrypted", + "rds_snapshots_public_access", + "s3_bucket_no_mfa_delete", + "s3_bucket_object_lock" + ], + "azure": [ + "storage_ensure_file_shares_soft_delete_is_enabled", + "storage_ensure_soft_delete_is_enabled" + ], + "stackit": [ + "objectstorage_bucket_object_lock_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "11.4", + "name": "Establish and Maintain an Isolated Instance of Recovery Data", + "description": "Establish and maintain an isolated instance of recovery data. Example implementations include, version controlling backup destinations through offline, cloud, or off-site systems or services.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "11. Data Recovery", + "Function": "Recover", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "s3_bucket_cross_region_replication" + ], + "azure": [ + "mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled", + "postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled", + "storage_geo_redundant_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "11.5", + "name": "Test Data Recovery", + "description": "Test backup recovery quarterly, or more frequently, for a sampling of in-scope enterprise assets.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "11. Data Recovery", + "Function": "Recover", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "12.1", + "name": "Ensure Network Infrastructure is Up-to-Date", + "description": "Ensure network infrastructure is kept up-to-date. Example implementations include running the latest stable release of software and/or using currently supported network as a service (Naas) offerings. Review software versions monthly, or more frequently, to verify software support.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "12. Network Infrastructure Management", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Network", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "12.2", + "name": "Establish and Maintain a Secure Network Architecture", + "description": "Design and maintain a secure network architecture. A secure network architecture must address segmentation, least privilege, and availability, at a minimum. Example implementations may include documentation, policy, and design components.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "12. Network Infrastructure Management", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Network", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "cs_kubernetes_private_cluster_enabled", + "ecs_instance_no_legacy_network" + ], + "aws": [ + "appstream_fleet_default_internet_access_disabled", + "autoscaling_group_launch_configuration_no_public_ip", + "awslambda_function_inside_vpc", + "dms_instance_no_public_access", + "ec2_instance_public_ip", + "ec2_launch_template_no_public_ip", + "ec2_transitgateway_auto_accept_vpc_attachments", + "ecs_service_no_assign_public_ip", + "ecs_task_set_no_assign_public_ip", + "eks_cluster_not_publicly_accessible", + "eks_cluster_private_nodes_enabled", + "elasticache_cluster_uses_public_subnet", + "elb_internet_facing", + "elbv2_internet_facing", + "emr_cluster_account_public_block_enabled", + "emr_cluster_master_nodes_no_public_ip", + "emr_cluster_publicly_accesible", + "kafka_cluster_is_public", + "lightsail_database_public", + "lightsail_instance_public", + "mq_broker_not_publicly_accessible", + "neptune_cluster_uses_public_subnet", + "opensearch_service_domains_not_publicly_accessible", + "rds_instance_inside_vpc", + "rds_instance_no_public_access", + "redshift_cluster_public_access", + "sagemaker_models_vpc_settings_configured", + "sagemaker_notebook_instance_vpc_settings_configured", + "sagemaker_notebook_instance_without_direct_internet_access_configured", + "sagemaker_training_jobs_vpc_settings_configured", + "vpc_endpoint_connections_trust_boundaries", + "vpc_endpoint_services_allowed_principals_trust_boundaries", + "vpc_peering_routing_tables_with_least_privilege", + "vpc_subnet_no_public_ip_by_default", + "vpc_subnet_separate_private_public" + ], + "azure": [ + "aisearch_service_not_publicly_accessible", + "aks_clusters_public_access_disabled", + "app_function_not_publicly_accessible", + "containerregistry_not_publicly_accessible", + "containerregistry_uses_private_link", + "cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled", + "cosmosdb_account_use_private_endpoints", + "databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled", + "keyvault_access_only_through_private_endpoints", + "keyvault_private_endpoints", + "storage_account_public_network_access_disabled", + "storage_ensure_private_endpoints_in_storage_accounts" + ], + "gcp": [ + "cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc", + "cloudsql_instance_private_ip_assignment", + "cloudsql_instance_public_ip", + "cloudstorage_uses_vpc_service_controls", + "compute_instance_public_ip", + "compute_instance_single_network_interface", + "compute_network_default_in_use", + "compute_network_not_legacy" + ], + "mongodbatlas": [ + "projects_network_access_list_exposed_to_internet" + ], + "nhn": [ + "compute_instance_public_ip", + "network_vpc_subnet_has_external_router" + ], + "openstack": [ + "compute_instance_isolated_private_network" + ], + "oraclecloud": [ + "analytics_instance_access_restricted", + "database_autonomous_database_access_restricted", + "integration_instance_access_restricted", + "objectstorage_bucket_not_publicly_accessible" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "12.3", + "name": "Securely Manage Network Infrastructure", + "description": "Securely manage network infrastructure. Example implementations include version-controlled Infrastructure-as-Code (IaC), and the use of secure network protocols, such as SSH and HTTPS.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "12. Network Infrastructure Management", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Network", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "gcp": [ + "dns_dnssec_disabled", + "dns_rsasha1_in_use_to_key_sign_in_dnssec", + "dns_rsasha1_in_use_to_zone_sign_in_dnssec" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "12.4", + "name": "Establish and Maintain Architecture Diagram(s)", + "description": "Establish and maintain architecture diagram(s) and/or other network system documentation. Review and update documentation annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "12. Network Infrastructure Management", + "Function": "Govern", + "AssetType": "Documentation", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "12.5", + "name": "Centralize Network Authentication, Authorization, and Auditing (AAA)", + "description": "Centralize network AAA.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "12. Network Infrastructure Management", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Network", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "12.6", + "name": "Use of Secure Network Management and Communication Protocols", + "description": "Adopt secure network management protocols (e.g., 802.1X) and secure communication protocols (e.g., Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2) Enterprise or more secure alternatives).", + "attributes": { + "Section": "12. Network Infrastructure Management", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Network", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "azure": [ + "app_minimum_tls_version_12", + "cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version", + "mysql_flexible_server_minimum_tls_version_12", + "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", + "storage_ensure_minimum_tls_version_12", + "storage_smb_protocol_version_is_latest" + ], + "cloudflare": [ + "zone_automatic_https_rewrites_enabled", + "zone_hsts_enabled", + "zone_https_redirect_enabled", + "zone_min_tls_version_secure", + "zone_ssl_strict", + "zone_tls_1_3_enabled", + "zone_universal_ssl_enabled" + ], + "kubernetes": [ + "apiserver_client_ca_file_set", + "controllermanager_root_ca_file_set", + "controllermanager_rotate_kubelet_server_cert", + "etcd_client_cert_auth", + "etcd_peer_client_cert_auth", + "etcd_unique_ca", + "kubelet_client_ca_file_set", + "kubelet_rotate_certificates" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "12.7", + "name": "Ensure Remote Devices Utilize a VPN and are Connecting to an Enterprise's AAA Infrastructure", + "description": "Require users to authenticate to enterprise-managed VPN and authentication services prior to accessing enterprise resources on end-user devices.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "12. Network Infrastructure Management", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Devices", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "ec2_client_vpn_endpoint_connection_logging_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "12.8", + "name": "Establish and Maintain Dedicated Computing Resources for All Administrative Work", + "description": "Establish and maintain dedicated computing resources, either physically or logically separated, for all administrative tasks or tasks requiring administrative access. The computing resources should be segmented from the enterprise's primary network and not be allowed internet access.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "12. Network Infrastructure Management", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Devices", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "azure": [ + "network_bastion_host_exists", + "vm_jit_access_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "13.1", + "name": "Centralize Security Event Alerting", + "description": "Centralize security event alerting across enterprise assets for log correlation and analysis. Best practice implementation requires the use of a SIEM, which includes vendor-defined event correlation alerts. A log analytics platform configured with security-relevant correlation alerts also satisfies this Safeguard.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "13. Network Monitoring and Defense", + "Function": "Detect", + "AssetType": "Network", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "securitycenter_notification_enabled_high_risk", + "sls_cloud_firewall_changes_alert_enabled", + "sls_customer_created_cmk_changes_alert_enabled", + "sls_management_console_authentication_failures_alert_enabled", + "sls_management_console_signin_without_mfa_alert_enabled", + "sls_oss_bucket_policy_changes_alert_enabled", + "sls_oss_permission_changes_alert_enabled", + "sls_ram_role_changes_alert_enabled", + "sls_rds_instance_configuration_changes_alert_enabled", + "sls_root_account_usage_alert_enabled", + "sls_security_group_changes_alert_enabled", + "sls_unauthorized_api_calls_alert_enabled", + "sls_vpc_changes_alert_enabled", + "sls_vpc_network_route_changes_alert_enabled" + ], + "aws": [ + "cloudwatch_alarm_actions_alarm_state_configured", + "cloudwatch_alarm_actions_enabled", + "securityhub_delegated_admin_enabled_all_regions", + "securityhub_enabled" + ], + "azure": [ + "defender_additional_email_configured_with_a_security_contact", + "defender_attack_path_notifications_properly_configured", + "defender_ensure_notify_alerts_severity_is_high", + "defender_ensure_notify_emails_to_owners", + "monitor_alert_create_update_security_solution" + ], + "googleworkspace": [ + "rules_admin_privilege_granted_alert_configured", + "rules_gmail_employee_spoofing_alert_configured", + "rules_government_backed_attacks_alert_configured", + "rules_leaked_password_alert_configured", + "rules_password_changed_alert_configured", + "rules_suspicious_activity_suspension_alert_configured", + "rules_suspicious_login_alert_configured", + "rules_suspicious_programmatic_login_alert_configured" + ], + "oraclecloud": [ + "events_notification_topic_and_subscription_exists", + "events_rule_cloudguard_problems", + "events_rule_iam_group_changes", + "events_rule_iam_policy_changes", + "events_rule_identity_provider_changes", + "events_rule_idp_group_mapping_changes", + "events_rule_local_user_authentication", + "events_rule_network_gateway_changes", + "events_rule_network_security_group_changes", + "events_rule_route_table_changes", + "events_rule_security_list_changes", + "events_rule_user_changes", + "events_rule_vcn_changes" + ] + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] + }, + { + "id": "13.2", + "name": "Deploy a Host-Based Intrusion Detection Solution", + "description": "Deploy a host-based intrusion detection solution on enterprise assets, where appropriate and/or supported.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "13. Network Monitoring and Defense", + "Function": "Detect", + "AssetType": "Devices", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "securitycenter_all_assets_agent_installed", + "ecs_instance_endpoint_protection_installed" + ], + "azure": [ + "defender_ensure_defender_for_server_is_on", + "defender_ensure_wdatp_is_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "13.3", + "name": "Deploy a Network Intrusion Detection Solution", + "description": "Deploy a network intrusion detection solution on enterprise assets, where appropriate. Example implementations include the use of a Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) or equivalent cloud service provider (CSP) service.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "13. Network Monitoring and Defense", + "Function": "Detect", + "AssetType": "Network", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "guardduty_eks_audit_log_enabled", + "guardduty_eks_runtime_monitoring_enabled", + "guardduty_is_enabled" + ], + "azure": [ + "defender_ensure_defender_for_dns_is_on" + ], + "oraclecloud": [ + "cloudguard_enabled" + ] + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] + }, + { + "id": "13.4", + "name": "Perform Traffic Filtering Between Network Segments", + "description": "Perform traffic filtering between network segments, where appropriate.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "13. Network Monitoring and Defense", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Network", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "cs_kubernetes_network_policy_enabled" + ], + "aws": [ + "ec2_networkacl_allow_ingress_any_port", + "ec2_networkacl_allow_ingress_tcp_port_22", + "ec2_networkacl_allow_ingress_tcp_port_3389", + "networkfirewall_in_all_vpc", + "vpc_peering_routing_tables_with_least_privilege" + ], + "azure": [ + "network_http_internet_access_restricted", + "network_rdp_internet_access_restricted", + "network_ssh_internet_access_restricted", + "network_subnet_nsg_associated", + "network_udp_internet_access_restricted" + ], + "gcp": [ + "compute_firewall_rdp_access_from_the_internet_allowed", + "compute_firewall_ssh_access_from_the_internet_allowed" + ], + "linode": [ + "networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop", + "networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop", + "networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured", + "networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured" + ], + "mongodbatlas": [ + "projects_network_access_list_exposed_to_internet" + ], + "openstack": [ + "networking_security_group_allows_all_ingress_from_internet", + "networking_security_group_allows_rdp_from_internet", + "networking_security_group_allows_ssh_from_internet" + ], + "oraclecloud": [ + "network_default_security_list_restricts_traffic", + "network_security_group_ingress_from_internet_to_rdp_port", + "network_security_group_ingress_from_internet_to_ssh_port", + "network_security_list_ingress_from_internet_to_rdp_port", + "network_security_list_ingress_from_internet_to_ssh_port" + ], + "stackit": [ + "iaas_security_group_all_traffic_unrestricted", + "iaas_security_group_database_unrestricted", + "iaas_security_group_rdp_unrestricted", + "iaas_security_group_ssh_unrestricted" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "13.5", + "name": "Manage Access Control for Remote Assets", + "description": "Manage access control for assets remotely connecting to enterprise resources. Determine amount of access to enterprise resources based on: up-to-date anti-malware software installed, configuration compliance with the enterprise's secure configuration process, and ensuring the operating system and applications are up-to-date.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "13. Network Monitoring and Defense", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Devices", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "m365": [ + "entra_conditional_access_policy_compliant_device_hybrid_joined_device_mfa_required", + "entra_conditional_access_policy_mdm_compliant_device_required", + "entra_managed_device_required_for_authentication", + "intune_device_compliance_policy_unassigned_devices_not_compliant_by_default", + "sharepoint_onedrive_sync_restricted_unmanaged_devices" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "13.6", + "name": "Collect Network Traffic Flow Logs", + "description": "Collect network traffic flow logs and/or network traffic to review and alert upon from network devices.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "13. Network Monitoring and Defense", + "Function": "Detect", + "AssetType": "Network", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "alibabacloud": [ + "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "aws": [ + "vpc_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "azure": [ + "network_flow_log_captured_sent", + "network_flow_log_more_than_90_days", + "network_watcher_enabled" + ], + "gcp": [ + "compute_subnet_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "oraclecloud": [ + "network_vcn_subnet_flow_logs_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "13.7", + "name": "Deploy a Host-Based Intrusion Prevention Solution", + "description": "Deploy a host-based intrusion prevention solution on enterprise assets, where appropriate and/or supported. Example implementations include use of an Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) client or host-based IPS agent.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "13. Network Monitoring and Defense", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Devices", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "azure": [ + "defender_ensure_wdatp_is_enabled", + "defender_ensure_defender_for_server_is_on" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "13.8", + "name": "Deploy a Network Intrusion Prevention Solution", + "description": "Deploy a network intrusion prevention solution, where appropriate. Example implementations include the use of a Network Intrusion Prevention System (NIPS) or equivalent CSP service.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "13. Network Monitoring and Defense", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Network", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "networkfirewall_in_all_vpc", + "networkfirewall_policy_default_action_fragmented_packets", + "networkfirewall_policy_default_action_full_packets", + "networkfirewall_policy_rule_group_associated", + "shield_advanced_protection_in_associated_elastic_ips", + "shield_advanced_protection_in_classic_load_balancers", + "shield_advanced_protection_in_cloudfront_distributions", + "shield_advanced_protection_in_global_accelerators", + "shield_advanced_protection_in_internet_facing_load_balancers", + "shield_advanced_protection_in_route53_hosted_zones" + ], + "azure": [ + "network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled" + ], + "cloudflare": [ + "zone_bot_fight_mode_enabled", + "zone_firewall_blocking_rules_configured", + "zone_rate_limiting_enabled", + "zone_waf_enabled", + "zone_waf_owasp_ruleset_enabled" + ], + "vercel": [ + "security_managed_rulesets_enabled", + "security_rate_limiting_configured", + "security_waf_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "13.9", + "name": "Deploy Port-Level Access Control", + "description": "Deploy port-level access control. Port-level access control utilizes 802.1x, or similar network access control protocols, such as certificates, and may incorporate user and/or device authentication.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "13. Network Monitoring and Defense", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Network", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "13.10", + "name": "Perform Application Layer Filtering", + "description": "Perform application layer filtering. Example implementations include a filtering proxy, application layer firewall, or gateway.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "13. Network Monitoring and Defense", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Network", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "apigateway_restapi_waf_acl_attached", + "cloudfront_distributions_using_waf", + "cognito_user_pool_waf_acl_attached", + "elbv2_waf_acl_attached", + "waf_global_rule_with_conditions", + "waf_global_rulegroup_not_empty", + "waf_global_webacl_with_rules", + "waf_regional_rule_with_conditions", + "waf_regional_rulegroup_not_empty", + "waf_regional_webacl_with_rules", + "wafv2_webacl_with_rules" + ], + "cloudflare": [ + "dns_record_proxied", + "zone_bot_fight_mode_enabled", + "zone_browser_integrity_check_enabled", + "zone_firewall_blocking_rules_configured", + "zone_rate_limiting_enabled", + "zone_waf_enabled", + "zone_waf_owasp_ruleset_enabled" + ], + "vercel": [ + "security_custom_rules_configured", + "security_ip_blocking_rules_configured", + "security_managed_rulesets_enabled", + "security_rate_limiting_configured", + "security_waf_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "13.11", + "name": "Tune Security Event Alerting Thresholds", + "description": "Tune security event alerting thresholds monthly, or more frequently.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "13. Network Monitoring and Defense", + "Function": "Detect", + "AssetType": "Network", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "14.1", + "name": "Establish and Maintain a Security Awareness Program", + "description": "Establish and maintain a security awareness program. The purpose of a security awareness program is to educate the enterprise's workforce on how to interact with enterprise assets and data in a secure manner. Conduct training at hire and, at a minimum, annually. Review and update content annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "14. Security Awareness and Skills Training", + "Function": "Govern", + "AssetType": "Documentation", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "14.2", + "name": "Train Workforce Members to Recognize Social Engineering Attacks", + "description": "Train workforce members to recognize social engineering attacks, such as phishing, business email compromise (BEC), pretexting, and tailgating.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "14. Security Awareness and Skills Training", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "14.3", + "name": "Train Workforce Members on Authentication Best Practices", + "description": "Train workforce members on authentication best practices. Example topics include MFA, password composition, and credential management.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "14. Security Awareness and Skills Training", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "14.4", + "name": "Train Workforce on Data Handling Best Practices", + "description": "Train workforce members on how to identify and properly store, transfer, archive, and destroy sensitive data. This also includes training workforce members on clear screen and desk best practices, such as locking their screen when they step away from their enterprise asset, erasing physical and virtual whiteboards at the end of meetings, and storing data and assets securely.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "14. Security Awareness and Skills Training", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "14.5", + "name": "Train Workforce Members on Causes of Unintentional Data Exposure", + "description": "Train workforce members to be aware of causes for unintentional data exposure. Example topics include mis-delivery of sensitive data, losing a portable end-user device, or publishing data to unintended audiences.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "14. Security Awareness and Skills Training", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "14.6", + "name": "Train Workforce Members on Recognizing and Reporting Security Incidents", + "description": "Train workforce members to be able to recognize a potential incident and be able to report such an incident.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "14. Security Awareness and Skills Training", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "14.7", + "name": "Train Workforce on How to Identify and Report if Their Enterprise Assets are Missing Security Updates", + "description": "Train workforce to understand how to verify and report out-of-date software patches or any failures in automated processes and tools. Part of this training should include notifying IT personnel of any failures in automated processes and tools.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "14. Security Awareness and Skills Training", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "14.8", + "name": "Train Workforce on the Dangers of Connecting to and Transmitting Enterprise Data Over Insecure Networks", + "description": "Train workforce members on the dangers of connecting to, and transmitting data over, insecure networks for enterprise activities. If the enterprise has remote workers, training must include guidance to ensure that all users securely configure their home network infrastructure.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "14. Security Awareness and Skills Training", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "14.9", + "name": "Conduct Role-Specific Security Awareness and Skills Training", + "description": "Conduct role-specific security awareness and skills training. Example implementations include secure system administration courses for IT professionals, OWASP® Top 10 vulnerability awareness and prevention training for web application developers, and advanced social engineering awareness training for high-profile roles.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "14. Security Awareness and Skills Training", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "15.1", + "name": "Establish and Maintain an Inventory of Service Providers", + "description": "Establish and maintain an inventory of service providers. The inventory is to list all known service providers, include classification(s), and designate an enterprise contact for each service provider. Review and update the inventory annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "15. Service Provider Management", + "Function": "Identify", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "15.2", + "name": "Establish and Maintain a Service Provider Management Policy", + "description": "Establish and maintain a service provider management policy. Ensure the policy addresses the classification, inventory, assessment, monitoring, and decommissioning of service providers. Review and update the policy annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "15. Service Provider Management", + "Function": "Govern", + "AssetType": "Documentation", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "15.3", + "name": "Classify Service Providers", + "description": "Classify service providers. Classification consideration may include one or more characteristics, such as data sensitivity, data volume, availability requirements, applicable regulations, inherent risk, and mitigated risk. Update and review classifications annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "15. Service Provider Management", + "Function": "Govern", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "15.4", + "name": "Ensure Service Provider Contracts Include Security Requirements", + "description": "Ensure service provider contracts include security requirements. Example requirements may include minimum security program requirements, security incident and/or data breach notification and response, data encryption requirements, and data disposal commitments. These security requirements must be consistent with the enterprise's service provider management policy. Review service provider contracts annually to ensure contracts are not missing security requirements.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "15. Service Provider Management", + "Function": "Govern", + "AssetType": "Documentation", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "15.5", + "name": "Assess Service Providers", + "description": "Assess service providers consistent with the enterprise's service provider management policy. Assessment scope may vary based on classification(s), and may include review of standardized assessment reports, such as Service Organization Control 2 (SOC 2) and Payment Card Industry (PCI) Attestation of Compliance (AoC), customized questionnaires, or other appropriately rigorous processes. Reassess service providers annually, at a minimum, or with new and renewed contracts.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "15. Service Provider Management", + "Function": "Govern", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "15.6", + "name": "Monitor Service Providers", + "description": "Monitor service providers consistent with the enterprise's service provider management policy. Monitoring may include periodic reassessment of service provider compliance, monitoring service provider release notes, and dark web monitoring.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "15. Service Provider Management", + "Function": "Govern", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "15.7", + "name": "Securely Decommission Service Providers", + "description": "Securely decommission service providers. Example considerations include user and service account deactivation, termination of data flows, and secure disposal of enterprise data within service provider systems.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "15. Service Provider Management", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Data", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "16.1", + "name": "Establish and Maintain a Secure Application Development Process", + "description": "Establish and maintain a secure application development process. In the process, address such items as: secure application design standards, secure coding practices, developer training, vulnerability management, security of third-party code, and application security testing procedures. Review and update documentation annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "16. Application Software Security", + "Function": "Govern", + "AssetType": "Documentation", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "github": [ + "repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled", + "repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push", + "repository_default_branch_dismisses_stale_reviews", + "repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins", + "repository_default_branch_protection_enabled", + "repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review", + "repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution", + "repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history", + "repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals", + "repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits", + "repository_default_branch_status_checks_required", + "repository_has_codeowners_file" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "16.2", + "name": "Establish and Maintain a Process to Accept and Address Software Vulnerabilities", + "description": "Establish and maintain a process to accept and address reports of software vulnerabilities, including providing a means for external entities to report. The process is to include such items as: a vulnerability handling policy that identifies reporting process, responsible party for handling vulnerability reports, and a process for intake, assignment, remediation, and remediation testing. As part of the process, use a vulnerability tracking system that includes severity ratings and metrics for measuring timing for identification, analysis, and remediation of vulnerabilities. Review and update documentation annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard. Third-party application developers need to consider this an externally-facing policy that helps to set expectations for outside stakeholders.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "16. Application Software Security", + "Function": "Govern", + "AssetType": "Documentation", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "github": [ + "repository_public_has_securitymd_file" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "16.3", + "name": "Perform Root Cause Analysis on Security Vulnerabilities", + "description": "Perform root cause analysis on security vulnerabilities. When reviewing vulnerabilities, root cause analysis is the task of evaluating underlying issues that create vulnerabilities in code, and allows development teams to move beyond just fixing individual vulnerabilities as they arise.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "16. Application Software Security", + "Function": "Detect", + "AssetType": "Software", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "16.4", + "name": "Establish and Manage an Inventory of Third-Party Software Components", + "description": "Establish and manage an updated inventory of third-party components used in development, often referred to as a \"bill of materials,\" as well as components slated for future use. This inventory is to include any risks that each third-party component could pose. Evaluate the list at least monthly to identify any changes or updates to these components, and validate that the component is still supported.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "16. Application Software Security", + "Function": "Identify", + "AssetType": "Software", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "github": [ + "repository_dependency_scanning_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "16.5", + "name": "Use Up-to-Date and Trusted Third-Party Software Components", + "description": "Use up-to-date and trusted third-party software components. When possible, choose established and proven frameworks and libraries that provide adequate security. Acquire these components from trusted sources or evaluate the software for vulnerabilities before use.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "16. Application Software Security", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Software", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "codeartifact_packages_external_public_publishing_disabled" + ], + "github": [ + "repository_dependency_scanning_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "16.6", + "name": "Establish and Maintain a Severity Rating System and Process for Application Vulnerabilities", + "description": "Establish and maintain a severity rating system and process for application vulnerabilities that facilitates prioritizing the order in which discovered vulnerabilities are fixed. This process includes setting a minimum level of security acceptability for releasing code or applications. Severity ratings bring a systematic way of triaging vulnerabilities that improves risk management and helps ensure the most severe bugs are fixed first. Review and update the system and process annually.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "16. Application Software Security", + "Function": "Govern", + "AssetType": "Documentation", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "16.7", + "name": "Use Standard Hardening Configuration Templates for Application Infrastructure", + "description": "Use standard, industry-recommended hardening configuration templates for application infrastructure components. This includes underlying servers, databases, and web servers, and applies to cloud containers, Platform as a Service (PaaS) components, and SaaS components. Do not allow in-house developed software to weaken configuration hardening.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "16. Application Software Security", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Software", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "azure": [ + "app_ensure_using_http20", + "app_ftp_deployment_disabled", + "app_minimum_tls_version_12" + ], + "gcp": [ + "cloudsql_instance_mysql_local_infile_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_mysql_skip_show_database_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_sqlserver_contained_database_authentication_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_sqlserver_cross_db_ownership_chaining_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_sqlserver_external_scripts_enabled_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_sqlserver_remote_access_flag", + "compute_instance_shielded_vm_enabled", + "gke_cluster_no_default_service_account" + ], + "kubernetes": [ + "apiserver_always_pull_images_plugin", + "apiserver_deny_service_external_ips", + "apiserver_event_rate_limit", + "apiserver_namespace_lifecycle_plugin", + "apiserver_no_always_admit_plugin", + "apiserver_node_restriction_plugin", + "apiserver_security_context_deny_plugin", + "core_image_tag_fixed", + "core_minimize_admission_hostport_containers", + "core_minimize_admission_windows_hostprocess_containers", + "core_minimize_allowPrivilegeEscalation_containers", + "core_minimize_containers_added_capabilities", + "core_minimize_containers_capabilities_assigned", + "core_minimize_hostIPC_containers", + "core_minimize_hostNetwork_containers", + "core_minimize_hostPID_containers", + "core_minimize_net_raw_capability_admission", + "core_minimize_privileged_containers", + "core_minimize_root_containers_admission", + "core_seccomp_profile_docker_default" + ], + "vercel": [ + "project_auto_expose_system_env_disabled", + "project_directory_listing_disabled", + "project_git_fork_protection_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "16.8", + "name": "Separate Production and Non-Production Systems", + "description": "Maintain separate environments for production and non-production systems.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "16. Application Software Security", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Network", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "vercel": [ + "deployment_production_uses_stable_target", + "project_deployment_protection_enabled", + "project_environment_no_overly_broad_target", + "project_environment_production_vars_not_in_preview" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "16.9", + "name": "Train Developers in Application Security Concepts and Secure Coding", + "description": "Ensure that all software development personnel receive training in writing secure code for their specific development environment and responsibilities. Training can include general security principles and application security standard practices. Conduct training at least annually and design in a way to promote security within the development team, and build a culture of security among the developers.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "16. Application Software Security", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "16.10", + "name": "Apply Secure Design Principles in Application Architectures", + "description": "Apply secure design principles in application architectures. Secure design principles include the concept of least privilege and enforcing mediation to validate every operation that the user makes, promoting the concept of \"never trust user input.\" Examples include ensuring that explicit error checking is performed and documented for all input, including for size, data type, and acceptable ranges or formats. Secure design also means minimizing the application infrastructure attack surface, such as turning off unprotected ports and services, removing unnecessary programs and files, and renaming or removing default accounts.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "16. Application Software Security", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Software", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "apigateway_restapi_authorizers_enabled", + "apigateway_restapi_public_with_authorizer", + "apigatewayv2_api_authorizers_enabled", + "appsync_graphql_api_no_api_key_authentication", + "cognito_user_pool_client_prevent_user_existence_errors", + "ecs_task_definitions_containers_readonly_access", + "ecs_task_definitions_host_namespace_not_shared", + "ecs_task_definitions_host_networking_mode_users", + "ecs_task_definitions_no_privileged_containers", + "elb_desync_mitigation_mode", + "elbv2_alb_drop_invalid_header_fields_enabled", + "elbv2_desync_mitigation_mode", + "sagemaker_notebook_instance_root_access_disabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "16.11", + "name": "Leverage Vetted Modules or Services for Application Security Components", + "description": "Leverage vetted modules or services for application security components, such as identity management, encryption, auditing, and logging. Using platform features in critical security functions will reduce developers' workload and minimize the likelihood of design or implementation errors. Modern operating systems provide effective mechanisms for identification, authentication, and authorization and make those mechanisms available to applications. Use only standardized, currently accepted, and extensively reviewed encryption algorithms. Operating systems also provide mechanisms to create and maintain secure audit logs.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "16. Application Software Security", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Software", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "secretsmanager_automatic_rotation_enabled", + "secretsmanager_secret_rotated_periodically" + ], + "azure": [ + "app_ensure_auth_is_set_up", + "app_function_access_keys_configured", + "app_function_identity_is_configured", + "app_register_with_identity" + ], + "vercel": [ + "team_directory_sync_enabled", + "team_saml_sso_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "16.12", + "name": "Implement Code-Level Security Checks", + "description": "Apply static and dynamic analysis tools within the application life cycle to verify that secure coding practices are being followed.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "16. Application Software Security", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Software", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code", + "inspector2_is_enabled" + ], + "github": [ + "githubactions_workflow_security_scan", + "repository_secret_scanning_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "16.13", + "name": "Conduct Application Penetration Testing", + "description": "Conduct application penetration testing. For critical applications, authenticated penetration testing is better suited to finding business logic vulnerabilities than code scanning and automated security testing. Penetration testing relies on the skill of the tester to manually manipulate an application as an authenticated and unauthenticated user.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "16. Application Software Security", + "Function": "Detect", + "AssetType": "Software", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "16.14", + "name": "Conduct Threat Modeling", + "description": "Conduct threat modeling. Threat modeling is the process of identifying and addressing application security design flaws within a design, before code is created. It is conducted through specially trained individuals who evaluate the application design and gauge security risks for each entry point and access level. The goal is to map out the application, architecture, and infrastructure in a structured way to understand its weaknesses.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "16. Application Software Security", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Software", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "17.1", + "name": "Designate Personnel to Manage Incident Handling", + "description": "Designate one key person, and at least one backup, who will manage the enterprise's incident handling process. Management personnel are responsible for the coordination and documentation of incident response and recovery efforts and can consist of employees internal to the enterprise, service providers, or a hybrid approach. If using a service provider, designate at least one person internal to the enterprise to oversee any third-party work. Review annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "17. Incident Response Management", + "Function": "Respond", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "17.2", + "name": "Establish and Maintain Contact Information for Reporting Security Incidents", + "description": "Establish and maintain contact information for parties that need to be informed of security incidents. Contacts may include internal staff, service providers, law enforcement, cyber insurance providers, relevant government agencies, Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) partners, or other stakeholders. Verify contacts annually to ensure that information is up-to-date.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "17. Incident Response Management", + "Function": "Govern", + "AssetType": "Documentation", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "account_maintain_current_contact_details", + "account_maintain_different_contact_details_to_security_billing_and_operations", + "account_security_contact_information_is_registered" + ], + "gcp": [ + "iam_organization_essential_contacts_configured" + ], + "mongodbatlas": [ + "organizations_security_contact_defined" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "17.3", + "name": "Establish and Maintain an Enterprise Process for Reporting Incidents", + "description": "Establish and maintain an documented enterprise process for the workforce to report security incidents. The process includes reporting timeframe, personnel to report to, mechanism for reporting, and the minimum information to be reported. Ensure the process is publicly available to all of the workforce. Review annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "17. Incident Response Management", + "Function": "Govern", + "AssetType": "Documentation", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG1", + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "17.4", + "name": "Establish and Maintain an Incident Response Process", + "description": "Establish and maintain a documented incident response process that addresses roles and responsibilities, compliance requirements, and a communication plan. Review annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "17. Incident Response Management", + "Function": "Govern", + "AssetType": "Documentation", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "ssmincidents_enabled_with_plans" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "17.5", + "name": "Assign Key Roles and Responsibilities", + "description": "Assign key roles and responsibilities for incident response, including staff from legal, IT, information security, facilities, public relations, human resources, incident responders, analysts, and relevant third parties. Review annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "17. Incident Response Management", + "Function": "Respond", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "17.6", + "name": "Define Mechanisms for Communicating During Incident Response", + "description": "Determine which primary and secondary mechanisms will be used to communicate and report during a security incident. Mechanisms can include phone calls, emails, secure chat, or notification letters. Keep in mind that certain mechanisms, such as emails, can be affected during a security incident. Review annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "17. Incident Response Management", + "Function": "Respond", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "17.7", + "name": "Conduct Routine Incident Response Exercises", + "description": "Plan and conduct routine incident response exercises and scenarios for key personnel involved in the incident response process to prepare for responding to real-world incidents. Exercises need to test communication channels, decision making, and workflows. Conduct testing on an annual basis, at a minimum.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "17. Incident Response Management", + "Function": "Recover", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "17.8", + "name": "Conduct Post-Incident Reviews", + "description": "Conduct post-incident reviews. Post-incident reviews help prevent incident recurrence through identifying lessons learned and follow-up action.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "17. Incident Response Management", + "Function": "Recover", + "AssetType": "Users", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "17.9", + "name": "Establish and Maintain Security Incident Thresholds", + "description": "Establish and maintain security incident thresholds, including, at a minimum, differentiating between an incident and an event. Examples can include: abnormal activity, security vulnerability, security weakness, data breach, privacy incident, etc. Review annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "17. Incident Response Management", + "Function": "Recover", + "AssetType": "Documentation", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "18.1", + "name": "Establish and Maintain a Penetration Testing Program", + "description": "Establish and maintain a penetration testing program appropriate to the size, complexity, industry, and maturity of the enterprise. Penetration testing program characteristics include scope, such as network, web application, Application Programming Interface (API), hosted services, and physical premise controls; frequency; limitations, such as acceptable hours, and excluded attack types; point of contact information; remediation, such as how findings will be routed internally; and retrospective requirements.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "18. Penetration Testing", + "Function": "Govern", + "AssetType": "Documentation", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "18.2", + "name": "Perform Periodic External Penetration Tests", + "description": "Perform periodic external penetration tests based on program requirements, no less than annually. External penetration testing must include enterprise and environmental reconnaissance to detect exploitable information. Penetration testing requires specialized skills and experience and must be conducted through a qualified party. The testing may be clear box or opaque box.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "18. Penetration Testing", + "Function": "Detect", + "AssetType": "Network", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "18.3", + "name": "Remediate Penetration Test Findings", + "description": "Remediate penetration test findings based on the enterprise's documented vulnerability remediation process. This should include determining a timeline and level of effort based on the impact and prioritization of each identified finding.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "18. Penetration Testing", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Network", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG2", + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "18.4", + "name": "Validate Security Measures", + "description": "Validate security measures after each penetration test. If deemed necessary, modify rulesets and capabilities to detect the techniques used during testing.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "18. Penetration Testing", + "Function": "Protect", + "AssetType": "Network", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + }, + { + "id": "18.5", + "name": "Perform Periodic Internal Penetration Tests", + "description": "Perform periodic internal penetration tests based on program requirements, no less than annually. The testing may be clear box or opaque box.", + "attributes": { + "Section": "18. Penetration Testing", + "Function": "Detect", + "AssetType": "Network", + "ImplementationGroups": [ + "IG3" + ] + }, + "checks": {} + } + ] +} diff --git a/prowler/compliance/csa_ccm_4.0.json b/prowler/compliance/csa_ccm_4.0.json index e014c5f408..1cb7428e51 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/csa_ccm_4.0.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/csa_ccm_4.0.json @@ -229,7 +229,16 @@ "oraclecloud": [ "cloudguard_enabled" ] - } + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] }, { "id": "A&A-04", @@ -334,7 +343,23 @@ "oraclecloud": [ "cloudguard_enabled" ] - } + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] }, { "id": "AIS-04", @@ -978,7 +1003,16 @@ "defender_ensure_defender_for_server_is_on", "vm_backup_enabled" ] - } + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "drs_job_exist", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] }, { "id": "BCR-11", @@ -1087,7 +1121,9 @@ "storage_blob_versioning_is_enabled", "storage_geo_redundant_enabled", "vm_scaleset_associated_with_load_balancer", - "vm_scaleset_not_empty" + "vm_scaleset_not_empty", + "cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled", + "cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous" ], "gcp": [ "compute_instance_automatic_restart_enabled", @@ -1414,7 +1450,30 @@ "events_rule_security_list_changes", "events_rule_vcn_changes" ] - } + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] }, { "id": "CEK-03", @@ -1600,6 +1659,7 @@ "cloudfront_distributions_origin_traffic_encrypted", "cloudfront_distributions_custom_ssl_certificate", "transfer_server_in_transit_encryption_enabled", + "transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled", "sagemaker_notebook_instance_encryption_enabled", "sagemaker_training_jobs_volume_and_output_encryption_enabled", "workspaces_volume_encryption_enabled", @@ -1656,7 +1716,18 @@ "filestorage_file_system_encrypted_with_cmk", "objectstorage_bucket_encrypted_with_cmk" ] - } + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "storage_smb_channel_encryption_with_secure_algorithm", + "Provider": "azure", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_smb_channel_encryption_algorithms", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "AES-256-GCM" + ] + } + ] }, { "id": "CEK-04", @@ -1783,6 +1854,7 @@ "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", "elb_insecure_ssl_ciphers", "elbv2_insecure_ssl_ciphers", + "transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled", "cloudfront_distributions_using_deprecated_ssl_protocols" ], "azure": [ @@ -1798,7 +1870,29 @@ "dns_rsasha1_in_use_to_key_sign_in_dnssec", "dns_rsasha1_in_use_to_zone_sign_in_dnssec" ] - } + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "RSA-1024", + "P-192" + ] + }, + { + "Check": "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", + "Provider": "azure", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_minimal_tls_versions", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "1.2", + "1.3" + ] + } + ] }, { "id": "CEK-08", @@ -2341,7 +2435,16 @@ "alibabacloud": [ "securitycenter_all_assets_agent_installed" ] - } + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] }, { "id": "DSP-02", @@ -2579,7 +2682,16 @@ "alibabacloud": [ "securitycenter_all_assets_agent_installed" ] - } + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] }, { "id": "DSP-04", @@ -2993,7 +3105,19 @@ "oraclecloud": [ "compute_instance_in_transit_encryption_enabled" ] - } + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", + "Provider": "azure", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_minimal_tls_versions", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "1.2", + "1.3" + ] + } + ] }, { "id": "DSP-16", @@ -3399,7 +3523,23 @@ "oraclecloud": [ "cloudguard_enabled" ] - } + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] }, { "id": "IAM-02", @@ -6251,7 +6391,16 @@ "cloudguard_enabled", "events_rule_cloudguard_problems" ] - } + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] }, { "id": "LOG-02", @@ -6554,7 +6703,23 @@ "events_notification_topic_and_subscription_exists", "events_rule_local_user_authentication" ] - } + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] }, { "id": "LOG-04", @@ -7598,7 +7763,16 @@ "events_rule_cloudguard_problems", "events_notification_topic_and_subscription_exists" ] - } + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] }, { "id": "SEF-03", @@ -7876,7 +8050,23 @@ "oraclecloud": [ "cloudguard_enabled" ] - } + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] }, { "id": "SEF-08", @@ -8457,7 +8647,16 @@ "oraclecloud": [ "cloudguard_enabled" ] - } + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] }, { "id": "TVM-05", @@ -8725,7 +8924,16 @@ "oraclecloud": [ "cloudguard_enabled" ] - } + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] }, { "id": "UEM-08", diff --git a/prowler/compliance/dora.json b/prowler/compliance/dora.json deleted file mode 100644 index 2378a307c6..0000000000 --- a/prowler/compliance/dora.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,597 +0,0 @@ -{ - "framework": "DORA", - "name": "Digital Operational Resilience Act (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554)", - "version": "2022/2554", - "description": "The Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) is a European Union regulation (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) that sets a uniform framework for the digital operational resilience of the EU financial sector. Mandatory since 17 January 2025, it applies to financial entities (banks, insurers, investment firms, payment institutions, etc.) and to ICT third-party service providers. DORA is structured around five pillars: ICT risk management, ICT-related incident reporting, digital operational resilience testing, ICT third-party risk management, and information sharing. This Prowler mapping covers the technical controls auditable from cloud configuration; the organisational, contractual and supervisory obligations defined in DORA must be addressed outside of Prowler.", - "icon": "dora", - "attributes_metadata": [ - { - "key": "Pillar", - "label": "Pillar", - "type": "str", - "required": true, - "enum": [ - "ICT Risk Management", - "ICT-Related Incident Reporting", - "Digital Operational Resilience Testing", - "ICT Third-Party Risk Management", - "Information Sharing" - ], - "output_formats": { - "csv": true, - "ocsf": true - } - }, - { - "key": "Article", - "label": "Article", - "type": "str", - "required": true, - "output_formats": { - "csv": true, - "ocsf": true - } - }, - { - "key": "ArticleTitle", - "label": "Article Title", - "type": "str", - "required": true, - "output_formats": { - "csv": true, - "ocsf": true - } - } - ], - "outputs": { - "table_config": { - "group_by": "Pillar" - }, - "pdf_config": { - "language": "en", - "primary_color": "#003399", - "secondary_color": "#0055A5", - "bg_color": "#F0F4FA", - "group_by_field": "Pillar", - "sections": [ - "ICT Risk Management", - "ICT-Related Incident Reporting", - "Digital Operational Resilience Testing", - "ICT Third-Party Risk Management", - "Information Sharing" - ], - "section_short_names": { - "ICT Risk Management": "ICT Risk Mgmt", - "ICT-Related Incident Reporting": "Incident Reporting", - "Digital Operational Resilience Testing": "Resilience Testing", - "ICT Third-Party Risk Management": "Third-Party Risk", - "Information Sharing": "Info Sharing" - }, - "charts": [ - { - "id": "pillar_compliance", - "type": "horizontal_bar", - "group_by": "Pillar", - "title": "Compliance Score by DORA Pillar", - "y_label": "Pillar", - "x_label": "Compliance %", - "value_source": "compliance_percent", - "color_mode": "by_value" - } - ], - "filter": { - "only_failed": true, - "include_manual": false - } - } - }, - "requirements": [ - { - "id": "DORA-Art5", - "name": "Governance and organisation", - "description": "Financial entities shall have a sound, comprehensive and well-documented ICT internal governance and control framework. Senior management is accountable for ICT risk and shall enforce strong identity, authentication and least-privilege policies for privileged identities, including the root account.", - "attributes": { - "Pillar": "ICT Risk Management", - "Article": "Article 5", - "ArticleTitle": "Governance and organisation" - }, - "checks": { - "aws": [ - "iam_avoid_root_usage", - "iam_no_root_access_key", - "iam_root_mfa_enabled", - "iam_root_hardware_mfa_enabled", - "iam_root_credentials_management_enabled", - "iam_password_policy_minimum_length_14", - "iam_password_policy_lowercase", - "iam_password_policy_uppercase", - "iam_password_policy_number", - "iam_password_policy_symbol", - "iam_password_policy_reuse_24", - "iam_password_policy_expires_passwords_within_90_days_or_less", - "iam_securityaudit_role_created", - "iam_support_role_created", - "organizations_account_part_of_organizations", - "iam_user_mfa_enabled_console_access", - "iam_user_hardware_mfa_enabled" - ] - } - }, - { - "id": "DORA-Art6", - "name": "ICT risk management framework", - "description": "Financial entities shall have an ICT risk management framework that is sound, comprehensive and well-documented, enabling them to address ICT risk quickly, efficiently and comprehensively and to ensure a high level of digital operational resilience. This includes continuous configuration recording, security findings aggregation and an enterprise-wide visibility plane.", - "attributes": { - "Pillar": "ICT Risk Management", - "Article": "Article 6", - "ArticleTitle": "ICT risk management framework" - }, - "checks": { - "aws": [ - "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", - "config_recorder_using_aws_service_role", - "securityhub_enabled", - "accessanalyzer_enabled", - "accessanalyzer_enabled_without_findings", - "organizations_delegated_administrators", - "guardduty_centrally_managed", - "guardduty_delegated_admin_enabled_all_regions" - ] - } - }, - { - "id": "DORA-Art7", - "name": "ICT systems, protocols and tools", - "description": "Financial entities shall use and maintain updated ICT systems, protocols and tools that are appropriate to the magnitude of operations supporting ICT functions, technologically resilient, and adequately equipped to securely process data. Cryptographic primitives, certificate hygiene and network segmentation are core to this requirement.", - "attributes": { - "Pillar": "ICT Risk Management", - "Article": "Article 7", - "ArticleTitle": "ICT systems, protocols and tools" - }, - "checks": { - "aws": [ - "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", - "acm_certificates_transparency_logs_enabled", - "acm_certificates_expiration_check", - "ec2_ebs_default_encryption", - "kms_cmk_rotation_enabled", - "s3_bucket_secure_transport_policy", - "s3_bucket_default_encryption", - "s3_bucket_kms_encryption", - "vpc_subnet_separate_private_public", - "vpc_subnet_no_public_ip_by_default", - "elb_insecure_ssl_ciphers", - "elbv2_insecure_ssl_ciphers", - "elb_ssl_listeners", - "elbv2_ssl_listeners", - "cloudfront_distributions_using_deprecated_ssl_protocols", - "cloudfront_distributions_https_enabled", - "rds_instance_transport_encrypted" - ] - } - }, - { - "id": "DORA-Art8", - "name": "Identification", - "description": "Financial entities shall identify, classify and adequately document all ICT supported business functions, roles and responsibilities, the information assets and ICT assets supporting them, and their interdependencies. They shall on a continuous basis identify all sources of ICT risk, in particular the risk exposure to and from other financial entities.", - "attributes": { - "Pillar": "ICT Risk Management", - "Article": "Article 8", - "ArticleTitle": "Identification" - }, - "checks": { - "aws": [ - "accessanalyzer_enabled", - "accessanalyzer_enabled_without_findings", - "macie_is_enabled", - "macie_automated_sensitive_data_discovery_enabled", - "ec2_securitygroup_not_used", - "ec2_elastic_ip_unassigned", - "ec2_networkacl_unused", - "secretsmanager_secret_unused" - ] - } - }, - { - "id": "DORA-Art9", - "name": "Protection and prevention", - "description": "Financial entities shall continuously monitor and control the security and functioning of ICT systems and tools and minimise the impact of ICT risk by deploying appropriate ICT security tools, policies and procedures. Encryption at rest and in transit, blocking of public exposure, network access controls, secret management and instance hardening are central to this article.", - "attributes": { - "Pillar": "ICT Risk Management", - "Article": "Article 9", - "ArticleTitle": "Protection and prevention" - }, - "checks": { - "aws": [ - "kms_key_not_publicly_accessible", - "ec2_ebs_volume_encryption", - "ec2_ebs_snapshots_encrypted", - "ec2_ebs_public_snapshot", - "ec2_ebs_snapshot_account_block_public_access", - "s3_account_level_public_access_blocks", - "s3_bucket_level_public_access_block", - "s3_bucket_public_access", - "s3_bucket_policy_public_write_access", - "s3_bucket_public_write_acl", - "s3_bucket_public_list_acl", - "s3_bucket_acl_prohibited", - "s3_access_point_public_access_block", - "ec2_securitygroup_default_restrict_traffic", - "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_all_ports", - "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_any_port", - "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_high_risk_tcp_ports", - "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_22", - "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_3389", - "rds_instance_storage_encrypted", - "rds_cluster_storage_encrypted", - "rds_instance_no_public_access", - "rds_snapshots_public_access", - "secretsmanager_not_publicly_accessible", - "secretsmanager_has_restrictive_resource_policy", - "secretsmanager_automatic_rotation_enabled", - "dynamodb_tables_kms_cmk_encryption_enabled", - "sns_topics_kms_encryption_at_rest_enabled", - "sns_topics_not_publicly_accessible", - "ec2_instance_imdsv2_enabled", - "ec2_instance_account_imdsv2_enabled", - "efs_encryption_at_rest_enabled", - "awslambda_function_not_publicly_accessible" - ] - } - }, - { - "id": "DORA-Art10", - "name": "Detection", - "description": "Financial entities shall have in place mechanisms to promptly detect anomalous activities, including ICT network performance issues and ICT-related incidents, and to identify potential single points of failure. Threat detection across compute, identity, storage and the API control plane is required for timely detection.", - "attributes": { - "Pillar": "ICT Risk Management", - "Article": "Article 10", - "ArticleTitle": "Detection" - }, - "checks": { - "aws": [ - "guardduty_is_enabled", - "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", - "guardduty_ec2_malware_protection_enabled", - "guardduty_lambda_protection_enabled", - "guardduty_rds_protection_enabled", - "guardduty_s3_protection_enabled", - "guardduty_eks_audit_log_enabled", - "guardduty_eks_runtime_monitoring_enabled", - "securityhub_enabled", - "cloudtrail_threat_detection_enumeration", - "cloudtrail_threat_detection_llm_jacking", - "cloudtrail_threat_detection_privilege_escalation", - "cloudtrail_insights_exist", - "inspector2_is_enabled", - "inspector2_active_findings_exist", - "ec2_elastic_ip_shodan" - ] - } - }, - { - "id": "DORA-Art11", - "name": "Response and recovery", - "description": "Financial entities shall put in place a comprehensive ICT business continuity policy, including ICT response and recovery plans, that ensures the continuity of ICT-supported critical or important functions. Operational alarming, automated event routing and tested recovery actions are essential.", - "attributes": { - "Pillar": "ICT Risk Management", - "Article": "Article 11", - "ArticleTitle": "Response and recovery" - }, - "checks": { - "aws": [ - "cloudwatch_alarm_actions_enabled", - "cloudwatch_alarm_actions_alarm_state_configured", - "eventbridge_global_endpoint_event_replication_enabled", - "sns_subscription_not_using_http_endpoints", - "backup_plans_exist", - "backup_vaults_exist", - "rds_instance_critical_event_subscription", - "rds_cluster_critical_event_subscription" - ] - } - }, - { - "id": "DORA-Art12", - "name": "Backup policies and procedures, restoration and recovery procedures and methods", - "description": "Financial entities shall develop and document backup policies and procedures specifying the scope of data subject to backup and the minimum frequency of the backup, as well as restoration and recovery procedures and methods. Backups must be encrypted, retained, and resources must be designed for recoverability across availability zones and regions.", - "attributes": { - "Pillar": "ICT Risk Management", - "Article": "Article 12", - "ArticleTitle": "Backup policies and procedures, restoration and recovery procedures and methods" - }, - "checks": { - "aws": [ - "backup_plans_exist", - "backup_vaults_exist", - "backup_vaults_encrypted", - "backup_recovery_point_encrypted", - "backup_reportplans_exist", - "rds_instance_backup_enabled", - "rds_cluster_protected_by_backup_plan", - "rds_instance_protected_by_backup_plan", - "rds_instance_multi_az", - "rds_cluster_multi_az", - "rds_cluster_backtrack_enabled", - "rds_instance_deletion_protection", - "rds_cluster_deletion_protection", - "rds_snapshots_encrypted", - "s3_bucket_object_versioning", - "s3_bucket_object_lock", - "s3_bucket_cross_region_replication", - "s3_bucket_no_mfa_delete", - "dynamodb_tables_pitr_enabled", - "dynamodb_table_deletion_protection_enabled", - "ec2_ebs_volume_protected_by_backup_plan", - "ec2_ebs_volume_snapshots_exists", - "autoscaling_group_multiple_az", - "elb_is_in_multiple_az", - "elbv2_is_in_multiple_az", - "cloudfront_distributions_multiple_origin_failover_configured", - "dynamodb_table_protected_by_backup_plan" - ] - } - }, - { - "id": "DORA-Art13", - "name": "Learning and evolving", - "description": "Financial entities shall have in place capabilities and staff to gather information on vulnerabilities and cyber threats, perform post ICT-related incident reviews, and continuously feed lessons learnt back into the ICT risk assessment process. Findings aggregation and continuous insights drive this cycle.", - "attributes": { - "Pillar": "ICT Risk Management", - "Article": "Article 13", - "ArticleTitle": "Learning and evolving" - }, - "checks": { - "aws": [ - "securityhub_enabled", - "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", - "inspector2_active_findings_exist", - "accessanalyzer_enabled_without_findings", - "cloudtrail_insights_exist" - ] - } - }, - { - "id": "DORA-Art14", - "name": "Communication", - "description": "As part of the ICT risk management framework, financial entities shall have in place crisis communication plans enabling a responsible disclosure of ICT-related incidents or major vulnerabilities to clients, counterparts and the public. Reliable, encrypted and access-controlled notification channels are required.", - "attributes": { - "Pillar": "ICT Risk Management", - "Article": "Article 14", - "ArticleTitle": "Communication" - }, - "checks": { - "aws": [ - "sns_topics_kms_encryption_at_rest_enabled", - "sns_topics_not_publicly_accessible", - "sns_subscription_not_using_http_endpoints", - "eventbridge_bus_exposed", - "eventbridge_bus_cross_account_access", - "eventbridge_schema_registry_cross_account_access", - "cloudwatch_alarm_actions_enabled", - "cloudwatch_alarm_actions_alarm_state_configured" - ] - } - }, - { - "id": "DORA-Art17", - "name": "ICT-related incident management process", - "description": "Financial entities shall define, establish and implement an ICT-related incident management process to detect, manage and notify ICT-related incidents. Comprehensive trail logging, log integrity protection, retention and centralisation of ICT events are foundational requirements.", - "attributes": { - "Pillar": "ICT-Related Incident Reporting", - "Article": "Article 17", - "ArticleTitle": "ICT-related incident management process" - }, - "checks": { - "aws": [ - "cloudtrail_multi_region_enabled", - "cloudtrail_multi_region_enabled_logging_management_events", - "cloudtrail_kms_encryption_enabled", - "cloudtrail_log_file_validation_enabled", - "cloudtrail_cloudwatch_logging_enabled", - "cloudtrail_logs_s3_bucket_access_logging_enabled", - "cloudtrail_logs_s3_bucket_is_not_publicly_accessible", - "cloudtrail_s3_dataevents_read_enabled", - "cloudtrail_s3_dataevents_write_enabled", - "cloudtrail_bucket_requires_mfa_delete", - "cloudtrail_bedrock_logging_enabled", - "cloudwatch_log_group_retention_policy_specific_days_enabled", - "cloudwatch_log_group_kms_encryption_enabled", - "cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs", - "cloudwatch_log_group_not_publicly_accessible", - "vpc_flow_logs_enabled", - "ec2_client_vpn_endpoint_connection_logging_enabled", - "route53_public_hosted_zones_cloudwatch_logging_enabled", - "elb_logging_enabled", - "elbv2_logging_enabled", - "cloudfront_distributions_logging_enabled", - "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled" - ] - } - }, - { - "id": "DORA-Art18", - "name": "Classification of ICT-related incidents and cyber threats", - "description": "Financial entities shall classify ICT-related incidents and shall determine their impact based on criteria such as the number of clients affected, duration, geographical spread, data losses, and criticality of the services affected. Severity-aware threat detection across the estate underpins this classification.", - "attributes": { - "Pillar": "ICT-Related Incident Reporting", - "Article": "Article 18", - "ArticleTitle": "Classification of ICT-related incidents and cyber threats" - }, - "checks": { - "aws": [ - "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", - "guardduty_centrally_managed", - "guardduty_delegated_admin_enabled_all_regions", - "securityhub_enabled", - "inspector2_active_findings_exist", - "accessanalyzer_enabled_without_findings", - "cloudtrail_threat_detection_enumeration", - "cloudtrail_threat_detection_llm_jacking", - "cloudtrail_threat_detection_privilege_escalation" - ] - } - }, - { - "id": "DORA-Art19", - "name": "Reporting of major ICT-related incidents and voluntary notification of significant cyber threats", - "description": "Financial entities shall report major ICT-related incidents to the relevant competent authority and may, on a voluntary basis, notify significant cyber threats. Detective metric filters, change-tracking alarms and reliable notification topics are needed to surface and route reportable events.", - "attributes": { - "Pillar": "ICT-Related Incident Reporting", - "Article": "Article 19", - "ArticleTitle": "Reporting of major ICT-related incidents and voluntary notification of significant cyber threats" - }, - "checks": { - "aws": [ - "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_authentication_failures", - "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_unauthorized_api_calls", - "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_root_usage", - "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_sign_in_without_mfa", - "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_disable_or_scheduled_deletion_of_kms_cmk", - "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_for_s3_bucket_policy_changes", - "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_policy_changes", - "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_security_group_changes", - "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_aws_organizations_changes", - "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_and_alarm_for_aws_config_configuration_changes_enabled", - "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_and_alarm_for_cloudtrail_configuration_changes_enabled", - "cloudwatch_changes_to_network_acls_alarm_configured", - "cloudwatch_changes_to_network_gateways_alarm_configured", - "cloudwatch_changes_to_network_route_tables_alarm_configured", - "cloudwatch_changes_to_vpcs_alarm_configured", - "sns_subscription_not_using_http_endpoints" - ] - } - }, - { - "id": "DORA-Art24", - "name": "General requirements for the performance of digital operational resilience testing", - "description": "Financial entities shall establish, maintain and review a sound and comprehensive digital operational resilience testing programme, as an integral part of the ICT risk management framework. Continuous vulnerability discovery, configuration assessment and instance manageability are foundational.", - "attributes": { - "Pillar": "Digital Operational Resilience Testing", - "Article": "Article 24", - "ArticleTitle": "General requirements for the performance of digital operational resilience testing" - }, - "checks": { - "aws": [ - "inspector2_is_enabled", - "inspector2_active_findings_exist", - "securityhub_enabled", - "ec2_instance_managed_by_ssm", - "ec2_instance_with_outdated_ami", - "ssm_managed_compliant_patching" - ] - } - }, - { - "id": "DORA-Art25", - "name": "Testing of ICT tools and systems", - "description": "Financial entities shall ensure that tests are undertaken on ICT tools and systems, on critical ICT systems supporting all critical or important functions, at least yearly. Vulnerability assessments, deprecated component detection and certificate hygiene must be tracked.", - "attributes": { - "Pillar": "Digital Operational Resilience Testing", - "Article": "Article 25", - "ArticleTitle": "Testing of ICT tools and systems" - }, - "checks": { - "aws": [ - "inspector2_is_enabled", - "inspector2_active_findings_exist", - "guardduty_is_enabled", - "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", - "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", - "ec2_instance_with_outdated_ami", - "ec2_instance_managed_by_ssm", - "ec2_instance_paravirtual_type", - "rds_instance_deprecated_engine_version", - "acm_certificates_expiration_check", - "rds_instance_certificate_expiration", - "iam_no_expired_server_certificates_stored", - "ssm_managed_compliant_patching" - ] - } - }, - { - "id": "DORA-Art28", - "name": "General principles (ICT third-party risk)", - "description": "Financial entities shall manage ICT third-party risk as an integral component of ICT risk within their ICT risk management framework. Cross-account access, trust boundaries, organization-level controls and dependency visibility are critical to monitor third-party exposure on AWS.", - "attributes": { - "Pillar": "ICT Third-Party Risk Management", - "Article": "Article 28", - "ArticleTitle": "General principles (ICT third-party risk)" - }, - "checks": { - "aws": [ - "iam_role_cross_service_confused_deputy_prevention", - "iam_role_cross_account_readonlyaccess_policy", - "iam_no_custom_policy_permissive_role_assumption", - "accessanalyzer_enabled", - "accessanalyzer_enabled_without_findings", - "s3_bucket_cross_account_access", - "dynamodb_table_cross_account_access", - "eventbridge_bus_cross_account_access", - "eventbridge_schema_registry_cross_account_access", - "cloudwatch_cross_account_sharing_disabled", - "organizations_delegated_administrators", - "organizations_account_part_of_organizations", - "organizations_scp_check_deny_regions", - "vpc_endpoint_connections_trust_boundaries", - "vpc_endpoint_services_allowed_principals_trust_boundaries", - "vpc_peering_routing_tables_with_least_privilege", - "awslambda_function_using_cross_account_layers" - ] - } - }, - { - "id": "DORA-Art30", - "name": "Key contractual provisions", - "description": "Contractual arrangements with ICT third-party service providers shall be set out in writing and include, at minimum, agreed service levels and clear allocation of rights and obligations. Privilege boundaries, least-privilege policies and absence of administrative wildcards are the technical guardrails that enforce these contractual constraints inside AWS.", - "attributes": { - "Pillar": "ICT Third-Party Risk Management", - "Article": "Article 30", - "ArticleTitle": "Key contractual provisions" - }, - "checks": { - "aws": [ - "iam_aws_attached_policy_no_administrative_privileges", - "iam_customer_attached_policy_no_administrative_privileges", - "iam_customer_unattached_policy_no_administrative_privileges", - "iam_inline_policy_no_administrative_privileges", - "iam_inline_policy_allows_privilege_escalation", - "iam_policy_allows_privilege_escalation", - "iam_inline_policy_no_full_access_to_cloudtrail", - "iam_inline_policy_no_full_access_to_kms", - "iam_policy_no_full_access_to_cloudtrail", - "iam_policy_no_full_access_to_kms", - "iam_role_administratoraccess_policy", - "iam_user_administrator_access_policy", - "iam_group_administrator_access_policy", - "iam_administrator_access_with_mfa", - "iam_policy_attached_only_to_group_or_roles", - "accessanalyzer_enabled" - ] - } - }, - { - "id": "DORA-Art45", - "name": "Information-sharing arrangements on cyber threat information and intelligence", - "description": "Financial entities may exchange amongst themselves cyber threat information and intelligence, including indicators of compromise, tactics, techniques and procedures, cyber security alerts and configuration tools. Centralised threat detection, sensitive data discovery and trail-based intelligence enable participation in such information-sharing arrangements.", - "attributes": { - "Pillar": "Information Sharing", - "Article": "Article 45", - "ArticleTitle": "Information-sharing arrangements on cyber threat information and intelligence" - }, - "checks": { - "aws": [ - "guardduty_is_enabled", - "guardduty_centrally_managed", - "securityhub_enabled", - "macie_is_enabled", - "macie_automated_sensitive_data_discovery_enabled", - "cloudtrail_threat_detection_enumeration", - "cloudtrail_threat_detection_llm_jacking", - "cloudtrail_threat_detection_privilege_escalation", - "accessanalyzer_enabled_without_findings" - ] - } - } - ] -} diff --git a/prowler/compliance/dora_2022_2554.json b/prowler/compliance/dora_2022_2554.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3b828059da --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/compliance/dora_2022_2554.json @@ -0,0 +1,1421 @@ +{ + "framework": "DORA", + "name": "Digital Operational Resilience Act (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554)", + "version": "2022/2554", + "description": "The Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) is a European Union regulation (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) that sets a uniform framework for the digital operational resilience of the EU financial sector. Mandatory since 17 January 2025, it applies to financial entities (banks, insurers, investment firms, payment institutions, etc.) and to ICT third-party service providers. DORA is structured around five pillars: ICT risk management, ICT-related incident reporting, digital operational resilience testing, ICT third-party risk management, and information sharing. This Prowler mapping covers the technical controls auditable from cloud configuration; the organisational, contractual and supervisory obligations defined in DORA must be addressed outside of Prowler.", + "icon": "dora", + "attributes_metadata": [ + { + "key": "Pillar", + "label": "Pillar", + "type": "str", + "required": true, + "enum": [ + "ICT Risk Management", + "ICT-Related Incident Reporting", + "Digital Operational Resilience Testing", + "ICT Third-Party Risk Management", + "Information Sharing" + ], + "output_formats": { + "csv": true, + "ocsf": true + } + }, + { + "key": "Article", + "label": "Article", + "type": "str", + "required": true, + "output_formats": { + "csv": true, + "ocsf": true + } + }, + { + "key": "ArticleTitle", + "label": "Article Title", + "type": "str", + "required": true, + "output_formats": { + "csv": true, + "ocsf": true + } + } + ], + "outputs": { + "table_config": { + "group_by": "Pillar" + }, + "pdf_config": { + "language": "en", + "primary_color": "#003399", + "secondary_color": "#0055A5", + "bg_color": "#F0F4FA", + "group_by_field": "Pillar", + "sections": [ + "ICT Risk Management", + "ICT-Related Incident Reporting", + "Digital Operational Resilience Testing", + "ICT Third-Party Risk Management", + "Information Sharing" + ], + "section_short_names": { + "ICT Risk Management": "ICT Risk Mgmt", + "ICT-Related Incident Reporting": "Incident Reporting", + "Digital Operational Resilience Testing": "Resilience Testing", + "ICT Third-Party Risk Management": "Third-Party Risk", + "Information Sharing": "Info Sharing" + }, + "charts": [ + { + "id": "pillar_compliance", + "type": "horizontal_bar", + "group_by": "Pillar", + "title": "Compliance Score by DORA Pillar", + "y_label": "Pillar", + "x_label": "Compliance %", + "value_source": "compliance_percent", + "color_mode": "by_value" + } + ], + "filter": { + "only_failed": true, + "include_manual": false + } + } + }, + "requirements": [ + { + "id": "DORA-Art5", + "name": "Governance and organisation", + "description": "Financial entities shall have a sound, comprehensive and well-documented ICT internal governance and control framework. Senior management is accountable for ICT risk and shall enforce strong identity, authentication and least-privilege policies for privileged identities, including the root account.", + "attributes": { + "Pillar": "ICT Risk Management", + "Article": "Article 5", + "ArticleTitle": "Governance and organisation" + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "iam_avoid_root_usage", + "iam_no_root_access_key", + "iam_root_mfa_enabled", + "iam_root_hardware_mfa_enabled", + "iam_root_credentials_management_enabled", + "iam_password_policy_minimum_length_14", + "iam_password_policy_lowercase", + "iam_password_policy_uppercase", + "iam_password_policy_number", + "iam_password_policy_symbol", + "iam_password_policy_reuse_24", + "iam_password_policy_expires_passwords_within_90_days_or_less", + "iam_securityaudit_role_created", + "iam_support_role_created", + "organizations_account_part_of_organizations", + "iam_user_mfa_enabled_console_access", + "iam_user_hardware_mfa_enabled" + ], + "azure": [ + "entra_global_admin_in_less_than_five_users", + "entra_privileged_user_has_mfa", + "entra_non_privileged_user_has_mfa", + "entra_user_with_vm_access_has_mfa", + "entra_security_defaults_enabled", + "entra_conditional_access_policy_require_mfa_for_admin_portals", + "entra_conditional_access_policy_require_mfa_for_management_api", + "entra_policy_default_users_cannot_create_security_groups", + "entra_policy_ensure_default_user_cannot_create_apps", + "entra_policy_ensure_default_user_cannot_create_tenants", + "entra_users_cannot_create_microsoft_365_groups", + "iam_subscription_roles_owner_custom_not_created", + "iam_role_user_access_admin_restricted", + "iam_custom_role_has_permissions_to_administer_resource_locks" + ], + "gcp": [ + "compute_project_os_login_enabled", + "compute_project_os_login_2fa_enabled", + "iam_no_service_roles_at_project_level", + "iam_sa_no_administrative_privileges", + "iam_role_kms_enforce_separation_of_duties", + "iam_role_sa_enforce_separation_of_duties", + "iam_organization_essential_contacts_configured", + "iam_account_access_approval_enabled", + "iam_service_account_unused", + "compute_instance_default_service_account_in_use", + "compute_instance_default_service_account_in_use_with_full_api_access", + "gke_cluster_no_default_service_account" + ], + "alibabacloud": [ + "ram_no_root_access_key", + "ram_user_mfa_enabled_console_access", + "ram_user_console_access_unused", + "ram_rotate_access_key_90_days", + "ram_password_policy_minimum_length", + "ram_password_policy_lowercase", + "ram_password_policy_uppercase", + "ram_password_policy_number", + "ram_password_policy_symbol", + "ram_password_policy_password_reuse_prevention", + "ram_password_policy_max_password_age", + "ram_password_policy_max_login_attempts", + "ram_policy_attached_only_to_group_or_roles", + "ram_policy_no_administrative_privileges" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "DORA-Art6", + "name": "ICT risk management framework", + "description": "Financial entities shall have an ICT risk management framework that is sound, comprehensive and well-documented, enabling them to address ICT risk quickly, efficiently and comprehensively and to ensure a high level of digital operational resilience. This includes continuous configuration recording, security findings aggregation and an enterprise-wide visibility plane.", + "attributes": { + "Pillar": "ICT Risk Management", + "Article": "Article 6", + "ArticleTitle": "ICT risk management framework" + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "config_recorder_using_aws_service_role", + "securityhub_enabled", + "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "accessanalyzer_enabled_without_findings", + "organizations_delegated_administrators", + "guardduty_centrally_managed", + "guardduty_delegated_admin_enabled_all_regions" + ], + "azure": [ + "defender_ensure_defender_for_server_is_on", + "defender_ensure_defender_for_containers_is_on", + "defender_ensure_defender_for_storage_is_on", + "defender_ensure_defender_for_app_services_is_on", + "defender_ensure_defender_for_azure_sql_databases_is_on", + "defender_ensure_defender_for_sql_servers_is_on", + "defender_ensure_defender_for_databases_is_on", + "defender_ensure_defender_for_os_relational_databases_is_on", + "defender_ensure_defender_for_keyvault_is_on", + "defender_ensure_defender_for_arm_is_on", + "defender_ensure_defender_for_dns_is_on", + "defender_ensure_defender_for_cosmosdb_is_on", + "defender_ensure_mcas_is_enabled", + "defender_ensure_wdatp_is_enabled", + "defender_auto_provisioning_log_analytics_agent_vms_on", + "policy_ensure_asc_enforcement_enabled" + ], + "gcp": [ + "iam_cloud_asset_inventory_enabled", + "iam_audit_logs_enabled", + "logging_sink_created", + "gcr_container_scanning_enabled", + "artifacts_container_analysis_enabled", + "iam_organization_essential_contacts_configured" + ], + "alibabacloud": [ + "securitycenter_advanced_or_enterprise_edition", + "securitycenter_all_assets_agent_installed", + "securitycenter_vulnerability_scan_enabled", + "actiontrail_multi_region_enabled" + ] + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "guardduty_delegated_admin_enabled_all_regions", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] + }, + { + "id": "DORA-Art7", + "name": "ICT systems, protocols and tools", + "description": "Financial entities shall use and maintain updated ICT systems, protocols and tools that are appropriate to the magnitude of operations supporting ICT functions, technologically resilient, and adequately equipped to securely process data. Cryptographic primitives, certificate hygiene and network segmentation are core to this requirement.", + "attributes": { + "Pillar": "ICT Risk Management", + "Article": "Article 7", + "ArticleTitle": "ICT systems, protocols and tools" + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "acm_certificates_transparency_logs_enabled", + "acm_certificates_expiration_check", + "ec2_ebs_default_encryption", + "kms_cmk_rotation_enabled", + "s3_bucket_secure_transport_policy", + "s3_bucket_default_encryption", + "s3_bucket_kms_encryption", + "vpc_subnet_separate_private_public", + "vpc_subnet_no_public_ip_by_default", + "elb_insecure_ssl_ciphers", + "elbv2_insecure_ssl_ciphers", + "elb_ssl_listeners", + "elbv2_ssl_listeners", + "cloudfront_distributions_using_deprecated_ssl_protocols", + "cloudfront_distributions_https_enabled", + "rds_instance_transport_encrypted" + ], + "azure": [ + "storage_ensure_minimum_tls_version_12", + "storage_secure_transfer_required_is_enabled", + "storage_smb_channel_encryption_with_secure_algorithm", + "storage_smb_protocol_version_is_latest", + "app_minimum_tls_version_12", + "app_ensure_http_is_redirected_to_https", + "app_ensure_using_http20", + "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", + "mysql_flexible_server_minimum_tls_version_12", + "mysql_flexible_server_ssl_connection_enabled", + "postgresql_flexible_server_enforce_ssl_enabled", + "keyvault_key_rotation_enabled", + "storage_key_rotation_90_days", + "aks_network_policy_enabled" + ], + "gcp": [ + "cloudsql_instance_ssl_connections", + "compute_instance_encryption_with_csek_enabled", + "compute_instance_confidential_computing_enabled", + "bigquery_dataset_cmk_encryption", + "bigquery_table_cmk_encryption", + "dataproc_encrypted_with_cmks_disabled", + "kms_key_rotation_enabled", + "kms_key_rotation_max_90_days", + "dns_dnssec_disabled", + "dns_rsasha1_in_use_to_key_sign_in_dnssec", + "dns_rsasha1_in_use_to_zone_sign_in_dnssec", + "compute_network_not_legacy", + "compute_network_default_in_use", + "compute_instance_single_network_interface" + ], + "cloudflare": [ + "zone_universal_ssl_enabled", + "zone_ssl_strict", + "zone_min_tls_version_secure", + "zone_tls_1_3_enabled", + "zone_hsts_enabled", + "zone_https_redirect_enabled", + "zone_automatic_https_rewrites_enabled", + "zone_development_mode_disabled", + "zone_record_caa_exists", + "zone_dnssec_enabled" + ], + "alibabacloud": [ + "oss_bucket_secure_transport_enabled", + "rds_instance_ssl_enabled", + "rds_instance_tde_enabled", + "rds_instance_tde_key_custom", + "ecs_attached_disk_encrypted", + "ecs_unattached_disk_encrypted", + "ecs_instance_no_legacy_network" + ] + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "RSA-1024", + "P-192" + ] + }, + { + "Check": "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", + "Provider": "azure", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_minimal_tls_versions", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "1.2", + "1.3" + ] + }, + { + "Check": "storage_smb_channel_encryption_with_secure_algorithm", + "Provider": "azure", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_smb_channel_encryption_algorithms", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "AES-256-GCM" + ] + } + ] + }, + { + "id": "DORA-Art8", + "name": "Identification", + "description": "Financial entities shall identify, classify and adequately document all ICT supported business functions, roles and responsibilities, the information assets and ICT assets supporting them, and their interdependencies. They shall on a continuous basis identify all sources of ICT risk, in particular the risk exposure to and from other financial entities.", + "attributes": { + "Pillar": "ICT Risk Management", + "Article": "Article 8", + "ArticleTitle": "Identification" + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "accessanalyzer_enabled_without_findings", + "macie_is_enabled", + "macie_automated_sensitive_data_discovery_enabled", + "ec2_securitygroup_not_used", + "ec2_elastic_ip_unassigned", + "ec2_networkacl_unused", + "secretsmanager_secret_unused" + ], + "azure": [ + "defender_auto_provisioning_vulnerabilty_assessments_machines_on", + "network_watcher_enabled", + "network_public_ip_shodan", + "vm_scaleset_not_empty" + ], + "gcp": [ + "iam_cloud_asset_inventory_enabled", + "iam_service_account_unused", + "iam_sa_user_managed_key_unused", + "apikeys_key_exists", + "compute_instance_suspended_without_persistent_disks", + "compute_public_address_shodan" + ], + "cloudflare": [ + "dns_record_no_wildcard", + "dns_record_no_internal_ip", + "dns_record_cname_target_valid" + ], + "alibabacloud": [ + "securitycenter_all_assets_agent_installed", + "ram_user_console_access_unused" + ] + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] + }, + { + "id": "DORA-Art9", + "name": "Protection and prevention", + "description": "Financial entities shall continuously monitor and control the security and functioning of ICT systems and tools and minimise the impact of ICT risk by deploying appropriate ICT security tools, policies and procedures. Encryption at rest and in transit, blocking of public exposure, network access controls, secret management and instance hardening are central to this article.", + "attributes": { + "Pillar": "ICT Risk Management", + "Article": "Article 9", + "ArticleTitle": "Protection and prevention" + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "kms_key_not_publicly_accessible", + "ec2_ebs_volume_encryption", + "ec2_ebs_snapshots_encrypted", + "ec2_ebs_public_snapshot", + "ec2_ebs_snapshot_account_block_public_access", + "s3_account_level_public_access_blocks", + "s3_bucket_level_public_access_block", + "s3_bucket_public_access", + "s3_bucket_policy_public_write_access", + "s3_bucket_public_write_acl", + "s3_bucket_public_list_acl", + "s3_bucket_acl_prohibited", + "s3_access_point_public_access_block", + "ec2_securitygroup_default_restrict_traffic", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_all_ports", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_any_port", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_high_risk_tcp_ports", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_22", + "ec2_securitygroup_allow_ingress_from_internet_to_tcp_port_3389", + "rds_instance_storage_encrypted", + "rds_cluster_storage_encrypted", + "rds_instance_no_public_access", + "rds_snapshots_public_access", + "secretsmanager_not_publicly_accessible", + "secretsmanager_has_restrictive_resource_policy", + "secretsmanager_automatic_rotation_enabled", + "dynamodb_tables_kms_cmk_encryption_enabled", + "sns_topics_kms_encryption_at_rest_enabled", + "sns_topics_not_publicly_accessible", + "ec2_instance_imdsv2_enabled", + "ec2_instance_account_imdsv2_enabled", + "efs_encryption_at_rest_enabled", + "awslambda_function_not_publicly_accessible" + ], + "azure": [ + "storage_account_public_network_access_disabled", + "storage_blob_public_access_level_is_disabled", + "storage_default_network_access_rule_is_denied", + "storage_ensure_private_endpoints_in_storage_accounts", + "storage_ensure_encryption_with_customer_managed_keys", + "storage_infrastructure_encryption_is_enabled", + "storage_account_key_access_disabled", + "storage_default_to_entra_authorization_enabled", + "containerregistry_not_publicly_accessible", + "containerregistry_uses_private_link", + "cosmosdb_account_use_private_endpoints", + "cosmosdb_account_firewall_use_selected_networks", + "keyvault_private_endpoints", + "keyvault_access_only_through_private_endpoints", + "keyvault_rbac_enabled", + "app_function_not_publicly_accessible", + "aisearch_service_not_publicly_accessible", + "aks_clusters_public_access_disabled", + "aks_clusters_created_with_private_nodes", + "sqlserver_unrestricted_inbound_access", + "postgresql_flexible_server_allow_access_services_disabled", + "vm_ensure_attached_disks_encrypted_with_cmk", + "vm_ensure_unattached_disks_encrypted_with_cmk", + "vm_ensure_using_managed_disks", + "vm_trusted_launch_enabled", + "vm_linux_enforce_ssh_authentication", + "vm_jit_access_enabled", + "sqlserver_tde_encryption_enabled", + "sqlserver_tde_encrypted_with_cmk", + "databricks_workspace_cmk_encryption_enabled", + "network_ssh_internet_access_restricted", + "network_rdp_internet_access_restricted", + "network_http_internet_access_restricted", + "network_udp_internet_access_restricted", + "network_bastion_host_exists" + ], + "gcp": [ + "kms_key_not_publicly_accessible", + "bigquery_dataset_public_access", + "bigquery_dataset_cmk_encryption", + "bigquery_table_cmk_encryption", + "cloudstorage_bucket_public_access", + "cloudstorage_bucket_uniform_bucket_level_access", + "cloudstorage_uses_vpc_service_controls", + "cloudsql_instance_public_access", + "cloudsql_instance_public_ip", + "cloudsql_instance_private_ip_assignment", + "cloudsql_instance_ssl_connections", + "cloudsql_instance_cmek_encryption_enabled", + "compute_firewall_ssh_access_from_the_internet_allowed", + "compute_firewall_rdp_access_from_the_internet_allowed", + "compute_instance_public_ip", + "compute_instance_shielded_vm_enabled", + "compute_instance_confidential_computing_enabled", + "compute_instance_serial_ports_in_use", + "compute_instance_block_project_wide_ssh_keys_disabled", + "compute_instance_ip_forwarding_is_enabled", + "compute_instance_encryption_with_csek_enabled", + "compute_image_not_publicly_shared", + "dataproc_encrypted_with_cmks_disabled", + "kms_key_rotation_enabled", + "gke_cluster_no_default_service_account", + "cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc", + "apikeys_api_restrictions_configured", + "apikeys_api_restricted_with_gemini_api", + "cloudsql_instance_mysql_local_infile_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_mysql_skip_show_database_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_sqlserver_contained_database_authentication_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_sqlserver_cross_db_ownership_chaining_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_sqlserver_external_scripts_enabled_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_sqlserver_remote_access_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_sqlserver_trace_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_sqlserver_user_connections_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_sqlserver_user_options_flag" + ], + "cloudflare": [ + "zone_universal_ssl_enabled", + "zone_ssl_strict", + "zone_min_tls_version_secure", + "zone_tls_1_3_enabled", + "zone_hsts_enabled", + "zone_https_redirect_enabled", + "zone_automatic_https_rewrites_enabled", + "zone_record_caa_exists", + "zone_dnssec_enabled", + "zone_waf_enabled", + "zone_waf_owasp_ruleset_enabled", + "zone_firewall_blocking_rules_configured", + "zone_browser_integrity_check_enabled", + "zone_bot_fight_mode_enabled", + "zone_rate_limiting_enabled", + "zone_challenge_passage_configured", + "zone_ip_geolocation_enabled", + "dns_record_proxied", + "dns_record_no_internal_ip", + "dns_record_no_wildcard", + "dns_record_cname_target_valid", + "zone_record_spf_exists", + "zone_record_dkim_exists", + "zone_record_dmarc_exists" + ], + "alibabacloud": [ + "oss_bucket_not_publicly_accessible", + "oss_bucket_secure_transport_enabled", + "actiontrail_oss_bucket_not_publicly_accessible", + "ecs_attached_disk_encrypted", + "ecs_unattached_disk_encrypted", + "ecs_securitygroup_restrict_ssh_internet", + "ecs_securitygroup_restrict_rdp_internet", + "ecs_instance_endpoint_protection_installed", + "rds_instance_no_public_access_whitelist", + "rds_instance_ssl_enabled", + "rds_instance_tde_enabled", + "rds_instance_tde_key_custom", + "cs_kubernetes_network_policy_enabled", + "cs_kubernetes_eni_multiple_ip_enabled", + "cs_kubernetes_private_cluster_enabled", + "cs_kubernetes_rbac_enabled", + "cs_kubernetes_dashboard_disabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "DORA-Art10", + "name": "Detection", + "description": "Financial entities shall have in place mechanisms to promptly detect anomalous activities, including ICT network performance issues and ICT-related incidents, and to identify potential single points of failure. Threat detection across compute, identity, storage and the API control plane is required for timely detection.", + "attributes": { + "Pillar": "ICT Risk Management", + "Article": "Article 10", + "ArticleTitle": "Detection" + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "guardduty_is_enabled", + "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", + "guardduty_ec2_malware_protection_enabled", + "guardduty_lambda_protection_enabled", + "guardduty_rds_protection_enabled", + "guardduty_s3_protection_enabled", + "guardduty_eks_audit_log_enabled", + "guardduty_eks_runtime_monitoring_enabled", + "securityhub_enabled", + "cloudtrail_threat_detection_enumeration", + "cloudtrail_threat_detection_llm_jacking", + "cloudtrail_threat_detection_privilege_escalation", + "cloudtrail_insights_exist", + "inspector2_is_enabled", + "inspector2_active_findings_exist", + "ec2_elastic_ip_shodan" + ], + "azure": [ + "defender_ensure_defender_for_server_is_on", + "defender_ensure_defender_for_containers_is_on", + "defender_ensure_defender_for_storage_is_on", + "defender_ensure_defender_for_keyvault_is_on", + "defender_ensure_defender_for_arm_is_on", + "defender_ensure_defender_for_dns_is_on", + "defender_ensure_defender_for_azure_sql_databases_is_on", + "defender_ensure_defender_for_sql_servers_is_on", + "defender_ensure_wdatp_is_enabled", + "defender_ensure_mcas_is_enabled", + "defender_container_images_scan_enabled", + "defender_container_images_resolved_vulnerabilities", + "sqlserver_microsoft_defender_enabled", + "apim_threat_detection_llm_jacking" + ], + "gcp": [ + "compute_public_address_shodan", + "gcr_container_scanning_enabled", + "artifacts_container_analysis_enabled", + "compute_subnet_flow_logs_enabled", + "compute_network_dns_logging_enabled", + "cloudstorage_bucket_logging_enabled", + "compute_loadbalancer_logging_enabled", + "logging_sink_created" + ], + "cloudflare": [ + "zone_bot_fight_mode_enabled", + "zone_browser_integrity_check_enabled", + "zone_rate_limiting_enabled" + ], + "alibabacloud": [ + "securitycenter_vulnerability_scan_enabled", + "securitycenter_notification_enabled_high_risk", + "securitycenter_all_assets_agent_installed", + "ecs_instance_endpoint_protection_installed", + "cs_kubernetes_cloudmonitor_enabled" + ] + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] + }, + { + "id": "DORA-Art11", + "name": "Response and recovery", + "description": "Financial entities shall put in place a comprehensive ICT business continuity policy, including ICT response and recovery plans, that ensures the continuity of ICT-supported critical or important functions. Operational alarming, automated event routing and tested recovery actions are essential.", + "attributes": { + "Pillar": "ICT Risk Management", + "Article": "Article 11", + "ArticleTitle": "Response and recovery" + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "cloudwatch_alarm_actions_enabled", + "cloudwatch_alarm_actions_alarm_state_configured", + "eventbridge_global_endpoint_event_replication_enabled", + "sns_subscription_not_using_http_endpoints", + "backup_plans_exist", + "backup_vaults_exist", + "rds_instance_critical_event_subscription", + "rds_cluster_critical_event_subscription" + ], + "azure": [ + "monitor_alert_service_health_exists", + "monitor_alert_create_update_security_solution", + "monitor_alert_delete_security_solution", + "defender_additional_email_configured_with_a_security_contact", + "defender_ensure_notify_alerts_severity_is_high", + "defender_ensure_notify_emails_to_owners", + "defender_attack_path_notifications_properly_configured", + "vm_backup_enabled", + "vm_sufficient_daily_backup_retention_period" + ], + "gcp": [ + "compute_instance_automatic_restart_enabled", + "compute_instance_group_autohealing_enabled", + "compute_instance_on_host_maintenance_migrate", + "cloudsql_instance_high_availability_enabled", + "cloudsql_instance_automated_backups", + "compute_instance_deletion_protection_enabled", + "compute_instance_group_load_balancer_attached", + "compute_instance_preemptible_vm_disabled" + ], + "alibabacloud": [ + "securitycenter_notification_enabled_high_risk", + "cs_kubernetes_cluster_check_recent", + "cs_kubernetes_cluster_check_weekly" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "DORA-Art12", + "name": "Backup policies and procedures, restoration and recovery procedures and methods", + "description": "Financial entities shall develop and document backup policies and procedures specifying the scope of data subject to backup and the minimum frequency of the backup, as well as restoration and recovery procedures and methods. Backups must be encrypted, retained, and resources must be designed for recoverability across availability zones and regions.", + "attributes": { + "Pillar": "ICT Risk Management", + "Article": "Article 12", + "ArticleTitle": "Backup policies and procedures, restoration and recovery procedures and methods" + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "backup_plans_exist", + "backup_vaults_exist", + "backup_vaults_encrypted", + "backup_recovery_point_encrypted", + "backup_reportplans_exist", + "rds_instance_backup_enabled", + "rds_cluster_protected_by_backup_plan", + "rds_instance_protected_by_backup_plan", + "rds_instance_multi_az", + "rds_cluster_multi_az", + "rds_cluster_backtrack_enabled", + "rds_instance_deletion_protection", + "rds_cluster_deletion_protection", + "rds_snapshots_encrypted", + "s3_bucket_object_versioning", + "s3_bucket_object_lock", + "s3_bucket_cross_region_replication", + "s3_bucket_no_mfa_delete", + "dynamodb_tables_pitr_enabled", + "dynamodb_table_deletion_protection_enabled", + "ec2_ebs_volume_protected_by_backup_plan", + "ec2_ebs_volume_snapshots_exists", + "autoscaling_group_multiple_az", + "elb_is_in_multiple_az", + "elbv2_is_in_multiple_az", + "cloudfront_distributions_multiple_origin_failover_configured", + "dynamodb_table_protected_by_backup_plan" + ], + "azure": [ + "vm_backup_enabled", + "vm_sufficient_daily_backup_retention_period", + "vm_ensure_using_managed_disks", + "storage_ensure_soft_delete_is_enabled", + "storage_ensure_file_shares_soft_delete_is_enabled", + "storage_blob_versioning_is_enabled", + "storage_geo_redundant_enabled", + "keyvault_recoverable" + ], + "gcp": [ + "cloudsql_instance_automated_backups", + "cloudsql_instance_high_availability_enabled", + "cloudstorage_bucket_versioning_enabled", + "cloudstorage_bucket_soft_delete_enabled", + "cloudstorage_bucket_lifecycle_management_enabled", + "cloudstorage_bucket_sufficient_retention_period", + "compute_instance_group_multiple_zones", + "compute_instance_disk_auto_delete_disabled", + "compute_instance_deletion_protection_enabled", + "compute_snapshot_not_outdated", + "compute_instance_suspended_without_persistent_disks" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "DORA-Art13", + "name": "Learning and evolving", + "description": "Financial entities shall have in place capabilities and staff to gather information on vulnerabilities and cyber threats, perform post ICT-related incident reviews, and continuously feed lessons learnt back into the ICT risk assessment process. Findings aggregation and continuous insights drive this cycle.", + "attributes": { + "Pillar": "ICT Risk Management", + "Article": "Article 13", + "ArticleTitle": "Learning and evolving" + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "securityhub_enabled", + "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", + "inspector2_active_findings_exist", + "accessanalyzer_enabled_without_findings", + "cloudtrail_insights_exist" + ], + "azure": [ + "defender_auto_provisioning_vulnerabilty_assessments_machines_on", + "defender_assessments_vm_endpoint_protection_installed", + "defender_container_images_resolved_vulnerabilities", + "defender_container_images_scan_enabled", + "defender_ensure_system_updates_are_applied", + "sqlserver_vulnerability_assessment_enabled", + "sqlserver_va_periodic_recurring_scans_enabled", + "sqlserver_va_scan_reports_configured" + ], + "gcp": [ + "gcr_container_scanning_enabled", + "artifacts_container_analysis_enabled", + "iam_cloud_asset_inventory_enabled", + "logging_sink_created" + ], + "alibabacloud": [ + "securitycenter_vulnerability_scan_enabled", + "securitycenter_all_assets_agent_installed", + "ecs_instance_latest_os_patches_applied" + ] + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] + }, + { + "id": "DORA-Art14", + "name": "Communication", + "description": "As part of the ICT risk management framework, financial entities shall have in place crisis communication plans enabling a responsible disclosure of ICT-related incidents or major vulnerabilities to clients, counterparts and the public. Reliable, encrypted and access-controlled notification channels are required.", + "attributes": { + "Pillar": "ICT Risk Management", + "Article": "Article 14", + "ArticleTitle": "Communication" + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "sns_topics_kms_encryption_at_rest_enabled", + "sns_topics_not_publicly_accessible", + "sns_subscription_not_using_http_endpoints", + "eventbridge_bus_exposed", + "eventbridge_bus_cross_account_access", + "eventbridge_schema_registry_cross_account_access", + "cloudwatch_alarm_actions_enabled", + "cloudwatch_alarm_actions_alarm_state_configured" + ], + "azure": [ + "defender_additional_email_configured_with_a_security_contact", + "defender_ensure_notify_emails_to_owners", + "defender_ensure_notify_alerts_severity_is_high", + "defender_attack_path_notifications_properly_configured", + "monitor_alert_service_health_exists" + ], + "gcp": [ + "iam_organization_essential_contacts_configured", + "logging_sink_created", + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_project_ownership_changes_enabled", + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_audit_configuration_changes_enabled" + ], + "alibabacloud": [ + "securitycenter_notification_enabled_high_risk" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "DORA-Art17", + "name": "ICT-related incident management process", + "description": "Financial entities shall define, establish and implement an ICT-related incident management process to detect, manage and notify ICT-related incidents. Comprehensive trail logging, log integrity protection, retention and centralisation of ICT events are foundational requirements.", + "attributes": { + "Pillar": "ICT-Related Incident Reporting", + "Article": "Article 17", + "ArticleTitle": "ICT-related incident management process" + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "cloudtrail_multi_region_enabled", + "cloudtrail_multi_region_enabled_logging_management_events", + "cloudtrail_kms_encryption_enabled", + "cloudtrail_log_file_validation_enabled", + "cloudtrail_cloudwatch_logging_enabled", + "cloudtrail_logs_s3_bucket_access_logging_enabled", + "cloudtrail_logs_s3_bucket_is_not_publicly_accessible", + "cloudtrail_s3_dataevents_read_enabled", + "cloudtrail_s3_dataevents_write_enabled", + "cloudtrail_bucket_requires_mfa_delete", + "cloudtrail_bedrock_logging_enabled", + "cloudwatch_log_group_retention_policy_specific_days_enabled", + "cloudwatch_log_group_kms_encryption_enabled", + "cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs", + "cloudwatch_log_group_not_publicly_accessible", + "vpc_flow_logs_enabled", + "ec2_client_vpn_endpoint_connection_logging_enabled", + "route53_public_hosted_zones_cloudwatch_logging_enabled", + "elb_logging_enabled", + "elbv2_logging_enabled", + "cloudfront_distributions_logging_enabled", + "s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled" + ], + "azure": [ + "monitor_diagnostic_settings_exists", + "monitor_diagnostic_setting_with_appropriate_categories", + "monitor_storage_account_with_activity_logs_is_private", + "monitor_storage_account_with_activity_logs_cmk_encrypted", + "network_flow_log_captured_sent", + "network_flow_log_more_than_90_days", + "keyvault_logging_enabled", + "sqlserver_auditing_enabled", + "sqlserver_auditing_retention_90_days", + "mysql_flexible_server_audit_log_enabled", + "mysql_flexible_server_audit_log_connection_activated", + "postgresql_flexible_server_log_checkpoints_on", + "postgresql_flexible_server_log_connections_on", + "postgresql_flexible_server_log_disconnections_on", + "postgresql_flexible_server_log_retention_days_greater_3", + "app_http_logs_enabled", + "app_function_application_insights_enabled", + "appinsights_ensure_is_configured" + ], + "gcp": [ + "iam_audit_logs_enabled", + "cloudstorage_audit_logs_enabled", + "logging_sink_created", + "cloudstorage_bucket_logging_enabled", + "cloudstorage_bucket_log_retention_policy_lock", + "cloudstorage_bucket_sufficient_retention_period", + "compute_subnet_flow_logs_enabled", + "compute_network_dns_logging_enabled", + "compute_loadbalancer_logging_enabled", + "cloudsql_instance_postgres_enable_pgaudit_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_postgres_log_connections_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_postgres_log_disconnections_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_postgres_log_statement_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_postgres_log_min_messages_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_postgres_log_error_verbosity_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_postgres_log_min_error_statement_flag", + "cloudsql_instance_postgres_log_min_duration_statement_flag" + ], + "alibabacloud": [ + "actiontrail_multi_region_enabled", + "actiontrail_oss_bucket_not_publicly_accessible", + "oss_bucket_logging_enabled", + "sls_logstore_retention_period", + "vpc_flow_logs_enabled", + "cs_kubernetes_log_service_enabled", + "rds_instance_sql_audit_enabled", + "rds_instance_sql_audit_retention", + "rds_instance_postgresql_log_connections_enabled", + "rds_instance_postgresql_log_disconnections_enabled", + "rds_instance_postgresql_log_duration_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "DORA-Art18", + "name": "Classification of ICT-related incidents and cyber threats", + "description": "Financial entities shall classify ICT-related incidents and shall determine their impact based on criteria such as the number of clients affected, duration, geographical spread, data losses, and criticality of the services affected. Severity-aware threat detection across the estate underpins this classification.", + "attributes": { + "Pillar": "ICT-Related Incident Reporting", + "Article": "Article 18", + "ArticleTitle": "Classification of ICT-related incidents and cyber threats" + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", + "guardduty_centrally_managed", + "guardduty_delegated_admin_enabled_all_regions", + "securityhub_enabled", + "inspector2_active_findings_exist", + "accessanalyzer_enabled_without_findings", + "cloudtrail_threat_detection_enumeration", + "cloudtrail_threat_detection_llm_jacking", + "cloudtrail_threat_detection_privilege_escalation" + ], + "azure": [ + "defender_ensure_notify_alerts_severity_is_high", + "defender_attack_path_notifications_properly_configured", + "defender_ensure_defender_for_server_is_on", + "defender_ensure_wdatp_is_enabled", + "defender_ensure_mcas_is_enabled", + "sqlserver_microsoft_defender_enabled", + "apim_threat_detection_llm_jacking" + ], + "gcp": [ + "gcr_container_scanning_enabled", + "artifacts_container_analysis_enabled", + "compute_public_address_shodan", + "iam_cloud_asset_inventory_enabled", + "iam_audit_logs_enabled" + ], + "alibabacloud": [ + "securitycenter_notification_enabled_high_risk", + "securitycenter_vulnerability_scan_enabled" + ] + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_delegated_admin_enabled_all_regions", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] + }, + { + "id": "DORA-Art19", + "name": "Reporting of major ICT-related incidents and voluntary notification of significant cyber threats", + "description": "Financial entities shall report major ICT-related incidents to the relevant competent authority and may, on a voluntary basis, notify significant cyber threats. Detective metric filters, change-tracking alarms and reliable notification topics are needed to surface and route reportable events.", + "attributes": { + "Pillar": "ICT-Related Incident Reporting", + "Article": "Article 19", + "ArticleTitle": "Reporting of major ICT-related incidents and voluntary notification of significant cyber threats" + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_authentication_failures", + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_unauthorized_api_calls", + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_root_usage", + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_sign_in_without_mfa", + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_disable_or_scheduled_deletion_of_kms_cmk", + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_for_s3_bucket_policy_changes", + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_policy_changes", + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_security_group_changes", + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_aws_organizations_changes", + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_and_alarm_for_aws_config_configuration_changes_enabled", + "cloudwatch_log_metric_filter_and_alarm_for_cloudtrail_configuration_changes_enabled", + "cloudwatch_changes_to_network_acls_alarm_configured", + "cloudwatch_changes_to_network_gateways_alarm_configured", + "cloudwatch_changes_to_network_route_tables_alarm_configured", + "cloudwatch_changes_to_vpcs_alarm_configured", + "sns_subscription_not_using_http_endpoints" + ], + "azure": [ + "monitor_alert_create_policy_assignment", + "monitor_alert_delete_policy_assignment", + "monitor_alert_create_update_nsg", + "monitor_alert_delete_nsg", + "monitor_alert_create_update_security_solution", + "monitor_alert_delete_security_solution", + "monitor_alert_create_update_sqlserver_fr", + "monitor_alert_delete_sqlserver_fr", + "monitor_alert_create_update_public_ip_address_rule", + "monitor_alert_delete_public_ip_address_rule", + "monitor_alert_service_health_exists", + "defender_additional_email_configured_with_a_security_contact" + ], + "gcp": [ + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_audit_configuration_changes_enabled", + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_bucket_permission_changes_enabled", + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_compute_configuration_changes_enabled", + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_custom_role_changes_enabled", + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_project_ownership_changes_enabled", + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_sql_instance_configuration_changes_enabled", + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_vpc_firewall_rule_changes_enabled", + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_vpc_network_changes_enabled", + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_vpc_network_route_changes_enabled", + "iam_organization_essential_contacts_configured", + "logging_sink_created" + ], + "alibabacloud": [ + "sls_management_console_authentication_failures_alert_enabled", + "sls_management_console_signin_without_mfa_alert_enabled", + "sls_root_account_usage_alert_enabled", + "sls_unauthorized_api_calls_alert_enabled", + "sls_ram_role_changes_alert_enabled", + "sls_oss_bucket_policy_changes_alert_enabled", + "sls_oss_permission_changes_alert_enabled", + "sls_rds_instance_configuration_changes_alert_enabled", + "sls_security_group_changes_alert_enabled", + "sls_vpc_changes_alert_enabled", + "sls_vpc_network_route_changes_alert_enabled", + "sls_cloud_firewall_changes_alert_enabled", + "sls_customer_created_cmk_changes_alert_enabled" + ] + } + }, + { + "id": "DORA-Art24", + "name": "General requirements for the performance of digital operational resilience testing", + "description": "Financial entities shall establish, maintain and review a sound and comprehensive digital operational resilience testing programme, as an integral part of the ICT risk management framework. Continuous vulnerability discovery, configuration assessment and instance manageability are foundational.", + "attributes": { + "Pillar": "Digital Operational Resilience Testing", + "Article": "Article 24", + "ArticleTitle": "General requirements for the performance of digital operational resilience testing" + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "inspector2_is_enabled", + "inspector2_active_findings_exist", + "securityhub_enabled", + "ec2_instance_managed_by_ssm", + "ec2_instance_with_outdated_ami", + "ssm_managed_compliant_patching" + ], + "azure": [ + "defender_auto_provisioning_vulnerabilty_assessments_machines_on", + "defender_ensure_system_updates_are_applied", + "defender_container_images_scan_enabled", + "defender_assessments_vm_endpoint_protection_installed", + "sqlserver_vulnerability_assessment_enabled", + "sqlserver_va_periodic_recurring_scans_enabled", + "vm_ensure_using_approved_images", + "vm_desired_sku_size" + ], + "gcp": [ + "gcr_container_scanning_enabled", + "artifacts_container_analysis_enabled", + "compute_instance_shielded_vm_enabled", + "compute_snapshot_not_outdated", + "compute_public_address_shodan" + ], + "alibabacloud": [ + "securitycenter_vulnerability_scan_enabled", + "securitycenter_advanced_or_enterprise_edition", + "ecs_instance_latest_os_patches_applied", + "cs_kubernetes_cluster_check_recent", + "cs_kubernetes_cluster_check_weekly" + ] + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] + }, + { + "id": "DORA-Art25", + "name": "Testing of ICT tools and systems", + "description": "Financial entities shall ensure that tests are undertaken on ICT tools and systems, on critical ICT systems supporting all critical or important functions, at least yearly. Vulnerability assessments, deprecated component detection and certificate hygiene must be tracked.", + "attributes": { + "Pillar": "Digital Operational Resilience Testing", + "Article": "Article 25", + "ArticleTitle": "Testing of ICT tools and systems" + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "inspector2_is_enabled", + "inspector2_active_findings_exist", + "guardduty_is_enabled", + "guardduty_no_high_severity_findings", + "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "ec2_instance_with_outdated_ami", + "ec2_instance_managed_by_ssm", + "ec2_instance_paravirtual_type", + "rds_instance_deprecated_engine_version", + "acm_certificates_expiration_check", + "rds_instance_certificate_expiration", + "iam_no_expired_server_certificates_stored", + "ssm_managed_compliant_patching" + ], + "azure": [ + "defender_auto_provisioning_vulnerabilty_assessments_machines_on", + "defender_container_images_resolved_vulnerabilities", + "sqlserver_vulnerability_assessment_enabled", + "sqlserver_va_periodic_recurring_scans_enabled", + "sqlserver_va_scan_reports_configured", + "sqlserver_va_emails_notifications_admins_enabled", + "keyvault_key_expiration_set_in_non_rbac", + "keyvault_rbac_key_expiration_set", + "keyvault_non_rbac_secret_expiration_set", + "keyvault_rbac_secret_expiration_set", + "app_ensure_java_version_is_latest", + "app_ensure_php_version_is_latest", + "app_ensure_python_version_is_latest", + "app_function_latest_runtime_version", + "storage_smb_protocol_version_is_latest" + ], + "gcp": [ + "gcr_container_scanning_enabled", + "artifacts_container_analysis_enabled", + "compute_snapshot_not_outdated", + "compute_network_not_legacy", + "dns_rsasha1_in_use_to_key_sign_in_dnssec", + "dns_rsasha1_in_use_to_zone_sign_in_dnssec", + "apikeys_key_rotated_in_90_days", + "iam_sa_user_managed_key_rotate_90_days" + ], + "cloudflare": [ + "zone_min_tls_version_secure" + ], + "alibabacloud": [ + "securitycenter_vulnerability_scan_enabled", + "ecs_instance_latest_os_patches_applied", + "ecs_instance_no_legacy_network" + ] + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] + }, + { + "id": "DORA-Art28", + "name": "General principles (ICT third-party risk)", + "description": "Financial entities shall manage ICT third-party risk as an integral component of ICT risk within their ICT risk management framework. Cross-account access, trust boundaries, organization-level controls and dependency visibility are critical to monitor third-party exposure on AWS.", + "attributes": { + "Pillar": "ICT Third-Party Risk Management", + "Article": "Article 28", + "ArticleTitle": "General principles (ICT third-party risk)" + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "iam_role_cross_service_confused_deputy_prevention", + "iam_role_cross_account_readonlyaccess_policy", + "iam_no_custom_policy_permissive_role_assumption", + "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "accessanalyzer_enabled_without_findings", + "s3_bucket_cross_account_access", + "dynamodb_table_cross_account_access", + "eventbridge_bus_cross_account_access", + "eventbridge_schema_registry_cross_account_access", + "cloudwatch_cross_account_sharing_disabled", + "organizations_delegated_administrators", + "organizations_account_part_of_organizations", + "organizations_scp_check_deny_regions", + "vpc_endpoint_connections_trust_boundaries", + "vpc_endpoint_services_allowed_principals_trust_boundaries", + "vpc_peering_routing_tables_with_least_privilege", + "awslambda_function_using_cross_account_layers" + ], + "azure": [ + "entra_policy_guest_users_access_restrictions", + "entra_policy_guest_invite_only_for_admin_roles", + "entra_policy_restricts_user_consent_for_apps", + "entra_policy_user_consent_for_verified_apps", + "storage_cross_tenant_replication_disabled", + "containerregistry_uses_private_link", + "cosmosdb_account_use_private_endpoints", + "keyvault_access_only_through_private_endpoints", + "aks_clusters_created_with_private_nodes" + ], + "gcp": [ + "bigquery_dataset_public_access", + "cloudstorage_bucket_public_access", + "kms_key_not_publicly_accessible", + "cloudstorage_uses_vpc_service_controls", + "cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc", + "iam_sa_no_user_managed_keys", + "iam_sa_no_administrative_privileges", + "iam_no_service_roles_at_project_level", + "apikeys_api_restrictions_configured", + "apikeys_api_restricted_with_gemini_api", + "compute_image_not_publicly_shared", + "iam_cloud_asset_inventory_enabled" + ], + "cloudflare": [ + "zone_record_caa_exists", + "dns_record_cname_target_valid" + ], + "alibabacloud": [ + "ram_policy_no_administrative_privileges", + "oss_bucket_not_publicly_accessible", + "actiontrail_oss_bucket_not_publicly_accessible" + ] + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] + }, + { + "id": "DORA-Art30", + "name": "Key contractual provisions", + "description": "Contractual arrangements with ICT third-party service providers shall be set out in writing and include, at minimum, agreed service levels and clear allocation of rights and obligations. Privilege boundaries, least-privilege policies and absence of administrative wildcards are the technical guardrails that enforce these contractual constraints inside AWS.", + "attributes": { + "Pillar": "ICT Third-Party Risk Management", + "Article": "Article 30", + "ArticleTitle": "Key contractual provisions" + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "iam_aws_attached_policy_no_administrative_privileges", + "iam_customer_attached_policy_no_administrative_privileges", + "iam_customer_unattached_policy_no_administrative_privileges", + "iam_inline_policy_no_administrative_privileges", + "iam_inline_policy_allows_privilege_escalation", + "iam_policy_allows_privilege_escalation", + "iam_inline_policy_no_full_access_to_cloudtrail", + "iam_inline_policy_no_full_access_to_kms", + "iam_policy_no_full_access_to_cloudtrail", + "iam_policy_no_full_access_to_kms", + "iam_role_administratoraccess_policy", + "iam_user_administrator_access_policy", + "iam_group_administrator_access_policy", + "iam_administrator_access_with_mfa", + "iam_policy_attached_only_to_group_or_roles", + "accessanalyzer_enabled" + ], + "azure": [ + "iam_subscription_roles_owner_custom_not_created", + "iam_role_user_access_admin_restricted", + "iam_custom_role_has_permissions_to_administer_resource_locks", + "entra_global_admin_in_less_than_five_users", + "app_function_identity_without_admin_privileges", + "entra_policy_default_users_cannot_create_security_groups", + "entra_policy_ensure_default_user_cannot_create_apps" + ], + "gcp": [ + "iam_sa_no_administrative_privileges", + "iam_no_service_roles_at_project_level", + "iam_role_kms_enforce_separation_of_duties", + "iam_role_sa_enforce_separation_of_duties", + "iam_sa_no_user_managed_keys", + "compute_instance_default_service_account_in_use", + "compute_instance_default_service_account_in_use_with_full_api_access", + "gke_cluster_no_default_service_account", + "iam_account_access_approval_enabled", + "apikeys_api_restrictions_configured" + ], + "alibabacloud": [ + "ram_policy_no_administrative_privileges", + "ram_policy_attached_only_to_group_or_roles", + "ram_no_root_access_key" + ] + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] + }, + { + "id": "DORA-Art45", + "name": "Information-sharing arrangements on cyber threat information and intelligence", + "description": "Financial entities may exchange amongst themselves cyber threat information and intelligence, including indicators of compromise, tactics, techniques and procedures, cyber security alerts and configuration tools. Centralised threat detection, sensitive data discovery and trail-based intelligence enable participation in such information-sharing arrangements.", + "attributes": { + "Pillar": "Information Sharing", + "Article": "Article 45", + "ArticleTitle": "Information-sharing arrangements on cyber threat information and intelligence" + }, + "checks": { + "aws": [ + "guardduty_is_enabled", + "guardduty_centrally_managed", + "securityhub_enabled", + "macie_is_enabled", + "macie_automated_sensitive_data_discovery_enabled", + "cloudtrail_threat_detection_enumeration", + "cloudtrail_threat_detection_llm_jacking", + "cloudtrail_threat_detection_privilege_escalation", + "accessanalyzer_enabled_without_findings" + ], + "azure": [ + "defender_ensure_mcas_is_enabled", + "defender_ensure_wdatp_is_enabled", + "defender_ensure_defender_for_server_is_on", + "defender_attack_path_notifications_properly_configured", + "sqlserver_microsoft_defender_enabled", + "apim_threat_detection_llm_jacking" + ], + "gcp": [ + "iam_cloud_asset_inventory_enabled", + "iam_audit_logs_enabled", + "gcr_container_scanning_enabled", + "artifacts_container_analysis_enabled", + "compute_public_address_shodan", + "logging_sink_created" + ], + "alibabacloud": [ + "securitycenter_advanced_or_enterprise_edition", + "securitycenter_notification_enabled_high_risk", + "actiontrail_multi_region_enabled", + "sls_logstore_retention_period" + ] + }, + "config_requirements": [ + { + "Check": "guardduty_is_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + }, + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": false + } + ] + } + ] +} diff --git a/prowler/compliance/gcp/ccc_gcp.json b/prowler/compliance/gcp/ccc_gcp.json index 67a75841ef..520b6b534a 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/gcp/ccc_gcp.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/gcp/ccc_gcp.json @@ -924,6 +924,14 @@ "cloudsql_instance_automated_backups", "cloudstorage_bucket_log_retention_policy_lock", "cloudstorage_bucket_sufficient_retention_period" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "cloudstorage_bucket_sufficient_retention_period", + "ConfigKey": "storage_min_retention_days", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 30 + } ] }, { @@ -5841,6 +5849,20 @@ "Checks": [ "iam_sa_user_managed_key_unused", "iam_service_account_unused" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "iam_sa_user_managed_key_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_account_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + }, + { + "Check": "iam_service_account_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_account_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 90 + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/gcp/cis_5.0_gcp.json b/prowler/compliance/gcp/cis_5.0_gcp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..edc962ff0c --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/compliance/gcp/cis_5.0_gcp.json @@ -0,0 +1,2097 @@ +{ + "Framework": "CIS", + "Name": "CIS Google Cloud Platform Foundation Benchmark v5.0.0", + "Version": "5.0", + "Provider": "GCP", + "Description": "The CIS Google Cloud Platform Foundations Benchmark provides prescriptive guidance for configuring security options for a subset of GCP with an emphasis on foundational, testable, and architecture agnostic settings.", + "Requirements": [ + { + "Id": "1.1.1", + "Description": "Ensure Super Admin Email Address Is Not Tied To A Single User", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "It is recommended that the super admin role is assigned to a dedicated email address (e.g., gcp-superadmin@company.com) rather than to individual user email addresses (e.g., john.doe@company.com). The dedicated super admin email should be a separate user account used exclusively for super admin level administrative tasks. When the GCP organization resource is created, existing super administrator accounts from Google Workspace or Cloud Identity automatically gain access to manage the organization. The super admin role has unrestricted access to all GCP organization resources and settings. Using individual user email addresses for super admin access creates security and operational risks.", + "RationaleStatement": "Using a dedicated email address for super admin accounts rather than individual user emails significantly reduces the risk of phishing attacks, as individual user accounts receive daily business emails and are high-value phishing targets, while a dedicated super admin email address not used for daily communications has minimal exposure to credential compromise. Dedicated super admin accounts can enforce stronger authentication requirements such as hardware security keys and shorter session timeouts without impacting day-to-day productivity. When employees leave the organization or change roles, super admin access remains continuous through the dedicated account rather than being tied to departing personnel. Separating super admin access from daily user activities prevents accidental misuse of elevated privileges and provides clear audit separation, supporting segregation of duties.", + "ImpactStatement": "Creating a new dedicated super admin account requires coordination with Google Workspace or Cloud Identity administrators. Existing super admin accounts tied to individual users should be replaced with the dedicated account, and individual user accounts should be removed from the super admin role once migration is complete.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Admin Console**\n\n1. Navigate to the Google Admin console at https://admin.google.com\n2. Go to `Account` --> `Admin roles` in the left navigation menu\n3. Click on `Super Admin` role\n4. Review the list of users assigned the Super Admin role\n5. Verify that the super admin role is assigned to a dedicated email address (e.g., gcp-superadmin@company.com) and that individual user email addresses are NOT assigned the Super Admin role directly.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Admin Console**\n\n1. Create a dedicated super admin user account: in the Google Admin console go to `Directory` -> `Users`, click `Add new user` and configure a dedicated address (e.g., gcp-superadmin@company.com). Enforce 2-Step Verification with a hardware security key.\n2. Assign the Super Admin role to the dedicated account: go to `Account` --> `Admin roles`, click `Super Admin` role, `Assigned Admins` --> `Assign users`, select the dedicated account and click `Assign role`.\n3. Remove individual user accounts from the Super Admin role: for each individual user email address, select the user, click `Unassign role` and confirm the removal. Verify that only the dedicated super admin account remains assigned.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "SubSection": "1.1 Organization Resource", + "DefaultValue": "When you first sign up for Google Workspace or Cloud Identity, the person who completes the signup process automatically becomes the first super administrator, typically resulting in an individual user's email address being assigned the super admin role by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.2", + "Description": "Ensure Super Admin Account Is Not Used For Google Cloud Administration", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "It is recommended that super admin accounts are not granted any IAM roles in Google Cloud Platform and are used exclusively for identity management in Google Workspace or Cloud Identity. Google Cloud administration should be performed using separate regular user accounts that are granted appropriate GCP IAM roles such as Organization Administrator. The Super Admin role and GCP resource management are two separate privilege domains that should not be combined in a single account.", + "RationaleStatement": "Separating super admin accounts from GCP administration is critical because Super Admin privileges are irrevocable and can override almost any setting in both Workspace and GCP. If a super admin account is granted GCP permissions and compromised through phishing, an attacker gains full control over both the email domain and the entire cloud infrastructure. Super admin accounts not granted GCP IAM permissions cannot be used to directly manipulate cloud resources even if compromised, limiting blast radius to identity management functions only. This separation enforces least privilege and reduces the attack surface by ensuring the most powerful account type is isolated from daily cloud operations.", + "ImpactStatement": "Organizations must create separate regular user accounts in Workspace/Cloud Identity for GCP administration. These accounts will be granted appropriate GCP IAM roles for cloud resource management. Existing super admin accounts that have been granted GCP IAM roles must have those permissions removed.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Admin Console**\n\n1. In the Google Admin console (https://admin.google.com), go to `Account` -> `Admin roles`, click `Super Admin` role and note all user accounts assigned the Super Admin role.\n2. In the Google Cloud Console (https://console.cloud.google.com), go to `IAM & Admin` -> `IAM` at the organization level and review all IAM policy bindings.\n3. Verify that none of the super admin accounts appear in the IAM permissions list and that they have NO IAM roles granted at organization, folder, or project levels.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Admin Console**\n\n1. Create a separate regular user account for GCP administration in `Directory` -> `Users` (do NOT assign it the Super Admin role).\n2. Grant GCP IAM roles to that cloud admin account in the Cloud Console under `IAM & Admin` -> `IAM` (e.g., Organization Administrator).\n3. Delete all GCP IAM bindings for super admin users: in `IAM & Admin` -> `IAM` at the organization level, edit each super admin principal and remove all assigned roles. Repeat for all folders and projects.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "SubSection": "1.1 Organization Resource", + "DefaultValue": "By default, super administrator accounts from Google Workspace or Cloud Identity gain access to manage the GCP organization resource when it is created." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.3", + "Description": "Ensure Folders Are Structured By Environment And Sensitivity", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that GCP Resource Manager folders are structured primarily by environment (for example, production, non-production, sandbox) and sensitivity (for example, security, logging, shared services, regulated workloads), rather than mirroring the corporate org chart. Folders should group projects that share similar security requirements and controls so that appropriate Organization Policies, IAM policies, and other guardrails can be applied consistently at the folder level.", + "RationaleStatement": "A clear folder structure based on environment and sensitivity makes it easier to apply consistent guardrails and centralized security controls to projects that have similar risk profiles and compliance needs. Folders enable hierarchical policy inheritance where stricter controls can be applied to production folders while development folders can have more relaxed policies. Poorly defined or ad-hoc folder structures complicate policy management, increase the chance of misapplied controls, and can lead to mixing workloads with different data sensitivities. Without proper folder segregation, a compromised development project can be used to pivot into production resources and compliance auditing becomes significantly more complex.", + "ImpactStatement": "Restructuring folders by environment and sensitivity can require moving projects, changing inherited Organization Policies and IAM policies, and updating automation that assumes existing folder paths. This may introduce short-term operational overhead, including policy revalidation, testing of workloads under new guardrails, and coordination with application and platform teams.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Admin Console**\n\n1. In the Cloud Console (https://console.cloud.google.com), select your organization and go to `IAM & Admin` -> `Manage resources` to view the organization hierarchy.\n2. Review and document the folder hierarchy (organization -> folders -> sub-folders -> projects).\n3. Evaluate whether top-level and key folders are clearly aligned to environment (production, non-production, sandbox) and sensitivity/function (security, logging, shared services, regulated).\n4. For each environment/sensitivity folder, sample projects and verify their primary workloads match the folder's stated purpose. Note any folders organized mainly by department/owner or that mix production and non-production workloads.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Admin Console**\n\n1. Work with security, platform, and application teams to agree on a small set of top-level folders (e.g., Security/Management, Shared Services/Infrastructure, Prod, Non-Prod). Define dedicated folders for highly regulated workloads.\n2. Create the folder structure under `IAM & Admin` -> `Manage resources` using `CREATE FOLDER`.\n3. Map each project to its target folder based on environment and sensitivity.\n4. Move projects to the environment/sensitivity-based folders (start with low-risk sandbox/non-production projects, test workloads, then proceed with production).\n5. Remove old folders that no longer reflect the target structure and update architecture docs and onboarding runbooks.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "SubSection": "1.1 Organization Resource" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.4", + "Description": "Ensure Organization Policies Are Configured For Centralized Constraints", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that one or more baseline Organization Policies are configured at the organization or folder level in accordance with enterprise security requirements. Organization Policies act as preventive guardrails that set centralized constraints on how resources can be configured across all projects within the organization hierarchy. These policies can enforce security invariants such as preventing public IP addresses on compute instances, requiring OS Login for SSH access, restricting resource locations to approved regions, enforcing uniform bucket-level access on Cloud Storage, or limiting IAM policy member domains to prevent external sharing.", + "RationaleStatement": "Organization Policies do not grant permissions but instead set organization-wide limits on resource configurations and service usage, regardless of local project-level IAM policies. Without baseline guardrail Organization Policies, each project can configure resources inconsistently, disable security features, use unapproved regions, allow public access to resources, or share data with external domains. Configuring standard Organization Policies at the organization or folder level enforces preventive, centralized control over high-risk configurations and supports consistent security posture at scale. Organization Policies are inherited down the resource hierarchy (organization -> folder -> project), making them an effective mechanism for enforcing security controls across large numbers of projects.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enforcing baseline Organization Policies can initially block some existing resource configurations, such as use of unapproved regions, creation of resources with public IPs, or external domain sharing. Teams may need to adjust deployment pipelines, Terraform configurations, and exception processes. Organizations should test policies in non-production folders before applying them broadly.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Admin Console**\n\nPre-requisite: Document your organization's baseline guardrail requirements (e.g., constraints/gcp.resourceLocations, constraints/compute.requireOsLogin, constraints/compute.vmExternalIpAccess, constraints/storage.uniformBucketLevelAccess, constraints/iam.allowedPolicyMemberDomains).\n\n1. In the Cloud Console (https://console.cloud.google.com), select your organization and go to `IAM & Admin` -> `Organization Policies`. Review the policies set at the organization level and verify baseline security constraints are configured (enforced, exceptions, configured values).\n2. Verify policies are not overridden or disabled at folder or project levels (look for policies marked as `Customized`).\n3. Compare your documented baseline requirements against the configured Organization Policies and identify gaps.", + "RemediationProcedure": "IMPORTANT: Before enforcing Organization Policies, use dry run mode to preview which resources would be blocked and review violations in Cloud Asset Inventory before actual enforcement.\n\n**From Google Cloud Admin Console**\n\n1. In `IAM & Admin` -> `Organization Policies`, review existing policies and identify gaps based on your security requirements.\n2. For each baseline constraint, search for the constraint, click `Manage policy`, select `Override parent's policy` and configure it (boolean: `Enforcement On`; list: choose Deny all/Allow all or Custom values). Click `Set policy` and verify it shows as `Enforced`.\n3. Configure folder-level policies if different constraints are needed per environment, ensuring folder-level policies do not weaken organization-level security controls unless explicitly approved.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "SubSection": "1.1 Organization Resource" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2", + "Description": "Ensure that Corporate Login Credentials are Used", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Use corporate login credentials instead of consumer accounts, such as Gmail accounts.", + "RationaleStatement": "It is recommended fully-managed corporate Google accounts be used for increased visibility, auditing, and controlling access to Cloud Platform resources. Email accounts based outside of the user's organization, such as consumer accounts, should not be used for business purposes.", + "ImpactStatement": "There will be increased overhead as maintaining accounts will now be required. For smaller organizations, this will not be an issue, but will balloon with size.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Remove all consumer Google accounts from IAM policies. Follow the documentation and setup corporate login accounts. **Prevention:** To ensure that no email addresses outside the organization can be granted IAM permissions to its Google Cloud projects, folders or organization, turn on the Organization Policy for `Domain Restricted Sharing`. Learn more at: [https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/organization-policy/restricting-domains](https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/organization-policy/restricting-domains)", + "AuditProcedure": "For each Google Cloud Platform project, list the accounts that have been granted access to that project: **From Google Cloud CLI** gcloud projects get-iam-policy PROJECT_ID Also list the accounts added on each folder: gcloud resource-manager folders get-iam-policy FOLDER_ID And list your organization's IAM policy: gcloud organizations get-iam-policy ORGANIZATION_ID No email accounts outside the organization domain should be granted permissions in the IAM policies. This excludes Google-owned service accounts.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6371476:https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/projects/get-iam-policy:https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/resource-manager/folders/get-iam-policy:https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/organizations/get-iam-policy:https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/organization-policy/restricting-domains:https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/organization-policy/org-policy-constraints", + "DefaultValue": "By default, no email addresses outside the organization's domain have access to its Google Cloud deployments, but any user email account can be added to the IAM policy for Google Cloud Platform projects, folders, or organizations.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3", + "Description": "Ensure that Multi-Factor Authentication is 'Enabled' for All Non-Service Accounts", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Setup multi-factor authentication for Google Cloud Platform accounts.", + "RationaleStatement": "Multi-factor authentication requires more than one mechanism to authenticate a user. This secures user logins from attackers exploiting stolen or weak credentials.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** For each Google Cloud Platform project: 1. Identify non-service accounts. 1. Setup multi-factor authentication for each account.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** For each Google Cloud Platform project, folder, or organization: 1. Identify non-service accounts. 1. Manually verify that multi-factor authentication for each account is set.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/solutions/securing-gcp-account-u2f:https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/185839", + "DefaultValue": "By default, multi-factor authentication is not set.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.4", + "Description": "Ensure that Security Key Enforcement is Enabled for All Admin Accounts", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Setup Security Key Enforcement for Google Cloud Platform admin accounts.", + "RationaleStatement": "Google Cloud Platform users with Organization Administrator roles have the highest level of privilege in the organization. These accounts should be protected with the strongest form of two-factor authentication: Security Key Enforcement. Ensure that admins use Security Keys to log in instead of weaker second factors like SMS or one-time passwords (OTP). Security Keys are actual physical keys used to access Google Organization Administrator Accounts. They send an encrypted signature rather than a code, ensuring that logins cannot be phished.", + "ImpactStatement": "If an organization administrator loses access to their security key, the user could lose access to their account. For this reason, it is important to set up backup security keys.", + "RemediationProcedure": "1. Identify users with the Organization Administrator role. 2. Setup Security Key Enforcement for each account. Learn more at: [https://cloud.google.com/security-key/](https://cloud.google.com/security-key/)", + "AuditProcedure": "1. Identify users with Organization Administrator privileges: gcloud organizations get-iam-policy ORGANIZATION_ID Look for members granted the role roles/resourcemanager.organizationAdmin. 2. Manually verify that Security Key Enforcement has been enabled for each account.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/security-key/:https://gsuite.google.com/learn-more/key_for_working_smarter_faster_and_more_securely.html", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Security Key Enforcement is not enabled for Organization Administrators.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.5", + "Description": "Ensure That There Are Only GCP-Managed Service Account Keys for Each Service Account", + "Checks": [ + "iam_sa_no_user_managed_keys" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "User-managed service accounts should not have user-managed keys.", + "RationaleStatement": "Anyone who has access to the keys will be able to access resources through the service account. GCP-managed keys are used by Cloud Platform services such as App Engine and Compute Engine. These keys cannot be downloaded. Google will keep the keys and automatically rotate them on an approximately weekly basis. User-managed keys are created, downloadable, and managed by users. They expire 10 years from creation. For user-managed keys, the user has to take ownership of key management activities which include: - Key storage - Key distribution - Key revocation - Key rotation - Protecting the keys from unauthorized users - Key recovery Even with key owner precautions, keys can be easily leaked by common development malpractices like checking keys into the source code or leaving them in the Downloads directory, or accidentally leaving them on support blogs/channels. It is recommended to prevent user-managed service account keys.", + "ImpactStatement": "Deleting user-managed service account keys may break communication with the applications using the corresponding keys.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the IAM page in the GCP Console using `https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/iam` 2. In the left navigation pane, click `Service accounts`. All service accounts and their corresponding keys are listed. 3. Click the service account. 4. Click the `edit` and delete the keys. **From Google Cloud CLI** To delete a user managed Service Account Key, gcloud iam service-accounts keys delete --iam-account= **Prevention:** You can disable service account key creation through the `Disable service account key creation` Organization policy by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/orgpolicies/iam-disableServiceAccountKeyCreation](https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/orgpolicies/iam-disableServiceAccountKeyCreation). Learn more at: [https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/organization-policy/restricting-service-accounts](https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/organization-policy/restricting-service-accounts) In addition, if you do not need to have service accounts in your project, you can also prevent the creation of service accounts through the `Disable service account creation` Organization policy: [https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/orgpolicies/iam-disableServiceAccountCreation](https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/orgpolicies/iam-disableServiceAccountCreation).", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the IAM page in the GCP Console using `https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/iam` 2. In the left navigation pane, click `Service accounts`. All service accounts and their corresponding keys are listed. 3. Click the service accounts and check if keys exist. **From Google Cloud CLI** List All the service accounts: gcloud iam service-accounts list Identify user-managed service accounts which have an account `EMAIL` ending with `iam.gserviceaccount.com` For each user-managed service account, list the keys managed by the user: gcloud iam service-accounts keys list --iam-account= --managed-by=user No keys should be listed.", + "AdditionalInformation": "A user-managed key cannot be created on GCP-Managed Service Accounts.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts#managing_service_account_keys:https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/organization-policy/restricting-service-accounts", + "DefaultValue": "By default, there are no user-managed keys created for user-managed service accounts.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.6", + "Description": "Ensure That Service Account Has No Admin Privileges", + "Checks": [ + "iam_sa_no_administrative_privileges" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "A service account is a special Google account that belongs to an application or a VM, instead of to an individual end-user. The application uses the service account to call the service's Google API so that users aren't directly involved. It's recommended not to use admin access for ServiceAccount.", + "RationaleStatement": "Service accounts represent service-level security of the Resources (application or a VM) which can be determined by the roles assigned to it. Enrolling ServiceAccount with Admin rights gives full access to an assigned application or a VM. A ServiceAccount Access holder can perform critical actions like delete, update change settings, etc. without user intervention. For this reason, it's recommended that service accounts not have Admin rights.", + "ImpactStatement": "Removing `*Admin` or `*admin` or `Editor` or `Owner` role assignments from service accounts may break functionality that uses impacted service accounts. Required role(s) should be assigned to impacted service accounts in order to restore broken functionalities.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `IAM & admin/IAM` using `https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/iam` 2. Under the `IAM` Tab look for `VIEW BY PRINCIPALS` 3. Filter `PRINCIPALS` using `type : Service account` 4. Look for the Service Account with the Principal nomenclature: `SERVICE_ACCOUNT_NAME@PROJECT_ID.iam.gserviceaccount.com` 5. Identify `User-Managed user created` service account with roles containing `*Admin` or `*admin` or role matching `Editor` or role matching `Owner` under `Role` Column. 6. Click on `Edit (Pencil Icon)` for the Service Account, it will open all the roles which are assigned to the Service Account. 7. Click the `Delete bin` icon to remove the role from the Principal (service account in this case) **From Google Cloud CLI** gcloud projects get-iam-policy PROJECT_ID --format json > iam.json 1. Using a text editor, Remove `Role` which contains `roles/*Admin` or `roles/*admin` or matched `roles/editor` or matches 'roles/owner`. Add a role to the bindings array that defines the group members and the role for those members. For example, to grant the role roles/appengine.appViewer to the `ServiceAccount` which is roles/editor, you would change the example shown below as follows: { bindings: [ { members: [ serviceAccount:our-project-123@appspot.gserviceaccount.com, ], role: roles/appengine.appViewer }, { members: [ user:email1@gmail.com ], role: roles/owner }, { members: [ serviceAccount:our-project-123@appspot.gserviceaccount.com, serviceAccount:123456789012-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com ], role: roles/editor } ], etag: BwUjMhCsNvY= } 2. Update the project's IAM policy: gcloud projects set-iam-policy PROJECT_ID iam.json ", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `IAM & admin/IAM` using `https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/iam` 2. Under the `IAM` Tab look for `VIEW BY PRINCIPALS` 3. Filter `PRINCIPALS` using `type : Service account` 4. Look for the Service Account with the nomenclature: `SERVICE_ACCOUNT_NAME@PROJECT_ID.iam.gserviceaccount.com` 5. Ensure that there are no such Service Accounts with roles containing `*Admin` or `*admin` or role matching `Editor` or role matching `Owner` under `Role` column. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Get the policy that you want to modify, and write it to a JSON file: gcloud projects get-iam-policy PROJECT_ID --format json > iam.json 2. The contents of the JSON file will look similar to the following. Note that `role` of members group associated with each `serviceaccount` does not contain `*Admin` or `*admin` or does not match `roles/editor` or does not match `roles/owner`. This recommendation is only applicable to `User-Managed user-created` service accounts. These accounts have the nomenclature: `SERVICE_ACCOUNT_NAME@PROJECT_ID.iam.gserviceaccount.com`. Note that some Google-managed, Google-created service accounts have the same naming format, and should be excluded (e.g., `appsdev-apps-dev-script-auth@system.gserviceaccount.com` which needs the Owner role). **Sample Json output:** { bindings: [ { members: [ serviceAccount:our-project-123@appspot.gserviceaccount.com, ], role: roles/appengine.appAdmin }, { members: [ user:email1@gmail.com ], role: roles/owner }, { members: [ serviceAccount:our-project-123@appspot.gserviceaccount.com, serviceAccount:123456789012-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com ], role: roles/editor } ], etag: BwUjMhCsNvY=, version: 1 }", + "AdditionalInformation": "Default (user-managed but not user-created) service accounts have the `Editor (roles/editor)` role assigned to them to support GCP services they offer. Such Service accounts are: `PROJECT_NUMBER-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com`, `PROJECT_ID@appspot.gserviceaccount.com`.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/iam/service-accounts/:https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-roles:https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts", + "DefaultValue": "User Managed (and not user-created) default service accounts have the `Editor (roles/editor)` role assigned to them to support GCP services they offer. By default, there are no roles assigned to `User Managed User created` service accounts.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.7", + "Description": "Ensure That IAM Users Are Not Assigned the Service Account User or Service Account Token Creator Roles at Project Level", + "Checks": [ + "iam_no_service_roles_at_project_level" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended to assign the `Service Account User (iam.serviceAccountUser)` and `Service Account Token Creator (iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator)` roles to a user for a specific service account rather than assigning the role to a user at project level.", + "RationaleStatement": "A service account is a special Google account that belongs to an application or a virtual machine (VM), instead of to an individual end-user. Application/VM-Instance uses the service account to call the service's Google API so that users aren't directly involved. In addition to being an identity, a service account is a resource that has IAM policies attached to it. These policies determine who can use the service account. Users with IAM roles to update the App Engine and Compute Engine instances (such as App Engine Deployer or Compute Instance Admin) can effectively run code as the service accounts used to run these instances, and indirectly gain access to all the resources for which the service accounts have access. Similarly, SSH access to a Compute Engine instance may also provide the ability to execute code as that instance/Service account. Based on business needs, there could be multiple user-managed service accounts configured for a project. Granting the `iam.serviceAccountUser` or `iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator` roles to a user for a project gives the user access to all service accounts in the project, including service accounts that may be created in the future. This can result in elevation of privileges by using service accounts and corresponding `Compute Engine instances`. In order to implement `least privileges` best practices, IAM users should not be assigned the `Service Account User` or `Service Account Token Creator` roles at the project level. Instead, these roles should be assigned to a user for a specific service account, giving that user access to the service account. The `Service Account User` allows a user to bind a service account to a long-running job service, whereas the `Service Account Token Creator` role allows a user to directly impersonate (or assert) the identity of a service account.", + "ImpactStatement": "After revoking `Service Account User` or `Service Account Token Creator` roles at the project level from all impacted user account(s), these roles should be assigned to a user(s) for specific service account(s) according to business needs.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the IAM page in the GCP Console by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/iam](https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/iam). 2. Click on the filter table text bar. Type `Role: Service Account User` 3. Click the `Delete Bin` icon in front of the role `Service Account User` for every user listed as a result of a filter. 4. Click on the filter table text bar. Type `Role: Service Account Token Creator` 5. Click the `Delete Bin` icon in front of the role `Service Account Token Creator` for every user listed as a result of a filter. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Using a text editor, remove the bindings with the `roles/iam.serviceAccountUser` or `roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator`. For example, you can use the iam.json file shown below as follows: { bindings: [ { members: [ serviceAccount:our-project-123@appspot.gserviceaccount.com, ], role: roles/appengine.appViewer }, { members: [ user:email1@gmail.com ], role: roles/owner }, { members: [ serviceAccount:our-project-123@appspot.gserviceaccount.com, serviceAccount:123456789012-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com ], role: roles/editor } ], etag: BwUjMhCsNvY= } 2. Update the project's IAM policy: gcloud projects set-iam-policy PROJECT_ID iam.json ", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the IAM page in the GCP Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/iam](https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/iam) 2. Click on the filter table text bar, Type `Role: Service Account User`. 3. Ensure no user is listed as a result of the filter. 4. Click on the filter table text bar, Type `Role: Service Account Token Creator`. 3. Ensure no user is listed as a result of the filter. **From Google Cloud CLI** To ensure IAM users are not assigned Service Account User role at the project level: gcloud projects get-iam-policy PROJECT_ID --format json | jq '.bindings[].role' | grep roles/iam.serviceAccountUser gcloud projects get-iam-policy PROJECT_ID --format json | jq '.bindings[].role' | grep roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator These commands should not return any output.", + "AdditionalInformation": "To assign the role `roles/iam.serviceAccountUser` or `roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator` to a user role on a service account instead of a project: 1. Go to [https://console.cloud.google.com/projectselector/iam-admin/serviceaccounts](https://console.cloud.google.com/projectselector/iam-admin/serviceaccounts) 2. Select ` Target Project` 3. Select `target service account`. Click `Permissions` on the top bar. It will open permission pane on right side of the page 4. Add desired members with `Service Account User` or `Service Account Token Creator` role.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-accounts:https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/granting-roles-to-service-accounts:https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-roles:https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/granting-changing-revoking-access:https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/iam", + "DefaultValue": "By default, users do not have the Service Account User or Service Account Token Creator role assigned at project level.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.8", + "Description": "Ensure User-Managed/External Keys for Service Accounts Are Rotated Every 90 Days or Fewer", + "Checks": [ + "iam_sa_user_managed_key_rotate_90_days" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Service Account keys consist of a key ID (Private_key_Id) and Private key, which are used to sign programmatic requests users make to Google cloud services accessible to that particular service account. It is recommended that all Service Account keys are regularly rotated.", + "RationaleStatement": "Rotating Service Account keys will reduce the window of opportunity for an access key that is associated with a compromised or terminated account to be used. Service Account keys should be rotated to ensure that data cannot be accessed with an old key that might have been lost, cracked, or stolen. Each service account is associated with a key pair managed by Google Cloud Platform (GCP). It is used for service-to-service authentication within GCP. Google rotates the keys daily. GCP provides the option to create one or more user-managed (also called external key pairs) key pairs for use from outside GCP (for example, for use with Application Default Credentials). When a new key pair is created, the user is required to download the private key (which is not retained by Google). With external keys, users are responsible for keeping the private key secure and other management operations such as key rotation. External keys can be managed by the IAM API, gcloud command-line tool, or the Service Accounts page in the Google Cloud Platform Console. GCP facilitates up to 10 external service account keys per service account to facilitate key rotation.", + "ImpactStatement": "Rotating service account keys will break communication for dependent applications. Dependent applications need to be configured manually with the new key `ID` displayed in the `Service account keys` section and the `private key` downloaded by the user.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** **Delete any external (user-managed) Service Account Key older than 90 days:** 1. Go to `APIs & ServicesCredentials` using `https://console.cloud.google.com/apis/credentials` 2. In the Section `Service Account Keys`, for every external (user-managed) service account key where `creation date` is greater than or equal to the past 90 days, click `Delete Bin Icon` to `Delete Service Account key` **Create a new external (user-managed) Service Account Key for a Service Account:** 1. Go to `APIs & ServicesCredentials` using `https://console.cloud.google.com/apis/credentials` 2. Click `Create Credentials` and Select `Service Account Key`. 3. Choose the service account in the drop-down list for which an External (user-managed) Service Account key needs to be created. 4. Select the desired key type format among `JSON` or `P12`. 5. Click `Create`. It will download the `private key`. Keep it safe. 6. Click `Close` if prompted. 7. The site will redirect to the `APIs & ServicesCredentials` page. Make a note of the new `ID` displayed in the `Service account keys` section.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `APIs & ServicesCredentials` using `https://console.cloud.google.com/apis/credentials` 2. In the section `Service Account Keys`, for every External (user-managed) service account key listed ensure the `creation date` is within the past 90 days. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List all Service accounts from a project. gcloud iam service-accounts list 2. For every service account list service account keys. gcloud iam service-accounts keys list --iam-account [Service_Account_Email_Id] --format=json 3. Ensure every service account key for a service account has a `validAfterTime` value within the past 90 days.", + "AdditionalInformation": "For user-managed Service Account key(s), key management is entirely the user's responsibility.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts#managing_service_account_keys:https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/iam/service-accounts/keys/list:https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-accounts", + "DefaultValue": "GCP does not provide an automation option for External (user-managed) Service key rotation.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.9", + "Description": "Ensure That Separation of Duties Is Enforced While Assigning Service Account Related Roles to Users", + "Checks": [ + "iam_role_kms_enforce_separation_of_duties" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended that the principle of 'Separation of Duties' is enforced while assigning service-account related roles to users.", + "RationaleStatement": "The built-in/predefined IAM role `Service Account admin` allows the user/identity to create, delete, and manage service account(s). The built-in/predefined IAM role `Service Account User` allows the user/identity (with adequate privileges on Compute and App Engine) to assign service account(s) to Apps/Compute Instances. Separation of duties is the concept of ensuring that one individual does not have all necessary permissions to be able to complete a malicious action. In Cloud IAM - service accounts, this could be an action such as using a service account to access resources that user should not normally have access to. Separation of duties is a business control typically used in larger organizations, meant to help avoid security or privacy incidents and errors. It is considered best practice. No user should have `Service Account Admin` and `Service Account User` roles assigned at the same time.", + "ImpactStatement": "The removed role should be assigned to a different user based on business needs.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `IAM & Admin/IAM` using `https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/iam`. 2. For any member having both `Service Account Admin` and `Service account User` roles granted/assigned, click the `Delete Bin` icon to remove either role from the member. Removal of a role should be done based on the business requirements.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `IAM & Admin/IAM` using `https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/iam`. 2. Ensure no member has the roles `Service Account Admin` and `Service account User` assigned together. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List all users and role assignments: gcloud projects get-iam-policy [Project_ID] --format json | jq -r '[ ([Service_Account_Admin_and_User] | (., map(length*-))), ( [ .bindings[] | select(.role == roles/iam.serviceAccountAdmin or .role == roles/iam.serviceAccountUser).members[] ] | group_by(.) | map({User: ., Count: length}) | .[] | select(.Count == 2).User | unique ) ] | .[] | @tsv' 2. All common users listed under `Service_Account_Admin_and_User` are assigned both the `roles/iam.serviceAccountAdmin` and `roles/iam.serviceAccountUser` roles.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Users granted with Owner (roles/owner) and Editor (roles/editor) have privileges equivalent to `Service Account Admin` and `Service Account User`. To avoid the misuse, Owner and Editor roles should be granted to very limited users and Use of these primitive privileges should be minimal. These requirements are addressed in separate recommendations.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-accounts:https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-roles:https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/granting-roles-to-service-accounts", + "DefaultValue": "", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.10", + "Description": "Ensure That Cloud KMS Cryptokeys Are Not Anonymously or Publicly Accessible", + "Checks": [ + "kms_key_not_publicly_accessible" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended that the IAM policy on Cloud KMS `cryptokeys` should restrict anonymous and/or public access.", + "RationaleStatement": "Granting permissions to `allUsers` or `allAuthenticatedUsers` allows anyone to access the dataset. Such access might not be desirable if sensitive data is stored at the location. In this case, ensure that anonymous and/or public access to a Cloud KMS `cryptokey` is not allowed.", + "ImpactStatement": "Removing the binding for `allUsers` and `allAuthenticatedUsers` members denies accessing `cryptokeys` to anonymous or public users.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List all Cloud KMS `Cryptokeys`. gcloud kms keys list --keyring=[key_ring_name] --location=global --format=json | jq '.[].name' 2. Remove IAM policy binding for a KMS key to remove access to `allUsers` and `allAuthenticatedUsers` using the below command. gcloud kms keys remove-iam-policy-binding [key_name] --keyring=[key_ring_name] --location=global --member='allAuthenticatedUsers' --role='[role]' gcloud kms keys remove-iam-policy-binding [key_name] --keyring=[key_ring_name] --location=global --member='allUsers' --role='[role]' ", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List all Cloud KMS `Cryptokeys`. gcloud kms keys list --keyring=[key_ring_name] --location=global --format=json | jq '.[].name' 2. Ensure the below command's output does not contain `allUsers` or `allAuthenticatedUsers`. gcloud kms keys get-iam-policy [key_name] --keyring=[key_ring_name] --location=global --format=json | jq '.bindings[].members[]' ", + "AdditionalInformation": "[key_ring_name] : Is the resource ID of the key ring, which is the fully-qualified Key ring name. This value is case-sensitive and in the form: projects/PROJECT_ID/locations/LOCATION/keyRings/KEY_RING You can retrieve the key ring resource ID using the Cloud Console: 1. Open the `Cryptographic Keys` page in the Cloud Console. 2. For the key ring whose resource ID you are retrieving, click the `More icon (3 vertical dots)`. 3. Click `Copy Resource ID`. The resource ID for the key ring is copied to your clipboard. [key_name] : Is the resource ID of the key, which is the fully-qualified CryptoKey name. This value is case-sensitive and in the form: projects/PROJECT_ID/locations/LOCATION/keyRings/KEY_RING/cryptoKeys/KEY You can retrieve the key resource ID using the Cloud Console: 1. Open the `Cryptographic Keys` page in the Cloud Console. 2. Click the name of the key ring that contains the key. 3. For the key whose resource ID you are retrieving, click the `More icon (3 vertical dots)`. 4. Click `Copy Resource ID`. The resource ID for the key is copied to your clipboard. [role] : The role to remove the member from.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/kms/keys/remove-iam-policy-binding:https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/kms/keys/set-iam-policy:https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/kms/keys/get-iam-policy:https://cloud.google.com/kms/docs/object-hierarchy#key_resource_id", + "DefaultValue": "By default Cloud KMS does not allow access to `allUsers` or `allAuthenticatedUsers`.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.11", + "Description": "Ensure KMS Encryption Keys Are Rotated Within a Period of 90 Days", + "Checks": [ + "kms_key_rotation_max_90_days" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Google Cloud Key Management Service stores cryptographic keys in a hierarchical structure designed for useful and elegant access control management. The format for the rotation schedule depends on the client library that is used. For the gcloud command-line tool, the next rotation time must be in `ISO` or `RFC3339` format, and the rotation period must be in the form `INTEGER[UNIT]`, where units can be one of seconds (s), minutes (m), hours (h) or days (d).", + "RationaleStatement": "Set a key rotation period and starting time. A key can be created with a specified `rotation period`, which is the time between when new key versions are generated automatically. A key can also be created with a specified next rotation time. A key is a named object representing a `cryptographic key` used for a specific purpose. The key material, the actual bits used for `encryption`, can change over time as new key versions are created. A key is used to protect some `corpus of data`. A collection of files could be encrypted with the same key and people with `decrypt` permissions on that key would be able to decrypt those files. Therefore, it's necessary to make sure the `rotation period` is set to a specific time.", + "ImpactStatement": "After a successful key rotation, the older key version is required in order to decrypt the data encrypted by that previous key version.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `Cryptographic Keys` by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/security/kms](https://console.cloud.google.com/security/kms). 2. Click on the specific key ring 3. From the list of keys, choose the specific key and Click on `Right side pop up the blade (3 dots)`. 4. Click on `Edit rotation period`. 5. On the pop-up window, `Select a new rotation period` in days which should be less than 90 and then choose `Starting on` date (date from which the rotation period begins). **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Update and schedule rotation by `ROTATION_PERIOD` and `NEXT_ROTATION_TIME` for each key: gcloud kms keys update new --keyring=KEY_RING --location=LOCATION --next-rotation-time=NEXT_ROTATION_TIME --rotation-period=ROTATION_PERIOD ", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `Cryptographic Keys` by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/security/kms](https://console.cloud.google.com/security/kms). 2. Click on each key ring, then ensure each key in the keyring has `Next Rotation` set for less than 90 days from the current date. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Ensure rotation is scheduled by `ROTATION_PERIOD` and `NEXT_ROTATION_TIME` for each key : gcloud kms keys list --keyring= --location= --format=json'(rotationPeriod)' Ensure outcome values for `rotationPeriod` and `nextRotationTime` satisfy the below criteria: `rotationPeriod is <= 129600m` `rotationPeriod is <= 7776000s` `rotationPeriod is <= 2160h` `rotationPeriod is <= 90d` `nextRotationTime is <= 90days` from current DATE", + "AdditionalInformation": "- Key rotation does NOT re-encrypt already encrypted data with the newly generated key version. If you suspect unauthorized use of a key, you should re-encrypt the data protected by that key and then disable or schedule destruction of the prior key version. - It is not recommended to rely solely on irregular rotation, but rather to use irregular rotation if needed in conjunction with a regular rotation schedule.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/kms/docs/key-rotation#frequency_of_key_rotation:https://cloud.google.com/kms/docs/re-encrypt-data", + "DefaultValue": "By default, KMS encryption keys are rotated every 90 days.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.12", + "Description": "Ensure That Separation of Duties Is Enforced While Assigning KMS Related Roles to Users", + "Checks": [ + "iam_role_kms_enforce_separation_of_duties" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended that the principle of 'Separation of Duties' is enforced while assigning KMS related roles to users.", + "RationaleStatement": "The built-in/predefined IAM role `Cloud KMS Admin` allows the user/identity to create, delete, and manage service account(s). The built-in/predefined IAM role `Cloud KMS CryptoKey Encrypter/Decrypter` allows the user/identity (with adequate privileges on concerned resources) to encrypt and decrypt data at rest using an encryption key(s). The built-in/predefined IAM role `Cloud KMS CryptoKey Encrypter` allows the user/identity (with adequate privileges on concerned resources) to encrypt data at rest using an encryption key(s). The built-in/predefined IAM role `Cloud KMS CryptoKey Decrypter` allows the user/identity (with adequate privileges on concerned resources) to decrypt data at rest using an encryption key(s). Separation of duties is the concept of ensuring that one individual does not have all necessary permissions to be able to complete a malicious action. In Cloud KMS, this could be an action such as using a key to access and decrypt data a user should not normally have access to. Separation of duties is a business control typically used in larger organizations, meant to help avoid security or privacy incidents and errors. It is considered best practice. No user(s) should have `Cloud KMS Admin` and any of the `Cloud KMS CryptoKey Encrypter/Decrypter`, `Cloud KMS CryptoKey Encrypter`, `Cloud KMS CryptoKey Decrypter` roles assigned at the same time.", + "ImpactStatement": "Removed roles should be assigned to another user based on business needs.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `IAM & Admin/IAM` using `https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/iam` 2. For any member having `Cloud KMS Admin` and any of the `Cloud KMS CryptoKey Encrypter/Decrypter`, `Cloud KMS CryptoKey Encrypter`, `Cloud KMS CryptoKey Decrypter` roles granted/assigned, click the `Delete Bin` icon to remove the role from the member. Note: Removing a role should be done based on the business requirement.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `IAM & Admin/IAM` by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/iam](https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/iam) 2. Ensure no member has the roles `Cloud KMS Admin` and any of the `Cloud KMS CryptoKey Encrypter/Decrypter`, `Cloud KMS CryptoKey Encrypter`, `Cloud KMS CryptoKey Decrypter` assigned. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List all users and role assignments: gcloud projects get-iam-policy PROJECT_ID 2. Ensure that there are no common users found in the member section for roles `cloudkms.admin` and any one of `Cloud KMS CryptoKey Encrypter/Decrypter`, `Cloud KMS CryptoKey Encrypter`, `Cloud KMS CryptoKey Decrypter`", + "AdditionalInformation": "Users granted with Owner (roles/owner) and Editor (roles/editor) have privileges equivalent to `Cloud KMS Admin` and `Cloud KMS CryptoKey Encrypter/Decrypter`. To avoid misuse, Owner and Editor roles should be granted to a very limited group of users. Use of these primitive privileges should be minimal.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/kms/docs/separation-of-duties", + "DefaultValue": "", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.13", + "Description": "Ensure API Keys Only Exist for Active Services", + "Checks": [ + "apikeys_key_exists" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "API Keys should only be used for services in cases where other authentication methods are unavailable. Unused keys with their permissions in tact may still exist within a project. Keys are insecure because they can be viewed publicly, such as from within a browser, or they can be accessed on a device where the key resides. It is recommended to use standard authentication flow instead.", + "RationaleStatement": "To avoid the security risk in using API keys, it is recommended to use standard authentication flow instead. Security risks involved in using API-Keys appear below: - API keys are simple encrypted strings - API keys do not identify the user or the application making the API request - API keys are typically accessible to clients, making it easy to discover and steal an API key", + "ImpactStatement": "Deleting an API key will break dependent applications (if any).", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Go to `APIs & ServicesCredentials` using https://console.cloud.google.com/apis/credentials. 1. In the section `API Keys`, to delete API Keys: Click the `Delete Bin Icon` in front of every `API Key Name`. **From Google Cloud Command Line** 1. Run the following from within the project you wish to audit gcloud services api-keys list --filter 1. Run the following command, providing the ID of the key or fully qualified identifier for the key for : gcloud services api-keys delete ", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. From within the Project you wish to audit Go to `APIs & ServicesCredentials`. 1. In the section `API Keys`, no API key should be listed. **From Google Cloud Command Line** 1. Run the following from within the project you wish to audit gcloud services api-keys list --filter 1. There should be no keys listed at the project level.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Google recommends using the standard authentication flow instead of using API keys. However, there are limited cases where API keys are more appropriate. For example, if there is a mobile application that needs to use the Google Cloud Translation API, but doesn't otherwise need a backend server, API keys are the simplest way to authenticate to that API. If a business requires API keys to be used, then the API keys should be secured properly.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/docs/authentication/api-keys:https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/services/api-keys/list:https://cloud.google.com/docs/authentication:https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/services/api-keys/delete", + "DefaultValue": "By default, API keys are not created for a project.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.14", + "Description": "Ensure API Keys Are Restricted To Use by Only Specified Hosts and Apps", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "API Keys should only be used for services in cases where other authentication methods are unavailable. In this case, unrestricted keys are insecure because they can be viewed publicly, such as from within a browser, or they can be accessed on a device where the key resides. It is recommended to restrict API key usage to trusted hosts, HTTP referrers and apps. It is recommended to use the more secure standard authentication flow instead.", + "RationaleStatement": "Security risks involved in using API-Keys appear below: - API keys are simple encrypted strings - API keys do not identify the user or the application making the API request - API keys are typically accessible to clients, making it easy to discover and steal an API key In light of these potential risks, Google recommends using the standard authentication flow instead of API keys. However, there are limited cases where API keys are more appropriate. For example, if there is a mobile application that needs to use the Google Cloud Translation API, but doesn't otherwise need a backend server, API keys are the simplest way to authenticate to that API. In order to reduce attack vectors, API-Keys can be restricted only to trusted hosts, HTTP referrers and applications.", + "ImpactStatement": "Setting `Application Restrictions` may break existing application functioning, if not done carefully.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** ***Leaving Keys in Place*** 1. Go to `APIs & ServicesCredentials` using `https://console.cloud.google.com/apis/credentials` 2. In the section `API Keys`, Click the `API Key Name`. The API Key properties display on a new page. 3. In the `Key restrictions` section, set the application restrictions to any of `HTTP referrers, IP addresses, Android apps, iOS apps`. 4. Click `Save`. 1. Repeat steps 2,3,4 for every unrestricted API key. **Note:** Do not set `HTTP referrers` to wild-cards (* or *.[TLD] or *.[TLD]/*) allowing access to any/wide HTTP referrer(s) Do not set `IP addresses` and referrer to `any host (0.0.0.0 or 0.0.0.0/0 or ::0)` ***Removing Keys*** Another option is to remove the keys entirely. 1. Go to `APIs & ServicesCredentials` using `https://console.cloud.google.com/apis/credentials` 2. In the section `API Keys`, select the checkbox next to each key you wish to remove 3. Select `Delete` and confirm.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `APIs & ServicesCredentials` using `https://console.cloud.google.com/apis/credentials` 1. In the section `API Keys`, Click the `API Key Name`. The API Key properties display on a new page. 1. For every API Key, ensure the section `Key restrictions` parameter `Application restrictions` is not set to `None`. Or, 1. Ensure `Application restrictions` is set to `HTTP referrers` and the referrer is not set to wild-cards `(* or *.[TLD] or *.[TLD]/*) allowing access to any/wide HTTP referrer(s)` Or, 1. Ensure `Application restrictions` is set to `IP addresses` and referrer is not set to `any host (0.0.0.0 or 0.0.0.0/0 or ::0)` **From Google Cloud Command Line** 1. Run the following from within the project you wish to audit gcloud services api-keys list --filter=-restrictions:* --format=table[box](displayName:label='Key With No Restrictions') ", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/docs/authentication/api-keys:https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/services/api-keys/list:https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/services/api-keys/update", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `Application Restrictions` are set to `None`.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.15", + "Description": "Ensure API Keys Are Restricted to Only APIs That Application Needs Access", + "Checks": [ + "apikeys_api_restrictions_configured" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "API Keys should only be used for services in cases where other authentication methods are unavailable. API keys are always at risk because they can be viewed publicly, such as from within a browser, or they can be accessed on a device where the key resides. It is recommended to restrict API keys to use (call) only APIs required by an application.", + "RationaleStatement": "Security risks involved in using API-Keys are below: - API keys are simple encrypted strings - API keys do not identify the user or the application making the API request - API keys are typically accessible to clients, making it easy to discover and steal an API key In light of these potential risks, Google recommends using the standard authentication flow instead of API-Keys. However, there are limited cases where API keys are more appropriate. For example, if there is a mobile application that needs to use the Google Cloud Translation API, but doesn't otherwise need a backend server, API keys are the simplest way to authenticate to that API. In order to reduce attack surfaces by providing `least privileges`, API-Keys can be restricted to use (call) only APIs required by an application.", + "ImpactStatement": "Setting `API restrictions` may break existing application functioning, if not done carefully.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Go to `APIs & ServicesCredentials` using `https://console.cloud.google.com/apis/credentials` 2. In the section `API Keys`, Click the `API Key Name`. The API Key properties display on a new page. 3. In the `Key restrictions` section go to `API restrictions`. 4. Click the `Select API` drop-down to choose an API. 5. Click `Save`. 6. Repeat steps 2,3,4,5 for every unrestricted API key **Note:** Do not set `API restrictions` to `Google Cloud APIs`, as this option allows access to all services offered by Google cloud. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List all API keys. gcloud services api-keys list 2. Note the `UID` of the key to add restrictions to. 3. Run the update command with the appropriate API target service or flags file with API target services and methods to add the required restrictions. Command with appropriate API target service: gcloud services api-keys update --api-target=service= Command with flags file: gcloud services api-keys update --flags-file=.yaml Content of flags file: - --api-target: service: foo.service.com - --api-target: service: bar.service.com methods: - foomethod - barmethod Note: Flags can be found by running: gcloud services api-keys update --help Note: Services can be found by running: gcloud services list or in this documentation https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/services/api-keys/update", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Console:** 1. Go to `APIs & ServicesCredentials` using `https://console.cloud.google.com/apis/credentials` 2. In the section `API Keys`, Click the `API Key Name`. The API Key properties display on a new page. 3. For every API Key, ensure the section `Key restrictions` parameter `API restrictions` is not set to `None`. Or, Ensure `API restrictions` is not set to `Google Cloud APIs` **Note:** `Google Cloud APIs` represents the API collection of all cloud services/APIs offered by Google cloud. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List all API Keys. gcloud services api-keys list Each key should have a line that says `restrictions:` followed by varying parameters and NOT have a line saying `- service: cloudapis.googleapis.com` as shown here restrictions: apiTargets: - service: cloudapis.googleapis.com ", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/docs/authentication/api-keys:https://cloud.google.com/apis/docs/overview", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `API restrictions` are set to `None`.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.16", + "Description": "Ensure API Keys Are Rotated Every 90 Days", + "Checks": [ + "apikeys_key_rotated_in_90_days" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "API Keys should only be used for services in cases where other authentication methods are unavailable. If they are in use it is recommended to rotate API keys every 90 days.", + "RationaleStatement": "Security risks involved in using API-Keys are listed below: - API keys are simple encrypted strings - API keys do not identify the user or the application making the API request - API keys are typically accessible to clients, making it easy to discover and steal an API key Because of these potential risks, Google recommends using the standard authentication flow instead of API Keys. However, there are limited cases where API keys are more appropriate. For example, if there is a mobile application that needs to use the Google Cloud Translation API, but doesn't otherwise need a backend server, API keys are the simplest way to authenticate to that API. Once a key is stolen, it has no expiration, meaning it may be used indefinitely unless the project owner revokes or regenerates the key. Rotating API keys will reduce the window of opportunity for an access key that is associated with a compromised or terminated account to be used. API keys should be rotated to ensure that data cannot be accessed with an old key that might have been lost, cracked, or stolen.", + "ImpactStatement": "`Regenerating Key` may break existing client connectivity as the client will try to connect with older API keys they have stored on devices.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `APIs & ServicesCredentials` using `https://console.cloud.google.com/apis/credentials` 2. In the section `API Keys`, Click the `API Key Name`. The API Key properties display on a new page. 3. Click `REGENERATE KEY` to rotate API key. 4. Click `Save`. 5. Repeat steps 2,3,4 for every API key that has not been rotated in the last 90 days. **Note:** Do not set `HTTP referrers` to wild-cards (* or *.[TLD] or *.[TLD]/*) allowing access to any/wide HTTP referrer(s) Do not set `IP addresses` and referrer to `any host (0.0.0.0 or 0.0.0.0/0 or ::0)` **From Google Cloud CLI** There is not currently a way to regenerate and API key using gcloud commands. To 'regenerate' a key you will need to create a new one, duplicate the restrictions from the key being rotated, and delete the old key. 1. List existing keys. gcloud services api-keys list 2. Note the `UID` and restrictions of the key to regenerate. 3. Run this command to create a new API key. is the display name of the new key. ` gcloud services api-keys create --display-name= ` Note the `UID` of the newly created key 4. Run the update command to add required restrictions. Note - the restriction may vary for each key. Refer to this documentation for the appropriate flags. https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/services/api-keys/update gcloud services api-keys update 5. Delete the old key. gcloud services api-keys delete ", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `APIs & ServicesCredentials` using `https://console.cloud.google.com/apis/credentials` 2. In the section `API Keys`, for every key ensure the `creation date` is less than 90 days. **From Google Cloud CLI** To list keys, use the command gcloud services api-keys list Ensure the date in `createTime` is within 90 days.", + "AdditionalInformation": "There is no option to automatically regenerate (rotate) API keys periodically.", + "References": "https://developers.google.com/maps/api-security-best-practices#regenerate-apikey:https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/services/api-keys/update", + "DefaultValue": "", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.17", + "Description": "Ensure Essential Contacts is Configured for Organization", + "Checks": [ + "iam_organization_essential_contacts_configured" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended that Essential Contacts is configured to designate email addresses for Google Cloud services to notify of important technical or security information.", + "RationaleStatement": "Many Google Cloud services, such as Cloud Billing, send out notifications to share important information with Google Cloud users. By default, these notifications are sent to members with certain Identity and Access Management (IAM) roles. With Essential Contacts, you can customize who receives notifications by providing your own list of contacts.", + "ImpactStatement": "There is no charge for Essential Contacts except for the 'Technical Incidents' category that is only available to premium support customers.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `Essential Contacts` by visiting https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/essential-contacts 2. Make sure the organization appears in the resource selector at the top of the page. The resource selector tells you what project, folder, or organization you are currently managing contacts for. 3. Click `+Add contact` 4. In the `Email` and `Confirm Email` fields, enter the email address of the contact. 5. From the `Notification categories` drop-down menu, select the notification categories that you want the contact to receive communications for. 6. Click `Save` **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. To add an organization Essential Contacts run a command: gcloud essential-contacts create --email= --notification-categories= --organization= ", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `Essential Contacts` by visiting https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/essential-contacts 2. Make sure the organization appears in the resource selector at the top of the page. The resource selector tells you what project, folder, or organization you are currently managing contacts for. 3. Ensure that appropriate email addresses are configured for each of the following notification categories: - `Legal` - `Security` - `Suspension` - `Technical` Alternatively, appropriate email addresses can be configured for the `All` notification category to receive all possible important notifications. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. To list all configured organization Essential Contacts run a command: gcloud essential-contacts list --organization= 2. Ensure at least one appropriate email address is configured for each of the following notification categories: - `LEGAL` - `SECURITY` - `SUSPENSION` - `TECHNICAL` Alternatively, appropriate email addresses can be configured for the `ALL` notification category to receive all possible important notifications.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/managing-notification-contacts", + "DefaultValue": "By default, there are no Essential Contacts configured. In the absence of an Essential Contact, the following IAM roles are used to identify users to notify for the following categories: - **Legal**: `roles/billing.admin` - **Security**: `roles/resourcemanager.organizationAdmin` - **Suspension**: `roles/owner` - **Technical**: `roles/owner` - **Technical Incidents**: `roles/owner`", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.18", + "Description": "Ensure Secrets are Not Stored in Cloud Functions Environment Variables by Using Secret Manager", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Identity and Access Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Google Cloud Functions allow you to host serverless code that is executed when an event is triggered, without the requiring the management a host operating system. These functions can also store environment variables to be used by the code that may contain authentication or other information that needs to remain confidential.", + "RationaleStatement": "It is recommended to use the Secret Manager, because environment variables are stored unencrypted, and accessible for all users who have access to the code.", + "ImpactStatement": "There should be no impact on the Cloud Function. There are minor costs after 10,000 requests a month to the Secret Manager API as well for a high use of other functions. Modifying the Cloud Function to use the Secret Manager may prevent it running to completion.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Enable Secret Manager API for your Project **From Google Cloud Console** 1. Within the project you wish to enable, select the Navigation hamburger menu in the top left. Hover over 'APIs & Services' to under the heading 'Serverless', then select 'Enabled APIs & Services' in the menu that opens up. 2. Click the button '+ Enable APIS and Services' 3. In the Search bar, search for 'Secret Manager API' and select it. 4. Click the blue box that says 'Enable'. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Within the project you wish to enable the API in, run the following command. gcloud services enable Secret Manager API Reviewing Environment Variables That Should Be Migrated to Secret Manager **From Google Cloud Console** 1. Log in to the Google Cloud Web Portal (https://console.cloud.google.com/) 1. Go to Cloud Functions 1. Click on a function name from the list 1. Click on Edit and review the Runtime environment for variables that should be secrets. Leave this list open for the next step. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. To view a list of your cloud functions run gcloud functions list 2. For each cloud function run the following command. gcloud functions describe 3. Review the settings of the buildEnvironmentVariables and environmentVariables. Keep this information for the next step. Migrating Environment Variables to Secrets within the Secret Manager **From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Secret Manager page in the Cloud Console. 1. On the Secret Manager page, click Create Secret. 1. On the Create secret page, under Name, enter the name of the Environment Variable you are replacing. This will then be the Secret Variable you will reference in your code. 1. You will also need to add a version. This is the actual value of the variable that will be referenced from the code. To add a secret version when creating the initial secret, in the Secret value field, enter the value from the Environment Variable you are replacing. 1. Leave the Regions section unchanged. 1. Click the Create secret button. 1. Repeat for all Environment Variables **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Run the following command with the Environment Variable name you are replacing in the ``. It is most secure to point this command to a file with the Environment Variable value located in it, as if you entered it via command line it would show up in your shell’s command history. gcloud secrets create --data-file=/path/to/file.txt Granting your Runtime's Service Account Access to Secrets **From Google Cloud Console** 1. Within the project containing your runtime login with account that has the 'roles/secretmanager.secretAccessor' permission. 2. Select the Navigation hamburger menu in the top left. Hover over 'Security' to under the then select 'Secret Manager' in the menu that opens up. 3. Click the name of a secret listed in this screen. 4. If it is not already open, click Show Info Panel in this screen to open the panel. 5.In the info panel, click Add principal. 6.In the New principals field, enter the service account your function uses for its identity. (If you need help locating or updating your runtime's service account, please see the 'docs/securing/function-identity#runtime_service_account' reference.) 7. In the Select a role dropdown, choose Secret Manager and then Secret Manager Secret Accessor. **From Google Cloud CLI** As of the time of writing, using Google CLI to list Runtime variables is only in beta. Because this is likely to change we are not including it here. Modifying the Code to use the Secrets in Secret Manager **From Google Cloud Console** This depends heavily on which language your runtime is in. For the sake of the brevity of this recommendation, please see the '/docs/creating-and-accessing-secrets#access' reference for language specific instructions. **From Google Cloud CLI** This depends heavily on which language your runtime is in. For the sake of the brevity of this recommendation, please see the' /docs/creating-and-accessing-secrets#access' reference for language specific instructions. Deleting the Insecure Environment Variables **Be certain to do this step last.** Removing variables from code actively referencing them will prevent it from completing successfully. **From Google Cloud Console** 1. Select the Navigation hamburger menu in the top left. Hover over 'Security' then select 'Secret Manager' in the menu that opens up. 1. Click the name of a function. Click Edit. 1. Click Runtime, build and connections settings to expand the advanced configuration options. 1. Click 'Security’. Hover over the secret you want to remove, then click 'Delete'. 1. Click Next. Click Deploy. The latest version of the runtime will now reference the secrets in Secret Manager. **From Google Cloud CLI** gcloud functions deploy --remove-env-vars If you need to find the env vars to remove, they are from the step where ‘gcloud functions describe ``’ was run.", + "AuditProcedure": "Determine if Confidential Information is Stored in your Functions in Cleartext **From Google Cloud Console** 1. Within the project you wish to audit, select the Navigation hamburger menu in the top left. Scroll down to under the heading 'Serverless', then select 'Cloud Functions' 1. Click on a function name from the list 1. Open the Variables tab and you will see both buildEnvironmentVariables and environmentVariables 1. Review the variables whether they are secrets 1. Repeat step 3-5 until all functions are reviewed **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. To view a list of your cloud functions run gcloud functions list 2. For each cloud function in the list run the following command. gcloud functions describe 3. Review the settings of the buildEnvironmentVariables and environmentVariables. Determine if this is data that should not be publicly accessible. Determine if Secret Manager API is 'Enabled' for your Project **From Google Cloud Console** 1. Within the project you wish to audit, select the Navigation hamburger menu in the top left. Hover over 'APIs & Services' to under the heading 'Serverless', then select 'Enabled APIs & Services' in the menu that opens up. 1. Click the button '+ Enable APIS and Services' 1. In the Search bar, search for 'Secret Manager API' and select it. 1. If it is enabled, the blue box that normally says 'Enable' will instead say 'Manage'. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Within the project you wish to audit, run the following command. gcloud services list 2. If 'Secret Manager API' is in the list, it is enabled.", + "AdditionalInformation": "There are slight additional costs to using the Secret Manager API. Review the documentation to determine your organizations' needs.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/functions/docs/configuring/env-var#managing_secrets:https://cloud.google.com/secret-manager/docs/overview", + "DefaultValue": "By default Secret Manager is not enabled.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1", + "Description": "Ensure That Cloud Audit Logging Is Configured Properly", + "Checks": [ + "iam_audit_logs_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended that Cloud Audit Logging is configured to track all admin activities and read, write access to user data.", + "RationaleStatement": "Cloud Audit Logging maintains two audit logs for each project, folder, and organization: Admin Activity and Data Access. 1. Admin Activity logs contain log entries for API calls or other administrative actions that modify the configuration or metadata of resources. Admin Activity audit logs are enabled for all services and cannot be configured. 2. Data Access audit logs record API calls that create, modify, or read user-provided data. These are disabled by default and should be enabled. There are three kinds of Data Access audit log information: - Admin read: Records operations that read metadata or configuration information. Admin Activity audit logs record writes of metadata and configuration information that cannot be disabled. - Data read: Records operations that read user-provided data. - Data write: Records operations that write user-provided data. It is recommended to have an effective default audit config configured in such a way that: 1. logtype is set to DATA_READ (to log user activity tracking) and DATA_WRITES (to log changes/tampering to user data). 2. audit config is enabled for all the services supported by the Data Access audit logs feature. 3. Logs should be captured for all users, i.e., there are no exempted users in any of the audit config sections. This will ensure overriding the audit config will not contradict the requirement.", + "ImpactStatement": "There is no charge for Admin Activity audit logs. Enabling the Data Access audit logs might result in your project being charged for the additional logs usage.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `Audit Logs` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/audit](https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/audit). 2. Follow the steps at [https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/configure-data-access](https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/configure-data-access) to enable audit logs for all Google Cloud services. Ensure that no exemptions are allowed. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. To read the project's IAM policy and store it in a file run a command: gcloud projects get-iam-policy PROJECT_ID > /tmp/project_policy.yaml Alternatively, the policy can be set at the organization or folder level. If setting the policy at the organization level, it is not necessary to also set it for each folder or project. gcloud organizations get-iam-policy ORGANIZATION_ID > /tmp/org_policy.yaml gcloud resource-manager folders get-iam-policy FOLDER_ID > /tmp/folder_policy.yaml 2. Edit policy in /tmp/policy.yaml, adding or changing only the audit logs configuration to: **Note: Admin Activity Logs are enabled by default, and cannot be disabled. So they are not listed in these configuration changes.** auditConfigs: - auditLogConfigs: - logType: DATA_WRITE - logType: DATA_READ service: allServices **Note:** `exemptedMembers:` is not set as audit logging should be enabled for all the users 3. To write new IAM policy run command: gcloud organizations set-iam-policy ORGANIZATION_ID /tmp/org_policy.yaml gcloud resource-manager folders set-iam-policy FOLDER_ID /tmp/folder_policy.yaml gcloud projects set-iam-policy PROJECT_ID /tmp/project_policy.yaml If the preceding command reports a conflict with another change, then repeat these steps, starting with the first step.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `Audit Logs` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/audit](https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/audit). 2. Ensure that Admin Read, Data Write, and Data Read are enabled for all Google Cloud services and that no exemptions are allowed. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List the Identity and Access Management (IAM) policies for the project, folder, or organization: gcloud organizations get-iam-policy ORGANIZATION_ID gcloud resource-manager folders get-iam-policy FOLDER_ID gcloud projects get-iam-policy PROJECT_ID 2. Policy should have a default auditConfigs section which has the logtype set to DATA_WRITES and DATA_READ for all services. Note that projects inherit settings from folders, which in turn inherit settings from the organization. When called, projects get-iam-policy, the result shows only the policies set in the project, not the policies inherited from the parent folder or organization. Nevertheless, if the parent folder has Cloud Audit Logging enabled, the project does as well. Sample output for default audit configs may look like this: auditConfigs: - auditLogConfigs: - logType: ADMIN_READ - logType: DATA_WRITE - logType: DATA_READ service: allServices 3. Any of the auditConfigs sections should not have parameter exemptedMembers: set, which will ensure that Logging is enabled for all users and no user is exempted.", + "AdditionalInformation": "- Log type `DATA_READ` is equally important to that of `DATA_WRITE` to track detailed user activities. - BigQuery Data Access logs are handled differently from other data access logs. BigQuery logs are enabled by default and cannot be disabled. They do not count against logs allotment and cannot result in extra logs charges.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/:https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/configure-data-access", + "DefaultValue": "Admin Activity logs are always enabled. They cannot be disabled. Data Access audit logs are disabled by default because they can be quite large.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.2", + "Description": "Ensure Google Workspace/Cloud Identity Data Sharing with Google Cloud is Enabled for Admin Audit Logging", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Google Workspace and Cloud Identity maintain audit logs for administrative actions, such as user creation, password changes, and modifications to security settings. By default, these logs are only available within the Google Admin Console. Enabling the \"Sharing of data with Google Cloud Services\" setting allows these logs to flow into the Google Cloud (GCP) Organization's Cloud Logging. This is critical for centralized security monitoring, long-term log retention, and the creation of automated alerts for high-risk identity events like privilege escalation.", + "RationaleStatement": "Without centralized logging of identity provider events, security teams cannot easily correlate Workspace/Identity administrative changes with GCP resource changes. If a Super Admin account is compromised, the audit trail must be preserved in a secure, centralized location to prevent an attacker from deleting evidence within the Workspace console.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Admin Console**\n\n1. Log in to the Google Admin Console as a Super Admin.\n2. From the Home page, go to `Account` > `Account settings`.\n3. Click on the `Legal and compliance` section.\n4. Locate the setting titled `Sharing options - Google Cloud Platform Sharing Options` and verify that the status is set to `Enabled`.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Admin Console**\n\n1. Log in to the Google Admin Console as a Super Admin.\n2. From the Home page, go to `Account` > `Account settings`.\n3. Click on the `Legal and compliance` section.\n4. Locate the setting titled `Sharing options - Google Cloud Platform Sharing Options`, click on `Enabled` and click `Save`.\n5. (Optional but Recommended) Navigate to the GCP Console > `Logging` > `Logs Explorer` and verify that the logs are arriving from the admin portal.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Google Workspace/Cloud Identity admin audit logs are only available within the Google Admin Console and are not shared with Google Cloud." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.3", + "Description": "Ensure That Sinks Are Configured for All Log Entries", + "Checks": [ + "cloudstorage_bucket_log_retention_policy_lock" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended to create a sink that will export copies of all the log entries. This can help aggregate logs from multiple projects and export them to a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM).", + "RationaleStatement": "Log entries are held in Cloud Logging. To aggregate logs, export them to a SIEM. To keep them longer, it is recommended to set up a log sink. Exporting involves writing a filter that selects the log entries to export, and choosing a destination in Cloud Storage, BigQuery, or Cloud Pub/Sub. The filter and destination are held in an object called a sink. To ensure all log entries are exported to sinks, ensure that there is no filter configured for a sink. Sinks can be created in projects, organizations, folders, and billing accounts.", + "ImpactStatement": "There are no costs or limitations in Cloud Logging for exporting logs, but the export destinations charge for storing or transmitting the log data.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `Logs Router` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/router](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/router). 2. Click on the arrow symbol with `CREATE SINK` text. 3. Fill out the fields for `Sink details`. 4. Choose Cloud Logging bucket in the Select sink destination drop down menu. 5. Choose a log bucket in the next drop down menu. 6. If an inclusion filter is not provided for this sink, all ingested logs will be routed to the destination provided above. This may result in higher than expected resource usage. 7. Click `Create Sink`. For more information, see [https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/export/configure_export_v2#dest-create](https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/export/configure_export_v2#dest-create). **From Google Cloud CLI** To create a sink to export all log entries in a Google Cloud Storage bucket: gcloud logging sinks create storage.googleapis.com/DESTINATION_BUCKET_NAME Sinks can be created for a folder or organization, which will include all projects. gcloud logging sinks create storage.googleapis.com/DESTINATION_BUCKET_NAME --include-children --folder=FOLDER_ID | --organization=ORGANIZATION_ID **Note:** 1. A sink created by the command-line above will export logs in storage buckets. However, sinks can be configured to export logs into BigQuery, or Cloud Pub/Sub, or `Custom Destination`. 2. While creating a sink, the sink option `--log-filter` is not used to ensure the sink exports all log entries. 3. A sink can be created at a folder or organization level that collects the logs of all the projects underneath bypassing the option `--include-children` in the gcloud command.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `Logs Router` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/router](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/router). 2. For every sink, click the 3-dot button for Menu options and select `View sink details`. 3. Ensure there is at least one sink with an `empty` Inclusion filter. 4. Additionally, ensure that the resource configured as `Destination` exists. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Ensure that a sink with an `empty filter` exists. List the sinks for the project, folder or organization. If sinks are configured at a folder or organization level, they do not need to be configured for each project: gcloud logging sinks list --folder=FOLDER_ID | --organization=ORGANIZATION_ID | --project=PROJECT_ID The output should list at least one sink with an `empty filter`. 2. Additionally, ensure that the resource configured as `Destination` exists. See [https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/beta/logging/sinks/list](https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/beta/logging/sinks/list) for more information.", + "AdditionalInformation": "For Command-Line Audit and Remediation, the sink destination of type `Cloud Storage Bucket` is considered. However, the destination could be configured to `Cloud Storage Bucket` or `BigQuery` or `Cloud PubSub` or `Custom Destination`. Command Line Interface commands would change accordingly.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/reference/tools/gcloud-logging:https://cloud.google.com/logging/quotas:https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview:https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/export/using_exported_logs:https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/export/configure_export_v2:https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/export/aggregated_exports:https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/beta/logging/sinks/list", + "DefaultValue": "By default, there are no sinks configured.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.4", + "Description": "Ensure That Retention Policies on Cloud Storage Buckets Used for Exporting Logs Are Configured Using Bucket Lock", + "Checks": [ + "cloudstorage_bucket_log_retention_policy_lock" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Enabling retention policies on log buckets will protect logs stored in cloud storage buckets from being overwritten or accidentally deleted. It is recommended to set up retention policies and configure Bucket Lock on all storage buckets that are used as log sinks.", + "RationaleStatement": "Logs can be exported by creating one or more sinks that include a log filter and a destination. As Cloud Logging receives new log entries, they are compared against each sink. If a log entry matches a sink's filter, then a copy of the log entry is written to the destination. Sinks can be configured to export logs in storage buckets. It is recommended to configure a data retention policy for these cloud storage buckets and to lock the data retention policy; thus permanently preventing the policy from being reduced or removed. This way, if the system is ever compromised by an attacker or a malicious insider who wants to cover their tracks, the activity logs are definitely preserved for forensics and security investigations.", + "ImpactStatement": "Locking a bucket is an irreversible action. Once you lock a bucket, you cannot remove the retention policy from the bucket or decrease the retention period for the policy. You will then have to wait for the retention period for all items within the bucket before you can delete them, and then the bucket.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. If sinks are **not** configured, first follow the instructions in the recommendation: `Ensure that sinks are configured for all Log entries`. 2. For each storage bucket configured as a sink, go to the Cloud Storage browser at `https://console.cloud.google.com/storage/browser/`. 3. Select the Bucket Lock tab near the top of the page. 4. In the Retention policy entry, click the Add Duration link. The `Set a retention policy` dialog box appears. 5. Enter the desired length of time for the retention period and click `Save policy`. 6. Set the `Lock status` for this retention policy to `Locked`. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. To list all sinks destined to storage buckets: gcloud logging sinks list --folder=FOLDER_ID | --organization=ORGANIZATION_ID | --project=PROJECT_ID 2. For each storage bucket listed above, set a retention policy and lock it: gsutil retention set [TIME_DURATION] gs://[BUCKET_NAME] gsutil retention lock gs://[BUCKET_NAME] For more information, visit [https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/using-bucket-lock#set-policy](https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/using-bucket-lock#set-policy).", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Open the Cloud Storage browser in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/storage/browser](https://console.cloud.google.com/storage/browser). 2. In the Column display options menu, make sure `Retention policy` is checked. 3. In the list of buckets, the retention period of each bucket is found in the `Retention policy` column. If the retention policy is locked, an image of a lock appears directly to the left of the retention period. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. To list all sinks destined to storage buckets: gcloud logging sinks list --folder=FOLDER_ID | --organization=ORGANIZATION_ID | --project=PROJECT_ID 2. For every storage bucket listed above, verify that retention policies and Bucket Lock are enabled: gsutil retention get gs://BUCKET_NAME For more information, see [https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/using-bucket-lock#view-policy](https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/using-bucket-lock#view-policy).", + "AdditionalInformation": "Caution: Locking a retention policy is an irreversible action. Once locked, you must delete the entire bucket in order to remove the bucket's retention policy. However, before you can delete the bucket, you must be able to delete all the objects in the bucket, which itself is only possible if all the objects have reached the retention period set by the retention policy.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/bucket-lock:https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/using-bucket-lock:https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/bucket-lock", + "DefaultValue": "By default, storage buckets used as log sinks do not have retention policies and Bucket Lock configured.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.5", + "Description": "Ensure Log Metric Filter and Alerts Exist for Project Ownership Assignments/Changes", + "Checks": [ + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_project_ownership_changes_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "In order to prevent unnecessary project ownership assignments to users/service-accounts and further misuses of projects and resources, all `roles/Owner` assignments should be monitored. Members (users/Service-Accounts) with a role assignment to primitive role `roles/Owner` are project owners. The project owner has all the privileges on the project the role belongs to. These are summarized below: - All viewer permissions on all GCP Services within the project - Permissions for actions that modify the state of all GCP services within the project - Manage roles and permissions for a project and all resources within the project - Set up billing for a project Granting the owner role to a member (user/Service-Account) will allow that member to modify the Identity and Access Management (IAM) policy. Therefore, grant the owner role only if the member has a legitimate purpose to manage the IAM policy. This is because the project IAM policy contains sensitive access control data. Having a minimal set of users allowed to manage IAM policy will simplify any auditing that may be necessary.", + "RationaleStatement": "Project ownership has the highest level of privileges on a project. To avoid misuse of project resources, the project ownership assignment/change actions mentioned above should be monitored and alerted to concerned recipients. - Sending project ownership invites - Acceptance/Rejection of project ownership invite by user - Adding `roleOwner` to a user/service-account - Removing a user/Service account from `roleOwner`", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling of logging may result in your project being charged for the additional logs usage.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** **Create the prescribed log metric:** 1. Go to `Logging/Logs-based Metrics` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics) and click CREATE METRIC. 2. Click the down arrow symbol on the `Filter Bar` at the rightmost corner and select `Convert to Advanced Filter`. 3. Clear any text and add: (protoPayload.serviceName=cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com) AND (ProjectOwnership OR projectOwnerInvitee) OR (protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas.action=REMOVE AND protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas.role=roles/owner) OR (protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas.action=ADD AND protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas.role=roles/owner) 4. Click `Submit Filter`. The logs display based on the filter text entered by the user. 5. In the `Metric Editor` menu on the right, fill out the name field. Set `Units` to `1` (default) and the `Type` to `Counter`. This ensures that the log metric counts the number of log entries matching the advanced logs query. 6. Click `Create Metric`. **Create the display prescribed Alert Policy:** 1. Identify the newly created metric under the section `User-defined Metrics` at [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics). 2. Click the 3-dot icon in the rightmost column for the desired metric and select `Create alert from Metric`. A new page opens. 3. Fill out the alert policy configuration and click `Save`. Choose the alerting threshold and configuration that makes sense for the user's organization. For example, a threshold of zero(0) for the most recent value will ensure that a notification is triggered for every owner change in the project: Set `Aggregator` to `Count` Set `Configuration`: - Condition: above - Threshold: 0 - For: most recent value 4. Configure the desired notifications channels in the section `Notifications`. 5. Name the policy and click `Save`. **From Google Cloud CLI** Create a prescribed Log Metric: - Use the command: gcloud beta logging metrics create - Reference for Command Usage: https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/beta/logging/metrics/create Create prescribed Alert Policy - Use the command: gcloud alpha monitoring policies create - Reference for Command Usage: https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/alpha/monitoring/policies/create", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** **Ensure that the prescribed log metric is present:** 1. Go to `Logging/Log-based Metrics` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics). 2. In the `User-defined Metrics` section, ensure that at least one metric `` is present with filter text: (protoPayload.serviceName=cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com) AND (ProjectOwnership OR projectOwnerInvitee) OR (protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas.action=REMOVE AND protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas.role=roles/owner) OR (protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas.action=ADD AND protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas.role=roles/owner) **Ensure that the prescribed Alerting Policy is present:** 3. Go to `Alerting` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/monitoring/alerting](https://console.cloud.google.com/monitoring/alerting). 4. Under the `Policies` section, ensure that at least one alert policy exists for the log metric above. Clicking on the policy should show that it is configured with a condition. For example, `Violates when: Any logging.googleapis.com/user/ stream` `is above a threshold of zero(0) for greater than zero(0) seconds` means that the alert will trigger for any new owner change. Verify that the chosen alerting thresholds make sense for your organization. 5. Ensure that the appropriate notifications channels have been set up. **From Google Cloud CLI** **Ensure that the prescribed log metric is present:** 1. List the log metrics: gcloud logging metrics list --format json 2. Ensure that the output contains at least one metric with filter set to: (protoPayload.serviceName=cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com) AND (ProjectOwnership OR projectOwnerInvitee) OR (protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas.action=REMOVE AND protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas.role=roles/owner) OR (protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas.action=ADD AND protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas.role=roles/owner) 3. Note the value of the property `metricDescriptor.type` for the identified metric, in the format `logging.googleapis.com/user/`. **Ensure that the prescribed alerting policy is present:** 4. List the alerting policies: gcloud alpha monitoring policies list --format json 5. Ensure that the output contains an least one alert policy where: - `conditions.conditionThreshold.filter` is set to `metric.type=logging.googleapis.com/user/` - AND `enabled` is set to `true`", + "AdditionalInformation": "1. Project ownership assignments for a user cannot be done using the gcloud utility as assigning project ownership to a user requires sending, and the user accepting, an invitation. 2. Project Ownership assignment to a service account does not send any invites. SetIAMPolicy to `role/owner`is directly performed on service accounts.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/logs-based-metrics/:https://cloud.google.com/monitoring/custom-metrics/:https://cloud.google.com/monitoring/alerts/:https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/reference/tools/gcloud-logging", + "DefaultValue": "", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.6", + "Description": "Ensure That the Log Metric Filter and Alerts Exist for Audit Configuration Changes", + "Checks": [ + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_audit_configuration_changes_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Google Cloud Platform (GCP) services write audit log entries to the Admin Activity and Data Access logs to help answer the questions of, who did what, where, and when? within GCP projects. Cloud audit logging records information includes the identity of the API caller, the time of the API call, the source IP address of the API caller, the request parameters, and the response elements returned by GCP services. Cloud audit logging provides a history of GCP API calls for an account, including API calls made via the console, SDKs, command-line tools, and other GCP services.", + "RationaleStatement": "Admin activity and data access logs produced by cloud audit logging enable security analysis, resource change tracking, and compliance auditing. Configuring the metric filter and alerts for audit configuration changes ensures the recommended state of audit configuration is maintained so that all activities in the project are audit-able at any point in time.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling of logging may result in your project being charged for the additional logs usage.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** **Create the prescribed log metric:** 1. Go to `Logging/Logs-based Metrics` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics) and click CREATE METRIC. 2. Click the down arrow symbol on the `Filter Bar` at the rightmost corner and select `Convert to Advanced Filter`. 3. Clear any text and add: protoPayload.methodName=SetIamPolicy AND protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.auditConfigDeltas:* 4. Click `Submit Filter`. Display logs appear based on the filter text entered by the user. 5. In the `Metric Editor` menu on the right, fill out the name field. Set `Units` to `1` (default) and `Type` to `Counter`. This will ensure that the log metric counts the number of log entries matching the user's advanced logs query. 6. Click `Create Metric`. **Create a prescribed Alert Policy:** 1. Identify the new metric the user just created, under the section `User-defined Metrics` at [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics). 2. Click the 3-dot icon in the rightmost column for the new metric and select `Create alert from Metric`. A new page opens. 3. Fill out the alert policy configuration and click `Save`. Choose the alerting threshold and configuration that makes sense for the organization. For example, a threshold of zero(0) for the most recent value will ensure that a notification is triggered for every owner change in the project: Set `Aggregator` to `Count` Set `Configuration`: - Condition: above - Threshold: 0 - For: most recent value 4. Configure the desired notifications channels in the section `Notifications`. 5. Name the policy and click `Save`. **From Google Cloud CLI** Create a prescribed Log Metric: - Use the command: gcloud beta logging metrics create - Reference for command usage: [https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/beta/logging/metrics/create ](https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/beta/logging/metrics/create) Create prescribed Alert Policy - Use the command: gcloud alpha monitoring policies create - Reference for command usage: [https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/alpha/monitoring/policies/create](https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/alpha/monitoring/policies/create)", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** **Ensure the prescribed log metric is present:** 1. Go to `Logging/Logs-based Metrics` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics). 2. In the `User-defined Metrics` section, ensure that at least one metric `` is present with the filter text: protoPayload.methodName=SetIamPolicy AND protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.auditConfigDeltas:* **Ensure that the prescribed alerting policy is present:** 3. Go to `Alerting` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/monitoring/alerting](https://console.cloud.google.com/monitoring/alerting). 4. Under the `Policies` section, ensure that at least one alert policy exists for the log metric above. Clicking on the policy should show that it is configured with a condition. For example, `Violates when: Any logging.googleapis.com/user/ stream` `is above a threshold of 0 for greater than zero(0) seconds`, means that the alert will trigger for any new owner change. Verify that the chosen alerting thresholds make sense for the user's organization. 5. Ensure that appropriate notifications channels have been set up. **From Google Cloud CLI** **Ensure that the prescribed log metric is present:** 1. List the log metrics: gcloud beta logging metrics list --format json 2. Ensure that the output contains at least one metric with the filter set to: protoPayload.methodName=SetIamPolicy AND protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.auditConfigDeltas:* 3. Note the value of the property `metricDescriptor.type` for the identified metric, in the format `logging.googleapis.com/user/`. **Ensure that the prescribed alerting policy is present:** 4. List the alerting policies: gcloud alpha monitoring policies list --format json 5. Ensure that the output contains at least one alert policy where: - `conditions.conditionThreshold.filter` is set to `metric.type=logging.googleapis.com/user/` - AND `enabled` is set to `true`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/logs-based-metrics/:https://cloud.google.com/monitoring/custom-metrics/:https://cloud.google.com/monitoring/alerts/:https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/reference/tools/gcloud-logging:https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/configure-data-access#getiampolicy-setiampolicy", + "DefaultValue": "", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.7", + "Description": "Ensure That the Log Metric Filter and Alerts Exist for Custom Role Changes", + "Checks": [ + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_custom_role_changes_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established for changes to Identity and Access Management (IAM) role creation, deletion and updating activities.", + "RationaleStatement": "Google Cloud IAM provides predefined roles that give granular access to specific Google Cloud Platform resources and prevent unwanted access to other resources. However, to cater to organization-specific needs, Cloud IAM also provides the ability to create custom roles. Project owners and administrators with the Organization Role Administrator role or the IAM Role Administrator role can create custom roles. Monitoring role creation, deletion and updating activities will help in identifying any over-privileged role at early stages.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling of logging may result in your project being charged for the additional logs usage.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Console:** **Create the prescribed log metric:** 1. Go to `Logging/Logs-based Metrics` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics) and click CREATE METRIC. 1. Click the down arrow symbol on the `Filter Bar` at the rightmost corner and select `Convert to Advanced Filter`. 1. Clear any text and add: resource.type=iam_role AND (protoPayload.methodName = google.iam.admin.v1.CreateRole OR protoPayload.methodName=google.iam.admin.v1.DeleteRole OR protoPayload.methodName=google.iam.admin.v1.UpdateRole OR protoPayload.methodName=google.iam.admin.v1.UndeleteRole) 1. Click `Submit Filter`. Display logs appear based on the filter text entered by the user. 1. In the `Metric Editor` menu on the right, fill out the name field. Set `Units` to `1` (default) and `Type` to `Counter`. This ensures that the log metric counts the number of log entries matching the advanced logs query. 1. Click `Create Metric`. **Create a prescribed Alert Policy:** 1. Identify the new metric that was just created under the section `User-defined Metrics` at [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics). 2. Click the 3-dot icon in the rightmost column for the metric and select `Create alert from Metric`. A new page displays. 3. Fill out the alert policy configuration and click `Save`. Choose the alerting threshold and configuration that makes sense for the user's organization. For example, a threshold of zero(0) for the most recent value ensures that a notification is triggered for every owner change in the project: Set `Aggregator` to `Count` Set `Configuration`: - Condition: above - Threshold: 0 - For: most recent value 1. Configure the desired notification channels in the section `Notifications`. 1. Name the policy and click `Save`. **From Google Cloud CLI** Create the prescribed Log Metric: - Use the command: gcloud logging metrics create Create the prescribed Alert Policy: - Use the command: gcloud alpha monitoring policies create ", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Console:** **Ensure that the prescribed log metric is present:** 1. Go to `Logging/Logs-based Metrics` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics). 2. In the `User-defined Metrics` section, ensure that at least one metric `` is present with filter text: resource.type=iam_role AND (protoPayload.methodName=google.iam.admin.v1.CreateRole OR protoPayload.methodName=google.iam.admin.v1.DeleteRole OR protoPayload.methodName=google.iam.admin.v1.UpdateRole OR protoPayload.methodName=google.iam.admin.v1.UndeleteRole) **Ensure that the prescribed alerting policy is present:** 3. Go to `Alerting` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/monitoring/alerting](https://console.cloud.google.com/monitoring/alerting). 4. Under the `Policies` section, ensure that at least one alert policy exists for the log metric above. Clicking on the policy should show that it is configured with a condition. For example, `Violates when: Any logging.googleapis.com/user/ stream` `is above a threshold of zero(0) for greater than zero(0) seconds` means that the alert will trigger for any new owner change. Verify that the chosen alerting thresholds make sense for the user's organization. 5. Ensure that the appropriate notifications channels have been set up. **From Google Cloud CLI** Ensure that the prescribed log metric is present: 1. List the log metrics: gcloud logging metrics list --format json 2. Ensure that the output contains at least one metric with the filter set to: resource.type=iam_role AND (protoPayload.methodName = google.iam.admin.v1.CreateRole OR protoPayload.methodName=google.iam.admin.v1.DeleteRole OR protoPayload.methodName=google.iam.admin.v1.UpdateRole OR protoPayload.methodName=google.iam.admin.v1.UndeleteRole) 3. Note the value of the property `metricDescriptor.type` for the identified metric, in the format `logging.googleapis.com/user/`. **Ensure that the prescribed alerting policy is present:** 4. List the alerting policies: gcloud alpha monitoring policies list --format json 5. Ensure that the output contains an least one alert policy where: - `conditions.conditionThreshold.filter` is set to `metric.type=logging.googleapis.com/user/` - AND `enabled` is set to `true`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/logs-based-metrics/:https://cloud.google.com/monitoring/custom-metrics/:https://cloud.google.com/monitoring/alerts/:https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/reference/tools/gcloud-logging:https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-custom-roles", + "DefaultValue": "", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.8", + "Description": "Ensure That the Log Metric Filter and Alerts Exist for VPC Network Firewall Rule Changes", + "Checks": [ + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_vpc_firewall_rule_changes_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established for Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) Network Firewall rule changes.", + "RationaleStatement": "Monitoring for Create or Update Firewall rule events gives insight to network access changes and may reduce the time it takes to detect suspicious activity.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling of logging may result in your project being charged for the additional logs usage. These charges could be significant depending on the size of the organization.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** **Create the prescribed log metric:** 1. Go to `Logging/Logs-based Metrics` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics) and click CREATE METRIC. 2. Click the down arrow symbol on the `Filter Bar` at the rightmost corner and select `Convert to Advanced Filter`. 3. Clear any text and add: resource.type=gce_firewall_rule AND (protoPayload.methodName:compute.firewalls.patch OR protoPayload.methodName:compute.firewalls.insert OR protoPayload.methodName:compute.firewalls.delete) 4. Click `Submit Filter`. Display logs appear based on the filter text entered by the user. 5. In the `Metric Editor` menu on the right, fill out the name field. Set `Units` to `1` (default) and `Type` to `Counter`. This ensures that the log metric counts the number of log entries matching the advanced logs query. 6. Click `Create Metric`. **Create the prescribed Alert Policy:** 1. Identify the newly created metric under the section `User-defined Metrics` at [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics). 2. Click the 3-dot icon in the rightmost column for the new metric and select `Create alert from Metric`. A new page displays. 3. Fill out the alert policy configuration and click `Save`. Choose the alerting threshold and configuration that makes sense for the user's organization. For example, a threshold of zero(0) for the most recent value ensures that a notification is triggered for every owner change in the project: Set `Aggregator` to `Count` Set `Configuration`: - Condition: above - Threshold: 0 - For: most recent value 4. Configure the desired notifications channels in the section `Notifications`. 5. Name the policy and click `Save`. **From Google Cloud CLI** Create the prescribed Log Metric - Use the command: gcloud logging metrics create Create the prescribed alert policy: - Use the command: gcloud alpha monitoring policies create", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** **Ensure that the prescribed log metric is present:** 1. Go to `Logging/Logs-based Metrics` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics). 2. In the `User-defined Metrics` section, ensure at least one metric `` is present with this filter text: resource.type=gce_firewall_rule AND (protoPayload.methodName:compute.firewalls.patch OR protoPayload.methodName:compute.firewalls.insert OR protoPayload.methodName:compute.firewalls.delete) **Ensure that the prescribed alerting policy is present:** 3. Go to `Alerting` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/monitoring/alerting](https://console.cloud.google.com/monitoring/alerting). 4. Under the `Policies` section, ensure that at least one alert policy exists for the log metric above. Clicking on the policy should show that it is configured with a condition. For example, `Violates when: Any logging.googleapis.com/user/ stream` `is above a threshold of zero(0) for greater than zero(0) seconds` means that the alert will trigger for any new owner change. Verify that the chosen alerting thresholds make sense for the user's organization. 5. Ensure that appropriate notification channels have been set up. **From Google Cloud CLI** **Ensure that the prescribed log metric is present:** 1. List the log metrics: gcloud logging metrics list --format json 2. Ensure that the output contains at least one metric with the filter set to: resource.type=gce_firewall_rule AND (protoPayload.methodName:compute.firewalls.patch OR protoPayload.methodName:compute.firewalls.insert OR protoPayload.methodName:compute.firewalls.delete) 3. Note the value of the property `metricDescriptor.type` for the identified metric, in the format `logging.googleapis.com/user/`. **Ensure that the prescribed alerting policy is present:** 4. List the alerting policies: gcloud alpha monitoring policies list --format json 5. Ensure that the output contains an least one alert policy where: - `conditions.conditionThreshold.filter` is set to `metric.type=logging.googleapis.com/user/` - AND `enabled` is set to `true`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/logs-based-metrics/:https://cloud.google.com/monitoring/custom-metrics/:https://cloud.google.com/monitoring/alerts/:https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/reference/tools/gcloud-logging:https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/firewalls", + "DefaultValue": "", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.9", + "Description": "Ensure That the Log Metric Filter and Alerts Exist for VPC Network Route Changes", + "Checks": [ + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_vpc_network_route_changes_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established for Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) network route changes.", + "RationaleStatement": "Google Cloud Platform (GCP) routes define the paths network traffic takes from a VM instance to another destination. The other destination can be inside the organization VPC network (such as another VM) or outside of it. Every route consists of a destination and a next hop. Traffic whose destination IP is within the destination range is sent to the next hop for delivery. Monitoring changes to route tables will help ensure that all VPC traffic flows through an expected path.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling of logging may result in your project being charged for the additional logs usage. These charges could be significant depending on the size of the organization.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** **Create the prescribed Log Metric:** 1. Go to `Logging/Logs-based Metrics` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics) and click CREATE METRIC. 2. Click the down arrow symbol on the `Filter Bar` at the rightmost corner and select `Convert to Advanced Filter` 3. Clear any text and add: resource.type=gce_route AND (protoPayload.methodName:compute.routes.delete OR protoPayload.methodName:compute.routes.insert) 4. Click `Submit Filter`. Display logs appear based on the filter text entered by the user. 5. In the `Metric Editor` menu on the right, fill out the name field. Set `Units` to `1` (default) and `Type` to `Counter`. This ensures that the log metric counts the number of log entries matching the user's advanced logs query. 6. Click `Create Metric`. **Create the prescribed alert policy:** 1. Identify the newly created metric under the section `User-defined Metrics` at [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics). 2. Click the 3-dot icon in the rightmost column for the new metric and select `Create alert from Metric`. A new page displays. 3. Fill out the alert policy configuration and click `Save`. Choose the alerting threshold and configuration that makes sense for the user's organization. For example, a threshold of zero(0) for the most recent value ensures that a notification is triggered for every owner change in the project: Set `Aggregator` to `Count` Set `Configuration`: - Condition: above - Threshold: 0 - For: most recent value 4. Configure the desired notification channels in the section `Notifications`. 5. Name the policy and click `Save`. **From Google Cloud CLI** Create the prescribed Log Metric: - Use the command: gcloud logging metrics create Create the prescribed the alert policy: - Use the command: gcloud alpha monitoring policies create", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** **Ensure that the prescribed Log metric is present:** 1. Go to `Logging/Logs-based Metrics` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics). 2. In the `User-defined Metrics` section, ensure that at least one metric `` is present with the filter text: resource.type=gce_route AND (protoPayload.methodName:compute.routes.delete OR protoPayload.methodName:compute.routes.insert) **Ensure the prescribed alerting policy is present:** 3. Go to `Alerting` by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/monitoring/alerting](https://console.cloud.google.com/monitoring/alerting). 4. Under the `Policies` section, ensure that at least one alert policy exists for the log metric above. Clicking on the policy should show that it is configured with a condition. For example, `Violates when: Any logging.googleapis.com/user/ stream` `is above a threshold of 0 for greater than zero(0) seconds` means that the alert will trigger for any new owner change. Verify that the chosen alert thresholds make sense for the user's organization. 5. Ensure that the appropriate notification channels have been set up. **From Google Cloud CLI** **Ensure the prescribed log metric is present:** 1. List the log metrics: gcloud logging metrics list --format json 2. Ensure that the output contains at least one metric with the filter set to: resource.type=gce_route AND (protoPayload.methodName:compute.routes.delete OR protoPayload.methodName:compute.routes.insert) 3. Note the value of the property `metricDescriptor.type` for the identified metric, in the format `logging.googleapis.com/user/`. **Ensure that the prescribed alerting policy is present:** 4. List the alerting policies: gcloud alpha monitoring policies list --format json 5. Ensure that the output contains an least one alert policy where: - `conditions.conditionThreshold.filter` is set to `metric.type=logging.googleapis.com/user/` - AND `enabled` is set to `true`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/logs-based-metrics/:https://cloud.google.com/monitoring/custom-metrics/:https://cloud.google.com/monitoring/alerts/:https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/reference/tools/gcloud-logging:https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/access-control/iam:https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/beta/logging/metrics/create:https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/alpha/monitoring/policies/create", + "DefaultValue": "", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.10", + "Description": "Ensure That the Log Metric Filter and Alerts Exist for VPC Network Changes", + "Checks": [ + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_vpc_network_changes_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established for Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) network changes.", + "RationaleStatement": "It is possible to have more than one VPC within a project. In addition, it is also possible to create a peer connection between two VPCs enabling network traffic to route between VPCs. Monitoring changes to a VPC will help ensure VPC traffic flow is not getting impacted.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling of logging may result in your project being charged for the additional logs usage. These charges could be significant depending on the size of the organization.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** **Create the prescribed log metric:** 1. Go to `Logging/Logs-based Metrics` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics) and click CREATE METRIC. 2. Click the down arrow symbol on `Filter Bar` at the rightmost corner and select `Convert to Advanced Filter`. 3. Clear any text and add: resource.type=gce_network AND (protoPayload.methodName:compute.networks.insert OR protoPayload.methodName:compute.networks.patch OR protoPayload.methodName:compute.networks.delete OR protoPayload.methodName:compute.networks.removePeering OR protoPayload.methodName:compute.networks.addPeering) 4. Click `Submit Filter`. Display logs appear based on the filter text entered by the user. 5. In the `Metric Editor` menu on the right, fill out the name field. Set `Units` to `1` (default) and `Type` to `Counter`. This ensures that the log metric counts the number of log entries matching the user's advanced logs query. 6. Click `Create Metric`. **Create the prescribed alert policy:** 1. Identify the newly created metric under the section `User-defined Metrics` at [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics). 2. Click the 3-dot icon in the rightmost column for the new metric and select `Create alert from Metric`. A new page appears. 3. Fill out the alert policy configuration and click `Save`. Choose the alerting threshold and configuration that makes sense for the user's organization. For example, a threshold of 0 for the most recent value will ensure that a notification is triggered for every owner change in the project: Set `Aggregator` to `Count` Set `Configuration`: - Condition: above - Threshold: 0 - For: most recent value 4. Configure the desired notification channels in the section `Notifications`. 5. Name the policy and click `Save`. **From Google Cloud CLI** Create the prescribed Log Metric: - Use the command: gcloud logging metrics create Create the prescribed alert policy: - Use the command: gcloud alpha monitoring policies create", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** **Ensure the prescribed log metric is present:** 1. Go to `Logging/Logs-based Metrics` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics). 2. In the `User-defined Metrics` section, ensure at least one metric `` is present with filter text: resource.type=gce_network AND (protoPayload.methodName:compute.networks.insert OR protoPayload.methodName:compute.networks.patch OR protoPayload.methodName:compute.networks.delete OR protoPayload.methodName:compute.networks.removePeering OR protoPayload.methodName:compute.networks.addPeering) **Ensure the prescribed alerting policy is present:** 3. Go to `Alerting` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/monitoring/alerting](https://console.cloud.google.com/monitoring/alerting). 4. Under the `Policies` section, ensure that at least one alert policy exists for the log metric above. Clicking on the policy should show that it is configured with a condition. For example, `Violates when: Any logging.googleapis.com/user/ stream` `is above a threshold of 0 for greater than 0 seconds` means that the alert will trigger for any new owner change. Verify that the chosen alerting thresholds make sense for the user's organization. 5. Ensure that appropriate notification channels have been set up. **From Google Cloud CLI** **Ensure the log metric is present:** 1. List the log metrics: gcloud logging metrics list --format json 2. Ensure that the output contains at least one metric with filter set to: resource.type=gce_network AND protoPayload.methodName=beta.compute.networks.insert OR protoPayload.methodName=beta.compute.networks.patch OR protoPayload.methodName=v1.compute.networks.delete OR protoPayload.methodName=v1.compute.networks.removePeering OR protoPayload.methodName=v1.compute.networks.addPeering 3. Note the value of the property `metricDescriptor.type` for the identified metric, in the format `logging.googleapis.com/user/`. **Ensure the prescribed alerting policy is present:** 4. List the alerting policies: gcloud alpha monitoring policies list --format json 5. Ensure that the output contains at least one alert policy where: - `conditions.conditionThreshold.filter` is set to `metric.type=logging.googleapis.com/user/` - AND `enabled` is set to `true`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/logs-based-metrics/:https://cloud.google.com/monitoring/custom-metrics/:https://cloud.google.com/monitoring/alerts/:https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/reference/tools/gcloud-logging:https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/overview", + "DefaultValue": "", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.11", + "Description": "Ensure That the Log Metric Filter and Alerts Exist for Cloud Storage IAM Permission Changes", + "Checks": [ + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_bucket_permission_changes_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established for Cloud Storage Bucket IAM changes.", + "RationaleStatement": "Monitoring changes to cloud storage bucket permissions may reduce the time needed to detect and correct permissions on sensitive cloud storage buckets and objects inside the bucket.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling of logging may result in your project being charged for the additional logs usage. These charges could be significant depending on the size of the organization.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** **Create the prescribed log metric:** 1. Go to `Logging/Logs-based Metrics` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics) and click CREATE METRIC. 2. Click the down arrow symbol on the `Filter Bar` at the rightmost corner and select `Convert to Advanced Filter`. 3. Clear any text and add: resource.type=gcs_bucket AND protoPayload.methodName=storage.setIamPermissions 4. Click `Submit Filter`. Display logs appear based on the filter text entered by the user. 5. In the `Metric Editor` menu on right, fill out the name field. Set `Units` to `1` (default) and `Type` to `Counter`. This ensures that the log metric counts the number of log entries matching the user's advanced logs query. 6. Click `Create Metric`. **Create the prescribed Alert Policy:** 1. Identify the newly created metric under the section `User-defined Metrics` at [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics). 2. Click the 3-dot icon in the rightmost column for the new metric and select `Create alert from Metric`. A new page appears. 3. Fill out the alert policy configuration and click `Save`. Choose the alerting threshold and configuration that makes sense for the user's organization. For example, a threshold of zero(0) for the most recent value will ensure that a notification is triggered for every owner change in the project: Set `Aggregator` to `Count` Set `Configuration`: - Condition: above - Threshold: 0 - For: most recent value 4. Configure the desired notifications channels in the section `Notifications`. 5. Name the policy and click `Save`. **From Google Cloud CLI** Create the prescribed Log Metric: - Use the command: gcloud beta logging metrics create Create the prescribed alert policy: - Use the command: gcloud alpha monitoring policies create", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** **Ensure the prescribed log metric is present:** 1. For each project that contains cloud storage buckets, go to `Logging/Logs-based Metrics` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics). 2. In the `User-defined Metrics` section, ensure at least one metric `` is present with the filter text: resource.type=gcs_bucket AND protoPayload.methodName=storage.setIamPermissions **Ensure that the prescribed alerting policy is present:** 3. Go to `Alerting` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/monitoring/alerting](https://console.cloud.google.com/monitoring/alerting). 4. Under the `Policies` section, ensure that at least one alert policy exists for the log metric above. Clicking on the policy should show that it is configured with a condition. For example, `Violates when: Any logging.googleapis.com/user/ stream` `is above a threshold of 0 for greater than 0 seconds` means that the alert will trigger for any new owner change. Verify that the chosen alerting thresholds make sense for the user's organization. 5. Ensure that the appropriate notifications channels have been set up. **From Google Cloud CLI** **Ensure that the prescribed log metric is present:** 1. List the log metrics: gcloud logging metrics list --format json 2. Ensure that the output contains at least one metric with the filter set to: resource.type=gcs_bucket AND protoPayload.methodName=storage.setIamPermissions 3. Note the value of the property `metricDescriptor.type` for the identified metric, in the format `logging.googleapis.com/user/`. **Ensure the prescribed alerting policy is present:** 4. List the alerting policies: gcloud alpha monitoring policies list --format json 5. Ensure that the output contains an least one alert policy where: - `conditions.conditionThreshold.filter` is set to `metric.type=logging.googleapis.com/user/` - AND `enabled` is set to `true`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/logs-based-metrics/:https://cloud.google.com/monitoring/custom-metrics/:https://cloud.google.com/monitoring/alerts/:https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/reference/tools/gcloud-logging:https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/overview:https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/access-control/iam-roles", + "DefaultValue": "", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.12", + "Description": "Ensure That the Log Metric Filter and Alerts Exist for SQL Instance Configuration Changes", + "Checks": [ + "logging_log_metric_filter_and_alert_for_sql_instance_configuration_changes_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established for SQL instance configuration changes.", + "RationaleStatement": "Monitoring changes to SQL instance configuration changes may reduce the time needed to detect and correct misconfigurations done on the SQL server. Below are a few of the configurable options which may the impact security posture of an SQL instance: - Enable auto backups and high availability: Misconfiguration may adversely impact business continuity, disaster recovery, and high availability - Authorize networks: Misconfiguration may increase exposure to untrusted networks", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling of logging may result in your project being charged for the additional logs usage. These charges could be significant depending on the size of the organization.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** **Create the prescribed Log Metric:** 1. Go to `Logging/Logs-based Metrics` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics) and click CREATE METRIC. 2. Click the down arrow symbol on the `Filter Bar` at the rightmost corner and select `Convert to Advanced Filter`. 3. Clear any text and add: protoPayload.methodName=cloudsql.instances.update 4. Click `Submit Filter`. Display logs appear based on the filter text entered by the user. 5. In the `Metric Editor` menu on right, fill out the name field. Set `Units` to `1` (default) and `Type` to `Counter`. This ensures that the log metric counts the number of log entries matching the user's advanced logs query. 6. Click `Create Metric`. **Create the prescribed alert policy:** 1. Identify the newly created metric under the section `User-defined Metrics` at [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics). 2. Click the 3-dot icon in the rightmost column for the new metric and select `Create alert from Metric`. A new page appears. 3. Fill out the alert policy configuration and click `Save`. Choose the alerting threshold and configuration that makes sense for the user's organization. For example, a threshold of zero(0) for the most recent value will ensure that a notification is triggered for every owner change in the user's project: Set `Aggregator` to `Count` Set `Configuration`: - Condition: above - Threshold: 0 - For: most recent value 4. Configure the desired notification channels in the section `Notifications`. 5. Name the policy and click `Save`. **From Google Cloud CLI** Create the prescribed log metric: - Use the command: gcloud logging metrics create Create the prescribed alert policy: - Use the command: gcloud alpha monitoring policies create - Reference for command usage: [https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/alpha/monitoring/policies/create](https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/alpha/monitoring/policies/create)", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** **Ensure the prescribed log metric is present:** 1. For each project that contains Cloud SQL instances, go to `Logging/Logs-based Metrics` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/metrics). 2. In the `User-defined Metrics` section, ensure that at least one metric `` is present with the filter text: protoPayload.methodName=cloudsql.instances.update **Ensure that the prescribed alerting policy is present:** 3. Go to `Alerting` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/monitoring/alerting](https://console.cloud.google.com/monitoring/alerting). 4. Under the `Policies` section, ensure that at least one alert policy exists for the log metric above. Clicking on the policy should show that it is configured with a condition. For example, `Violates when: Any logging.googleapis.com/user/ stream` `is above a threshold of zero(0) for greater than zero(0) seconds` means that the alert will trigger for any new owner change. Verify that the chosen alerting thresholds make sense for the user's organization. 5. Ensure that the appropriate notifications channels have been set up. **From Google Cloud CLI** **Ensure that the prescribed log metric is present:** 1. List the log metrics: gcloud logging metrics list --format json 2. Ensure that the output contains at least one metric with the filter set to protoPayload.methodName=cloudsql.instances.update 3. Note the value of the property `metricDescriptor.type` for the identified metric, in the format `logging.googleapis.com/user/`. **Ensure that the prescribed alerting policy is present:** 4. List the alerting policies: gcloud alpha monitoring policies list --format json 5. Ensure that the output contains at least one alert policy where: - `conditions.conditionThreshold.filter` is set to `metric.type=logging.googleapis.com/user/` - AND `enabled` is set to `true`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/logs-based-metrics/:https://cloud.google.com/monitoring/custom-metrics/:https://cloud.google.com/monitoring/alerts/:https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/reference/tools/gcloud-logging:https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/overview:https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/:https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/mysql/:https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/postgres/", + "DefaultValue": "", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.13", + "Description": "Ensure That Cloud DNS Logging Is Enabled for All VPC Networks", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Cloud DNS logging records the queries from the name servers within your VPC to Stackdriver. Logged queries can come from Compute Engine VMs, GKE containers, or other GCP resources provisioned within the VPC.", + "RationaleStatement": "Security monitoring and forensics cannot depend solely on IP addresses from VPC flow logs, especially when considering the dynamic IP usage of cloud resources, HTTP virtual host routing, and other technology that can obscure the DNS name used by a client from the IP address. Monitoring of Cloud DNS logs provides visibility to DNS names requested by the clients within the VPC. These logs can be monitored for anomalous domain names, evaluated against threat intelligence, and Note: For full capture of DNS, firewall must block egress UDP/53 (DNS) and TCP/443 (DNS over HTTPS) to prevent client from using external DNS name server for resolution.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling of Cloud DNS logging might result in your project being charged for the additional logs usage.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud CLI** **Add New DNS Policy With Logging Enabled** For each VPC network that needs a DNS policy with logging enabled: gcloud dns policies create enable-dns-logging --enable-logging --description=Enable DNS Logging --networks=VPC_NETWORK_NAME The VPC_NETWORK_NAME can be one or more networks in comma-separated list **Enable Logging for Existing DNS Policy** For each VPC network that has an existing DNS policy that needs logging enabled: gcloud dns policies update POLICY_NAME --enable-logging --networks=VPC_NETWORK_NAME The VPC_NETWORK_NAME can be one or more networks in comma-separated list", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List all VPCs networks in a project: gcloud compute networks list --format=table[box,title='All VPC Networks'](name:label='VPC Network Name') 2. List all DNS policies, logging enablement, and associated VPC networks: gcloud dns policies list --flatten=networks[] --format=table[box,title='All DNS Policies By VPC Network'](name:label='Policy Name',enableLogging:label='Logging Enabled':align=center,networks.networkUrl.basename():label='VPC Network Name') Each VPC Network should be associated with a DNS policy with logging enabled.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Additional Info - Only queries that reach a name server are logged. Cloud DNS resolvers cache responses, queries answered from caches, or direct queries to an external DNS resolver outside the VPC are not logged.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/dns/docs/monitoring", + "DefaultValue": "Cloud DNS logging is disabled by default on each network.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.14", + "Description": "Ensure Cloud Asset Inventory Is Enabled", + "Checks": [ + "iam_cloud_asset_inventory_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "GCP Cloud Asset Inventory is services that provides a historical view of GCP resources and IAM policies through a time-series database. The information recorded includes metadata on Google Cloud resources, metadata on policies set on Google Cloud projects or resources, and runtime information gathered within a Google Cloud resource. Cloud Asset Inventory Service (CAIS) API enablement is not required for operation of the service, but rather enables the mechanism for searching/exporting CAIS asset data directly.", + "RationaleStatement": "The GCP resources and IAM policies captured by GCP Cloud Asset Inventory enables security analysis, resource change tracking, and compliance auditing. It is recommended GCP Cloud Asset Inventory be enabled for all GCP projects.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** Enable the Cloud Asset API: 1. Go to `API & Services/Library` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/apis/library](https://console.cloud.google.com/apis/library) 2. Search for `Cloud Asset API` and select the result for _Cloud Asset API_ 3. Click the `ENABLE` button. **From Google Cloud CLI** Enable the Cloud Asset API: 1. Enable the Cloud Asset API through the services interface: gcloud services enable cloudasset.googleapis.com ", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** Ensure that the Cloud Asset API is enabled: 1. Go to `API & Services/Library` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/apis/library](https://console.cloud.google.com/apis/library) 2. Search for `Cloud Asset API` and select the result for _Cloud Asset API_ 3. Ensure that `API Enabled` is displayed. **From Google Cloud CLI** Ensure that the Cloud Asset API is enabled: 1. Query enabled services: gcloud services list --enabled --filter=name:cloudasset.googleapis.com If the API is listed, then it is enabled. If the response is `Listed 0 items` the API is not enabled.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Additional info - Cloud Asset Inventory only keeps a five-week history of Google Cloud asset metadata. If a longer history is desired, automation to export the history to Cloud Storage or BigQuery should be evaluated. Users need not enable CAI API if they don't have any plans to export.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/asset-inventory/docs", + "DefaultValue": "The Cloud Asset Inventory API is disabled by default in each project.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.15", + "Description": "Ensure 'Access Transparency' is 'Enabled'", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "GCP Access Transparency provides audit logs for all actions that Google personnel take in your Google Cloud resources.", + "RationaleStatement": "Controlling access to your information is one of the foundations of information security. Given that Google Employees do have access to your organizations' projects for support reasons, you should have logging in place to view who, when, and why your information is being accessed.", + "ImpactStatement": "To use Access Transparency your organization will need to have at one of the following support level: Premium, Enterprise, Platinum, or Gold. There will be subscription costs associated with support, as well as increased storage costs for storing the logs. You will also not be able to turn Access Transparency off yourself, and you will need to submit a service request to Google Cloud Support.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** **Add privileges to enable Access Transparency** 1. From the Google Cloud Home, within the project you wish to check, click on the Navigation hamburger menu in the top left. Hover over the 'IAM and Admin'. Select `IAM` in the top of the column that opens. 2. Click the blue button the says `+add` at the top of the screen. 3. In the `principals` field, select a user or group by typing in their associated email address. 4. Click on the `role` field to expand it. In the filter field enter `Access Transparency Admin` and select it. 5. Click `save`. **Verify that the Google Cloud project is associated with a billing account** 1. From the Google Cloud Home, click on the Navigation hamburger menu in the top left. Select `Billing`. 2. If you see `This project is not associated with a billing account` you will need to enter billing information or switch to a project with a billing account. **Enable Access Transparency** 1. From the Google Cloud Home, click on the Navigation hamburger menu in the top left. Hover over the IAM & Admin Menu. Select `settings` in the middle of the column that opens. 2. Click the blue button labeled Enable `Access Transparency for Organization`", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** **Determine if Access Transparency is Enabled** 1. From the Google Cloud Home, click on the Navigation hamburger menu in the top left. Hover over the IAM & Admin Menu. Select `settings` in the middle of the column that opens. 2. The status will be under the heading `Access Transparency`. Status should be `Enabled`", + "AdditionalInformation": "To enable Access Transparency for your Google Cloud organization, your Google Cloud organization must have one of the following customer support levels: Premium, Enterprise, Platinum, or Gold.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/cloud-provider-access-management/access-transparency/docs/overview:https://cloud.google.com/cloud-provider-access-management/access-transparency/docs/enable:https://cloud.google.com/cloud-provider-access-management/access-transparency/docs/reading-logs:https://cloud.google.com/cloud-provider-access-management/access-transparency/docs/reading-logs#justification_reason_codes:https://cloud.google.com/cloud-provider-access-management/access-transparency/docs/supported-services", + "DefaultValue": "By default Access Transparency is not enabled.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.16", + "Description": "Ensure 'Access Approval' is 'Enabled'", + "Checks": [ + "iam_account_access_approval_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "GCP Access Approval enables you to require your organizations' explicit approval whenever Google support try to access your projects. You can then select users within your organization who can approve these requests through giving them a security role in IAM. All access requests display which Google Employee requested them in an email or Pub/Sub message that you can choose to Approve. This adds an additional control and logging of who in your organization approved/denied these requests.", + "RationaleStatement": "Controlling access to your information is one of the foundations of information security. Google Employees do have access to your organizations' projects for support reasons. With Access Approval, organizations can then be certain that their information is accessed by only approved Google Personnel.", + "ImpactStatement": "To use Access Approval your organization will need have enabled Access Transparency and have at one of the following support level: Enhanced or Premium. There will be subscription costs associated with these support levels, as well as increased storage costs for storing the logs. You will also not be able to turn the Access Transparency which Access Approval depends on, off yourself. To do so you will need to submit a service request to Google Cloud Support. There will also be additional overhead in managing user permissions. There may also be a potential delay in support times as Google Personnel will have to wait for their access to be approved.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. From the Google Cloud Home, within the project you wish to enable, click on the Navigation hamburger menu in the top left. Hover over the `Security` Menu. Select `Access Approval` in the middle of the column that opens. 2. The status will be displayed here. On this screen, there is an option to click `Enroll`. If it is greyed out and you see an error bar at the top of the screen that says `Access Transparency is not enabled` please view the corresponding reference within this section to enable it. 3. In the second screen click `Enroll`. **Grant an IAM Group or User the role with permissions to Add Users to be Access Approval message Recipients** 1. From the Google Cloud Home, within the project you wish to enable, click on the Navigation hamburger menu in the top left. Hover over the `IAM and Admin`. Select `IAM` in the middle of the column that opens. 2. Click the blue button the says `+ ADD` at the top of the screen. 3. In the `principals` field, select a user or group by typing in their associated email address. 4. Click on the role field to expand it. In the filter field enter `Access Approval Approver` and select it. 5. Click `save`. **Add a Group or User as an Approver for Access Approval Requests** 1. As a user with the `Access Approval Approver` permission, within the project where you wish to add an email address to which request will be sent, click on the Navigation hamburger menu in the top left. Hover over the `Security` Menu. Select `Access Approval` in the middle of the column that opens. 2. Click `Manage Settings` 3. Under `Set up approval notifications`, enter the email address associated with a Google Cloud User or Group you wish to send Access Approval requests to. All future access approvals will be sent as emails to this address. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. To update all services in an entire project, run the following command from an account that has permissions as an 'Approver for Access Approval Requests' gcloud access-approval settings update --project= --enrolled_services=all --notification_emails='@' ", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** **Determine if Access Transparency is Enabled as it is a Dependency** 1. From the Google Cloud Home inside the project you wish to audit, click on the Navigation hamburger menu in the top left. Hover over the `IAM & Admin` Menu. Select `settings` in the middle of the column that opens. 2. The status should be Enabled' under the heading `Access Transparency` **Determine if Access Approval is Enabled** 1. From the Google Cloud Home, within the project you wish to check, click on the Navigation hamburger menu in the top left. Hover over the `Security` Menu. Select `Access Approval` in the middle of the column that opens. 2. The status will be displayed here. If you see a screen saying you need to enroll in Access Approval, it is not enabled. **From Google Cloud CLI** **Determine if Access Approval is Enabled** 1. From within the project you wish to audit, run the following command. gcloud access-approval settings get 2. The status will be displayed in the output. IF Access Approval is not enabled you should get this output: API [accessapproval.googleapis.com] not enabled on project [-----]. Would you like to enable and retry (this will take a few minutes)? (y/N)? After entering `Y` if you get the following output, it means that `Access Transparency` is not enabled: ERROR: (gcloud.access-approval.settings.get) FAILED_PRECONDITION: Precondition check failed. ", + "AdditionalInformation": "The recipients of Access Requests will also need to be logged into a Google Cloud account associated with an email address in this list. To approve requests they can click approve within the email. Or they can view requests at the the Access Approval page within the Security submenu.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/cloud-provider-access-management/access-approval/docs:https://cloud.google.com/cloud-provider-access-management/access-approval/docs/overview:https://cloud.google.com/cloud-provider-access-management/access-approval/docs/quickstart-custom-key:https://cloud.google.com/cloud-provider-access-management/access-approval/docs/supported-services:https://cloud.google.com/cloud-provider-access-management/access-approval/docs/view-historical-requests", + "DefaultValue": "By default Access Approval and its dependency of Access Transparency are not enabled.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.17", + "Description": "Ensure Logging is enabled for HTTP(S) Load Balancer", + "Checks": [ + "compute_loadbalancer_logging_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Logging and Monitoring", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Logging enabled on a HTTPS Load Balancer will show all network traffic and its destination.", + "RationaleStatement": "Logging will allow you to view HTTPS network traffic to your web applications.", + "ImpactStatement": "On high use systems with a high percentage sample rate, the logging file may grow to high capacity in a short amount of time. Ensure that the sample rate is set appropriately so that storage costs are not exorbitant.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. From Google Cloud home open the Navigation Menu in the top left. 1. Under the `Networking` heading select `Network services`. 1. Select the HTTPS load-balancer you wish to audit. 1. Select `Edit` then `Backend Configuration`. 1. Select `Edit` on the corresponding backend service. 1. Click `Enable Logging`. 1. Set `Sample Rate` to a desired value. This is a percentage as a decimal point. 1.0 is 100%. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Run the following command gcloud compute backend-services update --region=REGION --enable-logging --logging-sample-rate= ", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. From Google Cloud home open the Navigation Menu in the top left. 1. Under the `Networking` heading select `Network services`. 1. Select the HTTPS load-balancer you wish to audit. 1. Select `Edit` then `Backend Configuration`. 1. Select `Edit` on the corresponding backend service. 1. Ensure that `Enable Logging` is selected. Also ensure that `Sample Rate` is set to an appropriate level for your needs. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Run the following command gcloud compute backend-services describe 1. Ensure that enable-logging is enabled and sample rate is set to your desired level.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/load-balancing/:https://cloud.google.com/load-balancing/docs/https/https-logging-monitoring#gcloud:-global-mode:https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/backend-services/", + "DefaultValue": "By default logging for https load balancing is disabled. When logging is enabled it sets the default sample rate as 1.0 or 100%. Ensure this value fits the need of your organization to avoid high storage costs.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.1", + "Description": "Ensure That the Default Network Does Not Exist in a Project", + "Checks": [ + "compute_network_default_in_use" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Networking", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "To prevent use of `default` network, a project should not have a `default` network.", + "RationaleStatement": "The `default` network has a preconfigured network configuration and automatically generates the following insecure firewall rules: - default-allow-internal: Allows ingress connections for all protocols and ports among instances in the network. - default-allow-ssh: Allows ingress connections on TCP port 22(SSH) from any source to any instance in the network. - default-allow-rdp: Allows ingress connections on TCP port 3389(RDP) from any source to any instance in the network. - default-allow-icmp: Allows ingress ICMP traffic from any source to any instance in the network. These automatically created firewall rules do not get audit logged by default. Furthermore, the default network is an auto mode network, which means that its subnets use the same predefined range of IP addresses, and as a result, it's not possible to use Cloud VPN or VPC Network Peering with the default network. Based on organization security and networking requirements, the organization should create a new network and delete the `default` network.", + "ImpactStatement": "When an organization deletes the default network, it will need to remove all asests from that network and migrate them to a new network.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the `VPC networks` page by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/networking/networks/list](https://console.cloud.google.com/networking/networks/list). 2. Click the network named `default`. 2. On the network detail page, click `EDIT`. 3. Click `DELETE VPC NETWORK`. 4. If needed, create a new network to replace the default network. **From Google Cloud CLI** For each Google Cloud Platform project, 1. Delete the default network: gcloud compute networks delete default 2. If needed, create a new network to replace it: gcloud compute networks create NETWORK_NAME **Prevention:** The user can prevent the default network and its insecure default firewall rules from being created by setting up an Organization Policy to `Skip default network creation` at [https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/orgpolicies/compute-skipDefaultNetworkCreation](https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/orgpolicies/compute-skipDefaultNetworkCreation).", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the `VPC networks` page by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/networking/networks/list](https://console.cloud.google.com/networking/networks/list). 2. Ensure that a network with the name `default` is not present. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Set the project name in the Google Cloud Shell: gcloud config set project PROJECT_ID 2. List the networks configured in that project: gcloud compute networks list It should not list `default` as one of the available networks in that project.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/networking#firewall_rules:https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/latest/networks/insert:https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/latest/networks/delete:https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/firewall-rules-logging:https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/vpc#default-network:https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/networks/delete", + "DefaultValue": "By default, for each project, a `default` network is created.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.2", + "Description": "Ensure Legacy Networks Do Not Exist for Older Projects", + "Checks": [ + "compute_network_not_legacy" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Networking", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "In order to prevent use of legacy networks, a project should not have a legacy network configured. As of now, Legacy Networks are gradually being phased out, and you can no longer create projects with them. This recommendation is to check older projects to ensure that they are not using Legacy Networks.", + "RationaleStatement": "Legacy networks have a single network IPv4 prefix range and a single gateway IP address for the whole network. The network is global in scope and spans all cloud regions. Subnetworks cannot be created in a legacy network and are unable to switch from legacy to auto or custom subnet networks. Legacy networks can have an impact for high network traffic projects and are subject to a single point of contention or failure.", + "ImpactStatement": "None.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud CLI** For each Google Cloud Platform project, 1. Follow the documentation and create a non-legacy network suitable for the organization's requirements. 2. Follow the documentation and delete the networks in the `legacy` mode.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud CLI** For each Google Cloud Platform project, 1. Set the project name in the Google Cloud Shell: gcloud config set project 2. List the networks configured in that project: gcloud compute networks list None of the listed networks should be in the `legacy` mode.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/using-legacy#creating_a_legacy_network:https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/using-legacy#deleting_a_legacy_network", + "DefaultValue": "By default, networks are not created in the `legacy` mode.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.3", + "Description": "Ensure That DNSSEC Is Enabled for Cloud DNS", + "Checks": [ + "dns_dnssec_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Networking", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Cloud Domain Name System (DNS) is a fast, reliable and cost-effective domain name system that powers millions of domains on the internet. Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) in Cloud DNS enables domain owners to take easy steps to protect their domains against DNS hijacking and man-in-the-middle and other attacks.", + "RationaleStatement": "Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) adds security to the DNS protocol by enabling DNS responses to be validated. Having a trustworthy DNS that translates a domain name like www.example.com into its associated IP address is an increasingly important building block of today’s web-based applications. Attackers can hijack this process of domain/IP lookup and redirect users to a malicious site through DNS hijacking and man-in-the-middle attacks. DNSSEC helps mitigate the risk of such attacks by cryptographically signing DNS records. As a result, it prevents attackers from issuing fake DNS responses that may misdirect browsers to nefarious websites.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `Cloud DNS` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/net-services/dns/zones](https://console.cloud.google.com/net-services/dns/zones). 2. For each zone of `Type` `Public`, set `DNSSEC` to `On`. **From Google Cloud CLI** Use the below command to enable `DNSSEC` for Cloud DNS Zone Name. gcloud dns managed-zones update ZONE_NAME --dnssec-state on ", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `Cloud DNS` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/net-services/dns/zones](https://console.cloud.google.com/net-services/dns/zones). 2. For each zone of `Type` `Public`, ensure that `DNSSEC` is set to `On`. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List all the Managed Zones in a project: gcloud dns managed-zones list 2. For each zone of `VISIBILITY` `public`, get its metadata: gcloud dns managed-zones describe ZONE_NAME 3. Ensure that `dnssecConfig.state` property is `on`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloudplatform.googleblog.com/2017/11/DNSSEC-now-available-in-Cloud-DNS.html:https://cloud.google.com/dns/dnssec-config#enabling:https://cloud.google.com/dns/dnssec", + "DefaultValue": "By default DNSSEC is not enabled.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.4", + "Description": "Ensure That RSASHA1 Is Not Used for the Key-Signing Key in Cloud DNS DNSSEC", + "Checks": [ + "dns_rsasha1_in_use_to_key_sign_in_dnssec" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Networking", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "NOTE: Currently, the SHA1 algorithm has been removed from general use by Google, and, if being used, needs to be whitelisted on a project basis by Google and will also, therefore, require a Google Cloud support contract. DNSSEC algorithm numbers in this registry may be used in CERT RRs. Zone signing (DNSSEC) and transaction security mechanisms (SIG(0) and TSIG) make use of particular subsets of these algorithms. The algorithm used for key signing should be a recommended one and it should be strong.", + "RationaleStatement": "Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) algorithm numbers in this registry may be used in CERT RRs. Zonesigning (DNSSEC) and transaction security mechanisms (SIG(0) and TSIG) make use of particular subsets of these algorithms. The algorithm used for key signing should be a recommended one and it should be strong. When enabling DNSSEC for a managed zone, or creating a managed zone with DNSSEC, the user can select the DNSSEC signing algorithms and the denial-of-existence type. Changing the DNSSEC settings is only effective for a managed zone if DNSSEC is not already enabled. If there is a need to change the settings for a managed zone where it has been enabled, turn DNSSEC off and then re-enable it with different settings.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud CLI** 1. If it is necessary to change the settings for a managed zone where it has been enabled, DNSSEC must be turned off and re-enabled with different settings. To turn off DNSSEC, run the following command: gcloud dns managed-zones update ZONE_NAME --dnssec-state off 2. To update key-signing for a reported managed DNS Zone, run the following command: gcloud dns managed-zones update ZONE_NAME --dnssec-state on --ksk-algorithm KSK_ALGORITHM --ksk-key-length KSK_KEY_LENGTH --zsk-algorithm ZSK_ALGORITHM --zsk-key-length ZSK_KEY_LENGTH --denial-of-existence DENIAL_OF_EXISTENCE Supported algorithm options and key lengths are as follows. Algorithm KSK Length ZSK Length --------- ---------- ---------- RSASHA1 1024,2048 1024,2048 RSASHA256 1024,2048 1024,2048 RSASHA512 1024,2048 1024,2048 ECDSAP256SHA256 256 256 ECDSAP384SHA384 384 384", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud CLI** Ensure the property algorithm for keyType keySigning is not using `RSASHA1`. gcloud dns managed-zones describe ZONENAME --format=json(dnsName,dnssecConfig.state,dnssecConfig.defaultKeySpecs)", + "AdditionalInformation": "1. RSASHA1 key-signing support may be required for compatibility reasons. 2. Remediation CLI works well with gcloud-cli version 221.0.0 and later.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/dns/dnssec-advanced#advanced_signing_options", + "DefaultValue": "", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.5", + "Description": "Ensure That RSASHA1 Is Not Used for the Zone-Signing Key in Cloud DNS DNSSEC", + "Checks": [ + "dns_rsasha1_in_use_to_zone_sign_in_dnssec" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Networking", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "NOTE: Currently, the SHA1 algorithm has been removed from general use by Google, and, if being used, needs to be whitelisted on a project basis by Google and will also, therefore, require a Google Cloud support contract. DNSSEC algorithm numbers in this registry may be used in CERT RRs. Zone signing (DNSSEC) and transaction security mechanisms (SIG(0) and TSIG) make use of particular subsets of these algorithms. The algorithm used for key signing should be a recommended one and it should be strong.", + "RationaleStatement": "DNSSEC algorithm numbers in this registry may be used in CERT RRs. Zone signing (DNSSEC) and transaction security mechanisms (SIG(0) and TSIG) make use of particular subsets of these algorithms. The algorithm used for key signing should be a recommended one and it should be strong. When enabling DNSSEC for a managed zone, or creating a managed zone with DNSSEC, the DNSSEC signing algorithms and the denial-of-existence type can be selected. Changing the DNSSEC settings is only effective for a managed zone if DNSSEC is not already enabled. If the need exists to change the settings for a managed zone where it has been enabled, turn DNSSEC off and then re-enable it with different settings.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud CLI** 1. If the need exists to change the settings for a managed zone where it has been enabled, DNSSEC must be turned off and then re-enabled with different settings. To turn off DNSSEC, run following command: gcloud dns managed-zones update ZONE_NAME --dnssec-state off 2. To update zone-signing for a reported managed DNS Zone, run the following command: gcloud dns managed-zones update ZONE_NAME --dnssec-state on --ksk-algorithm KSK_ALGORITHM --ksk-key-length KSK_KEY_LENGTH --zsk-algorithm ZSK_ALGORITHM --zsk-key-length ZSK_KEY_LENGTH --denial-of-existence DENIAL_OF_EXISTENCE Supported algorithm options and key lengths are as follows. Algorithm KSK Length ZSK Length --------- ---------- ---------- RSASHA1 1024,2048 1024,2048 RSASHA256 1024,2048 1024,2048 RSASHA512 1024,2048 1024,2048 ECDSAP256SHA256 256 384 ECDSAP384SHA384 384 384", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud CLI** Ensure the property algorithm for keyType zone signing is not using RSASHA1. gcloud dns managed-zones describe --format=json(dnsName,dnssecConfig.state,dnssecConfig.defaultKeySpecs) ", + "AdditionalInformation": "1. RSASHA1 zone-signing support may be required for compatibility reasons. 2. The remediation CLI works well with gcloud-cli version 221.0.0 and later.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/dns/dnssec-advanced#advanced_signing_options", + "DefaultValue": "", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.6", + "Description": "Ensure That SSH Access Is Restricted From the Internet", + "Checks": [ + "compute_firewall_ssh_access_from_the_internet_allowed" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Networking", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "GCP `Firewall Rules` are specific to a `VPC Network`. Each rule either `allows` or `denies` traffic when its conditions are met. Its conditions allow the user to specify the type of traffic, such as ports and protocols, and the source or destination of the traffic, including IP addresses, subnets, and instances. Firewall rules are defined at the VPC network level and are specific to the network in which they are defined. The rules themselves cannot be shared among networks. Firewall rules only support IPv4 traffic. When specifying a source for an ingress rule or a destination for an egress rule by address, only an `IPv4` address or `IPv4 block in CIDR` notation can be used. Generic `(0.0.0.0/0)` incoming traffic from the internet to VPC or VM instance using `SSH` on `Port 22` can be avoided.", + "RationaleStatement": "GCP `Firewall Rules` within a `VPC Network` apply to outgoing (egress) traffic from instances and incoming (ingress) traffic to instances in the network. Egress and ingress traffic flows are controlled even if the traffic stays within the network (for example, instance-to-instance communication). For an instance to have outgoing Internet access, the network must have a valid Internet gateway route or custom route whose destination IP is specified. This route simply defines the path to the Internet, to avoid the most general `(0.0.0.0/0)` destination `IP Range` specified from the Internet through `SSH` with the default `Port 22`. Generic access from the Internet to a specific IP Range needs to be restricted.", + "ImpactStatement": "All Secure Shell (SSH) connections from outside of the network to the concerned VPC(s) will be blocked. There could be a business need where SSH access is required from outside of the network to access resources associated with the VPC. In that case, specific source IP(s) should be mentioned in firewall rules to white-list access to SSH port for the concerned VPC(s).", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `VPC Network`. 2. Go to the `Firewall Rules`. 3. Click the `Firewall Rule` you want to modify. 4. Click `Edit`. 5. Modify `Source IP ranges` to specific `IP`. 6. Click `Save`. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1.Update the Firewall rule with the new `SOURCE_RANGE` from the below command: gcloud compute firewall-rules update FirewallName --allow=[PROTOCOL[:PORT[-PORT]],...] --source-ranges=[CIDR_RANGE,...]", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `VPC network`. 2. Go to the `Firewall Rules`. 3. Ensure that `Port` is not equal to `22` and `Action` is not set to `Allow`. 4. Ensure `IP Ranges` is not equal to `0.0.0.0/0` under `Source filters`. **From Google Cloud CLI** gcloud compute firewall-rules list --format=table'(name,direction,sourceRanges,allowed)' Ensure that there is no rule matching the below criteria: - `SOURCE_RANGES` is `0.0.0.0/0` - AND `DIRECTION` is `INGRESS` - AND IPProtocol is `tcp` or `ALL` - AND `PORTS` is set to `22` or `range containing 22` or `Null (not set)` Note: - When ALL TCP ports are allowed in a rule, PORT does not have any value set (`NULL`) - When ALL Protocols are allowed in a rule, PORT does not have any value set (`NULL`)", + "AdditionalInformation": "Currently, GCP VPC only supports IPV4; however, Google is already working on adding IPV6 support for VPC. In that case along with source IP range `0.0.0.0`, the rule should be checked for IPv6 equivalent `::/0` as well.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/firewalls#blockedtraffic:https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/cloud-iap-enables-context-aware-access-to-vms-via-ssh-and-rdp-without-bastion-hosts", + "DefaultValue": "", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.7", + "Description": "Ensure That RDP Access Is Restricted From the Internet", + "Checks": [ + "compute_firewall_rdp_access_from_the_internet_allowed" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Networking", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "GCP `Firewall Rules` are specific to a `VPC Network`. Each rule either `allows` or `denies` traffic when its conditions are met. Its conditions allow users to specify the type of traffic, such as ports and protocols, and the source or destination of the traffic, including IP addresses, subnets, and instances. Firewall rules are defined at the VPC network level and are specific to the network in which they are defined. The rules themselves cannot be shared among networks. Firewall rules only support IPv4 traffic. When specifying a source for an ingress rule or a destination for an egress rule by address, an `IPv4` address or `IPv4 block in CIDR` notation can be used. Generic `(0.0.0.0/0)` incoming traffic from the Internet to a VPC or VM instance using `RDP` on `Port 3389` can be avoided.", + "RationaleStatement": "GCP `Firewall Rules` within a `VPC Network`. These rules apply to outgoing (egress) traffic from instances and incoming (ingress) traffic to instances in the network. Egress and ingress traffic flows are controlled even if the traffic stays within the network (for example, instance-to-instance communication). For an instance to have outgoing Internet access, the network must have a valid Internet gateway route or custom route whose destination IP is specified. This route simply defines the path to the Internet, to avoid the most general `(0.0.0.0/0)` destination `IP Range` specified from the Internet through `RDP` with the default `Port 3389`. Generic access from the Internet to a specific IP Range should be restricted.", + "ImpactStatement": "All Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections from outside of the network to the concerned VPC(s) will be blocked. There could be a business need where secure shell access is required from outside of the network to access resources associated with the VPC. In that case, specific source IP(s) should be mentioned in firewall rules to white-list access to RDP port for the concerned VPC(s).", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `VPC Network`. 2. Go to the `Firewall Rules`. 3. Click the `Firewall Rule` to be modified. 4. Click `Edit`. 5. Modify `Source IP ranges` to specific `IP`. 6. Click `Save`. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1.Update RDP Firewall rule with new `SOURCE_RANGE` from the below command: gcloud compute firewall-rules update FirewallName --allow=[PROTOCOL[:PORT[-PORT]],...] --source-ranges=[CIDR_RANGE,...]", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `VPC network`. 2. Go to the `Firewall Rules`. 3. Ensure `Port` is not equal to `3389` and `Action` is not `Allow`. 4. Ensure `IP Ranges` is not equal to `0.0.0.0/0` under `Source filters`. **From Google Cloud CLI** gcloud compute firewall-rules list --format=table'(name,direction,sourceRanges,allowed)' Ensure that there is no rule matching the below criteria: - `SOURCE_RANGES` is `0.0.0.0/0` - AND `DIRECTION` is `INGRESS` - AND IPProtocol is `TCP` or `ALL` - AND `PORTS` is set to `3389` or `range containing 3389` or `Null (not set)` Note: - When ALL TCP ports are allowed in a rule, PORT does not have any value set (`NULL`) - When ALL Protocols are allowed in a rule, PORT does not have any value set (`NULL`)", + "AdditionalInformation": "Currently, GCP VPC only supports IPV4; however, Google is already working on adding IPV6 support for VPC. In that case along with source IP range `0.0.0.0`, the rule should be checked for IPv6 equivalent `::/0` as well.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/firewalls#blockedtraffic:https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/cloud-iap-enables-context-aware-access-to-vms-via-ssh-and-rdp-without-bastion-hosts", + "DefaultValue": "", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.8", + "Description": "Ensure VPC Service Controls Is Enabled for Supported Google Cloud Services", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Networking", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that VPC Service Controls are configured to create security perimeters around sensitive Google Cloud resources, preventing unauthorized data exfiltration and limiting access to resources from approved networks and identities. VPC Service Controls provide an additional layer of defense-in-depth by allowing organizations to define trust boundaries around GCP services and control data movement across those boundaries.", + "RationaleStatement": "VPC Service Controls provide critical protection against data exfiltration attacks by creating security perimeters that restrict data access based on client identity, device state, and network origin. Without VPC Service Controls, an attacker who compromises credentials or exploits misconfigurations can freely move data between projects, organizations, or external systems. VPC Service Controls enforce defense-in-depth by adding network-level access controls that complement IAM policies. This control is essential for organizations handling regulated data or implementing zero-trust security architectures, and it also protects against supply chain attacks by restricting which services and APIs can interact with protected resources.", + "ImpactStatement": "Implementing VPC Service Controls requires careful planning as it restricts network access to protected resources. Services outside the perimeter will be denied access to resources inside the perimeter by default, which may impact application connectivity, cross-project data pipelines, third-party integrations, and administrative access from non-corporate networks. Organizations should use VPC Service Controls dry-run mode to test policies before enforcement. There is no direct performance impact on services within the perimeter.", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: The following audit instructions use Cloud Storage (GCS) as an example. Similar steps should be followed for other supported services (BigQuery, Cloud SQL, Bigtable, etc.).\n\n**From Google Cloud CLI**\n\n1. Check if the Access Context Manager API is enabled:\n`gcloud services list --enabled --filter=\"name:accesscontextmanager.googleapis.com\" --format=\"value(name)\"`\n2. List Access Context Manager policies and perimeters in the organization:\n`gcloud access-context-manager policies list --organization=`\n`gcloud access-context-manager perimeters list --policy=`\n3. Check if a project's resources are protected by a perimeter and verify perimeter configuration with `gcloud access-context-manager perimeters describe --policy=`.\n4. Check whether perimeters have access levels configured for conditional access.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Note: The following remediation instructions use Cloud Storage (GCS) as an example. Similar steps should be followed for other supported services.\n\n**From Google Cloud CLI**\n\n1. Create an Access Context Manager policy if none exists: `gcloud access-context-manager policies create --organization= --title=\"VPC Service Controls Policy\"`.\n2. Create a service perimeter to protect resources: `gcloud access-context-manager perimeters create --resources=projects/ --restricted-services=storage.googleapis.com --policy= --perimeter-type=regular`.\n3. Add additional projects and restricted services to the perimeter as needed.\n4. Test with dry-run mode before enforcement and monitor dry-run logs for blocked requests, then enforce the perimeter with `gcloud access-context-manager perimeters dry-run enforce`.\n5. Optionally create access levels for conditional access and add them to the perimeter.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "By default, VPC Service Controls are not configured and no service perimeters protect Google Cloud resources." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.9", + "Description": "Ensure Private Service Connect is Used for Access to Google APIs", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Networking", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that VPCs use Private Service Connect endpoints for access to Google APIs such as Cloud Storage, BigQuery, Pub/Sub, Artifact Registry, and other googleapis.com services, so that traffic from workloads to these APIs stays on the Google private network instead of traversing the public internet. Private Service Connect for Google APIs creates a dedicated endpoint in your VPC with firewall rule enforcement, providing more granular control than Private Google Access.", + "RationaleStatement": "Accessing Google APIs over the public internet exposes traffic to network-level threats, requires managing NAT gateways or external IPs, and makes it harder to enforce egress controls. Private Service Connect for Google APIs allows workloads to reach googleapis.com services over Google's private network using a dedicated endpoint in your VPC. Combined with VPC firewall rules, PSC ensures only authorized workloads can access Google APIs, preventing unauthorized API usage and enforcing least-privilege network access. This control eliminates reliance on internet connectivity for API access, enables granular network segmentation per API consumer, supports VPC Service Controls integration, and is essential for zero-trust architectures.", + "ImpactStatement": "Implementing Private Service Connect for Google APIs requires creating PSC endpoints in each VPC and configuring DNS to resolve googleapis.com domains to the private endpoint IP addresses. This introduces per-endpoint charges and operational overhead for DNS management. Migrating from public API access requires updating DNS configurations and may require changes to firewall rules. Workloads without proper firewall rules or DNS configuration will be unable to reach Google APIs after migration.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud CLI**\n\n1. Identify in-scope VPCs that host production or sensitive workloads accessing Google APIs: `gcloud compute networks list --format=\"table(name)\"`.\n2. For each in-scope VPC, check for a Private Service Connect endpoint for Google APIs: `gcloud compute addresses list --filter=\"purpose=PRIVATE_SERVICE_CONNECT\"`. At least one PSC endpoint should exist per VPC that needs Google API access.\n3. Verify the PSC endpoint targets Google's service attachment by listing global forwarding rules and looking for targets containing `all-apis` or `vpc-sc`.\n4. Check Cloud DNS for a private zone for googleapis.com with a wildcard A record pointing to the PSC endpoint IP.\n5. Verify firewall rules restrict access to the PSC endpoint using specific sourceRanges/sourceTags and do not allow 0.0.0.0/0.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud CLI**\n\n1. Reserve an internal IP for the PSC endpoint: `gcloud compute addresses create psc-apis-endpoint --global --purpose=PRIVATE_SERVICE_CONNECT --addresses= --network=projects//global/networks/`.\n2. Create the PSC endpoint forwarding rule targeting Google's all-apis bundle: `gcloud compute forwarding-rules create pscapis --global --network= --address=psc-apis-endpoint --target-google-apis-bundle=all-apis`.\n3. Configure DNS by creating a private zone for googleapis.com and a wildcard A record pointing to the PSC endpoint IP.\n4. Configure VPC firewall rules to restrict PSC endpoint access to specific subnets only.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "By default, workloads access Google APIs over public Google API endpoints rather than through Private Service Connect endpoints." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.10", + "Description": "Ensure that VPC Flow Logs is Enabled for Every Subnet in a VPC Network", + "Checks": [ + "compute_subnet_flow_logs_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Networking", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Flow Logs is a feature that enables users to capture information about the IP traffic going to and from network interfaces in the organization's VPC Subnets. Once a flow log is created, the user can view and retrieve its data in Stackdriver Logging. It is recommended that Flow Logs be enabled for every business-critical VPC subnet.", + "RationaleStatement": "VPC networks and subnetworks not reserved for internal HTTP(S) load balancing provide logically isolated and secure network partitions where GCP resources can be launched. When Flow Logs are enabled for a subnet, VMs within that subnet start reporting on all Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) flows. Each VM samples the TCP and UDP flows it sees, inbound and outbound, whether the flow is to or from another VM, a host in the on-premises datacenter, a Google service, or a host on the Internet. If two GCP VMs are communicating, and both are in subnets that have VPC Flow Logs enabled, both VMs report the flows. Flow Logs supports the following use cases: - Network monitoring - Understanding network usage and optimizing network traffic expenses - Network forensics - Real-time security analysis Flow Logs provide visibility into network traffic for each VM inside the subnet and can be used to detect anomalous traffic or provide insight during security workflows. The Flow Logs must be configured such that all network traffic is logged, the interval of logging is granular to provide detailed information on the connections, no logs are filtered, and metadata to facilitate investigations are included. **Note**: Subnets reserved for use by internal HTTP(S) load balancers do not support VPC flow logs.", + "ImpactStatement": "Standard pricing for Stackdriver Logging, BigQuery, or Cloud Pub/Sub applies. VPC Flow Logs generation will be charged starting in GA as described in reference: https://cloud.google.com/vpc/", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the VPC network GCP Console visiting `https://console.cloud.google.com/networking/networks/list` 2. Click the name of a subnet, The `Subnet details` page displays. 3. Click the `EDIT` button. 4. Set `Flow Logs` to `On`. 5. Expand the `Configure Logs` section. 6. Set `Aggregation Interval` to `5 SEC`. 7. Check the box beside `Include metadata`. 8. Set `Sample rate` to `100`. 9. Click Save. **Note**: It is not possible to configure a Log filter from the console. **From Google Cloud CLI** To enable VPC Flow Logs for a network subnet, run the following command: gcloud compute networks subnets update [SUBNET_NAME] --region [REGION] --enable-flow-logs --logging-aggregation-interval=interval-5-sec --logging-flow-sampling=1 --logging-metadata=include-all ", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the VPC network GCP Console visiting `https://console.cloud.google.com/networking/networks/list` 2. From the list of network subnets, make sure for each subnet: - `Flow Logs` is set to `On` - `Aggregation Interval` is set to `5 sec` - `Include metadata` checkbox is checked - `Sample rate` is set to `100%` **Note**: It is not possible to determine if a Log filter has been defined from the console. **From Google Cloud CLI** gcloud compute networks subnets list --format json | jq -r '([Subnet,Purpose,Flow_Logs,Aggregation_Interval,Flow_Sampling,Metadata,Logs_Filtered] | (., map(length*-))), (.[] | [ .name, .purpose, (if has(enableFlowLogs) and .enableFlowLogs == true then Enabled else Disabled end), (if has(logConfig) then .logConfig.aggregationInterval else N/A end), (if has(logConfig) then .logConfig.flowSampling else N/A end), (if has(logConfig) then .logConfig.metadata else N/A end), (if has(logConfig) then (.logConfig | has(filterExpr)) else N/A end) ] ) | @tsv' | column -t The output of the above command will list: - each subnet - the subnet's purpose - a `Enabled` or `Disabled` value if `Flow Logs` are enabled - the value for `Aggregation Interval` or `N/A` if disabled, the value for `Flow Sampling` or `N/A` if disabled - the value for `Metadata` or `N/A` if disabled - 'true' or 'false' if a Logging Filter is configured or 'N/A' if disabled. If the subnet's purpose is `PRIVATE` then `Flow Logs` should be `Enabled`. If `Flow Logs` is enabled then: - `Aggregation_Interval` should be `INTERVAL_5_SEC` - `Flow_Sampling` should be 1 - `Metadata` should be `INCLUDE_ALL_METADATA` - `Logs_Filtered` should be `false`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/using-flow-logs#enabling_vpc_flow_logging:https://cloud.google.com/vpc/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Flow Logs is set to Off when a new VPC network subnet is created.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.11", + "Description": "Ensure No HTTPS or SSL Proxy Load Balancers Permit SSL Policies With Weak Cipher Suites", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Networking", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) policies determine what port Transport Layer Security (TLS) features clients are permitted to use when connecting to load balancers. To prevent usage of insecure features, SSL policies should use (a) at least TLS 1.2 with the MODERN profile; or (b) the RESTRICTED profile, because it effectively requires clients to use TLS 1.2 regardless of the chosen minimum TLS version; or (3) a CUSTOM profile that does not support any of the following features: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ", + "RationaleStatement": "Load balancers are used to efficiently distribute traffic across multiple servers. Both SSL proxy and HTTPS load balancers are external load balancers, meaning they distribute traffic from the Internet to a GCP network. GCP customers can configure load balancer SSL policies with a minimum TLS version (1.0, 1.1, or 1.2) that clients can use to establish a connection, along with a profile (Compatible, Modern, Restricted, or Custom) that specifies permissible cipher suites. To comply with users using outdated protocols, GCP load balancers can be configured to permit insecure cipher suites. In fact, the GCP default SSL policy uses a minimum TLS version of 1.0 and a Compatible profile, which allows the widest range of insecure cipher suites. As a result, it is easy for customers to configure a load balancer without even knowing that they are permitting outdated cipher suites.", + "ImpactStatement": "Creating more secure SSL policies can prevent clients using older TLS versions from establishing a connection.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** If the TargetSSLProxy or TargetHttpsProxy does not have an SSL policy configured, create a new SSL policy. Otherwise, modify the existing insecure policy. 1. Navigate to the `SSL Policies` page by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/net-security/sslpolicies](https://console.cloud.google.com/net-security/sslpolicies) 2. Click on the name of the insecure policy to go to its `SSL policy details` page. 3. Click `EDIT`. 4. Set `Minimum TLS version` to `TLS 1.2`. 5. Set `Profile` to `Modern` or `Restricted`. 6. Alternatively, if teh user selects the profile `Custom`, make sure that the following features are disabled: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. For each insecure SSL policy, update it to use secure cyphers: gcloud compute ssl-policies update NAME [--profile COMPATIBLE|MODERN|RESTRICTED|CUSTOM] --min-tls-version 1.2 [--custom-features FEATURES] 2. If the target proxy has a GCP default SSL policy, use the following command corresponding to the proxy type to update it. gcloud compute target-ssl-proxies update TARGET_SSL_PROXY_NAME --ssl-policy SSL_POLICY_NAME gcloud compute target-https-proxies update TARGET_HTTPS_POLICY_NAME --ssl-policy SSL_POLICY_NAME ", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. See all load balancers by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/net-services/loadbalancing/loadBalancers/list](https://console.cloud.google.com/net-services/loadbalancing/loadBalancers/list). 2. For each load balancer for `SSL (Proxy)` or `HTTPS`, click on its name to go the `Load balancer details` page. 3. Ensure that each target proxy entry in the `Frontend` table has an `SSL Policy` configured. 4. Click on each SSL policy to go to its `SSL policy details` page. 5. Ensure that the SSL policy satisfies one of the following conditions: - has a `Min TLS` set to `TLS 1.2` and `Profile` set to `Modern` profile, or - has `Profile` set to `Restricted`. Note that a Restricted profile effectively requires clients to use TLS 1.2 regardless of the chosen minimum TLS version, or - has `Profile` set to `Custom` and the following features are all disabled: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List all TargetHttpsProxies and TargetSslProxies. gcloud compute target-https-proxies list gcloud compute target-ssl-proxies list 2. For each target proxy, list its properties: gcloud compute target-https-proxies describe TARGET_HTTPS_PROXY_NAME gcloud compute target-ssl-proxies describe TARGET_SSL_PROXY_NAME 3. Ensure that the `sslPolicy` field is present and identifies the name of the SSL policy: sslPolicy: https://www.googleapis.com/compute/v1/projects/PROJECT_ID/global/sslPolicies/SSL_POLICY_NAME If the `sslPolicy` field is missing from the configuration, it means that the GCP default policy is used, which is insecure. 4. Describe the SSL policy: gcloud compute ssl-policies describe SSL_POLICY_NAME 5. Ensure that the policy satisfies one of the following conditions: - has `Profile` set to `Modern` and `minTlsVersion` set to `TLS_1_2`, or - has `Profile` set to `Restricted`, or - has `Profile` set to `Custom` and `enabledFeatures` does not contain any of the following values: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/load-balancing/docs/use-ssl-policies:https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-52r2.pdf", + "DefaultValue": "The GCP default SSL policy is the least secure setting: Min TLS 1.0 and Compatible profile", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.12", + "Description": "Use Identity Aware Proxy (IAP) to Ensure Only Traffic From Google IP Addresses are 'Allowed'", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Networking", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "IAP authenticates the user requests to your apps via a Google single sign in. You can then manage these users with permissions to control access. It is recommended to use both IAP permissions and firewalls to restrict this access to your apps with sensitive information.", + "RationaleStatement": "IAP ensure that access to VMs is controlled by authenticating incoming requests. Access to your apps and the VMs should be restricted by firewall rules that allow only the proxy IAP IP addresses contained in the 35.235.240.0/20 subnet. Otherwise, unauthenticated requests can be made to your apps. To ensure that load balancing works correctly health checks should also be allowed.", + "ImpactStatement": "If firewall rules are not configured correctly, legitimate business services could be negatively impacted. It is recommended to make these changes during a time of low usage.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud Console [VPC network > Firewall rules](https://console.cloud.google.com/networking/firewalls/list?_ga=2.72166934.480049361.1580860862-1336643914.1580248695). 2. Select the checkbox next to the following rules: - default-allow-http - default-allow-https - default-allow-internal 3. Click `Delete`. 4. Click `Create firewall rule` and set the following values: - Name: allow-iap-traffic - Targets: All instances in the network - Source IP ranges (press Enter after you paste each value in the box, copy each full CIDR IP address): - IAP Proxy Addresses `35.235.240.0/20` - Google Health Check `130.211.0.0/22` - Google Health Check `35.191.0.0/16` - Protocols and ports: - Specified protocols and ports required for access and management of your app. For example most health check connection protocols would be covered by; - tcp:80 (Default HTTP Health Check port) - tcp:443 (Default HTTPS Health Check port) **Note: if you have custom ports used by your load balancers, you will need to list them here** 5. When you're finished updating values, click `Create`.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. For each of your apps that have IAP enabled go to the Cloud Console VPC network > Firewall rules. 2. Verify that the only rules correspond to the following values: - Targets: All instances in the network - Source IP ranges: - IAP Proxy Addresses `35.235.240.0/20` - Google Health Check `130.211.0.0/22` - Google Health Check `35.191.0.0/16` - Protocols and ports: - Specified protocols and ports required for access and management of your app. For example most health check connection protocols would be covered by; - tcp:80 (Default HTTP Health Check port) - tcp:443 (Default HTTPS Health Check port) **Note: if you have custom ports used by your load balancers, you will need to list them here**", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/iap/docs/concepts-overview:https://cloud.google.com/iap/docs/load-balancer-howto:https://cloud.google.com/load-balancing/docs/health-checks:https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/cloud-iap-enables-context-aware-access-to-vms-via-ssh-and-rdp-without-bastion-hosts", + "DefaultValue": "By default all traffic is allowed.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.1", + "Description": "Ensure That Instances Are Not Configured To Use the Default Service Account", + "Checks": [ + "compute_instance_default_service_account_in_use" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Virtual Machines", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended to configure your instance to not use the default Compute Engine service account because it has the Editor role on the project.", + "RationaleStatement": "When a default Compute Engine service account is created, it is automatically granted the Editor role (roles/editor) on your project which allows read and write access to most Google Cloud Services. This role includes a very large number of permissions. To defend against privilege escalations if your VM is compromised and prevent an attacker from gaining access to all of your project, you should either revoke the Editor role from the default Compute Engine service account or create a new service account and assign only the permissions needed by your instance. To mitigate this at scale, we strongly recommend that you disable the automatic role grant by adding a constraint to your organization policy. The default Compute Engine service account is named `[PROJECT_NUMBER]-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com`.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the `VM instances` page by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances). 2. Click on the instance name to go to its `VM instance details` page. 3. Click `STOP` and then click `EDIT`. 4. Under the section `API and identity management`, select a service account other than the default Compute Engine service account. You may first need to create a new service account. 5. Click `Save` and then click `START`. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Stop the instance: gcloud compute instances stop 2. Update the instance: gcloud compute instances set-service-account --service-account= 3. Restart the instance: gcloud compute instances start ", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the `VM instances` page by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances). 2. Click on each instance name to go to its `VM instance details` page. 3. Under the section `API and identity management`, ensure that the default Compute Engine service account is not used. This account is named `[PROJECT_NUMBER]-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com`. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List the instances in your project and get details on each instance: gcloud compute instances list --format=json | jq -r '. | SA: (.[].serviceAccounts[].email) Name: (.[].name)' 2. Ensure that the service account section has an email that does not match the pattern `[PROJECT_NUMBER]-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com`. **Exception:** VMs created by GKE should be excluded. These VMs have names that start with `gke-` and are labeled `goog-gke-node`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/access/service-accounts:https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/access/create-enable-service-accounts-for-instances:https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/set-service-account", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Compute instances are configured to use the default Compute Engine service account.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.2", + "Description": "Ensure That Instances Are Not Configured To Use the Default Service Account With Full Access to All Cloud APIs", + "Checks": [ + "compute_instance_default_service_account_in_use_with_full_api_access" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Virtual Machines", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "To support principle of least privileges and prevent potential privilege escalation it is recommended that instances are not assigned to default service account `Compute Engine default service account` with Scope `Allow full access to all Cloud APIs`.", + "RationaleStatement": "Along with ability to optionally create, manage and use user managed custom service accounts, Google Compute Engine provides default service account `Compute Engine default service account` for an instances to access necessary cloud services. `Project Editor` role is assigned to `Compute Engine default service account` hence, This service account has almost all capabilities over all cloud services except billing. However, when `Compute Engine default service account` assigned to an instance it can operate in 3 scopes. 1. Allow default access: Allows only minimum access required to run an Instance (Least Privileges) 2. Allow full access to all Cloud APIs: Allow full access to all the cloud APIs/Services (Too much access) 3. Set access for each API: Allows Instance administrator to choose only those APIs that are needed to perform specific business functionality expected by instance When an instance is configured with `Compute Engine default service account` with Scope `Allow full access to all Cloud APIs`, based on IAM roles assigned to the user(s) accessing Instance, it may allow user to perform cloud operations/API calls that user is not supposed to perform leading to successful privilege escalation.", + "ImpactStatement": "In order to change service account or scope for an instance, it needs to be stopped.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the `VM instances` page by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances). 2. Click on the impacted VM instance. 3. If the instance is not stopped, click the `Stop` button. Wait for the instance to be stopped. 4. Next, click the `Edit` button. 5. Scroll down to the `Service Account` section. 6. Select a different service account or ensure that `Allow full access to all Cloud APIs` is not selected. 7. Click the `Save` button to save your changes and then click `START`. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Stop the instance: gcloud compute instances stop 2. Update the instance: gcloud compute instances set-service-account --service-account= --scopes [SCOPE1, SCOPE2...] 3. Restart the instance: gcloud compute instances start ", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the `VM instances` page by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances). 2. Click on each instance name to go to its `VM instance details` page. 3. Under the `API and identity management`, ensure that `Cloud API access scopes` is not set to `Allow full access to all Cloud APIs`. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List the instances in your project and get details on each instance: gcloud compute instances list --format=json | jq -r '. | SA Scopes: (.[].serviceAccounts[].scopes) Name: (.[].name) Email: (.[].serviceAccounts[].email)' 2. Ensure that the service account section has an email that does not match the pattern `[PROJECT_NUMBER]-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com`. **Exception:** VMs created by GKE should be excluded. These VMs have names that start with `gke-` and are labeled `goog-gke-node", + "AdditionalInformation": "- User IAM roles will override service account scope but configuring minimal scope ensures defense in depth - Non-default service accounts do not offer selection of access scopes like default service account. IAM roles with non-default service accounts should be used to control VM access.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/access/create-enable-service-accounts-for-instances:https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/access/service-accounts", + "DefaultValue": "While creating an VM instance, default service account is used with scope `Allow default access`.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.3", + "Description": "Ensure “Block Project-Wide SSH Keys” Is Enabled for VM Instances", + "Checks": [ + "compute_instance_block_project_wide_ssh_keys_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Virtual Machines", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended to use Instance specific SSH key(s) instead of using common/shared project-wide SSH key(s) to access Instances.", + "RationaleStatement": "Project-wide SSH keys are stored in Compute/Project-meta-data. Project wide SSH keys can be used to login into all the instances within project. Using project-wide SSH keys eases the SSH key management but if compromised, poses the security risk which can impact all the instances within project. It is recommended to use Instance specific SSH keys which can limit the attack surface if the SSH keys are compromised.", + "ImpactStatement": "Users already having Project-wide ssh key pairs and using third party SSH clients will lose access to the impacted Instances. For Project users using gcloud or GCP Console based SSH option, no manual key creation and distribution is required and will be handled by GCE (Google Compute Engine) itself. To access Instance using third party SSH clients Instance specific SSH key pairs need to be created and distributed to the required users.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the `VM instances` page by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances). It will list all the instances in your project. 2. Click on the name of the Impacted instance 3. Click `Edit` in the toolbar 4. Under SSH Keys, go to the `Block project-wide SSH keys` checkbox 5. To block users with project-wide SSH keys from connecting to this instance, select `Block project-wide SSH keys` 6. Click `Save` at the bottom of the page 7. Repeat steps for every impacted Instance **From Google Cloud CLI** To block project-wide public SSH keys, set the metadata value to `TRUE`: gcloud compute instances add-metadata --metadata block-project-ssh-keys=TRUE ", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the `VM instances` page by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances). It will list all the instances in your project. 2. For every instance, click on the name of the instance. 3. Under `SSH Keys`, ensure `Block project-wide SSH keys` is selected. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List the instances in your project and get details on each instance: gcloud compute instances list --format=json 2. Ensure `key: block-project-ssh-keys` is set to `value: 'true'`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "If OS Login is enabled, SSH keys in instance metadata are ignored, and therefore blocking project-wide SSH keys is not necessary.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/adding-removing-ssh-keys:https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/topic/formats", + "DefaultValue": "By Default `Block Project-wide SSH keys` is not enabled.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.4", + "Description": "Ensure Oslogin Is Enabled for a Project", + "Checks": [ + "compute_project_os_login_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Virtual Machines", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Enabling OS login binds SSH certificates to IAM users and facilitates effective SSH certificate management.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling osLogin ensures that SSH keys used to connect to instances are mapped with IAM users. Revoking access to IAM user will revoke all the SSH keys associated with that particular user. It facilitates centralized and automated SSH key pair management which is useful in handling cases like response to compromised SSH key pairs and/or revocation of external/third-party/Vendor users.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling OS Login on project disables metadata-based SSH key configurations on all instances from a project. Disabling OS Login restores SSH keys that you have configured in project or instance meta-data.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the VM compute metadata page by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/metadata](https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/metadata). 2. Click `Edit`. 3. Add a metadata entry where the key is `enable-oslogin` and the value is `TRUE`. 4. Click `Save` to apply the changes. 5. For every instance that overrides the project setting, go to the `VM Instances` page at [https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances). 6. Click the name of the instance on which you want to remove the metadata value. 7. At the top of the instance details page, click `Edit` to edit the instance settings. 8. Under `Custom metadata`, remove any entry with key `enable-oslogin` and the value is `FALSE` 9. At the bottom of the instance details page, click `Save` to apply your changes to the instance. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Configure oslogin on the project: gcloud compute project-info add-metadata --metadata enable-oslogin=TRUE 2. Remove instance metadata that overrides the project setting. gcloud compute instances remove-metadata --keys=enable-oslogin Optionally, you can enable two factor authentication for OS login. For more information, see: [https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/oslogin/setup-two-factor-authentication](https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/oslogin/setup-two-factor-authentication).", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the VM compute metadata page by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/metadata](https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/metadata). 2. Ensure that key `enable-oslogin` is present with value set to `TRUE`. 3. Because instances can override project settings, ensure that no instance has custom metadata with key `enable-oslogin` and value `FALSE`. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List the instances in your project and get details on each instance: gcloud compute instances list --format=json 2. Verify that the section `commonInstanceMetadata` has a key `enable-oslogin` set to value `TRUE`. **Exception:** VMs created by GKE should be excluded. These VMs have names that start with `gke-` and are labeled `goog-gke-node`", + "AdditionalInformation": "1. In order to use osLogin, instance using Custom Images must have the latest version of the Linux Guest Environment installed. The following image families do not yet support OS Login: Project cos-cloud (Container-Optimized OS) image family cos-stable. All project coreos-cloud (CoreOS) image families Project suse-cloud (SLES) image family sles-11 All Windows Server and SQL Server image families 2. Project enable-oslogin can be over-ridden by setting enable-oslogin parameter to an instance metadata individually.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/managing-instance-access:https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/managing-instance-access#enable_oslogin:https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/remove-metadata:https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/oslogin/setup-two-factor-authentication", + "DefaultValue": "By default, parameter `enable-oslogin` is not set, which is equivalent to setting it to `FALSE`.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.5", + "Description": "Ensure ‘Enable Connecting to Serial Ports’ Is Not Enabled for VM Instance", + "Checks": [ + "compute_instance_serial_ports_in_use" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Virtual Machines", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Interacting with a serial port is often referred to as the serial console, which is similar to using a terminal window, in that input and output is entirely in text mode and there is no graphical interface or mouse support. If you enable the interactive serial console on an instance, clients can attempt to connect to that instance from any IP address. Therefore interactive serial console support should be disabled.", + "RationaleStatement": "A virtual machine instance has four virtual serial ports. Interacting with a serial port is similar to using a terminal window, in that input and output is entirely in text mode and there is no graphical interface or mouse support. The instance's operating system, BIOS, and other system-level entities often write output to the serial ports, and can accept input such as commands or answers to prompts. Typically, these system-level entities use the first serial port (port 1) and serial port 1 is often referred to as the serial console. The interactive serial console does not support IP-based access restrictions such as IP whitelists. If you enable the interactive serial console on an instance, clients can attempt to connect to that instance from any IP address. This allows anybody to connect to that instance if they know the correct SSH key, username, project ID, zone, and instance name. Therefore interactive serial console support should be disabled.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Login to Google Cloud console 2. Go to Computer Engine 3. Go to VM instances 4. Click on the Specific VM 5. Click `EDIT` 6. Unselect `Enable connecting to serial ports` below `Remote access` block. 7. Click `Save` **From Google Cloud CLI** Use the below command to disable gcloud compute instances add-metadata --zone= --metadata=serial-port-enable=false or gcloud compute instances add-metadata --zone= --metadata=serial-port-enable=0 **Prevention:** You can prevent VMs from having serial port access enable by `Disable VM serial port access` organization policy: [https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/orgpolicies/compute-disableSerialPortAccess](https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/orgpolicies/compute-disableSerialPortAccess).", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Login to Google Cloud console 2. Go to Compute Engine 3. Go to VM instances 4. Click on the Specific VM 5. Ensure the statement `Connecting to serial serial ports is disabled` is displayed at the top of the details tab, just below the `Connect to serial console` drop-down.. **From Google Cloud CLI** Ensure the below command's output shows `null`: gcloud compute instances describe --zone= --format=json(metadata.items[].key,metadata.items[].value) or `key` and `value` properties from below command's json response are equal to `serial-port-enable` and `0` or `false` respectively. { metadata: { items: [ { key: serial-port-enable, value: 0 } ] } } ", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/interacting-with-serial-console", + "DefaultValue": "By default, connecting to serial ports is not enabled.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.6", + "Description": "Ensure That IP Forwarding Is Not Enabled on Instances", + "Checks": [ + "compute_instance_ip_forwarding_is_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Virtual Machines", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Compute Engine instance cannot forward a packet unless the source IP address of the packet matches the IP address of the instance. Similarly, GCP won't deliver a packet whose destination IP address is different than the IP address of the instance receiving the packet. However, both capabilities are required if you want to use instances to help route packets. Forwarding of data packets should be disabled to prevent data loss or information disclosure.", + "RationaleStatement": "Compute Engine instance cannot forward a packet unless the source IP address of the packet matches the IP address of the instance. Similarly, GCP won't deliver a packet whose destination IP address is different than the IP address of the instance receiving the packet. However, both capabilities are required if you want to use instances to help route packets. To enable this source and destination IP check, disable the `canIpForward` field, which allows an instance to send and receive packets with non-matching destination or source IPs.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "You only edit the `canIpForward` setting at instance creation or using CLI. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Use the instances export command to export the existing instance properties: gcloud compute instances export --project --zone --destination= **Note**Replace the following: INSTANCE_NAME the name for the instance that you want to export. PROJECT_ID: the project ID for this request. ZONE: the zone for this instance. FILE_PATH: the output path where you want to save the instance configuration file on your local workstation. 2. Use a text editor to modify this file Replace `canIpForward: true` with `canIpForward: false` 3. Run this command to import the file you just modified gcloud compute instances update-from-file INSTANCE_NAME --project PROJECT_ID --zone ZONE --source=FILE_PATH --most-disruptive-allowed-action=REFRESH If the update request is valid and the required resources are available, the instance update process begins. You can monitor the status of this operation by viewing the audit logs. This update requires only a REFRESH not a full restart.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the `VM Instances` page by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances). 2. For every instance, click on its name to go to the `VM instance details` page. 3. Under the `Network interfaces` section, ensure that `IP forwarding` is set to `Off` for every network interface. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List all instances: gcloud compute instances list --format='table(name,canIpForward)' 2. Ensure that `CAN_IP_FORWARD` column in the output of above command does not contain `True` for any VM instance. **Exception:** Instances created by GKE should be excluded because they need to have IP forwarding enabled and cannot be changed. Instances created by GKE have names that start with gke-.", + "AdditionalInformation": "You can only set the `canIpForward` field at instance creation time or using CLI.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/using-routes#canipforward:https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/update-instance-properties", + "DefaultValue": "By default, instances are not configured to allow IP forwarding.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.7", + "Description": "Ensure VM Disks for Critical VMs Are Encrypted With Customer-Supplied Encryption Keys (CSEK)", + "Checks": [ + "compute_instance_encryption_with_csek_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Virtual Machines", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Customer-Supplied Encryption Keys (CSEK) are a feature in Google Cloud Storage and Google Compute Engine. If you supply your own encryption keys, Google uses your key to protect the Google-generated keys used to encrypt and decrypt your data. By default, Google Compute Engine encrypts all data at rest. Compute Engine handles and manages this encryption for you without any additional actions on your part. However, if you wanted to control and manage this encryption yourself, you can provide your own encryption keys.", + "RationaleStatement": "By default, Google Compute Engine encrypts all data at rest. Compute Engine handles and manages this encryption for you without any additional actions on your part. However, if you wanted to control and manage this encryption yourself, you can provide your own encryption keys. If you provide your own encryption keys, Compute Engine uses your key to protect the Google-generated keys used to encrypt and decrypt your data. Only users who can provide the correct key can use resources protected by a customer-supplied encryption key. Google does not store your keys on its servers and cannot access your protected data unless you provide the key. This also means that if you forget or lose your key, there is no way for Google to recover the key or to recover any data encrypted with the lost key. At least business critical VMs should have VM disks encrypted with CSEK.", + "ImpactStatement": "If you lose your encryption key, you will not be able to recover the data.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Currently there is no way to update the encryption of an existing disk. Therefore you should create a new disk with `Encryption` set to `Customer supplied`. **From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to Compute Engine `Disks` by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/disks](https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/disks). 2. Click `CREATE DISK`. 3. Set `Encryption type` to `Customer supplied`, 4. Provide the `Key` in the box. 5. Select `Wrapped key`. 6. Click `Create`. **From Google Cloud CLI** In the gcloud compute tool, encrypt a disk using the --csek-key-file flag during instance creation. If you are using an RSA-wrapped key, use the gcloud beta component: gcloud compute instances create --csek-key-file To encrypt a standalone persistent disk: gcloud compute disks create --csek-key-file ", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to Compute Engine `Disks` by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/disks](https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/disks). 2. Click on the disk for your critical VMs to see its configuration details. 4. Ensure that `Encryption type` is set to `Customer supplied`. **From Google Cloud CLI** Ensure `diskEncryptionKey` property in the below command's response is not null, and contains key `sha256` with corresponding value gcloud compute disks describe --zone --format=json(diskEncryptionKey,name) ", + "AdditionalInformation": "`Note 1:` When you delete a persistent disk, Google discards the cipher keys, rendering the data irretrievable. This process is irreversible. `Note 2:` It is up to you to generate and manage your key. You must provide a key that is a 256-bit string encoded in RFC 4648 standard base64 to Compute Engine. `Note 3:` An example key file looks like this. [ { uri: https://www.googleapis.com/compute/v1/projects/myproject/zones/us-central1-a/disks/example-disk, key: acXTX3rxrKAFTF0tYVLvydU1riRZTvUNC4g5I11NY-c=, key-type: raw }, { uri: https://www.googleapis.com/compute/v1/projects/myproject/global/snapshots/my-private-snapshot, key: ieCx/NcW06PcT7Ep1X6LUTc/hLvUDYyzSZPPVCVPTVEohpeHASqC8uw5TzyO9U+Fka9JFHz0mBibXUInrC/jEk014kCK/NPjYgEMOyssZ4ZINPKxlUh2zn1bV+MCaTICrdmuSBTWlUUiFoDD6PYznLwh8ZNdaheCeZ8ewEXgFQ8V+sDroLaN3Xs3MDTXQEMMoNUXMCZEIpg9Vtp9x2oeQ5lAbtt7bYAAHf5l+gJWw3sUfs0/Glw5fpdjT8Uggrr+RMZezGrltJEF293rvTIjWOEB3z5OHyHwQkvdrPDFcTqsLfh+8Hr8g+mf+7zVPEC8nEbqpdl3GPv3A7AwpFp7MA== key-type: rsa-encrypted } ]", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/disks/customer-supplied-encryption#encrypt_a_new_persistent_disk_with_your_own_keys:https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/rest/v1/disks/get:https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/disks/customer-supplied-encryption#key_file", + "DefaultValue": "By default, VM disks are encrypted with Google-managed keys. They are not encrypted with Customer-Supplied Encryption Keys.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.8", + "Description": "Ensure Compute Instances Are Launched With Shielded VM Enabled", + "Checks": [ + "compute_instance_shielded_vm_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Virtual Machines", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "To defend against advanced threats and ensure that the boot loader and firmware on your VMs are signed and untampered, it is recommended that Compute instances are launched with Shielded VM enabled.", + "RationaleStatement": "Shielded VMs are virtual machines (VMs) on Google Cloud Platform hardened by a set of security controls that help defend against rootkits and bootkits. Shielded VM offers verifiable integrity of your Compute Engine VM instances, so you can be confident your instances haven't been compromised by boot- or kernel-level malware or rootkits. Shielded VM's verifiable integrity is achieved through the use of Secure Boot, virtual trusted platform module (vTPM)-enabled Measured Boot, and integrity monitoring. Shielded VM instances run firmware which is signed and verified using Google's Certificate Authority, ensuring that the instance's firmware is unmodified and establishing the root of trust for Secure Boot. Integrity monitoring helps you understand and make decisions about the state of your VM instances and the Shielded VM vTPM enables Measured Boot by performing the measurements needed to create a known good boot baseline, called the integrity policy baseline. The integrity policy baseline is used for comparison with measurements from subsequent VM boots to determine if anything has changed. Secure Boot helps ensure that the system only runs authentic software by verifying the digital signature of all boot components, and halting the boot process if signature verification fails.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "To be able turn on `Shielded VM` on an instance, your instance must use an image with Shielded VM support. **From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the `VM instances` page by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances). 2. Click on the instance name to see its `VM instance details` page. 3. Click `STOP` to stop the instance. 4. When the instance has stopped, click `EDIT`. 5. In the Shielded VM section, select `Turn on vTPM` and `Turn on Integrity Monitoring`. 6. Optionally, if you do not use any custom or unsigned drivers on the instance, also select `Turn on Secure Boot`. 7. Click the `Save` button to modify the instance and then click `START` to restart it. **From Google Cloud CLI** You can only enable Shielded VM options on instances that have Shielded VM support. For a list of Shielded VM public images, run the gcloud compute images list command with the following flags: gcloud compute images list --project gce-uefi-images --no-standard-images 1. Stop the instance: gcloud compute instances stop 2. Update the instance: gcloud compute instances update --shielded-vtpm --shielded-vm-integrity-monitoring 3. Optionally, if you do not use any custom or unsigned drivers on the instance, also turn on secure boot. gcloud compute instances update --shielded-vm-secure-boot 4. Restart the instance: gcloud compute instances start **Prevention:** You can ensure that all new VMs will be created with Shielded VM enabled by setting up an Organization Policy to for `Shielded VM` at [https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/orgpolicies/compute-requireShieldedVm](https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/orgpolicies/compute-requireShieldedVm). Learn more at: [https://cloud.google.com/security/shielded-cloud/shielded-vm#organization-policy-constraint](https://cloud.google.com/security/shielded-cloud/shielded-vm#organization-policy-constraint).", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the `VM instances` page by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances). 2. Click on the instance name to see its `VM instance details` page. 3. Under the section `Shielded VM`, ensure that `vTPM` and `Integrity Monitoring` are `on`. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. For each instance in your project, get its metadata: gcloud compute instances list --format=json | jq -r '. | vTPM: (.[].shieldedInstanceConfig.enableVtpm) IntegrityMonitoring: (.[].shieldedInstanceConfig.enableIntegrityMonitoring) Name: (.[].name)' 2. Ensure that there is a `shieldedInstanceConfig` configuration and that configuration has the `enableIntegrityMonitoring` and `enableVtpm` set to `true`. If the VM is not a Shield VM image, you will not see a shieldedInstanceConfig` in the output.", + "AdditionalInformation": "If you do use custom or unsigned drivers on the instance, enabling Secure Boot will cause the machine to no longer boot. Turn on Secure Boot only on instances that have been verified to not have any custom drivers installed.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/modifying-shielded-vm:https://cloud.google.com/shielded-vm:https://cloud.google.com/security/shielded-cloud/shielded-vm#organization-policy-constraint", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Compute Instances do not have Shielded VM enabled.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.9", + "Description": "Ensure That Compute Instances Do Not Have Public IP Addresses", + "Checks": [ + "compute_instance_public_ip" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Virtual Machines", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Compute instances should not be configured to have external IP addresses.", + "RationaleStatement": "To reduce your attack surface, Compute instances should not have public IP addresses. Instead, instances should be configured behind load balancers, to minimize the instance's exposure to the internet.", + "ImpactStatement": "Removing the external IP address from your Compute instance may cause some applications to stop working.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the `VM instances` page by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances). 2. Click on the instance name to go the the `Instance detail page`. 3. Click `Edit`. 4. For each Network interface, ensure that `External IP` is set to `None`. 5. Click `Done` and then click `Save`. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Describe the instance properties: gcloud compute instances describe --zone= 2. Identify the access config name that contains the external IP address. This access config appears in the following format: networkInterfaces: - accessConfigs: - kind: compute#accessConfig name: External NAT natIP: 130.211.181.55 type: ONE_TO_ONE_NAT 3. Delete the access config. gcloud compute instances delete-access-config --zone= --access-config-name In the above example, the `ACCESS_CONFIG_NAME` is `External NAT`. The name of your access config might be different. **Prevention:** You can configure the `Define allowed external IPs for VM instances` Organization Policy to prevent VMs from being configured with public IP addresses. Learn more at: [https://console.cloud.google.com/orgpolicies/compute-vmExternalIpAccess](https://console.cloud.google.com/orgpolicies/compute-vmExternalIpAccess)", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the `VM instances` page by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances). 2. For every VM, ensure that there is no `External IP` configured. **From Google Cloud CLI** gcloud compute instances list --format=json 1. The output should not contain an `accessConfigs` section under `networkInterfaces`. Note that the `natIP` value is present only for instances that are running or for instances that are stopped but have a static IP address. For instances that are stopped and are configured to have an ephemeral public IP address, the `natIP` field will not be present. Example output: networkInterfaces: - accessConfigs: - kind: compute#accessConfig name: External NAT networkTier: STANDARD type: ONE_TO_ONE_NAT **Exception:** Instances created by GKE should be excluded because some of them have external IP addresses and cannot be changed by editing the instance settings. Instances created by GKE should be excluded. These instances have names that start with gke- and are labeled goog-gke-node.", + "AdditionalInformation": "You can connect to Linux VMs that do not have public IP addresses by using Identity-Aware Proxy for TCP forwarding. Learn more at [https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/connecting-advanced#sshbetweeninstances](https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/connecting-advanced#sshbetweeninstances) For Windows VMs, see [https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/connecting-to-instance](https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/connecting-to-instance).", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/load-balancing/docs/backend-service#backends_and_external_ip_addresses:https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/connecting-advanced#sshbetweeninstances:https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/connecting-to-instance:https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/ip-addresses/reserve-static-external-ip-address#unassign_ip:https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/organization-policy/org-policy-constraints", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Compute instances have a public IP address.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.10", + "Description": "Ensure That App Engine Applications Enforce HTTPS Connections", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Virtual Machines", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "In order to maintain the highest level of security all connections to an application should be secure by default.", + "RationaleStatement": "Insecure HTTP connections maybe subject to eavesdropping which can expose sensitive data.", + "ImpactStatement": "All connections to appengine will automatically be redirected to the HTTPS endpoint ensuring that all connections are secured by TLS.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Add a line to the app.yaml file controlling the application which enforces secure connections. For example handlers: - url: /.* **secure: always** redirect_http_response_code: 301 script: auto [https://cloud.google.com/appengine/docs/standard/python3/config/appref]", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that the app.yaml file controlling the application contains a line which enforces secure connections. For example handlers: - url: /.* secure: always redirect_http_response_code: 301 script: auto [https://cloud.google.com/appengine/docs/standard/python3/config/appref](https://cloud.google.com/appengine/docs/standard/python3/config/appref)", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/appengine/docs/standard/python3/config/appref:https://cloud.google.com/appengine/docs/flexible/nodejs/configuring-your-app-with-app-yaml", + "DefaultValue": "By default both HTTP and HTTP are supported", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.11", + "Description": "Ensure That Compute Instances Have Confidential Computing Enabled", + "Checks": [ + "compute_instance_confidential_computing_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Virtual Machines", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Google Cloud encrypts data at-rest and in-transit, but customer data must be decrypted for processing. Confidential Computing is a breakthrough technology that encrypts data in-use while it is being processed. Confidential Computing environments keep data encrypted in memory and elsewhere outside the central processing unit (CPU). Confidential VMs leverage hardware-based memory encryption technologies, such as AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV), AMD SEV-SNP, and Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX), depending on the chosen machine type and CPU platform. Customer data will stay encrypted while it is used, indexed, queried, or trained on. Encryption keys are generated by and reside solely in dedicated hardware and are not exportable, enhancing isolation and security. Built-in hardware optimizations ensure Confidential Computing workloads experience minimal to no significant performance penalties.", + "RationaleStatement": "Confidential Computing enables customers' sensitive code and other data encrypted in memory during processing. Google does not have access to the encryption keys. Confidential VM can help alleviate concerns about risk related to either dependency on Google infrastructure or Google insiders' access to customer data in the clear.", + "ImpactStatement": "- Confidential Computing for Compute instances does not support live migration. Unlike regular Compute instances, Confidential VMs experience disruptions during maintenance events like a software or hardware update. - Additional charges may be incurred when enabling this security feature. See [https://cloud.google.com/compute/confidential-vm/pricing](https://cloud.google.com/compute/confidential-vm/pricing) for more info.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Confidential Computing can only be enabled when an instance is created. You must delete the current instance and create a new one. **From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the VM instances page by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances). 2. Click `CREATE INSTANCE`. 3. Fill out the desired configuration for your instance. 4. Under the `Confidential VM service` section, check the option `Enable the Confidential Computing service on this VM instance`. 5. Click `Create`. **From Google Cloud CLI** Create a new instance with Confidential Compute enabled. gcloud compute instances create --zone --confidential-compute --maintenance-policy=TERMINATE ", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: Confidential Computing is currently only supported on limited VM configurations. To learn more about VM configurations supported by Confidential Computing, visit [https://cloud.google.com/confidential-computing/confidential-vm/docs/supported-configurations](https://cloud.google.com/confidential-computing/confidential-vm/docs/supported-configurations) **From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the `VM instances` page by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances). 2. Click on the instance name to see its VM instance details page. 3. Ensure that `Confidential VM service` is `Enabled`. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List the instances in your project and get details on each instance: gcloud compute instances list --format=json 2. Ensure that `enableConfidentialCompute` is set to `true` for all instances with machine type starting with n2d-. confidentialInstanceConfig: enableConfidentialCompute: true ", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/compute/confidential-vm/docs/creating-cvm-instance:https://cloud.google.com/compute/confidential-vm/docs/about-cvm:https://cloud.google.com/confidential-computing:https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/introducing-google-cloud-confidential-computing-with-confidential-vms", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Confidential Computing is disabled for Compute instances.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.12", + "Description": "Ensure the Latest Operating System Updates Are Installed On Your Virtual Machines in All Projects", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Virtual Machines", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Google Cloud Virtual Machines have the ability via an OS Config agent API to periodically (about every 10 minutes) report OS inventory data. A patch compliance API periodically reads this data, and cross references metadata to determine if the latest updates are installed. This is not the only Patch Management solution available to your organization and you should weigh your needs before committing to using this method.", + "RationaleStatement": "Keeping virtual machine operating systems up to date is a security best practice. Using this service will simplify this process.", + "ImpactStatement": "Most Operating Systems require a restart or changing critical resources to apply the updates. Using the Google Cloud VM manager for its OS Patch management will incur additional costs for each VM managed by it. Please view the VM manager pricing reference for further information.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** **Enabling OS Patch Management on a Project by Project Basis** **Install OS Config API for the Project** 1. Navigate into a project. In the expanded portal menu located at the top left of the screen hover over APIs & Services. Then in the menu right of that select API Libraries 2. Search for VM Manager (OS Config API) or scroll down in the left hand column and select the filter labeled Compute where it is the last listed. Open this API. 3. Click the blue 'Enable' button. **Add MetaData Tags for OSConfig Parsing** 1. From the main Google Cloud console, open the portal menu in the top left. Mouse over Computer Engine to expand the menu next to it. 2. Under the Settings heading, select Metadata. 3. In this view there will be a list of the project wide metadata tags for VMs. Click edit and 'add item' in the key column type 'enable-osconfig' and in the value column set it to 'true'. From Command Line 1. For project wide tagging, run the following command gcloud compute project-info add-metadata --project --metadata=enable-osconfig=TRUE Please see the reference /compute/docs/troubleshooting/vm-manager/verify-setup#metadata-enabled at the bottom for more options like instance specific tagging. Note: Adding a new tag via commandline may overwrite existing tags. You will need to do this at a time of low usage for the least impact. **Install and Start the Local OSConfig for Data Parsing** There is no way to centrally manage or start the Local OSConfig agent. Please view the reference of manage-os#agent-install to view specific operating system commands. **Setup a project wide Service Account** Please view Recommendation 4.1 to view how to setup a service account. Rerun the audit procedure to test if it has taken effect. **Enable NAT or Configure Private Google Access to allow Access to Public Update Hosting** For the sake of brevity, please see the attached resources to enable NAT or Private Google Access. Rerun the audit procedure to test if it has taken effect. From Command Line: **Install OS Config API for the Project** 1. In each project you wish to audit run gcloud services enable osconfig.googleapis.com **Install and Start the Local OSConfig for Data Parsing** Please view the reference of manage-os#agent-install to view specific operating system commands. **Setup a project wide Service Account** Please view Recommendation 4.1 to view how to setup a service account. Rerun the audit procedure to test if it has taken effect. **Enable NAT or Configure Private Google Access to allow Access to Public Update Hosting** For the sake of brevity, please see the attached resources to enable NAT or Private Google Access. Rerun the audit procedure to test if it has taken effect. Determine if Instances can connect to public update hosting Linux Debian Based Operating Systems sudo apt update The output should have a numbered list of lines with Hit: URL of updates. Redhat Based Operating Systems yum check-update The output should show a list of packages that have updates available. Windows ping http://windowsupdate.microsoft.com/ The ping should successfully be delivered and received.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** **Determine if OS Config API is Enabled for the Project** 1. Navigate into a project. In the expanded navigation menu located at the top left of the screen hover over `APIs & Services`. Then in the menu right of that select `API Libraries` 2. Search for VM Manager (OS Config API) or scroll down in the left hand column and select the filter labeled Compute where it is the last listed. Open this API. 3. Verify the blue button at the top is enabled. **Determine if VM Instances have correct metadata tags for OSConfig parsing** 1. From the main Google Cloud console, open the hamburger menu in the top left. Mouse over Computer Engine to expand the menu next to it. 1. Under the Settings heading, select Metadata. 1. In this view there will be a list of the project wide metadata tags for VMs. Determine if the tag enable-osconfig is set to true. **Determine if the Operating System of VM Instances have the local OS-Config Agent running** There is no way to determine this from the Google Cloud console. The only way is to run operating specific commands locally inside the operating system via remote connection. For the sake of brevity of this recommendation please view the docs/troubleshooting/vm-manager/verify-setup reference at the bottom of the page. If you initialized your VM instance with a Google Supplied OS Image with a build date of later than v20200114 it will have the service installed. You should still determine its status for proper operation. **Verify the service account you have setup for the project in Recommendation 4.1 is running** 1. Go to the `VM instances` page by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances). 2. Click on each instance name to go to its `VM instance details` page. 3. Under the section `Service Account`, take note of the service account 4. Run the commands locally for your operating system that are located at the docs/troubleshooting/vm-manager/verify-setup#service-account-enabled reference located at the bottom of this page. They should return the name of your service account. **Determine if Instances can connect to public update hosting** Each type of operating system has its own update process. You will need to determine on each operating system that it can reach the update servers via its network connection. The VM Manager doesn't host the updates, it will only allow you to centrally issue a command to each VM to update. **Determine if OS Config API is Enabled for the Project** 1. In each project you wish to enable run the following command gcloud services list 2. If osconfig.googleapis.com is in the left hand column it is enabled for this project. **Determine if VM Manager is Enabled for the Project** 1. Within the project run the following command: gcloud compute instances os-inventory describe VM-NAME --zone=ZONE The output will look like INSTANCE_ID INSTANCE_NAME OS OSCONFIG_AGENT_VERSION UPDATE_TIME 29255009728795105 centos7 CentOS Linux 7 (Core) 20210217.00-g1.el7 2021-04-12T22:19:36.559Z 5138980234596718741 rhel-8 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.3 (Ootpa) 20210316.00-g1.el8 2021-09-16T17:19:24Z 7127836223366142250 windows Microsoft Windows Server 2019 Datacenter 20210316.00.0+win@1 2021-09-16T17:13:18Z **Determine if VM Instances have correct metadata tags for OSConfig parsing** 1. Select the project you want to view tagging in. **From Google Cloud Console** 1. From the main Google Cloud console, open the hamburger menu in the top left. Mouse over Computer Engine to expand the menu next to it. 2. Under the Settings heading, select Metadata. 3. In this view there will be a list of the project wide metadata tags for Vms. Verify a tag of ‘enable-osconfig’ is in this list and it is set to ‘true’. **From Command Line** Run the following command to view instance data gcloud compute instances list --format=table(name,status,tags.list()) On each instance it should have a tag of ‘enable-osconfig’ set to ‘true’ **Determine if the Operating System of VM Instances have the local OS-Config Agent running** There is no way to determine this from the Google Cloud CLI. The best way is to run the the commands inside the operating system located at 'Check OS-Config agent is installed and running' at the /docs/troubleshooting/vm-manager/verify-setup reference at the bottom of the page. If you initialized your VM instance with a Google Supplied OS Image with a build date of later than v20200114 it will have the service installed. You should still determine its status. **Verify the service account you have setup for the project in Recommendation 4.1 is running** 1. Go to the `VM instances` page by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/compute/instances). 2. Click on each instance name to go to its `VM instance details` page. 3. Under the section `Service Account`, take note of the service account 4. View the compute/docs/troubleshooting/vm-manager/verify-setup#service-account-enabled resource at the bottom of the page for operating system specific commands to run locally. **Determine if Instances can connect to public update hosting** Linux Debian Based Operating Systems sudo apt update The output should have a numbered list of lines with Hit: URL of updates. Redhat Based Operating Systems yum check-update The output should show a list of packages that have updates available. Windows ping http://windowsupdate.microsoft.com/ The ping should successfully be delivered and received.", + "AdditionalInformation": "This is not your only solution to handle updates. This is a Google Cloud specific recommendation to leverage a resource to solve the need for comprehensive update procedures and policy. If you have a solution already in place you do not need to make the switch. There are also further resources that would be out of the scope of this recommendation. If you need to allow your VMs to access public hosted updates, please see the reference to setup NAT or Private Google Access.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/manage-os:https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/os-patch-management:https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/vm-manager:https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/images/os-details#vm-manager:https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/vm-manager#pricing:https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/troubleshooting/vm-manager/verify-setup:https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/view-os-details#view-data-tools:https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/os-patch-management/create-patch-job:https://cloud.google.com/nat/docs/set-up-network-address-translation:https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/configure-private-google-access:https://workbench.cisecurity.org/sections/811638/recommendations/1334335:https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/manage-os#agent-install:https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/troubleshooting/vm-manager/verify-setup#service-account-enabled:https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/os-patch-management#use-dashboard:https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/troubleshooting/vm-manager/verify-setup#metadata-enabled", + "DefaultValue": "By default most operating systems and programs do not update themselves. The Google Cloud VM Manager which is a dependency of the OS Patch management feature is installed on Google Built OS images with a build date of v20200114 or later. The VM manager is not enabled in a project by default and will need to be setup.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1", + "Description": "Ensure That Cloud Storage Bucket Is Not Anonymously or Publicly Accessible", + "Checks": [ + "cloudstorage_bucket_public_access" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Storage", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended that IAM policy on Cloud Storage bucket does not allows anonymous or public access.", + "RationaleStatement": "Allowing anonymous or public access grants permissions to anyone to access bucket content. Such access might not be desired if you are storing any sensitive data. Hence, ensure that anonymous or public access to a bucket is not allowed.", + "ImpactStatement": "No storage buckets would be publicly accessible. You would have to explicitly administer bucket access.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `Storage browser` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/storage/browser](https://console.cloud.google.com/storage/browser). 2. Click on the bucket name to go to its `Bucket details` page. 3. Click on the `Permissions` tab. 4. Click `Delete` button in front of `allUsers` and `allAuthenticatedUsers` to remove that particular role assignment. **From Google Cloud CLI** Remove `allUsers` and `allAuthenticatedUsers` access. gsutil iam ch -d allUsers gs://BUCKET_NAME gsutil iam ch -d allAuthenticatedUsers gs://BUCKET_NAME **Prevention:** You can prevent Storage buckets from becoming publicly accessible by setting up the `Domain restricted sharing` organization policy at:[ https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/orgpolicies/iam-allowedPolicyMemberDomains ](https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/orgpolicies/iam-allowedPolicyMemberDomains).", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `Storage browser` by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/storage/browser](https://console.cloud.google.com/storage/browser). 2. Click on each bucket name to go to its `Bucket details` page. 3. Click on the `Permissions` tab. 4. Ensure that `allUsers` and `allAuthenticatedUsers` are not in the `Members` list. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List all buckets in a project gsutil ls 2. Check the IAM Policy for each bucket: gsutil iam get gs://BUCKET_NAME No role should contain `allUsers` and/or `allAuthenticatedUsers` as a member. **Using Rest API** 1. List all buckets in a project Get https://www.googleapis.com/storage/v1/b?project= 2. Check the IAM Policy for each bucket GET https://www.googleapis.com/storage/v1/b//iam No role should contain `allUsers` and/or `allAuthenticatedUsers` as a member.", + "AdditionalInformation": "To implement Access restrictions on buckets, configuring Bucket IAM is preferred way than configuring Bucket ACL. On GCP console, Edit Permissions for bucket exposes IAM configurations only. Bucket ACLs are configured automatically as per need in order to implement/support User enforced Bucket IAM policy. In-case administrator changes bucket ACL using command-line(gsutils)/API bucket IAM also gets updated automatically.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/access-control/iam-reference:https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/access-control/making-data-public:https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/gsutil/commands/iam", + "DefaultValue": "By Default, Storage buckets are not publicly shared.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2", + "Description": "Ensure That Cloud Storage Buckets Have Uniform Bucket-Level Access Enabled", + "Checks": [ + "cloudstorage_bucket_uniform_bucket_level_access" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Storage", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended that uniform bucket-level access is enabled on Cloud Storage buckets.", + "RationaleStatement": "It is recommended to use uniform bucket-level access to unify and simplify how you grant access to your Cloud Storage resources. Cloud Storage offers two systems for granting users permission to access your buckets and objects: Cloud Identity and Access Management (Cloud IAM) and Access Control Lists (ACLs). These systems act in parallel - in order for a user to access a Cloud Storage resource, only one of the systems needs to grant the user permission. Cloud IAM is used throughout Google Cloud and allows you to grant a variety of permissions at the bucket and project levels. ACLs are used only by Cloud Storage and have limited permission options, but they allow you to grant permissions on a per-object basis. In order to support a uniform permissioning system, Cloud Storage has uniform bucket-level access. Using this feature disables ACLs for all Cloud Storage resources: access to Cloud Storage resources then is granted exclusively through Cloud IAM. Enabling uniform bucket-level access guarantees that if a Storage bucket is not publicly accessible, no object in the bucket is publicly accessible either.", + "ImpactStatement": "If you enable uniform bucket-level access, you revoke access from users who gain their access solely through object ACLs. Certain Google Cloud services, such as Stackdriver, Cloud Audit Logs, and Datastore, cannot export to Cloud Storage buckets that have uniform bucket-level access enabled.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Open the Cloud Storage browser in the Google Cloud Console by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/storage/browser](https://console.cloud.google.com/storage/browser) 2. In the list of buckets, click on the name of the desired bucket. 3. Select the `Permissions` tab near the top of the page. 4. In the text box that starts with `This bucket uses fine-grained access control...`, click `Edit`. 5. In the pop-up menu that appears, select `Uniform`. 6. Click `Save`. **From Google Cloud CLI** Use the on option in a uniformbucketlevelaccess set command: gsutil uniformbucketlevelaccess set on gs://BUCKET_NAME/ **Prevention** You can set up an Organization Policy to enforce that any new bucket has uniform bucket level access enabled. Learn more at: [https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/setting-org-policies#uniform-bucket](https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/setting-org-policies#uniform-bucket)", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Open the Cloud Storage browser in the Google Cloud Console by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/storage/browser](https://console.cloud.google.com/storage/browser) 2. For each bucket, make sure that `Access control` column has the value `Uniform`. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List all buckets in a project gsutil ls 2. For each bucket, verify that uniform bucket-level access is enabled. gsutil uniformbucketlevelaccess get gs://BUCKET_NAME/ If uniform bucket-level access is enabled, the response looks like: Uniform bucket-level access setting for gs://BUCKET_NAME/: Enabled: True LockedTime: LOCK_DATE ", + "AdditionalInformation": "Uniform bucket-level access can no longer be disabled if it has been active on a bucket for 90 consecutive days.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/uniform-bucket-level-access:https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/using-uniform-bucket-level-access:https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/setting-org-policies#uniform-bucket", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Cloud Storage buckets do not have uniform bucket-level access enabled.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.1", + "Description": "Ensure That a MySQL Instance Does Not Allow Anyone To Connect With Administrative Privileges", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Cloud SQL Database Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 MySQL Database", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "It is recommended to set a password for the administrative user (`root` by default) to prevent unauthorized access to the SQL database instances. This recommendation is applicable only for MySQL Instances. PostgreSQL does not offer any setting for No Password from the cloud console.", + "RationaleStatement": "At the time of MySQL Instance creation, not providing an administrative password allows anyone to connect to the SQL database instance with administrative privileges. The root password should be set to ensure only authorized users have these privileges.", + "ImpactStatement": "Connection strings for administrative clients need to be reconfigured to use a password.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Platform Console using `https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/` 2. Select the instance to open its Overview page. 3. Select `Access Control > Users`. 4. Click the `More actions icon` for the user to be updated. 5. Select `Change password`, specify a `New password`, and click `OK`. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Set a password to a MySql instance: gcloud sql users set-password root --host= --instance= --prompt-for-password 2. A prompt will appear, requiring the user to enter a password: Instance Password: 3. With a successful password configured, the following message should be seen: Updating Cloud SQL user...done. ", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List All SQL database instances of type MySQL: gcloud sql instances list --filter='DATABASE_VERSION:MYSQL*' --project --format=(NAME,PRIMARY_ADDRESS) 2. For every MySQL instance try to connect using the `PRIMARY_ADDRESS`, if available: mysql -u root -h The command should return either an error message or a password prompt. Sample Error message: ERROR 1045 (28000): Access denied for user 'root'@'' (using password: NO) If a command produces the `mysql>` prompt, the MySQL instance allows anyone to connect with administrative privileges without needing a password. **Note:** The `No Password` setting is exposed only at the time of MySQL instance creation. Once the instance is created, the Google Cloud Platform Console does not expose the set to confirm whether a password for an administrative user is set to a MySQL instance.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/mysql/create-manage-users:https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/mysql/create-instance", + "DefaultValue": "From the Google Cloud Platform Console, the `Create Instance` workflow enforces the rule to enter the root password unless the option `No Password` is selected explicitly." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.2", + "Description": "Ensure ‘Skip_show_database’ Database Flag for Cloud SQL MySQL Instance Is Set to ‘On’", + "Checks": [ + "cloudsql_instance_mysql_skip_show_database_flag" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Cloud SQL Database Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 MySQL Database", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended to set `skip_show_database` database flag for Cloud SQL Mysql instance to `on`", + "RationaleStatement": "`skip_show_database` database flag prevents people from using the SHOW DATABASES statement if they do not have the SHOW DATABASES privilege. This can improve security if you have concerns about users being able to see databases belonging to other users. Its effect depends on the SHOW DATABASES privilege: If the variable value is ON, the SHOW DATABASES statement is permitted only to users who have the SHOW DATABASES privilege, and the statement displays all database names. If the value is OFF, SHOW DATABASES is permitted to all users, but displays the names of only those databases for which the user has the SHOW DATABASES or other privilege. This recommendation is applicable to Mysql database instances.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the Mysql instance for which you want to enable to database flag. 3. Click `Edit`. 4. Scroll down to the `Flags` section. 5. To set a flag that has not been set on the instance before, click `Add a Database Flag`, choose the flag `skip_show_database` from the drop-down menu, and set its value to `on`. 6. Click `Save` to save your changes. 7. Confirm your changes under `Flags` on the Overview page. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List all Cloud SQL database Instances gcloud sql instances list 2. Configure the `skip_show_database` database flag for every Cloud SQL Mysql database instance using the below command. gcloud sql instances patch --database-flags skip_show_database=on **Note**: This command will overwrite all database flags previously set. To keep those and add new ones, include the values for all flags you want set on the instance; any flag not specifically included is set to its default value. For flags that do not take a value, specify the flag name followed by an equals sign (=).", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the instance to open its `Instance Overview` page 3. Ensure the database flag `skip_show_database` that has been set is listed under the `Database flags` section. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List all Cloud SQL database Instances gcloud sql instances list 2. Ensure the below command returns `on` for every Cloud SQL Mysql database instance gcloud sql instances describe --format=json | jq '.settings.databaseFlags[] | select(.name==skip_show_database)|.value' ", + "AdditionalInformation": "WARNING: This patch modifies database flag values, which may require your instance to be restarted. Check the list of supported flags - https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/mysql/flags - to see if your instance will be restarted when this patch is submitted. **Note**: some database flag settings can affect instance availability or stability, and remove the instance from the Cloud SQL SLA. For information about these flags, see Operational Guidelines. **Note**: Configuring the above flag restarts the Cloud SQL instance.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/mysql/flags:https://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/5.7/en/server-system-variables.html#sysvar_skip_show_database", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.3", + "Description": "Ensure That the ‘Local_infile’ Database Flag for a Cloud SQL MySQL Instance Is Set to ‘Off’", + "Checks": [ + "cloudsql_instance_mysql_local_infile_flag" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Cloud SQL Database Services", + "SubSection": "6.1 MySQL Database", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended to set the `local_infile` database flag for a Cloud SQL MySQL instance to `off`.", + "RationaleStatement": "The `local_infile` flag controls the server-side LOCAL capability for LOAD DATA statements. Depending on the `local_infile` setting, the server refuses or permits local data loading by clients that have LOCAL enabled on the client side. To explicitly cause the server to refuse LOAD DATA LOCAL statements (regardless of how client programs and libraries are configured at build time or runtime), start mysqld with local_infile disabled. local_infile can also be set at runtime. Due to security issues associated with the `local_infile` flag, it is recommended to disable it. This recommendation is applicable to MySQL database instances.", + "ImpactStatement": "Disabling `local_infile` makes the server refuse local data loading by clients that have LOCAL enabled on the client side.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the MySQL instance where the database flag needs to be enabled. 3. Click `Edit`. 4. Scroll down to the `Flags` section. 5. To set a flag that has not been set on the instance before, click `Add a Database Flag`, choose the flag `local_infile` from the drop-down menu, and set its value to `off`. 6. Click `Save`. 7. Confirm the changes under `Flags` on the Overview page. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List all Cloud SQL database instances using the following command: gcloud sql instances list 2. Configure the `local_infile` database flag for every Cloud SQL Mysql database instance using the below command: gcloud sql instances patch --database-flags local_infile=off **Note**: This command will overwrite all database flags that were previously set. To keep those and add new ones, include the values for all flags to be set on the instance; any flag not specifically included is set to its default value. For flags that do not take a value, specify the flag name followed by an equals sign (=).", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the instance to open its `Instance Overview` page 3. Ensure the database flag `local_infile` that has been set is listed under the `Database flags` section. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List all Cloud SQL database instances: gcloud sql instances list 2. Ensure the below command returns `off` for every Cloud SQL MySQL database instance. gcloud sql instances describe --format=json | jq '.settings.databaseFlags[] | select(.name==local_infile)|.value' ", + "AdditionalInformation": "WARNING: This patch modifies database flag values, which may require the instance to be restarted. Check the list of supported flags - https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/mysql/flags - to see if your instance will be restarted when this patch is submitted. **Note**: some database flag settings can affect instance availability or stability, and remove the instance from the Cloud SQL SLA. For information about these flags, see Operational Guidelines.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/mysql/flags:https://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/5.7/en/server-system-variables.html#sysvar_local_infile:https://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/5.7/en/load-data-local.html", + "DefaultValue": "By default `local_infile` is `on`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.2.1", + "Description": "Ensure ‘Log_error_verbosity’ Database Flag for Cloud SQL PostgreSQL Instance Is Set to ‘DEFAULT’ or Stricter", + "Checks": [ + "cloudsql_instance_postgres_log_error_verbosity_flag" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Cloud SQL Database Services", + "SubSection": "6.2 PostgreSQL Database", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The `log_error_verbosity` flag controls the verbosity/details of messages logged. Valid values are: - `TERSE` - `DEFAULT` - `VERBOSE` `TERSE` excludes the logging of `DETAIL`, `HINT`, `QUERY`, and `CONTEXT` error information. `VERBOSE` output includes the `SQLSTATE` error code, source code file name, function name, and line number that generated the error. Ensure an appropriate value is set to 'DEFAULT' or stricter.", + "RationaleStatement": "Auditing helps in troubleshooting operational problems and also permits forensic analysis. If `log_error_verbosity` is not set to the correct value, too many details or too few details may be logged. This flag should be configured with a value of 'DEFAULT' or stricter. This recommendation is applicable to PostgreSQL database instances.", + "ImpactStatement": "Turning on logging will increase the required storage over time. Mismanaged logs may cause your storage costs to increase. Setting custom flags via command line on certain instances will cause all omitted flags to be reset to defaults. This may cause you to lose custom flags and could result in unforeseen complications or instance restarts. Because of this, it is recommended you apply these flags changes during a period of low usage.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances. 2. Select the PostgreSQL instance for which you want to enable the database flag. 3. Click `Edit`. 4. Scroll down to the `Flags` section. 5. To set a flag that has not been set on the instance before, click `Add a Database Flag`, choose the flag `log_error_verbosity` from the drop-down menu and set appropriate value. 6. Click `Save` to save your changes. 7. Confirm your changes under `Flags` on the Overview page. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Configure the log_error_verbosity database flag for every Cloud SQL PosgreSQL database instance using the below command. gcloud sql instances patch INSTANCE_NAME --database-flags log_error_verbosity= **Note**: This command will overwrite all database flags previously set. To keep those and add new ones, include the values for all flags you want set on the instance; any flag not specifically included is set to its default value. For flags that do not take a value, specify the flag name followed by an equals sign (=).", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the instance to open its `Instance Overview` page 3. Go to `Configuration` card 4. Under `Database flags`, check the value of `log_error_verbosity` flag is set to 'DEFAULT' or stricter. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Use the below command for every Cloud SQL PostgreSQL database instance to verify the value of `log_error_verbosity` gcloud sql instances describe [INSTANCE_NAME] --format=json | jq '.settings.databaseFlags[] | select(.name==log_error_verbosity)|.value' In the output, database flags are listed under the settings as the collection databaseFlags.", + "AdditionalInformation": "WARNING: This patch modifies database flag values, which may require your instance to be restarted. Check the list of supported flags - https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/postgres/flags - to see if your instance will be restarted when this patch is submitted. **Note**: some database flag settings can affect instance availability or stability and remove the instance from the Cloud SQL SLA. For information about these flags, see Operational Guidelines. **Note**: Configuring the above flag does not require restarting the Cloud SQL instance.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/postgres/flags:https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/runtime-config-logging.html#GUC-LOG-ERROR-VERBOSITY", + "DefaultValue": "By default `log_error_verbosity` is `DEFAULT`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.2.2", + "Description": "Ensure That the ‘Log_connections’ Database Flag for Cloud SQL PostgreSQL Instance Is Set to ‘On’", + "Checks": [ + "cloudsql_instance_postgres_log_connections_flag" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Cloud SQL Database Services", + "SubSection": "6.2 PostgreSQL Database", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Enabling the `log_connections` setting causes each attempted connection to the server to be logged, along with successful completion of client authentication. This parameter cannot be changed after the session starts.", + "RationaleStatement": "PostgreSQL does not log attempted connections by default. Enabling the `log_connections` setting will create log entries for each attempted connection as well as successful completion of client authentication which can be useful in troubleshooting issues and to determine any unusual connection attempts to the server. This recommendation is applicable to PostgreSQL database instances.", + "ImpactStatement": "Turning on logging will increase the required storage over time. Mismanaged logs may cause your storage costs to increase. Setting custom flags via command line on certain instances will cause all omitted flags to be reset to defaults. This may cause you to lose custom flags and could result in unforeseen complications or instance restarts. Because of this, it is recommended you apply these flags changes during a period of low usage.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances. 2. Select the PostgreSQL instance for which you want to enable the database flag. 3. Click `Edit`. 4. Scroll down to the `Flags` section. 5. To set a flag that has not been set on the instance before, click `Add a Database Flag`, choose the flag `log_connections` from the drop-down menu and set the value as `on`. 6. Click `Save`. 7. Confirm the changes under `Flags` on the Overview page. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Configure the `log_connections` database flag for every Cloud SQL PosgreSQL database instance using the below command. gcloud sql instances patch --database-flags log_connections=on **Note**: This command will overwrite all previously set database flags. To keep those and add new ones, include the values for all flags to be set on the instance; any flag not specifically included is set to its default value. For flags that do not take a value, specify the flag name followed by an equals sign (=).", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the instance to open its `Instance Overview` page. 3. Go to the `Configuration` card. 4. Under `Database flags`, check the value of `log_connections` flag to determine if it is configured as expected. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Ensure the below command returns `on` for every Cloud SQL PostgreSQL database instance: gcloud sql instances describe [INSTANCE_NAME] --format=json | jq '.settings.databaseFlags[] | select(.name==log_connections)|.value' In the output, database flags are listed under the `settings` as the collection `databaseFlags`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "WARNING: This patch modifies database flag values, which may require your instance to be restarted. Check the list of supported flags - https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/postgres/flags - to see if your instance will be restarted when this patch is submitted. **Note**: some database flag settings can affect instance availability or stability and remove the instance from the Cloud SQL SLA. For information about these flags, see the Operational Guidelines. **Note**: Configuring the above flag does not require restarting the Cloud SQL instance.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/postgres/flags:https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/runtime-config-logging.html#GUC-LOG-CONNECTIONS", + "DefaultValue": "By default `log_connections` is `off`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.2.3", + "Description": "Ensure That the ‘Log_disconnections’ Database Flag for Cloud SQL PostgreSQL Instance Is Set to ‘On’", + "Checks": [ + "cloudsql_instance_postgres_log_disconnections_flag" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Cloud SQL Database Services", + "SubSection": "6.2 PostgreSQL Database", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Enabling the `log_disconnections` setting logs the end of each session, including the session duration.", + "RationaleStatement": "PostgreSQL does not log session details such as duration and session end by default. Enabling the `log_disconnections` setting will create log entries at the end of each session which can be useful in troubleshooting issues and determine any unusual activity across a time period. The `log_disconnections` and `log_connections` work hand in hand and generally, the pair would be enabled/disabled together. This recommendation is applicable to PostgreSQL database instances.", + "ImpactStatement": "Turning on logging will increase the required storage over time. Mismanaged logs may cause your storage costs to increase. Setting custom flags via command line on certain instances will cause all omitted flags to be reset to defaults. This may cause you to lose custom flags and could result in unforeseen complications or instance restarts. Because of this, it is recommended you apply these flags changes during a period of low usage.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the PostgreSQL instance where the database flag needs to be enabled. 3. Click `Edit`. 4. Scroll down to the `Flags` section. 5. To set a flag that has not been set on the instance before, click `Add a Database Flag`, choose the flag `log_disconnections` from the drop-down menu and set the value as `on`. 6. Click `Save`. 7. Confirm the changes under `Flags` on the Overview page. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Configure the `log_disconnections` database flag for every Cloud SQL PosgreSQL database instance using the below command: gcloud sql instances patch --database-flags log_disconnections=on **Note**: This command will overwrite all previously set database flags. To keep those and add new ones, include the values for all flags to be set on the instance; any flag not specifically included is set to its default value. For flags that do not take a value, specify the flag name followed by an equals sign (=).", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the instance to open its `Instance Overview` page 3. Go to the `Configuration` card. 4. Under `Database flags`, check the value of `log_disconnections` flag is configured as expected. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Ensure the below command returns `on` for every Cloud SQL PostgreSQL database instance: gcloud sql instances list --format=json | jq '.[].settings.databaseFlags[] | select(.name==log_disconnections)|.value' ", + "AdditionalInformation": "WARNING: This patch modifies database flag values, which may require your instance to be restarted. Check the list of supported flags - https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/postgres/flags - to see if your instance will be restarted when this patch is submitted. **Note**: some database flag settings can affect instance availability or stability and remove the instance from the Cloud SQL SLA. For information about these flags, see Operational Guidelines. **Note**: Configuring the above flag does not require restarting the Cloud SQL instance.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/postgres/flags:https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/runtime-config-logging.html#GUC-LOG-DISCONNECTIONS", + "DefaultValue": "By default `log_disconnections` is off." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.2.4", + "Description": "Ensure ‘Log_statement’ Database Flag for Cloud SQL PostgreSQL Instance Is Set Appropriately", + "Checks": [ + "cloudsql_instance_postgres_log_statement_flag" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Cloud SQL Database Services", + "SubSection": "6.2 PostgreSQL Database", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The value of `log_statement` flag determined the SQL statements that are logged. Valid values are: - `none` - `ddl` - `mod` - `all` The value `ddl` logs all data definition statements. The value `mod` logs all ddl statements, plus data-modifying statements. The statements are logged after a basic parsing is done and statement type is determined, thus this does not logs statements with errors. When using extended query protocol, logging occurs after an Execute message is received and values of the Bind parameters are included. A value of 'ddl' is recommended unless otherwise directed by your organization's logging policy.", + "RationaleStatement": "Auditing helps in forensic analysis. If `log_statement` is not set to the correct value, too many statements may be logged leading to issues in finding the relevant information from the logs, or too few statements may be logged with relevant information missing from the logs. Setting log_statement to align with your organization's security and logging policies facilitates later auditing and review of database activities. This recommendation is applicable to PostgreSQL database instances.", + "ImpactStatement": "Turning on logging will increase the required storage over time. Mismanaged logs may cause your storage costs to increase. Setting custom flags via command line on certain instances will cause all omitted flags to be reset to defaults. This may cause you to lose custom flags and could result in unforeseen complications or instance restarts. Because of this, it is recommended you apply these flags changes during a period of low usage.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the PostgreSQL instance for which you want to enable the database flag. 3. Click `Edit`. 4. Scroll down to the `Flags` section. 5. To set a flag that has not been set on the instance before, click `Add a Database Flag`, choose the flag `log_statement` from the drop-down menu and set appropriate value. 6. Click `Save` to save your changes. 7. Confirm your changes under `Flags` on the Overview page. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Configure the `log_statement` database flag for every Cloud SQL PosgreSQL database instance using the below command. gcloud sql instances patch --database-flags log_statement= **Note**: This command will overwrite all database flags previously set. To keep those and add new ones, include the values for all flags you want set on the instance; any flag not specifically included is set to its default value. For flags that do not take a value, specify the flag name followed by an equals sign (=).", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the instance to open its `Instance Overview` page 3. Go to `Configuration` card 4. Under `Database flags`, check the value of `log_statement` flag is set to appropriately. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Use the below command for every Cloud SQL PostgreSQL database instance to verify the value of `log_statement` gcloud sql instances list --format=json | jq '.[].settings.databaseFlags[] | select(.name==log_statement)|.value' ", + "AdditionalInformation": "WARNING: This patch modifies database flag values, which may require your instance to be restarted. Check the list of supported flags - https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/postgres/flags - to see if your instance will be restarted when this patch is submitted. **Note**: some database flag settings can affect instance availability or stability and remove the instance from the Cloud SQL SLA. For information about these flags, see Operational Guidelines. **Note**: Configuring the above flag does not require restarting the Cloud SQL instance.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/postgres/flags:https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/runtime-config-logging.html#GUC-LOG-STATEMENT", + "DefaultValue": "`none`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.2.5", + "Description": "Ensure that the ‘Log_min_messages’ Flag for a Cloud SQL PostgreSQL Instance is set at minimum to 'Warning'", + "Checks": [ + "cloudsql_instance_postgres_log_min_messages_flag" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Cloud SQL Database Services", + "SubSection": "6.2 PostgreSQL Database", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The `log_min_messages` flag defines the minimum message severity level that is considered as an error statement. Messages for error statements are logged with the SQL statement. Valid values include (from lowest to highest severity) `DEBUG5`, `DEBUG4`, `DEBUG3`, `DEBUG2`, `DEBUG1`, `INFO`, `NOTICE`, `WARNING`, `ERROR`, `LOG`, `FATAL`, and `PANIC`. Each severity level includes the subsequent levels mentioned above. ERROR is considered the best practice setting. Changes should only be made in accordance with the organization's logging policy.", + "RationaleStatement": "Auditing helps in troubleshooting operational problems and also permits forensic analysis. If `log_min_messages` is not set to the correct value, messages may not be classified as error messages appropriately. Setting the threshold to 'Warning' will log messages for the most needed error messages. This recommendation is applicable to PostgreSQL database instances.", + "ImpactStatement": "Setting the threshold too low will might result in increased log storage size and length, making it difficult to find actual errors. Higher severity levels may cause errors needed to troubleshoot to not be logged. An organization will need to decide their own threshold for logging `log_min_messages` flag. **Note**: To effectively turn off logging failing statements, set this parameter to PANIC.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances) 2. Select the PostgreSQL instance for which you want to enable the database flag. 3. Click `Edit`. 4. Scroll down to the `Flags` section. 5. To set a flag that has not been set on the instance before, click `Add a Database Flag`, choose the flag `log_min_messages` from the drop-down menu and set appropriate value. 6. Click `Save` to save the changes. 7. Confirm the changes under `Flags` on the Overview page. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Configure the `log_min_messages` database flag for every Cloud SQL PosgreSQL database instance using the below command. gcloud sql instances patch --database-flags log_min_messages= **Note**: This command will overwrite all database flags previously set. To keep those and add new ones, include the values for all flags to be set on the instance; any flag not specifically included is set to its default value. For flags that do not take a value, specify the flag name followed by an equals sign (=).", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the instance to open its `Instance Overview` page. 3. Go to the `Configuration` card. 4. Under `Database flags`, check the value of `log_min_messages` flag is set to `warning` or higher (WARNING|ERROR|LOG|FATAL|PANIC). **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Use the below command for every Cloud SQL PostgreSQL database instance to verify that the value of `log_min_messages` is set to `warning` or higher . gcloud sql instances describe [INSTANCE_NAME] --format=json | jq '.settings.databaseFlags[] | select(.name==log_min_messages)|.value' ", + "AdditionalInformation": "WARNING: This patch modifies database flag values, which may require your instance to be restarted. Check the list of supported flags - https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/postgres/flags - to see if your instance will be restarted when this patch is submitted. **Note**: Some database flag settings can affect instance availability or stability and remove the instance from the Cloud SQL SLA. For information about these flags, see Operational Guidelines. **Note**: Configuring the above flag does not require restarting the Cloud SQL instance.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/postgres/flags:https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/runtime-config-logging.html#GUC-LOG-MIN-MESSAGES", + "DefaultValue": "By default `log_min_messages` is `ERROR`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.2.6", + "Description": "Ensure ‘Log_min_error_statement’ Database Flag for Cloud SQL PostgreSQL Instance Is Set to ‘Error’ or Stricter", + "Checks": [ + "cloudsql_instance_postgres_log_min_error_statement_flag" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Cloud SQL Database Services", + "SubSection": "6.2 PostgreSQL Database", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The `log_min_error_statement` flag defines the minimum message severity level that are considered as an error statement. Messages for error statements are logged with the SQL statement. Valid values include (from lowest to highest severity) `DEBUG5`, `DEBUG4`, `DEBUG3`, `DEBUG2`, `DEBUG1`, `INFO`, `NOTICE`, `WARNING`, `ERROR`, `LOG`, `FATAL`, and `PANIC`. Each severity level includes the subsequent levels mentioned above. Ensure a value of `ERROR` or stricter is set.", + "RationaleStatement": "Auditing helps in troubleshooting operational problems and also permits forensic analysis. If `log_min_error_statement` is not set to the correct value, messages may not be classified as error messages appropriately. Considering general log messages as error messages would make is difficult to find actual errors and considering only stricter severity levels as error messages may skip actual errors to log their SQL statements. The `log_min_error_statement` flag should be set to `ERROR` or stricter. This recommendation is applicable to PostgreSQL database instances.", + "ImpactStatement": "Turning on logging will increase the required storage over time. Mismanaged logs may cause your storage costs to increase. Setting custom flags via command line on certain instances will cause all omitted flags to be reset to defaults. This may cause you to lose custom flags and could result in unforeseen complications or instance restarts. Because of this, it is recommended you apply these flags changes during a period of low usage.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the PostgreSQL instance for which you want to enable the database flag. 3. Click `Edit`. 4. Scroll down to the `Flags` section. 5. To set a flag that has not been set on the instance before, click `Add item`, choose the flag `log_min_error_statement` from the drop-down menu and set appropriate value. 6. Click `Save` to save your changes. 7. Confirm your changes under `Flags` on the Overview page. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Configure the `log_min_error_statement` database flag for every Cloud SQL PosgreSQL database instance using the below command. gcloud sql instances patch --database-flags log_min_error_statement= **Note**: This command will overwrite all database flags previously set. To keep those and add new ones, include the values for all flags you want set on the instance; any flag not specifically included is set to its default value. For flags that do not take a value, specify the flag name followed by an equals sign (=).", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the instance to open its `Instance Overview` page 3. Go to `Configuration` card 4. Under `Database flags`, check the value of `log_min_error_statement` flag is configured as to `ERROR` or stricter. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Use the below command for every Cloud SQL PostgreSQL database instance to verify the value of `log_min_error_statement` is set to `ERROR` or stricter. gcloud sql instances describe --format=json | jq '.[].settings.databaseFlags[] | select(.name==log_min_error_statement)|.value' In the output, database flags are listed under the `settings` as the collection `databaseFlags`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "WARNING: This patch modifies database flag values, which may require your instance to be restarted. Check the list of supported flags - https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/postgres/flags - to see if your instance will be restarted when this patch is submitted. **Note**: some database flag settings can affect instance availability or stability and remove the instance from the Cloud SQL SLA. For information about these flags, see Operational Guidelines. **Note**: Configuring the above flag does not require restarting the Cloud SQL instance.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/postgres/flags:https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/runtime-config-logging.html#GUC-LOG-MIN-ERROR-STATEMENT", + "DefaultValue": "By default `log_min_error_statement` is `ERROR`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.2.7", + "Description": "Ensure That the ‘Log_min_duration_statement’ Database Flag for Cloud SQL PostgreSQL Instance Is Set to '-1' (Disabled)", + "Checks": [ + "cloudsql_instance_postgres_log_min_duration_statement_flag" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Cloud SQL Database Services", + "SubSection": "6.2 PostgreSQL Database", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The `log_min_duration_statement` flag defines the minimum amount of execution time of a statement in milliseconds where the total duration of the statement is logged. Ensure that `log_min_duration_statement` is disabled, i.e., a value of `-1` is set.", + "RationaleStatement": "Logging SQL statements may include sensitive information that should not be recorded in logs. This recommendation is applicable to PostgreSQL database instances.", + "ImpactStatement": "Turning on logging will increase the required storage over time. Mismanaged logs may cause your storage costs to increase. Setting custom flags via command line on certain instances will cause all omitted flags to be reset to defaults. This may cause you to lose custom flags and could result in unforeseen complications or instance restarts. Because of this, it is recommended you apply these flags changes during a period of low usage.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the PostgreSQL instance where the database flag needs to be enabled. 3. Click `Edit`. 4. Scroll down to the `Flags` section. 5. To set a flag that has not been set on the instance before, click `Add item`, choose the flag `log_min_duration_statement` from the drop-down menu and set a value of `-1`. 6. Click `Save`. 7. Confirm the changes under `Flags` on the Overview page. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List all Cloud SQL database instances using the following command: gcloud sql instances list 2. Configure the `log_min_duration_statement` flag for every Cloud SQL PosgreSQL database instance using the below command: gcloud sql instances patch --database-flags log_min_duration_statement=-1 **Note**: This command will overwrite all database flags previously set. To keep those and add new ones, include the values for all flags to be set on the instance; any flag not specifically included is set to its default value. For flags that do not take a value, specify the flag name followed by an equals sign (=).", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the instance to open its `Instance Overview` page. 3. Go to the `Configuration` card. 4. Under `Database flags`, check that the value of `log_min_duration_statement` flag is set to `-1`. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Use the below command for every Cloud SQL PostgreSQL database instance to verify the value of `log_min_duration_statement` is set to `-1`. gcloud sql instances describe --format=json| jq '.settings.databaseFlags[] | select(.name==log_min_duration_statement)|.value' In the output, database flags are listed under the `settings` as the collection `databaseFlags`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "WARNING: This patch modifies database flag values, which may require your instance to be restarted. Check the list of supported flags - https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/postgres/flags - to see if your instance will be restarted when this patch is submitted. **Note**: Some database flag settings can affect instance availability or stability and remove the instance from the Cloud SQL SLA. For information about these flags, see Operational Guidelines. **Note**: Configuring the above flag does not require restarting the Cloud SQL instance.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/postgres/flags:https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/runtime-config-logging.html#GUC-LOG-MIN-DURATION-STATEMENT", + "DefaultValue": "By default `log_min_duration_statement` is `-1`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.2.8", + "Description": "Ensure That 'cloudsql.enable_pgaudit' Database Flag for each Cloud Sql Postgresql Instance Is Set to 'on' For Centralized Logging", + "Checks": [ + "cloudsql_instance_postgres_enable_pgaudit_flag" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Cloud SQL Database Services", + "SubSection": "6.2 PostgreSQL Database", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure `cloudsql.enable_pgaudit` database flag for Cloud SQL PostgreSQL instance is set to `on` to allow for centralized logging.", + "RationaleStatement": "As numerous other recommendations in this section consist of turning on flags for logging purposes, your organization will need a way to manage these logs. You may have a solution already in place. If you do not, consider installing and enabling the open source pgaudit extension within PostgreSQL and enabling its corresponding flag of `cloudsql.enable_pgaudit`. This flag and installing the extension enables database auditing in PostgreSQL through the open-source pgAudit extension. This extension provides detailed session and object logging to comply with government, financial, & ISO standards and provides auditing capabilities to mitigate threats by monitoring security events on the instance. Enabling the flag and settings later in this recommendation will send these logs to Google Logs Explorer so that you can access them in a central location. to This recommendation is applicable only to PostgreSQL database instances.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling the pgAudit extension can lead to increased data storage requirements and to ensure durability of pgAudit log records in the event of unexpected storage issues, it is recommended to enable the `Enable automatic storage increases` setting on the instance. Enabling flags via the command line will also overwrite all existing flags, so you should apply all needed flags in the CLI command. Also flags may require a restart of the server to be implemented or will break existing functionality so update your servers at a time of low usage.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Initialize the pgAudit flag** **From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the instance to open its `Overview` page. 3. Click `Edit`. 4. Scroll down and expand `Flags`. 5. To set a flag that has not been set on the instance before, click `Add item`. 6. Enter `cloudsql.enable_pgaudit` for the flag name and set the flag to `on`. 7. Click `Done`. 8. Click `Save` to update the configuration. 9. Confirm your changes under `Flags` on the `Overview` page. **From Google Cloud CLI** Run the below command by providing `` to enable `cloudsql.enable_pgaudit` flag. gcloud sql instances patch --database-flags cloudsql.enable_pgaudit=on Note: `RESTART` is required to get this configuration in effect. **Creating the extension** 1. Connect to the the server running PostgreSQL or through a SQL client of your choice. 2. Run the following command as a superuser. CREATE EXTENSION pgaudit; **Updating the previously created pgaudit.log flag for your Logging Needs** **From Console:** Note: there are multiple options here. This command will enable logging for all databases on a server. Please see the customizing database audit logging reference for more flag options. 1. Go to [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the instance to open its `Overview` page. 3. Click `Edit`. 4. Scroll down and expand `Flags`. 5. To set a flag that has not been set on the instance before, click `Add item`. 6. Enter `pgaudit.log=all` for the flag name and set the flag to `on`. 7. Click `Done`. 8. Click `Save` to update the configuration. 9. Confirm your changes under `Flags` on the `Overview` page. **From Command Line:** Run the command gcloud sql instances patch --database-flags cloudsql.enable_pgaudit=on,pgaudit.log=all **Determine if logs are being sent to Logs Explorer** 1. From the Google Console home page, open the hamburger menu in the top left. 2. In the menu that pops open, scroll down to Logs Explorer under Operations. 3. In the query box, paste the following and search resource.type=cloudsql_database logName=projects//logs/cloudaudit.googleapis.com%2Fdata_access protoPayload.request.@type=type.googleapis.com/google.cloud.sql.audit.v1.PgAuditEntry If it returns any log sources, they are correctly setup.", + "AuditProcedure": "**Determining if the pgAudit Flag is set to 'on'** **From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the instance to open its `Overview` page. 3. Click `Edit`. 4. Scroll down and expand `Flags`. 5. Ensure that `cloudsql.enable_pgaudit` flag is set to `on`. **From Google Cloud CLI** Run the command by providing ``. Ensure the value of the flag is `on`. gcloud sql instances describe --format=json | jq '.settings|.|.databaseFlags[]|select(.name==cloudsql.enable_pgaudit)|.value' **Determine if the pgAudit extension is installed** 1. Connect to the the server running PostgreSQL or through a SQL client of your choice. 2. Run the following command SELECT * FROM pg_extension; 3. If pgAudit is in this list. If so, it is installed. **Determine if Data Access Audit logs are enabled for your project and have sufficient privileges** 1. From the homepage open the hamburger menu in the top left. 2. Scroll down to `IAM & Admin`and hover over it. 3. In the menu that opens up, select `Audit Logs` 4. In the middle of the page, in the search box next to `filter` search for `Cloud Composer API` 5. Select it, and ensure that both 'Admin Read' and 'Data Read' are checked. **Determine if logs are being sent to Logs Explorer** 1. From the Google Console home page, open the hamburger menu in the top left. 2. In the menu that pops open, scroll down to Logs Explorer under Operations. 3. In the query box, paste the following and search resource.type=cloudsql_database logName=projects//logs/cloudaudit.googleapis.com%2Fdata_access protoPayload.request.@type=type.googleapis.com/google.cloud.sql.audit.v1.PgAuditEntry 4. If it returns any log sources, they are correctly setup.", + "AdditionalInformation": "WARNING: This patch modifies database flag values, which may require your instance to be restarted. Check the list of supported flags - https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/postgres/flags - to see if your instance will be restarted when this patch is submitted. Note: Configuring the 'cloudsql.enable_pgaudit' database flag requires restarting the Cloud SQL PostgreSQL instance.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/postgres/flags#list-flags-postgres:https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/postgres/pg-audit#enable-auditing-flag:https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/postgres/pg-audit#customizing-database-audit-logging:https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/configure-data-access#config-console-enable", + "DefaultValue": "By default `cloudsql.enable_pgaudit` database flag is set to `off` and the extension is not enabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.3.1", + "Description": "Ensure 'external scripts enabled' Database Flag for Cloud SQL SQL Server Instance Is Set to 'off'", + "Checks": [ + "cloudsql_instance_sqlserver_external_scripts_enabled_flag" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Cloud SQL Database Services", + "SubSection": "6.3 SQL Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended to set `external scripts enabled` database flag for Cloud SQL SQL Server instance to `off`", + "RationaleStatement": "`external scripts enabled` enable the execution of scripts with certain remote language extensions. This property is OFF by default. When Advanced Analytics Services is installed, setup can optionally set this property to true. As the External Scripts Enabled feature allows scripts external to SQL such as files located in an R library to be executed, which could adversely affect the security of the system, hence this should be disabled. This recommendation is applicable to SQL Server database instances.", + "ImpactStatement": "Setting custom flags via command line on certain instances will cause all omitted flags to be reset to defaults. This may cause you to lose custom flags and could result in unforeseen complications or instance restarts. Because of this, it is recommended you apply these flags changes during a period of low usage.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the SQL Server instance for which you want to enable to database flag. 3. Click `Edit`. 4. Scroll down to the `Flags` section. 5. To set a flag that has not been set on the instance before, click `Add item`, choose the flag `external scripts enabled` from the drop-down menu, and set its value to `off`. 6. Click `Save` to save your changes. 7. Confirm your changes under `Flags` on the Overview page. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Configure the `external scripts enabled` database flag for every Cloud SQL SQL Server database instance using the below command. gcloud sql instances patch --database-flags external scripts enabled=off **Note**: This command will overwrite all database flags previously set. To keep those and add new ones, include the values for all flags you want set on the instance; any flag not specifically included is set to its default value. For flags that do not take a value, specify the flag name followed by an equals sign (=).", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the instance to open its `Instance Overview` page 3. Ensure the database flag `external scripts enabled` that has been set is listed under the `Database flags` section. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Ensure the below command returns `off` for every Cloud SQL SQL Server database instance gcloud sql instances describe --format=json | jq '.settings.databaseFlags[] | select(.name==external scripts enabled)|.value' In the output, database flags are listed under the `settings` as the collection `databaseFlags`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "WARNING: This patch modifies database flag values, which may require your instance to be restarted. Check the list of supported flags - https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/sqlserver/flags - to see if your instance will be restarted when this patch is submitted. **Note**: some database flag settings can affect instance availability or stability, and remove the instance from the Cloud SQL SLA. For information about these flags, see Operational Guidelines. **Note**: Configuring the above flag restarts the Cloud SQL instance.", + "References": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/database-engine/configure-windows/external-scripts-enabled-server-configuration-option?view=sql-server-ver15:https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/sqlserver/flags:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/advanced-analytics/concepts/security?view=sql-server-ver15:https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/ms_sql_server_2016_instance/2018-03-09/finding/V-79347", + "DefaultValue": "By default `external scripts enabled` is `off`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.3.2", + "Description": "Ensure 'cross db ownership chaining' Database Flag for Cloud SQL SQL Server Instance Is Set to 'off'", + "Checks": [ + "cloudsql_instance_sqlserver_cross_db_ownership_chaining_flag" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Cloud SQL Database Services", + "SubSection": "6.3 SQL Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended to set `cross db ownership chaining` database flag for Cloud SQL SQL Server instance to `off`. This flag is deprecated for all SQL Server versions in CGP. Going forward, you can't set its value to on. However, if you have this flag enabled, we strongly recommend that you either remove the flag from your database or set it to off. For cross-database access, use the [Microsoft tutorial for signing stored procedures with a certificate](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/tutorial-signing-stored-procedures-with-a-certificate?view=sql-server-ver16).", + "RationaleStatement": "Use the `cross db ownership` for chaining option to configure cross-database ownership chaining for an instance of Microsoft SQL Server. This server option allows you to control cross-database ownership chaining at the database level or to allow cross-database ownership chaining for all databases. Enabling `cross db ownership` is not recommended unless all of the databases hosted by the instance of SQL Server must participate in cross-database ownership chaining and you are aware of the security implications of this setting. This recommendation is applicable to SQL Server database instances.", + "ImpactStatement": "Updating flags may cause the database to restart. This may cause it to unavailable for a short amount of time, so this is best done at a time of low usage. You should also determine if the tables in your databases reference another table without using credentials for that database, as turning off cross database ownership will break this relationship.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the SQL Server instance for which you want to enable to database flag. 3. Click `Edit`. 4. Scroll down to the `Flags` section. 5. To set a flag that has not been set on the instance before, click `Add item`, choose the flag `cross db ownership chaining` from the drop-down menu, and set its value to `off`. 6. Click `Save`. 7. Confirm the changes under `Flags` on the Overview page. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Configure the `cross db ownership chaining` database flag for every Cloud SQL SQL Server database instance using the below command: gcloud sql instances patch --database-flags cross db ownership chaining=off **Note**: This command will overwrite all database flags previously set. To keep those and add new ones, include the values for all flags to be set on the instance; any flag not specifically included is set to its default value. For flags that do not take a value, specify the flag name followed by an equals sign (=).", + "AuditProcedure": "**NOTE:** This flag is deprecated for all SQL Server versions. Going forward, you can't set its value to on. However, if you have this flag enabled it should be removed from your database or set to off. **From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console. 2. Select the instance to open its `Instance Overview` page 3. Ensure the database flag `cross db ownership chaining` that has been set is listed under the `Database flags` section. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Ensure the below command returns `off` for every Cloud SQL SQL Server database instance: gcloud sql instances describe --format=json | jq '.settings.databaseFlags[] | select(.name==cross db ownership chaining)|.value' In the output, database flags are listed under the `settings` as the collection `databaseFlags`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "WARNING: This patch modifies database flag values, which may require your instance to be restarted. Check the list of supported flags - https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/sqlserver/flags - to see if your instance will be restarted when this patch is submitted. **Note**: Some database flag settings can affect instance availability or stability, and remove the instance from the Cloud SQL SLA. For information about these flags, see Operational Guidelines. **Note**: Configuring the above flag does not restart the Cloud SQL instance.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/sqlserver/flags:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/database-engine/configure-windows/cross-db-ownership-chaining-server-configuration-option?view=sql-server-ver15", + "DefaultValue": "This flag is deprecated for all SQL Server versions. Going forward, you can't set its value to on." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.3.3", + "Description": "Ensure 'user Connections' Database Flag for Cloud SQL SQL Server Instance Is Set to a Non-limiting Value", + "Checks": [ + "cloudsql_instance_sqlserver_user_connections_flag" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Cloud SQL Database Services", + "SubSection": "6.3 SQL Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended to check the `user connections` for a Cloud SQL SQL Server instance to ensure that it is not artificially limiting connections.", + "RationaleStatement": "The `user connections` option specifies the maximum number of simultaneous user connections that are allowed on an instance of SQL Server. The actual number of user connections allowed also depends on the version of SQL Server that you are using, and also the limits of your application or applications and hardware. SQL Server allows a maximum of 32,767 user connections. Because user connections is by default a self-configuring value, with SQL Server adjusting the maximum number of user connections automatically as needed, up to the maximum value allowable. For example, if only 10 users are logged in, 10 user connection objects are allocated. In most cases, you do not have to change the value for this option. The default is 0, which means that the maximum (32,767) user connections are allowed. However if there is a number defined here that limits connections, SQL Server will not allow anymore above this limit. If the connections are at the limit, any new requests will be dropped, potentially causing lost data or outages for those using the database.", + "ImpactStatement": "Setting custom flags via command line on certain instances will cause all omitted flags to be reset to defaults. This may cause you to lose custom flags and could result in unforeseen complications or instance restarts. Because of this, it is recommended you apply these flags changes during a period of low usage.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the SQL Server instance for which you want to enable to database flag. 3. Click `Edit`. 4. Scroll down to the `Flags` section. 5. To set a flag that has not been set on the instance before, click `Add item`, choose the flag `user connections` from the drop-down menu, and set its value to your organization recommended value. 6. Click `Save` to save your changes. 7. Confirm your changes under `Flags` on the Overview page. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Configure the `user connections` database flag for every Cloud SQL SQL Server database instance using the below command. gcloud sql instances patch --database-flags user connections=[0-32,767] **Note**: This command will overwrite all database flags previously set. To keep those and add new ones, include the values for all flags you want set on the instance; any flag not specifically included is set to its default value. For flags that do not take a value, specify the flag name followed by an equals sign (=).", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the instance to open its `Instance Overview` page 3. Ensure the database flag `user connections` listed under the `Database flags` section is 0. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Ensure the below command returns a value of 0, for every Cloud SQL SQL Server database instance. gcloud sql instances describe --format=json | jq '.settings.databaseFlags[] | select(.name==user connections)|.value' ", + "AdditionalInformation": "WARNING: This patch modifies database flag values, which may require your instance to be restarted. Check the list of supported flags - https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/sqlserver/flags - to see if your instance will be restarted when this patch is submitted. **Note**: some database flag settings can affect instance availability or stability, and remove the instance from the Cloud SQL SLA. For information about these flags, see Operational Guidelines. **Note**: Configuring the above flag restarts the Cloud SQL instance.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/sqlserver/flags:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/database-engine/configure-windows/configure-the-user-connections-server-configuration-option?view=sql-server-ver15:https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/ms_sql_server_2016_instance/2018-03-09/finding/V-79119", + "DefaultValue": "By default `user connections` is set to '0' which does not limit the number of connections, giving the server free reign to facilitate a max of 32,767 connections." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.3.4", + "Description": "Ensure 'user options' Database Flag for Cloud SQL SQL Server Instance Is Not Configured", + "Checks": [ + "cloudsql_instance_sqlserver_user_options_flag" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Cloud SQL Database Services", + "SubSection": "6.3 SQL Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The `user options` option specifies global defaults for all users. A list of default query processing options is established for the duration of a user's work session. The user options option allows you to change the default values of the SET options (if the server's default settings are not appropriate). A user can override these defaults by using the SET statement. You can configure user options dynamically for new logins. After you change the setting of user options, new login sessions use the new setting; current login sessions are not affected. This recommendation is applicable to SQL Server database instances.", + "RationaleStatement": "It is recommended that, `user options` database flag for Cloud SQL SQL Server instance should not be configured. A user can override these defaults set with `user options` by using the SET statement. Some of these features/options could adversely affect the security of the system if enabled.", + "ImpactStatement": "Setting custom flags via command line on certain instances will cause all omitted flags to be reset to defaults. This may cause you to lose custom flags and could result in unforeseen complications or instance restarts. Because of this, it is recommended you apply these flags changes during a period of low usage.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the SQL Server instance for which you want to enable to database flag. 3. Click `Edit`. 4. Scroll down to the `Flags` section. 5. Click the X next `user options` flag shown 6. Click `Save` to save your changes. 7. Confirm your changes under `Flags` on the Overview page. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List all Cloud SQL database Instances gcloud sql instances list 2. Clear the `user options` database flag for every Cloud SQL SQL Server database instance using either of the below commands. Clearing all flags to their default value gcloud sql instances patch --clear-database-flags OR To clear only `user options` database flag, configure the database flag by overriding the `user options`. Exclude `user options` flag and its value, and keep all other flags you want to configure. gcloud sql instances patch --database-flags [FLAG1=VALUE1,FLAG2=VALUE2] **Note**: This command will overwrite all database flags previously set. To keep those and add new ones, include the values for all flags you want set on the instance; any flag not specifically included is set to its default value. For flags that do not take a value, specify the flag name followed by an equals sign (=).", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the instance to open its `Instance Overview` page 3. Ensure the database flag `user options` that has been set is not listed under the `Database flags` section. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Ensure the below command returns empty result for every Cloud SQL SQL Server database instance gcloud sql instances describe --format=json | jq '.settings.databaseFlags[] | select(.name==user options)|.value' In the output, database flags are listed under the `settings` as the collection `databaseFlags`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "WARNING: This patch modifies database flag values, which may require your instance to be restarted. Check the list of supported flags - https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/sqlserver/flags - to see if your instance will be restarted when this patch is submitted. **Note**: some database flag settings can affect instance availability or stability, and remove the instance from the Cloud SQL SLA. For information about these flags, see Operational Guidelines. **Note**: Configuring the above flag does not restart the Cloud SQL instance.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/sqlserver/flags:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/database-engine/configure-windows/configure-the-user-options-server-configuration-option?view=sql-server-ver15:https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/ms_sql_server_2016_instance/2018-03-09/finding/V-79335", + "DefaultValue": "By default 'user options' is not configured." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.3.5", + "Description": "Ensure 'remote access' Database Flag for Cloud SQL SQL Server Instance Is Set to 'off'", + "Checks": [ + "cloudsql_instance_sqlserver_remote_access_flag" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Cloud SQL Database Services", + "SubSection": "6.3 SQL Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended to set `remote access` database flag for Cloud SQL SQL Server instance to `off`.", + "RationaleStatement": "The `remote access` option controls the execution of stored procedures from local or remote servers on which instances of SQL Server are running. This default value for this option is 1. This grants permission to run local stored procedures from remote servers or remote stored procedures from the local server. To prevent local stored procedures from being run from a remote server or remote stored procedures from being run on the local server, this must be disabled. The Remote Access option controls the execution of local stored procedures on remote servers or remote stored procedures on local server. 'Remote access' functionality can be abused to launch a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack on remote servers by off-loading query processing to a target, hence this should be disabled. This recommendation is applicable to SQL Server database instances.", + "ImpactStatement": "Setting custom flags via command line on certain instances will cause all omitted flags to be reset to defaults. This may cause you to lose custom flags and could result in unforeseen complications or instance restarts. Because of this, it is recommended you apply these flags changes during a period of low usage.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the SQL Server instance for which you want to enable to database flag. 3. Click `Edit`. 4. Scroll down to the `Flags` section. 5. To set a flag that has not been set on the instance before, click `Add item`, choose the flag `remote access` from the drop-down menu, and set its value to `off`. 6. Click `Save` to save your changes. 7. Confirm your changes under `Flags` on the Overview page. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Configure the `remote access` database flag for every Cloud SQL SQL Server database instance using the below command gcloud sql instances patch --database-flags remote access=off **Note**: This command will overwrite all database flags previously set. To keep those and add new ones, include the values for all flags you want set on the instance; any flag not specifically included is set to its default value. For flags that do not take a value, specify the flag name followed by an equals sign (=).", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the instance to open its `Instance Overview` page 3. Ensure the database flag `remote access` that has been set is listed under the `Database flags` section. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Ensure the below command returns `off` for every Cloud SQL SQL Server database instance gcloud sql instances describe --format=json | jq '.settings.databaseFlags[] | select(.name==remote access)|.value' In the output, database flags are listed under the `settings` as the collection `databaseFlags`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "WARNING: This patch modifies database flag values, which may require your instance to be restarted. Check the list of supported flags - https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/sqlserver/flags - to see if your instance will be restarted when this patch is submitted. **Note**: some database flag settings can affect instance availability or stability, and remove the instance from the Cloud SQL SLA. For information about these flags, see Operational Guidelines. **Note**: Configuring the above flag restarts the Cloud SQL instance.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/sqlserver/flags:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/database-engine/configure-windows/configure-the-remote-access-server-configuration-option?view=sql-server-ver15:https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/ms_sql_server_2016_instance/2018-03-09/finding/V-79337", + "DefaultValue": "By default 'remote access' is 'on'." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.3.6", + "Description": "Ensure '3625 (trace flag)' Database Flag for all Cloud SQL SQL Server Instances Is Set to 'on'", + "Checks": [ + "cloudsql_instance_sqlserver_trace_flag" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Cloud SQL Database Services", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended to set `3625 (trace flag)` database flag for Cloud SQL SQL Server instance to `on`.", + "RationaleStatement": "Microsoft SQL Trace Flags are frequently used to diagnose performance issues or to debug stored procedures or complex computer systems, but they may also be recommended by Microsoft Support to address behavior that is negatively impacting a specific workload. All documented trace flags and those recommended by Microsoft Support are fully supported in a production environment when used as directed. `3625(trace log)` Limits the amount of information returned to users who are not members of the sysadmin fixed server role, by masking the parameters of some error messages using '******'. Setting this in a Google Cloud flag for the instance allows for security through obscurity and prevents the disclosure of sensitive information, hence this is recommended to set this flag globally to on to prevent the flag having been left off, or changed by bad actors. This recommendation is applicable to SQL Server database instances.", + "ImpactStatement": "Changing flags on a database may cause it to be restarted. The best time to do this is at a time where there is low usage.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the SQL Server instance for which you want to enable to database flag. 3. Click `Edit`. 4. Scroll down to the `Flags` section. 5. To set a flag that has not been set on the instance before, click `Add item`, choose the flag `3625` from the drop-down menu, and set its value to `on`. 6. Click `Save` to save your changes. 7. Confirm your changes under `Flags` on the Overview page. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Configure the `3625` database flag for every Cloud SQL SQL Server database instance using the below command. gcloud sql instances patch --database-flags 3625=on **Note**: This command will overwrite all database flags previously set. To keep those and add new ones, include the values for all flags you want set on the instance; any flag not specifically included is set to its default value. For flags that do not take a value, specify the flag name followed by an equals sign (=).", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the instance to open its `Instance Overview` page 3. Ensure the database flag `3625` that has been set is listed under the `Database flags` section. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Ensure the below command returns `on` for every Cloud SQL SQL Server database instance gcloud sql instances describe --format=json | jq '.settings.databaseFlags[] | select(.name==3625)|.value' ", + "AdditionalInformation": "WARNING: This patch modifies database flag values, which may require your instance to be restarted. Check the list of supported flags - https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/sqlserver/flags - to see if your instance will be restarted when this patch is submitted. **Note**: some database flag settings can affect instance availability or stability, and remove the instance from the Cloud SQL SLA. For information about these flags, see Operational Guidelines. **Note**: Configuring the above flag restarts the Cloud SQL instance.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/sqlserver/flags:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/t-sql/database-console-commands/dbcc-traceon-trace-flags-transact-sql?view=sql-server-ver15#trace-flags:https://github.com/ktaranov/sqlserver-kit/blob/master/SQL%20Server%20Trace%20Flag.md", + "DefaultValue": "MS SQL Server implementations by default have trace flags, including the '3625' flag, turned off, as they are used for logging purposes.", + "SubSection": "6.3 SQL Server" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.3.7", + "Description": "Ensure 'contained database authentication' Database Flag for Cloud SQL SQL Server Instance Is Set to 'off'", + "Checks": [ + "cloudsql_instance_sqlserver_contained_database_authentication_flag" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Cloud SQL Database Services", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "A contained database includes all database settings and metadata required to define the database and has no configuration dependencies on the instance of the Database Engine where the database is installed. Users can connect to the database without authenticating a login at the Database Engine level. Isolating the database from the Database Engine makes it possible to easily move the database to another instance of SQL Server. Contained databases have some unique threats that should be understood and mitigated by SQL Server Database Engine administrators. Most of the threats are related to the USER WITH PASSWORD authentication process, which moves the authentication boundary from the Database Engine level to the database level, hence this is recommended not to enable this flag. This recommendation is applicable to SQL Server database instances.", + "RationaleStatement": "When contained databases are enabled, database users with the ALTER ANY USER permission, such as members of the db_owner and db_accessadmin database roles, can grant access to databases and by doing so, grant access to the instance of SQL Server. This means that control over access to the server is no longer limited to members of the sysadmin and securityadmin fixed server role, and logins with the server level CONTROL SERVER and ALTER ANY LOGIN permission. It is recommended to set `contained database authentication` database flag for Cloud SQL on the SQL Server instance to `off`.", + "ImpactStatement": "When `contained database authentication` is off (0) for the instance, contained databases cannot be created, or attached to the Database Engine. Setting custom flags via command line on certain instances will cause all omitted flags to be reset to defaults. This may cause you to lose custom flags and could result in unforeseen complications or instance restarts. Because of this, it is recommended you apply these flags changes during a period of low usage.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the SQL Server instance for which you want to enable to database flag. 3. Click `Edit`. 4. Scroll down to the `Flags` section. 5. If the flag `contained database authentication` is present and its value is set to 'on', then change it to 'off'. 6. Click `Save`. 7. Confirm the changes under `Flags` on the Overview page. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. If any Cloud SQL for SQL Server instance has the database flag `contained database authentication` set to 'on', then change it to 'off' using the below command: gcloud sql instances patch --database-flags contained database authentication=off **Note**: This command will overwrite all database flags previously set. To keep those and add new ones, include the values for all flags to be set on the instance; any flag not specifically included is set to its default value. For flags that do not take a value, specify the flag name followed by an equals sign (=).", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the instance to open its `Instance Overview` page 3. Under the 'Database flags' section, if the database flag `contained database authentication` is present, then ensure that it is set to 'off'. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Ensure the below command returns `off` for any Cloud SQL for SQL Server database instance. gcloud sql instances describe --format=json | jq '.settings.databaseFlags[] | select(.name==contained database authentication)|.value' ", + "AdditionalInformation": "WARNING: This patch modifies database flag values, which may require your instance to be restarted. Check the list of supported flags - https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/sqlserver/flags - to see if your instance will be restarted when this patch is submitted. **Note**: Some database flag settings can affect instance availability or stability, and remove the instance from the Cloud SQL SLA. For information about these flags, see Operational Guidelines. **Note**: Configuring the above flag does not restart the Cloud SQL instance.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/sqlserver/flags:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/database-engine/configure-windows/contained-database-authentication-server-configuration-option?view=sql-server-ver15:https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/databases/security-best-practices-with-contained-databases?view=sql-server-ver15", + "DefaultValue": "", + "SubSection": "6.3 SQL Server" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.4", + "Description": "Ensure That the Cloud SQL Database Instance Requires All Incoming Connections To Use SSL", + "Checks": [ + "cloudsql_instance_ssl_connections" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Cloud SQL Database Services", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended to enforce all incoming connections to SQL database instance to use SSL.", + "RationaleStatement": "SQL database connections if successfully trapped (MITM); can reveal sensitive data like credentials, database queries, query outputs etc. For security, it is recommended to always use SSL encryption when connecting to your instance. This recommendation is applicable for Postgresql, MySql generation 1, MySql generation 2 and SQL Server 2017 instances.", + "ImpactStatement": "After enforcing SSL requirement for connections, existing client will not be able to communicate with Cloud SQL database instance unless they use SSL encrypted connections to communicate to Cloud SQL database instance.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Click on an instance name to see its configuration overview. 3. In the left-side panel, select `Connections`. 3. In the `security` section, select SSL mode as `Allow only SSL connections`. 4. Under `Configure SSL server certificates` click `Create new certificate` and save the setting **From Google Cloud CLI** To enforce SSL encryption for an instance run the command: gcloud sql instances patch INSTANCE_NAME --ssl-mode= ENCRYPTED_ONLY Note: `RESTART` is required for type MySQL Generation 1 Instances (`backendType: FIRST_GEN`) to get this configuration in effect.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Click on an instance name to see its configuration overview. 3. In the left-side panel, select `Connections`. 3. In the `Security` section, ensure that `Allow only SSL connections` option is selected. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Get the detailed configuration for every SQL database instance using the following command: gcloud sql instances list --format=json Ensure that section `settings: ipConfiguration` has the parameter `sslMode` set to `ENCRYPTED_ONLY `.", + "AdditionalInformation": "By default `Settings: ipConfiguration` has no `authorizedNetworks` set/configured. In that case even if by default `sslMode` is not set, which is equivalent to `sslMode:ALLOW_UNENCRYPTED_AND_ENCRYPTED ` there is no risk as instance cannot be accessed outside of the network unless `authorizedNetworks` are configured. However, If default for `sslMode` is not updated to `ENCRYPTED_ONLY ` any `authorizedNetworks` created later on will not enforce SSL only connection.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/postgres/configure-ssl-instance/", + "DefaultValue": "By default parameter `settings: ipConfiguration: sslMode` is not set which is equivalent to `sslMode:ALLOW_UNENCRYPTED_AND_ENCRYPTED`.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.5", + "Description": "Ensure That Cloud SQL Database Instances Do Not Implicitly Whitelist All Public IP Addresses", + "Checks": [ + "cloudsql_instance_public_access" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Cloud SQL Database Services", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Database Server should accept connections only from trusted Network(s)/IP(s) and restrict access from public IP addresses.", + "RationaleStatement": "To minimize attack surface on a Database server instance, only trusted/known and required IP(s) should be white-listed to connect to it. An authorized network should not have IPs/networks configured to `0.0.0.0/0` which will allow access to the instance from anywhere in the world. Note that authorized networks apply only to instances with public IPs.", + "ImpactStatement": "The Cloud SQL database instance would not be available to public IP addresses.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Click the instance name to open its `Instance details` page. 3. Under the `Configuration` section click `Edit configurations` 4. Under `Configuration options` expand the `Connectivity` section. 5. Click the `delete` icon for the authorized network `0.0.0.0/0`. 6. Click `Save` to update the instance. **From Google Cloud CLI** Update the authorized network list by dropping off any addresses. gcloud sql instances patch --authorized-networks=IP_ADDR1,IP_ADDR2... **Prevention:** To prevent new SQL instances from being configured to accept incoming connections from any IP addresses, set up a `Restrict Authorized Networks on Cloud SQL instances` Organization Policy at: [https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/orgpolicies/sql-restrictAuthorizedNetworks](https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/orgpolicies/sql-restrictAuthorizedNetworks).", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Click the instance name to open its `Instance details` page. 3. Under the `Configuration` section click `Edit configurations` 4. Under `Configuration options` expand the `Connectivity` section. 5. Ensure that no authorized network is configured to allow `0.0.0.0/0`. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Get detailed configuration for every Cloud SQL database instance. gcloud sql instances list --format=json Ensure that the section `settings: ipConfiguration : authorizedNetworks` does not have any parameter `value` containing `0.0.0.0/0`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "There is no IPv6 configuration found for Google cloud SQL server services.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/mysql/configure-ip:https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/orgpolicies/sql-restrictAuthorizedNetworks:https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/organization-policy/org-policy-constraints:https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/mysql/connection-org-policy", + "DefaultValue": "By default, authorized networks are not configured. Remote connection to Cloud SQL database instance is not possible unless authorized networks are configured.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.6", + "Description": "Ensure Cloud SQL Database Instances Have IAM Database Authentication Enabled", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Cloud SQL Database Services", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "It is recommended to enable IAM database authentication for Cloud SQL instances (PostgreSQL and MySQL) to eliminate static password-based authentication and instead use short-lived IAM tokens for database access. When enabled, database users can be created that authenticate via IAM, and connections use automatically-generated, short-lived tokens instead of static passwords. This recommendation is applicable to Cloud SQL for PostgreSQL and Cloud SQL for MySQL instances. Cloud SQL for SQL Server does not support IAM database authentication.", + "RationaleStatement": "IAM database authentication eliminates static database passwords by using short-lived IAM tokens for database access. This provides automatic credential rotation, centralized access control through Cloud IAM, and immediate revocation capabilities without password distribution across applications. Database access is correlated with GCP IAM principals in Cloud Logging, enabling better audit trails and attribution of database queries to specific service accounts or users. This recommendation is applicable to Cloud SQL for PostgreSQL and MySQL instances.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling IAM database authentication may require application changes, including updating connection methods and replacing password-based database users with IAM principals. Existing users and scripts that depend on static credentials may need to be reworked, and rollout should be coordinated carefully to avoid service disruption.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud CLI**\n\n1. List all Cloud SQL instances: `gcloud sql instances list`.\n2. For every PostgreSQL instance, verify the IAM authentication flag is enabled: `gcloud sql instances describe --format=\"json\" | jq '.settings.databaseFlags[] | select(.name==\"cloudsql.iam_authentication\")'`. It should return value `on`.\n3. For every MySQL instance, verify the flag `cloudsql_iam_authentication` is set to `on`. If the command returns no output, the flag is not set.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud CLI**\n\n1. For PostgreSQL instances, enable IAM authentication: `gcloud sql instances patch --database-flags=cloudsql.iam_authentication=on`. For MySQL instances, use `cloudsql_iam_authentication=on`. Note: patching database flags overwrites previously set flags, so include all required flags.\n2. Create database users configured for IAM authentication using `gcloud sql users create ... --type=CLOUD_IAM_USER` (or `CLOUD_IAM_SERVICE_ACCOUNT`).\n3. Grant the necessary privileges to the database users via SQL GRANT commands.\n4. Ensure IAM principals have the roles `roles/cloudsql.client` and `roles/cloudsql.instanceUser`.\n5. Test the configuration by connecting using IAM authentication via the Cloud SQL Proxy.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "By default, IAM database authentication is not enabled on Cloud SQL instances." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.7", + "Description": "Ensure That Cloud SQL Database Instances Do Not Have Public IPs", + "Checks": [ + "cloudsql_instance_public_access" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Cloud SQL Database Services", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended to configure Second Generation Sql instance to use private IPs instead of public IPs.", + "RationaleStatement": "To lower the organization's attack surface, Cloud SQL databases should not have public IPs. Private IPs provide improved network security and lower latency for your application.", + "ImpactStatement": "Removing the public IP address on SQL instances may break some applications that relied on it for database connectivity.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console: [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances) 2. Click the instance name to open its Instance details page. 3. Select the `Connections` tab. 4. Deselect the `Public IP` checkbox. 5. Click `Save` to update the instance. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. For every instance remove its public IP and assign a private IP instead: gcloud sql instances patch --network= --no-assign-ip 2. Confirm the changes using the following command:: gcloud sql instances describe **Prevention:** To prevent new SQL instances from getting configured with public IP addresses, set up a `Restrict Public IP access on Cloud SQL instances` Organization policy at: [https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/orgpolicies/sql-restrictPublicIp](https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/orgpolicies/sql-restrictPublicIp).", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console: [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances) 2. Ensure that every instance has a private IP address and no public IP address configured. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List all Cloud SQL database instances using the following command: gcloud sql instances list 2. For every instance of type `instanceType: CLOUD_SQL_INSTANCE` with `backendType: SECOND_GEN`, get detailed configuration. Ignore instances of type `READ_REPLICA_INSTANCE` because these instances inherit their settings from the primary instance. Also, note that first generation instances cannot be configured to have a private IP address. gcloud sql instances describe 3. Ensure that the setting `ipAddresses` has an IP address configured of `type: PRIVATE` and has no IP address of `type: PRIMARY`. `PRIMARY` IP addresses are public addresses. An instance can have both a private and public address at the same time. Note also that you cannot use private IP with First Generation instances.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Replicas inherit their private IP status from their primary instance. You cannot configure a private IP directly on a replica.", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/mysql/configure-private-ip:https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/mysql/private-ip:https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/organization-policy/org-policy-constraints:https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/orgpolicies/sql-restrictPublicIp", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Cloud Sql instances have a public IP.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.8", + "Description": "Ensure That Cloud SQL Database Instances Are Configured With Automated Backups", + "Checks": [ + "cloudsql_instance_automated_backups" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Cloud SQL Database Services", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended to have all SQL database instances set to enable automated backups.", + "RationaleStatement": "Backups provide a way to restore a Cloud SQL instance to recover lost data or recover from a problem with that instance. Automated backups need to be set for any instance that contains data that should be protected from loss or damage. This recommendation is applicable for SQL Server, PostgreSql, MySql generation 1 and MySql generation 2 instances.", + "ImpactStatement": "Automated Backups will increase required size of storage and costs associated with it.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Select the instance where the backups need to be configured. 3. Click `Edit`. 4. In the `Backups` section, check `Enable automated backups', and choose a backup window. 5. Click `Save`. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List all Cloud SQL database instances using the following command: gcloud sql instances list --format=json | jq '. | map(select(.instanceType != READ_REPLICA_INSTANCE)) | .[].name' NOTE: gcloud command has been added with the filter to exclude read-replicas instances, as GCP do not provide Automated Backups for read-replica instances. 2. Enable `Automated backups` for every Cloud SQL database instance using the below command: gcloud sql instances patch --backup-start-time <[HH:MM]> The `backup-start-time` parameter is specified in 24-hour time, in the UTC±00 time zone, and specifies the start of a 4-hour backup window. Backups can start any time during the backup window.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to the Cloud SQL Instances page in the Google Cloud Console by visiting [https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances](https://console.cloud.google.com/sql/instances). 2. Click the instance name to open its instance details page. 3. Go to the `Backups` menu. 4. Ensure that `Automated backups` is set to `Enabled` and `Backup time` is mentioned. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. List all Cloud SQL database instances using the following command: gcloud sql instances list --format=json | jq '. | map(select(.instanceType != READ_REPLICA_INSTANCE)) | .[].name' NOTE: gcloud command has been added with the filter to exclude read-replicas instances, as GCP do not provide Automated Backups for read-replica instances. 2. Ensure that the below command returns `True` for every Cloud SQL database instance. gcloud sql instances describe --format=value('Enabled':settings.backupConfiguration.enabled) ", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/mysql/backup-recovery/backups:https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/postgres/backup-recovery/backups:https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/sqlserver/backup-recovery/backups:https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/mysql/backup-recovery/backing-up:https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/postgres/backup-recovery/backing-up:https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/sqlserver/backup-recovery/backing-up", + "DefaultValue": "By default, automated backups are not configured for Cloud SQL instances.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.9", + "Description": "Ensure Cloud SQL Database Instances Have Deletion Protection Enabled", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Cloud SQL Database Services", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that deletion protection is enabled on all Cloud SQL database instances to prevent accidental or unauthorized deletion. This setting safeguards critical databases by requiring explicit disabling of deletion protection before deletion, reducing the risk of data loss through human error or malicious activity.", + "RationaleStatement": "Cloud SQL instances without deletion protection can be permanently deleted with a single API call or console action, allowing compromised credentials, operational errors, or malicious insiders to cause catastrophic data loss. Deletion protection provides a critical safeguard against inadvertent or malicious deletion of production databases. By requiring deliberate action to disable deletion protection before an instance can be deleted, organizations mitigate risks associated with accidental data deletion and enhance the overall resilience of their data storage platform. This control is particularly important for production workloads where data loss could result in significant business disruption, regulatory compliance violations, and reputational damage.", + "ImpactStatement": "There is no performance impact to enabling deletion protection on Cloud SQL instances. The setting only affects delete operations. Administrators will need to explicitly disable deletion protection before deleting an instance, adding an additional step to the deletion workflow.", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud CLI**\n\n1. List all Cloud SQL database instances to identify those without deletion protection: `gcloud sql instances list --format=\"table(name,settings.deletionProtectionEnabled)\"`.\n2. For each instance, verify deletion protection is enabled: `gcloud sql instances describe --format=\"value(settings.deletionProtectionEnabled)\"`. The command should return `True`. If it returns `False` or empty, deletion protection is not enabled.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud CLI**\n\n1. To enable deletion protection on an existing Cloud SQL instance: `gcloud sql instances patch --deletion-protection`.\n2. To enable deletion protection when creating a new Cloud SQL instance, include the `--deletion-protection` flag in the `gcloud sql instances create` command.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "By default, deletion protection is not enabled on Cloud SQL database instances." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.1", + "Description": "Ensure That BigQuery Datasets Are Not Anonymously or Publicly Accessible", + "Checks": [ + "bigquery_dataset_public_access" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 BigQuery", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "It is recommended that the IAM policy on BigQuery datasets does not allow anonymous and/or public access.", + "RationaleStatement": "Granting permissions to `allUsers` or `allAuthenticatedUsers` allows anyone to access the dataset. Such access might not be desirable if sensitive data is being stored in the dataset. Therefore, ensure that anonymous and/or public access to a dataset is not allowed.", + "ImpactStatement": "The dataset is not publicly accessible. Explicit modification of IAM privileges would be necessary to make them publicly accessible.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `BigQuery` by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/bigquery](https://console.cloud.google.com/bigquery). 2. Select the dataset from 'Resources'. 3. Click `SHARING` near the right side of the window and select `Permissions`. 4. Review each attached role. 5. Click the delete icon for each member `allUsers` or `allAuthenticatedUsers`. On the popup click `Remove`. **From Google Cloud CLI** List the name of all datasets. bq ls Retrieve the data set details: bq show --format=prettyjson PROJECT_ID:DATASET_NAME > PATH_TO_FILE In the access section of the JSON file, update the dataset information to remove all roles containing `allUsers` or `allAuthenticatedUsers`. Update the dataset: bq update --source PATH_TO_FILE PROJECT_ID:DATASET_NAME **Prevention:** You can prevent Bigquery dataset from becoming publicly accessible by setting up the `Domain restricted sharing` organization policy at: https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/orgpolicies/iam-allowedPolicyMemberDomains .", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `BigQuery` by visiting: [https://console.cloud.google.com/bigquery](https://console.cloud.google.com/bigquery). 2. Select a dataset from `Resources`. 3. Click `SHARING` near the right side of the window and select `Permissions`. 4. Validate that none of the attached roles contain `allUsers` or `allAuthenticatedUsers`. **From Google Cloud CLI** List the name of all datasets. bq ls Retrieve each dataset details using the following command: bq show PROJECT_ID:DATASET_NAME Ensure that `allUsers` and `allAuthenticatedUsers` have not been granted access to the dataset.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/bigquery/docs/dataset-access-controls", + "DefaultValue": "By default, BigQuery datasets are not publicly accessible.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.2", + "Description": "Ensure That All BigQuery Tables Are Encrypted With Customer-Managed Encryption Key (CMEK)", + "Checks": [ + "bigquery_table_cmk_encryption" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 BigQuery", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "BigQuery by default encrypts the data as rest by employing `Envelope Encryption` using Google managed cryptographic keys. The data is encrypted using the `data encryption keys` and data encryption keys themselves are further encrypted using `key encryption keys`. This is seamless and do not require any additional input from the user. However, if you want to have greater control, Customer-managed encryption keys (CMEK) can be used as encryption key management solution for BigQuery Data Sets. If CMEK is used, the CMEK is used to encrypt the data encryption keys instead of using google-managed encryption keys.", + "RationaleStatement": "BigQuery by default encrypts the data as rest by employing `Envelope Encryption` using Google managed cryptographic keys. This is seamless and does not require any additional input from the user. For greater control over the encryption, customer-managed encryption keys (CMEK) can be used as encryption key management solution for BigQuery tables. The CMEK is used to encrypt the data encryption keys instead of using google-managed encryption keys. BigQuery stores the table and CMEK association and the encryption/decryption is done automatically. Applying the Default Customer-managed keys on BigQuery data sets ensures that all the new tables created in the future will be encrypted using CMEK but existing tables need to be updated to use CMEK individually. Note: Google does not store your keys on its servers and cannot access your protected data unless you provide the key. This also means that if you forget or lose your key, there is no way for Google to recover the key or to recover any data encrypted with the lost key. ", + "ImpactStatement": "Using Customer-managed encryption keys (CMEK) will incur additional labor-hour investment to create, protect, and manage the keys.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud CLI** Use the following command to copy the data. The source and the destination needs to be same in case copying to the original table. bq cp --destination_kms_key source_dataset.source_table destination_dataset.destination_table ", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `Analytics` 2. Go to `BigQuery` 3. Under `SQL Workspace`, select the project 4. Select Data Set, select the table 5. Go to `Details` tab 6. Under `Table info`, verify `Customer-managed key` is present. 7. Repeat for each table in all data sets for all projects. **From Google Cloud CLI** List all dataset names bq ls Use the following command to view the table details. Verify the `kmsKeyName` is present. bq show ", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/bigquery/docs/customer-managed-encryption", + "DefaultValue": "Google Managed keys are used as `key encryption keys`.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.3", + "Description": "Ensure That a Default Customer-Managed Encryption Key (CMEK) Is Specified for All BigQuery Data Sets", + "Checks": [ + "bigquery_dataset_cmk_encryption" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 BigQuery", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "BigQuery by default encrypts the data as rest by employing `Envelope Encryption` using Google managed cryptographic keys. The data is encrypted using the `data encryption keys` and data encryption keys themselves are further encrypted using `key encryption keys`. This is seamless and do not require any additional input from the user. However, if you want to have greater control, Customer-managed encryption keys (CMEK) can be used as encryption key management solution for BigQuery Data Sets.", + "RationaleStatement": "BigQuery by default encrypts the data as rest by employing `Envelope Encryption` using Google managed cryptographic keys. This is seamless and does not require any additional input from the user. For greater control over the encryption, customer-managed encryption keys (CMEK) can be used as encryption key management solution for BigQuery Data Sets. Setting a Default Customer-managed encryption key (CMEK) for a data set ensure any tables created in future will use the specified CMEK if none other is provided. Note: Google does not store your keys on its servers and cannot access your protected data unless you provide the key. This also means that if you forget or lose your key, there is no way for Google to recover the key or to recover any data encrypted with the lost key. ", + "ImpactStatement": "Using Customer-managed encryption keys (CMEK) will incur additional labor-hour investment to create, protect, and manage the keys.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud CLI** The default CMEK for existing data sets can be updated by specifying the default key in the `EncryptionConfiguration.kmsKeyName` field when calling the `datasets.insert` or `datasets.patch` methods", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Go to `Analytics` 2. Go to `BigQuery` 3. Under `Analysis` click on `SQL Workspaces`, select the project 4. Select Data Set 5. Ensure `Customer-managed key` is present under `Dataset info` section. 6. Repeat for each data set in all projects. **From Google Cloud CLI** List all dataset names bq ls Use the following command to view each dataset details. bq show Verify the `kmsKeyName` is present.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/bigquery/docs/customer-managed-encryption", + "DefaultValue": "Google Managed keys are used as `key encryption keys`.", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.4", + "Description": "Ensure all data in BigQuery has been classified", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 BigQuery", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "BigQuery tables can contain sensitive data that for security purposes should be discovered, monitored, classified, and protected. Google Cloud's Sensitive Data Protection tools can automatically provide data classification of all BigQuery data across an organization.", + "RationaleStatement": "Using a cloud service or 3rd party software to continuously monitor and automate the process of data discovery and classification for BigQuery tables is an important part of protecting the data. Sensitive Data Protection is a fully managed data protection and data privacy platform that uses machine learning and pattern matching to discover and classify sensitive data in Google Cloud.", + "ImpactStatement": "There is a cost associated with using Sensitive Data Protection. There is also typically a cost associated with 3rd party tools that perform similar processes and protection.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**Enable profiling:** 1. Go to Cloud DLP by visiting https://console.cloud.google.com/dlp/landing/dataProfiles/configurations 1. Click Create Configuration 1. For projects follow https://cloud.google.com/dlp/docs/profile-project. For organizations or folders follow https://cloud.google.com/dlp/docs/profile-org-folder **Review findings:** - Columns or tables with high data risk have evidence of sensitive information without additional protections. To lower the data risk score, consider doing the following: - For columns containing sensitive data, apply a BigQuery policy tag to restrict access to accounts with specific access rights. - De-identify the raw sensitive data using de-identification techniques like masking and tokenization. **Incorporate findings into your security and governance operations:** - Enable sending findings into your security and posture services. You can publish data profiles to Security Command Center and Chronicle. - Automate remediation or enable alerting of new or changed data risk with Pub/Sub.", + "AuditProcedure": "1. Go to Cloud DLP by visiting https://console.cloud.google.com/dlp/landing/dataProfiles/configurations. 2. Verify there is a discovery scan configuration either for the organization or project.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/dlp/docs/data-profiles:https://cloud.google.com/dlp/docs/analyze-data-profiles:https://cloud.google.com/dlp/docs/data-profiles-remediation:https://cloud.google.com/dlp/docs/send-profiles-to-scc:https://cloud.google.com/dlp/docs/profile-org-folder#chronicle:https://cloud.google.com/dlp/docs/profile-org-folder#publish-pubsub", + "DefaultValue": "", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1", + "Description": "Ensure that Dataproc Cluster is encrypted using Customer-Managed Encryption Key", + "Checks": [ + "dataproc_encrypted_with_cmks_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Dataproc", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "When you use Dataproc, cluster and job data is stored on Persistent Disks (PDs) associated with the Compute Engine VMs in your cluster and in a Cloud Storage staging bucket. This PD and bucket data is encrypted using a Google-generated data encryption key (DEK) and key encryption key (KEK). The CMEK feature allows you to create, use, and revoke the key encryption key (KEK). Google still controls the data encryption key (DEK).", + "RationaleStatement": "Cloud services offer the ability to protect data related to those services using encryption keys managed by the customer within Cloud KMS. These encryption keys are called customer-managed encryption keys (CMEK). When you protect data in Google Cloud services with CMEK, the CMEK key is within your control.", + "ImpactStatement": "Using Customer Managed Keys involves additional overhead in maintenance by administrators.", + "RemediationProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Login to the GCP Console and navigate to the Dataproc Cluster page by visiting https://console.cloud.google.com/dataproc/clusters. 1. Select the project from the projects dropdown list. 1. On the `Dataproc Cluster` page, click on the `Create Cluster` to create a new cluster with Customer managed encryption keys. 1. On `Create a cluster` page, perform below steps: - Inside `Set up cluster` section perform below steps: -In the `Name` textbox, provide a name for your cluster. - From `Location` select the location in which you want to deploy a cluster. - Configure other configurations as per your requirements. - Inside `Configure Nodes` and `Customize cluster` section configure the settings as per your requirements. - Inside `Manage security` section, perform below steps: - From `Encryption`, select `Customer-managed key`. - Select a customer-managed key from dropdown list. - Ensure that the selected KMS Key have Cloud KMS CryptoKey Encrypter/Decrypter role assign to Dataproc Cluster service account (serviceAccount:service-@compute-system.iam.gserviceaccount.com). - Click on `Create` to create a cluster. - Once the cluster is created migrate all your workloads from the older cluster to the new cluster and delete the old cluster by performing the below steps: - On the `Clusters` page, select the old cluster and click on `Delete cluster`. - On the `Confirm deletion` window, click on `Confirm` to delete the cluster. - Repeat step above for other Dataproc clusters available in the selected project. - Change the project from the project dropdown list and repeat the remediation procedure for other Dataproc clusters available in other projects. **From Google Cloud CLI** Before creating cluster ensure that the selected KMS Key have Cloud KMS CryptoKey Encrypter/Decrypter role assign to Dataproc Cluster service account (serviceAccount:service-@compute-system.iam.gserviceaccount.com). Run clusters create command to create new cluster with customer-managed key: gcloud dataproc clusters create --region=us-central1 --gce-pd-kms-key= The above command will create a new cluster in the selected region. Once the cluster is created migrate all your workloads from the older cluster to the new cluster and Run clusters delete command to delete cluster: gcloud dataproc clusters delete --region=us-central1 Repeat step no. 1 to create a new Dataproc cluster. Change the project by running the below command and repeat the remediation procedure for other projects: gcloud config set project ", + "AuditProcedure": "**From Google Cloud Console** 1. Login to the GCP Console and navigate to the Dataproc Cluster page by visiting https://console.cloud.google.com/dataproc/clusters. 1. Select the project from the project dropdown list. 1. On the `Dataproc Clusters` page, select the cluster and click on the Name attribute value that you want to examine. 1. On the `details` page, select the `Configurations` tab. 1. On the `Configurations` tab, check the `Encryption type` configuration attribute value. If the value is set to `Google-managed key`, then Dataproc Cluster is not encrypted with Customer managed encryption keys. Repeat step no. 3 - 5 for other Dataproc Clusters available in the selected project. 6. Change the project from the project dropdown list and repeat the audit procedure for other projects. **From Google Cloud CLI** 1. Run clusters list command to list all the Dataproc Clusters available in the region: gcloud dataproc clusters list --region='us-central1' 2. Run clusters describe command to get the key details of the selected cluster: gcloud dataproc clusters describe --region=us-central1 --flatten=config.encryptionConfig.gcePdKmsKeyName 3. If the above command output return null, then the selected cluster is not encrypted with Customer managed encryption keys. 4. Repeat step no. 2 and 3 for other Dataproc Clusters available in the selected region. Change the region by updating --region and repeat step no. 2 for other clusters available in the project. Change the project by running the below command and repeat the audit procedure for other Dataproc clusters available in other projects: gcloud config set project ", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://cloud.google.com/docs/security/encryption/default-encryption", + "DefaultValue": "", + "SubSection": null + } + ] + } + ] +} diff --git a/prowler/compliance/github/cis_1.2.0_github.json b/prowler/compliance/github/cis_1.2.0_github.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..840b5aa3d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/compliance/github/cis_1.2.0_github.json @@ -0,0 +1,2574 @@ +{ + "Framework": "CIS", + "Name": "CIS GitHub Benchmark v1.2.0", + "Version": "1.2.0", + "Provider": "GitHub", + "Description": "This document provides prescriptive guidance for establishing a secure configuration posture for securing GitHub.", + "Requirements": [ + { + "Id": "1.1.1", + "Description": "Manage all code projects in a version control platform.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.1 Code Changes", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Manage all code projects in a version control platform.", + "RationaleStatement": "Version control platforms keep track of every modification to code. They represent the cornerstone of code security, as well as allowing for better code collaboration within engineering teams. With granular access management, change tracking, and key signing of code edits, version control platforms are the first step in securing the software supply chain.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Upload existing code projects to a dedicated Github organization and repositories and create an identity for each active team member who might contribute or need access to it.", + "AuditProcedure": "Ensure that all code activity is managed through Github repository for every micro-service or application developed by an organization.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.2", + "Description": "Use a task management system to trace any code back to its associated task.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.1 Code Changes", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Use a task management system to trace any code back to its associated task.", + "RationaleStatement": "The ability to trace each piece of code back to its associated task simplifies the Agile and DevOps process by enabling transparency of any code changes. This allows faster remediation of bugs and security issues, while also making it harder to push unauthorized code changes to sensitive projects. Additionally, using a task management system simplifies achieving compliance, as it is easier to track each regulation.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Use a task management system to manage tasks as the starting point for each code change. Whether it is a new feature, bug fix, or security fix - all should originate from a dedicated task (ticket) in your organization's task management system. These tasks should also be linked to the code changes themselves in a way that is easy to follow: from code to task, and from task back to code.", + "AuditProcedure": "Ensure every code change can be traced back to its origin task in a task management system.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.3", + "Description": "Ensure that every code change is reviewed and approved by two authorized contributors who are both strongly authenticated - using Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), from the team relevant to the code change.", + "Checks": [ + "repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.1 Code Changes", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that every code change is reviewed and approved by two authorized contributors who are both strongly authenticated - using Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), from the team relevant to the code change.", + "RationaleStatement": "To prevent malicious or unauthorized code changes, the first layer of protection is the process of code review. This process involves engineer teammates reviewing each other's code for errors, optimizations, and general knowledge-sharing. With proper peer reviews in place, an organization can detect unwanted code changes very early in the process of release. In order to help facilitate code review, companies should employ automation to verify that every code change has been reviewed and approved by at least two team members before it is pushed into the code base. These team members should be from the team that is related to the code change, so it will be a meaningful review.", + "ImpactStatement": "To enforce a code review requirement, verification for a minimum of two reviewers must be put into place. This will ensure new code will not be able to be pushed to the code base before it has received two independent approvals.", + "RemediationProcedure": "For every code repository in use, perform the next steps to require two approvals from the specific code repository team in order to push new code to the code base:\n\n1. On GitHub, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", verify that there is at least one rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, click **Add rule**.\n5. If you added the rule, under \"Branch name pattern\", type the branch name or pattern you want to protect.\n6. Check **Require a pull request before merging** and **Require approvals**, and set **Required number of approvals before merging** to 2.\n5. Click **Create** or **Save changes**.", + "AuditProcedure": "For every code repository in use, perform the next steps to verify that two approvals from the specific code repository team are required to push new code to the code base:\n\n1. On GitHub, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", verify that there is at least one rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, you are not compliant.\n5. Ensure that **Require a pull request before merging** and **Require approvals** are checked, and verify that **Required number of approvals before merging** is set to 2.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "0" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.4", + "Description": "Ensure that when a proposed code change is updated, previous approvals are declined, and new approvals are required.", + "Checks": [ + "repository_default_branch_dismisses_stale_reviews" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.1 Code Changes", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that when a proposed code change is updated, previous approvals are declined, and new approvals are required.", + "RationaleStatement": "An approval process is necessary when code changes are suggested. Through this approval process, however, changes can still be made to the original proposal even after some approvals have already been given. This means malicious code can find its way into the code base even if the organization has enforced a review policy. To ensure this is not possible, outdated approvals must be declined when changes to the suggestion are introduced.", + "ImpactStatement": "If new code changes are pushed to a specific proposal, all previously accepted code change proposals must be declined.", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each code repository in use, perform the next steps to enforce dismissal of given approvals to code change suggestions if those suggestions were updated:\n\n1. On GitHub, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", verify that there is at least one rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, click **Add rule**.\n5. If you added the rule, under \"Branch name pattern\", type the branch name or pattern you want to protect.\n6. Select **Require pull request reviews before merging** and then **Dismiss stale pull request approvals when new commits are pushed**.\n5. Click **Create** or **Save changes**.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each code repository in use, perform the next steps to verify that each updated code suggestion declines the previously received approvals:\n\n1. On GitHub, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", verify that there is at least one rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, you are not compliant.\n5. Ensure that **Require a pull request before merging** is checked, and verify that **Dismiss stale pull request approvals when new commits are pushed** is checked.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.5", + "Description": "Only trusted users should be allowed to dismiss code change reviews.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.1 Code Changes", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Only trusted users should be allowed to dismiss code change reviews.", + "RationaleStatement": "Dismissing a code change review permits users to merge new suggested code changes without going through the standard process of approvals. Controlling who can perform this action will prevent malicious actors from simply dismissing the required reviews to code changes and merging malicious or dysfunctional code into the code base.", + "ImpactStatement": "In cases where a code change proposal has been updated since it was last reviewed and the person who reviewed it isn't available for approval, a general collaborator would not be able to merge their code changes until a user with \"dismiss review\" abilities could dismiss the open review.\n\nUsers who are not allowed to dismiss code change reviews will not be permitted to do so, and thus are unable to waive the standard flow of approvals.", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each code repository in use, perform the next steps to restrict dismissal of code changes reviews unless it is necessary:\n\n1. On GitHub, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", verify that there is at least one rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, click **Add rule**.\n5. If you added the rule, under \"Branch name pattern\", type the branch name or pattern you want to protect.\n4. Select **Require pull request reviews before merging** and **Restrict who can dismiss pull request reviews**.\n5. Do not add any user or team unless it is obligatory. If it is obligatory, carefully select the users or teams whom you trust with the ability to dismiss code change reviews.\n6. Click **Create** or **Save changes**.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each code repository in use, perform the next steps to verify that only trusted users are allowed to dismiss code change reviews: \n\n1. On GitHub, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", verify that there is at least one rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, you are not compliant.\n4. Verify that **Require a pull request before merging** and **Restrict who can dismiss pull request reviews** is checked.\n5. Verify that no users and teams are specified except for organization and repository admins. If it is obligatory, verify that the users or teams specified were carefully selected to be trusted with the ability to dismiss code change reviews.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "By default, all users who have write access to the code repository are able to dismiss code change reviews." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.6", + "Description": "Code owners are trusted users that are responsible for reviewing and managing an important piece of code or configuration. An organization is advised to set code owners for every extremely sensitive code or configuration.", + "Checks": [ + "repository_has_codeowners_file" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.1 Code Changes", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Code owners are trusted users that are responsible for reviewing and managing an important piece of code or configuration. An organization is advised to set code owners for every extremely sensitive code or configuration.", + "RationaleStatement": "Configuring code owners protects data by verifying that trusted users will notice and review every edit, thus preventing unwanted or malicious changes from potentially compromising sensitive code or configurations.", + "ImpactStatement": "Code owner users will receive notifications for every change that occurs to the code and subsequently added as reviewers of pull requests automatically.", + "RemediationProcedure": "In every code repository create a CODEOWNERS file in the root, docs/, or .github/ directory of the repository.\nIn the file, specify codeowners for the .github/workflows/ directory atleast. Specify organization members you trust. For example:\n```\n.github/workflows/ @user1 @user2\n```", + "AuditProcedure": "In every code repository, verify that a file named CODEOWNERS exists in the root, docs/, or .github/ directory of the repository.\nIn the CODEOWNERS file, verify that the users specified are users you trust.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/managing-your-repositorys-settings-and-features/customizing-your-repository/about-code-owners", + "DefaultValue": "None" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.7", + "Description": "Ensure trusted code owners are required to review and approve any code change proposal made to their respective owned areas in the code base.", + "Checks": [ + "repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.1 Code Changes", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure trusted code owners are required to review and approve any code change proposal made to their respective owned areas in the code base.", + "RationaleStatement": "Configuring code owners ensures that no code, especially code which could prove malicious, will slip into the source code or configuration files of a repository. This allows an organization to mark areas in the code base that are especially sensitive or more prone to an attack. It can also enforce review by specific individuals who are designated as owners to those areas so that they may filter out unauthorized or unwanted changes beforehand.", + "ImpactStatement": "If an organization enforces code owner-based reviews, some code change proposals would not be able to be merged to the codebase before specific, trusted individuals approve them.", + "RemediationProcedure": "For every code repository in use, perform the following steps to require code owners' approvals for each change proposal related to code they own:\n\n1. On GitHub, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", verify that there is at least one rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, click **Add rule**.\n5. If you add the rule, under \"Branch name pattern\", type the branch name or pattern you want to protect.\n6. Select **Require pull request reviews before merging** and **Require review from Code Owners**.\n7. Click **Create** or **Save changes**.", + "AuditProcedure": "For every code repository in use, perform the following steps to verify that code owners are required to review all code change proposals relevant to areas they own before code merge:\n\n1. On GitHub, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", verify that there is at least one rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, you are not compliant.\n4. Ensure that **Require a pull request before merging** and **Require review from Code Owners** are checked.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "Code owners are not required to review changes by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.8", + "Description": "Keep track of code branches that are inactive for a lengthy period of time and periodically remove them.", + "Checks": [ + "repository_inactive_not_archived", + "repository_branch_delete_on_merge_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.1 Code Changes", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Keep track of code branches that are inactive for a lengthy period of time and periodically remove them.", + "RationaleStatement": "Git branches that have been inactive (i.e., no new changes introduced) for a long period of time are enlarging the surface of attack for malicious code injection, sensitive data leaks, and CI pipeline exploitation. They potentially contain outdated dependencies which may leave them highly vulnerable. They are more likely to be improperly managed, and could possibly be accessed by a large number of members of the organization.", + "ImpactStatement": "Removing inactive Git branches means that any code changes they contain would be removed along with them, thus work done in the past might not be accessible after auditing for inactivity.", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each code repository in use, review existing Git branches and remove those which have not been active for a period of time by performing the following:\n\n1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Above the list of files, click **Branches**.\n3. Use the navigation at the top of the page to view the Stale branches. The Stale view shows all branches that no one has committed to in the last three months, ordered by the branches with the oldest commits first.\n4. For each branch listed, either delete it by clicking the trash bin icon, or find the valid reason it still exists.\n\nYou can perform the next steps to prevent pull request branches from becoming stale branches:\n\n1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click Settings.\n3. Under \"Pull Requests\", select **Automatically delete head branches**.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each code repository in use, verify that all existing Git branches are active or have yet to be checked for inactivity by performing the next steps:\n\n1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Above the list of files, click **Branches**.\n3. Use the navigation at the top of the page to view the Stale branches. The Stale view shows all branches that no one has committed to in the last three months, ordered by the branches with the oldest commits first.\n4. If the list is empty, you are compliant. If the list is not empty, but there is a valid reason the branches listed are not deleted, you are compliant.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "By default, newly opened Git branches would never be removed, regardless of activity or inactivity." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.9", + "Description": "Before a code change request can be merged to the code base, all predefined checks must successfully pass.", + "Checks": [ + "repository_default_branch_status_checks_required" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.1 Code Changes", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Before a code change request can be merged to the code base, all predefined checks must successfully pass.", + "RationaleStatement": "On top of manual reviews of code changes, a code protect should contain a set of prescriptive checks which validate each change. Organizations should enforce those status checks so that changes can only be introduced if all checks have successfully passed. This set of checks should serve as the absolute quality, stability, and security conditions which must be met in order to merge new code to a project.", + "ImpactStatement": "Code changes in which all checks do not pass successfully would not be able to be pushed into the code base of the specific code repository.", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each code repository in use, require all status checks to pass before permitting a merge of new code by performing the following:\n\n1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", check if there is a rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, click **Add rule**.\n5. If you add the rule, under \"Branch name pattern\", type the branch name or pattern you want to protect.\n6. Select **Require status checks to pass before merging**.\n7. Click **Create** or **Save changes**.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each code repository in use, verify that status checks are required to pass before allowing any code change proposal merge by performing the following:\n\n1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", verify that there is at least one rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, you are not compliant.\n5. Ensure that **Require status checks to pass before merging** is checked.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "By default, no checks are defined per project, and thus no enforcement of checks is made." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.10", + "Description": "Organizations should make sure each suggested code change is in full sync with the existing state of its origin code repository before allowing merging.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.1 Code Changes", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Organizations should make sure each suggested code change is in full sync with the existing state of its origin code repository before allowing merging.", + "RationaleStatement": "Git branches can easily become outdated since the origin code repository is constantly being edited. This means engineers working on separate code branches can accidentally include outdated code with potential security issues which might have already been fixed, overriding the potential solutions for those security issues when merging their own changes.", + "ImpactStatement": "If enforced, outdated branches would not be able to be merged into their origin repository without first being updated to contain any recent changes.", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each code repository in use, enforce a policy to only allow merging open branches if they are current with the latest change from their original repository by performing the following:\n\n1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", verify that there is at least one rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, click **Add rule**.\n5. If you add the rule, under \"Branch name pattern\", type the branch name or pattern you want to protect.\n6. Select **Require status checks to pass before merging** and **Require branches to be up to date before merging**.\n7. Click **Create** or **Save changes**.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each code repository in use, verify that open branches must be updated before merging is permitted by performing the following:\n\n1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", verify that there is at least one rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, you are not compliant.\n5. Ensure that **Require status checks to pass before merging** and **Require branches to be up to date before merging** are checked.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://github.blog/changelog/2022-02-03-more-ways-to-keep-your-pull-request-branch-up-to-date/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, there is no requirement to update a branch before merging it." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.11", + "Description": "Organizations should enforce a \"no open comments\" policy before allowing code change merging.", + "Checks": [ + "repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.1 Code Changes", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Organizations should enforce a \"no open comments\" policy before allowing code change merging.", + "RationaleStatement": "In an open code change proposal, reviewers can leave comments containing their questions and suggestions. These comments can also include potential bugs and security issues. Requiring all comments on a code change proposal to be resolved before it can be merged ensures that every concern is properly addressed or acknowledged before the new code changes are introduced to the code base.", + "ImpactStatement": "Code change proposals containing open comments would not be able to be merged into the code base.", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each code repository in use, require open comments to be resolved before the relevant code change can be merged by performing the following:\n\n1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", verify that there is at least one rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, click **Add rule**.\n5. If you add the rule, under \"Branch name pattern\", type the branch name or pattern you want to protect.\n6. Select **Require conversation resolution before merging**.\n7. Click **Create** or **Save changes**.", + "AuditProcedure": "For every code repository in use, verify that each merged code change does not contain open, unattended comments by performing the following:\n\n1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", verify that there is at least one rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, you are not compliant.\n5. Ensure that **Require conversation resolution before merging** is checked.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "By default, code changes with open comments on them are able to be merged into the code \nbase." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.12", + "Description": "Ensure every commit in a pull request is signed and verified before merging.", + "Checks": [ + "repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.1 Code Changes", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure every commit in a pull request is signed and verified before merging.", + "RationaleStatement": "Signing commits, or requiring to sign commits, gives other users confidence about the origin of a specific code change. It ensures that the author of the change is not hidden and is verified by the version control system, thus the change comes from a trusted source.", + "ImpactStatement": "Pull requests with unsigned commits cannot be merged.", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each repository in use, enforce the branch protection rule of requiring signed commits, and make sure only signed commits are capable of merging by performing the following:\n\n1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", verify that there is at least one rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, click **Add rule**.\n5. If you add the rule, under \"Branch name pattern\", type the branch name or pattern you want to protect.\n6. Select **Require signed commits**.\n7. Click **Create** or **Save changes**.", + "AuditProcedure": "Ensure only signed commits can be merged for every branch, especially the main branch, via branch protection rules by performing the following:\n\n1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", verify that there is at least one rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, you are not compliant.\n5. Ensure that **Require signed commits** is checked.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/managing-commit-signature-verification/signing-commits", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.13", + "Description": "Linear history is the name for Git history where all commits are listed in chronological order, one after another. Such history exists if a pull request is merged either by rebase merge (re-order the commits history) or squash merge (squashes all commits to one). Ensure that linear history is required by requiring the use of rebase or squash merge when merging a pull request.", + "Checks": [ + "repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.1 Code Changes", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Linear history is the name for Git history where all commits are listed in chronological order, one after another. Such history exists if a pull request is merged either by rebase merge (re-order the commits history) or squash merge (squashes all commits to one). Ensure that linear history is required by requiring the use of rebase or squash merge when merging a pull request.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enforcing linear history produces a clear record of activity, and as such it offers specific advantages: it is easier to follow, easier to revert a change, and bugs can be found more easily.", + "ImpactStatement": "Pull request cannot be merged except squash or rebase merge.", + "RemediationProcedure": "For every code repository in use, perform the following steps to require linear history and/or allow only rebase merge and squash merge:\n\n1. On GitHub, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", verify that there is at least one rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, click **Add rule**.\n5. If you add the rule, under \"Branch name pattern\", type the branch name or pattern you want to protect.\n6. Select **Require linear history**.\n7. Click **Create** or **Save changes**.", + "AuditProcedure": "For every code repository in use, perform the following steps to verify that linear history is required and/or that only squash merge and rebase merge are allowed:\n\n1. On GitHub, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", verify that there is at least one rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, you are not compliant.\n5. Ensure that **Require linear history** is checked.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.14", + "Description": "Ensure administrators are subject to branch protection rules.", + "Checks": [ + "repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.1 Code Changes", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure administrators are subject to branch protection rules.", + "RationaleStatement": "Administrators by default are excluded from any branch protection rules. This means these privileged users (both on the repository and organization levels) are not subject to protections meant to prevent untrusted code insertion, including malicious code. This is extremely important since administrator accounts are often targeted for account hijacking due to their privileged role.", + "ImpactStatement": "Administrator users won't be able to push code directly to the protected branch without being compliant with listed branch protection rules.", + "RemediationProcedure": "For every code repository in use, enforce branch protection rules on administrators as well, by performing the following:\n\n1. On GitHub, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", verify that there is at least one rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, click **Add rule**.\n5. If you add the rule, under \"Branch name pattern\", type the branch name or pattern you want to protect.\n6. Select **Do not allow bypassing the above settings**.\n7. Click **Create** or **Save changes**.", + "AuditProcedure": "For every code repository in use, validate branch protection rules also apply to administrator accounts by performing the next steps:\n\n1. On GitHub, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", verify that there is at least one rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, you are not compliant.\n5. Ensure that **Do not allow bypassing the above settings** is checked.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/defining-the-mergeability-of-pull-requests/managing-a-branch-protection-rule", + "DefaultValue": "Administrator accounts are not subject to branch protection rules by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.15", + "Description": "Ensure that only trusted users can push or merge new code to protected branches.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.1 Code Changes", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that only trusted users can push or merge new code to protected branches.", + "RationaleStatement": "Requiring that only trusted users may push or merge new changes reduces the risk of unverified code, especially malicious code, to a protected branch by reducing the number of trusted users who are capable of doing such.", + "ImpactStatement": "Only administrators and trusted users can push or merge to the protected branch.", + "RemediationProcedure": "For every code repository in use, allow only trusted and responsible users to push or merge new code by performing the following:\n\n1. On GitHub, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4.Next to \"Branch protection rules\", verify that there is at least one rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, click **Add rule**.\n5. If you add the rule, under \"Branch name pattern\", type the branch name or pattern you want to protect.\n6. Select **Restrict who can push to matching branches** and choose trusted and responsible users and teams who will have the permission to do so. \n7. Click **Create** or **Save changes**.", + "AuditProcedure": "For every code repository in use, ensure only trusted and responsible users can push or merge new code by performing the following:\n\n1. On GitHub, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", verify that there is at least one rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, you are not compliant.\n5. Ensure that **Restrict who can push to matching branches** is checked and that only trusted and responsible users and teams are selected.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/defining-the-mergeability-of-pull-requests/managing-a-branch-protection-rule", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.16", + "Description": "The \"Force Push\" option allows users with \"Push\" permissions to force their changes directly to the branch without a pull request, and thus should be disabled.", + "Checks": [ + "repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.1 Code Changes", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "The \"Force Push\" option allows users with \"Push\" permissions to force their changes directly to the branch without a pull request, and thus should be disabled.", + "RationaleStatement": "The \"Force Push\" option allows users to override the existing code with their own code. This can lead to both intentional and unintentional data loss, as well as data infection with malicious code. Disabling the \"Force Push\" option prohibits users from forcing their changes to the master branch, which ultimately prevents malicious code from entering source code.", + "ImpactStatement": "Users cannot force push to protected branches.", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each repository in use, block the option to \"Force Push\" code by performing the following:\n\nEnsure that Trunk / Long-standing branches are protected by Policies and submitted to PR while applying the 4-eyes approach.\n\n1. On GitHub, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", verify that there is at least one rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, click **Add rule**.\n5. If you add the rule, under \"Branch name pattern\", type the branch name or pattern you want to protect.\n6. Uncheck **Allow force pushes**.\n7. Click **Create** or **Save changes**.", + "AuditProcedure": "For every code repository in use, validate that no one can force push code by performing the following:\n\n1. On GitHub, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", verify that there is at least one rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, you are not compliant.\n5. Ensure that **Allow force pushes** is not checked.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/defining-the-mergeability-of-pull-requests/managing-a-branch-protection-rule", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.17", + "Description": "Ensure that users with only push access are incapable of deleting a protected branch.", + "Checks": [ + "repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.1 Code Changes", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that users with only push access are incapable of deleting a protected branch.", + "RationaleStatement": "When enabling deletion of a protected branch, any user with at least push access to the repository can delete a branch. This can be potentially dangerous, as a simple human mistake or a hacked account can lead to data loss if a branch is deleted. It is therefore crucial to prevent such incidents by denying protected branch deletion.", + "ImpactStatement": "Protected branches cannot be deleted.", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each repository that is being used, block the option to delete protected branches by performing the following:\n\n1. On GitHub, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", verify that there is at least one rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, click **Add rule**.\n5. If you add the rule, under \"Branch name pattern\", type the branch name or pattern you want to protect.\n6. Uncheck **Allow deletions**.\n7. Click **Create** or **Save changes**.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each repository that is being used, verify that protected branches cannot be deleted by performing the following:\n\n1. On GitHub, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", verify that there is at least one rule for your main branch. If there is, click **Edit** to its right. If there isn't, you are not compliant.\n5. Ensure that **Allow deletions** is not checked.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/defining-the-mergeability-of-pull-requests/managing-a-branch-protection-rule", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.18", + "Description": "Ensure that every pull request is required to be scanned for risks.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.1 Code Changes", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that every pull request is required to be scanned for risks.", + "RationaleStatement": "Scanning pull requests to detect risks allows for early detection of vulnerable code and/or dependencies and helps mitigate potentially malicious code.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For every repository in use, enforce risk scanning on every pull request by performing the following:\n\n1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Actions**.\n3. If the repository already has at least one workflow set up and running, click **New workflow** and go to step 5. If there are currently no workflows configured for the repository, go to the next step.\n4. Scroll down to the \"Security\" category and click **Configure** under the workflow you want to configure or click **View all** to see all available security workflows.\n5. On the right pane of the workflow page, click **Documentation** and follow the on-screen instructions to tailor the workflow to your needs.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each repository in use, ensure that every pull request must be scanned for risks by performing the following:\n\n1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Actions**.\n3. Ensure that at least one workflow is configured to run like that: \n```\non:\n push:\n branches: [ \"main\" ]\n pull_request:\n branches: [ \"main\" ]\n```\nand that it has a step that runs code scanning on the code.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.19", + "Description": "Ensure that changes in the branch protection rules are audited.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.1 Code Changes", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that changes in the branch protection rules are audited.", + "RationaleStatement": "Branch protection rules should be configured on every repository. The only users who may change such rules are administrators. In a case of an attack on an administrator account or of human error on the part of an administrator, protection rules could be disabled, and thus decrease source code confidentiality as a result. It is important to track and audit such changes to prevent potential incidents as soon as possible.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Use the audit log to audit changes in branch protection rules by performing the following:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Archives\" section of the sidebar, click **Logs**, then click **Audit log**.\n4. Use the action qualifier in your query and look for **protected_branch** category. Ensure every action is reasonable and secure and investigate if not.", + "AuditProcedure": "Ensure changes in branch protection rules are audited by performing the following regularly:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Archives\" section of the sidebar, click **Logs**, then click **Audit log**.\n4. Use the action qualifier in your query and look for **protected_branch** category. Ensure every action is reasonable and secure and is investigated if not.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/defining-the-mergeability-of-pull-requests/about-protected-branches", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.20", + "Description": "Enforce branch protection on the default and main branch.", + "Checks": [ + "repository_default_branch_protection_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.1 Code Changes", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Enforce branch protection on the default and main branch.", + "RationaleStatement": "The default or main branch of repositories is considered very important, as it is eventually gets deployed to the production. Therefore it needs protection. By enforcing branch protection rules on this branch, it is secured from unwanted or unauthorized changes. It can also be protected from untested and unreviewed changes and more.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Perform the following to enforce branch protection on the main branch:\n\n1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Next to \"Branch protection rules\", click **Add rule**.\n5. Under \"Branch name pattern\", type the branch name or pattern you want to protect. Ensure it applies to the main branch name.\n6. Configure policies you want.\n7. Click Create.", + "AuditProcedure": "Perform the following to ensure branch protection is enforced on the main branch:\n\n1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Code and automation\" section of the sidebar, click **Branches**.\n4. Under **Branch protection rules**, verify that there is a rule applied to the \"main\" or default branch.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.1", + "Description": "A SECURITY.md file is a security policy file that offers instruction on reporting security vulnerabilities in a project. When someone creates an issue within a specific project, a link to the SECURITY.md file will subsequently be shown.", + "Checks": [ + "repository_public_has_securitymd_file" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.2 Repository Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "A SECURITY.md file is a security policy file that offers instruction on reporting security vulnerabilities in a project. When someone creates an issue within a specific project, a link to the SECURITY.md file will subsequently be shown.", + "RationaleStatement": "A SECURITY.md file provides users with crucial security information. It can also serve an important role in project maintenance, encouraging users to think ahead about how to properly handle potential security issues, updates, and general security practices.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Enforce that each public repository has a SECURITY.md file by performing the following:\n\n1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under the repository name, click **Security**.\n3. In the left sidebar, click **Security policy**.\n4. Click **Start setup**.\n5. In the new SECURITY.md file, add information about supported versions of your project and how to report a vulnerability.\n6. At the bottom of the page, type a commit message.\n7. Below the commit message fields, choose to create a new branch for your commit and then create a pull request.\n8. Click **Propose file change**.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that each public repository has a SECURITY.md file by performing the following:\n\n1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under the repository name, click **Security**.\n3. Verify that **Security policy** is enabled.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.2", + "Description": "Limit the ability to create repositories to trusted users and teams.", + "Checks": [ + "organization_repository_creation_limited" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.2 Repository Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Limit the ability to create repositories to trusted users and teams.", + "RationaleStatement": "Restricting repository creation to trusted users and teams is recommended in order to keep the organization properly structured, track fewer items, prevent impersonation, and to not overload the version-control system. It will allow administrators easier source code tracking and management capabilities, as they will have fewer repositories to track. The process of detecting potential attacks also becomes far more straightforward, as well, since the easier it is to track the source code, the easier it is to detect malicious acts within it. Additionally, the possibility of a member creating a public repository and sharing the organization's data externally is significantly decreased.", + "ImpactStatement": "Specific users will not be permitted to create repositories.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Restrict repository creation to trusted users and teams only by performing the following:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Access\" section of the sidebar, click **Member privileges**.\n4. Under \"Repository creation\", unselect both options - **Public** and **Private**.\n5. Click **Save**.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that only trusted users and teams can create repositories by performing the following:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Access\" section of the sidebar, click **Member privileges**.\n4. Under \"Repository creation\", ensure that **Public** and **Private** are not checked. This means only owners are able to create repositories.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.3", + "Description": "Ensure only a limited number of trusted users can delete repositories.", + "Checks": [ + "organization_repository_deletion_limited" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.2 Repository Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure only a limited number of trusted users can delete repositories.", + "RationaleStatement": "Restricting the ability to delete repositories protects the organization from intentional and unintentional data loss. This ensures that users cannot delete repositories or cause other potential damage — whether by accident or due to their account being hacked — unless they have the correct privileges.", + "ImpactStatement": "Certain users will not be permitted to delete repositories.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Enforce repository deletion by a few trusted and responsible users only by performing either of the following steps:\n\nIf Your organizations > Settings > Access > Member privileges > Allow members to delete or transfer repositories for this organization is selected, allow only trusted members to have admin privileges:\n1. In every repository, on GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings** and then in the \"Access\" section of the sidebar, click **Collaborators & teams**.\n3. Under \"Manage access\" use the dropdown **Role** menu to filter and search for admin members. Change their role by clicking the **Role** dropdown next to the username until there are only two trusted and qualified users with admin privileges. \n\nIf it is not selected, allow only trusted users to become an organization owner:\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Click the name of your organization and under your organization name, click **People**.\n3. You will see a list of the people in your organization. Click Role and select Owners. Check every member you want to change permissions to. Above the list of members, use the drop-down menu and click Change role and choose Member > change role. Do that until there are only a few trusted and qualified users with organization owner privileges. \n\nIn any case, only members with administrator or organization owner privileges can delete repositories, regardless of your setting.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that only a limited number of trusted users can delete repositories by performing either of the following steps:\n\nIf Your organizations > Settings > Access > Member privileges > Allow members to delete or transfer repositories for this organization is selected, verify that every admin member is trusted by you:\n1. In every repository, on GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings** and then in the \"Access\" section of the sidebar, click **Collaborators & teams**.\n3. Under \"Manage access\" use the dropdown **Role** menu to filter and search for admin members. Verify that there are only two of them and that they are trusted and qualified. \n\nIf it is not selected, verify that every organization owner is trusted by you:\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Click the name of your organization and under your organization name, click **People**.\n3. You will see a list of the people in your organization. Click Role and select Owners. Verify that there are only a few of them and that they are trusted and qualified. \n\nIn any case, only members with administrator or organization owner privileges can delete repositories, regardless of your setting.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "Only organization owners or members with admin privileges can delete repositories." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.4", + "Description": "Ensure only trusted and responsible users can delete issues.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.2 Repository Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure only trusted and responsible users can delete issues.", + "RationaleStatement": "Issues are a way to keep track of things happening in repositories, such as setting new milestones or requesting urgent fixes. Deleting an issue is not a benign activity, as it might harm the development workflow or attempt to hide malicious behavior. Because of this, it should be restricted and allowed only by trusted and responsible users.", + "ImpactStatement": "Certain users will not be permitted to delete issues.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Restrict issue deletion to a few trusted and responsible users only by performing either of the following steps:\n\nIf Your organizations > Settings > Access > Member privileges > Allow members to delete issues for this organization is selected, allow only trusted members to have admin privileges:\n1. In every repository, on GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings** and then in the \"Access\" section of the sidebar, click **Collaborators & teams**.\n3. Under \"Manage access\" use the dropdown **Role** menu to filter and search for admin members. Change their role by clicking the **Role** dropdown next to the username until there are only two trusted and qualified users with admin privileges.\n\nIf it is not selected, allow only trusted users to become an organization owner:\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click Your organizations.\n2. Click the name of your organization and under your organization name, click **People**.\n3. You will see a list of the people in your organization. Click **Role** and select **Owners**. Check every member you want to change permissions to. Above the list of members, use the drop-down menu and click **Change role** and choose Member > change role. Do that until there are only a few trusted and qualified users with organization owner privileges.\n\nIn any case, only members with administrator or organization owner privileges can delete issues, regardless of your setting.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that only a limited number of trusted users can delete issues by performing either of the following steps:\n\nIf Your organizations > Settings > Access > Member privileges > Allow members to delete issues for this organization is selected, verify that every admin member is trusted by you:\n1. In every repository, on GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings** and then in the \"Access\" section of the sidebar, click **Collaborators & teams**.\n3. Under \"Manage access\" use the dropdown **Role** menu to filter and search for admin members. Verify that there are only two of them and that they are trusted and qualified.\n\nIf it is not selected, verify that every organization owner is trusted by you:\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click Your organizations.\n2. Click the name of your organization and under your organization name, click **People**.\n3. You will see a list of the people in your organization. Click **Role** and select **Owners**. Verify that there are only a few of them and that they are trusted and qualified.\n\nIn any case, only members with administrator or organization owner privileges can delete issues, regardless of your setting.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "Only organization owners or members with admin privileges can delete issues." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.5", + "Description": "Track every fork of code and ensure it is accounted for.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.2 Repository Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Track every fork of code and ensure it is accounted for.", + "RationaleStatement": "A fork is a copy of a repository. On top of being a plain copy, any updates to the original repository itself can be pulled and reflected by the fork under certain conditions. A large number of repository copies (forks) become difficult to manage and properly secure. New and sensitive changes can often be pushed into a critical repository without developer knowledge of an updated copy of the very same repository. If there is no limit on doing this, then it is recommended to track and delete copies of organization repositories as needed.", + "ImpactStatement": "Disabling forks completely may slow down the development process as more actions will be necessary to take in order to fork a repository.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Track forks and examine them by performing the following on a regular basis:\n\n1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Insights**.\n3. In the left sidebar, click **Forks**.\n4. Examine the forks listed there.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that the following steps are done regularly to track and examine forks:\n\n1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Insights**.\n3. In the left sidebar, click **Forks**.\n4. Examine the forks listed there.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.6", + "Description": "Ensure every change in visibility of projects is tracked.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.2 Repository Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure every change in visibility of projects is tracked.", + "RationaleStatement": "Visibility of projects determines who can access a project and/or fork it: anyone, designated users, or only members of the organization. If a private project becomes public, this may point to a potential attack, which can ultimately lead to data loss, the leaking of sensitive information, and finally to a supply chain attack. It is crucial to track these changes in order to prevent such incidents.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Track every change in project visibility and investigate if suspicious behavior occurs, by performing the following regularly:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Archives\" section of the sidebar, click **Logs**, then click **Audit log**.\n4. Use the **repo** qualifier in your query and look for **access** category. Ensure every change is reasonable and secure and investigate if it is not.", + "AuditProcedure": "Ensure that every change in project visibility is tracked and investigated, by performing the following regularly:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Archives\" section of the sidebar, click **Logs**, then click **Audit log**.\n4. Use the **repo** qualifier in your query and look for **access** category. Ensure every change is reasonable and secure and is investigated if it is not.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.7", + "Description": "Track inactive repositories and remove them periodically.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.2 Repository Management", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Track inactive repositories and remove them periodically.", + "RationaleStatement": "Inactive repositories (i.e., no new changes introduced for a long period of time) can enlarge the surface of a potential attack or data leak. These repositories are more likely to be improperly managed, and thus could possibly be accessed by a large number of users in an organization.", + "ImpactStatement": "Bug fixes and deployment of necessary changes could prove complicated for archived repositories.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Perform the following to review all inactive repositories and archive them periodically:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Click on your organization name and then on **repositories**.\n3. Ensure every repository listed has been active in the last 3 to 6 months. Every repository that isn't active you should either review or archive by performing the next steps:\n 1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n 2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n 3. Under \"Danger Zone\", click **Archive this repository**.\n 4. Read the warnings.\n 5. Type the name of the repository you want to archive.\n 6. Click **I understand the consequences, archive this repository**.", + "AuditProcedure": "Perform the following to ensure that all the repositories in the organization are active, and those that are not reviewed or archived:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Click on your organization name and then on **repositories**.\n3. Ensure every repository listed has been active in the last 3 to 6 months. If it's not, then ensure it is archived or reviewed regularly.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.1", + "Description": "Track inactive user accounts and periodically remove them.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.3 Contribution Access", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Track inactive user accounts and periodically remove them.", + "RationaleStatement": "User accounts that have been inactive for a long period of time are enlarging the surface of attack. Inactive users with high-level privileges are of particular concern, as these accounts are more likely to be targets for attackers. This could potentially allow access to large portions of an organization should such an attack prove successful. It is recommended to remove them as soon as possible in order to prevent this.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "If you have GitHub Enterprise Cloud, perform the following:\n\n1. In the top-right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your enterprises**.\n2. In the list of enterprises, click the enterprise you want to view.\n3. In the enterprise account sidebar, click **Compliance**.\n4. To download your Dormant Users (beta) report as a CSV file, under \"Other\", click **Download**.\n5. Find the users listed in the file under **Your organizations** > your organization > **People** and select them.\n6. Click **Remove from organization** and **Remove members**.", + "AuditProcedure": "If you have GitHub Enterprise Cloud, perform the following:\n\n1. In the top-right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your enterprises**.\n2. In the list of enterprises, click the enterprise you want to view.\n3. In the enterprise account sidebar, click **Compliance**.\n4. To download your Dormant Users (beta) report as a CSV file, under \"Other\", click **Download**.\n5. Verify that there are no users listed.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.2", + "Description": "Limit ability to create teams to trusted and specific users.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.3 Contribution Access", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Limit ability to create teams to trusted and specific users.", + "RationaleStatement": "The ability to create new teams should be restricted to specific members in order to keep the organization orderly and ensure users have access to only the lowest privilege level necessary. Teams typically inherit permissions from their parent team, thus if base permissions are less restricted and any user has the ability to create a team, a permission leverage could occur in which certain data is made available to users who should not have access to it. Such a situation could potentially lead to the creation of shadow teams by an attacker. Restricting team creation will also reduce additional clutter in the organizational structure, and as a result will make it easier to track changes and anomalies.", + "ImpactStatement": "Only specific users will be able to create new teams.", + "RemediationProcedure": "For every organization, limit team creation to specific, trusted users by performing the following:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Access\" section of the sidebar, click **Member privileges**.\n4. Under \"Team creation rules\", deselect **Allow members to create teams**.\n5. Click **Save**.", + "AuditProcedure": "For every organization, ensure that team creation is limited to specific, trusted users by performing the following:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Access\" section of the sidebar, click **Member privileges**.\n4. Under \"Team creation rules\", verify that **Allow members to create teams** is not selected.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.3", + "Description": "Ensure the organization has a minimum number of administrators.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.3 Contribution Access", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure the organization has a minimum number of administrators.", + "RationaleStatement": "Organization administrators have the highest level of permissions, including the ability to add/remove collaborators, create or delete repositories, change branch protection policy, and convert to a publicly-accessible repository. Due to the permissive access granted to an organization administrator, it is highly recommended to keep the number of administrator accounts as minimal as possible.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Set the minimum number of administrators in your organization by performing the following:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub, click your profile photo, then click **Your profile**.\n2. On the left side of your profile page, under \"Organizations\", click the icon for your organization.\n3. Under your organization name, click **People**. \n4. In the Role drop-down, choose **Owners**.\n5. Select the person or people you'd like to remove from owner role.\n6. Above the list of members, use the drop-down menu and click Change role.\n7. Select **Member**, then click **Change role**.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify the minimum number of administrators in your organization by performing the following:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub, click your profile photo, then click **Your profile**.\n2. On the left side of your profile page, under \"Organizations\", click the icon for your organization.\n3. Under your organization name, click **People**. \n4. In the Role drop-down, choose **Owners**.\n5. If there are minimum number of members in the list, you are compliant.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.4", + "Description": "Require collaborators from outside the organization to use Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) in addition to a standard user name and password when authenticating to the source code management platform.", + "Checks": [ + "organization_members_mfa_required" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.3 Contribution Access", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Require collaborators from outside the organization to use Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) in addition to a standard user name and password when authenticating to the source code management platform.", + "RationaleStatement": "By default every user authenticates within the system by password only. If the password of a user is compromised, however, the user account and every repository to which they have access are in danger of data loss, malicious code commits, and data theft. It is therefore recommended that each user has Multi-Factor Authentication enabled. This adds an additional layer of protection to ensure the account remains secure even if the user's password is compromised.", + "ImpactStatement": "A member without enabled Multi-Factor Authentication cannot contribute to the project. They must enable Multi-Factor Authentication a before they can contribute any code.", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each repository in use, enforce Multi-Factor Authentication is the only way to authenticate for contributors, by doing the following:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Security\" section of the sidebar, click **Authentication security**.\n4. Under \"Authentication\", select **Require two-factor authentication for everyone in your organization**, then click **Save**.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each repository in use, verify that Multi-Factor Authentication is enforced for contributors and is the only way to authenticate, by doing the following:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Security\" section of the sidebar, click **Authentication security**.\n4. Under \"Authentication\", check if **Require two-factor authentication for everyone in your organization** is checked. If so, you are compliant.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.5", + "Description": "Require members of the organization to use Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) in addition to a standard user name and password when authenticating to the source code management platform.", + "Checks": [ + "organization_members_mfa_required" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.3 Contribution Access", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Require members of the organization to use Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) in addition to a standard user name and password when authenticating to the source code management platform.", + "RationaleStatement": "By default every user authenticates within the system by password only. If the password of a user is compromised, however, the user account and every repository to which they have access are in danger of data loss, malicious code commits, and data theft. It is therefore recommended that each user has Multi-Factor Authentication enabled. This adds an additional layer of protection to ensure the account remains secure even if the user's password is compromised.", + "ImpactStatement": "Members will be removed from the organization if they don't have Multi-Factor Authentication already enabled. If this is the case, it is recommended that an invitation be sent to reinstate the user's access and former privileges. They must enable Multi-Factor Authentication to accept the invitation.", + "RemediationProcedure": "For every organization that exists in your GitHub platform, enforce Multi-Factor Authentication and define it as the only way to authenticate, by doing the following:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Security\" section of the sidebar, click **Authentication security**.\n4. Under \"Authentication\", select **Require two-factor authentication for everyone in your organization**, then click **Save**.\n5. If prompted, read the information about members and outside collaborators who will be removed from the organization. Type your organization's name to confirm the change, then click **Remove members & require two-factor authentication**.", + "AuditProcedure": "For every organization that exists in your GitHub platform, verify that Multi-Factor Authentication is enforced and is the only way to authenticate, by doing the following:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Security\" section of the sidebar, click **Authentication security**.\n4. Under \"Authentication\", check if **Require two-factor authentication for everyone in your organization** is checked. If so, you are compliant.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.6", + "Description": "Existing members of an organization can invite new members to join, however new members must only be invited with their company-approved email.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.3 Contribution Access", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Existing members of an organization can invite new members to join, however new members must only be invited with their company-approved email.", + "RationaleStatement": "Ensuring new members of an organization have company-approved email prevents existing members of the organization from inviting arbitrary new users to join. Without this verification, they can invite anyone who is using the organization's version control system or has an active email account, thus allowing outside users (and potential threat actors) to easily gain access to company private code and resources. This practice will subsequently reduce the chance of human error or typos when inviting a new member.", + "ImpactStatement": "Existing members would not be able to invite new users who do not have a company-approved email address.", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each organization, allow only users with company-approved email to be invited. If a user was invited without company-approved email, perform the following:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Click the name of your organization and under your organization name, click **People**.\n3. On the People tab, click **Invitations**. Next to the username or email address of the person whose invitation you'd like to cancel, click **Edit invitation**.\n4. To cancel the user's invitation to join your organization, click **Cancel invitation**.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each organization in use, verify for every invitation that the invited email address is company-approved by performing the following:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Click the name of your organization and under your organization name, click **People**.\n3. On the People tab, click **Invitations**. Verify that each invitation email is company approved by your company.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.7", + "Description": "Ensure every repository has two users with administrative permissions.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.3 Contribution Access", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure every repository has two users with administrative permissions.", + "RationaleStatement": "Repository administrators have the highest permissions to said repository. These include the ability to add/remove collaborators, change branch protection policy, and convert to a publicly-accessible repository. Due to the liberal access granted to a repository administrator, it is highly recommended that only two contributors occupy this role.", + "ImpactStatement": "Removing administrative users from a repository would result in them losing high-level access to that repository.", + "RemediationProcedure": "For every repository in use, set two administrators by performing the following:\n\n1. On GitHub, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Access\" section of the sidebar, click **Collaborators & teams**.\n4. Under **Manage access**, find the team or person whose you'd like to revoke admin permissions, then select the Role drop-down and click a new role.", + "AuditProcedure": "For every repository in use, verify there are two administrators by performing the following:\n\n1. On GitHub, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Access\" section of the sidebar, click **Collaborators & teams**.\n4. Under **Manage access**, verify that there are only 2 members with Admin permission.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.8", + "Description": "Base permissions define the permission level automatically granted to all organization members. Define strict base access permissions for all of the repositories in the organization, including new ones.", + "Checks": [ + "organization_default_repository_permission_strict" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.3 Contribution Access", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Base permissions define the permission level automatically granted to all organization members. Define strict base access permissions for all of the repositories in the organization, including new ones.", + "RationaleStatement": "Defining strict base permissions is the best practice in every role-based access control (RBAC) system. If the base permission is high — for example, \"write\" permission — every member of the organization will have \"write\" permission to every repository in the organization. This will apply regardless of the specific permissions a user might need, which generally differ between organization repositories. The higher the permission, the higher the risk for incidents such as bad code commit or data breach. It is therefore recommended to set the base permissions to the strictest level possible.", + "ImpactStatement": "Users might not be able to access organization repositories or perform some acts as commits. These specific permissions should be granted individually for each user or team, as needed.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Set strict base permissions for the organization repositories with the next steps:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Access\" section of the sidebar, click **Member privileges**.\n4. Under \"Base permissions\", use the drop-down to select new base permissions - \"Read\" or \"None\".\n5. Review the changes. To confirm, click **Change default permission to PERMISSION**.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that strict base permissions are set for the organization repositories by doing the following:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Access\" section of the sidebar, click **Member privileges**.\n4. Under \"Base permissions\", verify that it is set to \"Read\" or \"None\". If it does, you are compliant.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "Read permission" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.9", + "Description": "Confirm the domains an organization owns with a \"Verified\" badge.", + "Checks": [ + "organization_verified_badge" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.3 Contribution Access", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Confirm the domains an organization owns with a \"Verified\" badge.", + "RationaleStatement": "Verifying the organization's domain gives developers assurance that a given domain is truly the official home for a public organization. Attackers can pretend to be an organization and steal information via a faked/spoof domain, therefore the use of a \"Verified\" badge instills more confidence and trust between developers and the open-source community.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Only if you have an enterprise account, verify the organization's domains and secure a \"Verified\" badge next to its name by performing the following:\n\n1. In the top-right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your enterprises**.\n2. In the list of enterprises, click the enterprise you want to view. Then in the enterprise account sidebar, click **Settings**.\n3. Under \"Settings\", click **Verified & approved domains**.\n4. Click **Add a domain**.\n5. In the domain field, type the domain you'd like to verify, then click **Add domain**.\n6. Follow the instructions under **Add a DNS TXT record** to create a DNS TXT record with your domain hosting service. Wait for your DNS configuration to change, which may take up to 72 hours. You can confirm your DNS configuration has changed by running the `dig` command on the command line, replacing ENTERPRISE-ACCOUNT with the name of your enterprise account, and example.com with the domain you'd like to verify. You should see your new TXT record listed in the command output.\n```\ndig _github-challenge-ENTERPRISE-ACCOUNT.DOMAIN-NAME +nostats +nocomments +nocmd TXT\n```\n7. After confirming your TXT record is added to your DNS, follow steps one through three above to navigate to your enterprise account's approved and verified domains.\n8. To the right of the domain that's pending verification, click the 3-dots, then click **Continue verifying**. Click **Verify**.\n9. Optionally, after the \"Verified\" badge is visible on your organizations' profiles, delete the TXT entry from the DNS record at your domain hosting service.", + "AuditProcedure": "Only if you have an enterprise account, view the enterprise organization profile page and ensure it has a \"Verified\" badge in it.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.github.com/en/organizations/managing-organization-settings/verifying-or-approving-a-domain-for-your-organization", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.10", + "Description": "Restrict the Source Code Management (SCM) organization's email notifications to approved domains only.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.3 Contribution Access", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Restrict the Source Code Management (SCM) organization's email notifications to approved domains only.", + "RationaleStatement": "Restricting Source Code Management email notifications to verified domains only prevents data leaks, as personal emails and custom domains are more prone to account takeover via DNS hijacking or password breach.", + "ImpactStatement": "Only members with approved email would be able to receive Source Code Management notifications.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Only if you have an enterprise account, restrict Source Code Management email notifications to approved domains only by performing the following:\n\n1. In the top-right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your enterprises**.\n2. In the list of enterprises, click the enterprise you want to view. Then in the enterprise account sidebar, click **Settings**.\n3. Under \"Settings\", click **Verified & approved domains**.\n4. Under \"Notification preferences\", select **Restrict email notifications to only approved or verified domains**.\n5. Click **Save**.", + "AuditProcedure": "Only if you have an enterprise account, ensure Source Code Management email notifications are restricted to approved domains only by performing the following:\n\n1. In the top-right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your enterprises**.\n2. In the list of enterprises, click the enterprise you want to view. Then in the enterprise account sidebar, click **Settings**.\n3. Under \"Settings\", click **Verified & approved domains**.\n4. Under \"Notification preferences\", verify that **Restrict email notifications to only approved or verified domains** is selected.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.11", + "Description": "As an organization, become an SSH Certificate Authority and provide SSH keys for accessing repositories.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.3 Contribution Access", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "As an organization, become an SSH Certificate Authority and provide SSH keys for accessing repositories.", + "RationaleStatement": "There are two ways for remotely working with Source Code Management: via HTTPS, which requires authentication by user/password, or via SSH, which requires the use of SSH keys. SSH authentication is better in terms of security; key creation and distribution, however, must be done in a secure manner. This can be accomplished by implementing SSH certificates, which are used to validate the server's identity. A developer will not be able to connect to a Git server if its key cannot be verified by the SSH Certificate Authority (CA) server.\nAs an organization, one can verify the SSH certificate signature used to authenticate if a CA is defined and used. This ensures that only verified developers can access organization repositories, as their SSH key will be the only one signed by the CA certificate. This reduces the risk of misuse and malicious code commits.", + "ImpactStatement": "Members with unverified keys will not be able to clone organization repositories. Signing, certification, and verification might also slow down the development process.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Only if you have an enterprise account, deploy an SSH Certificate Authority server and configure it to provide an SSH certificate with which to sign keys by performing the following:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Security\" section of the sidebar, click **Authentication security**.\n4. To the right of \"SSH Certificate Authorities\", click **New CA**.\n5. Under \"Key,\" paste your public SSH key.\n6. Click **Add CA**.\n7. Click **Save**.", + "AuditProcedure": "Only if you have an enterprise account, verify that the enterprise organization has an SSH Certificate Authority server and provides an SSH certificate with which to sign keys by performing the following:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Security\" section of the sidebar, click **Authentication security**.\n4. Verify that there's an SSH certificate authority listed there.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.12", + "Description": "Limit Git access based on IP addresses by having a allowlist of IP addresses from which connection is possible.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.3 Contribution Access", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Limit Git access based on IP addresses by having a allowlist of IP addresses from which connection is possible.", + "RationaleStatement": "Allowing access to Git repositories (source code) only from specific IP addresses adds yet another layer of restriction and reduces the risk of unauthorized connection to the organization's assets. This will prevent attackers from accessing Source Code Management (SCM), as they would first need to know the allowed IP addresses to gain access to them.", + "ImpactStatement": "Only members with allowlisted IP addresses will be able to access the organization's Git repositories.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Only if you have an enterprise account, create an IP allowlist and forbid all other IPs from accessing the source code by performing the following:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Security\" section of the sidebar, click **Authentication security**.\n4. At the bottom of the \"IP allow list\" section, enter an IP address, or a range of addresses in CIDR notation. Optionally, enter a description of the allowed IP address or range.\n5. Click **Add**.\n6. After that, under \"IP allow list\", select **Enable IP allow list**.\n7. Click **Save**.", + "AuditProcedure": "Only if you have an enterprise account, in every organization of yours, ensure access is allowed only by IP allowlist, and that access is forbidden for all other IPs by performing the following:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Security\" section of the sidebar, click **Authentication security**.\n4. Verify that there's an IP address, or a range of addresses in CIDR notation listed. Also verify that **Enable IP allow list** is selected.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.github.com/en/organizations/keeping-your-organization-secure/managing-allowed-ip-addresses-for-your-organization", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.13", + "Description": "Track code anomalies.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.3 Contribution Access", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Track code anomalies.", + "RationaleStatement": "Carefully analyze any code anomalies within the organization. For example, a code anomaly could be a push made outside of working hours. Such a code push has a higher likelihood of being the result of an attack, as most if not all members of the organization would likely be outside the office. Another example is an activity that exceeds the average activity of a particular user.\nTracking and auditing such behaviors creates additional layers of security and can aid in early detection of potential attacks.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For every repository in use, track and investigate anomalous code behavior and activity.", + "AuditProcedure": "For every repository in use, ensure code anomalies relevant to the organization are promptly investigated.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.4.1", + "Description": "Ensure an administrator approval is required when installing applications.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.4 Third-Party", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure an administrator approval is required when installing applications.", + "RationaleStatement": "Applications are typically automated integrations that improve the workflow of an organization. They are written by third-party developers, and therefore should be validated before using in case they're malicious or not trustable. Because administrators are expected to be the most qualified and trusted members of the organization, they should review the applications being installed and decide whether they are both trusted and necessary.", + "ImpactStatement": "Applications will not be installed without administrator approval.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Require an administrator approval for every installed application:\n\na. For GitHub Apps, you are compliant by default. That is because by default only organization owners and administrators can install them.\n\nb. For OAuth Apps, perform the following:\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Third-party Access\" section of the sidebar, click **OAuth application policy**.\n4. Under \"Third-party application access policy\", click **Setup application access restrictions**.\n5. After you review the information about third-party access restrictions, click **Restrict third-party application access**.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that applications are installed only after receiving administrator approval:\n\na. For GitHub Apps, you are compliant by default. That is because by default only organization owners and administrators can install them.\n\nb. For OAuth Apps, perform the following:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Third-party Access\" section of the sidebar, click **OAuth application policy**.\n4. Under \"Third-party application access policy\" verify that the policy status is **Access restricted**.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "Maintainers are organization owners." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.4.2", + "Description": "Ensure stale (inactive) applications are reviewed and removed if no longer in use.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.4 Third-Party", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure stale (inactive) applications are reviewed and removed if no longer in use.", + "RationaleStatement": "Applications that have been inactive for a long period of time are enlarging the surface of attack for data leaks. They are more likely to be improperly managed, and could possibly be accessed by third-party developers as a tool for collecting internal data of the organization or repository in which they are installed. It is important to remove these inactive applications as soon as possible.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Review all stale applications and periodically remove them.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that all the applications in the organization are actively used, and remove those that are no longer in use.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.4.3", + "Description": "Ensure installed application permissions are limited to the lowest privilege level required.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.4 Third-Party", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure installed application permissions are limited to the lowest privilege level required.", + "RationaleStatement": "Applications are typically automated integrations that can improve the workflow of an organization. They are written by third-party developers, and therefore should be reviewed carefully before use. It is recommended to use the \"least privilege\" principle, granting applications the lowest level of permissions required. This may prevent harm from a potentially malicious application with unnecessarily high-level permissions leaking data or modifying source code.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Grant permissions to applications by the \"least privilege\" principle, meaning the lowest possible permission necessary:\n\na. For GitHub Apps, perform the following:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Integrations\" section of the sidebar, click **GitHub Apps**.\n4. Next to every GitHub App, click **Configure**.\n5. Review the GitHub App's permissions and repository access. Edit the permissions granted to the least possible. For example, restrict the number of repositories the App can access.\n6. Click **Save**.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that each installed application has the least privilege needed:\n\na. For GitHub Apps, perform the following:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Integrations\" section of the sidebar, click **GitHub Apps**.\n4. Next to every GitHub App, click **Configure**.\n5. Review the GitHub App's permissions and repository access. Verify that the App permissions are the least possible and that it can access only necessary repositories.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.4.4", + "Description": "Use only secured webhooks in the source code management platform.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.4 Third-Party", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Use only secured webhooks in the source code management platform.", + "RationaleStatement": "A webhook is an event listener, attached to critical and sensitive parts of the software delivery process. It is triggered by a list of events (such as a new code being committed), and when triggered, the webhook sends out a notification with some payload to specific internet endpoints. Since the payload of the webhook contains sensitive organization data, it's important all webhooks are directed to an endpoint (URL) protected by SSL verification (HTTPS). This helps ensure that the data sent is delivered to securely without any man-in-the-middle, who could easily access and even alter the payload of the request.", + "ImpactStatement": "Perform the following to ensure all webhooks used are secured (HTTPS):\n\n1. Navigate to your organization or repository and select **Settings**.\n2. Select **Webhooks** on the side menu.\n3. Verify that each webhook URL starts with 'https'.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Perform the following to secure all webhooks used(over HTTPS):\n\n1. Navigate to your organization or repository and select **Settings**.\n2. Select **Webhooks** on the side menu.\n3. Find the webhooks that starts with 'http' and not 'https'.\n4. Ensure the endpoint (URL) of the webhook listens to secured port (443) and uses certificate.\n5. Click **Edit**.\n6. Change the payload URL to https and ensure **Enable SSL verification** is checked.\n7. Click **Update webhook**.", + "AuditProcedure": "Perform the following to secure all webhooks used(over HTTPS):\n\n1. Navigate to your organization or repository and select **Settings**.\n2. Select **Webhooks** on the side menu.\n3. Ensure all webhooks starts with 'https'.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.5.1", + "Description": "Detect and prevent sensitive data in code, such as confidential ID numbers, passwords, etc.", + "Checks": [ + "repository_secret_scanning_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.5 Code Risks", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Detect and prevent sensitive data in code, such as confidential ID numbers, passwords, etc.", + "RationaleStatement": "Having sensitive data in the source code makes it easier for attackers to maliciously use such information. In order to avoid this, designate scanners to identify and prevent the existence of sensitive data in the code.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For every repository in use, designate scanners to identify and prevent sensitive data in code by performing the following (enterprise only):\n\n1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Security\" section of the sidebar, click **Code security and analysis**.\n4. Scroll down to the bottom of the page and click **Enable** for secret scanning.", + "AuditProcedure": "For every repository in use, verify that scanners are set to identify and prevent the existence of sensitive data in code by performing the following (enterprise only):\n\n1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the \"Security\" section of the sidebar, click **Code security and analysis**.\n4. Scroll down to the bottom of the page. If you see a **Disable** button, it means that secret scanning is already enabled for the repository.", + "AdditionalInformation": "By January 2023, this feature is supposed to be open to all plans. Until then it is only for enterprise users.", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.5.2", + "Description": "Detect and prevent misconfigurations and insecure instructions in CI pipelines", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.5 Code Risks", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Detect and prevent misconfigurations and insecure instructions in CI pipelines", + "RationaleStatement": "Detecting and fixing misconfigurations or insecure instructions in CI pipelines decreases the risk for a successful attack through or on the CI pipeline. The more secure the pipeline, the less risk there is for potential exposure of sensitive data, a deployment being compromised, or external access mistakenly being granted to the CI infrastructure or the source code.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Set a CI instructions scanning tool to identify and prevent misconfigurations and insecure instructions and scans all CI pipelines.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that a CI instructions scanning tool is set to identify and prevent misconfigurations and insecure instructions and that it scans all CI pipelines.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.5.3", + "Description": "Detect and prevent misconfigurations or insecure instructions in Infrastructure as Code (IaC) files, such as Terraform files.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.5 Code Risks", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Detect and prevent misconfigurations or insecure instructions in Infrastructure as Code (IaC) files, such as Terraform files.", + "RationaleStatement": "Detecting and fixing misconfigurations and/or insecure instructions in IaC (Infrastructure as Code) files decreases the risk for data leak or data theft. It is important to secure IaC instructions in order to prevent further problems of deployment, exposed assets, or improper configurations, which can ultimately lead to easier ways to attack and steal organization data.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For every repository that holds IaC instructions files, set a scanning tool to identify and prevent misconfigurations and insecure instructions.", + "AuditProcedure": "For every repository that holds IaC instructions files, verify that a scanning tool is set to identify and prevent misconfigurations and insecure instructions.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.5.4", + "Description": "Detect and prevent known open source vulnerabilities in the code.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.5 Code Risks", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Detect and prevent known open source vulnerabilities in the code.", + "RationaleStatement": "Open source code blocks are used a lot in developed software. This has its own advantages, but it also has risks. Because the code is open for everyone, it means that attackers can publish or add malicious code to these open-source code blocks, or use their knowledge to find vulnerabilities in an existing code. Detecting and fixing such code vulnerabilities, by SCA (Software Composition Analysis) prevents insecure flaws from reaching production. It gives another opportunity for developers to secure the source code before it is deployed in production, where it is far more exposed and vulnerable to attacks.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For every repository that is in use, set a scanning tool to identify and prevent code vulnerabilities by performing the following:\n\n1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under the repository name, click **Security**.\n3. To the right of \"Code scanning alerts\", click **Set up code scanning**.\n4. Under \"Get started with code scanning\", click Set up this workflow on a workflow of your choice.\n5. To customize how code scanning scans your code, edit the workflow.\n6. Use the **Start commit** drop-down and type a commit message.\n7. Choose whether you'd like to commit directly to the default branch or create a new branch and start a pull request.\n8. Click **Commit new file** or **Propose new file**.", + "AuditProcedure": "For every repository that is in use, verify that a scanning tool is set to identify and prevent code vulnerabilities by performing the following:\n\n1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under the repository name, click **Security**.\n3. Verify that \"Code scanning alerts\" is **Enabled** or that there is a workflow that scans your code.", + "AdditionalInformation": "All public repositories in all plans can use code scanning in GitHub. In private repositories, only GitHub Enterprise can use code scanning.", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.5.5", + "Description": "Detect, prevent and monitor known open-source vulnerabilities in packages that are being used.", + "Checks": [ + "repository_dependency_scanning_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.5 Code Risks", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Detect, prevent and monitor known open-source vulnerabilities in packages that are being used.", + "RationaleStatement": "Open-source vulnerabilities might exist before one starts to use a package, but they are also discovered over time. New attacks and vulnerabilities are announced every now and then. It is important to keep track of these and to monitor whether the dependencies used are affected by the recent vulnerability. Detecting and fixing those packages' vulnerabilities decreases the attack surface within deployed and running applications that use such packages. It prevents security flaws from reaching the production environment which could eventually lead to a security breach.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Set scanners that will monitor, identify, and prevent open-source vulnerabilities in packages by performing the following:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**. In the \"Security\" section of the sidebar, click **Code security and analysis**.\n3. Under \"Code security and analysis\", to the right of Dependabot alerts, click **Disable all** or **Enable all**.\n4. Check the **Enable by default for new repositories** option and then click **Enable Dependabot alerts**.\n\nIt is also recommended to use another additional solution for package scanning because GitHub doesn't always recognize the vulnerabilities.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that scanners are set to monitor, identify, and prevent open-source vulnerabilities in packages by performing the following:\n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**. In the \"Security\" section of the sidebar, click **Code security and analysis**.\n3. Verify that the Dependabot alerts is enabled and that **Enable by default for new repositories** is checked.\n\nIt is also recommended to verify that you're using another additional solution for package scanning because GitHub doesn't always recognize the vulnerabilities.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.5.6", + "Description": "Detect open-source license problems in used dependencies and fix them.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Source Code", + "Subsection": "1.5 Code Risks", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Detect open-source license problems in used dependencies and fix them.", + "RationaleStatement": "A software license is a legal document that establishes several key conditions between a software company or developer and a user in order to allow the use of software. Software licenses have the potential to create code dependencies. Not following the conditions in the software license can also lead to lawsuits. When using packages with a software license, especially commercial ones (which are the most permissive), it is important to verify what is allowed by that license in order to be protected against lawsuits.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Designate a license scanning tool to identify open-source license problems and fix them and scan every package you use.", + "AuditProcedure": "Ensure a license scanning tool is set up to identify open-source license problems and that every package you use is scanned by it.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.1", + "Description": "Ensure each pipeline has a single responsibility in the build process.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.1 Build Environment", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure each pipeline has a single responsibility in the build process.", + "RationaleStatement": "Build pipelines generally have access to multiple secrets depending on their purposes. There are, for example, secrets of the test environment for the test phase, repository and artifact credentials for the build phase, etc. Limiting access to these credentials/secrets is therefore recommended by dividing pipeline responsibilities, as well as having a dedicated pipeline for each phase with the lowest privilege instead of a single pipeline for all. This will ensure that any potential damage caused by attacks on a workflow will be limited.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Divide each multi-responsibility pipeline into multiple pipelines, each having a single responsibility with the least privilege. Additionally, create all new pipelines with a sole purpose going forward.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each pipeline, ensure it has only one responsibility in the build process.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-jobs/assigning-permissions-to-jobs", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.2", + "Description": "Ensure the pipeline orchestrator and its configuration are immutable.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.1 Build Environment", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure the pipeline orchestrator and its configuration are immutable.", + "RationaleStatement": "An immutable infrastructure is one that cannot be changed during execution of the pipeline. This can be done, for example, by using Infrastructure as Code for configuring the pipeline and the pipeline environment. Utilizing such infrastructure creates a more predictable environment because updates will require re-deployment to prevent any previous configuration from interfering. Because it is dependent on automation, it is easier to revert changes. Testing code is also simpler because it is based on virtualization. Most importantly, an immutable pipeline infrastructure ensures that a potential attacker seeking to compromise the build environment itself would not be able to do so if the orchestrator, its configuration, and any other component cannot be changed. Verifying that all aspects of the pipeline infrastructure and configuration are immutable therefore keeps them safe from malicious tampering attempts.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Use an immutable pipeline orchestrator and ensure that its configuration and all other aspects of the built environment are immutable, as well.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that the pipeline orchestrator, its configuration, and all other aspects of the build environment are immutable.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.3", + "Description": "Keep build logs of the build environment detailing configuration and all activity within it. Also, consider to store them in a centralized organizational log store.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.1 Build Environment", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Keep build logs of the build environment detailing configuration and all activity within it. Also, consider to store them in a centralized organizational log store.", + "RationaleStatement": "Logging the environment is important for two primary reasons: one, for debugging and investigating the environment in case of a bug or security incident; and two, for reproducing the environment easily when needed. Storing these logs in a centralized organizational log store allows the organization to generate useful insights and identify anomalies in the build process faster.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Keep logs of the build environment. For example, use the .buildinfo file for Debian build workers. Also, store the logs in a centralized organizational log store.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that the build environment is logged and stored in a centralized organizational log store.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.4", + "Description": "Automate the creation of the build environment.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.1 Build Environment", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Automate the creation of the build environment.", + "RationaleStatement": "Automating the deployment of the build environment reduces the risk for human mistakes — such as a wrong configuration or exposure of sensitive data — because it requires less human interaction and intervention. It also eases re-deployment of the environment. It is best to automate with Infrastructure as Code because it offers more control over changes made to the environment creation configuration and stores to a version control platform.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Automate the deployment of the build environment.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that the deployment of the build environment is automated and can be easily redeployed.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.5", + "Description": "Restrict access to the build environment (orchestrator, pipeline executor, their environment, etc.) to trusted and qualified users only.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.1 Build Environment", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Restrict access to the build environment (orchestrator, pipeline executor, their environment, etc.) to trusted and qualified users only.", + "RationaleStatement": "A build environment contains sensitive data such as environment variables, secrets, and the source code itself. Any user that has access to this environment can make changes to the build process, including changes to the code within it. Restricting access to the build environment to trusted and qualified users only will reduce the risk for mistakes such as exposure of secrets or misconfiguration. Limiting access also reduces the number of accounts that are vulnerable to hijacking in order to potentially harm the build environment.", + "ImpactStatement": "Reducing the number of users who have access to the build process means those users would lose their ability to make direct changes to that process.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Restrict access to the build environment to trusted and qualified users.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify each build environment is accessible only to known and authorized users.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.6", + "Description": "Require users to login in to access the build environment - where the orchestrator, the pipeline executer, where the build workers are running, etc.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.1 Build Environment", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Require users to login in to access the build environment - where the orchestrator, the pipeline executer, where the build workers are running, etc.", + "RationaleStatement": "Requiring users to authenticate and disabling anonymous access to the build environment allows organization to track every action on that environment, good or bad, to its actor. This will help recognizing attack and its attacker because the authentication is required.", + "ImpactStatement": "Anonymous users won't be able to access the build environment.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Require authentication to access the build environment and disable anonymous access.", + "AuditProcedure": "Ensure authentication is required to access the build environment.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.7", + "Description": "Build tools providers offer a secure way to store secrets that should be used during the build process.\nThese secrets will often be credentials used to access other tools, for example for pulling code or for uploading artifacts.\nAccess to these secrets can be defined on various scopes, for example in github it could be on an organization level or a repository level and there is also control on whether these secrets are passed to forked pull request.\nTo protect these critical assets it is important to choose the most restrictive scope necessary.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.1 Build Environment", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Build tools providers offer a secure way to store secrets that should be used during the build process.\nThese secrets will often be credentials used to access other tools, for example for pulling code or for uploading artifacts.\nAccess to these secrets can be defined on various scopes, for example in github it could be on an organization level or a repository level and there is also control on whether these secrets are passed to forked pull request.\nTo protect these critical assets it is important to choose the most restrictive scope necessary.", + "RationaleStatement": "Allowing over permissive access to these secrets may affect on their exposure.\nFor example if a secret is defined in an organization level, and users can create new repositories, there is a scenario where a user can create a new repo and run a controlled build just to exfiltrate these secrets.", + "ImpactStatement": "Increased risk of exposure of build related secrets.", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each build tool, review the secrets defined and their permissions scope and change over permissive scopes to more restrictive ones based on the required access.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each build tool in use, review the secrets defined and the permission scopes they are assigned.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.8", + "Description": "Scan the build infrastructure and its dependencies for vulnerabilities. It is recommended that this be done automatically.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.1 Build Environment", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Scan the build infrastructure and its dependencies for vulnerabilities. It is recommended that this be done automatically.", + "RationaleStatement": "Automatic scanning for vulnerabilities detects known vulnerabilities in the tooling used by the build infrastructure and its dependencies. These vulnerabilities can lead\nto a potentially massive breach if not handled as fast as possible, as attackers might also be\naware of such vulnerabilities.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Set an automated vulnerability scanning for your build infrastructure.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that your build infrastructure is automatically scanned for vulnerabilities.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.9", + "Description": "Do not use default passwords of build tools and components.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.1 Build Environment", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Do not use default passwords of build tools and components.", + "RationaleStatement": "Sometimes build tools and components are provided with default passwords for the first login. This password is intended to be used only on the first login and should be changed immediately after. Using the default password substantially increases the attack risk. It is especially important to ensure that default passwords are not used in build tools and components.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each build tool, change the default password.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each build tool, ensure the password used is not the default one.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.10", + "Description": "Use secured webhooks of the build environment.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.1 Build Environment", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Use secured webhooks of the build environment.", + "RationaleStatement": "Webhooks are used for triggering an HTTP request based on an action made in the platform. Typically, build environment feature webhooks for a pipeline trigger based on source code event. Since webhooks are an HTTP POST request, they can be malformed if not secured over SSL. To prevent a potential hack and compromise of the webhook or to the environment or web server excepting the request, use only secured webhooks.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each webhook in use, change it to secured (over HTTPS).", + "AuditProcedure": "For each webhook in use, ensure it is secured (HTTPS).", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.11", + "Description": "Ensure the build environment has a minimum number of administrators.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.1 Build Environment", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure the build environment has a minimum number of administrators.", + "RationaleStatement": "Build environment administrators have the highest level of permissions, including the ability to add/remove users, create or delete pipelines, control build workers, change build trigger permissions and more. Due to the permissive access granted to a build environment administrator, it is highly recommended to keep the number of administrator accounts as minimal as possible.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Set the minimum number of administrators in the build environment.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that the build environment has only the minimum number of administrators.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.2.1", + "Description": "Use a clean instance of build worker for every pipeline run.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.2 Build Worker", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Use a clean instance of build worker for every pipeline run.", + "RationaleStatement": "Using a clean instance of build worker for every pipeline run eliminates the risks of data theft, data integrity breaches, and unavailability. It limits the pipeline's access to data stored on the file system from previous runs, and the cache is volatile. This prevents malicious changes from affecting other pipelines or the Continuous Integration/Continuous Delivery system itself.", + "ImpactStatement": "Data and cache will not be saved in different pipeline runs.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Create a clean build worker for every pipeline that is being run, or use build platform-hosted runners, as they typically offer a clean instance for every run.", + "AuditProcedure": "Ensure that every pipeline that is being run has its own clean, new runner.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.2.2", + "Description": "A worker’s environment can be passed (for example, a pod in a Kubernetes cluster in which an environment variable is passed to it). It also can be pulled, like a virtual machine that is installing a package. Ensure that the environment and commands are passed to the workers and not pulled from it.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.2 Build Worker", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "A worker’s environment can be passed (for example, a pod in a Kubernetes cluster in which an environment variable is passed to it). It also can be pulled, like a virtual machine that is installing a package. Ensure that the environment and commands are passed to the workers and not pulled from it.", + "RationaleStatement": "Passing an environment means additional configuration happens in the build time phase and not in run time. It will also pass locally and not remotely. Passing a worker environment, instead of pulling it from an outer source, reduces the possibility for an attacker to gain access and potentially pull malicious code into it. By passing locally and not pulling from remote, there is also less chance of an attack based on the remote connection, such as a man-in-the-middle or malicious scripts that can run from remote. This therefore prevents possible infection of the build worker.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each build worker, pass its environment and commands to it instead of pulling it.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each build worker, ensure its environment and commands are passed and not pulled.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.2.3", + "Description": "Separate responsibilities in the build workflow, such as testing, compiling, pushing artifacts, etc., to different build workers so that each worker will have a single duty.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.2 Build Worker", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Separate responsibilities in the build workflow, such as testing, compiling, pushing artifacts, etc., to different build workers so that each worker will have a single duty.", + "RationaleStatement": "Separating duties and allocating them to many workers makes it easier to verify each step in the build process and ensure there is no corruption. It also limits the effect of an attack on a build worker, as such an attack would be less critical if the worker has less access and duties that are subject to harm.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each build worker, limit its responsibility to one duty.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each build worker, ensure it has the least responsibility possible, preferably only one duty.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.2.4", + "Description": "Ensure that build workers have minimal network connectivity.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.2 Build Worker", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that build workers have minimal network connectivity.", + "RationaleStatement": "Restricting the network connectivity of build workers decreases the possibility that an attacker would be capable of entering the organization from the outside. If the build workers are connected to the public internet without any restriction, it is far simpler for attackers to compromise them. Limiting network connectivity between build workers also protects the organization in case an attacker was successful and subsequently attempts to spread the attack to other components of the environment.", + "ImpactStatement": "Developers will not have connectivity to every resource they might need from the outside. Workers will also only be able to exchange data through shareable storage.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Limit the network connectivity of build workers, environment, and any other components to the necessary minimum.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that build workers, environment, and any other components have only the required minimum of network connectivity.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.2.5", + "Description": "Add traces to build workers' operating systems and installed applications so that in run time, collected events can be analyzed to detect suspicious behavior patterns and malware.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.2 Build Worker", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Add traces to build workers' operating systems and installed applications so that in run time, collected events can be analyzed to detect suspicious behavior patterns and malware.", + "RationaleStatement": "Build workers are exposed to data exfiltration attacks, code injection attacks, and more while running. It is important to secure them from such attacks by enforcing run-time security on the build worker itself. This will identify attempted attacks in real time and prevent them.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Deploy and enforce a run-time security solution on build workers.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that a run-time security solution is enforced on every active build worker.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.2.6", + "Description": "Scan build workers for vulnerabilities. It is recommended that this be done automatically.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.2 Build Worker", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Scan build workers for vulnerabilities. It is recommended that this be done automatically.", + "RationaleStatement": "Automatic scanning for vulnerabilities detects known weaknesses in environmental sources in use, such as docker images or kernel versions. Such vulnerabilities can lead to a massive breach if these environments are not replaced as fast as possible, since attackers also know about these vulnerabilities and often try to take advantage of them. Setting automatic scanning which scans environmental sources ensures that if any new vulnerability is revealed, it can be replaced quickly and easily. This protects the worker from being exposed to attacks.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each build worker, automatically scan its environmental sources, such as docker image, for vulnerabilities.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each build worker, ensure the environmental sources it uses are scanned for vulnerabilities.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.2.7", + "Description": "Store the deployment configuration of build workers in a version control platform, such as Github.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.2 Build Worker", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Store the deployment configuration of build workers in a version control platform, such as Github.", + "RationaleStatement": "Build workers are a sensitive part of the build phase. They generally have access to the code repository, the Continuous Integration platform, the deployment platform, etc. This means that an attacker gaining access to a build worker may compromise other platforms in the organization and cause a major incident. One thing that can protect workers is to ensure that their deployment configuration is safe and well-configured. Storing the deployment configuration in version control enables more observability of these configurations because everything is catalogued in a single place. It adds another layer of security, as every change will be reviewed and noticed, and thus malicious changes will theoretically occur less. In the case of a mistake, bug, or security incident, it also offers an easier way to \"revert\" back to a safe version or add a \"hot fix\" quickly.", + "ImpactStatement": "Changes in deployment configuration may only be applied by declaration in the version control platform. This could potentially slow down the development process.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Document and store every deployment configuration of build workers in a version control platform.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that the deployment configuration of build workers is stored in a version control platform.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.2.8", + "Description": "Monitor the resource consumption of build workers and set alerts for high consumption that can lead to resource exhaustion.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.2 Build Worker", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Monitor the resource consumption of build workers and set alerts for high consumption that can lead to resource exhaustion.", + "RationaleStatement": "Resource exhaustion is when machine resources or services are highly consumed until exhausted. Resource exhaustion may lead to DOS (Denial of Service). When such a situation happens to build workers, it slows down and even stops the build process, which harms the production of artifacts and the organization's ability to deliver software on schedule. To prevent that, it is recommended to monitor resources consumption in the build workers and set alerts to notify when they are highly consumed. That way resource exhaustion can be acknowledged and prevented at an early stage.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Set reources consumption monitoring for each build worker.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that there is monitoring of resources consumption for each build worker.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.3.1", + "Description": "Use pipeline as code for build pipelines and their defined steps.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.3 Pipeline Instructions", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Use pipeline as code for build pipelines and their defined steps.", + "RationaleStatement": "Storing pipeline instructions as code in a version control system means automation of the build steps and less room for human error, which could potentially lead to a security breach. Additionally, It creates the ability to revert back to a previous pipeline configuration in order to pinpoint the affected change should a malicious incident occur.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Convert pipeline instructions into code-based syntax and upload them to the organization's version control platform.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that all build steps are defined as code and stored in a version control system.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.3.2", + "Description": "Define clear expected input and output for each build stage.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.3 Pipeline Instructions", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Define clear expected input and output for each build stage.", + "RationaleStatement": "In order to have more control over data flow in the build pipeline, clearly define the input and output of the pipeline steps. If anything malicious happens during the build stage, it will be recognized more easily and stand out as an anomaly.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each build stage, clearly define what is expected for input and output.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each build stage, verify that the expected input and output are clearly defined.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.3.3", + "Description": "Write pipeline output artifacts to a secured storage repository.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.3 Pipeline Instructions", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Write pipeline output artifacts to a secured storage repository.", + "RationaleStatement": "To maintain output artifacts securely and reduce the potential surface for attack, store such artifacts separately in secure storage. This separation enforces the Single Responsibility Principle by ensuring the orchestration platform will not be the same as the artifact storage, which reduces the potential harm of an attack. Using the same security considerations as the input (for example, the source code) will protect artifacts stored and will make it harder for a malicious actor to successfully execute an attack.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each pipeline that produces output artifacts, write them to a secured storage repository.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each pipeline that produces output artifacts, ensure that they're written to a secured storage repository.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.3.4", + "Description": "Track and review changes to pipeline files.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.3 Pipeline Instructions", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Track and review changes to pipeline files.", + "RationaleStatement": "Pipeline files are sensitive files. They have the ability to access sensitive data and control the build process, thus it is just as important to review changes to pipeline files as it is to verify source code. Malicious actors can potentially add harmful code to these files, which may lead to sensitive data exposure and hijacking of the build environment or artifacts.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each pipeline file, track changes to it and review them.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each pipeline file, ensure changes to it are being tracked and reviewed.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.3.5", + "Description": "Restrict access to pipeline triggers.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.3 Pipeline Instructions", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Restrict access to pipeline triggers.", + "RationaleStatement": "Build pipelines are used for multiple reasons. Some are very sensitive, such as pipelines which deploy to production. In order to protect the environment from malicious acts or human mistakes, such as a developer deploying a bug to production, it is important to apply the Least Privilege principle to pipeline triggering. This principle requires restrictions placed on which users can run which pipeline. It allows for sensitive pipelines to only be run by administrators, who are generally the most trusted and skilled members of the organization.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For every pipeline in use, grant only the necessary users permission to trigger it.", + "AuditProcedure": "For every pipeline in use, verify only the necessary users have permission to trigger it.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.3.6", + "Description": "Scan the pipeline for misconfigurations. It is recommended that this be performed automatically.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.3 Pipeline Instructions", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Scan the pipeline for misconfigurations. It is recommended that this be performed automatically.", + "RationaleStatement": "Automatic scans for misconfigurations detect human mistakes and misconfigured tasks. This protects the environment from backdoors caused by such mistakes, which create easier access for attackers. For example, a task that mistakenly configures credentials to persist on the disk makes it easier for an attacker to steal them. This type of incident can be prevented by auto-scanning.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each pipeline, set automated misconfiguration scanning.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each pipeline, verify that it is automatically scanned for misconfigurations.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.3.7", + "Description": "Scan pipelines for vulnerabilities. It is recommended that this be implemented automatically.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.3 Pipeline Instructions", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Scan pipelines for vulnerabilities. It is recommended that this be implemented automatically.", + "RationaleStatement": "Automatic scanning for vulnerabilities detects known vulnerabilities in pipeline instructions and components, allowing faster patching in case one is found. These vulnerabilities can lead to a potentially massive breach if not handled as fast as possible, as attackers might also be aware of such vulnerabilities.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each pipeline, set automated vulnerability scanning.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each pipeline, verify that it is automatically scanned for vulnerabilities.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.3.8", + "Description": "Detect and prevent sensitive data, such as confidential ID numbers, passwords, etc., in pipelines.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.3 Pipeline Instructions", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Detect and prevent sensitive data, such as confidential ID numbers, passwords, etc., in pipelines.", + "RationaleStatement": "Sensitive data in pipeline configuration, such as cloud provider credentials or repository credentials, create vulnerabilities with which malicious actors could steal such information if they gain access to a pipeline. In order to mitigate this, set scanners that will identify and prevent the existence of sensitive data in the pipeline.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For every pipeline that is in use, set scanners that will identify and prevent sensitive data within it.", + "AuditProcedure": "For every pipeline that is in use, verify that scanners are set to identify and prevent the existence of sensitive data within it.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.4.1", + "Description": "Sign all artifacts in all releases with user or organization keys.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.4 Pipeline Integrity", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Sign all artifacts in all releases with user or organization keys.", + "RationaleStatement": "Signing artifacts is used to validate both their integrity and security. Organizations signal that artifacts may be trusted and they themselves produced them by ensuring that every artifact is properly signed. The presence of this signature also makes potentially malicious activity far more difficult.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For every artifact in every release, verify that all are properly signed.", + "AuditProcedure": "Ensure every artifact in every release is signed.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.4.2", + "Description": "External dependencies may be public packages needed in the pipeline, or perhaps the public image being used for the build worker. Lock these external dependencies in every build pipeline.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.4 Pipeline Integrity", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "External dependencies may be public packages needed in the pipeline, or perhaps the public image being used for the build worker. Lock these external dependencies in every build pipeline.", + "RationaleStatement": "External dependencies are sources of code that aren't under organizational control. They might be intentionally or unintentionally infected with malicious code or have known vulnerabilities, which could result in sensitive data exposure, data harvesting, or the erosion of trust in an organization. Locking each external dependency to a specific, safe version gives more control and less chance for risk.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For all external dependencies being used in pipelines, verify they are locked.", + "AuditProcedure": "Ensure every external dependency being used in pipelines is locked.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://argon.io/blog/pipeline-composition-analysis-how-your-ci-pipeline-presents-new-opportunities-for-attackers/", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.4.3", + "Description": "Validate every dependency of the pipeline before use.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.4 Pipeline Integrity", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Validate every dependency of the pipeline before use.", + "RationaleStatement": "To ensure that a dependency used in a pipeline is trusted and has not been infected by malicious actor (for example, the codecov incident), validate dependencies before using them. This can be accomplished by comparing the checksum of the dependency to its checksum in a trusted source. If a difference arises, this is a sign that an unknown actor has interfered and may have added malevolent code. If this dependency is used, it will infect the environment, which could end in a massive breach and leave the organization exposed to data leaks, etc.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For every dependency used in every pipeline, validate each one.", + "AuditProcedure": "For every dependency used in every pipeline, ensure it has been validated.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.4.4", + "Description": "Verify that the build pipeline creates reproducible artifacts, meaning that an artifact of the build pipeline is the same in every run when given the same input.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.4 Pipeline Integrity", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Verify that the build pipeline creates reproducible artifacts, meaning that an artifact of the build pipeline is the same in every run when given the same input.", + "RationaleStatement": "A reproducible build is a build that produces the same artifact when given the same input data. Ensuring that the build pipeline produces the same artifact when given the same input helps verify that no change has been made to the artifact. This action allows an organization to trust that its artifacts are built only from safe code that has been reviewed and tested and has not been tainted or changed abruptly.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Create build pipelines that produce the same artifact given the same input (for example, artifacts that do not rely on timestamps).", + "AuditProcedure": "Ensure that build pipelines create reproducible artifacts.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.4.5", + "Description": "SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) is a file that specifies each component of software or a build process. Generate an SBOM after each run of a pipeline.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.4 Pipeline Integrity", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) is a file that specifies each component of software or a build process. Generate an SBOM after each run of a pipeline.", + "RationaleStatement": "Generating a Software Bill of Materials after each run of a pipeline will validate the integrity and security of that pipeline. Recording every step or component role in the pipeline ensures that no malicious acts have been committed during the pipeline's run.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each pipeline, configure it to produce a Software Bill of Materials on every run.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each pipeline, ensure it produces a Software Bill of Materials on every run.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.4.6", + "Description": "SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) is a file that specifies each component of software or a build process. It should be generated after every pipeline run. After it is generated, it must then be signed.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Build Pipelines", + "Subsection": "2.4 Pipeline Integrity", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) is a file that specifies each component of software or a build process. It should be generated after every pipeline run. After it is generated, it must then be signed.", + "RationaleStatement": "Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) is a file used to validate the integrity and security of a build pipeline. Signing it ensures that no one tampered with the file when it was delivered. Such interference can happen if someone tries to hide unusual activity. Validating the SBOM signature can detect this activity and prevent much greater incident.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each pipeline, configure it to sign its produced Software Bill of Materials on every run.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each pipeline, ensure it signs the Software Bill of Materials it produces on every run.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.1.1", + "Description": "Ensure third-party artifacts and open-source libraries in use are trusted and verified.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Dependencies", + "Subsection": "3.1 Third-Party Packages", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure third-party artifacts and open-source libraries in use are trusted and verified.", + "RationaleStatement": "Verify third-party artifacts used in code are trusted and have not been infected by a malicious actor before use. This can be accomplished, for example, by comparing the checksum of the dependency to its checksum in a trusted source. If a difference arises, this may be a sign that someone interfered and added malicious code. If this dependency is used, it will infect the environment and could end in a massive breach, leaving the organization exposed to data leaks and more.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Verify every GitHub action (building block of a GitHub workflow) in use by performing the following: \n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**.\n3. In the left sidebar, click **Actions**, then click **General**.\n4. Under \"Policies\", check **Allow OWNER, and select non-OWNER, actions and reusable workflows**, and then **Allow actions created by GitHub**.\n5. Click **Save**.\n\nAlternatively, perform the following for each repository where GitHub actions are used:\n\n1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the left sidebar, click **Actions**, then click **General**.\n4. Under \"Actions permissions\", check **Allow OWNER, and select non-OWNER, actions and reusable workflows**, and then **Allow actions created by GitHub**.\n5. Click **Save**.", + "AuditProcedure": "For every GitHub action (building block of a GitHub workflow), ensure verification before use by performing the following: \n\n1. In the top right corner of GitHub.com, click your profile photo, then click **Your organizations**.\n2. Next to the organization, click **Settings**.\n3. In the left sidebar, click **Actions**, then click **General**.\n4. Under \"Policies\", ensure **Allow OWNER, and select non-OWNER, actions and reusable workflows**, and **Allow actions created by GitHub** are checked.\n\nAlternatively, perform the following for each repository where GitHub actions are used:\n\n1. On GitHub.com, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n2. Under your repository name, click **Settings**.\n3. In the left sidebar, click **Actions**, then click **General**.\n4. Under \"Actions permissions\", ensure **Allow OWNER, and select non-OWNER, actions and reusable workflows** and **Allow actions created by GitHub** are checked.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.1.2", + "Description": "A Software Bill Of Materials (SBOM) is a file that specifies each component of software or a build process. Require an SBOM from every third-party provider.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Dependencies", + "Subsection": "3.1 Third-Party Packages", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "A Software Bill Of Materials (SBOM) is a file that specifies each component of software or a build process. Require an SBOM from every third-party provider.", + "RationaleStatement": "A Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for every third-party artifact helps to ensure an artifact is safe to use and fully compliant. This file lists all important metadata, especially all the dependencies of an artifact, and allows for verification of each dependency. If one of the dependencies/artifacts are attacked or has a new vulnerability (for example, the \"SolarWinds\" or even \"log4j\" attacks), it is easier to detect what has been affected by this incident because dependencies in use are listed in the SBOM file.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For every third-party dependency in use, require a Software Bill of Materials from its supplier.", + "AuditProcedure": "For every third-party dependency in use, ensure it has a Software Bill of Materials.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.1.3", + "Description": "Require and verify signed metadata of the build process for all dependencies in use.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Dependencies", + "Subsection": "3.1 Third-Party Packages", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Require and verify signed metadata of the build process for all dependencies in use.", + "RationaleStatement": "The metadata of a build process lists every action that took place during an artifact build. It is used to ensure that an artifact has not been compromised during the build, that no malicious code was injected into it, and that no nefarious dependencies were added during the build phase. This creates trust between user and vendor that the software supplied is exactly the software that was promised. Signing this metadata adds a checksum to ensure there have been no revisions since its creation, as this checksum changes when the metadata is altered. Verification of proper metadata signature with Certificate Authority confirms that the signature was produced by a trusted entity.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each artifact in use, require and verify signed metadata of the build process.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each artifact used, ensure it was supplied with verified and signed metadata of its build process. The signature should be the organizational signature and should be verifiable by common Certificate Authority servers.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.1.4", + "Description": "Monitor, or ask software suppliers to monitor, dependencies between open-source components in use.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Dependencies", + "Subsection": "3.1 Third-Party Packages", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Monitor, or ask software suppliers to monitor, dependencies between open-source components in use.", + "RationaleStatement": "Monitoring dependencies between open-source components helps to detect if software has fallen victim to attack on a common open-source component. Swift detection can aid in quick application of a fix. It also helps find potential compliance problems with components usage. Some dependencies might not be compatible with the organization's policies, and other dependencies might have a license that is not compatible with how the organization uses this specific dependency. If dependencies are monitored, such situations can be detected and mitigated sooner, potentially deterring malicious attacks.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each open-source component, monitor its dependencies.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each open-source component, ensure its dependencies are monitored.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.1.5", + "Description": "Prioritize trusted package registries over others when pulling a package.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Dependencies", + "Subsection": "3.1 Third-Party Packages", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Prioritize trusted package registries over others when pulling a package.", + "RationaleStatement": "When pulling a package by name, the package manager might look for it in several package registries, some of which may be untrusted or badly configured. If the package is pulled from such a registry, there is a higher likelihood that it could prove malicious. In order to avoid this, configure packages to be pulled from trusted package registries.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each package to be downloaded, configure it to be downloaded from a trusted source.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each package registry in use, ensure it is trusted.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.1.6", + "Description": "A Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) is a file that specifies each component of software or a build process. When using a dependency, demand its SBOM and ensure it is signed for validation purposes.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Dependencies", + "Subsection": "3.1 Third-Party Packages", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "A Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) is a file that specifies each component of software or a build process. When using a dependency, demand its SBOM and ensure it is signed for validation purposes.", + "RationaleStatement": "A Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) creates trust between its provider and its users by ensuring that the software supplied is the software described, without any potential interference in between. Signing an SBOM creates a checksum for it, which will change if the SBOM's content was changed. With that checksum, a software user can be certain nothing had happened to it during the supply chain, engendering trust in the software. When there is no such trust in the software, the risk surface is increased because one cannot know if the software is potentially vulnerable. Demanding a signed SBOM and validating it decreases that risk.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For every artifact supplied, require and verify a signed Software Bill of Materials from its supplier.", + "AuditProcedure": "For every artifact supplied, ensure it has a validated, signed Software Bill of Materials.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.1.7", + "Description": "Pin dependencies to a specific version. Avoid using the \"latest\" tag or broad version.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Dependencies", + "Subsection": "3.1 Third-Party Packages", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Pin dependencies to a specific version. Avoid using the \"latest\" tag or broad version.", + "RationaleStatement": "When using a wildcard version of a package, or the \"latest\" tag, the risk of encountering a new, potentially malicious package increases. The \"latest\" tag pulls the last package pushed to the registry. This means that if an attacker pushes a new, malicious package successfully to the registry, the next user who pulls the \"latest\" will pull it and risk attack. This same rule applies to a wildcard version - assuming one is using version v1.*, it will install the latest version of the major version 1, meaning that if an attacker can push a malicious package with that same version, those using it will be subject to possible attack. By using a secure, verified version, use is restricted to this version only and no other may be pulled, decreasing the risk for any malicious package.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For every dependency in use, pin to a specific version.", + "AuditProcedure": "For every dependency in use, ensure it is pinned to a specific version.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.1.8", + "Description": "Use packages that are more than 60 days old.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Dependencies", + "Subsection": "3.1 Third-Party Packages", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Use packages that are more than 60 days old.", + "RationaleStatement": "Third-party packages are a major risk since an organization cannot control their source code, and there is always the possibility these packages could be malicious. It is therefore good practice to remain cautious with any third-party or open-source package, especially new ones, until they can be verified that they are safe to use. Avoiding a new package allows the organization to fully examine it, its maintainer, and its behavior, and gives enough time to determine whether or not to use it.", + "ImpactStatement": "Developers may not use packages that are less than 60 days old.", + "RemediationProcedure": "If a package used is less than 60 days old, stop using it and find another solution.", + "AuditProcedure": "For every package used, ensure it is more than 60 days old.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.2.1", + "Description": "Enforce a policy for dependency usage across the organization. For example, disallow the use of packages less than 60 days old.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Dependencies", + "Subsection": "3.2 Validate Packages", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Enforce a policy for dependency usage across the organization. For example, disallow the use of packages less than 60 days old.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enforcing a policy for dependency usage in an organization helps to manage dependencies across the organization and ensure that all usage is compliant with security policy. If, for example, the policy limits the package managers that can be used, enforcing it will make sure that every dependency is installed only from these package managers, and limit the risk of installing from any untrusted source.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Enforce policies for dependency usage across the organization.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that a policy for dependency usage is enforced across the organization.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.2.2", + "Description": "Automatically scan every package for vulnerabilities.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Dependencies", + "Subsection": "3.2 Validate Packages", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Automatically scan every package for vulnerabilities.", + "RationaleStatement": "Automatic scanning for vulnerabilities detects known vulnerabilities in packages and dependencies in use, allowing faster patching when one is found. Such vulnerabilities can lead to a massive breach if not handled as fast as possible, as attackers will also know about those vulnerabilities and swiftly try to take advantage of them. Scanning packages regularly for vulnerabilities can also verify usage compliance with the organization's security policy.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Set automatic scanning of packages for vulnerabilities.", + "AuditProcedure": "Ensure automatic scanning of packages for vulnerabilities is enabled.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.2.3", + "Description": "A software license is a document that provides legal conditions and guidelines for the use and distribution of software, usually defined by the author. It is recommended to scan for any legal implications automatically.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Dependencies", + "Subsection": "3.2 Validate Packages", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "A software license is a document that provides legal conditions and guidelines for the use and distribution of software, usually defined by the author. It is recommended to scan for any legal implications automatically.", + "RationaleStatement": "When using packages with software licenses, especially commercial ones which tend to be the strictest, it is important to verify that the use of the package meets the conditions of the license. If the use of the package violates the licensing agreement, it exposes the organization to possible lawsuits. Scanning used packages for such license implications leads to faster detection and quicker fixes of such violations, and also reduces the risk for a lawsuit.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Set automatic package scanning for license implications.", + "AuditProcedure": "Ensure license implication rules are configured and are scanned automatically.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.2.4", + "Description": "Scan every package automatically for ownership change.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Dependencies", + "Subsection": "3.2 Validate Packages", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Scan every package automatically for ownership change.", + "RationaleStatement": "A change in package ownership is not a regular action. In some cases it can lead to a massive problem (for example, the \"event-stream\" incident). Open-source contributors are not always trusted, since by its very nature everyone can contribute. This means malicious actors can become contributors as well. Package maintainers might transfer their ownership to someone they do not know if maintaining the package is too much for them, in some cases without the other user's knowledge. This has led to known security breaches in the past. It is best to be aware of such activity as soon as it happens and to carefully examine the situation before continuing using the package in order to determine its safety.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Set automatic scanning of packages for ownership change.", + "AuditProcedure": "Ensure automatic scanning of packages for ownership change is set.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://blog.npmjs.org/post/182828408610/the-security-risks-of-changing-package-owners.html:https://blog.npmjs.org/post/180565383195/details-about-the-event-stream-incident", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.1.1", + "Description": "Configure the build pipeline to sign every artifact it produces and verify that each artifact has the appropriate signature.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Artifacts", + "Subsection": "4.1 Verification", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Configure the build pipeline to sign every artifact it produces and verify that each artifact has the appropriate signature.", + "RationaleStatement": "A cryptographic signature can be used to verify artifact authenticity. The signature created with a certain key is unique and not reversible, thus making it unique to the author. This means that an attacker tampering with a signed artifact will be noticed immediately using a simple verification step because the signature will change. Signing artifacts by the build pipeline that produces them ensures the integrity of those artifacts.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Sign every artifact produced with the build pipeline that created it. Configure the build pipeline to sign each artifact.\n\nSteps from GitHub Documentation:\n\nYou can follow the steps below to sign artifacts in GitHub actions. The trick involves loading in your private key into GitHub Actions using the gpg command-line commands.\n\nExport your gpg private key from the system that you have created it.\nFind your key-id (using gpg --list-secret-keys --keyid-format=long)\nExport the gpg secret key to an ASCII file using gpg --export-secret-keys -a > secret.txt\nEdit secret.txt using a plain text editor, and replace all newlines with a literal \"\\n\" until everything is on a single line\nSet up GitHub Actions secrets\nCreate a secret called OSSRH_GPG_SECRET_KEY using the text from your edited secret.txt file (the whole text should be in a single line)\nCreate a secret called OSSRH_GPG_SECRET_KEY_PASSWORD containing the password for your gpg secret key\nCreate a GitHub Actions step to install the gpg secret key\nAdd an action similar to:\n```\n- id: install-secret-key\n name: Install gpg secret key\n run: |\n cat <(echo -e \"${{ secrets.OSSRH_GPG_SECRET_KEY }}\") | gpg --batch --import\n gpg --list-secret-keys --keyid-format LONG\n```\nVerify that the secret key is shown in the GitHub Actions logs\nYou can remove the output from list secret keys if you are confident that this action will work, but it is better to leave it in there\nBring it all together, and create a GitHub Actions step to publish\nAdd an action similar to:\n```\n- id: publish-to-central\n name: Publish to Central Repository\n env:\n MAVEN_USERNAME: ${{ secrets.OSSRH_USERNAME }}\n MAVEN_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.OSSRH_TOKEN }}\n run: |\n mvn \\\n --no-transfer-progress \\\n --batch-mode \\\n -Dgpg.passphrase=${{ secrets.OSSRH_GPG_SECRET_KEY_PASSWORD }} \\\n clean deploy\n```\nAfter a couple of hours, verify that the artifact got published to The Central Repository", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that the build pipeline signs every new artifact it produces and all artifacts are signed.\n\nThere are many different signing tools or options each have there own method or commands to verify that the code or package created is signed.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/supply-chain-security/end-to-end-supply-chain/securing-builds:https://gist.github.com/sualeh/ae78dc16123899d7942bc38baba5203c", + "DefaultValue": "Artifacts are not signed by Default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.1.2", + "Description": "Encrypt artifacts before they are distributed and ensure only trusted platforms have decryption capabilities.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Artifacts", + "Subsection": "4.1 Verification", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Encrypt artifacts before they are distributed and ensure only trusted platforms have decryption capabilities.", + "RationaleStatement": "Build artifacts might contain sensitive data such as production configurations. In order to protect them and decrease the risk for breach, it is recommended to encrypt them before delivery. Encryption makes data unreadable, so even if attackers gain access to these artifacts, they won't be able to harvest sensitive data from them without the decryption key.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Encrypt every artifact before distribution.", + "AuditProcedure": "Ensure every artifact is encrypted before it is delivered.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "Artifacts do not get encrypted by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.1.3", + "Description": "Grant decryption capabilities of artifacts only to trusted and authorized platforms.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Artifacts", + "Subsection": "4.1 Verification", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Grant decryption capabilities of artifacts only to trusted and authorized platforms.", + "RationaleStatement": "Build artifacts might contain sensitive data such as production configuration. To protect them and decrease the risk of a breach, it is recommended to encrypt them before delivery. This will make them unreadable for every unauthorized user who doesn't have the decryption key. By implementing this, the decryption capabilities become overly sensitive in order to prevent a data leak or theft. Ensuring that only trusted and authorized platforms can decrypt the organization's packages decreases the possibility for an attacker to gain access to the critical data in artifacts.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Grant decryption capabilities of the organization's artifacts only for trusted and authorized platforms.", + "AuditProcedure": "Ensure only trusted and authorized platforms have decryption capabilities of the organization's artifacts.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.2.1", + "Description": "Software certification is used to verify the safety of certain software usage and to establish trust between the supplier and the consumer. Any artifact can be certified. Limit the authority to certify different artifacts.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Artifacts", + "Subsection": "4.2 Access to Artifacts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Software certification is used to verify the safety of certain software usage and to establish trust between the supplier and the consumer. Any artifact can be certified. Limit the authority to certify different artifacts.", + "RationaleStatement": "Artifact certification is a powerful tool in establishing trust. Clients use a software certificate to verify that the artifact is safe to use according to their security policies. Because of this, certifying artifacts is considered sensitive. If an artifact is for debugging or internal use, or if it were compromised, the organization would not want certification. An attacker gaining access to both certificate authority and the artifact registry might also be able to certify its own artifact and cause a major breach. To prevent these issues, limit which artifacts can be certified by which platform so there will be minimal access to certification.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Limit which artifact can be certified by which authority.", + "AuditProcedure": "Ensure only certain artifacts can be certified by certain parties.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.2.2", + "Description": "Minimize ability to upload artifacts to the lowest number of trusted users possible.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Artifacts", + "Subsection": "4.2 Access to Artifacts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Minimize ability to upload artifacts to the lowest number of trusted users possible.", + "RationaleStatement": "Artifacts might contain sensitive data. Even the simplest mistake can also lead to trust issues with customers and harm the integrity of the product. To decrease these risks, allow only trusted and qualified users to upload new artifacts. Those users are less likely to make mistakes. Having the lowest number of such users possible will also decrease the risk of hacked user accounts, which could lead to a massive breach or artifact compromising.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Allow only trusted and qualified users to upload new artifacts and limit them in number.", + "AuditProcedure": "Ensure only trusted and qualified users can upload new artifacts, and that their number is the lowest possible.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.2.3", + "Description": "Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for user access to the package registry.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Artifacts", + "Subsection": "4.2 Access to Artifacts", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for user access to the package registry.", + "RationaleStatement": "By default, every user authenticates to the system by password only. If a user's password is compromised, the user account and all its related packages are in danger of data theft and malicious builds. It is therefore recommended that each user enables Multi-Factor Authentication. This additional step guarantees that the account stays secure even if the user's password is compromised, as it adds another layer of authentication.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each package registry in use, enforce Multi-Factor Authentication as the only way to authenticate.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each package registry in use, verify that Multi-Factor Authentication is enforced and is the only way to authenticate.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.2.4", + "Description": "Manage users and their access to the package registry with an external authentication server and not with the package registry itself.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Artifacts", + "Subsection": "4.2 Access to Artifacts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Manage users and their access to the package registry with an external authentication server and not with the package registry itself.", + "RationaleStatement": "Some package registries offer a tool for user management, aside from the main Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) or Active Directory (AD) server of the organization. That tool usually offers simple authentication and role-based permissions, which might not be granular enough. Having multiple user management tools in the organization could result in confusion and privilege escalation, as there will be more to manage. To avoid a situation where users escalate their privileges because someone missed them, manage user access to the package registry via the main authentication server and not locally on the package registry.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each package registry, use the main authentication server of the organization for user management and do not manage locally.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each package registry, verify that its user access is not managed locally, but instead with the main authentication server of the organization.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.2.5", + "Description": "For GitHub Private or Internal repositories anonymous access is not available. Verify that all repos that require access controls are Private or Internal.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Artifacts", + "Subsection": "4.2 Access to Artifacts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "For GitHub Private or Internal repositories anonymous access is not available. Verify that all repos that require access controls are Private or Internal.", + "RationaleStatement": "Disable the option to view artifacts as an anonymous user in order to protect private artifacts from being exposed.", + "ImpactStatement": "Only logged and authorized users will be able to access artifacts.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Changing a repository's visibility\n\n1. On your GitHub Enterprise Server instance, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n1. Under your repository name, click Settings\n1. Under \"Danger Zone\", to the right of to \"Change repository visibility\", click Change visibility.\n1. Select a visibility.\n\n1. Choose \n - Mark private\n - Make Internal\n\n6. To verify that you're changing the correct repository's visibility, type the name of the repository you want to change the visibility of.", + "AuditProcedure": "To Audit the existing settings:\n\n1. On your GitHub Enterprise Server instance, navigate to the main page of the repository.\n1. Under your repository name, click Settings\n3. Under \"Danger Zone\", to the right of to \"Change repository visibility\", click Change visibility.\n\nReview the current selection.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-server@3.3/repositories/managing-your-repositorys-settings-and-features/managing-repository-settings/setting-repository-visibility", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.2.6", + "Description": "Ensure the package registry has a minimum number of administrators.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Artifacts", + "Subsection": "4.2 Access to Artifacts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure the package registry has a minimum number of administrators.", + "RationaleStatement": "Package registry admins have the ability to add/remove users, repositories, packages. Due to the permissive access granted to an admin, it is highly recommended to keep the number of administrator accounts as minimal as possible.", + "ImpactStatement": "Administrator privileges are required to provide and maintain a secure and stable platform but allowing extraneous administrator accounts can create a vulnerability.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Set the minimum number of administrators in your package registry.\n\nTo accomplish this:\n\nFor each repository that you administer on GitHub, you can see an overview of every team or person with access to the repository. From the overview, choose Manage access and provide access to the appropriate people or teams.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that your package registry has only the minimum number of administrators.\n\nFor each repository that you administer on GitHub, you can see an overview of every team or person with access to the repository. From the overview, you can also invite new teams or people, change each team or person's role for the repository, or remove access to the repository.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/managing-your-repositorys-settings-and-features/managing-repository-settings/managing-teams-and-people-with-access-to-your-repository", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.3.1", + "Description": "Validate artifact signatures before uploading to the package registry.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Artifacts", + "Subsection": "4.3 Package Registries", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Validate artifact signatures before uploading to the package registry.", + "RationaleStatement": "Cryptographic signature is a tool to verify artifact authenticity. Every artifact is supposed to be signed by its creator in order to confirm that it was not compromised before reaching the client. Validating an artifact signature before delivering it is another level of protection which ensures the signature has not been changed, meaning no one tried or succeeded in tampering with the artifact. This creates trust between the supplier and the client.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Validate every artifact with its signature before uploading it to the package registry. It is recommended to do so automatically.", + "AuditProcedure": "Ensure every artifact in the package registry has been validated with its signature.\n\n1. On GitHub, navigate to a pull request\n2. On the pull request, click <> Commits and view the detailed information regarding the signature.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/managing-commit-signature-verification/about-commit-signature-verification:https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/managing-commit-signature-verification/signing-commits", + "DefaultValue": "Artifacts are not scanned by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.3.2", + "Description": "Validate the signature of all versions of an existing artifact.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Artifacts", + "Subsection": "4.3 Package Registries", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Validate the signature of all versions of an existing artifact.", + "RationaleStatement": "In order to be certain a version of an existing and trusted artifact is not malicious or delivered by someone looking to interfere with the supply chain, it is a good practice to validate the signatures of each version. Doing so decreases the risk of using a compromised artifact, which might lead to a breach.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each artifact, sign and validate each version before uploading or using the artifact.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each artifact, ensure that all of its versions are signed and validated before it is uploaded or used.\n\nEnsure every artifact in the package registry has been validated with its signature.\n\nOn GitHub, navigate to a pull request\nOn the pull request, click <> Commits and view the detailed information regarding the signature.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.3.3", + "Description": "Audit changes of the package registry configuration.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Artifacts", + "Subsection": "4.3 Package Registries", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Audit changes of the package registry configuration.", + "RationaleStatement": "The package registry is a crucial component in the software supply chain. It stores artifacts with potentially sensitive data that will eventually be deployed and used in production. Every change made to the package registry configuration must be examined carefully to ensure no exposure of the registry's sensitive data. This examination also ensures no malicious actors have performed modifications to a stored artifact. Auditing the configuration and its changes helps in decreasing such risks.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Audit the changes to the package registry configuration.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that all changes to the packages registry configuration are audited.\n\nSearch the audit log with\n\nrepo category actions", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://docs.github.com/en/organizations/keeping-your-organization-secure/managing-security-settings-for-your-organization/reviewing-the-audit-log-for-your-organization", + "DefaultValue": "GitHub audits this by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.3.4", + "Description": "Use secured webhooks to reduce the possibility of malicious payloads.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Artifacts", + "Subsection": "4.3 Package Registries", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Use secured webhooks to reduce the possibility of malicious payloads.", + "RationaleStatement": "Webhooks are used for triggering an HTTP request based on an action made in the platform. Typically, package registries feature webhooks when a package receives an update. Since webhooks are an HTTP POST request, they can be malformed if not secured over SSL. To prevent a potential hack and compromise of the webhook or to the registry or web server excepting the request, use only secured webhooks.", + "ImpactStatement": "Reduces the payloads that the web hook can listen for and receive.", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each webhook in use, change it to secured (over HTTPS).", + "AuditProcedure": "", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.4.1", + "Description": "When delivering artifacts, ensure they have information about their origin. This may be done by providing a Software Bill of Manufacture (SBOM) or some metadata files.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Artifacts", + "Subsection": "4.4 Origin Traceability", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "When delivering artifacts, ensure they have information about their origin. This may be done by providing a Software Bill of Manufacture (SBOM) or some metadata files.", + "RationaleStatement": "Information about artifact origin can be used for verification purposes. Having this kind of information allows the user to decide if the organization supplying the artifact is trusted. In a case of potential vulnerability or version update, this can be used to verify that the organization issuing it is the actual origin and not someone else. If users need to report problems with the artifact, they will have an address to contact as well.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each artifact supplied, supply information about its origin. For each artifact in use, ask for information about its origin.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each artifact, ensure it has information about its origin.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.1", + "Description": "Deployment configurations are often stored in a version control system. Separate deployment configuration files from source code repositories.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Deployment", + "Subsection": "5.1 Deployment Configuration", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Deployment configurations are often stored in a version control system. Separate deployment configuration files from source code repositories.", + "RationaleStatement": "Deployment configuration manifests are often stored in version control systems. Storing them in dedicated repositories, separately from source code repositories, has several benefits. First, it adds order to both maintenance and version control history. This makes it easier to track code or manifest changes, as well as spot any malicious code or misconfigurations. Second, it helps achieve the Least Privilege principle. Because access can be configured differently for each repository, fewer users will have access to this configuration, which is typically sensitive.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Store each deployment configuration file in a dedicated repository separately from source code.", + "AuditProcedure": "Ensure each deployment configuration file is stored separately from source code.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.2", + "Description": "Audit and track changes made in deployment configuration.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Deployment", + "Subsection": "5.1 Deployment Configuration", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Audit and track changes made in deployment configuration.", + "RationaleStatement": "Deployment configuration is sensitive in nature. The tiniest mistake can lead to downtime or bugs in production, which consequently may have a direct effect on both product integrity and customer trust. Misconfigurations might also be used by malicious actors to attack the production platform. Because of this, every change in the configuration needs a review and possible \"revert\" in case of a mistake or malicious change. Auditing every change and tracking them helps detect and fix such incidents more quickly.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each deployment configuration, track and audit changes made to it.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each deployment configuration, ensure changes made to it are audited and tracked.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.3", + "Description": "Detect and prevent sensitive data – such as confidential ID numbers, passwords, etc. – in deployment configurations.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Deployment", + "Subsection": "5.1 Deployment Configuration", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Detect and prevent sensitive data – such as confidential ID numbers, passwords, etc. – in deployment configurations.", + "RationaleStatement": "Sensitive data in deployment configurations might create a major incident if an attacker gains access to it, as this can cause data loss and theft. It is important to keep sensitive data safe and to not expose it in the configuration. In order to prevent a possible exposure, set scanners that will identify and prevent such data in deployment configurations.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each deployment configuration file, set scanners to identify and prevent sensitive data within it.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each deployment configuration file, verify that scanners are set to identify and prevent the existence of sensitive data within it.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.4", + "Description": "Restrict access to the deployment configuration to trusted and qualified users only.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Deployment", + "Subsection": "5.1 Deployment Configuration", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Restrict access to the deployment configuration to trusted and qualified users only.", + "RationaleStatement": "Deployment configurations are sensitive in nature. The tiniest mistake can lead to downtime or bugs in production, which can have a direct effect on the product's integrity and customer trust. Misconfigurations might also be used by malicious actors to attack the production platform. To avoid such harm as much as possible, ensure only trusted and qualified users have access to such configurations. This will also reduce the number of accounts that might affect the environment in case of an attack.", + "ImpactStatement": "Reducing the number of users who have access to the deployment configuration means those users would lose their ability to make direct changes to that configuration.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Restrict access to the deployment configuration to trusted and qualified users.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify each deployment configuration is accessible only to known and authorized users.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.5", + "Description": "Detect and prevent misconfigurations or insecure instructions in Infrastructure as Code (IaC) files, such as Terraform files.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Deployment", + "Subsection": "5.1 Deployment Configuration", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Detect and prevent misconfigurations or insecure instructions in Infrastructure as Code (IaC) files, such as Terraform files.", + "RationaleStatement": "Infrastructure as Code (IaC) files are used for production environment and application deployment. These are sensitive parts of the software supply chain because they are always in touch with customers, and thus might affect their opinion of or trust in the product. Attackers often target these environments. Detecting and fixing misconfigurations and/or insecure instructions in IaC files decreases the risk for data leak or data theft. It is important to secure IaC instructions in order to prevent further problems of deployment, exposed assets, or improper configurations, which might ultimately lead to easier ways to attack and steal organization data.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For every Infrastructure as Code (IaC) instructions file, set scanners to identify and prevent misconfigurations and insecure instructions.", + "AuditProcedure": "For every Infrastructure as Code (IaC) instructions file, verify that scanners are set to identify and prevent misconfigurations and insecure instructions.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.6", + "Description": "Verify the deployment configuration manifests.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Deployment", + "Subsection": "5.1 Deployment Configuration", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Verify the deployment configuration manifests.", + "RationaleStatement": "To ensure that the configuration manifests used are trusted and have not been infected by malicious actors before arriving at the platform, it is important to verify the manifests. This may be done by comparing the checksum of the manifest file to its checksum in a trusted source. If a difference arises, this is a sign that an unknown actor has interfered and may have added malicious instructions. If this manifest is used, it might harm the environment and application deployment, which could end in a massive breach and leave the organization exposed to data leaks, etc.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Verify each deployment configuration manifest in use.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each deployment configuration manifest in use, ensure it has been verified.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.7", + "Description": "Deployment configuration is often stored in a version control system and is pulled from there. Pin the configuration used to a specific, verified version or commit Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA). Avoid referring configuration without its version tag specified.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Deployment", + "Subsection": "5.1 Deployment Configuration", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Deployment configuration is often stored in a version control system and is pulled from there. Pin the configuration used to a specific, verified version or commit Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA). Avoid referring configuration without its version tag specified.", + "RationaleStatement": "Deployment configuration manifests are often stored in version control systems and pulled from there either by automation platforms, for example Ansible, or GitOps platforms, such as ArgoCD. When a manifest is pulled from a version control system without tag or commit Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) specified, it is pulled from the HEAD revision, which is equal to the 'latest' tag, and pulls the last change made. This increases the risk of encountering a new, potentially malicious configuration. If an attacker pushes malicious configuration to the version control system, the next user who pulls the HEAD revision will pull it and risk attack. To avoid that risk, use a version tag of verified version or a commit SHA of a trusted commit, which will ensure this is the only version pulled.", + "ImpactStatement": "Changes in deployment configuration will not be pulled unless their version tag or commit Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) is specified. This might slow down the deployment process.", + "RemediationProcedure": "For every deployment configuration manifest in use, pin to a specific version or commit Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA).", + "AuditProcedure": "For every deployment configuration manifest in use, ensure it is pinned to a specific version or commit Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA).", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.1", + "Description": "Automate deployments of production environment and application.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Deployment", + "Subsection": "5.2 Deployment Environment", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Automate deployments of production environment and application.", + "RationaleStatement": "Automating the deployments of both production environment and applications reduces the risk for human mistakes — such as a wrong configuration or exposure of sensitive data — because it requires less human interaction or intervention. It also eases redeployment of the environment. It is best to automate with Infrastructure as Code (IaC) because it offers more control over changes made to the environment creation configuration and stores to a version control platform.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Automate each deployment process of the production environment and application.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each deployment process, ensure it is automated.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2", + "Description": "Verify that the deployment environment – the orchestrator and the production environment where the application is deployed – is reproducible. This means that the environment stays the same in each deployment if the configuration has not changed.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Deployment", + "Subsection": "5.2 Deployment Environment", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Verify that the deployment environment – the orchestrator and the production environment where the application is deployed – is reproducible. This means that the environment stays the same in each deployment if the configuration has not changed.", + "RationaleStatement": "A reproducible build is a build that produces the same artifact when given the same input data, and in this case the same environment. Ensuring that the same environment is produced when given the same input helps verify that no change has been made to it. This action allows an organization to trust that its deployment environment is built only from safe code and configuration that has been reviewed and tested and has not been tainted or changed abruptly.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Adjust the process that deploys the deployment/production environment to build the same environment each time when the configuration has not changed.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that the deployment/production environment is reproducible.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.3", + "Description": "Restrict access to the production environment to a few trusted and qualified users only.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Deployment", + "Subsection": "5.2 Deployment Environment", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Restrict access to the production environment to a few trusted and qualified users only.", + "RationaleStatement": "The production environment is an extremely sensitive one. It directly affects the customer experience and trust in a product, which has serious effects on the organization itself. Because of this sensitive nature, it is important to restrict access to the production environment to only a few trusted and qualified users. This will reduce the risk of mistakes such as exposure of secrets or misconfiguration. This restriction also reduces the number of accounts that are vulnerable to hijacking in order to potentially harm the production environment.", + "ImpactStatement": "Reducing the number of users who have access to the production environment means those users would lose their ability to make direct changes to that environment.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Restrict access to the production environment to trusted and qualified users.", + "AuditProcedure": "Verify that the production environment is accessible only to trusted and qualified users.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.4", + "Description": "Do not use default passwords of deployment tools and components.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Deployment", + "Subsection": "5.2 Deployment Environment", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Do not use default passwords of deployment tools and components.", + "RationaleStatement": "Many deployment tools and components are provided with default passwords for the first login. This password is intended to be used only on the first login and should be changed immediately after. Using the default password substantially increases the attack risk. It is very important to ensure that default passwords are not used in deployment tools and components.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each deployment tool, change the password.", + "AuditProcedure": "For each deployment tool, ensure the password is not the default one.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + } + ] +} diff --git a/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/cis_1.10_kubernetes.json b/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/cis_1.10_kubernetes.json index a049efc040..ed0e90d88f 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/cis_1.10_kubernetes.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/cis_1.10_kubernetes.json @@ -820,6 +820,14 @@ "Checks": [ "apiserver_audit_log_maxage_set" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_audit_log_maxage_set", + "ConfigKey": "audit_log_maxage", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 30 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", @@ -858,6 +866,14 @@ "DefaultValue": "By default, auditing is not enabled.", "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-apiserver/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/cluster-administration/audit/:https://github.com/kubernetes/features/issues/22" } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_audit_log_maxbackup_set", + "ConfigKey": "audit_log_maxbackup", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 10 + } ] }, { @@ -881,6 +897,14 @@ "DefaultValue": "By default, auditing is not enabled.", "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-apiserver/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/cluster-administration/audit/:https://github.com/kubernetes/features/issues/22" } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_audit_log_maxsize_set", + "ConfigKey": "audit_log_maxsize", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 100 + } ] }, { @@ -1109,6 +1133,18 @@ "DefaultValue": "By default the Kubernetes API server supports a wide range of TLS ciphers", "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://github.com/ssllabs/research/wiki/SSL-and-TLS-Deployment-Best-Practices#23-use-secure-cipher-suites" } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_strong_ciphers_only", + "ConfigKey": "apiserver_strong_ciphers", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", + "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", + "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -2069,6 +2105,23 @@ "DefaultValue": "By default the Kubernetes API server supports a wide range of TLS ciphers", "References": "" } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "kubelet_strong_ciphers_only", + "ConfigKey": "kubelet_strong_ciphers", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", + "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", + "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305", + "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", + "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305", + "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", + "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", + "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" + ] + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/cis_1.11_kubernetes.json b/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/cis_1.11_kubernetes.json index 6a19ea4161..25d725683f 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/cis_1.11_kubernetes.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/cis_1.11_kubernetes.json @@ -820,6 +820,14 @@ "Checks": [ "apiserver_audit_log_maxage_set" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_audit_log_maxage_set", + "ConfigKey": "audit_log_maxage", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 30 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", @@ -858,6 +866,14 @@ "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug/debug-cluster/audit/:https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/issues/22", "DefaultValue": "By default, auditing is not enabled." } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_audit_log_maxbackup_set", + "ConfigKey": "audit_log_maxbackup", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 10 + } ] }, { @@ -881,6 +897,14 @@ "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug/debug-cluster/audit/:https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/issues/22", "DefaultValue": "By default, auditing is not enabled." } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_audit_log_maxsize_set", + "ConfigKey": "audit_log_maxsize", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 100 + } ] }, { @@ -1109,6 +1133,18 @@ "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://github.com/ssllabs/research/wiki/SSL-and-TLS-Deployment-Best-Practices#23-use-secure-cipher-suites", "DefaultValue": "By default the Kubernetes API server supports a wide range of TLS ciphers" } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_strong_ciphers_only", + "ConfigKey": "apiserver_strong_ciphers", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", + "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", + "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -2112,6 +2148,23 @@ "References": "", "DefaultValue": "By default the Kubernetes API server supports a wide range of TLS ciphers" } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "kubelet_strong_ciphers_only", + "ConfigKey": "kubelet_strong_ciphers", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", + "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", + "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305", + "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", + "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305", + "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", + "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", + "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" + ] + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/cis_1.12_kubernetes.json b/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/cis_1.12_kubernetes.json index 1ba1e55a88..ded2d6944a 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/cis_1.12_kubernetes.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/cis_1.12_kubernetes.json @@ -820,6 +820,14 @@ "Checks": [ "apiserver_audit_log_maxage_set" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_audit_log_maxage_set", + "ConfigKey": "audit_log_maxage", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 30 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", @@ -858,6 +866,14 @@ "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug/debug-cluster/audit/:https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/issues/22", "DefaultValue": "By default, auditing is not enabled." } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_audit_log_maxbackup_set", + "ConfigKey": "audit_log_maxbackup", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 10 + } ] }, { @@ -881,6 +897,14 @@ "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug/debug-cluster/audit/:https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/issues/22", "DefaultValue": "By default, auditing is not enabled." } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_audit_log_maxsize_set", + "ConfigKey": "audit_log_maxsize", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 100 + } ] }, { @@ -1109,6 +1133,18 @@ "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://github.com/ssllabs/research/wiki/SSL-and-TLS-Deployment-Best-Practices#23-use-secure-cipher-suites", "DefaultValue": "By default the Kubernetes API server supports a wide range of TLS ciphers" } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_strong_ciphers_only", + "ConfigKey": "apiserver_strong_ciphers", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", + "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", + "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -2090,6 +2126,23 @@ "References": "", "DefaultValue": "By default the Kubernetes API server supports a wide range of TLS ciphers" } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "kubelet_strong_ciphers_only", + "ConfigKey": "kubelet_strong_ciphers", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", + "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", + "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305", + "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", + "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305", + "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", + "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", + "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" + ] + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/cis_1.8_kubernetes.json b/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/cis_1.8_kubernetes.json index 24a5733a05..a09d753f58 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/cis_1.8_kubernetes.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/cis_1.8_kubernetes.json @@ -843,6 +843,14 @@ "Checks": [ "apiserver_audit_log_maxage_set" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_audit_log_maxage_set", + "ConfigKey": "audit_log_maxage", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 30 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", @@ -881,6 +889,14 @@ "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-apiserver/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/cluster-administration/audit/:https://github.com/kubernetes/features/issues/22", "DefaultValue": "By default, auditing is not enabled." } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_audit_log_maxbackup_set", + "ConfigKey": "audit_log_maxbackup", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 10 + } ] }, { @@ -904,6 +920,14 @@ "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-apiserver/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/cluster-administration/audit/:https://github.com/kubernetes/features/issues/22", "DefaultValue": "By default, auditing is not enabled." } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_audit_log_maxsize_set", + "ConfigKey": "audit_log_maxsize", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 100 + } ] }, { @@ -1132,6 +1156,18 @@ "References": "https://github.com/ssllabs/research/wiki/SSL-and-TLS-Deployment-Best-Practices#23-use-secure-cipher-suites", "DefaultValue": "By default the Kubernetes API server supports a wide range of TLS ciphers" } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_strong_ciphers_only", + "ConfigKey": "apiserver_strong_ciphers", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", + "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", + "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -2092,6 +2128,23 @@ "References": "", "DefaultValue": "By default the Kubernetes API server supports a wide range of TLS ciphers" } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "kubelet_strong_ciphers_only", + "ConfigKey": "kubelet_strong_ciphers", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", + "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", + "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305", + "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", + "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305", + "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", + "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", + "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" + ] + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/cis_2.0.1_kubernetes.json b/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/cis_2.0.1_kubernetes.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2b9e695dd2 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/cis_2.0.1_kubernetes.json @@ -0,0 +1,2968 @@ +{ + "Framework": "CIS", + "Name": "CIS Kubernetes Benchmark v2.0.1", + "Version": "2.0.1", + "Provider": "Kubernetes", + "Description": "This CIS Kubernetes Benchmark provides prescriptive guidance for establishing a secure configuration posture for Kubernetes v1.34 - v1.35", + "Requirements": [ + { + "Id": "1.1.1", + "Description": "Ensure that the API server pod specification file permissions are set to 600 or more restrictive", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.1 Control Plane Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that the API server pod specification file has permissions of `600` or more restrictive.", + "RationaleStatement": "The API server pod specification file controls various parameters that set the behavior of the API server. You should restrict its file permissions to maintain the integrity of the file. The file should be writable by only the administrators on the system.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` chmod 600 /etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` stat -c %a /etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml ``` Verify that the permissions are `600` or more restrictive.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-apiserver/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, the `kube-apiserver.yaml` file has permissions of `640`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.2", + "Description": "Ensure that the API server pod specification file ownership is set to root:root", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.1 Control Plane Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that the API server pod specification file ownership is set to `root:root`.", + "RationaleStatement": "The API server pod specification file controls various parameters that set the behavior of the API server. You should set its file ownership to maintain the integrity of the file. The file should be owned by `root:root`.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` chown root:root /etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` stat -c %U:%G /etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml ``` Verify that the ownership is set to `root:root`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-apiserver/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, the `kube-apiserver.yaml` file ownership is set to `root:root`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.3", + "Description": "Ensure that the controller manager pod specification file permissions are set to 600 or more restrictive", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.1 Control Plane Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that the controller manager pod specification file has permissions of `600` or more restrictive.", + "RationaleStatement": "The controller manager pod specification file controls various parameters that set the behavior of the Controller Manager on the master node. You should restrict its file permissions to maintain the integrity of the file. The file should be writable by only the administrators on the system.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` chmod 600 /etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-controller-manager.yaml ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` stat -c %a /etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-controller-manager.yaml ``` Verify that the permissions are `600` or more restrictive.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-apiserver/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, the `kube-controller-manager.yaml` file has permissions of `640`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.4", + "Description": "Ensure that the controller manager pod specification file ownership is set to root:root", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.1 Control Plane Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that the controller manager pod specification file ownership is set to `root:root`.", + "RationaleStatement": "The controller manager pod specification file controls various parameters that set the behavior of various components of the master node. You should set its file ownership to maintain the integrity of the file. The file should be owned by `root:root`.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` chown root:root /etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-controller-manager.yaml ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` stat -c %U:%G /etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-controller-manager.yaml ``` Verify that the ownership is set to `root:root`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-controller-manager", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `kube-controller-manager.yaml` file ownership is set to `root:root`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.5", + "Description": "Ensure that the scheduler pod specification file permissions are set to 600 or more restrictive", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.1 Control Plane Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that the scheduler pod specification file has permissions of `600` or more restrictive.", + "RationaleStatement": "The scheduler pod specification file controls various parameters that set the behavior of the Scheduler service in the master node. You should restrict its file permissions to maintain the integrity of the file. The file should be writable by only the administrators on the system.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` chmod 600 /etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-scheduler.yaml ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` stat -c %a /etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-scheduler.yaml ``` Verify that the permissions are `600` or more restrictive.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-scheduler/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `kube-scheduler.yaml` file has permissions of `640`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.6", + "Description": "Ensure that the scheduler pod specification file ownership is set to root:root", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.1 Control Plane Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that the scheduler pod specification file ownership is set to `root:root`.", + "RationaleStatement": "The scheduler pod specification file controls various parameters that set the behavior of the `kube-scheduler` service in the master node. You should set its file ownership to maintain the integrity of the file. The file should be owned by `root:root`.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` chown root:root /etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-scheduler.yaml ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` stat -c %U:%G /etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-scheduler.yaml ``` Verify that the ownership is set to `root:root`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-scheduler/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `kube-scheduler.yaml` file ownership is set to `root:root`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.7", + "Description": "Ensure that the etcd pod specification file permissions are set to 600 or more restrictive", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.1 Control Plane Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that the `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/etcd.yaml` file has permissions of `600` or more restrictive.", + "RationaleStatement": "The etcd pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/etcd.yaml` controls various parameters that set the behavior of the `etcd` service in the master node. etcd is a highly-available key-value store which Kubernetes uses for persistent storage of all of its REST API object. You should restrict its file permissions to maintain the integrity of the file. The file should be writable by only the administrators on the system.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` chmod 600 /etc/kubernetes/manifests/etcd.yaml ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` stat -c %a /etc/kubernetes/manifests/etcd.yaml ``` Verify that the permissions are `600` or more restrictive.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://coreos.com/etcd:https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/etcd/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/etcd.yaml` file has permissions of `640`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.8", + "Description": "Ensure that the etcd pod specification file ownership is set to root:root", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.1 Control Plane Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that the `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/etcd.yaml` file ownership is set to `root:root`.", + "RationaleStatement": "The etcd pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/etcd.yaml` controls various parameters that set the behavior of the `etcd` service in the master node. etcd is a highly-available key-value store which Kubernetes uses for persistent storage of all of its REST API object. You should set its file ownership to maintain the integrity of the file. The file should be owned by `root:root`.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` chown root:root /etc/kubernetes/manifests/etcd.yaml ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` stat -c %U:%G /etc/kubernetes/manifests/etcd.yaml ``` Verify that the ownership is set to `root:root`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://coreos.com/etcd:https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/etcd/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/etcd.yaml` file ownership is set to `root:root`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.9", + "Description": "Ensure that the Container Network Interface file permissions are set to 600 or more restrictive", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.1 Control Plane Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that the Container Network Interface files have permissions of `600` or more restrictive.", + "RationaleStatement": "Container Network Interface provides various networking options for overlay networking. You should consult their documentation and restrict their respective file permissions to maintain the integrity of those files. Those files should be writable by only the administrators on the system.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` chmod 600 ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` stat -c %a ``` Verify that the permissions are `600` or more restrictive.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/cluster-administration/networking/", + "DefaultValue": "NA" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.10", + "Description": "Ensure that the Container Network Interface file ownership is set to root:root", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.1 Control Plane Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that the Container Network Interface files have ownership set to `root:root`.", + "RationaleStatement": "Container Network Interface provides various networking options for overlay networking. You should consult their documentation and restrict their respective file permissions to maintain the integrity of those files. Those files should be owned by `root:root`.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` chown root:root ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` stat -c %U:%G ``` Verify that the ownership is set to `root:root`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/cluster-administration/networking/", + "DefaultValue": "NA" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.11", + "Description": "Ensure that the etcd data directory permissions are set to 700 or more restrictive", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.1 Control Plane Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that the etcd data directory has permissions of `700` or more restrictive.", + "RationaleStatement": "etcd is a highly-available key-value store used by Kubernetes deployments for persistent storage of all of its REST API objects. This data directory should be protected from any unauthorized reads or writes. It should not be readable or writable by any group members or the world.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "On the etcd server node, get the etcd data directory, passed as an argument `--data-dir`, from the below command: ``` ps -ef | grep etcd ``` Run the below command (based on the etcd data directory found above). For example, ``` chmod 700 /var/lib/etcd ```", + "AuditProcedure": "On the etcd server node, get the etcd data directory, passed as an argument `--data-dir`, from the below command: ``` ps -ef | grep etcd ``` Run the below command (based on the etcd data directory found above). For example, ``` stat -c %a /var/lib/etcd ``` Verify that the permissions are `700` or more restrictive.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://coreos.com/etcd/docs/latest/op-guide/configuration.html#data-dir:https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/etcd/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, etcd data directory has permissions of `755`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.12", + "Description": "Ensure that the etcd data directory ownership is set to etcd:etcd", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.1 Control Plane Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that the etcd data directory ownership is set to `etcd:etcd`.", + "RationaleStatement": "etcd is a highly-available key-value store used by Kubernetes deployments for persistent storage of all of its REST API objects. This data directory should be protected from any unauthorized reads or writes. It should be owned by `etcd:etcd`.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "On the etcd server node, get the etcd data directory, passed as an argument `--data-dir`, from the below command: ``` ps -ef | grep etcd ``` Run the below command (based on the etcd data directory found above). For example, ``` chown etcd:etcd /var/lib/etcd ```", + "AuditProcedure": "On the etcd server node, get the etcd data directory, passed as an argument `--data-dir`, from the below command: ``` ps -ef | grep etcd ``` Run the below command (based on the etcd data directory found above). For example, ``` stat -c %U:%G /var/lib/etcd ``` Verify that the ownership is set to `etcd:etcd`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://coreos.com/etcd/docs/latest/op-guide/configuration.html#data-dir:https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/etcd/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, etcd data directory ownership is set to `etcd:etcd`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.13", + "Description": "Ensure that the default administrative credential file permissions are set to 600", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.1 Control Plane Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that the `admin.conf` file (and `super-admin.conf` file, where it exists) have permissions of `600`.", + "RationaleStatement": "As part of initial cluster setup, default kubeconfig files are created to be used by the administrator of the cluster. These files contain private keys and certificates which allow for privileged access to the cluster. You should restrict their file permissions to maintain the integrity and confidentiality of the file(s). The file(s) should be readable and writable by only the administrators on the system.", + "ImpactStatement": "None.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` chmod 600 /etc/kubernetes/admin.conf ``` On Kubernetes 1.29+ the `super-admin.conf` file should also be modified, if present. For example, ``` chmod 600 /etc/kubernetes/super-admin.conf ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` stat -c %a /etc/kubernetes/admin.conf ``` On Kubernetes version 1.29 and higher run the following command as well :- ``` stat -c %a /etc/kubernetes/super-admin.conf ``` Verify that the permissions are `600` or more restrictive.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/setup/independent/create-cluster-kubeadm/:https://raesene.github.io/blog/2024/01/06/when-is-admin-not-admin/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, admin.conf and super-admin.conf have permissions of `600`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.14", + "Description": "Ensure that the default administrative credential file ownership is set to root:root", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.1 Control Plane Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that the `admin.conf` (and `super-admin.conf` file, where it exists) file ownership is set to `root:root`.", + "RationaleStatement": "As part of initial cluster setup, default kubeconfig files are created to be used by the administrator of the cluster. These files contain private keys and certificates which allow for privileged access to the cluster. You should set their file ownership to maintain the integrity and confidentiality of the file. The file(s) should be owned by `root:root`.", + "ImpactStatement": "None.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` chown root:root /etc/kubernetes/admin.conf ``` On Kubernetes 1.29+ the super-admin.conf file should also be modified, if present. For example, ``` chown root:root /etc/kubernetes/super-admin.conf ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` stat -c %U:%G /etc/kubernetes/admin.conf ``` On Kubernetes version 1.29 and higher run the following command as well :- ``` stat -c %U:%G /etc/kubernetes/super-admin.conf ``` Verify that the ownership is set to `root:root`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kubeadm/:https://raesene.github.io/blog/2024/01/06/when-is-admin-not-admin/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `admin.conf` and `super-admin.conf` file ownership is set to `root:root`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.15", + "Description": "Ensure that the scheduler.conf file permissions are set to 600 or more restrictive", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.1 Control Plane Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that the `scheduler.conf` file has permissions of `600` or more restrictive.", + "RationaleStatement": "The `scheduler.conf` file is the kubeconfig file for the Scheduler. You should restrict its file permissions to maintain the integrity of the file. The file should be writable by only the administrators on the system.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` chmod 600 /etc/kubernetes/scheduler.conf ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` stat -c %a /etc/kubernetes/scheduler.conf ``` Verify that the permissions are `600` or more restrictive.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/setup/independent/create-cluster-kubeadm/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `scheduler.conf` has permissions of `640`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.16", + "Description": "Ensure that the scheduler.conf file ownership is set to root:root", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.1 Control Plane Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that the `scheduler.conf` file ownership is set to `root:root`.", + "RationaleStatement": "The `scheduler.conf` file is the kubeconfig file for the Scheduler. You should set its file ownership to maintain the integrity of the file. The file should be owned by `root:root`.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` chown root:root /etc/kubernetes/scheduler.conf ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` stat -c %U:%G /etc/kubernetes/scheduler.conf ``` Verify that the ownership is set to `root:root`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kubeadm/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `scheduler.conf` file ownership is set to `root:root`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.17", + "Description": "Ensure that the controller-manager.conf file permissions are set to 600 or more restrictive", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.1 Control Plane Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that the `controller-manager.conf` file has permissions of 600 or more restrictive.", + "RationaleStatement": "The `controller-manager.conf` file is the kubeconfig file for the Controller Manager. You should restrict its file permissions to maintain the integrity of the file. The file should be writable by only the administrators on the system.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` chmod 600 /etc/kubernetes/controller-manager.conf ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` stat -c %a /etc/kubernetes/controller-manager.conf ``` Verify that the permissions are `600` or more restrictive.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-controller-manager/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `controller-manager.conf` has permissions of `640`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.18", + "Description": "Ensure that the controller-manager.conf file ownership is set to root:root", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.1 Control Plane Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that the `controller-manager.conf` file ownership is set to `root:root`.", + "RationaleStatement": "The `controller-manager.conf` file is the kubeconfig file for the Controller Manager. You should set its file ownership to maintain the integrity of the file. The file should be owned by `root:root`.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` chown root:root /etc/kubernetes/controller-manager.conf ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` stat -c %U:%G /etc/kubernetes/controller-manager.conf ``` Verify that the ownership is set to `root:root`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-controller-manager/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `controller-manager.conf` file ownership is set to `root:root`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.19", + "Description": "Ensure that the Kubernetes PKI directory and file ownership is set to root:root", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.1 Control Plane Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that the Kubernetes PKI directory and file ownership is set to `root:root`.", + "RationaleStatement": "Kubernetes makes use of a number of certificates as part of its operation. You should set the ownership of the directory containing the PKI information and all files in that directory to maintain their integrity. The directory and files should be owned by `root:root`.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` chown -R root:root /etc/kubernetes/pki/ ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` ls -laR /etc/kubernetes/pki/ ``` Verify that the ownership of all files and directories in this hierarchy is set to `root:root`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-apiserver/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, the /etc/kubernetes/pki/ directory and all of the files and directories contained within it, are set to be owned by the root user." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.20", + "Description": "Ensure that the Kubernetes PKI certificate file permissions are set to 644 or more restrictive", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.1 Control Plane Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that Kubernetes PKI certificate files have permissions of `644` or more restrictive.", + "RationaleStatement": "Kubernetes makes use of a number of certificate files as part of the operation of its components. The permissions on these files should be set to `644` or more restrictive to protect their integrity and confidentiality.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` chmod -R 644 /etc/kubernetes/pki/*.crt ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` stat -c '%a' /etc/kubernetes/pki/*.crt ``` Verify that the permissions are `644` or more restrictive. or ``` ls -l /etc/kubernetes/pki/*.crt ``` Verify -rw------", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-apiserver/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, the certificates used by Kubernetes are set to have permissions of `644`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.21", + "Description": "Ensure that the Kubernetes PKI key file permissions are set to 600", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.1 Control Plane Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that Kubernetes PKI key files have permissions of `600`.", + "RationaleStatement": "Kubernetes makes use of a number of key files as part of the operation of its components. The permissions on these files should be set to `600` to protect their integrity and confidentiality.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` chmod -R 600 /etc/kubernetes/pki/*.key ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the Control Plane node. For example, ``` stat -c '%a' /etc/kubernetes/pki/*.key ``` Verify that the permissions are `600` or more restrictive. or ``` ls -l /etc/kubernetes/pki/*.key ``` Verify that the permissions are `-rw------`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-apiserver/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, the keys used by Kubernetes are set to have permissions of `600`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.1", + "Description": "Ensure that the --anonymous-auth argument is set to false", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_anonymous_requests" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Disable anonymous requests to the API server.", + "RationaleStatement": "When enabled, requests that are not rejected by other configured authentication methods are treated as anonymous requests. These requests are then served by the API server. You should rely on authentication to authorize access and disallow anonymous requests. If you are using RBAC authorization, it is generally considered reasonable to allow anonymous access to the API Server for health checks and discovery purposes, and hence this recommendation is not scored. However, you should consider whether anonymous discovery is an acceptable risk for your purposes.", + "ImpactStatement": "Anonymous requests will be rejected.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` on the Control Plane node and set the below parameter. ``` --anonymous-auth=false ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--anonymous-auth` argument is set to `false`. Alternative Audit Method ``` kubectl get pod -nkube-system -lcomponent=kube-apiserver -o=jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.spec.containers[*].command} {\\}{end}' | grep '--anonymous-auth' | grep -i false ``` If the exit code is '1', then the control isn't present / failed", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-apiserver/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/authentication/#anonymous-requests", + "DefaultValue": "By default, anonymous access is enabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.2", + "Description": "Ensure that the --token-auth-file parameter is not set", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_no_token_auth_file" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Do not use token based authentication.", + "RationaleStatement": "The token-based authentication utilizes static tokens to authenticate requests to the apiserver. The tokens are stored in clear-text in a file on the apiserver, and cannot be revoked or rotated without restarting the apiserver. Hence, do not use static token-based authentication.", + "ImpactStatement": "You will have to configure and use alternate authentication mechanisms such as certificates. Static token based authentication could not be used.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Follow the documentation and configure alternate mechanisms for authentication. Then, edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` on the master node and remove the `--token-auth-file=` parameter.", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--token-auth-file` argument does not exist. Alternative Audit Method ``` kubectl get pod -nkube-system -lcomponent=kube-apiserver -o=jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.spec.containers[*].command} {\\}{end}' | grep '--token-auth-file' | grep -i false ``` If the exit code is '1', then the control isn't present / failed", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/authentication/#static-token-file:https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-apiserver/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `--token-auth-file` argument is not set." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.3", + "Description": "Ensure that the DenyServiceExternalIPs is set", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_deny_service_external_ips" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "This admission controller rejects all net-new usage of the Service field externalIPs.", + "RationaleStatement": "Most users do not need the ability to set the `externalIPs` field for a `Service` at all, and cluster admins should consider disabling this functionality by enabling the `DenyServiceExternalIPs` admission controller. Clusters that do need to allow this functionality should consider using some custom policy to manage its usage.", + "ImpactStatement": "When enabled, users of the cluster may not create new Services which use externalIPs and may not add new values to externalIPs on existing Service objects.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` on the master node and append the Kubernetes API server flag --enable-admission-plugins with the DenyServiceExternalIPs plugin. Note, the Kubernetes API server flag --enable-admission-plugins takes a comma-delimited list of admission control plugins to be enabled, even if they are in the list of plugins enabled by default. ``` kube-apiserver --enable-admission-plugins=DenyServiceExternalIPs ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `DenyServiceExternalIPs' argument exist as a string value in --enable-admission-plugins.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/admission-controllers/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-apiserver/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, --enable-admission-plugins=DenyServiceExternalIP argument is not set, and the use of externalIPs is authorized." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.4", + "Description": "Ensure that the --kubelet-client-certificate and --kubelet-client-key arguments are set as appropriate", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_kubelet_tls_auth" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Enable certificate based kubelet authentication.", + "RationaleStatement": "The apiserver, by default, does not authenticate itself to the kubelet's HTTPS endpoints. The requests from the apiserver are treated anonymously. You should set up certificate-based kubelet authentication to ensure that the apiserver authenticates itself to kubelets when submitting requests.", + "ImpactStatement": "You require TLS to be configured on apiserver as well as kubelets.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Follow the Kubernetes documentation and set up the TLS connection between the apiserver and kubelets. Then, edit API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` on the Control Plane node and set the kubelet client certificate and key parameters as below. ``` --kubelet-client-certificate= --kubelet-client-key= ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--kubelet-client-certificate` and `--kubelet-client-key` arguments exist and they are set as appropriate. Alternative Audit ``` kubectl get pod -nkube-system -lcomponent=kube-apiserver -o=jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.spec.containers[*].command} {\\}{end}' | grep '--kubelet-client-certificate' | grep -i false ``` If the exit code is '1', then the control isn't present / failed", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-apiserver/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kubelet-authentication-authorization/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/cluster-administration/master-node-communication/#apiserver---kubelet", + "DefaultValue": "By default, certificate-based kubelet authentication is not set." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.5", + "Description": "Ensure that the --kubelet-certificate-authority argument is set as appropriate", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_kubelet_cert_auth" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Verify kubelet's certificate before establishing connection.", + "RationaleStatement": "The connections from the apiserver to the kubelet are used for fetching logs for pods, attaching (through kubectl) to running pods, and using the kubelet’s port-forwarding functionality. These connections terminate at the kubelet’s HTTPS endpoint. By default, the apiserver does not verify the kubelet’s serving certificate, which makes the connection subject to man-in-the-middle attacks, and unsafe to run over untrusted and/or public networks.", + "ImpactStatement": "You require TLS to be configured on apiserver as well as kubelets.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Follow the Kubernetes documentation and setup the TLS connection between the apiserver and kubelets. Then, edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` on the Control Plane node and set the `--kubelet-certificate-authority` parameter to the path to the cert file for the certificate authority. ``` --kubelet-certificate-authority= ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--kubelet-certificate-authority` argument exists and is set as appropriate. Alternative Audit ``` kubectl get pod -nkube-system -lcomponent=kube-apiserver -o=jsonpath='{range .items[]}{.spec.containers[].command} {\\}{end}' | grep '--kubelet-certificate-authority' | grep -i false ``` If the exit code is '1', then the control isn't present / failed", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-apiserver/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kubelet-authentication-authorization/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/cluster-administration/master-node-communication/#apiserver---kubelet", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `--kubelet-certificate-authority` argument is not set." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.6", + "Description": "Ensure that the --authorization-mode argument is not set to AlwaysAllow", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_auth_mode_not_always_allow" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Do not always authorize all requests.", + "RationaleStatement": "The API Server, can be configured to allow all requests. This mode should not be used on any production cluster.", + "ImpactStatement": "Only authorized requests will be served.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` on the Control Plane node and set the `--authorization-mode` parameter to values other than `AlwaysAllow`. One such example could be as below. ``` --authorization-mode=RBAC ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--authorization-mode` argument exists and is not set to `AlwaysAllow`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/authorization/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `AlwaysAllow` is not enabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.7", + "Description": "Ensure that the --authorization-mode argument includes Node", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_auth_mode_include_node" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Restrict kubelet nodes to reading only objects associated with them.", + "RationaleStatement": "The `Node` authorization mode only allows kubelets to read `Secret`, `ConfigMap`, `PersistentVolume`, and `PersistentVolumeClaim` objects associated with their nodes.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` on the Control Plane node and set the `--authorization-mode` parameter to a value that includes `Node`. ``` --authorization-mode=Node,RBAC ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--authorization-mode` argument exists and is set to a value to include `Node`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-apiserver/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/authorization/node/:https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/46076:https://acotten.com/post/kube17-security", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `Node` authorization is not enabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.8", + "Description": "Ensure that the --authorization-mode argument includes RBAC", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_auth_mode_include_rbac" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Turn on Role Based Access Control.", + "RationaleStatement": "Role Based Access Control (RBAC) allows fine-grained control over the operations that different entities can perform on different objects in the cluster. It is recommended to use the RBAC authorization mode.", + "ImpactStatement": "When RBAC is enabled you will need to ensure that appropriate RBAC settings (including Roles, RoleBindings and ClusterRoleBindings) are configured to allow appropriate access.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` on the Control Plane node and set the `--authorization-mode` parameter to a value that includes `RBAC`, for example: ``` --authorization-mode=Node,RBAC ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--authorization-mode` argument exists and is set to a value to include `RBAC`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `RBAC` authorization is not enabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.9", + "Description": "Ensure that the admission control plugin EventRateLimit is set", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_event_rate_limit" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Limit the rate at which the API server accepts requests.", + "RationaleStatement": "Using `EventRateLimit` admission control enforces a limit on the number of events that the API Server will accept in a given time slice. A misbehaving workload could overwhelm and DoS the API Server, making it unavailable. This particularly applies to a multi-tenant cluster, where there might be a small percentage of misbehaving tenants which could have a significant impact on the performance of the cluster overall. Hence, it is recommended to limit the rate of events that the API server will accept.", + "ImpactStatement": "You need to carefully tune in limits as per your environment.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Follow the Kubernetes documentation and set the desired limits in a configuration file. Then, edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` and set the below parameters. ``` --enable-admission-plugins=...,EventRateLimit,... --admission-control-config-file= ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--enable-admission-plugins` argument is set to a value that includes `EventRateLimit`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/admission-controllers/#eventratelimit:https://github.com/staebler/community/blob/9873b632f4d99b5d99c38c9b15fe2f8b93d0a746/contributors/design-proposals/admission_control_event_rate_limit.md", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `EventRateLimit` is not set." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.10", + "Description": "Ensure that the admission control plugin AlwaysAdmit is not set", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_no_always_admit_plugin" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Do not allow all requests.", + "RationaleStatement": "Setting admission control plugin `AlwaysAdmit` allows all requests and do not filter any requests. The `AlwaysAdmit` admission controller was deprecated in Kubernetes v1.13. Its behavior was equivalent to turning off all admission controllers.", + "ImpactStatement": "Only requests explicitly allowed by the admissions control plugins would be served.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` on the Control Plane node and either remove the `--enable-admission-plugins` parameter, or set it to a value that does not include `AlwaysAdmit`.", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that if the `--enable-admission-plugins` argument is set, its value does not include `AlwaysAdmit`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/admission-controllers/#alwaysadmit", + "DefaultValue": "`AlwaysAdmit` is not in the list of default admission plugins." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.11", + "Description": "Ensure that the admission control plugin AlwaysPullImages is set", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_always_pull_images_plugin" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Always pull images.", + "RationaleStatement": "Setting admission control policy to `AlwaysPullImages` forces every new pod to pull the required images every time. In a multi-tenant cluster users can be assured that their private images can only be used by those who have the credentials to pull them. Without this admission control policy, once an image has been pulled to a node, any pod from any user can use it simply by knowing the image’s name, without any authorization check against the image ownership. When this plug-in is enabled, images are always pulled prior to starting containers, which means valid credentials are required.", + "ImpactStatement": "Credentials would be required to pull the private images every time. Also, in trusted environments, this might increases load on network, registry, and decreases speed. This setting could impact offline or isolated clusters, which have images preloaded and do not have access to a registry to pull in-use images. This setting is not appropriate for clusters which use this configuration.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` on the Control Plane node and set the `--enable-admission-plugins` parameter to include `AlwaysPullImages`. ``` --enable-admission-plugins=...,AlwaysPullImages,... ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--enable-admission-plugins` argument is set to a value that includes `AlwaysPullImages`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/admission-controllers/#alwayspullimages", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `AlwaysPullImages` is not set." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.12", + "Description": "Ensure that the admission control plugin ServiceAccount is set", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_service_account_plugin" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Automate service accounts management.", + "RationaleStatement": "When you create a pod, if you do not specify a service account, it is automatically assigned the `default` service account in the same namespace. You should create your own service account and let the API server manage its security tokens.", + "ImpactStatement": "None.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Follow the documentation and create `ServiceAccount` objects as per your environment. Then, edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` on the master node and ensure that the `--disable-admission-plugins` parameter is set to a value that does not include `ServiceAccount`.", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--disable-admission-plugins` argument is set to a value that does not includes `ServiceAccount`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/admission-controllers/#serviceaccount:https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/configure-service-account/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `ServiceAccount` is set." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.13", + "Description": "Ensure that the admission control plugin NamespaceLifecycle is set", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_namespace_lifecycle_plugin" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Reject creating objects in a namespace that is undergoing termination.", + "RationaleStatement": "Setting admission control policy to `NamespaceLifecycle` ensures that objects cannot be created in non-existent namespaces, and that namespaces undergoing termination are not used for creating the new objects. This is recommended to enforce the integrity of the namespace termination process and also for the availability of the newer objects.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` on the Control Plane node and set the `--disable-admission-plugins` parameter to ensure it does not include `NamespaceLifecycle`.", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--disable-admission-plugins` argument is set to a value that does not include `NamespaceLifecycle`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/admission-controllers/#namespacelifecycle", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `NamespaceLifecycle` is set." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.14", + "Description": "Ensure that the admission control plugin NodeRestriction is set", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_node_restriction_plugin" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Limit the `Node` and `Pod` objects that a kubelet could modify.", + "RationaleStatement": "Using the `NodeRestriction` plug-in ensures that the kubelet is restricted to the `Node` and `Pod` objects that it could modify as defined. Such kubelets will only be allowed to modify their own `Node` API object, and only modify `Pod` API objects that are bound to their node.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Follow the Kubernetes documentation and configure `NodeRestriction` plug-in on kubelets. Then, edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` on the master node and set the `--enable-admission-plugins` parameter to a value that includes `NodeRestriction`. ``` --enable-admission-plugins=...,NodeRestriction,... ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--enable-admission-plugins` argument is set to a value that includes `NodeRestriction`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/admission-controllers/#noderestriction:https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/node/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `NodeRestriction` is not set." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.15", + "Description": "Ensure that the --profiling argument is set to false", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_disable_profiling" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Disable profiling, if not needed.", + "RationaleStatement": "Profiling allows for the identification of specific performance bottlenecks. It generates a significant amount of program data that could potentially be exploited to uncover system and program details. If you are not experiencing any bottlenecks and do not need the profiler for troubleshooting purposes, it is recommended to turn it off to reduce the potential attack surface.", + "ImpactStatement": "Profiling information would not be available.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` on the Control Plane node and set the below parameter. ``` --profiling=false ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--profiling` argument is set to `false`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, profiling is enabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.16", + "Description": "Ensure that the --audit-log-path argument is set", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_audit_log_path_set" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Enable auditing on the Kubernetes API Server and set the desired audit log path.", + "RationaleStatement": "Auditing the Kubernetes API Server provides a security-relevant chronological set of records documenting the sequence of activities that have affected system by individual users, administrators or other components of the system. Even though currently, Kubernetes provides only basic audit capabilities, it should be enabled. You can enable it by setting an appropriate audit log path.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` on the Control Plane node and set the `--audit-log-path` parameter to a suitable path and file where you would like audit logs to be written, for example: ``` --audit-log-path=/var/log/apiserver/audit.log ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--audit-log-path` argument is set as appropriate.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug/debug-cluster/audit/:https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/issues/22", + "DefaultValue": "By default, auditing is not enabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.17", + "Description": "Ensure that the --audit-log-maxage argument is set to 30 or as appropriate", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_audit_log_maxage_set" + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_audit_log_maxage_set", + "ConfigKey": "audit_log_maxage", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 30 + } + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Retain the logs for at least 30 days or as appropriate.", + "RationaleStatement": "Retaining logs for at least 30 days ensures that you can go back in time and investigate or correlate any events. Set your audit log retention period to 30 days or as per your business requirements.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` on the Control Plane node and set the `--audit-log-maxage` parameter to 30 or as an appropriate number of days: ``` --audit-log-maxage=30 ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--audit-log-maxage` argument is set to `30` or as appropriate.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug/debug-cluster/audit/:https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/issues/22", + "DefaultValue": "By default, auditing is not enabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.18", + "Description": "Ensure that the --audit-log-maxbackup argument is set to 10 or as appropriate", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_audit_log_maxbackup_set" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Retain 10 or an appropriate number of old log files.", + "RationaleStatement": "Kubernetes automatically rotates the log files. Retaining old log files ensures that you would have sufficient log data available for carrying out any investigation or correlation. For example, if you have set file size of 100 MB and the number of old log files to keep as 10, you would approximate have 1 GB of log data that you could potentially use for your analysis.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` on the Control Plane node and set the `--audit-log-maxbackup` parameter to 10 or to an appropriate value. ``` --audit-log-maxbackup=10 ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--audit-log-maxbackup` argument is set to `10` or as appropriate.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug/debug-cluster/audit/:https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/issues/22", + "DefaultValue": "By default, auditing is not enabled." + } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_audit_log_maxbackup_set", + "ConfigKey": "audit_log_maxbackup", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 10 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.19", + "Description": "Ensure that the --audit-log-maxsize argument is set to 100 or as appropriate", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_audit_log_maxsize_set" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Rotate log files on reaching 100 MB or as appropriate.", + "RationaleStatement": "Kubernetes automatically rotates the log files. Retaining old log files ensures that you would have sufficient log data available for carrying out any investigation or correlation. If you have set file size of 100 MB and the number of old log files to keep as 10, you would approximate have 1 GB of log data that you could potentially use for your analysis.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` on the Control Plane node and set the `--audit-log-maxsize` parameter to an appropriate size in MB. For example, to set it as 100 MB: ``` --audit-log-maxsize=100 ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--audit-log-maxsize` argument is set to `100` or as appropriate.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug/debug-cluster/audit/:https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/issues/22", + "DefaultValue": "By default, auditing is not enabled." + } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_audit_log_maxsize_set", + "ConfigKey": "audit_log_maxsize", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 100 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.20", + "Description": "Ensure that the --request-timeout argument is set as appropriate", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_request_timeout_set" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Set global request timeout for API server requests as appropriate.", + "RationaleStatement": "Setting global request timeout allows extending the API server request timeout limit to a duration appropriate to the user's connection speed. By default, it is set to 60 seconds which might be problematic on slower connections making cluster resources inaccessible once the data volume for requests exceeds what can be transmitted in 60 seconds. But, setting this timeout limit to be too large can exhaust the API server resources making it prone to Denial-of-Service attack. Hence, it is recommended to set this limit as appropriate and change the default limit of 60 seconds only if needed.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` and set the below parameter as appropriate and if needed. For example, ``` --request-timeout=300s ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--request-timeout` argument is either not set or set to an appropriate value.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/51415", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `--request-timeout` is set to 60 seconds." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.21", + "Description": "Ensure that the --service-account-lookup argument is set to true", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_service_account_lookup_true" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Validate service account before validating token.", + "RationaleStatement": "If `--service-account-lookup` is not enabled, the apiserver only verifies that the authentication token is valid, and does not validate that the service account token mentioned in the request is actually present in etcd. This allows using a service account token even after the corresponding service account is deleted. This is an example of time of check to time of use security issue.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` on the Control Plane node and set the below parameter. ``` --service-account-lookup=true ``` Alternatively, you can delete the `--service-account-lookup` parameter from this file so that the default takes effect.", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that if the `--service-account-lookup` argument exists it is set to `true`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/24167:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time-of-check_to_time-of-use", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `--service-account-lookup` argument is set to `true`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.22", + "Description": "Ensure that the --service-account-key-file argument is set as appropriate", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_service_account_key_file_set" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Explicitly set a service account public key file for service accounts on the apiserver.", + "RationaleStatement": "By default, if no `--service-account-key-file` is specified to the apiserver, it uses the private key from the TLS serving certificate to verify service account tokens. To ensure that the keys for service account tokens could be rotated as needed, a separate public/private key pair should be used for signing service account tokens. Hence, the public key should be specified to the apiserver with `--service-account-key-file`.", + "ImpactStatement": "The corresponding private key must be provided to the controller manager. You would need to securely maintain the key file and rotate the keys based on your organization's key rotation policy.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` on the Control Plane node and set the `--service-account-key-file` parameter to the public key file for service accounts: ``` --service-account-key-file= ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--service-account-key-file` argument exists and is set as appropriate.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/24167", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `--service-account-key-file` argument is not set." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.23", + "Description": "Ensure that the --etcd-certfile and --etcd-keyfile arguments are set as appropriate", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_etcd_tls_config" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "etcd should be configured to make use of TLS encryption for client connections.", + "RationaleStatement": "etcd is a highly-available key value store used by Kubernetes deployments for persistent storage of all of its REST API objects. These objects are sensitive in nature and should be protected by client authentication. This requires the API server to identify itself to the etcd server using a client certificate and key.", + "ImpactStatement": "TLS and client certificate authentication must be configured for etcd.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Follow the Kubernetes documentation and set up the TLS connection between the apiserver and etcd. Then, edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` on the master node and set the etcd certificate and key file parameters. ``` --etcd-certfile= --etcd-keyfile= ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--etcd-certfile` and `--etcd-keyfile` arguments exist and they are set as appropriate.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `--etcd-certfile` and `--etcd-keyfile` arguments are not set" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.24", + "Description": "Ensure that the --tls-cert-file and --tls-private-key-file arguments are set as appropriate", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_tls_config" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Setup TLS connection on the API server.", + "RationaleStatement": "API server communication contains sensitive parameters that should remain encrypted in transit. Configure the API server to serve only HTTPS traffic.", + "ImpactStatement": "TLS and client certificate authentication must be configured for your Kubernetes cluster deployment.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Follow the Kubernetes documentation and set up the TLS connection on the apiserver. Then, edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` on the master node and set the TLS certificate and private key file parameters. ``` --tls-cert-file= --tls-private-key-file= ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--tls-cert-file` and `--tls-private-key-file` arguments exist and they are set as appropriate.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://github.com/kelseyhightower/docker-kubernetes-tls-guide", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `--tls-cert-file` and `--tls-private-key-file` are presented and created for use." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.25", + "Description": "Ensure that the --client-ca-file argument is set as appropriate", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_client_ca_file_set" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Setup TLS connection on the API server.", + "RationaleStatement": "API server communication contains sensitive parameters that should remain encrypted in transit. Configure the API server to serve only HTTPS traffic. If `--client-ca-file` argument is set, any request presenting a client certificate signed by one of the authorities in the `client-ca-file` is authenticated with an identity corresponding to the CommonName of the client certificate.", + "ImpactStatement": "TLS and client certificate authentication must be configured for your Kubernetes cluster deployment.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Follow the Kubernetes documentation and set up the TLS connection on the apiserver. Then, edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` on the master node and set the client certificate authority file. ``` --client-ca-file= ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--client-ca-file` argument exists and it is set as appropriate.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://github.com/kelseyhightower/docker-kubernetes-tls-guide", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `--client-ca-file` argument is not set." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.26", + "Description": "Ensure that the --etcd-cafile argument is set as appropriate", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_etcd_cafile_set" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "etcd should be configured to make use of TLS encryption for client connections.", + "RationaleStatement": "etcd is a highly-available key value store used by Kubernetes deployments for persistent storage of all of its REST API objects. These objects are sensitive in nature and should be protected by client authentication. This requires the API server to identify itself to the etcd server using a SSL Certificate Authority file.", + "ImpactStatement": "TLS and client certificate authentication must be configured for etcd.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Follow the Kubernetes documentation and set up the TLS connection between the apiserver and etcd. Then, edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` on the master node and set the etcd certificate authority file parameter. ``` --etcd-cafile= ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--etcd-cafile` argument exists and it is set as appropriate.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `--etcd-cafile` is not set." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.27", + "Description": "Ensure that the --encryption-provider-config argument is set as appropriate", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_encryption_provider_config_set" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Encrypt etcd key-value store.", + "RationaleStatement": "etcd is a highly available key-value store used by Kubernetes deployments for persistent storage of all of its REST API objects. These objects are sensitive in nature and should be encrypted at rest to avoid any disclosures.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Follow the Kubernetes documentation and configure a `EncryptionConfig` file. Then, edit the API server pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml` on the master node and set the `--encryption-provider-config` parameter to the path of that file: ``` --encryption-provider-config= ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--encryption-provider-config` argument is set to a `EncryptionConfig` file. Additionally, ensure that the `EncryptionConfig` file has all the desired `resources` covered especially any secrets.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/encrypt-data/:https://acotten.com/post/kube17-security:https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/issues/92", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `--encryption-provider-config` is not set." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.28", + "Description": "Ensure that encryption providers are appropriately configured", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Where `etcd` encryption is used, appropriate providers should be configured.", + "RationaleStatement": "Where `etcd` encryption is used, it is important to ensure that the appropriate set of encryption providers is used. Currently, the `aescbc`, `kms`, and `secretbox` are likely to be appropriate options.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Follow the Kubernetes documentation and configure a `EncryptionConfig` file. In this file, choose `aescbc`, `kms`, or `secretbox` as the encryption provider.", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Get the `EncryptionConfig` file set for `--encryption-provider-config` argument. Verify that `aescbc`, `kms`, or `secretbox` is set as the encryption provider for all the desired `resources`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/encrypt-data/:https://acotten.com/post/kube17-security:https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/issues/92:https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/encrypt-data/#providers", + "DefaultValue": "By default, no encryption provider is set." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.29", + "Description": "Ensure that the API Server only makes use of Strong Cryptographic Ciphers", + "Checks": [ + "apiserver_strong_ciphers_only" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that the API server is configured to only use strong cryptographic ciphers.", + "RationaleStatement": "TLS ciphers have had a number of known vulnerabilities and weaknesses, which can reduce the protection provided by them. By default Kubernetes supports a number of TLS cipher suites including some that have security concerns, weakening the protection provided.", + "ImpactStatement": "API server clients that cannot support modern cryptographic ciphers will not be able to make connections to the API server.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the API server pod specification file /etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml on the Control Plane node and set the below parameter. ``` --tls-cipher-suites=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256. ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--tls-cipher-suites` argument returns a value that is in this list `TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Insecure values: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA.", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/:https://github.com/ssllabs/research/wiki/SSL-and-TLS-Deployment-Best-Practices#23-use-secure-cipher-suites", + "DefaultValue": "By default the Kubernetes API server supports a wide range of TLS ciphers" + } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_strong_ciphers_only", + "ConfigKey": "apiserver_strong_ciphers", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", + "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", + "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" + ] + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.30", + "Description": "Ensure that the --service-account-extend-token-expiration parameter is set to false", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.2 API Server", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "By default Kubernetes extends service account token lifetimes to one year to aid in transition from the legacy token settings.", + "RationaleStatement": "This default setting is not ideal for security as it ignores other settings related to maximum token lifetime and means that a lost or stolen credential could be valid for an extended period of time.", + "ImpactStatement": "Disabling this setting means that the service account token expiry set in the cluster will be enforced, and service account tokens will expire at the end of that time frame.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the API server pod specification file /etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml on the Control Plane node and set the --service-account-extend-token-expiration parameter to false. ``` --service-account-extend-token-expiration=false ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the --service-account-extend-token-expiration argument is set to false.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-apiserver/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, this parameter is set to true" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.1", + "Description": "Ensure that the --terminated-pod-gc-threshold argument is set as appropriate", + "Checks": [ + "controllermanager_garbage_collection" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.3 Controller Manager", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Activate garbage collector on pod termination, as appropriate.", + "RationaleStatement": "Garbage collection is important to ensure sufficient resource availability and avoiding degraded performance and availability. In the worst case, the system might crash or just be unusable for a long period of time. The current setting for garbage collection is 12,500 terminated pods which might be too high for your system to sustain. Based on your system resources and tests, choose an appropriate threshold value to activate garbage collection.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the Controller Manager pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-controller-manager.yaml` on the Control Plane node and set the `--terminated-pod-gc-threshold` to an appropriate threshold, for example: ``` --terminated-pod-gc-threshold=10 ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-controller-manager ``` Verify that the `--terminated-pod-gc-threshold` argument is set as appropriate.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-controller-manager/:https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/28484", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `--terminated-pod-gc-threshold` is set to `12500`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.2", + "Description": "Ensure that the --profiling argument is set to false", + "Checks": [ + "controllermanager_disable_profiling" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.3 Controller Manager", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Disable profiling, if not needed.", + "RationaleStatement": "Profiling allows for the identification of specific performance bottlenecks. It generates a significant amount of program data that could potentially be exploited to uncover system and program details. If you are not experiencing any bottlenecks and do not need the profiler for troubleshooting purposes, it is recommended to turn it off to reduce the potential attack surface.", + "ImpactStatement": "Profiling information would not be available.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the Controller Manager pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-controller-manager.yaml` on the Control Plane node and set the below parameter. ``` --profiling=false ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-controller-manager ``` Verify that the `--profiling` argument is set to `false`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-controller-manager/:https://github.com/kubernetes/community/blob/master/contributors/devel/profiling.md", + "DefaultValue": "By default, profiling is enabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.3", + "Description": "Ensure that the --use-service-account-credentials argument is set to true", + "Checks": [ + "controllermanager_service_account_credentials" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.3 Controller Manager", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Use individual service account credentials for each controller.", + "RationaleStatement": "The controller manager creates a service account per controller in the `kube-system` namespace, generates a credential for it, and builds a dedicated API client with that service account credential for each controller loop to use. Setting the `--use-service-account-credentials` to `true` runs each control loop within the controller manager using a separate service account credential. When used in combination with RBAC, this ensures that the control loops run with the minimum permissions required to perform their intended tasks.", + "ImpactStatement": "Whatever authorizer is configured for the cluster, it must grant sufficient permissions to the service accounts to perform their intended tasks. When using the RBAC authorizer, those roles are created and bound to the appropriate service accounts in the `kube-system` namespace automatically with default roles and rolebindings that are auto-reconciled on startup. If using other authorization methods (ABAC, Webhook, etc), the cluster deployer is responsible for granting appropriate permissions to the service accounts (the required permissions can be seen by inspecting the `controller-roles.yaml` and `controller-role-bindings.yaml` files for the RBAC roles.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the Controller Manager pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-controller-manager.yaml` on the Control Plane node to set the below parameter. ``` --use-service-account-credentials=true ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-controller-manager ``` Verify that the `--use-service-account-credentials` argument is set to `true`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-controller-manager/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/service-accounts-admin/:https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/blob/release-1.6/plugin/pkg/auth/authorizer/rbac/bootstrappolicy/testdata/controller-roles.yaml:https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/blob/release-1.6/plugin/pkg/auth/authorizer/rbac/bootstrappolicy/testdata/controller-role-bindings.yaml:https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/authorization/rbac/#controller-roles", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `--use-service-account-credentials` is set to false." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.4", + "Description": "Ensure that the --service-account-private-key-file argument is set as appropriate", + "Checks": [ + "controllermanager_service_account_private_key_file" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.3 Controller Manager", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Explicitly set a service account private key file for service accounts on the controller manager.", + "RationaleStatement": "To ensure that keys for service account tokens can be rotated as needed, a separate public/private key pair should be used for signing service account tokens. The private key should be specified to the controller manager with `--service-account-private-key-file` as appropriate.", + "ImpactStatement": "You would need to securely maintain the key file and rotate the keys based on your organization's key rotation policy.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the Controller Manager pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-controller-manager.yaml` on the Control Plane node and set the `--service-account-private-key-file` parameter to the private key file for service accounts. ``` --service-account-private-key-file= ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-controller-manager ``` Verify that the `--service-account-private-key-file` argument is set as appropriate.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-controller-manager/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `--service-account-private-key-file` it not set." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.5", + "Description": "Ensure that the --root-ca-file argument is set as appropriate", + "Checks": [ + "controllermanager_root_ca_file_set" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.3 Controller Manager", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Allow pods to verify the API server's serving certificate before establishing connections.", + "RationaleStatement": "Processes running within pods that need to contact the API server must verify the API server's serving certificate. Failing to do so could be a subject to man-in-the-middle attacks. Providing the root certificate for the API server's serving certificate to the controller manager with the `--root-ca-file` argument allows the controller manager to inject the trusted bundle into pods so that they can verify TLS connections to the API server.", + "ImpactStatement": "You need to setup and maintain root certificate authority file.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the Controller Manager pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-controller-manager.yaml` on the Control Plane node and set the `--root-ca-file` parameter to the certificate bundle file`. ``` --root-ca-file= ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-controller-manager ``` Verify that the `--root-ca-file` argument exists and is set to a certificate bundle file containing the root certificate for the API server's serving certificate.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-controller-manager/:https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/11000", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `--root-ca-file` is not set." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.6", + "Description": "Ensure that the RotateKubeletServerCertificate argument is set to true", + "Checks": [ + "controllermanager_rotate_kubelet_server_cert" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.3 Controller Manager", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Enable kubelet server certificate rotation on controller-manager.", + "RationaleStatement": "`RotateKubeletServerCertificate` causes the kubelet to both request a serving certificate after bootstrapping its client credentials and rotate the certificate as its existing credentials expire. This automated periodic rotation ensures that the there are no downtimes due to expired certificates and thus addressing availability in the CIA security triad. Note: This recommendation only applies if you let kubelets get their certificates from the API server. In case your kubelet certificates come from an outside authority/tool (e.g. Vault) then you need to take care of rotation yourself.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the Controller Manager pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-controller-manager.yaml` on the Control Plane node and set the `--feature-gates` parameter to include `RotateKubeletServerCertificate=true`. ``` --feature-gates=RotateKubeletServerCertificate=true ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-controller-manager ``` Verify that `RotateKubeletServerCertificate` argument exists and is set to `true`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kubelet-tls-bootstrapping/#approval-controller:https://github.com/kubernetes/features/issues/267:https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/45059:https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-controller-manager/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `RotateKubeletServerCertificate` is set to true this recommendation verifies that it has not been disabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.7", + "Description": "Ensure that the --bind-address argument is set to 127.0.0.1", + "Checks": [ + "controllermanager_bind_address" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.3 Controller Manager", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Do not bind the Controller Manager service to non-loopback insecure addresses.", + "RationaleStatement": "The Controller Manager API service which runs on port 10252/TCP by default is used for health and metrics information and is available without authentication or encryption. As such it should only be bound to a localhost interface, to minimize the cluster's attack surface", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the Controller Manager pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-controller-manager.yaml` on the Control Plane node and ensure the correct value for the `--bind-address` parameter", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-controller-manager ``` Verify that the `--bind-address` argument is set to 127.0.0.1", + "AdditionalInformation": "Although the current Kubernetes documentation site says that `--address` is deprecated in favour of `--bind-address` Kubeadm 1.11 still makes use of `--address`", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-controller-manager/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, the `--bind-address` parameter is set to 0.0.0.0" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.4.1", + "Description": "Ensure that the --profiling argument is set to false", + "Checks": [ + "scheduler_profiling" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.4 Scheduler", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Disable profiling, if not needed.", + "RationaleStatement": "Profiling allows for the identification of specific performance bottlenecks. It generates a significant amount of program data that could potentially be exploited to uncover system and program details. If you are not experiencing any bottlenecks and do not need the profiler for troubleshooting purposes, it is recommended to turn it off to reduce the potential attack surface.", + "ImpactStatement": "Profiling information would not be available.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the Scheduler pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-scheduler.yaml` file on the Control Plane node and set the below parameter. ``` --profiling=false ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-scheduler ``` Verify that the `--profiling` argument is set to `false`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-scheduler/:https://github.com/kubernetes/community/blob/master/contributors/devel/profiling.md", + "DefaultValue": "By default, profiling is enabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.4.2", + "Description": "Ensure that the --bind-address argument is set to 127.0.0.1", + "Checks": [ + "scheduler_bind_address" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Control Plane Components", + "SubSection": "1.4 Scheduler", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Do not bind the scheduler service to non-loopback insecure addresses.", + "RationaleStatement": "The Scheduler API service which runs on port 10251/TCP by default is used for health and metrics information and is available without authentication or encryption. As such it should only be bound to a localhost interface, to minimize the cluster's attack surface", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the Scheduler pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-scheduler.yaml` on the Control Plane node and ensure the correct value for the `--bind-address` parameter", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the Control Plane node: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-scheduler ``` Verify that the `--bind-address` argument is set to 127.0.0.1", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-scheduler/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, the `--bind-address` parameter is set to 0.0.0.0" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1", + "Description": "Ensure that the --cert-file and --key-file arguments are set as appropriate", + "Checks": [ + "etcd_tls_encryption" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 etcd", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Configure TLS encryption for the etcd service.", + "RationaleStatement": "etcd is a highly-available key value store used by Kubernetes deployments for persistent storage of all of its REST API objects. These objects are sensitive in nature and should be encrypted in transit.", + "ImpactStatement": "Client connections only over TLS would be served.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Follow the etcd service documentation and configure TLS encryption. Then, edit the etcd pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/etcd.yaml` on the master node and set the below parameters. ``` --cert-file= --key-file= ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the etcd server node ``` ps -ef | grep etcd ``` Verify that the `--cert-file` and the `--key-file` arguments are set as appropriate.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://coreos.com/etcd/docs/latest/op-guide/security.html:https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/etcd/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, TLS encryption is not set." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.2", + "Description": "Ensure that the --client-cert-auth argument is set to true", + "Checks": [ + "etcd_client_cert_auth" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 etcd", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Enable client authentication on etcd service.", + "RationaleStatement": "etcd is a highly-available key value store used by Kubernetes deployments for persistent storage of all of its REST API objects. These objects are sensitive in nature and should not be available to unauthenticated clients. You should enable the client authentication via valid certificates to secure the access to the etcd service.", + "ImpactStatement": "All clients attempting to access the etcd server will require a valid client certificate.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the etcd pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/etcd.yaml` on the master node and set the below parameter. ``` --client-cert-auth=true ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the etcd server node: ``` ps -ef | grep etcd ``` Verify that the `--client-cert-auth` argument is set to `true`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://coreos.com/etcd/docs/latest/op-guide/security.html:https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/etcd/:https://coreos.com/etcd/docs/latest/op-guide/configuration.html#client-cert-auth", + "DefaultValue": "By default, the etcd service can be queried by unauthenticated clients." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.3", + "Description": "Ensure that the --auto-tls argument is not set to true", + "Checks": [ + "etcd_no_auto_tls" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 etcd", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Do not use self-signed certificates for TLS.", + "RationaleStatement": "etcd is a highly-available key value store used by Kubernetes deployments for persistent storage of all of its REST API objects. These objects are sensitive in nature and should not be available to unauthenticated clients. You should enable the client authentication via valid certificates to secure the access to the etcd service.", + "ImpactStatement": "Clients will not be able to use self-signed certificates for TLS.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the etcd pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/etcd.yaml` on the master node and either remove the `--auto-tls` parameter or set it to `false`. ``` --auto-tls=false ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the etcd server node: ``` ps -ef | grep etcd ``` Verify that if the `--auto-tls` argument exists, it is not set to `true`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://coreos.com/etcd/docs/latest/op-guide/security.html:https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/etcd/:https://coreos.com/etcd/docs/latest/op-guide/configuration.html#auto-tls", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `--auto-tls` is set to `false`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.4", + "Description": "Ensure that the --peer-cert-file and --peer-key-file arguments are set as appropriate", + "Checks": [ + "etcd_peer_tls_config" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 etcd", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "etcd should be configured to make use of TLS encryption for peer connections.", + "RationaleStatement": "etcd is a highly-available key value store used by Kubernetes deployments for persistent storage of all of its REST API objects. These objects are sensitive in nature and should be encrypted in transit and also amongst peers in the etcd clusters.", + "ImpactStatement": "etcd cluster peers would need to set up TLS for their communication.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Follow the etcd service documentation and configure peer TLS encryption as appropriate for your etcd cluster. Then, edit the etcd pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/etcd.yaml` on the master node and set the below parameters. ``` --peer-client-file= --peer-key-file= ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the etcd server node: ``` ps -ef | grep etcd ``` Verify that the `--peer-cert-file` and `--peer-key-file` arguments are set as appropriate. **Note:** This recommendation is applicable only for etcd clusters. If you are using only one etcd server in your environment then this recommendation is not applicable.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://coreos.com/etcd/docs/latest/op-guide/security.html:https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/etcd/", + "DefaultValue": "**Note:** This recommendation is applicable only for etcd clusters. If you are using only one etcd server in your environment then this recommendation is not applicable. By default, peer communication over TLS is not configured." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.5", + "Description": "Ensure that the --peer-client-cert-auth argument is set to true", + "Checks": [ + "etcd_peer_client_cert_auth" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 etcd", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "etcd should be configured for peer authentication.", + "RationaleStatement": "etcd is a highly-available key value store used by Kubernetes deployments for persistent storage of all of its REST API objects. These objects are sensitive in nature and should be accessible only by authenticated etcd peers in the etcd cluster.", + "ImpactStatement": "All peers attempting to communicate with the etcd server will require a valid client certificate for authentication.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the etcd pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/etcd.yaml` on the master node and set the below parameter. ``` --peer-client-cert-auth=true ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the etcd server node: ``` ps -ef | grep etcd ``` Verify that the `--peer-client-cert-auth` argument is set to `true`. **Note:** This recommendation is applicable only for etcd clusters. If you are using only one etcd server in your environment then this recommendation is not applicable.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://coreos.com/etcd/docs/latest/op-guide/security.html:https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/etcd/:https://coreos.com/etcd/docs/latest/op-guide/configuration.html#peer-client-cert-auth", + "DefaultValue": "**Note:** This recommendation is applicable only for etcd clusters. If you are using only one etcd server in your environment then this recommendation is not applicable. By default, `--peer-client-cert-auth` argument is set to `false`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.6", + "Description": "Ensure that the --peer-auto-tls argument is not set to true", + "Checks": [ + "etcd_no_peer_auto_tls" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 etcd", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Do not use automatically generated self-signed certificates for TLS connections between peers.", + "RationaleStatement": "etcd is a highly-available key value store used by Kubernetes deployments for persistent storage of all of its REST API objects. These objects are sensitive in nature and should be accessible only by authenticated etcd peers in the etcd cluster. Hence, do not use self-signed certificates for authentication.", + "ImpactStatement": "All peers attempting to communicate with the etcd server will require a valid client certificate for authentication.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the etcd pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/etcd.yaml` on the master node and either remove the `--peer-auto-tls` parameter or set it to `false`. ``` --peer-auto-tls=false ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on the etcd server node: ``` ps -ef | grep etcd ``` Verify that if the `--peer-auto-tls` argument exists, it is not set to `true`. **Note:** This recommendation is applicable only for etcd clusters. If you are using only one etcd server in your environment then this recommendation is not applicable.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://coreos.com/etcd/docs/latest/op-guide/security.html:https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/etcd/:https://coreos.com/etcd/docs/latest/op-guide/configuration.html#peer-auto-tls", + "DefaultValue": "**Note:** This recommendation is applicable only for etcd clusters. If you are using only one etcd server in your environment then this recommendation is not applicable. By default, `--peer-auto-tls` argument is set to `false`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.7", + "Description": "Ensure that a unique Certificate Authority is used for etcd", + "Checks": [ + "etcd_unique_ca" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 etcd", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Use a different certificate authority for etcd from the one used for Kubernetes.", + "RationaleStatement": "etcd is a highly available key-value store used by Kubernetes deployments for persistent storage of all of its REST API objects. Its access should be restricted to specifically designated clients and peers only. Authentication to etcd is based on whether the certificate presented was issued by a trusted certificate authority. There is no checking of certificate attributes such as common name or subject alternative name. As such, if any attackers were able to gain access to any certificate issued by the trusted certificate authority, they would be able to gain full access to the etcd database.", + "ImpactStatement": "Additional management of the certificates and keys for the dedicated certificate authority will be required.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Follow the etcd documentation and create a dedicated certificate authority setup for the etcd service. Then, edit the etcd pod specification file `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/etcd.yaml` on the master node and set the below parameter. ``` --trusted-ca-file= ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Review the CA used by the etcd environment and ensure that it does not match the CA certificate file used for the management of the overall Kubernetes cluster. Run the following command on the master node: ``` ps -ef | grep etcd ``` Note the file referenced by the `--trusted-ca-file` argument. Run the following command on the master node: ``` ps -ef | grep apiserver ``` Verify that the file referenced by the `--client-ca-file` for apiserver is different from the `--trusted-ca-file` used by etcd.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://coreos.com/etcd/docs/latest/op-guide/security.html", + "DefaultValue": "By default, no etcd certificate is created and used." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.1.1", + "Description": "Client certificate authentication should not be used for users", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Control Plane Configuration", + "SubSection": "3.1 Authentication and Authorization", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Kubernetes provides the option to use client certificates for user authentication. However as there is no way to revoke these certificates when a user leaves an organization or loses their credential, they are not suitable for this purpose. It is not possible to fully disable client certificate use within a cluster as it is used for component to component authentication.", + "RationaleStatement": "With any authentication mechanism the ability to revoke credentials if they are compromised or no longer required, is a key control. Kubernetes client certificate authentication does not allow for this due to a lack of support for certificate revocation.", + "ImpactStatement": "External mechanisms for authentication generally require additional software to be deployed.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Alternative mechanisms provided by Kubernetes such as the use of OIDC should be implemented in place of client certificates.", + "AuditProcedure": "Review user access to the cluster and ensure that users are not making use of Kubernetes client certificate authentication.", + "AdditionalInformation": "The lack of certificate revocation was flagged up as a high risk issue in the recent Kubernetes security audit. Without this feature, client certificate authentication is not suitable for end users.", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "Client certificate authentication is enabled by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.1.2", + "Description": "Service account token authentication should not be used for users", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Control Plane Configuration", + "SubSection": "3.1 Authentication and Authorization", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Kubernetes provides service account tokens which are intended for use by workloads running in the Kubernetes cluster, for authentication to the API server. These tokens are not designed for use by end-users and do not provide for features such as revocation or expiry, making them insecure. A newer version of the feature (Bound service account token volumes) does introduce expiry but still does not allow for specific revocation.", + "RationaleStatement": "With any authentication mechanism the ability to revoke credentials if they are compromised or no longer required, is a key control. Service account token authentication does not allow for this due to the use of JWT tokens as an underlying technology.", + "ImpactStatement": "External mechanisms for authentication generally require additional software to be deployed.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Alternative mechanisms provided by Kubernetes such as the use of OIDC should be implemented in place of service account tokens.", + "AuditProcedure": "Review user access to the cluster and ensure that users are not making use of service account token authentication.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "Service account token authentication is enabled by default." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.1.3", + "Description": "Bootstrap token authentication should not be used for users", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Control Plane Configuration", + "SubSection": "3.1 Authentication and Authorization", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Kubernetes provides bootstrap tokens which are intended for use by new nodes joining the cluster These tokens are not designed for use by end-users they are specifically designed for the purpose of bootstrapping new nodes and not for general authentication", + "RationaleStatement": "Bootstrap tokens are not intended for use as a general authentication mechanism and impose constraints on user and group naming that do not facilitate good RBAC design. They also cannot be used with MFA resulting in a weak authentication mechanism being available.", + "ImpactStatement": "External mechanisms for authentication generally require additional software to be deployed.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Alternative mechanisms provided by Kubernetes such as the use of OIDC should be implemented in place of bootstrap tokens.", + "AuditProcedure": "Review user access to the cluster and ensure that users are not making use of bootstrap token authentication.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "Bootstrap token authentication is not enabled by default and requires an API server parameter to be set." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.2.1", + "Description": "Ensure that a minimal audit policy is created", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Control Plane Configuration", + "SubSection": "3.2 Logging", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Kubernetes can audit the details of requests made to the API server. The `--audit-policy-file` flag must be set for this logging to be enabled.", + "RationaleStatement": "Logging is an important detective control for all systems, to detect potential unauthorised access.", + "ImpactStatement": "Audit logs will be created on the master nodes, which will consume disk space. Care should be taken to avoid generating too large volumes of log information as this could impact the available of the cluster nodes.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Create an audit policy file for your cluster.", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on one of the cluster master nodes: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver ``` Verify that the `--audit-policy-file` is set. Review the contents of the file specified and ensure that it contains a valid audit policy.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug-application-cluster/audit/", + "DefaultValue": "Unless the `--audit-policy-file` flag is specified, no auditing will be carried out." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.2.2", + "Description": "Ensure that the audit policy covers key security concerns", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Control Plane Configuration", + "SubSection": "3.2 Logging", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that the audit policy created for the cluster covers key security concerns.", + "RationaleStatement": "Security audit logs should cover access and modification of key resources in the cluster, to enable them to form an effective part of a security environment.", + "ImpactStatement": "Increasing audit logging will consume resources on the nodes or other log destination.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Consider modification of the audit policy in use on the cluster to include these items, at a minimum.", + "AuditProcedure": "Review the audit policy provided for the cluster and ensure that it covers at least the following areas :- - Access to Secrets managed by the cluster. Care should be taken to only log Metadata for requests to Secrets, ConfigMaps, and TokenReviews, in order to avoid the risk of logging sensitive data. - Modification of `pod` and `deployment` objects. - Use of `pods/exec`, `pods/portforward`, `pods/proxy` and `services/proxy`. - Use of the `CertificateSigningRequest` API which allows for creation of new credentials. - Use of the Token sub-resource of `ServiceAccount` objects which allows for creation of new credentials. For most requests, minimally logging at the Metadata level is recommended (the most basic level of logging). Exceptions should be created in the audit logging policy to ensure that system operations (e.g. the Kubelet creating new credentials) are not logged, to reduce operational load and the risk of false positives.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://github.com/k8scop/k8s-security-dashboard/blob/master/configs/kubernetes/adv-audit.yaml:https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug-application-cluster/audit/#audit-policy:https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/blob/master/cluster/gce/gci/configure-helper.sh#L735", + "DefaultValue": "By default Kubernetes clusters do not log audit information." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.1.1", + "Description": "Ensure that the kubelet service file permissions are set to 600 or more restrictive", + "Checks": [ + "kubelet_service_file_permissions" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Worker Nodes", + "SubSection": "4.1 Worker Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that the `kubelet` service file has permissions of `600` or more restrictive.", + "RationaleStatement": "The `kubelet` service file controls various parameters that set the behavior of the `kubelet` service in the worker node. You should restrict its file permissions to maintain the integrity of the file. The file should be writable by only the administrators on the system.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the each worker node. For example, ``` chmod 600 /etc/systemd/system/kubelet.service.d/kubeadm.conf ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Automated AAC auditing has been modified to allow CIS-CAT to input a variable for the / of the kubelet service config file. Please set $kubelet_service_config= based on the file location on your system for example: ``` export kubelet_service_config=/etc/systemd/system/kubelet.service.d/kubeadm.conf ``` To perform the audit manually: Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the each worker node. For example, ``` stat -c %a /etc/systemd/system/kubelet.service.d/10-kubeadm.conf ``` Verify that the permissions are `600` or more restrictive.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kubelet/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/setup/independent/create-cluster-kubeadm/#44-joining-your-nodes:https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kubeadm/#kubelet-drop-in", + "DefaultValue": "By default, the `kubelet` service file has permissions of `640`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.1.2", + "Description": "Ensure that the kubelet service file ownership is set to root:root", + "Checks": [ + "kubelet_service_file_ownership_root" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Worker Nodes", + "SubSection": "4.1 Worker Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that the `kubelet` service file ownership is set to `root:root`.", + "RationaleStatement": "The `kubelet` service file controls various parameters that set the behavior of the `kubelet` service in the worker node. You should set its file ownership to maintain the integrity of the file. The file should be owned by `root:root`.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the each worker node. For example, ``` chown root:root /etc/systemd/system/kubelet.service.d/kubeadm.conf ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Automated AAC auditing has been modified to allow CIS-CAT to input a variable for the / of the kubelet service config file. Please set $kubelet_service_config= based on the file location on your system for example: ``` export kubelet_service_config=/etc/systemd/system/kubelet.service.d/kubeadm.conf ``` To perform the audit manually: Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the each worker node. For example, ``` stat -c %U:%G /etc/systemd/system/kubelet.service.d/10-kubeadm.conf ``` Verify that the ownership is set to `root:root`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kubelet/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/setup/independent/create-cluster-kubeadm/#44-joining-your-nodes:https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kubeadm/#kubelet-drop-in", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `kubelet` service file ownership is set to `root:root`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.1.3", + "Description": "If proxy kubeconfig file exists ensure permissions are set to 600 or more restrictive", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Worker Nodes", + "SubSection": "4.1 Worker Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "If `kube-proxy` is running, and if it is using a file-based kubeconfig file, ensure that the proxy kubeconfig file has permissions of `600` or more restrictive.", + "RationaleStatement": "The `kube-proxy` kubeconfig file controls various parameters of the `kube-proxy` service in the worker node. You should restrict its file permissions to maintain the integrity of the file. The file should be writable by only the administrators on the system. It is possible to run `kube-proxy` with the kubeconfig parameters configured as a Kubernetes ConfigMap instead of a file. In this case, there is no proxy kubeconfig file.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the each worker node. For example, ``` chmod 600 ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Find the kubeconfig file being used by `kube-proxy` by running the following command: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-proxy ``` If `kube-proxy` is running, get the kubeconfig file location from the `--kubeconfig` parameter. To perform the audit: Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the each worker node. For example, ``` stat -c %a ``` Verify that a file is specified and it exists with permissions are `600` or more restrictive.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-proxy/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, proxy file has permissions of `640`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.1.4", + "Description": "If proxy kubeconfig file exists ensure ownership is set to root:root", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Worker Nodes", + "SubSection": "4.1 Worker Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "If `kube-proxy` is running, ensure that the file ownership of its kubeconfig file is set to `root:root`.", + "RationaleStatement": "The kubeconfig file for `kube-proxy` controls various parameters for the `kube-proxy` service in the worker node. You should set its file ownership to maintain the integrity of the file. The file should be owned by `root:root`.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the each worker node. For example, ``` chown root:root ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Find the kubeconfig file being used by `kube-proxy` by running the following command: ``` ps -ef | grep kube-proxy ``` If `kube-proxy` is running, get the kubeconfig file location from the `--kubeconfig` parameter. To perform the audit: Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the each worker node. For example, ``` stat -c %U:%G ``` Verify that the ownership is set to `root:root`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kube-proxy/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `proxy` file ownership is set to `root:root`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.1.5", + "Description": "Ensure that the --kubeconfig kubelet.conf file permissions are set to 600 or more restrictive", + "Checks": [ + "kubelet_conf_file_permissions" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Worker Nodes", + "SubSection": "4.1 Worker Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that the `kubelet.conf` file has permissions of `600` or more restrictive.", + "RationaleStatement": "The `kubelet.conf` file is the kubeconfig file for the node, and controls various parameters that set the behavior and identity of the worker node. You should restrict its file permissions to maintain the integrity of the file. The file should be writable by only the administrators on the system.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the each worker node. For example, ``` chmod 600 /etc/kubernetes/kubelet.conf ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Automated AAC auditing has been modified to allow CIS-CAT to input a variable for the / of the kubelet config file. Please set $kubelet_config= based on the file location on your system for example: ``` export kubelet_config=/etc/kubernetes/kubelet.conf ``` To perform the audit manually: Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the each worker node. For example, ``` stat -c %a /etc/kubernetes/kubelet.conf ``` Verify that the ownership is set to `root:root`.Verify that the permissions are `600` or more restrictive.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kubelet/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `kubelet.conf` file has permissions of `600`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.1.6", + "Description": "Ensure that the --kubeconfig kubelet.conf file ownership is set to root:root", + "Checks": [ + "kubelet_conf_file_ownership" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Worker Nodes", + "SubSection": "4.1 Worker Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that the `kubelet.conf` file ownership is set to `root:root`.", + "RationaleStatement": "The `kubelet.conf` file is the kubeconfig file for the node, and controls various parameters that set the behavior and identity of the worker node. You should set its file ownership to maintain the integrity of the file. The file should be owned by `root:root`.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the each worker node. For example, ``` chown root:root /etc/kubernetes/kubelet.conf ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Automated AAC auditing has been modified to allow CIS-CAT to input a variable for the / of the kubelet config file. Please set $kubelet_config= based on the file location on your system for example: ``` export kubelet_config=/etc/kubernetes/kubelet.conf ``` To perform the audit manually: Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the each worker node. For example, ``` stat -c %U:%G /etc/kubernetes/kubelet.conf ``` Verify that the ownership is set to `root:root`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kubelet/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `kubelet.conf` file ownership is set to `root:root`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.1.7", + "Description": "Ensure that the certificate authorities file permissions are set to 644 or more restrictive", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Worker Nodes", + "SubSection": "4.1 Worker Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that the certificate authorities file has permissions of `644` or more restrictive.", + "RationaleStatement": "The certificate authorities file controls the authorities used to validate API requests. You should restrict its file permissions to maintain the integrity of the file. The file should be writable by only the administrators on the system.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the following command to modify the file permissions of the `--client-ca-file` ``` chmod 644 ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command: ``` ps -ef | grep kubelet ``` Find the file specified by the `--client-ca-file` argument. Run the following command: ``` stat -c %a ``` Verify that the permissions are `644` or more restrictive.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/authentication/#x509-client-certs", + "DefaultValue": "By default no `--client-ca-file` is specified." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.1.8", + "Description": "Ensure that the client certificate authorities file ownership is set to root:root", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Worker Nodes", + "SubSection": "4.1 Worker Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that the certificate authorities file ownership is set to `root:root`.", + "RationaleStatement": "The certificate authorities file controls the authorities used to validate API requests. You should set its file ownership to maintain the integrity of the file. The file should be owned by `root:root`.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the following command to modify the ownership of the `--client-ca-file`. ``` chown root:root ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command: ``` ps -ef | grep kubelet ``` Find the file specified by the `--client-ca-file` argument. Run the following command: ``` stat -c %U:%G ``` Verify that the ownership is set to `root:root`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/authentication/#x509-client-certs", + "DefaultValue": "By default no `--client-ca-file` is specified." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.1.9", + "Description": "If the kubelet config.yaml configuration file is being used validate permissions set to 600 or more restrictive", + "Checks": [ + "kubelet_config_yaml_permissions" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Worker Nodes", + "SubSection": "4.1 Worker Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that if the kubelet refers to a configuration file with the `--config` argument, that file has permissions of 600 or more restrictive.", + "RationaleStatement": "The kubelet reads various parameters, including security settings, from a config file specified by the `--config` argument. If this file is specified you should restrict its file permissions to maintain the integrity of the file. The file should be writable by only the administrators on the system.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the following command (using the config file location identified in the Audit step) ``` chmod 600 /var/lib/kubelet/config.yaml ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Automated AAC auditing has been modified to allow CIS-CAT to input a variable for the / of the kubelet config yaml file. Please set $kubelet_config_yaml= based on the file location on your system for example: ``` export kubelet_config_yaml=/var/lib/kubelet/config.yaml ``` To perform the audit manually: Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the each worker node. For example, ``` stat -c %a /var/lib/kubelet/config.yaml ``` Verify that the permissions are `600` or more restrictive.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/kubelet-config-file/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, the /var/lib/kubelet/config.yaml file as set up by `kubeadm` has permissions of 600." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.1.10", + "Description": "If the kubelet config.yaml configuration file is being used validate file ownership is set to root:root", + "Checks": [ + "kubelet_config_yaml_ownership" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Worker Nodes", + "SubSection": "4.1 Worker Node Configuration Files", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Ensure that if the kubelet refers to a configuration file with the `--config` argument, that file is owned by root:root.", + "RationaleStatement": "The kubelet reads various parameters, including security settings, from a config file specified by the `--config` argument. If this file is specified you should restrict its file permissions to maintain the integrity of the file. The file should be owned by root:root.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Run the following command (using the config file location identied in the Audit step) ``` chown root:root /etc/kubernetes/kubelet.conf ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Automated AAC auditing has been modified to allow CIS-CAT to input a variable for the / of the kubelet config yaml file. Please set $kubelet_config_yaml= based on the file location on your system for example: ``` export kubelet_config_yaml=/var/lib/kubelet/config.yaml ``` To perform the audit manually: Run the below command (based on the file location on your system) on the each worker node. For example, ``` stat -c %U:%G /var/lib/kubelet/config.yaml ```Verify that the ownership is set to `root:root`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/kubelet-config-file/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `/var/lib/kubelet/config.yaml` file as set up by `kubeadm` is owned by `root:root`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.2.1", + "Description": "Ensure that the --anonymous-auth argument is set to false", + "Checks": [ + "kubelet_disable_anonymous_auth" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Worker Nodes", + "SubSection": "4.2 Kubelet", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Disable anonymous requests to the Kubelet server.", + "RationaleStatement": "When enabled, requests that are not rejected by other configured authentication methods are treated as anonymous requests. These requests are then served by the Kubelet server. You should rely on authentication to authorize access and disallow anonymous requests.", + "ImpactStatement": "Anonymous requests will be rejected.", + "RemediationProcedure": "If using a Kubelet config file, edit the file to set `authentication: anonymous: enabled` to `false`. If using executable arguments, edit the kubelet service file `/etc/kubernetes/kubelet.conf` on each worker node and set the below parameter in `KUBELET_SYSTEM_PODS_ARGS` variable. ``` --anonymous-auth=false ``` Based on your system, restart the `kubelet` service. For example: ``` systemctl daemon-reload systemctl restart kubelet.service ```", + "AuditProcedure": "If using a Kubelet configuration file, check that there is an entry for `authentication: anonymous: enabled` set to `false`. Run the following command on each node: ``` ps -ef | grep kubelet ``` Verify that the `--anonymous-auth` argument is set to `false`. This executable argument may be omitted, provided there is a corresponding entry set to `false` in the Kubelet config file.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kubelet/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kubelet-authentication-authorization/#kubelet-authentication", + "DefaultValue": "By default, anonymous access is enabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.2.2", + "Description": "Ensure that the --authorization-mode argument is not set to AlwaysAllow", + "Checks": [ + "kubelet_authorization_mode" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Worker Nodes", + "SubSection": "4.2 Kubelet", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Do not allow all requests. Enable explicit authorization.", + "RationaleStatement": "Kubelets, by default, allow all authenticated requests (even anonymous ones) without needing explicit authorization checks from the apiserver. You should restrict this behavior and only allow explicitly authorized requests.", + "ImpactStatement": "Unauthorized requests will be denied.", + "RemediationProcedure": "If using a Kubelet config file, edit the file to set `authorization: mode` to `Webhook`. If using executable arguments, edit the kubelet service file `/etc/kubernetes/kubelet.conf` on each worker node and set the below parameter in `KUBELET_AUTHZ_ARGS` variable. ``` --authorization-mode=Webhook ``` Based on your system, restart the `kubelet` service. For example: ``` systemctl daemon-reload systemctl restart kubelet.service ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on each node: ``` ps -ef | grep kubelet ``` If the `--authorization-mode` argument is present check that it is not set to `AlwaysAllow`. If it is not present check that there is a Kubelet config file specified by `--config`, and that file sets `authorization: mode` to something other than `AlwaysAllow`. It is also possible to review the running configuration of a Kubelet via the `/configz` endpoint on the Kubelet API port (typically `10250/TCP`). Accessing these with appropriate credentials will provide details of the Kubelet's configuration.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kubelet/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kubelet-authentication-authorization/#kubelet-authentication", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `--authorization-mode` argument is set to `AlwaysAllow`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.2.3", + "Description": "Ensure that the --client-ca-file argument is set as appropriate", + "Checks": [ + "kubelet_client_ca_file_set" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Worker Nodes", + "SubSection": "4.2 Kubelet", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Enable Kubelet authentication using certificates.", + "RationaleStatement": "The connections from the apiserver to the kubelet are used for fetching logs for pods, attaching (through kubectl) to running pods, and using the kubelet’s port-forwarding functionality. These connections terminate at the kubelet’s HTTPS endpoint. By default, the apiserver does not verify the kubelet’s serving certificate, which makes the connection subject to man-in-the-middle attacks, and unsafe to run over untrusted and/or public networks. Enabling Kubelet certificate authentication ensures that the apiserver could authenticate the Kubelet before submitting any requests.", + "ImpactStatement": "You require TLS to be configured on apiserver as well as kubelets.", + "RemediationProcedure": "If using a Kubelet config file, edit the file to set `authentication: x509: clientCAFile` to the location of the client CA file. If using command line arguments, edit the kubelet service file `/etc/kubernetes/kubelet.conf` on each worker node and set the below parameter in `KUBELET_AUTHZ_ARGS` variable. ``` --client-ca-file= ``` Based on your system, restart the `kubelet` service. For example: ``` systemctl daemon-reload systemctl restart kubelet.service ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on each node: ``` ps -ef | grep kubelet ``` Verify that the `--client-ca-file` argument exists and is set to the location of the client certificate authority file. If the `--client-ca-file` argument is not present, check that there is a Kubelet config file specified by `--config`, and that the file sets `authentication: x509: clientCAFile` to the location of the client certificate authority file.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kubelet/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet-authentication-authorization/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `--client-ca-file` argument is not set." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.2.4", + "Description": "Verify that if defined, readOnlyPort is set to 0", + "Checks": [ + "kubelet_disable_read_only_port" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Worker Nodes", + "SubSection": "4.2 Kubelet", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Disable the read-only port.", + "RationaleStatement": "The Kubelet process provides a read-only API in addition to the main Kubelet API. Unauthenticated access is provided to this read-only API which could possibly retrieve potentially sensitive information about the cluster.", + "ImpactStatement": "Removal of the read-only port will require that any service which made use of it will need to be re-configured to use the main Kubelet API.", + "RemediationProcedure": "If using a Kubelet config file, edit the file to set `readOnlyPort` to `0`. If using command line arguments, edit the kubelet service file `/etc/kubernetes/kubelet.conf` on each worker node and set the below parameter in `KUBELET_SYSTEM_PODS_ARGS` variable. ``` --read-only-port=0 ``` Based on your system, restart the `kubelet` service. For example: ``` systemctl daemon-reload systemctl restart kubelet.service ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on each node: ``` ps -ef | grep kubelet ``` Verify that the `--read-only-port` argument exists and is set to `0`. If the `--read-only-port` argument is not present, check that there is a Kubelet config file specified by `--config`. Check that if there is a `readOnlyPort` entry in the file, it is set to `0`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet/", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kubelet/:https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/blob/6cedc0853faa118df0ba3d41b48b993422ad3df6/staging/src/k8s.io/kubelet/config/v1beta1/types.go#L142", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.2.5", + "Description": "Ensure that the --streaming-connection-idle-timeout argument is not set to 0", + "Checks": [ + "kubelet_streaming_connection_timeout" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Worker Nodes", + "SubSection": "4.2 Kubelet", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Do not disable timeouts on streaming connections.", + "RationaleStatement": "Setting idle timeouts ensures that you are protected against Denial-of-Service attacks, inactive connections and running out of ephemeral ports. **Note:** By default, `--streaming-connection-idle-timeout` is set to 4 hours which might be too high for your environment. Setting this as appropriate would additionally ensure that such streaming connections are timed out after serving legitimate use cases.", + "ImpactStatement": "Long-lived connections could be interrupted.", + "RemediationProcedure": "If using a Kubelet config file, edit the file to set `streamingConnectionIdleTimeout` to a value other than 0. If using command line arguments, edit the kubelet service file `/etc/kubernetes/kubelet.conf` on each worker node and set the below parameter in `KUBELET_SYSTEM_PODS_ARGS` variable. ``` --streaming-connection-idle-timeout=5m ``` Based on your system, restart the `kubelet` service. For example: ``` systemctl daemon-reload systemctl restart kubelet.service ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on each node: ``` ps -ef | grep kubelet ``` Verify that the `--streaming-connection-idle-timeout` argument is not set to `0`. If the argument is not present, and there is a Kubelet config file specified by `--config`, check that it does not set `streamingConnectionIdleTimeout` to 0.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kubelet/:https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/18552", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `--streaming-connection-idle-timeout` is set to 4 hours." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.2.6", + "Description": "Ensure that the --make-iptables-util-chains argument is set to true", + "Checks": [ + "kubelet_manage_iptables" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Worker Nodes", + "SubSection": "4.2 Kubelet", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Allow Kubelet to manage iptables.", + "RationaleStatement": "Kubelets can automatically manage the required changes to iptables based on how you choose your networking options for the pods. It is recommended to let kubelets manage the changes to iptables. This ensures that the iptables configuration remains in sync with pods networking configuration. Manually configuring iptables with dynamic pod network configuration changes might hamper the communication between pods/containers and to the outside world. You might have iptables rules too restrictive or too open.", + "ImpactStatement": "Kubelet would manage the iptables on the system and keep it in sync. If you are using any other iptables management solution, then there might be some conflicts.", + "RemediationProcedure": "If using a Kubelet config file, edit the file to set `makeIPTablesUtilChains: true`. If using command line arguments, edit the kubelet service file `/etc/kubernetes/kubelet.conf` on each worker node and remove the `--make-iptables-util-chains` argument from the `KUBELET_SYSTEM_PODS_ARGS` variable. Based on your system, restart the `kubelet` service. For example: ``` systemctl daemon-reload systemctl restart kubelet.service ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on each node: ``` ps -ef | grep kubelet ``` Verify that if the `--make-iptables-util-chains` argument exists then it is set to `true`. If the `--make-iptables-util-chains` argument does not exist, and there is a Kubelet config file specified by `--config`, verify that the file does not set `makeIPTablesUtilChains` to `false`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kubelet/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `--make-iptables-util-chains` argument is set to `true`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.2.7", + "Description": "Ensure that the --hostname-override argument is not set", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Worker Nodes", + "SubSection": "4.2 Kubelet", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Do not override node hostnames.", + "RationaleStatement": "Overriding hostnames could potentially break TLS setup between the kubelet and the apiserver. Additionally, with overridden hostnames, it becomes increasingly difficult to associate logs with a particular node and process them for security analytics. Hence, you should setup your kubelet nodes with resolvable FQDNs and avoid overriding the hostnames with IPs.", + "ImpactStatement": "Some cloud providers may require this flag to ensure that hostname matches names issued by the cloud provider. In these environments, this recommendation should not apply.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the kubelet service file `/etc/systemd/system/kubelet.service.d/10-kubeadm.conf` on each worker node and remove the `--hostname-override` argument from the `KUBELET_SYSTEM_PODS_ARGS` variable. Based on your system, restart the `kubelet` service. For example: ``` systemctl daemon-reload systemctl restart kubelet.service ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on each node: ``` ps -ef | grep kubelet ``` Verify that `--hostname-override` argument does not exist. **Note** This setting is not configurable via the Kubelet config file.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kubelet/:https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/22063", + "DefaultValue": "By default, `--hostname-override` argument is not set." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.2.8", + "Description": "Ensure that the eventRecordQPS argument is set to a level which ensures appropriate event capture", + "Checks": [ + "kubelet_event_record_qps" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Worker Nodes", + "SubSection": "4.2 Kubelet", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Security relevant information should be captured. The eventRecordQPS on the Kubelet configuration can be used to limit the rate at which events are gathered and sets the maximum event creations per second. Setting this too low could result in relevant events not being logged, however the unlimited setting of `0` could result in a denial of service on the kubelet.", + "RationaleStatement": "It is important to capture all events and not restrict event creation. Events are an important source of security information and analytics that ensure that your environment is consistently monitored using the event data.", + "ImpactStatement": "Setting this parameter to `0` could result in a denial of service condition due to excessive events being created. The cluster's event processing and storage systems should be scaled to handle expected event loads.", + "RemediationProcedure": "If using a Kubelet config file, edit the file to set `eventRecordQPS:` to an appropriate level. If using command line arguments, edit the kubelet service file `/etc/systemd/system/kubelet.service.d/10-kubeadm.conf` on each worker node and set the below parameter in `KUBELET_ARGS` variable. Based on your system, restart the `kubelet` service. For example: ``` systemctl daemon-reload systemctl restart kubelet.service ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on each node: ``` sudo grep eventRecordQPS /etc/systemd/system/kubelet.service.d/10-kubeadm.conf ``` or If using command line arguments, kubelet service file is located /etc/systemd/system/kubelet.service.d/10-kubelet-args.conf ``` sudo grep eventRecordQPS /etc/systemd/system/kubelet.service.d/10-kubelet-args.conf ``` Review the value set for the argument and determine whether this has been set to an appropriate level for the cluster. If the argument does not exist, check that there is a Kubelet config file specified by `--config` and review the value in this location. If using command line arguments", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kubelet/:https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/blob/master/pkg/kubelet/apis/kubeletconfig/v1beta1/types.go", + "DefaultValue": "By default, eventRecordQPS argument is set to `5`." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.2.9", + "Description": "Ensure that the --tls-cert-file and --tls-private-key-file arguments are set as appropriate", + "Checks": [ + "kubelet_tls_cert_and_key" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Worker Nodes", + "SubSection": "4.2 Kubelet", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Setup TLS connection on the Kubelets.", + "RationaleStatement": "The connections from the apiserver to the kubelet are used for fetching logs for pods, attaching (through kubectl) to running pods, and using the kubelet’s port-forwarding functionality. These connections terminate at the kubelet’s HTTPS endpoint. By default, the apiserver does not verify the kubelet’s serving certificate, which makes the connection subject to man-in-the-middle attacks, and unsafe to run over untrusted and/or public networks.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "If using a Kubelet config file, edit the file to set tlsCertFile to the location of the certificate file to use to identify this Kubelet, and tlsPrivateKeyFile to the location of the corresponding private key file. If using command line arguments, edit the kubelet service file /etc/kubernetes/kubelet.conf on each worker node and set the below parameters in KUBELET_CERTIFICATE_ARGS variable. --tls-cert-file= --tls-private-key-file= Based on your system, restart the kubelet service. For example: ``` systemctl daemon-reload systemctl restart kubelet.service ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on each node: ``` ps -ef | grep kubelet ``` Verify that the --tls-cert-file and --tls-private-key-file arguments exist and they are set as appropriate. If these arguments are not present, check that there is a Kubelet config specified by --config and that it contains appropriate settings for tlsCertFile and tlsPrivateKeyFile.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.2.10", + "Description": "Ensure that the --rotate-certificates argument is not set to false", + "Checks": [ + "kubelet_rotate_certificates" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Worker Nodes", + "SubSection": "4.2 Kubelet", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Enable kubelet client certificate rotation.", + "RationaleStatement": "The `--rotate-certificates` setting causes the kubelet to rotate its client certificates by creating new CSRs as its existing credentials expire. This automated periodic rotation ensures that the there is no downtime due to expired certificates and thus addressing availability in the CIA security triad. **Note:** This recommendation only applies if you let kubelets get their certificates from the API server. In case your kubelet certificates come from an outside authority/tool (e.g. Vault) then you need to take care of rotation yourself. **Note:** This feature also require the `RotateKubeletClientCertificate` feature gate to be enabled (which is the default since Kubernetes v1.7)", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "If using a Kubelet config file, edit the file to add the line `rotateCertificates: true` or remove it altogether to use the default value. If using command line arguments, edit the kubelet service file `/etc/kubernetes/kubelet.conf` on each worker node and remove `--rotate-certificates=false` argument from the `KUBELET_CERTIFICATE_ARGS` variable or set --rotate-certificates=true . Based on your system, restart the `kubelet` service. For example: ``` systemctl daemon-reload systemctl restart kubelet.service ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command on each node: ``` ps -ef | grep kubelet ``` Verify that the `RotateKubeletServerCertificate` argument is not present, or is set to `true`. If the RotateKubeletServerCertificate argument is not present, verify that if there is a Kubelet config file specified by `--config`, that file does not contain `RotateKubeletServerCertificate: false`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/41912:https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet-tls-bootstrapping/#kubelet-configuration:https://kubernetes.io/docs/imported/release/notes/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/feature-gates/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, kubelet client certificate rotation is enabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.2.11", + "Description": "Verify that the RotateKubeletServerCertificate argument is set to true", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Worker Nodes", + "SubSection": "4.2 Kubelet", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Enable kubelet server certificate rotation.", + "RationaleStatement": "`RotateKubeletServerCertificate` causes the kubelet to both request a serving certificate after bootstrapping its client credentials and rotate the certificate as its existing credentials expire. This automated periodic rotation ensures that the there are no downtimes due to expired certificates and thus addressing availability in the CIA security triad. Note: This recommendation only applies if you let kubelets get their certificates from the API server. In case your kubelet certificates come from an outside authority/tool (e.g. Vault) then you need to take care of rotation yourself.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Edit the kubelet service file `/etc/kubernetes/kubelet.conf` on each worker node and set the below parameter in `KUBELET_CERTIFICATE_ARGS` variable. ``` --feature-gates=RotateKubeletServerCertificate=true ``` Based on your system, restart the `kubelet` service. For example: ``` systemctl daemon-reload systemctl restart kubelet.service ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Ignore this check if serverTLSBootstrap is true in the kubelet config file or if the --rotate-server-certificates parameter is set on kubelet Run the following command on each node: ``` ps -ef | grep kubelet ``` Verify that `RotateKubeletServerCertificate` argument exists and is set to `true`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/45059:https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/kubelet-tls-bootstrapping/#kubelet-configuration", + "DefaultValue": "By default, kubelet server certificate rotation is enabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.2.12", + "Description": "Ensure that the Kubelet only makes use of Strong Cryptographic Ciphers", + "Checks": [ + "kubelet_strong_ciphers_only" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Worker Nodes", + "SubSection": "4.2 Kubelet", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that the Kubelet is configured to only use strong cryptographic ciphers.", + "RationaleStatement": "TLS ciphers have had a number of known vulnerabilities and weaknesses, which can reduce the protection provided by them. By default Kubernetes supports a number of TLS ciphersuites including some that have security concerns, weakening the protection provided.", + "ImpactStatement": "Kubelet clients that cannot support modern cryptographic ciphers will not be able to make connections to the Kubelet API.", + "RemediationProcedure": "If using a Kubelet config file, edit the file to set `tlsCipherSuites:` to `TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256` or to a subset of these values. If using executable arguments, edit the kubelet service file `/etc/kubernetes/kubelet.conf` on each worker node and set the `--tls-cipher-suites` parameter as follows, or to a subset of these values. ``` --tls-cipher-suites=TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ``` Based on your system, restart the `kubelet` service. For example: ``` systemctl daemon-reload systemctl restart kubelet.service ```", + "AuditProcedure": "The set of cryptographic ciphers currently considered secure is the following: - `TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256` - `TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256` - `TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305` - `TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384` - `TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305` - `TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384` - `TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384` - `TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256` Run the following command on each node: ``` ps -ef | grep kubelet ``` If the `--tls-cipher-suites` argument is present, ensure it only contains values included in this set. If it is not present check that there is a Kubelet config file specified by `--config`, and that file sets `tlsCipherSuites:` to only include values from this set.", + "AdditionalInformation": "The list chosen above should be fine for modern clients. It's essentially the list from the Mozilla Modern cipher option with the ciphersuites supporting CBC mode removed, as CBC has traditionally had a lot of issues", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "By default the Kubernetes API server supports a wide range of TLS ciphers" + } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "kubelet_strong_ciphers_only", + "ConfigKey": "kubelet_strong_ciphers", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", + "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", + "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305", + "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", + "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305", + "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", + "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", + "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" + ] + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.2.13", + "Description": "Ensure that a limit is set on pod PIDs", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Worker Nodes", + "SubSection": "4.2 Kubelet", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that the Kubelet sets limits on the number of PIDs that can be created by pods running on the node.", + "RationaleStatement": "By default pods running in a cluster can consume any number of PIDs, potentially exhausting the resources available on the node. Setting an appropriate limit reduces the risk of a denial of service attack on cluster nodes.", + "ImpactStatement": "Setting this value will restrict the number of processes per pod. If this limit is lower than the number of PIDs required by a pod it will not operate.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Decide on an appropriate level for this parameter and set it, either via the `--pod-max-pids` command line parameter or the `PodPidsLimit` configuration file setting.", + "AuditProcedure": "Review the Kubelet's start-up parameters for the value of `--pod-max-pids`, and check the Kubelet configuration file for the `PodPidsLimit` . If neither of these values is set, then there is no limit in place.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/policy/pid-limiting/#pod-pid-limits", + "DefaultValue": "By default the number of PIDs is not limited." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.2.14", + "Description": "Ensure that the --seccomp-default parameter is set to true", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Worker Nodes", + "SubSection": "4.2 Kubelet", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensure that the Kubelet enforces the use of the RuntimeDefault seccomp profile", + "RationaleStatement": "By default, Kubernetes disables the seccomp profile which ships with most container runtimes. Setting this parameter will ensure workloads running on the node are protected by the runtime's seccomp profile.", + "ImpactStatement": "Setting this will remove some rights from pods running on the node.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Set the parameter, either via the `--seccomp-default` command line parameter or the `seccompDefault` configuration file setting.", + "AuditProcedure": "Review the Kubelet's start-up parameters for the value of `--seccomp-default`, and check the Kubelet configuration file for the `seccompDefault` . If neither of these values is set, then the seccomp profile is not in use.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tutorials/security/seccomp/#enable-the-use-of-runtimedefault-as-the-default-seccomp-profile-for-all-workloads", + "DefaultValue": "By default the seccomp profile is not enabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.3.1", + "Description": "Ensure that the kube-proxy metrics service is bound to localhost", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Worker Nodes", + "SubSection": "4.3 kube-proxy", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Do not bind the kube-proxy metrics port to non-loopback addresses.", + "RationaleStatement": "kube-proxy has two APIs which provided access to information about the service and can be bound to network ports. The metrics API service includes endpoints (`/metrics` and `/configz`) which disclose information about the configuration and operation of kube-proxy. These endpoints should not be exposed to untrusted networks as they do not support encryption or authentication to restrict access to the data they provide.", + "ImpactStatement": "3rd party services which try to access metrics or configuration information related to kube-proxy will require access to the localhost interface of the node.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Modify or remove any values which bind the metrics service to a non-localhost address", + "AuditProcedure": "review the start-up flags provided to kube proxy Run the following command on each node: ``` ps -ef | grep -i kube-proxy ``` Ensure that the `--metrics-bind-address` parameter is not set to a value other than 127.0.0.1. From the output of this command gather the location specified in the `--config` parameter. Review any file stored at that location and ensure that it does not specify a value other than 127.0.0.1 for `metricsBindAddress`.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-proxy/", + "DefaultValue": "The default value is `127.0.0.1:10249`" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.1", + "Description": "Ensure that the cluster-admin role is only used where required", + "Checks": [ + "rbac_cluster_admin_usage" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.1 RBAC and Service Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "The RBAC role `cluster-admin` provides wide-ranging powers over the environment and should be used only where and when needed.", + "RationaleStatement": "Kubernetes provides a set of default roles where RBAC is used. Some of these roles such as `cluster-admin` provide wide-ranging privileges which should only be applied where absolutely necessary. Roles such as `cluster-admin` allow super-user access to perform any action on any resource. When used in a `ClusterRoleBinding`, it gives full control over every resource in the cluster and in all namespaces. When used in a `RoleBinding`, it gives full control over every resource in the rolebinding's namespace, including the namespace itself.", + "ImpactStatement": "Care should be taken before removing any `clusterrolebindings` from the environment to ensure they were not required for operation of the cluster. Specifically, modifications should not be made to `clusterrolebindings` with the `system:` prefix as they are required for the operation of system components.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Identify all clusterrolebindings to the cluster-admin role. Check if they are used and if they need this role or if they could use a role with fewer privileges. Where possible, first bind users to a lower privileged role and then remove the clusterrolebinding to the cluster-admin role : ``` kubectl delete clusterrolebinding [name] ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Obtain a list of the principals who have access to the `cluster-admin` role by reviewing the `clusterrolebinding` output for each role binding that has access to the `cluster-admin` role. ``` kubectl get clusterrolebindings -o=custom-columns=NAME:.metadata.name,ROLE:.roleRef.name,SUBJECT:.subjects[*].name ``` Review each principal listed and ensure that `cluster-admin` privilege is required for it.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/authorization/rbac/#user-facing-roles", + "DefaultValue": "By default a single `clusterrolebinding` called `cluster-admin` is provided with the `system:masters` group as its principal." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.2", + "Description": "Minimize access to secrets", + "Checks": [ + "rbac_minimize_secret_access" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.1 RBAC and Service Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "The Kubernetes API stores secrets, which may be service account tokens for the Kubernetes API or credentials used by workloads in the cluster. Access to these secrets should be restricted to the smallest possible group of users to reduce the risk of privilege escalation.", + "RationaleStatement": "Inappropriate access to secrets stored within the Kubernetes cluster can allow for an attacker to gain additional access to the Kubernetes cluster or external resources whose credentials are stored as secrets.", + "ImpactStatement": "Care should be taken not to remove access to secrets to system components which require this for their operation", + "RemediationProcedure": "Where possible, restrict access to secret objects in the cluster by removing get, list, and watch permissions.", + "AuditProcedure": "Review the users who have `get`, `list`, or `watch` access to `secrets` objects in the Kubernetes API.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "By default in a kubeadm cluster the following list of principals have `get` privileges on `secret` objects ``` CLUSTERROLEBINDING SUBJECT TYPE SA-NAMESPACE cluster-admin system:masters Group system:controller:clusterrole-aggregation-controller clusterrole-aggregation-controller ServiceAccount kube-system system:controller:expand-controller expand-controller ServiceAccount kube-system system:controller:generic-garbage-collector generic-garbage-collector ServiceAccount kube-system system:controller:namespace-controller namespace-controller ServiceAccount kube-system system:controller:persistent-volume-binder persistent-volume-binder ServiceAccount kube-system system:kube-controller-manager system:kube-controller-manager User ```" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.3", + "Description": "Minimize wildcard use in Roles and ClusterRoles", + "Checks": [ + "rbac_minimize_wildcard_use_roles" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.1 RBAC and Service Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Kubernetes Roles and ClusterRoles provide access to resources based on sets of objects and actions that can be taken on those objects. It is possible to set either of these to be the wildcard * which matches all items. Use of wildcards is not optimal from a security perspective as it may allow for inadvertent access to be granted when new resources are added to the Kubernetes API either as CRDs or in later versions of the product.", + "RationaleStatement": "The principle of least privilege recommends that users are provided only the access required for their role and nothing more. The use of wildcard rights grants is likely to provide excessive rights to the Kubernetes API.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Where possible replace any use of wildcards in ClusterRoles and Roles with specific objects or actions.", + "AuditProcedure": "Retrieve the roles defined across each namespaces in the cluster and review for wildcards ``` kubectl get roles --all-namespaces -o yaml ``` Retrieve the cluster roles defined in the cluster and review for wildcards ``` kubectl get clusterroles -o yaml ```", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.4", + "Description": "Minimize access to create pods", + "Checks": [ + "rbac_minimize_pod_creation_access" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.1 RBAC and Service Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "The ability to create pods in a namespace can provide a number of opportunities for privilege escalation, such as assigning privileged service accounts to these pods or mounting hostPaths with access to sensitive data (unless Pod Security Policies are implemented to restrict this access) As such, access to create new pods should be restricted to the smallest possible group of users.", + "RationaleStatement": "The ability to create pods in a cluster opens up possibilities for privilege escalation and should be restricted, where possible.", + "ImpactStatement": "Care should be taken not to remove access to pods to system components which require this for their operation", + "RemediationProcedure": "Where possible, remove `create` access to `pod` objects in the cluster.", + "AuditProcedure": "Review the users who have create access to pod objects in the Kubernetes API.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "By default in a kubeadm cluster the following list of principals have `create` privileges on `pod` objects ``` CLUSTERROLEBINDING SUBJECT TYPE SA-NAMESPACE cluster-admin system:masters Group system:controller:clusterrole-aggregation-controller clusterrole-aggregation-controller ServiceAccount kube-system system:controller:daemon-set-controller daemon-set-controller ServiceAccount kube-system system:controller:job-controller job-controller ServiceAccount kube-system system:controller:persistent-volume-binder persistent-volume-binder ServiceAccount kube-system system:controller:replicaset-controller replicaset-controller ServiceAccount kube-system system:controller:replication-controller replication-controller ServiceAccount kube-system system:controller:statefulset-controller statefulset-controller ServiceAccount kube-system ```" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.5", + "Description": "Ensure that default service accounts are not actively used.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.1 RBAC and Service Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "The `default` service account should not be used to ensure that rights granted to applications can be more easily audited and reviewed.", + "RationaleStatement": "Kubernetes provides a default service account which is used by cluster workloads where no specific service account is assigned to the pod. Where access to the Kubernetes API from a pod is required, a specific service account should be created for that pod, and rights granted to that service account. The default service account should be configured to ensure that it does not automatically provide a service account token, and it must not have any non-default role bindings or custom role assignments", + "ImpactStatement": "All workloads which require access to the Kubernetes API will require an explicit service account to be created.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Create explicit service accounts wherever a Kubernetes workload requires specific access to the Kubernetes API server. Modify the configuration of each default service account to include this value ``` automountServiceAccountToken: false ```", + "AuditProcedure": "For each namespace in the cluster, review the rights assigned to the default service account and ensure that it has no roles or cluster roles bound to it apart from the defaults. Additionally ensure that the `automountServiceAccountToken: false` setting is in place for each default service account.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/configure-service-account/", + "DefaultValue": "By default the `default` service account allows for its service account token to be mounted in pods in its namespace." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.6", + "Description": "Ensure that Service Account Tokens are only mounted where necessary", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.1 RBAC and Service Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Service accounts tokens should not be mounted in pods except where the workload running in the pod explicitly needs to communicate with the API server", + "RationaleStatement": "Mounting service account tokens inside pods can provide an avenue for privilege escalation attacks where an attacker is able to compromise a single pod in the cluster. Avoiding mounting these tokens removes this attack avenue.", + "ImpactStatement": "Pods mounted without service account tokens will not be able to communicate with the API server, except where the resource is available to unauthenticated principals.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Modify the definition of pods and service accounts which do not need to mount service account tokens to disable it.", + "AuditProcedure": "Review pod and service account objects in the cluster and ensure that the option below is set, unless the resource explicitly requires this access. ``` automountServiceAccountToken: false ```", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/configure-service-account/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, all pods get a service account token mounted in them." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.7", + "Description": "Avoid use of system:masters group", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.1 RBAC and Service Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "The special group `system:masters` should not be used to grant permissions to any user or service account, except where strictly necessary (e.g. bootstrapping access prior to RBAC being fully available)", + "RationaleStatement": "The `system:masters` group has unrestricted access to the Kubernetes API hard-coded into the API server source code. An authenticated user who is a member of this group cannot have their access reduced, even if all bindings and cluster role bindings which mention it, are removed. When combined with client certificate authentication, use of this group can allow for irrevocable cluster-admin level credentials to exist for a cluster.", + "ImpactStatement": "Once the RBAC system is operational in a cluster `system:masters` should not be specifically required, as ordinary bindings from principals to the `cluster-admin` cluster role can be made where unrestricted access is required.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Remove the `system:masters` group from all users in the cluster.", + "AuditProcedure": "Review a list of all credentials which have access to the cluster and ensure that the group `system:masters` is not used.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/blob/master/pkg/registry/rbac/escalation_check.go#L38", + "DefaultValue": "By default some clusters will create a break glass client certificate which is a member of this group. Access to this client certificate should be carefully controlled and it should not be used for general cluster operations." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.8", + "Description": "Limit use of the Bind, Impersonate and Escalate permissions in the Kubernetes cluster", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.1 RBAC and Service Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Cluster roles and roles with the impersonate, bind or escalate permissions should not be granted unless strictly required. Each of these permissions allow a particular subject to escalate their privileges beyond those explicitly granted by cluster administrators", + "RationaleStatement": "The impersonate privilege allows a subject to impersonate other users gaining their rights to the cluster. The bind privilege allows the subject to add a binding to a cluster role or role which escalates their effective permissions in the cluster. The escalate privilege allows a subject to modify cluster roles to which they are bound, increasing their rights to that level. Each of these permissions has the potential to allow for privilege escalation to cluster-admin level.", + "ImpactStatement": "There are some cases where these permissions are required for cluster service operation, and care should be taken before removing these permissions from system service accounts.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Where possible, remove the impersonate, bind, and escalate rights from subjects.", + "AuditProcedure": "Review the users who have access to cluster roles or roles which provide the impersonate, bind, or escalate privileges.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://raesene.github.io/blog/2020/12/12/Escalating_Away/:https://raesene.github.io/blog/2021/01/16/Getting-Into-A-Bind-with-Kubernetes/", + "DefaultValue": "In a default kubeadm cluster, the system:masters group and clusterrole-aggregation-controller service account have access to the escalate privilege. The system:masters group also has access to bind and impersonate." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.9", + "Description": "Minimize access to create persistent volumes", + "Checks": [ + "rbac_minimize_pv_creation_access" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.1 RBAC and Service Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "The ability to create persistent volumes in a cluster can provide an opportunity for privilege escalation, via the creation of `hostPath` volumes. As persistent volumes are not covered by Pod Security Admission, a user with access to create persistent volumes may be able to get access to sensitive files from the underlying host even where restrictive Pod Security Admission policies are in place.", + "RationaleStatement": "The ability to create persistent volumes in a cluster opens up possibilities for privilege escalation and should be restricted, where possible.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Where possible, remove `create` access to `PersistentVolume` objects in the cluster.", + "AuditProcedure": "Review the users who have create access to `PersistentVolume` objects in the Kubernetes API.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/rbac-good-practices/#persistent-volume-creation", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.10", + "Description": "Minimize access to the proxy sub-resource of nodes", + "Checks": [ + "rbac_minimize_node_proxy_subresource_access" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.1 RBAC and Service Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Users with access to the `Proxy` sub-resource of `Node` objects automatically have permissions to use the kubelet API, which may allow for privilege escalation or bypass cluster security controls such as audit logs. The kubelet provides an API which includes rights to execute commands in any container running on the node. Access to this API is covered by permissions to the main Kubernetes API via the `node` object. The proxy sub-resource specifically allows wide ranging access to the kubelet API. Direct access to the kubelet API bypasses controls like audit logging (there is no audit log of kubelet API access) and admission control.", + "RationaleStatement": "The ability to use the `proxy` sub-resource of `node` objects opens up possibilities for privilege escalation and should be restricted, where possible.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Where possible, remove access to the `proxy` sub-resource of `node` objects.", + "AuditProcedure": "Review the users who have access to the `proxy` sub-resource of `node` objects in the Kubernetes API.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/rbac-good-practices/#access-to-proxy-subresource-of-nodes:https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/kubelet-authn-authz/#kubelet-authorization", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.11", + "Description": "Minimize access to the approval sub-resource of certificatesigningrequests objects", + "Checks": [ + "rbac_minimize_csr_approval_access" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.1 RBAC and Service Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Users with access to the update the `approval` sub-resource of `CertificateSigningRequests` objects can approve new client certificates for the Kubernetes API effectively allowing them to create new high-privileged user accounts. This can allow for privilege escalation to full cluster administrator, depending on users configured in the cluster", + "RationaleStatement": "The ability to update certificate signing requests should be limited.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Where possible, remove access to the `approval` sub-resource of `CertificateSigningRequests` objects.", + "AuditProcedure": "Review the users who have access to update the `approval` sub-resource of `CertificateSigningRequests` objects in the Kubernetes API.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/rbac-good-practices/#csrs-and-certificate-issuing", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.12", + "Description": "Minimize access to webhook configuration objects", + "Checks": [ + "rbac_minimize_webhook_config_access" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.1 RBAC and Service Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Users with rights to create/modify/delete `validatingwebhookconfigurations` or `mutatingwebhookconfigurations` can control webhooks that can read any object admitted to the cluster, and in the case of mutating webhooks, also mutate admitted objects. This could allow for privilege escalation or disruption of the operation of the cluster.", + "RationaleStatement": "The ability to manage webhook configuration should be limited", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Where possible, remove access to the `validatingwebhookconfigurations` or `mutatingwebhookconfigurations` objects", + "AuditProcedure": "Review the users who have access to `validatingwebhookconfigurations` or `mutatingwebhookconfigurations` objects in the Kubernetes API.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/rbac-good-practices/#control-admission-webhooks", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.13", + "Description": "Minimize access to the service account token creation", + "Checks": [ + "rbac_minimize_service_account_token_creation" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.1 RBAC and Service Accounts", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Users with rights to create new service account tokens at a cluster level, can create long-lived privileged credentials in the cluster. This could allow for privilege escalation and persistent access to the cluster, even if the users account has been revoked.", + "RationaleStatement": "The ability to create service account tokens should be limited.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "Where possible, remove access to the `token` sub-resource of `serviceaccount` objects.", + "AuditProcedure": "Review the users who have access to create the `token` sub-resource of `serviceaccount` objects in the Kubernetes API.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/rbac-good-practices/#token-request", + "DefaultValue": "" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.1", + "Description": "Ensure that the cluster has at least one active policy control mechanism in place", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.2 Pod Security Standards", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Every Kubernetes cluster should have at least one policy control mechanism in place to enforce the other requirements in this section. This could be the in-built Pod Security Admission controller, or a third party policy control system.", + "RationaleStatement": "Without an active policy control mechanism, it is not possible to limit the use of containers with access to underlying cluster nodes, via mechanisms like privileged containers, or the use of hostPath volume mounts.", + "ImpactStatement": "Where policy control systems are in place, there is a risk that workloads required for the operation of the cluster may be stopped from running. Care is required when implementing admission control policies to ensure that this does not occur.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Ensure that either Pod Security Admission or an external policy control system is in place for every namespace which contains user workloads.", + "AuditProcedure": "Review the workloads deployed to the cluster to understand if Pod Security Admission or external admission control systems are in place.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-admission", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Pod Security Admission is enabled but no policies are in place." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2", + "Description": "Minimize the admission of privileged containers", + "Checks": [ + "core_minimize_privileged_containers" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.2 Pod Security Standards", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Do not generally permit containers to be run with the `securityContext.privileged` flag set to `true`.", + "RationaleStatement": "Privileged containers have access to all Linux Kernel capabilities and devices. A container running with full privileges can do almost everything that the host can do. This flag exists to allow special use-cases, like manipulating the network stack and accessing devices. There should be at least one admission control policy defined which does not permit privileged containers. If you need to run privileged containers, this should be defined in a separate policy and you should carefully check to ensure that only limited service accounts and users are given permission to use that policy.", + "ImpactStatement": "Pods defined with `spec.containers[].securityContext.privileged: true`, `spec.initContainers[].securityContext.privileged: true` and `spec.ephemeralContainers[].securityContext.privileged: true` will not be permitted.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Add policies to each namespace in the cluster which has user workloads to restrict the admission of privileged containers.", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command: `kubectl get pods -A -o=jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{@.metadata.name}: {@..securityContext}{end}'`It will produce an inventory of all the privileged use on the cluster, if any (please, refer to a sample below). Further grepping can be done to automate each specific violation detection. calico-kube-controllers-57b57c56f-jtmk4: {} << No Elevated Privileges calico-node-c4xv4: {} {privileged:true} {privileged:true} {privileged:true} {privileged:true} << Violates 5.2.2 dashboard-metrics-scraper-7bc864c59-2m2xw: {seccompProfile:{type:RuntimeDefault}} {allowPrivilegeEscalation:false,readOnlyRootFilesystem:true,runAsGroup:2001,runAsUser:1001}", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-standards/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, there are no restrictions on the creation of privileged containers." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.3", + "Description": "Minimize the admission of containers wishing to share the host process ID namespace", + "Checks": [ + "core_minimize_hostPID_containers" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.2 Pod Security Standards", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Do not generally permit containers to be run with the `hostPID` flag set to true.", + "RationaleStatement": "A container running in the host's PID namespace can inspect processes running outside the container. If the container also has access to ptrace capabilities this can be used to escalate privileges outside of the container. There should be at least one admission control policy defined which does not permit containers to share the host PID namespace. If you need to run containers which require hostPID, this should be defined in a separate policy and you should carefully check to ensure that only limited service accounts and users are given permission to use that policy.", + "ImpactStatement": "Pods defined with `spec.hostPID: true` will not be permitted unless they are run under a specific policy.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Configure the Admission Controller to restrict the admission of `hostPID` containers.", + "AuditProcedure": "Fetch hostPID from each pod with `get pods -A -o=jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{@.metadata.name}: {@.spec.hostPID}{end}'`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-standards/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, there are no restrictions on the creation of `hostPID` containers." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.4", + "Description": "Minimize the admission of containers wishing to share the host IPC namespace", + "Checks": [ + "core_minimize_hostIPC_containers" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.2 Pod Security Standards", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Do not generally permit containers to be run with the `hostIPC` flag set to true.", + "RationaleStatement": "A container running in the host's IPC namespace can use IPC to interact with processes outside the container. There should be at least one admission control policy defined which does not permit containers to share the host IPC namespace. If you need to run containers which require hostIPC, this should be defined in a separate policy and you should carefully check to ensure that only limited service accounts and users are given permission to use that policy.", + "ImpactStatement": "Pods defined with `spec.hostIPC: true` will not be permitted unless they are run under a specific policy.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Add policies to each namespace in the cluster which has user workloads to restrict the admission of `hostIPC` containers.", + "AuditProcedure": "Fetch hostIPC from each pod with `get pods -A -o=jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{@.metadata.name}: {@.spec.hostIPC}{end}'`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-standards/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, there are no restrictions on the creation of `hostIPC` containers." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.5", + "Description": "Minimize the admission of containers wishing to share the host network namespace", + "Checks": [ + "core_minimize_hostNetwork_containers" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.2 Pod Security Standards", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Do not generally permit containers to be run with the `hostNetwork` flag set to true.", + "RationaleStatement": "A container running in the host's network namespace could access the local loopback device, and could access network traffic to and from other pods. There should be at least one admission control policy defined which does not permit containers to share the host network namespace. If you need to run containers which require access to the host's network namespaces, this should be defined in a separate policy and you should carefully check to ensure that only limited service accounts and users are given permission to use that policy.", + "ImpactStatement": "Pods defined with `spec.hostNetwork: true` will not be permitted unless they are run under a specific policy.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Add policies to each namespace in the cluster which has user workloads to restrict the admission of `hostNetwork` containers.", + "AuditProcedure": "Fetch hostNetwork from each pod with `get pods -A -o=jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{@.metadata.name}: {@.spec.hostNetwork}{end}'`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-standards/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, there are no restrictions on the creation of `hostNetwork` containers." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.6", + "Description": "Minimize the admission of containers with allowPrivilegeEscalation", + "Checks": [ + "core_minimize_allowPrivilegeEscalation_containers" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.2 Pod Security Standards", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Do not generally permit containers to be run with the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` flag set to true. Allowing this right can lead to a process running a container getting more rights than it started with. It's important to note that these rights are still constrained by the overall container sandbox, and this setting does not relate to the use of privileged containers.", + "RationaleStatement": "A container running with the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` flag set to `true` may have processes that can gain more privileges than their parent. There should be at least one admission control policy defined which does not permit containers to allow privilege escalation. The option exists (and is defaulted to true) to permit setuid binaries to run. If you have need to run containers which use setuid binaries or require privilege escalation, this should be defined in a separate policy and you should carefully check to ensure that only limited service accounts and users are given permission to use that policy.", + "ImpactStatement": "Pods defined with `securityContext: allowPrivilegeEscalation: true` will not be permitted unless they are run under a specific policy.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Add policies to each namespace in the cluster which has user workloads to restrict the admission of containers with `securityContext: allowPrivilegeEscalation: true`", + "AuditProcedure": "List the policies in use for each namespace in the cluster, ensure that each policy disallows the admission of containers which allow privilege escalation. To fetch a list of pods which `allowPrivilegeEscalation` run this command: `get pods -A -o=jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{@.metadata.name}: {@..securityContext}{end}'`", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-standards/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, there are no restrictions on contained process ability to escalate privileges, within the context of the container." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.7", + "Description": "Minimize the admission of root containers", + "Checks": [ + "core_minimize_root_containers_admission" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.2 Pod Security Standards", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Do not generally permit containers to be run as the root user.", + "RationaleStatement": "Containers may run as any Linux user. Containers which run as the root user, whilst constrained by Container Runtime security features still have a escalated likelihood of container breakout. Ideally, all containers should run as a defined non-UID 0 user. There should be at least one admission control policy defined which does not permit root containers. If you need to run root containers, this should be defined in a separate policy and you should carefully check to ensure that only limited service accounts and users are given permission to use that policy.", + "ImpactStatement": "Pods with containers which run as the root user will not be permitted.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Create a policy for each namespace in the cluster, ensuring that either `MustRunAsNonRoot` or `MustRunAs` with the range of UIDs not including 0, is set.", + "AuditProcedure": "List the policies in use for each namespace in the cluster, ensure that each policy restricts the use of root containers by setting `MustRunAsNonRoot` or `MustRunAs` with the range of UIDs not including 0.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-standards/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, there are no restrictions on the use of root containers and if a User is not specified in the image, the container will run as root." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.8", + "Description": "Minimize the admission of containers with the NET_RAW capability", + "Checks": [ + "core_minimize_net_raw_capability_admission" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.2 Pod Security Standards", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Do not generally permit containers with the potentially dangerous NET_RAW capability.", + "RationaleStatement": "Containers run with a default set of capabilities as assigned by the Container Runtime. By default this can include potentially dangerous capabilities. With Docker as the container runtime the NET_RAW capability is enabled which may be misused by malicious containers. Ideally, all containers should drop this capability. There should be at least one admission control policy defined which does not permit containers with the NET_RAW capability. If you need to run containers with this capability, this should be defined in a separate policy and you should carefully check to ensure that only limited service accounts and users are given permission to use that policy.", + "ImpactStatement": "Pods with containers which run with the NET_RAW capability will not be permitted.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Add policies to each namespace in the cluster which has user workloads to restrict the admission of containers with the `NET_RAW` capability.", + "AuditProcedure": "List the policies in use for each namespace in the cluster, ensure that at least one policy disallows the admission of containers with the `NET_RAW` capability.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-standards/:https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/our-research/abusing-privileged-and-unprivileged-linux-containers/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, there are no restrictions on the creation of containers with the `NET_RAW` capability." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.9", + "Description": "Minimize the admission of containers with capabilities assigned", + "Checks": [ + "core_minimize_containers_capabilities_assigned" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.2 Pod Security Standards", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Do not generally permit containers with capabilities", + "RationaleStatement": "Containers run with a default set of capabilities as assigned by the Container Runtime. Capabilities are parts of the rights generally granted on a Linux system to the root user. In many cases applications running in containers do not require any capabilities to operate, so from the perspective of the principal of least privilege use of capabilities should be minimized.", + "ImpactStatement": "Pods with containers require capabilities to operate will not be permitted.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Review the use of capabilities in applications running on your cluster. Where a namespace contains applications which do not require any Linux capabilities to operate consider adding a policy which forbids the admission of containers which do not drop all capabilities.", + "AuditProcedure": "List the policies in use for each namespace in the cluster, ensure that at least one policy requires that capabilities are dropped by all containers.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-standards/:https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/our-research/abusing-privileged-and-unprivileged-linux-containers/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, there are no restrictions on the creation of containers with additional capabilities" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.10", + "Description": "Minimize the admission of Windows HostProcess Containers", + "Checks": [ + "core_minimize_admission_windows_hostprocess_containers" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.2 Pod Security Standards", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Do not generally permit Windows containers to be run with the `hostProcess` flag set to true.", + "RationaleStatement": "A Windows container making use of the `hostProcess` flag can interact with the underlying Windows cluster node. As per the Kubernetes documentation, this provides privileged access to the Windows node. Where Windows containers are used inside a Kubernetes cluster, there should be at least one admission control policy which does not permit `hostProcess` Windows containers. If you need to run Windows containers which require `hostProcess`, this should be defined in a separate policy and you should carefully check to ensure that only limited service accounts and users are given permission to use that policy.", + "ImpactStatement": "Pods defined with `securityContext.windowsOptions.hostProcess: true` will not be permitted unless they are run under a specific policy.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Add policies to each namespace in the cluster which has user workloads to restrict the admission of `hostProcess` containers.", + "AuditProcedure": "List the policies in use for each namespace in the cluster, ensure that each policy disallows the admission of `hostProcess` containers", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/create-hostprocess-pod/:https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-standards/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, there are no restrictions on the creation of `hostProcess` containers." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.11", + "Description": "Minimize the admission of HostPath volumes", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.2 Pod Security Standards", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Do not generally admit containers which make use of `hostPath` volumes.", + "RationaleStatement": "A container which mounts a `hostPath` volume as part of its specification will have access to the filesystem of the underlying cluster node. The use of `hostPath` volumes may allow containers access to privileged areas of the node filesystem. There should be at least one admission control policy defined which does not permit containers to mount `hostPath` volumes. If you need to run containers which require `hostPath` volumes, this should be defined in a separate policy and you should carefully check to ensure that only limited service accounts and users are given permission to use that policy.", + "ImpactStatement": "Pods defined which make use of `hostPath` volumes will not be permitted unless they are run under a specific policy.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Add policies to each namespace in the cluster which has user workloads to restrict the admission of containers which use `hostPath` volumes.", + "AuditProcedure": "List the policies in use for each namespace in the cluster, ensure that each policy disallows the admission of containers with `hostPath` volumes.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-standards/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, there are no restrictions on the creation of `hostPath` volumes." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.12", + "Description": "Minimize the admission of containers which use HostPorts", + "Checks": [ + "core_minimize_admission_hostport_containers" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.2 Pod Security Standards", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Do not generally permit containers which require the use of HostPorts.", + "RationaleStatement": "Host ports connect containers directly to the host's network. This can bypass controls such as network policy. There should be at least one admission control policy defined which does not permit containers which require the use of HostPorts. If you need to run containers which require HostPorts, this should be defined in a separate policy and you should carefully check to ensure that only limited service accounts and users are given permission to use that policy.", + "ImpactStatement": "Pods defined with `hostPort` settings in either the container, initContainer or ephemeralContainer sections will not be permitted unless they are run under a specific policy.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Add policies to each namespace in the cluster which has user workloads to restrict the admission of containers which use `hostPort` sections.", + "AuditProcedure": "List the policies in use for each namespace in the cluster, ensure that each policy disallows the admission of containers which have `hostPort` sections.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-standards/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, there are no restrictions on the use of HostPorts." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.3.1", + "Description": "Ensure that the CNI in use supports Network Policies", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.3 Network Policies and CNI", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "There are a variety of CNI plugins available for Kubernetes. If the CNI in use does not support Network Policies it may not be possible to effectively restrict traffic in the cluster.", + "RationaleStatement": "Kubernetes network policies are enforced by the CNI plugin in use. As such it is important to ensure that the CNI plugin supports both Ingress and Egress network policies.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "If the CNI plugin in use does not support network policies, consideration should be given to making use of a different plugin, or finding an alternate mechanism for restricting traffic in the Kubernetes cluster.", + "AuditProcedure": "Review the documentation of CNI plugin in use by the cluster, and confirm that it supports Ingress and Egress network policies.", + "AdditionalInformation": "One example here is Flannel (https://github.com/coreos/flannel) which does not support Network policy unless Calico is also in use.", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/extend-kubernetes/compute-storage-net/network-plugins/", + "DefaultValue": "This will depend on the CNI plugin in use." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.3.2", + "Description": "Ensure that all Namespaces have Network Policies defined", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.3 Network Policies and CNI", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Use network policies to isolate traffic in your cluster network.", + "RationaleStatement": "Running different applications on the same Kubernetes cluster creates a risk of one compromised application attacking a neighboring application. Network segmentation is important to ensure that containers can communicate only with those they are supposed to. A network policy is a specification of how selections of pods are allowed to communicate with each other and other network endpoints. Network Policies are namespace scoped. When a network policy is introduced to a given namespace, all traffic not allowed by the policy is denied. However, if there are no network policies in a namespace all traffic will be allowed into and out of the pods in that namespace.", + "ImpactStatement": "Once network policies are in use within a given namespace, traffic not explicitly allowed by a network policy will be denied. As such it is important to ensure that, when introducing network policies, legitimate traffic is not blocked.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Follow the documentation and create `NetworkPolicy` objects as you need them.", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the below command and review the `NetworkPolicy` objects created in the cluster. ``` kubectl get networkpolicy --all-namespaces ``` Ensure that each namespace defined in the cluster has at least one Network Policy.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/networkpolicies/:https://octetz.com/posts/k8s-network-policy-apis:https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/declare-network-policy/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, network policies are not created." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.4.1", + "Description": "Prefer using secrets as files over secrets as environment variables", + "Checks": [ + "core_no_secrets_envs" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.4 Secrets Management", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Kubernetes supports mounting secrets as data volumes or as environment variables. Minimize the use of environment variable secrets.", + "RationaleStatement": "It is reasonably common for application code to log out its environment (particularly in the event of an error). This will include any secret values passed in as environment variables, so secrets can easily be exposed to any user or entity who has access to the logs.", + "ImpactStatement": "Application code which expects to read secrets in the form of environment variables would need modification", + "RemediationProcedure": "If possible, rewrite application code to read secrets from mounted secret files, rather than from environment variables.", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the following command to find references to objects which use environment variables defined from secrets. ``` kubectl get all -o jsonpath='{range .items[?(@..secretKeyRef)]}{.kind}{@.metadata.name}{end}' -A ```", + "AdditionalInformation": "Mounting secrets as volumes has the additional benefit that secret values can be updated without restarting the pod", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/configuration/secret/#using-secrets", + "DefaultValue": "By default, secrets are not defined" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.4.2", + "Description": "Consider external secret storage", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.4 Secrets Management", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Consider the use of an external secrets storage and management system, instead of using Kubernetes Secrets directly, if you have more complex secret management needs. Ensure the solution requires authentication to access secrets, has auditing of access to and use of secrets, and encrypts secrets. Some solutions also make it easier to rotate secrets.", + "RationaleStatement": "Kubernetes supports secrets as first-class objects, but care needs to be taken to ensure that access to secrets is carefully limited. Using an external secrets provider can ease the management of access to secrets, especially where secrests are used across both Kubernetes and non-Kubernetes environments.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Refer to the secrets management options offered by your cloud provider or a third-party secrets management solution.", + "AuditProcedure": "Review your secrets management implementation.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "By default, no external secret management is configured." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.5.1", + "Description": "Configure Image Provenance using ImagePolicyWebhook admission controller", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.5 Extensible Admission Control", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Configure Image Provenance for your deployment.", + "RationaleStatement": "Kubernetes supports plugging in provenance rules to accept or reject the images in your deployments. You could configure such rules to ensure that only approved images are deployed in the cluster.", + "ImpactStatement": "You need to regularly maintain your provenance configuration based on container image updates.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Follow the Kubernetes documentation and setup image provenance.", + "AuditProcedure": "Review the pod definitions in your cluster and verify that image provenance is configured as appropriate.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/admission-controllers/#imagepolicywebhook:https://github.com/kubernetes/community/blob/master/contributors/design-proposals/image-provenance.md:https://hub.docker.com/r/dnurmi/anchore-toolbox/:https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/22888", + "DefaultValue": "By default, image provenance is not set." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.6.1", + "Description": "Create administrative boundaries between resources using namespaces", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.6 General Policies", + "Profile": "Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Use namespaces to isolate your Kubernetes objects.", + "RationaleStatement": "Limiting the scope of user permissions can reduce the impact of mistakes or malicious activities. A Kubernetes namespace allows you to partition created resources into logically named groups. Resources created in one namespace can be hidden from other namespaces. By default, each resource created by a user in Kubernetes cluster runs in a default namespace, called `default`. You can create additional namespaces and attach resources and users to them. You can use Kubernetes Authorization plugins to create policies that segregate access to namespace resources between different users.", + "ImpactStatement": "You need to switch between namespaces for administration.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Follow the documentation and create namespaces for objects in your deployment as you need them.", + "AuditProcedure": "Run the below command and review the namespaces created in the cluster. ``` kubectl get namespaces ``` Ensure that these namespaces are the ones you need and are adequately administered as per your requirements.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/working-with-objects/namespaces/#viewing-namespaces:http://blog.kubernetes.io/2016/08/security-best-practices-kubernetes-deployment.html:https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/tree/master/keps/sig-node/589-efficient-node-heartbeats", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Kubernetes starts with 4 initial namespaces: 1. `default` - The default namespace for objects with no other namespace 1. `kube-system` - The namespace for objects created by the Kubernetes system 1. `kube-node-lease` - Namespace used for node heartbeats 1. `kube-public` - Namespace used for public information in a cluster" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.6.2", + "Description": "Ensure that the seccomp profile is set to docker/default in your pod definitions", + "Checks": [ + "core_seccomp_profile_docker_default" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.6 General Policies", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Enable `docker/default` seccomp profile in your pod definitions.", + "RationaleStatement": "Seccomp (secure computing mode) is used to restrict the set of system calls applications can make, allowing cluster administrators greater control over the security of workloads running in the cluster. Kubernetes disables seccomp profiles by default for historical reasons. You should enable it to ensure that the workloads have restricted actions available within the container.", + "ImpactStatement": "If the `docker/default` seccomp profile is too restrictive for you, you would have to create/manage your own seccomp profiles.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Use security context to enable the `docker/default` seccomp profile in your pod definitions. An example is as below: ``` securityContext: seccompProfile: type: RuntimeDefault ```", + "AuditProcedure": "Review the pod definitions in your cluster. It should create a line as below: ``` securityContext: seccompProfile: type: RuntimeDefault ```", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tutorials/clusters/seccomp/:https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/seccomp/", + "DefaultValue": "By default, seccomp profile is set to `unconfined` which means that no seccomp profiles are enabled." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.6.3", + "Description": "Apply Security Context to Your Pods and Containers", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.6 General Policies", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Apply Security Context to Your Pods and Containers", + "RationaleStatement": "A security context defines the operating system security settings (uid, gid, capabilities, SELinux role, etc..) applied to a container. When designing your containers and pods, make sure that you configure the security context for your pods, containers, and volumes. A security context is a property defined in the deployment yaml. It controls the security parameters that will be assigned to the pod/container/volume. There are two levels of security context: pod level security context, and container level security context.", + "ImpactStatement": "If you incorrectly apply security contexts, you may have trouble running the pods.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Follow the Kubernetes documentation and apply security contexts to your pods. For a suggested list of security contexts, you may refer to the CIS Security Benchmark for Docker Containers.", + "AuditProcedure": "Review the pod definitions in your cluster and verify that you have security contexts defined as appropriate.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/policy/security-context/:https://learn.cisecurity.org/benchmarks", + "DefaultValue": "By default, no security contexts are automatically applied to pods." + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.6.4", + "Description": "The default namespace should not be used", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Policies", + "SubSection": "5.6 General Policies", + "Profile": "Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Kubernetes provides a default namespace, where objects are placed if no namespace is specified for them. Placing objects in this namespace makes application of RBAC and other controls more difficult.", + "RationaleStatement": "Resources in a Kubernetes cluster should be segregated by namespace, to allow for security controls to be applied at that level and to make it easier to manage resources.", + "ImpactStatement": "None", + "RemediationProcedure": "Ensure that namespaces are created to allow for appropriate segregation of Kubernetes resources and that all new resources are created in a specific namespace.", + "AuditProcedure": "Run this command to list objects in default namespace ``` kubectl get $(kubectl api-resources --verbs=list --namespaced=true -o name | paste -sd, -) --ignore-not-found -n default ``` The only entries there should be system managed resources such as the `kubernetes` service", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "References": "", + "DefaultValue": "Unless a namespace is specific on object creation, the `default` namespace will be used" + } + ] + } + ] +} diff --git a/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/pci_4.0_kubernetes.json b/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/pci_4.0_kubernetes.json index 0b301a0645..38d9557d5f 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/pci_4.0_kubernetes.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/pci_4.0_kubernetes.json @@ -8268,6 +8268,14 @@ "Checks": [ "apiserver_audit_log_maxage_set" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_audit_log_maxage_set", + "ConfigKey": "audit_log_maxage", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 365 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "10.5.1: Audit log history is retained and available for analysis.", @@ -10054,6 +10062,14 @@ "Checks": [ "apiserver_audit_log_maxage_set" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_audit_log_maxage_set", + "ConfigKey": "audit_log_maxage", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 365 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "3.3.1.3: Sensitive authentication data (SAD) is not stored after authorization.", @@ -10250,6 +10266,14 @@ "Checks": [ "apiserver_audit_log_maxage_set" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_audit_log_maxage_set", + "ConfigKey": "audit_log_maxage", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 365 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "3.3.3: Sensitive authentication data (SAD) is not stored after authorization.", @@ -13004,6 +13028,14 @@ "Checks": [ "apiserver_audit_log_maxage_set" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_audit_log_maxage_set", + "ConfigKey": "audit_log_maxage", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 365 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Section": "5.3.4: Anti-malware mechanisms and processes are active, maintained, and monitored.", diff --git a/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/prowler_threatscore_kubernetes.json b/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/prowler_threatscore_kubernetes.json index 11ffe42485..58ef7c6ddb 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/prowler_threatscore_kubernetes.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/kubernetes/prowler_threatscore_kubernetes.json @@ -1083,6 +1083,23 @@ "LevelOfRisk": 4, "Weight": 100 } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "kubelet_strong_ciphers_only", + "ConfigKey": "kubelet_strong_ciphers", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": [ + "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", + "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", + "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305", + "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", + "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305", + "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", + "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", + "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -1199,6 +1216,14 @@ "Checks": [ "apiserver_audit_log_maxage_set" ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_audit_log_maxage_set", + "ConfigKey": "audit_log_maxage", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 30 + } + ], "Attributes": [ { "Title": "API Server audit log retention configured", @@ -1227,6 +1252,14 @@ "LevelOfRisk": 3, "Weight": 10 } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_audit_log_maxbackup_set", + "ConfigKey": "audit_log_maxbackup", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 10 + } ] }, { @@ -1245,6 +1278,14 @@ "LevelOfRisk": 2, "Weight": 8 } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "apiserver_audit_log_maxsize_set", + "ConfigKey": "audit_log_maxsize", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 100 + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/linode/__init__.py b/prowler/compliance/linode/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/compliance/m365/cis_4.0_m365.json b/prowler/compliance/m365/cis_4.0_m365.json index 23582fbaac..35d64d358e 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/m365/cis_4.0_m365.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/m365/cis_4.0_m365.json @@ -565,6 +565,68 @@ "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/get-malwarefilterpolicy?view=exchange-ps:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-malware-policies-configure?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/office/compatibility/office-file-format-reference", "DefaultValue": "The following extensions are blocked by default:ace, ani, apk, app, appx, arj, bat, cab, cmd, com, deb, dex, dll, docm, elf, exe, hta, img, iso, jar, jnlp, kext, lha, lib, library, lnk, lzh, macho, msc, msi, msix, msp, mst, pif, ppa, ppam, reg, rev, scf, scr, sct, sys, uif, vb, vbe, vbs, vxd, wsc, wsf, wsh, xll, xz, z" } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_blocked_file_types", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "ace", + "ani", + "apk", + "app", + "appx", + "arj", + "bat", + "cab", + "cmd", + "com", + "deb", + "dex", + "dll", + "docm", + "elf", + "exe", + "hta", + "img", + "iso", + "jar", + "jnlp", + "kext", + "lha", + "lib", + "library", + "lnk", + "lzh", + "macho", + "msc", + "msi", + "msix", + "msp", + "mst", + "pif", + "ppa", + "ppam", + "reg", + "rev", + "scf", + "scr", + "sct", + "sys", + "uif", + "vb", + "vbe", + "vbs", + "vxd", + "wsc", + "wsf", + "wsh", + "xll", + "xz", + "z" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -1209,6 +1271,14 @@ "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/howto-conditional-access-session-lifetime", "DefaultValue": "The default configuration for user sign-in frequency is a rolling window of 90 days." } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "entra_admin_users_sign_in_frequency_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "sign_in_frequency", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 4 + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/m365/cis_6.0_m365.json b/prowler/compliance/m365/cis_6.0_m365.json index d0dcfb2e6d..5815c67ac9 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/m365/cis_6.0_m365.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/m365/cis_6.0_m365.json @@ -582,6 +582,68 @@ "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/get-malwarefilterpolicy?view=exchange-ps:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-malware-policies-configure?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/office/compatibility/office-file-format-reference", "DefaultValue": "53 extensions are blocked by default." } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_blocked_file_types", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "ace", + "ani", + "apk", + "app", + "appx", + "arj", + "bat", + "cab", + "cmd", + "com", + "deb", + "dex", + "dll", + "docm", + "elf", + "exe", + "hta", + "img", + "iso", + "jar", + "jnlp", + "kext", + "lha", + "lib", + "library", + "lnk", + "lzh", + "macho", + "msc", + "msi", + "msix", + "msp", + "mst", + "pif", + "ppa", + "ppam", + "reg", + "rev", + "scf", + "scr", + "sct", + "sys", + "uif", + "vb", + "vbe", + "vbs", + "vxd", + "wsc", + "wsf", + "wsh", + "xll", + "xz", + "z" + ] + } ] }, { @@ -1949,6 +2011,14 @@ "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-mailboxes?view=o365-worldwide", "DefaultValue": "AuditEnabled: True for all mailboxes except Resource Mailboxes, Public Folder Mailboxes, and DiscoverySearch Mailbox" } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "exchange_user_mailbox_auditing_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "audit_log_age", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 90 + } ] }, { @@ -2110,6 +2180,14 @@ "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/clients-and-mobile-in-exchange-online/mailtips/mailtips", "DefaultValue": "MailTipsAllTipsEnabled: True, MailTipsExternalRecipientsTipsEnabled: False, MailTipsGroupMetricsEnabled: True, MailTipsLargeAudienceThreshold: 25" } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "exchange_organization_mailtips_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_mailtips_large_audience_threshold", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 25 + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/m365/cis_7.0_m365.json b/prowler/compliance/m365/cis_7.0_m365.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a913f339be --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/compliance/m365/cis_7.0_m365.json @@ -0,0 +1,3614 @@ +{ + "Framework": "CIS", + "Name": "CIS Microsoft 365 Foundations Benchmark v7.0.0", + "Version": "7.0", + "Provider": "M365", + "Description": "The CIS Microsoft 365 Foundations Benchmark provides prescriptive guidance for establishing a secure configuration posture for Microsoft 365 Cloud offerings running on any OS. This guide includes recommendations for Exchange Online, SharePoint Online, OneDrive for Business, Teams, Power BI (Fabric) and Microsoft Entra ID.", + "Requirements": [ + { + "Id": "1.1.1", + "Description": "Administrative accounts are special privileged accounts that could have varying levels of access to data, users, and settings. Regular user accounts should never be utilized for administrative tasks and care should be taken, in the case of a hybrid environment, to keep administrative accounts separate from on-prem accounts. Administrative accounts should not have applications assigned so that they have no access to potentially vulnerable services (EX. email, Teams, SharePoint, etc.) and only access to perform tasks as needed for administrative purposes. Ensure administrative accounts are not On-premises sync enabled.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_admin_users_cloud_only" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Microsoft 365 admin center", + "SubSection": "1.1 Users", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Administrative accounts are special privileged accounts that could have varying levels of access to data, users, and settings. Regular user accounts should never be utilized for administrative tasks and care should be taken, in the case of a hybrid environment, to keep administrative accounts separate from on-prem accounts. Administrative accounts should not have applications assigned so that they have no access to potentially vulnerable services (EX. email, Teams, SharePoint, etc.) and only access to perform tasks as needed for administrative purposes. Ensure administrative accounts are not On-premises sync enabled.", + "RationaleStatement": "In a hybrid environment, having separate accounts will help ensure that in the event of a breach in the cloud, that the breach does not affect the on-prem environment and vice versa.", + "ImpactStatement": "Administrative users will need to utilize login/logout functionality to switch accounts when performing administrative tasks, which means they will not benefit from SSO. This will require a migration process from the 'daily driver' account to a dedicated admin account. Once the new admin account is created, permission sets should be migrated from the 'daily driver' account to the new admin account. This includes both M365 and Azure RBAC roles. Failure to migrate Azure RBAC roles could prevent an admin from seeing their subscriptions/resources while using their admin account.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Remediation will require first identifying the privileged accounts that are synced from on- premises and then creating a new cloud-only account for that user. Once a replacement account is established, the hybrid account should have its role reduced to that of a non- privileged user or removed depending on the need.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Identity > Users and select All users. 3. To the right of the search box click the Add filter button. 4. Add the On-premises sync enabled filter with the value set to Yes and click Apply. 5. Verify that no user accounts in administrative roles are present in the filtered list. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"RoleManagement.Read.Directory\",\"User.Read.All\" 2. Run the following PowerShell script: $DirectoryRoles = Get-MgDirectoryRole # Get privileged role IDs $PrivilegedRoles = $DirectoryRoles | Where-Object { $_.DisplayName -like \"*Administrator*\" -or $_.DisplayName -eq \"Global Reader\" } # Get the members of these various roles $RoleMembers = $PrivilegedRoles | ForEach-Object { Get-MgDirectoryRoleMember -DirectoryRoleId $_.Id } | Select-Object Id -Unique # Retrieve details about the members in these roles $PrivilegedUsers = $RoleMembers | ForEach-Object { Get-MgUser -UserId $_.Id -Property UserPrincipalName, DisplayName, Id, OnPremisesSyncEnabled } $PrivilegedUsers | Where-Object { $_.OnPremisesSyncEnabled -eq $true } | ft DisplayName,UserPrincipalName,OnPremisesSyncEnabled 3. The script will output any hybrid users that are also members of privileged roles. If nothing returns, then no users with that criteria exist.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "N/A", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/add-users/add-users?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/enterprise/protect-your-global-administrator-accounts?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/best-practices#9-use-cloud-native-accounts-for-microsoft-entra-roles:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/whatis:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.2", + "Description": "Emergency access or \"break glass\" accounts are limited for emergency scenarios where normal administrative accounts are unavailable. They are not assigned to a specific user and will have a combination of physical and technical controls to prevent them from being accessed outside a true emergency. These emergencies could be due to several things, including: - Technical failures of a cellular provider or Microsoft related service such as MFA. - The last remaining Global Administrator account is inaccessible. Ensure two Emergency Access accounts have been defined. Note: Microsoft provides several recommendations for these accounts and how to configure them. For more information on this, please refer to the references section. The CIS Benchmark outlines the more critical things to consider.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_break_glass_account_fido2_security_key_registered", + "entra_emergency_access_exclusion" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Microsoft 365 admin center", + "SubSection": "1.1 Users", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Emergency access or \"break glass\" accounts are limited for emergency scenarios where normal administrative accounts are unavailable. They are not assigned to a specific user and will have a combination of physical and technical controls to prevent them from being accessed outside a true emergency. These emergencies could be due to several things, including: - Technical failures of a cellular provider or Microsoft related service such as MFA. - The last remaining Global Administrator account is inaccessible. Ensure two Emergency Access accounts have been defined. Note: Microsoft provides several recommendations for these accounts and how to configure them. For more information on this, please refer to the references section. The CIS Benchmark outlines the more critical things to consider.", + "RationaleStatement": "In various situations, an organization may require the use of a break glass account to gain emergency access. In the event of losing access to administrative functions, an organization may experience a significant loss in its ability to provide support, lose insight into its security posture, and potentially suffer financial losses.", + "ImpactStatement": "Failure to properly implement emergency access accounts can weaken the security posture. Microsoft recommends excluding at least one of the two emergency access accounts from all conditional access rules, necessitating passwords with sufficient entropy and length to protect against random guesses. For a secure passwordless solution, FIDO2 security keys may be used instead of passwords.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: Step 1 - Create two emergency access accounts: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com 2. Expand Users > Active Users 3. Click Add user and create a new user with this criteria: o Name the account in a way that does NOT identify it with a particular person. o Assign the account to the default .onmicrosoft.com domain and not the organization's. o The password must be at least 16 characters and generated randomly. o Do not assign a license. o Assign the user the Global Administrator role. 4. Repeat the above steps for the second account. Step 2 - Exclude at least one account from conditional access policies: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand Protection > Conditional Access. 3. Inspect the conditional access policies. 4. For each rule add an exclusion for at least one of the emergency access accounts. 5. Users > Exclude > Users and groups and select one emergency access account. Step 3 - Ensure the necessary procedures and policies are in place: - In order for accounts to be effectively used in a break glass situation the proper policies and procedures must be authorized and distributed by senior management. - FIDO2 Security Keys should be locked in a secure separate fireproof location. - Passwords should be at least 16 characters, randomly generated and MAY be separated in multiple pieces to be joined in case of an emergency. Warning: As of 10/15/2024 MFA is required for all users including Break Glass Accounts. It is recommended to update these accounts to use passkey (FIDO2) or configure certificate-based authentication for MFA. Both methods satisfy the MFA requirement. Additional suggestions for emergency account management: - Create access reviews for these users. - Exclude users from conditional access rules. - Add the account to a restricted management administrative unit. Warning: If CA (conditional access) exclusion is managed by a group, this group should be added to PIM for groups (licensing required) or be created as a role-assignable group. If it is a regular security group, then users with the Group Administrators role are able to bypass CA entirely.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: Step 1 - Ensure a policy and procedure is in place at the organization: - In order for accounts to be effectively used in a break-glass situation the proper policies and procedures must be authorized and distributed by senior management. - FIDO2 Security Keys should be locked in a secure separate fireproof location. - Passwords should be at least 16 characters, randomly generated and MAY be separated in multiple pieces to be joined in case of an emergency. Step 2 - Ensure two emergency access accounts are defined: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com 2. Expand Users > Active Users 3. Inspect the designated emergency access accounts and ensure the following: o The accounts are named correctly, and do NOT identify with a particular person. o The accounts use the default .onmicrosoft.com domain and not the organization's. o The accounts are cloud-only. o The accounts are unlicensed. o The accounts are not disabled or Sign-in blocked. o The accounts are assigned the Global Administrator directory role. Step 3 - Ensure at least one account is excluded from all conditional access rules: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand Protection > Conditional Access. 3. Inspect the conditional access rules. 4. Ensure one of the emergency access accounts is excluded from all rules. Warning: As of 10/15/2024 MFA is required for all users including Break Glass Accounts. It is recommended to update these accounts to use passkey (FIDO2) or configure certificate-based authentication for MFA. Both methods satisfy the MFA requirement.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Microsoft has additional instructions regarding using Azure Monitor to capture events in the Log Analytics workspace, and then generate alerts for Emergency Access accounts. This requires an Azure subscription but should be strongly considered as a method of monitoring activity on these accounts: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/security- emergency-access#monitor-sign-in-and-audit-logs", + "DefaultValue": "Not defined.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/security-planning#stage-1-critical-items-to-do-right-now:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/security-emergency-access:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/admin-units-restricted-management:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-mandatory-multifactor-authentication#accounts" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.3", + "Description": "Between two and four global administrators should be designated in the tenant. Ideally, these accounts will not have licenses assigned to them which supports additional controls found in this benchmark.", + "Checks": [ + "admincenter_users_between_two_and_four_global_admins" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Microsoft 365 admin center", + "SubSection": "1.1 Users", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Between two and four global administrators should be designated in the tenant. Ideally, these accounts will not have licenses assigned to them which supports additional controls found in this benchmark.", + "RationaleStatement": "The Global Administrator role grants unrestricted access across all services in Microsoft Entra ID and should never be used for routine daily activities. Limiting the number of Global Administrators reduces the attack surface of the tenant and aligns with the principle of least privilege. Fewer than two Global Administrators creates a single point of failure and removes the peer oversight needed to detect unauthorized actions. More than four increases the likelihood of account compromise by an external attacker. Maintaining between two and four Global Administrators balances operational redundancy against privileged access risk. For any accounts assigned the Global Administrator role, at least one strong authentication method such as a FIDO2 key or certificate is strongly advised.", + "ImpactStatement": "The potential impact associated with ensuring compliance with this requirement is dependent upon the current number of global administrators configured in the tenant. If there is only one global administrator in a tenant, an additional global administrator will need to be identified and configured. If there are more than four global administrators, a review of role requirements for current global administrators will be required to identify which of the users require global administrator access.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com 2. Select Users > Active Users. 3. In the Search field enter the name of the user to be made a Global Administrator. 4. To create a new Global Admin: 1. Select the user's name. 2. A window will appear to the right. 3. Select Manage roles. 4. Select Admin center access. 5. Check Global Administrator. 6. Click Save changes. 5. To remove a Global Admin: 1. In the Search field, enter the name of the user to be removed. 2. Select the user's name. 3. A window will appear to the right. 4. Under Roles, select Manage roles. 5. Uncheck Global Administrator. 6. Click Save changes.", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: If an organization's tenant is using a third-party identity provider, the audit and remediation procedures presented here may not be relevant. The principle of the recommendation is still relevant, and compensating controls that are relevant to the third-party identity provider should be implemented. To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com 2. Select Roles > Role assignments. 3. Select the Global Administrator role from the list and click on Assigned. 4. Review the list of Global Administrators. o If there are groups present, then inspect each group and its members. o Take note of the total number of Global Administrators in and outside of groups. 5. Verify the number of Global Administrators is between two and four. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes Directory.Read.All 2. Run the following PowerShell script: # Determine Id of GA role using the immutable RoleTemplateId value. $GlobalAdminRole = Get-MgDirectoryRole -Filter \"RoleTemplateId eq '62e90394- 69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10'\" $RoleMembers = Get-MgDirectoryRoleMember -DirectoryRoleId $GlobalAdminRole.Id $GlobalAdmins = [System.Collections.Generic.List[Object]]::new() foreach ($object in $RoleMembers) { $Type = $object.AdditionalProperties.'@odata.type' # Check for and process role assigned groups if ($Type -eq '#microsoft.graph.group') { $GroupId = $object.Id $GroupMembers = (Get-MgGroupMember -GroupId $GroupId).AdditionalProperties foreach ($member in $GroupMembers) { if ($member.'@odata.type' -eq '#microsoft.graph.user') { $GlobalAdmins.Add([PSCustomObject][Ordered]@{ DisplayName = $member.displayName UserPrincipalName = $member.userPrincipalName }) } } } elseif ($Type -eq '#microsoft.graph.user') { $DisplayName = $object.AdditionalProperties.displayName $UPN = $object.AdditionalProperties.userPrincipalName $GlobalAdmins.Add([PSCustomObject][Ordered]@{ DisplayName = $DisplayName UserPrincipalName = $UPN }) } } $GlobalAdmins = $GlobalAdmins | select DisplayName,UserPrincipalName -Unique Write-Host \"*** There are\" $GlobalAdmins.Count \"Global Administrators in the organization.\" 3. Review the output and ensure there are between 2 and 4 Global Administrators. Note: When tallying the number of Global Administrators, the above does not account for Partner relationships. Those are located under Settings > Partner Relationships and should be reviewed on a recurring basis.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.graph.identity.directorymanagement/get-mgdirectoryrole?view=graph-powershell-1.0:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference#all-roles:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/best-practices#5-limit-the-number-of-global-administrators-to-less-than-5:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide#security-guidelines-for-assigning-roles" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.1.4", + "Description": "Administrative accounts are special privileged accounts that could have varying levels of access to data, users, and settings. A license can enable an account to gain access to a variety of different applications, depending on the license assigned. The recommended state is to not license a privileged account or use licenses without associated applications such as Microsoft Entra ID P1 or Microsoft Entra ID P2.", + "Checks": [ + "admincenter_users_admins_reduced_license_footprint" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Microsoft 365 admin center", + "SubSection": "1.1 Users", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Administrative accounts are special privileged accounts that could have varying levels of access to data, users, and settings. A license can enable an account to gain access to a variety of different applications, depending on the license assigned. The recommended state is to not license a privileged account or use licenses without associated applications such as Microsoft Entra ID P1 or Microsoft Entra ID P2.", + "RationaleStatement": "Ensuring administrative accounts do not use licenses with applications assigned to them will reduce the attack surface of high privileged identities in the organization's environment. Granting access to a mailbox or other collaborative tools increases the likelihood that privileged users might interact with these applications, raising the risk of exposure to social engineering attacks or malicious content. These activities should be restricted to an unprivileged 'daily driver' account. Note: In order to participate in Microsoft 365 security services such as Identity Protection, PIM and Conditional Access an administrative account will need a license attached to it. Ensure that the license used does not include any applications with potentially vulnerable services by using either Microsoft Entra ID P1 or Microsoft Entra ID P2 for the cloud-only account with administrator roles.", + "ImpactStatement": "Administrative users will be required to switch accounts and use manual login/logout procedures when performing privileged tasks. This change also means they will not benefit from Single Sign-On (SSO), potentially impacting workflow efficiency and user experience. Note: Alerts will be sent to TenantAdmins, including Global Administrators, by default. To ensure proper receipt, configure alerts to be sent to security or operations staff with valid email addresses or a security operations center. Otherwise, after adoption of this recommendation, alerts sent to TenantAdmins may go unreceived due to the lack of an application-based license assigned to the Global Administrator accounts.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Users > Active users. 3. Click Add a user. 4. Fill out the appropriate fields for Name, user, etc. 5. When prompted to assign licenses select as needed Microsoft Entra ID P1 or Microsoft Entra ID P2, then click Next. 6. Under the Option settings screen you may choose from several types of privileged roles. Choose Admin center access followed by the appropriate role then click Next. 7. Select Finish adding. Note: Utilizing PIM to best practices will satisfy this control. CIS and Microsoft recommend an organization keep zero permanently active assignments for roles other than emergency access accounts.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Users > Active users. 3. Sort by the Licenses column. 4. For each user account in an administrative role verify the account is assigned a license that is not associated with applications i.e. (Microsoft Entra ID P1, Microsoft Entra ID P2). o If an organization uses PIM to elevate a daily driver account to privileged levels, this control and licensing requirement can be considered satisfied. Note: The final step assumes PIM is properly configured to best practices. Accounts eligible for the Global Administrator role should require approval to activate. Using the PIM blade to permanently assign accounts to privileged roles would not satisfy this audit procedure. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"RoleManagement.Read.Directory\",\"User.Read.All\" 2. Run the following PowerShell script: $DirectoryRoles = Get-MgDirectoryRole # Get privileged role IDs $PrivilegedRoles = $DirectoryRoles | Where-Object { $_.DisplayName -like \"*Administrator*\" -or $_.DisplayName -eq \"Global Reader\" } # Get the members of these various roles $RoleMembers = $PrivilegedRoles | ForEach-Object { Get-MgDirectoryRoleMember -DirectoryRoleId $_.Id } | Select-Object Id -Unique # Retrieve details about the members in these roles $PrivilegedUsers = $RoleMembers | ForEach-Object { Get-MgUser -UserId $_.Id -Property UserPrincipalName, DisplayName, Id } $Report = [System.Collections.Generic.List[Object]]::new() foreach ($Admin in $PrivilegedUsers) { $License = $null $License = (Get-MgUserLicenseDetail -UserId $Admin.id).SkuPartNumber - join \", \" $Object = [pscustomobject][ordered]@{ DisplayName = $Admin.DisplayName UserPrincipalName = $Admin.UserPrincipalName License = $License } $Report.Add($Object) } $Report 3. The output will display users assigned privileged roles alongside their assigned licenses. Additional manual assessment is required to determine if the licensing is appropriate for the user.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "N/A", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/enterprise/protect-your-global-administrator-accounts?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/whatis#what-are-the-microsoft-entra-id-licenses:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/business-premium/m365bp-protect-admin-accounts?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/enterprise/subscriptions-licenses-accounts-and-tenants-for-microsoft-cloud-offerings?view=o365-worldwide#licenses:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-deployment-plan#principle-of-least-privilege" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.1", + "Description": "Microsoft 365 Groups is the foundational membership service that drives all teamwork across Microsoft 365. With Microsoft 365 Groups, you can give a group of people access to a collection of shared resources. When a new group is created in the Administration panel, the default privacy value of the group is \"Public\". (In this case, 'public' means accessible to the identities within the organization without requiring group owner authorization to join.) The recommended state is Microsoft 365 Groups are set to Private in the Administration panel. Note: Although there are several different group types, this recommendation concerns Microsoft 365 Groups specifically.", + "Checks": [ + "admincenter_groups_not_public_visibility" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Microsoft 365 admin center", + "SubSection": "1.2 Teams & groups", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Microsoft 365 Groups is the foundational membership service that drives all teamwork across Microsoft 365. With Microsoft 365 Groups, you can give a group of people access to a collection of shared resources. When a new group is created in the Administration panel, the default privacy value of the group is \"Public\". (In this case, 'public' means accessible to the identities within the organization without requiring group owner authorization to join.) The recommended state is Microsoft 365 Groups are set to Private in the Administration panel. Note: Although there are several different group types, this recommendation concerns Microsoft 365 Groups specifically.", + "RationaleStatement": "If group privacy is not controlled, any user may access sensitive information, depending on the group they try to access. When the privacy value of a group is set to \"Public,\" users may access data related to this group (e.g. SharePoint) via three methods: 1. The Azure Portal: Users can add themselves to the public group via the Azure Portal; however, administrators are notified when users access the Portal. 2. Access Requests: Users can request to join the group via the Groups application in the Access Panel. This provides the user with immediate access to the group, even though they are required to send a message to the group owner when requesting to join. 3. SharePoint URL: Users can directly access a group via its SharePoint URL, which is usually guessable and can be found in the Groups application within the Access Panel.", + "ImpactStatement": "If the recommendation is applied, group owners could receive more access requests than usual, especially regarding groups originally meant to be public.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Teams & groups > Active teams & groups. 3. On the Active teams and groups page, select the group's name that is public. 4. On the popup groups name page, Select Settings. 5. Under Privacy, select Private.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Teams & groups > Active teams & groups. 3. On the Active teams and groups page, check that no groups have the status 'Public' in the privacy column. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to the Microsoft Graph service using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Group.Read.All\". 2. Run the following Microsoft Graph PowerShell command: $Groups = Get-MgGroup -All -Filter \"groupTypes/any(c:c eq 'Unified')\" ` -Property Id,DisplayName,Visibility,GroupTypes # Displays the groups to the console for review $Groups | ft Id,DisplayName,Visibility 3. Verify that Visibility is Private for each group.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Public when created from the Administration portal; private otherwise.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/users/groups-self-service-management:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/create-groups/compare-groups?view=o365-worldwide" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.2.2", + "Description": "Shared mailboxes are used when multiple people need access to the same mailbox, such as a company information or support email address, reception desk, or other function that might be shared by multiple people. Users with permissions to the group mailbox can send as or send on behalf of the mailbox email address if the administrator has given that user permissions to do that. This is particularly useful for help and support mailboxes because users can send emails from \"Contoso Support\" or \"Building A Reception Desk.\" Shared mailboxes are created with a corresponding user account using a system generated password that is unknown at the time of creation. The recommended state is Sign in blocked for Shared mailboxes.", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_shared_mailbox_sign_in_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Microsoft 365 admin center", + "SubSection": "1.2 Teams & groups", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Shared mailboxes are used when multiple people need access to the same mailbox, such as a company information or support email address, reception desk, or other function that might be shared by multiple people. Users with permissions to the group mailbox can send as or send on behalf of the mailbox email address if the administrator has given that user permissions to do that. This is particularly useful for help and support mailboxes because users can send emails from \"Contoso Support\" or \"Building A Reception Desk.\" Shared mailboxes are created with a corresponding user account using a system generated password that is unknown at the time of creation. The recommended state is Sign in blocked for Shared mailboxes.", + "RationaleStatement": "The intent of the shared mailbox is to only allow delegated access from other mailboxes. An admin could reset the password, or an attacker could potentially gain access to the shared mailbox allowing the direct sign-in to the shared mailbox and subsequently the sending of email from a sender that does not have a unique identity. To prevent this, block sign-in for the account that is associated with the shared mailbox.", + "ImpactStatement": "Blocking sign-in to shared mailboxes prevents direct authentication to these accounts. Authorized users can still access shared mailbox content through their own accounts using Outlook delegation or by being granted Send As/Send on Behalf permissions. This change strengthens security by ensuring shared mailboxes cannot serve as entry points for unauthorized access.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/ 2. Click to expand Teams & groups and select Shared mailboxes. 3. Take note of all shared mailboxes. 4. Click to expand Users and select Active users. 5. Select a shared mailbox account to open its properties pane and then select Block sign-in. 6. Check the box for Block this user from signing in. 7. Repeat for any additional shared mailboxes. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"User.ReadWrite.All\" 2. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 3. To disable sign-in for a single account: $MBX = Get-EXOMailbox -Identity TestUser@example.com Update-MgUser -UserId $MBX.ExternalDirectoryObjectId -AccountEnabled:$false The following can be used block sign-in to all Shared Mailboxes: $MBX = Get-EXOMailbox -RecipientTypeDetails SharedMailbox $MBX | ForEach-Object { Update-MgUser -UserId $_.ExternalDirectoryObjectId - AccountEnabled:$false }", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand Teams & groups and select Shared mailboxes. 3. Take note of all shared mailboxes. 4. Expand Users and select Active users. 5. Select a shared mailbox account to open its properties pane, and review. 6. Verify that the text under the name reads Sign-in blocked. 7. Repeat for any additional shared mailboxes. Note: If sign-in is not blocked there will be an option to Block sign-in. This means the shared mailbox is out of compliance with this recommendation. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline 2. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"User.Read.All\" 3. Run the following PowerShell commands: $MBX = Get-EXOMailbox -RecipientTypeDetails SharedMailbox -ResultSize Unlimited $MBX | ForEach-Object { Get-MgUser -UserId $_.ExternalDirectoryObjectId ` -Property DisplayName, UserPrincipalName, AccountEnabled } | Format-Table DisplayName, UserPrincipalName, AccountEnabled 4. Ensure AccountEnabled is set to False for all Shared Mailboxes.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "AccountEnabled: True", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/email/about-shared-mailboxes?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/email/create-a-shared-mailbox?view=o365-worldwide#block-sign-in-for-the-shared-mailbox-account:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/enterprise/block-user-accounts-with-microsoft-365-powershell?view=o365-worldwide#block-individual-user-accounts" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.1", + "Description": "Microsoft cloud-only accounts have a pre-defined password policy that cannot be changed. The only items that can change are the number of days until a password expires and whether or not passwords expire at all.", + "Checks": [ + "admincenter_settings_password_never_expire" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Microsoft 365 admin center", + "SubSection": "1.3 Settings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Microsoft cloud-only accounts have a pre-defined password policy that cannot be changed. The only items that can change are the number of days until a password expires and whether or not passwords expire at all.", + "RationaleStatement": "Organizations such as NIST and Microsoft recommend against arbitrarily requiring users to change their passwords after a set period, unless there is evidence of compromise or the user has forgotten the password. This guidance applies even to single-factor (password-only) scenarios, as forced, periodic changes often lead to weaker passwords and reduced security. Additionally, this Benchmark advises implementing multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all accounts, which further diminishes the value of password expiration policies. Long-lived passwords can be further strengthened by enabling additional password protection features in Entra ID.", + "ImpactStatement": "When setting passwords not to expire it is important to have other controls in place to supplement this setting. See below for related recommendations and user guidance. - Ban common passwords. - Educate users to not reuse organization passwords anywhere else. - Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication registration for all users.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Settings > Org Settings. 3. Click on Security & privacy. 4. Check the Set passwords to never expire (recommended) box. 5. Click Save. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to the Microsoft Graph service using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Domain.ReadWrite.All\". 2. Run the following Microsoft Graph PowerShell command: Update-MgDomain -DomainId -PasswordValidityPeriodInDays 2147483647", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Settings > Org Settings. 3. Click on Security & privacy. 4. Select Password expiration policy and verify that Set passwords to never expire (recommended) has been checked. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to the Microsoft Graph service using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Domain.Read.All\". 2. Run the following Microsoft Online PowerShell command: Get-MgDomain | ft id,PasswordValidityPeriodInDays 3. Verify the value returned for valid domains is 2147483647", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "If the property is not set, a default value of 90 days will be used", + "References": "https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html:https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/cis-password-policy-guide/:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/misc/password-policy-recommendations?view=o365-worldwide" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.2", + "Description": "Idle session timeout allows the configuration of a setting which will timeout inactive users after a pre-determined amount of time. When a user reaches the set idle timeout session, they'll get a notification that they're about to be signed out. They must choose to stay signed in or they'll be automatically signed out of all Microsoft 365 web apps. Combined with a Conditional Access rule this will only impact unmanaged devices. A managed device is considered a device managed by Intune MDM or joined to a domain (Entra ID or Hybrid joined). The following Microsoft 365 web apps are supported. - Outlook Web App - OneDrive - SharePoint - Microsoft Fabric - Microsoft365.com and other start pages - Microsoft 365 web apps (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) - Microsoft 365 Admin Center - M365 Defender Portal - Microsoft Purview Compliance Portal The recommended setting is 3 hours (or less) for unmanaged devices. Note: Idle session timeout doesn't affect Microsoft 365 desktop and mobile apps.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Microsoft 365 admin center", + "SubSection": "1.3 Settings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Idle session timeout allows the configuration of a setting which will timeout inactive users after a pre-determined amount of time. When a user reaches the set idle timeout session, they'll get a notification that they're about to be signed out. They must choose to stay signed in or they'll be automatically signed out of all Microsoft 365 web apps. Combined with a Conditional Access rule this will only impact unmanaged devices. A managed device is considered a device managed by Intune MDM or joined to a domain (Entra ID or Hybrid joined). The following Microsoft 365 web apps are supported. - Outlook Web App - OneDrive - SharePoint - Microsoft Fabric - Microsoft365.com and other start pages - Microsoft 365 web apps (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) - Microsoft 365 Admin Center - M365 Defender Portal - Microsoft Purview Compliance Portal The recommended setting is 3 hours (or less) for unmanaged devices. Note: Idle session timeout doesn't affect Microsoft 365 desktop and mobile apps.", + "RationaleStatement": "Ending idle sessions through an automatic process can help protect sensitive company data and will add another layer of security for end users who work on unmanaged devices that can potentially be accessed by the public. Unauthorized individuals onsite or remotely can take advantage of systems left unattended over time. Automatic timing out of sessions makes this more difficult.", + "ImpactStatement": "If step 2 in the Audit/Remediation procedure is left out, then there is no issue with this from a security standpoint. However, it will require users on trusted devices to sign in more frequently which could result in credential prompt fatigue. Users don't get signed out in these cases: - If they get single sign-on (SSO) into the web app from the device joined account. - If they selected Stay signed in at the time of sign-in. For more info on hiding this option for your organization, see Add branding to your organization's sign-in page. - If they're on a managed device, that is compliant or joined to a domain and using a supported browser, like Microsoft Edge, or Google Chrome with the Microsoft Single Sign On extension. Note: Idle session timeout also affects the Azure Portal idle timeout if this is not explicitly set to a different timeout. The Azure Portal idle timeout applies to all kinds of devices, not just unmanaged. See: change the directory timeout setting admin", + "RemediationProcedure": "Step 1 - Configure Idle session timeout: To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Settings > Org settings. 3. Click Security & Privacy tab. 4. Select Idle session timeout. 5. Check the box Turn on to set the period of inactivity for users to be signed off of Microsoft 365 web apps 6. Set a maximum value of 3 hours. 7. Click save. Step 2 - Ensure the Conditional Access policy is in place: To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand Protect > Conditional Access. 3. Click New policy and give the policy a name. o Select Users > All users. o Select Cloud apps or actions > Select apps and select Office 365 o Select Conditions > Client apps > Yes check only Browser unchecking all other boxes. o Select Sessions and check Use app enforced restrictions. 4. Set Enable policy to On and click Create. Note: To ensure that idle timeouts affect only unmanaged devices, both steps 1 and 2 must be completed. Otherwise managed devices will also be impacted by the timeout policy.", + "AuditProcedure": "Step 1 - Ensure Idle session timeout is configured: To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Settings > Org settings. 3. Click Security & Privacy tab. 4. Select Idle session timeout. 5. Verify that Turn on to set the period of inactivity for users to be signed off of Microsoft 365 web apps is set to 3 hours (or less). To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.Read.All\": 2. Run the following script: $TimeoutPolicy = Get-MgPolicyActivityBasedTimeoutPolicy $BenchmarkTimeSpan = [TimeSpan]::Parse('03:00:00') # 3 hours if ($TimeoutPolicy) { $PolicyDefinition = $TimeoutPolicy.Definition | ConvertFrom-Json $Timeout = $PolicyDefinition.ActivityBasedTimeoutPolicy.ApplicationPolicies[0].WebSessio nIdleTimeout $TimeSpan = [TimeSpan]::Parse($Timeout) $TimeoutReadable = \"{0} days, {1} hours, {2} minutes\" ` -f $TimeSpan.Days, $TimeSpan.Hours, $TimeSpan.Minutes if ($TimeSpan -le $BenchmarkTimeSpan) { Write-Host \"** PASS ** Timeout is set to $TimeoutReadable.\" } else { Write-Host \"** FAIL ** Timeout is too long. It is set to $TimeoutReadable.\" } } else { Write-Host \"** FAIL **: Idle session timeout is not configured.\" } 3. Verify the policy exists and is 3 hours or less. Step 2 - Ensure the Conditional Access policy is in place: To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand Protect > Conditional Access. 3. Inspect existing conditional access rules for one that meets the below conditions: o Users or agents (Preview) is set to include All users. o Cloud apps or actions > Select apps is set to Office 365. o Conditions > Client apps is Browser and nothing else. o Session is set to Use app enforced restrictions. o Enable Policy is set to On To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.Read.All\": 2. Run the following script: $Caps = Get-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy -All | Where-Object { $_.SessionControls.ApplicationEnforcedRestrictions.IsEnabled } $CapReport = [System.Collections.Generic.List[Object]]::new() # Filter to policies with \"Use app enforced restrictions\" enabled # Loop through policies and generate a per policy report. foreach ($policy in $Caps) { $Name = $policy.DisplayName $Users = $policy.Conditions.Users.IncludeUsers $Targets = $policy.Conditions.Applications.IncludeApplications $ClientApps = $policy.Conditions.ClientAppTypes $Restrictions = $policy.SessionControls.ApplicationEnforcedRestrictions.IsEnabled $State = $policy.State $CountPass = $Targets.count -eq 1 -and $ClientApps.count -eq 1 $Pass = $Targets -eq 'Office365' -and $ClientApps -eq 'browser' -and $Restrictions -and $CountPass -and $State -eq 'enabled' $obj = [PSCustomObject]@{ DisplayName = $Name AuditState = if ($Pass) { \"PASS\" } else { \"FAIL\" } IncludeUsers = $Users IncludeApplications = $Targets ClientAppTypes = $ClientApps AppEnforcedRestrictions = $Restrictions State = $State } $CapReport.Add($obj) } if ($Caps) { $CapReport } else { Write-Host \"** FAIL **: There are no qualifying conditional access policies.\" } 3. The script will output qualifying Conditional Access Policies. If one policy passes, then the recommendation passes. A passing policy will have the following properties: DisplayName : (CIS) Idle timeout for unmanaged AuditState : PASS IncludeUsers : {All} # IncludeUsers not currently scored IncludeApplications : {Office365} ClientAppTypes : {browser} AppEnforcedRestrictions : True State : enabled Note: Both steps 1 and 2 must pass audit checks in order for the recommendation to pass as a whole.", + "AdditionalInformation": "According to Microsoft idle session timeout isn't supported when third party cookies are disabled in the browser. Users won't see any sign-out prompts.", + "DefaultValue": "Not configured. (Idle sessions will not timeout.)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/manage/idle-session-timeout-web-apps?view=o365-worldwide" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.3", + "Description": "External calendar sharing allows an administrator to enable the ability for users to share calendars with anyone outside of the organization. Outside users will be sent a URL that can be used to view the calendar.", + "Checks": [ + "admincenter_external_calendar_sharing_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Microsoft 365 admin center", + "SubSection": "1.3 Settings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "External calendar sharing allows an administrator to enable the ability for users to share calendars with anyone outside of the organization. Outside users will be sent a URL that can be used to view the calendar.", + "RationaleStatement": "Attackers often spend time learning about organizations before launching an attack. Publicly available calendars can help attackers understand organizational relationships and determine when specific users may be more vulnerable to an attack, such as when they are traveling.", + "ImpactStatement": "This functionality is not widely used. As a result, it is unlikely that implementation of this setting will cause an impact to most users. Users that do utilize this functionality are likely to experience a minor inconvenience when scheduling meetings or synchronizing calendars with people outside the tenant.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Settings select Org settings. 3. In the Services section click Calendar. 4. Uncheck Let your users share their calendars with people outside of your organization who have Office 365 or Exchange. 5. Click Save. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following Exchange Online PowerShell command: Set-SharingPolicy -Identity \"Default Sharing Policy\" -Enabled $False", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Settings > Org settings. 3. In the Services section click Calendar. 4. Verify that Let your users share their calendars with people outside of your organization who have Office 365 or Exchange is unchecked. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following Exchange Online PowerShell command: Get-SharingPolicy -Identity \"Default Sharing Policy\" | ft Name,Enabled 3. Verify that Enabled is set to False", + "AdditionalInformation": "The following script can be used to audit any mailboxes that might be sharing calendars prior to disabling the feature globally: $mailboxes = Get-Mailbox -ResultSize Unlimited foreach ($mailbox in $mailboxes) { # Get the name of the default calendar folder (depends on the mailbox's language) $calendarFolder = [string](Get-ExoMailboxFolderStatistics $mailbox.PrimarySmtpAddress -FolderScope Calendar| Where-Object { $_.FolderType -eq 'Calendar' }).Name # Get users calendar folder settings for their default Calendar folder # calendar has the format identity:\\ $calendar = Get-MailboxCalendarFolder -Identity \"$($mailbox.PrimarySmtpAddress):\\$calendarFolder\" if ($calendar.PublishEnabled) { Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow \"Calendar publishing is enabled for $($mailbox.PrimarySmtpAddress) on $($calendar.PublishedCalendarUrl)\" } }", + "DefaultValue": "Enabled (True)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/manage/share-calendars-with-external-users?view=o365-worldwide" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.4", + "Description": "By default, users can install add-ins in their Microsoft Word, Excel, and PowerPoint applications, allowing data access within the application. Do not allow users to install add-ins in Word, Excel, or PowerPoint.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Microsoft 365 admin center", + "SubSection": "1.3 Settings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "By default, users can install add-ins in their Microsoft Word, Excel, and PowerPoint applications, allowing data access within the application. Do not allow users to install add-ins in Word, Excel, or PowerPoint.", + "RationaleStatement": "Attackers commonly use vulnerable and custom-built add-ins to access data in user applications. While allowing users to install add-ins by themselves does allow them to easily acquire useful add-ins that integrate with Microsoft applications, it can represent a risk if not used and monitored carefully. Disabling future users' ability to install add-ins in Microsoft Word, Excel, or PowerPoint helps reduce your threat-surface and mitigate this risk.", + "ImpactStatement": "Implementation of this change will impact both end users and administrators. End users will not be able to install add-ins that they may want to install.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Settings > Org settings. 3. In Services select User owned apps and services. 4. Uncheck Let users access the Office Store and Let users start trials on behalf of your organization. 5. Click Save. To remediate using PowerShell 1. Connect to the Microsoft Graph service using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"OrgSettings-AppsAndServices.ReadWrite.All\". 2. Run the following Microsoft Graph PowerShell commands: $uri = \"https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/admin/appsAndServices\" $body = @{ \"Settings\" = @{ \"isAppAndServicesTrialEnabled\" = $false \"isOfficeStoreEnabled\" = $false } } | ConvertTo-Json Invoke-MgGraphRequest -Method PATCH -Uri $uri -Body $body", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Settings > Org settings. 3. In Services select User owned apps and services. 4. Verify that Let users access the Office Store and Let users start trials on behalf of your organization are not checked. To Audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to the Microsoft Graph service using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"OrgSettings-AppsAndServices.Read.All\". 2. Run the following Microsoft Graph PowerShell command: $Uri = \"https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/admin/appsAndServices/settings\" Invoke-MgGraphRequest -Uri $Uri 3. Verify both isOfficeStoreEnabled and isAppAndServicesTrialEnabled are False.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Let users access the Office Store is Checked Let users start trials on behalf of your organization is Checked", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/manage/manage-addins-in-the-admin-center?view=o365-worldwide#manage-add-in-downloads-by-turning-onoff-the-office-store-across-all-apps-except-outlook" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.5", + "Description": "Microsoft Forms can be used for phishing attacks by asking personal or sensitive information and collecting the results. Microsoft 365 has built-in protection that will proactively scan for phishing attempt in forms such personal information request.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Microsoft 365 admin center", + "SubSection": "1.3 Settings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Microsoft Forms can be used for phishing attacks by asking personal or sensitive information and collecting the results. Microsoft 365 has built-in protection that will proactively scan for phishing attempt in forms such personal information request.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling internal phishing protection for Microsoft Forms will prevent attackers using forms for phishing attacks by asking personal or other sensitive information and URLs.", + "ImpactStatement": "If potential phishing was detected, the form will be temporarily blocked and cannot be distributed, and response collection will not happen until it is unblocked by the administrator or keywords were removed by the creator.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Settings > Org settings. 3. Under Services select Microsoft Forms. 4. Click the checkbox labeled Add internal phishing protection under Phishing protection. 5. Click Save. To remediate using PowerShell 1. Connect to the Microsoft Graph service using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"OrgSettings-AppsAndServices.ReadWrite.All\". 2. Run the following Microsoft Graph PowerShell commands: $uri = 'https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/admin/forms/settings' $body = @{ \"isInOrgFormsPhishingScanEnabled\" = $true } | ConvertTo-Json Invoke-MgGraphRequest -Method PATCH -Uri $uri -Body $body", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Settings > Org settings. 3. Under Services select Microsoft Forms. 4. Verify the checkbox labeled Add internal phishing protection is checked under Phishing protection. To Audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to the Microsoft Graph service using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"OrgSettings-Forms.Read.All\". 2. Run the following Microsoft Graph PowerShell commands: $uri = 'https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/admin/forms/settings' Invoke-MgGraphRequest -Uri $uri | select isInOrgFormsPhishingScanEnabled 3. Verify that isInOrgFormsPhishingScanEnabled is 'True'.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Internal Phishing Protection is enabled.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-US/microsoft-forms/administrator-settings-microsoft-forms:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-US/microsoft-forms/review-unblock-forms-users-detected-blocked-potential-phishing" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.6", + "Description": "Customer Lockbox is a security feature that provides an additional layer of control and transparency to customer data in Microsoft 365. It offers an approval process for Microsoft support personnel to access organization data and creates an audited trail to meet compliance requirements.", + "Checks": [ + "admincenter_organization_customer_lockbox_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Microsoft 365 admin center", + "SubSection": "1.3 Settings", + "Profile": "E5 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Customer Lockbox is a security feature that provides an additional layer of control and transparency to customer data in Microsoft 365. It offers an approval process for Microsoft support personnel to access organization data and creates an audited trail to meet compliance requirements.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling this feature protects organizational data against data spillage and exfiltration.", + "ImpactStatement": "Administrators will need to grant Microsoft access to the tenant environment prior to a Microsoft engineer accessing the environment for support or troubleshooting.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Settings > Org settings. 3. Select Security & privacy tab. 4. Click Customer lockbox. 5. Check the box Require approval for all data access requests. 6. Click Save. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Set-OrganizationConfig -CustomerLockBoxEnabled $true", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Settings > Org settings. 3. Select Security & privacy tab. 4. Click Customer lockbox. 5. Verify the box labeled Require approval for all data access requests is checked. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Get-OrganizationConfig | Select-Object CustomerLockBoxEnabled 3. Verify the value is set to True.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Require approval for all data access requests - Unchecked CustomerLockboxEnabled - False", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/customer-lockbox-requests#turn-customer-lockbox-requests-on-or-off" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.7", + "Description": "Third-party storage can be enabled for users in Microsoft 365, allowing them to store and share documents using services such as Dropbox, alongside OneDrive and team sites. Ensure Microsoft 365 on the web third-party storage services are restricted.", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_mailbox_policy_additional_storage_restricted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Microsoft 365 admin center", + "SubSection": "1.3 Settings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Third-party storage can be enabled for users in Microsoft 365, allowing them to store and share documents using services such as Dropbox, alongside OneDrive and team sites. Ensure Microsoft 365 on the web third-party storage services are restricted.", + "RationaleStatement": "By using external storage services an organization may increase the risk of data breaches and unauthorized access to confidential information. Additionally, third-party services may not adhere to the same security standards as the organization, making it difficult to maintain data privacy and security.", + "ImpactStatement": "Impact associated with this change is highly dependent upon current practices in the tenant. If users do not use other storage providers, then minimal impact is likely. However, if users do regularly utilize providers outside of the tenant this will affect their ability to continue to do so.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com 2. Go to Settings > Org Settings > Services > Microsoft 365 on the web 3. Uncheck Let users open files stored in third-party storage services in Microsoft 365 on the web To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Application.ReadWrite.All\" 2. Run the following script: $SP = Get-MgServicePrincipal -Filter \"appId eq 'c1f33bc0-bdb4-4248-ba9b- 096807ddb43e'\" # If the service principal doesn't exist then create it first. if (-not $SP) { $SP = New-MgServicePrincipal -AppId \"c1f33bc0-bdb4-4248-ba9b- 096807ddb43e\" } Update-MgServicePrincipal -ServicePrincipalId $SP.Id -AccountEnabled:$false", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com 2. Go to Settings > Org Settings > Services > Microsoft 365 on the web 3. Verify that Let users open files stored in third-party storage services in Microsoft 365 on the web is not checked. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Application.Read.All\". 2. Run the following script: $SP = Get-MgServicePrincipal -Filter \"appId eq 'c1f33bc0-bdb4-4248-ba9b- 096807ddb43e'\" if ((-not $SP) -or $SP.AccountEnabled) { Write-Host \"Audit Result: ** FAIL **\" } else { Write-Host \"Audit Result: ** PASS **\" } 3. Verify that AccountEnabled is False. Note: The check will also fail if the Service Principal does not exist as users will still be able to open files stored in third-party storage services in Microsoft 365 on the web.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Enabled - Users are able to open files stored in third-party storage services", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/setup/set-up-file-storage-and-sharing?view=o365-worldwide#enable-or-disable-third-party-storage-services" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.8", + "Description": "Sway is a Microsoft 365 app that lets organizations create interactive, web-based presentations using images, text, videos and other media. Its design engine simplifies the process, allowing for quick customization. Presentations can then be shared via a link. This setting controls user Sway sharing capability, both within and outside of the organization. By default, Sway is enabled for everyone in the organization.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Microsoft 365 admin center", + "SubSection": "1.3 Settings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Sway is a Microsoft 365 app that lets organizations create interactive, web-based presentations using images, text, videos and other media. Its design engine simplifies the process, allowing for quick customization. Presentations can then be shared via a link. This setting controls user Sway sharing capability, both within and outside of the organization. By default, Sway is enabled for everyone in the organization.", + "RationaleStatement": "Disable external sharing of Sway documents that can contain sensitive information to prevent accidental or arbitrary data leaks.", + "ImpactStatement": "Interactive reports, presentations, newsletters, and other items created in Sway will not be shared outside the organization by users.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Settings > Org settings. 3. Under Services select Sway o Uncheck: Let people in your organization share their sways with people outside your organization. 4. Click Save.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Settings > Org settings. 3. Under Services select Sway. 4. Verify that under Sharing, the following is not checked: o Let people in your organization share their sways with people outside your organization.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Let people in your organization share their sways with people outside your organization - Enabled", + "References": "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/administrator-settings-for-sway-d298e79b-b6ab-44c6-9239-aa312f5784d4:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/servicedescriptions/microsoft-sway-service-description" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "1.3.9", + "Description": "Shared Bookings allows you to invite your team members and create booking pages and let your customers book time with you and your team. It contains various settings to define services, manage staff members, configure schedules and availability, business hours and customize how appointments are scheduled. These pages can be customized to fit the diverse needs of your organization. It is an extension of Person Bookings. The recommended state is to restrict the OwaMailboxPolicy-Default policy or disable at the organization level.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "1 Microsoft 365 admin center", + "SubSection": "1.3 Settings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Shared Bookings allows you to invite your team members and create booking pages and let your customers book time with you and your team. It contains various settings to define services, manage staff members, configure schedules and availability, business hours and customize how appointments are scheduled. These pages can be customized to fit the diverse needs of your organization. It is an extension of Person Bookings. The recommended state is to restrict the OwaMailboxPolicy-Default policy or disable at the organization level.", + "RationaleStatement": "Shared Bookings pages can be exploited by threat actors to impersonate legitimate users using convincing internal email addresses. A compromised low-privilege account could be used to mimic high-profile identities (e.g., the CEO) and bypass impersonation filters to initiate fraudulent actions like fund transfers. Additionally, attackers may create authoritative-looking addresses (e.g., admin@, hostmaster@) to conduct social engineering attacks on external parties aimed at the transfer of infrastructure control. To reduce this risk, access to Shared Bookings should be limited to users with a clear business need and subject to monitoring and governance.", + "ImpactStatement": "Disabling Shared Bookings will limit users' ability to create self-service scheduling pages, which may reduce convenience for teams that rely on automated meeting coordination. Approved users will need to be added to a separate OWA Policy which will increase administrative overhead. Note: Before modifying the default owa policy, ensure that any users who rely on Shared Bookings are assigned a separate policy that explicitly allows its use. This will help prevent unintended service disruptions.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Set-OwaMailboxPolicy \"OwaMailboxPolicy-Default\" - BookingsMailboxCreationEnabled $false Optionally: For a more restrictive state Bookings can be disabled at the organization level 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following command: Set-OrganizationConfig -BookingsEnabled $false Note: Disabling Bookings at the tenant (organization) level will be more impactful to end users and is not required for compliance.", + "AuditProcedure": "Ensure Shared Bookings is turned off in the OWA Default policy. If booking is disabled at the tenant (OrganizationConfig) level this is also a compliant state. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following command: Get-OwaMailboxPolicy -Identity OwaMailboxPolicy-Default | fl BookingsMailboxCreationEnabled 3. Verify that BookingsMailboxCreationEnabled is set to False. Optionally: If Bookings is disabled at the organization level, this is also considered a compliant state. 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following command: Get-OrganizationConfig | fl BookingsEnabled 3. If BookingsEnabled is set to False, the organization is using a more restrictive and compliant configuration. In this case changing the default OWA policy would not be required for compliance.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "BookingsMailboxCreationEnabled : True (OwaMailboxPolicy-Default) BookingsEnabled : True", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/bookings/turn-bookings-on-or-off?view=o365-worldwide:https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/office365businessappsblog/enhancing-security-in-microsoft-bookings-best-practices-for-admins/4382447:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/bookings/best-practices-shared-bookings?view=o365-worldwide&source=recommendations:https://www.cyberis.com/article/microsoft-bookings-facilitating-impersonation" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.1", + "Description": "Enabling Safe Links policy for Office applications allows URL's that exist inside of Office documents and email applications opened by Office, Office Online and Office mobile to be processed against Defender for Office time-of-click verification and rewritten if required. Note: E5 Licensing includes a number of Built-in Protection policies. When auditing policies note which policy you are viewing, and keep in mind CIS recommendations often extend the Default or Built-in Policies provided by MS. In order to Pass the highest priority policy must match all settings recommended.", + "Checks": [ + "defender_safelinks_policy_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Microsoft Defender", + "SubSection": "2.1 Email & collaboration", + "Profile": "E5 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Enabling Safe Links policy for Office applications allows URL's that exist inside of Office documents and email applications opened by Office, Office Online and Office mobile to be processed against Defender for Office time-of-click verification and rewritten if required. Note: E5 Licensing includes a number of Built-in Protection policies. When auditing policies note which policy you are viewing, and keep in mind CIS recommendations often extend the Default or Built-in Policies provided by MS. In order to Pass the highest priority policy must match all settings recommended.", + "RationaleStatement": "Safe Links for Office applications extends phishing protection to documents and emails that contain hyperlinks, even after they have been delivered to a user.", + "ImpactStatement": "User impact associated with this change is minor - users may experience a very short delay when clicking on URLs in Office documents before being directed to the requested site. Users should be informed of the change as, in the event a link is unsafe and blocked, they will receive a message that it has been blocked.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com 2. Under Email & collaboration select Policies & rules 3. Select Threat policies then Safe Links 4. Click on +Create 5. Name the policy then click Next 6. In Domains select all valid domains for the organization and Next 7. Ensure the following URL & click protection settings are defined: Email o Checked On: Safe Links checks a list of known, malicious links when users click links in email. URLs are rewritten by default o Checked Apply Safe Links to email messages sent within the organization o Checked Apply real-time URL scanning for suspicious links and links that point to files o Checked Wait for URL scanning to complete before delivering the message o Unchecked Do not rewrite URLs, do checks via Safe Links API only. Teams o Checked On: Safe Links checks a list of known, malicious links when users click links in Microsoft Teams. URLs are not rewritten Office 365 Apps o Checked On: Safe Links checks a list of known, malicious links when users click links in Microsoft Office apps. URLs are not rewritten Click protection settings o Checked Track user clicks o Unchecked Let users click through the original URL o There is no recommendation for organization branding. 8. Click Next twice and finally Submit To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell script to create a policy at highest priority that will apply to all valid domains on the tenant: # Create the Policy $params = @{ Name = \"CIS SafeLinks Policy\" EnableSafeLinksForEmail = $true EnableSafeLinksForTeams = $true EnableSafeLinksForOffice = $true TrackClicks = $true AllowClickThrough = $false ScanUrls = $true EnableForInternalSenders = $true DeliverMessageAfterScan = $true DisableUrlRewrite = $false } New-SafeLinksPolicy @params # Create the rule for all users in all valid domains and associate with Policy New-SafeLinksRule -Name \"CIS SafeLinks\" -SafeLinksPolicy \"CIS SafeLinks Policy\" -RecipientDomainIs (Get-AcceptedDomain).Name -Priority 0", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com 2. Under Email & collaboration select Policies & rules 3. Select Threat policies then Safe Links 4. Inspect each policy and attempt to identify one that matches the parameters outlined below. 5. Scroll down the pane and click on Edit Protection settings (Global Readers will look for on or off values) 6. Verify that the following protection settings are set as outlined: Email o Checked On: Safe Links checks a list of known, malicious links when users click links in email. URLs are rewritten by default o Checked Apply Safe Links to email messages sent within the organization o Checked Apply real-time URL scanning for suspicious links and links that point to files o Checked Wait for URL scanning to complete before delivering the message o Unchecked Do not rewrite URLs, do checks via Safe Links API only. Teams o Checked On: Safe Links checks a list of known, malicious links when users click links in Microsoft Teams. URLs are not rewritten Office 365 Apps o Checked On: Safe Links checks a list of known, malicious links when users click links in Microsoft Office apps. URLs are not rewritten Click protection settings oChecked Track user clicks oUnchecked Let users click through the original URL 7. There is no recommendation for organization branding. 8. Click close To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following to output properties from all Safe Links policies: $params = @( 'Identity', 'EnableSafeLinksForEmail', 'EnableSafeLinksForTeams', 'EnableSafeLinksForOffice', 'TrackClicks', 'AllowClickThrough', 'ScanUrls', 'EnableForInternalSenders', 'DeliverMessageAfterScan', 'DisableUrlRewrite' ) Get-SafeLinksPolicy | Select-Object -Property $Params 3. Verify there is at least one policy that matches the properties and values below: Identity : EnableSafeLinksForEmail : True EnableSafeLinksForTeams : True EnableSafeLinksForOffice : True TrackClicks : True AllowClickThrough : False ScanUrls : True EnableForInternalSenders : True DeliverMessageAfterScan : True DisableUrlRewrite : False", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/safe-links-policies-configure?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-safelinkspolicy?view=exchange-ps:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/preset-security-policies?view=o365-worldwide" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.2", + "Description": "The Common Attachment Types Filter is a setting within Exchange Online Protection's anti-malware policy that blocks inbound and outbound email messages containing attachments of specified file types. When enabled, messages with attachments matching the blocked extensions are quarantined before delivery. Microsoft maintains a default set of file types considered high risk; organizations may also add custom extensions to the list. The recommended state is Enable the common attachments filter set to On, on the default anti-malware policy, with the default list of blocked file types.", + "Checks": [ + "defender_malware_policy_common_attachments_filter_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Microsoft Defender", + "SubSection": "2.1 Email & collaboration", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The Common Attachment Types Filter is a setting within Exchange Online Protection's anti-malware policy that blocks inbound and outbound email messages containing attachments of specified file types. When enabled, messages with attachments matching the blocked extensions are quarantined before delivery. Microsoft maintains a default set of file types considered high risk; organizations may also add custom extensions to the list. The recommended state is Enable the common attachments filter set to On, on the default anti-malware policy, with the default list of blocked file types.", + "RationaleStatement": "Email is a primary delivery vector for malware, including ransomware, trojans, and remote access tools distributed via executable, script, and installer file formats. The Common Attachment Types Filter blocks delivery of file types that have no legitimate business use in email but are routinely weaponized (such as .exe, .vbs, .bat, .msi), and similar formats. Enforcing this filter at the gateway reduces the attack surface before any client-side or endpoint control has the opportunity to respond.", + "ImpactStatement": "Emails containing attachments with blocked extensions, including those sent by trusted internal senders, will be quarantined and not delivered. Some file types in the default block list may be used legitimately in some IT workflows. Administrators who need to permit specific extensions for specific users or groups should create a scoped custom anti-malware policy with a higher priority than the Default policy rather than modifying the Default policy's file type list.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Email & collaboration > Policies & rules. 3. On the Policies & rules page select Threat policies. 4. Under polices select Anti-malware and click on the Default (Default) policy. 5. On the Policy page that appears on the right hand pane scroll to the bottom and click on Edit protection settings, check the Enable the common attachments filter. o If any of the default file types are missing click Select file types and add the missing file types in. o Reference the Default Value section of this document for the list of extensions that should be blocked. 6. Click Save to save the changes. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following to enable the common attachment filter: Set-MalwareFilterPolicy -Identity Default -EnableFileFilter $true 3. Use Set-MalwareFilterPolicy -Identity Default with the -FileTypes parameter to add any missing file types from the default list. o FileTypes accepts an array of strings. o To avoid using it destructively, first retrieve the existing list of file types using Get-MalwareFilterPolicy and append any missing file types to the list before using Set-MalwareFilterPolicy to update the policy.", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: The following procedures audit only the Default anti-malware policy. Auditing custom policies is not required for compliance and is discretionary based on the organization's needs. To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Email & collaboration > Policies & rules. 3. On the Policies & rules page select Threat policies. 4. Under Policies select Anti-malware and click on the Default (Default) policy. 5. On the policy page that appears on the righthand pane, under Protection settings, verify that the Enable the common attachments filter has the value of On. 6. Click on Edit protection settings to view the list of file types that are blocked by the common attachment filter. Verify that the list of file types contains at least the 53 file types found in the Default Value section of this document. Note: Verifying the complete file type list via the UI requires manual comparison against the default extensions listed in the Default Value section of this document. Auditors who require a programmatic comparison should use the PowerShell method. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following Exchange Online PowerShell command: Get-MalwareFilterPolicy -Identity Default 3. Verify that the EnableFileFilter property has the value of True. 4. Verify that the FileTypes property contains at least default list of 53 file types found in the Default Value section of this document.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "EnableFileFilter : True Default extensions: [ \"ani\", \"apk\", \"app\", \"appx\", \"arj\", \"bat\", \"cab\", \"cmd\", \"com\", \"deb\", \"dex\", \"dll\", \"docm\", \"elf\", \"exe\", \"hta\", \"img\", \"iso\", \"jar\", \"jnlp\", \"kext\", \"lha\", \"lib\", \"library\", \"lnk\", \"lzh\", \"macho\", \"msc\", \"msi\", \"msix\", \"msp\", \"mst\", \"pif\", \"ppa\", \"ppam\", \"reg\", \"rev\", \"scf\", \"scr\", \"sct\", \"sys\", \"uif\", \"vb\", \"vbe\", \"vbs\", \"vxd\", \"wsc\", \"wsf\", \"wsh\", \"xll\", \"xz\", \"z\", \"ace\" ]", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/get-malwarefilterpolicy?view=exchange-ps:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/anti-malware-policies-configure?view=o365-worldwide" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.3", + "Description": "Exchange Online Protection (EOP) is Microsoft's cloud-based filtering service that protects organizations against spam, malware, and other email threats. EOP is included in all Microsoft 365 organizations with Exchange Online mailboxes. EOP uses flexible anti-malware policies for malware protection settings. These policies can be set to notify Admins of malicious activity.", + "Checks": [ + "defender_malware_policy_notifications_internal_users_malware_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Microsoft Defender", + "SubSection": "2.1 Email & collaboration", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Exchange Online Protection (EOP) is Microsoft's cloud-based filtering service that protects organizations against spam, malware, and other email threats. EOP is included in all Microsoft 365 organizations with Exchange Online mailboxes. EOP uses flexible anti-malware policies for malware protection settings. These policies can be set to notify Admins of malicious activity.", + "RationaleStatement": "This setting alerts administrators that an internal user sent a message that contained malware. This may indicate an account or machine compromise that would need to be investigated.", + "ImpactStatement": "Notification of account with potential issues should not have an impact on the user.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com. 2. Expand E-mail & Collaboration > Policies & rules. 3. On the Policies & rules page select Threat policies. 4. Under Policies select Anti-malware. 5. Click on the Default (Default) policy. 6. Click on Edit protection settings and change the settings for Notify an admin about undelivered messages from internal senders to On and enter the email address of the administrator who should be notified under Administrator email address. 7. Click Save. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following command: Set-MalwareFilterPolicy -Identity '{Identity Name}' - EnableInternalSenderAdminNotifications $True -InternalSenderAdminAddress {admin@domain1.com} Note: Audit and Remediation guidance may focus on the Default policy however, if a Custom Policy exists in the organization's tenant, then ensure the setting is set as outlined in the highest priority policy listed.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com. 2. Expand E-mail & Collaboration > Policies & rules. 3. On the Policies & rules page select Threat policies. 4. Under Policies select Anti-malware. 5. Click on the Default (Default) policy. 6. Verify that Notify an admin about undelivered messages from internal senders is set to On and that there is at least one email address under Administrator email address. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following command: Get-MalwareFilterPolicy | fl Identity, EnableInternalSenderAdminNotifications, InternalSenderAdminAddress 3. Verify that EnableInternalSenderAdminNotifications is set to True and a InternalSenderAdminAddress address is defined. Note: Audit and Remediation guidance may focus on the Default policy however, if a Custom Policy exists in the organization's tenant, then ensure the setting is set as outlined in the highest priority policy listed.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "EnableInternalSenderAdminNotifications : False InternalSenderAdminAddress : $null", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/anti-malware-protection-about:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/anti-malware-policies-configure" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.4", + "Description": "The Safe Attachments policy helps protect users from malware in email attachments by scanning attachments for viruses, malware, and other malicious content. When an email attachment is received by a user, Safe Attachments will scan the attachment in a secure environment and provide a verdict on whether the attachment is safe or not.", + "Checks": [ + "defender_safe_attachments_policy_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Microsoft Defender", + "SubSection": "2.1 Email & collaboration", + "Profile": "E5 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The Safe Attachments policy helps protect users from malware in email attachments by scanning attachments for viruses, malware, and other malicious content. When an email attachment is received by a user, Safe Attachments will scan the attachment in a secure environment and provide a verdict on whether the attachment is safe or not.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling Safe Attachments policy helps protect against malware threats in email attachments by analyzing suspicious attachments in a secure, cloud-based environment before they are delivered to the user's inbox. This provides an additional layer of security and can prevent new or unseen types of malware from infiltrating the organization's network.", + "ImpactStatement": "Delivery of email with attachments may be delayed while scanning is occurring.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com. 2. Expand E-mail & Collaboration > Policies & rules. 3. On the Policies & rules page select Threat policies. 4. Under Policies select Safe Attachments. 5. Click + Create. 6. Create a Policy Name and Description, and then click Next. 7. Select all valid domains and click Next. 8. Select Block. 9. Quarantine policy is AdminOnlyAccessPolicy. 10. Leave Enable redirect unchecked. 11. Click Next and finally Submit. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. To change an existing policy modify the example below and run the following PowerShell command: Set-SafeAttachmentPolicy -Identity 'Example policy' -Action 'Block' - QuarantineTag 'AdminOnlyAccessPolicy' -Enable $true 3. Or, edit and run the below example to create a new safe attachments policy. New-SafeAttachmentPolicy -Name \"CIS 2.1.4\" -Enable $true -Action 'Block' - QuarantineTag 'AdminOnlyAccessPolicy' New-SafeAttachmentRule -Name \"CIS 2.1.4 Rule\" -SafeAttachmentPolicy \"CIS 2.1.4\" -RecipientDomainIs 'exampledomain[.]com' Note: Policy targets such as users and domains should include domains, or groups that provide coverage for a majority of users in the organization. Different inclusion and exclusion use cases are not covered in the benchmark.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com. 2. Expand E-mail & Collaboration > Policies & rules. 3. On the Policies & rules page select Threat policies. 4. Under Policies select Safe Attachments. 5. Inspect the highest priority policy. 6. Verify that Users and domains and Included recipient domains are in scope for the organization. 7. Verify that Safe Attachments detection response: is set to Block - Block current and future messages and attachments with detected malware. 8. Verify that Quarantine Policy is set to AdminOnlyAccessPolicy. 9. Verify that the policy is not disabled. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Get-SafeAttachmentPolicy | ft Identity,Enable,Action,QuarantineTag 3. Inspect the highest priority safe attachments policy and ensure the properties and values match the below: Enable : True Action : Block QuarantineTag : AdminOnlyAccessPolicy Note: To view the priority for a policy the Get-SafeAttachmentRule must be used. Built-in policies will always have a priority of lowest while presets like strict and standard can be viewed with Get-ATPProtectionPolicyRule. Strict and standard presets always operate at a higher priority than custom policies.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Identity : Built-In Protection Policy Enable : True Action : Block QuarantineTag : AdminOnlyAccessPolicy Priority : (lowest)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/safe-attachments-about:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/safe-attachments-policies-configure" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.5", + "Description": "Safe Attachments for SharePoint, OneDrive, and Microsoft Teams scans these services for malicious files.", + "Checks": [ + "defender_atp_safe_attachments_and_docs_configured" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Microsoft Defender", + "SubSection": "2.1 Email & collaboration", + "Profile": "E5 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Safe Attachments for SharePoint, OneDrive, and Microsoft Teams scans these services for malicious files.", + "RationaleStatement": "Safe Attachments for SharePoint, OneDrive, and Microsoft Teams protect organizations from inadvertently sharing malicious files. When a malicious file is detected that file is blocked so that no one can open, copy, move, or share it until further actions are taken by the organization's security team.", + "ImpactStatement": "Impact associated with Safe Attachments is minimal, and equivalent to impact associated with anti-virus scanners in an environment.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com 2. Under Email & collaboration select Policies & rules 3. Select Threat policies then Safe Attachments. 4. Click on Global settings 5. Click to Enable Turn on Defender for Office 365 for SharePoint, OneDrive, and Microsoft Teams 6. Click to Enable Turn on Safe Documents for Office clients 7. Click to Disable Allow people to click through Protected View even if Safe Documents identified the file as malicious. 8. Click Save To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Set-AtpPolicyForO365 -EnableATPForSPOTeamsODB $true -EnableSafeDocs $true - AllowSafeDocsOpen $false", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com. 2. Under Email & collaboration select Policies & rules. 3. Select Threat policies then Safe Attachments. 4. Click on Global settings. 5. Verify that the Turn on Defender for Office 365 for SharePoint, OneDrive, and Microsoft Teams toggle is set to Enabled. 6. Verify that the Turn on Safe Documents for Office clients toggle is set to Enabled. 7. Verify that the Allow people to click through Protected View even if Safe Documents identified the file as malicious toggle is set to Disabled. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Get-AtpPolicyForO365 | fl Name,EnableATPForSPOTeamsODB,EnableSafeDocs,AllowSafeDocsOpen Verify the values for each parameter as below: EnableATPForSPOTeamsODB : True EnableSafeDocs : True AllowSafeDocsOpen : False", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/safe-attachments-for-spo-odfb-teams-about" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.6", + "Description": "In Microsoft 365 organizations with mailboxes in Exchange Online or standalone Exchange Online Protection (EOP) organizations without Exchange Online mailboxes, email messages are automatically protected against spam (junk email) by EOP. Configure Exchange Online Spam Policies to copy emails and notify someone when a sender in the organization has been blocked for sending spam emails.", + "Checks": [ + "defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Microsoft Defender", + "SubSection": "2.1 Email & collaboration", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "In Microsoft 365 organizations with mailboxes in Exchange Online or standalone Exchange Online Protection (EOP) organizations without Exchange Online mailboxes, email messages are automatically protected against spam (junk email) by EOP. Configure Exchange Online Spam Policies to copy emails and notify someone when a sender in the organization has been blocked for sending spam emails.", + "RationaleStatement": "A blocked account is a good indication that the account in question has been breached, and an attacker is using it to send spam emails to other people.", + "ImpactStatement": "Notification of users that have been blocked should not cause an impact to the user.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Email & collaboration > Policies & rules> Threat policies. 3. Under Policies select Anti-spam. 4. Click on the Anti-spam outbound policy (default). 5. Select Edit protection settings then under Notifications: 6. Check Send a copy of suspicious outbound messages or message that exceed these limits to these users and groups then enter the desired email addresses. 7. Check Notify these users and groups if a sender is blocked due to sending outbound spam then enter the desired email addresses. 8. Click Save. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: $BccEmailAddress = @(\"\") $NotifyEmailAddress = @(\"\") Set-HostedOutboundSpamFilterPolicy -Identity Default - BccSuspiciousOutboundAdditionalRecipients $BccEmailAddress - BccSuspiciousOutboundMail $true -NotifyOutboundSpam $true - NotifyOutboundSpamRecipients $NotifyEmailAddress Note: Audit and Remediation guidance may focus on the Default policy however, if a Custom Policy exists in the organization's tenant, then ensure the setting is set as outlined in the highest priority policy listed.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Email & collaboration > Policies & rules > Threat policies. 3. Under Policies select Anti-spam. 4. Click on the Anti-spam outbound policy (default). 5. Verify that Send a copy of suspicious outbound messages or message that exceed these limits to these users and groups is set to On, ensure the email address is correct. 6. Verify that Notify these users and groups if a sender is blocked due to sending outbound spam is set to On, ensure the email address is correct. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Get-HostedOutboundSpamFilterPolicy | Select-Object Bcc*, Notify* 3. Verify both BccSuspiciousOutboundMail and NotifyOutboundSpam are set to True and the email addresses to be notified are correct. Note: Audit and Remediation guidance may focus on the Default policy however, if a Custom Policy exists in the organization's tenant, then ensure the setting is set as outlined in the highest priority policy listed.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "BccSuspiciousOutboundAdditionalRecipients : {} BccSuspiciousOutboundMail : False NotifyOutboundSpamRecipients : {} NotifyOutboundSpam : False", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/outbound-spam-protection-about" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.7", + "Description": "By default, Office 365 includes built-in features that help protect users from phishing attacks. Set up anti-phishing polices to increase this protection, for example by refining settings to better detect and prevent impersonation and spoofing attacks. The default policy applies to all users within the organization and is a single view to fine-tune anti- phishing protection. Custom policies can be created and configured for specific users, groups or domains within the organization and will take precedence over the default policy for the scoped users.", + "Checks": [ + "defender_antiphishing_policy_configured" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Microsoft Defender", + "SubSection": "2.1 Email & collaboration", + "Profile": "E5 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "By default, Office 365 includes built-in features that help protect users from phishing attacks. Set up anti-phishing polices to increase this protection, for example by refining settings to better detect and prevent impersonation and spoofing attacks. The default policy applies to all users within the organization and is a single view to fine-tune anti- phishing protection. Custom policies can be created and configured for specific users, groups or domains within the organization and will take precedence over the default policy for the scoped users.", + "RationaleStatement": "Protects users from phishing attacks (like impersonation and spoofing) and uses safety tips to warn users about potentially harmful messages.", + "ImpactStatement": "Mailboxes that are used for support systems such as helpdesk and billing systems send mail to internal users and are often not suitable candidates for impersonation protection. Care should be taken to ensure that these systems are excluded from Impersonation Protection.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Email & collaboration > Policies & rules 3. Select Threat policies. 4. Under Policies select Anti-phishing and click Create. 5. Name the policy, continuing and clicking Next as needed: o Add Groups and/or Domains that contain a majority of the organization. o Set Phishing email threshold to 3 - More Aggressive o Check Enable users to protect and add up to 350 users o Check Enable domains to protect and check Include domains I own o Check Enable mailbox intelligence (Recommended) o Check Enable Intelligence for impersonation protection (Recommended) o Check Enable spoof intelligence (Recommended) 6. Under Actions configure the following: o Set If a message is detected as user impersonation to Quarantine the message o Set If a message is detected as domain impersonation to Quarantine the message o Set If Mailbox Intelligence detects an impersonated user to Quarantine the message o Leave Honor DMARC record policy when the message is detected as spoof checked. o Check Show first contact safety tip (Recommended) o Check Show user impersonation safety tip o Check Show domain impersonation safety tip o Check Show user impersonation unusual characters safety tip 7. Finally, click Next and Submit the policy. Note: DefaultFullAccessWithNotificationPolicy is suggested but not required. Users will be notified that impersonation emails are in the Quarantine. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online service using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following Exchange Online PowerShell script to create an AntiPhish policy: # Create the Policy $params = @{ Name = \"CIS AntiPhish Policy\" PhishThresholdLevel = 3 EnableTargetedUserProtection = $true EnableOrganizationDomainsProtection = $true EnableMailboxIntelligence = $true EnableMailboxIntelligenceProtection = $true EnableSpoofIntelligence = $true TargetedUserProtectionAction = 'Quarantine' TargetedDomainProtectionAction = 'Quarantine' MailboxIntelligenceProtectionAction = 'Quarantine' TargetedUserQuarantineTag = 'DefaultFullAccessWithNotificationPolicy' MailboxIntelligenceQuarantineTag = 'DefaultFullAccessWithNotificationPolicy' TargetedDomainQuarantineTag = 'DefaultFullAccessWithNotificationPolicy' EnableFirstContactSafetyTips = $true EnableSimilarUsersSafetyTips = $true EnableSimilarDomainsSafetyTips = $true EnableUnusualCharactersSafetyTips = $true HonorDmarcPolicy = $true } New-AntiPhishPolicy @params # Create the rule for all users in all valid domains and associate with Policy New-AntiPhishRule -Name $params.Name -AntiPhishPolicy $params.Name - RecipientDomainIs (Get-AcceptedDomain).Name -Priority 0 3. The new policy can be edited in the UI or via PowerShell. Note: Remediation guidance is intended to help create a qualifying AntiPhish policy that meets the recommended criteria while protecting the majority of the organization. It's understood some individual user exceptions may exist or exceptions for the entire policy if another product acts as a similar control.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Email & collaboration > Policies & rules 3. Select Threat policies. 4. Under Policies select Anti-phishing. 5. Verify an AntiPhish policy exists that is On and meets the following criteria: 6. Under Users, groups, and domains o Verify that the included domains and groups includes a majority of the organization. 7. Under Phishing threshold & protection verify the following: o Phishing email threshold is at least 3 - More Aggressive. o User impersonation protection is On and contains a subset of users. o Domain impersonation protection is On for owned domains. o Mailbox intelligence and Mailbox intelligence for impersonations and Spoof intelligence are On. 8. Under Actions verify the following: o If a message is detected as user impersonation is set to Quarantine the message. o If a message is detected as domain impersonation is set to Quarantine the message. o If Mailbox Intelligence detects an impersonated user is set to Quarantine the message. o First contact safety tip is On. o User impersonation safety tip is On. o Domain impersonation safety tip is On. o Unusual characters safety tip is On. o Honor DMARC record policy when the message is detected as spoof is On. Note: DefaultFullAccessWithNotificationPolicy is suggested but not required. Users will be notified that impersonation emails are in the Quarantine. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online service using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following Exchange Online PowerShell commands: $params = @( \"name\",\"Enabled\",\"PhishThresholdLevel\",\"EnableTargetedUserProtection\" \"EnableOrganizationDomainsProtection\",\"EnableMailboxIntelligence\" \"EnableMailboxIntelligenceProtection\",\"EnableSpoofIntelligence\" \"TargetedUserProtectionAction\",\"TargetedDomainProtectionAction\" \"MailboxIntelligenceProtectionAction\",\"EnableFirstContactSafetyTips\" \"EnableSimilarUsersSafetyTips\",\"EnableSimilarDomainsSafetyTips\" \"EnableUnusualCharactersSafetyTips\",\"TargetedUsersToProtect\" \"HonorDmarcPolicy\" ) Get-AntiPhishPolicy | fl $params 3. Verify there is a policy created that has matching values for the following parameters: Enabled : True PhishThresholdLevel : 3 EnableTargetedUserProtection : True EnableOrganizationDomainsProtection : True EnableMailboxIntelligence : True EnableMailboxIntelligenceProtection : True EnableSpoofIntelligence : True TargetedUserProtectionAction : Quarantine TargetedDomainProtectionAction : Quarantine MailboxIntelligenceProtectionAction : Quarantine EnableFirstContactSafetyTips : True EnableSimilarUsersSafetyTips : True EnableSimilarDomainsSafetyTips : True EnableUnusualCharactersSafetyTips : True TargetedUsersToProtect : {} HonorDmarcPolicy : True 4. Verify that TargetedUsersToProtect contains a subset of the organization, up to 350 users, for targeted Impersonation Protection. 5. Use PowerShell to verify the AntiPhishRule is configured and enabled. Get-AntiPhishRule | ft AntiPhishPolicy,Priority,State,SentToMemberOf,RecipientDomainIs 6. Identity correct rule from the matching AntiPhishPolicy name in step 3. Ensure the rule defines groups or domains that include the majority of the organization by inspecting SentToMemberOf or RecipientDomainIs. Note: Audit guidance is intended to help identify a qualifying AntiPhish policy+rule that meets the recommended criteria while protecting the majority of the organization. It's understood some individual user exceptions may exist or exceptions for the entire policy if another product stands in as an equivalent control.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/anti-phishing-protection-about:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/anti-phishing-policies-eop-configure" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.8", + "Description": "For each domain that is configured in Exchange, a corresponding Sender Policy Framework (SPF) record should be created.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Microsoft Defender", + "SubSection": "2.1 Email & collaboration", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "For each domain that is configured in Exchange, a corresponding Sender Policy Framework (SPF) record should be created.", + "RationaleStatement": "SPF records enable Exchange Online Protection and other mail systems to verify which servers are authorized to send email for a domain. This helps those systems determine whether a message is legitimate or potentially spoofed. Enforcing a -all or ~all ensures that any undocumented or unauthorized networks attempting to send on behalf of the organization are immediately rejected, reducing the risk of impersonation. If an organization does not have full visibility into where its email originates, this represents a significant security gap. For example, if an email server is sending mail from an unexpected location across the country without your knowledge, that is a serious issue. Addressing this requires a deliberate discovery process to identify all legitimate sending sources, rather than allowing unknown systems to continue sending email unchecked.", + "ImpactStatement": "Setting up SPF records typically has minimal operational impact. However, organizations must ensure proper configuration, as misconfigured SPF records can cause legitimate email to be flagged as spam or fail authentication checks. Additionally, identifying all legitimate senders outside of the default Microsoft 365 IP ranges may require extra time and coordination during the discovery phase.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using a DNS provider: For each domain identified as non-compliant during the audit, make the necessary updates in your DNS provider or through your third-party SPF management service. Missing SPF Record: If a domain does not currently have an SPF record, create one similar to the example below, assuming all email is routed through Exchange Online (Microsoft 365 or Microsoft 365 GCC): # Hard fail v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all # Soft fail v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com ~all Additional Senders: If other authorized email services are used, add their SPF entries using the include: mechanism as needed. For example: v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:exampledomain.net -all", + "AuditProcedure": "STEP 1: Determine the list of domains to audit Using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com 2. Expand Settings > Domains. 3. Take note of all custom domains and subdomains defined. o Exclude the (MOERA) domain *.onmicrosoft.com o Exclude the coexistence domain *.mail.onmicrosoft.com (if shown). 4. Use this list of domains in the audit procedure. Using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following: Get-AcceptedDomain | Where-Object {$_.IsCoExistenceDomain -eq $false -and $_.InitialDomain -eq $false} 3. Use this list in the audit procedure. Note: Microsoft owns the tenant's organizational level *.onmicrosoft.com domains, so it is not necessary to create SPF records for the initial (MOERA) or the coexistence (hybrid) domain. STEP 2: Perform the Audit using PowerShell: 1. Open a PowerShell prompt. 2. Run the following for each custom domain identified in Step 1 that sends email from Exchange Online: Resolve-DnsName domain1.com -Type TXT | fl Ensure the following criteria are met: 1. A valid TXT record must begin with v=spf1, which indicates it is SPF v1 (the current standard). 2. The record must be either directly or indirectly managed: o An indirectly managed record uses a modifier like redirect=[domain], which allows centralized SPF management by a trusted vendor. 3. The record must end with a hard or soft fail policy: o The record must end with: -all or ~all, allowing for a hard fail or soft fail. o If the SPF record uses the redirect= modifier, the redirected SPF record must terminate with a compliant qualifier (not the parent). This will require repeating the DNS lookup against the redirected domain. o Other qualifiers not listed are not compliant as an end state. Parked domains: Ensure that any domain not used for sending email has an SPF record explicitly indicating that no mail is authorized from that domain, using v=spf1 - all. Below are examples of SPF records that are compliant. The audit does not evaluate specific include domains for compliant states. v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com ~all # GCC High or DoD example v=spf1 include:exampledomain.net include:spf.protection.office365.us ~all # 21Vianet v=spf1 include:spf.protection.partner.outlook.cn ~all # Parked domains v=spf1 -all Note: Resolve-DnsName is not available on versions of Windows earlier than Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012. Use alternatives such as nslookup when needed.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/email-authentication-spf-configure?view=o365-worldwide:https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7208:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/email-authentication-spf-configure?view=o365-worldwide#scenario-parked-domains" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.9", + "Description": "DKIM is one of the trio of Authentication methods (SPF, DKIM and DMARC) that help prevent attackers from sending messages that look like they come from your domain. DKIM lets an organization add a digital signature to outbound email messages in the message header. When DKIM is configured, the organization authorizes it's domain to associate, or sign, it's name to an email message using cryptographic authentication. Email systems that get email from this domain can use a digital signature to help verify whether incoming email is legitimate. Use of DKIM in addition to SPF and DMARC to help prevent malicious actors using spoofing techniques from sending messages that look like they are coming from your domain.", + "Checks": [ + "defender_domain_dkim_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Microsoft Defender", + "SubSection": "2.1 Email & collaboration", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "DKIM is one of the trio of Authentication methods (SPF, DKIM and DMARC) that help prevent attackers from sending messages that look like they come from your domain. DKIM lets an organization add a digital signature to outbound email messages in the message header. When DKIM is configured, the organization authorizes it's domain to associate, or sign, it's name to an email message using cryptographic authentication. Email systems that get email from this domain can use a digital signature to help verify whether incoming email is legitimate. Use of DKIM in addition to SPF and DMARC to help prevent malicious actors using spoofing techniques from sending messages that look like they are coming from your domain.", + "RationaleStatement": "By enabling DKIM with Office 365, messages that are sent from Exchange Online will be cryptographically signed. This will allow the receiving email system to validate that the messages were generated by a server that the organization authorized and not being spoofed.", + "ImpactStatement": "There should be no impact of setting up DKIM however, organizations should ensure appropriate setup to ensure continuous mail-flow.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand Email & collaboration > Policies & rules > Threat policies. 3. Under Rules section click Email authentication settings. 4. Select DKIM 5. Select the domain to remediate. 6. Click Create DKIM keys. 7. Microsoft provides the properly formatted CNAME records, copy these for later use. 8. In another browser tab or window, go to the domain registrar for the domain, and then create the two CNAME records using the information from the previous step. 9. Return the domain properties flyout and toggle Sign messages for this domain with DKIM signatures to Enabled. If successful the status will show Signing DKIM signatures for this domain.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand Email & collaboration > Policies & rules > Threat policies. 3. Under Rules section click Email authentication settings. 4. Select DKIM. 5. For each Accepted domain that is configured to send email: o Skip any *.onmicrosoft.com domain (MOERA or Coexistence), these outbound messages are automatically signed by Microsoft. o Click on the domain name. o Confirm Sign messages for this domain with DKIM signatures is Enabled. o Ensure Status reads Signing DKIM signatures for this domain. 6. A status of Not signing DKIM signatures for this domain or No DKIM keys saved for this domain is out of compliance. Note: For step 5 these can also be audited the overview showing all domains. In this case a passing audit procedure will display the Toggle set as Enabled and Status as Valid. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online service using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following: # Get-DkimSigningConfig does not display unconfigured domains, # so we first get all accepted domains and then match them against # the DKIM signing configurations. $Domains = Get-AcceptedDomain | Where-Object {$_.IsCoExistenceDomain -eq $false -and $_.InitialDomain -eq $false} $DKIMCfg = Get-DkimSigningConfig # Generate the report $Report = foreach ($Domain in $Domains) { $DKIM = $DKIMCfg | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq $Domain.Name } [PSCustomObject]@{ DomainName = $Domain.Name Enabled = [bool]$DKIM.Enabled Status = if ($DKIM) { $DKIM.Status } else { \"Not Configured\" } IsCISCompliant = ($DKIM.Enabled -and $DKIM.Status -eq \"Valid\") } } # Output the report $Report | Format-Table -AutoSize # Optionally, export the report to a CSV file # $Report | Export-Csv -Path \"2_1_9.csv\" -NoTypeInformation 3. For each domain that is configured to send email verify: o Enabled is True o Status is Valid. o Note: The property IsCISCompliant will also validate whether the state is compliant. Note: If you own registered domains that aren't used for email or anything at all (also known as parked domains), don't publish DKIM records for those domains. The lack of a DKIM record (hence, the lack of a public key in DNS to validate the message signature) prevents DKIM validation of forged domains.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Custom domains: Not configured by default MOERA onmicrosoft.com domain: Outbound email is automatically signed", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/email-authentication-dkim-configure?view=o365-worldwide" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.10", + "Description": "DMARC, or Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance, assists recipient mail systems in determining the appropriate action to take when messages from a domain fail to meet SPF or DKIM authentication criteria.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Microsoft Defender", + "SubSection": "2.1 Email & collaboration", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "DMARC, or Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance, assists recipient mail systems in determining the appropriate action to take when messages from a domain fail to meet SPF or DKIM authentication criteria.", + "RationaleStatement": "DMARC strengthens the trustworthiness of messages sent from an organization's domain to destination email systems. When combined with SPF (Sender Policy Framework) and DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail), DMARC significantly enhances defenses against email spoofing and phishing attempts. This includes the MOERA domain (e.g., contoso.onmicrosoft.com), which is provisioned with every Microsoft 365 tenant and is capable of originating email. Because it is often overlooked in favor of custom domains, it represents a common gap in email authentication coverage if left unprotected. Leaving a DMARC policy set to p=none can result in the mail system taking no action when a spear-phishing email fails DMARC but passes SPF and DKIM checks. Having DMARC fully configured is a critical part of preventing business email compromise.", + "ImpactStatement": "The remediation portion can take time to implement and involves a multi-staged approach over time. First, a baseline of the current state of email will be established with p=none and rua and ruf. Once the environment is better understood and reports have been analyzed, an organization will move to the final state with DMARC record values as outlined in the audit section.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using a DNS provider: 1. For any out of compliance domain sending email, add the following record to DNS: Record: _dmarc.domain1.com Type: TXT Value: v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:; ruf=mailto: 2. This will create a basic DMARC policy that will allow the organization to start monitoring message statistics. 3. One week is enough time for data generated by the reports to be useful in understanding email trends and traffic. The final step requires implementing a policy of p=reject OR p=quarantine and pct=100 with the necessary rua and ruf email addresses defined: Record: _dmarc.domain1.com Type: TXT Value: v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:; ruf=mailto: Parked Domains: For any domain not used for sending email, add the following record to DNS: Record: _dmarc.domain1.com Type: TXT Value: v=DMARC1; p=reject; To remediate the MOERA domain using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand Settings and select Domains. 3. Select your tenant domain (for example, contoso.onmicrosoft.com). 4. Select DNS records and click + Add record. 5. Add a new record with the TXT name of _dmarc with the appropriate values outlined above.", + "AuditProcedure": "STEP 1: Determine the list of domains to audit Using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com 2. Expand Settings > Domains. 3. Take note of all custom domains and subdomains defined. o Exclude the coexistence domain *.mail.onmicrosoft.com (if shown). 4. Include the MOERA domain: [tenant].onmicrosoft.com 5. Use this list of domains in the audit procedure. Using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following: Get-AcceptedDomain | Where-Object {$_.IsCoExistenceDomain -eq $false} 3. Use this list in the audit procedure. STEP 2: Perform the Audit using PowerShell: Note: Resolve-DnsName is not available on versions of Windows earlier than Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012. Use alternatives such as nslookup when needed. 1. Open a PowerShell prompt. 2. Run the following for each domain identified in Step 1: Resolve-DnsName _dmarc.domain1.com -Type TXT 3. Ensure the following criteria are met: 1. The record must be either directly or indirectly managed: - An indirectly managed record would use a CNAME to point to another record. - If the record is managed indirectly then that record must meet all criteria. This would require an additional DNS lookup. 2. The version v tag value must be v=DMARC1, which identifies it as a DMARC record. 3. The policy p tag value is p=quarantine OR p=reject. 4. The sampling rate pct tag value is pct=100 or does not exist. (A non- existent pct tag indicates sampling is 100 percent) 5. The aggregate data rua tag value is configured, i.e. rua=mailto:. 6. The failure data ruf tag value is configured, i.e. ruf=mailto:. 4. Subdomain considerations o When subdomains of the organizational domain are in scope, DMARC policy is determined using a two-step record discovery process (RFC 7489, Section 6.6.3): 1. If the subdomain has its own valid DMARC record (i.e., a record that includes the required p= tag), only that record is used. Nothing is inherited from the organizational domain. Any tags not explicitly defined in the subdomain's record fall back to their RFC- defined default values. 2. If the subdomain does not have a valid DMARC record - either because no record exists or because the record is malformed (e.g., missing the required p= tag) - the organizational domain's record is used. When determining policy disposition, the sp= (subdomain policy) tag is applied if present; otherwise, the p= tag is used. o This fallback is record discovery, not per-tag inheritance. The lookup always falls back to the organizational domain directly. Intermediate parent subdomains are never consulted. o The sp= tag is only meaningful when set on the organizational domain's record and is ignored on subdomain records. 5. Compliance is met when each domain and subdomain meets the requirements in steps 3 and 4. Parked Domains: Ensure that any domain not used for sending email has a DMARC record explicitly indicating that no mail is authorized from that domain. 1. The version v tag value must be v=DMARC1, which identifies it as a DMARC record. 2. The policy p tag value is p=reject. The following example records would pass as they contain a policy that would either quarantine or reject messages failing DMARC, and the policy affects 100% of mail pct=100 as well as containing valid reporting and aggregate addresses: v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:rua@example.com; ruf=mailto:ruf@example.com; fo=1 v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:rua@example.com; ruf=mailto:ruf@example.com; fo=1 v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100; sp=none; fo=1; ri=3600; rua=mailto:rua@example.com; ruf=mailto:ruf@example.com; # Parked domains v=DMARC1; p=reject; Note: The third example includes sp=none, which sets the subdomain policy to monitor- only. While the organizational domain itself would be compliant, any subdomains would not meet the audit criteria if they exist. Auditors must evaluate subdomains separately to confirm compliance.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Microsoft has a list of best practices for implementing DMARC that cover these steps in detail.", + "DefaultValue": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/email-authentication-dmarc-configure?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/step-by-step-guides/how-to-enable-dmarc-reporting-for-microsoft-online-email-routing-address-moera-and-parked-domains?view=o365-worldwide:https://media.defense.gov/2024/May/02/2003455483/-1/-1/0/CSA-NORTH-KOREAN-ACTORS-EXPLOIT-WEAK-DMARC.PDF:https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7489" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.11", + "Description": "The Common Attachment Types Filter lets a user block known and custom malicious file types from being attached to emails. The policy provided by Microsoft covers 53 extensions, and an additional custom list of extensions can be defined. The list of 186 extensions provided in this recommendation is comprehensive but not exhaustive.", + "Checks": [ + "defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Microsoft Defender", + "SubSection": "2.1 Email & collaboration", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The Common Attachment Types Filter lets a user block known and custom malicious file types from being attached to emails. The policy provided by Microsoft covers 53 extensions, and an additional custom list of extensions can be defined. The list of 186 extensions provided in this recommendation is comprehensive but not exhaustive.", + "RationaleStatement": "Blocking known malicious file types can help prevent malware-infested files from infecting a host or performing other malicious attacks such as phishing and data extraction. Defining a comprehensive list of attachments can help protect against additional unknown and known threats. Many legacy file formats, binary files and compressed files have been used as delivery mechanisms for malicious software. Organizations can protect themselves from Business E-mail Compromise (BEC) by allow-listing only the file types relevant to their line of business and blocking all others.", + "ImpactStatement": "For file types that are business necessary users will need to use other organizationally approved methods to transfer blocked extension types between business partners.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To Remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following script after editing InternalSenderAdminAddress: # Create an attachment policy and associated rule. The rule is # intentionally disabled allowing the org to enable it when ready $Policy = @{ Name = \"CIS L2 Attachment Policy\" EnableFileFilter = $true ZapEnabled = $true EnableInternalSenderAdminNotifications = $true InternalSenderAdminAddress = 'admin@contoso.com' # Change this. } $L2Extensions = @( \"7z\", \"a3x\", \"ace\", \"ade\", \"adp\", \"ani\", \"app\", \"appinstaller\", \"applescript\", \"application\", \"appref-ms\", \"appx\", \"appxbundle\", \"arj\", \"asd\", \"asx\", \"bas\", \"bat\", \"bgi\", \"bz2\", \"cab\", \"chm\", \"cmd\", \"com\", \"cpl\", \"crt\", \"cs\", \"csh\", \"daa\", \"dbf\", \"dcr\", \"deb\", \"desktopthemepackfile\", \"dex\", \"diagcab\", \"dif\", \"dir\", \"dll\", \"dmg\", \"doc\", \"docm\", \"dot\", \"dotm\", \"elf\", \"eml\", \"exe\", \"fxp\", \"gadget\", \"gz\", \"hlp\", \"hta\", \"htc\", \"htm\", \"html\", \"hwpx\", \"ics\", \"img\", \"inf\", \"ins\", \"iqy\", \"iso\", \"isp\", \"jar\", \"jnlp\", \"js\", \"jse\", \"kext\", \"ksh\", \"lha\", \"lib\", \"library-ms\", \"lnk\", \"lzh\", \"macho\", \"mam\", \"mda\", \"mdb\", \"mde\", \"mdt\", \"mdw\", \"mdz\", \"mht\", \"mhtml\", \"mof\", \"msc\", \"msi\", \"msix\", \"msp\", \"msrcincident\", \"mst\", \"ocx\", \"odt\", \"ops\", \"oxps\", \"pcd\", \"pif\", \"plg\", \"pot\", \"potm\", \"ppa\", \"ppam\", \"ppkg\", \"pps\", \"ppsm\", \"ppt\", \"pptm\", \"prf\", \"prg\", \"ps1\", \"ps11\", \"ps11xml\", \"ps1xml\", \"ps2\", \"ps2xml\", \"psc1\", \"psc2\", \"pub\", \"py\", \"pyc\", \"pyo\", \"pyw\", \"pyz\", \"pyzw\", \"rar\", \"reg\", \"rev\", \"rtf\", \"scf\", \"scpt\", \"scr\", \"sct\", \"searchConnector-ms\", \"service\", \"settingcontent-ms\", \"sh\", \"shb\", \"shs\", \"shtm\", \"shtml\", \"sldm\", \"slk\", \"so\", \"spl\", \"stm\", \"svg\", \"swf\", \"sys\", \"tar\", \"theme\", \"themepack\", \"timer\", \"uif\", \"url\", \"uue\", \"vb\", \"vbe\", \"vbs\", \"vhd\", \"vhdx\", \"vxd\", \"wbk\", \"website\", \"wim\", \"wiz\", \"ws\", \"wsc\", \"wsf\", \"wsh\", \"xla\", \"xlam\", \"xlc\", \"xll\", \"xlm\", \"xls\", \"xlsb\", \"xlsm\", \"xlt\", \"xltm\", \"xlw\", \"xnk\", \"xps\", \"xsl\", \"xz\", \"z\" ) # Create the policy New-MalwareFilterPolicy @Policy -FileTypes $L2Extensions # Create the rule for all accepted domains $Rule = @{ Name = $Policy.Name Enabled = $false MalwareFilterPolicy = $Policy.Name RecipientDomainIs = (Get-AcceptedDomain).Name Priority = 0 } New-MalwareFilterRule @Rule 3. When prepared enable the rule either through the UI or PowerShell. Note: Due to the number of extensions the UI method is not covered. The objects can however be edited in the UI or manually added using the list from the script. 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender at https://security.microsoft.com/ 2. Browse to Policies & rules > Threat policies > Anti-malware.", + "AuditProcedure": "For this control, a Level 2 comprehensive attachment policy is defined as one that includes at least 120 extensions. The 184 extensions included are a known vector for malicious activity. To pass, organizations must demonstrate at least a 90% adoption rate of the extension list referenced in the script below, with allowances for justified exceptions. Since individual extensions are not assigned specific risk weights, exceptions should be based on documented business needs. Note: Utilizing the UI for auditing Anti-malware policies can be very time consuming so it is recommended to use a script like the one supplied below. To Audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following script: $AttachExts = @( '7z', 'a3x', 'ace', 'ade', 'adp', 'ani', 'apk', 'app', 'appinstaller', 'applescript', 'application', 'appref-ms', 'appx', 'appxbundle', 'arj', 'asd', 'asx', 'bas', 'bat', 'bgi', 'bz2', 'cab', 'chm', 'cmd', 'com', 'cpl', 'crt', 'cs', 'csh', 'daa', 'dbf', 'dcr', 'deb', 'desktopthemepackfile', 'dex', 'diagcab', 'dif', 'dir', 'dll', 'dmg', 'doc', 'docm', 'dot', 'dotm', 'elf', 'eml', 'exe', 'fxp', 'gadget', 'gz', 'hlp', 'hta', 'htc', 'htm', 'html', 'hwpx', 'ics', 'img', 'inf', 'ins', 'iqy', 'iso', 'isp', 'jar', 'jnlp', 'js', 'jse', 'kext', 'ksh', 'lha', 'lib', 'library', 'library-ms', 'lnk', 'lzh', 'macho', 'mam', 'mda', 'mdb', 'mde', 'mdt', 'mdw', 'mdz', 'mht', 'mhtml', 'mof', 'msc', 'msi', 'msix', 'msp', 'msrcincident', 'mst', 'ocx', 'odt', 'ops', 'oxps', 'pcd', 'pif', 'plg', 'pot', 'potm', 'ppa', 'ppam', 'ppkg', 'pps', 'ppsm', 'ppt', 'pptm', 'prf', 'prg', 'ps1', 'ps11', 'ps11xml', 'ps1xml', 'ps2', 'ps2xml', 'psc1', 'psc2', 'pub', 'py', 'pyc', 'pyo', 'pyw', 'pyz', 'pyzw', 'rar', 'reg', 'rev', 'rtf', 'scf', 'scpt', 'scr', 'sct', 'searchConnector-ms', 'service', 'settingcontent-ms', 'sh', 'shb', 'shs', 'shtm', 'shtml', 'sldm', 'slk', 'so', 'spl', 'stm', 'svg', 'swf', 'sys', 'tar', 'theme', 'themepack', 'timer', 'uif', 'url', 'uue', 'vb', 'vbe', 'vbs', 'vhd', 'vhdx', 'vxd', 'wbk', 'website', 'wim', 'wiz', 'ws', 'wsc', 'wsf', 'wsh', 'xla', 'xlam', 'xlc', 'xll', 'xlm', 'xls', 'xlsb', 'xlsm', 'xlt', 'xltm', 'xlw', 'xnk', 'xps', 'xsl', 'xz', 'z' ) $MalwareFilterPolicies = Get-MalwareFilterPolicy $MalwareFilterRules = Get-MalwareFilterRule # A policy must have at least 90% of the extensions in the reference list to pass. # This allows for some flexibility with exceptions. $PassingValue = .90 # 90% $FailThreshold = [int]($AttachExts.count * (1 - $PassingValue)) # Only evaluate policies that have more than 120 extensions defined # so we don't output failures on policies that aren't specific to # extension filtering. $CompPolicies = $MalwareFilterPolicies | Where-Object { $_.FileTypes.Count - gt 120 } if (-not $CompPolicies) { Write-Output \"## FAIL ## No comprehensive policies found to evaluate.\" return } $ExtensionReport = foreach ($policy in $CompPolicies) { $Missing = Compare-Object -ReferenceObject $AttachExts ` -DifferenceObject $policy.FileTypes ` -PassThru | Where-Object { $_.SideIndicator -eq '<=' } $FoundRule = $MalwareFilterRules | Where-Object { $_.MalwareFilterPolicy -eq $policy.Id } # Define passing conditions to determine if this policy passes all checks. $Pass = ($Missing.Count -lt $FailThreshold) -and ($FoundRule.State -eq 'Enabled') -and ($policy.EnableFileFilter -eq $true) [PSCustomObject]@{ PolicyName = $policy.Identity IsCISCompliant = $Pass EnableFileFilter = $policy.EnableFileFilter State = $FoundRule.State MissingCount = $Missing.count MissingExtensions = $Missing -join \", \" ExtensionCount = $policy.FileTypes.count } } # Output results in various formats $ExtensionReport | Format-Table -AutoSize <# Optional: Export methods $ExtensionReport | Out-GridView -Title \"Attachment Filter results\" $ExtensionReport | Export-Csv -Path \"2.1.11.csv\" -NoTypeInformation $ExtensionReport | ConvertTo-Json | Out-File -FilePath \"2.1.11.json\" #> 3. Review the results, only policies with over 120 extensions defined will be evaluated. At the end of the script examples of different output formats are given. 4. A pass is given for the following conditions: o A single active policy exists that covers all file extensions listed except those defined as an exception by the organization. o The policy has a state of Enabled. o The EnableFileFilter property is set to True. 5. The report includes a IsCISCompliant property, where True indicates in compliance, allowing for up to 10% of the listed extensions to be missing as documented exceptions. Note: Organizations should evaluate any extensions missing from the report to determine if they are valid exceptions. Note: The audit procedure intentionally does not include the action taken for matched extensions, e.g. Reject with NDR or Quarantine the message. These are considered organization specific and are not scored. When FileTypeAction is not specified the action will default to Reject the message with a non-delivery receipt (NDR). The Quarantine Policy is also considered organization specific.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "The following extensions are blocked by default: ace, ani, apk, app, appx, arj, bat, cab, cmd, com, deb, dex, dll, docm, elf, exe, hta, img, iso, jar, jnlp, kext, lha, lib, library, lnk, lzh, macho, msc, msi, msix, msp, mst, pif, ppa, ppam, reg, rev, scf, scr, sct, sys, uif, vb, vbe, vbs, vxd, wsc, wsf, wsh, xll, xz, z", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/get-malwarefilterpolicy?view=exchange-ps:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-malware-policies-configure?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/office/compatibility/office-file-format-reference" + } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_blocked_file_types", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "ace", + "ani", + "apk", + "app", + "appx", + "arj", + "bat", + "cab", + "cmd", + "com", + "deb", + "dex", + "dll", + "docm", + "elf", + "exe", + "hta", + "img", + "iso", + "jar", + "jnlp", + "kext", + "lha", + "lib", + "library", + "lnk", + "lzh", + "macho", + "msc", + "msi", + "msix", + "msp", + "mst", + "pif", + "ppa", + "ppam", + "reg", + "rev", + "scf", + "scr", + "sct", + "sys", + "uif", + "vb", + "vbe", + "vbs", + "vxd", + "wsc", + "wsf", + "wsh", + "xll", + "xz", + "z" + ] + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.12", + "Description": "In Microsoft 365 organizations with Exchange Online mailboxes or standalone Exchange Online Protection (EOP) organizations without Exchange Online mailboxes, connection filtering and the default connection filter policy identify good or bad source email servers by IP addresses. The key components of the default connection filter policy are IP Allow List, IP Block List and Safe list. The recommended state is IP Allow List empty or undefined.", + "Checks": [ + "defender_antispam_connection_filter_policy_empty_ip_allowlist" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Microsoft Defender", + "SubSection": "2.1 Email & collaboration", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "In Microsoft 365 organizations with Exchange Online mailboxes or standalone Exchange Online Protection (EOP) organizations without Exchange Online mailboxes, connection filtering and the default connection filter policy identify good or bad source email servers by IP addresses. The key components of the default connection filter policy are IP Allow List, IP Block List and Safe list. The recommended state is IP Allow List empty or undefined.", + "RationaleStatement": "Without additional verification like mail flow rules, email from sources in the IP Allow List skips spam filtering and sender authentication (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) checks. This method creates a high risk of attackers successfully delivering email to the Inbox that would otherwise be filtered. Messages that are determined to be malware or high confidence phishing are filtered.", + "ImpactStatement": "This is the default behavior. IP Allow lists may reduce false positives, however, this benefit is outweighed by the importance of a policy which scans all messages regardless of the origin. This supports the principle of zero trust.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Email & collaboration > Policies & rules> Threat policies. 3. Under Policies select Anti-spam. 4. Click on the Connection filter policy (Default). 5. Click Edit connection filter policy. 6. Remove any IP entries from Always allow messages from the following IP addresses or address range:. 7. Click Save. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Set-HostedConnectionFilterPolicy -Identity Default -IPAllowList @{}", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Email & collaboration > Policies & rules > Threat policies. 3. Under Policies select Anti-spam. 4. Click on the Connection filter policy (Default). 5. Verify that IP Allow list contains no entries. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Get-HostedConnectionFilterPolicy -Identity Default | fl IPAllowList 3. Verify that IPAllowList is empty or {}", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "IPAllowList : {}", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/connection-filter-policies-configure:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/create-safe-sender-lists-in-office-365#use-the-ip-allow-list:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/how-policies-and-protections-are-combined#user-and-tenant-settings-conflict" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.13", + "Description": "In Microsoft 365 organizations with Exchange Online mailboxes or standalone Exchange Online Protection (EOP) organizations without Exchange Online mailboxes, connection filtering and the default connection filter policy identify good or bad source email servers by IP addresses. The key components of the default connection filter policy are IP Allow List, IP Block List and Safe list. The safe list is a pre-configured allow list that is dynamically updated by Microsoft. The recommended safe list state is: Off or False", + "Checks": [ + "defender_antispam_connection_filter_policy_safe_list_off" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Microsoft Defender", + "SubSection": "2.1 Email & collaboration", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "In Microsoft 365 organizations with Exchange Online mailboxes or standalone Exchange Online Protection (EOP) organizations without Exchange Online mailboxes, connection filtering and the default connection filter policy identify good or bad source email servers by IP addresses. The key components of the default connection filter policy are IP Allow List, IP Block List and Safe list. The safe list is a pre-configured allow list that is dynamically updated by Microsoft. The recommended safe list state is: Off or False", + "RationaleStatement": "Without additional verification like mail flow rules, email from sources in the IP Allow List skips spam filtering and sender authentication (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) checks. This method creates a high risk of attackers successfully delivering email to the Inbox that would otherwise be filtered. Messages that are determined to be malware or high confidence phishing are filtered. The safe list is managed dynamically by Microsoft, and administrators do not have visibility into which senders are included. Incoming messages from email servers on the safe list bypass spam filtering.", + "ImpactStatement": "This is the default behavior. IP Allow lists may reduce false positives, however, this benefit is outweighed by the importance of a policy which scans all messages regardless of the origin. This supports the principle of zero trust.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Email & collaboration > Policies & rules> Threat policies. 3. Under Policies select Anti-spam. 4. Click on the Connection filter policy (Default). 5. Click Edit connection filter policy. 6. Uncheck Turn on safe list. 7. Click Save. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Set-HostedConnectionFilterPolicy -Identity Default -EnableSafeList $false", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Email & collaboration > Policies & rules > Threat policies. 3. Under Policies select Anti-spam. 4. Click on the Connection filter policy (Default). 5. Verify that Safe list is Off. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Get-HostedConnectionFilterPolicy -Identity Default | fl EnableSafeList 3. Verify that EnableSafeList is False", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "EnableSafeList : False", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/connection-filter-policies-configure:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/create-safe-sender-lists-in-office-365#use-the-ip-allow-list:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/how-policies-and-protections-are-combined#user-and-tenant-settings-conflict" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.14", + "Description": "Anti-spam protection is a feature of Exchange Online that utilizes policies to help to reduce the amount of junk email, bulk and phishing emails a mailbox receives. These policies contain lists to allow or block specific senders or domains. - The allowed senders list - The allowed domains list - The blocked senders list - The blocked domains list The recommended state is: Do not define any Allowed domains", + "Checks": [ + "defender_antispam_policy_inbound_no_allowed_domains" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Microsoft Defender", + "SubSection": "2.1 Email & collaboration", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Anti-spam protection is a feature of Exchange Online that utilizes policies to help to reduce the amount of junk email, bulk and phishing emails a mailbox receives. These policies contain lists to allow or block specific senders or domains. - The allowed senders list - The allowed domains list - The blocked senders list - The blocked domains list The recommended state is: Do not define any Allowed domains", + "RationaleStatement": "Messages from entries in the allowed senders list or the allowed domains list bypass most email protection (except malware and high confidence phishing) and email authentication checks (SPF, DKIM and DMARC). Entries in the allowed senders list or the allowed domains list create a high risk of attackers successfully delivering email to the Inbox that would otherwise be filtered. The risk is increased even more when allowing common domain names as these can be easily spoofed by attackers. Microsoft specifies in its documentation that allowed domains should be used for testing purposes only.", + "ImpactStatement": "This is the default behavior. Allowed domains may reduce false positives, however, this benefit is outweighed by the importance of having a policy which scans all messages regardless of the origin. As an alternative consider sender based lists. This supports the principle of zero trust.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Email & collaboration > Policies & rules> Threat policies. 3. Under Policies select Anti-spam. 4. Open each out of compliance inbound anti-spam policy by clicking on it. 5. Click Edit allowed and blocked senders and domains. 6. Select Allow domains. 7. Delete each domain from the domains list. 8. Click Done > Save. 9. Repeat as needed. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Set-HostedContentFilterPolicy -Identity -AllowedSenderDomains @{} Or, run this to remove allowed domains from all inbound anti-spam policies: $AllowedDomains = Get-HostedContentFilterPolicy | Where-Object {$_.AllowedSenderDomains} $AllowedDomains | Set-HostedContentFilterPolicy -AllowedSenderDomains @{}", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Email & collaboration > Policies & rules > Threat policies. 3. Under Policies select Anti-spam. 4. Inspect each inbound anti-spam policy 5. Verify that Allowed domains does not contain any domain names. 6. Repeat as needed for any additional inbound anti-spam policy. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Get-HostedContentFilterPolicy | ft Identity,AllowedSenderDomains 3. Verify that AllowedSenderDomains is undefined for each inbound policy. Note: Each inbound policy must pass for this recommendation to be considered to be in a passing state.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "AllowedSenderDomains : {}", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/anti-spam-protection-about#allow-and-block-lists-in-anti-spam-policies" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.1.15", + "Description": "The default outbound anti-spam policy in Microsoft Defender automatically applies to all users and is designed to detect and limit suspicious email-sending behavior. The policy enforces limits based on both volume and spam detection. If a user sends too many emails too quickly or if a high percentage of their messages are flagged as spam, their ability to send email can be temporarily restricted. This helps prevent abuse from compromised accounts or inadvertent spam campaigns. When these limits are exceeded, Microsoft routes the messages through a high-risk delivery pool to protect its IP reputation and notifies administrators through built-in alert policies. The recommended state is: - External: Restrict sending to external recipients (per hour) - 500 - Internal: Restrict sending to internal recipients (per hour) - 1000 - Daily: Maximum recipient limit per day - 1000 - Action: Over limit action - Restrict the user from sending mail", + "Checks": [ + "defender_antispam_outbound_policy_configured" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Microsoft Defender", + "SubSection": "2.1 Email & collaboration", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The default outbound anti-spam policy in Microsoft Defender automatically applies to all users and is designed to detect and limit suspicious email-sending behavior. The policy enforces limits based on both volume and spam detection. If a user sends too many emails too quickly or if a high percentage of their messages are flagged as spam, their ability to send email can be temporarily restricted. This helps prevent abuse from compromised accounts or inadvertent spam campaigns. When these limits are exceeded, Microsoft routes the messages through a high-risk delivery pool to protect its IP reputation and notifies administrators through built-in alert policies. The recommended state is: - External: Restrict sending to external recipients (per hour) - 500 - Internal: Restrict sending to internal recipients (per hour) - 1000 - Daily: Maximum recipient limit per day - 1000 - Action: Over limit action - Restrict the user from sending mail", + "RationaleStatement": "Message limit settings help lessen the impact of a Business Email Compromise (BEC) by automatically restricting accounts that send unusually high volumes of email. This containment prevents compromised accounts from launching large-scale attacks and helps ensure the organization's email remains trusted and deliverable. Without these limits, excessive or suspicious outbound traffic could result in Microsoft blocking the organization's email, disrupting communication and damaging reputation.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enforcing message limits may result in legitimate users being temporarily blocked from sending email if their bulk messaging activity resembles spam or exceeds volume thresholds. This can disrupt business operations, delay communication, and require administrative effort to investigate and restore access. However, these adverse effects typically stem from a lack of planning around mass mailings. To avoid triggering these limits, Microsoft recommends sending bulk email through custom subdomains or third- party bulk email providers.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Email & collaboration > Policies & rules> Threat policies. 3. Under Policies select Anti-spam and click to open Anti-spam outbound policy (Default). 4. Select Edit protection settings. 5. Set the following settings to the recommended values, or more restrictive values. Message limit values of 0 are not compliant, as it represents the service default o External: Set an external message limit - 500 o Internal: Set an internal message limit - 1000 o Daily: Set a daily message limit - 1000 o Action: Restriction placed on users who reach the message limit - Restrict the user from sending mail 6. Verify that Notify these users and groups if a sender is blocked due to sending outbound spam contains a monitored mailbox. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Change the example email addresses below and run the following PowerShell commands: $params = @{ RecipientLimitExternalPerHour = 500 RecipientLimitInternalPerHour = 1000 RecipientLimitPerDay = 1000 ActionWhenThresholdReached = 'BlockUser' NotifyOutboundSpamRecipients = @('admin@example.com','security@example.com') } Set-HostedOutboundSpamFilterPolicy -Identity 'Default' @params", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Email & collaboration > Policies & rules > Threat policies. 3. Under Policies select Anti-spam and click to open Anti-spam outbound policy (Default). 4. Verify the following settings are configured to the recommended level or a more restrictive value. Message limit values of 0 are not compliant, as it represents the service default: o External: Restrict sending to external recipients (per hour) - 500 o Internal: Restrict sending to internal recipients (per hour) - 1000 o Daily: Maximum recipient limit per day - 1000 o Action: Over limit action - Restrict the user from sending mail 5. Verify that a monitored mailbox is configured as a recipient under Notify these users and groups if a sender is blocked due to sending outbound spam. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following: $params = @( 'RecipientLimitExternalPerHour' 'RecipientLimitInternalPerHour' 'RecipientLimitPerDay' 'ActionWhenThresholdReached' 'NotifyOutboundSpamRecipients' ) Get-HostedOutboundSpamFilterPolicy -Identity Default | fl $params 3. Verify that each of the following properties is configured as specified: o RecipientLimitExternalPerHour is 500 or less, but not 0 o RecipientLimitInternalPerHour is 1000 or less, but not 0 o RecipientLimitPerDay is 1000 or less, but not 0 o ActionWhenThresholdReached is BlockUser o NotifyOutboundSpamRecipients contains a monitored mailbox. Note: Microsoft's Recommended Strict values represent a more restrictive and also compliant configuration. These values 400, 800, and 800 align with the values above. For further details on Standard and Strict settings, refer to the references section.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "RecipientLimitExternalPerHour : 0 RecipientLimitInternalPerHour : 0 RecipientLimitPerDay : 0 ActionWhenThresholdReached : BlockUserForToday The value of 0 means the service defaults are being used. More information on sending limits is here: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/servicedescriptions/exchange- online-service-description/exchange-online-limits#sending-limits-1", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/outbound-spam-protection-about:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/recommended-settings-for-eop-and-office365#outbound-spam-policy-settings:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/servicedescriptions/exchange-online-service-description/exchange-online-limits#sending-limits-1" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.2.1", + "Description": "Organizations should monitor sign-in and audit log activity from the emergency accounts and trigger notifications to other administrators. When you monitor the activity for emergency access accounts, you can verify these accounts are only used for testing or actual emergencies. You can use Azure Monitor, Microsoft Sentinel, Defender for Cloud Apps or other tools to monitor the sign-in logs and trigger email and SMS alerts to your administrators whenever emergency access accounts sign in. This recommendation uses Defender for Cloud Apps Policies to alert on emergency access account activity. The recommended state is to monitor Activity type Log on on break-glass or emergency access accounts.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Microsoft Defender", + "SubSection": "2.2 Cloud apps", + "Profile": "E5 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Organizations should monitor sign-in and audit log activity from the emergency accounts and trigger notifications to other administrators. When you monitor the activity for emergency access accounts, you can verify these accounts are only used for testing or actual emergencies. You can use Azure Monitor, Microsoft Sentinel, Defender for Cloud Apps or other tools to monitor the sign-in logs and trigger email and SMS alerts to your administrators whenever emergency access accounts sign in. This recommendation uses Defender for Cloud Apps Policies to alert on emergency access account activity. The recommended state is to monitor Activity type Log on on break-glass or emergency access accounts.", + "RationaleStatement": "Emergency access accounts should be used in very few scenarios, for example, the last Global Administrator has left the organization and the account is inaccessible. All activity on an emergency access account should be reviewed at the time of the event to ensure the sign on is legitimate and authorized.", + "ImpactStatement": "There is no real world impact to monitoring these accounts beyond allocating staff. The frequency of emergency account sign on should be so low that any activity raises a red flag that is treated with the highest priority.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com 2. Under the Cloud Apps section select Policies -> Policy management. 3. Click on All policies and then Create policy -> Activity policy. 4. Give the policy a name and set the following: o Policy severity to High severity. o Category to Privileged accounts. o Act on Single activity. o Click Select a filter -> Activity type equals Log on. o Click Add a filter -> User Name equals as Any role. o Ensure all emergency access accounts are added to this policy or another. o Select an alert method such as Send alert as email. Note: Multiple accounts can be monitored by a single policy or by separate policies.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com 2. Under the Cloud Apps section select Policies -> Policy management. 3. Locate a privileged accounts policy that meets the following criteria o Policy severity is High severity. o Category is Privileged accounts. o Act on Single activity is selected. o Under Activities matching all of the following verify: o Filter1: Activity type equals Log on o Filter2: User Name equals as Any role o Verify all additional emergency access accounts are accounted for. o Under Alerts, verify alerting is configured. 4. Repeat this process for any additional emergency access or break-glass accounts in the organization. If matching policies do not exist, then the audit procedure is considered a fail. Note: Multiple accounts can be monitored by a single policy or by separate policies. Note: Emergency access account activity can be monitored in various ways. The audit procedure passes as long as all emergency access account activity is monitored.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "A policy to monitor emergency access accounts does not exist by default.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/security-emergency-access#monitor-sign-in-and-audit-logs:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/control-cloud-apps-with-policies" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.4.1", + "Description": "Identify priority accounts to utilize Microsoft 365's advanced custom security features. This is an essential tool to bolster protection for users who are frequently targeted due to their critical positions, such as executives, leaders, managers, or others who have access to sensitive, confidential, financial, or high-priority information. Once these accounts are identified, several services and features can be enabled, including threat policies, enhanced sign-in protection through conditional access policies, and alert policies, enabling faster response times for incident response teams.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Microsoft Defender", + "SubSection": "2.4 System", + "Profile": "E5 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Identify priority accounts to utilize Microsoft 365's advanced custom security features. This is an essential tool to bolster protection for users who are frequently targeted due to their critical positions, such as executives, leaders, managers, or others who have access to sensitive, confidential, financial, or high-priority information. Once these accounts are identified, several services and features can be enabled, including threat policies, enhanced sign-in protection through conditional access policies, and alert policies, enabling faster response times for incident response teams.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling priority account protection for users in Microsoft 365 is necessary to enhance security for accounts with access to sensitive data and high privileges, such as CEOs, CISOs, CFOs, and IT admins. These priority accounts are often targeted by spear phishing or whaling attacks and require stronger protection to prevent account compromise. To address this, Microsoft 365 and Microsoft Defender for Office 365 offer several key features that provide extra security, including the identification of incidents and alerts involving priority accounts and the use of built-in custom protections designed specifically for them.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: Remediate with a 3-step process Step 1: Enable Priority account protection in Microsoft 365 Defender: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com/ 2. Select System > Settings near the bottom of the left most panel. 3. Select E-mail & Collaboration > Priority account protection 4. Ensure Priority account protection is set to On Step 2: Tag priority accounts: 5. Select User tags 6. Select the PRIORITY ACCOUNT tag and click Edit 7. Select Add members to add users, or groups. Groups are recommended. 8. Repeat the previous 2 steps for any additional tags needed, such as Finance or HR. 9. Next and Submit. Step 3: Configure E-mail alerts for Priority Accounts: 10. Expand E-mail & Collaboration on the left column. 11. Select Policies & rules > Alert policy 12. Select New Alert Policy 13. Enter a valid policy Name & Description. Set Severity to High and Category to Threat management. 14. Set Activity is to Detected malware in an e-mail message 15. Mail direction is Inbound 16. Select Add Condition and User: recipient tags are 17. In the Selection option field add chosen priority tags such as Priority account. 18. Select Every time an activity matches the rule. 19. Next and verify valid recipient(s) are selected. 20. Next and select Yes, turn it on right away. Click Submit to save the alert. 21. Repeat steps 12 - 18 to create a 2nd alert for the Activity field Activity is: Phishing email detected at time of delivery Note: Any additional activity types may be added as needed. Above are the minimum recommended.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: Audit with a 3-step process Step 1: Verify Priority account protection is enabled: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com/ 2. Select System > Settings near the bottom of the left most panel. 3. Select E-mail & collaboration > Priority account protection 4. Verify that Priority account protection is set to On Step 2: Verify that priority accounts are identified and tagged accordingly: 5. Select User tags 6. Select the PRIORITY ACCOUNT tag and click Edit 7. Verify the assigned members match the organization's defined priority accounts or groups. 8. Repeat the previous 2 steps for any additional tags identified, such as Finance or HR. Step 3: Ensure alerts are configured: 9. Expand E-mail & Collaboration on the left column. 10. Select Policies & rules > Alert policy 11. Verify that at least two alert policies are configured to monitor priority accounts for the activities Detected malware in an email message and Phishing email detected at time of delivery. These alerts should meet the following criteria: o Severity: High o Category: Threat management o Mail Direction: Inbound o Recipient Tags: Includes Priority account To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange using Connect-ExchangeOnline 2. Retrieve the Priority Account protection state: Get-EmailTenantSettings | select EnablePriorityAccountProtection - Ensure EnablePriorityAccountProtection is true. 3. Connect to Security & Compliance PowerShell using Connect-IPPSSession 4. Retrieve alert policies targeting priority accounts: Get-ProtectionAlert | Where-Object { $_.RecipientTags -Match 'Priority account' } 5. For each returned policy, verify all of the following criteria: o Severity is High o Filter matches the pattern Mail.Direction -eq 'Inbound' o RecipientTags matches the pattern Priority account o NotificationEnabled is true o NotifyUser contains a valid email recipient o Disabled is false 6. The control is compliant when the results include: o One passing phishing policy (ThreatType = Phish) o One passing malware policy (ThreatType = Malware). o EnablePriorityAccountProtection is true from step 2.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "By default, priority accounts are undefined.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/setup/priority-accounts:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/priority-accounts-security-recommendations" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.4.2", + "Description": "Preset security policies have been established by Microsoft, utilizing observations and experiences within datacenters to strike a balance between the exclusion of malicious content from users and limiting unwarranted disruptions. These policies can apply to all, or select users and encompass recommendations for addressing spam, malware, and phishing threats. The policy parameters are pre-determined and non-adjustable. Strict protection has the most aggressive protection of the 3 presets. - EOP: Anti-spam, Anti-malware and Anti-phishing - Defender: Spoof protection, Impersonation protection and Advanced phishing - Defender: Safe Links and Safe Attachments NOTE: The preset security polices cannot target Priority account TAGS currently, groups should be used instead.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Microsoft Defender", + "SubSection": "2.4 System", + "Profile": "E5 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Preset security policies have been established by Microsoft, utilizing observations and experiences within datacenters to strike a balance between the exclusion of malicious content from users and limiting unwarranted disruptions. These policies can apply to all, or select users and encompass recommendations for addressing spam, malware, and phishing threats. The policy parameters are pre-determined and non-adjustable. Strict protection has the most aggressive protection of the 3 presets. - EOP: Anti-spam, Anti-malware and Anti-phishing - Defender: Spoof protection, Impersonation protection and Advanced phishing - Defender: Safe Links and Safe Attachments NOTE: The preset security polices cannot target Priority account TAGS currently, groups should be used instead.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling priority account protection for users in Microsoft 365 is necessary to enhance security for accounts with access to sensitive data and high privileges, such as CEOs, CISOs, CFOs, and IT admins. These priority accounts are often targeted by spear phishing or whaling attacks and require stronger protection to prevent account compromise. The implementation of stringent, pre-defined policies may result in instances of false positive, however, the benefit of requiring the end-user to preview junk email before accessing their inbox outweighs the potential risk of mistakenly perceiving a malicious email as safe due to its placement in the inbox.", + "ImpactStatement": "Strict policies are more likely to cause false positives in anti-spam, phishing, impersonation, spoofing and intelligence responses.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand E-mail & collaboration > Policies & rules > Threat policies. 3. Select Preset security policies. 4. Click to Manage protection settings for Strict protection preset. 5. For Apply Exchange Online Protection select at minimum Specific recipients and include the Accounts/Groups identified as Priority Accounts. 6. For Apply Defender for Office 365 Protection select at minimum Specific recipients and include the Accounts/Groups identified as Priority Accounts. 7. For Impersonation protection click Next and add valid e-mails or priority accounts both internal and external that may be subject to impersonation. 8. For Protected custom domains add the organization's domain name, along side other key partners. 9. Click Next and finally Confirm", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand E-mail & collaboration > Policies & rules > Threat policies. 3. From here visit each section in turn: Anti-phishing Anti-spam Anti-malware Safe Attachments Safe Links 4. Verify that each contains a policy named Strict Preset Security Policy that includes the organization's priority accounts and groups. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange using Connect-ExchangeOnline 2. Retrieve the ATP strict presets rule for Defender: Get-ATPProtectionPolicyRule | Where-Object { $_.Identity -eq 'Strict Preset Security Policy' } 3. Retrieve the EOP strict preset rule for Defender: Get-EOPProtectionPolicyRule | Where-Object { $_.Identity -eq 'Strict Preset Security Policy' } 4. Verify the following criteria for both the EOP Rule and ATP Rule: o State is Enabled o At least one recipient target is populated with a VIP, i.e.: - SentTo, SentToMemberOf or RecipientDomainIs is not null 5. The control is compliant when both the ATP rule and the EOP rule exist and pass the criteria in step 4.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "By default, presets are not applied to any users or groups.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/preset-security-policies?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/priority-accounts-security-recommendations:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/recommended-settings-for-eop-and-office365?view=o365-worldwide#impersonation-settings-in-anti-phishing-policies-in-microsoft-defender-for-office-365" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.4.3", + "Description": "Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps is a Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB). It provides visibility into suspicious activity in Microsoft 365, enabling investigation into potential security issues and facilitating the implementation of remediation measures if necessary. Some risk detection methods provided by Entra Identity Protection also require Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps: - Suspicious manipulation of inbox rules - Suspicious inbox forwarding - New country detection - Impossible travel detection - Activity from anonymous IP addresses - Mass access to sensitive files", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Microsoft Defender", + "SubSection": "2.4 System", + "Profile": "E5 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps is a Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB). It provides visibility into suspicious activity in Microsoft 365, enabling investigation into potential security issues and facilitating the implementation of remediation measures if necessary. Some risk detection methods provided by Entra Identity Protection also require Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps: - Suspicious manipulation of inbox rules - Suspicious inbox forwarding - New country detection - Impossible travel detection - Activity from anonymous IP addresses - Mass access to sensitive files", + "RationaleStatement": "Security teams can receive notifications of triggered alerts for atypical or suspicious activities, see how the organization's data in Microsoft 365 is accessed and used, suspend user accounts exhibiting suspicious activity, and require users to log back in to Microsoft 365 apps after an alert has been triggered.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand System > Settings > Cloud apps. 3. Scroll to Information Protection and select Files. 4. Check Enable file monitoring. 5. Scroll up to Cloud Discovery and select Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. 6. Check Enforce app access, configure a Notification URL and Save. Note: Defender for Endpoint requires a Defender for Endpoint license. Configure App Connectors: 1. Scroll to Connected apps and select App connectors. 2. Click on Connect an app and select Microsoft 365. 3. Check all Azure and Office 365 boxes then click Connect Office 365. 4. Repeat for the Microsoft Azure application.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand System > Settings > Cloud apps. 3. Scroll to Connected apps and select App connectors. 4. Verify that Microsoft 365 and Microsoft Azure both show in the list as Connected. 5. Go to Cloud Discovery > Microsoft Defender for Endpoint and verify that the integration is enabled. 6. Go to Information Protection > Files and verify Enable file monitoring is checked.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Additional Microsoft 365 Defender features include: - The option to use Defender for cloud apps as a reverse proxy, allowing for the application of access or session controls through the definition of a conditional access policy. - The purchase and implementation of the \"App Governance\" add-on, which provides more precise control over OAuth app permissions and includes additional built-in policies. A list of Defender for Cloud Apps built-in policies for Office 365 can be found at https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/protect-office-365.", + "DefaultValue": "Disabled", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/protect-office-365#connect-microsoft-365-to-microsoft-defender-for-cloud-apps:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/protect-azure#connect-azure-to-microsoft-defender-for-cloud-apps:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/best-practices:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/get-started:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.4.4", + "Description": "Zero-hour auto purge (ZAP) is a protection feature that retroactively detects and neutralizes malware and high confidence phishing. When ZAP for Teams protection blocks a message, the message is blocked for everyone in the chat. The initial block happens right after delivery, but ZAP occurs up to 48 hours after delivery.", + "Checks": [ + "defender_zap_for_teams_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Microsoft Defender", + "SubSection": "2.4 System", + "Profile": "E5 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Zero-hour auto purge (ZAP) is a protection feature that retroactively detects and neutralizes malware and high confidence phishing. When ZAP for Teams protection blocks a message, the message is blocked for everyone in the chat. The initial block happens right after delivery, but ZAP occurs up to 48 hours after delivery.", + "RationaleStatement": "ZAP is intended to protect users that have received zero-day malware messages or content that is weaponized after being delivered to users. It does this by continually monitoring spam and malware signatures taking automated retroactive action on messages that have already been delivered.", + "ImpactStatement": "As with any anti-malware or anti-phishing product, false positives may occur.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand System > Settings > Email & collaboration > Microsoft Teams protection. 3. Set Zero-hour auto purge (ZAP) to On (Default) To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following cmdlet: Set-TeamsProtectionPolicy -Identity \"Teams Protection Policy\" -ZapEnabled $true", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand System > Settings > Email & collaboration > Microsoft Teams protection. 3. Verify that Zero-hour auto purge (ZAP) is set to On (Default) 4. Under Exclude these participants review the list of exclusions and verify they are justified and within tolerance for the organization. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following cmdlets: Get-TeamsProtectionPolicy | fl ZapEnabled Get-TeamsProtectionPolicyRule | fl ExceptIf* 3. Verify that ZapEnabled is True. 4. Review the list of exclusions and ensure they are justified and within tolerance for the organization. If nothing returns from the 2nd cmdlet then there are no exclusions defined.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "On (Default)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/zero-hour-auto-purge?view=o365-worldwide#zero-hour-auto-purge-zap-in-microsoft-teams:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/mdo-support-teams-about?view=o365-worldwide#configure-zap-for-teams-protection-in-defender-for-office-365-plan-2" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "2.4.5", + "Description": "Automated Investigation and Response (AIR) investigates alerts and correlates related signals into investigations. When AIR identifies malicious email messages, it groups them into clusters based on shared characteristics like common malicious file, URL, or sending attributes and produces remediation actions for each cluster. This setting controls whether AIR-identified malicious message clusters are remediated automatically, without requiring SecOps approval. Administrators can enable automatic remediation for one or more cluster types: - Similar files: Clusters sharing a similar malicious file - Similar URLs: Clusters sharing a similar malicious URL - Multiple similar attributes: Clusters grouped by multiple shared attributes such as sender IP address, sender domain, or message subject When enabled, the configured remediation action is applied immediately upon cluster identification. The recommended state is to automatically remediate message clusters.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "2 Microsoft Defender", + "SubSection": "2.4 System", + "Profile": "E5 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Automated Investigation and Response (AIR) investigates alerts and correlates related signals into investigations. When AIR identifies malicious email messages, it groups them into clusters based on shared characteristics like common malicious file, URL, or sending attributes and produces remediation actions for each cluster. This setting controls whether AIR-identified malicious message clusters are remediated automatically, without requiring SecOps approval. Administrators can enable automatic remediation for one or more cluster types: - Similar files: Clusters sharing a similar malicious file - Similar URLs: Clusters sharing a similar malicious URL - Multiple similar attributes: Clusters grouped by multiple shared attributes such as sender IP address, sender domain, or message subject When enabled, the configured remediation action is applied immediately upon cluster identification. The recommended state is to automatically remediate message clusters.", + "RationaleStatement": "When automatic remediation is disabled, malicious message clusters identified by AIR remain in users' mailboxes as pending actions until a security analyst manually approves each remediation. During this approval window, users may interact with, open, or forward malicious messages, increasing the risk of a successful compromise. Enabling automatic remediation ensures identified threats are contained immediately upon detection, minimizing the exposure window and reducing the operational burden on security teams to manually review and approve routine threat clusters.", + "ImpactStatement": "Automatic remediation removes the manual SecOps approval step for qualifying message cluster actions. If AIR incorrectly classifies a legitimate message cluster as malicious, affected messages will be soft deleted without prior review. Soft deleted messages are moved to the Recoverable Items folder and can be restored through the Action center, Threat Explorer, or Advanced Hunting, subject to each mailbox's deleted item retention period (14 days by default). Organizations should verify retention policies and legal obligations before enabling this setting, as retention configuration affects whether soft deleted messages remain recoverable. Clusters exceeding 10,000 messages are always excluded from automatic remediation and will continue to require manual approval. License Requirement: This setting requires Defender for Office 365 Plan 2 which is included in Microsoft 365 E5.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand System > Settings > Email & collaboration > MDO automation settings. 3. Under Message clusters check the following: o Similar files o Similar URLs o Multiple similar attributes 4. Click Save to apply the changes.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender https://security.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand System > Settings > Email & collaboration > MDO automation settings. 3. Verify that under Message clusters the following are checked: o Similar files o Similar URLs o Multiple similar attributes Note: At the time of publication, Soft delete is the only available remediation action and is selected by default. Because the action cannot be changed, verifying the selected remediation action is not part of the audit criteria for this recommendation.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "By default automatic remediation for message clusters is disabled.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/air-auto-remediation:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/air-about:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/security-and-compliance/recoverable-items-folder/recoverable-items-folder:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/recipients-in-exchange-online/manage-user-mailboxes/change-deleted-item-retention" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.1.1", + "Description": "When audit log search is enabled in the Microsoft Purview compliance portal, user and admin activity within the organization is recorded in the audit log and retained for 180 days by default. However, some organizations may prefer to use a third-party security information and event management (SIEM) application to access their auditing data. In this scenario, a global admin can choose to turn off audit log search in Microsoft 365.", + "Checks": [ + "purview_audit_log_search_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Microsoft Purview", + "SubSection": "3.1 Audit", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "When audit log search is enabled in the Microsoft Purview compliance portal, user and admin activity within the organization is recorded in the audit log and retained for 180 days by default. However, some organizations may prefer to use a third-party security information and event management (SIEM) application to access their auditing data. In this scenario, a global admin can choose to turn off audit log search in Microsoft 365.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling audit log search in the Microsoft Purview compliance portal can help organizations improve their security posture, meet regulatory compliance requirements, respond to security incidents, and gain valuable operational insights.", + "ImpactStatement": "", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Purview https://purview.microsoft.com/ 2. Select Solutions and then Audit to open the audit search. 3. Click blue bar Start recording user and admin activity. 4. Click Yes on the dialog box to confirm. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Set-AdminAuditLogConfig -UnifiedAuditLogIngestionEnabled $true", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Purview https://purview.microsoft.com/ 2. Select Solutions and then Audit to open the audit search. 3. Choose a date and time frame in the past 30 days. 4. Verify search capabilities (e.g. try searching for Activities as Accessed file and results should be displayed). To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Get-AdminAuditLogConfig | Select-Object UnifiedAuditLogIngestionEnabled 3. Ensure UnifiedAuditLogIngestionEnabled is set to True. Note: If the Get-AdminAuditLogConfig cmdlet is executed while connected to both Security & Compliance PowerShell as well as Exchange Online PowerShell then UnifiedAuditLogIngestionEnabled will always display False. This depends on the orders the module were imported. If Security & Compliance is needed in the same session be sure to connect to it first, and then Exchange PowerShell second.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "180 days", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-enable-disable?view=o365-worldwide&tabs=microsoft-purview-portal:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-adminauditlogconfig?view=exchange-ps:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-enable-disable?view=o365-worldwide&tabs=microsoft-purview-portal#verify-the-auditing-status-for-your-organization" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.2.1", + "Description": "Data Loss Prevention (DLP) policies allow Exchange Online and SharePoint Online content to be scanned for specific types of data like social security numbers, credit card numbers, or passwords.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Microsoft Purview", + "SubSection": "3.2 Data Loss Protection", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Data Loss Prevention (DLP) policies allow Exchange Online and SharePoint Online content to be scanned for specific types of data like social security numbers, credit card numbers, or passwords.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling DLP policies alerts users and administrators that specific types of data should not be exposed, helping to protect the data from accidental exposure.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling a Teams DLP policy will allow sensitive data in Exchange Online and SharePoint Online to be detected or blocked. Always ensure to follow appropriate procedures during testing and implementation of DLP policies based on organizational standards.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Purview https://purview.microsoft.com/ 2. Click Solutions > Data loss prevention then Policies. 3. Click Create policy. 4. Create a policy that is specific to the types of data the organization wishes to protect.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Purview https://purview.microsoft.com/ 2. Click Solutions > Data loss prevention and then Policies. 3. Inspect the list of policies and verify the following criteria: o A policy exists that meets the organizations DLP needs o Mode is On 4. Open the policy and verify there is at least one of the following locations defined: o Exchange email o SharePoint sites o OneDrive accounts o Teams chat and channel messages 5. Compliance is met when there is at least one policy the meets the above criteria. To audit using the PowerShell: 1. Connect to the Security & Compliance PowerShell using Connect-IPPSSession. 2. Execute the following cmdlet to get a list of DLP Policies: Get-DlpCompliancePolicy 3. For each policy returned verify the following criteria: o Mode is Enable o At least one of the following locations is defined: o ExchangeLocation o SharePointLocation o OneDriveLocation o TeamsLocation 4. Compliance is met when there is at least one policy the meets the above criteria. Note: The types of policies an organization should implement to protect information are specific to their industry. However, certain types of information, such as credit card numbers, social security numbers, and certain personally identifiable information (PII), are universally important to safeguard across all industries.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/dlp-learn-about-dlp?view=o365-worldwide" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.2.2", + "Description": "The default Teams Data Loss Prevention (DLP) policy rule in Microsoft 365 is a preconfigured rule that is automatically applied to all Teams conversations and channels. The default rule helps prevent accidental sharing of sensitive information by detecting and blocking certain types of content that are deemed sensitive or inappropriate by the organization. By default, the rule includes a check for the sensitive info type Credit Card Number which is pre-defined by Microsoft.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Microsoft Purview", + "SubSection": "3.2 Data Loss Protection", + "Profile": "E5 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The default Teams Data Loss Prevention (DLP) policy rule in Microsoft 365 is a preconfigured rule that is automatically applied to all Teams conversations and channels. The default rule helps prevent accidental sharing of sensitive information by detecting and blocking certain types of content that are deemed sensitive or inappropriate by the organization. By default, the rule includes a check for the sensitive info type Credit Card Number which is pre-defined by Microsoft.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling the default Teams DLP policy rule in Microsoft 365 helps protect an organization's sensitive information by preventing accidental sharing or leakage of Credit Card information in Teams conversations and channels. DLP rules are not one size fits all, but at a minimum something should be defined. The organization should identify sensitive information important to them and seek to intercept it using DLP.", + "ImpactStatement": "End-users may be prevented from sharing certain types of content, which may require them to adjust their behavior or seek permission from administrators to share specific content. Administrators may receive requests from end-users for permission to share certain types of content or to modify the policy to better fit the needs of their teams.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Purview compliance portal https://purview.microsoft.com/ 2. Under Solutions select Data loss prevention then Policies. 3. Click Policies tab. 4. Check Default policy for Teams then click Edit policy. 5. The edit policy window will appear click Next 6. At the Choose locations to apply the policy page, turn the status toggle to On for Teams chat and channel messages location and then click Next. 7. On Customized advanced DLP rules page, ensure the Default Teams DLP policy rule Status is On and click Next. 8. On the Policy mode page, select the radial for Turn it on right away and click Next. 9. Review all the settings for the created policy on the Review your policy and create it page, and then click submit. 10. Once the policy has been successfully submitted click Done. Note: Some tenants may not have a default policy for teams as Microsoft started creating these by default at a particular point in time. In this case a new policy will have to be created that includes a rule to protect data important to the organization such as credit cards and PII.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Purview compliance portal https://purview.microsoft.com/ 2. Under Solutions select Data loss prevention then Policies. 3. Locate the Default policy for Teams. 4. Verify the Status is On. 5. Verify Locations include Teams chat and channel messages - All accounts. 6. Verify Policy settings includes the Default Teams DLP policy rule or one specific to the organization. Note: If there is not a default policy for teams inspect existing policies starting with step 4. DLP rules are specific to the organization and each organization should take steps to protect the data that matters to them. The default teams DLP rule will only alert on Credit Card matches. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to the Security & Compliance PowerShell using Connect-IPPSSession. 2. Run the following to return policies that include Teams chat and channel messages: $DlpPolicy = Get-DlpCompliancePolicy $DlpPolicy | Where-Object {$_.Workload -match \"Teams\"} | ft Name,Mode,TeamsLocation* 3. If nothing returns, then there are no policies that include Teams and remediation is required. 4. For any returned policy verify Mode is set to Enable. 5. Verify TeamsLocation includes All. 6. Verify TeamsLocationException includes only permitted exceptions. Note: Some tenants may not have a default policy for teams as Microsoft started creating these by default at a particular point in time. In this case a new policy will have to be created that includes a rule to protect data important to the organization such as credit cards and PII.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Enabled (On)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/exchange/connect-to-scc-powershell?view=exchange-ps:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/dlp-teams-default-policy:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/connect-ippssession?view=exchange-ps" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.2.3", + "Description": "Microsoft Purview Data Loss Prevention (DLP) policies can be scoped to Microsoft 365 Copilot and Copilot Chat interactions. When active, these policies can restrict Copilot from processing or surfacing content that matches configured sensitive information types. Organizations must define the sensitive data categories relevant to their environment and configure at least one DLP policy that covers Copilot interactions in enforcement mode. The recommended state is to configure at least one DLP policy that includes Microsoft 365 Copilot and Copilot Chat - All accounts as a location with rules specific to the organization's needs.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Microsoft Purview", + "SubSection": "3.2 Data Loss Protection", + "Profile": "E5 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Microsoft Purview Data Loss Prevention (DLP) policies can be scoped to Microsoft 365 Copilot and Copilot Chat interactions. When active, these policies can restrict Copilot from processing or surfacing content that matches configured sensitive information types. Organizations must define the sensitive data categories relevant to their environment and configure at least one DLP policy that covers Copilot interactions in enforcement mode. The recommended state is to configure at least one DLP policy that includes Microsoft 365 Copilot and Copilot Chat - All accounts as a location with rules specific to the organization's needs.", + "RationaleStatement": "Microsoft 365 Copilot can retrieve, summarize, and generate content based on data the authenticated user has access to across M365 workloads, including SharePoint, OneDrive, Teams, and Exchange. Without a DLP policy scoped to Copilot interactions, no technical control exists to prevent sensitive information such as PII, financial data, or health records from being incorporated into Copilot-generated responses and potentially exposed to users who would not otherwise have direct access to the source content. Enforcing DLP policies for Copilot ensures that sensitive data categories defined by the organization are intercepted before they are processed or surfaced by AI-generated responses.", + "ImpactStatement": "Users may find that Copilot declines to process or respond to prompts that involve content matching the organization's configured sensitive information types. In these cases, Copilot will notify the user that the request was blocked by policy. Users who rely on Copilot to summarize, draft, or retrieve content containing sensitive data such as documents with PII, financial records, or health information may need to rephrase their prompts or work with the content directly outside of Copilot. Administrators should communicate the scope of active DLP policies to affected users prior to enforcement.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: Note: Microsoft provides a guided wizard to create the Default DLP policy - Protect sensitive M365 Copilot interactions policy, which can be used when no Copilot DLP policy exists in the tenant. The steps below describe how to create a custom policy from scratch with Copilot included as a location. 1. Navigate to Microsoft Purview compliance portal https://purview.microsoft.com/ 2. Under Solutions select Data loss prevention then Policies. 3. Click Policies tab. 4. Click + Create Policy. 5. Click on Enterprise applications & devices. 6. Under Categories select Custom and then Custom policy for the regulation. 7. Name the policy, and if appropriate, select an Admin Unit. 8. In Locations select Microsoft 365 Copilot and Copilot Chat. 9. Click on Next to proceed to the Advanced DLP rules page. 10. Click on + Create Rule 1. Name the rule and give a brief description of the data that is being targeted. 2. Click on + Add condition and select Content Contains 3. Click on Add and select Sensitive info types 4. Select the sensitive information types the organization wants to protect from being processed in Copilot interactions and click Add. 5. Click on + Add an action and select Restrict Copilot from processing content 6. Check the box for a relevant restriction. 7. Click on Save. 11. Repeat step 10 to create as many rules as the organization requires 12. Click Next. 13. On the Policy mode page, select the radial for Turn it on right away and click Next. 14. Click Submit to create the policy once it has been reviewed. 15. Finally, click Done. Note: Compliance with this recommendation is not achieved until the policy is in enforcement mode.", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: Some tenants may have a default policy called Default DLP policy - Protect sensitive M365 Copilot interactions that was automatically created. If not present, it can also be created using a guided process in the Policies blade. If this policy exists, it may be used to satisfy the requirements of this control provided it meets the compliance criteria below. To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Purview compliance portal https://purview.microsoft.com/ 2. Under Solutions select Data loss prevention then Policies. 3. Inspect the list of policies and verify the following criteria: o Locations includes Microsoft 365 Copilot and Copilot Chat - All accounts. o Mode is On. o The policy includes Rules that restrict sensitive data from being shared in Copilot interactions based on the organization's needs. 4. Compliance is met when there is at least one policy that meets the above criteria. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to the Security & Compliance PowerShell using Connect-IPPSSession. 2. Run the following to return policies that include Teams chat and channel messages: $DlpPolicy = Get-DlpCompliancePolicy $DlpPolicy | Where-Object {$_.EnforcementPlanes -match \"CopilotExperiences\"} | FT Name,Mode,LocationInclusions,LocationExclusions 3. If nothing returns, then there are no policies that include Copilot and remediation is required. 4. For any returned policy verify Mode is set to Enable. 5. Verify LocationInclusions includes All. 6. Verify LocationExclusions includes only permitted exceptions. Note: DLP rules are specific to the organization and each organization should take steps to protect the data that matters to them. At a minimum, organizations should consider protecting personally identifiable information (PII) specific to their locale.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "No Copilot DLP policy exists by default for most tenants. Some tenants may have had a Default DLP policy - Protect sensitive M365 Copilot interactions policy automatically provisioned by Microsoft; if present, it may satisfy this recommendation if it meets the audit criteria.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/dlp-microsoft365-copilot-location-learn-about:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/dlp-microsoft365-copilot-location-default-policy:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/exchange/connect-to-scc-powershell?view=exchange-ps" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "3.3.1", + "Description": "Sensitivity labels enable organizations to classify and label content across Microsoft 365 based on its sensitivity and business impact. These labels can be applied manually by users or automatically based on the content. When applied, labels can automatically encrypt content, provide \"Confidential\" watermarks, restrict access, and offer various data protection features. Labels can be scoped to data assets and containers: - Files & other data assets in Microsoft 365, Fabric, Azure, AWS and other platforms - Email messages sent from all versions of Outlook - Meeting calendar events and schedules in Outlook and Teams - Teams, Microsoft 365 Groups and SharePoint sites", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "3 Microsoft Purview", + "SubSection": "3.3 Information Protection", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Sensitivity labels enable organizations to classify and label content across Microsoft 365 based on its sensitivity and business impact. These labels can be applied manually by users or automatically based on the content. When applied, labels can automatically encrypt content, provide \"Confidential\" watermarks, restrict access, and offer various data protection features. Labels can be scoped to data assets and containers: - Files & other data assets in Microsoft 365, Fabric, Azure, AWS and other platforms - Email messages sent from all versions of Outlook - Meeting calendar events and schedules in Outlook and Teams - Teams, Microsoft 365 Groups and SharePoint sites", + "RationaleStatement": "Consistent usage of sensitivity labels can help reduce the risk of data loss or exposure and enable more effective incident response if a breach does occur. They can also help organizations comply with regulatory requirements and provide visibility and control over sensitive information.", + "ImpactStatement": "Encryption configurations (control access, DKE, BYOK) in the individual labels may impact users' ability to access site documents and information. Careful consideration of the individual sensitivity label configurations should be exercised prior to applying an auto labeling policy, publishing policy, sensitivity label configuration, or PowerShell based label settings to SharePoint sites. Additionally, when updating or deleting Sensitivity Labels, an assessment of the potential impacts should be conducted to avoid unintended consequences. If tenants are configured for sharing with guests or external domains and Sensitivity Labels have encryption applied, this can affect the ability to share documents via email stored in SharePoint. Some recipients may be unable to open the document depending on their email client, which could trigger Purview Advanced Encryptions and OME flows based on the recipient type and the cloud license from which the email is sent (e.g., government clouds vs. commercial clouds).", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Purview compliance portal https://purview.microsoft.com/ 2. Select Information protection > Sensitivity labels. 3. Click Create a label to create a label. 4. Click Publish labels and select any newly created labels to publish according to the organization's information protection needs.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Purview compliance portal https://purview.microsoft.com/ 2. Select Information protection > Policies > Label publishing policies. 3. Ensure that a Label policy exists and is published according to the organization's information protection needs. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to the Security & Compliance PowerShell using Connect-IPPSSession. 2. Run the following script: $Policies = Get-LabelPolicy -WarningAction Ignore | Where-Object { $_.Type -eq \"PublishedSensitivityLabel\" } if ($Policies) { $Policies | Format-List -Property Name, *Location* Write-Host \"$($Policies.Count) Sensitivity Label policies found.\" } else { Write-Host \"No Sensitivity Label policies found\" } 3. Ensure there is at least one sensitivity label policy published. 4. Review the locations defined to ensure they're in scope with the organization's needs. Note: These policies are specific to the information protection needs of each organization. Whether an organization passes the audit is open to interpretation by the auditor and depends largely on how effectively it implements information protection features to safeguard data.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "The \"Global sensitivity label policy\" exists by default.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/sensitivity-labels:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/create-sensitivity-labels" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.1", + "Description": "Compliance policies are sets of rules and conditions that are used to evaluate the configuration of managed devices. These policies can help secure organizational data and resources from devices that don't meet those configuration requirements. Managed devices must satisfy the conditions you set in your policies to be considered compliant by Intune. When combined with conditional access, this allows more control over how non-compliant devices are treated. The recommended state is Mark devices with no compliance policy assigned as as Not compliant", + "Checks": [ + "intune_device_compliance_policy_unassigned_devices_not_compliant_by_default" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Microsoft Intune admin center", + "SubSection": "", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Compliance policies are sets of rules and conditions that are used to evaluate the configuration of managed devices. These policies can help secure organizational data and resources from devices that don't meet those configuration requirements. Managed devices must satisfy the conditions you set in your policies to be considered compliant by Intune. When combined with conditional access, this allows more control over how non-compliant devices are treated. The recommended state is Mark devices with no compliance policy assigned as as Not compliant", + "RationaleStatement": "Implementing this setting is a first step in adopting compliance policies for devices. When used together with Conditional Access policies the attack surface can be reduced by forcing an action to be taken for non-compliant devices. Note: This section does not focus on which compliance policies to use, only that an organization should adopt and enforce them to their needs.", + "ImpactStatement": "Any devices without a compliance policy will be marked not compliant. Care should be taken to first deploy any new compliance policies with a Conditional Access (CA) policy that is in the Report-only state. After the environment's device compliance is better understood it is then appropriate to finally align with Mark devices with no compliance policy assigned as and enable any CA policies that enforce actions based on device compliance. If a mature environment already has an existing device compliance CA policy and a large number of devices without an assigned compliance policy, this could cause disruption as those devices would then be suddenly considered not compliant.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Intune admin center https://intune.microsoft.com/ 2. Select Devices and then under Manage devices click Compliance 3. Click Compliance settings. 4. Set Mark devices with no compliance policy assigned as to Not compliant. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"DeviceManagementConfiguration.ReadWrite.All\" 2. Run the following commands: $Uri = 'https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/deviceManagement' $Body = @{ settings = @{ secureByDefault = $true } } | ConvertTo-Json Invoke-MgGraphRequest -Uri $Uri -Method PATCH -Body $Body", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Intune admin center https://intune.microsoft.com/ 2. Select Devices and then under Manage devices click Compliance 3. Click Compliance settings. 4. Verify that Mark devices with no compliance policy assigned as is set to Not compliant. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"DeviceManagementConfiguration.Read.All\" 2. Run the following commands: $Uri = 'https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/deviceManagement/settings' Invoke-MgGraphRequest -Uri $Uri -Method GET 3. Verify that secureByDefault is set to True.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "UI: \"Compliant\" Graph: secureByDefault = $false", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/protect/device-compliance-get-started" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "4.2", + "Description": "Device enrollment restrictions let you restrict devices from enrolling in Intune based on certain device attributes such as device limit, device platform, OS Version, manufacturer or device ownership (Personally owned devices). The recommended state is to Block personally owned devices from enrollment.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "4 Microsoft Intune admin center", + "SubSection": "", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Device enrollment restrictions let you restrict devices from enrolling in Intune based on certain device attributes such as device limit, device platform, OS Version, manufacturer or device ownership (Personally owned devices). The recommended state is to Block personally owned devices from enrollment.", + "RationaleStatement": "Restricting the enrollment of personally owned devices prevents attackers who have bypassed other controls from registering a new device to gain an additional foothold, further hiding or obscuring their activities. An attack path could be: 1. Account Compromise via Phishing and AiTM 2. Conditional Access Bypass 3. Reconnaissance using e.g. ROADrecon, GraphRunner or AADInternals 4. Lateral Movement, Privilege Escalation or Persistence through a newly registered device enrolled in Intune", + "ImpactStatement": "Per platform personally owned device enrollment impacts are listed below. It is important to test the changes to the defaults prior to moving into production and implementing this control. Windows Devices The following enrollment methods are authorized for corporate enrollment for Windows devices, any other enrollment method will be considered \"Personal\" and blocked: - The device enrolls through Windows Autopilot. - The device enrolls through GPO, or automatic enrollment from Configuration Manager for co-management. - The device enrolls through a bulk provisioning package. - The enrolling user is using a device enrollment manager account. MacOS By default, Intune classifies macOS devices as personally owned. To be classified as corporate-owned, a Mac must fulfill one of the following conditions: - Registered with a serial number. - Enrolled via Apple Automated Device Enrollment (ADE). iOS/IPadOS devices By default, Intune classifies iOS/iPadOS devices as personally owned. To be classified as corporate-owned, an iOS/iPadOS device must fulfill one of the following conditions: - Registered with a serial number or IMEI. - Enrolled by using Automated Device Enrollment (formerly Device Enrollment Program). Android devices By default, until you manually make changes in the admin center, your Android Enterprise work profile device settings and Android device administrator device settings are the same. If you block Android Enterprise work profile enrollment on personal devices, only corporate-owned devices can enroll with personally owned work profiles.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Intune admin center https://intune.microsoft.com/ 2. Select Devices and then under Device onboarding click Enrollment 3. Under Enrollment options select Device platform restriction. 4. Inspect the policies listed under Device type restrictions o For the Default priority policy, click All Users. o Select Properties. 5. Click Edit to change Platform settings. 6. In the Personally owned column set each platform to Block. Note: Blocking platforms that are not used in the organization is a more restrictive best practice and will also effectively block enrollment of personally owned devices for the selected platform, ensuring compliance for this recommendation.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Intune admin center https://intune.microsoft.com/ 2. Select Devices and then under Device onboarding click Enrollment 3. Under Enrollment options select Device platform restriction. 4. Inspect the policies listed under Device type restrictions o For the Default priority policy, click All Users. o Select Properties. 5. Verify that all platforms are set to Block in the Personally owned column. 6. If the Platform itself is set to Block for any of the platforms shown this is also a passing state for that platform. Note: Blocking platforms that are not used in the organization is a more restrictive best practice and will also effectively block enrollment of personally owned devices for the selected platform, ensuring compliance for this recommendation. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"DeviceManagementConfiguration.Read.All\" 2. Run the following script: $Uri = 'https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/deviceManagement/deviceEnrollmentConfigurat ions' $Config = (Invoke-MgGraphRequest -Uri $Uri -Method GET).value | Where-Object { $_.id -match 'DefaultPlatformRestrictions' -and $_.priority - eq 0 } $Result = [PSCustomObject]@{ WindowsPersonalDeviceEnrollmentBlocked = $Config.windowsRestriction.personalDeviceEnrollmentBlocked iOSPersonalDeviceEnrollmentBlocked = $Config.iosRestriction.personalDeviceEnrollmentBlocked AndroidForWorkPersonalDeviceEnrollmentBlocked = $Config.androidForWorkRestriction.personalDeviceEnrollmentBlocked MacOPersonalDeviceEnrollmentBlocked = $Config.macOSRestriction.personalDeviceEnrollmentBlocked AndroidPersonalDeviceEnrollmentBlocked = $Config.androidRestriction.personalDeviceEnrollmentBlocked } $Result 3. Inspect the output, ensure each platform displays True next to its property. A passing output will look like the below: WindowsPersonalDeviceEnrollmentBlocked : True iOSPersonalDeviceEnrollmentBlocked : True AndroidForWorkPersonalDeviceEnrollmentBlocked : True MacOPersonalDeviceEnrollmentBlocked : True AndroidPersonalDeviceEnrollmentBlocked : True Note: If platformBlocked is true then that platform is also in compliance as the platform is blocked from enrollment entirely. This is not currently reflected in the audit script but can be queried from the same API call.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Allow", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/enrollment/enrollment-restrictions-set:https://www.glueckkanja.com/blog/security/2025/01/compliant-device-bypass-en/" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.2.1", + "Description": "Legacy per-user Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) can be configured to require individual users to provide multiple authentication factors, such as passwords and additional verification codes, to access their accounts. It was introduced in earlier versions of Office 365, prior to the more comprehensive implementation of Conditional Access (CA).", + "Checks": [ + "entra_users_mfa_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.2 Users", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Legacy per-user Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) can be configured to require individual users to provide multiple authentication factors, such as passwords and additional verification codes, to access their accounts. It was introduced in earlier versions of Office 365, prior to the more comprehensive implementation of Conditional Access (CA).", + "RationaleStatement": "Both security defaults and conditional access with security defaults turned off are not compatible with per-user multi-factor authentication (MFA), which can lead to undesirable user authentication states. The CIS Microsoft 365 Benchmark explicitly employs Conditional Access for MFA as an enhancement over security defaults and as a replacement for the outdated per-user MFA. To ensure a consistent authentication state disable per-user MFA on all accounts.", + "ImpactStatement": "Accounts using per-user MFA will need to be migrated to use CA. Prior to disabling per-user MFA the organization must be prepared to implement conditional access MFA to avoid security gaps and allow for a smooth transition. This will help ensure relevant accounts are covered by MFA during the change phase from disabling per-user MFA to enabling CA MFA. Section 5.2.2 in this document covers the creation of a CA rule for both administrators and all users in the tenant. Microsoft has documentation on migrating from per-user MFA Convert users from per- user MFA to Conditional Access based MFA", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Users and select All users. 3. Click on Per-user MFA on the top row. 4. Click the empty box next to Display Name to select all accounts. 5. On the far right under quick steps click Disable.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Users and select All users. 3. Click on Per-user MFA on the top row. 4. Verify that the Multi-factor Auth Status column shows Disabled for each account. To audit using Microsoft Graph 1. Determine the id or userPrincipalName of the user being audited. 2. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: beta/users/{id | userPrincipalName}/authentication/requirements # Example https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/users/071cc716-8147-4397-a5ba- b2105951cc0b/authentication/requirements 3. Verify that the perUserMfaState property is set to disabled. 4. Repeat this process for all users within the tenant. Note: This API is in beta and does not support a list operation. To prevent server-side throttling, clients should implement batching and client-side rate limiting when auditing medium to large sized environments.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Disabled", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-mfa-userstates#convert-users-from-per-user-mfa-to-conditional-access:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/security-and-compliance/set-up-multi-factor-authentication?view=o365-worldwide#use-conditional-access-policies:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-mfa-userstates#convert-per-user-mfa-enabled-and-enforced-users-to-disabled:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/authentication-get?view=graph-rest-beta" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.2.2", + "Description": "This setting controls whether standard users can register applications in the Microsoft Entra ID directory. When enabled, any user can create app registrations, which function as identity objects for applications.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_thirdparty_integrated_apps_not_allowed" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.2 Users", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting controls whether standard users can register applications in the Microsoft Entra ID directory. When enabled, any user can create app registrations, which function as identity objects for applications.", + "RationaleStatement": "Allowing standard users to create app registrations expands the tenant's attack surface. A compromised account or malicious insider could create a rogue app registration to establish a persistent OAuth client, facilitate token theft, or impersonate a legitimate application. Restricting app registration to privileged roles ensures that new application identities in the directory are subject to administrative review and approval before they can be granted permissions to organizational resources.", + "ImpactStatement": "End users will no longer be able to register applications independently, including both third-party integrations and custom applications. Developers and IT staff who create app registrations as part of normal workflows will be affected and will need to submit registration requests to a privileged administrator (e.g., Application Administrator or Cloud Application Administrator). Organizations should establish a formal request and approval process before implementing this change to avoid workflow disruption.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Users and select Users settings. 3. Set Users can register applications to No. 4. Click Save. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.ReadWrite.Authorization\" 2. Run the following commands: $param = @{ AllowedToCreateApps = $false } Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -DefaultUserRolePermissions $param", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Users and select Users settings. 3. Verify that Users can register applications is set to No. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.Read.All\" 2. Run the following command: (Get-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy).DefaultUserRolePermissions | fl AllowedToCreateApps 3. Verify the returned value is False.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Yes (Users can register applications.)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/how-applications-are-added:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/delegate-app-roles#restrict-who-can-create-applications" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.2.3", + "Description": "Non-privileged users can create tenants in the Microsoft Entra ID and Microsoft Entra administration portal under \"Manage tenant\". The creation of a tenant is recorded in the Audit log as category \"DirectoryManagement\" and activity \"Create Company\". By default, the user who creates a Microsoft Entra tenant is automatically assigned the Global Administrator role. The newly created tenant doesn't inherit any settings or configurations.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_policy_ensure_default_user_cannot_create_tenants" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.2 Users", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Non-privileged users can create tenants in the Microsoft Entra ID and Microsoft Entra administration portal under \"Manage tenant\". The creation of a tenant is recorded in the Audit log as category \"DirectoryManagement\" and activity \"Create Company\". By default, the user who creates a Microsoft Entra tenant is automatically assigned the Global Administrator role. The newly created tenant doesn't inherit any settings or configurations.", + "RationaleStatement": "Restricting tenant creation prevents unauthorized or uncontrolled deployment of resources and ensures that the organization retains control over its infrastructure. User generation of shadow IT could lead to multiple, disjointed environments that can make it difficult for IT to manage and secure the organization's data, especially if other users in the organization began using these tenants for business purposes under the misunderstanding that they were secured by the organization's security team.", + "ImpactStatement": "Non-admin users will need to contact I.T. if they have a valid reason to create a tenant.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand Entra ID > Users and select User settings. 3. Set Restrict non-admin users from creating tenants to Yes then Save. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.ReadWrite.Authorization\" 2. Run the following commands: # Create hashtable and update the auth policy $params = @{ AllowedToCreateTenants = $false } Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -DefaultUserRolePermissions $params", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand Entra ID > Users and select User settings. 3. Verify that Restrict non-admin users from creating tenants is set to Yes To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.Read.All\" 2. Run the following commands: (Get-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy).DefaultUserRolePermissions | Select-Object AllowedToCreateTenants 3. Verify the returned value is False", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "No - Non-administrators can create tenants. AllowedToCreateTenants is True", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/users-default-permissions#restrict-member-users-default-permissions:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference#tenant-creator" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.2.4", + "Description": "This setting restricts non-administrators from loading a set of frequently visited pages in the Microsoft Entra admin center and Azure portal, including home, tenant overview, and the users list. What does it not do? - It does not block programmatic access to Microsoft Entra data via PowerShell, Microsoft Graph API, or other tools like Visual Studio. - It does not apply to users with an administrative role, including custom roles. - It does not prevent all access to the admin center. Many areas are still reachable through alternate paths.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_admin_portals_access_restriction" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.2 Users", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "This setting restricts non-administrators from loading a set of frequently visited pages in the Microsoft Entra admin center and Azure portal, including home, tenant overview, and the users list. What does it not do? - It does not block programmatic access to Microsoft Entra data via PowerShell, Microsoft Graph API, or other tools like Visual Studio. - It does not apply to users with an administrative role, including custom roles. - It does not prevent all access to the admin center. Many areas are still reachable through alternate paths.", + "RationaleStatement": "The Microsoft Entra admin center contains sensitive data and permission settings, which are still enforced based on the user's role. However, an end user may inadvertently change properties or account settings on their own account. This could result in increased administrative overhead. Additionally, a compromised end-user account could be used to enumerate tenant structure, users, and group memberships to support privilege escalation or lateral movement.", + "ImpactStatement": "Non-administrators who own groups will be unable to reach group management pages through the standard admin center navigation. Self-service access to other portal-facing features may also be affected depending on the navigation path used. Because the restriction targets specific frequently accessed pages rather than all portal content, users with direct (deep) links to other admin center sections may still be able to access them. Note: Users will still be able to sign into Microsoft Entra admin center but will be unable to see directory information.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand Entra ID > Users and select User settings. 3. Set Restrict access to Microsoft Entra admin center to Yes then Save.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand Entra ID > Users and select User settings. 3. Verify under the Administration center section that Restrict access to Microsoft Entra admin center is set to Yes.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "No - Non-administrators can access the Microsoft Entra admin center.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/users-default-permissions#restrict-member-users-default-permissions" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.2.5", + "Description": "The option for the user to Stay signed in, or the Keep me signed in option, will prompt a user after a successful login. When the user selects this option, a persistent refresh token is created. The refresh token lasts for 90 days by default and does not prompt for sign-in or multifactor.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.2 Users", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "The option for the user to Stay signed in, or the Keep me signed in option, will prompt a user after a successful login. When the user selects this option, a persistent refresh token is created. The refresh token lasts for 90 days by default and does not prompt for sign-in or multifactor.", + "RationaleStatement": "Allowing users to select this option presents risk, especially if the user signs into their account on a publicly accessible computer/web browser. In this case it would be trivial for an unauthorized person to gain access to any associated cloud data from that account.", + "ImpactStatement": "Once this setting is hidden users will no longer be prompted upon sign-in with the message Stay signed in?. This may mean users will be forced to sign in more frequently. Important: some features of SharePoint Online and Office 2010 have a dependency on users remaining signed in. If you hide this option, users may get additional and unexpected sign in prompts.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Users and select User settings. 3. Set Show keep user signed in to No. 4. Click Save.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Users and select User settings. 3. Verify that Show keep user signed in is highlighted No.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Users may select stay signed in", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concepts-azure-multi-factor-authentication-prompts-session-lifetime:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/how-to-manage-stay-signed-in-prompt" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.2.6", + "Description": "LinkedIn account connections allow users to connect their Microsoft work or school account with LinkedIn. After a user connects their accounts, information and highlights from LinkedIn are available in some Microsoft apps and services.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.2 Users", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "LinkedIn account connections allow users to connect their Microsoft work or school account with LinkedIn. After a user connects their accounts, information and highlights from LinkedIn are available in some Microsoft apps and services.", + "RationaleStatement": "Disabling LinkedIn integration prevents potential phishing attacks and risk scenarios where an external party could accidentally disclose sensitive information.", + "ImpactStatement": "Users will not be able to sync contacts or use LinkedIn integration.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Users and select User settings. 3. Under LinkedIn account connections select No. 4. Click Save.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Users and select User settings. 3. Under LinkedIn account connections, verify that No is selected.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "LinkedIn integration is enabled by default.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/users/linkedin-integration:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/users/linkedin-user-consent" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.3.1", + "Description": "This setting allows users in the organization to create new security groups and add members to these groups in the Azure portal, API, or PowerShell. These new groups also show up in the Access Panel for all other users. If the policy setting on the group allows it, other users can create requests to join these groups. The recommended state is Users can create security groups in Azure portals, API or PowerShell set to No.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.3 Groups", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting allows users in the organization to create new security groups and add members to these groups in the Azure portal, API, or PowerShell. These new groups also show up in the Access Panel for all other users. If the policy setting on the group allows it, other users can create requests to join these groups. The recommended state is Users can create security groups in Azure portals, API or PowerShell set to No.", + "RationaleStatement": "Allowing end users to create security groups without oversight can lead to uncontrolled group sprawl, increasing the risk of inappropriate access to sensitive data. The default assignment of group ownership to the creator introduces a potential for privilege escalation, especially if IT teams overlook how these groups are later used to manage access. A more malicious scenario arises when a compromised non-privileged user creates deceptively named security groups such as \"Accounting\" or \"Break-glass\", or uses homograph techniques to mimic legitimate group names. Third-party IT teams may be particularly susceptible, as they might not be familiar with the environment or lack consistent naming conventions. An unsuspecting administrator could then mistakenly assign elevated privileges, grant access to sensitive data, or exclude these groups from Conditional Access policies, inadvertently creating a serious security gap.", + "ImpactStatement": "Restrictions may introduce some operational friction, particularly in fast-paced or decentralized environments where teams rely on self-service capabilities for collaboration and access management. This can increase reliance on IT teams for routine tasks, potentially causing delays. However, these impacts can be minimized through automated approval workflows and clear governance processes.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Groups and select General. 3. Set Users can create security groups in Azure portals, API or PowerShell to No. 4. Click Save. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.ReadWrite.Authorization\" 2. Run the following commands: $params = @{ defaultUserRolePermissions = @{ AllowedToCreateSecurityGroups = $false } } Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -BodyParameter $params", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Groups and select General. 3. Verify that Users can create security groups in Azure portals, API or PowerShell is set to No. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.Read.All\" 2. Run the following command: (Get-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy).DefaultUserRolePermissions | fl 3. Verify that AllowedToCreateSecurityGroups is False.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "AllowedToCreateSecurityGroups : True", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/users/groups-self-service-management?WT.mc_id=Portal-Microsoft_AAD_IAM#group-settings:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/authorizationpolicy-get?view=graph-rest-1.0&tabs=http:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/users/groups-self-service-management#making-a-group-available-for-end-user-self-service" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.3.2", + "Description": "This setting restricts standard users from accessing the My Groups web interface in the My Account portal (https://myaccount.microsoft.com/groups). When set to Yes, this web interface access is removed for standard users. The recommended state is Yes.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.3 Groups", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "This setting restricts standard users from accessing the My Groups web interface in the My Account portal (https://myaccount.microsoft.com/groups). When set to Yes, this web interface access is removed for standard users. The recommended state is Yes.", + "RationaleStatement": "By default, any authenticated user can access the My Groups portal and enumerate group memberships, SharePoint site URLs, group email addresses, Teams URLs, and Yammer URLs across the tenant. This information enables reconnaissance, where a user could identify high-value or privileged groups, map resource URLs, and use that data to plan further attacks or lateral movement. Restricting the web interface limits passive enumeration by users who do not require group browsing as part of their duties, reducing the available attack surface without impacting core productivity. Note: This setting applies only to the My Groups web interface. API-based enumeration remains possible for users with appropriate permissions or tooling, and this control should not be treated as a complete enumeration defense.", + "ImpactStatement": "Setting this to Yes creates administrative overhead for users who need to look up group memberships and must now request that information from an administrator.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Groups and select General. 3. Under Self Service Group Management, set Restrict user ability to access groups features in My Groups. Group and User Admin will have read-only access when the value of this setting is 'Yes' to Yes. 4. Click Save.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Groups and select General. 3. Under Self Service Group Management, verify that Restrict user ability to access groups features in My Groups. Group and User Admin will have read-only access when the value of this setting is 'Yes' is set to Yes.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "No", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/users/groups-self-service-management" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.3.3", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra ID provides self-service group management features that enable users to create and manage their own security groups or Microsoft 365 groups. The owner of the group can approve or deny membership requests and delegate control of group membership. Self-service group management features aren't available for mail-enabled security groups or distribution lists. The recommended state is No.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.3 Groups", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra ID provides self-service group management features that enable users to create and manage their own security groups or Microsoft 365 groups. The owner of the group can approve or deny membership requests and delegate control of group membership. Self-service group management features aren't available for mail-enabled security groups or distribution lists. The recommended state is No.", + "RationaleStatement": "Group owners are standard users who may not have visibility into access governance requirements for a given group. Allowing owners to approve membership requests through My Groups means additions to security groups or Microsoft 365 groups can occur without administrator review, bypassing formal access provisioning controls. Unauthorized or excessive group membership can expand a user's effective permissions and increase the blast radius of a compromised account.", + "ImpactStatement": "Administrators will be responsible for managing group membership requests instead of group owners, which is the default behavior. Administrative overhead will only increase if this setting was previously changed to Yes.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Groups select General. 3. Set Owners can manage group membership requests in My Groups to No. 4. Click Save.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Groups and select General. 3. Verify that Owners can manage group membership requests in My Groups is set to No", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "No", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/users/groups-self-service-management#making-a-group-available-for-end-user-self-service" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.3.4", + "Description": "All users within a Microsoft Entra organization are permitted to create new Microsoft 365 groups and add members to those groups through the Azure portal, API, or PowerShell. Newly created groups also appear in the Access Panel for all other users. When the applicable group policy settings allow it, users can submit requests to join these groups. The recommended state is No.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.3 Groups", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "All users within a Microsoft Entra organization are permitted to create new Microsoft 365 groups and add members to those groups through the Azure portal, API, or PowerShell. Newly created groups also appear in the Access Panel for all other users. When the applicable group policy settings allow it, users can submit requests to join these groups. The recommended state is No.", + "RationaleStatement": "Restricting Microsoft 365 group creation to administrators only ensures that creation of Microsoft 365 groups is controlled by the administrator. Appropriate groups should be created and managed by the administrator and group creation rights should not be delegated to any other user.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling this setting could create a number of requests that would need to be managed by an administrator.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Groups and select General. 3. Set Users can create Microsoft 365 groups in Azure portals, API or PowerShell to No 4. Click Save. To remediate using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a PATCH request to the following relative URI: v1.0/groupSettings 2. Target the object with the templateId of 62375ab9-6b52-47ed-826b- 58e47e0e304b 3. Update EnableGroupCreation to false. Note: If a group with the above templateId doesn't exist this means the defaults are present and it would be advisable to use the UI to remediate, as this will automatically create the Group.Unified object with its defaults. Microsoft's documentation does cover using a POST request to build this using the API, however.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Groups and select General. 3. Verify that Users can create Microsoft 365 groups in Azure portals, API or PowerShell is set to No To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/groupSettings 2. Filter to groups with the templateId of 62375ab9-6b52-47ed-826b- 58e47e0e304b 3. Verify that EnableGroupCreation is false. 4. If the group with the above templateId does not exist, then it means the setting is in its default state and is not compliant.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Yes", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/solutions/manage-creation-of-groups:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/group-list-settings?view=graph-rest-0&tabs=http:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/groupsetting-update?view=graph-rest-1.0&tabs=http" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.4.1", + "Description": "This setting enables you to select the users who can register their devices as Microsoft Entra joined devices. The recommended state is Selected or None. Note: This setting is applicable only to Microsoft Entra join on Windows 10 or newer. This setting doesn't apply to Microsoft Entra hybrid joined devices, Microsoft Entra joined VMs in Azure, or Microsoft Entra joined devices that use Windows Autopilot self- deployment mode because these methods work in a userless context.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.4 Devices", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting enables you to select the users who can register their devices as Microsoft Entra joined devices. The recommended state is Selected or None. Note: This setting is applicable only to Microsoft Entra join on Windows 10 or newer. This setting doesn't apply to Microsoft Entra hybrid joined devices, Microsoft Entra joined VMs in Azure, or Microsoft Entra joined devices that use Windows Autopilot self- deployment mode because these methods work in a userless context.", + "RationaleStatement": "If a threat actor compromises a standard user account, they can enroll a rogue device under that user's identity. This device may inherit MDM policies and appear compliant, giving attackers persistent access to cloud resources without triggering MFA. In a 2023 blog, Microsoft IR reports that it has detected threat actors registering their own devices to the Microsoft Entra tenant, giving them a platform to escalate the cyberattack. While simply joining a device to a Microsoft Entra tenant may present limited immediate risk, it could allow a threat actor to establish a foothold in the environment.", + "ImpactStatement": "Restricting the setting requires IT teams to assign enrollment permissions to specific staff, such as helpdesk or provisioning personnel, which may impact user-driven Autopilot scenarios and increase administrative overhead for device onboarding and support.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Devices and select Device settings. 3. Set Users may join devices to Microsoft Entra to Selected (and add members) or None.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Devices and select Device settings. 3. Verify that Users may join devices to Microsoft Entra is set to Selected or None. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: beta/policies/deviceRegistrationPolicy 3. Verify that azureADJoin.allowedToJoin.@odata.type is one of the following: o #microsoft.graph.enumeratedDeviceRegistrationMembership (Selected) o #microsoft.graph.noDeviceRegistrationMembership (None). Note: When set to Selected, users and groups will also appear in the output of the Graph Request.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "All", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/devices/manage-device-identities#configure-device-settings:https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/12/05/microsoft-incident-response-lessons-on-preventing-cloud-identity-compromise/#poor-device:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/deviceregistrationpolicy?view=graph-rest-beta" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.4.2", + "Description": "This setting defines the maximum number of Microsoft Entra joined or registered devices that a user can have in Microsoft Entra ID. Once this limit is reached, no additional devices can be added until existing ones are removed. Values above 100 are automatically capped at 100. The recommended state is 10 or less.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.4 Devices", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting defines the maximum number of Microsoft Entra joined or registered devices that a user can have in Microsoft Entra ID. Once this limit is reached, no additional devices can be added until existing ones are removed. Values above 100 are automatically capped at 100. The recommended state is 10 or less.", + "RationaleStatement": "Microsoft incident response teams have observed threat actors enrolling their own devices to establish persistence after a non-privileged user has been compromised. High device quotas can exacerbate this risk by enabling attackers to register multiple devices that appear legitimate, while also contributing to unmanaged or personal devices cluttering the environment, driving up licensing costs and complicating compliance efforts. Enforcing a reasonable device limit per user supports good governance, reduces the attack surface, and encourages administrators to reassess and clean up legacy or unused device enrollments.", + "ImpactStatement": "IT staff who need to enroll more than 10 devices on behalf of the organization must be assigned the role of Device Enrollment Manager in the Intune admin center. Device Enrollment Managers are non-administrator accounts that can enroll and manage up to 1,000 devices. It is recommended to use dedicated service accounts for this role rather than assigning it to users' primary or daily-use accounts. Warning: Do not delete accounts assigned as a Device enrollment manager if any devices were enrolled using the account. Doing so will lead to issues with these devices.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Devices and select Device settings. 3. Set Maximum number of devices per user to 10 or less.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Devices and select Device settings. 3. Verify that Maximum number of devices per user is set to 10 or less. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/policies/deviceRegistrationPolicy 2. Verify that userDeviceQuota is 10 or less.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "50", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/devices/manage-device-identities#configure-device-settings:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/intune-service/enrollment/device-enrollment-manager-enroll:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/deviceregistrationpolicy?view=graph-rest-beta" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.4.3", + "Description": "This setting controls whether the Global Administrator role is automatically added to the local administrators group on a device during the Microsoft Entra join process. The recommended state is No.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.4 Devices", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting controls whether the Global Administrator role is automatically added to the local administrators group on a device during the Microsoft Entra join process. The recommended state is No.", + "RationaleStatement": "System administrators may be inclined to use over-privileged accounts for convenience when managing devices. Enforcing this control helps discourage that behavior by requiring administrative actions to be performed using accounts specifically designated for local administration. This promotes adherence to the principle of least privilege and reduces the risk associated with using high-level roles for routine tasks. For example, using a Global Administrator account to authenticate to a compromised endpoint and continue performing tasks significantly increases the risk of broader organizational compromise.", + "ImpactStatement": "Restricting the default behavior and requiring manual assignment to least privilege roles introduces minor administrative overhead. During the Microsoft Entra join process, the Microsoft Entra Joined Device Local Administrator role is automatically added to the device's local administrators group and should be used instead.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Devices and select Device settings. 3. Set Global administrator role is added as local administrator on the device during Microsoft Entra join (Preview) to No.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Devices and select Device settings. 3. Verify that Global administrator role is added as local administrator on the device during Microsoft Entra join (Preview) is set to No. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: beta/policies/deviceRegistrationPolicy 2. Verify that azureADJoin.localAdmins.enableGlobalAdmins is False.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Yes", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/devices/manage-device-identities#configure-device-settings:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/deviceregistrationpolicy?view=graph-rest-beta:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/devices/assign-local-admin" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.4.4", + "Description": "This setting determines if the Microsoft Entra user registering their device as Microsoft Entra join will be added to the local administrators group. This setting applies only once during the actual registration of the device as Microsoft Entra join. The recommended state is Selected or None.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.4 Devices", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting determines if the Microsoft Entra user registering their device as Microsoft Entra join will be added to the local administrators group. This setting applies only once during the actual registration of the device as Microsoft Entra join. The recommended state is Selected or None.", + "RationaleStatement": "To uphold the principle of least privilege, the assignment of local administrator rights during Microsoft Entra join should be centrally managed using appropriate built-in roles through Intune. This approach minimizes the number of disparate users with elevated privileges, reducing the attack surface and potential for misuse. Centralized management also streamlines the deprovisioning process, ensuring that administrative access can be revoked efficiently and consistently across all devices, rather than requiring manual intervention on each individual endpoint.", + "ImpactStatement": "Restricting the default behavior and requiring manual assignment to built-in roles introduces minor administrative overhead. During the Microsoft Entra join process, the Microsoft Entra Joined Device Local Administrator role is automatically added to the device's local administrators group and should be used instead.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Devices and select Device settings. 3. Set Registering user is added as local administrator on the device during Microsoft Entra join (Preview) to Selected (and add members) or None.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Devices and select Device settings. 3. Verify that Registering user is added as local administrator on the device during Microsoft Entra join (Preview) is set to Selected or None. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: beta/policies/deviceRegistrationPolicy 2. Verify that azureADJoin.localAdmins.registeringUsers.@odata.type is one of the following: o #microsoft.graph.enumeratedDeviceRegistrationMembership (Selected) o #microsoft.graph.noDeviceRegistrationMembership (None). Note: When set to Selected, users and groups will also appear in the output of the Graph Request.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "All", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/devices/manage-device-identities#configure-device-settings:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/deviceregistrationpolicy?view=graph-rest-beta:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/devices/assign-local-admin" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.4.5", + "Description": "Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS) is the management of local account passwords on Windows devices. LAPS provides a solution to securely manage and retrieve the built-in local admin password. With cloud version of LAPS, customers can enable storing and rotation of local admin passwords for both Microsoft Entra and Microsoft Entra hybrid join devices The recommended state is Yes.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.4 Devices", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS) is the management of local account passwords on Windows devices. LAPS provides a solution to securely manage and retrieve the built-in local admin password. With cloud version of LAPS, customers can enable storing and rotation of local admin passwords for both Microsoft Entra and Microsoft Entra hybrid join devices The recommended state is Yes.", + "RationaleStatement": "Managing local Administrator passwords across multiple systems can be challenging. As a result, many organizations opt to configure the same password on all workstations and/or member servers during deployment. However, this practice introduces a significant security risk: if an attacker compromises one system and obtains the local Administrator password, they can potentially gain administrative access to every other system using that same password. Additionally, enabling LAPS at the tenant level is a prerequisite for implementing LAPS- related recommendations outlined in the CIS Microsoft Intune for Windows Workstation Benchmarks. Note: Enabling LAPS at the tenant level does not automatically enforce password rotation for built-in Administrator accounts. To activate LAPS functionality, appropriate policies must be configured in Intune Settings Catalog or under the Endpoint security > Account protection blade. The CIS Microsoft 365 Foundations Benchmark focuses on hardening at the tenant level, while the CIS Intune Benchmarks focus on endpoint-specific configurations.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling LAPS requires some additional operational overhead. Although unlikely if a password is rotated and not retrieved or backed up before the device becomes unreachable (e.g., due to hardware failure, network isolation, or being decommissioned), administrators may be locked out.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Devices and select Device settings. 3. Set Enable Microsoft Entra Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS) to Yes.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Devices and select Device settings. 3. Verify that Enable Microsoft Entra Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS) is set to Yes. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/policies/deviceRegistrationPolicy 2. Verify that localAdminPassword.isEnabled is True.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "No", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/devices/manage-device-identities#configure-device-settings:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/deviceregistrationpolicy?view=graph-rest-beta:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/devices/howto-manage-local-admin-passwords" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.4.6", + "Description": "This setting determines if users can self-service recover their BitLocker key(s). 'Yes' restricts non-admin users from being able to see the BitLocker key(s) for their owned devices if there are any. 'No' allows all users to recover their BitLocker key(s). The recommended state is Yes.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.4 Devices", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting determines if users can self-service recover their BitLocker key(s). 'Yes' restricts non-admin users from being able to see the BitLocker key(s) for their owned devices if there are any. 'No' allows all users to recover their BitLocker key(s). The recommended state is Yes.", + "RationaleStatement": "Restricting user access to the self-service BitLocker recovery key portal helps mitigate the risk of recovery key exposure in the event of a compromised user account. If an attacker gains access to both the user's credentials and the physical device, they could potentially retrieve the recovery key and decrypt sensitive data. The recovery key itself is also considered sensitive information.", + "ImpactStatement": "Restricting this setting will increase administrative overhead and may introduce friction between end users and the helpdesk, as users will no longer be able to retrieve BitLocker recovery keys through the self-service portal. This portal was originally designed to streamline recovery and reduce support burden. During the CrowdStrike Falcon Sensor outage in July 2024, many endpoints entered recovery mode, and delays in accessing recovery keys contributed to prolonged downtime. Limiting self-service access could exacerbate such delays in future incidents, especially in large or distributed environments.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Devices and select Device settings. 3. Set Restrict users from recovering the BitLocker key(s) for their owned devices to Yes. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.ReadWrite.Authorization\" 2. Run the following: $params = @{ defaultUserRolePermissions = @{ AllowedToReadBitlockerKeysForOwnedDevice = $false } } Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -BodyParameter $params", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Devices and select Device settings. 3. Verify that Restrict users from recovering the BitLocker key(s) for their owned devices is set to Yes. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.Read.All\" 2. Run the following: (Get-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy).DefaultUserRolePermissions | fl 3. Verify that AllowedToReadBitlockerKeysForOwnedDevice is False.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "No", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/devices/manage-device-identities#configure-device-settings:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/authorizationpolicy-get?view=graph-rest-1.0:https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/intunecustomersuccess/user-self-service-bitlocker-recovery-key-access-with-intune-company-portal-websi/4150458:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/recovery-process#self-recovery" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.5.1", + "Description": "Control when end users and group owners are allowed to grant consent to applications, and when they will be required to request administrator review and approval. Allowing users to grant apps access to data helps them acquire useful applications and be productive but can represent a risk in some situations if it's not monitored and controlled carefully.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_policy_restricts_user_consent_for_apps" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.5 Enterprise apps", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Control when end users and group owners are allowed to grant consent to applications, and when they will be required to request administrator review and approval. Allowing users to grant apps access to data helps them acquire useful applications and be productive but can represent a risk in some situations if it's not monitored and controlled carefully.", + "RationaleStatement": "Attackers commonly use custom applications to trick users into granting them access to company data. Restricting user consent mitigates this risk and helps to reduce the threat-surface.", + "ImpactStatement": "If user consent is disabled, previous consent grants will still be honored but all future consent operations must be performed by an administrator. Tenant-wide admin consent can be requested by users through an integrated administrator consent request workflow or through organizational support processes.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID and select Enterprise apps. 3. Under Security select Consent and permissions > User consent settings. 4. Under User consent for applications select Do not allow user consent. 5. Click the Save option at the top of the window.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID and select Enterprise apps. 3. Under Security select Consent and permissions > User consent settings. 4. Verify that User consent for applications is set to Do not allow user consent. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.Read.All\" 2. Run the following command: (Get-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy).DefaultUserRolePermissions | Select-Object -ExpandProperty PermissionGrantPoliciesAssigned 3. Verify that the returned array does not contain either ManagePermissionGrantsForSelf.microsoft-user-default-low or ManagePermissionGrantsForSelf.microsoft-user-default-legacy. If either of these strings is present, the audit fails.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "UI - Allow user consent for apps", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/enterprise-apps/configure-user-consent?pivots=portal:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.graph.identity.signins/get-mgpolicyauthorizationpolicy?view=graph-powershell-1.0" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.5.2", + "Description": "The admin consent workflow gives admins a secure way to grant access to applications that require admin approval. When a user tries to access an application but is unable to provide consent, they can send a request for admin approval. The request is sent via email to admins who have been designated as reviewers. A reviewer takes action on the request, and the user is notified of the action.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_admin_consent_workflow_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.5 Enterprise apps", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The admin consent workflow gives admins a secure way to grant access to applications that require admin approval. When a user tries to access an application but is unable to provide consent, they can send a request for admin approval. The request is sent via email to admins who have been designated as reviewers. A reviewer takes action on the request, and the user is notified of the action.", + "RationaleStatement": "The admin consent workflow (Preview) gives admins a secure way to grant access to applications that require admin approval. When a user tries to access an application but is unable to provide consent, they can send a request for admin approval. The request is sent via email to admins who have been designated as reviewers. A reviewer acts on the request, and the user is notified of the action.", + "ImpactStatement": "To approve requests, a reviewer must be a global administrator, cloud application administrator, or application administrator. The reviewer must already have one of these admin roles assigned; simply designating them as a reviewer doesn't elevate their privileges.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID and select Enterprise apps. 3. Under Security select Consent and permissions. 4. Under Manage select Admin consent settings. 5. Set Users can request admin consent to apps they are unable to consent to to Yes under Admin consent requests. 6. Under the Reviewers choose the Roles and Groups that will review user generated app consent requests. 7. Set Selected users will receive email notifications for requests to Yes 8. Select Save at the top of the window.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID and select Enterprise apps. 3. Under Security select Consent and permissions. 4. Under Manage select Admin consent settings. 5. Verify that Users can request admin consent to apps they are unable to consent to is set to Yes. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.Read.All\" 2. Run the following command: Get-MgPolicyAdminConsentRequestPolicy | fl IsEnabled,NotifyReviewers,RemindersEnabled 3. Verify that IsEnabled is True.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "- Users can request admin consent to apps they are unable to consent to: No - Selected users to review admin consent requests: None - Selected users will receive email notifications for requests: Yes - Selected users will receive request expiration reminders: Yes - Consent request expires after (days): 30", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/enterprise-apps/configure-admin-consent-workflow" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.5.3", + "Description": "In Microsoft Entra ID, applications and service principals can authenticate using either certificate credentials or password credentials (also referred to as client secrets). This setting enforces a tenant-wide restriction that prevents new password credentials from being added to any application registration or service principal. The policy is implemented through the default app management policy and applies to all applications unless scoped exceptions are configured. The setting does not revoke or invalidate existing password credentials; credentials created before the policy was enabled remain valid until they expire or are explicitly removed. The recommended state is Block password addition set to On.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_default_app_management_policy_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.5 Enterprise apps", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "In Microsoft Entra ID, applications and service principals can authenticate using either certificate credentials or password credentials (also referred to as client secrets). This setting enforces a tenant-wide restriction that prevents new password credentials from being added to any application registration or service principal. The policy is implemented through the default app management policy and applies to all applications unless scoped exceptions are configured. The setting does not revoke or invalidate existing password credentials; credentials created before the policy was enabled remain valid until they expire or are explicitly removed. The recommended state is Block password addition set to On.", + "RationaleStatement": "Password credentials (client secrets) used for application authentication are static string values that offer weaker security guarantees than certificate or federated credentials. Unlike certificates, client secrets carry no built-in proof of possession and are frequently stored in plaintext in source code, configuration files, CI/CD pipelines, and shell history. A leaked client secret grants any holder the ability to authenticate as the application to Microsoft Entra ID, potentially accessing any resource or permission scope assigned to that application. Blocking the addition of new password credentials eliminates this attack surface for applications created going forward and forces adoption of stronger credential types such as certificates.", + "ImpactStatement": "This policy applies to new password credential additions only. Existing client secrets remain valid until they expire or are explicitly revoked; this recommendation does not retroactively invalidate credentials created before the policy was enabled. Any automated process, pipeline, or script that programmatically adds client secrets to application registrations or service principals will be blocked once the policy is enabled, unless an exception is configured. Applications that have not yet migrated to certificate- based authentication or workload identity federation will require changes before new credentials can be added.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID and select Enterprise apps. 3. Under Security select Application policies. 4. Select Block password addition. 5. Set Status to On. 6. Set Applies to to one of the following: o All applications o All applications with exclusions (if using exclusions, ensure they are reviewed annually). 7. Set Only apply to apps created after to a desired date or leave it unconfigured. 8. Select Save and close to apply the changes. To remediate using the Microsoft Graph API: Important: The PATCH request replaces the passwordCredentials array in full. Retrieve the current policy first and include all existing entries in the request body to avoid overwriting other configured restrictions or exclusions. 1. Execute a GET request to retrieve the current policy: v1.0/policies/defaultAppManagementPolicy 2. Modify the returned JSON to reflect the following changes: - Set isEnabled to true. - Under applicationRestrictions.passwordCredentials, locate the entry where restrictionType is passwordAddition and set the following: o state to enabled o restrictForAppsCreatedAfterDateTime to 0001-01-01T00:00:00Z or a desired date. - Under servicePrincipalRestrictions.passwordCredentials, locate the entry where restrictionType is passwordAddition and set the following: o state to enabled o restrictForAppsCreatedAfterDateTime to 0001-01-01T00:00:00Z or a desired date. 3. Execute a PATCH request to the same URI with the modified JSON in the request body to apply the changes. Note: The References section includes a link to the API documentation with full remediation examples in multiple languages including HTTP, PowerShell, and Python.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID and select Enterprise apps. 3. Under Security select Application policies. 4. Select Block password addition. 5. Verify that Status is set to On. 6. Verify that Applies to is set to one of the following: o All applications o All applications with exclusions (if using exclusions, verify they are reviewed annually). 7. Verify that Only apply to apps created after is one of the following states: o Not configured (Field will show Select a date with no date selected) o A date that is on or before the date of the assessment. 8. Compliance is met when all of the above conditions are satisfied. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: Note: Both the application restrictions and service principal restrictions must be audited to ensure password addition is properly blocked, as they can be independently configured in Graph or PowerShell. The UI only surfaces the combined state of both settings. 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI to get the default app management policy: v1.0/policies/defaultAppManagementPolicy 2. Verify that isEnabled is true, this indicates that the default app management policy is enabled and being applied to the tenant. Part 1: Audit application restrictions 1. Under applicationRestrictions.passwordCredentials, locate the entry where restrictionType is passwordAddition. 2. Verify the following conditions are met for applicationRestrictions.passwordCredentials: o state is enabled o restrictForAppsCreatedAfterDateTime is one of the following states: - 0001-01-01T00:00:00Z (not configured) - A date that is on or before the date of the assessment. 3. Compliance is met when all of the above conditions are satisfied. Part 2: Audit service principal restrictions 1. Under servicePrincipalRestrictions.passwordCredentials, locate the entry where restrictionType is passwordAddition. 2. Verify the following conditions are met for servicePrincipalRestrictions.passwordCredentials: o state is enabled o restrictForAppsCreatedAfterDateTime is one of the following states: - 0001-01-01T00:00:00Z (not configured) - A date that is on or before the date of the assessment. 3. Compliance is met when all of the above conditions are satisfied. Note: Presently the API does not surface application exclusions, only excluded callers, so it is not necessary to audit them for compliance.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Off", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/enterprise-apps/configure-app-management-policies?tabs=portal:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/enterprise-apps/tutorial-enforce-secret-standards?pivots=ms-graph:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/tenantappmanagementpolicy?view=graph-rest-1.0:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/zero-trust-protect-identities#enforce-standards-for-app-secrets-and-certificates" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.5.4", + "Description": "In Microsoft Entra ID, applications and service principals can authenticate using password credentials (also referred to as client secrets). This setting enforces a tenant- wide maximum lifetime for new password credentials added to any application registration or service principal. When enabled, any client secret created must have an expiration date that falls within the configured maximum, which for this recommendation is 180 days or less. The policy is implemented through the default app management policy and applies to all applications unless scoped exceptions are configured. The setting does not retroactively shorten or invalidate existing password credentials; secrets created before the policy was enabled remain valid until they expire or are explicitly removed. The recommended state is Restrict max password lifetime set to On: 180 days or less.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_default_app_management_policy_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.5 Enterprise apps", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "In Microsoft Entra ID, applications and service principals can authenticate using password credentials (also referred to as client secrets). This setting enforces a tenant- wide maximum lifetime for new password credentials added to any application registration or service principal. When enabled, any client secret created must have an expiration date that falls within the configured maximum, which for this recommendation is 180 days or less. The policy is implemented through the default app management policy and applies to all applications unless scoped exceptions are configured. The setting does not retroactively shorten or invalidate existing password credentials; secrets created before the policy was enabled remain valid until they expire or are explicitly removed. The recommended state is Restrict max password lifetime set to On: 180 days or less.", + "RationaleStatement": "Long-lived client secrets extend the window of exploitation if a credential is compromised. A secret valid for multiple years that is never rotated remains usable even if it was leaked in source code, a build log, or a security breach long after the initial exposure. Enforcing a maximum lifetime of 180 days ensures that client secrets expire on a regular basis, limiting the period during which a stolen credential remains valid and reducing the blast radius of a compromise. This control also encourages teams to establish automated rotation practices, which further reduces reliance on static, long- lived credentials.", + "ImpactStatement": "Any automated process, pipeline, or script that creates client secrets with a lifetime exceeding the configured maximum will fail once the policy is enabled, unless an exception is configured. Organizations will need to update secret creation workflows to specify expiration dates within the allowed range and establish rotation processes for secrets approaching expiry.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID and select Enterprise apps. 3. Under Security select Application policies. 4. Select Restrict max password lifetime. 5. Set Status to On. 6. Set the maximum lifetime to 180 days or less. 7. Set Applies to to one of the following: o All applications o All applications with exclusions (if using exclusions, ensure they are reviewed annually). 8. Set Only apply to apps created after to a desired date or leave it unconfigured. 9. Select Save and close to apply the changes. To remediate using the Microsoft Graph API: Important: The PATCH request replaces the passwordCredentials array in full. Retrieve the current policy first and include all existing entries in the request body to avoid overwriting other configured restrictions or exclusions. 1. Execute a GET request to retrieve the current policy: v1.0/policies/defaultAppManagementPolicy 2. Modify the returned JSON to reflect the following changes: o Set isEnabled to true. o Under applicationRestrictions.passwordCredentials, locate the entry where restrictionType is passwordLifetime and set the following: - state to enabled - maxLifetime to P180D or a shorter duration. - restrictForAppsCreatedAfterDateTime to 0001-01- 01T00:00:00Z or a desired date. o Under servicePrincipalRestrictions.passwordCredentials, locate the entry where restrictionType is passwordLifetime and set the following: - state to enabled - maxLifetime to P180D or a shorter duration. - restrictForAppsCreatedAfterDateTime to 0001-01- 01T00:00:00Z or a desired date. 3. Execute a PATCH request to the same URI with the modified JSON in the request body to apply the changes. Note: The References section includes a link to the API documentation with full remediation examples in multiple languages including HTTP, PowerShell, and Python.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID and select Enterprise apps. 3. Under Security select Application policies. 4. Select Restrict max password lifetime. 5. Verify that Status is set to On. 6. Verify that the configured maximum lifetime is 180 days or less. 7. Verify that Applies to is set to one of the following: o All applications o All applications with exclusions (if using exclusions, verify they are reviewed annually). 8. Verify that Only apply to apps created after is one of the following states: o Not configured (Field will show Select a date with no date selected) o A date that is on or before the date of the assessment. 9. Compliance is met when all of the above conditions are satisfied. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: Note: Both the application restrictions and service principal restrictions must be audited to ensure the password lifetime is properly restricted, as they can be independently configured in Graph or PowerShell. The UI only surfaces the combined state of both settings. 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI to get the default app management policy: v1.0/policies/defaultAppManagementPolicy 2. Verify that isEnabled is true, this indicates that the default app management policy is enabled and being applied to the tenant. Part 1: Audit application restrictions 1. Under applicationRestrictions.passwordCredentials, locate the entry where restrictionType is passwordLifetime. 2. Verify the following conditions are met for applicationRestrictions.passwordCredentials: o state is enabled o maxLifetime is P180D or a shorter duration (e.g., P90D, P30D, etc.) o restrictForAppsCreatedAfterDateTime is one of the following states: - 0001-01-01T00:00:00Z (not configured) - A date that is on or before the date of the assessment. 3. Compliance is met when all of the above conditions are satisfied. Part 2: Audit service principal restrictions 1. Under servicePrincipalRestrictions.passwordCredentials, locate the entry where restrictionType is passwordLifetime. 2. Verify the following conditions are met for servicePrincipalRestrictions.passwordCredentials: o state is enabled o maxLifetime is P180D or a shorter duration (e.g., P90D, P30D, etc.) o restrictForAppsCreatedAfterDateTime is one of the following states: - 0001-01-01T00:00:00Z (not configured) - A date that is on or before the date of the assessment. 3. Compliance is met when all of the above conditions are satisfied. Note: Presently the API does not surface application exclusions, only excluded callers, so it is not necessary to audit them for compliance.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Off", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/enterprise-apps/configure-app-management-policies?tabs=portal:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/enterprise-apps/tutorial-enforce-secret-standards?pivots=ms-graph:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/tenantappmanagementpolicy?view=graph-rest-1.0:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/zero-trust-protect-identities#enforce-standards-for-app-secrets-and-certificates" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.5.5", + "Description": "In Microsoft Entra ID, applications and service principals can authenticate using password credentials (also referred to as client secrets). By default, when adding a new password credential, the caller may supply a custom password value or allow the system to generate one. This setting enforces a tenant-wide restriction that blocks the use of custom password values, requiring all new password credentials to be system- generated. The policy is implemented through the default app management policy and applies to all applications unless scoped exceptions are configured. The setting does not affect existing password credentials; credentials created before the policy was enabled remain valid until they expire or are explicitly removed. The recommended state is Block custom passwords set to On.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_default_app_management_policy_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.5 Enterprise apps", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "In Microsoft Entra ID, applications and service principals can authenticate using password credentials (also referred to as client secrets). By default, when adding a new password credential, the caller may supply a custom password value or allow the system to generate one. This setting enforces a tenant-wide restriction that blocks the use of custom password values, requiring all new password credentials to be system- generated. The policy is implemented through the default app management policy and applies to all applications unless scoped exceptions are configured. The setting does not affect existing password credentials; credentials created before the policy was enabled remain valid until they expire or are explicitly removed. The recommended state is Block custom passwords set to On.", + "RationaleStatement": "Custom password values are chosen by the caller and are susceptible to low entropy, predictable patterns, and reuse across multiple applications. A weak or reused client secret that is compromised through source code exposure, logging, or a supply-chain breach can be trivially exploited by an attacker to authenticate as the application. System-generated passwords use random values of sufficient length and complexity, making them resistant to brute-force and dictionary attacks. Blocking custom passwords removes the weakest credential creation path and ensures that all new client secrets meet a consistent entropy baseline.", + "ImpactStatement": "Any automated process, pipeline, or script that programmatically creates a client secret by supplying a custom password value will be blocked once the policy is enabled, unless an exception is configured. Most tooling, including the Microsoft Entra admin center, Azure CLI, and Azure PowerShell, already defaults to system-generated values, so the operational impact for typical workflows is minimal. Organizations that rely on custom password values in their automation will need to update those workflows to omit the custom value and accept the system-generated secret. Organizations that have policies or regulatory requirements that mandate specific password formats may need to maintain exclusions for certain applications. Exceptions should be scoped narrowly and reviewed regularly to minimize risk.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID and select Enterprise apps. 3. Under Security select Application policies. 4. Select Block custom passwords. 5. Set Status to On. 6. Set Applies to to one of the following: o All applications o All applications with exclusions (if using exclusions, ensure they are reviewed annually). 7. Set Only apply to apps created after to a desired date or leave it unconfigured. 8. Select Save and close to apply the changes. To remediate using the Microsoft Graph API: Important: The PATCH request replaces the passwordCredentials array in full. Retrieve the current policy first and include all existing entries in the request body to avoid overwriting other configured restrictions or exclusions. 1. Execute a GET request to retrieve the current policy: v1.0/policies/defaultAppManagementPolicy 2. Modify the returned JSON to reflect the following changes: o Set isEnabled to true. o Under applicationRestrictions.passwordCredentials, locate the entry where restrictionType is customPasswordAddition and set the following: - state to enabled - restrictForAppsCreatedAfterDateTime to 0001-01- 01T00:00:00Z or a desired date. o Under servicePrincipalRestrictions.passwordCredentials, locate the entry where restrictionType is customPasswordAddition and set the following: - state to enabled - restrictForAppsCreatedAfterDateTime to 0001-01- 01T00:00:00Z or a desired date. 3. Execute a PATCH request to the same URI with the modified JSON in the request body to apply the changes. Note: The References section includes a link to the API documentation with full remediation examples in multiple languages including HTTP, PowerShell, and Python.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID and select Enterprise apps. 3. Under Security select Application policies. 4. Select Block custom passwords. 5. Verify that Status is set to On. 6. Verify that Applies to is set to one of the following: o All applications o All applications with exclusions (if using exclusions, verify they are reviewed annually). 7. Verify that Only apply to apps created after is one of the following states: o Not configured (Field will show Select a date with no date selected) o A date that is on or before the date of the assessment. 8. Compliance is met when all of the above conditions are satisfied. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: Note: Both the application restrictions and service principal restrictions must be audited to ensure custom password addition is properly blocked, as they can be independently configured in Graph or PowerShell. The UI only surfaces the combined state of both settings. 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI to get the default app management policy: v1.0/policies/defaultAppManagementPolicy 2. Verify that isEnabled is true, this indicates that the default app management policy is enabled and being applied to the tenant. Part 1: Audit application restrictions 1. Under applicationRestrictions.passwordCredentials, locate the entry where restrictionType is customPasswordAddition. 2. Verify the following conditions are met for applicationRestrictions.passwordCredentials: o state is enabled o restrictForAppsCreatedAfterDateTime is one of the following states: - 0001-01-01T00:00:00Z (not configured) - A date that is on or before the date of the assessment. 3. Compliance is met when all of the above conditions are satisfied. Part 2: Audit service principal restrictions 1. Under servicePrincipalRestrictions.passwordCredentials, locate the entry where restrictionType is customPasswordAddition. 2. Verify the following conditions are met for servicePrincipalRestrictions.passwordCredentials: o state is enabled o restrictForAppsCreatedAfterDateTime is one of the following states: - 0001-01-01T00:00:00Z (not configured) - A date that is on or before the date of the assessment. 3. Compliance is met when all of the above conditions are satisfied. Note: Presently the API does not surface application exclusions, only excluded callers, so it is not necessary to audit them for compliance.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Off", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/enterprise-apps/configure-app-management-policies?tabs=portal:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/enterprise-apps/tutorial-enforce-secret-standards?pivots=ms-graph:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/tenantappmanagementpolicy?view=graph-rest-1.0:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/zero-trust-protect-identities#enforce-standards-for-app-secrets-and-certificates" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.5.6", + "Description": "In Microsoft Entra ID, applications and service principals can authenticate using certificate credentials. This setting enforces a tenant-wide maximum lifetime for new certificate credentials added to any application registration or service principal. When enabled, any certificate uploaded must have a validity period that falls within the configured maximum, which for this recommendation is 180 days or less. The policy is implemented through the default app management policy and applies to all applications unless scoped exceptions are configured. The setting does not retroactively shorten or invalidate existing certificate credentials; certificates uploaded before the policy was enabled remain valid until they expire or are explicitly removed. The recommended state is Restrict maximum certificate lifetime set to On: 180 days or less.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_default_app_management_policy_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.5 Enterprise apps", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "In Microsoft Entra ID, applications and service principals can authenticate using certificate credentials. This setting enforces a tenant-wide maximum lifetime for new certificate credentials added to any application registration or service principal. When enabled, any certificate uploaded must have a validity period that falls within the configured maximum, which for this recommendation is 180 days or less. The policy is implemented through the default app management policy and applies to all applications unless scoped exceptions are configured. The setting does not retroactively shorten or invalidate existing certificate credentials; certificates uploaded before the policy was enabled remain valid until they expire or are explicitly removed. The recommended state is Restrict maximum certificate lifetime set to On: 180 days or less.", + "RationaleStatement": "Long-lived certificates extend the window of exploitation if a credential is compromised. A certificate valid for multiple years that is never rotated remains usable even if the private key was exposed through a server breach, misconfigured storage, or supply- chain compromise long after the initial exposure. Enforcing a maximum lifetime of 180 days ensures that certificates expire on a regular basis, limiting the period during which a stolen credential remains valid and reducing the blast radius of a compromise. This control also encourages teams to establish automated certificate rotation practices, which further reduces reliance on static, long-lived credentials.", + "ImpactStatement": "Any automated process, pipeline, or script that uploads certificates with a validity period exceeding the configured maximum will be blocked once the policy is enabled, unless an exception is configured. Organizations will need to update certificate issuance workflows to generate certificates with expiration dates within the allowed range and establish rotation processes for certificates approaching expiry.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID and select Enterprise apps. 3. Under Security select Application policies. 4. Select Restrict max certificate lifetime. 5. Set Status to On. 6. Set Applies to to one of the following: o All applications o All applications with exclusions (if using exclusions, ensure they are reviewed annually). 7. Set Only apply to apps created after to a desired date or leave it unconfigured. 8. Set Maximum lifetime (in days) to 180 days or less. 9. Select Save and close to apply the changes. To remediate using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to retrieve the current policy: v1.0/policies/defaultAppManagementPolicy 2. Modify the returned JSON to reflect the following changes: o Set isEnabled to true. o Under applicationRestrictions.keyCredentials, locate the entry where restrictionType is asymmetricKeyLifetime and set the following: - state to enabled - maxLifetime to P180D or a shorter duration. - restrictForAppsCreatedAfterDateTime to 0001-01- 01T00:00:00Z or a desired date. o Under servicePrincipalRestrictions.keyCredentials, locate the entry where restrictionType is asymmetricKeyLifetime and set the following: - state to enabled - maxLifetime to P180D or a shorter duration. - restrictForAppsCreatedAfterDateTime to 0001-01- 01T00:00:00Z or a desired date. 3. Execute a PATCH request to the same URI with the modified JSON in the request body to apply the changes. Note: The References section includes a link to the API documentation with full remediation examples in multiple languages including HTTP, PowerShell, and Python.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID and select Enterprise apps. 3. Under Security select Application policies. 4. Select Restrict max certificate lifetime. 5. Verify that Status is set to On. 6. Verify that Applies to is set to one of the following: o All applications o All applications with exclusions (if using exclusions, verify they are reviewed annually). 7. Verify that Only apply to apps created after is one of the following states: o Not configured (Field will show Select a date with no date selected) o A date that is on or before the date of the assessment. 8. Verify that Maximum lifetime (in days) is 180 days or less. 9. Compliance is met when all of the above conditions are satisfied. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: Note: Both the application restrictions and service principal restrictions must be audited to ensure the certificate lifetime is properly restricted, as they can be independently configured in Graph or PowerShell. The UI only surfaces the combined state of both settings. 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI to get the default app management policy: v1.0/policies/defaultAppManagementPolicy 2. Verify that isEnabled is true, this indicates that the default app management policy is enabled and being applied to the tenant. Part 1: Audit application restrictions 1. Under applicationRestrictions.keyCredentials, locate the entry where restrictionType is asymmetricKeyLifetime. 2. Verify the following conditions are met for applicationRestrictions.keyCredentials: o state is enabled o maxLifetime is P180D or a shorter duration (e.g., P90D, P30D, etc.) o restrictForAppsCreatedAfterDateTime is one of the following states: - 0001-01-01T00:00:00Z (not configured) - A date that is on or before the date of the assessment. 3. Compliance is met when all of the above conditions are satisfied. Part 2: Audit service principal restrictions 1. Under servicePrincipalRestrictions.keyCredentials, locate the entry where restrictionType is asymmetricKeyLifetime. 2. Verify the following conditions are met for servicePrincipalRestrictions.keyCredentials: o state is enabled o maxLifetime is P180D or a shorter duration (e.g., P90D, P30D, etc.) o restrictForAppsCreatedAfterDateTime is one of the following states: - 0001-01-01T00:00:00Z (not configured) - A date that is on or before the date of the assessment. 3. Compliance is met when all of the above conditions are satisfied. Note: Presently the API does not surface application exclusions, only excluded callers, so it is not necessary to audit them for compliance.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Off", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/enterprise-apps/configure-app-management-policies?tabs=portal:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/enterprise-apps/tutorial-enforce-secret-standards?pivots=ms-graph:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/tenantappmanagementpolicy?view=graph-rest-1.0:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/zero-trust-protect-identities#enforce-standards-for-app-secrets-and-certificates" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.6.1", + "Description": "B2B collaboration is a feature within Microsoft Entra External ID that allows for guest invitations to an organization. Ensure users can only send invitations to specified domains. Note: This list works independently from OneDrive for Business and SharePoint Online allow/block lists. To restrict individual file sharing in SharePoint Online, set up an allow or blocklist for OneDrive for Business and SharePoint Online. For instance, in SharePoint or OneDrive users can still share with external users from prohibited domains by using Anyone links if they haven't been disabled.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.6 External Identities", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "B2B collaboration is a feature within Microsoft Entra External ID that allows for guest invitations to an organization. Ensure users can only send invitations to specified domains. Note: This list works independently from OneDrive for Business and SharePoint Online allow/block lists. To restrict individual file sharing in SharePoint Online, set up an allow or blocklist for OneDrive for Business and SharePoint Online. For instance, in SharePoint or OneDrive users can still share with external users from prohibited domains by using Anyone links if they haven't been disabled.", + "RationaleStatement": "By specifying allowed domains for collaborations, external user's companies are explicitly identified. Also, this prevents internal users from inviting unknown external users such as personal accounts and granting them access to resources.", + "ImpactStatement": "This could make collaboration more difficult if the setting is not quickly updated when a new domain is identified as \"allowed\".", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > External Identities and select External collaboration settings. 3. Under Collaboration restrictions, select Allow invitations only to the specified domains (most restrictive) is selected. Then specify the allowed domains under Target domains.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > External Identities and select External collaboration settings. 3. Under Collaboration restrictions, verify that Allow invitations only to the specified domains (most restrictive) is selected. Then verify allowed domains are specified under Target domains. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.Read.All\" 2. Run the following: $Uri = \"https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/legacy/policies\" $Response = (Invoke-MgGraphRequest -Uri $Uri).value | Where-Object { $_.type -eq 'B2BManagementPolicy' } if ($Response) { $Definition = $Response.definition | ConvertFrom-Json $DomainsPolicy = $Definition.B2BManagementPolicy.InvitationsAllowedAndBlockedDomainsPolicy } else { Write-Output \"No policy found.\" return } $DomainsPolicy 3. Verify that the output includes an AllowedDomains property that either contains no domains or lists only organizationally approved domains. If a BlockedDomains property is present, the configuration is considered non-compliant. Example of a compliant output with AllowedDomains defined: AllowedDomains -------------- {cisecurity.org, contoso.com, example.com} Allowed with no domains allowed (also compliant): AllowedDomains -------------- {}", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Allow invitations to be sent to any domain (most inclusive)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/external-id/allow-deny-list:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/external-id/what-is-b2b" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.6.2", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra ID, part of Microsoft Entra, allows you to restrict what external guest users can see in their organization in Microsoft Entra ID. Guest users are set to a limited permission level by default in Microsoft Entra ID, while the default for member users is the full set of user permissions. These directory level permissions are enforced across Microsoft Entra services including Microsoft Graph, PowerShell v2, the Azure portal, and My Apps portal. Microsoft 365 services leveraging Microsoft 365 groups for collaboration scenarios are also affected, specifically Outlook, Microsoft Teams, and SharePoint. They do not override the SharePoint or Microsoft Teams guest settings. The recommended state is at least Guest users have limited access to properties and memberships of directory objects or more restrictive.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_policy_guest_users_access_restrictions" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.6 External Identities", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra ID, part of Microsoft Entra, allows you to restrict what external guest users can see in their organization in Microsoft Entra ID. Guest users are set to a limited permission level by default in Microsoft Entra ID, while the default for member users is the full set of user permissions. These directory level permissions are enforced across Microsoft Entra services including Microsoft Graph, PowerShell v2, the Azure portal, and My Apps portal. Microsoft 365 services leveraging Microsoft 365 groups for collaboration scenarios are also affected, specifically Outlook, Microsoft Teams, and SharePoint. They do not override the SharePoint or Microsoft Teams guest settings. The recommended state is at least Guest users have limited access to properties and memberships of directory objects or more restrictive.", + "RationaleStatement": "By limiting guest access to the most restrictive state this helps prevent malicious group and user object enumeration in the Microsoft 365 environment. This first step, known as reconnaissance in The Cyber Kill Chain, is often conducted by attackers prior to more advanced targeted attacks.", + "ImpactStatement": "The default is Guest users have limited access to properties and memberships of directory objects. When using the 'most restrictive' setting, guests will only be able to access their own profiles and will not be allowed to see other users' profiles, groups, or group memberships. There are some known issues with Yammer that will prevent guests that are signed in from leaving the group.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > External Identities and select External collaboration settings. 3. Under Guest user access set Guest user access restrictions to one of the following: o Guest users have limited access to properties and memberships of directory objects o Guest user access is restricted to properties and memberships of their own directory objects (most restrictive) To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.ReadWrite.Authorization\" 2. Run the following command to set the guest user access restrictions to default: # Guest users have limited access to properties and memberships of directory objects Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -GuestUserRoleId '10dae51f-b6af-4016-8d66- 8c2a99b929b3' 3. Or, run the following command to set it to the \"most restrictive\": # Guest user access is restricted to properties and memberships of their own directory objects (most restrictive) Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -GuestUserRoleId '2af84b1e-32c8-42b7-82bc- daa82404023b' Note: Either setting allows for a passing state.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > External Identities and select External collaboration settings. 3. Under Guest user access verify that Guest user access restrictions is set to one of the following: o Guest users have limited access to properties and memberships of directory objects o Guest user access is restricted to properties and memberships of their own directory objects (most restrictive) To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.Read.All\" 2. Run the following command: Get-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy | fl GuestUserRoleId 3. Verify that the value returned is 10dae51f-b6af-4016-8d66-8c2a99b929b3 or 2af84b1e-32c8-42b7-82bc-daa82404023b (most restrictive) Note: Either setting allows for a passing state. Note 2: The value of a0b1b346-4d3e-4e8b-98f8-753987be4970 is equal to Guest users have the same access as members (most inclusive) and should not be used.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "- UI: Guest users have limited access to properties and memberships of directory objects - PowerShell: 10dae51f-b6af-4016-8d66-8c2a99b929b3", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/users/users-restrict-guest-permissions:https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/capabilities/cyber/cyber-kill-chain.html" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.6.3", + "Description": "By default, all users in the organization, including B2B collaboration guest users, can invite external users to B2B collaboration. The ability to send invitations can be limited by turning it on or off for everyone, or by restricting invitations to certain roles. The recommended state is Only users assigned to specific admin roles can invite guest users or No one in the organization can invite guest users including admins (most restrictive).", + "Checks": [ + "entra_policy_guest_invite_only_for_admin_roles" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.6 External Identities", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "By default, all users in the organization, including B2B collaboration guest users, can invite external users to B2B collaboration. The ability to send invitations can be limited by turning it on or off for everyone, or by restricting invitations to certain roles. The recommended state is Only users assigned to specific admin roles can invite guest users or No one in the organization can invite guest users including admins (most restrictive).", + "RationaleStatement": "Restricting who can invite guests limits the exposure the organization might face from unauthorized accounts. The default behavior allows anyone within the organization to invite guests and non-admins to the tenant, posing a security risk.", + "ImpactStatement": "This introduces an obstacle to collaboration by restricting who can invite guest users to the organization. Designated Guest Inviters must be assigned, and an approval process established and clearly communicated to all users.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > External Identities and select External collaboration settings. 3. Under Guest invite settings set Guest invite restrictions to one of the desired compliant states: o Only users assigned to specific admin roles can invite guest users o No one in the organization can invite guest users including admins (most restrictive) To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.ReadWrite.Authorization\" 2. Run one of the following PowerShell commands depending on the desired compliant state: To set to Only users assigned to specific admin roles can invite guest users: Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -AllowInvitesFrom 'adminsAndGuestInviters' To set to No one in the organization can invite guest users including admins (most restrictive): Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -AllowInvitesFrom \"none\"", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > External Identities and select External collaboration settings. 3. Under Guest invite settings verify that Guest invite restrictions is set to one of the following: o Only users assigned to specific admin roles can invite guest users o No one in the organization can invite guest users including admins (most restrictive) To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.Read.All\" 2. Run the following command: Get-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy | fl AllowInvitesFrom 3. Verify the value returned is adminsAndGuestInviters or none.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "- UI: Anyone in the organization can invite guest users including guests and non-admins (most inclusive) - PowerShell: everyone", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/external-id/external-collaboration-settings-configure:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference#guest-inviter" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.1.8.1", + "Description": "Password Hash Synchronization is one of the sign-in methods used to enable hybrid identity authentication. With this method, Microsoft Entra Connect synchronizes a cryptographically derived representation of a user's on-premises Active Directory password to Microsoft Entra ID. The original NT password hash (MD4) is never transmitted to Entra ID. Instead, Entra Connect computes a SHA-256 hash of the original MD4 hash and synchronizes that value. Because only this secondary hash is stored in the cloud, the credential material in Entra ID cannot be reused for on-premises pass-the-hash attacks, even if compromised. Note: The audit and remediation procedures described in this recommendation are applicable only to Microsoft 365 tenants operating in a hybrid identity configuration using Microsoft Entra Connect. They do not apply to federated or cloud-only deployments.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_password_hash_sync_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.1.8 Hybrid management", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Password Hash Synchronization is one of the sign-in methods used to enable hybrid identity authentication. With this method, Microsoft Entra Connect synchronizes a cryptographically derived representation of a user's on-premises Active Directory password to Microsoft Entra ID. The original NT password hash (MD4) is never transmitted to Entra ID. Instead, Entra Connect computes a SHA-256 hash of the original MD4 hash and synchronizes that value. Because only this secondary hash is stored in the cloud, the credential material in Entra ID cannot be reused for on-premises pass-the-hash attacks, even if compromised. Note: The audit and remediation procedures described in this recommendation are applicable only to Microsoft 365 tenants operating in a hybrid identity configuration using Microsoft Entra Connect. They do not apply to federated or cloud-only deployments.", + "RationaleStatement": "Password hash synchronization helps by reducing the number of passwords your users need to maintain to just one and enables leaked credential detection for your hybrid accounts. Leaked credential protection is leveraged through Entra ID Protection and is a subset of that feature which can help identify if an organization's user account passwords have appeared on the dark web or public spaces. Using other options for your directory synchronization may be less resilient as Microsoft can still process sign-ins to 365 with Hash Sync even if a network connection to your on-premises environment is not available. This minimizes downtime and ensures business continuity.", + "ImpactStatement": "Compliance or regulatory restrictions may exist, depending on the organization's business sector, that preclude hashed versions of passwords from being securely transmitted to cloud data centers.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the on-prem Microsoft Entra Connect tool: 1. Log in to the on premises server that hosts the Microsoft Entra Connect tool 2. Double-click the Azure AD Connect icon that was created on the desktop 3. Click Configure. 4. On the Additional tasks page, select Customize synchronization options and click Next. 5. Enter the username and password for your global administrator. 6. On the Connect your directories screen, click Next. 7. On the Domain and OU filtering screen, click Next. 8. On the Optional features screen, check Password hash synchronization and click Next. 9. On the Ready to configure screen click Configure. 10. Once the configuration completes, click Exit.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: Only Global Admin and Hybrid Identity Administrator roles have access to view the actual Password Hash Sync status message. Inadequate role access will result in a default message stating: \"Unable to retrieve your tenant's password hash sync information.\" 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Entra Connect. 3. Select Connect Sync. 4. Under Microsoft Entra Connect sync, verify the Password Hash Sync status message indicates that synchronization is occurring and no errors are present, with one of the following messages: o Password hash synchronization is enabled o Password hash synchronization cloud configuration is enabled o Password hash synchronization heartbeat detected To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: Permission required: OnPremDirectorySynchronization.Read.All 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/directory/onPremisesSynchronization 2. Verify that features.passwordSyncEnabled is true. To audit for the on-prem tool: 1. Log in to the server that hosts the Microsoft Entra Connect tool. 2. Run Azure AD Connect, and then click Configure and View or export current configuration. 3. Verify that PASSWORD HASH SYNCHRONIZATION is enabled on your tenant. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Open PowerShell on the on-premises server running Microsoft Entra Connect. 2. Run the following cmdlet: Get-ADSyncAADCompanyFeature 3. Verify that PasswordHashSync is True.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "- Microsoft Entra Connect sync disabled by default - Password Hash Sync is Microsoft's recommended setting for new deployments", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/whatis-phs:https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=47594:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/how-to-connect-sync-staging-server:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/how-to-connect-password-hash-synchronization:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/onpremisesdirectorysynchronizationfeature?view=graph-rest-1.0" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.1", + "Description": "Multifactor authentication is a process that requires an additional form of identification during the sign-in process, such as a code from a mobile device or a fingerprint scan, to enhance security. Ensure users in administrator roles have MFA capabilities enabled.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_admin_users_mfa_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.2 Conditional Access", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Multifactor authentication is a process that requires an additional form of identification during the sign-in process, such as a code from a mobile device or a fingerprint scan, to enhance security. Ensure users in administrator roles have MFA capabilities enabled.", + "RationaleStatement": "Multifactor authentication requires an individual to present a minimum of two separate forms of authentication before access is granted. Multifactor authentication provides additional assurance that the individual attempting to gain access is who they claim to be. With multifactor authentication, an attacker would need to compromise at least two different authentication mechanisms, increasing the difficulty of compromise and thus reducing the risk. Note: To ensure that accounts cannot be easily used to enumerate resources (reconnaissance) through Microsoft Admin Portals or through Microsoft Azure Service Management API, both MFA conditional access policies must target All Resources: - \"Ensure multifactor authentication is enabled for all users\" and - \"Ensure multifactor authentication is enabled for all users in administrative roles\" (this recommendation)", + "ImpactStatement": "Implementation of multifactor authentication for all users in administrative roles will necessitate a change to user routine. All users in administrative roles will be required to enroll in multifactor authentication using phone, SMS, or an authentication application. After enrollment, use of multifactor authentication will be required for future access to the environment.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Click New policy. o Under Users or agents (Preview) include Select users and groups and check Directory roles. o At a minimum, include the directory roles listed below in this section of the document. o Under Target resources include All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps') and do not create any exclusions. - Under Exclude exclude any break-glass accounts. o Under Grant select Grant Access and check either Require multifactor authentication or Require authentication strength. o Click Select at the bottom of the pane. 4. Under Enable policy set it to Report-only. 5. Click Create. 6. After allowing the policy to run in Report-only mode for at least one week, review the Sign-in logs for any unexpected impact, then return to the policy and set Enable policy to On. At minimum these directory roles should be included for MFA: - Application administrator - Authentication administrator - Billing administrator - Cloud application administrator - Conditional Access administrator - Exchange administrator - Global administrator - Global reader - Helpdesk administrator - Password administrator - Privileged authentication administrator - Privileged role administrator - Security administrator - SharePoint administrator - User administrator", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: Break-glass accounts should be excluded from all Conditional Access policies. To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Verify that a policy exists with the following criteria and is set to On: o Under Users or agents (Preview) verify Directory roles specific to administrators are included. o Verify that only documented user exclusions exist and that they are reviewed annually. o Under Target resources verify All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps') is selected with no exclusions. o Under Grant verify Grant Access is on and either Require multifactor authentication or Require authentication strength is checked. 4. Verify that Enable policy is set to On. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/identity/conditionalAccess/policies 2. For each policy returned, verify the following criteria: o Conditions.Users.IncludeRoles contains the directory roles specific to administrators* o Conditions.Applications.IncludeApplications is All o GrantControls.BuiltInControls contains mfa OR GrantControls.AuthenticationStrength.id is defined o State is enabled 3. Compliance is met when at least one policy is found to meet all the criteria listed above. 4. Verify that any exclusions are documented and reviewed annually. Note: The Authentication Strength requirement is satisfied when any valid GUID is present in the authenticationStrength property of a matching policy. Because Authentication Strength configurations are inherently stronger than the built-in Require multifactor authentication control, the presence of a valid Authentication Strength also fulfills the MFA requirement for all users. Note: A list of Directory roles can be found in the Remediation section.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "This policy does not exist by default.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/howto-conditional-access-policy-admin-mfa:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/conditionalaccessroot-list-policies?view=graph-rest-1.0" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.2", + "Description": "Enable multifactor authentication for all users in the Microsoft 365 tenant. Users will be prompted to authenticate with a second factor upon logging in to Microsoft 365 services. The second factor is most commonly a text message to a registered mobile phone number where they type in an authorization code, or with a mobile application like Microsoft Authenticator. Note: Since 2024, Microsoft has been rolling out mandatory multifactor authentication.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_users_mfa_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.2 Conditional Access", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Enable multifactor authentication for all users in the Microsoft 365 tenant. Users will be prompted to authenticate with a second factor upon logging in to Microsoft 365 services. The second factor is most commonly a text message to a registered mobile phone number where they type in an authorization code, or with a mobile application like Microsoft Authenticator. Note: Since 2024, Microsoft has been rolling out mandatory multifactor authentication.", + "RationaleStatement": "Multifactor authentication requires an individual to present a minimum of two separate forms of authentication before access is granted. Multifactor authentication provides additional assurance that the individual attempting to gain access is who they claim to be. With multifactor authentication, an attacker would need to compromise at least two different authentication mechanisms, increasing the difficulty of compromise and thus reducing the risk. Note: To ensure that accounts cannot be easily used to enumerate resources (reconnaissance) through Microsoft Admin Portals or through Microsoft Azure Service Management API, both MFA conditional access policies must target All Resources: - \"Ensure multifactor authentication is enabled for all users in administrative roles\" and - \"Ensure multifactor authentication is enabled for all users\" (this recommendation)", + "ImpactStatement": "Implementation of multifactor authentication for all users will necessitate a change to user routine. All users will be required to enroll in multifactor authentication using phone, SMS, or an authentication application. After enrollment, use of multifactor authentication will be required for future authentication to the environment. External identities that attempt to access documents that utilize Purview Information Protection (Sensitivity Labels) will find their access disrupted. In order to mitigate this create an exclusion for Microsoft Rights Management Services ID: 00000012- 0000-0000-c000-000000000000 Note: Organizations that struggle to enforce MFA globally due to budget constraints preventing the provision of company-owned mobile devices to every user, or due to regulations, unions, or policies that prevent forcing end users to use their personal devices, have another option. FIDO2 security keys can be used as an alternative. They are more secure, phishing-resistant, and affordable for organizations to issue to every end user.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Click New policy. o Under Users or agents (Preview) include All users. o Under Target resources include All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps') and do not create any exclusions. - Under Exclude exclude any break-glass accounts. o Under Grant select Grant Access and check either Require multifactor authentication or Require authentication strength. o Click Select at the bottom of the pane. 4. Under Enable policy set it to Report-only. 5. Click Create. 6. After allowing the policy to run in Report-only mode for at least one week, review the Sign-in logs for any unexpected impact, then return to the policy and set Enable policy to On.", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: Break-glass accounts should be excluded from all Conditional Access policies. To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Verify that a policy exists with the following criteria and is set to On: o Under Users or agents (Preview) verify All users is included. o Verify that only documented user exclusions exist and that they are reviewed annually. o Under Target resources verify All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps') is selected with no exclusions. o Under Grant verify Grant Access and either Require multifactor authentication or Require authentication strength is checked. 4. Verify that Enable policy is set to On. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/identity/conditionalAccess/policies 2. For each policy returned, verify the following criteria: o Conditions.Users.IncludeUsers is All o Conditions.Applications.IncludeApplications is All o GrantControls.BuiltInControls contains mfa OR GrantControls.AuthenticationStrength.id is defined o State is enabled 3. Compliance is met when at least one policy is found to meet all the criteria listed above. 4. Verify that any exclusions are documented and reviewed annually. Note: The Authentication Strength requirement is satisfied when any valid GUID is present in the authenticationStrength property of a matching policy. Because Authentication Strength configurations are inherently stronger than the built-in Require multifactor authentication control, the presence of a valid Authentication Strength also fulfills the MFA requirement for all users.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "This policy does not exist by default. It may be present as a Microsoft-managed policy or created from a Conditional Access template.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/howto-conditional-access-policy-all-users-mfa:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/conditionalaccessroot-list-policies?view=graph-rest-1.0:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-mandatory-multifactor-authentication" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.3", + "Description": "Entra ID supports the most widely used authentication and authorization protocols including legacy authentication. This authentication pattern includes basic authentication, a widely used industry-standard method for collecting username and password information. The following messaging protocols support legacy authentication: - Authenticated SMTP - Used to send authenticated email messages. - Autodiscover - Used by Outlook and EAS clients to find and connect to mailboxes in Exchange Online. - Exchange ActiveSync (EAS) - Used to connect to mailboxes in Exchange Online. - Exchange Online PowerShell - Used to connect to Exchange Online with remote PowerShell. If you block Basic authentication for Exchange Online PowerShell, you need to use the Exchange Online PowerShell Module to connect. For instructions, see Connect to Exchange Online PowerShell using multifactor authentication. - Exchange Web Services (EWS) - A programming interface that's used by Outlook, Outlook for Mac, and third-party apps. - IMAP4 - Used by IMAP email clients. - MAPI over HTTP (MAPI/HTTP) - Primary mailbox access protocol used by Outlook 2010 SP2 and later. - Offline Address Book (OAB) - A copy of address list collections that are downloaded and used by Outlook. - Outlook Anywhere (RPC over HTTP) - Legacy mailbox access protocol supported by all current Outlook versions. - POP3 - Used by POP email clients. - Reporting Web Services - Used to retrieve report data in Exchange Online. - Universal Outlook - Used by the Mail and Calendar app for Windows 10. - Other clients - Other protocols identified as utilizing legacy authentication.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_legacy_authentication_blocked" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.2 Conditional Access", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Entra ID supports the most widely used authentication and authorization protocols including legacy authentication. This authentication pattern includes basic authentication, a widely used industry-standard method for collecting username and password information. The following messaging protocols support legacy authentication: - Authenticated SMTP - Used to send authenticated email messages. - Autodiscover - Used by Outlook and EAS clients to find and connect to mailboxes in Exchange Online. - Exchange ActiveSync (EAS) - Used to connect to mailboxes in Exchange Online. - Exchange Online PowerShell - Used to connect to Exchange Online with remote PowerShell. If you block Basic authentication for Exchange Online PowerShell, you need to use the Exchange Online PowerShell Module to connect. For instructions, see Connect to Exchange Online PowerShell using multifactor authentication. - Exchange Web Services (EWS) - A programming interface that's used by Outlook, Outlook for Mac, and third-party apps. - IMAP4 - Used by IMAP email clients. - MAPI over HTTP (MAPI/HTTP) - Primary mailbox access protocol used by Outlook 2010 SP2 and later. - Offline Address Book (OAB) - A copy of address list collections that are downloaded and used by Outlook. - Outlook Anywhere (RPC over HTTP) - Legacy mailbox access protocol supported by all current Outlook versions. - POP3 - Used by POP email clients. - Reporting Web Services - Used to retrieve report data in Exchange Online. - Universal Outlook - Used by the Mail and Calendar app for Windows 10. - Other clients - Other protocols identified as utilizing legacy authentication.", + "RationaleStatement": "Legacy authentication protocols do not support multi-factor authentication. These protocols are often used by attackers because of this deficiency. Blocking legacy authentication makes it harder for attackers to gain access. Note: Basic authentication is now disabled in all tenants. Before December 31 2022, you could re-enable the affected protocols if users and apps in your tenant couldn't connect. Now no one (you or Microsoft support) can re-enable Basic authentication in your tenant.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling this setting will block legacy authentication, preventing access from older versions of Microsoft Office, Exchange ActiveSync, and protocols such as IMAP, POP, and SMTP. As a result, some users may need to upgrade to newer Office versions or use email clients that support modern authentication. This change may also affect multifunction devices (MFPs), such as printers using legacy authentication for scan-to-email. Microsoft provides mail flow best practices (linked below) to configure MFPs without relying on legacy authentication. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/mail-flow-best-practices/how-to-set-up-a- multifunction-device-or-application-to-send-email-using-microsoft-365-or-office-365", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Create a new policy by selecting New policy. o Under Users or agents (Preview) include All users. o Under Target resources include All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps'). - Under Exclude exclude any break-glass accounts. o Under Conditions select Client apps and check the boxes for Exchange ActiveSync clients and Other clients. o Under Grant select Block Access. o Click Select. 4. Set the policy On and click Create.", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: Break-glass accounts should be excluded from all Conditional Access policies. To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Verify that a policy exists with the following criteria and is set to On: o Under Users or agents (Preview) verify All users is included. o Verify that only documented user exclusions exist and that they are reviewed annually. o Under Target resources verify All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps') is selected. o Verify that only documented resource exclusions exist and that they are reviewed annually. o Under Conditions select Client apps then verify Exchange ActiveSync clients and Other clients is checked. o Under Grant verify Block access is selected. 4. Verify that Enable policy is set to On. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/identity/conditionalAccess/policies 2. Filter to policies where Conditions.ClientAppTypes contains exchangeActiveSync OR other. 3. For each policy returned, verify the following criteria: o Conditions.Users.IncludeUsers is All o Conditions.Applications.IncludeApplications is All o Conditions.ClientAppTypes contains exchangeActiveSync o Conditions.ClientAppTypes contains other o GrantControls.BuiltInControls is block o State is enabled 4. Compliance is met when at least one policy is found to meet all the criteria listed above. 5. Verify that any exclusions are documented and reviewed annually.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Basic authentication is disabled by default as of January 2023.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/clients-and-mobile-in-exchange-online/disable-basic-authentication-in-exchange-online:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/mail-flow-best-practices/how-to-set-up-a-multifunction-device-or-application-to-send-email-using-microsoft-365-or-office-365:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/clients-and-mobile-in-exchange-online/deprecation-of-basic-authentication-exchange-online" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.4", + "Description": "In complex deployments, organizations might have a need to restrict authentication sessions. Conditional Access policies allow for the targeting of specific user accounts. Some scenarios might include: - Resource access from an unmanaged or shared device - Access to sensitive information from an external network - High-privileged users - Business-critical applications Note: This CA policy can be added to the previous CA policy in this benchmark \"Ensure multifactor authentication is enabled for all users in administrative roles\"", + "Checks": [ + "entra_admin_users_sign_in_frequency_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.2 Conditional Access", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "In complex deployments, organizations might have a need to restrict authentication sessions. Conditional Access policies allow for the targeting of specific user accounts. Some scenarios might include: - Resource access from an unmanaged or shared device - Access to sensitive information from an external network - High-privileged users - Business-critical applications Note: This CA policy can be added to the previous CA policy in this benchmark \"Ensure multifactor authentication is enabled for all users in administrative roles\"", + "RationaleStatement": "Forcing a time out for MFA will help ensure that sessions are not kept alive for an indefinite period of time, ensuring that browser sessions are not persistent will help in prevention of drive-by attacks in web browsers, this also prevents creation and saving of session cookies leaving nothing for an attacker to take.", + "ImpactStatement": "Users with Administrative roles will be prompted at the frequency set for MFA.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Click New policy. o Under Users or agents (Preview) include Select users and groups and check Directory roles. o At a minimum, include the directory roles listed below in this section of the document. o Under Target resources include All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps'). - Under Exclude exclude any break-glass accounts. o Under Grant select Grant Access and check Require multifactor authentication. o Under Session select Sign-in frequency select Periodic reauthentication and set it to 4 hours (or less). o Check Persistent browser session then select Never persistent in the drop-down menu. 4. Under Enable policy set it to Report-only. 5. Click Create. 6. After allowing the policy to run in Report-only mode for at least one week, review the Sign-in logs for any unexpected impact, then return to the policy and set Enable policy to On. At minimum these directory roles should be included in the policy: - Application administrator - Authentication administrator - Billing administrator - Cloud application administrator - Conditional Access administrator - Exchange administrator - Global administrator - Global reader - Helpdesk administrator - Password administrator - Privileged authentication administrator - Privileged role administrator - Security administrator - SharePoint administrator - User administrator", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: Break-glass accounts should be excluded from all Conditional Access policies. To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Verify that a policy exists with the following criteria and is set to On: o Under Users or agents (Preview) verify Directory roles specific to administrators are included. o Verify that only documented user exclusions exist and that they are reviewed annually. o Under Target resources verify All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps') is selected. o Verify that only documented resource exclusions exist and that they are reviewed annually. o Under Session verify Sign-in frequency is checked and set to Periodic reauthentication. o Verify the timeframe is set to the time determined by the organization. o Verify that Periodic reauthentication does not exceed 4 hours (or less). o Verify that Persistent browser session is set to Never persistent. 4. Verify that Enable policy is set to On To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/identity/conditionalAccess/policies 2. Filter to policies where SessionControls.PersistentBrowser.IsEnabled is true. 3. For each policy returned, verify the following criteria: o Conditions.Users.IncludeRoles contains the directory roles specific to administrators* o Conditions.Applications.IncludeApplications is All o SessionControls.SignInFrequency.IsEnabled is true o SessionControls.SignInFrequency.FrequencyInterval is everyTime OR is timeBased AND does not exceed 4 hours. o SessionControls.PersistentBrowser.IsEnabled is true o SessionControls.PersistentBrowser.Mode is never o State is enabled 4. Compliance is met when at least one policy is found to meet all the criteria listed above. 5. Verify that any exclusions are documented and reviewed annually. Note: A list of directory roles applying to Administrators can be found in the remediation section.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "The default configuration for user sign-in frequency is a rolling window of 90 days.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/howto-conditional-access-session-lifetime" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.5", + "Description": "Authentication strength is a Conditional Access control that allows administrators to specify which combination of authentication methods can be used to access a resource. For example, they can make only phishing-resistant authentication methods available to access a sensitive resource. But to access a non-sensitive resource, they can allow less secure multifactor authentication (MFA) combinations, such as password + SMS. Microsoft has 3 built-in authentication strengths. MFA strength, Passwordless MFA strength, and Phishing-resistant MFA strength. Ensure administrator roles are using a CA policy with Phishing-resistant MFA strength. Administrators can then enroll using one of 3 methods: - FIDO2 Security Key - Windows Hello for Business - Certificate-based authentication (Multi-Factor) Note: Additional steps to configure methods such as FIDO2 keys are not covered here but can be found in related MS articles in the references section. The Conditional Access policy only ensures 1 of the 3 methods is used. Warning: Administrators should be pre-registered for a strong authentication mechanism before this Conditional Access Policy is enforced. Additionally, as stated elsewhere in the CIS Benchmark a break-glass administrator account should be excluded from this policy to ensure unfettered access in the case of an emergency.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_admin_users_phishing_resistant_mfa_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.2 Conditional Access", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Authentication strength is a Conditional Access control that allows administrators to specify which combination of authentication methods can be used to access a resource. For example, they can make only phishing-resistant authentication methods available to access a sensitive resource. But to access a non-sensitive resource, they can allow less secure multifactor authentication (MFA) combinations, such as password + SMS. Microsoft has 3 built-in authentication strengths. MFA strength, Passwordless MFA strength, and Phishing-resistant MFA strength. Ensure administrator roles are using a CA policy with Phishing-resistant MFA strength. Administrators can then enroll using one of 3 methods: - FIDO2 Security Key - Windows Hello for Business - Certificate-based authentication (Multi-Factor) Note: Additional steps to configure methods such as FIDO2 keys are not covered here but can be found in related MS articles in the references section. The Conditional Access policy only ensures 1 of the 3 methods is used. Warning: Administrators should be pre-registered for a strong authentication mechanism before this Conditional Access Policy is enforced. Additionally, as stated elsewhere in the CIS Benchmark a break-glass administrator account should be excluded from this policy to ensure unfettered access in the case of an emergency.", + "RationaleStatement": "Sophisticated attacks targeting MFA are more prevalent as the use of it becomes more widespread. These 3 methods are considered phishing-resistant as they remove passwords from the login workflow. It also ensures that public/private key exchange can only happen between the devices and a registered provider which prevents login to fake or phishing websites.", + "ImpactStatement": "If administrators aren't pre-registered for a strong authentication method prior to a conditional access policy being created, then a condition could occur where a user can't register for strong authentication because they don't meet the conditional access policy requirements and therefore are prevented from signing in. Additionally, Internet Explorer based credential prompts in PowerShell do not support prompting for a security key. Implementing phishing-resistant MFA with a security key may prevent admins from running their existing sets of PowerShell scripts. Device Authorization Grant Flow can be used as a workaround in some instances.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Click New policy. o Under Users or agents (Preview) include Select users and groups and check Directory roles. o At a minimum, include the directory roles listed below in this section of the document. o Under Target resources include All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps') and do not create any exclusions other than break-glass accounts. o Under Grant select Grant Access and check Require authentication strength and set Phishing-resistant MFA in the dropdown box. o Click Select. 4. Under Enable policy set it to Report-only. 5. Click Create. 6. After allowing the policy to run in Report-only mode for at least one week, review the Sign-in logs for any unexpected impact, then return to the policy and set Enable policy to On. Warning: Ensure administrators are pre-registered with strong authentication before enforcing the policy. After which the policy must be set to On. At minimum these directory roles should be included for the policy: - Application administrator - Authentication administrator - Billing administrator - Cloud application administrator - Conditional Access administrator - Exchange administrator - Global administrator - Global reader - Helpdesk administrator - Password administrator - Privileged authentication administrator - Privileged role administrator - Security administrator - SharePoint administrator - User administrator", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: Break-glass accounts should be excluded from all Conditional Access policies. To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Verify that a policy exists with the following criteria and is set to On: o Under Users or agents (Preview) verify Directory roles specific to administrators are included. o Verify that only documented user exclusions exist and that they are reviewed annually. o Directory Roles should include at minimum the roles listed in the remediation section. o Under Target resources verify All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps') is selected with no exclusions. o Under Grant verify Grant Access is selected and Require authentication strength is checked with Phishing-resistant MFA set as the value. 4. Verify that Enable policy is set to On. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/identity/conditionalAccess/policies 2. Filter to policies where GrantControls.AuthenticationStrength.Id contains any valid id. 3. For each policy returned, verify the following criteria: o Conditions.Users.IncludeRoles contains the directory roles specific to administrators* o Conditions.Applications.IncludeApplications is All o GrantControls.AuthenticationStrength.AllowedCombinations only contains windowsHelloForBusiness OR fido2 OR x509CertificateMultiFactor o State is enabled 4. Compliance is met when at least one policy is found to meet all the criteria listed above. 5. Verify that any exclusions are documented and reviewed annually.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "This policy does not exist by default. It can be created from a Conditional Access template.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-passwordless#fido2-security-keys:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/how-to-enable-passkey-fido2:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-strengths:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/howto-identity-protection-configure-mfa-policy" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.6", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra ID Protection user risk policies detect the probability that a user account has been compromised. Note: While Identity Protection also provides two risk policies with limited conditions, Microsoft highly recommends setting up risk-based policies in Conditional Access as opposed to the \"legacy method\" for the following benefits: - Enhanced diagnostic data - Report-only mode integration - Graph API support - Use more Conditional Access attributes like sign-in frequency in the policy", + "Checks": [ + "entra_identity_protection_user_risk_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.2 Conditional Access", + "Profile": "E5 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra ID Protection user risk policies detect the probability that a user account has been compromised. Note: While Identity Protection also provides two risk policies with limited conditions, Microsoft highly recommends setting up risk-based policies in Conditional Access as opposed to the \"legacy method\" for the following benefits: - Enhanced diagnostic data - Report-only mode integration - Graph API support - Use more Conditional Access attributes like sign-in frequency in the policy", + "RationaleStatement": "With the user risk policy turned on, Entra ID protection detects the probability that a user account has been compromised. Administrators can configure a user risk conditional access policy to automatically respond to a specific user risk level.", + "ImpactStatement": "Upon policy activation, account access will be either blocked or the user will be required to use multi-factor authentication (MFA) and change their password. Users without registered MFA will be denied access, necessitating an admin to recover the account. To avoid inconvenience, it is advised to configure the MFA registration policy for all users under the User Risk policy. Additionally, users identified in the Risky Users section will be affected by this policy. To gain a better understanding of the impact on the organization's environment, the list of Risky Users should be reviewed before enforcing the policy.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Create a new policy by selecting New policy. o Under Users or agents (Preview) choose All users o Under Target resources choose All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps') - Under Exclude exclude any break-glass accounts. o Under Conditions choose User risk then Yes and select the user risk level High. o Under Grant select Grant access then check Require multifactor authentication or Require authentication strength. Finally check Require password change. o Under Session set Sign-in frequency to Every time. o Click Select. 4. Under Enable policy set it to Report-only. 5. Click Create. 6. After allowing the policy to run in Report-only mode for at least one week, review the Sign-in logs for any unexpected impact, then return to the policy and set Enable policy to On.", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: Break-glass accounts should be excluded from all Conditional Access policies. To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Verify that a policy exists with the following criteria and is set to On: o Under Users or agents (Preview) verify All users is included. o Verify that only documented user exclusions exist and that they are reviewed annually. o Under Target resources verify All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps') is selected. o Under Conditions verify User risk is set to High. o Under Grant verify Grant access is selected and either Require multifactor authentication or Require authentication strength are checked. Then verify Require password change is checked. o Under Session ensure Sign-in frequency is set to Every time. 4. Verify that Enable policy is set to On. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/identity/conditionalAccess/policies 2. Filter to policies where Conditions.UserRiskLevels contains any string. 3. For each policy returned, verify the following criteria: o Conditions.Users.IncludeUsers is All o Conditions.Applications.IncludeApplications is All o Conditions.UserRiskLevels contains high o GrantControls.BuiltInControls contains passwordChange o GrantControls.BuiltInControls contains mfa OR GrantControls.AuthenticationStrength.id is any id o SessionControls.SignInFrequency.IsEnabled is true o SessionControls.SignInFrequency.FrequencyInterval is everyTime o State is enabled 4. Compliance is met when at least one policy is found to meet all the criteria listed above. 5. Verify that any exclusions are documented and reviewed annually. Note: If the UserRiskLevels array includes medium or low, this still qualifies as compliant, as these enforcement levels are considered more strict. However, it must always include high; omitting this level would exclude users who are classified as high risk.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "This policy does not exist by default. It may be created from a Conditional Access template.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/howto-identity-protection-risk-feedback:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.7", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra ID Protection sign-in risk detects risks in real-time and offline. A risky sign-in is an indicator for a sign-in attempt that might not have been performed by the legitimate owner of a user account. Note: While Identity Protection also provides two risk policies with limited conditions, Microsoft highly recommends setting up risk-based policies in Conditional Access as opposed to the \"legacy method\" for the following benefits: - Enhanced diagnostic data - Report-only mode integration - Graph API support - Use more Conditional Access attributes like sign-in frequency in the policy", + "Checks": [ + "entra_identity_protection_sign_in_risk_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.2 Conditional Access", + "Profile": "E5 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra ID Protection sign-in risk detects risks in real-time and offline. A risky sign-in is an indicator for a sign-in attempt that might not have been performed by the legitimate owner of a user account. Note: While Identity Protection also provides two risk policies with limited conditions, Microsoft highly recommends setting up risk-based policies in Conditional Access as opposed to the \"legacy method\" for the following benefits: - Enhanced diagnostic data - Report-only mode integration - Graph API support - Use more Conditional Access attributes like sign-in frequency in the policy", + "RationaleStatement": "Turning on the sign-in risk policy ensures that suspicious sign-ins are challenged for multi-factor authentication.", + "ImpactStatement": "When the policy triggers, the user will need MFA to access the account. In the case of a user who hasn't registered MFA on their account, they would be blocked from accessing their account. It is therefore recommended that the MFA registration policy be configured for all users who are a part of the Sign-in Risk policy.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Create a new policy by selecting New policy. o Under Users or agents (Preview) choose All users. o Under Target resources choose All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps'). - Under Exclude exclude any break-glass accounts. o Under Conditions choose Sign-in risk then Yes and check the risk level boxes High and Medium. o Under Grant click Grant access then select Require multifactor authentication. o Under Session select Sign-in Frequency and set to Every time. o Click Select. 4. Under Enable policy set it to Report-only. 5. Click Create. 6. After allowing the policy to run in Report-only mode for at least one week, review the Sign-in logs for any unexpected impact, then return to the policy and set Enable policy to On.", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: Break-glass accounts should be excluded from all Conditional Access policies. To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Verify that a policy exists with the following criteria and is set to On: o Under Users or agents (Preview) verify All users is included. o Verify that only documented user exclusions exist and that they are reviewed annually. o Under Target resources verify All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps') is selected. o Under Conditions verify Sign-in risk is set to Yes ensuring High and Medium are selected. o Under Grant verify grant Grant access is selected and Require multifactor authentication checked. o Under Session verify Sign-in Frequency is set to Every time. 4. Verify that Enable policy is set to On. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/identity/conditionalAccess/policies 2. Filter to policies where Conditions.SignInRiskLevels contains any string. 3. For each policy returned, verify the following criteria: o Conditions.Users.IncludeUsers is All o Conditions.Applications.IncludeApplications is All o Conditions.SignInRiskLevels contains high o Conditions.SignInRiskLevels contains medium o GrantControls.BuiltInControls contains mfa OR GrantControls.AuthenticationStrength.id is any id o SessionControls.SignInFrequency.IsEnabled is true o SessionControls.SignInFrequency.FrequencyInterval is everyTime o State is enabled 4. Compliance is met when at least one policy is found to meet all the criteria listed above. 5. Verify that any exclusions are documented and reviewed annually. Note: If the SignInRiskLevels array includes low, this still qualifies as compliant, as these enforcement levels are considered more strict. However, it must always include high and medium; omitting these levels would exclude users who are classified as such. Note 2: If GrantControls.BuiltInControls is block then the Grant and Session controls are considered satisfied, as this is considered a more strict enforcement of sign-in risk control.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "This policy does not exist by default. It may be created from a Conditional Access template.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/howto-identity-protection-risk-feedback:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.8", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra ID Protection sign-in risk detects risks in real-time and offline. A risky sign-in is an indicator for a sign-in attempt that might not have been performed by the legitimate owner of a user account. Note: While Identity Protection also provides two risk policies with limited conditions, Microsoft highly recommends setting up risk-based policies in Conditional Access as opposed to the \"legacy method\" for the following benefits: - Enhanced diagnostic data - Report-only mode integration - Graph API support - Use more Conditional Access attributes like sign-in frequency in the policy", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.2 Conditional Access", + "Profile": "E5 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra ID Protection sign-in risk detects risks in real-time and offline. A risky sign-in is an indicator for a sign-in attempt that might not have been performed by the legitimate owner of a user account. Note: While Identity Protection also provides two risk policies with limited conditions, Microsoft highly recommends setting up risk-based policies in Conditional Access as opposed to the \"legacy method\" for the following benefits: - Enhanced diagnostic data - Report-only mode integration - Graph API support - Use more Conditional Access attributes like sign-in frequency in the policy", + "RationaleStatement": "Sign-in risk is determined at the time of sign-in and includes criteria across both real- time and offline detections for risk. Blocking sign-in to accounts that have risk can prevent undesired access from potentially compromised devices or unauthorized users.", + "ImpactStatement": "Sign-in risk is heavily dependent on detecting risk based on atypical behaviors. Due to this it is important to run this policy in a report-only mode to better understand how the organization's environment and user activity may influence sign-in risk before turning the policy on. Once it's understood what actions may trigger a medium or high sign-in risk event I.T. can then work to create an environment to reduce false positives. For example, employees might be required to notify security personnel when they intend to travel with intent to access work resources.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Create a new policy by selecting New policy. o Under Users or agents (Preview) include All users. o Under Target resources include All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps') and do not set any exclusions. - Under Exclude exclude any break-glass accounts. o Under Conditions choose Sign-in risk values of High and Medium and click Done. o Under Grant choose Block access and click Select. 4. Under Enable policy set it to Report-only. 5. Click Create. 6. After allowing the policy to run in Report-only mode for at least one week, review the Sign-in logs for any unexpected impact, then return to the policy and set Enable policy to On.", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: Break-glass accounts should be excluded from all Conditional Access policies. To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Verify that a policy exists with the following criteria and is set to On: o Under Users or agents (Preview) verify All users is included. o Verify that only documented user exclusions exist and that they are reviewed annually. o Under Target resources verify All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps') is selected with no exclusions. o Under Conditions verify Sign-in risk values of High and Medium are selected. o Under Grant verify Block access is selected. 4. Verify that Enable policy is set to On. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/identity/conditionalAccess/policies 2. Filter to policies where Conditions.SignInRiskLevels contains any string. 3. For each policy returned, verify the following criteria: o Conditions.Users.IncludeUsers is All o Conditions.Applications.IncludeApplications is All o Conditions.Applications.ExcludeApplications is null or empty o Conditions.SignInRiskLevels contains high o Conditions.SignInRiskLevels contains medium o GrantControls.BuiltInControls is block o State is enabled 4. Compliance is met when at least one policy is found to meet all the criteria listed above. 5. Verify that any exclusions are documented and reviewed annually. Note: If the SignInRiskLevels array includes low, this still qualifies as compliant, as these enforcement levels are considered more strict. However, it must always include high and medium; omitting these levels would exclude users who are classified as such.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "This policy does not exist by default.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#risk-detections-mapped-to-riskeventtype" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.9", + "Description": "Conditional Access (CA) can be configured to enforce access based on the device's compliance status or whether it is Entra hybrid joined. Collectively this allows CA to classify devices as managed or unmanaged, providing more granular control over authentication policies. When using Require device to be marked as compliant, the device must pass checks configured in compliance policies defined within Microsoft Intune. Before these checks can be applied, the device must first be enrolled in Intune MDM. By selecting Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device this means the device must first be synchronized from an on-premises Active Directory to qualify for authentication. When configured to the recommended state below only one condition needs to be met for the user to authenticate from the device. This functions as an \"OR\" operator. The recommended state for authentication is: - Require device to be marked as compliant - Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device (optional for hybrid environments) - Require one of the selected controls", + "Checks": [ + "entra_managed_device_required_for_authentication" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.2 Conditional Access", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Conditional Access (CA) can be configured to enforce access based on the device's compliance status or whether it is Entra hybrid joined. Collectively this allows CA to classify devices as managed or unmanaged, providing more granular control over authentication policies. When using Require device to be marked as compliant, the device must pass checks configured in compliance policies defined within Microsoft Intune. Before these checks can be applied, the device must first be enrolled in Intune MDM. By selecting Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device this means the device must first be synchronized from an on-premises Active Directory to qualify for authentication. When configured to the recommended state below only one condition needs to be met for the user to authenticate from the device. This functions as an \"OR\" operator. The recommended state for authentication is: - Require device to be marked as compliant - Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device (optional for hybrid environments) - Require one of the selected controls", + "RationaleStatement": "\"Managed\" devices are considered more secure because they often have additional configuration hardening enforced through centralized management such as Intune or Group Policy. These devices are also typically equipped with MDR/EDR, managed patching and alerting systems. As a result, they provide a safer environment for users to authenticate and operate from. This policy also ensures that attackers must first gain access to a compliant or trusted device before authentication is permitted, reducing the risk posed by compromised account credentials. When combined with other distinct Conditional Access (CA) policies, such as requiring multi-factor authentication, this adds one additional factor before authentication is permitted. Note: Avoid combining these two settings with other Grant settings in the same policy. In a single policy you can only choose between Require all the selected controls or Require one of the selected controls, which limits the ability to integrate this recommendation with others in this benchmark. CA policies function as an \"AND\" operator across multiple policies. The goal here is to both (Require MFA for all users) AND (Require device to be marked as compliant OR Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device).", + "ImpactStatement": "Unmanaged devices will not be permitted as a valid authenticator. As a result this may require the organization to mature their device enrollment and management. The following devices can be considered managed: - Entra hybrid joined from Active Directory - Entra joined and enrolled in Intune, with compliance policies - Entra registered and enrolled in Intune, with compliance policies If Guest or external users are collaborating with the organization, they must either be excluded or onboarded with a compliant device to authenticate. Failure to adequately survey the environment and test the Conditional Access (CA) policy in the Report-only state could result in access disruptions for these guest users.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Create a new policy by selecting New policy. o Under Users or agents (Preview) include All users. o Under Target resources include All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps'). - Under Exclude exclude any break-glass accounts. o Under Grant select Grant access. o Select the checkbox Require device to be marked as compliant. o Optionally, also select Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device if the organization uses hybrid joined devices. o Choose Require one of the selected controls. o Click Select at the bottom. 4. Under Enable policy set it to Report-only. 5. Click Create. 6. After allowing the policy to run in Report-only mode for at least one week, review the Sign-in logs for any unexpected impact, then return to the policy and set Enable policy to On. Note: Guest user accounts, if collaborating with the organization, should be considered when testing this policy.", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: Break-glass accounts should be excluded from all Conditional Access policies. To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Verify that a policy exists with the following criteria and is set to On: o Under Users or agents (Preview) verify All users is included. o Verify that only documented user exclusions exist and that they are reviewed annually. o Under Target resources verify All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps') is selected. o Verify that only documented resource exclusions exist and that they are reviewed annually. o Under Grant verify that Require device to be marked as compliant is checked. o Under Grant verify that no other controls are checked except, optionally, Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device. o Verify Require one of the selected controls is selected. 4. Verify that Enable policy is set to On. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/identity/conditionalAccess/policies 2. Filter to policies where GrantControls.BuiltInControls contains compliantDevice or domainJoinedDevice. 3. For each policy returned, verify the following criteria: o Conditions.Users.IncludeUsers is All o Conditions.Applications.IncludeApplications is All o GrantControls.BuiltInControls contains compliantDevice o GrantControls.BuiltInControls does not contain any values other than compliantDevice and domainJoinedDevice o GrantControls.Operator is OR o State is enabled 4. Compliance is met when at least one policy is found to meet all the criteria listed above. 5. Verify that any exclusions are documented and reviewed annually.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "This policy does not exist by default.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/concept-conditional-access-grant#require-device-to-be-marked-as-compliant:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/devices/concept-hybrid-join:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/fundamentals/deployment-guide-enrollment" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.10", + "Description": "Conditional Access (CA) can be configured to enforce access based on the device's compliance status or whether it is Entra hybrid joined. Collectively, this allows CA to classify devices as managed or unmanaged, providing more granular control over whether a user can register security information from a device. When using Require device to be marked as compliant, the device must pass checks configured in compliance policies defined within Microsoft Intune. Before these checks can be applied, the device must first be enrolled in Intune MDM. By selecting Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device this means the device must first be synchronized from an on-premises Active Directory to qualify. When configured to the recommended state below only one condition needs to be met for the user to authenticate from the device. This functions as an \"OR\" operator. The recommended state for registering security information is: - Require device to be marked as compliant - Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device (optional for hybrid environments) - Require one of the selected controls", + "Checks": [ + "entra_managed_device_required_for_mfa_registration" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.2 Conditional Access", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Conditional Access (CA) can be configured to enforce access based on the device's compliance status or whether it is Entra hybrid joined. Collectively, this allows CA to classify devices as managed or unmanaged, providing more granular control over whether a user can register security information from a device. When using Require device to be marked as compliant, the device must pass checks configured in compliance policies defined within Microsoft Intune. Before these checks can be applied, the device must first be enrolled in Intune MDM. By selecting Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device this means the device must first be synchronized from an on-premises Active Directory to qualify. When configured to the recommended state below only one condition needs to be met for the user to authenticate from the device. This functions as an \"OR\" operator. The recommended state for registering security information is: - Require device to be marked as compliant - Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device (optional for hybrid environments) - Require one of the selected controls", + "RationaleStatement": "Requiring registration on a managed device significantly reduces the risk of bad actors using stolen credentials to register security information. Accounts that are created but never registered with an MFA method are particularly vulnerable to this type of attack. Enforcing this requirement will both reduce the attack surface for fake registrations and ensure that legitimate users register using trusted devices which typically have additional security measures in place already.", + "ImpactStatement": "The organization will be required to have a mature device management process. New devices provided to users will need to be pre-enrolled in Intune, auto-enrolled, or be Entra hybrid joined. Otherwise, the user will be unable to complete registration, requiring additional resources from I.T. This could be more disruptive in remote worker environments where the MDM maturity is low. Users who do not yet have access to a managed device, such as new hires, users with lost or replaced devices, or users registering MFA methods on personal mobile devices - will be unable to satisfy the device compliance grant control. To address this, organizations should configure a Temporary Access Pass (TAP) policy and issue a one- time TAP to these users. A one-time TAP satisfies multifactor authentication requirements and allows the user to register security information from any device or location. B2B collaboration users (guest accounts) will also be blocked by this policy, as their devices are not managed in the resource tenant. Organizations should consider excluding All guest and external users from this policy. Alternatively, organizations that trust partner device compliance claims can configure this through cross-tenant access settings.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Create a new policy by selecting New policy. o Under Users or agents (Preview) include All users. o Under Target resources select User actions and check Register security information. - Under Exclude exclude any break-glass accounts. o Under Grant select Grant access. o Select the checkbox Require device to be marked as compliant. o Optionally, also select Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device if the organization uses hybrid joined devices. o Choose Require one of the selected controls. o Click Select at the bottom. 4. Under Enable policy set it to Report-only. 5. Click Create. 6. After allowing the policy to run in Report-only mode for at least one week, review the Sign-in logs for any unexpected impact, then return to the policy and set Enable policy to On.", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: Break-glass accounts should be excluded from all Conditional Access policies. To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Verify that a policy exists with the following criteria and is set to On: o Under Users or agents (Preview) verify All users is included. o Verify that only documented user exclusions exist and that they are reviewed annually. o Under Target resources verify User actions is selected with Register security information checked. o Under Grant verify that Require device to be marked as compliant is checked. o Under Grant verify that no other controls are checked except, optionally, Require Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device. o Verify Require one of the selected controls is selected. 4. Verify that Enable policy is set to On. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/identity/conditionalAccess/policies 2. Filter to policies where Conditions.Applications.IncludeUserActions contains urn:user:registersecurityinfo. 3. For each policy returned, verify the following criteria: o Conditions.Users.IncludeUsers is All o Conditions.Applications.IncludeUserActions is urn:user:registersecurityinfo o GrantControls.BuiltInControls contains compliantDevice o GrantControls.BuiltInControls does not contain any values other than compliantDevice and domainJoinedDevice o GrantControls.Operator is OR o State is enabled 4. Compliance is met when at least one policy is found to meet all the criteria listed above. 5. Verify that any exclusions are documented and reviewed annually.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "This policy does not exist by default.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/concept-conditional-access-grant#require-device-to-be-marked-as-compliant:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/devices/concept-hybrid-join:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/fundamentals/deployment-guide-enrollment:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/concept-conditional-access-cloud-apps#user-actions:https://docs.azure.cn/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-strength-how-it-works#how-multiple-authentication-strength-policies-are-evaluated-for-registering-security-info" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.11", + "Description": "Sign-in frequency defines the time period before a user is asked to sign in again when attempting to access a resource. The Microsoft Entra ID default configuration for user sign-in frequency is a rolling window of 90 days. The recommended state is a Sign-in frequency of Every time for Microsoft Intune Enrollment Note: Microsoft accounts for a five-minute clock skew when 'every time' is selected in a conditional access policy, ensuring that users are not prompted more frequently than once every five minutes.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_intune_enrollment_sign_in_frequency_every_time" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.2 Conditional Access", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Sign-in frequency defines the time period before a user is asked to sign in again when attempting to access a resource. The Microsoft Entra ID default configuration for user sign-in frequency is a rolling window of 90 days. The recommended state is a Sign-in frequency of Every time for Microsoft Intune Enrollment Note: Microsoft accounts for a five-minute clock skew when 'every time' is selected in a conditional access policy, ensuring that users are not prompted more frequently than once every five minutes.", + "RationaleStatement": "Intune Enrollment is considered a sensitive action and should be safeguarded. An attack path exists that allows for a bypass of device compliance Conditional Access rule. This could allow compromised credentials to be used through a newly registered device enrolled in Intune, enabling persistence and privilege escalation. Setting sign-in frequency to every time limits the timespan an attacker could use fresh credentials to enroll a new device to Intune.", + "ImpactStatement": "New users enrolling into Intune through an automated process may need to sign-in again if the enrollment process goes on for too long.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Note: If the Microsoft Intune Enrollment cloud app isn't available then it must be created. To add the app for new tenants, a Microsoft Entra administrator must create a service principal object, with app ID d4ebce55-015a-49b5-a083-c84d1797ae8c, in PowerShell or Microsoft Graph. To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Create a new policy by selecting New policy. o Under Users or agents (Preview) include All users. o Under Target resources select Resources (formerly cloud apps), choose Select resources and add Microsoft Intune Enrollment to the list. - Under Exclude exclude any break-glass accounts. o Under Grant select Grant access. o Check either Require multifactor authentication or Require authentication strength. o Under Session check Sign-in frequency and select Every time. 4. Under Enable policy set it to Report-only. 5. Click Create. 6. After allowing the policy to run in Report-only mode for at least one week, review the Sign-in logs for any unexpected impact, then return to the policy and set Enable policy to On.", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: Break-glass accounts should be excluded from all Conditional Access policies. To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Verify that a policy exists with the following criteria and is set to On: o Under Users or agents (Preview) verify All users is included. o Verify that only documented user exclusions exist and that they are reviewed annually. o Under Target resources verify Resources (formerly cloud apps) includes Microsoft Intune Enrollment. o Under Grant verify Require multifactor authentication or Require authentication strength is checked. o Under Session verify Sign-in frequency is set to Every time. 4. Verify that Enable policy is set to On. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: Note: The Authentication Strength requirement is satisfied when any valid GUID is present in the authenticationStrength property of a matching policy. Because Authentication Strength configurations are inherently stronger than the built-in Require multifactor authentication control, the presence of a valid Authentication Strength also fulfills the MFA requirement for all users. 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/identity/conditionalAccess/policies 2. Filter to policies where Conditions.Applications.IncludeApplications contains d4ebce55-015a-49b5-a083-c84d1797ae8c. 3. For each policy returned, verify the following criteria: o Conditions.Users.IncludeUsers is All o Conditions.Applications.IncludeApplications contains d4ebce55- 015a-49b5-a083-c84d1797ae8c o GrantControls.BuiltInControls contains mfa OR GrantControls.AuthenticationStrength.id is defined o SessionControls.SignInFrequency.IsEnabled is true o SessionControls.SignInFrequency.FrequencyInterval is everyTime o State is enabled 4. Compliance is met when at least one policy is found to meet all the criteria listed above. 5. Verify that any exclusions are documented and reviewed annually.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "This policy does not exist by default. Sign-in frequency defaults to 90 days.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/concept-session-lifetime#require-reauthentication-every-time:https://www.blackhat.com/eu-24/briefings/schedule/#unveiling-the-power-of-intune-leveraging-intune-for-breaking-into-your-cloud-and-on-premise-42176:https://www.glueckkanja.com/blog/security/2025/01/compliant-device-bypass-en/" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.12", + "Description": "The Microsoft identity platform supports the device authorization grant, which allows users to sign in to input-constrained devices such as a smart TV, IoT device, or a printer. To enable this flow, the device has the user visit a webpage in a browser on another device to sign in. Once the user signs in, the device is able to get access tokens and refresh tokens as needed. The recommended state is to Block access for Device code flow in Conditional Access.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_conditional_access_policy_device_code_flow_blocked" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.2 Conditional Access", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The Microsoft identity platform supports the device authorization grant, which allows users to sign in to input-constrained devices such as a smart TV, IoT device, or a printer. To enable this flow, the device has the user visit a webpage in a browser on another device to sign in. Once the user signs in, the device is able to get access tokens and refresh tokens as needed. The recommended state is to Block access for Device code flow in Conditional Access.", + "RationaleStatement": "Since August 2024, Microsoft has observed threat actors, such as Storm-2372, employing \"device code phishing\" attacks. These attacks deceive users into logging into productivity applications, capturing authentication tokens to gain further access to compromised accounts. To mitigate this specific attack, block authentication code flows and permit only those from devices within trusted environments, identified by specific IP addresses.", + "ImpactStatement": "Some administrative overhead will be required for stricter management of these devices. Since exclusions do not violate compliance, this feature can still be utilized effectively within a controlled environment.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Create a new policy by selecting New policy. o Under Users or agents (Preview) include All users. o Under Target resources > Resources (formerly cloud apps) include All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps'). - Under Exclude exclude any break-glass accounts. o Under Conditions > Authentication flows set Configure to Yes and check Device code flow. o Click Save. o Under Grant select Block access and click Select. 4. Under Enable policy set it to Report-only. 5. Click Create. 6. After allowing the policy to run in Report-only mode for at least one week, review the Sign-in logs for any unexpected impact, then return to the policy and set Enable policy to `On", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: Break-glass accounts should be excluded from all Conditional Access policies. To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Verify that a policy exists with the following criteria and is set to On: o Under Users or agents (Preview) verify All users is included. o Verify that only documented user exclusions exist and that they are reviewed annually. o Under Target resources verify Resources (formerly cloud apps) includes All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps') o Under Conditions > Authentication flows verify Configure is set to Yes and Device code flow is checked. o Under Grant verify Block access is selected. 4. Verify that Enable policy is set to On. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/identity/conditionalAccess/policies 2. Filter to policies where Conditions.AuthenticationFlows.TransferMethods contains deviceCodeFlow. 3. For each policy returned, verify the following criteria: o Conditions.Users.IncludeUsers is All o Conditions.Applications.IncludeApplications is All o Conditions.AuthenticationFlows.TransferMethods contains deviceCodeFlow o GrantControls.BuiltInControls is block o State is enabled 4. Compliance is met when at least one policy is found to meet all the criteria listed above. 5. Verify that any exclusions are documented and reviewed annually.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "This policy does not exist by default. It may be present as a Microsoft-managed policy.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/v2-oauth2-device-code:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/concept-authentication-flows:https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/02/13/storm-2372-conducts-device-code-phishing-campaign/:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/policy-block-authentication-flows#device-code-flow-policies" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.13", + "Description": "Sign-in frequency defines the time period before a user is asked to sign in again when attempting to access a resource. The Microsoft Entra ID default configuration for user sign-in frequency is a rolling window of 90 days. The recommended state for all users is to enforce periodic reauthentication for 7 days or less.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.2 Conditional Access", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Sign-in frequency defines the time period before a user is asked to sign in again when attempting to access a resource. The Microsoft Entra ID default configuration for user sign-in frequency is a rolling window of 90 days. The recommended state for all users is to enforce periodic reauthentication for 7 days or less.", + "RationaleStatement": "A 7-day interval balances security and user experience by reducing the maximum lifespan of compromised credentials or stolen tokens without introducing excessive reauthentication prompts that can increase phishing susceptibility and user fatigue.", + "ImpactStatement": "Most users will not find weekly reauthentication requirements disruptive. Organizations with legacy applications, custom authentication workflows, or users relying on long-running sessions (such as shared or kiosk devices) may need to evaluate compatibility and apply appropriate exclusions to prevent user disruption.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Create a new policy by selecting New policy. o Under Users or agents (Preview) include All users. o Under Target resources verify Resources (formerly cloud apps) include All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps'). - Under Exclude exclude any break-glass accounts. o Under Session select Sign-in frequency and set Periodic reauthentication to 7 days or less. 4. Under Enable policy set it to Report-only. 5. Click Create. 6. After allowing the policy to run in Report-only mode for at least one week, review the Sign-in logs for any unexpected impact, then return to the policy and set Enable policy to On.", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: Break-glass accounts should be excluded from all Conditional Access policies. To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Verify that a policy exists with the following criteria and is set to On: o Under Users or agents (Preview) verify All users is included. o Verify that only documented user exclusions exist and that they are reviewed annually. o Under Target resources verify Resources (formerly cloud apps) includes All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps') o Under Session ensure Sign-in frequency is checked, and Periodic reauthentication is set to 7 days or less. 4. Verify that Enable policy is set to On. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/identity/conditionalAccess/policies 2. Filter to policies where SessionControls.SignInFrequency.IsEnabled is true 3. Filter out policies where Conditions.signInRiskLevels and Conditions.userRiskLevels have values defined, excluding these from the assessment. 4. For each policy returned, verify the following criteria: o Conditions.Users.IncludeUsers is All o Conditions.Applications.IncludeApplications is All o SessionControls.SignInFrequency.frequencyInterval is timeBased o SessionControls.SignInFrequency.type is days* o SessionControls.SignInFrequency.value is 7 (or less)* o State is enabled 5. Compliance is met when at least one policy is found to meet all the criteria listed above. 6. Verify that any exclusions are documented and reviewed annually. Note: Any SignInFrequency type and value combination is considered compliant as long as the reauthentication interval is less than or equal to 7 days. For example, a policy applied to all users that requires reauthentication every 20 hours would still meet the requirement.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "This policy does not exist by default.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/howto-conditional-access-session-lifetime" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.14", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra ID Conditional Access allows an organization to configure Named locations and configure whether those locations are trusted or untrusted. These settings provide organizations the means to specify Geographical locations for use in conditional access policies, or define actual IP addresses and IP ranges and whether or not those IP addresses and/or ranges are trusted by the organization. The recommended state is to define at least one trusted, IP range named location.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.2 Conditional Access", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra ID Conditional Access allows an organization to configure Named locations and configure whether those locations are trusted or untrusted. These settings provide organizations the means to specify Geographical locations for use in conditional access policies, or define actual IP addresses and IP ranges and whether or not those IP addresses and/or ranges are trusted by the organization. The recommended state is to define at least one trusted, IP range named location.", + "RationaleStatement": "Defining trusted source IP addresses or ranges enables organizations to better tailor and enforce Conditional Access policies based on whether authentication attempts originate from trusted or untrusted network locations. Users signing in from trusted IP ranges can be granted reduced access requirements or fewer authentication prompts, while users coming from untrusted or unknown locations may face stricter controls. Additionally, marking named locations as trusted improves the accuracy of Microsoft Entra ID Protection's risk evaluations. When a user authenticates from a trusted location, their sign-in risk is appropriately lowered, helping reduce false positives and ensuring that risk-based policies trigger only when truly necessary.", + "ImpactStatement": "Configuring named locations by country cannot designate those locations as trusted, which means Conditional Access policies cannot use the \"All trusted locations\" option and must instead rely on explicitly selecting locations. This increases the administrative effort needed to configure and maintain these policies and requires more thorough testing to prevent unintended authentication blocks. Because Conditional Access policies can fully prevent users from signing in to Entra ID if misconfigured, organizations should maintain a dedicated break-glass Global Administrator account that is excluded from all Conditional Access policies and secured with a strong passphrase and hardware-based authentication. This account exists solely to recover access if all other administrators are locked out.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Under Manage, click Named locations. 4. Click on IP ranges location to add a new location. 5. Enter a name for this location setting in the Name field. 6. Click on the + icon. 7. Add only a trusted IP Address Range in CIDR notation inside the text box that appears. 8. Click on the Add button. 9. Repeat steps 6 through 8 for each additional IP range. 10. Select the Mark as trusted location checkbox. 11. Once finished, click on Create. Note: There is no single prescribed method for applying a named location to a Conditional Access policy, as the correct configuration depends on the specific access control requirements. Implementers should have a clear understanding of how named locations function before applying them to production policies.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Under Manage, click Named locations. 4. For each named location with a Location type of IP ranges, verify there is one with the following criteria: o Trusted is set to Yes. o At least one IP Range is defined 5. Compliance is met when at least one named location is found to meet all the criteria listed above. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/identity/conditionalAccess/namedLocations?$filter=isof('microsoft.graph. ipNamedLocation') 2. For each named location returned, verify the following criteria: o isTrusted is true o ipRanges contains at least one ipv4 or ipv6 range 3. Compliance is met when at least one named location is found to meet all the criteria listed above.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Named locations are not configured by default.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/concept-assignment-network:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-risk-detection-types#locations:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/conditionalaccesspolicy?view=graph-rest-1.0" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.15", + "Description": "Conditional Access Policies can be used to block access from geographic locations that are deemed out-of-scope for your organization or application. The scope and variables for this policy should be carefully examined and defined. The recommended state is to configure at least one policy to block access from untrusted locations.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.2 Conditional Access", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Conditional Access Policies can be used to block access from geographic locations that are deemed out-of-scope for your organization or application. The scope and variables for this policy should be carefully examined and defined. The recommended state is to configure at least one policy to block access from untrusted locations.", + "RationaleStatement": "Using Conditional Access as a deny list at the tenant or subscription level enables an organization to block inbound and outbound traffic from geographic locations that fall outside its operational scope (e.g., customers, suppliers) or legal jurisdiction. Restricting access to only required regions significantly reduces unnecessary exposure to international threat actors, including advanced persistent threats (APTs), and helps maintain a more controlled and defensible security posture. Note: Because the selection of allowed or blocked locations is unique to each organization, this control does not prescribe specific countries or regions. Each organization should determine its geographic access requirements based on operational needs, regulatory obligations, and risk tolerance.", + "ImpactStatement": "Limiting access geographically will deny access to users that are traveling or working remotely in a different part of the world. A point-to-site or site to site tunnel such as a VPN is recommended to address exceptions to geographic access policies. CAUTION: If these policies are created without first auditing and testing the result, misconfiguration can potentially lock out administrators or create undesired access issues.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Create a new policy by selecting New policy. o Under Users or agents (Preview) include All users o Under Target resources include All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps'). - Under Exclude exclude any break-glass accounts. o Under Network set Configure to Yes: - Select Include, then add entries for untrusted locations that should be blocked - Select Exclude, then add entries for trusted locations that should be allowed 4. Under Access Controls, select Grant select Block Access. 5. Under Enable policy set it to Report-only. 6. Click Create. 7. After allowing the policy to run in Report-only mode for at least one week, review the Sign-in logs for any unexpected impact, then return to the policy and set Enable policy to On.", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: Break-glass accounts should be excluded from all Conditional Access policies. To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Verify that a policy exists with the following criteria: o Under Users or agents (Preview) verify All users is included o Verify that only documented user exclusions exist and that they are reviewed annually o Under Target resources verify All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps') is selected o Under Network verify Include> Selected networks and locations contains at least one untrusted location o Under Network verify Exclude contains trusted locations through either All trusted networks and locations or Selected networks and locations o Under Grant verify Block access is selected 4. Verify that Enable policy is set to On. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/identity/conditionalAccess/policies 2. For each policy returned, verify the following criteria: o conditions.users.includeUsers is All o conditions.applications.includeApplications is All o conditions.locations.includeLocations contains at least one GUID of at least one untrusted location. o conditions.locations.excludeLocations is AllTrusted OR contains at least one GUID of at least one trusted location. o grantControls.builtInControls is block o state is enabled 3. Compliance is met when at least one policy is found to meet all the criteria listed above. 4. Verify that any exclusions are documented and reviewed annually.", + "AdditionalInformation": "These policies should be tested by using the What If tool in the References. Setting these can and will create issues with logging in for users until they use an MFA device linked to their accounts. Further testing can also be done via the insights and reporting resource in References which monitors Azure sign ins.", + "DefaultValue": "This policy does not exist by default.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/policy-block-by-location:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/concept-conditional-access-report-only" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.16", + "Description": "Token Protection is a Conditional Access session control that attempts to reduce token replay attacks by ensuring only device bound sign-in session tokens, like Primary Refresh Tokens (PRTs), are accepted by Microsoft Entra ID when applications request access to protected resources. When a user registers a supported device with Microsoft Entra, a PRT is issued and cryptographically bound to that device. This binding ensures that even if a threat actor steals the token, it can't be used from another device. With Token Protection enforced, Microsoft Entra validates that only these bound sign-in session tokens are used by supported applications. The recommended state is to enforce Token Protection for Office 365 Exchange Online, Office 365 SharePoint Online and Microsoft Teams Services.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.2 Conditional Access", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Token Protection is a Conditional Access session control that attempts to reduce token replay attacks by ensuring only device bound sign-in session tokens, like Primary Refresh Tokens (PRTs), are accepted by Microsoft Entra ID when applications request access to protected resources. When a user registers a supported device with Microsoft Entra, a PRT is issued and cryptographically bound to that device. This binding ensures that even if a threat actor steals the token, it can't be used from another device. With Token Protection enforced, Microsoft Entra validates that only these bound sign-in session tokens are used by supported applications. The recommended state is to enforce Token Protection for Office 365 Exchange Online, Office 365 SharePoint Online and Microsoft Teams Services.", + "RationaleStatement": "When properly configured, Conditional Access can aid in preventing attacks involving token theft, via hijacking or replay, as part of the attack flow. Although currently considered a rare event, the impact from token impersonation can be severe.", + "ImpactStatement": "Token Protection currently supports native applications only. Browser-based applications are not supported. There are also many other known limitations documented in the link below: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/deployment-guide- token-protection-windows#known-limitations", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Select New policy. 4. Select Users or agents (Preview): 1. Under Include, select the users or groups to apply this policy. 2. Under Exclude exclude any break-glass accounts. 5. Select Target resources > Resources > Include > Select resources 1. Under Select specific resources, select the following applications: 1. Office 365 Exchange Online 2. Office 365 SharePoint Online 3. Microsoft Teams Services 2. Choose Select 6. Select Conditions: 1. Under Device platforms 1. Set Configure to Yes. 2. Include > Select device platforms > Windows. 3. Select Done. 2. Under Client apps: 1. Set Configure to Yes 2. Under Modern authentication clients, only select Mobile apps and desktop clients. 3. Select Done 7. Under Access controls > Session, select Require token protection for sign-in sessions (Generally available for Windows. Preview for MacOS, iOS) and click Select. 8. Under Enable policy set it to Report-only. 9. Click Create. 10. After allowing the policy to run in Report-only mode for at least one week, review the Sign-in logs for any unexpected impact, then return to the policy and set Enable policy to On.", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: Break-glass accounts should be excluded from all Conditional Access policies. To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access and select Policies. 3. Verify that a policy exists with the following criteria: o Under Users or agents (Preview) verify that None is not selected. o Verify that only documented exclusions exist and that they are reviewed annually o Under Target resources select Select resources and verify at minimum the following are checked: - Office 365 Exchange Online - Office 365 SharePoint Online - Microsoft Teams Services 4. Under Conditions > Device Platforms: verify that Configure is set to Yes and Include indicates Windows platforms. 5. Under Conditions > Client Apps: verify that Configure is set to Yes and only Mobile Apps and Desktop Clients is selected. 6. Under Access controls > Session, verify that Require token protection for sign-in sessions (Generally available for Windows. Preview for MacOS, iOS) is selected. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/identity/conditionalAccess/policies 2. Filter to policies where sessionControls.secureSignInSession.isEnabled is true. 3. For each policy returned, verify the following criteria: o conditions.users.includeUsers is not None o conditions.applications.includeApplications contains at least the following GUIDs: - 00000002-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000 (Office 365 Exchange Online) - 00000003-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000 (Office 365 SharePoint Online) - cc15fd57-2c6c-4117-a88c-83b1d56b4bbe (Microsoft Teams Services) o conditions.platforms.includePlatforms contains windows o conditions.clientAppTypes is mobileAppsAndDesktopClients o sessionControls.secureSignInSession.isEnabled is true o State is enabled 4. Compliance is met when at least one policy is found to meet all the criteria listed above. 5. Verify that any exclusions are documented and reviewed annually.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "This policy does not exist by default.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/concept-token-protection:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/deployment-guide-token-protection-windows:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/devices/protecting-tokens-microsoft-entra-id" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.2.17", + "Description": "Authentication transfer is a flow that lets users seamlessly transfer authenticated state from one device to another. For example, users might see a QR code in the desktop version of Outlook that, when scanned on their mobile device, transfers their authenticated state to the mobile device. The recommended state is to block Authentication transfer.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.2 Conditional Access", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Authentication transfer is a flow that lets users seamlessly transfer authenticated state from one device to another. For example, users might see a QR code in the desktop version of Outlook that, when scanned on their mobile device, transfers their authenticated state to the mobile device. The recommended state is to block Authentication transfer.", + "RationaleStatement": "Blocking authentication transfer helps protect against token theft and replay attacks by preventing the use of device tokens to silently authenticate on other devices or browsers. When authentication transfer is enabled, a threat actor who gains access to one device can access resources to unapproved devices, bypassing standard authentication and device compliance checks. When administrators block this flow, organizations can ensure that each authentication request must originate from the original device, maintaining the integrity of the device compliance and user session context.", + "ImpactStatement": "Users will no longer be able to use authentication transfer to sign into mobile versions of Microsoft apps (e.g., scanning a QR code in Outlook desktop to sign into Outlook mobile). Each device will require independent, interactive sign-in subject to applicable Conditional Access policies.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access. 3. Create a new policy by selecting New policy. o Under Users or agents (Preview) include All users. o Under Target resources > Resources (formerly cloud apps) include All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps'). - Under Exclude exclude any break-glass accounts. o Under Conditions > Authentication flows set Configure to Yes and check Authentication transfer. - Click Save. o Under Grant select Block access and click Select. 4. Under Enable policy set it to Report-only until the organization is ready to enable it. 5. Click Create. 6. After allowing the policy to run in Report-only mode for at least one week, review the Sign-in logs for any unexpected impact, then return to the policy and set Enable policy to On.", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: Break-glass accounts should be excluded from all Conditional Access policies. To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Conditional Access. 3. Verify that a policy exists with the following criteria: o Under Users or agents (Preview) verify All users is selected. o Verify that only documented user exclusions exist and that they are reviewed annually. o Under Target resources verify Resources (formerly cloud apps) includes All resources (formerly 'All cloud apps') o Under Conditions > Authentication flows verify Configure is set to Yes and Authentication transfer is checked. o Under Grant verify Block access is selected. 4. Verify that Enable policy is set to On. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/identity/conditionalAccess/policies 2. Filter to policies where conditions.authenticationFlows.transferMethods contains authenticationTransfer. 3. For each policy returned, verify the following criteria: o conditions.users.includeUsers is All o conditions.applications.includeApplications is All o conditions.authenticationFlows.transferMethods contains authenticationTransfer o grantControls.builtInControls is block o state is enabled 4. Compliance is met when at least one policy is found to meet all the criteria listed above. 5. Verify that any exclusions are documented and reviewed annually.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "This policy does not exist by default.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/policy-block-authentication-flows#authentication-transfer-policies:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/zero-trust-protect-identities#authentication-transfer-is-blocked:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/concept-authentication-flows:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/concept-authentication-transfer" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.3.1", + "Description": "Microsoft provides supporting settings to enhance the configuration of the Microsoft Authenticator application. These settings provide users with additional information and context when they receive MFA passwordless and push requests, including the geographic location of the request, the requesting application, and a requirement for number matching. The recommended state is Enabled for the following: - Show application name in push and passwordless notifications - Show geographic location in push and passwordless notifications Note: On February 27, 2023 Microsoft started enforcing number matching tenant-wide for all users using Microsoft Authenticator.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.3 Authentication Methods", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Microsoft provides supporting settings to enhance the configuration of the Microsoft Authenticator application. These settings provide users with additional information and context when they receive MFA passwordless and push requests, including the geographic location of the request, the requesting application, and a requirement for number matching. The recommended state is Enabled for the following: - Show application name in push and passwordless notifications - Show geographic location in push and passwordless notifications Note: On February 27, 2023 Microsoft started enforcing number matching tenant-wide for all users using Microsoft Authenticator.", + "RationaleStatement": "As the use of strong authentication has become more widespread, attackers have started to exploit the tendency of users to experience \"MFA fatigue.\" This occurs when users are repeatedly asked to provide additional forms of identification, leading them to eventually approve requests without fully verifying the source. To counteract this, number matching can be employed to ensure the security of the authentication process. With this method, users are prompted to confirm a number displayed on their original device and enter it into the device being used for MFA. Additionally, other information such as geolocation and application details are displayed to enhance the end user's awareness. Among these 3 options, number matching provides the strongest net security gain.", + "ImpactStatement": "Additional interaction will be required by end users using number matching as opposed to simply pressing \"Approve\" for login attempts.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Click to expand Entra ID > Authentication methods and select Policies. 3. Select Microsoft Authenticator 4. Under Enable and Target ensure the setting is set to Enable. 5. Select Configure 6. Set the following Microsoft Authenticator settings: o Show application name in push and passwordless notifications Status is set to Enabled, Target All users o Show geographic location in push and passwordless notifications Status is set to Enabled, Target All users Note: Valid groups such as break glass accounts can be excluded per organization policy.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Authentication methods and select Policies. 3. Under Method select Microsoft Authenticator. 4. Under Enable and Target verify the setting is set to Enable. 5. In the Include tab verify that All users is selected. 6. In the Exclude tab verify only valid groups are present (i.e. Break Glass accounts). 7. Select Configure 8. Verify the following Microsoft Authenticator settings: o Show application name in push and passwordless notifications Status is set to Enabled, Target All users o Show geographic location in push and passwordless notifications Status is set to Enabled, Target All users 9. In each setting select Exclude and verify only valid groups are present (i.e. Break Glass accounts). To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/policies/authenticationMethodsPolicy/authenticationMethodConfigurations/ microsoftAuthenticator 2. Verify that the state is enabled. 3. Verify that includeTargets.id is all_users. 4. Verify that the excludeTargets only includes valid groups (i.e. Break Glass accounts). 5. Under featureSettings verify the following settings: o displayAppInformationRequiredState.state is enabled o displayAppInformationRequiredState.includeTarget.id is all_users o displayLocationInformationRequiredState.state is enabled o displayLocationInformationRequiredState.includeTarget.id is all_users 6. In each setting excludeTarget only includes a valid group (i.e. Break Glass accounts) or a target id of 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 Note: Compliance cannot be easily validated for exclusions so adding these to a report for human manual review is recommended. These should be reviewed annually.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Microsoft-managed", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-default-enablement:https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-entra-blog/defend-your-users-from-mfa-fatigue-attacks/ba-p/2365677:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/how-to-mfa-number-match:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/authenticationmethodspolicy-get?view=graph-rest-1.0" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.3.2", + "Description": "With Entra Password Protection, default global banned password lists are automatically applied to all users in an Entra ID tenant. To support business and security needs, custom banned password lists can be defined. When users change or reset their passwords, these banned password lists are checked to enforce the use of strong passwords. A custom banned password list should include some of the following examples: - Brand names - Product names - Locations, such as company headquarters - Company-specific internal terms - Abbreviations that have specific company meaning", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.3 Authentication Methods", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "With Entra Password Protection, default global banned password lists are automatically applied to all users in an Entra ID tenant. To support business and security needs, custom banned password lists can be defined. When users change or reset their passwords, these banned password lists are checked to enforce the use of strong passwords. A custom banned password list should include some of the following examples: - Brand names - Product names - Locations, such as company headquarters - Company-specific internal terms - Abbreviations that have specific company meaning", + "RationaleStatement": "Creating a new password can be difficult regardless of one's technical background. It is common to look around one's environment for suggestions when building a password, however, this may include picking words specific to the organization as inspiration for a password. An adversary may employ what is called a 'mangler' to create permutations of these specific words in an attempt to crack passwords or hashes making it easier to reach their goal.", + "ImpactStatement": "If a custom banned password list includes too many common dictionary words, or short words that are part of compound words, then perfectly secure passwords may be blocked. The organization should consider a balance between security and usability when creating a list.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand Entra ID > Authentication methods and select Password protection. 3. Set Enforce custom list to Yes 4. In Custom banned password list create a list using suggestions outlined in this document. 5. Click Save Note: Below is a list of examples that can be used as a starting place. The references section contains more suggestions. - Brand names - Product names - Locations, such as company headquarters - Company-specific internal terms - Abbreviations that have specific company meaning", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand Entra ID > Authentication methods and select Password protection. 3. Verify that Enforce custom list is set to Yes 4. Verify that Custom banned password list contains entries specific to the organization or matches a pre-determined list. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Directory.Read.All\" 2. Run the following commands: $PwRuleSettings = '5cf42378-d67d-4f36-ba46-e8b86229381d' Get-MgGroupSetting | Where-Object TemplateId -eq $PwRuleSettings | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Values 3. Verify that EnableBannedPasswordCheck is True and BannedPasswordList is populated.", + "AdditionalInformation": "Organization-specific terms can be added to the custom banned password list, such as the following examples: - Brand names - Product names - Locations, such as company headquarters - Company-specific terms - Abbreviations that have specific company meaning - Months and weekdays with your company's local languages The default global banned password list is already applied to your resources which applies the following basic requirements: Characters allowed: - Uppercase characters (A - Z) - Lowercase characters (a - z) - Numbers (0 - 9) - Symbols: - @#$%^&*-_!+=[]{}|\\:',.?/`~\"();<> - blank space Characters not allowed: - Unicode characters Password length: Passwords require: - A minimum of eight characters - A maximum of 256 characters Password complexity: Passwords require three out of four of the following categories: - Uppercase characters - Lowercase characters - Numbers - Symbols Note: Password complexity check isn't required for Education tenants. Password not recently used: - When a user changes or resets their password, the new password can't be the same as the current or recently used passwords. - Password isn't banned by Entra ID Password Protection. - The password can't be on the global list of banned passwords for Azure AD Password Protection, or on the customizable list of banned passwords specific to your organization. Evaluation New passwords are evaluated for strength and complexity by validating against the combined list of terms from the global and custom banned password lists. Even if a user's password contains a banned password, the password may be accepted if the overall password is otherwise strong enough.", + "DefaultValue": "By default the custom banned password list is not 'Enabled'.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-password-ban-bad#custom-banned-password-list:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/tutorial-configure-custom-password-protection:https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/publication/password-guidance/:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-identity-management#im-6-use-strong-authentication-controls" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.3.3", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra Password Protection provides a global and custom banned password list. A password change request fails if there's a match in these banned password list. To protect on-premises Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) environment, install and configure Entra Password Protection. Note: This recommendation applies to Hybrid deployments only and will have no impact unless working with on-premises Active Directory.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.3 Authentication Methods", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra Password Protection provides a global and custom banned password list. A password change request fails if there's a match in these banned password list. To protect on-premises Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) environment, install and configure Entra Password Protection. Note: This recommendation applies to Hybrid deployments only and will have no impact unless working with on-premises Active Directory.", + "RationaleStatement": "This feature protects an organization by prohibiting the use of weak or leaked passwords. In addition, organizations can create custom banned password lists to prevent their users from using easily guessed passwords that are specific to their industry. Deploying this feature to Active Directory will strengthen the passwords that are used in the environment.", + "ImpactStatement": "The potential impact associated with implementation of this setting is dependent upon the existing password policies in place in the environment. For environments that have strong password policies in place, the impact will be minimal. For organizations that do not have strong password policies in place, implementation of Microsoft Entra Password Protection may require users to change passwords and adhere to more stringent requirements than they have been accustomed to.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: - Download and install the Azure AD Password Proxies and DC Agents from the following location: https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=57071 After installed follow the steps below. 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Authentication methods and select Password protection. 3. Set Enable password protection on Windows Server Active Directory to Yes and Mode to Enforced.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Authentication methods and select Password protection. 3. Verify that Enable password protection on Windows Server Active Directory is set to Yes and that Mode is set to Enforced. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Directory.Read.All\" 2. Run the following command: (Get-MgGroupSetting | ? { $_.TemplateId -eq '5cf42378-d67d-4f36-ba46- e8b86229381d' }).Values 3. Verify that EnableBannedPasswordCheckOnPremises is set to True and BannedPasswordCheckOnPremisesMode is set to Enforce.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Enable - Yes Mode - Audit", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-password-ban-bad-on-premises-operations" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.3.4", + "Description": "Microsoft defines Multifactor authentication capable as being registered and enabled for a strong authentication method. The method must also be allowed by the authentication methods policy. Ensure all member users are MFA capable.", + "Checks": [ + "entra_users_mfa_capable" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.3 Authentication Methods", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Microsoft defines Multifactor authentication capable as being registered and enabled for a strong authentication method. The method must also be allowed by the authentication methods policy. Ensure all member users are MFA capable.", + "RationaleStatement": "Multifactor authentication requires an individual to present a minimum of two separate forms of authentication before access is granted. Users who are not MFA Capable have never registered a strong authentication method for multifactor authentication that is within policy and may not be using MFA. This could be a result of having never signed in, exclusion from a Conditional Access (CA) policy requiring MFA, or a CA policy does not exist. Reviewing this list of users will help identify possible lapses in policy or procedure.", + "ImpactStatement": "When using the UI audit method guest users will appear in the report and unless the organization is applying MFA rules to guests then they will need to be manually filtered. Accounts that provide on-premises directory synchronization also appear in these reports.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Remediation steps will depend on the status of the personnel in question or configuration of Conditional Access policies and will not be covered in detail. Administrators should review each user identified on a case-by-case basis using the conditions below. User has never signed on: - Employment status should be reviewed, and appropriate action taken on the user account's roles, licensing and enablement. Conditional Access policy applicability: - Ensure a CA policy is in place requiring all users to use MFA. - Ensure the user is not excluded from the CA MFA policy. - Ensure the policy's state is set to On. - Use What if to determine applicable CA policies. (Protection > Conditional Access > Policies) - Review the user account in Sign-in logs. Under the Activity Details pane click the Conditional Access tab to view applied policies. Note: Conditional Access is covered step by step in section 5.2.2", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Authentication methods and select User registration details. 3. Set the filter option Multifactor authentication capable to Not Capable. 4. Review the non-guest users in this list. 5. Excluding any exceptions users found in this report may require remediation. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"UserAuthenticationMethod.Read.All,AuditLog.Read.All\" 2. Run the following: Get-MgReportAuthenticationMethodUserRegistrationDetail ` -Filter \"IsMfaCapable eq false and UserType eq 'Member'\" | ft UserPrincipalName,IsMfaCapable,IsAdmin 3. Verify that IsMfaCapable is set to True. 4. Excluding any exceptions users found in this report may require remediation. Note: The CA rule must be in place for a successful deployment of Multifactor Authentication. This policy is outlined in the conditional access section 5.2.2 Note 2: Possible exceptions include on-premises synchronization accounts.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.graph.reports/update-mgreportauthenticationmethoduserregistrationdetail?view=graph-powershell-0#-ismfacapable:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/how-to-view-applied-conditional-access-policies:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/what-if-tool:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-authentication-methods-activity" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.3.5", + "Description": "Authentication methods support a wide variety of scenarios for signing in to Microsoft 365 resources. Some of these methods are inherently more secure than others but require more investment in time to get users enrolled and operational. SMS and Voice Call rely on telephony carrier communication methods to deliver the authenticating factor. The recommended state is to Disable these methods: - SMS - Voice Call", + "Checks": [ + "entra_authentication_method_sms_voice_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.3 Authentication Methods", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Authentication methods support a wide variety of scenarios for signing in to Microsoft 365 resources. Some of these methods are inherently more secure than others but require more investment in time to get users enrolled and operational. SMS and Voice Call rely on telephony carrier communication methods to deliver the authenticating factor. The recommended state is to Disable these methods: - SMS - Voice Call", + "RationaleStatement": "Traditional MFA methods such as SMS codes, email-based OTPs, and push notifications are becoming less effective against today's attackers. Sophisticated phishing campaigns have demonstrated that second factors can be intercepted or spoofed. Attackers now exploit social engineering, man-in-the-middle tactics, and user fatigue (e.g., MFA bombing) to bypass these mechanisms. These risks are amplified in distributed, cloud-first organizations with hybrid workforces and varied device ecosystems. The SMS and Voice call methods are vulnerable to SIM swapping which could allow an attacker to gain access to your Microsoft 365 account.", + "ImpactStatement": "There may be increased administrative overhead in adopting more secure authentication methods depending on the maturity of the organization.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Authentication methods and select Policies. 3. Inspect each method that is out of compliance and remediate: o Click on the method to open it. o Change the Enable toggle to the off position. o Click Save. Note: If the save button remains greyed out after toggling a method off, then first turn it back on and then change the position of the Target selection (all users or select groups). Turn the method off again and save. This was observed to be a bug in the UI at the time this document was published. To remediate using Powershell: 1. Connect to Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.ReadWrite.AuthenticationMethod\" 2. Run the following to disable both authentication methods: $params = @( @{ Id = \"Sms\"; State = \"disabled\" }, @{ Id = \"Voice\"; State = \"disabled\" } ) Update-MgPolicyAuthenticationMethodPolicy -AuthenticationMethodConfigurations $params", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Authentication methods and select Policies. 3. Verify that the following methods in the Enabled column are set to No. o Method: SMS o Method: Voice call To audit using Powershell: 1. Connect to Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.Read.All\" 2. Run the following: (Get-MgPolicyAuthenticationMethodPolicy).AuthenticationMethodConfigurations 3. Verify that Sms and Voice are disabled.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "- SMS : Disabled - Voice Call : Disabled", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-methods-manage:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/zero-trust/sfi/phishing-resistant-mfa#context-and-problem:https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365-life-hacks/privacy-and-safety/what-is-sim-swapping" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.3.6", + "Description": "System-preferred multifactor authentication (MFA) prompts users to sign in by using the most secure method they registered. The user is prompted to sign-in with the most secure method according to the below order. The order of authentication methods is dynamic. It's updated by Microsoft as the security landscape changes, and as better authentication methods emerge. 1. Temporary Access Pass 2. Passkey (FIDO2) 3. Microsoft Authenticator notifications 4. External authentication methods 5. Time-based one-time password (TOTP) 6. Telephony 7. Certificate-based authentication The recommended state is Enabled.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.3 Authentication Methods", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "System-preferred multifactor authentication (MFA) prompts users to sign in by using the most secure method they registered. The user is prompted to sign-in with the most secure method according to the below order. The order of authentication methods is dynamic. It's updated by Microsoft as the security landscape changes, and as better authentication methods emerge. 1. Temporary Access Pass 2. Passkey (FIDO2) 3. Microsoft Authenticator notifications 4. External authentication methods 5. Time-based one-time password (TOTP) 6. Telephony 7. Certificate-based authentication The recommended state is Enabled.", + "RationaleStatement": "Regardless of the authentication method enabled by an administrator or set as preferred by the user, the system will dynamically select the most secure option available at the time of authentication. This approach acts as an additional safeguard to prevent the use of weaker methods, such as voice calls, SMS, and email OTPs, which may have been inadvertently left enabled due to misconfiguration or lack of configuration hardening. Enforcing the default behavior also ensures the feature is not disabled.", + "ImpactStatement": "The Microsoft managed value of system-preferred MFA is Enabled and as such enforces the default behavior. No additional impact is expected. Note: Due to known issues with certificate-based authentication (CBA) and system- preferred MFA, Microsoft moved CBA to the bottom of the list. It is still considered a strong authentication method.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Authentication methods and select Settings. 3. Set the System-preferred multifactor authentication State to Enabled and include All users. 4. Any users exclusions should be documented and reviewed annually.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Authentication methods and select Settings. 3. Verify the System-preferred multifactor authentication State is set to Enabled and All users are included. 4. Verify that only documented exclusions exist and that they are reviewed annually To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Microsoft Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.Read.AuthenticationMethod\" 2. Run the following commands: $Uri = 'https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/policies/authenticationMethodsPolicy' (Invoke-MgGraphRequest -Method GET -Uri $Uri).systemCredentialPreferences 3. Verify that includeTargets is set to all_users and state is set to enabled.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Microsoft Managed (Enabled)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-system-preferred-multifactor-authentication:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-system-preferred-multifactor-authentication#how-does-system-preferred-mfa-determine-the-most-secure-method" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.3.7", + "Description": "Authentication methods support a wide variety of scenarios for signing in to Microsoft 365 resources. Some of these methods are inherently more secure than others but require more investment in time to get users enrolled and operational. The email one-time passcode feature is a way to authenticate B2B collaboration users when they can't be authenticated through other means, such as Microsoft Entra ID, Microsoft account (MSA), or social identity providers. When a B2B guest user tries to redeem your invitation or sign in to your shared resources, they can request a temporary passcode, which is sent to their email address. Then they enter this passcode to continue signing in. The recommended state is to Disable email OTP.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.3 Authentication Methods", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Authentication methods support a wide variety of scenarios for signing in to Microsoft 365 resources. Some of these methods are inherently more secure than others but require more investment in time to get users enrolled and operational. The email one-time passcode feature is a way to authenticate B2B collaboration users when they can't be authenticated through other means, such as Microsoft Entra ID, Microsoft account (MSA), or social identity providers. When a B2B guest user tries to redeem your invitation or sign in to your shared resources, they can request a temporary passcode, which is sent to their email address. Then they enter this passcode to continue signing in. The recommended state is to Disable email OTP.", + "RationaleStatement": "Traditional MFA methods such as SMS codes, email-based OTPs, and push notifications are becoming less effective against today's attackers. Sophisticated phishing campaigns have demonstrated that second factors can be intercepted or spoofed. Attackers now exploit social engineering, man-in-the-middle tactics, and user fatigue (e.g., MFA bombing) to bypass these mechanisms. These risks are amplified in distributed, cloud-first organizations with hybrid workforces and varied device ecosystems.", + "ImpactStatement": "Disabling Email OTP will prevent one-time pass codes from being sent to unverified guest users accessing Microsoft 365 resources on the tenant such as \"@yahoo.com\". They will be required to use a personal Microsoft account, a managed Microsoft Entra account, be part of a federation or be configured as a guest in the host tenant's Microsoft Entra ID.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Authentication methods and select Policies. 3. Click on Email OTP. 4. Change the Enable toggle to the off position\\ 5. Click Save. Note: If the save button remains greyed out after toggling a method off, then first turn it back on and then change the position of the Target selection (all users or select groups). Turn the method off again and save. This was observed to be a bug in the UI at the time this document was published. To remediate using Powershell: 1. Connect to Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.ReadWrite.AuthenticationMethod\" 2. Run the following: $params = @( @{ Id = \"Email\"; State = \"disabled\" } ) Update-MgPolicyAuthenticationMethodPolicy -AuthenticationMethodConfigurations $params", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Authentication methods and select Policies. 3. Verify that Email OTP is set to No in the Enabled column. To audit using Powershell: 1. Connect to Graph using Connect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Policy.Read.All\" 2. Run the following: (Get-MgPolicyAuthenticationMethodPolicy).AuthenticationMethodConfigurations 3. Verify the id type Email is set to disabled.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "- Email OTP : Enabled", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-methods-manage:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/external-id/one-time-passcode:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/zero-trust/sfi/phishing-resistant-mfa#context-and-problem" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.3.8", + "Description": "The account lockout threshold determines how many failed login attempts are permitted prior to placing the account in a locked-out state and initiating a variable lockout duration. The recommended Lockout threshold is 10 or less.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.3 Authentication Methods", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The account lockout threshold determines how many failed login attempts are permitted prior to placing the account in a locked-out state and initiating a variable lockout duration. The recommended Lockout threshold is 10 or less.", + "RationaleStatement": "Account lockout is a method of protecting against brute-force and password spray attacks. Once the lockout threshold has been exceeded, the account enters a locked- out state which prevents all login attempts for a variable duration. The lockout in combination with a reasonable duration reduces the total number of failed login attempts that a malicious actor can execute in a given period of time.", + "ImpactStatement": "If account lockout threshold is set too low (less than 3), users may experience frequent lockout events and the resulting security alerts may contribute to alert fatigue. If account lockout threshold is set too high (more than 10), malicious actors can programmatically execute more password attempts in a given period of time. In hybrid environments using pass-through authentication (PTA), the Microsoft Entra lockout threshold must be set lower than the AD DS account lockout threshold. If the AD DS threshold is equal to or lower than the Entra threshold, AD DS will lock the account before Entra smart lockout activates, bypassing the cloud-side protection and resulting in on-premises account lockouts that require manual administrator intervention to clear. Microsoft recommends configuring the AD DS lockout threshold to be at least two to three times greater than the Entra lockout threshold.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Authentication methods and select Password protection. 3. Set Lockout threshold to 10 or less. Note: In hybrid environments using pass-through authentication (PTA), Microsoft recommends to configure the AD DS account lockout threshold to be at least two to three times greater than the value set here to ensure Entra smart lockout activates before AD DS lockout.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Authentication methods and select Password protection. 3. Verify that Lockout threshold is set to 10 or less. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/groupSettings 2. Filter to Password Rule settings, where templateId is 5cf42378-d67d-4f36- ba46-e8b86229381d 3. Verify that LockoutThreshold is 10 or less.", + "AdditionalInformation": "NOTE: The variable number for failed login attempts allowed before lockout is prescribed by many security and compliance frameworks. The appropriate setting for this variable should be determined by the most restrictive security or compliance framework that your organization follows.", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Lockout threshold is set to 10.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-password-smart-lockout#manage-microsoft-entra-smart-lockout-values:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/group-list-settings?view=graph-rest-0" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.3.9", + "Description": "The account lockout duration value determines how long an account retains the status of lockout, and therefore how long before a user can continue to attempt to login after passing the lockout threshold. The recommended state is Lockout duration in seconds is at least 60.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.3 Authentication Methods", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The account lockout duration value determines how long an account retains the status of lockout, and therefore how long before a user can continue to attempt to login after passing the lockout threshold. The recommended state is Lockout duration in seconds is at least 60.", + "RationaleStatement": "Account lockout is a method of protecting against brute-force and password spray attacks. Once the lockout threshold has been exceeded, the account enters a locked- out state which prevents all login attempts for a variable duration. The lockout in combination with a reasonable duration reduces the total number of failed login attempts that a malicious actor can execute in a given period of time.", + "ImpactStatement": "If account lockout duration is set too low (less than 60 seconds), malicious actors can perform more password spray and brute-force attempts over a given period of time. If the account lockout duration is set too high (more than 300 seconds) users may experience inconvenient delays during lockout. In hybrid environments using pass-through authentication (PTA), the Microsoft Entra lockout duration must be set longer than the AD DS account lockout duration. Note that Entra lockout duration is configured in seconds while AD DS lockout duration is configured in minutes; verify the units when comparing the two values to ensure Entra smart lockout expires after AD DS lockout.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Authentication methods and select Password protection. 3. Set the Lockout duration in seconds to 60 or higher. 4. Click Save. Note: In hybrid environments using pass-through authentication (PTA), ensure the AD DS account lockout duration is shorter than the value set here. The Entra lockout duration is configured in seconds while AD DS lockout duration is configured in minutes; account for the unit difference when comparing the two values.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Authentication methods and select Password protection. 3. Verify that Lockout duration in seconds is set to 60 or higher. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/groupSettings 2. Filter to Password Rule settings, where templateId is 5cf42378-d67d-4f36- ba46-e8b86229381d 3. Verify that LockoutDurationInSeconds is greater than or equal to 60.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "By default, Lockout duration in seconds is set to 60.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-password-smart-lockout#manage-microsoft-entra-smart-lockout-values:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/group-list-settings?view=graph-rest-0" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.3.10", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra ID includes a feature called Authenticator Lite, which embeds a subset of Microsoft Authenticator functionality into companion applications such as Outlook mobile. When enabled, users can satisfy MFA requirements using push notifications or time-based one-time passcodes (TOTP) directly from the companion application without installing the standalone Microsoft Authenticator app. The recommended state is Microsoft Authenticator on companion applications set to Disabled.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.3 Authentication Methods", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra ID includes a feature called Authenticator Lite, which embeds a subset of Microsoft Authenticator functionality into companion applications such as Outlook mobile. When enabled, users can satisfy MFA requirements using push notifications or time-based one-time passcodes (TOTP) directly from the companion application without installing the standalone Microsoft Authenticator app. The recommended state is Microsoft Authenticator on companion applications set to Disabled.", + "RationaleStatement": "Authenticator Lite does not support application name or geographic location context in push notifications, regardless of tenant-wide Authenticator feature settings. These are key defenses against MFA fatigue attacks that are only available in the full Microsoft Authenticator app. Authenticator Lite also does not satisfy Conditional Access authentication strength requirements, does not support passwordless authentication, and does not support SSPR via push notifications. Disabling this feature ensures users authenticate through the full Microsoft Authenticator app where all available security protections are active.", + "ImpactStatement": "Users who have registered Authenticator Lite as their only MFA method will be unable to complete MFA until they install and register the standalone Microsoft Authenticator app. Administrators should communicate this change in advance and verify that affected users have registered an alternative MFA method before disabling this feature to avoid authentication lockouts.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Authentication methods and select Policies. 3. Under Method select Microsoft Authenticator. 4. Select Configure. 5. Set Microsoft Authenticator on companion applications: Status to Disabled. 6. Select Save.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Entra ID > Authentication methods and select Policies. 3. Under Method select Microsoft Authenticator. 4. Select Configure. 5. Verify that Microsoft Authenticator on companion applications: Status is set to Disabled. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: beta/policies/authenticationMethodsPolicy/authenticationMethodConfigurations/ microsoftAuthenticator 2. Verify that featureSettings.companionAppAllowedState.state is disabled.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Microsoft managed (enabled as of June 26, 2023)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/how-to-mfa-authenticator-lite:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-default-enablement:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/how-to-mfa-additional-context" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.4.1", + "Description": "Enabling self-service password reset allows users to reset their own passwords in Entra ID. When users sign in to Microsoft 365, they will be prompted to enter additional contact information that will help them reset their password in the future. If combined registration is enabled additional information, outside of multi-factor, will not be needed. The recommended state is All. Note: Effective Oct. 1st, 2022, Microsoft will begin to enable combined registration for all users in Entra ID tenants created before August 15th, 2020. Tenants created after this date are enabled with combined registration by default.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.4 Password reset", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Enabling self-service password reset allows users to reset their own passwords in Entra ID. When users sign in to Microsoft 365, they will be prompted to enter additional contact information that will help them reset their password in the future. If combined registration is enabled additional information, outside of multi-factor, will not be needed. The recommended state is All. Note: Effective Oct. 1st, 2022, Microsoft will begin to enable combined registration for all users in Entra ID tenants created before August 15th, 2020. Tenants created after this date are enabled with combined registration by default.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enabling Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) significantly reduces helpdesk interactions, streamlining support operations and improving user experience. Traditional methods involving temporary passwords pose notable security risks-they are often weak, predictable, and susceptible to interception. This creates a window of opportunity for threat actors to compromise accounts before users can update their credentials. SSPR minimizes credential exposure and strengthens overall identity protection.", + "ImpactStatement": "Users will be required to provide additional contact information in order to enroll in SSPR. Some light user education may be necessary, particularly for individuals who are accustomed to contacting the help desk for password reset assistance. In hybrid environments, SSPR writeback must be enabled before users are able to reset their passwords through self-service.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Password reset and select Properties. 3. Set Self service password reset enabled to All", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Password reset and select Properties. 3. Verify that Self service password reset enabled is set to All", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/add-users/let-users-reset-passwords?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/tutorial-enable-sspr:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-registration-mfa-sspr-combined:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-sspr-writeback" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.4.2", + "Description": "Ensures that two alternate forms of identification are provided before allowing a password reset. The recommended state is Number of methods required to reset set to 2.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.4 Password reset", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "Ensures that two alternate forms of identification are provided before allowing a password reset. The recommended state is Number of methods required to reset set to 2.", + "RationaleStatement": "Requiring Multi-factor Authentication (MFA) for Self-service Password Reset (SSPR) strengthens the password reset process by confirming the user's identity with two separate methods of authentication. With multiple methods required for password reset, an attacker would have to compromise multiple authentication methods before resetting a user's password.", + "ImpactStatement": "If multiple methods are required for password reset and a user has lost access to other authentication methods, the resetting user will need an administrator with permissions to remove the lost authentication method. Policy and training are recommended to teach administrators to verify the identity of the requesting user so that social engineering is not an effective vector of compromise. If multifactor authentication is not currently enabled for all users, users with only one registered form of authentication will not be able to reset their passwords through SSPR until another form of authentication is registered. If multifactor authentication is already enabled for all users, the impact of this recommendation should be minimal.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Password reset and select Authentication methods. 3. Set the Number of methods required to reset to 2 4. Click Save", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Password reset and select Authentication methods. 3. Verify that Number of methods required to reset is set to 2", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "By default, the Number of methods required to reset is 1.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/tutorial-enable-sspr:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-registration-mfa-sspr-combined:https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/account-billing/reset-your-work-or-school-password-using-security-info-23dde81f-08bb-4776-ba72-e6b72b9dda9e:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-methods" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.4.3", + "Description": "The Require users to register when signing in? setting controls whether users are prompted to register their self-service password reset (SSPR) authentication methods at their next sign-in. When set to Yes, users who have not yet registered are prompted to do so upon signing in. The Number of days before users are asked to re-confirm their authentication information setting designates the period of time before registered users are prompted to re-confirm their existing authentication information is still valid, up to a maximum of 730 days. If set to 0 days, registered users will never be prompted to re-confirm their authentication information.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.4 Password reset", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "The Require users to register when signing in? setting controls whether users are prompted to register their self-service password reset (SSPR) authentication methods at their next sign-in. When set to Yes, users who have not yet registered are prompted to do so upon signing in. The Number of days before users are asked to re-confirm their authentication information setting designates the period of time before registered users are prompted to re-confirm their existing authentication information is still valid, up to a maximum of 730 days. If set to 0 days, registered users will never be prompted to re-confirm their authentication information.", + "RationaleStatement": "Without requiring users to register, users may never establish SSPR authentication methods, rendering the re-confirmation setting ineffective regardless of the value it is set to. When users do register authentication methods for self-service password reset (SSPR), those methods may become stale over time as phone numbers, email addresses, or other contact information changes. If re-confirmation is disabled, outdated recovery information persists indefinitely. An attacker who gains access to a former phone number or email address associated with a user's account can exploit that stale recovery information to reset the user's password and take over the account. Requiring registration and periodic re-confirmation ensures that the authentication methods on record remain accurate and under the user's control.", + "ImpactStatement": "Because both settings default to the compliant state, organizations that have not altered them will experience no impact. Re-enabling registration prompts unregistered users to register at their next sign-in; re-enabling re-confirmation prompts registered users to verify their information on the configured interval. Organizations with large user populations and short re-confirmation intervals should expect increased SSPR support volume.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Password reset and select Registration. 3. Set Require users to register when signing in? to Yes. 4. Set Number of days before users are asked to re-confirm their authentication information to any organization-approved value other than 0. 5. Click Save.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Password reset and select Registration. 3. Verify that Require users to register when signing in? is set to Yes. 4. Verify that Number of days before users are asked to re-confirm their authentication information is not set to 0.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "- Require users to register when signing in?: Yes - Number of days before users are asked to re-confirm their authentication information: 180", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-sspr-howitworks#registration:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-methods" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.4.4", + "Description": "This setting determines whether or not users receive an email to their primary and alternate email addresses notifying them when their own password has been reset via the Self-Service Password Reset portal. The recommended state is Notify users on password resets? is set to Yes.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.4 Password reset", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "This setting determines whether or not users receive an email to their primary and alternate email addresses notifying them when their own password has been reset via the Self-Service Password Reset portal. The recommended state is Notify users on password resets? is set to Yes.", + "RationaleStatement": "User notification on password reset is a proactive way of confirming password reset activity. It helps the user to recognize unauthorized password reset activities.", + "ImpactStatement": "Users will receive emails alerting them to password changes to both their primary and alternate emails.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Password reset and select Notifications. 3. Set Notify users on password resets? to Yes 4. Click Save.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Password reset and select Notifications. 3. Verify that Notify users on password resets? is set to Yes.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Yes", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/tutorial-enable-sspr#set-up-notifications-and-customizations:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-sspr-howitworks#notifications:https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/account-billing/reset-your-work-or-school-password-using-security-info-23dde81f-08bb-4776-ba72-e6b72b9dda9e" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.2.4.5", + "Description": "This setting determines whether or not all global administrators receive an email to their primary email address when other administrators reset their own passwords via the Self-Service Password Reset Portal. The recommended state is Notify all admins when other admins reset their password? is set to Yes.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.2.4 Password reset", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "This setting determines whether or not all global administrators receive an email to their primary email address when other administrators reset their own passwords via the Self-Service Password Reset Portal. The recommended state is Notify all admins when other admins reset their password? is set to Yes.", + "RationaleStatement": "Administrator accounts are sensitive. Any password reset activity notification, when sent to all Administrators, ensures that all Global Administrators can passively confirm if such a reset is a common pattern within their group. For example, if all Administrators change their password every 30 days, any password reset activity before that may require administrator(s) to evaluate any unusual activity and confirm its origin.", + "ImpactStatement": "All Global Administrators will receive a notification from Azure every time a password is reset. This is useful for auditing procedures to confirm that there are no out of the ordinary password resets for Administrators. There is additional overhead, however, in the time required for Global Administrators to audit the notifications. This setting is only useful if all Global Administrators pay attention to the notifications and audit each one.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Password reset and select Notifications. 3. Set Notify all admins when other admins reset their password? to Yes 4. Click Save", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Password reset and select Notifications. 3. Verify that Notify all admins when other admins reset their password? is set to Yes", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "No", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-sspr-howitworks#notifications:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/tutorial-enable-sspr#set-up-notifications-and-customizations" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.3.1", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management (PIM) provides just-in-time (JIT) activation workflows for privileged Entra ID and Microsoft 365 roles, enabling time- bound access with approval and justification requirements. Rather than holding permanent role assignments, users are made eligible for a role and must explicitly activate it when needed. PIM supports requiring multi-factor authentication at activation, mandatory justification, approval workflows, and configurable activation durations.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.3 ID Governance", + "Profile": "E5 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management (PIM) provides just-in-time (JIT) activation workflows for privileged Entra ID and Microsoft 365 roles, enabling time- bound access with approval and justification requirements. Rather than holding permanent role assignments, users are made eligible for a role and must explicitly activate it when needed. PIM supports requiring multi-factor authentication at activation, mandatory justification, approval workflows, and configurable activation durations.", + "RationaleStatement": "Permanent active role assignments expose privileged access continuously, regardless of whether a user is actively performing administrative tasks. If a permanently privileged account is compromised, an attacker immediately holds full role permissions with no time boundary. PIM eliminates standing privilege by requiring users to explicitly activate role assignments, scoping elevated access to a defined duration and requiring justification and, optionally, approval. This reduces the window of opportunity for both external attackers and insider threats to exploit privileged access.", + "ImpactStatement": "The implementation of Just in Time privileged access is likely to necessitate changes to administrator routine. Administrators will only be granted access to administrative roles when required. When administrators request role activation, they will need to document the reason for requiring role access, anticipated time required to have the access, and to reauthenticate to enable role access. Note: If all global admins become eligible then there will be no global admin to receive notifications, by default. Alerts are sent to TenantAdmins, including Global Administrators, by default. To ensure proper receipt, configure alerts to be sent to security or operations staff with valid email addresses or a security operations center. Otherwise, after adoption of this recommendation, alerts sent to TenantAdmins may go unreceived due to the lack of a licensed permanently active Global Administrator.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Roles & admins and select All roles. 3. For each user or group role assignment that is out of compliance: o Click on the role to open it in PIM. o Select the Active assignments tab. o Under action click Update or Remove. - If Update is selected, set the Assignment type to Eligible and click Save. - If Remove is selected, the assignment will be removed and the principal will no longer hold the role. 4. For each privileged role with a non-compliant service principal active assignment: 1. Open the Active assignments tab. 2. Click Update to modify the service principal assignment. 3. Uncheck Permanently assigned and set an appropriate end time to create a time-bound assignment based on business needs. 4. Click Save to apply the changes. 5. Repeat for any other privileged role assignments that are out of compliance. Note: CIS Safeguard 6.8, Define and Maintain Role-Based Access Control, recommends reviewing access on a recurring schedule, at least annually and more frequently as needed. This practice is strongly encouraged for service principals when defining time-bound assignments.", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: There is no programmatic way to reliably determine whether a principal is a designated break-glass account. Global Administrator assignments require manual review and judgment to confirm that any permanent assignments belong exclusively to the organization's two approved break-glass accounts. To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand Entra ID > Roles & admins and select All roles. 3. Select Add filters and apply the Privileged filter to scope the review to built- in and custom privileged roles. 4. For each PRIVILEGED role that has one or more assignments, perform the following review of active assignments: 1. Select the role to open it. 2. Open the Active assignments tab. 3. For each assignment where Type is User or Group, verify that State is Activated. - A State of Assigned is permitted only for approved break-glass accounts assigned to the Global Administrator role, and no more than 2 such accounts may hold this permanent assignment. 4. For each assignment where Type is Service principal, verify that State is Assigned and an End time is designated. 5. Compliance is met when all privileged role assignments meet the verification requirements in step 4. Usage of PIM for management of other administrator roles is recommended but not required for compliance. To audit using Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI to retrieve privileged roles (custom or built-in): beta/roleManagement/directory/roleDefinitions?$filter=isPrivileged eq true&$select=id,displayName,isPrivileged,isBuiltIn,isEnabled 2. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI to retrieve all instances of active role assignments: v1.0/roleManagement/directory/roleAssignmentScheduleInstances?$expand=princip al 3. Correlate by matching each assignment instance's roleDefinitionId to the privileged role list's id to produce a list of privileged role assignment instances. 4. For each privileged role assignment instance, verify the appropriate condition for the principal type: o For users and groups (principal@odata.type is #microsoft.graph.user or #microsoft.graph.group), verify that assignmentType is Activated. An assignmentType of Assigned is permitted only for approved break-glass accounts assigned to the Global Administrator role, and no more than 2 such accounts may hold this permanent assignment. o For service principals (principal@odata.type is #microsoft.graph.servicePrincipal), verify that assignmentType is Assigned and endDateTime is defined (time-bound assignment). 5. Compliance is met when all privileged role assignments meet the verification requirements in step 4. Usage of PIM for management of other administrator roles is recommended but not required for compliance.", + "AdditionalInformation": "In addition to enforcing just-in-time activation for active privileged role assignments, organizations are encouraged to periodically review eligible PIM role assignments to confirm ongoing business justification and remove stale entries. Annual review at minimum is recommended. This is a governance process that requires manual judgment and is outside the scope of the automated compliance check for this recommendation.", + "DefaultValue": "Without Privileged Identity Management configured, all privileged role assignments are permanent active assignments with no expiration or activation requirement.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-configure" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.3.2", + "Description": "Access reviews enable administrators to establish an efficient automated process for reviewing group memberships, access to enterprise applications, and role assignments. These reviews can be scheduled to recur regularly, with flexible options for delegating the task of reviewing membership to different members of the organization. When configured for guest users, access reviews can automatically remove access if no reviewer responds within the review period, enforcing a fail-closed posture for external identities.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.3 ID Governance", + "Profile": "E5 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Access reviews enable administrators to establish an efficient automated process for reviewing group memberships, access to enterprise applications, and role assignments. These reviews can be scheduled to recur regularly, with flexible options for delegating the task of reviewing membership to different members of the organization. When configured for guest users, access reviews can automatically remove access if no reviewer responds within the review period, enforcing a fail-closed posture for external identities.", + "RationaleStatement": "Access to groups and applications for guests can change over time. If a guest user's access to a particular resource goes unnoticed, they may unintentionally gain access to sensitive data if a member adds new files or data to the resource. Access reviews can help reduce the risks associated with outdated assignments by requiring a member of the organization to conduct the reviews. Furthermore, these reviews can enable a fail- closed mechanism to remove access to the subject if the reviewer does not respond to the review.", + "ImpactStatement": "Legitimate guest users may lose access to resources if designated reviewers fail to respond within the review window, requiring re-invitation and re-provisioning of access. Organizations with a large number of Microsoft 365 groups may face significant reviewer workload from monthly review cycles, which can lead to approval fatigue. - Microsoft Entra ID Governance licensing (included in Microsoft 365 E5) is required to configure access reviews. - As of January 15, 2026, a linked Azure subscription is required to use Entra ID Governance features for guest users.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand ID Governance and select Access reviews 3. Click New access review. 4. In the Resource review box click Select. 5. In Review Type set the following: o Select what to review choose Teams + Groups. o Review Scope to All Microsoft 365 groups with guest users. o Scope to Guest users only then click Next: Reviews. 6. In Reviews set the following: o Select reviewers to Group members or Selected users and groups, ensuring that at least one reviewer is assigned and that the guest is not performing a self-review. o Duration (in days) to 14 days or less. o Review recurrence to Monthly or more frequent. o Start date for the review, ensuring the review becomes active before the next audit date. o End to Never, then click Next: Settings. 7. In Settings set the following: o Auto apply results to resource is checked. o If reviewers don't respond to Remove access o Justification required is checked. o E-mail notifications is checked. o Reminders is checked. o Click Next: Review + Create 8. Click Create. To remediate using the Microsoft Graph API: To create a new access review, execute a POST request to the following relative URI. To update an existing review, execute a PATCH request to the same URI appended with the review's id: v1.0/identityGovernance/accessReviews/definitions The request body must include properties that satisfy the audit criteria above. The Graph API documentation provides complete sample request bodies in multiple languages including HTTP, PowerShell, and Python. See Reference 3 for details.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand ID Governance and select Access reviews 3. Inspect the access reviews, and verify an access review is created with the following criteria: o Overview: Scope is set to Guest users only and Review status is Active o Reviewers: At least one reviewer is assigned, and the reviewer is not a guest user. o Settings > General: - Mail notifications is set to Enable - Reminders is set to Enable o Settings > Reviewers: - Require reason on approval is set to Enable o Settings > Scheduling: - Frequency is set to Monthly or more frequent - Duration (in days) does not exceed 14 days - End is set to Never o Settings > When completed: - Auto apply results to resource is set to Enable - If reviewers don't respond is set to Remove access 4. The control is compliant if there is at least one access review for guests that meets all criteria above. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/identityGovernance/accessReviews/definitions 2. Apply the following filters to identify access reviews targeting guest users: o scope.resourceScopes.query matches the pattern userType eq 'Guest' OR o scope.query matches the pattern userType eq 'Guest' 3. For each review that passes the filters above, verify the following criteria: o Recurrence is configured as monthly or more frequent: - recurrence.pattern.type is absoluteMonthly OR - recurrence.pattern.type is weekly o reviewers is not empty o settings.mailNotificationsEnabled is true o settings.instanceDurationInDays is 14 days or less o settings.reminderNotificationsEnabled is true o settings.justificationRequiredOnApproval is true o settings.autoApplyDecisionsEnabled is true o settings.defaultDecision is Deny o settings.recurrence.range.type is noEnd 4. The control is compliant if there is at least one access review for guests that meets all criteria above.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "By default access reviews are not configured.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/access-reviews-overview:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/create-access-review:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/accessreviewscheduledefinition?view=graph-rest-1.0" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.3.3", + "Description": "Access reviews in Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management (PIM) enable administrators to periodically validate whether users still require their privileged role assignments. These reviews can be scheduled to recur on a regular cadence and can be delegated to reviewers other than the role holders themselves, such as security auditors.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.3 ID Governance", + "Profile": "E5 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Access reviews in Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management (PIM) enable administrators to periodically validate whether users still require their privileged role assignments. These reviews can be scheduled to recur on a regular cadence and can be delegated to reviewers other than the role holders themselves, such as security auditors.", + "RationaleStatement": "Regular review of critical high privileged roles in Entra ID will help identify role drift, or potential malicious activity. This will enable the practice and application of \"separation of duties\" where even non-privileged users like security auditors can be assigned to review assigned roles in an organization. These reviews can optionally be configured to automatically remove access if a reviewer does not respond within the review window, though this recommendation conservatively sets non-response to result in no change to avoid inadvertent removal of privileged accounts including break-glass accounts.", + "ImpactStatement": "In order to avoid disruption reviewers who have the authority to revoke roles should be trusted individuals who understand the significance of access reviews. Additionally, the principle of separation of duties should be applied to ensure that no administrator is responsible for reviewing their own access levels. This will cause additional administrative overhead. If the reviews are configured to automatically revoke highly privileged roles like the Global Administrator role, then this could result in removing all Global Administrators from the organization. Care should be taken when configuring this setting especially in the case of break-glass accounts which would be included in the scope. - Microsoft Entra ID Governance licensing (included in Microsoft 365 E5) is required to configure access reviews.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Note: An access review is created for each role selected after completing the process. To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand ID Governance > Privileged Identity Management. 3. Select Microsoft Entra Roles under Manage. 4. Select Access reviews and click New. o Provide a name and description. o Set Frequency to Monthly or more frequently. o Set Duration (in days) to at most 14. o Set End to Never. o Set Users scope to All users and groups. o In Role select the directory roles outlined in the Additional Information section. o Set Assignment type to All active and eligible assignments. o Set Reviewers to member(s) responsible for this type of review, other than self. 5. In Upon completion settings set the following: o Auto apply results to resource to Enable. o If reviewers don't respond to No change. 6. In Advanced settings set the following: o Require reason on approval to Enable o Mail notifications to Enable o Reminders to Enable 7. Click Start to save and begin the review series. Warning: Care should be taken when configuring the If reviewers don't respond setting for Global Administrator reviews, if misconfigured break-glass accounts could automatically have roles revoked. Additionally, reviewers should be educated on the purpose of break-glass accounts to prevent accidental manual removal of roles. To remediate using the Microsoft Graph API: To create a new access review, execute a POST request to the following relative URI. To update an existing review, execute a PATCH request to the same URI appended with the review's id: v1.0/identityGovernance/accessReviews/definitions The request body must include properties that satisfy the audit criteria above. The Graph API documentation provides complete sample request bodies in multiple languages including HTTP, PowerShell, and Python. See Reference 3 for details", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand ID Governance > Privileged Identity Management. 3. Select Microsoft Entra Roles under Manage. 4. Select Access reviews 5. For each privileged role listed in the Additional Information section, verify an access review exists that meets the following criteria: o Overview: - Role assignment type is set to Eligible and Active - Scope is set to Everyone - Review status is Active o Reviewers: At least one reviewer is assigned, and the reviewer is not self- reviewing. o Settings > General: - Mail notifications is set to Enable - Reminders is set to Enable o Settings > Reviewers: - Require reason on approval is set to Enable o Settings > Scheduling: - Frequency is set to Monthly or more frequently - Duration (in days) does not exceed 14 days - End is set to Never o Settings > When completed: - Auto apply results to resource is set to Enable - If reviewers don't respond is set to No change To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI: v1.0/identityGovernance/accessReviews/definitions 2. Apply the following filters to identify relevant access review definitions: o scope.resourceScopes.query matches the pattern /directory/roleDefinitions/ o scope.resourceScopes.query matches the GUID of one of the 6 privileged directory roles outlined in the Additional Information section. 3. For each review that passes the filters above, verify the following criteria: o Scoped to Eligible and Active role assignments: - scope.principalScopes.query contains /v1.0/users AND - scope.principalScopes.query contains /v1.0/groups o Recurrence is configured as monthly or more frequent: - recurrence.pattern.type is absoluteMonthly OR - recurrence.pattern.type is weekly - recurrence.range.startDate is in the past relative to the audit date o reviewers is not empty o settings.mailNotificationsEnabled is true o settings.reminderNotificationsEnabled is true o settings.justificationRequiredOnApproval is true o settings.instanceDurationInDays is less than or equal to 14 o settings.autoApplyDecisionsEnabled is true o settings.defaultDecision is None 4. The control is compliant when all 6 privileged directory roles have an associated access review definition that meets all the criteria listed above. Note: The 6 roles referenced and their associated GUIDs can be found in the Additional Information section.", + "AdditionalInformation": "The 6 privileged directory roles referenced in the audit and remediation procedures and their associated GUIDs are as follows: Role Name Role Definition GUID Global Administrator 62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10 Privileged Role Administrator e8611ab8-c189-46e8-94e1-60213ab1f814 Exchange Administrator 29232cdf-9323-42fd-ade2-1d097af3e4de SharePoint Administrator f28a1f50-f6e7-4571-818b-6a12f2af6b6c Teams Administrator 69091246-20e8-4a56-aa4d-066075b2a7a8 Security Administrator 194ae4cb-b126-40b2-bd5b-6091b380977d", + "DefaultValue": "By default access reviews are not configured.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-create-roles-and-resource-roles-review:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/access-reviews-overview:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/accessreviewscheduledefinition?view=graph-rest-1.0" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.3.4", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management can be used to audit roles, allow just in time activation of roles and allow for periodic role attestation. Requiring approval before activation allows one of the selected approvers to first review and then approve the activation prior to PIM granted the role. The approver doesn't have to be a group member or owner. The recommended state is Require approval to activate for the Global Administrator role.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.3 ID Governance", + "Profile": "E5 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management can be used to audit roles, allow just in time activation of roles and allow for periodic role attestation. Requiring approval before activation allows one of the selected approvers to first review and then approve the activation prior to PIM granted the role. The approver doesn't have to be a group member or owner. The recommended state is Require approval to activate for the Global Administrator role.", + "RationaleStatement": "Requiring approval for Global Administrator role activation enhances visibility and accountability every time this highly privileged role is used. This process reduces the risk of an attacker elevating a compromised account to the highest privilege level, as any activation must first be reviewed and approved by a trusted party. Note: This only acts as protection for eligible users that are activating a role. Directly assigning a role does not require an approval workflow so therefore it is important to implement and use PIM correctly.", + "ImpactStatement": "Approvers do not need to be assigned the same role or be members of the same group. It's important to have at least two approvers and an emergency access (break-glass) account to prevent a scenario where no Global Administrators are available. For example, if the last active Global Administrator leaves the organization, and only eligible but inactive Global Administrators remain, a trusted approver without the Global Administrator role or an emergency access account would be essential to avoid delays in critical administrative tasks.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand ID Governance > Privileged Identity Management. 3. Under Manage select Microsoft Entra Roles. 4. Under Manage select Roles. 5. Select Global Administrator in the list. 6. Select Role settings and click Edit. 7. Check the Require approval to activate box. 8. Add at least one approver. 9. Click Update.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand ID Governance > Privileged Identity Management. 3. Under Manage select Microsoft Entra Roles. 4. Under Manage select Roles. 5. Select Global Administrator in the list. 6. Select Role settings. 7. Verify that Require approval to activate is set to Yes. 8. Verify there is at least 1 approvers in the list. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI to retrieve the policyID for the Global Administrator-role: v1.0/policies/roleManagementPolicyAssignments?$filter=scopeId eq '/' and scopeType eq 'DirectoryRole' and roleDefinitionId eq '62e90394-69f5-4237- 9190-012177145e10'&$select=policyId 2. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI to retrieve the policy's Approval setting using the policyId from the previous call: v1.0/policies/roleManagementPolicies/{policyID}/rules/Approval_EndUser_Assign ment # Example https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/policies/roleManagementPolicies/DirectoryRol e_9c4d49a8-1f7a-4256-b1a2-b7cb0e7180f4_86522f3f-cfd0-4634-95a0- 38083127ca00/rules/Approval_EndUser_Assignment 3. Verify that isApprovalRequired is true. 4. Verify that approvalStages.primaryApprovers contains one or more valid users. Note: Approvers should be reviewed on a regular basis to ensure the members are active and valid.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Require approval to activate : No.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-configure:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/groups-role-settings#require-approval-to-activate" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "5.3.5", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management can be used to audit roles, allow just in time activation of roles and allow for periodic role attestation. Requiring approval before activation allows one of the selected approvers to first review and then approve the activation prior to PIM granted the role. The approver doesn't have to be a group member or owner. The recommended state is Require approval to activate for the Privileged Role Administrator role.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "5 Microsoft Entra admin center", + "SubSection": "5.3 ID Governance", + "Profile": "E5 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management can be used to audit roles, allow just in time activation of roles and allow for periodic role attestation. Requiring approval before activation allows one of the selected approvers to first review and then approve the activation prior to PIM granted the role. The approver doesn't have to be a group member or owner. The recommended state is Require approval to activate for the Privileged Role Administrator role.", + "RationaleStatement": "This role grants the ability to manage assignments for all Microsoft Entra roles including the Global Administrator role. This role does not include any other privileged abilities in Microsoft Entra ID like creating or updating users. However, users assigned to this role can grant themselves or others additional privilege by assigning additional roles. Requiring approval for activation enhances visibility and accountability every time this highly privileged role is used. This process reduces the risk of an attacker elevating a compromised account to the highest privilege level, as any activation must first be reviewed and approved by a trusted party. Note: This only acts as protection for eligible users that are activating a role. Directly assigning a role does not require an approval workflow so therefore it is important to implement and use PIM correctly.", + "ImpactStatement": "Requiring approvers for automatic role assignment can slightly increase administrative overhead and add delays to tasks.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand ID Governance > Privileged Identity Management. 3. Under Manage select Microsoft Entra Roles. 4. Under Manage select Roles. 5. Select Privileged Role Administrator in the list. 6. Select Role settings and click Edit. 7. Check the Require approval to activate box. 8. Add at least one approver. 9. Click Update.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Entra admin center https://entra.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand ID Governance > Privileged Identity Management. 3. Under Manage select Microsoft Entra Roles. 4. Under Manage select Roles. 5. Select Privileged Role Administrator in the list. 6. Select Role settings. 7. Verify Require approval to activate is set to Yes. 8. Verify there is at least one approvers in the list. To audit using the Microsoft Graph API: 1. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI to retrieve the policyID for the Privileged Role Administrator-role: v1.0/policies/roleManagementPolicyAssignments?$filter=scopeId eq '/' and scopeType eq 'DirectoryRole' and roleDefinitionId eq 'e8611ab8-c189-46e8- 94e1-60213ab1f814'&$select=policyId 2. Execute a GET request to the following relative URI to retrieve the policy's Approval setting using the policyId from the previous call: v1.0/policies/roleManagementPolicies/{policyID}/rules/Approval_EndUser_Assign ment # Example https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/policies/roleManagementPolicies/DirectoryRol e_d1fdbf46-5729-4c53-a951-7ab677be380f_3679e0d0-412a-444d-b517- ab23973d6067/rules/Approval_EndUser_Assignment 3. Verify that isApprovalRequired is true. 4. Verify that approvalStages.primaryApprovers contains one or more valid users. Note: Approvers should be reviewed on a regular basis to ensure the members are active and valid.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Require approval to activate : No.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-configure:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/groups-role-settings#require-approval-to-activate" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.1", + "Description": "The value False indicates that mailbox auditing on by default is turned on for the organization. Mailbox auditing on by default in the organization overrides the mailbox auditing settings on individual mailboxes. For example, if mailbox auditing is turned off for a mailbox (the AuditEnabled property on the mailbox is False), the default mailbox actions are still audited for the mailbox, because mailbox auditing on by default is turned on for the organization. Turning off mailbox auditing on by default ($true) has the following results: - Mailbox auditing is turned off for your organization. - From the time you turn off mailbox auditing on by default, no mailbox actions are audited, even if mailbox auditing is enabled on a mailbox (the AuditEnabled property on the mailbox is True). - Mailbox auditing isn't turned on for new mailboxes and setting the AuditEnabled property on a new or existing mailbox to True is ignored. - Any mailbox audit bypass association settings (configured by using the Set- MailboxAuditBypassAssociation cmdlet) are ignored. - Existing mailbox audit records are retained until the audit log age limit for the record expires. The recommended state for this setting is False at the organization level. This will enable auditing and enforce the default.", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_organization_mailbox_auditing_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Exchange admin center", + "SubSection": "6.1 Audit", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The value False indicates that mailbox auditing on by default is turned on for the organization. Mailbox auditing on by default in the organization overrides the mailbox auditing settings on individual mailboxes. For example, if mailbox auditing is turned off for a mailbox (the AuditEnabled property on the mailbox is False), the default mailbox actions are still audited for the mailbox, because mailbox auditing on by default is turned on for the organization. Turning off mailbox auditing on by default ($true) has the following results: - Mailbox auditing is turned off for your organization. - From the time you turn off mailbox auditing on by default, no mailbox actions are audited, even if mailbox auditing is enabled on a mailbox (the AuditEnabled property on the mailbox is True). - Mailbox auditing isn't turned on for new mailboxes and setting the AuditEnabled property on a new or existing mailbox to True is ignored. - Any mailbox audit bypass association settings (configured by using the Set- MailboxAuditBypassAssociation cmdlet) are ignored. - Existing mailbox audit records are retained until the audit log age limit for the record expires. The recommended state for this setting is False at the organization level. This will enable auditing and enforce the default.", + "RationaleStatement": "Enforcing the default ensures auditing was not turned off intentionally or accidentally. Auditing mailbox actions will allow forensics and IR teams to trace various malicious activities that can generate TTPs caused by inbox access and tampering.", + "ImpactStatement": "None - this is the default behavior as of 2019.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Set-OrganizationConfig -AuditDisabled $false", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Get-OrganizationConfig | Format-List AuditDisabled 3. Verify that AuditDisabled is set to False.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "False", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-mailboxes?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-organizationconfig?view=exchange-ps#-auditdisabled" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.2", + "Description": "Mailbox audit logging is turned on by default in all organizations. This effort started in January 2019, and means that certain actions performed by mailbox owners, delegates, and admins are automatically logged. The corresponding mailbox audit records are available for admins to search in the mailbox audit log. Mailboxes and shared mailboxes have actions assigned to them individually in order to audit the data the organization determines valuable at the mailbox level. The recommended state per mailbox is AuditEnabled to True including all default audit actions with additional actions outlined below in the audit and remediation sections. Note: Audit (Standard) licensing allows for up to 180 days log retention as of October 2023.", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_user_mailbox_auditing_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Exchange admin center", + "SubSection": "6.1 Audit", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Mailbox audit logging is turned on by default in all organizations. This effort started in January 2019, and means that certain actions performed by mailbox owners, delegates, and admins are automatically logged. The corresponding mailbox audit records are available for admins to search in the mailbox audit log. Mailboxes and shared mailboxes have actions assigned to them individually in order to audit the data the organization determines valuable at the mailbox level. The recommended state per mailbox is AuditEnabled to True including all default audit actions with additional actions outlined below in the audit and remediation sections. Note: Audit (Standard) licensing allows for up to 180 days log retention as of October 2023.", + "RationaleStatement": "Whether it is for regulatory compliance or for tracking unauthorized configuration changes in Microsoft 365, enabling mailbox auditing and ensuring the proper mailbox actions are accounted for allows for Microsoft 365 teams to run security operations, forensics or general investigations on mailbox activities. The following mailbox types ignore the organizational default and must have AuditEnabled set to True at the mailbox level in order to capture relevant audit data. - Resource Mailboxes - Public Folder Mailboxes - DiscoverySearch Mailbox", + "ImpactStatement": "Adding additional audit action types and increasing the AuditLogAgeLimit from 90 to 180 days will have a limited impact on mailbox storage. Mailbox audit log records are stored in a subfolder (named Audits) in the Recoverable Items folder in each user's mailbox. - Mailbox audit records count against the storage quota of the Recoverable Items folder. - Mailbox audit records also count against the folder limit for the Recoverable Items folder. A maximum of 3 million items (audit records) can be stored in the Audits subfolder. The following cmdlet in Exchange Online PowerShell can be run to display the size and number of items in the Audits subfolder in the Recoverable Items folder: Get-MailboxFolderStatistics -Identity -FolderScope RecoverableItems | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq 'Audits'} | Format-List FolderPath,FolderSize,ItemsInFolder Note: It's unlikely that mailbox auditing on by default impacts the storage quota or the folder limit for the Recoverable Items folder.", + "RemediationProcedure": "For each UserMailbox ensure AuditEnabled is True and the following audit actions are included in addition to default actions of each sign-in type. - Admin actions: Copy, FolderBind and Move. - Delegate actions: FolderBind and Move. - Owner actions: Create, MailboxLogin and Move. Note: The defaults can be found in the Default Value section and the combined total can be found in the scripts of the Audit/Remediation sections. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell script to remediate every 'UserMailbox' in the organization: $AuditAdmin = @( \"ApplyRecord\", \"Copy\", \"Create\", \"FolderBind\", \"HardDelete\", \"MailItemsAccessed\", \"Move\", \"MoveToDeletedItems\", \"SendAs\", \"SendOnBehalf\", \"Send\", \"SoftDelete\", \"Update\", \"UpdateCalendarDelegation\", \"UpdateFolderPermissions\", \"UpdateInboxRules\" ) $AuditDelegate = @( \"ApplyRecord\", \"Create\", \"FolderBind\", \"HardDelete\", \"Move\", \"MailItemsAccessed\", \"MoveToDeletedItems\", \"SendAs\", \"SendOnBehalf\", \"SoftDelete\", \"Update\", \"UpdateFolderPermissions\", \"UpdateInboxRules\" ) $AuditOwner = @( \"ApplyRecord\", \"Create\", \"HardDelete\", \"MailboxLogin\", \"Move\", \"MailItemsAccessed\", \"MoveToDeletedItems\", \"Send\", \"SoftDelete\", \"Update\", \"UpdateCalendarDelegation\", \"UpdateFolderPermissions\", \"UpdateInboxRules\" ) $MBX = Get-EXOMailbox -ResultSize Unlimited | Where-Object { $_.RecipientTypeDetails -eq \"UserMailbox\" } $MBX | Set-Mailbox -AuditEnabled $true ` -AuditLogAgeLimit 180 -AuditAdmin $AuditAdmin -AuditDelegate $AuditDelegate ` -AuditOwner $AuditOwner 3. The script will apply the prescribed Audit Actions for each sign-in type (Owner, Delegate, Admin) and the AuditLogAgeLimit to each UserMailbox in the organization. Note: Mailboxes with Audit (Premium) licenses, which is included with E5, can retain audit logs beyond 180 days.", + "AuditProcedure": "Inspect each UserMailbox and ensure AuditEnabled is True and the following audit actions are included in addition to default actions of each sign-in type. - Admin actions: Copy, FolderBind and Move. - Delegate actions: FolderBind and Move. - Owner actions: Create, MailboxLogin and Move. Note: The defaults can be found in the Default Value section and the combined total can be found in the scripts of the Audit/Remediation sections. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell script: $AdminActions = @( \"ApplyRecord\", \"Copy\", \"Create\", \"FolderBind\", \"HardDelete\", \"MailItemsAccessed\", \"Move\", \"MoveToDeletedItems\", \"SendAs\", \"SendOnBehalf\", \"Send\", \"SoftDelete\", \"Update\", \"UpdateCalendarDelegation\", \"UpdateFolderPermissions\", \"UpdateInboxRules\" ) $DelegateActions = @( \"ApplyRecord\", \"Create\", \"FolderBind\", \"HardDelete\", \"Move\", \"MailItemsAccessed\", \"MoveToDeletedItems\", \"SendAs\", \"SendOnBehalf\", \"SoftDelete\", \"Update\", \"UpdateFolderPermissions\", \"UpdateInboxRules\" ) $OwnerActions = @( \"ApplyRecord\", \"Create\", \"HardDelete\", \"MailboxLogin\", \"Move\", \"MailItemsAccessed\", \"MoveToDeletedItems\", \"Send\", \"SoftDelete\", \"Update\", \"UpdateCalendarDelegation\", \"UpdateFolderPermissions\", \"UpdateInboxRules\" ) function VerifyActions { param ( [array]$ExpectedActions, [array]$ActualActions ) $Missing = $ExpectedActions | Where-Object { $_ -notin $ActualActions } return $Missing } $MBX = Get-EXOMailbox -PropertySets Audit, Minimum -ResultSize Unlimited | Where-Object { $_.RecipientTypeDetails -eq \"UserMailbox\" } $Results = foreach ($mailbox in $MBX) { $AdminMissing = VerifyActions -ExpectedActions $AdminActions ` -ActualActions $mailbox.AuditAdmin $DelegateMissing = VerifyActions -ExpectedActions $DelegateActions ` -ActualActions $mailbox.AuditDelegate $OwnerMissing = VerifyActions -ExpectedActions $OwnerActions ` -ActualActions $mailbox.AuditOwner $IsCompliant = $AdminMissing.Count -eq 0 -and $DelegateMissing.Count -eq 0 -and $OwnerMissing.Count -eq 0 -and $mailbox.AuditEnabled [PSCustomObject]@{ Mailbox = $mailbox.UserPrincipalName AuditEnabled = $mailbox.AuditEnabled AdminMissing = if ($AdminMissing.Count -gt 0) { $AdminMissing -join \", \" } else { \"None\" } DelegateMissing = if ($DelegateMissing.Count -gt 0) { $DelegateMissing -join \", \" } else { \"None\" } OwnerMissing = if ($OwnerMissing.Count -gt 0) { $OwnerMissing -join \", \" } else { \"None\" } ComplianceState = if ($IsCompliant) { \"Compliant\" } else { \"Non-Compliant\" } } } # Display results in table format $Results | Format-Table -AutoSize <# Optional: Export methods $Results | Out-GridView -Title \"Mailbox Audit Results\" $Results | Export-Csv -Path \"6.1.2.csv\" -NoTypeInformation $Results | ConvertTo-Json | Out-File -FilePath \"6.1.2.json\" #> 3. Inspect the results. Mailboxes will be labeled as either Compliant or Non- compliant, accompanied by supporting details that outline the missing actions for each type and the current state of AuditEnabled. Optional methods for exporting the data to CSV, JSON, or GridView are also shown at the end of the script. Note: Mailboxes with Audit (Premium) licenses, which is included with E5, can retain audit logs beyond 180 days.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "AuditEnabled: True for all mailboxes except below: - Resource Mailboxes - Public Folder Mailboxes - DiscoverySearch Mailbox AuditAdmin: ApplyRecord, Create, HardDelete, MailItemsAccessed, MoveToDeletedItems, Send, SendAs, SendOnBehalf, SoftDelete, Update, UpdateCalendarDelegation, UpdateFolderPermissions, UpdateInboxRules AuditDelegate: ApplyRecord, Create, HardDelete, MailItemsAccessed, MoveToDeletedItems, SendAs, SendOnBehalf, SoftDelete, Update, UpdateFolderPermissions, UpdateInboxRules AuditOwner: ApplyRecord, HardDelete, MailItemsAccessed, MoveToDeletedItems, Send, SoftDelete, Update, UpdateCalendarDelegation, UpdateFolderPermissions, UpdateInboxRules", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-mailboxes?view=o365-worldwide" + } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "exchange_user_mailbox_auditing_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "audit_log_age", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 90 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.1.3", + "Description": "When configuring a user or computer account to bypass mailbox audit logging, the system will not record any access, or actions performed by the said user or computer account on any mailbox. Administratively this was introduced to reduce the volume of entries in the mailbox audit logs on trusted user or computer accounts. Ensure AuditBypassEnabled is not enabled on accounts without a written exception.", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_mailbox_audit_bypass_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Exchange admin center", + "SubSection": "6.1 Audit", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "When configuring a user or computer account to bypass mailbox audit logging, the system will not record any access, or actions performed by the said user or computer account on any mailbox. Administratively this was introduced to reduce the volume of entries in the mailbox audit logs on trusted user or computer accounts. Ensure AuditBypassEnabled is not enabled on accounts without a written exception.", + "RationaleStatement": "If a mailbox audit bypass association is added for an account, the account can access any mailbox in the organization to which it has been assigned access permissions, without generating any mailbox audit logging entries for such access or recording any actions taken, such as message deletions. Enabling this parameter, whether intentionally or unintentionally, could allow insiders or malicious actors to conceal their activity on specific mailboxes. Ensuring proper logging of user actions and mailbox operations in the audit log will enable comprehensive incident response and forensics.", + "ImpactStatement": "None - this is the default behavior.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. The following example PowerShell script will disable AuditBypass for all mailboxes which currently have it enabled: # Get mailboxes with AuditBypassEnabled set to $true $MBXAudit = Get-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation -ResultSize unlimited | Where- Object { $_.AuditBypassEnabled -eq $true } foreach ($mailbox in $MBXAudit) { $mailboxName = $mailbox.Name Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation -Identity $mailboxName - AuditBypassEnabled $false Write-Host \"Audit Bypass disabled for mailbox Identity: $mailboxName\" - ForegroundColor Green }", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: $MBXData = Get-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation -ResultSize unlimited $Report = $MBXData | ? {$_.AuditBypassEnabled -eq $true} | select Name,AuditBypassEnabled $Report <# Optional: Export methods $Report | Out-GridView -Title \"Mailbox Audit Bypass Association\" $Report | Export-Csv -Path \"6.1.3.csv\" -NoTypeInformation #> 3. If nothing is returned, then there are no accounts with Audit Bypass enabled. Note: The cmdlet Get-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation may display a WARNING on system objects that begin with \"Asc-2X1\", this is not part of the Audit procedure and can be ignored.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "AuditBypassEnabled False", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/get-mailboxauditbypassassociation?view=exchange-ps" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.2.1", + "Description": "Exchange Online offers several methods of managing the flow of email messages. These are Remote domain, Transport Rules, and Anti-spam outbound policies. These methods work together to provide comprehensive coverage for potential automatic forwarding channels: - Outlook forwarding using inbox rules. - Outlook forwarding configured using OOF rule. - OWA forwarding setting (ForwardingSmtpAddress). - Forwarding set by the admin using EAC (ForwardingAddress). - Forwarding using Power Automate / Flow. Ensure a Transport rule and Anti-spam outbound policy are used to block mail forwarding. NOTE: Any exclusions should be implemented based on organizational policy.", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_transport_rules_mail_forwarding_disabled", + "defender_antispam_outbound_policy_forwarding_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Exchange admin center", + "SubSection": "6.2 Mail flow", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Exchange Online offers several methods of managing the flow of email messages. These are Remote domain, Transport Rules, and Anti-spam outbound policies. These methods work together to provide comprehensive coverage for potential automatic forwarding channels: - Outlook forwarding using inbox rules. - Outlook forwarding configured using OOF rule. - OWA forwarding setting (ForwardingSmtpAddress). - Forwarding set by the admin using EAC (ForwardingAddress). - Forwarding using Power Automate / Flow. Ensure a Transport rule and Anti-spam outbound policy are used to block mail forwarding. NOTE: Any exclusions should be implemented based on organizational policy.", + "RationaleStatement": "Attackers often create these rules to exfiltrate data from your tenancy, this could be accomplished via access to an end-user account or otherwise. An insider could also use one of these methods as a secondary channel to exfiltrate sensitive data.", + "ImpactStatement": "Care should be taken before implementation to ensure there is no business need for case-by-case auto-forwarding. Disabling auto-forwarding to remote domains will affect all users in an organization. Any exclusions should be implemented based on organizational policy.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Note: Remediation is a two step procedure as follows: STEP 1: Transport rules To remediate using the UI: 1. Select Exchange to open the Exchange admin center. 2. Select Mail Flow then Rules. 3. For each rule that redirects email to external domains, select the rule and click the 'Delete' icon. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Remove-TransportRule {RuleName} STEP 2: Anti-spam outbound policy To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 Defender https://security.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand E-mail & collaboration then select Policies & rules. 3. Select Threat policies > Anti-spam. 4. Select Anti-spam outbound policy (default) 5. Click Edit protection settings 6. Set Automatic forwarding rules dropdown to Off - Forwarding is disabled and click Save 7. Repeat steps 4-6 for any additional higher priority, custom policies. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Set-HostedOutboundSpamFilterPolicy -Identity {policyName} -AutoForwardingMode Off 3. To remove AutoForwarding from all outbound policies you can also run: Get-HostedOutboundSpamFilterPolicy | Set-HostedOutboundSpamFilterPolicy - AutoForwardingMode Off", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: Audit is a two step procedure as follows: STEP 1: Transport rules To audit using the UI: 1. Select Exchange to open the Exchange admin center. 2. Select Mail Flow then Rules. 3. Review the rules and verify that none of them are forwards or redirects e-mail to external domains. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command to review the Transport Rules that are redirecting email: Get-TransportRule | Where-Object {$_.RedirectMessageTo -ne $null} | ft Name,RedirectMessageTo 3. Verify that none of the addresses listed belong to external domains outside of the organization. If nothing returns then there are no transport rules set to redirect messages. STEP 2: Anti-spam outbound policy To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 Defender https://security.microsoft.com/ 2. Expand E-mail & collaboration then select Policies & rules. 3. Select Threat policies > Anti-spam. 4. Inspect Anti-spam outbound policy (default) and ensure Automatic forwarding is set to Off - Forwarding is disabled 5. Inspect any additional custom outbound policies and ensure Automatic forwarding is set to Off - Forwarding is disabled, in accordance with the organization's exclusion policies. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell cmdlet: Get-HostedOutboundSpamFilterPolicy | ft Name, AutoForwardingMode 3. In each outbound policy verify AutoForwardingMode is Off. Note: According to Microsoft if a recipient is defined in multiple policies of the same type (anti-spam, anti-phishing, etc.), only the policy with the highest priority is applied to the recipient. Any remaining policies of that type are not evaluated for the recipient (including the default policy). However, it is our recommendation to audit the default policy as well in the case a higher priority custom policy is removed. This will keep the organization's security posture strong.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/security-and-compliance/mail-flow-rules/mail-flow-rules:https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/all-you-need-to-know-about-automatic-email-forwarding-in/ba-p/2074888#:~:text=%20%20%20Automatic%20forwarding%20option%20%20,%:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/outbound-spam-policies-external-email-forwarding?view=o365-worldwide" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.2.2", + "Description": "Mail flow rules (transport rules) in Exchange Online can be configured to set the spam confidence level (SCL) of a message to -1, which bypasses spam and phishing filtering. When a rule applies this action to messages based on the sender's domain, all mail from that domain is treated as trusted and skips anti-malware and anti-phishing evaluation regardless of message content.", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_transport_rules_whitelist_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Exchange admin center", + "SubSection": "6.2 Mail flow", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Mail flow rules (transport rules) in Exchange Online can be configured to set the spam confidence level (SCL) of a message to -1, which bypasses spam and phishing filtering. When a rule applies this action to messages based on the sender's domain, all mail from that domain is treated as trusted and skips anti-malware and anti-phishing evaluation regardless of message content.", + "RationaleStatement": "Whitelisting domains in transport rules bypasses regular malware and phishing scanning, which can enable an attacker to launch attacks against your users from a safe haven domain. Note: If an organization identifies a business need for an exception, the domain should only be whitelisted if inbound emails from that domain originate from a specific IP address. These exceptions should be documented and regularly reviewed.", + "ImpactStatement": "Removing SCL bypass rules will subject previously whitelisted domains to standard spam and phishing filtering. Mail from those domains that does not pass filtering may be quarantined or rejected, which could disrupt established business communications. Prior to removal, identify any rules in scope and coordinate with affected business owners. If a legitimate need exists, consider replacing domain-based whitelisting with approved sender lists at the connection level.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Exchange admin center https://admin.exchange.microsoft.com 2. Click to expand Mail Flow and then select Rules. 3. For each rule that sets the spam confidence level to -1 for a specific domain, select the rule and click Delete. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. To remove a specific non-compliant rule: Remove-TransportRule -Identity \"RuleName\" Note: If the rule serves a legitimate purpose beyond domain whitelisting, consider modifying it to remove the SenderDomainIs condition or the SetSCL -1 action rather than deleting it entirely.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Exchange admin center https://admin.exchange.microsoft.com 2. Click to expand Mail Flow and then select Rules. 3. Review each rule and ensure that a single rule does not contain both of these properties together: o Under Apply this rule if: Sender's address domain portion belongs to any of these domains: '' o Under Do the following: Set the spam confidence level (SCL) to '-1' Note: Setting the spam confidence level to -1 indicates the message is from a trusted sender, so the message bypasses spam filtering. The recommendation fails if any external domain has a SCL of -1. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Get-TransportRule | Where-Object { $_.setscl -eq -1 -and $_.SenderDomainIs - ne $null } | ft Name,SenderDomainIs,SetSCL 3. Transport rules that fail the audit will be shown. If no output is shown, the recommendation passes. To pass, all rules with SetSCL set to -1 must not include any domains in the SenderDomainIs property.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "No mail flow rules that set the SCL to -1 based on sender domain exist by default.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/security-and-compliance/mail-flow-rules/configuration-best-practices:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/security-and-compliance/mail-flow-rules/mail-flow-rules" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.2.3", + "Description": "External callouts provide a native experience to identify emails from senders outside the organization. This is achieved by presenting a new tag on emails called \"External\" (the string is localized based on the client language setting) and exposing related user interface at the top of the message reading view to see and verify the real sender's email address. The recommended state is ExternalInOutlook set to Enabled True", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_external_email_tagging_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Exchange admin center", + "SubSection": "6.2 Mail flow", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "External callouts provide a native experience to identify emails from senders outside the organization. This is achieved by presenting a new tag on emails called \"External\" (the string is localized based on the client language setting) and exposing related user interface at the top of the message reading view to see and verify the real sender's email address. The recommended state is ExternalInOutlook set to Enabled True", + "RationaleStatement": "Tagging emails from external senders helps to inform end users about the origin of the email. This can allow them to proceed with more caution and make informed decisions when it comes to identifying spam or phishing emails. Mail flow rules are often used by Exchange administrators to accomplish the External email tagging by appending a tag to the front of a subject line. There are limitations to this outlined here. The preferred method in the CIS Benchmark is to use the native experience. Note: Existing emails in a user's inbox from external senders are not tagged retroactively.", + "ImpactStatement": "Mail flow rules using external tagging must be disabled, along with third-party mail filtering tools that offer similar features, to avoid duplicate [External] tags. External tags can consume additional screen space on systems with limited real estate, such as thin clients or mobile devices. After enabling this feature via PowerShell, it may take 24-48 hours for users to see the External sender tag in emails from outside your organization. Rolling back the feature takes the same amount of time. Note: Third-party tools that provide similar functionality will also meet compliance requirements, although Microsoft recommends using the native experience for better interoperability.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Set-ExternalInOutlook -Enabled $true", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Get-ExternalInOutlook 3. For each identity verify Enabled is set to True and the AllowList only contains email addresses the organization has permitted to bypass external tagging.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Disabled (False)", + "References": "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/native-external-sender-callouts-on-email-in-outlook/ba-p/2250098:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-externalinoutlook?view=exchange-ps" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.3.1", + "Description": "Role assignment policies in Exchange Online control whether users can install and manage add-ins for Outlook. Three management roles govern this capability: My Custom Apps allows users to sideload custom add-ins, My Marketplace Apps allows users to install add-ins from the marketplace, and My ReadWriteMailbox Apps allows users to install add-ins that request read/write mailbox permissions. When these roles are assigned to a user's role assignment policy, users can self-install add-ins in both Outlook desktop and Outlook on the web, granting those add-ins access to mailbox data. This recommendation applies to the default role assignment policy, which is automatically assigned to new mailboxes unless a custom policy is specified.", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_roles_assignment_policy_addins_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Exchange admin center", + "SubSection": "6.3 Roles", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Role assignment policies in Exchange Online control whether users can install and manage add-ins for Outlook. Three management roles govern this capability: My Custom Apps allows users to sideload custom add-ins, My Marketplace Apps allows users to install add-ins from the marketplace, and My ReadWriteMailbox Apps allows users to install add-ins that request read/write mailbox permissions. When these roles are assigned to a user's role assignment policy, users can self-install add-ins in both Outlook desktop and Outlook on the web, granting those add-ins access to mailbox data. This recommendation applies to the default role assignment policy, which is automatically assigned to new mailboxes unless a custom policy is specified.", + "RationaleStatement": "Attackers exploit vulnerable or malicious add-ins to read, exfiltrate, or modify mailbox content including email, calendar items, and contacts. Restricting user-installed add-ins reduces this attack surface and centralizes add-in approval with administrators.", + "ImpactStatement": "End users will be unable to self-install third-party Outlook add-ins. Administrators may receive requests to evaluate and deploy add-ins on behalf of users. Organizations that rely on user-deployed add-ins for business workflows should inventory those add-ins and deploy them centrally via Centralized Deployment before implementing this recommendation.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Exchange admin center https://admin.exchange.microsoft.com. 2. Click to expand Roles and select User roles. 3. Select Default Role Assignment Policy. 4. In the properties pane on the right click on Manage permissions. 5. Under Other roles uncheck any non-compliant roles: My Custom Apps, My Marketplace Apps, and My ReadWriteMailbox Apps. 6. Click Save changes. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following script: $TargetRoles = @( \"My Custom Apps\", \"My Marketplace Apps\", \"My ReadWriteMailbox Apps\" ) $DefaultPolicy = Get-RoleAssignmentPolicy | Where-Object { $_.IsDefault -eq $true } $Assignments = Get-ManagementRoleAssignment -RoleAssignee $DefaultPolicy.Identity | Where-Object { $_.Role -in $TargetRoles } foreach ($Assignment in $Assignments) { Remove-ManagementRoleAssignment -Identity $Assignment.Identity - Confirm:$false }", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Exchange admin center https://admin.exchange.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Roles and select User roles. 3. Select Default Role Assignment Policy. 4. In the properties pane on the right click on Manage permissions. 5. Under Other roles verify that My Custom Apps, My Marketplace Apps, and My ReadWriteMailbox Apps are not checked. Note: As of this release of the Benchmark the manage permissions link no longer displays anything when a user assigned the Global Reader role clicks on it. As an alternative, users assigned the Global Reader directory role can inspect the Roles column or use the PowerShell method to perform the audit. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following script: $RoleList = @( \"My Custom Apps\", \"My Marketplace Apps\", \"My ReadWriteMailbox Apps\" ) $DefaultPolicy = Get-RoleAssignmentPolicy | Where-Object { $_.IsDefault -eq $true } $NonCompliantRoles = $DefaultPolicy.AssignedRoles | Where-Object { $_ -in $RoleList } Write-Host \"Checking Default Role Assignment Policy: $($DefaultPolicy.Name)\" if ($NonCompliantRoles) { \"Non-compliant - the following roles are assigned: \" + ($NonCompliantRoles -join \", \") } else { \"Compliant - no add-in roles are assigned to the default policy.\" } 3. Verify that the output indicates compliance. If My Custom Apps, My Marketplace Apps, or My ReadWriteMailbox Apps are listed, the default policy is non-compliant.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "UI - My Custom Apps, My Marketplace Apps, and My ReadWriteMailbox Apps are checked. PowerShell - My Custom Apps, My Marketplace Apps, and My ReadWriteMailbox Apps are assigned.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/clients-and-mobile-in-exchange-online/add-ins-for-outlook/specify-who-can-install-and-manage-add-ins?source=recommendations:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/permissions-exo/role-assignment-policies" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.3.2", + "Description": "Outlook on the web (OWA) mailbox policies include two settings that control personal account integration in Outlook. PersonalAccountsEnabled controls whether users can add personal email accounts (e.g., Outlook.com, Gmail, Yahoo) in the new Outlook for Windows. PersonalAccountCalendarsEnabled controls whether users can connect personal Outlook.com or Google calendars in Outlook on the web. Neither setting applies to classic Outlook for Windows, Outlook for Mac, or Outlook mobile apps. The recommended state for the default OWA Mailbox Policy is: - PersonalAccountsEnabled is set to False - PersonalAccountCalendarsEnabled is set to False", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Exchange admin center", + "SubSection": "6.3 Roles", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Outlook on the web (OWA) mailbox policies include two settings that control personal account integration in Outlook. PersonalAccountsEnabled controls whether users can add personal email accounts (e.g., Outlook.com, Gmail, Yahoo) in the new Outlook for Windows. PersonalAccountCalendarsEnabled controls whether users can connect personal Outlook.com or Google calendars in Outlook on the web. Neither setting applies to classic Outlook for Windows, Outlook for Mac, or Outlook mobile apps. The recommended state for the default OWA Mailbox Policy is: - PersonalAccountsEnabled is set to False - PersonalAccountCalendarsEnabled is set to False", + "RationaleStatement": "Personal email accounts are not subject to corporate security controls such as anti- malware scanning, data loss prevention (DLP), Safe Links, or audit logging. Allowing personal accounts alongside the corporate mailbox enables side-channel data exfiltration (e.g., forwarding sensitive content to a personal inbox) and creates an ingress path for malware and phishing payloads that bypass tenant mail-flow protections.", + "ImpactStatement": "This control does not apply to classic Outlook for Windows, Outlook for Mac, or Outlook mobile apps. Organizations requiring broader coverage should evaluate additional controls like application management policies to restrict personal account usage on those clients. This also does not block users from accessing personal accounts via other email clients or web browsers. Changes to OWA mailbox policies may take up to 60 minutes to take effect. If users previously added personal accounts before this policy was applied, those accounts will be disabled once the policy is detected, and affected users will see a message advising them to remove the personal account from Outlook, which may generate helpdesk inquiries. The audit only applies to the default OWA mailbox policy. Users assigned to a non- default OWA mailbox policy are not covered; optionally, custom policies can be reviewed separately to ensure a level of enforcement beyond the compliance requirements of this control.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following: $DefaultPolicy = Get-OwaMailboxPolicy | Where-Object { $_.IsDefault } Set-OwaMailboxPolicy -Identity $DefaultPolicy.Identity - PersonalAccountsEnabled $false -PersonalAccountCalendarsEnabled $false", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: The default OWA Mailbox Policy is the only policy required for compliance with this control. Other mailbox policies are discretionary and left up to the organization to audit as needed. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following: Get-OwaMailboxPolicy | Where-Object { $_.IsDefault } | Format-List PersonalAccountsEnabled, PersonalAccountCalendarsEnabled 3. Verify the output matches the following: PersonalAccountsEnabled : False PersonalAccountCalendarsEnabled : False", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "- PersonalAccountsEnabled is True. - PersonalAccountCalendarsEnabled is True.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchangepowershell/set-owamailboxpolicy?view=exchange-ps#-personalaccountsenabled:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365-apps/outlook/get-started/supported-account-types#prevent-adding-personal-accounts:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365-apps/outlook/manage/policy-management" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.5.1", + "Description": "Modern authentication in Microsoft 365 enables authentication features like multifactor authentication (MFA) using smart cards, certificate-based authentication (CBA), and third-party SAML identity providers. When you enable modern authentication in Exchange Online, Outlook 2016 and Outlook 2013 use modern authentication to log in to Microsoft 365 mailboxes. When you disable modern authentication in Exchange Online, Outlook 2016 and Outlook 2013 use basic authentication to log in to Microsoft 365 mailboxes. When users initially configure certain email clients, like Outlook 2013 and Outlook 2016, they may be required to authenticate using enhanced authentication mechanisms, such as multifactor authentication. Other Outlook clients that are available in Microsoft 365 (for example, Outlook Mobile and Outlook for Mac 2016) always use modern authentication to log in to Microsoft 365 mailboxes.", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_organization_modern_authentication_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Exchange admin center", + "SubSection": "6.5 Settings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Modern authentication in Microsoft 365 enables authentication features like multifactor authentication (MFA) using smart cards, certificate-based authentication (CBA), and third-party SAML identity providers. When you enable modern authentication in Exchange Online, Outlook 2016 and Outlook 2013 use modern authentication to log in to Microsoft 365 mailboxes. When you disable modern authentication in Exchange Online, Outlook 2016 and Outlook 2013 use basic authentication to log in to Microsoft 365 mailboxes. When users initially configure certain email clients, like Outlook 2013 and Outlook 2016, they may be required to authenticate using enhanced authentication mechanisms, such as multifactor authentication. Other Outlook clients that are available in Microsoft 365 (for example, Outlook Mobile and Outlook for Mac 2016) always use modern authentication to log in to Microsoft 365 mailboxes.", + "RationaleStatement": "Strong authentication controls, such as the use of multifactor authentication, may be circumvented if basic authentication is used by Exchange Online email clients such as Outlook 2016 and Outlook 2013. Enabling modern authentication for Exchange Online ensures strong authentication mechanisms are used when establishing sessions between email clients and Exchange Online.", + "ImpactStatement": "Users of older email clients, such as Outlook 2013 and Outlook 2016, will no longer be able to authenticate to Exchange using Basic Authentication, which will necessitate migration to modern authentication practices.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Settings and select Org Settings. 3. Select Modern authentication. 4. Check Turn on modern authentication for Outlook 2013 for Windows and later (recommended) to enable modern authentication. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Run the Microsoft Exchange Online PowerShell Module. 2. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 3. Run the following PowerShell command: Set-OrganizationConfig -OAuth2ClientProfileEnabled $True", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 admin center https://admin.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Settings and select Org Settings. 3. Select Modern authentication. 4. Verify that Turn on modern authentication for Outlook 2013 for Windows and later (recommended) is checked. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Run the Microsoft Exchange Online PowerShell Module. 2. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 3. Run the following PowerShell command: Get-OrganizationConfig | Format-Table -Auto Name, OAuth* 4. Verify that OAuth2ClientProfileEnabled is True.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "True", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/clients-and-mobile-in-exchange-online/enable-or-disable-modern-authentication-in-exchange-online" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.5.2", + "Description": "MailTips are informative messages displayed to users while they're composing a message. While a new message is open and being composed, Exchange analyzes the message (including recipients). If a potential problem is detected, the user is notified with a MailTip prior to sending the message. Using the information in the MailTip, the user can adjust the message to avoid undesirable situations or non-delivery reports (also known as NDRs or bounce messages).", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_organization_mailtips_enabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Exchange admin center", + "SubSection": "6.5 Settings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "MailTips are informative messages displayed to users while they're composing a message. While a new message is open and being composed, Exchange analyzes the message (including recipients). If a potential problem is detected, the user is notified with a MailTip prior to sending the message. Using the information in the MailTip, the user can adjust the message to avoid undesirable situations or non-delivery reports (also known as NDRs or bounce messages).", + "RationaleStatement": "Setting up MailTips gives a visual aid to users when they send emails to large groups of recipients or send emails to recipients not within the tenant.", + "ImpactStatement": "Not applicable.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: $TipsParams = @{ MailTipsAllTipsEnabled = $true MailTipsExternalRecipientsTipsEnabled = $true MailTipsGroupMetricsEnabled = $true MailTipsLargeAudienceThreshold = '25' } Set-OrganizationConfig @TipsParams", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Get-OrganizationConfig | fl MailTips* 3. Verify the values for MailTipsAllTipsEnabled, MailTipsExternalRecipientsTipsEnabled, and MailTipsGroupMetricsEnabled are set to True and MailTipsLargeAudienceThreshold is set to an acceptable value; 25 is the default value.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "MailTipsAllTipsEnabled: True MailTipsExternalRecipientsTipsEnabled: False MailTipsGroupMetricsEnabled: True MailTipsLargeAudienceThreshold: 25", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/clients-and-mobile-in-exchange-online/mailtips/mailtips:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-organizationconfig?view=exchange-ps" + } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "exchange_organization_mailtips_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_mailtips_large_audience_threshold", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 25 + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.5.3", + "Description": "This setting allows users to open certain external files while working in Outlook on the web. If allowed, keep in mind that Microsoft doesn't control the use terms or privacy policies of those third-party services. Ensure AdditionalStorageProvidersAvailable is restricted on the default OWA policy.", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_mailbox_policy_additional_storage_restricted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Exchange admin center", + "SubSection": "6.5 Settings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting allows users to open certain external files while working in Outlook on the web. If allowed, keep in mind that Microsoft doesn't control the use terms or privacy policies of those third-party services. Ensure AdditionalStorageProvidersAvailable is restricted on the default OWA policy.", + "RationaleStatement": "By default, additional storage providers are allowed in Office on the Web (such as Box, Dropbox, Facebook, Google Drive, OneDrive Personal, etc.). This could lead to information leakage and additional risk of infection from organizational non-trusted storage providers. Restricting this will inherently reduce risk as it will narrow opportunities for infection and data leakage.", + "ImpactStatement": "The impact associated with this change is highly dependent upon current practices in the tenant. If users do not use other storage providers, then minimal impact is likely. However, if users do regularly utilize providers outside of the tenant this will affect their ability to continue to do so.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Set-OwaMailboxPolicy -Identity OwaMailboxPolicy-Default - AdditionalStorageProvidersAvailable $false", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command to audit the default OWA policy: Get-OwaMailboxPolicy -Identity OwaMailboxPolicy-Default | fl AdditionalStorageProvidersAvailable 3. Verify that AdditionalStorageProvidersAvailable is False.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "AdditionalStorageProvidersAvailable : True", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-owamailboxpolicy?view=exchange-ps:https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/3rd-party-cloud-storage-services-supported-by-office-apps-fce12782-eccc-4cf5-8f4b-d1ebec513f72" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.5.4", + "Description": "This setting enables or disables authenticated client SMTP submission (SMTP AUTH) at an organization level in Exchange Online. The recommended state is Turn off SMTP AUTH protocol for your organization (checked).", + "Checks": [ + "exchange_transport_config_smtp_auth_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Exchange admin center", + "SubSection": "6.5 Settings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting enables or disables authenticated client SMTP submission (SMTP AUTH) at an organization level in Exchange Online. The recommended state is Turn off SMTP AUTH protocol for your organization (checked).", + "RationaleStatement": "SMTP AUTH is a legacy protocol. Disabling it at the organization level supports the principle of least functionality and serves to further back additional controls that block legacy protocols, such as in Conditional Access. Virtually all modern email clients that connect to Exchange Online mailboxes in Microsoft 365 can do so without using SMTP AUTH.", + "ImpactStatement": "This enforces the default behavior, so no impact is expected unless the organization is using it globally. A per-mailbox setting exists that overrides the tenant-wide setting, allowing an individual mailbox SMTP AUTH capability for special cases.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Exchange admin center https://admin.exchange.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Settings and select Mail flow. 3. Check Turn off SMTP AUTH protocol for your organization to disable the protocol. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Set-TransportConfig -SmtpClientAuthenticationDisabled $true", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Exchange admin center https://admin.exchange.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Settings and select Mail flow. 3. Ensure Turn off SMTP AUTH protocol for your organization is checked. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Get-TransportConfig | Format-List SmtpClientAuthenticationDisabled 3. Verify that the value returned is True.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "SmtpClientAuthenticationDisabled : True", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/clients-and-mobile-in-exchange-online/authenticated-client-smtp-submission" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "6.5.5", + "Description": "Direct Send is a method used to send emails directly to an Exchange Online customer's hosted mailboxes from on-premises devices, applications, or third-party cloud services using the customer's own accepted domain. This method does not require any form of authentication because, by its nature, it mimics incoming anonymous emails from the internet, apart from the sender domain. The recommended state is to configure RejectDirectSend to True.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "6 Exchange admin center", + "SubSection": "6.5 Settings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Direct Send is a method used to send emails directly to an Exchange Online customer's hosted mailboxes from on-premises devices, applications, or third-party cloud services using the customer's own accepted domain. This method does not require any form of authentication because, by its nature, it mimics incoming anonymous emails from the internet, apart from the sender domain. The recommended state is to configure RejectDirectSend to True.", + "RationaleStatement": "Direct Send allows devices and applications to transmit unauthenticated email directly to Exchange Online. While this method may support legacy systems such as printers or scanners, it introduces significant security risks: - Unauthenticated Email Delivery: Direct Send does not require authentication, making it an attractive vector for threat actors to deliver spoofed or malicious emails that appear to originate from trusted internal sources. - Phishing and Spoofing Risks: Because these emails bypass standard authentication mechanisms, they can easily impersonate internal users or services, increasing the likelihood of successful phishing attacks. - Lack of Visibility and Control: Emails sent via Direct Send may not be subject to the same security policies, logging, or filtering as authenticated traffic, reducing the organization's ability to monitor and respond to threats effectively. Threat research from Varonis has shown that attackers are actively exploiting Direct Send to impersonate internal accounts and distribute malicious content without needing to compromise any credentials. These campaigns have successfully targeted organizations by leveraging predictable infrastructure and public user data to craft convincing phishing emails. Because these messages originate from outside the tenant but appear internal, they often evade detection and filtering mechanisms.", + "ImpactStatement": "Per Microsoft, there is a forwarding scenario that could be affected by this feature. It is possible that someone in your organization sends a message to a 3rd party and they in turn forward it to another mailbox in your organization. If the 3rd party's email provider does not support Sender Rewriting Scheme (SRS), the message will return with the original sender's address. Prior to this feature being enabled, those messages will already be punished by SPF failing but could still end up in inboxes. Enabling the Reject Direct Send feature without a partner mail flow connector being set up will lead to these messages being rejected outright.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Set-OrganizationConfig -RejectDirectSend $true", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Exchange Online using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Get-OrganizationConfig | fl RejectDirectSend 3. Verify that the value returned for RejectDirectSend is True.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "RejectDirectSend : False", + "References": "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/exchange/introducing-more-control-over-direct-send-in-exchange-online/4408790?WT.mc_id=M365-MVP-9501:https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/exchange/direct-send-vs-sending-directly-to-an-exchange-online-tenant/4439865:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchangepowershell/set-organizationconfig?view=exchange-ps:https://www.varonis.com/blog/direct-send-exploit:https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/discussions/microsoft-365/disable-direct-send-in-exchange-online-to-mitigate-ongoing-phishing-threats/4434649" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.2.1", + "Description": "Modern authentication in Microsoft 365 enables authentication features like multifactor authentication (MFA) using smart cards, certificate-based authentication (CBA), and third-party SAML identity providers.", + "Checks": [ + "sharepoint_modern_authentication_required" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 SharePoint admin center", + "SubSection": "7.2 Policies", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Modern authentication in Microsoft 365 enables authentication features like multifactor authentication (MFA) using smart cards, certificate-based authentication (CBA), and third-party SAML identity providers.", + "RationaleStatement": "Strong authentication controls, such as the use of multifactor authentication, may be circumvented if basic authentication is used by SharePoint applications. Requiring modern authentication for SharePoint applications ensures strong authentication mechanisms are used when establishing sessions between these applications, SharePoint, and connecting users.", + "ImpactStatement": "Implementation of modern authentication for SharePoint will require users to authenticate to SharePoint using modern authentication. This may cause a minor impact to typical user behavior. This may also prevent third-party apps from accessing SharePoint Online resources. Also, this will also block apps using the SharePointOnlineCredentials class to access SharePoint Online resources.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to SharePoint admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint. 2. Expand Policies and select Access control. 3. Select Apps that don't use modern authentication. 4. Select the radio button for Block access. 5. Click Save. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online using Connect-SPOService -Url https://tenant-admin.sharepoint.com replacing tenant with your value. 2. Run the following SharePoint Online PowerShell command: Set-SPOTenant -LegacyAuthProtocolsEnabled $false", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to SharePoint admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint. 2. Expand Policies and select Access control. 3. Select Apps that don't use modern authentication and ensure that it is set to Block access. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online using Connect-SPOService -Url https://tenant-admin.sharepoint.com replacing tenant with your value. 2. Run the following SharePoint Online PowerShell command: Get-SPOTenant | ft LegacyAuthProtocolsEnabled 3. Verify that the returned value is False.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "True (Apps that don't use modern authentication are allowed)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/sharepoint-online/set-spotenant?view=sharepoint-ps" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.2.2", + "Description": "Entra ID B2B provides authentication and management of guests. Authentication happens via one-time passcode when they don't already have a work or school account or a Microsoft account. Integration with SharePoint and OneDrive allows for more granular control of how guest user accounts are managed in the organization's AAD, unifying a similar guest experience already deployed in other Microsoft 365 services such as Teams. Note: Global Reader role currently can't access SharePoint using PowerShell.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 SharePoint admin center", + "SubSection": "7.2 Policies", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Entra ID B2B provides authentication and management of guests. Authentication happens via one-time passcode when they don't already have a work or school account or a Microsoft account. Integration with SharePoint and OneDrive allows for more granular control of how guest user accounts are managed in the organization's AAD, unifying a similar guest experience already deployed in other Microsoft 365 services such as Teams. Note: Global Reader role currently can't access SharePoint using PowerShell.", + "RationaleStatement": "External users assigned guest accounts will be subject to Entra ID access policies, such as multi-factor authentication. This provides a way to manage guest identities and control access to SharePoint and OneDrive resources. Without this integration, files can be shared without account registration, making it more challenging to audit and manage who has access to the organization's data.", + "ImpactStatement": "After enabling Microsoft Entra B2B integration, external users attempting to access previously shared links (One Time Passcode) will encounter access issues. They receive error 'This organization has updated its guest access settings'. To restore access, your users need to reshare files/folders/sites to external users.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online using Connect-SPOService 2. Run the following command: Set-SPOTenant -EnableAzureADB2BIntegration $true", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online using Connect-SPOService 2. Run the following command: Get-SPOTenant | ft EnableAzureADB2BIntegration 3. Verify that the returned value is True.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "False", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/sharepoint-azureb2b-integration#enabling-the-integration:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/external-id/what-is-b2b:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/sharepoint-online/set-spotenant?view=sharepoint-ps" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.2.3", + "Description": "The external sharing settings govern sharing for the organization overall. Each site has its own sharing setting that can be set independently, though it must be at the same or more restrictive setting as the organization. The new and existing guests option requires people who have received invitations to sign in with their work or school account (if their organization uses Microsoft 365) or a Microsoft account, or to provide a code to verify their identity. Users can share with guests already in your organization's directory, and they can send invitations to people who will be added to the directory if they sign in. The recommended state is New and existing guests or less permissive.", + "Checks": [ + "sharepoint_external_sharing_restricted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 SharePoint admin center", + "SubSection": "7.2 Policies", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The external sharing settings govern sharing for the organization overall. Each site has its own sharing setting that can be set independently, though it must be at the same or more restrictive setting as the organization. The new and existing guests option requires people who have received invitations to sign in with their work or school account (if their organization uses Microsoft 365) or a Microsoft account, or to provide a code to verify their identity. Users can share with guests already in your organization's directory, and they can send invitations to people who will be added to the directory if they sign in. The recommended state is New and existing guests or less permissive.", + "RationaleStatement": "Forcing guest authentication on the organization's tenant enables the implementation of controls and oversight over external file sharing. When a guest is registered with the organization, they now have an identity which can be accounted for. This identity can also have other restrictions applied to it through group membership and conditional access rules.", + "ImpactStatement": "When using B2B integration, Entra ID external collaboration settings, such as guest invite settings and collaboration restrictions apply.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to SharePoint admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint 2. Expand Policies > Sharing. 3. Locate the External sharing section. 4. Under SharePoint, move the slider bar to New and existing guests or a less permissive level. o OneDrive will also be moved to the same level and can never be more permissive than SharePoint. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online service using Connect-SPOService. 2. Run the following cmdlet to establish the minimum recommended state: Set-SPOTenant -SharingCapability ExternalUserSharingOnly Note: Other acceptable values for this parameter that are more restrictive include: Disabled and ExistingExternalUserSharingOnly.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to SharePoint admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint 2. Expand Policies > Sharing. 3. Locate the External sharing section. 4. Under SharePoint, verify that the slider bar is set to New and existing guests or a less permissive level. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online service using Connect-SPOService. 2. Run the following cmdlet: Get-SPOTenant | fl SharingCapability 3. Verify that SharingCapability is set to one of the following values: o ExternalUserSharingOnly o ExistingExternalUserSharingOnly o Disabled", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Anyone (ExternalUserAndGuestSharing)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/turn-external-sharing-on-or-off:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/sharepoint-online/set-spotenant?view=sharepoint-ps" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.2.4", + "Description": "This setting governs the global permissiveness of OneDrive content sharing in the organization. OneDrive content sharing can be restricted independent of SharePoint but can never be more permissive than the level established with SharePoint. The recommended state is Only people in your organization.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 SharePoint admin center", + "SubSection": "7.2 Policies", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting governs the global permissiveness of OneDrive content sharing in the organization. OneDrive content sharing can be restricted independent of SharePoint but can never be more permissive than the level established with SharePoint. The recommended state is Only people in your organization.", + "RationaleStatement": "OneDrive, designed for end-user cloud storage, inherently provides less oversight and control compared to SharePoint, which often involves additional content overseers or site administrators. This autonomy can lead to potential risks such as inadvertent sharing of privileged information by end users. Restricting external OneDrive sharing will require users to transfer content to SharePoint folders first which have those tighter controls.", + "ImpactStatement": "Users will be required to take additional steps to share OneDrive content or use other official channels.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to SharePoint admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint 2. Expand Policies > Sharing. 3. Locate the External sharing section. 4. Under OneDrive, set the slider bar to Only people in your organization. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online service using Connect-SPOService. 2. Run the following cmdlet: Set-SPOTenant -OneDriveSharingCapability Disabled Alternative remediation method using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online. 2. Run one of the following: # Replace [tenant] with your tenant id Set-SPOSite -Identity https://[tenant]-my.sharepoint.com/ -SharingCapability Disabled # Or run this to filter to the specific site without supplying the tenant name. $OneDriveSite = Get-SPOSite -Filter { Url -like \"*-my.sharepoint.com/\" } Set-SPOSite -Identity $OneDriveSite -SharingCapability Disabled", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to SharePoint admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint 2. Expand Policies > Sharing. 3. Locate the External sharing section. 4. Under OneDrive, verify that the slider bar is set to Only people in your organization. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online service using Connect-SPOService. 2. Run the following cmdlet: Get-SPOTenant | fl OneDriveSharingCapability 3. Verify that the returned value is Disabled. Alternative audit method using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online. 2. Use one of the following methods: # Replace [tenant] with your tenant id Get-SPOSite -Identity https://[tenant]-my.sharepoint.com/ | fl Url,SharingCapability # Or run this to filter to the specific site without supplying the tenant name. $OneDriveSite = Get-SPOSite -Filter { Url -like \"*-my.sharepoint.com/\" } Get-SPOSite -Identity $OneDriveSite | fl Url,SharingCapability 2. Verify that the returned value for SharingCapability is Disabled Note: As of March 2024, using Get-SPOSite with Where-Object or filtering against the entire site and then returning the SharingCapability parameter can result in a different value as opposed to running the cmdlet specifically against the OneDrive specific site using the -Identity switch as shown in the example. Note 2: The parameter OneDriveSharingCapability may not be yet fully available in all tenants. It is demonstrated in official Microsoft documentation as linked in the references section but not in the Set-SPOTenant cmdlet itself. If the parameter is unavailable, then either use the UI method or alternative PowerShell audit method.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Anyone (ExternalUserAndGuestSharing)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/sharepoint-online/set-spotenant?view=sharepoint-ps#-onedrivesharingcapability" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.2.5", + "Description": "SharePoint gives users the ability to share files, folders, and site collections. Internal users can share with external collaborators, and with the right permissions could share to other external parties.", + "Checks": [ + "sharepoint_guest_sharing_restricted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 SharePoint admin center", + "SubSection": "7.2 Policies", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "SharePoint gives users the ability to share files, folders, and site collections. Internal users can share with external collaborators, and with the right permissions could share to other external parties.", + "RationaleStatement": "Sharing and collaboration are key; however, file, folder, or site collection owners should have the authority over what external users get shared with to prevent unauthorized disclosures of information.", + "ImpactStatement": "The impact associated with this change is highly dependent upon current practices. If users do not regularly share with external parties, then minimal impact is likely. However, if users do regularly share with guests/externally, minimum impacts could occur as those external users will be unable to 're-share' content.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to SharePoint admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint 2. Expand Policies > Sharing. 3. Expand More external sharing settings, uncheck Allow guests to share items they don't own. 4. Click Save. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online service using Connect-SPOService. 2. Run the following SharePoint Online PowerShell command: Set-SPOTenant -PreventExternalUsersFromResharing $True", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to SharePoint admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint 2. Expand Policies > Sharing. 3. Expand More external sharing settings, verify that Allow guests to share items they don't own is unchecked. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online service using Connect-SPOService. 2. Run the following SharePoint Online PowerShell command: Get-SPOTenant | ft PreventExternalUsersFromResharing 3. Verify that the returned value is True.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Checked (False)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/turn-external-sharing-on-or-off:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/external-sharing-overview" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.2.6", + "Description": "The external sharing features of SharePoint and OneDrive let users in the organization share content with people outside the organization (such as partners, vendors, clients, or customers). It can also be used to share between licensed users on multiple Microsoft 365 subscriptions if your organization has more than one subscription. The recommended state is Limit external sharing by domain > Allow only specific domains", + "Checks": [ + "sharepoint_external_sharing_managed" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 SharePoint admin center", + "SubSection": "7.2 Policies", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "The external sharing features of SharePoint and OneDrive let users in the organization share content with people outside the organization (such as partners, vendors, clients, or customers). It can also be used to share between licensed users on multiple Microsoft 365 subscriptions if your organization has more than one subscription. The recommended state is Limit external sharing by domain > Allow only specific domains", + "RationaleStatement": "Attackers will often attempt to expose sensitive information to external entities through sharing, and restricting the domains that users can share documents with will reduce that surface area.", + "ImpactStatement": "Users will be unable to initiate new shares with parties whose domains are not on the approved allowlist, which may require administrative action before collaboration with new partners or vendors can begin. Administrators must keep the allowlist current to reflect active business relationships; an outdated list can block legitimate sharing and generate support requests. Note that existing shares to domains not on the allowlist are not revoked when this setting is configured.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to SharePoint admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint. 2. Expand Policies > Sharing. 3. Expand More external sharing settings and check Limit external sharing by domain. 4. Select Add domains, choose Allow only specific domains, enter the list of approved domain names, and select Done. 5. Click Save at the bottom of the page. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online using Connect-SPOService. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Set-SPOTenant -SharingDomainRestrictionMode AllowList - SharingAllowedDomainList \"domain1.com domain2.com\"", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: If the SharePoint external sharing slider is set to Only people in your organization, this recommendation is compliant regardless of the configured value for Limit external sharing by domain. To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to SharePoint admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint 2. Expand Policies > Sharing. 3. Locate the External sharing section. 4. If the SharePoint slider is set to Only people in your organization, this recommendation is compliant. 5. Otherwise, expand More external sharing settings and confirm that Limit external sharing by domain is checked. 6. Verify that Allow only specific domains is selected and that domains listed are approved by the organization. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online using Connect-SPOService. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Get-SPOTenant | fl SharingCapability,SharingDomainRestrictionMode,SharingAllowedDomainList 3. Verify that one of the following conditions is true: o SharingCapability is Disabled, OR o SharingDomainRestrictionMode is AllowList and SharingAllowedDomainList contains domains trusted by the organization for external sharing.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Limit external sharing by domain is unchecked SharingDomainRestrictionMode: None SharingAllowedDomainList: (empty)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/turn-external-sharing-on-or-off?WT.mc_id=365AdminCSH_spo#more-external-sharing-settings" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.2.7", + "Description": "This setting sets the default link type that a user will see when sharing content in OneDrive or SharePoint. It does not restrict or exclude any other options. The recommended state is Specific people (only the people the user specifies) or Only people in your organization.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 SharePoint admin center", + "SubSection": "7.2 Policies", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting sets the default link type that a user will see when sharing content in OneDrive or SharePoint. It does not restrict or exclude any other options. The recommended state is Specific people (only the people the user specifies) or Only people in your organization.", + "RationaleStatement": "By defaulting to specific people, the user will first need to consider whether or not the content being shared should be accessible by the entire organization versus select individuals. This aids in reinforcing the concept of least privilege.", + "ImpactStatement": "Changing the default sharing link type influences the user experience when sharing files and folders in SharePoint and OneDrive. The configured default option will appear pre- selected in the sharing dialog, guiding users toward the organization's preferred sharing method.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to SharePoint admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint 2. Expand Policies > Sharing. 3. Scroll to File and folder links. 4. Set Choose the type of link that's selected by default when users share files and folders in SharePoint and OneDrive to Specific people (only the people the user specifies) or Only people in your organization. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online using Connect-SPOService. 2. Run one of the following PowerShell commands depending on the desired compliant state: To set the default sharing link to specific people: Set-SPOTenant -DefaultSharingLinkType Direct To set the default sharing link to people in the organization: Set-SPOTenant -DefaultSharingLinkType Internal", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to SharePoint admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint 2. Expand Policies > Sharing. 3. Scroll to File and folder links. 4. Verify that the setting Choose the type of link that's selected by default when users share files and folders in SharePoint and OneDrive is set to Specific people (only the people the user specifies) or Only people in your organization. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online using Connect-SPOService. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Get-SPOTenant | fl DefaultSharingLinkType 3. Verify that the returned value is Direct or Internal.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Only people in your organization (Internal)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/sharepoint-online/set-spotenant?view=sharepoint-ps" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.2.8", + "Description": "External sharing of content can be restricted to specific security groups. This setting is global, applies to sharing in both SharePoint and OneDrive and cannot be set at the site level in SharePoint.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 SharePoint admin center", + "SubSection": "7.2 Policies", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "External sharing of content can be restricted to specific security groups. This setting is global, applies to sharing in both SharePoint and OneDrive and cannot be set at the site level in SharePoint.", + "RationaleStatement": "Without restricting external sharing to designated security groups, any user in the organization can share SharePoint or OneDrive content with external recipients. A compromised or insider-threat account can exfiltrate sensitive data by sharing files externally without additional authorization controls. Limiting external sharing to members of specific Entra ID security groups ensures that only reviewed and authorized users have this capability, reducing the attack surface for data exfiltration through sharing.", + "ImpactStatement": "Users who are not members of the designated security groups will lose the ability to create new external shares or invite new external guests. Existing sharing links they previously established will remain active for current recipients. Organizations should ensure the security groups are populated with appropriate members before enabling this setting to avoid inadvertently blocking all external sharing. Helpdesk volume may increase as users in non-designated groups encounter sharing restrictions.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to SharePoint admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint 2. Expand Policies > Sharing. 3. Scroll to and expand More external sharing settings. 4. Set the following: o Check Allow only users in specific security groups to share externally o Click Manage security groups, then add at least one security group authorized for external sharing. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online using Connect-SPOService. 2. Run the following command, replacing with the GUID of the security group to be authorized for external sharing: Set-SPOTenant -WhoCanShareAuthenticatedGuestAllowList \"\" Note: To authorize multiple security groups, provide a comma-delimited list of Object IDs: \"\",\"\". Note: Users in the designated security groups must also be permitted to invite guests in Microsoft Entra. Verify this at Identity > External Identities > External collaboration settings.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to SharePoint admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint 2. Expand Policies > Sharing. 3. Locate the External sharing section. 4. If the SharePoint slider is set to Only people in your organization, this recommendation is compliant. 5. Otherwise, scroll to and expand More external sharing settings. 6. Verify the following: o Allow only users in specific security groups to share externally is checked o Manage security groups contains at least one security group. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online using Connect-SPOService. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Get-SPOTenant | fl SharingCapability, WhoCanShareAuthenticatedGuestAllowList 3. Verify the output using the following logic: o If SharingCapability is Disabled, the recommendation is compliant regardless of the value of WhoCanShareAuthenticatedGuestAllowList. o Otherwise, verify that WhoCanShareAuthenticatedGuestAllowList contains at least one security group GUID. If the value is empty or $null, the recommendation is not compliant.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "By default, this restriction is not in place, allowing any user in the organization to share content externally, subject only to the top-level sharing slider.", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/manage-security-groups:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.online.sharepoint.powershell/set-spotenant?view=sharepoint-ps" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.2.9", + "Description": "This policy setting configures the expiration time for each guest that is invited to the SharePoint site or with whom users share individual files and folders with. Expiration can be a number 30 to 730. The recommended state is 30.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 SharePoint admin center", + "SubSection": "7.2 Policies", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This policy setting configures the expiration time for each guest that is invited to the SharePoint site or with whom users share individual files and folders with. Expiration can be a number 30 to 730. The recommended state is 30.", + "RationaleStatement": "This setting ensures that guests who no longer need access to the site or link no longer have access after a set period of time. Allowing guest access for an indefinite amount of time could lead to loss of data confidentiality and oversight. Note: Guest membership applies at the Microsoft 365 group level. Guests who have permission to view a SharePoint site or use a sharing link may also have access to a Microsoft Teams team or security group.", + "ImpactStatement": "Site collection administrators will have to renew access to guests who still need access after 30 days. They will receive an e-mail notification once per week about guest access that is about to expire. Note: The guest expiration policy only applies to guests who use sharing links or guests who have direct permissions to a SharePoint site after the guest policy is enabled. The guest policy does not apply to guest users that have pre-existing permissions or access through a sharing link before the guest expiration policy is applied.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to SharePoint admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint 2. Expand Policies > Sharing. 3. Scroll to and expand More external sharing settings. 4. Set Guest access to a site or OneDrive will expire automatically after this many days to 30 To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online service using Connect-SPOService. 2. Run the following cmdlet: Set-SPOTenant -ExternalUserExpireInDays 30 -ExternalUserExpirationRequired $True", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to SharePoint admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint 2. Expand Policies > Sharing. 3. Scroll to and expand More external sharing settings. 4. Verify that Guest access to a site or OneDrive will expire automatically after this many days is checked and set to 30. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online service using Connect-SPOService. 2. Run the following cmdlet: Get-SPOTenant | fl ExternalUserExpirationRequired,ExternalUserExpireInDays 3. Verify the following values are returned: o ExternalUserExpirationRequired is True. o ExternalUserExpireInDays is 30.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "ExternalUserExpirationRequired $false ExternalUserExpireInDays 60 days", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/turn-external-sharing-on-or-off#change-the-organization-level-external-sharing-setting:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/community/sharepoint-security-a-team-effort" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.2.10", + "Description": "This setting configures if guests who use a verification code to access the site or links are required to reauthenticate after a set number of days. The recommended state is 15 or less.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 SharePoint admin center", + "SubSection": "7.2 Policies", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting configures if guests who use a verification code to access the site or links are required to reauthenticate after a set number of days. The recommended state is 15 or less.", + "RationaleStatement": "By increasing the frequency of times guests need to reauthenticate this ensures guest user access to data is not prolonged beyond an acceptable amount of time.", + "ImpactStatement": "Guests who use Microsoft 365 in their organization can sign in using their work or school account to access the site or document. After the one-time passcode for verification has been entered for the first time, guests will authenticate with their work or school account and have a guest account created in the host's organization. Note: If OneDrive and SharePoint integration with Entra ID B2B is enabled as per the CIS Benchmark the one-time-passcode experience will be replaced. Please visit Secure external sharing in SharePoint - SharePoint in Microsoft 365 | Microsoft Learn for more information.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to SharePoint admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint 2. Expand Policies > Sharing. 3. Scroll to and expand More external sharing settings. 4. Set People who use a verification code must reauthenticate after this many days to 15 or less. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online service using Connect-SPOService. 2. Run the following cmdlet: Set-SPOTenant -EmailAttestationRequired $true -EmailAttestationReAuthDays 15", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to SharePoint admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint 2. Expand Policies > Sharing. 3. Scroll to and expand More external sharing settings. 4. Verify that People who use a verification code must reauthenticate after this many days is set to 15 or less. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online service using Connect-SPOService. 2. Run the following cmdlet: Get-SPOTenant | fl EmailAttestationRequired,EmailAttestationReAuthDays 3. Verify that the following values are returned: o EmailAttestationRequired True o EmailAttestationReAuthDays 15 or less days.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "EmailAttestationRequired : False EmailAttestationReAuthDays : 30", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/what-s-new-in-sharing-in-targeted-release:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/turn-external-sharing-on-or-off#change-the-organization-level-external-sharing-setting:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/external-id/one-time-passcode" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.2.11", + "Description": "This setting configures the permission that is selected by default for sharing link from a SharePoint site. The recommended state is View.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 SharePoint admin center", + "SubSection": "7.2 Policies", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting configures the permission that is selected by default for sharing link from a SharePoint site. The recommended state is View.", + "RationaleStatement": "Setting the view permission as the default ensures that users must deliberately select the edit permission when sharing a link. This approach reduces the risk of unintentionally granting edit privileges to a resource that only requires read access, supporting the principle of least privilege.", + "ImpactStatement": "Not applicable.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to SharePoint admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint 2. Expand Policies > Sharing. 3. Scroll to File and folder links. 4. Set Choose the permission that's selected by default for sharing links to View. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online service using Connect-SPOService. 2. Run the following cmdlet: Set-SPOTenant -DefaultLinkPermission View", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to SharePoint admin center https://admin.microsoft.com/sharepoint 2. Expand Policies > Sharing. 3. Scroll to File and folder links. 4. Verify that Choose the permission that's selected by default for sharing links is set to View. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online service using Connect-SPOService. 2. Run the following cmdlet: Get-SPOTenant | fl DefaultLinkPermission 3. Verify that the returned value is View.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "DefaultLinkPermission : Edit", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/turn-external-sharing-on-or-off#file-and-folder-links" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "7.3.1", + "Description": "By default, SharePoint online allows files that Defender for Office 365 has detected as infected to be downloaded.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "7 SharePoint admin center", + "SubSection": "7.3 Settings", + "Profile": "E5 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "By default, SharePoint online allows files that Defender for Office 365 has detected as infected to be downloaded.", + "RationaleStatement": "Defender for Office 365 for SharePoint, OneDrive, and Microsoft Teams protects your organization from inadvertently sharing malicious files. When an infected file is detected that file is blocked so that no one can open, copy, move, or share it until further actions are taken by the organization's security team.", + "ImpactStatement": "The only potential impact associated with implementation of this setting is potential inconvenience associated with the small percentage of false positive detections that may occur.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online using Connect-SPOService -Url https://tenant-admin.sharepoint.com, replacing \"tenant\" with the appropriate value. 2. Run the following PowerShell command to set the recommended value: Set-SPOTenant -DisallowInfectedFileDownload $true Note: The Global Reader role cannot access SharePoint using PowerShell according to Microsoft. See the reference section for more information.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to SharePoint Online using Connect-SPOService -Url https://tenant-admin.sharepoint.com, replacing \"tenant\" with the appropriate value. 2. Run the following PowerShell command: Get-SPOTenant | Select-Object DisallowInfectedFileDownload 3. Ensure that the DisallowInfectedFileDownload is set to True. Note: According to Microsoft, SharePoint cannot be accessed through PowerShell by users with the Global Reader role. For further information, please refer to the reference section.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "False", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/safe-attachments-for-spo-odfb-teams-configure?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/anti-malware-protection-for-spo-odfb-teams-about?view=o365-worldwide:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference#global-reader" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.1", + "Description": "Microsoft Teams enables collaboration via file sharing. This file sharing is conducted within Teams, using SharePoint Online, by default; however, third-party cloud services are allowed as well. Note: Skype for business is deprecated as of July 31, 2021 although these settings may still be valid for a period of time. See the link in the references section for more information.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_external_file_sharing_restricted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Microsoft Teams admin center", + "SubSection": "8.1 Teams", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Microsoft Teams enables collaboration via file sharing. This file sharing is conducted within Teams, using SharePoint Online, by default; however, third-party cloud services are allowed as well. Note: Skype for business is deprecated as of July 31, 2021 although these settings may still be valid for a period of time. See the link in the references section for more information.", + "RationaleStatement": "Ensuring that only authorized cloud storage providers are accessible from Teams will help to dissuade the use of non-approved storage providers.", + "ImpactStatement": "The impact associated with this change is highly dependent upon current practices in the tenant. If users do not use other storage providers, then minimal impact is likely. However, if users do regularly utilize providers outside of the tenant this will affect their ability to continue to do so.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Select Settings & policies > Global (Org-wide default) settings. 3. Click Teams to open the Teams settings section. 4. Under files set storages providers to Off unless they have first been authorized by the organization. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams 2. Run the following PowerShell command to disable external providers that are not authorized. (the example disables Citrix Files, DropBox, Box, Google Drive and Egnyte) $Params = @{ Identity = 'Global' AllowGoogleDrive = $false AllowShareFile = $false AllowBox = $false AllowDropBox = $false AllowEgnyte = $false } Set-CsTeamsClientConfiguration @Params", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Select Settings & policies > Global (Org-wide default) settings. 3. Click Teams to open the Teams settings section. 4. Under files verify that only organizationally authorized cloud storage options are set to On and all others Off. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams 2. Run the following to verify the recommended state: $Params = @( 'AllowDropbox' 'AllowBox' 'AllowGoogleDrive' 'AllowShareFile' 'AllowEgnyte' ) Get-CsTeamsClientConfiguration -Identity Global | fl $Params 3. Verify that only authorized providers are set to True and all others False.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "AllowDropBox : True AllowBox : True AllowGoogleDrive : True AllowShareFile : True AllowEgnyte : True", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/teams-powershell-managing-teams" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.1.2", + "Description": "This setting controls whether Teams channels are allowed to receive emails sent to their unique email addresses. When enabled, emails sent to a channel's address will be delivered and appear in the channel's conversation thread; when disabled, the channel will reject incoming emails, preventing them from being posted. The recommended state is Off.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_email_sending_to_channel_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Microsoft Teams admin center", + "SubSection": "8.1 Teams", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting controls whether Teams channels are allowed to receive emails sent to their unique email addresses. When enabled, emails sent to a channel's address will be delivered and appear in the channel's conversation thread; when disabled, the channel will reject incoming emails, preventing them from being posted. The recommended state is Off.", + "RationaleStatement": "Channel email addresses are not under the tenant's domain and organizations do not have control over the security settings for this email address. An attacker could email channels directly if they discover the channel email address.", + "ImpactStatement": "Depending on the organization's adoption, disabling this may disrupt workflows that rely on email-to-channel communication, particularly in environments where email is used to bridge external systems or vendors into Teams. This could include reduced visibility of important updates or alerts that were previously routed into Teams channels via email.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Select Settings & policies > Global (Org-wide default) settings. 3. Click Teams to open the Teams settings section. 4. Under email integration set Users can send emails to a channel email address to Off. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams. 2. Run the following command to set the recommended state: Set-CsTeamsClientConfiguration -Identity Global -AllowEmailIntoChannel $false", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Select Settings & policies > Global (Org-wide default) settings. 3. Click Teams to open the Teams settings section. 4. Under email integration verify that Users can send emails to a channel email address is Off. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams. 2. Run the following command to verify the recommended state: Get-CsTeamsClientConfiguration -Identity Global | fl AllowEmailIntoChannel 3. Ensure the returned value is False.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "On (True)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/step-by-step-guides/reducing-attack-surface-in-microsoft-teams?view=o365-worldwide#restricting-channel-email-messages-to-approved-domains:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/settings-policies-reference#email-integration:https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/send-an-email-to-a-channel-in-microsoft-teams-d91db004-d9d7-4a47-82e6-fb1b16dfd51e" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.2.1", + "Description": "This policy controls whether external domains are allowed, blocked or permitted based on an allowlist or denylist. When external domains are allowed, users in your organization can chat, add users to meetings, and use audio video conferencing with users in external organizations. The recommended state is Off on the Global (Org-wide default) policy.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_external_domains_restricted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Microsoft Teams admin center", + "SubSection": "8.2 Users", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This policy controls whether external domains are allowed, blocked or permitted based on an allowlist or denylist. When external domains are allowed, users in your organization can chat, add users to meetings, and use audio video conferencing with users in external organizations. The recommended state is Off on the Global (Org-wide default) policy.", + "RationaleStatement": "Unrestricted external federation allows any Teams user from any organization to initiate contact with your users, making them susceptible to social engineering, phishing, and malware delivery via Teams chat. Restricting external domains to an allowlist or blocking them entirely eliminates this unsolicited contact vector. Real-world attacks and exploits delivered via Teams over external access channels include: - DarkGate malware - Social engineering / phishing attacks by \"Midnight Blizzard\" - GIFShell - Username enumeration", + "ImpactStatement": "Restricting external domains will limit users' ability to collaborate with individuals outside the organization unless their domain is explicitly allowlisted or they are invited as a guest in Microsoft Entra ID. Administrators choosing an allowlist approach will incur ongoing overhead to manage approved domains as external collaboration needs evolve. Note: Organizations may create custom external access policies with federation enabled and assign them to specific users or groups requiring external access, while keeping the Global (Org-wide default) policy restrictive.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Note: Configuring this setting at the organization level in Organization settings to either Off, Block all external domains or Allow only specific external domains is also a compliant remediation for this control. To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand External collaboration and select External access. 3. Open the Policies tab. 4. Click on the Global (Org-wide default) settings policy. 5. Set Manage external domains for this policy to Off. 6. Click Save. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams 2. Run the following command to configure the Global (Org-wide default) policy. Set-CsExternalAccessPolicy -Identity Global -EnableFederationAccess $false", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: The focus of this control at a minimum is the Global (Org-wide default) policy. If the organization-wide setting is configured to Allow only specific external domains or Block all external domains, then this is also considered a passing state due to its increased restrictiveness. To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand External collaboration and select External access. 3. Open the Policies tab. 4. Click on the Global (Org-wide default) settings policy. 5. Verify that Manage external domains for this policy is set to Off. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams 2. Run the following command: Get-CsExternalAccessPolicy -Identity Global 3. Verify that EnableFederationAccess is False. Organization settings: Optional passing state 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand External collaboration and select External access. 3. Open the Organization settings tab. 4. Verify that Manage external domains for this organization is set to one of the following: o Off o On with Allow or block external domains set to Allow only specific external domains o On with Allow or block external domains set to Block all external domains To audit using PowerShell: 1. Run the following command: Get-CsTenantFederationConfiguration | fl AllowFederatedUsers,AllowedDomains 2. Verify the output meets one of the following compliant conditions: o Off: AllowFederatedUsers is False o Block all external domains: AllowFederatedUsers is True and AllowedDomains is empty o Allow only specific external domains: AllowFederatedUsers is True and AllowedDomains contains only authorized domain names", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "EnableFederationAccess - $True", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/trusted-organizations-external-meetings-chat?tabs=organization-settings:https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/08/02/midnight-blizzard-conducts-targeted-social-engineering-over-microsoft-teams/:https://www.bitdefender.com/blog/hotforsecurity/gifshell-attack-lets-hackers-create-reverse-shell-through-microsoft-teams-gifs/" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.2.2", + "Description": "This policy setting controls chats and meetings initiated through the external access channel with unmanaged Teams users (those not managed by an organization, such as Microsoft Teams (free)). This does not govern anonymous meeting join via shared link, which is controlled separately. The recommended state is: People in my org can chat and have meetings with external users who have unmanaged Microsoft accounts set to Off.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_unmanaged_communication_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Microsoft Teams admin center", + "SubSection": "8.2 Users", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This policy setting controls chats and meetings initiated through the external access channel with unmanaged Teams users (those not managed by an organization, such as Microsoft Teams (free)). This does not govern anonymous meeting join via shared link, which is controlled separately. The recommended state is: People in my org can chat and have meetings with external users who have unmanaged Microsoft accounts set to Off.", + "RationaleStatement": "Allowing users to communicate with unmanaged Teams users presents a potential security threat as little effort is required by threat actors to gain access to a trial or free Microsoft Teams account. Real-world attacks and exploits delivered via Teams over external access channels include: - DarkGate malware - Social engineering / Phishing attacks by \"Midnight Blizzard\" - GIFShell - Username enumeration", + "ImpactStatement": "Users will be unable to communicate with Teams users who are not managed by an organization. Organizations may choose to create additional policies for specific groups needing to communicate with unmanaged external users. Note: The settings that govern chats and meetings with external unmanaged Teams users aren't available in GCC, GCC High, or DOD deployments, or in private cloud environments.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Note: Configuring this setting at the organization level in Organization settings to Off is also a compliant remediation for this control. To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand External collaboration and select External access. 3. Open the Policies tab. 4. Click on the Global (Org-wide default) settings policy. 5. Set People in my org can chat and have meetings with external users who have unmanaged Microsoft accounts to Off. 6. Click Save. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams 2. Run the following command: Set-CsExternalAccessPolicy -Identity Global -EnableTeamsConsumerAccess $false", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: The focus of this control at a minimum is the Global (Org-wide default) policy. If the organization-wide setting is configured to Off, then this is also considered a passing state due to its increased restrictiveness. To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand External collaboration and select External access. 3. Open the Policies tab. 4. Click on the Global (Org-wide default) settings policy. 5. Verify that People in my org can chat and have meetings with external users who have unmanaged Microsoft accounts is set to Off. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams 2. Run the following command: Get-CsExternalAccessPolicy -Identity Global Verify that EnableTeamsConsumerAccess is set to False. Organization settings: Optional passing state 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand External collaboration and select External access. 3. Open the Organization settings tab. 4. Verify that People in my org can chat and have meetings with external users who have unmanaged Microsoft accounts is set to Off. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Run the following command: Get-CsTenantFederationConfiguration | fl AllowTeamsConsumer 2. Verify that AllowTeamsConsumer is False.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "- EnableTeamsConsumerAccess (Global policy): True - AllowTeamsConsumer (Organization settings): True", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/trusted-organizations-external-meetings-chat?tabs=organization-settings:https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/08/02/midnight-blizzard-conducts-targeted-social-engineering-over-microsoft-teams/:https://www.bitdefender.com/blog/hotforsecurity/gifshell-attack-lets-hackers-create-reverse-shell-through-microsoft-teams-gifs/" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.2.3", + "Description": "This setting prevents external users who are not managed by an organization from initiating contact with users in the protected organization. The recommended state is to uncheck People in my org can chat and have meetings with external users who have unmanaged Microsoft accounts. Note: Disabling this setting is used as an additional stop gap for the parent setting which disables communication with unmanaged Teams users entirely. If an organization chooses to have an exception to Ensure communication with unmanaged Teams users is disabled they can do so while also disabling the ability for the same group of users to initiate contact. Disabling communication entirely will also disable the ability for unmanaged users to initiate contact.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_external_users_cannot_start_conversations" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Microsoft Teams admin center", + "SubSection": "8.2 Users", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting prevents external users who are not managed by an organization from initiating contact with users in the protected organization. The recommended state is to uncheck People in my org can chat and have meetings with external users who have unmanaged Microsoft accounts. Note: Disabling this setting is used as an additional stop gap for the parent setting which disables communication with unmanaged Teams users entirely. If an organization chooses to have an exception to Ensure communication with unmanaged Teams users is disabled they can do so while also disabling the ability for the same group of users to initiate contact. Disabling communication entirely will also disable the ability for unmanaged users to initiate contact.", + "RationaleStatement": "Allowing users to communicate with unmanaged Teams users presents a potential security threat as little effort is required by threat actors to gain access to a trial or free Microsoft Teams account. Real-world attacks and exploits delivered via Teams over external access channels include: - DarkGate malware - Social engineering / Phishing attacks by \"Midnight Blizzard\" - GIFShell - Username enumeration", + "ImpactStatement": "Unmanaged Teams users (those using personal Microsoft accounts or free Teams) will be unable to initiate new chats or meeting invitations with members of the organization. Organization members may still be able to join externally-initiated meetings depending on the configuration of the parent setting. Organizations that need to allow inbound contact from specific external users can assign a custom external access policy to those users that has EnableTeamsConsumerInbound enabled. Note: Chats and meetings with external unmanaged Teams users isn't available in GCC, GCC High, or DOD deployments, or in private cloud environments.", + "RemediationProcedure": "Note: Configuring this setting at the organization level in Organization settings to Off is also a compliant remediation for this control. To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand External collaboration and select External access. 3. Open the Policies tab. 4. Click on the Global (Org-wide default) settings policy. 5. Locate the parent setting People in my org can chat and have meetings with external users who have unmanaged Microsoft accounts. 6. Uncheck People in my org can join external meetings and receive new chats from users who have unmanaged Microsoft accounts. 7. Click Save. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams 2. Run the following command: Set-CsExternalAccessPolicy -Identity Global -EnableTeamsConsumerInbound $false", + "AuditProcedure": "Note: The focus of this control at a minimum is the Global (Org-wide default) policy. If the equivalent organization-wide setting is disabled, then this is also considered a passing state due to its increased restrictiveness. To audit using the UI: Note: If the parent setting People in my org can chat and have meetings with external users who have unmanaged Microsoft accounts is already set to Off then this setting will not be visible in the UI. 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand External collaboration and select External access. 3. Open the Policies tab. 4. Click on the Global (Org-wide default) settings policy. 5. Locate the parent setting People in my org can chat and have meetings with external users who have unmanaged Microsoft accounts. 6. Verify that People in my org can join external meetings and receive new chats from users who have unmanaged Microsoft accounts is not checked. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams 2. Run the following command: Get-CsExternalAccessPolicy -Identity Global Verify that EnableTeamsConsumerInbound is False Organization settings: Optional passing state 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand External collaboration and select External access. 3. Select the Organization settings tab. 4. Locate the parent setting People in my org can chat and have meetings with external users who have unmanaged Microsoft accounts. 5. Verify that People in my org can join external meetings and receive new chats from users who have unmanaged Microsoft accounts is not checked. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Run the following command: Get-CsTenantFederationConfiguration | fl AllowTeamsConsumerInbound Verify that AllowTeamsConsumerInbound is False", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "- EnableTeamsConsumerInbound (Global policy) : True - AllowTeamsConsumerInbound (Organization settings) : True", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/trusted-organizations-external-meetings-chat?tabs=organization-settings:https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/08/02/midnight-blizzard-conducts-targeted-social-engineering-over-microsoft-teams/:https://www.bitdefender.com/blog/hotforsecurity/gifshell-attack-lets-hackers-create-reverse-shell-through-microsoft-teams-gifs/" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.2.4", + "Description": "This setting controls the organization's external access with Teams \"trial-only\" tenants. These are tenants that don't have any purchased seats. When set to Blocked, users from these trial-only tenants aren't able to search and contact your users via chats, Teams calls, and meetings (using the users' authenticated identities) and your users aren't able to reach users in these trial-only tenants. Users from the trial-only tenant are also removed from existing chats. The recommended state for People in my organization can communicate with accounts in trial Teams tenant is Off.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Microsoft Teams admin center", + "SubSection": "8.2 Users", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting controls the organization's external access with Teams \"trial-only\" tenants. These are tenants that don't have any purchased seats. When set to Blocked, users from these trial-only tenants aren't able to search and contact your users via chats, Teams calls, and meetings (using the users' authenticated identities) and your users aren't able to reach users in these trial-only tenants. Users from the trial-only tenant are also removed from existing chats. The recommended state for People in my organization can communicate with accounts in trial Teams tenant is Off.", + "RationaleStatement": "Microsoft introduced this setting as Off by default on July 29, 2024 in order to block attack vectors being exploited by threat actors who have abused trial tenants. Enforcing the default ensures the setting is not reenabled for any reason. Allowing users to communicate with unmanaged Teams users presents a potential security threat as little effort is required by threat actors to gain access to a trial or free Microsoft Teams account. Real-world attacks and exploits delivered via Teams over external access channels include: - DarkGate malware - Social engineering / Phishing attacks by \"Midnight Blizzard\" - GIFShell - Username enumeration", + "ImpactStatement": "Users currently in chat conversations with accounts from trial tenants will be removed from those existing chats when this setting is disabled. Organizations that have established communication with external contacts who are using trial tenants will need to use alternative channels (such as email) until those contacts migrate to a licensed tenant.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand External collaboration and select External access. 3. Select the Organization settings tab. 4. Set People in my organization can communicate with accounts in trial Teams tenant to Off. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams 2. Run the following command: Set-CsTenantFederationConfiguration -ExternalAccessWithTrialTenants \"Blocked\"", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com/. 2. Expand External collaboration and select External access. 3. Select the Organization settings tab. 4. Verify that People in my organization can communicate with accounts in trial Teams tenant is set to Off. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams 2. Run the following command: Get-CsTenantFederationConfiguration Verify that ExternalAccessWithTrialTenants is set to Blocked.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "- Off (UI) - Blocked (PowerShell)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/trusted-organizations-external-meetings-chat?tabs=organization-settings#block-federation-with-teams-trial-only-tenants:https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/08/02/midnight-blizzard-conducts-targeted-social-engineering-over-microsoft-teams/:https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/hotforsecurity/gifshell-attack-lets-hackers-create-reverse-shell-through-microsoft-teams-gifs" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.4.1", + "Description": "This policy setting controls which class of apps are available for users to install.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Microsoft Teams admin center", + "SubSection": "8.4 Teams apps", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Manual", + "Description": "This policy setting controls which class of apps are available for users to install.", + "RationaleStatement": "Allowing users to install third-party or unverified apps poses a potential risk of introducing malicious software to the environment.", + "ImpactStatement": "Users will only be able to install approved classes of apps.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Teams apps and select Manage apps. 3. In the upper right click Actions > Org-wide app settings. 4. For Third-party apps set Let users install and use available apps by default to Off. 5. For Custom apps set Let users install and use available apps by default to Off. 6. For Custom apps set Let users interact with custom apps in preview to Off.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Expand Teams apps and select Manage apps. 3. In the upper right click Actions > Org-wide app settings. 4. For Third-party apps verify Let users install and use available apps by default is Off. 5. For Custom apps verify Let users install and use available apps by default is Off. 6. For Custom apps verify Let users interact with custom apps in preview is Off.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "- Third-party apps: On - Custom apps: On", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/app-centric-management:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/step-by-step-guides/reducing-attack-surface-in-microsoft-teams?view=o365-worldwide#disabling-third-party--custom-apps" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.5.1", + "Description": "Anonymous users are users whose identity can't be verified. They may be logged in to an organization without a mutual trust relationship or they may not have an account (guest or user). Anonymous participants appear with \"(Unverified)\" appended to their name in meetings. These users could include: - Users who aren't logged in to Teams with a work or school account. - Users from non-trusted organizations (as configured in external access) and from organizations that you trust but which don't trust your organization. When defining trusted organizations for external meetings and chat, ensure both organizations allow each other's domains. Meeting organizers and participants should have user policies that allow external access. These settings prevent attendees from being considered anonymous due to external access settings. For details, see IT Admins - Manage external meetings and chat with people and organizations using Microsoft identities The recommended state is Anonymous users can join a meeting unverified set to Off.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_anonymous_user_join_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Microsoft Teams admin center", + "SubSection": "8.5 Meetings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Anonymous users are users whose identity can't be verified. They may be logged in to an organization without a mutual trust relationship or they may not have an account (guest or user). Anonymous participants appear with \"(Unverified)\" appended to their name in meetings. These users could include: - Users who aren't logged in to Teams with a work or school account. - Users from non-trusted organizations (as configured in external access) and from organizations that you trust but which don't trust your organization. When defining trusted organizations for external meetings and chat, ensure both organizations allow each other's domains. Meeting organizers and participants should have user policies that allow external access. These settings prevent attendees from being considered anonymous due to external access settings. For details, see IT Admins - Manage external meetings and chat with people and organizations using Microsoft identities The recommended state is Anonymous users can join a meeting unverified set to Off.", + "RationaleStatement": "For meetings that could contain sensitive information, it is best to allow the meeting organizer to vet anyone not directly sent an invite before admitting them to the meeting. This will also prevent the anonymous user from using the meeting link to have meetings at unscheduled times. Note: Those companies that don't normally operate at a Level 2 environment, but do deal with sensitive information, may want to consider this policy setting.", + "ImpactStatement": "Individuals who were not sent or forwarded a meeting invite will not be able to join the meeting automatically.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Click Settings & policies and select the Global (Org-wide default) settings tab. 3. Select Meetings to open the meeting settings section. 4. Under meeting join & lobby set Anonymous users can join a meeting unverified to Off. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams 2. Run the following command to set the recommended state: Set-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global -AllowAnonymousUsersToJoinMeeting $false", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Click Settings & policies and select the Global (Org-wide default) settings tab. 3. Select Meetings to open the meeting settings section. 4. Under meeting join & lobby verify that Anonymous users can join a meeting unverified is set to Off. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams. 2. Run the following command to verify the recommended state: Get-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global | fl AllowAnonymousUsersToJoinMeeting 3. Verify that the returned value is False.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "On (True)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/step-by-step-guides/reducing-attack-surface-in-microsoft-teams?view=o365-worldwide#configure-meeting-settings:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/settings-policies-reference?WT.mc_id=TeamsAdminCenterCSH#meeting-join--lobby:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/MicrosoftTeams/configure-meetings-sensitive-protection:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/anonymous-users-in-meetings:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/plan-meetings-external-participants" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.5.2", + "Description": "This policy setting controls if an anonymous participant can start a Microsoft Teams meeting without someone in attendance. Anonymous users and dial-in callers must wait in the lobby until the meeting is started by someone in the organization or an external user from a trusted organization. Anonymous participants are classified as: - Participants who are not logged in to Teams with a work or school account. - Participants from non-trusted organizations (as configured in external access). - Participants from organizations where there is not mutual trust. Note: This setting only applies when Who can bypass the lobby is set to Everyone. If the anonymous users can join a meeting organization-level setting or meeting policy is Off, this setting only applies to dial-in callers.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_anonymous_user_start_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Microsoft Teams admin center", + "SubSection": "8.5 Meetings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This policy setting controls if an anonymous participant can start a Microsoft Teams meeting without someone in attendance. Anonymous users and dial-in callers must wait in the lobby until the meeting is started by someone in the organization or an external user from a trusted organization. Anonymous participants are classified as: - Participants who are not logged in to Teams with a work or school account. - Participants from non-trusted organizations (as configured in external access). - Participants from organizations where there is not mutual trust. Note: This setting only applies when Who can bypass the lobby is set to Everyone. If the anonymous users can join a meeting organization-level setting or meeting policy is Off, this setting only applies to dial-in callers.", + "RationaleStatement": "Not allowing anonymous participants to automatically join a meeting reduces the risk of meeting spamming.", + "ImpactStatement": "Anonymous participants will not be able to start a Microsoft Teams meeting.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Click Settings & policies and select the Global (Org-wide default) settings tab. 3. Select Meetings to open the meeting settings section. 4. Under meeting join & lobby set Anonymous users and dial-in callers can start a meeting to Off. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams. 2. Run the following command to set the recommended state: Set-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global -AllowAnonymousUsersToStartMeeting $false", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Click Settings & policies and select the Global (Org-wide default) settings tab. 3. Select Meetings to open the meeting settings section. 4. Under meeting join & lobby verify that Anonymous users and dial-in callers can start a meeting is set to Off. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams. 2. Run the following command to verify the recommended state: Get-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global | fl AllowAnonymousUsersToStartMeeting 3. Verify that the returned value is False.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Off (False)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/anonymous-users-in-meetings:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/who-can-bypass-meeting-lobby#overview-of-lobby-settings-and-policies" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.5.3", + "Description": "This policy setting controls who can join a meeting directly and who must wait in the lobby until they're admitted by an organizer, co-organizer, or presenter of the meeting. The recommended state is People who were invited, People in my org or Only organizers and co-organizers.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_external_lobby_bypass_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Microsoft Teams admin center", + "SubSection": "8.5 Meetings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This policy setting controls who can join a meeting directly and who must wait in the lobby until they're admitted by an organizer, co-organizer, or presenter of the meeting. The recommended state is People who were invited, People in my org or Only organizers and co-organizers.", + "RationaleStatement": "For meetings that could contain sensitive information, it is best to allow the meeting organizer to vet anyone not directly sent an invite before admitting them to the meeting. This will also prevent the anonymous user from using the meeting link to have meetings at unscheduled times.", + "ImpactStatement": "Individuals who are not part of the organization will have to wait in the lobby until they're admitted by an organizer, co-organizer, or presenter of the meeting. Any individual who dials into the meeting regardless of status will also have to wait in the lobby. This includes internal users who are considered unauthenticated when dialing in.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Click Settings & policies and select the Global (Org-wide default) settings tab. 3. Select Meetings to open the meeting settings section. 4. Under meeting join & lobby set Who can bypass the lobby to one of the following: o People who were invited o People in my org o Only organizers and co-organizers To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams. 2. Run one of the following PowerShell commands depending on the desired compliant state: To set to People who were invited: Set-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global -AutoAdmittedUsers \"InvitedUsers\" To set to People in my org: Set-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global -AutoAdmittedUsers \"EveryoneInCompanyExcludingGuests\" To set to Only organizers and co-organizers: Set-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global -AutoAdmittedUsers \"OrganizerOnly\"", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Click Settings & policies and select the Global (Org-wide default) settings tab. 3. Select Meetings to open the meeting settings section. 4. Under meeting join & lobby verify Who can bypass the lobby is set to one of the following: o People who were invited o People in my org o Only organizers and co-organizers To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams. 2. Run the following command to verify the recommended state: Get-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global | fl AutoAdmittedUsers 3. Verify that the returned value is one of the following strings: o InvitedUsers o EveryoneInCompanyExcludingGuests o OrganizerOnly", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "People in my org and guests (EveryoneInCompany)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/who-can-bypass-meeting-lobby#overview-of-lobby-settings-and-policies:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/skype/set-csteamsmeetingpolicy?view=skype-ps" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.5.4", + "Description": "This policy setting controls if users who dial in by phone can join the meeting directly or must wait in the lobby. Admittance to the meeting from the lobby is authorized by the meeting organizer, co-organizer, or presenter of the meeting.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_dial_in_lobby_bypass_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Microsoft Teams admin center", + "SubSection": "8.5 Meetings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This policy setting controls if users who dial in by phone can join the meeting directly or must wait in the lobby. Admittance to the meeting from the lobby is authorized by the meeting organizer, co-organizer, or presenter of the meeting.", + "RationaleStatement": "For meetings that could contain sensitive information, it is best to allow the meeting organizer to vet anyone not directly from the organization.", + "ImpactStatement": "Individuals who are dialing in to the meeting must wait in the lobby until a meeting organizer, co-organizer, or presenter admits them.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Click Settings & policies and select the Global (Org-wide default) settings tab. 3. Select Meetings to open the meeting settings section. 4. Under meeting join & lobby set People dialing in can bypass the lobby to Off. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams. 2. Run the following command to set the recommended state: Set-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global -AllowPSTNUsersToBypassLobby $false", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Click Settings & policies and select the Global (Org-wide default) settings tab. 3. Select Meetings to open the meeting settings section. 4. Under meeting join & lobby verify that People dialing in can bypass the lobby is set to Off. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams. 2. Run the following command to verify the recommended state: Get-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global | fl AllowPSTNUsersToBypassLobby 3. Verify that the value is False.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Off (False)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/who-can-bypass-meeting-lobby#overview-of-lobby-settings-and-policies:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/skype/set-csteamsmeetingpolicy?view=skype-ps" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.5.5", + "Description": "This policy setting controls who has access to read and write chat messages during a meeting.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_chat_anonymous_users_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Microsoft Teams admin center", + "SubSection": "8.5 Meetings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This policy setting controls who has access to read and write chat messages during a meeting.", + "RationaleStatement": "Ensuring that only authorized individuals can read and write chat messages during a meeting reduces the risk that a malicious user can inadvertently show content that is not appropriate or view sensitive information.", + "ImpactStatement": "Only authorized individuals will be able to read and write chat messages during a meeting.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Click Settings & policies and select the Global (Org-wide default) settings tab. 3. Select Meetings to open the meeting settings section. 4. Under meeting engagement set Meeting chat to On for everyone but anonymous users. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams. 2. Run the following command to set the minimum recommended state: Set-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global -MeetingChatEnabledType \"EnabledExceptAnonymous\" Note: The audit section outlines additional compliant states which are more restrictive than the recommended state.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Click Settings & policies and select the Global (Org-wide default) settings tab. 3. Select Meetings to open the meeting settings section. 4. Under meeting engagement verify that Meeting chat is set to On for everyone but anonymous users or a more restrictive value: In-meeting only except anonymous or Off. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams. 2. Run the following command to verify the recommended state: Get-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global | fl MeetingChatEnabledType 3. Verify that the returned value is EnabledExceptAnonymous or a more restrictive value EnabledInMeetingOnlyForAllExceptAnonymous or Disabled.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "On for everyone (Enabled)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/skype/set-csteamsmeetingpolicy?view=skype-ps#-meetingchatenabledtype" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.5.6", + "Description": "This policy setting controls who can present in a Teams meeting. Note: Organizers and co-organizers can change this setting when the meeting is set up.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_presenters_restricted" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Microsoft Teams admin center", + "SubSection": "8.5 Meetings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This policy setting controls who can present in a Teams meeting. Note: Organizers and co-organizers can change this setting when the meeting is set up.", + "RationaleStatement": "Ensuring that only authorized individuals are able to present reduces the risk that a malicious user can inadvertently show content that is not appropriate.", + "ImpactStatement": "Only organizers and co-organizers will be able to present without being granted permission.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Click Settings & policies and select the Global (Org-wide default) settings tab. 3. Select Meetings to open the meeting settings section. 4. Under content sharing set Who can present to Only organizers and co- organizers. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams. 2. Run the following command to set the recommended state: Set-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global -DesignatedPresenterRoleMode \"OrganizerOnlyUserOverride\"", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Click Settings & policies and select the Global (Org-wide default) settings tab. 3. Select Meetings to open the meeting settings section. 4. Under content sharing verify Who can present is set to Only organizers and co-organizers. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams. 2. Run the following command to verify the recommended state: Get-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global | fl DesignatedPresenterRoleMode 3. Verify that the returned value is OrganizerOnlyUserOverride.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Everyone (EveryoneUserOverride)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-US/microsoftteams/meeting-who-present-request-control:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/meeting-who-present-request-control#manage-who-can-present:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/step-by-step-guides/reducing-attack-surface-in-microsoft-teams?view=o365-worldwide#configure-meeting-settings-restrict-presenters:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/skype/set-csteamsmeetingpolicy?view=skype-ps" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.5.7", + "Description": "This policy setting allows control of who can present in meetings and who can request control of the presentation while a meeting is underway.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_external_control_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Microsoft Teams admin center", + "SubSection": "8.5 Meetings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This policy setting allows control of who can present in meetings and who can request control of the presentation while a meeting is underway.", + "RationaleStatement": "Ensuring that only authorized individuals and not external participants are able to present and request control reduces the risk that a malicious user can inadvertently show content that is not appropriate. External participants are categorized as follows: external users, guests, and anonymous users.", + "ImpactStatement": "External participants will not be able to present or request control during the meeting. Warning: This setting also affects webinars. Note: At this time, to give and take control of shared content during a meeting, both parties must be using the Teams desktop client. Control isn't supported when either party is running Teams in a browser.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Click Settings & policies and select the Global (Org-wide default) settings tab. 3. Select Meetings to open the meeting settings section. 4. Under content sharing set External participants can give or request control to Off. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams. 2. Run the following command to set the recommended state: Set-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global - AllowExternalParticipantGiveRequestControl $false", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Click Settings & policies and select the Global (Org-wide default) settings tab. 3. Select Meetings to open the meeting settings section. 4. Under content sharing verify that External participants can give or request control is Off. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams. 2. Run the following command to verify the recommended state: Get-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global | fl AllowExternalParticipantGiveRequestControl 3. Verify that the returned value is False.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Off (False)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/meeting-who-present-request-control:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/skype/set-csteamsmeetingpolicy?view=skype-ps" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.5.8", + "Description": "This meeting policy setting controls whether users can read or write messages in external meeting chats with untrusted organizations. If an external organization is on the list of trusted organizations this setting will be ignored.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_external_chat_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Microsoft Teams admin center", + "SubSection": "8.5 Meetings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This meeting policy setting controls whether users can read or write messages in external meeting chats with untrusted organizations. If an external organization is on the list of trusted organizations this setting will be ignored.", + "RationaleStatement": "Restricting access to chat in meetings hosted by external organizations limits the opportunity for an exploit like GIFShell or DarkGate malware from being delivered to users.", + "ImpactStatement": "When joining external meetings users will be unable to read or write chat messages in Teams meetings with organizations that they don't have a trust relationship with. This will completely remove the chat functionality in meetings. From an I.T. perspective both the upkeep of adding new organizations to the trusted list and the decision-making process behind whether to trust or not trust an external partner will increase time expenditure.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Click Settings & policies and select the Global (Org-wide default) settings tab.. 3. Select Meetings to open the meeting settings section. 4. Under meeting engagement set External meeting chat to Off. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams. 2. Run the following command to set the recommended state: Set-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global -AllowExternalNonTrustedMeetingChat $false", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Click Settings & policies and select the Global (Org-wide default) settings tab. 3. Select Meetings to open the meeting settings section. 4. Under meeting engagement verify that External meeting chat is set to Off. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams. 2. Run the following command to verify the recommended state: Get-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global | fl AllowExternalNonTrustedMeetingChat 3. Verify that the returned value is False.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "On(True)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/settings-policies-reference#meeting-engagement" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.5.9", + "Description": "This setting controls the ability for a user to initiate a recording of a meeting in progress. The recommended state is Off for the Global (Org-wide default) meeting policy.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_meeting_recording_disabled" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Microsoft Teams admin center", + "SubSection": "8.5 Meetings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting controls the ability for a user to initiate a recording of a meeting in progress. The recommended state is Off for the Global (Org-wide default) meeting policy.", + "RationaleStatement": "Disabling meeting recordings in the Global meeting policy ensures that only authorized users, such as organizers, co-organizers, and leads, can initiate a recording. This measure helps safeguard sensitive information by preventing unauthorized individuals from capturing and potentially sharing meeting content. Restricting recording capabilities to specific roles allows organizations to exercise greater control over what is recorded, aligning it with the meeting's confidentiality requirements. Note: Creating a separate policy for users or groups who are allowed to record is expected and in compliance. This control is only for the default meeting policy.", + "ImpactStatement": "If there are no additional policies allowing anyone to record, then recording will effectively be disabled.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Click Settings & policies and select the Global (Org-wide default) settings tab. 3. Select Meetings to open the meeting settings section. 4. Under Recording & transcription set Meeting recording to Off. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams. 2. Run the following command to set the recommended state: Set-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global -AllowCloudRecording $false", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Click Settings & policies and select the Global (Org-wide default) settings tab. 3. Select Meetings to open the meeting settings section. 4. Under Recording & transcription verify that Meeting recording is set to Off. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams. 2. Run the following command to verify the recommended state: Get-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global | fl AllowCloudRecording 3. Verify that the returned value is False.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "On (True)", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/settings-policies-reference#recording--transcription" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "8.6.1", + "Description": "User reporting settings allow a user to report a message as malicious for further analysis. This recommendation is composed of 3 different settings and all must be configured for compliance: - In the Teams admin center: On by default and controls whether users are able to report messages from Teams. When this setting is turned off, users can't report messages within Teams, so the corresponding setting in the Microsoft 365 Defender portal is irrelevant. - In the Microsoft 365 Defender portal: On by default for new tenants. Existing tenants need to enable it. If user reporting of messages is turned on in the Teams admin center, it also needs to be turned on the Defender portal for user reported messages to show up correctly on the User reported tab on the Submissions page. - Defender - Report message destinations: This applies to more than just Microsoft Teams and allows for an organization to keep their reports contained. Due to how the parameters are configured on the backend it is included in this assessment as a requirement.", + "Checks": [ + "teams_security_reporting_enabled", + "defender_chat_report_policy_configured" + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "8 Microsoft Teams admin center", + "SubSection": "8.6 Messaging", + "Profile": "E5 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "User reporting settings allow a user to report a message as malicious for further analysis. This recommendation is composed of 3 different settings and all must be configured for compliance: - In the Teams admin center: On by default and controls whether users are able to report messages from Teams. When this setting is turned off, users can't report messages within Teams, so the corresponding setting in the Microsoft 365 Defender portal is irrelevant. - In the Microsoft 365 Defender portal: On by default for new tenants. Existing tenants need to enable it. If user reporting of messages is turned on in the Teams admin center, it also needs to be turned on the Defender portal for user reported messages to show up correctly on the User reported tab on the Submissions page. - Defender - Report message destinations: This applies to more than just Microsoft Teams and allows for an organization to keep their reports contained. Due to how the parameters are configured on the backend it is included in this assessment as a requirement.", + "RationaleStatement": "Users will be able to more quickly and systematically alert administrators of suspicious malicious messages within Teams. The content of these messages may be sensitive in nature and therefore should be kept within the organization and not shared with Microsoft without first consulting company policy. Note: - The reported message remains visible to the user in the Teams client. - Users can report the same message multiple times. - The message sender isn't notified that messages were reported.", + "ImpactStatement": "Enabling message reporting has an impact beyond just addressing security concerns. When users of the platform report a message, the content could include messages that are threatening or harassing in nature, possibly stemming from colleagues. Due to this the security staff responsible for reviewing and acting on these reports should be equipped with the skills to discern and appropriately direct such messages to the relevant departments, such as Human Resources (HR).", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Click Settings & policies and select the Global (Org-wide default) settings tab. 3. Select Messaging to open the messaging settings section. 4. Set Report a security concern to On. 5. Next, navigate to Microsoft 365 Defender https://security.microsoft.com/ 6. Expand System > Settings and select Email & collaboration. 7. Click on User reported settings. 8. Under Microsoft Teams check the box for Monitor reported items in Microsoft Teams and click Save. 9. Set Send reported messages to: to My reporting mailbox only with reports configured to be sent to authorized staff. To remediate using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams. 2. Connect to Exchange Online PowerShell using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 3. Run the following cmdlet: Set-CsTeamsMessagingPolicy -Identity Global -AllowSecurityEndUserReporting $true 4. To configure the Defender reporting policies, edit and run this script: $usersub = \"userreportedmessages@fabrikam.com\" # Change this. $params = @{ Identity = \"DefaultReportSubmissionPolicy\" EnableReportToMicrosoft = $false ReportChatMessageEnabled = $false ReportChatMessageToCustomizedAddressEnabled = $true ReportJunkToCustomizedAddress = $true ReportNotJunkToCustomizedAddress = $true ReportPhishToCustomizedAddress = $true ReportJunkAddresses = $usersub ReportNotJunkAddresses = $usersub ReportPhishAddresses = $usersub } Set-ReportSubmissionPolicy @params New-ReportSubmissionRule -Name DefaultReportSubmissionRule - ReportSubmissionPolicy DefaultReportSubmissionPolicy -SentTo $usersub", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Teams admin center https://admin.teams.microsoft.com. 2. Click Settings & policies and select the Global (Org-wide default) settings tab. 3. Select Messaging to open the messaging settings section. 4. Verify that Report a security concern is On. 5. Next, navigate to Microsoft 365 Defender https://security.microsoft.com/ 6. Expand System > Settings and select Email & collaboration. 7. Click on User reported settings. 8. Under Microsoft Teams verify that Monitor reported items in Microsoft Teams is checked. 9. Verify that Send reported messages to: is set to My reporting mailbox only with report email addresses defined for authorized staff. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Connect to Teams PowerShell using Connect-MicrosoftTeams. 2. Run the following cmdlet for to assess Teams: Get-CsTeamsMessagingPolicy -Identity Global | fl AllowSecurityEndUserReporting 3. Verify that the value returned is True. 4. Connect to Exchange Online PowerShell using Connect-ExchangeOnline. 5. Run this cmdlet to assess Defender: Get-ReportSubmissionPolicy | fl Report* 6. Verify that the output matches the following values with organization specific email addresses: ReportJunkToCustomizedAddress : True ReportNotJunkToCustomizedAddress : True ReportPhishToCustomizedAddress : True ReportJunkAddresses : {SOC@contoso.com} ReportNotJunkAddresses : {SOC@contoso.com} ReportPhishAddresses : {SOC@contoso.com} ReportChatMessageEnabled : False ReportChatMessageToCustomizedAddressEnabled : True", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "On (True) Report message destination: Microsoft Only", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/submissions-teams?view=o365-worldwide" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.1", + "Description": "This setting allows business-to-business (B2B) guests access to Microsoft Fabric, and contents that they have permissions to. With the setting turned off, B2B guest users receive an error when trying to access Power BI. The recommended state is Enabled for a subset of the organization or Disabled.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Microsoft Fabric", + "SubSection": "9.1 Tenant settings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting allows business-to-business (B2B) guests access to Microsoft Fabric, and contents that they have permissions to. With the setting turned off, B2B guest users receive an error when trying to access Power BI. The recommended state is Enabled for a subset of the organization or Disabled.", + "RationaleStatement": "Establishing and enforcing a dedicated security group prevents unauthorized access to Microsoft Fabric for guests collaborating in Azure that are new or assigned guest status from other applications. This upholds the principle of least privilege and uses role-based access control (RBAC). These security groups can also be used for tasks like conditional access, enhancing risk management and user accountability across the organization.", + "ImpactStatement": "Security groups will need to be more closely tended to and monitored.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Fabric https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal 2. Select Tenant settings. 3. Scroll to Export and Sharing settings. 4. Set Guest users can access Microsoft Fabric to one of these states: o Disabled o Enabled with Specific security groups selected and defined. Important: If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it Disabled.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Fabric https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal 2. Select Tenant settings. 3. Scroll to Export and Sharing settings. 4. Verify that Guest users can access Microsoft Fabric is set to one of the following: o Disabled o Enabled with Specific security groups selected and defined. Important: If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it Disabled. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Inspect the results of the Get-CISFabricTenantSettings function from the section overview. 2. Locate the settingName AllowGuestUserToAccessSharedContent in the output. 3. Verify that the properties adhere to one of the following compliant configurations: o enabled is false. o enabled is true AND enabledSecurityGroups contains at least one security group. 4. If neither condition is met, the setting is non-compliant. Note: If the Specific security groups setting is not enabled then the enabledSecurityGroups property does not appear in the output.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Enabled for the entire organization", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/fabric/admin/service-admin-portal-export-sharing" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.2", + "Description": "This setting helps organizations choose whether new external users can be invited to the organization through Power BI sharing, permissions, and subscription experiences. This setting only controls the ability to invite through Power BI. The recommended state is Enabled for a subset of the organization or Disabled. Note: To invite external users to the organization, the user must also have the Microsoft Entra Guest Inviter role.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Microsoft Fabric", + "SubSection": "9.1 Tenant settings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting helps organizations choose whether new external users can be invited to the organization through Power BI sharing, permissions, and subscription experiences. This setting only controls the ability to invite through Power BI. The recommended state is Enabled for a subset of the organization or Disabled. Note: To invite external users to the organization, the user must also have the Microsoft Entra Guest Inviter role.", + "RationaleStatement": "Establishing and enforcing a dedicated security group prevents unauthorized access to Microsoft Fabric for guests collaborating in Azure that are new or assigned guest status from other applications. This upholds the principle of least privilege and uses role-based access control (RBAC). These security groups can also be used for tasks like conditional access, enhancing risk management and user accountability across the organization.", + "ImpactStatement": "Guest user invitations will be limited to only specific employees.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Fabric https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal 2. Select Tenant settings. 3. Scroll to Export and Sharing settings. 4. Set Users can invite guest users to collaborate through item sharing and permissions to one of these states: o Disabled o Enabled with Specific security groups selected and defined. Important: If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it Disabled.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Fabric https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal 2. Select Tenant settings. 3. Scroll to Export and Sharing settings. 4. Verify that Users can invite guest users to collaborate through item sharing and permissions is set to one of the following: o Disabled o Enabled with Specific security groups selected and defined. Important: If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it Disabled. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Inspect the results of the Get-CISFabricTenantSettings function from the section overview. 2. Locate the settingName ExternalSharingV2 in the output. 3. Verify that the properties adhere to one of the following compliant configurations: o enabled is false. o enabled is true AND enabledSecurityGroups contains at least one security group. 4. If neither condition is met, the setting is non-compliant. Note: If the Specific security groups setting is not enabled then the enabledSecurityGroups property does not appear in the output.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Enabled for the entire organization", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/fabric/admin/service-admin-portal-export-sharing:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/power-bi/enterprise/service-admin-azure-ad-b2b#invite-guest-users" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.3", + "Description": "This setting allows Microsoft Entra B2B guest users to have full access to the browsing experience using the left-hand navigation pane in the organization. Guest users who have been assigned workspace roles or specific item permissions will continue to have those roles and/or permissions, even if this setting is disabled. The recommended state is Enabled for a subset of the organization or Disabled.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Microsoft Fabric", + "SubSection": "9.1 Tenant settings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting allows Microsoft Entra B2B guest users to have full access to the browsing experience using the left-hand navigation pane in the organization. Guest users who have been assigned workspace roles or specific item permissions will continue to have those roles and/or permissions, even if this setting is disabled. The recommended state is Enabled for a subset of the organization or Disabled.", + "RationaleStatement": "Establishing and enforcing a dedicated security group prevents unauthorized access to Microsoft Fabric for guests collaborating in Entra that are new or assigned guest status from other applications. This upholds the principle of least privilege and uses role-based access control (RBAC). These security groups can also be used for tasks like conditional access, enhancing risk management and user accountability across the organization.", + "ImpactStatement": "Security groups will need to be more closely tended to and monitored.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Fabric https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal 2. Select Tenant settings. 3. Scroll to Export and Sharing settings. 4. Set Guest users can browse and access Fabric content to one of these states: o Disabled o Enabled with Specific security groups selected and defined. Important: If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it Disabled.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Fabric https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal 2. Select Tenant settings. 3. Scroll to Export and Sharing settings. 4. Verify that Guest users can browse and access Fabric content is set to one of the following: o Disabled o Enabled with Specific security groups selected and defined. Important: If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it Disabled. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Inspect the results of the Get-CISFabricTenantSettings function from the section overview. 2. Locate the settingName ElevatedGuestsTenant in the output. 3. Verify that the properties adhere to one of the following compliant configurations: o enabled is false. o enabled is true AND enabledSecurityGroups contains at least one security group. 4. If neither condition is met, the setting is non-compliant. Note: If the Specific security groups setting is not enabled then the enabledSecurityGroups property does not appear in the output.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Disabled", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/fabric/admin/service-admin-portal-export-sharing" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.4", + "Description": "Power BI enables users to share reports and materials directly on the internet from both the application's desktop version and its web user interface. This functionality generates a publicly reachable web link that doesn't necessitate authentication or the need to be an Entra ID user in order to access and view it. The recommended state is Enabled for a subset of the organization or Disabled.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Microsoft Fabric", + "SubSection": "9.1 Tenant settings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Power BI enables users to share reports and materials directly on the internet from both the application's desktop version and its web user interface. This functionality generates a publicly reachable web link that doesn't necessitate authentication or the need to be an Entra ID user in order to access and view it. The recommended state is Enabled for a subset of the organization or Disabled.", + "RationaleStatement": "When using Publish to Web anyone on the Internet can view a published report or visual. Viewing requires no authentication. It includes viewing detail-level data that your reports aggregate. By disabling the feature, restricting access to certain users and allowing existing embed codes organizations can mitigate the exposure of confidential or proprietary information.", + "ImpactStatement": "Depending on the organization's utilization administrators may experience more overhead managing embed codes, and requests.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Fabric https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal 2. Select Tenant settings. 3. Scroll to Export and Sharing settings. 4. Set Publish to web to one of these states: o Disabled o Enabled with Choose how embed codes work set to Only allow existing codes AND Specific security groups selected and defined Important: If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it Disabled.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Fabric https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal 2. Select Tenant settings. 3. Scroll to Export and Sharing settings. 4. Verify that Publish to web is set to one of the following: o Disabled o Enabled with Choose how embed codes work set to Only allow existing codes AND Specific security groups selected and defined Important: If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it Disabled. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Inspect the results of the Get-CISFabricTenantSettings function from the section overview. 2. Locate the settingName PublishToWeb in the output. 3. Verify that the properties adhere to one of the following compliant configurations: o enabled is false. o enabled is true AND createP2w is false AND enabledSecurityGroups contains at least one security group. 4. If neither condition is met, the setting is non-compliant. Note: The createP2w property can be found nested under properties.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Enabled for the entire organization Only allow existing codes", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/power-bi/collaborate-share/service-publish-to-web:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/fabric/admin/service-admin-portal-export-sharing#publish-to-web" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.5", + "Description": "Power BI allows the integration of R and Python scripts directly into visuals. This feature allows data visualizations by incorporating custom calculations, statistical analyses, machine learning models, and more using R or Python scripts. Custom visuals can be created by embedding them directly into Power BI reports. Users can then interact with these visuals and see the results of the custom code within the Power BI interface.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Microsoft Fabric", + "SubSection": "9.1 Tenant settings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 2", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Power BI allows the integration of R and Python scripts directly into visuals. This feature allows data visualizations by incorporating custom calculations, statistical analyses, machine learning models, and more using R or Python scripts. Custom visuals can be created by embedding them directly into Power BI reports. Users can then interact with these visuals and see the results of the custom code within the Power BI interface.", + "RationaleStatement": "Disabling this feature can reduce the attack surface by preventing potential malicious code execution leading to data breaches, or unauthorized access. The potential for sensitive or confidential data being leaked to unintended users is also increased with the use of scripts.", + "ImpactStatement": "Use of R and Python scripting will require exceptions for developers, along with more stringent code review.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Fabric https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal 2. Select Tenant settings. 3. Scroll to R and Python visuals settings. 4. Set Interact with and share R and Python visuals to Disabled", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Fabric https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal 2. Select Tenant settings. 3. Scroll to R and Python visuals settings. 4. Verify that Interact with and share R and Python visuals is set to Disabled To audit using PowerShell: 1. Inspect the results of the Get-CISFabricTenantSettings function from the section overview. 2. Locate the settingName RScriptVisual in the output. 3. Verify that enabled is false.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Enabled", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/fabric/admin/service-admin-portal-r-python-visuals:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/power-bi/visuals/service-r-visuals:https://www.r-project.org/" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.6", + "Description": "Information protection tenant settings help to protect sensitive information in the Power BI tenant. Allowing and applying sensitivity labels to content ensures that information is only seen and accessed by the appropriate users. The recommended state is Enabled or Enabled for a subset of the organization. Note: Sensitivity labels and protection are only applied to files exported to Excel, PowerPoint, or PDF files, that are controlled by \"Export to Excel\" and \"Export reports as PowerPoint presentation or PDF documents\" settings. All other export and sharing options do not support the application of sensitivity labels and protection. Note 2: There are some prerequisite steps that need to be completed in order to fully utilize labeling. See here.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Microsoft Fabric", + "SubSection": "9.1 Tenant settings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Information protection tenant settings help to protect sensitive information in the Power BI tenant. Allowing and applying sensitivity labels to content ensures that information is only seen and accessed by the appropriate users. The recommended state is Enabled or Enabled for a subset of the organization. Note: Sensitivity labels and protection are only applied to files exported to Excel, PowerPoint, or PDF files, that are controlled by \"Export to Excel\" and \"Export reports as PowerPoint presentation or PDF documents\" settings. All other export and sharing options do not support the application of sensitivity labels and protection. Note 2: There are some prerequisite steps that need to be completed in order to fully utilize labeling. See here.", + "RationaleStatement": "Establishing data classifications and affixing labels to data at creation enables organizations to discern the data's criticality, sensitivity, and value. This initial identification enables the implementation of appropriate protective measures, utilizing technologies like Data Loss Prevention (DLP) to avert inadvertent exposure and enforcing access controls to safeguard against unauthorized access. This practice can also promote user awareness and responsibility in regard to the nature of the data they interact with. Which in turn can foster awareness in other areas of data management across the organization.", + "ImpactStatement": "Additional license requirements like Power BI Pro are required, as outlined in the Licensed and requirements page linked in the description and references sections.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Fabric https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal 2. Select Tenant settings. 3. Scroll to Information protection. 4. Set Allow users to apply sensitivity labels for content to one of these states: o Enabled o Enabled with Specific security groups selected and defined.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Fabric https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal 2. Select Tenant settings. 3. Scroll to Information protection. 4. Verify that Allow users to apply sensitivity labels for content is set to one of the following: o Enabled o Enabled with Specific security groups selected and defined. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Inspect the results of the Get-CISFabricTenantSettings function from the section overview. 2. Locate the settingName EimInformationProtectionEdit in the output. 3. Verify that the properties adhere to one of the following compliant configurations: o enabled is true. o enabled is true AND enabledSecurityGroups contains at least one security group. 4. If neither condition is met, the setting is non-compliant. Note: If the Specific security groups setting is not enabled then the enabledSecurityGroups property does not appear in the output.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Disabled", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/power-bi/enterprise/service-security-enable-data-sensitivity-labels:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/fabric/governance/data-loss-prevention-overview:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/power-bi/enterprise/service-security-enable-data-sensitivity-labels#licensing-and-requirements" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.7", + "Description": "Creating a shareable link allows a user to create a link to a report or dashboard, then add that link to an email or another messaging application. There are 3 options that can be selected when creating a shareable link: - People in your organization - People with existing access - Specific people This setting solely deals with restrictions to People in the organization. External users by default are not included in any of these categories, and therefore cannot use any of these links regardless of the state of this setting. The recommended state is Enabled for a subset of the organization or Disabled.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Microsoft Fabric", + "SubSection": "9.1 Tenant settings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Creating a shareable link allows a user to create a link to a report or dashboard, then add that link to an email or another messaging application. There are 3 options that can be selected when creating a shareable link: - People in your organization - People with existing access - Specific people This setting solely deals with restrictions to People in the organization. External users by default are not included in any of these categories, and therefore cannot use any of these links regardless of the state of this setting. The recommended state is Enabled for a subset of the organization or Disabled.", + "RationaleStatement": "While external users are unable to utilize shareable links, disabling or restricting this feature ensures that a user cannot generate a link accessible by individuals within the same organization who lack the necessary clearance to the shared data. For example, a member of Human Resources intends to share sensitive information with a particular employee or another colleague within their department. The owner would be prompted to specify either People with existing access or Specific people when generating the link requiring the person clicking the link to pass a first layer access control list. This measure along with proper file and folder permissions can help prevent unintended access and potential information leakage.", + "ImpactStatement": "If the setting is Enabled then only specific people in the organization would be allowed to create general links viewable by the entire organization.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Fabric https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal 2. Select Tenant settings. 3. Scroll to Export and Sharing settings. 4. Set Allow shareable links to grant access to everyone in your organization to one of these states: o Disabled o Enabled with Specific security groups selected and defined. Important: If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it Disabled.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Fabric https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal 2. Select Tenant settings. 3. Scroll to Export and Sharing settings. 4. Verify that Allow shareable links to grant access to everyone in your organization is set to one of the following: o Disabled o Enabled with Specific security groups selected and defined. Important: If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it Disabled. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Inspect the results of the Get-CISFabricTenantSettings function from the section overview. 2. Locate the settingName ShareLinkToEntireOrg in the output. 3. Verify that the properties adhere to one of the following compliant configurations: o enabled is set to false. o enabled is set to true AND enabledSecurityGroups contains at least one security group. 4. If neither condition is met, the setting is non-compliant. Note: If the Specific security groups setting is not enabled then the enabledSecurityGroups property does not appear in the output.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Enabled for the entire organization", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/power-bi/collaborate-share/service-share-dashboards?wt.mc_id=powerbi_inproduct_sharedialog#link-settings:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/fabric/admin/service-admin-portal-export-sharing" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.8", + "Description": "Power BI admins can specify which users or user groups can share datasets externally with guests from a different tenant through the in-place mechanism. Disabling this setting prevents any user from sharing datasets externally by restricting the ability of users to turn on external sharing for datasets they own or manage. The recommended state is Enabled for a subset of the organization or Disabled.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Microsoft Fabric", + "SubSection": "9.1 Tenant settings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Power BI admins can specify which users or user groups can share datasets externally with guests from a different tenant through the in-place mechanism. Disabling this setting prevents any user from sharing datasets externally by restricting the ability of users to turn on external sharing for datasets they own or manage. The recommended state is Enabled for a subset of the organization or Disabled.", + "RationaleStatement": "Establishing and enforcing a dedicated security group prevents unauthorized access to Microsoft Fabric for guests collaborating in Azure that are new or from other applications. This upholds the principle of least privilege and uses role-based access control (RBAC). These security groups can also be used for tasks like conditional access, enhancing risk management and user accountability across the organization.", + "ImpactStatement": "Security groups will need to be more closely tended to and monitored.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Fabric https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal 2. Select Tenant settings. 3. Scroll to Export and Sharing settings. 4. Set Allow specific users to turn on external data sharing to one of these states: o Disabled o Enabled with Specific security groups selected and defined. Important: If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it Disabled.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Fabric https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal 2. Select Tenant settings. 3. Scroll to Export and Sharing settings. 4. Verify that Allow specific users to turn on external data sharing is set to one of the following: o Disabled o Enabled with Specific security groups selected and defined. Important: If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it Disabled. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Inspect the results of the Get-CISFabricTenantSettings function from the section overview. 2. Locate the settingName EnableDatasetInPlaceSharing in the output. 3. Verify that the properties adhere to one of the following compliant configurations: o enabled is set to false. o enabled is set to true AND enabledSecurityGroups contains at least one security group. 4. If neither condition is met, the setting is non-compliant. Note: If the Specific security groups setting is not enabled then the enabledSecurityGroups property does not appear in the output.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Enabled for the entire organization", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/fabric/admin/service-admin-portal-export-sharing" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.9", + "Description": "This setting blocks the use of resource key based authentication. The Block ResourceKey Authentication setting applies to streaming and PUSH datasets. If blocked users will not be allowed to send data to streaming and PUSH datasets using the API with a resource key. The recommended state is Enabled.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Microsoft Fabric", + "SubSection": "9.1 Tenant settings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "This setting blocks the use of resource key based authentication. The Block ResourceKey Authentication setting applies to streaming and PUSH datasets. If blocked users will not be allowed to send data to streaming and PUSH datasets using the API with a resource key. The recommended state is Enabled.", + "RationaleStatement": "Resource keys are a form of authentication that allows users to access Power BI resources (such as reports, dashboards, and datasets) without requiring individual user accounts. While convenient, this method bypasses the organization's centralized identity and access management controls. Enabling ensures that access to Power BI resources is tied to the organization's authentication mechanisms, providing a more secure and controlled environment.", + "ImpactStatement": "Developers will need to request a special exception in order to use this feature.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Fabric https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal 2. Select Tenant settings. 3. Scroll to Developer settings. 4. Set Block ResourceKey Authentication to Enabled", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Fabric https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal 2. Select Tenant settings. 3. Scroll to Developer settings. 4. Verify that Block ResourceKey Authentication is set to Enabled. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Inspect the results of the Get-CISFabricTenantSettings function from the section overview. 2. Locate the settingName BlockResourceKeyAuthentication in the output. 3. Verify that enabled is set to true. Note: If the Specific security groups setting is not enabled then the enabledSecurityGroups property does not appear in the output.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Disabled for the entire organization", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/fabric/admin/service-admin-portal-developer:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/power-bi/connect-data/service-real-time-streaming" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.10", + "Description": "Use a service principal to access Fabric public APIs that include create, read, update, and delete (CRUD) operations, and are protected by a Fabric permission model. To allow an app to use service principal authentication, its service principal must be included in an allowed security group. You can control who can access service principals by creating dedicated security groups and using these groups in other tenant settings. The recommended state is Enabled for a subset of the organization or Disabled.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Microsoft Fabric", + "SubSection": "9.1 Tenant settings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Use a service principal to access Fabric public APIs that include create, read, update, and delete (CRUD) operations, and are protected by a Fabric permission model. To allow an app to use service principal authentication, its service principal must be included in an allowed security group. You can control who can access service principals by creating dedicated security groups and using these groups in other tenant settings. The recommended state is Enabled for a subset of the organization or Disabled.", + "RationaleStatement": "Leaving API access unrestricted increases the attack surface in the event an adversary gains access to a Service Principal. APIs are a feature-rich method for programmatic access to many areas of Power Bi and should be guarded closely.", + "ImpactStatement": "Service principals will need to be members of specific security groups in order to perform public API calls.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Fabric https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal 2. Select Tenant settings. 3. Scroll to Developer settings. 4. Set Service principals can call Fabric public APIs to one of the following: o Disabled o Enabled with Specific security groups selected and defined. Important: If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it Disabled.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Fabric https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal 2. Select Tenant settings. 3. Scroll to Developer settings. 4. Verify that Service principals can call Fabric public APIs is set to one of the following: o Disabled o Enabled with Specific security groups selected and defined. Important: If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it Disabled. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Inspect the results of the Get-CISFabricTenantSettings function from the section overview. 2. Locate the settingName ServicePrincipalAccessPermissionAPIs in the output. 3. Verify that the properties adhere to one of the following compliant configurations: o enabled is set to false. o enabled is set to true AND enabledSecurityGroups contains at least one security group. 4. If neither condition is met, the setting is non-compliant. Note: If the Specific security groups setting is not enabled then the enabledSecurityGroups property does not appear in the output.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Enabled for the entire organization", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/fabric/admin/service-admin-portal-developer" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.11", + "Description": "Service principal profiles provide a flexible solution for apps used in a multitenancy deployment. The profiles enable customer data isolation and tighter security boundaries between customers that are utilizing the app. The recommended state is Enabled for a subset of the organization or Disabled.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Microsoft Fabric", + "SubSection": "9.1 Tenant settings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Service principal profiles provide a flexible solution for apps used in a multitenancy deployment. The profiles enable customer data isolation and tighter security boundaries between customers that are utilizing the app. The recommended state is Enabled for a subset of the organization or Disabled.", + "RationaleStatement": "Service Principals should be restricted to a security group to limit which Service Principals can interact with profiles. This supports the principle of least privilege.", + "ImpactStatement": "Disabled is the default behavior.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Fabric https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal 2. Select Tenant settings. 3. Scroll to Developer settings. 4. Set Allow service principals to create and use profiles to one of the following: o Disabled o Enabled with Specific security groups selected and defined. Important: If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it Disabled.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Fabric https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal 2. Select Tenant settings. 3. Scroll to Developer settings. 4. Verify that Allow service principals to create and use profiles is set to one of the following: o Disabled o Enabled with Specific security groups selected and defined. Important: If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it Disabled. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Inspect the results of the Get-CISFabricTenantSettings function from the section overview. 2. Locate the settingName AllowServicePrincipalsCreateAndUseProfiles in the output. 3. Verify that the properties adhere to one of the following compliant configurations: o enabled is set to false. o enabled is set to true AND enabledSecurityGroups contains at least one security group. 4. If neither condition is met, the setting is non-compliant. Note: If the Specific security groups setting is not enabled then the enabledSecurityGroups property does not appear in the output.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Disabled for the entire organization", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/fabric/admin/service-admin-portal-developer:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/power-bi/developer/embedded/embed-multi-tenancy" + } + ] + }, + { + "Id": "9.1.12", + "Description": "Use a service principal to access these Fabric APIs that aren't protected by a Fabric permission model. - Create Workspace - Create Connection - Create Deployment Pipeline To allow an app to use service principal authentication, its service principal must be included in an allowed security group. You can control who can access service principals by creating dedicated security groups and using these groups in other tenant settings. The recommended state is Enabled for a subset of the organization or Disabled.", + "Checks": [], + "Attributes": [ + { + "Section": "9 Microsoft Fabric", + "SubSection": "9.1 Tenant settings", + "Profile": "E3 Level 1", + "AssessmentStatus": "Automated", + "Description": "Use a service principal to access these Fabric APIs that aren't protected by a Fabric permission model. - Create Workspace - Create Connection - Create Deployment Pipeline To allow an app to use service principal authentication, its service principal must be included in an allowed security group. You can control who can access service principals by creating dedicated security groups and using these groups in other tenant settings. The recommended state is Enabled for a subset of the organization or Disabled.", + "RationaleStatement": "Leaving API access unrestricted increases the attack surface in the event an adversary gains access to a Service Principal. APIs are a feature-rich method for programmatic access to many areas of Power Bi and should be guarded closely.", + "ImpactStatement": "Service principals will need to be members of specific security groups in order to perform public API calls.", + "RemediationProcedure": "To remediate using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Fabric https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal 2. Select Tenant settings. 3. Scroll to Developer settings. 4. Set Service principals can create workspaces, connections, and deployment pipelines to one of the following: o Disabled o Enabled with Specific security groups selected and defined. Important: If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it Disabled.", + "AuditProcedure": "To audit using the UI: 1. Navigate to Microsoft Fabric https://app.powerbi.com/admin-portal 2. Select Tenant settings. 3. Scroll to Developer settings. 4. Verify that Service principals can create workspaces, connections, and deployment pipelines is set to one of the following: o Disabled o Enabled with Specific security groups selected and defined. Important: If the organization doesn't actively use this feature it is recommended to keep it Disabled. To audit using PowerShell: 1. Inspect the results of the Get-CISFabricTenantSettings function from the section overview. 2. Locate the settingName ServicePrincipalAccessGlobalAPIs in the output. 3. Verify that the properties adhere to one of the following compliant configurations: o enabled is set to false. o enabled is set to true AND enabledSecurityGroups contains at least one security group. 4. If neither condition is met, the setting is non-compliant. Note: If the Specific security groups setting is not enabled then the enabledSecurityGroups property does not appear in the output.", + "AdditionalInformation": "", + "DefaultValue": "Disabled for the entire organization", + "References": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/fabric/admin/service-admin-portal-developer" + } + ] + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/prowler/compliance/m365/prowler_threatscore_m365.json b/prowler/compliance/m365/prowler_threatscore_m365.json index 286a4fff39..f5a6cd1cd8 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/m365/prowler_threatscore_m365.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/m365/prowler_threatscore_m365.json @@ -819,6 +819,14 @@ "LevelOfRisk": 4, "Weight": 100 } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "entra_admin_users_sign_in_frequency_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "sign_in_frequency", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 4 + } ] }, { @@ -964,6 +972,68 @@ "LevelOfRisk": 2, "Weight": 8 } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "defender_malware_policy_comprehensive_attachments_filter_applied", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_blocked_file_types", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": [ + "ace", + "ani", + "apk", + "app", + "appx", + "arj", + "bat", + "cab", + "cmd", + "com", + "deb", + "dex", + "dll", + "docm", + "elf", + "exe", + "hta", + "img", + "iso", + "jar", + "jnlp", + "kext", + "lha", + "lib", + "library", + "lnk", + "lzh", + "macho", + "msc", + "msi", + "msix", + "msp", + "mst", + "pif", + "ppa", + "ppam", + "reg", + "rev", + "scf", + "scr", + "sct", + "sys", + "uif", + "vb", + "vbe", + "vbs", + "vxd", + "wsc", + "wsf", + "wsh", + "xll", + "xz", + "z" + ] + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/compliance/okta/okta_idaas_stig_v1r2_okta.json b/prowler/compliance/okta/okta_idaas_stig_v1r2_okta.json index bac3d9132e..66747cdba7 100644 --- a/prowler/compliance/okta/okta_idaas_stig_v1r2_okta.json +++ b/prowler/compliance/okta/okta_idaas_stig_v1r2_okta.json @@ -25,6 +25,14 @@ "CheckText": "From the Admin Console: 1. Select Security >> Global Session Policy. 2. In the Default Policy, verify a rule is configured at Priority 1 that is not named \"Default Rule\". 3. Click the edit icon next to the Priority 1 rule. 4. Verify the \"Maximum Okta global session idle time\" is set to 15 minutes. If \"Maximum Okta global session idle time\" is not set to 15 minutes, this is a finding.", "FixText": "From the Admin Console: 1. Go to Security >> Global Session Policy. 2. Select the Default Policy. 3. In the Rules table, make these updates: - Click \"Add rule\". - Set \"Maximum Okta global session idle time\" to 15 minutes." } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "signon_global_session_idle_timeout_15min", + "ConfigKey": "okta_max_session_idle_minutes", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 15 + } ] }, { @@ -46,6 +54,14 @@ "CheckText": "From the Admin Console: 1. Select Applications >> Applications >> Okta Admin Console. 2. In the Sign On tab, under \"Okta Admin Console session\", verify the \"Maximum app session idle time\" is set to 15 minutes. If the \"Maximum app session idle time\" is not set to 15 minutes, this is a finding.", "FixText": "From the Admin Console: 1. Select Applications >> Applications >> Okta Admin Console. 2. In the Sign On tab, under \"Okta Admin Console session\", set the \"Maximum app session idle time\" to 15 minutes." } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "application_admin_console_session_idle_timeout_15min", + "ConfigKey": "okta_admin_console_idle_timeout_max_minutes", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 15 + } ] }, { @@ -69,6 +85,14 @@ "CheckText": "If Okta Services rely on external directory services for user sourcing, this is not applicable, and the connected directory services must perform this function. Go to Workflows >> Automations and verify that an Automation has been created to disable accounts after 35 days of inactivity. If the Okta configuration does not automatically disable accounts after a 35-day period of account inactivity, this is a finding.", "FixText": "From the Admin Console: 1. Go to Workflow >> Automations and select \"Add Automation\". 2. Create a name for the Automation (e.g., \"User Inactivity\"). 3. Click \"Add Condition\" and select \"User Inactivity in Okta\". 4. In the duration field, enter 35 days and click \"Save\". 5 Click the edit button next to \"Select Schedule\". 6. Configure the \"Schedule\" field for \"Run Daily\" and set the \"Time\" field to an organizationally defined time to run this automation. Click \"Save\". 7. Click the edit button next to \"Select group membership\". 8. In the \"Applies to\" field, select the group \"Everyone\" by typing it into the field. Click \"Save\". 9. Click \"Add Action\" and select \"Change User lifecycle state in Okta\". 10. In the \"Change user state to\" field, select \"Suspended\" and click \"Save\". 11. Click the \"Inactive\" button near the top of the section screen and select \"Activate\"." } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "user_inactivity_automation_35d_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "okta_user_inactivity_max_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 35 + } ] }, { @@ -395,6 +419,14 @@ "CheckText": "From the Admin Console: 1. Select Security >> Global Session Policy. 2. In the Default Policy, verify a rule is configured at Priority 1 that is not named \"Default Rule\". 3. Click the \"Edit\" icon next to the Priority 1 rule. 4. Verify \"Maximum Okta global session lifetime\" is set to 18 hours. If the above is not set, this is a finding.", "FixText": "From the Admin Console: 1. Go to Security >> Global Session Policy. 2. Select the Default Policy. 3. In the Rules table, make these updates: - Click \"Add rule\". - Set \"Maximum Okta global session lifetime\" to 18 hours." } + ], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": "signon_global_session_lifetime_18h", + "ConfigKey": "okta_max_session_lifetime_minutes", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 1080 + } ] }, { diff --git a/prowler/config/config.py b/prowler/config/config.py index 9e2b079da6..c664745000 100644 --- a/prowler/config/config.py +++ b/prowler/config/config.py @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ class _MutableTimestamp: timestamp = _MutableTimestamp(datetime.today()) timestamp_utc = _MutableTimestamp(datetime.now(timezone.utc)) -prowler_version = "5.31.0" +prowler_version = "5.32.0" html_logo_url = "https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/" square_logo_img = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/dc7d2d5aeb92fdf12e8604f42ef6472cd3e8e889/docs/img/prowler-logo-black.png" aws_logo = "https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/38561120/235953920-3e3fba08-0795-41dc-b480-9bea57db9f2e.png" @@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ class Provider(str, Enum): VERCEL = "vercel" OKTA = "okta" STACKIT = "stackit" + LINODE = "linode" # Compliance @@ -87,15 +88,22 @@ actual_directory = pathlib.Path(os.path.dirname(os.path.realpath(__file__))) def _get_ep_compliance_dirs() -> dict: - """Discover compliance directories from entry points. Returns {provider: path}.""" + """Discover compliance directories from entry points. Returns {provider: [paths]}. + + A provider may be contributed by several packages, so accumulate every + directory instead of overwriting. + """ dirs = {} for ep in importlib.metadata.entry_points(group="prowler.compliance"): try: module = ep.load() if hasattr(module, "__path__"): - dirs[ep.name] = module.__path__[0] + path = module.__path__[0] elif hasattr(module, "__file__"): - dirs[ep.name] = os.path.dirname(module.__file__) + path = os.path.dirname(module.__file__) + else: + continue + dirs.setdefault(ep.name, []).append(path) except Exception as error: logger.warning( f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" @@ -144,12 +152,15 @@ def get_available_compliance_frameworks(provider=None): continue if name not in available_compliance_frameworks: available_compliance_frameworks.append(name) - # External per-provider compliance via entry points. + # External compliance via entry points; a provider may be served by + # several packages, so iterate every directory it contributes. ep_dirs = _get_ep_compliance_dirs() - for prov, path in ep_dirs.items(): + for prov, paths in ep_dirs.items(): if provider and prov != provider: continue - if os.path.isdir(path): + for path in paths: + if not os.path.isdir(path): + continue for file in os.scandir(path): if file.is_file() and file.name.endswith(".json"): name = file.name.removesuffix(".json") @@ -288,6 +299,11 @@ def load_and_validate_config_file(provider: str, config_file_path: str) -> dict: Returns: dict: The configuration dictionary for the specified provider. """ + # Imported lazily to avoid an import cycle: schemas may eventually want to + # import from prowler.config.config (e.g. for shared constants). + from prowler.config.schema.registry import SCHEMAS + from prowler.config.schema.validator import validate_provider_config + try: with open(config_file_path, "r", encoding=encoding_format_utf_8) as f: config_file = yaml.safe_load(f) @@ -313,7 +329,11 @@ def load_and_validate_config_file(provider: str, config_file_path: str) -> dict: else: config = {} - return config + return validate_provider_config( + provider=provider, + raw=config, + schema_cls=SCHEMAS.get(provider), + ) except FileNotFoundError as error: logger.error( diff --git a/prowler/config/config.yaml b/prowler/config/config.yaml index 28f07c2051..5a796d698c 100644 --- a/prowler/config/config.yaml +++ b/prowler/config/config.yaml @@ -3,6 +3,32 @@ aws: # AWS Global Configuration # aws.mute_non_default_regions --> Set to True to muted failed findings in non-default regions for AccessAnalyzer, GuardDuty, SecurityHub, DRS and Config mute_non_default_regions: False + + # AWS Resource Scan Limit Configuration + # Limits the number of resources scanned per service for services that can + # accumulate huge numbers of resources (EBS snapshots, backup recovery + # points, CloudWatch log groups, Lambda functions, ECS task definitions, + # CodeArtifact packages). Limits apply to resources analyzed, not findings: + # a selected resource can produce zero, one, or many findings. Where the AWS + # API supports server-side ordering the latest resources are scanned first; + # otherwise it is best-effort API order. + # Disabled by default: scan every resource unless a positive limit is configured. + # Set to 0 (or a negative value) to disable the limit (scan every resource). + # aws.max_scanned_resources_per_service --> global default for all services below + max_scanned_resources_per_service: 0 + # Per-service overrides. Leave as null to fall back to the global default. + # aws.max_ebs_snapshots --> ec2_ebs_* checks (EBS snapshots) + max_ebs_snapshots: null + # aws.max_backup_recovery_points --> backup_recovery_point_* checks + max_backup_recovery_points: null + # aws.max_cloudwatch_log_groups --> cloudwatch_log_group_* checks + max_cloudwatch_log_groups: null + # aws.max_lambda_functions --> awslambda_function_* checks + max_lambda_functions: null + # aws.max_ecs_task_definitions --> ecs_task_definitions_* checks + max_ecs_task_definitions: null + # aws.max_codeartifact_packages --> codeartifact_packages_* checks + max_codeartifact_packages: null # aws.disallowed_regions --> List of AWS regions to exclude from the scan. # Also settable via the PROWLER_AWS_DISALLOWED_REGIONS environment variable or # the --excluded-region CLI flag. Precedence: CLI > env var > config file. @@ -380,6 +406,39 @@ aws: # Minimum number of Availability Zones that an ELBv2 must be in elbv2_min_azs: 2 + # AWS Post-Quantum TLS Configuration + # aws.acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm + # Allowed post-quantum key algorithms for AWS Private CA certificate authorities + acmpca_pqc_key_algorithms: + - "ML_DSA_44" + - "ML_DSA_65" + - "ML_DSA_87" + # aws.cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled + # Allowed CloudFront MinimumProtocolVersion values that enable post-quantum hybrid key exchange + cloudfront_pqc_min_protocol_versions: + - "TLSv1.3_2025" + # aws.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled + # Allowed post-quantum TLS security policies for API Gateway custom domain names + apigateway_pqc_tls_allowed_policies: + - "SecurityPolicy_TLS13_1_2_FIPS_PFS_PQ_2025_09" + - "SecurityPolicy_TLS13_1_2_PFS_PQ_2025_09" + - "SecurityPolicy_TLS13_1_2_PQ_2025_09" + + # aws.rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki + # Allowed post-quantum key algorithms for AWS Private CAs backing IAM Roles Anywhere trust anchors + rolesanywhere_pqc_pca_key_algorithms: + - "ML_DSA_44" + - "ML_DSA_65" + - "ML_DSA_87" + + # AWS Post-Quantum SSH Key Exchange Configuration + # aws.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled + # Allowed AWS Transfer Family security policies with post-quantum SSH key exchange + transfer_pqc_ssh_allowed_policies: + - "TransferSecurityPolicy-2025-03" + - "TransferSecurityPolicy-FIPS-2025-03" + - "TransferSecurityPolicy-AS2Restricted-2025-07" + # AWS Elasticache Configuration # aws.elasticache_redis_cluster_backup_enabled # Minimum number of days that a Redis cluster must have backups retention period @@ -390,6 +449,13 @@ aws: # Patterns to ignore in the secrets checks secrets_ignore_patterns: [] + # Validate discovered secrets by checking whether they are live against the + # provider APIs. WARNING: this makes outbound network calls that authenticate + # with the discovered secret itself; the credential is exercised against the + # provider and the call will appear in the audited account's logs (and may + # trigger its monitoring). Disabled by default (scans stay fully offline). + secrets_validate: False + # AWS Secrets Manager Configuration # aws.secretsmanager_secret_unused # Maximum number of days a secret can be unused @@ -403,37 +469,6 @@ aws: # Minimum retention period in hours for Kinesis streams min_kinesis_stream_retention_hours: 168 # 7 days - # Detect Secrets plugin configuration - detect_secrets_plugins: [ - {"name": "ArtifactoryDetector"}, - {"name": "AWSKeyDetector"}, - {"name": "AzureStorageKeyDetector"}, - {"name": "BasicAuthDetector"}, - {"name": "CloudantDetector"}, - {"name": "DiscordBotTokenDetector"}, - {"name": "GitHubTokenDetector"}, - {"name": "GitLabTokenDetector"}, - {"name": "Base64HighEntropyString", "limit": 6.0}, - {"name": "HexHighEntropyString", "limit": 3.0}, - {"name": "IbmCloudIamDetector"}, - {"name": "IbmCosHmacDetector"}, - # {"name": "IPPublicDetector"}, https://github.com/Yelp/detect-secrets/pull/885 - {"name": "JwtTokenDetector"}, - {"name": "KeywordDetector"}, - {"name": "MailchimpDetector"}, - {"name": "NpmDetector"}, - {"name": "OpenAIDetector"}, - {"name": "PrivateKeyDetector"}, - {"name": "PypiTokenDetector"}, - {"name": "SendGridDetector"}, - {"name": "SlackDetector"}, - {"name": "SoftlayerDetector"}, - {"name": "SquareOAuthDetector"}, - {"name": "StripeDetector"}, - # {"name": "TelegramBotTokenDetector"}, https://github.com/Yelp/detect-secrets/pull/878 - {"name": "TwilioKeyDetector"}, - ] - # AWS CodeBuild Configuration # aws.codebuild_project_uses_allowed_github_organizations codebuild_github_allowed_organizations: @@ -549,6 +584,9 @@ gcp: # GCP Storage Sufficient Retention Period # gcp.cloudstorage_bucket_sufficient_retention_period storage_min_retention_days: 90 + # GCP Secret Manager Rotation Period + # gcp.secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled + secretmanager_max_rotation_days: 90 # Kubernetes Configuration kubernetes: @@ -669,9 +707,50 @@ okta: # 15 per DISA STIG V-273186 (OKTA-APP-000020); raise it only with an # explicit risk acceptance. okta_max_session_idle_minutes: 15 + # okta.signon_global_session_lifetime_18h + # Maximum acceptable Global Session lifetime, in minutes. Defaults to + # 18h (1080); raise it only with an explicit risk acceptance. + okta_max_session_lifetime_minutes: 1080 # Okta Applications # okta.application_admin_console_session_idle_timeout_15min # Maximum acceptable Okta Admin Console app idle timeout, in minutes. # Defaults to 15 per DISA STIG V-273187 (OKTA-APP-000025); raise it only # with an explicit risk acceptance. okta_admin_console_idle_timeout_max_minutes: 15 + # Okta Users + # okta.user_inactivity_automation_35d_enabled + # Maximum number of days a user can stay inactive before the + # inactivity-automation check flags the org. Defaults to 35. + okta_user_inactivity_max_days: 35 + # Okta Identity Providers + # okta.idp_smart_card_dod_approved_ca + # Extra regex patterns matched against a Smart Card IdP certificate issuer + # DN to recognise a DOD-approved CA, on top of the built-in `OU=DoD` / + # `OU=ECA` patterns. + okta_dod_approved_ca_issuer_patterns: [] + +alibabacloud: + # alibabacloud.cs_kubernetes_cluster_check_recent / cs_kubernetes_cluster_check_weekly + # Maximum number of days an ACK cluster can go without a security check + # before being flagged. Defaults to 7. + max_cluster_check_days: 7 + # alibabacloud.ram_user_console_access_unused + # Days a RAM user's console access can stay unused before being flagged. + # Defaults to 90. + max_console_access_days: 90 + # alibabacloud.sls_logstore_retention_period + # Minimum required SLS log store retention, in days. Defaults to 365. + min_log_retention_days: 365 + # alibabacloud.rds_instance_sql_audit_retention + # Minimum required RDS SQL audit log retention, in days. Defaults to 180. + min_rds_audit_retention_days: 180 + +openstack: + # openstack.image_not_shared_with_multiple_projects + # Maximum number of accepted project members a shared image may have before + # being flagged. Defaults to 5. + image_sharing_threshold: 5 + # openstack._*_metadata_sensitive_data + # Regex patterns whose matches are excluded from secret scanning of + # resource metadata. + secrets_ignore_patterns: [] diff --git a/prowler/config/linode_mutelist_example.yaml b/prowler/config/linode_mutelist_example.yaml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1b08ab6fda --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/config/linode_mutelist_example.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +### Account, Check and/or Region can be * to apply for all the cases. +### Account == +### Region == * (Linode is non-regional) +### Resources and tags are lists that can have either Regex or Keywords. +### Tags is an optional list that matches on tuples of 'key=value' and are "ANDed" together. +### Use an alternation Regex to match one of multiple tags with "ORed" logic. +### For each check you can except Accounts, Regions, Resources and/or Tags. +########################### MUTELIST EXAMPLE ########################### +Mutelist: + Accounts: + "example-account-uuid": + Checks: + "administration_user_2fa_enabled": + Regions: + - "*" + Resources: + - "example-user@example.com" + - "another-user@example.com" diff --git a/prowler/config/scan_config_schema.py b/prowler/config/scan_config_schema.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ac00250c78 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/config/scan_config_schema.py @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +"""Bridge between the Pydantic-based provider schemas in +`prowler.config.schema` and the Prowler App backend (Django) + UI. + +The SDK runtime is intentionally LENIENT: invalid keys are dropped with a +warning and downstream checks fall back to their defaults +(`prowler.config.schema.validator.validate_provider_config`). + +The Prowler App, however, needs to surface those errors to the user when +they save a Scan Config from the UI, and to expose the schema as JSON so +the UI can validate live with `ajv`. This module provides: + +- `validate_scan_config(payload)` — STRICT: returns a list of + `{path, message}` errors without silently dropping anything. The DRF + serializer (`api/.../v1/serializers.py:validate_scan_config_payload`) + turns each entry into a `ValidationError`. + +- `SCAN_CONFIG_SCHEMA` — aggregated JSON Schema derived from the Pydantic + models via `model_json_schema()`. Served by the `/scan-configs/schema` + endpoint and consumed by the UI editor for in-editor live validation. +""" + +from typing import Any + +from pydantic import ValidationError + +from prowler.config.schema.registry import SCHEMAS + + +def _format_loc(loc: tuple) -> str: + """Render a Pydantic error location as a dot-separated path. + + Integer elements (array indices) are formatted as `[idx]` appended to the + previous component. String elements are joined with dots. An empty location + is rendered as ``. + + Examples: + ("aws", "regions", 0) -> "aws.regions[0]" + ("aws", "threshold") -> "aws.threshold" + () -> "" + """ + parts: list[str] = [] + for piece in loc: + if isinstance(piece, int): + if parts: + parts[-1] = f"{parts[-1]}[{piece}]" + else: + parts.append(f"[{piece}]") + else: + parts.append(str(piece)) + return ".".join(parts) if parts else "" + + +def validate_scan_config(payload: Any) -> list[dict]: + """Validate a scan config payload against the registered provider schemas. + + Strict by design: every Pydantic violation surfaces as a `{path, message}` + entry so the caller can decide how to present it. Unknown provider + sections are accepted (consistent with `additionalProperties: True` at + the top level — the SDK simply has no opinion on them). + """ + if not isinstance(payload, dict): + return [ + { + "path": "", + "message": "Scan config must be a mapping with provider sections.", + } + ] + + errors: list[dict] = [] + for provider, section in payload.items(): + schema_cls = SCHEMAS.get(provider) + if schema_cls is None: + # Unknown provider type: tolerated. The SDK will simply ignore it. + continue + if not isinstance(section, dict): + errors.append( + { + "path": str(provider), + "message": "section must be a mapping.", + } + ) + continue + try: + schema_cls.model_validate(section) + except ValidationError as exc: + for err in exc.errors(): + loc = err.get("loc") or () + path = _format_loc((str(provider), *loc)) + errors.append( + { + "path": path, + "message": err.get("msg", "validation error"), + } + ) + return errors + + +def _build_aggregated_schema() -> dict: + """Compose one JSON Schema per provider into a single top-level schema. + + The output mirrors the layout of `prowler/config/config.yaml` (a mapping + keyed by provider type) and is what the UI consumes via `ajv`. + """ + properties: dict[str, dict] = {} + for provider, schema_cls in SCHEMAS.items(): + properties[provider] = schema_cls.model_json_schema() + return { + "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", + "title": "Prowler Scan Config", + "type": "object", + "additionalProperties": True, + "properties": properties, + } + + +SCAN_CONFIG_SCHEMA: dict = _build_aggregated_schema() diff --git a/prowler/config/schema/__init__.py b/prowler/config/schema/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/config/schema/alibabacloud.py b/prowler/config/schema/alibabacloud.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..104f8a3556 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/config/schema/alibabacloud.py @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +"""Alibaba Cloud provider config schema with safety bounds.""" + +from typing import Optional + +from pydantic import Field + +from prowler.config.schema.base import ProviderConfigBase + + +class AlibabaCloudProviderConfig(ProviderConfigBase): + """Alibaba Cloud provider configuration schema. + + Bounds the retention and staleness thresholds consumed by the Alibaba + Cloud checks. Every field is optional: when omitted (or dropped for being + out of range) the check falls back to its own default via + ``audit_config.get(key, default)``. + """ + + max_cluster_check_days: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=1, + le=365, + description=( + "Maximum number of days an ACK cluster can go without a security " + "check before being flagged. Range: 1..365 (defaults to 7)." + ), + ) + max_console_access_days: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=30, + le=180, + description=( + "Days a RAM user's console access can stay unused before being " + "flagged. Range: 30..180 (defaults to 90)." + ), + ) + min_log_retention_days: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=1, + le=3650, + description=( + "Minimum required SLS log store retention, in days. Range: " + "1..3650 (defaults to 365)." + ), + ) + min_rds_audit_retention_days: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=1, + le=3650, + description=( + "Minimum required RDS SQL audit log retention, in days. Range: " + "1..3650 (defaults to 180)." + ), + ) diff --git a/prowler/config/schema/aws.py b/prowler/config/schema/aws.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a0dbe91932 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/config/schema/aws.py @@ -0,0 +1,459 @@ +"""AWS provider config schema. + +Bounds on every field are intentionally conservative: they are not the +absolute service maxima but the values that produce a useful security +check. A user is free to keep the built-in default by omitting the key — +out-of-range values are dropped with a warning at SDK runtime, and +rejected at the Prowler App backend. + +Whenever an upper bound is uncertain, the cap is set to a value that +still keeps the check meaningful (e.g. a 10-year window for date-based +thresholds) and avoids ints that obviously break downstream maths +(`min_kinesis_stream_retention_hours = 99999`). +""" + +from typing import Annotated, Literal, Optional + +from pydantic import AfterValidator, BeforeValidator, Field + +from prowler.config.schema.base import ProviderConfigBase +from prowler.config.schema.validators import ( + make_dotted_version_validator, + validate_ip_networks, + validate_port_range, +) + +# ---- Reusable constants ----------------------------------------------------- + +# CloudWatch Logs only accepts these retention values (in days). Anything else +# is silently coerced to the next valid value by the API — we reject upfront. +_CLOUDWATCH_RETENTION_DAYS = ( + 1, + 3, + 5, + 7, + 14, + 30, + 60, + 90, + 120, + 150, + 180, + 365, + 400, + 545, + 731, + 1096, + 1827, + 2192, + 2557, + 2922, + 3288, + 3653, +) + +_VALID_CW_RETENTION_LITERAL = Literal[ + 1, + 3, + 5, + 7, + 14, + 30, + 60, + 90, + 120, + 150, + 180, + 365, + 400, + 545, + 731, + 1096, + 1827, + 2192, + 2557, + 2922, + 3288, + 3653, +] + + +# ---- Custom validators ------------------------------------------------------ + + +# Reusable validators shared across providers (see schema/validators.py). +_validate_port_range = validate_port_range +_validate_trusted_ips = validate_ip_networks +# "1.4.0" style strings (used by Fargate platform versions). +_validate_semver = make_dotted_version_validator(3, 3) +# "1.28" style strings (EKS minor versions). +_validate_eks_minor = make_dotted_version_validator(2, 2) + + +def _validate_account_ids(v: Optional[list[str]]) -> Optional[list[str]]: + if v is None: + return v + for account_id in v: + if not (account_id.isdigit() and len(account_id) == 12): + raise ValueError( + f"trusted_account_ids entry {account_id!r} is not a 12-digit AWS account id" + ) + return v + + +def _reject_bool_resource_limit(v): + if isinstance(v, bool): + raise ValueError("resource scan limits must be integers, not booleans") + return v + + +ResourceScanLimit = Annotated[ + Optional[int], BeforeValidator(_reject_bool_resource_limit) +] + + +# ---- Main schema ------------------------------------------------------------ + + +class AWSProviderConfig(ProviderConfigBase): + # --- Resource scan limits --------------------------------------------- + max_scanned_resources_per_service: ResourceScanLimit = Field( + default=None, + ge=-1, + le=1_000_000, + description="Global resource scan limit for high-volume AWS services. Use 0 or -1 to disable.", + ) + max_ebs_snapshots: ResourceScanLimit = Field( + default=None, + ge=-1, + le=1_000_000, + description="Resource scan limit for EBS snapshots. Use 0 or -1 to disable.", + ) + max_backup_recovery_points: ResourceScanLimit = Field( + default=None, + ge=-1, + le=1_000_000, + description="Resource scan limit for AWS Backup recovery points. Use 0 or -1 to disable.", + ) + max_cloudwatch_log_groups: ResourceScanLimit = Field( + default=None, + ge=-1, + le=1_000_000, + description="Resource scan limit for CloudWatch log groups. Use 0 or -1 to disable.", + ) + max_lambda_functions: ResourceScanLimit = Field( + default=None, + ge=-1, + le=1_000_000, + description="Resource scan limit for Lambda functions. Use 0 or -1 to disable.", + ) + max_ecs_task_definitions: ResourceScanLimit = Field( + default=None, + ge=-1, + le=1_000_000, + description="Resource scan limit for ECS task definitions. Use 0 or -1 to disable.", + ) + max_codeartifact_packages: ResourceScanLimit = Field( + default=None, + ge=-1, + le=1_000_000, + description="Resource scan limit for CodeArtifact packages. Use 0 or -1 to disable.", + ) + + # --- IAM --------------------------------------------------------------- + mute_non_default_regions: Optional[bool] = None + disallowed_regions: Optional[list[str]] = None + max_unused_access_keys_days: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=30, + le=180, + description=( + "Days an IAM user access key can stay unused before being flagged. " + "Range: 30..180 days (CIS AWS 1.13 recommends 45; NIST IA-5 ≤90)." + ), + ) + max_console_access_days: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=30, + le=180, + description=( + "Days an IAM console password can stay unused before being flagged. " + "Range: 30..180 days (CIS AWS 1.12 recommends 45)." + ), + ) + max_unused_sagemaker_access_days: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=7, + le=180, + description=( + "Days a SageMaker user access key can stay unused. Range: 7..180 " + "(SageMaker tokens are usually high-privilege over S3/KMS)." + ), + ) + + # --- EC2 --------------------------------------------------------------- + shodan_api_key: Optional[str] = Field( + default=None, + max_length=512, + description="API key for Shodan lookups on EC2 public IPs.", + ) + max_security_group_rules: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=1, + le=1000, + description="Max ingress+egress rules per security group. AWS hard limit is 1000.", + ) + max_ec2_instance_age_in_days: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=1, + le=1095, + description=( + "Days an EC2 instance can run before being flagged as old. " + "Range: 1..1095 (3 years; instances should be refreshed for patching " + "per NIST CM-3 — anything older is a security smell)." + ), + ) + ec2_allowed_interface_types: Optional[list[str]] = None + ec2_allowed_instance_owners: Optional[list[str]] = None + ec2_high_risk_ports: Annotated[ + Optional[list[int]], AfterValidator(_validate_port_range) + ] = Field( + default=None, + description="TCP/UDP ports considered high-risk when reachable from the Internet (1..65535; port 0 is reserved).", + ) + + # --- ECS --------------------------------------------------------------- + fargate_linux_latest_version: Annotated[ + Optional[str], AfterValidator(_validate_semver) + ] = Field(default=None, description="Fargate Linux platform version (X.Y.Z).") + fargate_windows_latest_version: Annotated[ + Optional[str], AfterValidator(_validate_semver) + ] = Field(default=None, description="Fargate Windows platform version (X.Y.Z).") + + # --- Cross-account trust ---------------------------------------------- + trusted_account_ids: Annotated[ + Optional[list[str]], AfterValidator(_validate_account_ids) + ] = Field( + default=None, + description="Additional 12-digit AWS account IDs trusted by cross-account checks.", + ) + trusted_ips: Annotated[ + Optional[list[str]], AfterValidator(_validate_trusted_ips) + ] = Field( + default=None, + description="IPv4/IPv6 addresses or CIDR ranges that are NOT considered public.", + ) + + # --- CloudWatch / CloudFormation -------------------------------------- + log_group_retention_days: Optional[_VALID_CW_RETENTION_LITERAL] = Field( + default=None, + description=( + "Required CloudWatch Logs retention in days. Must match one of the " + f"values accepted by the AWS API: {list(_CLOUDWATCH_RETENTION_DAYS)}." + ), + ) + recommended_cdk_bootstrap_version: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=1, + le=100, + description="Min CDK bootstrap version expected on the account.", + ) + + # --- AppStream -------------------------------------------------------- + max_idle_disconnect_timeout_in_seconds: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=60, + le=1800, + description=( + "AppStream idle disconnect timeout (seconds). Range: 60..1800 " + "(NIST AC-12: sensitive sessions ≤15 min — cap at 30 min)." + ), + ) + max_disconnect_timeout_in_seconds: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=60, + le=3600, + description="AppStream disconnect timeout (seconds). Range: 60..3600.", + ) + max_session_duration_seconds: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=600, + le=86400, + description=( + "AppStream max session duration (seconds). Range: 600..86400 " + "(10 min .. 24 h — AWS AppStream hard limit per session)." + ), + ) + + # --- Lambda ----------------------------------------------------------- + obsolete_lambda_runtimes: Optional[list[str]] = None + lambda_min_azs: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=1, + le=6, + description="Min number of AZs a VPC-bound Lambda must span. Range: 1..6.", + ) + + # --- Organizations ---------------------------------------------------- + organizations_enabled_regions: Optional[list[str]] = None + organizations_trusted_delegated_administrators: Annotated[ + Optional[list[str]], AfterValidator(_validate_account_ids) + ] = None + organizations_trusted_ids: Optional[list[str]] = None + + # --- ECR -------------------------------------------------------------- + ecr_repository_vulnerability_minimum_severity: Optional[ + Literal["CRITICAL", "HIGH", "MEDIUM", "LOW", "INFORMATIONAL"] + ] = Field( + default=None, + description="Highest severity tolerated for ECR images.", + ) + + # --- Trusted Advisor -------------------------------------------------- + verify_premium_support_plans: Optional[bool] = None + + # --- CloudTrail threat detection: privilege escalation ---------------- + threat_detection_privilege_escalation_threshold: Optional[float] = Field( + default=None, + ge=0.0, + le=1.0, + description="Fraction of suspicious actions that triggers the priv-esc detection.", + ) + threat_detection_privilege_escalation_minutes: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=5, + le=43200, + description=( + "Lookback window (minutes) for priv-esc detection. Range: 5..43200 " + "(under 5 min the signal is dominated by false positives)." + ), + ) + threat_detection_privilege_escalation_actions: Optional[list[str]] = None + + # --- CloudTrail threat detection: enumeration ------------------------- + threat_detection_enumeration_threshold: Optional[float] = Field( + default=None, + ge=0.0, + le=1.0, + description="Fraction of suspicious actions that triggers the enumeration detection.", + ) + threat_detection_enumeration_minutes: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=5, + le=43200, + description="Lookback window (minutes) for enumeration detection. Range: 5..43200.", + ) + threat_detection_enumeration_actions: Optional[list[str]] = None + + # --- CloudTrail threat detection: LLM jacking ------------------------- + threat_detection_llm_jacking_threshold: Optional[float] = Field( + default=None, + ge=0.0, + le=1.0, + description="Fraction of suspicious actions that triggers the LLM-jacking detection.", + ) + threat_detection_llm_jacking_minutes: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=5, + le=43200, + description="Lookback window (minutes) for LLM-jacking detection. Range: 5..43200.", + ) + threat_detection_llm_jacking_actions: Optional[list[str]] = None + + # --- RDS -------------------------------------------------------------- + check_rds_instance_replicas: Optional[bool] = None + + # --- ACM -------------------------------------------------------------- + days_to_expire_threshold: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=7, + le=365, + description=( + "Days before certificate expiration to flag. Range: 7..365 " + "(PCI-DSS 4.2.1.1: alert ≥30 days before expiry; <7 days is too " + "tight to actually act on)." + ), + ) + insecure_key_algorithms: Optional[list[str]] = None + + # --- EKS -------------------------------------------------------------- + eks_required_log_types: Optional[ + list[ + Literal[ + "api", + "audit", + "authenticator", + "controllerManager", + "scheduler", + ] + ] + ] = Field( + default=None, + description="EKS control plane log types that must be enabled.", + ) + eks_cluster_oldest_version_supported: Annotated[ + Optional[str], AfterValidator(_validate_eks_minor) + ] = Field( + default=None, + description='Minimum supported EKS minor version, expected as "X.Y".', + ) + + # --- CodeBuild -------------------------------------------------------- + excluded_sensitive_environment_variables: Optional[list[str]] = None + codebuild_github_allowed_organizations: Optional[list[str]] = None + + # --- ELB / ELBv2 ------------------------------------------------------ + elb_min_azs: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=1, + le=6, + description="Min AZs a Classic ELB must span. Range: 1..6.", + ) + elbv2_min_azs: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=1, + le=6, + description="Min AZs an Application/Network LB must span. Range: 1..6.", + ) + + # --- ElastiCache ----------------------------------------------------- + minimum_snapshot_retention_period: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=1, + le=35, + description="Days an ElastiCache backup must be retained. Range: 1..35 (service hard limit).", + ) + + # --- Secrets --------------------------------------------------------- + secrets_ignore_patterns: Optional[list[str]] = None + secrets_validate: Optional[bool] = Field( + default=None, + description=( + "Validate discovered secrets against the provider APIs (live check). " + "Makes outbound network calls that authenticate with the discovered " + "secret. Disabled by default." + ), + ) + max_days_secret_unused: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=7, + le=365, + description="Days a Secrets Manager secret can stay unused. Range: 7..365.", + ) + max_days_secret_unrotated: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=1, + le=180, + description=( + "Days a Secrets Manager secret can go without rotation. Range: 1..180 " + "(NIST IA-5: rotate quarterly; CIS recommends ≤90)." + ), + ) + + # --- Kinesis --------------------------------------------------------- + min_kinesis_stream_retention_hours: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=24, + le=8760, + description="Hours of Kinesis stream retention. Range: 24..8760 (1 day .. 1 year).", + ) diff --git a/prowler/config/schema/azure.py b/prowler/config/schema/azure.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..75954c602b --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/config/schema/azure.py @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +"""Azure provider config schema with safety bounds. + +Bounds aim for values that produce a meaningful security check; out-of-range +values are dropped (SDK runtime) or rejected (Prowler App backend). +""" + +from typing import Annotated, Literal, Optional + +from pydantic import AfterValidator, Field + +from prowler.config.schema.base import ProviderConfigBase +from prowler.config.schema.validators import make_dotted_version_validator + +# Accept "8.2", "3.12", "17" style version strings. Used by App Service +# language version fields where the upstream APIs accept either MAJOR or +# MAJOR.MINOR notation. +_validate_dotted_version = make_dotted_version_validator(1, 2) + + +class AzureProviderConfig(ProviderConfigBase): + # --- Network --------------------------------------------------------- + shodan_api_key: Optional[str] = Field( + default=None, + max_length=512, + description="API key for Shodan lookups on Azure public IPs.", + ) + + # --- Defender -------------------------------------------------------- + defender_attack_path_minimal_risk_level: Optional[ + Literal["Low", "Medium", "High", "Critical"] + ] = Field( + default=None, + description="Minimum attack-path risk level worth a notification.", + ) + + # --- App Service ---------------------------------------------------- + php_latest_version: Annotated[ + Optional[str], AfterValidator(_validate_dotted_version) + ] = Field(default=None, description='PHP minimum acceptable version, e.g. "8.2".') + python_latest_version: Annotated[ + Optional[str], AfterValidator(_validate_dotted_version) + ] = Field( + default=None, description='Python minimum acceptable version, e.g. "3.12".' + ) + java_latest_version: Annotated[ + Optional[str], AfterValidator(_validate_dotted_version) + ] = Field(default=None, description='Java minimum acceptable version, e.g. "17".') + + # --- SQL ------------------------------------------------------------ + recommended_minimal_tls_versions: Optional[list[Literal["1.2", "1.3"]]] = Field( + default=None, + description="TLS versions accepted on Azure SQL Server.", + ) + + # --- Virtual Machines ----------------------------------------------- + desired_vm_sku_sizes: Optional[list[str]] = None + vm_backup_min_daily_retention_days: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=7, + le=9999, + description=( + "Min daily backup retention days. Range: 7..9999 " + "(Azure Backup hard limit; <7 days defeats DR/ransomware recovery)." + ), + ) + + # --- API Management threat detection (LLM jacking) ----------------- + apim_threat_detection_llm_jacking_threshold: Optional[float] = Field( + default=None, + ge=0.0, + le=1.0, + description="Fraction of suspicious actions that triggers the detection.", + ) + apim_threat_detection_llm_jacking_minutes: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=5, + le=43200, + description=( + "Lookback window (minutes) for LLM-jacking detection. Range: 5..43200 " + "(under 5 min the signal is dominated by false positives)." + ), + ) + apim_threat_detection_llm_jacking_actions: Optional[list[str]] = None diff --git a/prowler/config/schema/base.py b/prowler/config/schema/base.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cc473a4545 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/config/schema/base.py @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict + + +class ProviderConfigBase(BaseModel): + """Base for every provider config schema. + + ``extra="allow"`` is REQUIRED for backwards compatibility: third-party + check plugins frequently introduce config keys we do not know about, + and pre-existing user configs may carry deprecated keys. Validation + must never reject these. + """ + + model_config = ConfigDict( + extra="allow", + str_strip_whitespace=True, + validate_assignment=False, + ) diff --git a/prowler/config/schema/cloudflare.py b/prowler/config/schema/cloudflare.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..417092d6df --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/config/schema/cloudflare.py @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +"""Cloudflare provider config schema with safety bounds.""" + +from typing import Optional + +from pydantic import Field + +from prowler.config.schema.base import ProviderConfigBase + + +class CloudflareProviderConfig(ProviderConfigBase): + """Cloudflare provider configuration schema. + + Defines optional configuration parameters for Cloudflare security checks, + including API retry behavior. + """ + + max_retries: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=0, + le=10, + description=( + "Max retries for Cloudflare API requests. Range: 0..10 (0 disables retries)." + ), + ) diff --git a/prowler/config/schema/gcp.py b/prowler/config/schema/gcp.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..59e1a162fa --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/config/schema/gcp.py @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +"""GCP provider config schema with safety bounds.""" + +from typing import Optional + +from pydantic import Field + +from prowler.config.schema.base import ProviderConfigBase + + +class GCPProviderConfig(ProviderConfigBase): + shodan_api_key: Optional[str] = Field( + default=None, + max_length=512, + description="API key for Shodan lookups on GCP public IPs.", + ) + mig_min_zones: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=1, + le=5, + description="Min zones a Managed Instance Group must span. Range: 1..5.", + ) + max_snapshot_age_days: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=1, + le=1095, + description=( + "Days a disk snapshot can age before being flagged. Range: 1..1095 " + "(3 years; older snapshots typically miss data-class compliance)." + ), + ) + max_unused_account_days: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=30, + le=365, + description=( + "Days a service account or user-managed key can stay unused. " + "Range: 30..365." + ), + ) + storage_min_retention_days: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=1, + le=3650, + description="Min retention period on Cloud Storage buckets. Range: 1..3650.", + ) diff --git a/prowler/config/schema/github.py b/prowler/config/schema/github.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..30b5a13b85 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/config/schema/github.py @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +"""GitHub provider config schema with safety bounds.""" + +from typing import Optional + +from pydantic import Field + +from prowler.config.schema.base import ProviderConfigBase + + +class GitHubProviderConfig(ProviderConfigBase): + inactive_not_archived_days_threshold: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=30, + le=3650, + description=( + "Days a repository can stay inactive without being archived before " + "being flagged. Range: 30..3650 (CIS GitHub recommends 180; " + "<30 days produces false positives on seasonal projects)." + ), + ) diff --git a/prowler/config/schema/kubernetes.py b/prowler/config/schema/kubernetes.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3235971500 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/config/schema/kubernetes.py @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +"""Kubernetes provider config schema with safety bounds.""" + +from typing import Optional + +from pydantic import Field + +from prowler.config.schema.base import ProviderConfigBase + + +class KubernetesProviderConfig(ProviderConfigBase): + audit_log_maxbackup: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=2, + le=1000, + description=( + "API server audit log file rotations to keep. Range: 2..1000 " + "(CIS Kubernetes 1.2.18 recommends ≥10)." + ), + ) + audit_log_maxsize: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=10, + le=10000, + description=( + "Max MB per audit log file before rotation. Range: 10..10000 MB " + "(CIS Kubernetes 1.2.19 recommends ≥100 MB)." + ), + ) + audit_log_maxage: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=7, + le=3650, + description=( + "Days an audit log file is retained. Range: 7..3650 " + "(CIS Kubernetes 1.2.17 recommends ≥30 days)." + ), + ) + apiserver_strong_ciphers: Optional[list[str]] = Field( + default=None, + description="Whitelist of strong TLS cipher suites required on the API server.", + ) + kubelet_strong_ciphers: Optional[list[str]] = Field( + default=None, + description="Whitelist of strong TLS cipher suites required on kubelet.", + ) diff --git a/prowler/config/schema/m365.py b/prowler/config/schema/m365.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ff1ff98285 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/config/schema/m365.py @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +"""M365 provider config schema with safety bounds.""" + +from typing import Optional + +from pydantic import Field + +from prowler.config.schema.base import ProviderConfigBase + + +class M365ProviderConfig(ProviderConfigBase): + # --- Entra (sign-in policy) ---------------------------------------- + sign_in_frequency: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=1, + le=168, + description=( + "Hours between forced sign-ins for admin users. Range: 1..168 (1 h .. 7 days). " + "Microsoft Conditional Access baseline for admin roles is ≤24 h." + ), + ) + + # --- Teams --------------------------------------------------------- + allowed_cloud_storage_services: Optional[list[str]] = Field( + default=None, + description="External cloud storage services allowed in Teams.", + ) + + # --- Exchange ------------------------------------------------------ + recommended_mailtips_large_audience_threshold: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=5, + le=10000, + description=( + "Recipient count that should trigger a 'large audience' MailTip. " + "Range: 5..10000 (Microsoft default 25)." + ), + ) + + # --- Defender malware policy -------------------------------------- + default_recommended_extensions: Optional[list[str]] = Field( + default=None, + description="File extensions blocked by the malware policy.", + ) + + # --- Mailbox auditing --------------------------------------------- + audit_log_age: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=30, + le=3650, + description=( + "Days mailbox audit logs must be retained. Range: 30..3650 " + "(M365 E3 default is 90 days; SEC/FINRA require ≥7 years)." + ), + ) diff --git a/prowler/config/schema/mongodbatlas.py b/prowler/config/schema/mongodbatlas.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..552e0a7bbd --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/config/schema/mongodbatlas.py @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +"""MongoDB Atlas provider config schema with safety bounds.""" + +from typing import Optional + +from pydantic import Field + +from prowler.config.schema.base import ProviderConfigBase + + +class MongoDBAtlasProviderConfig(ProviderConfigBase): + """MongoDB Atlas provider configuration schema. + + Defines optional configuration parameters for MongoDB Atlas security checks, + including service account secret validity constraints. + """ + + max_service_account_secret_validity_hours: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=1, + le=720, + description=( + "Max hours a service account secret can stay valid. " + "Range: 1..720 (1 h .. 30 days)." + ), + ) diff --git a/prowler/config/schema/okta.py b/prowler/config/schema/okta.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d70794756c --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/config/schema/okta.py @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +"""Okta provider config schema with safety bounds.""" + +from typing import Optional + +from pydantic import Field + +from prowler.config.schema.base import ProviderConfigBase + + +class OktaProviderConfig(ProviderConfigBase): + """Okta provider configuration schema. + + Bounds the session, idle-timeout and inactivity thresholds consumed by + the Okta checks. Every field is optional: when omitted (or dropped for + being out of range) the check falls back to its own DISA STIG-derived + default via ``audit_config.get(key, default)``. + """ + + okta_max_session_idle_minutes: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=1, + le=1440, + description=( + "Maximum acceptable Global Session idle timeout, in minutes. " + "Range: 1..1440 (DISA STIG V-273186 recommends 15; raising it " + "weakens the idle-timeout control)." + ), + ) + okta_max_session_lifetime_minutes: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=1, + le=43200, + description=( + "Maximum acceptable Global Session lifetime, in minutes. " + "Range: 1..43200 i.e. up to 30 days (DISA STIG recommends 18h = " + "1080; raising it weakens the session-lifetime control)." + ), + ) + okta_admin_console_idle_timeout_max_minutes: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=1, + le=1440, + description=( + "Maximum acceptable Okta Admin Console app idle timeout, in " + "minutes. Range: 1..1440 (DISA STIG V-273187 recommends 15)." + ), + ) + okta_user_inactivity_max_days: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=1, + le=3650, + description=( + "Maximum number of days a user can stay inactive before the " + "inactivity-automation check flags the org. Range: 1..3650 " + "(defaults to 35)." + ), + ) + okta_dod_approved_ca_issuer_patterns: Optional[list[str]] = Field( + default=None, + description=( + "Additional regex patterns matched against a Smart Card IdP " + "certificate issuer DN to recognise a DOD-approved CA. Extends " + "the built-in `OU=DoD` / `OU=ECA` patterns." + ), + ) diff --git a/prowler/config/schema/openstack.py b/prowler/config/schema/openstack.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..02b94136ef --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/config/schema/openstack.py @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +"""OpenStack provider config schema with safety bounds.""" + +from typing import Optional + +from pydantic import Field + +from prowler.config.schema.base import ProviderConfigBase + + +class OpenStackProviderConfig(ProviderConfigBase): + """OpenStack provider configuration schema. + + Bounds the image-sharing threshold and reuses the ``secrets_ignore_patterns`` + config consumed by the metadata sensitive-data checks. Every field is + optional: when omitted (or dropped for being out of range) the check falls + back to its own default via ``audit_config.get(key, default)``. + """ + + image_sharing_threshold: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=1, + le=1000, + description=( + "Maximum number of accepted project members a shared image may " + "have before being flagged. Range: 1..1000 (defaults to 5)." + ), + ) + secrets_ignore_patterns: Optional[list[str]] = Field( + default=None, + description=( + "Regex patterns whose matches are excluded from secret " + "scanning of resource metadata." + ), + ) diff --git a/prowler/config/schema/registry.py b/prowler/config/schema/registry.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d34a9b866a --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/config/schema/registry.py @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +"""Mapping of provider name to its Pydantic schema class. + +Kept in its own module so the validator stays free of provider-schema imports +and callers pay the import cost only when they actually need the registry. +""" + +from prowler.config.schema.alibabacloud import AlibabaCloudProviderConfig +from prowler.config.schema.aws import AWSProviderConfig +from prowler.config.schema.azure import AzureProviderConfig +from prowler.config.schema.base import ProviderConfigBase +from prowler.config.schema.cloudflare import CloudflareProviderConfig +from prowler.config.schema.gcp import GCPProviderConfig +from prowler.config.schema.github import GitHubProviderConfig +from prowler.config.schema.kubernetes import KubernetesProviderConfig +from prowler.config.schema.m365 import M365ProviderConfig +from prowler.config.schema.mongodbatlas import MongoDBAtlasProviderConfig +from prowler.config.schema.okta import OktaProviderConfig +from prowler.config.schema.openstack import OpenStackProviderConfig +from prowler.config.schema.vercel import VercelProviderConfig + +SCHEMAS: dict[str, type[ProviderConfigBase]] = { + "aws": AWSProviderConfig, + "azure": AzureProviderConfig, + "gcp": GCPProviderConfig, + "kubernetes": KubernetesProviderConfig, + "m365": M365ProviderConfig, + "github": GitHubProviderConfig, + "mongodbatlas": MongoDBAtlasProviderConfig, + "cloudflare": CloudflareProviderConfig, + "vercel": VercelProviderConfig, + "okta": OktaProviderConfig, + "alibabacloud": AlibabaCloudProviderConfig, + "openstack": OpenStackProviderConfig, +} diff --git a/prowler/config/schema/validator.py b/prowler/config/schema/validator.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8113302855 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/config/schema/validator.py @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +from typing import Any + +from pydantic import ValidationError + +from prowler.config.schema.base import ProviderConfigBase +from prowler.lib.logger import logger + + +def validate_provider_config( + provider: str, + raw: Any, + schema_cls: type[ProviderConfigBase] | None, +) -> dict: + """Validate a provider's config dict against its Pydantic schema. + + Behavior is intentionally lenient to preserve backwards compatibility: + + - If ``raw`` is not a dict, return an empty dict (mirrors prior loader). + - If no schema is registered for ``provider``, return ``raw`` untouched. + - On validation errors, log one WARNING per offending field, DROP those + keys from the result, and continue. Consumers fall back to their own + hard-coded defaults via ``audit_config.get(key, default)``. + - Coerced values (e.g. ``"180"`` -> ``180``) replace the user's input + so that downstream checks never receive a wrongly-typed value. + """ + if not isinstance(raw, dict): + return {} + + if schema_cls is None: + return raw + + try: + model = schema_cls.model_validate(raw) + return model.model_dump(exclude_unset=True) + except ValidationError as exc: + bad_keys: set[str] = set() + for err in exc.errors(): + loc = err.get("loc") or () + if not loc: + continue + key = loc[0] + if not isinstance(key, str): + continue + bad_keys.add(key) + logger.warning( + f"prowler.config[{provider}.{key}] = {raw.get(key)!r} is invalid " + f"({err.get('msg', 'validation error')}); the value will be ignored " + f"and the built-in default will be used." + ) + + cleaned = {k: v for k, v in raw.items() if k not in bad_keys} + # Retry validation with the cleaned dict. Dropping invalid keys handles + # common field-level mismatches, but revalidation can still fail due to + # higher-level structural constraints (e.g. nested validation errors not + # captured in the top-level bad_keys). In that case, log and return the + # cleaned dict so consumers fall back to their own defaults. + try: + model = schema_cls.model_validate(cleaned) + return model.model_dump(exclude_unset=True) + except ValidationError as exc2: + logger.error( + f"prowler.config[{provider}] could not be revalidated after dropping " + f"invalid keys ({bad_keys}); passing through the cleaned dict as-is. " + f"Underlying errors: {exc2.errors()}" + ) + return cleaned diff --git a/prowler/config/schema/validators.py b/prowler/config/schema/validators.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3c87f532c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/config/schema/validators.py @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +"""Reusable field validators shared across provider config schemas. + +These are factored out so multiple providers can reuse the same validation +logic (version strings, port ranges, IP/CIDR entries) instead of duplicating +it per schema. Each validator accepts ``None`` so optional fields stay valid +when the key is absent. +""" + +from ipaddress import ip_network +from typing import Callable, Optional + +_VERSION_PART_LABELS = ("X", "Y", "Z", "W") + + +def make_dotted_version_validator( + min_parts: int, max_parts: int +) -> Callable[[Optional[str]], Optional[str]]: + """Build a validator for dotted numeric version strings. + + The returned validator accepts ``None`` and strings made of between + ``min_parts`` and ``max_parts`` dot-separated numeric components. Anything + else raises ``ValueError``. + + Examples: + ``make_dotted_version_validator(3, 3)`` accepts ``"1.4.0"`` (semver). + ``make_dotted_version_validator(2, 2)`` accepts ``"1.28"`` (EKS minor). + ``make_dotted_version_validator(1, 2)`` accepts ``"17"`` or ``"8.2"``. + """ + if min_parts == max_parts: + expected = ".".join(_VERSION_PART_LABELS[:min_parts]) + else: + expected = " or ".join( + f"'{'.'.join(_VERSION_PART_LABELS[:n])}'" + for n in range(min_parts, max_parts + 1) + ) + + def _validate(v: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]: + if v is None: + return v + parts = v.split(".") + if not (min_parts <= len(parts) <= max_parts) or not all( + p.isdigit() for p in parts + ): + raise ValueError(f"{v!r} is not a valid version (expected {expected})") + return v + + return _validate + + +def validate_port_range(v: Optional[list[int]]) -> Optional[list[int]]: + """Reject ports outside the valid ``1..65535`` range.""" + if v is None: + return v + for port in v: + if not 1 <= port <= 65535: + raise ValueError(f"port {port} is outside the valid range 1..65535") + return v + + +def validate_ip_networks(v: Optional[list[str]]) -> Optional[list[str]]: + """Reject entries that are not a valid IP address or CIDR network.""" + if v is None: + return v + for entry in v: + try: + ip_network(entry, strict=False) + except ValueError as exc: + raise ValueError( + f"entry {entry!r} is not a valid IP or CIDR ({exc})" + ) from exc + return v diff --git a/prowler/config/schema/vercel.py b/prowler/config/schema/vercel.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2e466e2049 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/config/schema/vercel.py @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +"""Vercel provider config schema with safety bounds.""" + +from typing import Optional + +from pydantic import Field + +from prowler.config.schema.base import ProviderConfigBase + + +class VercelProviderConfig(ProviderConfigBase): + """Vercel provider configuration schema. + + Defines optional configuration parameters for Vercel security checks, + including deployment branch policies, credential staleness thresholds, + RBAC ownership limits, and secret detection patterns. + """ + + stable_branches: Optional[list[str]] = Field( + default=None, + description="Branches considered stable for production deployments.", + ) + days_to_expire_threshold: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=7, + le=365, + description=( + "Days before token/certificate expiration to flag. Range: 7..365 " + "(PCI-DSS 4.2.1.1: alert ≥30 days before expiry)." + ), + ) + stale_token_threshold_days: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=30, + le=3650, + description=( + "Days of inactivity before a token is considered stale. Range: 30..3650 " + "(NIST AC-2(3) typical window 30..90 days)." + ), + ) + stale_invitation_threshold_days: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=7, + le=365, + description=( + "Days a pending invitation can stay open. Range: 7..365 " + "(OWASP ASVS 2.7.1 recommends short-lived invitations)." + ), + ) + max_owner_percentage: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=1, + le=50, + description=( + "Max percentage of team members that can have the OWNER role. " + "Range: 1..50 (PoLP — having >50% of a team as OWNER defeats RBAC; " + "industry guidance recommends ≤25%)." + ), + ) + max_owners: Optional[int] = Field( + default=None, + ge=1, + le=1000, + description="Absolute max owners (overrides percentage for large teams). Range: 1..1000.", + ) + secret_suffixes: Optional[list[str]] = Field( + default=None, + description="Suffixes that mark a project env var as secret-like.", + ) diff --git a/prowler/lib/banner.py b/prowler/lib/banner.py index bb693fb961..8115983bc6 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/banner.py +++ b/prowler/lib/banner.py @@ -28,15 +28,13 @@ def print_banner(legend: bool = False, provider: str = None): print_prowler_cloud_banner(provider) if legend: - print( - f""" + print(f""" {Style.BRIGHT}Color code for results:{Style.RESET_ALL} - {Fore.YELLOW}MANUAL (Manual check){Style.RESET_ALL} - {Fore.GREEN}PASS (Recommended value){Style.RESET_ALL} - {orange_color}MUTED (Muted by muted list){Style.RESET_ALL} - {Fore.RED}FAIL (Fix required){Style.RESET_ALL} - """ - ) + """) def print_prowler_cloud_banner(provider: str = None): @@ -56,18 +54,17 @@ def print_prowler_cloud_banner(provider: str = None): """ check = f"{Fore.GREEN}✓{Style.RESET_ALL}" bar = f"{banner_color}│{Style.RESET_ALL}" - print( - f""" -{bar} {Style.BRIGHT}You're getting a snapshot. Prowler Cloud gives you the full picture.{Style.RESET_ALL} + print(f""" +{bar} {Style.BRIGHT}You're getting a snapshot 📸. Prowler Cloud gives you the full picture:{Style.RESET_ALL} {bar} -{bar} {check} {Style.BRIGHT}Attack Path Visualization{Style.RESET_ALL} - see how attackers chain risks to reach your crown jewels -{bar} {check} {Style.BRIGHT}Lighthouse AI + MCP{Style.RESET_ALL} - autonomous triage, prioritization and remediation -{bar} {check} {Style.BRIGHT}Organizations{Style.RESET_ALL} - all your AWS accounts under one organization -{bar} {check} {Style.BRIGHT}Continuous scanning{Style.RESET_ALL} - scheduled scans with history, trends and alerts -{bar} {check} {Style.BRIGHT}Integrations{Style.RESET_ALL} - Jira, Slack, AWS Security Hub, Amazon S3, SSO and RBAC -{bar} {check} {Style.BRIGHT}Reports{Style.RESET_ALL} - download ready-to-share PDF reports -{bar} {check} {Style.BRIGHT}Live compliance{Style.RESET_ALL} - dashboards for 50+ frameworks, always up to date +{bar} {check} {Style.BRIGHT}Continuous Security Monitoring{Style.RESET_ALL} - scheduled scans with history, trends and alerts. +{bar} {check} {Style.BRIGHT}Lighthouse AI + MCP{Style.RESET_ALL} - autonomous triage, custom dashboards, prioritization with prevention and remediation. +{bar} {check} {Style.BRIGHT}Alerts{Style.RESET_ALL} - get notified when anything you want is happening. +{bar} {check} {Style.BRIGHT}Live Compliance{Style.RESET_ALL} - dashboards for 50+ frameworks, always up to date. +{bar} {check} {Style.BRIGHT}Remediation{Style.RESET_ALL} - complete guided remediation including Autonomous remediation with Lighthouse AI. +{bar} {check} {Style.BRIGHT}Attack Path Visualization{Style.RESET_ALL} - see how attackers chain risks to reach your crown jewels. +{bar} {check} {Style.BRIGHT}Bulk Provisioning{Style.RESET_ALL} - add your entire AWS Organization in seconds. +{bar} {check} {Style.BRIGHT}Integrations{Style.RESET_ALL} - Anything with our MCP + Jira, Slack, AWS Security Hub, Amazon S3, SSO and RBAC. {bar} -{bar} {Fore.BLUE}Start free at cloud.prowler.com{Style.RESET_ALL} -""" - ) +{bar} {Fore.BLUE}Start free at 👉 cloud.prowler.com{Style.RESET_ALL} +""") diff --git a/prowler/lib/check/check.py b/prowler/lib/check/check.py index 300520f589..c0c6a02e5d 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/check/check.py +++ b/prowler/lib/check/check.py @@ -797,6 +797,10 @@ def execute( is_finding_muted_args["org_domain"] = ( global_provider.identity.org_domain ) + elif global_provider.type == "linode": + is_finding_muted_args["account_id"] = ( + global_provider.identity.account_id + ) elif not is_builtin_provider(global_provider.type): # External/custom provider — delegate identity args is_finding_muted_args = global_provider.get_mutelist_finding_args() diff --git a/prowler/lib/check/compliance_config_eval.py b/prowler/lib/check/compliance_config_eval.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..763e1389c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/lib/check/compliance_config_eval.py @@ -0,0 +1,404 @@ +"""Shared evaluation of a requirement's configuration constraints. + +Some compliance requirements only hold if the configurable checks they map to +ran with a configuration strict enough for the requirement. For example CIS AWS +6.0 requirement 2.11 ("credentials unused for 45 days or more are disabled") +maps `iam_user_accesskey_unused` (config `max_unused_access_keys_days`); if the +user loosens that to 120 days the check can PASS while the requirement is, in +fact, not satisfied. + +A requirement declares its expectations via ``ConfigRequirements`` (a list of +``{Check, ConfigKey, Operator, Value}``). The configuration a scan applied is a +single, scan-global mapping (the provider's ``audit_config``), so the rules are +evaluated against that mapping directly. This module is consumed by the SDK +compliance outputs (CSV + CLI table) and by the Prowler App backend so the rule +lives in one place. +""" + +from typing import Any, Optional + +# Leading sentence of the message prepended to a finding's ``status_extended`` +# when its requirement's config constraints are not satisfied and the status is +# forced to FAIL. It opens every config-not-valid message, so it doubles as a +# stable marker for detecting the case programmatically. +CONFIG_NOT_VALID_PREFIX = "Configuration not valid for this requirement." + + +def _format_value(value: Any) -> str: + """Render a constraint value for a user-facing message (lists comma-joined).""" + if isinstance(value, (list, tuple, set)): + return ", ".join(str(item) for item in value) + return str(value) + + +def _describe_violation( + check: Any, config_key: Any, applied: Any, operator: str, expected: Any +) -> str: + """Return a product-friendly explanation of why a config violates a constraint. + + The message names the check and config key, the value the scan applied, what + the requirement needs, and how to fix it, in plain language rather than the + operator/value pair. + + Args: + check: the check the requirement maps to (e.g. ``iam_user_accesskey_unused``). + config_key: the config option that was too loose (e.g. ``max_unused_access_keys_days``). + applied: the value the scan actually applied. + operator: the constraint operator (``lte``/``gte``/``eq``/``in``/``subset``/``superset``). + expected: the value the requirement expects. + + Returns: + A full, human-readable message ending with an actionable fix. + """ + applied_str = _format_value(applied) + expected_str = _format_value(expected) + needs, fix = { + "lte": ( + f"a value of {expected_str} or lower", + f"Update it to {expected_str} or lower.", + ), + "gte": ( + f"a value of {expected_str} or higher", + f"Update it to {expected_str} or higher.", + ), + "eq": ( + f"it set to {expected_str}", + f"Update it to {expected_str}.", + ), + "in": ( + f"it set to one of {expected_str}", + f"Update it to one of {expected_str}.", + ), + "subset": ( + f"it limited to {expected_str}", + f"Remove any value that is not in {expected_str}.", + ), + "superset": ( + f"it to include {expected_str}", + f"Make sure it includes {expected_str}.", + ), + }.get(operator, (f"a different value (expected {operator} {expected_str})", "")) + message = ( + f"{CONFIG_NOT_VALID_PREFIX} The check {check} has {config_key} set to " + f"{applied_str}, but the requirement needs {needs}." + ) + return f"{message} {fix}".strip() + + +def _check_operator(applied: Any, operator: str, expected: Any) -> bool: + """Return whether ``applied`` satisfies ``operator`` against ``expected``.""" + try: + if operator == "lte": + return applied <= expected + if operator == "gte": + return applied >= expected + if operator == "eq": + return applied == expected + if operator == "in": + return applied in expected + if operator in ("subset", "superset"): + # Set comparisons for list-valued configs (allowlists / denylists). + # Both sides must be collections; anything else is not satisfiable. + if not isinstance(applied, (list, tuple, set)) or not isinstance( + expected, (list, tuple, set) + ): + return False + applied_set, expected_set = set(applied), set(expected) + if operator == "subset": + return applied_set <= expected_set + return applied_set >= expected_set + except TypeError: + # Mismatched/unhashable types → treat as not satisfied. + return False + # Unknown operator: do not block the requirement on a malformed constraint. + return True + + +def evaluate_config_constraints( + config_requirements: Optional[list[Any]], + audit_config: Optional[dict[str, Any]], + provider_type: Optional[str] = None, +) -> tuple[bool, str]: + """Evaluate a requirement's config constraints against the scan's config. + + Args: + config_requirements: list of constraints, each a mapping (or object with + the same attributes) holding ``Check``, ``ConfigKey``, ``Operator``, + ``Value`` and an optional ``Provider``. ``None``/empty means the + requirement has no config expectations. + audit_config: the scan-global configuration mapping (the provider's + ``audit_config``, i.e. ``{config_key: value}``). The applied config + is identical across every resource and region of a scan. + provider_type: the provider being scanned (e.g. ``aws``). A constraint + tagged with a ``Provider`` is only evaluated when it matches this + value; this scopes universal (multi-provider) framework constraints + to the right provider. ``None`` disables provider scoping (every + constraint is evaluated), which is the correct behaviour for + single-provider frameworks. + + Returns: + ``(is_compliant, reason)``. ``is_compliant`` is ``True`` when there are + no constraints or every explicitly-set value satisfies its constraint. + When a configured value violates a constraint, returns ``(False, reason)`` + describing the first violation. A constraint whose ``ConfigKey`` was not + explicitly set is skipped (the check's default is assumed to match what + the requirement expects). + """ + if not config_requirements: + return True, "" + + audit_config = audit_config or {} + + for constraint in config_requirements: + # Accept both dicts (API template) and objects (Pydantic model). + if isinstance(constraint, dict): + check = constraint.get("Check") + config_key = constraint.get("ConfigKey") + operator = constraint.get("Operator") + expected = constraint.get("Value") + provider = constraint.get("Provider") + else: + check = getattr(constraint, "Check", None) + config_key = getattr(constraint, "ConfigKey", None) + operator = getattr(constraint, "Operator", None) + expected = getattr(constraint, "Value", None) + provider = getattr(constraint, "Provider", None) + + # Constraint scoped to another provider → not applicable to this scan. + # Compared case-insensitively (and trimmed) so a constraint authored as + # e.g. "AWS" still scopes to the "aws" scan instead of being silently + # bypassed by a casing/format mismatch. + if ( + provider + and provider_type + and str(provider).strip().lower() != str(provider_type).strip().lower() + ): + continue + + if config_key not in audit_config: + # Config not explicitly set → default is assumed adequate. + continue + + applied = audit_config[config_key] + if not _check_operator(applied, operator, expected): + reason = _describe_violation(check, config_key, applied, operator, expected) + return False, reason + + return True, "" + + +def get_scan_audit_config() -> dict[str, Any]: + """Return the scan-global applied configuration (the provider's audit_config). + + The applied config is identical across every resource and region of a scan, + so every compliance output evaluates constraints against this single mapping. + Imported lazily to avoid a circular import with the provider package and to + keep this module usable from contexts without a global provider. + + Returns: + The provider's ``audit_config`` mapping, or ``{}`` when no global + provider is set (``AttributeError``) or the provider package cannot be + imported (``ImportError``). + """ + try: + from prowler.providers.common.provider import Provider + + return Provider.get_global_provider().audit_config or {} + except (AttributeError, ImportError): + # No global provider set, or provider package unavailable. + return {} + + +def get_scan_provider_type() -> str: + """Return the provider being scanned (e.g. ``aws``) for constraint scoping. + + Imported lazily to avoid a circular import with the provider package and to + keep this module usable from contexts without a global provider. + + Returns: + The provider's ``type`` (e.g. ``aws``), or ``""`` when no global provider + is set (``AttributeError``) or the provider package cannot be imported + (``ImportError``); an empty string disables provider scoping. + """ + try: + from prowler.providers.common.provider import Provider + + return Provider.get_global_provider().type or "" + except (AttributeError, ImportError): + # No global provider set, or provider package unavailable. + return "" + + +def _requirement_id(requirement: Any) -> Optional[str]: + """Return a requirement's id across the legacy (``Id``) and universal (``id``) models.""" + return getattr(requirement, "Id", None) or getattr(requirement, "id", None) + + +def _requirement_constraints(requirement: Any) -> Optional[list]: + """Return a requirement's config constraints across both model flavours. + + Legacy ``Compliance_Requirement`` exposes ``ConfigRequirements`` (a list of + Pydantic models); ``UniversalComplianceRequirement`` exposes + ``config_requirements`` (a list of dicts). ``evaluate_config_constraints`` + handles both element types. + """ + return getattr(requirement, "ConfigRequirements", None) or getattr( + requirement, "config_requirements", None + ) + + +def build_requirement_config_status( + requirements: list[Any], + audit_config: Optional[dict[str, Any]] = None, + provider_type: Optional[str] = None, +) -> dict[str, tuple[bool, str]]: + """Map every requirement id to its ``(is_compliant, reason)`` config verdict. + + Only requirements that actually declare constraints are included; callers use + ``dict.get(req_id)`` (returning ``None`` → no constraints → no override). + + Args: + requirements: the framework's requirements (legacy or universal models). + audit_config: the applied config; resolved via ``get_scan_audit_config`` + when omitted. + provider_type: the provider being scanned, for constraint scoping; + resolved via ``get_scan_provider_type`` when omitted. + + Returns: + A mapping ``{requirement_id: (is_compliant, reason)}`` containing only the + requirements that declare config constraints. + """ + if audit_config is None: + audit_config = get_scan_audit_config() + if provider_type is None: + provider_type = get_scan_provider_type() + status = {} + for requirement in requirements: + constraints = _requirement_constraints(requirement) + if constraints: + status[_requirement_id(requirement)] = evaluate_config_constraints( + constraints, audit_config, provider_type + ) + return status + + +def resolve_requirement_config_status( + requirement: Any, + audit_config: dict[str, Any], + cache: dict, + provider_type: Optional[str] = None, +) -> tuple[bool, str]: + """Return a requirement's ``(is_compliant, reason)`` verdict, memoised in ``cache``. + + For table generators that iterate findings × compliances and only encounter + each requirement lazily. + + Args: + requirement: the requirement (legacy or universal model). + audit_config: the scan-global applied config. + cache: a dict keyed by requirement id, reused across the whole table + build to memoise verdicts. + provider_type: the provider being scanned, for constraint scoping; + resolved via ``get_scan_provider_type`` when omitted. + + Returns: + The ``(is_compliant, reason)`` verdict; ``(True, "")`` when the + requirement declares no constraints. + """ + req_id = _requirement_id(requirement) + if req_id not in cache: + constraints = _requirement_constraints(requirement) + if constraints: + if provider_type is None: + provider_type = get_scan_provider_type() + cache[req_id] = evaluate_config_constraints( + constraints, audit_config, provider_type + ) + else: + cache[req_id] = (True, "") + return cache[req_id] + + +def apply_config_status( + status: str, + status_extended: str, + config_status: Optional[tuple[bool, str]], +) -> tuple[str, str]: + """Override a finding's ``(status, status_extended)`` when its config is invalid. + + A requirement whose configurable checks ran with a config too loose to trust + is forced to ``FAIL`` regardless of the finding's own status, with the reason + prepended to ``status_extended``. + + Args: + status: the finding's original status (e.g. ``PASS`` / ``FAIL``). + status_extended: the finding's extended status message. + config_status: the ``(is_compliant, reason)`` tuple from + ``build_requirement_config_status``/``resolve_requirement_config_status``, + or ``None`` when the requirement declares no constraints. + + Returns: + The ``(status, status_extended)`` to report: unchanged when the config is + valid (or ``config_status`` is ``None``); otherwise ``FAIL`` with the + reason prepended to ``status_extended``. + """ + if not config_status or config_status[0]: + return status, status_extended + return ( + "FAIL", + f"{config_status[1]} {status_extended}".strip(), + ) + + +def get_effective_status( + status: str, + config_status: Optional[tuple[bool, str]], +) -> str: + """Return the effective status for table aggregation. + + Args: + status: the finding's original status. + config_status: the ``(is_compliant, reason)`` tuple, or ``None`` when the + requirement declares no constraints. + + Returns: + ``FAIL`` when ``config_status`` marks the config invalid; otherwise the + finding's original ``status``. + """ + if not config_status or config_status[0]: + return status + return "FAIL" + + +def accumulate_overview_status( + index: int, + status: str, + pass_indices: set, + fail_indices: set, + muted_indices: set, +) -> None: + """Record a finding in the overview totals once, with FAIL precedence over PASS (sets mutated in place).""" + if status == "Muted": + muted_indices.add(index) + elif status == "FAIL": + fail_indices.add(index) + pass_indices.discard(index) + elif status == "PASS" and index not in fail_indices: + pass_indices.add(index) + + +def accumulate_group_status( + index: int, + status: str, + counts: dict, + seen: dict, +) -> None: + """Count a finding once per group, upgrading a counted PASS to FAIL on conflict (mutates ``counts``/``seen``).""" + previous = seen.get(index) + if previous is None: + seen[index] = status + counts[status] += 1 + elif previous == "PASS" and status == "FAIL": + seen[index] = "FAIL" + counts["PASS"] -= 1 + counts["FAIL"] += 1 diff --git a/prowler/lib/check/compliance_models.py b/prowler/lib/check/compliance_models.py index f883bf60b1..80322a6929 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/check/compliance_models.py +++ b/prowler/lib/check/compliance_models.py @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import json import os import sys from enum import Enum -from typing import Optional, Union +from typing import Any, Literal, Optional, Union from pydantic.v1 import BaseModel, Field, ValidationError, root_validator @@ -170,6 +170,79 @@ class ISO27001_2013_Requirement_Attribute(BaseModel): Check_Summary: str +# Base Compliance Model +class Compliance_Requirement_ConfigConstraint(BaseModel): + """A constraint a requirement places on a configurable check's config. + + Declares that the configurable check ``Check`` must have run with + ``ConfigKey`` satisfying ``Operator`` ``Value`` for the requirement's + result to be trusted. Example: ``max_unused_access_keys_days <= 45``. + + ``Provider`` scopes the constraint to a single provider. It is required for + universal (multi-provider) frameworks, where the same requirement maps + checks across providers and a constraint must only apply when that provider + is the one being scanned. Single-provider frameworks may omit it (the + framework's provider is already the one being scanned). + + Operators: + - ``lte``/``gte``/``eq``: scalar comparisons (e.g. a max-age or min-retention + threshold, or a boolean toggle). + - ``in``: the applied scalar must be one of ``Value`` (a list). + - ``subset``: the applied list must be a subset of ``Value`` — for allowlist + configs (e.g. ``recommended_minimal_tls_versions``); widening the allowlist + with a weaker value (e.g. TLS ``1.0``) breaks the constraint. + - ``superset``: the applied list must be a superset of ``Value`` — for + denylist configs (e.g. ``insecure_key_algorithms``); removing a forbidden + value from the denylist breaks the constraint. + """ + + Check: str + ConfigKey: str + Operator: Literal["lte", "gte", "eq", "in", "subset", "superset"] + # ``bool`` must precede ``int`` so pydantic v1 keeps booleans (e.g. a + # ``mute_non_default_regions == false`` constraint) instead of coercing + # them to 0/1. + Value: Union[bool, int, float, str, list[Any]] + # Provider this constraint applies to (e.g. ``aws``), matched + # case-insensitively. ``None`` applies whenever the requirement runs + # (single-provider frameworks). + Provider: Optional[str] = None + + @root_validator + @classmethod + def validate_value_matches_operator(cls, values): # noqa: F841 + """Ensure ``Value``'s type is consistent with ``Operator``. + + Without this, a mistyped value (e.g. ``gte`` with a list, or ``subset`` + with a scalar) is not rejected at load time and ``_check_operator`` + silently treats it as *not satisfied*, forcing the requirement to a + spurious config-not-valid FAIL. Validating here turns that into a + clear error when the framework is loaded. + """ + operator = values.get("Operator") + value = values.get("Value") + # If Operator/Value failed their own validation they are absent here. + if operator is None or value is None: + return values + if operator in ("in", "subset", "superset"): + if not isinstance(value, list): + raise ValueError( + f"operator '{operator}' requires a list Value, got {type(value).__name__}" + ) + elif operator in ("lte", "gte"): + # bool is an int subclass but is never a valid numeric threshold. + if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, (int, float)): + raise ValueError( + f"operator '{operator}' requires a numeric Value, got {value!r}" + ) + elif operator == "eq": + if not isinstance(value, (bool, int, float, str)): + raise ValueError( + f"operator 'eq' requires a scalar Value, got {type(value).__name__}" + ) + return values + + # MITRE Requirement Attribute for AWS class Mitre_Requirement_Attribute_AWS(BaseModel): """MITRE Requirement Attribute""" @@ -217,6 +290,9 @@ class Mitre_Requirement(BaseModel): list[Mitre_Requirement_Attribute_GCP], ] Checks: list[str] + # MITRE checks may also declare config constraints; without this field + # Pydantic silently drops them during parsing. + ConfigRequirements: Optional[list[Compliance_Requirement_ConfigConstraint]] = None # KISA-ISMS-P Requirement Attribute @@ -303,7 +379,6 @@ class STIG_Requirement_Attribute(BaseModel): FixText: Optional[str] = None -# Base Compliance Model # TODO: move this to compliance folder class Compliance_Requirement(BaseModel): """Compliance_Requirement holds the base model for every requirement within a compliance framework""" @@ -329,6 +404,7 @@ class Compliance_Requirement(BaseModel): ] ] Checks: list[str] + ConfigRequirements: Optional[list[Compliance_Requirement_ConfigConstraint]] = None class Compliance(BaseModel): @@ -701,6 +777,10 @@ class UniversalComplianceRequirement(BaseModel): name: Optional[str] = None attributes: dict = Field(default_factory=dict) checks: dict[str, list[str]] = Field(default_factory=dict) + # Typed with the same constraint model as legacy so the operator/value + # validation also covers universal frameworks. evaluate_config_constraints + # accepts both dicts and model objects, so downstream consumers are unaffected. + config_requirements: Optional[list[Compliance_Requirement_ConfigConstraint]] = None tactics: Optional[list] = None sub_techniques: Optional[list] = None platforms: Optional[list] = None @@ -894,6 +974,11 @@ def adapt_legacy_to_universal(legacy: Compliance) -> ComplianceFramework: # For MITRE, promote special fields and store raw attributes raw_attrs = [attr.dict() for attr in req.Attributes] attrs = {"_raw_attributes": raw_attrs} + config_requirements = ( + [c.dict() for c in req.ConfigRequirements] + if getattr(req, "ConfigRequirements", None) + else None + ) universal_requirements.append( UniversalComplianceRequirement( id=req.Id, @@ -901,6 +986,7 @@ def adapt_legacy_to_universal(legacy: Compliance) -> ComplianceFramework: name=req.Name, attributes=attrs, checks=req_checks, + config_requirements=config_requirements, tactics=req.Tactics, sub_techniques=req.SubTechniques, platforms=req.Platforms, @@ -913,6 +999,11 @@ def adapt_legacy_to_universal(legacy: Compliance) -> ComplianceFramework: attrs = req.Attributes[0].dict() else: attrs = {} + config_requirements = ( + [c.dict() for c in req.ConfigRequirements] + if getattr(req, "ConfigRequirements", None) + else None + ) universal_requirements.append( UniversalComplianceRequirement( id=req.Id, @@ -920,6 +1011,7 @@ def adapt_legacy_to_universal(legacy: Compliance) -> ComplianceFramework: name=req.Name, attributes=attrs, checks=req_checks, + config_requirements=config_requirements, ) ) diff --git a/prowler/lib/check/models.py b/prowler/lib/check/models.py index f9155c68f7..aa16d7969b 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/check/models.py +++ b/prowler/lib/check/models.py @@ -1106,6 +1106,37 @@ class CheckReportCloudflare(Check_Report): return "global" +@dataclass +class CheckReportLinode(Check_Report): + """Contains the Linode Check's finding information.""" + + resource_name: str + resource_id: str + region: str + + def __init__( + self, + metadata: Dict, + resource: Any, + resource_name: str, + resource_id: str, + region: str = "global", + ) -> None: + """Initialize the Linode Check's finding information. + + Args: + metadata: The metadata of the check. + resource: Basic information about the resource. + resource_name: The name of the resource related with the finding. + resource_id: The id of the resource related with the finding. + region: The region of the resource related with the finding. + """ + super().__init__(metadata, resource) + self.resource_name = resource_name + self.resource_id = resource_id + self.region = region + + @dataclass class CheckReportM365(Check_Report): """Contains the M365 Check's finding information.""" diff --git a/prowler/lib/cli/parser.py b/prowler/lib/cli/parser.py index 8f05fc30cb..67a7ea2824 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/cli/parser.py +++ b/prowler/lib/cli/parser.py @@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ from prowler.lib.check.models import Severity from prowler.lib.cli.redact import warn_sensitive_argument_values from prowler.lib.outputs.common import Status from prowler.providers.common.arguments import ( + PROVIDER_ALIASES, + enforce_invoked_provider_loaded, init_providers_parser, validate_asff_usage, validate_provider_arguments, @@ -49,6 +51,7 @@ class ProwlerArgumentParser: "okta", "scaleway", "stackit", + "linode", } all_providers = set(Provider.get_available_providers()) new_providers = sorted(all_providers - known_providers) @@ -71,10 +74,10 @@ class ProwlerArgumentParser: self.parser = argparse.ArgumentParser( prog="prowler", formatter_class=RawTextHelpFormatter, - usage=f"prowler [-h] [--version] {{aws,azure,gcp,kubernetes,m365,github,googleworkspace,okta,nhn,mongodbatlas,oraclecloud,alibabacloud,cloudflare,openstack,scaleway,stackit,vercel,dashboard,iac,image,llm{extra_providers_csv}}} ...", + usage=f"prowler [-h] [--version] {{aws,azure,gcp,kubernetes,m365,github,googleworkspace,okta,nhn,mongodbatlas,oraclecloud,alibabacloud,cloudflare,openstack,scaleway,stackit,vercel,linode,dashboard,iac,image,llm{extra_providers_csv}}} ...", epilog=f""" Available Cloud Providers: - {{aws,azure,gcp,kubernetes,m365,github,googleworkspace,okta,iac,llm,image,nhn,mongodbatlas,oraclecloud,alibabacloud,cloudflare,openstack,scaleway,stackit,vercel{extra_providers_csv}}} + {{aws,azure,gcp,kubernetes,m365,github,googleworkspace,okta,iac,llm,image,nhn,mongodbatlas,oraclecloud,alibabacloud,cloudflare,openstack,scaleway,stackit,vercel,linode{extra_providers_csv}}} aws AWS Provider azure Azure Provider gcp GCP Provider @@ -94,7 +97,8 @@ Available Cloud Providers: nhn NHN Provider (Unofficial) mongodbatlas MongoDB Atlas Provider scaleway Scaleway Provider - vercel Vercel Provider{extra_providers_text} + vercel Vercel Provider + linode Linode Provider{extra_providers_text} Available components: @@ -166,13 +170,13 @@ Detailed documentation at https://docs.prowler.com if sys.argv[1].startswith("-"): sys.argv = self.__set_default_provider__(sys.argv) - # Provider aliases mapping - # Microsoft 365 - elif sys.argv[1] == "microsoft365": - sys.argv[1] = "m365" - # Oracle Cloud Infrastructure - elif sys.argv[1] == "oci": - sys.argv[1] = "oraclecloud" + # Provider aliases mapping (single source: arguments.PROVIDER_ALIASES) + elif sys.argv[1] in PROVIDER_ALIASES: + sys.argv[1] = PROVIDER_ALIASES[sys.argv[1]] + + # Selective fail-loud here (post argv-normalisation, pre parse_args) + # so the invoked-provider check stays correct under parse(args=...). + enforce_invoked_provider_loaded(self) # Warn about sensitive flags passed with explicit values # Snapshot argv before parse_args() which may exit on errors @@ -469,6 +473,18 @@ Detailed documentation at https://docs.prowler.com default=default_fixer_config_file_path, help="Set configuration fixer file path", ) + config_parser.add_argument( + "--scan-secrets-validate", + action="store_true", + default=False, + help=( + "Validate secrets discovered by the secrets checks by checking " + "whether they are live against the provider APIs. WARNING: this " + "makes outbound network calls using the discovered secret itself; " + "the credential is exercised against the provider and the call " + "appears in the audited account's logs. Disabled by default." + ), + ) def __init_custom_checks_metadata_parser__(self): # CustomChecksMetadata diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/asd_essential_eight/asd_essential_eight.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/asd_essential_eight/asd_essential_eight.py index 75481fb6aa..074e684f33 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/asd_essential_eight/asd_essential_eight.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/asd_essential_eight/asd_essential_eight.py @@ -2,6 +2,13 @@ from colorama import Fore, Style from tabulate import tabulate from prowler.config.config import orange_color +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + accumulate_group_status, + accumulate_overview_status, + get_effective_status, + get_scan_audit_config, + resolve_requirement_config_status, +) def get_asd_essential_eight_table( @@ -19,15 +26,26 @@ def get_asd_essential_eight_table( "Status": [], "Muted": [], } - pass_count = [] - fail_count = [] - muted_count = [] + pass_count = set() + fail_count = set() + muted_count = set() + section_seen = {} + provider = "" + audit_config = get_scan_audit_config() + config_status_cache = {} for index, finding in enumerate(findings): check = bulk_checks_metadata[finding.check_metadata.CheckID] check_compliances = check.Compliance for compliance in check_compliances: if compliance.Framework == "ASD-Essential-Eight": + provider = compliance.Provider for requirement in compliance.Requirements: + config_status = resolve_requirement_config_status( + requirement, audit_config, config_status_cache + ) + effective_status = get_effective_status( + finding.status, config_status + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: section = attribute.Section if section not in sections: @@ -36,21 +54,19 @@ def get_asd_essential_eight_table( "PASS": 0, "Muted": 0, } - if finding.muted: - if index not in muted_count: - muted_count.append(index) - sections[section]["Muted"] += 1 - else: - if finding.status == "FAIL" and index not in fail_count: - fail_count.append(index) - sections[section]["FAIL"] += 1 - elif finding.status == "PASS" and index not in pass_count: - pass_count.append(index) - sections[section]["PASS"] += 1 + section_seen[section] = {} + + status = "Muted" if finding.muted else effective_status + accumulate_overview_status( + index, status, pass_count, fail_count, muted_count + ) + accumulate_group_status( + index, status, sections[section], section_seen[section] + ) sections = dict(sorted(sections.items())) for section in sections: - asd_essential_eight_compliance_table["Provider"].append(compliance.Provider) + asd_essential_eight_compliance_table["Provider"].append(provider) asd_essential_eight_compliance_table["Section"].append(section) if sections[section]["FAIL"] > 0: asd_essential_eight_compliance_table["Status"].append( diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/asd_essential_eight/asd_essential_eight_aws.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/asd_essential_eight/asd_essential_eight_aws.py index c264c81505..4bdf9cd851 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/asd_essential_eight/asd_essential_eight_aws.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/asd_essential_eight/asd_essential_eight_aws.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.asd_essential_eight.models import ( ASDEssentialEightAWSModel, @@ -36,10 +40,19 @@ class ASDEssentialEightAWS(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) + for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = ASDEssentialEightAWSModel( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -63,8 +76,8 @@ class ASDEssentialEightAWS(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_AuditProcedure=attribute.AuditProcedure, Requirements_Attributes_AdditionalInformation=attribute.AdditionalInformation, Requirements_Attributes_References=attribute.References, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/aws_well_architected/aws_well_architected.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/aws_well_architected/aws_well_architected.py index 4a157b0324..69a37949f8 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/aws_well_architected/aws_well_architected.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/aws_well_architected/aws_well_architected.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.aws_well_architected.models import ( AWSWellArchitectedModel, @@ -36,10 +40,18 @@ class AWSWellArchitected(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = AWSWellArchitectedModel( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -58,8 +70,8 @@ class AWSWellArchitected(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_AssessmentMethod=attribute.AssessmentMethod, Requirements_Attributes_Description=attribute.Description, Requirements_Attributes_ImplementationGuidanceUrl=attribute.ImplementationGuidanceUrl, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/c5/c5.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/c5/c5.py index 32eb7e0f5a..003b2664cf 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/c5/c5.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/c5/c5.py @@ -2,6 +2,13 @@ from colorama import Fore, Style from tabulate import tabulate from prowler.config.config import orange_color +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + accumulate_group_status, + accumulate_overview_status, + get_effective_status, + get_scan_audit_config, + resolve_requirement_config_status, +) def get_c5_table( @@ -18,37 +25,45 @@ def get_c5_table( "Status": [], "Muted": [], } - pass_count = [] - fail_count = [] - muted_count = [] + pass_count = set() + fail_count = set() + muted_count = set() sections = {} + section_seen = {} + provider = "" + audit_config = get_scan_audit_config() + config_status_cache = {} for index, finding in enumerate(findings): check = bulk_checks_metadata[finding.check_metadata.CheckID] check_compliances = check.Compliance for compliance in check_compliances: if compliance.Framework == "C5": + provider = compliance.Provider for requirement in compliance.Requirements: + config_status = resolve_requirement_config_status( + requirement, audit_config, config_status_cache + ) + effective_status = get_effective_status( + finding.status, config_status + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: section = attribute.Section if section not in sections: sections[section] = {"FAIL": 0, "PASS": 0, "Muted": 0} + section_seen[section] = {} - if finding.muted: - if index not in muted_count: - muted_count.append(index) - sections[section]["Muted"] += 1 - else: - if finding.status == "FAIL" and index not in fail_count: - fail_count.append(index) - sections[section]["FAIL"] += 1 - elif finding.status == "PASS" and index not in pass_count: - pass_count.append(index) - sections[section]["PASS"] += 1 + status = "Muted" if finding.muted else effective_status + accumulate_overview_status( + index, status, pass_count, fail_count, muted_count + ) + accumulate_group_status( + index, status, sections[section], section_seen[section] + ) sections = dict(sorted(sections.items())) for section in sections: - section_table["Provider"].append(compliance.Provider) + section_table["Provider"].append(provider) section_table["Section"].append(section) if sections[section]["FAIL"] > 0: section_table["Status"].append( diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/c5/c5_aws.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/c5/c5_aws.py index 5f13b77d7a..b8a4115482 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/c5/c5_aws.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/c5/c5_aws.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.c5.models import AWSC5Model from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput @@ -34,10 +38,19 @@ class AWSC5(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) + for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = AWSC5Model( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -52,8 +65,8 @@ class AWSC5(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_Type=attribute.Type, Requirements_Attributes_AboutCriteria=attribute.AboutCriteria, Requirements_Attributes_ComplementaryCriteria=attribute.ComplementaryCriteria, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/c5/c5_azure.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/c5/c5_azure.py index 1b3a9e6b90..0899ff6b15 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/c5/c5_azure.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/c5/c5_azure.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.c5.models import AzureC5Model from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput @@ -34,10 +38,19 @@ class AzureC5(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) + for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = AzureC5Model( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -52,8 +65,8 @@ class AzureC5(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_Type=attribute.Type, Requirements_Attributes_AboutCriteria=attribute.AboutCriteria, Requirements_Attributes_ComplementaryCriteria=attribute.ComplementaryCriteria, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/c5/c5_gcp.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/c5/c5_gcp.py index 84e66a141f..c8b874f622 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/c5/c5_gcp.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/c5/c5_gcp.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.c5.models import GCPC5Model from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput @@ -34,10 +38,19 @@ class GCPC5(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) + for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = GCPC5Model( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -52,8 +65,8 @@ class GCPC5(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_Type=attribute.Type, Requirements_Attributes_AboutCriteria=attribute.AboutCriteria, Requirements_Attributes_ComplementaryCriteria=attribute.ComplementaryCriteria, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ccc/ccc.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ccc/ccc.py index 99a6c91cd9..48b2086e78 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ccc/ccc.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ccc/ccc.py @@ -2,6 +2,13 @@ from colorama import Fore, Style from tabulate import tabulate from prowler.config.config import orange_color +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + accumulate_group_status, + accumulate_overview_status, + get_effective_status, + get_scan_audit_config, + resolve_requirement_config_status, +) def get_ccc_table( @@ -18,37 +25,45 @@ def get_ccc_table( "Status": [], "Muted": [], } - pass_count = [] - fail_count = [] - muted_count = [] + pass_count = set() + fail_count = set() + muted_count = set() sections = {} + section_seen = {} + provider = "" + audit_config = get_scan_audit_config() + config_status_cache = {} for index, finding in enumerate(findings): check = bulk_checks_metadata[finding.check_metadata.CheckID] check_compliances = check.Compliance for compliance in check_compliances: if compliance.Framework == "CCC": + provider = compliance.Provider for requirement in compliance.Requirements: + config_status = resolve_requirement_config_status( + requirement, audit_config, config_status_cache + ) + effective_status = get_effective_status( + finding.status, config_status + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: section = attribute.Section if section not in sections: sections[section] = {"FAIL": 0, "PASS": 0, "Muted": 0} + section_seen[section] = {} - if finding.muted: - if index not in muted_count: - muted_count.append(index) - sections[section]["Muted"] += 1 - else: - if finding.status == "FAIL" and index not in fail_count: - fail_count.append(index) - sections[section]["FAIL"] += 1 - elif finding.status == "PASS" and index not in pass_count: - pass_count.append(index) - sections[section]["PASS"] += 1 + status = "Muted" if finding.muted else effective_status + accumulate_overview_status( + index, status, pass_count, fail_count, muted_count + ) + accumulate_group_status( + index, status, sections[section], section_seen[section] + ) sections = dict(sorted(sections.items())) for section in sections: - section_table["Provider"].append(compliance.Provider) + section_table["Provider"].append(provider) section_table["Section"].append(section) if sections[section]["FAIL"] > 0: section_table["Status"].append( diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ccc/ccc_aws.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ccc/ccc_aws.py index 1114425574..20d42b1508 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ccc/ccc_aws.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ccc/ccc_aws.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.ccc.models import CCC_AWSModel from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput @@ -34,10 +38,19 @@ class CCC_AWS(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) + for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = CCC_AWSModel( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -56,8 +69,8 @@ class CCC_AWS(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_Recommendation=attribute.Recommendation, Requirements_Attributes_SectionThreatMappings=attribute.SectionThreatMappings, Requirements_Attributes_SectionGuidelineMappings=attribute.SectionGuidelineMappings, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ccc/ccc_azure.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ccc/ccc_azure.py index e0cdf32330..4dcc8c5ca8 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ccc/ccc_azure.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ccc/ccc_azure.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.ccc.models import CCC_AzureModel from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput @@ -34,10 +38,19 @@ class CCC_Azure(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) + for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = CCC_AzureModel( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -56,8 +69,8 @@ class CCC_Azure(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_Recommendation=attribute.Recommendation, Requirements_Attributes_SectionThreatMappings=attribute.SectionThreatMappings, Requirements_Attributes_SectionGuidelineMappings=attribute.SectionGuidelineMappings, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ccc/ccc_gcp.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ccc/ccc_gcp.py index 326a15e5c3..ed7c709c24 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ccc/ccc_gcp.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ccc/ccc_gcp.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.ccc.models import CCC_GCPModel from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput @@ -34,10 +38,19 @@ class CCC_GCP(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) + for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = CCC_GCPModel( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -56,8 +69,8 @@ class CCC_GCP(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_Recommendation=attribute.Recommendation, Requirements_Attributes_SectionThreatMappings=attribute.SectionThreatMappings, Requirements_Attributes_SectionGuidelineMappings=attribute.SectionGuidelineMappings, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis.py index 7f161f34c2..de3120f689 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis.py @@ -2,6 +2,13 @@ from colorama import Fore, Style from tabulate import tabulate from prowler.config.config import orange_color +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + accumulate_group_status, + accumulate_overview_status, + get_effective_status, + get_scan_audit_config, + resolve_requirement_config_status, +) def get_cis_table( @@ -13,6 +20,9 @@ def get_cis_table( compliance_overview: bool, ): sections = {} + section_muted_seen = {} + section_split_seen = {} + provider = "" cis_compliance_table = { "Provider": [], "Section": [], @@ -20,16 +30,25 @@ def get_cis_table( "Level 2": [], "Muted": [], } - pass_count = [] - fail_count = [] - muted_count = [] + pass_count = set() + fail_count = set() + muted_count = set() + audit_config = get_scan_audit_config() + config_status_cache = {} for index, finding in enumerate(findings): check = bulk_checks_metadata[finding.check_metadata.CheckID] check_compliances = check.Compliance for compliance in check_compliances: version_in_name = compliance_framework.split("_")[1] if compliance.Framework == "CIS" and version_in_name in compliance.Version: + provider = compliance.Provider for requirement in compliance.Requirements: + config_status = resolve_requirement_config_status( + requirement, audit_config, config_status_cache + ) + effective_status = get_effective_status( + finding.status, config_status + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: section = attribute.Section # Check if Section exists @@ -40,32 +59,44 @@ def get_cis_table( "Level 2": {"FAIL": 0, "PASS": 0}, "Muted": 0, } + section_muted_seen[section] = set() + section_split_seen[section] = { + "Level 1": {}, + "Level 2": {}, + } + + status = "Muted" if finding.muted else effective_status + accumulate_overview_status( + index, status, pass_count, fail_count, muted_count + ) if finding.muted: - if index not in muted_count: - muted_count.append(index) + # Per-section Muted: count each finding once per section + # it belongs to (a finding can map to several sections). + if index not in section_muted_seen[section]: + section_muted_seen[section].add(index) sections[section]["Muted"] += 1 - else: - if finding.status == "FAIL" and index not in fail_count: - fail_count.append(index) - elif finding.status == "PASS" and index not in pass_count: - pass_count.append(index) + if "Level 1" in attribute.Profile: if not finding.muted: - if finding.status == "FAIL": - sections[section]["Level 1"]["FAIL"] += 1 - else: - sections[section]["Level 1"]["PASS"] += 1 + accumulate_group_status( + index, + effective_status, + sections[section]["Level 1"], + section_split_seen[section]["Level 1"], + ) elif "Level 2" in attribute.Profile: if not finding.muted: - if finding.status == "FAIL": - sections[section]["Level 2"]["FAIL"] += 1 - else: - sections[section]["Level 2"]["PASS"] += 1 + accumulate_group_status( + index, + effective_status, + sections[section]["Level 2"], + section_split_seen[section]["Level 2"], + ) # Add results to table sections = dict(sorted(sections.items())) for section in sections: - cis_compliance_table["Provider"].append(compliance.Provider) + cis_compliance_table["Provider"].append(provider) cis_compliance_table["Section"].append(section) if sections[section]["Level 1"]["FAIL"] > 0: cis_compliance_table["Level 1"].append( diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_alibabacloud.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_alibabacloud.py index a1880d3af9..77bf02ee98 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_alibabacloud.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_alibabacloud.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.cis.models import AlibabaCloudCISModel from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput @@ -34,10 +38,18 @@ class AlibabaCloudCIS(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = AlibabaCloudCISModel( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -59,8 +71,8 @@ class AlibabaCloudCIS(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_AdditionalInformation=attribute.AdditionalInformation, Requirements_Attributes_DefaultValue=attribute.DefaultValue, Requirements_Attributes_References=attribute.References, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_aws.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_aws.py index ac0250150c..58bf7fbc27 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_aws.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_aws.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.cis.models import AWSCISModel from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput @@ -34,10 +38,19 @@ class AWSCIS(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) + for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = AWSCISModel( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -59,8 +72,8 @@ class AWSCIS(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_AdditionalInformation=attribute.AdditionalInformation, Requirements_Attributes_DefaultValue=attribute.DefaultValue, Requirements_Attributes_References=attribute.References, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_azure.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_azure.py index b1e09ca453..53b1cbdd32 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_azure.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_azure.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.cis.models import AzureCISModel from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput @@ -34,10 +38,18 @@ class AzureCIS(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = AzureCISModel( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -59,8 +71,8 @@ class AzureCIS(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_AdditionalInformation=attribute.AdditionalInformation, Requirements_Attributes_DefaultValue=attribute.DefaultValue, Requirements_Attributes_References=attribute.References, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_gcp.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_gcp.py index b2889333be..c2a11dae77 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_gcp.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_gcp.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.cis.models import GCPCISModel from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput @@ -34,10 +38,18 @@ class GCPCIS(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = GCPCISModel( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -58,8 +70,8 @@ class GCPCIS(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_AuditProcedure=attribute.AuditProcedure, Requirements_Attributes_AdditionalInformation=attribute.AdditionalInformation, Requirements_Attributes_References=attribute.References, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_github.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_github.py index 2ce5b64480..039bd1b993 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_github.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_github.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.cis.models import GithubCISModel from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput @@ -34,10 +38,18 @@ class GithubCIS(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = GithubCISModel( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -58,8 +70,8 @@ class GithubCIS(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_AdditionalInformation=attribute.AdditionalInformation, Requirements_Attributes_References=attribute.References, Requirements_Attributes_DefaultValue=attribute.DefaultValue, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_googleworkspace.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_googleworkspace.py index d74375bf85..cf2d3755c7 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_googleworkspace.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_googleworkspace.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.cis.models import GoogleWorkspaceCISModel from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput @@ -34,10 +38,18 @@ class GoogleWorkspaceCIS(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = GoogleWorkspaceCISModel( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -58,8 +70,8 @@ class GoogleWorkspaceCIS(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_AdditionalInformation=attribute.AdditionalInformation, Requirements_Attributes_DefaultValue=attribute.DefaultValue, Requirements_Attributes_References=attribute.References, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_kubernetes.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_kubernetes.py index 9607123e44..23c482310e 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_kubernetes.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_kubernetes.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.cis.models import KubernetesCISModel from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput @@ -34,10 +38,18 @@ class KubernetesCIS(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = KubernetesCISModel( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -59,8 +71,8 @@ class KubernetesCIS(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_AdditionalInformation=attribute.AdditionalInformation, Requirements_Attributes_References=attribute.References, Requirements_Attributes_DefaultValue=attribute.DefaultValue, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_m365.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_m365.py index 1a00166946..8dc06155e7 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_m365.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_m365.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.cis.models import M365CISModel from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput @@ -34,10 +38,18 @@ class M365CIS(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = M365CISModel( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -59,8 +71,8 @@ class M365CIS(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_AdditionalInformation=attribute.AdditionalInformation, Requirements_Attributes_DefaultValue=attribute.DefaultValue, Requirements_Attributes_References=attribute.References, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_oraclecloud.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_oraclecloud.py index 117c3ca004..d8110d72db 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_oraclecloud.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_oraclecloud.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.cis.models import OracleCloudCISModel from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput @@ -34,10 +38,18 @@ class OracleCloudCIS(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = OracleCloudCISModel( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -59,8 +71,8 @@ class OracleCloudCIS(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_AdditionalInformation=attribute.AdditionalInformation, Requirements_Attributes_DefaultValue=attribute.DefaultValue, Requirements_Attributes_References=attribute.References, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cisa_scuba/cisa_scuba_googleworkspace.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cisa_scuba/cisa_scuba_googleworkspace.py index 9f1336e832..d2f6faa212 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cisa_scuba/cisa_scuba_googleworkspace.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/cisa_scuba/cisa_scuba_googleworkspace.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.cisa_scuba.models import ( GoogleWorkspaceCISASCuBAModel, @@ -36,10 +40,18 @@ class GoogleWorkspaceCISASCuBA(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = GoogleWorkspaceCISASCuBAModel( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -52,8 +64,8 @@ class GoogleWorkspaceCISASCuBA(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_SubSection=attribute.SubSection, Requirements_Attributes_Service=attribute.Service, Requirements_Attributes_Type=attribute.Type, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ens/ens.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ens/ens.py index a414a0206d..4fcca922c7 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ens/ens.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ens/ens.py @@ -2,6 +2,11 @@ from colorama import Fore, Style from tabulate import tabulate from prowler.config.config import orange_color +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + get_effective_status, + get_scan_audit_config, + resolve_requirement_config_status, +) def get_ens_table( @@ -13,6 +18,8 @@ def get_ens_table( compliance_overview: bool, ): marcos = {} + marco_muted_seen = {} + provider = "" ens_compliance_table = { "Proveedor": [], "Marco/Categoria": [], @@ -23,15 +30,24 @@ def get_ens_table( "Opcional": [], "Muted": [], } - pass_count = [] - fail_count = [] - muted_count = [] + pass_count = set() + fail_count = set() + muted_count = set() + audit_config = get_scan_audit_config() + config_status_cache = {} for index, finding in enumerate(findings): check = bulk_checks_metadata[finding.check_metadata.CheckID] check_compliances = check.Compliance for compliance in check_compliances: if compliance.Framework == "ENS": + provider = compliance.Provider for requirement in compliance.Requirements: + config_status = resolve_requirement_config_status( + requirement, audit_config, config_status_cache + ) + effective_status = get_effective_status( + finding.status, config_status + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: marco_categoria = f"{attribute.Marco}/{attribute.Categoria}" # Check if Marco/Categoria exists @@ -44,22 +60,27 @@ def get_ens_table( "Bajo": 0, "Muted": 0, } + marco_muted_seen[marco_categoria] = set() if finding.muted: - if index not in muted_count: - muted_count.append(index) + # Overview total: count each finding once per framework + muted_count.add(index) + # Per-marco Muted: count each finding once per marco + # it belongs to (a finding can map to several marcos). + if index not in marco_muted_seen[marco_categoria]: + marco_muted_seen[marco_categoria].add(index) marcos[marco_categoria]["Muted"] += 1 else: - if finding.status == "FAIL": - if ( - attribute.Tipo != "recomendacion" - and index not in fail_count - ): - fail_count.append(index) + if effective_status == "FAIL": + if attribute.Tipo != "recomendacion": + fail_count.add(index) + pass_count.discard(index) + # Mark every marco the finding belongs to as + # NO CUMPLE, not just the first one seen. marcos[marco_categoria][ "Estado" ] = f"{Fore.RED}NO CUMPLE{Style.RESET_ALL}" - elif finding.status == "PASS" and index not in pass_count: - pass_count.append(index) + elif effective_status == "PASS" and index not in fail_count: + pass_count.add(index) if attribute.Nivel == "opcional": marcos[marco_categoria]["Opcional"] += 1 elif attribute.Nivel == "alto": @@ -71,7 +92,7 @@ def get_ens_table( # Add results to table for marco in sorted(marcos): - ens_compliance_table["Proveedor"].append(compliance.Provider) + ens_compliance_table["Proveedor"].append(provider) ens_compliance_table["Marco/Categoria"].append(marco) ens_compliance_table["Estado"].append(marcos[marco]["Estado"]) ens_compliance_table["Opcional"].append( diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ens/ens_aws.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ens/ens_aws.py index 40d185294b..543799f7b9 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ens/ens_aws.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ens/ens_aws.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.ens.models import AWSENSModel @@ -34,10 +38,19 @@ class AWSENS(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) + for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = AWSENSModel( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -60,8 +73,8 @@ class AWSENS(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_Dependencias=",".join( attribute.Dependencias ), - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ens/ens_azure.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ens/ens_azure.py index 20d727fed0..23055da2a2 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ens/ens_azure.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ens/ens_azure.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.ens.models import AzureENSModel @@ -34,10 +38,19 @@ class AzureENS(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) + for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = AzureENSModel( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -60,8 +73,8 @@ class AzureENS(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_Dependencias=",".join( attribute.Dependencias ), - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ens/ens_gcp.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ens/ens_gcp.py index 8a2baaca66..f616e48f83 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ens/ens_gcp.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/ens/ens_gcp.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.ens.models import GCPENSModel @@ -34,10 +38,19 @@ class GCPENS(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) + for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = GCPENSModel( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -60,8 +73,8 @@ class GCPENS(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_Dependencias=",".join( attribute.Dependencias ), - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/generic/generic.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/generic/generic.py index b774f09577..b3f1ad7ec9 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/generic/generic.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/generic/generic.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.generic.models import GenericComplianceModel @@ -35,11 +39,24 @@ class GenericCompliance(ComplianceOutput): - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) + def compliance_row(requirement, attribute, finding=None): # Read attribute fields defensively: GenericCompliance is the # last-resort renderer for any framework, and provider-specific # schemas (e.g. CIS, ENS, ISO27001) do not declare the universal # Section/SubSection/SubGroup/Service/Type/Comment fields. + status, status_extended = ( + apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) + if finding + else ("MANUAL", "Manual check") + ) return GenericComplianceModel( Provider=(finding.provider if finding else compliance.Provider.lower()), Description=compliance.Description, @@ -56,8 +73,8 @@ class GenericCompliance(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_Service=getattr(attribute, "Service", None), Requirements_Attributes_Type=getattr(attribute, "Type", None), Requirements_Attributes_Comment=getattr(attribute, "Comment", None), - Status=finding.status if finding else "MANUAL", - StatusExtended=(finding.status_extended if finding else "Manual check"), + Status=status, + StatusExtended=status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid if finding else "manual_check", ResourceName=finding.resource_name if finding else "Manual check", CheckId=finding.check_id if finding else "manual", diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/generic/generic_table.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/generic/generic_table.py index 9136cf19e2..060acda10a 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/generic/generic_table.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/generic/generic_table.py @@ -2,6 +2,11 @@ from colorama import Fore, Style from tabulate import tabulate from prowler.config.config import orange_color +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + get_effective_status, + get_scan_audit_config, + resolve_requirement_config_status, +) def get_generic_compliance_table( @@ -15,6 +20,8 @@ def get_generic_compliance_table( pass_count = [] fail_count = [] muted_count = [] + audit_config = get_scan_audit_config() + config_status_cache = {} for index, finding in enumerate(findings): check = bulk_checks_metadata[finding.check_metadata.CheckID] check_compliances = check.Compliance @@ -25,13 +32,21 @@ def get_generic_compliance_table( and compliance.Version in compliance_framework.upper() and compliance.Provider.upper() in compliance_framework.upper() ): - if finding.muted: - if index not in muted_count: - muted_count.append(index) - else: - if finding.status == "FAIL" and index not in fail_count: + for requirement in compliance.Requirements: + # A configurable check that passed with a too-loose config is + # forced to FAIL (source of truth: framework ConfigRequirements). + config_status = resolve_requirement_config_status( + requirement, audit_config, config_status_cache + ) + effective_status = get_effective_status( + finding.status, config_status + ) + if finding.muted: + if index not in muted_count: + muted_count.append(index) + elif effective_status == "FAIL" and index not in fail_count: fail_count.append(index) - elif finding.status == "PASS" and index not in pass_count: + elif effective_status == "PASS" and index not in pass_count: pass_count.append(index) if ( len(fail_count) + len(pass_count) + len(muted_count) > 1 diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/iso27001/iso27001_aws.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/iso27001/iso27001_aws.py index 282f27a218..3376b8c5ad 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/iso27001/iso27001_aws.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/iso27001/iso27001_aws.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.iso27001.models import AWSISO27001Model @@ -34,10 +38,18 @@ class AWSISO27001(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = AWSISO27001Model( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -52,8 +64,8 @@ class AWSISO27001(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_Objetive_ID=attribute.Objetive_ID, Requirements_Attributes_Objetive_Name=attribute.Objetive_Name, Requirements_Attributes_Check_Summary=attribute.Check_Summary, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, CheckId=finding.check_id, Muted=finding.muted, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/iso27001/iso27001_azure.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/iso27001/iso27001_azure.py index 0112bbd7e1..f1f964c726 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/iso27001/iso27001_azure.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/iso27001/iso27001_azure.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.iso27001.models import AzureISO27001Model @@ -34,10 +38,18 @@ class AzureISO27001(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = AzureISO27001Model( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -52,8 +64,8 @@ class AzureISO27001(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_Objetive_ID=attribute.Objetive_ID, Requirements_Attributes_Objetive_Name=attribute.Objetive_Name, Requirements_Attributes_Check_Summary=attribute.Check_Summary, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, CheckId=finding.check_id, Muted=finding.muted, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/iso27001/iso27001_gcp.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/iso27001/iso27001_gcp.py index f60a30e67e..9a5de17bfa 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/iso27001/iso27001_gcp.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/iso27001/iso27001_gcp.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.iso27001.models import GCPISO27001Model @@ -34,10 +38,18 @@ class GCPISO27001(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = GCPISO27001Model( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -52,8 +64,8 @@ class GCPISO27001(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_Objetive_ID=attribute.Objetive_ID, Requirements_Attributes_Objetive_Name=attribute.Objetive_Name, Requirements_Attributes_Check_Summary=attribute.Check_Summary, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, CheckId=finding.check_id, Muted=finding.muted, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/iso27001/iso27001_kubernetes.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/iso27001/iso27001_kubernetes.py index 59fd593ce6..5ca81e82d5 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/iso27001/iso27001_kubernetes.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/iso27001/iso27001_kubernetes.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.iso27001.models import KubernetesISO27001Model @@ -34,10 +38,18 @@ class KubernetesISO27001(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = KubernetesISO27001Model( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -52,8 +64,8 @@ class KubernetesISO27001(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_Objetive_ID=attribute.Objetive_ID, Requirements_Attributes_Objetive_Name=attribute.Objetive_Name, Requirements_Attributes_Check_Summary=attribute.Check_Summary, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, CheckId=finding.check_id, Muted=finding.muted, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/iso27001/iso27001_m365.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/iso27001/iso27001_m365.py index cf6712a4a6..84c5072002 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/iso27001/iso27001_m365.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/iso27001/iso27001_m365.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.iso27001.models import M365ISO27001Model @@ -34,10 +38,18 @@ class M365ISO27001(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = M365ISO27001Model( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -52,8 +64,8 @@ class M365ISO27001(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_Objetive_ID=attribute.Objetive_ID, Requirements_Attributes_Objetive_Name=attribute.Objetive_Name, Requirements_Attributes_Check_Summary=attribute.Check_Summary, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, CheckId=finding.check_id, Muted=finding.muted, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/iso27001/iso27001_nhn.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/iso27001/iso27001_nhn.py index 2ad5a0bda4..ad8ea6dcab 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/iso27001/iso27001_nhn.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/iso27001/iso27001_nhn.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.iso27001.models import NHNISO27001Model @@ -34,10 +38,18 @@ class NHNISO27001(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = NHNISO27001Model( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -52,8 +64,8 @@ class NHNISO27001(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_Objetive_ID=attribute.Objetive_ID, Requirements_Attributes_Objetive_Name=attribute.Objetive_Name, Requirements_Attributes_Check_Summary=attribute.Check_Summary, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, CheckId=finding.check_id, Muted=finding.muted, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/kisa_ismsp/kisa_ismsp.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/kisa_ismsp/kisa_ismsp.py index 93b925a5ff..dda83342b6 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/kisa_ismsp/kisa_ismsp.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/kisa_ismsp/kisa_ismsp.py @@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ from colorama import Fore, Style from tabulate import tabulate from prowler.config.config import orange_color +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + accumulate_overview_status, + get_effective_status, + get_scan_audit_config, + resolve_requirement_config_status, +) def get_kisa_ismsp_table( @@ -13,16 +19,20 @@ def get_kisa_ismsp_table( compliance_overview: bool, ): sections = {} + section_seen = {} sections_status = {} + provider = "" kisa_ismsp_compliance_table = { "Provider": [], "Section": [], "Status": [], "Muted": [], } - pass_count = [] - fail_count = [] - muted_count = [] + pass_count = set() + fail_count = set() + muted_count = set() + audit_config = get_scan_audit_config() + config_status_cache = {} for index, finding in enumerate(findings): check = bulk_checks_metadata[finding.check_metadata.CheckID] check_compliances = check.Compliance @@ -31,7 +41,14 @@ def get_kisa_ismsp_table( compliance.Framework.startswith("KISA") and compliance.Version in compliance_framework ): + provider = compliance.Provider for requirement in compliance.Requirements: + config_status = resolve_requirement_config_status( + requirement, audit_config, config_status_cache + ) + effective_status = get_effective_status( + finding.status, config_status + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: section = attribute.Section # Check if Section exists @@ -43,17 +60,27 @@ def get_kisa_ismsp_table( }, "Muted": 0, } - if finding.muted: - if index not in muted_count: - muted_count.append(index) + section_seen[section] = {} + + status = "Muted" if finding.muted else effective_status + accumulate_overview_status( + index, status, pass_count, fail_count, muted_count + ) + + # FAIL/PASS live under ["Status"], Muted at top level. + previous = section_seen[section].get(index) + if previous is None: + section_seen[section][index] = status + if status == "Muted": sections[section]["Muted"] += 1 - else: - if finding.status == "FAIL" and index not in fail_count: - fail_count.append(index) + elif status == "FAIL": sections[section]["Status"]["FAIL"] += 1 - elif finding.status == "PASS" and index not in pass_count: - pass_count.append(index) + elif status == "PASS": sections[section]["Status"]["PASS"] += 1 + elif previous == "PASS" and status == "FAIL": + section_seen[section][index] = "FAIL" + sections[section]["Status"]["PASS"] -= 1 + sections[section]["Status"]["FAIL"] += 1 # Add results to table sections = dict(sorted(sections.items())) @@ -70,7 +97,7 @@ def get_kisa_ismsp_table( else: sections_status[section] = f"{Fore.GREEN}PASS{Style.RESET_ALL}" for section in sections: - kisa_ismsp_compliance_table["Provider"].append(compliance.Provider) + kisa_ismsp_compliance_table["Provider"].append(provider) kisa_ismsp_compliance_table["Section"].append(section) kisa_ismsp_compliance_table["Status"].append(sections_status[section]) kisa_ismsp_compliance_table["Muted"].append( diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/kisa_ismsp/kisa_ismsp_aws.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/kisa_ismsp/kisa_ismsp_aws.py index f927c2d4b1..3d05632d26 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/kisa_ismsp/kisa_ismsp_aws.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/kisa_ismsp/kisa_ismsp_aws.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.kisa_ismsp.models import AWSKISAISMSPModel @@ -34,10 +38,19 @@ class AWSKISAISMSP(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) + for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = AWSKISAISMSPModel( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -55,8 +68,8 @@ class AWSKISAISMSP(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_RelatedRegulations=attribute.RelatedRegulations, Requirements_Attributes_AuditEvidence=attribute.AuditEvidence, Requirements_Attributes_NonComplianceCases=attribute.NonComplianceCases, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/mitre_attack/mitre_attack.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/mitre_attack/mitre_attack.py index bab3e4e31a..a352acfa6e 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/mitre_attack/mitre_attack.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/mitre_attack/mitre_attack.py @@ -2,6 +2,13 @@ from colorama import Fore, Style from tabulate import tabulate from prowler.config.config import orange_color +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + accumulate_group_status, + accumulate_overview_status, + get_effective_status, + get_scan_audit_config, + resolve_requirement_config_status, +) def get_mitre_attack_table( @@ -13,15 +20,19 @@ def get_mitre_attack_table( compliance_overview: bool, ): tactics = {} + tactic_seen = {} + provider = "" mitre_compliance_table = { "Provider": [], "Tactic": [], "Status": [], "Muted": [], } - pass_count = [] - fail_count = [] - muted_count = [] + pass_count = set() + fail_count = set() + muted_count = set() + audit_config = get_scan_audit_config() + config_status_cache = {} for index, finding in enumerate(findings): check = bulk_checks_metadata[finding.check_metadata.CheckID] check_compliances = check.Compliance @@ -30,27 +41,29 @@ def get_mitre_attack_table( "MITRE-ATTACK" in compliance.Framework and compliance.Version in compliance_framework ): + provider = compliance.Provider for requirement in compliance.Requirements: + config_status = resolve_requirement_config_status( + requirement, audit_config, config_status_cache + ) + effective_status = get_effective_status( + finding.status, config_status + ) + status = "Muted" if finding.muted else effective_status for tactic in requirement.Tactics: if tactic not in tactics: tactics[tactic] = {"FAIL": 0, "PASS": 0, "Muted": 0} - if finding.muted: - if index not in muted_count: - muted_count.append(index) - tactics[tactic]["Muted"] += 1 - else: - if finding.status == "FAIL": - if index not in fail_count: - fail_count.append(index) - tactics[tactic]["FAIL"] += 1 - elif finding.status == "PASS": - if index not in pass_count: - pass_count.append(index) - tactics[tactic]["PASS"] += 1 + tactic_seen[tactic] = {} + accumulate_overview_status( + index, status, pass_count, fail_count, muted_count + ) + accumulate_group_status( + index, status, tactics[tactic], tactic_seen[tactic] + ) # Add results to table tactics = dict(sorted(tactics.items())) for tactic in tactics: - mitre_compliance_table["Provider"].append(compliance.Provider) + mitre_compliance_table["Provider"].append(provider) mitre_compliance_table["Tactic"].append(tactic) if tactics[tactic]["FAIL"] > 0: mitre_compliance_table["Status"].append( diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/mitre_attack/mitre_attack_aws.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/mitre_attack/mitre_attack_aws.py index 33a7aca74b..92f4ac0e5b 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/mitre_attack/mitre_attack_aws.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/mitre_attack/mitre_attack_aws.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.mitre_attack.models import AWSMitreAttackModel @@ -35,10 +39,19 @@ class AWSMitreAttack(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) + for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) compliance_row = AWSMitreAttackModel( Provider=finding.provider, Description=compliance.Description, @@ -66,8 +79,8 @@ class AWSMitreAttack(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_Comments=", ".join( attribute.Comment for attribute in requirement.Attributes ), - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/mitre_attack/mitre_attack_azure.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/mitre_attack/mitre_attack_azure.py index 0254aad86e..a43e27e775 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/mitre_attack/mitre_attack_azure.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/mitre_attack/mitre_attack_azure.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.mitre_attack.models import AzureMitreAttackModel @@ -35,10 +39,19 @@ class AzureMitreAttack(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) + for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) compliance_row = AzureMitreAttackModel( Provider=finding.provider, Description=compliance.Description, @@ -67,8 +80,8 @@ class AzureMitreAttack(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_Comments=", ".join( attribute.Comment for attribute in requirement.Attributes ), - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/mitre_attack/mitre_attack_gcp.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/mitre_attack/mitre_attack_gcp.py index 4634273494..b8efdc5250 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/mitre_attack/mitre_attack_gcp.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/mitre_attack/mitre_attack_gcp.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.mitre_attack.models import GCPMitreAttackModel @@ -35,10 +39,19 @@ class GCPMitreAttack(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) + for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) compliance_row = GCPMitreAttackModel( Provider=finding.provider, Description=compliance.Description, @@ -66,8 +79,8 @@ class GCPMitreAttack(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_Comments=", ".join( attribute.Comment for attribute in requirement.Attributes ), - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/okta_idaas_stig/okta_idaas_stig.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/okta_idaas_stig/okta_idaas_stig.py index 5c76055a06..ef6bb2742a 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/okta_idaas_stig/okta_idaas_stig.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/okta_idaas_stig/okta_idaas_stig.py @@ -2,6 +2,11 @@ from colorama import Fore, Style from tabulate import tabulate from prowler.config.config import orange_color +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + get_effective_status, + get_scan_audit_config, + resolve_requirement_config_status, +) def get_okta_idaas_stig_table( @@ -22,33 +27,57 @@ def get_okta_idaas_stig_table( fail_count = [] muted_count = [] sections = {} + section_seen = {} + provider = "" + audit_config = get_scan_audit_config() + config_status_cache = {} for index, finding in enumerate(findings): check = bulk_checks_metadata[finding.check_metadata.CheckID] check_compliances = check.Compliance for compliance in check_compliances: if compliance.Framework == "Okta-IDaaS-STIG": + provider = compliance.Provider for requirement in compliance.Requirements: + # A configurable check that passed with a too-loose config is + # forced to FAIL (source of truth: framework ConfigRequirements). + config_status = resolve_requirement_config_status( + requirement, audit_config, config_status_cache + ) + effective_status = get_effective_status( + finding.status, config_status + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: section = attribute.Section if section not in sections: sections[section] = {"FAIL": 0, "PASS": 0, "Muted": 0} + section_seen[section] = set() + # Overview totals: count each finding once per framework if finding.muted: if index not in muted_count: muted_count.append(index) - sections[section]["Muted"] += 1 - else: - if finding.status == "FAIL" and index not in fail_count: + elif effective_status == "FAIL": + if index not in fail_count: fail_count.append(index) - sections[section]["FAIL"] += 1 - elif finding.status == "PASS" and index not in pass_count: + elif effective_status == "PASS": + if index not in pass_count: pass_count.append(index) + + # Per-section counts: count each finding once per section + # it belongs to (a finding can map to several sections). + if index not in section_seen[section]: + section_seen[section].add(index) + if finding.muted: + sections[section]["Muted"] += 1 + elif effective_status == "FAIL": + sections[section]["FAIL"] += 1 + elif effective_status == "PASS": sections[section]["PASS"] += 1 sections = dict(sorted(sections.items())) for section in sections: - section_table["Provider"].append(compliance.Provider) + section_table["Provider"].append(provider) section_table["Section"].append(section) if sections[section]["FAIL"] > 0: section_table["Status"].append( diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/okta_idaas_stig/okta_idaas_stig_okta.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/okta_idaas_stig/okta_idaas_stig_okta.py index 25f71b4def..b8a72f9f95 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/okta_idaas_stig/okta_idaas_stig_okta.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/okta_idaas_stig/okta_idaas_stig_okta.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.okta_idaas_stig.models import OktaIDaaSSTIGModel @@ -34,10 +38,18 @@ class OktaIDaaSSTIG(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = OktaIDaaSSTIGModel( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -54,8 +66,8 @@ class OktaIDaaSSTIG(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_CCI=attribute.CCI, Requirements_Attributes_CheckText=attribute.CheckText, Requirements_Attributes_FixText=attribute.FixText, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore.py index cfcd4a006e..cb23d67ffb 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore.py @@ -2,6 +2,13 @@ from colorama import Fore, Style from tabulate import tabulate from prowler.config.config import orange_color +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + accumulate_group_status, + accumulate_overview_status, + get_effective_status, + get_scan_audit_config, + resolve_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance @@ -20,22 +27,33 @@ def get_prowler_threatscore_table( "Score": [], "Muted": [], } - pass_count = [] - fail_count = [] - muted_count = [] + pass_count = set() + fail_count = set() + muted_count = set() pillars = {} + pillar_seen = {} + provider = "" generic_score = 0 max_generic_score = 0 - counted_findings_generic = [] + counted_findings_generic = {} score_per_pillar = {} max_score_per_pillar = {} counted_findings_per_pillar = {} + audit_config = get_scan_audit_config() + config_status_cache = {} for index, finding in enumerate(findings): check = bulk_checks_metadata[finding.check_metadata.CheckID] check_compliances = check.Compliance for compliance in check_compliances: if compliance.Framework == "ProwlerThreatScore": + provider = compliance.Provider for requirement in compliance.Requirements: + config_status = resolve_requirement_config_status( + requirement, audit_config, config_status_cache + ) + effective_status = get_effective_status( + finding.status, config_status + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: pillar = attribute.Section @@ -48,60 +66,68 @@ def get_prowler_threatscore_table( ): score_per_pillar[pillar] = 0 max_score_per_pillar[pillar] = 0 - counted_findings_per_pillar[pillar] = [] + counted_findings_per_pillar[pillar] = {} - if ( - index not in counted_findings_per_pillar[pillar] - and not finding.muted - ): - if finding.status == "PASS": - score_per_pillar[pillar] += ( - attribute.LevelOfRisk * attribute.Weight - ) - max_score_per_pillar[pillar] += ( - attribute.LevelOfRisk * attribute.Weight - ) - counted_findings_per_pillar[pillar].append(index) + # Revoke an earlier PASS score if a later requirement FAILs. + if not finding.muted: + contribution = attribute.LevelOfRisk * attribute.Weight + counted = counted_findings_per_pillar[pillar] + if index not in counted: + max_score_per_pillar[pillar] += contribution + if effective_status == "PASS": + score_per_pillar[pillar] += contribution + counted[index] = contribution + else: + counted[index] = 0 + elif effective_status == "FAIL" and counted[index]: + score_per_pillar[pillar] -= counted[index] + counted[index] = 0 if pillar not in pillars: pillars[pillar] = {"FAIL": 0, "PASS": 0, "Muted": 0} + pillar_seen[pillar] = {} - if finding.muted: - if index not in muted_count: - muted_count.append(index) - pillars[pillar]["Muted"] += 1 - else: - if finding.status == "FAIL" and index not in fail_count: - fail_count.append(index) - pillars[pillar]["FAIL"] += 1 - elif finding.status == "PASS" and index not in pass_count: - pass_count.append(index) - pillars[pillar]["PASS"] += 1 + status = "Muted" if finding.muted else effective_status + accumulate_overview_status( + index, status, pass_count, fail_count, muted_count + ) + accumulate_group_status( + index, status, pillars[pillar], pillar_seen[pillar] + ) - # Generic score - if index not in counted_findings_generic and not finding.muted: - if finding.status == "PASS": - generic_score += ( - attribute.LevelOfRisk * attribute.Weight - ) - max_generic_score += ( - attribute.LevelOfRisk * attribute.Weight - ) - counted_findings_generic.append(index) + # Generic score, with the same PASS-revocation on FAIL. + if not finding.muted: + contribution = attribute.LevelOfRisk * attribute.Weight + if index not in counted_findings_generic: + max_generic_score += contribution + if effective_status == "PASS": + generic_score += contribution + counted_findings_generic[index] = contribution + else: + counted_findings_generic[index] = 0 + elif ( + effective_status == "FAIL" + and counted_findings_generic[index] + ): + generic_score -= counted_findings_generic[index] + counted_findings_generic[index] = 0 no_findings_pillars = [] - bulk_compliance = Compliance.get_bulk(provider=compliance.Provider.lower()).get( - compliance_framework + bulk_compliance = ( + Compliance.get_bulk(provider=provider.lower()).get(compliance_framework) + if provider + else None ) - for requirement in bulk_compliance.Requirements: - for attribute in requirement.Attributes: - pillar = attribute.Section - if pillar not in pillars.keys() and pillar not in no_findings_pillars: - no_findings_pillars.append(pillar) + if bulk_compliance: + for requirement in bulk_compliance.Requirements: + for attribute in requirement.Attributes: + pillar = attribute.Section + if pillar not in pillars.keys() and pillar not in no_findings_pillars: + no_findings_pillars.append(pillar) pillars = dict(sorted(pillars.items())) for pillar in pillars: - pillar_table["Provider"].append(compliance.Provider) + pillar_table["Provider"].append(provider) pillar_table["Pillar"].append(pillar) if max_score_per_pillar[pillar] == 0: pillar_score = 100.0 @@ -127,7 +153,7 @@ def get_prowler_threatscore_table( ) for pillar in no_findings_pillars: - pillar_table["Provider"].append(compliance.Provider) + pillar_table["Provider"].append(provider) pillar_table["Pillar"].append(pillar) pillar_table["Score"].append(f"{Style.BRIGHT}{Fore.GREEN}100%{Style.RESET_ALL}") pillar_table["Status"].append(f"{Fore.GREEN}PASS{Style.RESET_ALL}") diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_alibaba.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_alibaba.py index 510c098dff..7d682a3e62 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_alibaba.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_alibaba.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.prowler_threatscore.models import ( @@ -36,10 +40,19 @@ class ProwlerThreatScoreAlibaba(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) + for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = ProwlerThreatScoreAlibabaModel( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -56,8 +69,8 @@ class ProwlerThreatScoreAlibaba(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_AdditionalInformation=attribute.AdditionalInformation, Requirements_Attributes_LevelOfRisk=attribute.LevelOfRisk, Requirements_Attributes_Weight=attribute.Weight, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_aws.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_aws.py index ae992f8a75..f1280808e3 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_aws.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_aws.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.prowler_threatscore.models import ( @@ -36,10 +40,19 @@ class ProwlerThreatScoreAWS(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) + for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = ProwlerThreatScoreAWSModel( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -56,8 +69,8 @@ class ProwlerThreatScoreAWS(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_AdditionalInformation=attribute.AdditionalInformation, Requirements_Attributes_LevelOfRisk=attribute.LevelOfRisk, Requirements_Attributes_Weight=attribute.Weight, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_azure.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_azure.py index dd0a3b9a56..5118511369 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_azure.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_azure.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.prowler_threatscore.models import ( @@ -36,10 +40,19 @@ class ProwlerThreatScoreAzure(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) + for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = ProwlerThreatScoreAzureModel( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -56,8 +69,8 @@ class ProwlerThreatScoreAzure(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_AdditionalInformation=attribute.AdditionalInformation, Requirements_Attributes_LevelOfRisk=attribute.LevelOfRisk, Requirements_Attributes_Weight=attribute.Weight, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_gcp.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_gcp.py index c3bad98ade..39f9c23850 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_gcp.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_gcp.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.prowler_threatscore.models import ( @@ -36,10 +40,19 @@ class ProwlerThreatScoreGCP(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) + for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = ProwlerThreatScoreGCPModel( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -56,8 +69,8 @@ class ProwlerThreatScoreGCP(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_AdditionalInformation=attribute.AdditionalInformation, Requirements_Attributes_LevelOfRisk=attribute.LevelOfRisk, Requirements_Attributes_Weight=attribute.Weight, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_kubernetes.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_kubernetes.py index 51f88348f0..88bf41582a 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_kubernetes.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_kubernetes.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.prowler_threatscore.models import ( @@ -36,10 +40,19 @@ class ProwlerThreatScoreKubernetes(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) + for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = ProwlerThreatScoreKubernetesModel( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -56,8 +69,8 @@ class ProwlerThreatScoreKubernetes(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_AdditionalInformation=attribute.AdditionalInformation, Requirements_Attributes_LevelOfRisk=attribute.LevelOfRisk, Requirements_Attributes_Weight=attribute.Weight, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_m365.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_m365.py index d0b2ad635c..b7b533c72a 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_m365.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_m365.py @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance_output import ComplianceOutput from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.prowler_threatscore.models import ( @@ -36,10 +40,19 @@ class ProwlerThreatScoreM365(ComplianceOutput): Returns: - None """ + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + compliance.Requirements + ) + for finding in findings: for requirement in compliance.Requirements: # Source of truth: framework JSON, not finding.compliance snapshot (avoids CSV/UI count drift). if finding.check_id in requirement.Checks: + row_status, row_status_extended = apply_config_status( + finding.status, + finding.status_extended, + requirement_config_status.get(requirement.Id), + ) for attribute in requirement.Attributes: compliance_row = ProwlerThreatScoreM365Model( Provider=finding.provider, @@ -56,8 +69,8 @@ class ProwlerThreatScoreM365(ComplianceOutput): Requirements_Attributes_AdditionalInformation=attribute.AdditionalInformation, Requirements_Attributes_LevelOfRisk=attribute.LevelOfRisk, Requirements_Attributes_Weight=attribute.Weight, - Status=finding.status, - StatusExtended=finding.status_extended, + Status=row_status, + StatusExtended=row_status_extended, ResourceId=finding.resource_uid, ResourceName=finding.resource_name, CheckId=finding.check_id, diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/ocsf_compliance.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/ocsf_compliance.py index 2886f7e4d2..07c1f67b10 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/ocsf_compliance.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/ocsf_compliance.py @@ -19,6 +19,10 @@ from py_ocsf_models.objects.product import Product from py_ocsf_models.objects.resource_details import ResourceDetails from prowler.config.config import prowler_version +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import ComplianceFramework from prowler.lib.logger import logger from prowler.lib.outputs.utils import unroll_dict_to_list @@ -181,11 +185,21 @@ class OCSFComplianceOutput: for check_id in all_checks: check_req_map.setdefault(check_id, []).append(req) + # Scope constraints to this output's provider (e.g. an Azure constraint + # must not affect an AWS output). + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + framework.requirements, provider_type=self._provider + ) + for finding in findings: if finding.check_id in check_req_map: for req in check_req_map[finding.check_id]: cf = self._build_compliance_finding( - finding, framework, req, compliance_name + finding, + framework, + req, + compliance_name, + requirement_config_status.get(req.id, (True, "")), ) if cf: self._data.append(cf) @@ -240,10 +254,14 @@ class OCSFComplianceOutput: framework: ComplianceFramework, requirement, compliance_name: str, + config_status: tuple = (True, ""), ) -> ComplianceFinding: try: + effective_status, message = apply_config_status( + finding.status, finding.status_extended, config_status + ) compliance_status = PROWLER_TO_COMPLIANCE_STATUS.get( - finding.status, ComplianceStatusID.Unknown + effective_status, ComplianceStatusID.Unknown ) check_status = PROWLER_TO_COMPLIANCE_STATUS.get( finding.status, ComplianceStatusID.Unknown @@ -272,6 +290,7 @@ class OCSFComplianceOutput: requirements=[requirement.id], control=requirement.description, status_id=compliance_status, + # Nested Check preserves the raw check result. checks=[ Check( uid=finding.check_id, @@ -293,7 +312,7 @@ class OCSFComplianceOutput: else None ), ), - message=finding.status_extended, + message=message, metadata=Metadata( event_code=finding.check_id, product=Product( @@ -339,8 +358,10 @@ class OCSFComplianceOutput: severity=finding_severity.name, status_id=event_status.value, status=event_status.name, - status_code=finding.status, - status_detail=finding.status_extended, + # Effective status, so the top-level never contradicts the + # nested compliance status. + status_code=effective_status, + status_detail=message, time=time_value, time_dt=( finding.timestamp diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/universal_output.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/universal_output.py index a3cdb1389a..59afd1fa31 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/universal_output.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/universal_output.py @@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Optional from pydantic.v1 import create_model from prowler.config.config import timestamp +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import ComplianceFramework from prowler.lib.logger import logger from prowler.lib.utils.utils import open_file @@ -134,7 +138,9 @@ class UniversalComplianceOutput: return " | ".join(str(v) for v in value) return value - def _build_row(self, finding, framework, requirement, is_manual=False): + def _build_row( + self, finding, framework, requirement, is_manual=False, config_status=None + ): """Build a single row dict for a finding + requirement combination.""" row = { "Provider": ( @@ -180,10 +186,14 @@ class UniversalComplianceOutput: ) row["Requirements_TechniqueURL"] = requirement.technique_url - row["Status"] = finding.status if not is_manual else "MANUAL" - row["StatusExtended"] = ( - finding.status_extended if not is_manual else "Manual check" - ) + if is_manual: + row["Status"] = "MANUAL" + row["StatusExtended"] = "Manual check" + else: + # Config-invalid PASS reports as FAIL, matching OCSF/table outputs. + row["Status"], row["StatusExtended"] = apply_config_status( + finding.status, finding.status_extended, config_status + ) row["ResourceId"] = finding.resource_uid if not is_manual else "manual_check" row["ResourceName"] = finding.resource_name if not is_manual else "Manual check" row["CheckId"] = finding.check_id if not is_manual else "manual" @@ -222,6 +232,12 @@ class UniversalComplianceOutput: check_req_map[check_id] = [] check_req_map[check_id].append(req) + # Scope constraints to this output's provider (e.g. an Azure constraint + # must not affect an AWS output). + requirement_config_status = build_requirement_config_status( + framework.requirements, provider_type=self._provider + ) + # Process findings using the provider-filtered check_req_map. # This ensures that for multi-provider dict checks, only the checks # belonging to the current provider produce output rows. @@ -229,7 +245,12 @@ class UniversalComplianceOutput: check_id = finding.check_id if check_id in check_req_map: for req in check_req_map[check_id]: - row = self._build_row(finding, framework, req) + row = self._build_row( + finding, + framework, + req, + config_status=requirement_config_status.get(req.id), + ) try: self._data.append(self._row_model(**row)) except Exception as e: diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/universal_table.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/universal_table.py index e838c5e9cf..5f4a6cf88b 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/universal_table.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/universal_table.py @@ -2,6 +2,13 @@ from colorama import Fore, Style from tabulate import tabulate from prowler.config.config import orange_color +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + accumulate_group_status, + accumulate_overview_status, + get_effective_status, + get_scan_audit_config, + resolve_requirement_config_status, +) from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import ComplianceFramework @@ -163,9 +170,12 @@ def _render_grouped( """Grouped mode: one row per group with pass/fail counts.""" check_map = _build_requirement_check_map(framework, provider) groups = {} - pass_count = [] - fail_count = [] - muted_count = [] + group_seen = {} + pass_count = set() + fail_count = set() + muted_count = set() + audit_config = get_scan_audit_config() + config_status_cache = {} for index, finding in enumerate(findings): check_id = finding.check_metadata.CheckID @@ -173,21 +183,24 @@ def _render_grouped( continue for req in check_map[check_id]: + effective_status = get_effective_status( + finding.status, + resolve_requirement_config_status( + req, audit_config, config_status_cache, provider_type=provider + ), + ) for group_key in _get_group_key(req, group_by): if group_key not in groups: groups[group_key] = {"FAIL": 0, "PASS": 0, "Muted": 0} + group_seen[group_key] = {} - if finding.muted: - if index not in muted_count: - muted_count.append(index) - groups[group_key]["Muted"] += 1 - else: - if finding.status == "FAIL" and index not in fail_count: - fail_count.append(index) - groups[group_key]["FAIL"] += 1 - elif finding.status == "PASS" and index not in pass_count: - pass_count.append(index) - groups[group_key]["PASS"] += 1 + status = "Muted" if finding.muted else effective_status + accumulate_overview_status( + index, status, pass_count, fail_count, muted_count + ) + accumulate_group_status( + index, status, groups[group_key], group_seen[group_key] + ) if not _print_overview( pass_count, fail_count, muted_count, compliance_framework_name, labels @@ -258,9 +271,13 @@ def _render_split( split_field = split_by.field split_values = split_by.values groups = {} - pass_count = [] - fail_count = [] - muted_count = [] + group_muted_seen = {} + group_split_seen = {} + pass_count = set() + fail_count = set() + muted_count = set() + audit_config = get_scan_audit_config() + config_status_cache = {} for index, finding in enumerate(findings): check_id = finding.check_metadata.CheckID @@ -268,32 +285,46 @@ def _render_split( continue for req in check_map[check_id]: + effective_status = get_effective_status( + finding.status, + resolve_requirement_config_status( + req, audit_config, config_status_cache, provider_type=provider + ), + ) for group_key in _get_group_key(req, group_by): if group_key not in groups: groups[group_key] = { sv: {"FAIL": 0, "PASS": 0} for sv in split_values } groups[group_key]["Muted"] = 0 + group_muted_seen[group_key] = set() + group_split_seen[group_key] = {sv: {} for sv in split_values} split_val = req.attributes.get(split_field, "") if finding.muted: - if index not in muted_count: - muted_count.append(index) + # Overview total: count each finding once per framework + muted_count.add(index) + # Per-group Muted: count each finding once per group it + # belongs to (a finding can map to several groups). + if index not in group_muted_seen[group_key]: + group_muted_seen[group_key].add(index) groups[group_key]["Muted"] += 1 else: - if finding.status == "FAIL" and index not in fail_count: - fail_count.append(index) - elif finding.status == "PASS" and index not in pass_count: - pass_count.append(index) + if effective_status == "FAIL": + fail_count.add(index) + pass_count.discard(index) + elif effective_status == "PASS" and index not in fail_count: + pass_count.add(index) for sv in split_values: if sv in str(split_val): - if not finding.muted: - if finding.status == "FAIL": - groups[group_key][sv]["FAIL"] += 1 - else: - groups[group_key][sv]["PASS"] += 1 + accumulate_group_status( + index, + effective_status, + groups[group_key][sv], + group_split_seen[group_key][sv], + ) if not _print_overview( pass_count, fail_count, muted_count, compliance_framework_name, labels @@ -364,16 +395,19 @@ def _render_scored( risk_field = scoring.risk_field weight_field = scoring.weight_field groups = {} - pass_count = [] - fail_count = [] - muted_count = [] + group_seen = {} + pass_count = set() + fail_count = set() + muted_count = set() score_per_group = {} max_score_per_group = {} counted_per_group = {} generic_score = 0 max_generic_score = 0 - counted_generic = [] + counted_generic = {} + audit_config = get_scan_audit_config() + config_status_cache = {} for index, finding in enumerate(findings): check_id = finding.check_metadata.CheckID @@ -381,6 +415,12 @@ def _render_scored( continue for req in check_map[check_id]: + effective_status = get_effective_status( + finding.status, + resolve_requirement_config_status( + req, audit_config, config_status_cache, provider_type=provider + ), + ) for group_key in _get_group_key(req, group_by): attrs = req.attributes risk = attrs.get(risk_field, 0) @@ -388,33 +428,47 @@ def _render_scored( if group_key not in groups: groups[group_key] = {"FAIL": 0, "PASS": 0, "Muted": 0} + group_seen[group_key] = {} score_per_group[group_key] = 0 max_score_per_group[group_key] = 0 - counted_per_group[group_key] = [] + counted_per_group[group_key] = {} - if index not in counted_per_group[group_key] and not finding.muted: - if finding.status == "PASS": - score_per_group[group_key] += risk * weight - max_score_per_group[group_key] += risk * weight - counted_per_group[group_key].append(index) + # Revoke an earlier PASS score if a later requirement FAILs. + if not finding.muted: + contribution = risk * weight + counted = counted_per_group[group_key] + if index not in counted: + max_score_per_group[group_key] += contribution + if effective_status == "PASS": + score_per_group[group_key] += contribution + counted[index] = contribution + else: + counted[index] = 0 + elif effective_status == "FAIL" and counted[index]: + score_per_group[group_key] -= counted[index] + counted[index] = 0 - if finding.muted: - if index not in muted_count: - muted_count.append(index) - groups[group_key]["Muted"] += 1 - else: - if finding.status == "FAIL" and index not in fail_count: - fail_count.append(index) - groups[group_key]["FAIL"] += 1 - elif finding.status == "PASS" and index not in pass_count: - pass_count.append(index) - groups[group_key]["PASS"] += 1 + status = "Muted" if finding.muted else effective_status + accumulate_overview_status( + index, status, pass_count, fail_count, muted_count + ) + accumulate_group_status( + index, status, groups[group_key], group_seen[group_key] + ) - if index not in counted_generic and not finding.muted: - if finding.status == "PASS": - generic_score += risk * weight - max_generic_score += risk * weight - counted_generic.append(index) + # Generic score, with the same PASS-revocation on FAIL. + if not finding.muted: + contribution = risk * weight + if index not in counted_generic: + max_generic_score += contribution + if effective_status == "PASS": + generic_score += contribution + counted_generic[index] = contribution + else: + counted_generic[index] = 0 + elif effective_status == "FAIL" and counted_generic[index]: + generic_score -= counted_generic[index] + counted_generic[index] = 0 if not _print_overview( pass_count, fail_count, muted_count, compliance_framework_name, labels diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/finding.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/finding.py index 9f772d17c4..ed8bda4039 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/finding.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/finding.py @@ -468,6 +468,24 @@ class Finding(BaseModel): output_data["resource_uid"] = check_output.resource_id output_data["region"] = check_output.region + elif provider.type == "linode": + output_data["auth_method"] = "api_token" + # account_uid is a required string, but the account ID may be + # unavailable when the token lacks account:read_only scope. Fall + # back to the username/email so findings are never dropped. + output_data["account_uid"] = ( + get_nested_attribute(provider, "identity.account_id") + or get_nested_attribute(provider, "identity.username") + or get_nested_attribute(provider, "identity.email") + or "linode" + ) + output_data["account_name"] = get_nested_attribute( + provider, "identity.username" + ) or get_nested_attribute(provider, "identity.email") + output_data["resource_name"] = check_output.resource_name + output_data["resource_uid"] = check_output.resource_id + output_data["region"] = check_output.region + elif provider.type == "alibabacloud": output_data["auth_method"] = get_nested_attribute( provider, "identity.identity_arn" diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/html/html.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/html/html.py index 52afd071ae..18dd4b0f3d 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/html/html.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/html/html.py @@ -73,8 +73,7 @@ class HTML(Output): elif finding.status == "FAIL": row_class = "table-danger" - self._data.append( - f""" + self._data.append(f""" {finding_status} {finding.metadata.Severity.value} @@ -89,8 +88,7 @@ class HTML(Output):

{HTML.process_markdown(finding.metadata.Remediation.Recommendation.Text)}

{parse_html_string(unroll_dict(finding.compliance, separator=": "))}

- """ - ) + """) except Exception as error: logger.error( f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" @@ -143,8 +141,7 @@ class HTML(Output): from_cli (bool): whether the request is from the CLI or not """ try: - file_descriptor.write( - f""" + file_descriptor.write(f""" @@ -253,8 +250,7 @@ class HTML(Output): Compliance - """ - ) + """) except Exception as error: logger.error( f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}] -- {error}" @@ -269,8 +265,7 @@ class HTML(Output): file_descriptor (file): the file descriptor to write the footer """ try: - file_descriptor.write( - """ + file_descriptor.write(""" @@ -409,8 +404,7 @@ class HTML(Output): -""" - ) +""") except Exception as error: logger.error( f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}] -- {error}" @@ -1588,6 +1582,63 @@ class HTML(Output): ) return "" + @staticmethod + def get_linode_assessment_summary(provider: Provider) -> str: + """ + get_linode_assessment_summary gets the HTML assessment summary for the Linode provider + + Args: + provider (Provider): the Linode provider object + + Returns: + str: HTML assessment summary for the Linode provider + """ + try: + username = getattr(provider.identity, "username", None) or "-" + email = getattr(provider.identity, "email", None) or "-" + account_id = getattr(provider.identity, "account_id", None) or "-" + + assessment_items = f""" +
  • + Account ID: {account_id} +
    • +
  • + Username: {username} +
    • +
  • + Email: {email} +
    • """ + + credentials_items = """ +
  • + Authentication: API Token +
    • """ + + return f""" +
    +
    +
    + Linode Assessment Summary +
    +
      {assessment_items} +
    +
    +
    +
    +
    +
    + Linode Credentials +
    +
      {credentials_items} +
    +
    +
    """ + except Exception as error: + logger.error( + f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}] -- {error}" + ) + return "" + @staticmethod def get_assessment_summary(provider: Provider) -> str: """ diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/jira/jira.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/jira/jira.py index f7f31666e1..9005b5274e 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/jira/jira.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/jira/jira.py @@ -341,6 +341,7 @@ class Jira: } TOKEN_URL = "https://auth.atlassian.com/oauth/token" API_TOKEN_URL = "https://api.atlassian.com/oauth/token/accessible-resources" + REQUEST_TIMEOUT = 90 HEADER_TEMPLATE = { "Content-Type": "application/json", "X-Force-Accept-Language": "true", @@ -578,7 +579,12 @@ class Jira: } headers = self.get_headers(content_type_json=True) - response = requests.post(self.TOKEN_URL, json=body, headers=headers) + response = requests.post( + self.TOKEN_URL, + json=body, + headers=headers, + timeout=self.REQUEST_TIMEOUT, + ) if response.status_code == 200: tokens = response.json() @@ -630,12 +636,17 @@ class Jira: response = requests.get( f"https://{domain}.atlassian.net/_edge/tenant_info", headers=headers, + timeout=self.REQUEST_TIMEOUT, ) response = response.json() return response.get("cloudId") else: headers = self.get_headers(access_token) - response = requests.get(self.API_TOKEN_URL, headers=headers) + response = requests.get( + self.API_TOKEN_URL, + headers=headers, + timeout=self.REQUEST_TIMEOUT, + ) if response.status_code == 200: resources = response.json() @@ -717,7 +728,12 @@ class Jira: } headers = self.get_headers(content_type_json=True) - response = requests.post(url, json=body, headers=headers) + response = requests.post( + url, + json=body, + headers=headers, + timeout=self.REQUEST_TIMEOUT, + ) if response.status_code == 200: tokens = response.json() @@ -874,6 +890,7 @@ class Jira: response = requests.get( f"https://api.atlassian.com/ex/jira/{self.cloud_id}/rest/api/3/project", headers=headers, + timeout=self.REQUEST_TIMEOUT, ) if response.status_code == 200: @@ -941,6 +958,7 @@ class Jira: response = requests.get( f"https://api.atlassian.com/ex/jira/{self.cloud_id}/rest/api/3/issue/createmeta?projectKeys={project_key}&expand=projects.issuetypes.fields", headers=headers, + timeout=self.REQUEST_TIMEOUT, ) if response.status_code == 200: @@ -986,6 +1004,7 @@ class Jira: response = requests.get( f"https://api.atlassian.com/ex/jira/{self.cloud_id}/rest/api/3/project", headers=headers, + timeout=self.REQUEST_TIMEOUT, ) if response.status_code == 200: projects_data = {} @@ -1001,6 +1020,7 @@ class Jira: project_response = requests.get( f"https://api.atlassian.com/ex/jira/{self.cloud_id}/rest/api/3/issue/createmeta?projectKeys={project['key']}&expand=projects.issuetypes.fields", headers=headers, + timeout=self.REQUEST_TIMEOUT, ) if project_response.status_code == 200: project_metadata = project_response.json() @@ -1923,6 +1943,7 @@ class Jira: f"https://api.atlassian.com/ex/jira/{self.cloud_id}/rest/api/3/issue", json=payload, headers=headers, + timeout=self.REQUEST_TIMEOUT, ) if response.status_code != 201: @@ -2127,6 +2148,7 @@ class Jira: f"https://api.atlassian.com/ex/jira/{self.cloud_id}/rest/api/3/issue", json=payload, headers=headers, + timeout=self.REQUEST_TIMEOUT, ) if response.status_code != 201: diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/outputs.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/outputs.py index a1f37a9dfc..40dc4635ba 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/outputs.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/outputs.py @@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ def stdout_report(finding, color, verbose, status, fix, provider=None): details = finding.region elif finding.check_metadata.Provider == "scaleway": details = finding.region + elif finding.check_metadata.Provider == "linode": + details = finding.region else: # Dynamic fallback: any external/custom provider if provider is None: diff --git a/prowler/lib/outputs/summary_table.py b/prowler/lib/outputs/summary_table.py index 43d4a547c1..77b4c2725a 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/outputs/summary_table.py +++ b/prowler/lib/outputs/summary_table.py @@ -121,6 +121,11 @@ def display_summary_table( elif provider.type == "scaleway": entity_type = "Organization" audited_entities = provider.identity.organization_id + elif provider.type == "linode": + entity_type = "Account" + audited_entities = ( + provider.identity.username or provider.identity.email or "linode" + ) else: # Dynamic fallback: any external/custom provider entity_type, audited_entities = provider.get_summary_entity() diff --git a/prowler/lib/resource_limit.py b/prowler/lib/resource_limit.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..da144e9dd0 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/lib/resource_limit.py @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +"""Scoped resource scan limits for high-volume resources. + +Some services accumulate huge numbers of resources (EBS snapshots, backup +recovery points, log groups, Lambda functions, ECS task definitions, +CodeArtifact packages). Scanning all of them causes API throttling, slow +scans, cost and noisy findings. + +``get_resource_scan_limit`` resolves the configured number of resources to +analyze for a supported resource path. A limited resource can produce zero, +one, or many findings; findings are not capped or re-ordered here. + +Tradeoff: for newest-based resources, services may need to list lightweight or +base metadata broadly to select the truly newest resources, then apply limits +only to expensive hydration or analysis. The helper must not send +user-configured limits as unsafe paginator ``PageSize`` values because AWS +services validate page sizes differently. +""" + +from collections.abc import Callable, Iterable, Iterator, Mapping +from itertools import islice +from typing import Any, Optional, Protocol, TypeVar + +GLOBAL_LIMIT_KEY = "max_scanned_resources_per_service" +T = TypeVar("T") + + +class PaginatorProtocol(Protocol): + """Minimal boto3-compatible paginator interface used by this module.""" + + def paginate(self, **operation_parameters: Any) -> Iterable[Mapping[str, Any]]: + """Return paginator pages for the provided operation parameters.""" + + +def get_resource_scan_limit(audit_config: dict, service_key: str) -> Optional[int]: + """Resolve the resource scan limit for a service. + + Precedence: per-service key (``service_key``) > global + ``max_scanned_resources_per_service`` > unlimited. + + A non-positive resolved value means **unlimited** (``None``), preserving + the legacy behavior as an explicit opt-out. + + Args: + audit_config: The provider ``audit_config`` dictionary. + service_key: The per-service config key, e.g. ``max_lambda_functions``. + + Returns: + The limit as a positive ``int``, or ``None`` for unlimited. + """ + value = audit_config.get(service_key) + if value is None: + value = audit_config.get(GLOBAL_LIMIT_KEY) + if value is None or value <= 0: + return None + return int(value) + + +def limit_resources(resources: Iterable[T], limit: Optional[int]) -> Iterator[T]: + """Yield up to ``limit`` resources without changing resource order.""" + if not limit or limit <= 0: + yield from resources + return + yield from islice(resources, limit) + + +def iter_limited_paginator_items( + paginator: PaginatorProtocol, + result_key: str, + limit: Optional[int], + item_filter: Optional[Callable[[T], bool]] = None, + **operation_parameters: Any, +) -> Iterator[T]: + """Yield paginator result items, stopping after ``limit`` selected items. + + The configured resource-analysis limit is intentionally not sent as + ``PageSize`` because AWS services validate page sizes differently. The + paginator receives only the operation parameters needed by the AWS API, + while this iterator applies the analysis limit defensively client-side. + """ + selected = 0 + for page in paginator.paginate(**operation_parameters): + for item in page.get(result_key, []): + if item_filter and not item_filter(item): + continue + yield item + selected += 1 + if limit and selected >= limit: + return diff --git a/prowler/lib/utils/utils.py b/prowler/lib/utils/utils.py index c4b29f6cc1..62e01d66ef 100644 --- a/prowler/lib/utils/utils.py +++ b/prowler/lib/utils/utils.py @@ -9,52 +9,116 @@ except ImportError: pass import re +import shutil +import subprocess import sys import tempfile from datetime import datetime -from hashlib import sha512 +from functools import lru_cache +from hashlib import sha1, sha512 from io import TextIOWrapper from ipaddress import ip_address from os.path import exists from time import mktime -from typing import Any, Optional +from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping, Optional, Union from colorama import Style -from detect_secrets import SecretsCollection -from detect_secrets.settings import transient_settings from prowler.config.config import encoding_format_utf_8 from prowler.lib.logger import logger -default_detect_secrets_plugins = [ - {"name": "ArtifactoryDetector"}, - {"name": "AWSKeyDetector"}, - {"name": "AzureStorageKeyDetector"}, - {"name": "BasicAuthDetector"}, - {"name": "CloudantDetector"}, - {"name": "DiscordBotTokenDetector"}, - {"name": "GitHubTokenDetector"}, - {"name": "GitLabTokenDetector"}, - {"name": "Base64HighEntropyString", "limit": 6.0}, - {"name": "HexHighEntropyString", "limit": 3.0}, - {"name": "IbmCloudIamDetector"}, - {"name": "IbmCosHmacDetector"}, - # {"name": "IPPublicDetector"}, https://github.com/Yelp/detect-secrets/pull/885 - {"name": "JwtTokenDetector"}, - {"name": "KeywordDetector"}, - {"name": "MailchimpDetector"}, - {"name": "NpmDetector"}, - {"name": "OpenAIDetector"}, - {"name": "PrivateKeyDetector"}, - {"name": "PypiTokenDetector"}, - {"name": "SendGridDetector"}, - {"name": "SlackDetector"}, - {"name": "SoftlayerDetector"}, - {"name": "SquareOAuthDetector"}, - {"name": "StripeDetector"}, - # {"name": "TelegramBotTokenDetector"}, https://github.com/Yelp/detect-secrets/pull/878 - {"name": "TwilioKeyDetector"}, -] +# Default minimum confidence level for reporting findings. "low" is required to +# enable Kingfisher's built-in generic rules (Generic Password / Secret / API +# Key), which preserve the keyword-based coverage Prowler had with +# detect-secrets' KeywordDetector; at "medium" those generic rules do not fire. +# Possible values: "low", "medium", "high". +default_secrets_confidence = "low" + +# Kingfisher exit codes considered successful: 0 (no findings), 200 (findings), +# 205 (validated findings). +_kingfisher_success_exit_codes = (0, 200, 205) + +# Number of payloads scanned per Kingfisher invocation in batch mode. Bounds +# peak temp-disk and memory while still amortizing the per-process spawn cost +# across many fragments (see detect_secrets_scan_batch). +default_secrets_batch_chunk_size = 500 + +# Wall-clock cap (seconds) for a single Kingfisher subprocess, so a hung binary +# cannot block the audit indefinitely. +default_secrets_scan_timeout = 300 + + +class SecretsScanError(Exception): + """The secret scanner could not produce a trustworthy result. + + Raised when Kingfisher exits with a non-success code, times out, cannot be + located/executed, or returns output that cannot be parsed. This is distinct + from "no secrets found": a security check must never treat a scanner failure + as a clean result, so callers are expected to surface it as ``MANUAL`` + (manual review required) instead of ``PASS``. + """ + + +@lru_cache(maxsize=1) +def get_kingfisher_binary() -> str: + """Return the path to the bundled Kingfisher binary (cached).""" + from kingfisher import get_binary_path + + return get_binary_path() + + +def _build_kingfisher_command( + scan_paths: list, + output_path: str, + confidence: str, + validate: bool, + no_dedup: bool = False, +) -> list: + """Build the Kingfisher ``scan`` command shared by single and batch scans.""" + command = [ + get_kingfisher_binary(), + "scan", + *scan_paths, + "--format", + "json", + "--output", + output_path, + "--no-update-check", + "--confidence", + confidence, + ] + if validate: + # Live-validate discovered secrets against provider APIs. Use + # conservative defaults (short timeout, no retries) to limit the blast + # radius of the outbound calls. + command += ["--validation-timeout", "5", "--validation-retries", "0"] + else: + command.append("--no-validate") + if no_dedup: + # Report every occurrence (one per file) so batched results match + # scanning each payload individually. + command.append("--no-dedup") + return command + + +def _finding_to_dict(entry: dict, fallback_filename: str) -> dict: + """Convert a Kingfisher finding entry into Prowler's finding dict shape.""" + rule = entry.get("rule", {}) + finding = entry.get("finding", {}) + snippet = finding.get("snippet", "") or "" + return { + "filename": finding.get("path", fallback_filename), + "line_number": finding.get("line"), + "type": rule.get("name"), + # Non-security identifier for the matched secret (matches the + # detect-secrets output shape); not used for security. + "hashed_secret": ( + sha1(snippet.encode(), usedforsecurity=False).hexdigest() + if snippet + else None + ), + "is_verified": finding.get("validation", {}).get("status") == "Active", + } def open_file(input_file: str, mode: str = "r") -> TextIOWrapper: @@ -111,77 +175,188 @@ def hash_sha512(string: str) -> str: return sha512(string.encode(encoding_format_utf_8)).hexdigest()[0:9] -def detect_secrets_scan( - data: str = None, - file=None, - excluded_secrets: list[str] = None, - detect_secrets_plugins: dict = None, -) -> list[dict[str, str]]: - """detect_secrets_scan scans the data or file for secrets using the detect-secrets library. - Args: - data (str): The data to scan for secrets. - file (str): The file to scan for secrets. - excluded_secrets (list): A list of regex patterns to exclude from the scan. - detect_secrets_plugins (dict): The settings to use for the scan. - Returns: - dict: The secrets found in the - Raises: - Exception: If an error occurs during the scan. - Examples: - >>> detect_secrets_scan(data="password=password") - [{'filename': 'data', 'hashed_secret': 'f7c3bc1d808e04732adf679965ccc34ca7ae3441', 'is_verified': False, 'line_number': 1, 'type': 'Secret Keyword'}] - >>> detect_secrets_scan(file="file.txt") - {'file.txt': [{'filename': 'file.txt', 'hashed_secret': 'f7c3bc1d808e04732adf679965ccc34ca7ae3441', 'is_verified': False, 'line_number': 1, 'type': 'Secret Keyword'}]} +def _scan_batch_chunk( + chunk: list, + excluded_secrets: list, + confidence: str, + validate: bool, + results: dict, +) -> None: + """Scan one chunk of ``(key, data)`` payloads in a single Kingfisher call. + + Writes each payload to its own file in a temp directory, scans the whole + directory once (``--no-dedup`` so per-file results match individual scans), + maps findings back to their key by file path, and appends them to + ``results``. The temp directory is always removed. """ + if not chunk: + return + tmp_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp() + temp_output_file = None try: - if not file: - temp_data_file = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False) - temp_data_file.write(bytes(data, encoding="raw_unicode_escape")) - temp_data_file.close() + index_to_key = {} + for index, (key, data) in enumerate(chunk): + content = data if data.endswith("\n") else data + "\n" + name = str(index) + with open(os.path.join(tmp_dir, name), "wb") as fh: + fh.write(bytes(content, encoding="raw_unicode_escape")) + index_to_key[name] = key - secrets = SecretsCollection() - - if not detect_secrets_plugins: - detect_secrets_plugins = default_detect_secrets_plugins - - settings = { - "plugins_used": detect_secrets_plugins, - "filters_used": [ - {"path": "detect_secrets.filters.common.is_invalid_file"}, - {"path": "detect_secrets.filters.common.is_known_false_positive"}, - {"path": "detect_secrets.filters.heuristic.is_likely_id_string"}, - {"path": "detect_secrets.filters.heuristic.is_potential_secret"}, - ], - } - - if excluded_secrets and len(excluded_secrets) > 0: - settings["filters_used"].append( - { - "path": "detect_secrets.filters.regex.should_exclude_line", - "pattern": excluded_secrets, - } + temp_output_file = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False, suffix=".json") + temp_output_file.close() + command = _build_kingfisher_command( + [tmp_dir], temp_output_file.name, confidence, validate, no_dedup=True + ) + process = subprocess.run( + command, + capture_output=True, + text=True, + timeout=default_secrets_scan_timeout, + ) + if process.returncode not in _kingfisher_success_exit_codes: + raise SecretsScanError( + f"Kingfisher exited with code {process.returncode}: " + f"{process.stderr.strip()[:500]}" ) - with transient_settings(settings): - if file: - secrets.scan_file(file) - else: - secrets.scan_file(temp_data_file.name) - if not file: - os.remove(temp_data_file.name) + with open(temp_output_file.name, encoding=encoding_format_utf_8) as f: + output = f.read() + kingfisher_output = json.loads(output) if output.strip() else {} - detect_secrets_output = secrets.json() + source_lines_cache = {} - if detect_secrets_output: - if file: - return detect_secrets_output[file] - else: - return detect_secrets_output[temp_data_file.name] - else: - return None - except Exception as e: - logger.error(f"Error scanning for secrets: {e}") - return None + def source_lines(file_name: str) -> list: + if file_name not in source_lines_cache: + with open( + os.path.join(tmp_dir, file_name), + encoding=encoding_format_utf_8, + errors="replace", + ) as f: + source_lines_cache[file_name] = f.read().splitlines() + return source_lines_cache[file_name] + + for entry in kingfisher_output.get("findings", []): + finding = entry.get("finding", {}) + name = os.path.basename(finding.get("path", "")) + key = index_to_key.get(name) + if key is None: + continue + # Validate the line index before any consumer trusts it. Checks use + # ``line_number`` as a 1-based index into their own parallel data + # (e.g. CloudWatch does ``events[line_number - 1]``), so a missing, + # non-integer, or out-of-range line would crash the check or map the + # secret to the wrong resource. Fail closed: surface a malformed + # finding as a scan failure so callers report MANUAL instead of a + # wrong PASS/FAIL. ``bool`` is rejected explicitly because it is a + # subclass of ``int``. + line_number = finding.get("line") + lines = source_lines(name) + if ( + isinstance(line_number, bool) + or not isinstance(line_number, int) + or not 1 <= line_number <= len(lines) + ): + raise SecretsScanError( + f"Kingfisher returned an invalid line number " + f"{line_number!r} for a finding in {name}" + ) + if excluded_secrets and any( + re.search(pattern, lines[line_number - 1]) + for pattern in excluded_secrets + ): + continue + results.setdefault(key, []).append(_finding_to_dict(entry, name)) + except SecretsScanError: + # Already a typed scan failure; propagate so callers report MANUAL. + raise + except subprocess.TimeoutExpired as error: + raise SecretsScanError( + f"Kingfisher timed out after {default_secrets_scan_timeout}s " + "while scanning for secrets" + ) from error + except Exception as error: + # Fail closed: a missing/unexecutable binary, unparseable JSON output or + # any other runtime failure must NOT be silently treated as "no secrets + # found". Surface it so callers can report MANUAL instead of PASS. + raise SecretsScanError(f"Secret scan failed: {error}") from error + finally: + if temp_output_file and os.path.exists(temp_output_file.name): + os.remove(temp_output_file.name) + shutil.rmtree(tmp_dir, ignore_errors=True) + + +def detect_secrets_scan_batch( + payloads: Union[Mapping[Any, str], Iterable[tuple[Any, str]]], + excluded_secrets: Optional[list[str]] = None, + confidence: str = default_secrets_confidence, + validate: bool = False, + chunk_size: int = default_secrets_batch_chunk_size, +) -> dict: + """Scan many payloads with Kingfisher in chunked subprocess invocations. + + This is the scan entry point used by every secret check. Each payload is + written to its own file and scanned with ``--no-dedup`` so per-payload + results match scanning each payload on its own. Payloads are processed in + chunks (writing each to disk and releasing it as it is consumed) to bound + peak temp-disk and memory use while amortizing the per-process spawn cost + across many fragments. + + By default the scan runs fully offline (``--no-validate``, + ``--no-update-check``): no network calls are made, so the scanned data is + never sent anywhere. When ``validate`` is True, Kingfisher additionally + checks whether each discovered secret is live by authenticating with it + against the provider's API (the secret itself is the credential; no extra + permissions are required). That makes outbound network calls, so it must be + explicitly opted in. + + Args: + payloads: a mapping ``{key: data}`` or any iterable of ``(key, data)`` + pairs. ``key`` is any hashable the caller uses to map findings back + to its source (e.g. a variable name or a ``(resource, stream)``). + excluded_secrets (list): regex patterns; a finding whose source line + matches one is excluded. + confidence (str): minimum Kingfisher confidence ("low"/"medium"/"high"). + validate (bool): live-validate discovered secrets (outbound calls). + chunk_size (int): payloads scanned per Kingfisher invocation. + Returns: + dict mapping each key that produced findings to its list of finding + dicts, each with ``filename``, ``line_number``, ``type``, + ``hashed_secret`` and ``is_verified`` keys. Keys with no findings are + omitted. + Raises: + SecretsScanError: if the scanner fails for any chunk (non-success exit + code, timeout, missing/unexecutable binary or unparseable output). + An empty result is therefore always "no secrets found", never a + silent scan failure; callers must report MANUAL on this error. + """ + items = payloads.items() if hasattr(payloads, "items") else payloads + results = {} + chunk = [] + for key, data in items: + chunk.append((key, data)) + if len(chunk) >= chunk_size: + _scan_batch_chunk(chunk, excluded_secrets, confidence, validate, results) + chunk = [] + _scan_batch_chunk(chunk, excluded_secrets, confidence, validate, results) + return results + + +def annotate_verified_secrets(report, secrets: list) -> None: + """Escalate and annotate a finding when any of its secrets is confirmed live. + + When secret validation (``--scan-secrets-validate`` / ``secrets_validate``) + confirms that a discovered secret is live, the finding is more severe than a + potential secret: its severity is raised to critical and a note is appended + to ``status_extended``. No-op when no secret was validated as live, so the + default offline behavior (and existing finding messages) is unchanged. + """ + if secrets and any(secret.get("is_verified") for secret in secrets): + from prowler.lib.check.models import Severity + + report.check_metadata.Severity = Severity.critical + report.status_extended += ( + " One or more of these secrets were confirmed to be live." + ) def validate_ip_address(ip_string): diff --git a/prowler/providers/alibabacloud/alibabacloud_provider.py b/prowler/providers/alibabacloud/alibabacloud_provider.py index 82e48e2f14..d7020186a0 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/alibabacloud/alibabacloud_provider.py +++ b/prowler/providers/alibabacloud/alibabacloud_provider.py @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ class AlibabacloudProvider(Provider): """ _type: str = "alibabacloud" + sdk_only: bool = False _identity: AlibabaCloudIdentityInfo _session: AlibabaCloudSession _audit_resources: list = [] diff --git a/prowler/providers/alibabacloud/services/cs/cs_kubernetes_cluster_check_weekly/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/alibabacloud/services/cs/cs_kubernetes_cluster_check_weekly/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/alibabacloud/services/ram/ram_password_policy_number/ram_password_policy_number.py b/prowler/providers/alibabacloud/services/ram/ram_password_policy_number/ram_password_policy_number.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..305570289c --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/alibabacloud/services/ram/ram_password_policy_number/ram_password_policy_number.py @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, CheckReportAlibabaCloud +from prowler.providers.alibabacloud.services.ram.ram_client import ram_client + + +class ram_password_policy_number(Check): + """Check if RAM password policy requires at least one number.""" + + def execute(self) -> list[CheckReportAlibabaCloud]: + findings = [] + + if ram_client.password_policy: + report = CheckReportAlibabaCloud( + metadata=self.metadata(), resource=ram_client.password_policy + ) + report.region = ram_client.region + report.resource_id = f"{ram_client.audited_account}-password-policy" + report.resource_arn = ( + f"acs:ram::{ram_client.audited_account}:password-policy" + ) + + if ram_client.password_policy.require_numbers: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + "RAM password policy requires at least one number." + ) + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + "RAM password policy does not require at least one number." + ) + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/aws_provider.py b/prowler/providers/aws/aws_provider.py index cf6cbdd73a..b4c9ed3771 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/aws_provider.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/aws_provider.py @@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ class AwsProvider(Provider): """ _type: str = "aws" + sdk_only: bool = False _identity: AWSIdentityInfo _session: AWSSession _organizations_metadata: AWSOrganizationsInfo diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/aws_regions_by_service.json b/prowler/providers/aws/aws_regions_by_service.json index 2e451910fb..68e164b13e 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/aws_regions_by_service.json +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/aws_regions_by_service.json @@ -2582,6 +2582,7 @@ "aws": [ "af-south-1", "ap-east-1", + "ap-east-2", "ap-northeast-1", "ap-northeast-2", "ap-northeast-3", @@ -2591,6 +2592,9 @@ "ap-southeast-2", "ap-southeast-3", "ap-southeast-4", + "ap-southeast-5", + "ap-southeast-6", + "ap-southeast-7", "ca-central-1", "ca-west-1", "eu-central-1", @@ -2604,6 +2608,7 @@ "il-central-1", "me-central-1", "me-south-1", + "mx-central-1", "sa-east-1", "us-east-1", "us-east-2", @@ -7344,6 +7349,7 @@ "lightsail": { "regions": { "aws": [ + "ap-east-1", "ap-northeast-1", "ap-northeast-2", "ap-south-1", @@ -7354,9 +7360,11 @@ "ca-central-1", "eu-central-1", "eu-north-1", + "eu-south-2", "eu-west-1", "eu-west-2", "eu-west-3", + "sa-east-1", "us-east-1", "us-east-2", "us-west-2" @@ -8269,7 +8277,9 @@ "cn-north-1", "cn-northwest-1" ], - "aws-eusc": [], + "aws-eusc": [ + "eusc-de-east-1" + ], "aws-us-gov": [ "us-gov-east-1", "us-gov-west-1" @@ -9208,11 +9218,13 @@ "pcs": { "regions": { "aws": [ + "af-south-1", "ap-northeast-1", "ap-northeast-3", "ap-south-1", "ap-southeast-1", "ap-southeast-2", + "ap-southeast-3", "eu-central-1", "eu-north-1", "eu-south-1", @@ -9220,6 +9232,7 @@ "eu-west-1", "eu-west-2", "eu-west-3", + "sa-east-1", "us-east-1", "us-east-2", "us-west-2" @@ -9986,6 +9999,8 @@ "ap-south-1", "ap-southeast-1", "ap-southeast-2", + "ap-southeast-5", + "ap-southeast-7", "ca-central-1", "eu-central-1", "eu-south-2", diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/lib/ip_ranges/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/aws/lib/ip_ranges/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/lib/ip_ranges/ip_ranges.py b/prowler/providers/aws/lib/ip_ranges/ip_ranges.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3dbb9d1b17 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/lib/ip_ranges/ip_ranges.py @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +import json +import urllib.error +import urllib.request +from ipaddress import ip_network + +from prowler.lib.logger import logger + +AWS_IP_RANGES_URL = "https://ip-ranges.amazonaws.com/ip-ranges.json" +AWS_IP_RANGES_TIMEOUT = 10 + + +def get_public_ip_networks() -> list: + """Fetch the AWS public IP prefixes as a list of ip_network objects. + + The request verifies the server certificate against the system trust store, + matching urllib's default behaviour. This replaces the unmaintained + awsipranges package, whose latest release (0.3.3) calls + urllib.request.urlopen() with the cafile/capath arguments that Python 3.13 + removed. + + Returns an empty list when the feed cannot be fetched or parsed, and skips + individual malformed prefixes, so a transient or corrupt feed never aborts + the calling check. + """ + try: + with urllib.request.urlopen( + AWS_IP_RANGES_URL, timeout=AWS_IP_RANGES_TIMEOUT + ) as response: + ranges = json.loads(response.read()) + except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, json.JSONDecodeError) as error: + logger.error( + f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + return [] + + networks = [] + for key, prefixes in ( + ("ip_prefix", ranges.get("prefixes", [])), + ("ipv6_prefix", ranges.get("ipv6_prefixes", [])), + ): + for prefix in prefixes: + cidr = prefix.get(key) + if not cidr: + continue + try: + networks.append(ip_network(cidr)) + except ValueError as error: + logger.warning( + f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + return networks diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/acmpca/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/acmpca/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/acmpca/acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/acmpca/acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/acmpca/acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm/acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/aws/services/acmpca/acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm/acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6915540539 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/acmpca/acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm/acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +{ + "Provider": "aws", + "CheckID": "acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm", + "CheckTitle": "AWS Private CA certificate authorities use a post-quantum (ML-DSA) key algorithm", + "CheckType": [ + "Software and Configuration Checks/AWS Security Best Practices" + ], + "ServiceName": "acmpca", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "low", + "ResourceType": "AwsAcmPcaCertificateAuthority", + "ResourceGroup": "security", + "Description": "**AWS Private Certificate Authorities (Private CAs)** are assessed for use of a **post-quantum digital signature key algorithm** (`ML_DSA_44`, `ML_DSA_65`, `ML_DSA_87`). CAs that still issue certificates with RSA or ECC algorithms produce signatures vulnerable to forgery once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer is available.", + "Risk": "RSA and ECC signatures can be broken by Shor's algorithm on a sufficiently large quantum computer. A compromised CA private key would let an attacker issue arbitrary certificates trusted across the PKI, undermining identity and code-signing controls. Migrating CAs to **ML-DSA** (NIST FIPS 204) provides quantum-resistant signatures so issued certificates retain integrity in the post-quantum era.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/privateca/latest/userguide/PcaTerms.html", + "https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2025/11/aws-private-ca-post-quantum-digital-certificates/", + "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/post-quantum-ml-dsa-code-signing-with-aws-private-ca-and-aws-kms/", + "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/final" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "aws acm-pca create-certificate-authority --certificate-authority-configuration '{\"KeyAlgorithm\":\"ML_DSA_65\",\"SigningAlgorithm\":\"ML_DSA_65\",\"Subject\":{...}}' --certificate-authority-type SUBORDINATE", + "NativeIaC": "```yaml\nResources:\n :\n Type: AWS::ACMPCA::CertificateAuthority\n Properties:\n Type: SUBORDINATE\n KeyAlgorithm: ML_DSA_65 # FIX: post-quantum signature algorithm\n SigningAlgorithm: ML_DSA_65\n Subject:\n CommonName: example-pqc-ca\n```", + "Other": "Existing CAs cannot have their key algorithm changed; create a new CA with KeyAlgorithm = ML_DSA_44 / ML_DSA_65 / ML_DSA_87, re-issue certificates from it, and decommission the legacy CA once dependent workloads have rotated.", + "Terraform": "```hcl\nresource \"aws_acmpca_certificate_authority\" \"\" {\n type = \"SUBORDINATE\"\n certificate_authority_configuration {\n key_algorithm = \"ML_DSA_65\" # FIX: post-quantum signature algorithm\n signing_algorithm = \"ML_DSA_65\"\n subject {\n common_name = \"example-pqc-ca\"\n }\n }\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Create new Private CAs with a **post-quantum key algorithm** (`ML_DSA_44`, `ML_DSA_65`, or `ML_DSA_87`) and migrate workloads off legacy RSA/ECC CAs. Plan crypto-agility for your PKI so that quantum-resistant trust anchors can be rolled out before threat actors gain access to a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "encryption" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "" +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/acmpca/acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm/acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/acmpca/acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm/acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..738875baee --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/acmpca/acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm/acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm.py @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_AWS +from prowler.providers.aws.services.acmpca.acmpca_client import acmpca_client + +PQC_PCA_KEY_ALGORITHMS_DEFAULT = [ + "ML_DSA_44", + "ML_DSA_65", + "ML_DSA_87", +] + + +class acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm(Check): + """Verify that every AWS Private CA uses a post-quantum key algorithm. + + A Private CA PASSES when its ``KeyAlgorithm`` belongs to the configured + allowlist of post-quantum signature algorithms (ML-DSA family). + Deleted CAs are skipped. + """ + + def execute(self) -> list[Check_Report_AWS]: + """Execute the check against AWS Private CAs. + + Returns: + A list of reports with each non-deleted CA PQC key algorithm status. + """ + + findings = [] + pqc_algorithms = acmpca_client.audit_config.get( + "acmpca_pqc_key_algorithms", PQC_PCA_KEY_ALGORITHMS_DEFAULT + ) + for ca in acmpca_client.certificate_authorities.values(): + if ca.status == "DELETED": + continue + report = Check_Report_AWS(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=ca) + algorithm = ca.key_algorithm or "" + if ca.key_algorithm in pqc_algorithms: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"AWS Private CA {ca.id} uses post-quantum key algorithm " + f"{algorithm}." + ) + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"AWS Private CA {ca.id} uses key algorithm {algorithm}, " + "which is not post-quantum (ML-DSA)." + ) + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/acmpca/acmpca_client.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/acmpca/acmpca_client.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c8e22730bc --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/acmpca/acmpca_client.py @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +from prowler.providers.aws.services.acmpca.acmpca_service import ACMPCA +from prowler.providers.common.provider import Provider + +acmpca_client = ACMPCA(Provider.get_global_provider()) diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/acmpca/acmpca_service.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/acmpca/acmpca_service.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9c6fb77096 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/acmpca/acmpca_service.py @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +from __future__ import annotations + +from typing import Any, Dict, List + +from pydantic.v1 import BaseModel, Field + +from prowler.lib.logger import logger +from prowler.lib.scan_filters.scan_filters import is_resource_filtered +from prowler.providers.aws.aws_provider import AwsProvider +from prowler.providers.aws.lib.service.service import AWSService + + +class ACMPCA(AWSService): + """AWS Private CA service class to list certificate authorities.""" + + def __init__(self, provider: AwsProvider) -> None: + """Initialize the AWS Private CA service. + + Args: + provider: AWS provider instance with session and audit context. + """ + + # The boto3 client identifier for AWS Private CA is "acm-pca" + super().__init__("acm-pca", provider) + self.certificate_authorities: dict[str, CertificateAuthority] = {} + self.__threading_call__(self._list_certificate_authorities) + + def _list_certificate_authorities(self, regional_client: Any) -> None: + """List AWS Private CAs and their tags in a region. + + Args: + regional_client: Regional AWS Private CA client. + """ + + logger.info("ACM PCA - Listing Certificate Authorities...") + try: + paginator = regional_client.get_paginator("list_certificate_authorities") + for page in paginator.paginate(): + for ca in page.get("CertificateAuthorities", []): + arn = ca.get("Arn", "") + if not arn: + continue + if self.audit_resources and not is_resource_filtered( + arn, self.audit_resources + ): + continue + config = ca.get("CertificateAuthorityConfiguration", {}) + tags = [] + try: + tags = regional_client.list_tags( + CertificateAuthorityArn=arn + ).get("Tags", []) + except Exception as error: + logger.error( + f"{regional_client.region} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + self.certificate_authorities[arn] = CertificateAuthority( + arn=arn, + id=arn.split("/")[-1], + region=regional_client.region, + status=ca.get("Status", ""), + type=ca.get("Type", ""), + usage_mode=ca.get("UsageMode", ""), + key_algorithm=config.get("KeyAlgorithm", ""), + signing_algorithm=config.get("SigningAlgorithm", ""), + tags=tags, + ) + except Exception as error: + logger.error( + f"{regional_client.region} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + + +class CertificateAuthority(BaseModel): + """AWS Private Certificate Authority metadata. + + Attributes: + arn: Certificate authority ARN. + id: Certificate authority identifier. + region: AWS region where the certificate authority exists. + status: Certificate authority lifecycle status. + type: Certificate authority type. + usage_mode: Certificate authority usage mode. + key_algorithm: Key algorithm configured for the certificate authority. + signing_algorithm: Signing algorithm configured for the certificate authority. + tags: Tags attached to the certificate authority. + """ + + arn: str + id: str + region: str + status: str = "" + type: str = "" + usage_mode: str = "" + key_algorithm: str = "" + signing_algorithm: str = "" + tags: List[Dict[str, str]] = Field(default_factory=list) diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/apigateway/apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/apigateway/apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/apigateway/apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled/apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/aws/services/apigateway/apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled/apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..276f6e1741 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/apigateway/apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled/apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +{ + "Provider": "aws", + "CheckID": "apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled", + "CheckTitle": "API Gateway custom domain names use a post-quantum TLS security policy", + "CheckType": [ + "Software and Configuration Checks/AWS Security Best Practices" + ], + "ServiceName": "apigateway", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "low", + "ResourceType": "AwsApiGatewayDomainName", + "ResourceGroup": "network", + "Description": "**API Gateway custom domain names** for REST APIs are assessed for use of a **post-quantum (PQ) TLS security policy** such as `SecurityPolicy_TLS13_1_2_PQ_2025_09`. Custom domains with legacy policies such as `TLS_1_0` or `TLS_1_2` lack hybrid ML-KEM key exchange, leaving captured traffic vulnerable to future quantum decryption.", + "Risk": "Without a PQ-ready TLS policy, traffic to API Gateway custom domains captured today can be decrypted once a **cryptographically relevant quantum computer** exists (**harvest-now, decrypt-later** attack). This threatens long-term **confidentiality** of API payloads, credentials, and bearer tokens.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/apigateway/latest/developerguide/apigateway-custom-domain-tls-version.html", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/apigateway/latest/developerguide/apigateway-security-policies-list.html", + "https://aws.amazon.com/security/post-quantum-cryptography/", + "https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "aws apigateway update-domain-name --domain-name --patch-operations op=replace,path=/securityPolicy,value=SecurityPolicy_TLS13_1_2_PQ_2025_09", + "NativeIaC": "```yaml\nResources:\n :\n Type: AWS::ApiGateway::DomainName\n Properties:\n DomainName: api.example.com\n RegionalCertificateArn: \n SecurityPolicy: SecurityPolicy_TLS13_1_2_PQ_2025_09 # FIX: enhanced post-quantum security policy\n EndpointConfiguration:\n Types:\n - REGIONAL\n```", + "Other": "1. In the AWS Console, go to API Gateway > Custom domain names\n2. Select the custom domain and choose Edit on Domain name configurations\n3. Set Security policy to SecurityPolicy_TLS13_1_2_PQ_2025_09 (post-quantum) and Endpoint access mode to Strict\n4. Save the changes", + "Terraform": "```hcl\nresource \"aws_api_gateway_domain_name\" \"\" {\n domain_name = \"api.example.com\"\n regional_certificate_arn = \"\"\n security_policy = \"SecurityPolicy_TLS13_1_2_PQ_2025_09\" # FIX: enhanced post-quantum security policy\n endpoint_configuration {\n types = [\"REGIONAL\"]\n }\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Migrate every API Gateway custom domain name to an **enhanced post-quantum TLS policy** such as `SecurityPolicy_TLS13_1_2_PQ_2025_09` that enables hybrid ML-KEM key exchange. Note that you must also enable Strict endpoint access mode and that mutual TLS is not supported on enhanced policies. Review allowed policies regularly as AWS publishes new PQ-ready options.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "encryption" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "API Gateway HTTP and WebSocket APIs only support the legacy TLS_1_2 security policy and therefore cannot use post-quantum TLS today; this check evaluates REST API custom domain names only." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/apigateway/apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled/apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/apigateway/apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled/apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d9c2d071f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/apigateway/apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled/apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.py @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_AWS +from prowler.providers.aws.services.apigateway.apigateway_client import ( + apigateway_client, +) + +PQC_APIGATEWAY_POLICIES_DEFAULT = [ + "SecurityPolicy_TLS13_1_2_FIPS_PFS_PQ_2025_09", + "SecurityPolicy_TLS13_1_2_PFS_PQ_2025_09", + "SecurityPolicy_TLS13_1_2_PQ_2025_09", +] + + +def _get_allowed_policies(configured_policies: object) -> list[str]: + if not isinstance(configured_policies, list): + return PQC_APIGATEWAY_POLICIES_DEFAULT + + return configured_policies + + +class apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled(Check): + """Verify that every API Gateway custom domain name uses a post-quantum TLS policy. + + A custom domain name PASSES when its ``securityPolicy`` belongs to the + configured allowlist of enhanced post-quantum policies. + """ + + def execute(self) -> list[Check_Report_AWS]: + """Execute the API Gateway custom domain post-quantum TLS check. + + Returns: + A list of reports for API Gateway custom domain names and their + post-quantum TLS policy compliance status. + """ + findings = [] + pqc_policies = _get_allowed_policies( + apigateway_client.audit_config.get("apigateway_pqc_tls_allowed_policies") + ) + for domain in apigateway_client.domain_names: + report = Check_Report_AWS(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=domain) + policy = domain.security_policy or "" + if domain.security_policy in pqc_policies: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"API Gateway custom domain {domain.name} uses post-quantum " + f"TLS policy {policy}." + ) + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"API Gateway custom domain {domain.name} uses TLS policy " + f"{policy}, which is not in the post-quantum allowlist." + ) + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/apigateway/apigateway_service.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/apigateway/apigateway_service.py index 4f887a2da8..099551f440 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/apigateway/apigateway_service.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/apigateway/apigateway_service.py @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -from typing import Optional +from typing import Any, Optional from botocore.exceptions import ClientError from pydantic.v1 import BaseModel @@ -13,12 +13,45 @@ class APIGateway(AWSService): # Call AWSService's __init__ super().__init__(__class__.__name__, provider) self.rest_apis = [] + self.domain_names = [] self.__threading_call__(self._get_rest_apis) + self.__threading_call__(self._get_domain_names) self._get_authorizers() self._get_rest_api() self._get_stages() self._get_resources() + def _get_domain_names(self, regional_client: Any) -> None: + """Get API Gateway custom domain names for a regional client. + + Args: + regional_client: Regional API Gateway boto3 client used to list + custom domain names. + """ + logger.info("APIGateway - Getting custom domain names...") + try: + paginator = regional_client.get_paginator("get_domain_names") + for page in paginator.paginate(): + for item in page.get("items", []): + domain_name = item.get("domainName", "") + arn = f"arn:{self.audited_partition}:apigateway:{regional_client.region}::/domainnames/{domain_name}" + if not self.audit_resources or ( + is_resource_filtered(arn, self.audit_resources) + ): + self.domain_names.append( + DomainName( + name=domain_name, + arn=arn, + region=regional_client.region, + security_policy=item.get("securityPolicy", ""), + tags=[item.get("tags", {})], + ) + ) + except Exception as error: + logger.error( + f"{regional_client.region} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + def _get_rest_apis(self, regional_client): logger.info("APIGateway - Getting Rest APIs...") try: @@ -249,3 +282,21 @@ class RestAPI(BaseModel): stages: list[Stage] = [] tags: Optional[list] = [] resources: list[PathResourceMethods] = [] + + +class DomainName(BaseModel): + """API Gateway custom domain name metadata. + + Attributes: + name: Custom domain name. + arn: Custom domain name ARN. + region: AWS region where the custom domain name exists. + security_policy: TLS security policy configured for the custom domain. + tags: Custom domain tags. + """ + + name: str + arn: str + region: str + security_policy: str = "" + tags: Optional[list] = [] diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/autoscaling/autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration/autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/autoscaling/autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration/autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration.py index 6595b71085..dbe6fc534c 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/autoscaling/autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration/autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/autoscaling/autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration/autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration.py @@ -4,7 +4,11 @@ from base64 import b64decode from prowler.config.config import encoding_format_utf_8 from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_AWS from prowler.lib.logger import logger -from prowler.lib.utils.utils import detect_secrets_scan +from prowler.lib.utils.utils import ( + SecretsScanError, + annotate_verified_secrets, + detect_secrets_scan_batch, +) from prowler.providers.aws.services.autoscaling.autoscaling_client import ( autoscaling_client, ) @@ -16,13 +20,19 @@ class autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration(Check): secrets_ignore_patterns = autoscaling_client.audit_config.get( "secrets_ignore_patterns", [] ) - for ( - configuration_arn, - configuration, - ) in autoscaling_client.launch_configurations.items(): - report = Check_Report_AWS(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=configuration) + validate = autoscaling_client.audit_config.get("secrets_validate", False) + configurations = list(autoscaling_client.launch_configurations.values()) - if configuration.user_data: + # Collect the decoded User Data of each launch configuration and scan it + # all in batched Kingfisher invocations instead of one subprocess each. + # Configurations whose User Data cannot be decoded are undecodable (no report), + # matching the original per-resource behavior. + undecodable = set() + + def payloads(): + for index, configuration in enumerate(configurations): + if not configuration.user_data: + continue user_data = b64decode(configuration.user_data) try: if user_data[0:2] == b"\x1f\x8b": # GZIP magic number @@ -35,24 +45,46 @@ class autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration(Check): logger.warning( f"{configuration.region} -- Unable to decode user data in autoscaling launch configuration {configuration.name}: {error}" ) + undecodable.add(index) continue except Exception as error: logger.error( f"{configuration.region} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" ) + undecodable.add(index) continue + yield index, user_data - has_secrets = detect_secrets_scan( - data=user_data, - excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, - detect_secrets_plugins=autoscaling_client.audit_config.get( - "detect_secrets_plugins" - ), + scan_error = None + try: + batch_results = detect_secrets_scan_batch( + payloads(), excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, validate=validate + ) + except SecretsScanError as error: + batch_results = {} + scan_error = error + + for index, configuration in enumerate(configurations): + report = Check_Report_AWS(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=configuration) + + if scan_error and configuration.user_data: + report.status = "MANUAL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Could not scan autoscaling {configuration.name} User Data for " + f"secrets: {scan_error}; manual review is required." ) + findings.append(report) + continue + if index in undecodable: + report.status = "MANUAL" + report.status_extended = f"Could not decode User Data for autoscaling {configuration.name}; manual review is required to scan for secrets." + elif configuration.user_data: + has_secrets = batch_results.get(index) if has_secrets: report.status = "FAIL" report.status_extended = f"Potential secret found in autoscaling {configuration.name} User Data." + annotate_verified_secrets(report, has_secrets) else: report.status = "PASS" report.status_extended = f"No secrets found in autoscaling {configuration.name} User Data." diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/awslambda/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/awslambda/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code.py index 51c56a2011..66ecf1e88f 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/awslambda/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/awslambda/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code.py @@ -1,65 +1,105 @@ import os import tempfile +from collections import defaultdict from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_AWS -from prowler.lib.utils.utils import detect_secrets_scan +from prowler.lib.utils.utils import ( + SecretsScanError, + annotate_verified_secrets, + detect_secrets_scan_batch, +) from prowler.providers.aws.services.awslambda.awslambda_client import awslambda_client class awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code(Check): def execute(self): findings = [] - if awslambda_client.functions: - secrets_ignore_patterns = awslambda_client.audit_config.get( - "secrets_ignore_patterns", [] - ) + if not awslambda_client.functions: + return findings + + secrets_ignore_patterns = awslambda_client.audit_config.get( + "secrets_ignore_patterns", [] + ) + validate = awslambda_client.audit_config.get("secrets_validate", False) + + # Scan the top-level files of every function's package in batched + # Kingfisher invocations instead of one subprocess per file per function. + # Each package is extracted one at a time and its top-level files are + # read (byte-faithfully via latin-1) before the extraction is released, + # so only a single package is on disk at a time. Findings are keyed by + # (function index, file name) so they can be grouped back per function. + functions_with_code = [] + + def code_payloads(): for function, function_code in awslambda_client._get_function_code(): - if function_code: - report = Check_Report_AWS( - metadata=self.metadata(), resource=function + if not function_code: + continue + index = len(functions_with_code) + functions_with_code.append(function) + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp_dir_name: + function_code.code_zip.extractall(tmp_dir_name) + for file_name in next(os.walk(tmp_dir_name))[2]: + try: + with open( + os.path.join(tmp_dir_name, file_name), "rb" + ) as code_file: + content = code_file.read().decode("latin-1") + except Exception: + continue + yield (index, file_name), content + + scan_error = None + try: + batch_results = detect_secrets_scan_batch( + code_payloads(), + excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, + validate=validate, + ) + except SecretsScanError as error: + batch_results = {} + scan_error = error + + if scan_error: + # The scan failed before any function's code could be cleared. Report + # MANUAL for every function rather than risk a false PASS. + for function in awslambda_client.functions.values(): + report = Check_Report_AWS(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=function) + report.status = "MANUAL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Could not scan Lambda function {function.name} code for " + f"secrets: {scan_error}; manual review is required." + ) + findings.append(report) + return findings + + findings_by_function = defaultdict(dict) + for (index, file_name), file_findings in batch_results.items(): + findings_by_function[index][file_name] = file_findings + + for index, function in enumerate(functions_with_code): + report = Check_Report_AWS(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=function) + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"No secrets found in Lambda function {function.name} code." + ) + + files_with_secrets = findings_by_function.get(index) + if files_with_secrets: + all_secrets = [] + secrets_findings = [] + for file_name, file_findings in files_with_secrets.items(): + all_secrets.extend(file_findings) + secrets_string = ", ".join( + f"{secret['type']} on line {secret['line_number']}" + for secret in file_findings ) + secrets_findings.append(f"{file_name}: {secrets_string}") - report.status = "PASS" - report.status_extended = ( - f"No secrets found in Lambda function {function.name} code." - ) - with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp_dir_name: - function_code.code_zip.extractall(tmp_dir_name) - # List all files - files_in_zip = next(os.walk(tmp_dir_name))[2] - secrets_findings = [] - for file in files_in_zip: - detect_secrets_output = detect_secrets_scan( - file=f"{tmp_dir_name}/{file}", - excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, - detect_secrets_plugins=awslambda_client.audit_config.get( - "detect_secrets_plugins", - ), - ) - if detect_secrets_output: - for ( - secret - ) in ( - detect_secrets_output - ): # Appears that only 1 file is being scanned at a time, so could rework this - output_file_name = secret["filename"].replace( - f"{tmp_dir_name}/", "" - ) - secrets_string = ", ".join( - [ - f"{secret['type']} on line {secret['line_number']}" - for secret in detect_secrets_output - ] - ) - secrets_findings.append( - f"{output_file_name}: {secrets_string}" - ) + final_output_string = "; ".join(secrets_findings) + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"Potential {'secrets' if len(secrets_findings) > 1 else 'secret'} found in Lambda function {function.name} code -> {final_output_string}." + annotate_verified_secrets(report, all_secrets) - if secrets_findings: - final_output_string = "; ".join(secrets_findings) - report.status = "FAIL" - report.status_extended = f"Potential {'secrets' if len(secrets_findings) > 1 else 'secret'} found in Lambda function {function.name} code -> {final_output_string}." - - findings.append(report) + findings.append(report) return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/awslambda/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/awslambda/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables.py index 9448b0239f..065cc7a9b9 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/awslambda/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/awslambda/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables.py @@ -1,7 +1,11 @@ import json from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_AWS -from prowler.lib.utils.utils import detect_secrets_scan +from prowler.lib.utils.utils import ( + SecretsScanError, + annotate_verified_secrets, + detect_secrets_scan_batch, +) from prowler.providers.aws.services.awslambda.awslambda_client import awslambda_client @@ -11,7 +15,30 @@ class awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables(Check): secrets_ignore_patterns = awslambda_client.audit_config.get( "secrets_ignore_patterns", [] ) - for function in awslambda_client.functions.values(): + validate = awslambda_client.audit_config.get("secrets_validate", False) + functions = list(awslambda_client.functions.values()) + + # Scan every function's environment variables in batched Kingfisher + # invocations instead of one subprocess per function. Payloads are + # yielded lazily so only a chunk is held/written at a time, which matters + # for accounts with very large numbers of Lambda functions. + def environment_payloads(): + for index, function in enumerate(functions): + if function.environment: + yield index, json.dumps(function.environment, indent=2) + + scan_error = None + try: + batch_results = detect_secrets_scan_batch( + environment_payloads(), + excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, + validate=validate, + ) + except SecretsScanError as error: + batch_results = {} + scan_error = error + + for index, function in enumerate(functions): report = Check_Report_AWS(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=function) report.status = "PASS" @@ -20,17 +47,17 @@ class awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables(Check): ) if function.environment: - detect_secrets_output = detect_secrets_scan( - data=json.dumps(function.environment, indent=2), - excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, - detect_secrets_plugins=awslambda_client.audit_config.get( - "detect_secrets_plugins", - ), - ) - original_env_vars = [] - for name, value in function.environment.items(): - original_env_vars.append(name) + if scan_error: + report.status = "MANUAL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Could not scan Lambda function {function.name} variables " + f"for secrets: {scan_error}; manual review is required." + ) + findings.append(report) + continue + detect_secrets_output = batch_results.get(index) if detect_secrets_output: + original_env_vars = list(function.environment.keys()) secrets_string = ", ".join( [ f"{secret['type']} in variable {original_env_vars[secret['line_number'] - 2]}" @@ -39,6 +66,7 @@ class awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables(Check): ) report.status = "FAIL" report.status_extended = f"Potential secret found in Lambda function {function.name} variables -> {secrets_string}." + annotate_verified_secrets(report, detect_secrets_output) findings.append(report) diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/awslambda/awslambda_service.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/awslambda/awslambda_service.py index 433a5ab588..ac90e9fb11 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/awslambda/awslambda_service.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/awslambda/awslambda_service.py @@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ from botocore.client import ClientError from pydantic.v1 import BaseModel from prowler.lib.logger import logger +from prowler.lib.resource_limit import ( + get_resource_scan_limit, + limit_resources, +) from prowler.lib.scan_filters.scan_filters import is_resource_filtered from prowler.providers.aws.lib.service.service import AWSService @@ -18,8 +22,16 @@ class Lambda(AWSService): def __init__(self, provider): # Call AWSService's __init__ super().__init__(__class__.__name__, provider) + # Functions are listed first, then trimmed to the subset selected for + # analysis before expensive per-function detail is hydrated. self.functions = {} + self.security_groups_in_use = set() + self.regions_with_functions = set() + self.function_limit = get_resource_scan_limit( + self.audit_config, "max_lambda_functions" + ) self.__threading_call__(self._list_functions) + self._select_functions_for_analysis() self._list_tags_for_resource() self.__threading_call__(self._get_policy) self.__threading_call__(self._get_function_url_config) @@ -30,24 +42,29 @@ class Lambda(AWSService): try: list_functions_paginator = regional_client.get_paginator("list_functions") for page in list_functions_paginator.paginate(): - for function in page["Functions"]: - if not self.audit_resources or ( - is_resource_filtered( - function["FunctionArn"], self.audit_resources - ) + for function in page.get("Functions", []): + if not self.audit_resources or is_resource_filtered( + function["FunctionArn"], self.audit_resources ): lambda_name = function["FunctionName"] lambda_arn = function["FunctionArn"] vpc_config = function.get("VpcConfig", {}) + security_groups = vpc_config.get("SecurityGroupIds", []) + self.security_groups_in_use.update(security_groups) + self.regions_with_functions.add(regional_client.region) # We must use the Lambda ARN as the dict key since we could have Lambdas in different regions with the same name self.functions[lambda_arn] = Function( name=lambda_name, arn=lambda_arn, - security_groups=vpc_config.get("SecurityGroupIds", []), + security_groups=security_groups, vpc_id=vpc_config.get("VpcId"), subnet_ids=set(vpc_config.get("SubnetIds", [])), region=regional_client.region, ) + if "LastModified" in function: + self.functions[lambda_arn].last_modified = function[ + "LastModified" + ] if "Runtime" in function: self.functions[lambda_arn].runtime = function["Runtime"] if "Environment" in function: @@ -76,26 +93,61 @@ class Lambda(AWSService): f" {error}" ) + def _select_functions_for_analysis(self): + self.functions = { + function.arn: function + for function in limit_resources( + sorted( + self.functions.values(), + key=lambda f: f.last_modified or "", + reverse=True, + ), + self.function_limit, + ) + } + def _list_event_source_mappings(self, regional_client): logger.info("Lambda - Listing Event Source Mappings...") try: paginator = regional_client.get_paginator("list_event_source_mappings") - for page in paginator.paginate(): - for mapping in page.get("EventSourceMappings", []): - function_arn = mapping.get("FunctionArn", "") - # Normalise to unqualified ARN (strip :qualifier suffix if present) - base_arn = ":".join(function_arn.split(":")[:7]) - if base_arn not in self.functions: - continue - self.functions[base_arn].event_source_mappings.append( - EventSourceMapping( - uuid=mapping["UUID"], - event_source_arn=mapping.get("EventSourceArn", ""), - state=mapping.get("State", ""), - batch_size=mapping.get("BatchSize"), - starting_position=mapping.get("StartingPosition"), + if not self.function_limit: + for page in paginator.paginate(): + self._add_event_source_mappings(page.get("EventSourceMappings", [])) + return + + for function in self.functions.values(): + if function.region != regional_client.region: + continue + try: + for page in paginator.paginate(FunctionName=function.name): + self._add_event_source_mappings( + page.get("EventSourceMappings", []) ) - ) + except ClientError as error: + if ( + error.response.get("Error", {}).get("Code") + == "InvalidParameterValueException" + ): + logger.warning( + f"{function.region} --" + f" {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]:" + f" {error}" + ) + else: + logger.error( + f"{function.region} --" + f" {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]:" + f" {error}" + ) + raise + except ClientError as error: + if self.function_limit: + raise + logger.error( + f"{regional_client.region} --" + f" {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]:" + f" {error}" + ) except Exception as error: logger.error( f"{regional_client.region} --" @@ -103,6 +155,23 @@ class Lambda(AWSService): f" {error}" ) + def _add_event_source_mappings(self, event_source_mappings): + for mapping in event_source_mappings: + function_arn = mapping.get("FunctionArn", "") + # Normalise to unqualified ARN (strip :qualifier suffix if present) + base_arn = ":".join(function_arn.split(":")[:7]) + if base_arn not in self.functions: + continue + self.functions[base_arn].event_source_mappings.append( + EventSourceMapping( + uuid=mapping["UUID"], + event_source_arn=mapping.get("EventSourceArn", ""), + state=mapping.get("State", ""), + batch_size=mapping.get("BatchSize"), + starting_position=mapping.get("StartingPosition"), + ) + ) + def _get_function_code(self): logger.info("Lambda - Getting Function Code...") # Use a thread pool handle the queueing and execution of the _fetch_function_code tasks, up to max_workers tasks concurrently. @@ -158,7 +227,6 @@ class Lambda(AWSService): except ClientError as e: if e.response["Error"]["Code"] == "ResourceNotFoundException": self.functions[function.arn].policy = {} - except Exception as error: logger.error( f"{regional_client.region} --" @@ -187,7 +255,6 @@ class Lambda(AWSService): except ClientError as e: if e.response["Error"]["Code"] == "ResourceNotFoundException": self.functions[function.arn].url_config = None - except Exception as error: logger.error( f"{regional_client.region} --" @@ -206,10 +273,9 @@ class Lambda(AWSService): except ClientError as e: if e.response["Error"]["Code"] == "ResourceNotFoundException": function.tags = [] - except Exception as error: logger.error( - f"{regional_client.region} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + f"{function.region} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" ) @@ -259,6 +325,7 @@ class Function(BaseModel): name: str arn: str security_groups: list + last_modified: Optional[str] = None runtime: Optional[str] = None environment: Optional[dict] = None region: str diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/backup/backup_service.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/backup/backup_service.py index 4320d42c0b..ddacc9e6d2 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/backup/backup_service.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/backup/backup_service.py @@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ from botocore.client import ClientError from pydantic.v1 import BaseModel from prowler.lib.logger import logger +from prowler.lib.resource_limit import ( + get_resource_scan_limit, + limit_resources, +) from prowler.lib.scan_filters.scan_filters import is_resource_filtered from prowler.providers.aws.lib.service.service import AWSService @@ -27,8 +31,14 @@ class Backup(AWSService): self.__threading_call__(self._list_backup_report_plans) self.protected_resources = [] self.__threading_call__(self._list_backup_selections) + # Recovery points are listed first, then only the selected subset is + # tagged and exposed for checks. self.recovery_points = [] - self.__threading_call__(self._list_recovery_points) + self.recovery_point_limit = get_resource_scan_limit( + self.audit_config, "max_backup_recovery_points" + ) + self.__threading_call__(self._list_recovery_points, self.backup_vaults or []) + self._select_recovery_points_for_analysis() self.__threading_call__(self._list_tags, self.recovery_points) def _list_backup_vaults(self, regional_client): @@ -183,40 +193,63 @@ class Backup(AWSService): f"{self.region} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" ) - def _list_recovery_points(self, regional_client): + def _list_recovery_points(self, backup_vault=None): logger.info("Backup - Listing Recovery Points...") + if backup_vault is None: + for vault in self.backup_vaults or []: + self._list_recovery_points(vault) + return + try: - if self.backup_vaults: - for backup_vault in self.backup_vaults: - paginator = regional_client.get_paginator( - "list_recovery_points_by_backup_vault" - ) - for page in paginator.paginate(BackupVaultName=backup_vault.name): - for recovery_point in page.get("RecoveryPoints", []): - arn = recovery_point.get("RecoveryPointArn") - if arn: - self.recovery_points.append( - RecoveryPoint( - arn=arn, - id=arn.split(":")[-1], - backup_vault_name=backup_vault.name, - encrypted=recovery_point.get( - "IsEncrypted", False - ), - backup_vault_region=backup_vault.region, - region=regional_client.region, - tags=[], - ) - ) + regional_client = self.regional_clients[backup_vault.region] + paginator = regional_client.get_paginator( + "list_recovery_points_by_backup_vault" + ) + for page in paginator.paginate(BackupVaultName=backup_vault.name): + for recovery_point in page.get("RecoveryPoints", []): + arn = recovery_point.get("RecoveryPointArn") + if arn: + rp = RecoveryPoint( + arn=arn, + id=arn.split(":")[-1], + backup_vault_name=backup_vault.name, + encrypted=recovery_point.get("IsEncrypted", False), + creation_date=recovery_point.get("CreationDate"), + backup_vault_region=backup_vault.region, + region=backup_vault.region, + tags=[], + ) + self.recovery_points.append(rp) except ClientError as error: logger.error( - f"{regional_client.region} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + f"{backup_vault.region} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" ) except Exception as error: logger.error( - f"{regional_client.region} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + f"{backup_vault.region} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" ) + def _select_recovery_points_for_analysis(self): + self.recovery_points = list( + limit_resources( + sorted( + self.recovery_points, + key=lambda rp: ( + ( + -rp.creation_date.timestamp() + if isinstance(rp.creation_date, datetime) + else 0.0 + ), + rp.region or "", + rp.backup_vault_name or "", + rp.arn or "", + rp.id or "", + ), + ), + self.recovery_point_limit, + ) + ) + class BackupVault(BaseModel): arn: str @@ -256,4 +289,5 @@ class RecoveryPoint(BaseModel): backup_vault_name: str encrypted: bool backup_vault_region: str + creation_date: Optional[datetime] = None tags: Optional[list] = None diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/bedrock/bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled/bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/bedrock/bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled/bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled.py index c4adddc344..230cfd2295 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/bedrock/bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled/bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/bedrock/bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled/bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled.py @@ -30,12 +30,13 @@ class bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled(Check): s3_encryption = False if logging.cloudwatch_log_group: log_group_arn = f"arn:{logs_client.audited_partition}:logs:{region}:{logs_client.audited_account}:log-group:{logging.cloudwatch_log_group}" + all_log_groups = getattr(logs_client, "all_log_groups", None) or {} if ( - log_group_arn in logs_client.log_groups - and not logs_client.log_groups[log_group_arn].kms_id + log_group_arn in all_log_groups + and not all_log_groups[log_group_arn].kms_id ) or ( - log_group_arn + ":*" in logs_client.log_groups - and not logs_client.log_groups[log_group_arn + ":*"].kms_id + log_group_arn + ":*" in all_log_groups + and not all_log_groups[log_group_arn + ":*"].kms_id ): cloudwatch_encryption = False if not s3_encryption and not cloudwatch_encryption: diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/cloudformation/cloudformation_stack_outputs_find_secrets/cloudformation_stack_outputs_find_secrets.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/cloudformation/cloudformation_stack_outputs_find_secrets/cloudformation_stack_outputs_find_secrets.py index f9b47932bb..b86f851765 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/cloudformation/cloudformation_stack_outputs_find_secrets/cloudformation_stack_outputs_find_secrets.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/cloudformation/cloudformation_stack_outputs_find_secrets/cloudformation_stack_outputs_find_secrets.py @@ -1,5 +1,9 @@ from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_AWS -from prowler.lib.utils.utils import detect_secrets_scan +from prowler.lib.utils.utils import ( + SecretsScanError, + annotate_verified_secrets, + detect_secrets_scan_batch, +) from prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudformation.cloudformation_client import ( cloudformation_client, ) @@ -14,26 +18,41 @@ class cloudformation_stack_outputs_find_secrets(Check): secrets_ignore_patterns = cloudformation_client.audit_config.get( "secrets_ignore_patterns", [] ) - for stack in cloudformation_client.stacks: + validate = cloudformation_client.audit_config.get("secrets_validate", False) + stacks = list(cloudformation_client.stacks) + + # Collect one payload per stack (its Outputs) and scan them all in + # batched Kingfisher invocations instead of one subprocess per stack. + def payloads(): + for index, stack in enumerate(stacks): + if stack.outputs: + yield index, "".join(f"{output}\n" for output in stack.outputs) + + scan_error = None + try: + batch_results = detect_secrets_scan_batch( + payloads(), excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, validate=validate + ) + except SecretsScanError as error: + batch_results = {} + scan_error = error + + for index, stack in enumerate(stacks): report = Check_Report_AWS(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=stack) report.status = "PASS" report.status_extended = ( f"No secrets found in CloudFormation Stack {stack.name} Outputs." ) if stack.outputs: - data = "" - # Store the CloudFormation Stack Outputs into a file - for output in stack.outputs: - data += f"{output}\n" - - detect_secrets_output = detect_secrets_scan( - data=data, - excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, - detect_secrets_plugins=cloudformation_client.audit_config.get( - "detect_secrets_plugins", - ), - ) - # If secrets are found, update the report status + if scan_error: + report.status = "MANUAL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Could not scan CloudFormation Stack {stack.name} Outputs " + f"for secrets: {scan_error}; manual review is required." + ) + findings.append(report) + continue + detect_secrets_output = batch_results.get(index) if detect_secrets_output: secrets_string = ", ".join( [ @@ -43,7 +62,7 @@ class cloudformation_stack_outputs_find_secrets(Check): ) report.status = "FAIL" report.status_extended = f"Potential secret found in CloudFormation Stack {stack.name} Outputs -> {secrets_string}." - + annotate_verified_secrets(report, detect_secrets_output) else: report.status = "PASS" report.status_extended = ( diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/cloudfront/cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/cloudfront/cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/cloudfront/cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled/cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/aws/services/cloudfront/cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled/cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..465f4335c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/cloudfront/cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled/cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +{ + "Provider": "aws", + "CheckID": "cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled", + "CheckTitle": "CloudFront distributions enforce a post-quantum TLS 1.3 security policy", + "CheckType": [ + "Software and Configuration Checks/AWS Security Best Practices" + ], + "ServiceName": "cloudfront", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "low", + "ResourceType": "AwsCloudFrontDistribution", + "ResourceGroup": "network", + "Description": "**CloudFront distributions** are assessed for use of a **TLS 1.3-only security policy** (`TLSv1.3_2025`). CloudFront's quantum-safe key exchanges (`X25519MLKEM768`, `SecP256r1MLKEM768`) only work with TLS 1.3. Distributions that allow TLS 1.2 (or older) fallback to classical key exchanges and are exposed to `harvest-now, decrypt-later` attacks.", + "Risk": "Without a TLS 1.3-only policy, viewer traffic captured today can be decrypted once a **cryptographically relevant quantum computer** is available. Distributions using the default CloudFront certificate (`*.cloudfront.net`) cannot enable a post-quantum policy because they are pinned to the legacy `TLSv1` policy.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudFront/latest/DeveloperGuide/secure-connections-supported-viewer-protocols-ciphers.html", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudFront/latest/DeveloperGuide/DownloadDistValuesGeneral.html#DownloadDistValues-security-policy", + "https://aws.amazon.com/security/post-quantum-cryptography/", + "https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "aws cloudfront update-distribution --id --distribution-config '{...\"ViewerCertificate\":{\"MinimumProtocolVersion\":\"TLSv1.3_2025\",...}}'", + "NativeIaC": "```yaml\nResources:\n :\n Type: AWS::CloudFront::Distribution\n Properties:\n DistributionConfig:\n ViewerCertificate:\n AcmCertificateArn: \n SslSupportMethod: sni-only\n MinimumProtocolVersion: TLSv1.3_2025 # FIX: enforces TLS 1.3 + post-quantum KEX\n```", + "Other": "1. In the AWS Console, go to CloudFront > Distributions\n2. Select the distribution and open the General tab\n3. Choose Edit on Settings\n4. Set Custom SSL certificate (do not use the default *.cloudfront.net certificate)\n5. Set Security policy to TLSv1.3_2025\n6. Save changes", + "Terraform": "```hcl\nresource \"aws_cloudfront_distribution\" \"\" {\n # ...\n viewer_certificate {\n acm_certificate_arn = \"\"\n ssl_support_method = \"sni-only\"\n minimum_protocol_version = \"TLSv1.3_2025\" # FIX: enforces TLS 1.3 + post-quantum KEX\n }\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Use a **custom SSL certificate** with **SNI** support and set `MinimumProtocolVersion` to `TLSv1.3_2025` so CloudFront refuses TLS 1.2 handshakes and uses the hybrid ML-KEM key exchange. Distributions still using the default CloudFront certificate must be migrated to a custom certificate to enable post-quantum TLS.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "encryption" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [ + "cloudfront_distributions_using_deprecated_ssl_protocols" + ], + "Notes": "" +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/cloudfront/cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled/cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/cloudfront/cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled/cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6c472d43c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/cloudfront/cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled/cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled.py @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_AWS +from prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudfront.cloudfront_client import ( + cloudfront_client, +) + +PQC_CLOUDFRONT_POLICIES_DEFAULT = [ + "TLSv1.3_2025", +] + + +class cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled(Check): + """Verify that every CloudFront distribution enforces TLS 1.3 with post-quantum key exchange. + + Quantum-safe key exchanges (``X25519MLKEM768``, ``SecP256r1MLKEM768``) are + only available on TLS 1.3 viewer connections. A distribution PASSES when + its ``MinimumProtocolVersion`` belongs to the configured allowlist of + TLS 1.3-only policies. Distributions that rely on the default CloudFront + certificate are pinned to the legacy ``TLSv1`` policy and therefore FAIL. + """ + + def execute(self) -> list[Check_Report_AWS]: + """Execute the CloudFront post-quantum TLS policy check. + + Returns: + A list of reports containing each CloudFront distribution's + post-quantum TLS compliance status. + """ + findings = [] + pqc_policies = cloudfront_client.audit_config.get( + "cloudfront_pqc_min_protocol_versions", PQC_CLOUDFRONT_POLICIES_DEFAULT + ) + for distribution in cloudfront_client.distributions.values(): + report = Check_Report_AWS(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=distribution) + policy = distribution.minimum_protocol_version or "" + if distribution.default_certificate: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"CloudFront Distribution {distribution.id} uses the default " + "CloudFront certificate, which pins the security policy to " + "TLSv1 and cannot enable post-quantum TLS." + ) + elif distribution.minimum_protocol_version in pqc_policies: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"CloudFront Distribution {distribution.id} uses post-quantum " + f"TLS policy {policy}." + ) + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"CloudFront Distribution {distribution.id} uses TLS policy " + f"{policy}, which is not in the post-quantum allowlist." + ) + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/cloudfront/cloudfront_service.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/cloudfront/cloudfront_service.py index 0826c9adfd..660b483c4c 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/cloudfront/cloudfront_service.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/cloudfront/cloudfront_service.py @@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ class CloudFront(AWSService): "SSLSupportMethod", "static-ip" ) ) + minimum_protocol_version = item["ViewerCertificate"].get( + "MinimumProtocolVersion", "" + ) origins = [] for origin in item.get("Origins", {}).get("Items", []): origins.append( @@ -79,6 +82,7 @@ class CloudFront(AWSService): ssl_support_method=ssl_support_method, default_certificate=default_certificate, certificate=certificate, + minimum_protocol_version=minimum_protocol_version, ) self.distributions[distribution_id] = distribution @@ -268,3 +272,4 @@ class Distribution(BaseModel): origin_failover: Optional[bool] = None ssl_support_method: Optional[SSLSupportMethod] = None certificate: Optional[str] = None + minimum_protocol_version: str = "" diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/cloudwatch/cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs/cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/cloudwatch/cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs/cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs.py index 5154a5acb7..9cfd17ab0a 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/cloudwatch/cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs/cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/cloudwatch/cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs/cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs.py @@ -1,7 +1,11 @@ from json import dumps, loads from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_AWS -from prowler.lib.utils.utils import detect_secrets_scan +from prowler.lib.utils.utils import ( + SecretsScanError, + annotate_verified_secrets, + detect_secrets_scan_batch, +) from prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudwatch.cloudwatch_service import ( convert_to_cloudwatch_timestamp_format, ) @@ -11,95 +15,197 @@ from prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudwatch.logs_client import logs_client class cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs(Check): def execute(self): findings = [] - if logs_client.log_groups: - secrets_ignore_patterns = logs_client.audit_config.get( - "secrets_ignore_patterns", [] - ) + if not logs_client.log_groups: + return findings + + secrets_ignore_patterns = logs_client.audit_config.get( + "secrets_ignore_patterns", [] + ) + validate = logs_client.audit_config.get("secrets_validate", False) + + # Phase 1: batch-scan every (log group, log stream). Payloads are yielded + # lazily so only a chunk is written/held at a time, which matters for + # accounts with very large numbers of log groups/streams. The log group + # ARN (not its name) keys every map below, since group and stream names + # are not unique across regions and would otherwise collide. + def stream_payloads(): for log_group in logs_client.log_groups.values(): - report = Check_Report_AWS(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=log_group) - report.status = "PASS" - report.status_extended = ( - f"No secrets found in {log_group.name} log group." + if not log_group.log_streams: + continue + for log_stream_name, events in log_group.log_streams.items(): + yield ( + (log_group.arn, log_stream_name), + "\n".join(dumps(event["message"]) for event in events), + ) + + # A scanner failure here must never look like "no secrets": log groups + # whose streams could not be scanned are reported MANUAL in Phase 4. + stream_scan_error = None + try: + stream_results = detect_secrets_scan_batch( + stream_payloads(), + excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, + validate=validate, + ) + except SecretsScanError as error: + stream_results = {} + stream_scan_error = error + + # Phase 2: plan the per-event secrets for each flagged stream and collect + # the multiline events to rescan. Each multiline event is rescanned once + # to resolve per-line detail; the rescans are batched in Phase 3 instead + # of one subprocess per event. The event index (``line_number - 1``, + # since Phase 1 joins one event per line) is the per-event discriminator: + # a CloudWatch stream can hold several events sharing one millisecond + # timestamp, so keying only by timestamp would let a later multiline + # event overwrite an earlier one's payload and lose secret evidence. + # Output still groups/displays by timestamp; only the rescan identity is + # per event. + # stream_plans: (group arn, stream) -> + # {timestamp: {event index: {"multiline", "types"}}} + # rescan_payloads: (group arn, stream, timestamp, event index) -> + # multiline event data + stream_plans = {} + rescan_payloads = {} + groups_with_rescan = set() # group arns that depend on the Phase 3 rescan + for log_group in logs_client.log_groups.values(): + for log_stream_name in log_group.log_streams or {}: + stream_secrets = stream_results.get((log_group.arn, log_stream_name)) + if not stream_secrets: + continue + events = log_group.log_streams[log_stream_name] + plan = {} + for secret in stream_secrets: + event_index = secret["line_number"] - 1 + flagged_event = events[event_index] + cloudwatch_timestamp = convert_to_cloudwatch_timestamp_format( + flagged_event["timestamp"] + ) + try: + log_event_data = dumps( + loads(flagged_event["message"]), indent=2 + ) + except Exception: + log_event_data = dumps(flagged_event["message"], indent=2) + multiline = len(log_event_data.split("\n")) > 1 + events_at_timestamp = plan.setdefault(cloudwatch_timestamp, {}) + if event_index not in events_at_timestamp: + events_at_timestamp[event_index] = { + "multiline": multiline, + "types": [], + } + if multiline: + # More informative output is possible with more than one + # line: the event is rescanned to get the type and line + # number of each secret. + rescan_payloads[ + ( + log_group.arn, + log_stream_name, + cloudwatch_timestamp, + event_index, + ) + ] = log_event_data + groups_with_rescan.add(log_group.arn) + else: + events_at_timestamp[event_index]["types"].append(secret["type"]) + stream_plans[(log_group.arn, log_stream_name)] = plan + + # Phase 3: one batched rescan for all multiline flagged events. Validation + # is never enabled here: this rescan only resolves line numbers for + # display and must not re-authenticate the secret. + # If the rescan fails we know secrets were already found in Phase 1, so + # the affected groups must not silently pass; they are reported MANUAL. + rescan_scan_error = None + rescan_results = {} + if rescan_payloads: + try: + rescan_results = detect_secrets_scan_batch( + rescan_payloads, excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns ) - log_group_secrets = [] - if log_group.log_streams: - for log_stream_name in log_group.log_streams: - log_stream_secrets = {} - log_stream_data = "\n".join( - [ - dumps(event["message"]) - for event in log_group.log_streams[log_stream_name] - ] - ) - log_stream_secrets_output = detect_secrets_scan( - data=log_stream_data, - excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, - detect_secrets_plugins=logs_client.audit_config.get( - "detect_secrets_plugins", - ), - ) + except SecretsScanError as error: + rescan_scan_error = error - if log_stream_secrets_output: - for secret in log_stream_secrets_output: - flagged_event = log_group.log_streams[log_stream_name][ - secret["line_number"] - 1 - ] - cloudwatch_timestamp = ( - convert_to_cloudwatch_timestamp_format( - flagged_event["timestamp"] - ) - ) - if ( - cloudwatch_timestamp - not in log_stream_secrets.keys() - ): - log_stream_secrets[cloudwatch_timestamp] = ( - SecretsDict() - ) + # Phase 4: assemble one report per log group. + for log_group in logs_client.log_groups.values(): + report = Check_Report_AWS(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=log_group) + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"No secrets found in {log_group.name} log group." - try: - log_event_data = dumps( - loads(flagged_event["message"]), indent=2 - ) - except Exception: - log_event_data = dumps( - flagged_event["message"], indent=2 - ) - if len(log_event_data.split("\n")) > 1: - # Can get more informative output if there is more than 1 line. - # Will rescan just this event to get the type of secret and the line number - event_detect_secrets_output = detect_secrets_scan( - data=log_event_data, - detect_secrets_plugins=logs_client.audit_config.get( - "detect_secrets_plugins" - ), - ) - if event_detect_secrets_output: - for secret in event_detect_secrets_output: - log_stream_secrets[ - cloudwatch_timestamp - ].add_secret( - secret["line_number"], secret["type"] - ) - else: - log_stream_secrets[cloudwatch_timestamp].add_secret( - 1, secret["type"] - ) - if log_stream_secrets: - secrets_string = "; ".join( - [ - f"at {timestamp} - {log_stream_secrets[timestamp].to_string()}" - for timestamp in log_stream_secrets - ] - ) - log_group_secrets.append( - f"in log stream {log_stream_name} {secrets_string}" - ) - if log_group_secrets: - secrets_string = "; ".join(log_group_secrets) - report.status = "FAIL" - report.status_extended = f"Potential secrets found in log group {log_group.name} {secrets_string}." + # The stream scan failed: we cannot conclude this group is clean. + if stream_scan_error and log_group.log_streams: + report.status = "MANUAL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Could not scan log group {log_group.name} for secrets: " + f"{stream_scan_error}; manual review is required." + ) findings.append(report) + continue + + log_group_secrets = [] + all_secrets = [] + for log_stream_name in log_group.log_streams or {}: + stream_secrets = stream_results.get((log_group.arn, log_stream_name)) + if not stream_secrets: + continue + all_secrets.extend(stream_secrets) + log_stream_secrets = {} + for cloudwatch_timestamp, events_at_timestamp in stream_plans[ + (log_group.arn, log_stream_name) + ].items(): + secrets_dict = SecretsDict() + # Multiple events can share one timestamp; aggregate each + # event's secrets into the timestamp's display entry. + for event_index, entry in events_at_timestamp.items(): + if entry["multiline"]: + for event_secret in rescan_results.get( + ( + log_group.arn, + log_stream_name, + cloudwatch_timestamp, + event_index, + ), + [], + ): + secrets_dict.add_secret( + event_secret["line_number"], event_secret["type"] + ) + else: + for secret_type in entry["types"]: + secrets_dict.add_secret(1, secret_type) + # Only record the event when at least one non-ignored secret + # remains after the rescan. A multiline event whose secrets + # were all dropped by ``secrets_ignore_patterns`` leaves an + # empty SecretsDict, which must not produce a FAIL with no + # actual secret evidence. + if secrets_dict: + log_stream_secrets[cloudwatch_timestamp] = secrets_dict + if log_stream_secrets: + secrets_string = "; ".join( + [ + f"at {timestamp} - {log_stream_secrets[timestamp].to_string()}" + for timestamp in log_stream_secrets + ] + ) + log_group_secrets.append( + f"in log stream {log_stream_name} {secrets_string}" + ) + # The multiline rescan failed for a group that had flagged secrets: + # detail is unavailable, so report MANUAL rather than risk a false + # PASS when every flagged event was multiline. + if rescan_scan_error and log_group.arn in groups_with_rescan: + report.status = "MANUAL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Secrets were detected in log group {log_group.name} but the " + f"detailed rescan failed: {rescan_scan_error}; manual review " + "is required." + ) + elif log_group_secrets: + secrets_string = "; ".join(log_group_secrets) + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"Potential secrets found in log group {log_group.name} {secrets_string}." + annotate_verified_secrets(report, all_secrets) + findings.append(report) return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/cloudwatch/cloudwatch_service.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/cloudwatch/cloudwatch_service.py index 29ac103867..56b7ebe25c 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/cloudwatch/cloudwatch_service.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/cloudwatch/cloudwatch_service.py @@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ from botocore.exceptions import ClientError from pydantic.v1 import BaseModel from prowler.lib.logger import logger +from prowler.lib.resource_limit import ( + get_resource_scan_limit, + limit_resources, +) from prowler.lib.scan_filters.scan_filters import is_resource_filtered from prowler.providers.aws.lib.service.service import AWSService @@ -83,8 +87,19 @@ class Logs(AWSService): # Call AWSService's __init__ super().__init__(__class__.__name__, provider) self.log_group_arn_template = f"arn:{self.audited_partition}:logs:{self.region}:{self.audited_account}:log-group" + # Log groups are listed first, then only the selected subset is enriched + # and exposed for primary log group checks. Keep a complete lightweight + # index for cross-service evidence lookups. + self.all_log_groups = {} self.log_groups = {} + self._log_groups_hydrated = set() + self.log_group_limit = get_resource_scan_limit( + self.audit_config, "max_cloudwatch_log_groups" + ) + # The threshold for number of events to return per log group. + self.events_per_log_group_threshold = 1000 self.__threading_call__(self._describe_log_groups) + self._select_log_groups_for_analysis() self.resource_policies = {} self.__threading_call__(self._describe_resource_policies) self.metric_filters = [] @@ -94,14 +109,27 @@ class Logs(AWSService): "cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs" in provider.audit_metadata.expected_checks ): - self.events_per_log_group_threshold = ( - 1000 # The threshold for number of events to return per log group. - ) - self.__threading_call__(self._get_log_events) + self.__threading_call__(self._get_log_events, self.log_groups.values()) self.__threading_call__( self._list_tags_for_resource, self.log_groups.values() ) + def _select_log_groups_for_analysis(self): + """Select the newest log groups for bounded analysis.""" + if not self.log_groups: + return + self.log_groups = { + log_group.arn: log_group + for log_group in limit_resources( + sorted( + self.log_groups.values(), + key=lambda lg: lg.creation_time or 0, + reverse=True, + ), + self.log_group_limit, + ) + } + def _describe_metric_filters(self, regional_client): logger.info("CloudWatch Logs - Describing metric filters...") try: @@ -118,11 +146,21 @@ class Logs(AWSService): self.metric_filters = [] log_group = None - for lg in self.log_groups.values(): - if lg.name == filter["logGroupName"]: + for lg in (self.all_log_groups or {}).values(): + if ( + lg.name == filter["logGroupName"] + and lg.region == regional_client.region + ): log_group = lg break + if ( + log_group + and log_group.arn in (self.log_groups or {}) + and log_group.arn not in self._log_groups_hydrated + ): + self._list_tags_for_resource(log_group) + self.metric_filters.append( MetricFilter( arn=arn, @@ -156,9 +194,9 @@ class Logs(AWSService): "describe_log_groups" ) for page in describe_log_groups_paginator.paginate(): - for log_group in page["logGroups"]: - if not self.audit_resources or ( - is_resource_filtered(log_group["arn"], self.audit_resources) + for log_group in page.get("logGroups", []): + if not self.audit_resources or is_resource_filtered( + log_group["arn"], self.audit_resources ): never_expire = False kms = log_group.get("kmsKeyId") @@ -168,20 +206,26 @@ class Logs(AWSService): retention_days = 9999 if self.log_groups is None: self.log_groups = {} - self.log_groups[log_group["arn"]] = LogGroup( + if self.all_log_groups is None: + self.all_log_groups = {} + log_group_object = LogGroup( arn=log_group["arn"], name=log_group["logGroupName"], retention_days=retention_days, never_expire=never_expire, kms_id=kms, + creation_time=log_group.get("creationTime"), region=regional_client.region, ) + self.all_log_groups[log_group_object.arn] = log_group_object + self.log_groups[log_group_object.arn] = log_group_object except ClientError as error: if error.response["Error"]["Code"] == "AccessDeniedException": logger.error( f"{regional_client.region} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" ) if not self.log_groups: + self.all_log_groups = None self.log_groups = None else: logger.error( @@ -192,37 +236,29 @@ class Logs(AWSService): f"{regional_client.region} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" ) - def _get_log_events(self, regional_client): - regional_log_groups = [ - log_group - for log_group in self.log_groups.values() - if log_group.region == regional_client.region - ] - total_log_groups = len(regional_log_groups) + def _get_log_events(self, log_group): + """Retrieve recent log events for a selected log group. + + Args: + log_group: Log group selected for bounded analysis. + """ logger.info( - f"CloudWatch Logs - Retrieving log events for {total_log_groups} log groups in {regional_client.region}..." + f"CloudWatch Logs - Retrieving log events for log group {log_group.name}..." ) try: - for count, log_group in enumerate(regional_log_groups, start=1): - events = regional_client.filter_log_events( - logGroupName=log_group.name, - limit=self.events_per_log_group_threshold, - )["events"] - for event in events: - if event["logStreamName"] not in log_group.log_streams: - log_group.log_streams[event["logStreamName"]] = [] - log_group.log_streams[event["logStreamName"]].append(event) - if count % 10 == 0: - logger.info( - f"CloudWatch Logs - Retrieved log events for {count}/{total_log_groups} log groups in {regional_client.region}..." - ) + regional_client = self.regional_clients[log_group.region] + events = regional_client.filter_log_events( + logGroupName=log_group.name, + limit=self.events_per_log_group_threshold, + )["events"] + for event in events: + if event["logStreamName"] not in log_group.log_streams: + log_group.log_streams[event["logStreamName"]] = [] + log_group.log_streams[event["logStreamName"]].append(event) except Exception as error: logger.error( - f"{regional_client.region} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + f"{log_group.region} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" ) - logger.info( - f"CloudWatch Logs - Finished retrieving log events in {regional_client.region}..." - ) def _describe_resource_policies(self, regional_client): logger.info("CloudWatch Logs - Describing resource policies...") @@ -257,6 +293,13 @@ class Logs(AWSService): ) def _list_tags_for_resource(self, log_group): + """Hydrate tags for a selected log group once. + + Args: + log_group: Log group selected for tag hydration. + """ + if log_group.arn in self._log_groups_hydrated: + return logger.info(f"CloudWatch Logs - List Tags for Log Group {log_group.name}...") try: regional_client = self.regional_clients[log_group.region] @@ -264,6 +307,7 @@ class Logs(AWSService): resourceArn=log_group.arn )["tags"] log_group.tags = [response] + self._log_groups_hydrated.add(log_group.arn) except ClientError as error: if error.response["Error"]["Code"] == "ResourceNotFoundException": logger.warning( @@ -292,6 +336,7 @@ class LogGroup(BaseModel): retention_days: int never_expire: bool kms_id: Optional[str] + creation_time: Optional[int] = None region: str log_streams: dict[str, list[str]] = ( {} diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/codeartifact/codeartifact_service.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/codeartifact/codeartifact_service.py index 1465092063..9a13e8fcf7 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/codeartifact/codeartifact_service.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/codeartifact/codeartifact_service.py @@ -1,10 +1,14 @@ from enum import Enum -from typing import Optional +from typing import Iterator, Optional, Tuple from botocore.exceptions import ClientError from pydantic.v1 import BaseModel from prowler.lib.logger import logger +from prowler.lib.resource_limit import ( + get_resource_scan_limit, + iter_limited_paginator_items, +) from prowler.lib.scan_filters.scan_filters import is_resource_filtered from prowler.providers.aws.lib.service.service import AWSService @@ -15,9 +19,18 @@ class CodeArtifact(AWSService): super().__init__(__class__.__name__, provider) # repositories is a dictionary containing all the codeartifact service information self.repositories = {} + # repository ARNs whose selected packages have been listed and memoized + # into repository.packages. + self._packages_listed = set() + self.package_limit = get_resource_scan_limit( + self.audit_config, "max_codeartifact_packages" + ) self.__threading_call__(self._list_repositories) - self.__threading_call__(self._list_packages) - self._list_tags_for_resource() + for _ in self._load_packages_for_analysis(): + pass + self.__threading_call__( + self._list_tags_for_resource, self.repositories.values() + ) def _list_repositories(self, regional_client): logger.info("CodeArtifact - Listing Repositories...") @@ -51,134 +64,146 @@ class CodeArtifact(AWSService): f" {error}" ) - def _list_packages(self, regional_client): - logger.info("CodeArtifact - Listing Packages and retrieving information...") - for repository in self.repositories: - try: - if self.repositories[repository].region == regional_client.region: - list_packages_paginator = regional_client.get_paginator( - "list_packages" + def _iter_repository_packages( + self, repository, limit: Optional[int] = None + ) -> Iterator["Package"]: + """Yield packages for a single repository, hydrating each one lazily. + + Each package requires an extra ``list_package_versions`` call to + resolve its latest version, so producing them lazily lets the resource + limit stop before extra package version calls. + """ + regional_client = self.regional_clients[repository.region] + try: + list_packages_paginator = regional_client.get_paginator("list_packages") + list_packages_parameters = { + "domain": repository.domain_name, + "domainOwner": repository.domain_owner, + "repository": repository.name, + } + for package in iter_limited_paginator_items( + list_packages_paginator, + "packages", + limit, + **list_packages_parameters, + ): + # Package information + package_format = package["format"] + package_namespace = package.get("namespace") + package_name = package["package"] + package_origin_configuration_restrictions_publish = package[ + "originConfiguration" + ]["restrictions"]["publish"] + package_origin_configuration_restrictions_upstream = package[ + "originConfiguration" + ]["restrictions"]["upstream"] + # Get Latest Package Version + list_package_versions_parameters = { + "domain": repository.domain_name, + "domainOwner": repository.domain_owner, + "repository": repository.name, + "format": package_format, + "package": package_name, + "sortBy": "PUBLISHED_TIME", + "maxResults": 1, + } + if package_namespace: + list_package_versions_parameters["namespace"] = package_namespace + latest_version_information = regional_client.list_package_versions( + **list_package_versions_parameters + ) + latest_version = "" + latest_origin_type = "UNKNOWN" + latest_status = "Published" + if latest_version_information.get("versions"): + latest_version = latest_version_information["versions"][0].get( + "version" ) - list_packages_parameters = { - "domain": self.repositories[repository].domain_name, - "domainOwner": self.repositories[repository].domain_owner, - "repository": self.repositories[repository].name, - } - packages = [] - for page in list_packages_paginator.paginate( - **list_packages_parameters - ): - for package in page["packages"]: - # Package information - package_format = package["format"] - package_namespace = package.get("namespace") - package_name = package["package"] - package_origin_configuration_restrictions_publish = package[ - "originConfiguration" - ]["restrictions"]["publish"] - package_origin_configuration_restrictions_upstream = ( - package["originConfiguration"]["restrictions"][ - "upstream" - ] - ) - # Get Latest Package Version - if package_namespace: - latest_version_information = ( - regional_client.list_package_versions( - domain=self.repositories[ - repository - ].domain_name, - domainOwner=self.repositories[ - repository - ].domain_owner, - repository=self.repositories[repository].name, - format=package_format, - namespace=package_namespace, - package=package_name, - sortBy="PUBLISHED_TIME", - maxResults=1, - ) - ) - else: - latest_version_information = ( - regional_client.list_package_versions( - domain=self.repositories[ - repository - ].domain_name, - domainOwner=self.repositories[ - repository - ].domain_owner, - repository=self.repositories[repository].name, - format=package_format, - package=package_name, - sortBy="PUBLISHED_TIME", - maxResults=1, - ) - ) - latest_version = "" - latest_origin_type = "UNKNOWN" - latest_status = "Published" - if latest_version_information.get("versions"): - latest_version = latest_version_information["versions"][ - 0 - ].get("version") - latest_origin_type = ( - latest_version_information["versions"][0] - .get("origin", {}) - .get("originType", "UNKNOWN") - ) - latest_status = latest_version_information["versions"][ - 0 - ].get("status", "Published") - - packages.append( - Package( - name=package_name, - namespace=package_namespace, - format=package_format, - origin_configuration=OriginConfiguration( - restrictions=Restrictions( - publish=package_origin_configuration_restrictions_publish, - upstream=package_origin_configuration_restrictions_upstream, - ) - ), - latest_version=LatestPackageVersion( - version=latest_version, - status=latest_status, - origin=OriginInformation( - origin_type=latest_origin_type - ), - ), - ) - ) - # Save all the packages information - self.repositories[repository].packages = packages - - except ClientError as error: - if error.response["Error"]["Code"] == "ResourceNotFoundException": - logger.warning( - f"{regional_client.region} --" - f" {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]:" - f" {error}" + latest_origin_type = ( + latest_version_information["versions"][0] + .get("origin", {}) + .get("originType", "UNKNOWN") + ) + latest_status = latest_version_information["versions"][0].get( + "status", "Published" ) - continue - except Exception as error: - logger.error( - f"{regional_client.region} --" + yield Package( + name=package_name, + namespace=package_namespace, + format=package_format, + origin_configuration=OriginConfiguration( + restrictions=Restrictions( + publish=package_origin_configuration_restrictions_publish, + upstream=package_origin_configuration_restrictions_upstream, + ) + ), + latest_version=LatestPackageVersion( + version=latest_version, + status=latest_status, + origin=OriginInformation(origin_type=latest_origin_type), + ), + ) + + except ClientError as error: + if error.response["Error"]["Code"] == "ResourceNotFoundException": + logger.warning( + f"{repository.region} --" f" {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]:" f" {error}" ) + else: + logger.error( + f"{repository.region} --" + f" {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]:" + f" {error}" + ) + except Exception as error: + logger.error( + f"{repository.region} --" + f" {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]:" + f" {error}" + ) - def _list_tags_for_resource(self): + def _load_packages_for_analysis(self) -> Iterator[Tuple["Repository", "Package"]]: + """Yield the ``(repository, package)`` pairs selected for analysis. + + Package listing stays in the service layer so checks receive only the + selected packages and remain unaware of resource-analysis limits. + """ + yielded = 0 + for repository in list(self.repositories.values()): + if repository.arn in self._packages_listed: + for package in repository.packages: + yield repository, package + yielded += 1 + if self.package_limit and yielded >= self.package_limit: + return + continue + collected = [] + remaining_limit = None + if self.package_limit: + remaining_limit = self.package_limit - yielded + if remaining_limit <= 0: + return + for package in self._iter_repository_packages(repository, remaining_limit): + collected.append(package) + repository.packages = collected + yield repository, package + yielded += 1 + if self.package_limit and yielded >= self.package_limit: + self._packages_listed.add(repository.arn) + return + self._packages_listed.add(repository.arn) + + def _list_tags_for_resource(self, repository): logger.info("CodeArtifact - List Tags...") try: - for repository in self.repositories.values(): - regional_client = self.regional_clients[repository.region] - response = regional_client.list_tags_for_resource( - resourceArn=repository.arn - )["tags"] - repository.tags = response + regional_client = self.regional_clients[repository.region] + response = regional_client.list_tags_for_resource( + resourceArn=repository.arn + )["tags"] + repository.tags = response except Exception as error: logger.error( f"{regional_client.region} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/codebuild/codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables/codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/codebuild/codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables/codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables.py index 8d031cc25a..2e0c5863eb 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/codebuild/codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables/codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/codebuild/codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables/codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables.py @@ -1,7 +1,11 @@ import json from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_AWS -from prowler.lib.utils.utils import detect_secrets_scan +from prowler.lib.utils.utils import ( + SecretsScanError, + annotate_verified_secrets, + detect_secrets_scan_batch, +) from prowler.providers.aws.services.codebuild.codebuild_client import codebuild_client @@ -14,35 +18,71 @@ class codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables(Check): secrets_ignore_patterns = codebuild_client.audit_config.get( "secrets_ignore_patterns", [] ) - for project in codebuild_client.projects.values(): + validate = codebuild_client.audit_config.get("secrets_validate", False) + projects = list(codebuild_client.projects.values()) + + # Collect every scannable plaintext variable across all projects and scan + # them in batched Kingfisher invocations instead of one subprocess per + # variable. Findings are keyed by (project index, variable index). + def payloads(): + for project_index, project in enumerate(projects): + if project.environment_variables: + for var_index, env_var in enumerate(project.environment_variables): + if ( + env_var.type == "PLAINTEXT" + and env_var.name not in sensitive_vars_excluded + ): + yield (project_index, var_index), json.dumps( + {env_var.name: env_var.value} + ) + + scan_error = None + try: + batch_results = detect_secrets_scan_batch( + payloads(), excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, validate=validate + ) + except SecretsScanError as error: + batch_results = {} + scan_error = error + + for project_index, project in enumerate(projects): report = Check_Report_AWS(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=project) report.status = "PASS" report.status_extended = f"CodeBuild project {project.name} does not have sensitive environment plaintext credentials." secrets_found = [] + all_secrets = [] + + if scan_error and any( + env_var.type == "PLAINTEXT" + and env_var.name not in sensitive_vars_excluded + for env_var in project.environment_variables or [] + ): + report.status = "MANUAL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Could not scan CodeBuild project {project.name} environment " + f"variables for secrets: {scan_error}; manual review is required." + ) + findings.append(report) + continue if project.environment_variables: - for env_var in project.environment_variables: - if ( - env_var.type == "PLAINTEXT" - and env_var.name not in sensitive_vars_excluded - ): - detect_secrets_output = detect_secrets_scan( - data=json.dumps({env_var.name: env_var.value}), - excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, - detect_secrets_plugins=codebuild_client.audit_config.get( - "detect_secrets_plugins", - ), - ) - if detect_secrets_output: - secrets_info = [ + for var_index, env_var in enumerate(project.environment_variables): + detect_secrets_output = batch_results.get( + (project_index, var_index) + ) + if detect_secrets_output: + all_secrets.extend(detect_secrets_output) + secrets_found.extend( + [ f"{secret['type']} in variable {env_var.name}" for secret in detect_secrets_output ] - secrets_found.extend(secrets_info) + ) if secrets_found: report.status = "FAIL" report.status_extended = f"CodeBuild project {project.name} has sensitive environment plaintext credentials in variables: {', '.join(secrets_found)}." + annotate_verified_secrets(report, all_secrets) findings.append(report) diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/codepipeline/codepipeline_project_repo_private/codepipeline_project_repo_private.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/codepipeline/codepipeline_project_repo_private/codepipeline_project_repo_private.py index 0c745fc658..bc9f569f1b 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/codepipeline/codepipeline_project_repo_private/codepipeline_project_repo_private.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/codepipeline/codepipeline_project_repo_private/codepipeline_project_repo_private.py @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ from prowler.providers.aws.services.codepipeline.codepipeline_client import ( codepipeline_client, ) +HTTP_TIMEOUT = 30 + class codepipeline_project_repo_private(Check): """Checks if AWS CodePipeline source repositories are configured as private. @@ -87,9 +89,8 @@ class codepipeline_project_repo_private(Check): repo_url = repo_url[:-4] try: - context = ssl._create_unverified_context() req = urllib.request.Request(repo_url, method="HEAD") - response = urllib.request.urlopen(req, context=context) + response = urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=HTTP_TIMEOUT) return not response.geturl().endswith("sign_in") - except (urllib.error.HTTPError, urllib.error.URLError): + except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, ssl.SSLError): return False diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_instance_secrets_user_data/ec2_instance_secrets_user_data.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_instance_secrets_user_data/ec2_instance_secrets_user_data.py index 3c3864c479..31b3f8fb05 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_instance_secrets_user_data/ec2_instance_secrets_user_data.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_instance_secrets_user_data/ec2_instance_secrets_user_data.py @@ -4,7 +4,11 @@ from base64 import b64decode from prowler.config.config import encoding_format_utf_8 from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_AWS from prowler.lib.logger import logger -from prowler.lib.utils.utils import detect_secrets_scan +from prowler.lib.utils.utils import ( + SecretsScanError, + annotate_verified_secrets, + detect_secrets_scan_batch, +) from prowler.providers.aws.services.ec2.ec2_client import ec2_client @@ -14,54 +18,86 @@ class ec2_instance_secrets_user_data(Check): secrets_ignore_patterns = ec2_client.audit_config.get( "secrets_ignore_patterns", [] ) - for instance in ec2_client.instances: - if instance.state != "terminated": - report = Check_Report_AWS(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=instance) - if instance.user_data: - user_data = b64decode(instance.user_data) - try: - if user_data[0:2] == b"\x1f\x8b": # GZIP magic number - user_data = zlib.decompress( - user_data, zlib.MAX_WBITS | 32 - ).decode(encoding_format_utf_8) - else: - user_data = user_data.decode(encoding_format_utf_8) - except UnicodeDecodeError as error: - logger.warning( - f"{instance.region} -- Unable to decode user data in EC2 instance {instance.id}: {error}" - ) - continue - except Exception as error: - logger.error( - f"{instance.region} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" - ) - continue - detect_secrets_output = detect_secrets_scan( - data=user_data, - excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, - detect_secrets_plugins=ec2_client.audit_config.get( - "detect_secrets_plugins" - ), - ) - if detect_secrets_output: - secrets_string = ", ".join( - [ - f"{secret['type']} on line {secret['line_number']}" - for secret in detect_secrets_output - ] - ) - report.status = "FAIL" - report.status_extended = f"Potential secret found in EC2 instance {instance.id} User Data -> {secrets_string}." + validate = ec2_client.audit_config.get("secrets_validate", False) + instances = list(ec2_client.instances) + # Collect the decoded User Data of each non-terminated instance and scan + # it all in batched Kingfisher invocations instead of one subprocess each. + # Instances whose User Data cannot be decoded are undecodable (no report), + # matching the original per-resource behavior. + undecodable = set() + + def payloads(): + for index, instance in enumerate(instances): + if instance.state == "terminated" or not instance.user_data: + continue + user_data = b64decode(instance.user_data) + try: + if user_data[0:2] == b"\x1f\x8b": # GZIP magic number + user_data = zlib.decompress( + user_data, zlib.MAX_WBITS | 32 + ).decode(encoding_format_utf_8) else: - report.status = "PASS" - report.status_extended = ( - f"No secrets found in EC2 instance {instance.id} User Data." - ) + user_data = user_data.decode(encoding_format_utf_8) + except UnicodeDecodeError as error: + logger.warning( + f"{instance.region} -- Unable to decode user data in EC2 instance {instance.id}: {error}" + ) + undecodable.add(index) + continue + except Exception as error: + logger.error( + f"{instance.region} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + undecodable.add(index) + continue + yield index, user_data + + scan_error = None + try: + batch_results = detect_secrets_scan_batch( + payloads(), excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, validate=validate + ) + except SecretsScanError as error: + batch_results = {} + scan_error = error + + for index, instance in enumerate(instances): + if instance.state == "terminated": + continue + report = Check_Report_AWS(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=instance) + if scan_error and instance.user_data: + report.status = "MANUAL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Could not scan EC2 instance {instance.id} User Data for " + f"secrets: {scan_error}; manual review is required." + ) + findings.append(report) + continue + if index in undecodable: + report.status = "MANUAL" + report.status_extended = f"Could not decode User Data for EC2 instance {instance.id}; manual review is required to scan for secrets." + elif instance.user_data: + detect_secrets_output = batch_results.get(index) + if detect_secrets_output: + secrets_string = ", ".join( + [ + f"{secret['type']} on line {secret['line_number']}" + for secret in detect_secrets_output + ] + ) + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"Potential secret found in EC2 instance {instance.id} User Data -> {secrets_string}." + annotate_verified_secrets(report, detect_secrets_output) else: report.status = "PASS" - report.status_extended = f"No secrets found in EC2 instance {instance.id} since User Data is empty." + report.status_extended = ( + f"No secrets found in EC2 instance {instance.id} User Data." + ) + else: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"No secrets found in EC2 instance {instance.id} since User Data is empty." - findings.append(report) + findings.append(report) return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_launch_template_no_secrets/ec2_launch_template_no_secrets.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_launch_template_no_secrets/ec2_launch_template_no_secrets.py index 823553bcdf..e84da724a2 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_launch_template_no_secrets/ec2_launch_template_no_secrets.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_launch_template_no_secrets/ec2_launch_template_no_secrets.py @@ -4,7 +4,11 @@ from base64 import b64decode from prowler.config.config import encoding_format_utf_8 from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_AWS from prowler.lib.logger import logger -from prowler.lib.utils.utils import detect_secrets_scan +from prowler.lib.utils.utils import ( + SecretsScanError, + annotate_verified_secrets, + detect_secrets_scan_batch, +) from prowler.providers.aws.services.ec2.ec2_client import ec2_client @@ -14,43 +18,77 @@ class ec2_launch_template_no_secrets(Check): secrets_ignore_patterns = ec2_client.audit_config.get( "secrets_ignore_patterns", [] ) - for template in ec2_client.launch_templates: + validate = ec2_client.audit_config.get("secrets_validate", False) + templates = list(ec2_client.launch_templates) + + # Track versions whose User Data cannot be decoded so the template is + # surfaced (MANUAL) instead of silently claiming no secrets were found. + undecodable_versions = {} + + # Collect the decoded User Data of every (template, version) and scan it + # all in batched Kingfisher invocations instead of one subprocess per + # version. Versions whose User Data cannot be decoded are recorded above. + def payloads(): + for template_index, template in enumerate(templates): + for version_index, version in enumerate(template.versions): + if not version.template_data.user_data: + continue + user_data = b64decode(version.template_data.user_data) + try: + if user_data[0:2] == b"\x1f\x8b": # GZIP magic number + user_data = zlib.decompress( + user_data, zlib.MAX_WBITS | 32 + ).decode(encoding_format_utf_8) + else: + user_data = user_data.decode(encoding_format_utf_8) + except UnicodeDecodeError as error: + logger.warning( + f"{template.region} -- Unable to decode User Data in EC2 Launch Template {template.name} version {version.version_number}: {error}" + ) + undecodable_versions.setdefault(template_index, []).append( + version.version_number + ) + continue + except Exception as error: + logger.error( + f"{template.region} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + undecodable_versions.setdefault(template_index, []).append( + version.version_number + ) + continue + yield (template_index, version_index), user_data + + scan_error = None + try: + batch_results = detect_secrets_scan_batch( + payloads(), excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, validate=validate + ) + except SecretsScanError as error: + batch_results = {} + scan_error = error + + for template_index, template in enumerate(templates): report = Check_Report_AWS(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=template) - versions_with_secrets = [] - - for version in template.versions: - if not version.template_data.user_data: - continue - user_data = b64decode(version.template_data.user_data) - - try: - if user_data[0:2] == b"\x1f\x8b": # GZIP magic number - user_data = zlib.decompress( - user_data, zlib.MAX_WBITS | 32 - ).decode(encoding_format_utf_8) - else: - user_data = user_data.decode(encoding_format_utf_8) - except UnicodeDecodeError as error: - logger.warning( - f"{template.region} -- Unable to decode User Data in EC2 Launch Template {template.name} version {version.version_number}: {error}" - ) - continue - except Exception as error: - logger.error( - f"{template.region} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" - ) - continue - - version_secrets = detect_secrets_scan( - data=user_data, - excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, - detect_secrets_plugins=ec2_client.audit_config.get( - "detect_secrets_plugins" - ), + if scan_error and any( + version.template_data.user_data for version in template.versions + ): + report.status = "MANUAL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Could not scan EC2 Launch Template {template.name} User Data " + f"for secrets: {scan_error}; manual review is required." ) + findings.append(report) + continue + versions_with_secrets = [] + all_secrets = [] + + for version_index, version in enumerate(template.versions): + version_secrets = batch_results.get((template_index, version_index)) if version_secrets: + all_secrets.extend(version_secrets) secrets_string = ", ".join( [ f"{secret['type']} on line {secret['line_number']}" @@ -61,9 +99,14 @@ class ec2_launch_template_no_secrets(Check): f"Version {version.version_number}: {secrets_string}" ) + undecodable = undecodable_versions.get(template_index, []) if len(versions_with_secrets) > 0: report.status = "FAIL" report.status_extended = f"Potential secret found in User Data for EC2 Launch Template {template.name} in template versions: {', '.join(versions_with_secrets)}." + annotate_verified_secrets(report, all_secrets) + elif undecodable: + report.status = "MANUAL" + report.status_extended = f"Could not decode User Data for EC2 Launch Template {template.name} versions: {', '.join(str(version_number) for version_number in undecodable)}; manual review is required to scan for secrets." else: report.status = "PASS" report.status_extended = f"No secrets found in User Data of any version for EC2 Launch Template {template.name}." diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_securitygroup_not_used/ec2_securitygroup_not_used.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_securitygroup_not_used/ec2_securitygroup_not_used.py index aa621abdfb..c45693c498 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_securitygroup_not_used/ec2_securitygroup_not_used.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_securitygroup_not_used/ec2_securitygroup_not_used.py @@ -15,11 +15,10 @@ class ec2_securitygroup_not_used(Check): report.resource_details = security_group.name report.status = "PASS" report.status_extended = f"Security group {security_group.name} ({security_group.id}) it is being used." - sg_in_lambda = False + sg_in_lambda = ( + security_group.id in awslambda_client.security_groups_in_use + ) sg_associated = False - for function in awslambda_client.functions.values(): - if security_group.id in function.security_groups: - sg_in_lambda = True for sg in ec2_client.security_groups.values(): if security_group.id in sg.associated_sgs: sg_associated = True diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_service.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_service.py index ccdb9e58fe..45a45e10d5 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_service.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_service.py @@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ from botocore.client import ClientError from pydantic.v1 import BaseModel from prowler.lib.logger import logger +from prowler.lib.resource_limit import ( + get_resource_scan_limit, + limit_resources, +) from prowler.lib.scan_filters.scan_filters import is_resource_filtered from prowler.providers.aws.lib.service.service import AWSService @@ -26,8 +30,12 @@ class EC2(AWSService): self.snapshots = [] self.volumes_with_snapshots = {} self.regions_with_snapshots = {} + # Snapshots are listed first, then limited after per-region snapshot + # presence is derived and before public status is hydrated. + self.snapshot_limit = get_resource_scan_limit( + self.audit_config, "max_ebs_snapshots" + ) self.__threading_call__(self._describe_snapshots) - self.__threading_call__(self._determine_public_snapshots, self.snapshots) self.network_interfaces = {} self.__threading_call__(self._describe_network_interfaces) self.images = [] @@ -36,6 +44,8 @@ class EC2(AWSService): self.__threading_call__(self._describe_volumes) self.attributes_for_regions = {} self.__threading_call__(self._get_resources_for_regions) + self._select_snapshots_for_analysis() + self.__threading_call__(self._determine_public_snapshots, self.snapshots) self.ebs_encryption_by_default = [] self.__threading_call__(self._get_ebs_encryption_settings) self.elastic_ips = [] @@ -207,6 +217,7 @@ class EC2(AWSService): arn=arn, region=regional_client.region, encrypted=snapshot.get("Encrypted", False), + start_time=snapshot.get("StartTime"), tags=snapshot.get("Tags"), volume=snapshot["VolumeId"], ) @@ -243,6 +254,18 @@ class EC2(AWSService): f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" ) + def _select_snapshots_for_analysis(self): + self.snapshots = list( + limit_resources( + sorted( + self.snapshots, + key=lambda s: (s.start_time.timestamp() if s.start_time else 0.0), + reverse=True, + ), + self.snapshot_limit, + ) + ) + def _describe_network_interfaces(self, regional_client): try: # Get Network Interfaces with Public IPs @@ -686,6 +709,7 @@ class Snapshot(BaseModel): region: str encrypted: bool public: bool = False + start_time: Optional[datetime] = None tags: Optional[list] = [] volume: Optional[str] diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/ecs/ecs_service.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/ecs/ecs_service.py index 560125bf58..e14197162f 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/ecs/ecs_service.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/ecs/ecs_service.py @@ -1,9 +1,16 @@ +from datetime import datetime +from itertools import zip_longest from re import sub from typing import Optional from pydantic.v1 import BaseModel from prowler.lib.logger import logger +from prowler.lib.resource_limit import ( + get_resource_scan_limit, + iter_limited_paginator_items, + limit_resources, +) from prowler.lib.scan_filters.scan_filters import is_resource_filtered from prowler.providers.aws.lib.service.service import AWSService @@ -12,40 +19,95 @@ class ECS(AWSService): def __init__(self, provider): # Call AWSService's __init__ super().__init__(__class__.__name__, provider) + # Task definition ARNs are listed first, then only the selected subset + # is described and exposed for checks. self.task_definitions = {} + self._task_definition_arns = None + self._task_definition_arns_by_region = {} + self.task_definition_limit = get_resource_scan_limit( + self.audit_config, "max_ecs_task_definitions" + ) self.services = {} self.clusters = {} self.task_sets = {} - self.__threading_call__(self._list_task_definitions) - self.__threading_call__( - self._describe_task_definition, self.task_definitions.values() - ) + for _ in self._load_task_definitions_for_analysis(): + pass self.__threading_call__(self._list_clusters) self.__threading_call__(self._describe_clusters, self.clusters.values()) self.__threading_call__(self._describe_services, self.clusters.values()) - def _list_task_definitions(self, regional_client): + def _list_task_definition_arns(self) -> list: + """List task definition ARNs newest-first, memoized. + + AWS returns ``list_task_definitions(sort=DESC)`` results per region. + Prowler limits the task definitions it describes and exposes to checks. + """ + if self._task_definition_arns is not None: + return self._task_definition_arns logger.info("ECS - Listing Task Definitions...") + self.__threading_call__(self._list_task_definition_arns_by_region) + arns_by_region = [] + for region in self.regional_clients: + arns_by_region.append(self._task_definition_arns_by_region.get(region, [])) + arns = [] + for task_definition_batch in zip_longest(*arns_by_region): + for task_definition in task_definition_batch: + if task_definition: + arns.append(task_definition) + self._task_definition_arns = arns + return arns + + def _list_task_definition_arns_by_region(self, regional_client): try: list_ecs_paginator = regional_client.get_paginator("list_task_definitions") - for page in list_ecs_paginator.paginate(): - for task_definition in page["taskDefinitionArns"]: - if not self.audit_resources or ( - is_resource_filtered(task_definition, self.audit_resources) - ): - self.task_definitions[task_definition] = TaskDefinition( - # we want the family name without the revision - name=sub(":.*", "", task_definition.split("/")[-1]), - arn=task_definition, - revision=task_definition.split(":")[-1], - region=regional_client.region, - environment_variables=[], - ) + regional_arns = [] + for task_definition in iter_limited_paginator_items( + list_ecs_paginator, + "taskDefinitionArns", + None, + item_filter=lambda task_definition: not self.audit_resources + or is_resource_filtered(task_definition, self.audit_resources), + sort="DESC", + ): + regional_arns.append((task_definition, regional_client.region)) + self._task_definition_arns_by_region[regional_client.region] = regional_arns except Exception as error: logger.error( f"{regional_client.region} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" ) + def _load_task_definitions_for_analysis(self): + """Yield task definitions lazily, describing each one on demand. + + Resources already fetched are memoized in ``self.task_definitions`` and + reused across checks (checks run sequentially, so no locking is needed). + The configured resource limit bounds ``describe_task_definition`` calls. + """ + task_definitions = [] + for arn, region in limit_resources( + self._list_task_definition_arns(), self.task_definition_limit + ): + task_definition = self.task_definitions.get(arn) + if task_definition is None: + task_definition = TaskDefinition( + # we want the family name without the revision + name=sub(":.*", "", arn.split("/")[-1]), + arn=arn, + revision=arn.split(":")[-1], + region=region, + environment_variables=[], + ) + self.task_definitions[arn] = task_definition + task_definitions.append(task_definition) + + self.__threading_call__(self._describe_task_definition, task_definitions) + + for arn, _ in limit_resources( + self._list_task_definition_arns(), self.task_definition_limit + ): + task_definition = self.task_definitions[arn] + yield task_definition + def _describe_task_definition(self, task_definition): logger.info("ECS - Describing Task Definition...") try: @@ -84,6 +146,9 @@ class ECS(AWSService): ) ) task_definition.pid_mode = response["taskDefinition"].get("pidMode", "") + task_definition.registered_at = response["taskDefinition"].get( + "registeredAt" + ) task_definition.tags = response.get("tags") task_definition.network_mode = response["taskDefinition"].get( "networkMode", "bridge" @@ -208,6 +273,7 @@ class TaskDefinition(BaseModel): region: str container_definitions: list[ContainerDefinition] = [] pid_mode: Optional[str] + registered_at: Optional[datetime] = None tags: Optional[list] = [] network_mode: Optional[str] diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/ecs/ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets/ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/ecs/ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets/ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets.py index cd835d0149..b0bc7198ee 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/ecs/ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets/ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/ecs/ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets/ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets.py @@ -1,7 +1,11 @@ from json import dumps from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_AWS -from prowler.lib.utils.utils import detect_secrets_scan +from prowler.lib.utils.utils import ( + SecretsScanError, + annotate_verified_secrets, + detect_secrets_scan_batch, +) from prowler.providers.aws.services.ecs.ecs_client import ecs_client @@ -11,33 +15,67 @@ class ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets(Check): secrets_ignore_patterns = ecs_client.audit_config.get( "secrets_ignore_patterns", [] ) - for task_definition in ecs_client.task_definitions.values(): + validate = ecs_client.audit_config.get("secrets_validate", False) + task_definitions = list(ecs_client.task_definitions.values()) + + # Scan every (task definition, container) environment in batched + # Kingfisher invocations instead of one subprocess per container. + # Payloads are yielded lazily so only a chunk is held/written at a time. + def environment_payloads(): + for td_index, task_definition in enumerate(task_definitions): + for c_index, container in enumerate( + task_definition.container_definitions + ): + if container.environment: + dump_env_vars = { + env_var.name: env_var.value + for env_var in container.environment + } + yield (td_index, c_index), dumps(dump_env_vars, indent=2) + + scan_error = None + try: + batch_results = detect_secrets_scan_batch( + environment_payloads(), + excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, + validate=validate, + ) + except SecretsScanError as error: + batch_results = {} + scan_error = error + + for td_index, task_definition in enumerate(task_definitions): report = Check_Report_AWS( metadata=self.metadata(), resource=task_definition ) report.resource_id = f"{task_definition.name}:{task_definition.revision}" report.status = "PASS" extended_status_parts = [] + all_secrets = [] - for container in task_definition.container_definitions: + if scan_error and any( + container.environment + for container in task_definition.container_definitions + ): + report.status = "MANUAL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Could not scan ECS task definition {task_definition.name} with " + f"revision {task_definition.revision} for secrets: {scan_error}; " + "manual review is required." + ) + findings.append(report) + continue + + for c_index, container in enumerate(task_definition.container_definitions): container_secrets_found = [] if container.environment: - dump_env_vars = {} - original_env_vars = [] - for env_var in container.environment: - dump_env_vars.update({env_var.name: env_var.value}) - original_env_vars.append(env_var.name) - - env_data = dumps(dump_env_vars, indent=2) - detect_secrets_output = detect_secrets_scan( - data=env_data, - excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, - detect_secrets_plugins=ecs_client.audit_config.get( - "detect_secrets_plugins", - ), - ) + original_env_vars = [ + env_var.name for env_var in container.environment + ] + detect_secrets_output = batch_results.get((td_index, c_index)) if detect_secrets_output: + all_secrets.extend(detect_secrets_output) secrets_string = ", ".join( [ f"{secret['type']} on the environment variable {original_env_vars[secret['line_number'] - 2]}" @@ -56,6 +94,7 @@ class ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets(Check): + "; ".join(extended_status_parts) + "." ) + annotate_verified_secrets(report, all_secrets) else: report.status_extended = f"No secrets found in variables of ECS task definition {task_definition.name} with revision {task_definition.revision}." findings.append(report) diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/glue/glue_etl_jobs_no_secrets_in_arguments/glue_etl_jobs_no_secrets_in_arguments.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/glue/glue_etl_jobs_no_secrets_in_arguments/glue_etl_jobs_no_secrets_in_arguments.py index 50c92f8619..fec480efb1 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/glue/glue_etl_jobs_no_secrets_in_arguments/glue_etl_jobs_no_secrets_in_arguments.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/glue/glue_etl_jobs_no_secrets_in_arguments/glue_etl_jobs_no_secrets_in_arguments.py @@ -1,52 +1,83 @@ -import json - -from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_AWS -from prowler.lib.utils.utils import detect_secrets_scan -from prowler.providers.aws.services.glue.glue_client import glue_client - - -class glue_etl_jobs_no_secrets_in_arguments(Check): - """Check if Glue ETL jobs have secrets in their default arguments. - - Scans the DefaultArguments of each Glue job for hardcoded credentials, - tokens, passwords, and other sensitive values that should be stored in - Secrets Manager or Parameter Store instead. - """ - - def execute(self): - findings = [] - secrets_ignore_patterns = glue_client.audit_config.get( - "secrets_ignore_patterns", [] - ) - for job in glue_client.jobs: - report = Check_Report_AWS(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=job) - report.status = "PASS" - report.status_extended = ( - f"No secrets found in Glue job {job.name} default arguments." - ) - - if job.arguments: - secrets_found = [] - for arg_name, arg_value in job.arguments.items(): - detect_secrets_output = detect_secrets_scan( - data=json.dumps({arg_name: arg_value}), - excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, - detect_secrets_plugins=glue_client.audit_config.get( - "detect_secrets_plugins", - ), - ) - if detect_secrets_output: - secrets_found.extend( - [ - f"{secret['type']} in argument {arg_name}" - for secret in detect_secrets_output - ] - ) - - if secrets_found: - report.status = "FAIL" - report.status_extended = f"Potential secrets found in Glue job {job.name} default arguments: {', '.join(secrets_found)}." - - findings.append(report) - - return findings +import json + +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_AWS +from prowler.lib.utils.utils import ( + SecretsScanError, + annotate_verified_secrets, + detect_secrets_scan_batch, +) +from prowler.providers.aws.services.glue.glue_client import glue_client + + +class glue_etl_jobs_no_secrets_in_arguments(Check): + """Check if Glue ETL jobs have secrets in their default arguments. + + Scans the DefaultArguments of each Glue job for hardcoded credentials, + tokens, passwords, and other sensitive values that should be stored in + Secrets Manager or Parameter Store instead. + """ + + def execute(self): + findings = [] + secrets_ignore_patterns = glue_client.audit_config.get( + "secrets_ignore_patterns", [] + ) + validate = glue_client.audit_config.get("secrets_validate", False) + jobs = list(glue_client.jobs) + + # Collect every default argument across all jobs and scan them in batched + # Kingfisher invocations instead of one subprocess per argument. Findings + # are keyed by (job index, argument name). + def payloads(): + for job_index, job in enumerate(jobs): + if job.arguments: + for arg_name, arg_value in job.arguments.items(): + yield (job_index, arg_name), json.dumps({arg_name: arg_value}) + + scan_error = None + try: + batch_results = detect_secrets_scan_batch( + payloads(), excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, validate=validate + ) + except SecretsScanError as error: + batch_results = {} + scan_error = error + + for job_index, job in enumerate(jobs): + report = Check_Report_AWS(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=job) + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"No secrets found in Glue job {job.name} default arguments." + ) + + if job.arguments and scan_error: + report.status = "MANUAL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Could not scan Glue job {job.name} default arguments for " + f"secrets: {scan_error}; manual review is required." + ) + findings.append(report) + continue + + if job.arguments: + secrets_found = [] + all_secrets = [] + for arg_name in job.arguments: + detect_secrets_output = batch_results.get((job_index, arg_name)) + if detect_secrets_output: + all_secrets.extend(detect_secrets_output) + secrets_found.extend( + [ + f"{secret['type']} in argument {arg_name}" + for secret in detect_secrets_output + ] + ) + + if secrets_found: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"Potential secrets found in Glue job {job.name} default arguments: {', '.join(secrets_found)}." + annotate_verified_secrets(report, all_secrets) + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/iam/iam_policy_allows_privilege_escalation/iam_policy_allows_privilege_escalation.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/aws/services/iam/iam_policy_allows_privilege_escalation/iam_policy_allows_privilege_escalation.metadata.json index 79b02882d7..4c7962242e 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/iam/iam_policy_allows_privilege_escalation/iam_policy_allows_privilege_escalation.metadata.json +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/iam/iam_policy_allows_privilege_escalation/iam_policy_allows_privilege_escalation.metadata.json @@ -37,7 +37,8 @@ } }, "Categories": [ - "identity-access" + "identity-access", + "privilege-escalation" ], "DependsOn": [], "RelatedTo": [], diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/inspector2/inspector2_is_enabled/inspector2_is_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/inspector2/inspector2_is_enabled/inspector2_is_enabled.py index a9f5efbedd..fd414badfa 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/inspector2/inspector2_is_enabled/inspector2_is_enabled.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/inspector2/inspector2_is_enabled/inspector2_is_enabled.py @@ -15,11 +15,10 @@ class inspector2_is_enabled(Check): if inspector.status == "ENABLED": report.status = "PASS" report.status_extended = "Inspector2 is enabled for EC2 instances, ECR container images, Lambda functions and code." - funtions_in_region = False + functions_in_region = ( + inspector.region in awslambda_client.regions_with_functions + ) ec2_in_region = False - for function in awslambda_client.functions.values(): - if function.region == inspector.region: - funtions_in_region = True for instance in ec2_client.instances: if instance == inspector.region: ec2_in_region = True @@ -36,12 +35,12 @@ class inspector2_is_enabled(Check): failed_services.append("ECR") if inspector.lambda_status != "ENABLED" and ( inspector2_client.provider.scan_unused_services - or funtions_in_region + or functions_in_region ): failed_services.append("Lambda") if inspector.lambda_code_status != "ENABLED" and ( inspector2_client.provider.scan_unused_services - or funtions_in_region + or functions_in_region ): failed_services.append("Lambda Code") diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/rolesanywhere/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/rolesanywhere/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/rolesanywhere/rolesanywhere_client.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/rolesanywhere/rolesanywhere_client.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..254f0a5dbf --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/rolesanywhere/rolesanywhere_client.py @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +from prowler.providers.aws.services.rolesanywhere.rolesanywhere_service import ( + RolesAnywhere, +) +from prowler.providers.common.provider import Provider + +rolesanywhere_client = RolesAnywhere(Provider.get_global_provider()) diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/rolesanywhere/rolesanywhere_service.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/rolesanywhere/rolesanywhere_service.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..46dca281d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/rolesanywhere/rolesanywhere_service.py @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +from typing import Dict, List + +from pydantic.v1 import BaseModel, Field + +from prowler.lib.logger import logger +from prowler.lib.scan_filters.scan_filters import is_resource_filtered +from prowler.providers.aws.lib.service.service import AWSService + + +class RolesAnywhere(AWSService): + def __init__(self, provider): + super().__init__(__class__.__name__, provider) + self.trust_anchors = {} + self.__threading_call__(self._list_trust_anchors) + + def _list_trust_anchors(self, regional_client): + logger.info("RolesAnywhere - Listing Trust Anchors...") + try: + paginator = regional_client.get_paginator("list_trust_anchors") + for page in paginator.paginate(): + for ta in page.get("trustAnchors", []): + arn = ta.get("trustAnchorArn", "") + if not arn: + continue + if self.audit_resources and not is_resource_filtered( + arn, self.audit_resources + ): + continue + source = ta.get("source", {}) or {} + source_data = source.get("sourceData", {}) or {} + tags = [] + try: + tags = regional_client.list_tags_for_resource( + resourceArn=arn + ).get("tags", []) + except Exception as error: + logger.warning( + f"{regional_client.region} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + self.trust_anchors[arn] = TrustAnchor( + arn=arn, + id=ta.get("trustAnchorId", ""), + name=ta.get("name", ""), + region=regional_client.region, + enabled=ta.get("enabled", False), + source_type=source.get("sourceType", ""), + acm_pca_arn=source_data.get("acmPcaArn", ""), + tags=tags, + ) + except Exception as error: + logger.error( + f"{regional_client.region} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + + +class TrustAnchor(BaseModel): + arn: str + id: str + name: str + region: str + enabled: bool = False + source_type: str = "" + acm_pca_arn: str = "" + tags: List[Dict[str, str]] = Field(default_factory=list) diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/rolesanywhere/rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/rolesanywhere/rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/rolesanywhere/rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki/rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/aws/services/rolesanywhere/rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki/rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7d919f83a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/rolesanywhere/rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki/rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +{ + "Provider": "aws", + "CheckID": "rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki", + "CheckTitle": "IAM Roles Anywhere trust anchors are backed by a post-quantum (ML-DSA) PKI", + "CheckType": [ + "Software and Configuration Checks/AWS Security Best Practices" + ], + "ServiceName": "rolesanywhere", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "low", + "ResourceType": "AwsRolesAnywhereTrustAnchor", + "ResourceGroup": "security", + "Description": "**IAM Roles Anywhere trust anchors** are assessed for use of a **post-quantum digital signature algorithm** (ML-DSA). A trust anchor backed by an AWS Private CA whose `KeyAlgorithm` is RSA or ECC produces signatures vulnerable to forgery by a future quantum attacker, allowing an unintended actor to issue certificates and obtain unauthorized AWS access.", + "Risk": "Trust anchors are the root of trust for workloads authenticating to AWS via X.509 certificates. If the signing CA uses RSA or ECC, an attacker with quantum capability could forge end-entity certificates and impersonate workloads. Migrating trust anchors to **ML-DSA-backed PKI** (NIST FIPS 204) protects this control plane in the post-quantum era.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/rolesanywhere/latest/userguide/introduction.html", + "https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2026/03/iam-roles-anywhere-post-quantum-digital-certificates/", + "https://aws.amazon.com/security/post-quantum-cryptography/", + "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/final" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "aws rolesanywhere create-trust-anchor --name pqc-trust --source 'sourceType=AWS_ACM_PCA,sourceData={acmPcaArn=}' --enabled", + "NativeIaC": "```yaml\nResources:\n :\n Type: AWS::RolesAnywhere::TrustAnchor\n Properties:\n Name: pqc-trust\n Enabled: true\n Source:\n SourceType: AWS_ACM_PCA\n SourceData:\n AcmPcaArn: # FIX: PCA must use ML_DSA key algorithm\n```", + "Other": "1. Create a new AWS Private CA with a post-quantum KeyAlgorithm (ML_DSA_44/65/87)\n2. Create a new Roles Anywhere trust anchor with sourceType=AWS_ACM_PCA pointing to the new CA\n3. Rotate end-entity certificates issued from the new CA\n4. Delete the legacy trust anchor once workloads have rotated", + "Terraform": "```hcl\nresource \"aws_rolesanywhere_trust_anchor\" \"\" {\n name = \"pqc-trust\"\n enabled = true\n source {\n source_type = \"AWS_ACM_PCA\"\n source_data {\n acm_pca_arn = \"\" # FIX: PCA must use ML_DSA key algorithm\n }\n }\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Back IAM Roles Anywhere trust anchors with an **AWS Private CA that uses an ML-DSA key algorithm**. For trust anchors backed by an external certificate bundle, ensure the certificates were issued by an ML-DSA CA and re-verify periodically as the cryptographic landscape evolves.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "encryption" + ], + "DependsOn": [ + "acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm" + ], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "Trust anchors backed by an external CERTIFICATE_BUNDLE cannot be evaluated automatically by this check and are reported as FAIL with guidance to migrate to an AWS Private CA using an ML-DSA key algorithm." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/rolesanywhere/rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki/rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/rolesanywhere/rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki/rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..495ed4e9c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/rolesanywhere/rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki/rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki.py @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_AWS +from prowler.providers.aws.services.acmpca.acmpca_client import acmpca_client +from prowler.providers.aws.services.rolesanywhere.rolesanywhere_client import ( + rolesanywhere_client, +) + +PQC_PCA_KEY_ALGORITHMS_DEFAULT = [ + "ML_DSA_44", + "ML_DSA_65", + "ML_DSA_87", +] + + +class rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki(Check): + """Verify that IAM Roles Anywhere trust anchors are backed by a post-quantum PKI. + + For trust anchors whose source is ``AWS_ACM_PCA``, the linked Private CA's + ``KeyAlgorithm`` is checked against the configured ML-DSA allowlist. + Trust anchors backed by an external ``CERTIFICATE_BUNDLE`` are reported as + FAIL because their certificate signature algorithm cannot be inspected + from the IAM Roles Anywhere API alone. + """ + + def execute(self) -> list[Check_Report_AWS]: + findings = [] + pqc_algorithms = rolesanywhere_client.audit_config.get( + "rolesanywhere_pqc_pca_key_algorithms", PQC_PCA_KEY_ALGORITHMS_DEFAULT + ) + for trust_anchor in rolesanywhere_client.trust_anchors.values(): + report = Check_Report_AWS(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=trust_anchor) + if trust_anchor.source_type == "AWS_ACM_PCA": + linked_ca = acmpca_client.certificate_authorities.get( + trust_anchor.acm_pca_arn + ) + if linked_ca and linked_ca.status != "ACTIVE": + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"IAM Roles Anywhere trust anchor {trust_anchor.name} is " + f"backed by Private CA {linked_ca.id}, which is in " + f"{linked_ca.status or ''} status and cannot be " + "used as an active post-quantum PKI trust root." + ) + elif linked_ca and linked_ca.key_algorithm in pqc_algorithms: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"IAM Roles Anywhere trust anchor {trust_anchor.name} is " + f"backed by Private CA {linked_ca.id} using post-quantum " + f"key algorithm {linked_ca.key_algorithm}." + ) + elif linked_ca: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"IAM Roles Anywhere trust anchor {trust_anchor.name} is " + f"backed by Private CA {linked_ca.id} using key algorithm " + f"{linked_ca.key_algorithm or ''}, which is not " + "post-quantum (ML-DSA)." + ) + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"IAM Roles Anywhere trust anchor {trust_anchor.name} is " + f"backed by Private CA {trust_anchor.acm_pca_arn}, which " + "could not be inspected (cross-account or missing " + "acm-pca permissions). Verify the CA uses an ML-DSA key " + "algorithm." + ) + else: + source = trust_anchor.source_type or "" + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"IAM Roles Anywhere trust anchor {trust_anchor.name} uses " + f"source type {source}; the certificate signature algorithm " + "cannot be inspected automatically. Migrate to an AWS Private " + "CA using an ML-DSA key algorithm to enable post-quantum " + "evaluation." + ) + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/route53/route53_dangling_ip_subdomain_takeover/route53_dangling_ip_subdomain_takeover.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/route53/route53_dangling_ip_subdomain_takeover/route53_dangling_ip_subdomain_takeover.py index caf3629816..25703b979f 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/route53/route53_dangling_ip_subdomain_takeover/route53_dangling_ip_subdomain_takeover.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/route53/route53_dangling_ip_subdomain_takeover/route53_dangling_ip_subdomain_takeover.py @@ -1,10 +1,9 @@ import re from ipaddress import ip_address -import awsipranges - from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_AWS from prowler.lib.utils.utils import validate_ip_address +from prowler.providers.aws.lib.ip_ranges.ip_ranges import get_public_ip_networks from prowler.providers.aws.services.ec2.ec2_client import ec2_client from prowler.providers.aws.services.route53.route53_client import route53_client from prowler.providers.aws.services.s3.s3_client import s3_client @@ -21,6 +20,10 @@ class route53_dangling_ip_subdomain_takeover(Check): def execute(self) -> Check_Report_AWS: findings = [] + # AWS public IP prefixes are fetched lazily, at most once per run, only + # when a dangling-candidate public IP is found. + aws_ip_networks = None + # When --region is used, Route53 service gathers EIPs from all regions # to avoid false positives. Otherwise, use ec2_client data directly. if route53_client.all_account_elastic_ips: @@ -42,6 +45,7 @@ class route53_dangling_ip_subdomain_takeover(Check): if record_set.type == "A" and not record_set.is_alias: for record in record_set.records: if validate_ip_address(record): + record_ip = ip_address(record) report = Check_Report_AWS( metadata=self.metadata(), resource=record_set ) @@ -53,14 +57,12 @@ class route53_dangling_ip_subdomain_takeover(Check): report.status = "PASS" report.status_extended = f"Route53 record {record} (name: {record_set.name}) in Hosted Zone {hosted_zone.name} is not a dangling IP." # If Public IP check if it is in the AWS Account - if ( - not ip_address(record).is_private - and record not in public_ips - ): + if not record_ip.is_private and record not in public_ips: report.status_extended = f"Route53 record {record} (name: {record_set.name}) in Hosted Zone {hosted_zone.name} does not belong to AWS and it is not a dangling IP." # Check if potential dangling IP is within AWS Ranges - aws_ip_ranges = awsipranges.get_ranges() - if aws_ip_ranges.get(record): + if aws_ip_networks is None: + aws_ip_networks = get_public_ip_networks() + if any(record_ip in network for network in aws_ip_networks): report.status = "FAIL" report.status_extended = f"Route53 record {record} (name: {record_set.name}) in Hosted Zone {hosted_zone.name} is a dangling IP which can lead to a subdomain takeover attack." findings.append(report) diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/ssm/ssm_document_secrets/ssm_document_secrets.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/ssm/ssm_document_secrets/ssm_document_secrets.py index 0ec8502bab..1755c6f736 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/ssm/ssm_document_secrets/ssm_document_secrets.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/ssm/ssm_document_secrets/ssm_document_secrets.py @@ -1,7 +1,11 @@ import json from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_AWS -from prowler.lib.utils.utils import detect_secrets_scan +from prowler.lib.utils.utils import ( + SecretsScanError, + annotate_verified_secrets, + detect_secrets_scan_batch, +) from prowler.providers.aws.services.ssm.ssm_client import ssm_client @@ -11,7 +15,26 @@ class ssm_document_secrets(Check): secrets_ignore_patterns = ssm_client.audit_config.get( "secrets_ignore_patterns", [] ) - for document in ssm_client.documents.values(): + validate = ssm_client.audit_config.get("secrets_validate", False) + documents = list(ssm_client.documents.values()) + + # Collect one payload per document (its content) and scan them all in + # batched Kingfisher invocations instead of one subprocess per document. + def payloads(): + for index, document in enumerate(documents): + if document.content: + yield index, json.dumps(document.content, indent=2) + + scan_error = None + try: + batch_results = detect_secrets_scan_batch( + payloads(), excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, validate=validate + ) + except SecretsScanError as error: + batch_results = {} + scan_error = error + + for index, document in enumerate(documents): report = Check_Report_AWS(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=document) report.status = "PASS" report.status_extended = ( @@ -19,13 +42,15 @@ class ssm_document_secrets(Check): ) if document.content: - detect_secrets_output = detect_secrets_scan( - data=json.dumps(document.content, indent=2), - excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, - detect_secrets_plugins=ssm_client.audit_config.get( - "detect_secrets_plugins" - ), - ) + if scan_error: + report.status = "MANUAL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Could not scan SSM Document {document.name} for secrets: " + f"{scan_error}; manual review is required." + ) + findings.append(report) + continue + detect_secrets_output = batch_results.get(index) if detect_secrets_output: secrets_string = ", ".join( [ @@ -35,6 +60,7 @@ class ssm_document_secrets(Check): ) report.status = "FAIL" report.status_extended = f"Potential secret found in SSM Document {document.name} -> {secrets_string}." + annotate_verified_secrets(report, detect_secrets_output) findings.append(report) diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/stepfunctions/stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/stepfunctions/stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/stepfunctions/stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk/stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/aws/services/stepfunctions/stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk/stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..14b65b886b --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/stepfunctions/stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk/stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +{ + "Provider": "aws", + "CheckID": "stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk", + "CheckTitle": "Step Functions state machine is encrypted at rest with a customer-managed KMS key", + "CheckType": [ + "Software and Configuration Checks/AWS Security Best Practices", + "Software and Configuration Checks/Industry and Regulatory Standards/AWS Foundational Security Best Practices", + "Software and Configuration Checks/Industry and Regulatory Standards/NIST 800-53 Controls (USA)" + ], + "ServiceName": "stepfunctions", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "AwsStepFunctionStateMachine", + "ResourceGroup": "serverless", + "Description": "**AWS Step Functions state machines** store execution history and input/output data passed between workflow states. This check verifies that each state machine uses a **customer-managed KMS key** (`CUSTOMER_MANAGED_KMS_KEY`) for encryption at rest rather than the default AWS-owned key.", + "Risk": "Without a customer-managed KMS key, execution history containing **sensitive input/output data** is protected only by an AWS-owned key you cannot control, rotate, or revoke. This limits **auditability** via CloudTrail, prevents independent access revocation, and weakens **confidentiality** for regulated workloads.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/step-functions/latest/dg/encryption-at-rest.html", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/concepts.html#customer-cmk" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "aws stepfunctions update-state-machine --state-machine-arn --encryption-configuration '{\"kmsKeyId\": \"\", \"type\": \"CUSTOMER_MANAGED_KMS_KEY\", \"kmsDataKeyReusePeriodSeconds\": 300}'", + "NativeIaC": "```yaml\nResources:\n :\n Type: AWS::StepFunctions::StateMachine\n Properties:\n RoleArn: arn:aws:iam:::role/\n DefinitionString: |\n {\"StartAt\":\"Pass\",\"States\":{\"Pass\":{\"Type\":\"Pass\",\"End\":true}}}\n EncryptionConfiguration:\n KmsKeyId: arn:aws:kms:::key/ # Critical: customer-managed KMS key\n Type: CUSTOMER_MANAGED_KMS_KEY # Critical: must be CUSTOMER_MANAGED_KMS_KEY\n KmsDataKeyReusePeriodSeconds: 300\n```", + "Other": "1. Open AWS Console > Step Functions > State machines\n2. Select the state machine and click Edit\n3. Under Encryption, select Customer managed key\n4. Choose an existing KMS key or create a new one\n5. Save changes", + "Terraform": "```hcl\nresource \"aws_sfn_state_machine\" \"\" {\n name = \"\"\n role_arn = \"arn:aws:iam:::role/\"\n definition = jsonencode({ StartAt = \"Pass\", States = { Pass = { Type = \"Pass\", End = true } } })\n\n encryption_configuration {\n kms_key_id = \"arn:aws:kms:::key/\" # Critical: customer-managed KMS key\n type = \"CUSTOMER_MANAGED_KMS_KEY\" # Critical: must be CUSTOMER_MANAGED_KMS_KEY\n kms_data_key_reuse_period_seconds = 300\n }\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Configure each Step Functions state machine to use a **customer-managed KMS key** for encryption at rest. Assign a least-privilege key policy, enable **automatic key rotation**, and grant the execution role `kms:GenerateDataKey` and `kms:Decrypt`. Monitor key usage via CloudTrail.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "encryption" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [ + "stepfunctions_statemachine_logging_enabled" + ], + "Notes": "" +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/stepfunctions/stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk/stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/stepfunctions/stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk/stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b14de0b482 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/stepfunctions/stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk/stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk.py @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +from typing import List + +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_AWS +from prowler.providers.aws.services.stepfunctions.stepfunctions_client import ( + stepfunctions_client, +) +from prowler.providers.aws.services.stepfunctions.stepfunctions_service import ( + EncryptionType, +) + + +class stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk(Check): + """Ensure Step Functions state machines are encrypted at rest with a customer-managed KMS key. + + This check evaluates whether each AWS Step Functions state machine uses a + customer-managed KMS key (CUSTOMER_MANAGED_KMS_KEY) for encryption at rest rather + than the default AWS-owned key (AWS_OWNED_KEY). + + - PASS: The state machine encryption_configuration type is CUSTOMER_MANAGED_KMS_KEY. + - FAIL: The state machine has no encryption_configuration or its type is AWS_OWNED_KEY. + """ + + def execute(self) -> List[Check_Report_AWS]: + """Execute the Step Functions state machine encryption at rest check. + + Iterates over all Step Functions state machines and generates a report + indicating whether each state machine uses a customer-managed KMS key + for encryption at rest. + + Returns: + List[Check_Report_AWS]: A list of report objects with the results of the check. + """ + findings = [] + for state_machine in stepfunctions_client.state_machines.values(): + report = Check_Report_AWS(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=state_machine) + + if ( + state_machine.encryption_configuration + and state_machine.encryption_configuration.type + == EncryptionType.CUSTOMER_MANAGED_KMS_KEY + ): + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"Step Functions state machine {state_machine.name} is encrypted at rest with a customer-managed KMS key." + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"Step Functions state machine {state_machine.name} is not encrypted at rest with a customer-managed KMS key." + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/stepfunctions/stepfunctions_statemachine_no_secrets_in_definition/stepfunctions_statemachine_no_secrets_in_definition.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/stepfunctions/stepfunctions_statemachine_no_secrets_in_definition/stepfunctions_statemachine_no_secrets_in_definition.py index db04710029..12934528e9 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/stepfunctions/stepfunctions_statemachine_no_secrets_in_definition/stepfunctions_statemachine_no_secrets_in_definition.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/stepfunctions/stepfunctions_statemachine_no_secrets_in_definition/stepfunctions_statemachine_no_secrets_in_definition.py @@ -1,5 +1,9 @@ from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_AWS -from prowler.lib.utils.utils import detect_secrets_scan +from prowler.lib.utils.utils import ( + SecretsScanError, + annotate_verified_secrets, + detect_secrets_scan_batch, +) from prowler.providers.aws.services.stepfunctions.stepfunctions_client import ( stepfunctions_client, ) @@ -13,20 +17,41 @@ class stepfunctions_statemachine_no_secrets_in_definition(Check): secrets_ignore_patterns = stepfunctions_client.audit_config.get( "secrets_ignore_patterns", [] ) - for state_machine in stepfunctions_client.state_machines.values(): + validate = stepfunctions_client.audit_config.get("secrets_validate", False) + state_machines = list(stepfunctions_client.state_machines.values()) + + # Collect one payload per state machine (its definition) and scan them + # all in batched Kingfisher invocations instead of one subprocess each. + def payloads(): + for index, state_machine in enumerate(state_machines): + if state_machine.definition: + yield index, state_machine.definition + + scan_error = None + try: + batch_results = detect_secrets_scan_batch( + payloads(), excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, validate=validate + ) + except SecretsScanError as error: + batch_results = {} + scan_error = error + + for index, state_machine in enumerate(state_machines): report = Check_Report_AWS(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=state_machine) report.status = "PASS" report.status_extended = f"No secrets found in Step Functions state machine {state_machine.name} definition." if state_machine.definition: - detect_secrets_output = detect_secrets_scan( - data=state_machine.definition, - excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, - detect_secrets_plugins=stepfunctions_client.audit_config.get( - "detect_secrets_plugins", - ), - ) - + if scan_error: + report.status = "MANUAL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Could not scan Step Functions state machine " + f"{state_machine.name} definition for secrets: {scan_error}; " + "manual review is required." + ) + findings.append(report) + continue + detect_secrets_output = batch_results.get(index) if detect_secrets_output: secrets_string = ", ".join( [ @@ -40,6 +65,7 @@ class stepfunctions_statemachine_no_secrets_in_definition(Check): f"found in Step Functions state machine {state_machine.name} definition " f"-> {secrets_string}." ) + annotate_verified_secrets(report, detect_secrets_output) findings.append(report) return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/transfer/transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/transfer/transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/transfer/transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled/transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/aws/services/transfer/transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled/transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..773c85b7ab --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/transfer/transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled/transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +{ + "Provider": "aws", + "CheckID": "transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled", + "CheckTitle": "AWS Transfer Family server uses a post-quantum hybrid SSH key exchange security policy", + "CheckType": [ + "Software and Configuration Checks/AWS Security Best Practices" + ], + "ServiceName": "transfer", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "low", + "ResourceType": "AwsTransferServer", + "ResourceGroup": "network", + "Description": "**AWS Transfer Family servers** (SFTP, FTPS, AS2) are assessed for use of an approved **post-quantum (PQ) hybrid SSH key exchange security policy**. Servers whose `SecurityPolicyName` is not in the configured allowlist of PQ-ready Transfer Family security policies leave file-transfer sessions exposed to **harvest-now, decrypt-later** attacks.", + "Risk": "Without a PQ-ready security policy, SSH/SFTP traffic captured today can be stored and decrypted in the future once a **cryptographically relevant quantum computer** is available. This threatens long-term **confidentiality** of transferred files, credentials, and metadata.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/transfer/latest/userguide/post-quantum-security-policies.html", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/transfer/latest/userguide/security-policies.html", + "https://aws.amazon.com/security/post-quantum-cryptography/", + "https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "aws transfer update-server --server-id --security-policy-name TransferSecurityPolicy-2025-03", + "NativeIaC": "```yaml\nResources:\n :\n Type: AWS::Transfer::Server\n Properties:\n Protocols:\n - SFTP\n SecurityPolicyName: TransferSecurityPolicy-2025-03 # FIX: post-quantum hybrid SSH KEX policy\n```", + "Other": "1. In the AWS Console, go to AWS Transfer Family > Servers\n2. Select the server and choose Edit on the Additional details panel\n3. Set Cryptographic algorithm options (Security policy) to TransferSecurityPolicy-2025-03 (or another approved PQ policy)\n4. Save the changes", + "Terraform": "```hcl\nresource \"aws_transfer_server\" \"\" {\n protocols = [\"SFTP\"]\n security_policy_name = \"TransferSecurityPolicy-2025-03\" # FIX: post-quantum hybrid SSH KEX policy\n endpoint_type = \"PUBLIC\"\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Migrate AWS Transfer Family servers to a **post-quantum security policy** (e.g., `TransferSecurityPolicy-2025-03`, `TransferSecurityPolicy-FIPS-2025-03`, `TransferSecurityPolicy-AS2Restricted-2025-07`) that adds ML-KEM hybrid SSH key exchange. Avoid deprecated `*-PQ-SSH-Experimental-2023-04` policies. Review allowed policies regularly as AWS publishes new PQ-ready options.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "encryption" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [ + "transfer_server_in_transit_encryption_enabled" + ], + "Notes": "" +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/transfer/transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled/transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/transfer/transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled/transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a7d70df2df --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/transfer/transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled/transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled.py @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_AWS +from prowler.providers.aws.services.transfer.transfer_client import transfer_client + +PQC_TRANSFER_POLICIES_DEFAULT = [ + "TransferSecurityPolicy-2025-03", + "TransferSecurityPolicy-FIPS-2025-03", + "TransferSecurityPolicy-AS2Restricted-2025-07", +] + + +class transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled(Check): + """Verify that every AWS Transfer Family server uses a post-quantum security policy. + + A Transfer Family server PASSES when its ``SecurityPolicyName`` is in the + configured allowlist of policies that enable hybrid ML-KEM SSH key exchange. + """ + + def execute(self) -> list[Check_Report_AWS]: + """Check whether Transfer Family servers use approved PQ SSH KEX policies. + + Iterates through discovered AWS Transfer Family servers and compares each + server's ``SecurityPolicyName`` with the configured allowlist of + post-quantum hybrid SSH key exchange security policies. + + Returns: + list[Check_Report_AWS]: A list of reports for each Transfer Family + server, including the evaluated security policy context. + """ + findings = [] + pqc_policies = transfer_client.audit_config.get( + "transfer_pqc_ssh_allowed_policies", PQC_TRANSFER_POLICIES_DEFAULT + ) + for server in transfer_client.servers.values(): + report = Check_Report_AWS(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=server) + policy = server.security_policy_name or "" + if server.security_policy_name in pqc_policies: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Transfer Server {server.id} uses post-quantum security policy " + f"{policy}." + ) + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Transfer Server {server.id} uses security policy {policy}, " + "which does not enable post-quantum hybrid SSH key exchange." + ) + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/transfer/transfer_service.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/transfer/transfer_service.py index f86e195a31..968b0c9e60 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/transfer/transfer_service.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/transfer/transfer_service.py @@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ class Transfer(AWSService): ) for protocol in server_description.get("Protocols", []): server.protocols.append(Protocol(protocol)) + server.security_policy_name = server_description.get( + "SecurityPolicyName", "" + ) server.tags = server_description.get("Tags", []) except Exception as error: logger.error( @@ -65,4 +68,5 @@ class Server(BaseModel): id: str region: str protocols: List[Protocol] = Field(default_factory=list) + security_policy_name: str = "" tags: List[Dict[str, str]] = Field(default_factory=list) diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/waf/waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/waf/waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/waf/waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled/waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/aws/services/waf/waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled/waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b213398059 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/waf/waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled/waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +{ + "Provider": "aws", + "CheckID": "waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled", + "CheckTitle": "AWS WAF Classic Regional Web ACL has logging enabled", + "CheckType": [ + "Software and Configuration Checks/Industry and Regulatory Standards/AWS Foundational Security Best Practices", + "Software and Configuration Checks/Industry and Regulatory Standards/NIST 800-53 Controls (USA)", + "Software and Configuration Checks/Industry and Regulatory Standards/PCI-DSS" + ], + "ServiceName": "waf", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "AwsWafRegionalWebAcl", + "ResourceGroup": "security", + "Description": "**AWS WAF Classic Regional Web ACLs** are evaluated for **logging** enabled to capture evaluated web requests and rule actions. Regional Web ACLs protect Application Load Balancers and API Gateway stages.", + "Risk": "Without **WAF logging**, you lose **visibility** into attacks (SQLi/XSS probes, bots, brute-force) and into allow/block decisions for ALB and API Gateway traffic. This limits detection, forensics, and incident response, weakening **confidentiality**, **integrity**, and **availability**.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/waf/latest/developerguide/classic-logging.html", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/latest/userguide/waf-controls.html", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/waf-regional/put-logging-configuration.html" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "aws waf-regional put-logging-configuration --logging-configuration ResourceArn=,LogDestinationConfigs= --region ", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. Create an Amazon Kinesis Data Firehose delivery stream with a name starting with \"aws-waf-logs-\" in the same region as your Web ACL\n2. Open the AWS WAF console and switch to AWS WAF Classic\n3. Select Filter: Regional (your region) and go to Web ACLs\n4. Open the target Web ACL and go to the Logging tab\n5. Click Enable logging and select the Firehose delivery stream created in step 1\n6. Click Enable/Save", + "Terraform": "" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Enable **logging** on all Regional Web ACLs and send records to a centralized logging platform. Apply **least privilege** to log destinations, redact sensitive fields, and monitor for anomalies. Integrate logs with incident response for **defense in depth** and faster containment.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "logging" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [ + "waf_global_webacl_logging_enabled" + ], + "Notes": "" +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/waf/waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled/waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/waf/waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled/waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8d832d6c1e --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/waf/waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled/waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled.py @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +from typing import List + +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_AWS +from prowler.providers.aws.services.waf.wafregional_client import wafregional_client + + +class waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled(Check): + """Ensure AWS WAF Classic Regional Web ACLs have logging enabled. + + This check evaluates whether each AWS WAF Classic Regional Web ACL has logging + enabled by verifying the presence of at least one log destination configured + in its logging configuration. + + - PASS: The Web ACL has at least one log destination configured. + - FAIL: The Web ACL has no log destinations configured (logging is disabled). + """ + + def execute(self) -> List[Check_Report_AWS]: + """Execute the WAF Regional Web ACL logging enabled check. + + Iterates over all WAF Classic Regional Web ACLs and generates a report + indicating whether each Web ACL has logging enabled. + + Returns: + List[Check_Report_AWS]: A list of report objects with the results of the check. + """ + findings = [] + for acl in wafregional_client.web_acls.values(): + report = Check_Report_AWS(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=acl) + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"AWS WAF Regional Web ACL {acl.name} does not have logging enabled." + ) + + if acl.logging_enabled: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"AWS WAF Regional Web ACL {acl.name} does have logging enabled." + ) + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/aws/services/waf/waf_service.py b/prowler/providers/aws/services/waf/waf_service.py index 25476e6858..602b7116f6 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/aws/services/waf/waf_service.py +++ b/prowler/providers/aws/services/waf/waf_service.py @@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ class WAFRegional(AWSService): ) self.__threading_call__(self._list_web_acls) self.__threading_call__(self._get_web_acl, self.web_acls.values()) + self.__threading_call__(self._get_logging_configuration, self.web_acls.values()) self.__threading_call__(self._list_resources_for_web_acl) def _list_rules(self, regional_client): @@ -277,6 +278,34 @@ class WAFRegional(AWSService): f"{acl.region} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" ) + def _get_logging_configuration(self, acl): + """Fetch and store the logging configuration for a Regional Web ACL. + + Calls the WAF Regional GetLoggingConfiguration API for the given ACL and + sets acl.logging_enabled to True if at least one log destination is configured, + False otherwise. + + Args: + acl (WebAcl): The Regional Web ACL instance to update. + """ + logger.info( + f"WAFRegional - Getting Regional Web ACL {acl.name} logging configuration..." + ) + try: + get_logging_configuration = self.regional_clients[ + acl.region + ].get_logging_configuration(ResourceArn=acl.arn) + acl.logging_enabled = bool( + get_logging_configuration.get("LoggingConfiguration", {}).get( + "LogDestinationConfigs", [] + ) + ) + + except Exception as error: + logger.error( + f"{acl.region} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + def _list_resources_for_web_acl(self, regional_client): logger.info("WAFRegional - Describing resources...") try: diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/azure_provider.py b/prowler/providers/azure/azure_provider.py index c9496ac0a5..cb27bdfdb1 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/azure/azure_provider.py +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/azure_provider.py @@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ class AzureProvider(Provider): """ _type: str = "azure" + sdk_only: bool = False _session: DefaultAzureCredential _identity: AzureIdentityInfo _audit_config: dict diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled/aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled/aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..77096d6a20 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled/aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +{ + "Provider": "azure", + "CheckID": "aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled", + "CheckTitle": "AKS cluster has automatic upgrade enabled", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "aks", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "microsoft.containerservice/managedclusters", + "ResourceGroup": "container", + "Description": "**AKS clusters** are evaluated for an **automatic upgrade channel** other than `none`. Automatic upgrades keep the Kubernetes control plane and node pools on supported patch/minor versions and reduce version drift across clusters.", + "Risk": "Without automatic upgrades, AKS clusters can remain on unsupported or vulnerable Kubernetes versions. Delayed patching increases exposure to **known CVEs**, control plane/node defects, and exploit chains that can affect workload **confidentiality**, **integrity**, and **availability**.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/aks/auto-upgrade-cluster", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/aks/supported-kubernetes-versions" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "az aks update --resource-group --name --auto-upgrade-channel patch", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "", + "Terraform": "" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Configure an AKS automatic upgrade channel so clusters receive Kubernetes version updates and security patches without relying only on manual upgrade processes. Use `patch` or `stable` for conservative production upgrades, reserve faster channels such as `rapid` for environments that can absorb quicker version changes, and avoid `none` unless a documented exception and manual patching process exists.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "vulnerabilities", + "cluster-security" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "Automatic upgrade channels can change cluster versions during Azure-managed upgrade windows. Select a channel that matches the workload change tolerance and use planned maintenance windows, staging validation, and documented rollback procedures for production clusters." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled/aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled/aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9d1f8b48a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled/aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled.py @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Azure +from prowler.providers.azure.services.aks.aks_client import aks_client + + +class aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled(Check): + def execute(self) -> list[Check_Report_Azure]: + findings = [] + + for subscription_name, clusters in aks_client.clusters.items(): + for cluster in clusters.values(): + report = Check_Report_Azure(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=cluster) + report.subscription = subscription_name + + auto_upgrade_channel = ( + (cluster.auto_upgrade_channel or "").strip().lower() + ) + if auto_upgrade_channel and auto_upgrade_channel != "none": + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Cluster '{cluster.name}' has auto-upgrade channel." + ) + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"Cluster '{cluster.name}' does not have auto-upgrade configured." + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled/aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled/aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..362b8e4d73 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled/aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +{ + "Provider": "azure", + "CheckID": "aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled", + "CheckTitle": "AKS cluster has Azure Monitor metrics enabled", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "aks", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "microsoft.containerservice/managedclusters", + "ResourceGroup": "container", + "Description": "**Azure Kubernetes Service** clusters are evaluated for **Azure Monitor managed service for Prometheus** (the cluster's `azureMonitorProfile.metrics` configuration). When enabled, cluster and workload metrics are collected into an Azure Monitor workspace for dashboards and alerting. This is distinct from Container Insights (the `omsagent` logs addon).", + "Risk": "Without **Azure Monitor metrics**, cluster degradation, resource exhaustion, and anomalous behavior go undetected. Lack of metric-based observability delays incident detection and hampers investigation after a security or availability event.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/containers/kubernetes-monitoring-enable", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/containers/prometheus-metrics-enable", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/templates/microsoft.containerservice/managedclusters" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "az aks update --resource-group --name --enable-azure-monitor-metrics", + "NativeIaC": "```bicep\n// Bicep: AKS cluster with Azure Monitor managed Prometheus metrics enabled\nresource aks 'Microsoft.ContainerService/managedClusters@2024-02-01' = {\n name: ''\n location: resourceGroup().location\n properties: {\n azureMonitorProfile: {\n metrics: {\n enabled: true // CRITICAL: enables Azure Monitor managed service for Prometheus (metrics)\n }\n }\n }\n}\n```", + "Other": "1. Sign in to the Azure portal and open your AKS cluster\n2. In the left menu, select Monitoring > Insights\n3. Click Configure monitoring\n4. Ensure 'Enable Prometheus metrics' is selected and choose (or create) an Azure Monitor workspace\n5. Click Configure to enable Azure Monitor managed Prometheus metrics", + "Terraform": "```hcl\n# Terraform: AKS cluster with Azure Monitor managed Prometheus metrics enabled\nresource \"azurerm_kubernetes_cluster\" \"\" {\n name = \"\"\n location = \"\"\n resource_group_name = \"\"\n dns_prefix = \"\"\n\n monitor_metrics {} # CRITICAL: enables Azure Monitor managed service for Prometheus (metrics)\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Enable **Azure Monitor managed service for Prometheus** on AKS clusters so cluster and workload metrics are collected into an Azure Monitor workspace. Pair it with alerting on cluster health and resource saturation, and consider also enabling Container Insights (logs) for full observability.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "logging" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "" +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled/aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled/aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0c47f6373c --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled/aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled.py @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Azure +from prowler.providers.azure.services.aks.aks_client import aks_client + + +class aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled(Check): + """ + Ensure Azure Monitor is enabled for AKS clusters. + + This check evaluates whether each Azure Kubernetes Service cluster has Azure Monitor integration enabled for metrics collection, log aggregation, and alerting. + + - PASS: The cluster has Azure Monitor enabled. + - FAIL: The cluster does not have Azure Monitor enabled. + """ + + def execute(self) -> list[Check_Report_Azure]: + findings = [] + + for subscription_name, clusters in aks_client.clusters.items(): + for cluster in clusters.values(): + report = Check_Report_Azure(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=cluster) + report.subscription = subscription_name + + if cluster.azure_monitor_enabled: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"Cluster '{cluster.name}' has Azure Monitor managed Prometheus metrics enabled." + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"Cluster '{cluster.name}' does not have Azure Monitor managed Prometheus metrics enabled." + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_defender_enabled/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_defender_enabled/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_defender_enabled/aks_cluster_defender_enabled.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_defender_enabled/aks_cluster_defender_enabled.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..90bbd45f3b --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_defender_enabled/aks_cluster_defender_enabled.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +{ + "Provider": "azure", + "CheckID": "aks_cluster_defender_enabled", + "CheckTitle": "AKS cluster has Microsoft Defender security profile enabled", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "aks", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "high", + "ResourceType": "microsoft.containerservice/managedclusters", + "ResourceGroup": "container", + "Description": "**AKS clusters** are evaluated for the **Microsoft Defender security profile** (`securityProfile.defender.securityMonitoring.enabled=true`). Defender for Containers extends security monitoring, threat detection, vulnerability assessment, and security posture insights to Azure Kubernetes Service workloads.", + "Risk": "Without the Microsoft Defender security profile, AKS runtime threats such as **cryptomining**, suspicious Kubernetes API activity, vulnerable container images, and malicious workload behavior may go undetected. Compromised containers can pivot to cluster resources and cloud APIs, impacting **confidentiality**, **integrity**, and **availability**.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/defender-for-containers-deployment-overview", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/aks?view=azure-cli-latest#az-aks-update", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/templates/microsoft.containerservice/managedclusters" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "az aks update --resource-group --name --enable-defender", + "NativeIaC": "```bicep\n// AKS cluster with Microsoft Defender security monitoring enabled\nresource aks 'Microsoft.ContainerService/managedClusters@2024-05-01' = {\n name: ''\n location: ''\n identity: {\n type: 'SystemAssigned'\n }\n properties: {\n dnsPrefix: ''\n securityProfile: {\n defender: {\n logAnalyticsWorkspaceResourceId: ''\n securityMonitoring: {\n enabled: true // Critical: enables Defender security monitoring for AKS\n }\n }\n }\n agentPoolProfiles: [\n {\n name: 'system'\n count: 1\n vmSize: 'Standard_DS2_v2'\n mode: 'System'\n }\n ]\n }\n}\n```", + "Other": "1. In Microsoft Defender for Cloud, enable the Containers plan for the subscription that contains the AKS cluster\n2. In the AKS cluster configuration, enable the Microsoft Defender security profile\n3. Verify that Defender security monitoring is enabled for the managed cluster", + "Terraform": "```hcl\nresource \"azurerm_log_analytics_workspace\" \"example\" {\n name = \"\"\n location = \"\"\n resource_group_name = \"\"\n sku = \"PerGB2018\"\n}\n\nresource \"azurerm_kubernetes_cluster\" \"example\" {\n name = \"\"\n location = \"\"\n resource_group_name = \"\"\n dns_prefix = \"\"\n\n default_node_pool {\n name = \"system\"\n node_count = 1\n vm_size = \"Standard_DS2_v2\"\n }\n\n identity {\n type = \"SystemAssigned\"\n }\n\n microsoft_defender {\n log_analytics_workspace_id = azurerm_log_analytics_workspace.example.id\n }\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Enable the Microsoft Defender security profile for AKS clusters and ensure the subscription has Defender for Containers enabled. Route security monitoring data to the appropriate workspace and review Defender alerts and recommendations as part of the cluster operations process.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/aks_cluster_defender_enabled" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "threat-detection", + "cluster-security" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "This check evaluates the AKS managed cluster Defender security monitoring flag. Defender for Containers plan availability, billing, workspace routing, and alert response processes should be validated separately at the subscription and security operations levels." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_defender_enabled/aks_cluster_defender_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_defender_enabled/aks_cluster_defender_enabled.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..08074754a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_defender_enabled/aks_cluster_defender_enabled.py @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Azure +from prowler.providers.azure.services.aks.aks_client import aks_client + + +class aks_cluster_defender_enabled(Check): + def execute(self) -> list[Check_Report_Azure]: + findings = [] + + for subscription_name, clusters in aks_client.clusters.items(): + for cluster in clusters.values(): + report = Check_Report_Azure(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=cluster) + report.subscription = subscription_name + + if cluster.defender_enabled is True: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Cluster '{cluster.name}' has Defender for Containers " + "enabled." + ) + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Cluster '{cluster.name}' does not have Defender for " + "Containers enabled." + ) + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled/aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled/aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5577d4799c --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled/aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +{ + "Provider": "azure", + "CheckID": "aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled", + "CheckTitle": "AKS cluster has local accounts disabled", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "aks", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "high", + "ResourceType": "microsoft.containerservice/managedclusters", + "ResourceGroup": "container", + "Description": "**Azure Kubernetes Service** clusters are evaluated for **local account** status. Disabling local accounts forces all cluster authentication through Microsoft Entra ID, ensuring centralized identity management, MFA, and conditional access.", + "Risk": "Local accounts bypass **Entra ID** authentication, MFA, and conditional access policies. Compromised local credentials (such as the static cluster-admin certificate) provide persistent cluster access without an identity-based audit trail or governance.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/aks/manage-local-accounts-managed-azure-ad", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/aks?view=azure-cli-latest#az-aks-update", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/templates/microsoft.containerservice/managedclusters" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "az aks update --resource-group --name --disable-local-accounts", + "NativeIaC": "```bicep\n// Bicep: AKS cluster with local accounts disabled\nresource aks 'Microsoft.ContainerService/managedClusters@2024-02-01' = {\n name: ''\n location: resourceGroup().location\n properties: {\n disableLocalAccounts: true // CRITICAL: forces authentication through Entra ID\n aadProfile: {\n managed: true\n enableAzureRbac: true\n }\n }\n}\n```", + "Other": "1. Sign in to the Azure portal and open your AKS cluster\n2. Ensure Microsoft Entra ID (AAD) authentication is configured for the cluster\n3. Under Settings, select Cluster configuration (or Authentication and Authorization)\n4. Set Local accounts to Disabled\n5. Save the configuration", + "Terraform": "```hcl\n# Terraform: AKS cluster with local accounts disabled\nresource \"azurerm_kubernetes_cluster\" \"\" {\n name = \"\"\n location = \"\"\n resource_group_name = \"\"\n dns_prefix = \"\"\n local_account_disabled = true # CRITICAL: forces authentication through Entra ID\n\n azure_active_directory_role_based_access_control {\n azure_rbac_enabled = true\n }\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Disable local accounts on AKS clusters and require **Microsoft Entra ID** authentication with Azure RBAC. Before disabling, confirm Entra ID integration and break-glass access are in place so administrators retain authenticated access, then enforce MFA and conditional access on cluster identities.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "identity-access" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "" +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled/aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled/aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..85670e0d15 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled/aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled.py @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Azure +from prowler.providers.azure.services.aks.aks_client import aks_client + + +class aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled(Check): + """ + Ensure local accounts are disabled on AKS clusters. + + This check evaluates whether each Azure Kubernetes Service cluster has local accounts disabled, forcing all authentication through Microsoft Entra ID. + + - PASS: The cluster has local accounts disabled. + - FAIL: The cluster has local accounts enabled. + """ + + def execute(self) -> list[Check_Report_Azure]: + findings = [] + + for subscription_name, clusters in aks_client.clusters.items(): + for cluster in clusters.values(): + report = Check_Report_Azure(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=cluster) + report.subscription = subscription_name + + if cluster.local_accounts_disabled: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Cluster '{cluster.name}' has local accounts disabled." + ) + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Cluster '{cluster.name}' has local accounts enabled." + ) + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_service.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_service.py index 3d158a2f70..081edd7b17 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_service.py +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_service.py @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass -from typing import List +from typing import List, Optional from azure.mgmt.containerservice import ContainerServiceClient @@ -55,6 +55,56 @@ class AKS(AzureService): ) ], rbac_enabled=getattr(cluster, "enable_rbac", False), + auto_upgrade_channel=getattr( + getattr(cluster, "auto_upgrade_profile", None), + "upgrade_channel", + None, + ), + defender_enabled=bool( + getattr( + getattr( + getattr( + getattr( + cluster, + "security_profile", + None, + ), + "defender", + None, + ), + "security_monitoring", + None, + ), + "enabled", + False, + ) + ), + azure_monitor_enabled=( + bool( + getattr( + getattr( + getattr( + cluster, + "azure_monitor_profile", + None, + ), + "metrics", + None, + ), + "enabled", + False, + ) + ) + if getattr( + cluster, "azure_monitor_profile", None + ) + else False + ), + local_accounts_disabled=bool( + getattr( + cluster, "disable_local_accounts", False + ) + ), ) } ) @@ -82,3 +132,7 @@ class Cluster: agent_pool_profiles: List[ManagedClusterAgentPoolProfile] rbac_enabled: bool location: str + auto_upgrade_channel: Optional[str] = None + defender_enabled: bool = False + azure_monitor_enabled: bool = False + local_accounts_disabled: bool = False diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled/cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled/cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..41246ff7a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled/cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +{ + "Provider": "azure", + "CheckID": "cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled", + "CheckTitle": "Cosmos DB account has automatic failover enabled", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "cosmosdb", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "microsoft.documentdb/databaseaccounts", + "ResourceGroup": "database", + "Description": "**Azure Cosmos DB accounts** are evaluated for **automatic failover** configuration. When enabled, Cosmos DB automatically promotes a secondary region to primary during a regional outage, ensuring continuous availability without manual intervention.", + "Risk": "Without **automatic failover**, a regional outage requires **manual failover** which delays recovery and risks data unavailability. Applications dependent on the primary region experience downtime until an operator intervenes.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cosmos-db/how-to-manage-database-account#automatic-failover", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cosmos-db/high-availability", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cosmos-db/distribute-data-globally" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "az cosmosdb update --name --resource-group --enable-automatic-failover true", + "NativeIaC": "```bicep\n// Bicep: Enable automatic failover on a Cosmos DB account\nresource account 'Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts@2025-10-15' = {\n name: ''\n location: resourceGroup().location\n kind: 'GlobalDocumentDB'\n properties: {\n databaseAccountOfferType: 'Standard'\n locations: [\n { locationName: '', failoverPriority: 0 }\n { locationName: '', failoverPriority: 1 }\n ]\n enableAutomaticFailover: true // Critical: Promotes a secondary region during a primary region outage\n }\n}\n```", + "Other": "1. Sign in to the Azure portal and open your Cosmos DB account\n2. In the left menu, select Replicate data globally\n3. Click Automatic Failover\n4. Toggle Enable Automatic Failover to On\n5. Set failover priorities for each region\n6. Click Save", + "Terraform": "```hcl\n# Terraform: Enable automatic failover on a Cosmos DB account\nresource \"azurerm_cosmosdb_account\" \"\" {\n name = \"\"\n resource_group_name = \"\"\n location = \"\"\n offer_type = \"Standard\"\n kind = \"GlobalDocumentDB\"\n\n geo_location {\n location = \"\"\n failover_priority = 0\n }\n\n geo_location {\n location = \"\"\n failover_priority = 1\n }\n\n enable_automatic_failover = true # Critical: Promotes a secondary region during a primary region outage\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Enable **automatic failover** on Cosmos DB accounts with **multi-region** deployments so a secondary region is promoted automatically when the primary region becomes unavailable. Configure **failover priorities** to reflect your recovery strategy, validate **RTO/RPO** expectations with periodic failover drills, and combine with **multi-region writes** where active-active is required.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "forensics-ready" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "" +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled/cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled/cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7d7d2e5023 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled/cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled.py @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Azure +from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_client import cosmosdb_client + + +class cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled(Check): + """Ensure that Cosmos DB accounts have automatic failover enabled.""" + + def execute(self) -> Check_Report_Azure: + """Execute the Cosmos DB automatic failover check. + + Iterates over every Cosmos DB account fetched by the service and reports + PASS when `enableAutomaticFailover` is True, FAIL otherwise. + + Returns: + A list of Check_Report_Azure with one report per Cosmos DB account. + """ + findings = [] + for subscription, accounts in cosmosdb_client.accounts.items(): + for account in accounts: + report = Check_Report_Azure(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=account) + report.subscription = subscription + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"CosmosDB account {account.name} from subscription {subscription} does not have automatic failover enabled." + if account.enable_automatic_failover: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"CosmosDB account {account.name} from subscription {subscription} has automatic failover enabled." + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous/cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous/cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1631aa5b3a --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous/cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +{ + "Provider": "azure", + "CheckID": "cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous", + "CheckTitle": "Cosmos DB account uses continuous backup policy", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "cosmosdb", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "microsoft.documentdb/databaseaccounts", + "ResourceGroup": "database", + "Description": "**Azure Cosmos DB accounts** are evaluated for **continuous backup** policy. Continuous backup provides **point-in-time restore (PITR)** enabling recovery to any point within the retention window, unlike periodic backup which only supports full restores at fixed intervals.", + "Risk": "**Periodic backup** limits recovery to the last backup snapshot. Data changes between snapshots are lost during restore. **Continuous backup** enables **granular recovery** from accidental deletes, corruption, or ransomware.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cosmos-db/continuous-backup-restore-introduction", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cosmos-db/migrate-continuous-backup", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cosmos-db/restore-account-continuous-backup" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "az cosmosdb update --name --resource-group --backup-policy-type Continuous --continuous-tier Continuous30Days", + "NativeIaC": "```bicep\n// Bicep: Switch a Cosmos DB account to Continuous backup (irreversible)\nresource account 'Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts@2025-10-15' = {\n name: ''\n location: resourceGroup().location\n kind: 'GlobalDocumentDB'\n properties: {\n databaseAccountOfferType: 'Standard'\n locations: [{ locationName: resourceGroup().location }]\n backupPolicy: {\n type: 'Continuous' // Critical: Enables point-in-time restore. Migration from Periodic is one-way.\n continuousModeProperties: {\n tier: 'Continuous30Days' // or 'Continuous7Days' for the lower-cost tier\n }\n }\n }\n}\n```", + "Other": "1. Sign in to the Azure portal and open your Cosmos DB account\n2. In the left menu, select Backup & Restore\n3. Click Switch to Continuous backup\n4. Select the retention tier (Continuous30Days or Continuous7Days)\n5. Acknowledge that the migration from Periodic to Continuous is irreversible\n6. Click Save", + "Terraform": "```hcl\n# Terraform: Configure Cosmos DB account with Continuous backup (irreversible)\nresource \"azurerm_cosmosdb_account\" \"\" {\n name = \"\"\n resource_group_name = \"\"\n location = \"\"\n offer_type = \"Standard\"\n kind = \"GlobalDocumentDB\"\n\n geo_location {\n location = \"\"\n failover_priority = 0\n }\n\n backup {\n type = \"Continuous\" # Critical: Enables point-in-time restore. One-way migration from Periodic.\n tier = \"Continuous30Days\" # or \"Continuous7Days\" for the lower-cost tier\n }\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Use **Continuous backup** for Cosmos DB accounts that require **point-in-time restore (PITR)**. Pick the retention tier (`Continuous7Days` or `Continuous30Days`) based on recovery objectives, and validate restore procedures with periodic drills. Note that switching from **Periodic** to **Continuous** is a **one-way** migration; plan the change and review pricing before applying.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "forensics-ready" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "" +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous/cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous/cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f1a00fc2e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous/cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous.py @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Azure +from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_client import cosmosdb_client + + +class cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous(Check): + """Ensure that Cosmos DB accounts use the continuous backup policy.""" + + def execute(self) -> Check_Report_Azure: + """Execute the Cosmos DB continuous-backup check. + + Iterates over every Cosmos DB account fetched by the service and reports + PASS when `backupPolicy.type` is `Continuous`, FAIL otherwise (including + when the property is missing). + + Returns: + A list of Check_Report_Azure with one report per Cosmos DB account. + """ + findings = [] + for subscription, accounts in cosmosdb_client.accounts.items(): + for account in accounts: + report = Check_Report_Azure(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=account) + report.subscription = subscription + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"CosmosDB account {account.name} from subscription {subscription} does not use continuous backup policy." + if account.backup_policy_type == "Continuous": + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"CosmosDB account {account.name} from subscription {subscription} uses continuous backup policy." + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version/cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version/cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f9ddb2baa0 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version/cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +{ + "Provider": "azure", + "CheckID": "cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version", + "CheckTitle": "Cosmos DB account enforces TLS 1.2 or higher", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "cosmosdb", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "microsoft.documentdb/databaseaccounts", + "ResourceGroup": "database", + "Description": "**Azure Cosmos DB accounts** are evaluated for **minimum TLS version**. TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are deprecated and contain known weaknesses. Enforcing **TLS 1.2** ensures all client connections negotiate modern, secure encryption protocols.", + "Risk": "Allowing **TLS 1.0/1.1** exposes client connections to **POODLE**, **BEAST**, and other protocol downgrade attacks that can compromise the **confidentiality** and **integrity** of data in transit, and may enable credential interception via weakened cipher suites.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cosmos-db/security", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/cosmosdb", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/templates/microsoft.documentdb/databaseaccounts" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "az cosmosdb update --name --resource-group --minimal-tls-version Tls12", + "NativeIaC": "```bicep\n// Bicep: Enforce minimum TLS 1.2 on a Cosmos DB account\nresource account 'Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts@2025-10-15' = {\n name: ''\n location: resourceGroup().location\n kind: 'GlobalDocumentDB'\n properties: {\n databaseAccountOfferType: 'Standard'\n locations: [{ locationName: resourceGroup().location }]\n minimalTlsVersion: 'Tls12' // Critical: Rejects client connections negotiating TLS 1.0 or 1.1\n }\n}\n```", + "Other": "1. Sign in to the Azure portal and open your Cosmos DB account\n2. In the left menu, select Networking\n3. Locate the Minimum TLS version setting\n4. Select TLS 1.2\n5. Click Save\n6. Validate that all client applications support TLS 1.2 before enforcing the change", + "Terraform": "```hcl\n# Terraform: Enforce minimum TLS 1.2 on a Cosmos DB account\nresource \"azurerm_cosmosdb_account\" \"\" {\n name = \"\"\n resource_group_name = \"\"\n location = \"\"\n offer_type = \"Standard\"\n kind = \"GlobalDocumentDB\"\n\n geo_location {\n location = \"\"\n failover_priority = 0\n }\n\n minimal_tls_version = \"Tls12\" # Critical: Rejects client connections negotiating TLS 1.0 or 1.1\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Set the Cosmos DB account **minimum TLS version** to at least **1.2** to block legacy protocols (`TLS 1.0`/`1.1`) vulnerable to known downgrade and cipher attacks. Inventory and update **client SDKs** and **drivers** to support TLS 1.2 prior to enforcement, and pair this control with **private endpoints**, **AAD/RBAC authentication**, and **handshake failure monitoring** to identify outdated clients.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "encryption" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "" +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version/cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version/cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5d85072367 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version/cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version.py @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Azure +from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_client import cosmosdb_client + + +class cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version(Check): + """Ensure that Cosmos DB accounts enforce TLS 1.2 or higher.""" + + def execute(self) -> Check_Report_Azure: + """Execute the Cosmos DB minimum TLS version check. + + Iterates over every Cosmos DB account fetched by the service and reports + PASS when `minimalTlsVersion` is `Tls12` or higher, FAIL otherwise + (including when the property is missing or set to a legacy value). + + Returns: + A list of Check_Report_Azure with one report per Cosmos DB account. + """ + findings = [] + for subscription, accounts in cosmosdb_client.accounts.items(): + for account in accounts: + report = Check_Report_Azure(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=account) + report.subscription = subscription + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"CosmosDB account {account.name} from subscription {subscription} does not enforce TLS 1.2 or higher." + if account.minimal_tls_version in {"Tls12", "Tls13"}: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"CosmosDB account {account.name} from subscription {subscription} enforces TLS 1.2 or higher." + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled/cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled/cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2d8a61a54e --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled/cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +{ + "Provider": "azure", + "CheckID": "cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled", + "CheckTitle": "Cosmos DB account has public network access disabled", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "cosmosdb", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "microsoft.documentdb/databaseaccounts", + "ResourceGroup": "database", + "Description": "**Azure Cosmos DB accounts** are evaluated for **public network access**. Disabling public network access ensures the account is only reachable through **private endpoints** or **VNet service endpoints**, reducing the attack surface and preventing direct exposure of the data plane to the internet.", + "Risk": "Allowing **public network access** exposes the Cosmos DB data plane to the internet. Combined with leaked **connection strings**, weak **firewall rules**, or compromised **AAD tokens**, this enables **unauthorized data access**, **enumeration**, **brute force**, and **data exfiltration** from any source on the internet.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cosmos-db/how-to-configure-private-endpoints", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cosmos-db/how-to-configure-firewall", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/templates/microsoft.documentdb/databaseaccounts" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "az cosmosdb update --name --resource-group --public-network-access Disabled", + "NativeIaC": "```bicep\n// Bicep: Disable public network access on a Cosmos DB account\nresource account 'Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts@2025-10-15' = {\n name: ''\n location: resourceGroup().location\n kind: 'GlobalDocumentDB'\n properties: {\n databaseAccountOfferType: 'Standard'\n locations: [{ locationName: resourceGroup().location }]\n publicNetworkAccess: 'Disabled' // Critical: Blocks all public-internet traffic to the data plane\n }\n}\n```", + "Other": "1. Sign in to the Azure portal and open your Cosmos DB account\n2. In the left menu, select Networking\n3. Under Public network access, select Disabled\n4. Configure private endpoints or VNet service endpoints before saving so clients retain connectivity\n5. Click Save", + "Terraform": "```hcl\n# Terraform: Disable public network access on a Cosmos DB account\nresource \"azurerm_cosmosdb_account\" \"\" {\n name = \"\"\n resource_group_name = \"\"\n location = \"\"\n offer_type = \"Standard\"\n kind = \"GlobalDocumentDB\"\n\n geo_location {\n location = \"\"\n failover_priority = 0\n }\n\n public_network_access_enabled = false # Critical: Blocks all public-internet traffic to the data plane\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Disable **public network access** on Cosmos DB accounts and require connectivity via **private endpoints** or **VNet service endpoints**. Before enforcement, validate that all application workloads have private-network connectivity, and pair this control with **AAD/RBAC authentication**, **TLS 1.2+**, and **firewall rules** restricted to the minimum trusted ranges to uphold **defense in depth**.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "internet-exposed" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "" +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled/cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled/cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ec2d29728d --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled/cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled.py @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Azure +from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_client import cosmosdb_client + + +class cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled(Check): + """Ensure that Cosmos DB accounts have public network access disabled.""" + + def execute(self) -> Check_Report_Azure: + """Execute the Cosmos DB public network access check. + + Iterates over every Cosmos DB account fetched by the service and reports + PASS when `publicNetworkAccess` is `Disabled` or `SecuredByPerimeter` + (Microsoft Network Security Perimeter), FAIL otherwise (including when + the property is missing or set to `Enabled`). + + Returns: + A list of Check_Report_Azure with one report per Cosmos DB account. + """ + findings = [] + for subscription, accounts in cosmosdb_client.accounts.items(): + for account in accounts: + report = Check_Report_Azure(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=account) + report.subscription = subscription + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"CosmosDB account {account.name} from subscription {subscription} does not have public network access disabled (current value: {account.public_network_access!r})." + if account.public_network_access in {"Disabled", "SecuredByPerimeter"}: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"CosmosDB account {account.name} from subscription {subscription} has public network access disabled." + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_service.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_service.py index c36af1d2e9..e7c53799a7 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_service.py +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_service.py @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass -from typing import List +from typing import List, Optional from azure.mgmt.cosmosdb import CosmosDBManagementClient @@ -36,14 +36,29 @@ class CosmosDB(AzureService): name=private_endpoint_connection.name, type=private_endpoint_connection.type, ) - for private_endpoint_connection in getattr( - account, "private_endpoint_connections", [] + for private_endpoint_connection in ( + getattr(account, "private_endpoint_connections", []) + or [] ) if private_endpoint_connection ], disable_local_auth=getattr( account, "disable_local_auth", False ), + enable_automatic_failover=getattr( + account, "enable_automatic_failover", False + ), + backup_policy_type=getattr( + getattr(account, "backup_policy", None), + "type", + None, + ), + public_network_access=getattr( + account, "public_network_access", None + ), + minimal_tls_version=getattr( + account, "minimal_tls_version", None + ), ) ) except Exception as error: @@ -71,3 +86,7 @@ class Account: location: str private_endpoint_connections: List[PrivateEndpointConnection] disable_local_auth: bool = False + enable_automatic_failover: bool = False + backup_policy_type: Optional[str] = None + public_network_access: Optional[str] = None + minimal_tls_version: Optional[str] = None diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_service.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_service.py index 7920500d88..b7367d3cbb 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_service.py +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_service.py @@ -62,10 +62,21 @@ class Databricks(AzureService): else: managed_disk_encryption = None + enable_no_public_ip = getattr( + workspace_parameters, "enable_no_public_ip", None + ) workspaces[subscription][workspace.id] = DatabricksWorkspace( id=workspace.id, name=workspace.name, location=workspace.location, + public_network_access=getattr( + workspace, "public_network_access", None + ), + no_public_ip_enabled=( + getattr(enable_no_public_ip, "value", None) + if enable_no_public_ip + else None + ), custom_managed_vnet_id=( getattr( workspace_parameters, "custom_virtual_network_id", None @@ -107,6 +118,8 @@ class DatabricksWorkspace(BaseModel): id: The unique identifier of the workspace. name: The name of the workspace. location: The Azure region where the workspace is deployed. + public_network_access: Whether public network access is "Enabled" or "Disabled", if configured. + no_public_ip_enabled: Whether secure cluster connectivity (no public IP) is enabled. None when the workspace does not expose this classic-compute setting (e.g. serverless workspaces). custom_managed_vnet_id: The ID of the custom managed virtual network, if configured. managed_disk_encryption: The encryption settings for the workspace's managed disks. """ @@ -114,5 +127,7 @@ class DatabricksWorkspace(BaseModel): id: str name: str location: str + public_network_access: Optional[str] = None + no_public_ip_enabled: Optional[bool] = None custom_managed_vnet_id: Optional[str] = None managed_disk_encryption: Optional[ManagedDiskEncryption] = None diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled/databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled/databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4062199474 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled/databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +{ + "Provider": "azure", + "CheckID": "databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled", + "CheckTitle": "Databricks workspace has secure cluster connectivity (no public IP)", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "databricks", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "microsoft.databricks/workspaces", + "ResourceGroup": "ai_ml", + "Description": "**Azure Databricks workspaces** are evaluated for **secure cluster connectivity** (No Public IP / NPIP). When enabled, compute (cluster) nodes are deployed without public IP addresses and communicate with the control plane through a secure relay, reducing the workspace's exposure to the internet.", + "Risk": "Without **secure cluster connectivity**, Databricks compute nodes are assigned **public IP addresses** and are directly reachable from the internet. This enables **port scanning**, **lateral movement** from a compromised node, and **data exfiltration** that bypasses private-network controls.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/databricks/security/network/classic/secure-cluster-connectivity", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/databricks/security/network/classic/vnet-inject", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/templates/microsoft.databricks/workspaces" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "az databricks workspace create --name --resource-group --location --sku premium --enable-no-public-ip", + "NativeIaC": "```bicep\n// Bicep: Deploy a Databricks workspace with secure cluster connectivity (No Public IP)\nresource workspace 'Microsoft.Databricks/workspaces@2023-02-01' = {\n name: ''\n location: resourceGroup().location\n sku: {\n name: 'premium'\n }\n properties: {\n managedResourceGroupId: '/subscriptions//resourceGroups/'\n parameters: {\n enableNoPublicIp: {\n value: true // CRITICAL: Deploys cluster nodes without public IP addresses\n }\n }\n }\n}\n```", + "Other": "1. Sign in to the Azure portal and start creating a new Azure Databricks workspace (No Public IP must be set at creation; it cannot be enabled on an existing workspace)\n2. On the Networking tab, set Deploy Azure Databricks workspace with Secure Cluster Connectivity (No Public IP) to Yes\n3. Complete the VNet injection configuration if required\n4. Review + create the workspace\n5. Migrate workloads to the new workspace and decommission the old one", + "Terraform": "```hcl\n# Terraform: Databricks workspace with secure cluster connectivity (No Public IP)\nresource \"azurerm_databricks_workspace\" \"\" {\n name = \"\"\n resource_group_name = \"\"\n location = \"\"\n sku = \"premium\"\n\n custom_parameters {\n no_public_ip = true # CRITICAL: Deploys cluster nodes without public IP addresses\n }\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Deploy Databricks workspaces with **secure cluster connectivity (No Public IP)** so compute nodes have no public IP addresses. Because this is set at creation, plan a migration for existing workspaces, and pair it with **VNet injection**, **private endpoints / disabled public network access**, and least-privilege NSG rules to uphold **defense in depth**.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "internet-exposed" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "Secure cluster connectivity (No Public IP) applies to classic compute and is set at workspace creation. Serverless workspaces do not expose this setting (they have no customer-managed cluster nodes with public IPs) and are reported as MANUAL for verification." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled/databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled/databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..13b7742ffa --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled/databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled.py @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Azure +from prowler.providers.azure.services.databricks.databricks_client import ( + databricks_client, +) + + +class databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled(Check): + """ + Ensure Azure Databricks workspaces have secure cluster connectivity (no public IP) enabled. + + This check evaluates whether each Azure Databricks workspace in the subscription is deployed with secure cluster connectivity (No Public IP / NPIP), so cluster nodes are not assigned public IP addresses. + + Secure cluster connectivity is a classic-compute setting. Serverless workspaces do not expose it (they have no customer-managed cluster nodes with public IPs), so the workspace is reported as MANUAL for verification rather than failed. + + - PASS: The workspace has secure cluster connectivity enabled (no_public_ip_enabled is True). + - FAIL: The workspace has secure cluster connectivity disabled (no_public_ip_enabled is False). + - MANUAL: The workspace does not expose the setting (no_public_ip_enabled is None, e.g. serverless workspaces). + """ + + def execute(self): + findings = [] + for subscription, workspaces in databricks_client.workspaces.items(): + subscription_name = databricks_client.subscriptions.get( + subscription, subscription + ) + for workspace in workspaces.values(): + report = Check_Report_Azure( + metadata=self.metadata(), resource=workspace + ) + report.subscription = subscription + if workspace.no_public_ip_enabled is None: + report.status = "MANUAL" + report.status_extended = f"Databricks workspace {workspace.name} in subscription {subscription_name} ({subscription}) does not expose secure cluster connectivity (no public IP) settings (for example, serverless workspaces have no public-IP cluster nodes); verify the network configuration manually." + elif workspace.no_public_ip_enabled: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"Databricks workspace {workspace.name} in subscription {subscription_name} ({subscription}) has secure cluster connectivity (no public IP) enabled." + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"Databricks workspace {workspace.name} in subscription {subscription_name} ({subscription}) does not have secure cluster connectivity (no public IP) enabled." + findings.append(report) + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled/databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled/databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cb92d6df0f --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled/databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +{ + "Provider": "azure", + "CheckID": "databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled", + "CheckTitle": "Databricks workspace has public network access disabled", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "databricks", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "high", + "ResourceType": "microsoft.databricks/workspaces", + "ResourceGroup": "ai_ml", + "Description": "**Azure Databricks workspaces** are evaluated for **public network access**. Disabling public network access ensures the workspace is only reachable through **private endpoints**, reducing the attack surface and preventing direct exposure of the control plane and data plane to the internet.", + "Risk": "Allowing **public network access** exposes the Databricks workspace control plane and data plane to the internet. Combined with leaked **credentials**, **personal access tokens**, or unpatched vulnerabilities, this enables **unauthorized access**, **brute force**, and **data exfiltration** from any source on the internet.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/databricks/security/network/classic/private-link", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/databricks/security/network/classic/private-link#step-4-disable-public-network-access", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/templates/microsoft.databricks/workspaces" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "az databricks workspace update --name --resource-group --public-network-access Disabled", + "NativeIaC": "```bicep\n// Bicep: Disable public network access on a Databricks workspace\nresource workspace 'Microsoft.Databricks/workspaces@2023-02-01' = {\n name: ''\n location: resourceGroup().location\n sku: {\n name: 'premium'\n }\n properties: {\n managedResourceGroupId: '/subscriptions//resourceGroups/'\n publicNetworkAccess: 'Disabled' // CRITICAL: Blocks all public-internet traffic to the workspace\n }\n}\n```", + "Other": "1. Sign in to the Azure portal and open your Databricks workspace\n2. In the left menu, select Networking\n3. Under Public network access, select Disabled\n4. Configure Azure Private Link private endpoints before saving so clients retain connectivity\n5. Click Save", + "Terraform": "```hcl\n# Terraform: Disable public network access on a Databricks workspace\nresource \"azurerm_databricks_workspace\" \"\" {\n name = \"\"\n resource_group_name = \"\"\n location = \"\"\n sku = \"premium\"\n\n public_network_access_enabled = false # CRITICAL: Blocks all public-internet traffic to the workspace\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Disable **public network access** on Databricks workspaces and require connectivity via **Azure Private Link** private endpoints. Before enforcement, validate that all application workloads have private-network connectivity, and pair this control with **VNet injection**, **secure cluster connectivity (no public IP)**, and least-privilege access to uphold **defense in depth**.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "internet-exposed" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "" +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled/databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled/databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e8193cedb6 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled/databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled.py @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Azure +from prowler.providers.azure.services.databricks.databricks_client import ( + databricks_client, +) + + +class databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled(Check): + """ + Ensure Azure Databricks workspaces have public network access disabled. + + This check evaluates whether each Azure Databricks workspace in the subscription restricts connectivity to private endpoints by disabling public network access. + + - PASS: The workspace has public network access disabled (public_network_access is "Disabled"). + - FAIL: The workspace has public network access enabled (or the value is not set). + """ + + def execute(self): + findings = [] + for subscription, workspaces in databricks_client.workspaces.items(): + subscription_name = databricks_client.subscriptions.get( + subscription, subscription + ) + for workspace in workspaces.values(): + report = Check_Report_Azure( + metadata=self.metadata(), resource=workspace + ) + report.subscription = subscription + if workspace.public_network_access == "Disabled": + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"Databricks workspace {workspace.name} in subscription {subscription_name} ({subscription}) has public network access disabled." + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"Databricks workspace {workspace.name} in subscription {subscription_name} ({subscription}) has public network access enabled." + findings.append(report) + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/defender/defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/defender/defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/defender/defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on/defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/azure/services/defender/defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on/defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cae92490af --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/defender/defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on/defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +{ + "Provider": "azure", + "CheckID": "defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on", + "CheckTitle": "Microsoft Defender CSPM is set to On", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "defender", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "microsoft.security/pricings", + "ResourceGroup": "security", + "Description": "**Microsoft Defender for Cloud** Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM) plan is evaluated for **standard tier** activation. Defender CSPM provides advanced posture management capabilities including attack path analysis, cloud security explorer, agentless scanning, and governance rules.", + "Risk": "Without Defender CSPM, the subscription relies on **foundational CSPM** (free tier) which lacks attack path analysis, agentless vulnerability scanning, and security governance. Advanced threats exploiting misconfiguration chains go undetected.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-cloud-security-posture-management", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/enable-enhanced-security" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "az security pricing create -n CloudPosture --tier Standard", + "NativeIaC": "```bicep\ntargetScope = 'subscription'\n\nresource defenderCSPM 'Microsoft.Security/pricings@2024-01-01' = {\n name: 'CloudPosture'\n properties: {\n pricingTier: 'Standard' // Critical: enables Defender CSPM\n }\n}\n```", + "Other": "1. Sign in to Azure portal\n2. Go to Microsoft Defender for Cloud\n3. Select Environment Settings\n4. Click on the subscription\n5. Set Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM) to On\n6. Click Save", + "Terraform": "```hcl\nresource \"azurerm_security_center_subscription_pricing\" \"\" {\n tier = \"Standard\" # Critical: enables Defender CSPM\n resource_type = \"CloudPosture\"\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Enable **Defender CSPM** standard tier for advanced cloud security posture management. Evaluate the cost against the security benefits \u2014 CSPM provides attack path analysis and agentless scanning.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "threat-detection" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "" +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/defender/defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on/defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/defender/defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on/defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cf7957400c --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/defender/defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on/defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on.py @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Azure +from prowler.providers.azure.services.defender.defender_client import defender_client + + +class defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on(Check): + """ + Ensure Microsoft Defender Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM) is set to On. + + This check evaluates whether the Defender CSPM plan (CloudPosture pricing) is enabled with the Standard tier for each subscription. + + - PASS: The CloudPosture pricing tier is "Standard" (Defender CSPM is on). + - FAIL: The CloudPosture pricing tier is not "Standard" (Defender CSPM is off). + """ + + def execute(self) -> Check_Report_Azure: + findings = [] + for subscription, pricings in defender_client.pricings.items(): + subscription_name = defender_client.subscriptions.get( + subscription, subscription + ) + if "CloudPosture" in pricings: + report = Check_Report_Azure( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=pricings["CloudPosture"], + ) + report.subscription = subscription + report.resource_name = "Defender plan CSPM" + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"Defender plan CSPM from subscription {subscription_name} ({subscription}) is set to ON (pricing tier standard)." + if pricings["CloudPosture"].pricing_tier != "Standard": + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"Defender plan CSPM from subscription {subscription_name} ({subscription}) is set to OFF (pricing tier not standard)." + + findings.append(report) + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired/entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired/entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c786fd49af --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired/entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +{ + "Provider": "azure", + "CheckID": "entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired", + "CheckTitle": "App registration credentials are not expired or expiring soon", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "entra", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "high", + "ResourceType": "NotDefined", + "ResourceGroup": "IAM", + "Description": "**Microsoft Entra ID** app registrations are evaluated for **credential validity**. Each app's password secrets and certificate credentials are checked for expiration. Credentials that are already expired, expiring within 30 days, or have no expiration date are flagged.", + "Risk": "Expired credentials cause **service outages** when apps can no longer authenticate. Credentials without expiration violate **least privilege** by persisting indefinitely. Long-lived or leaked secrets enable **unauthorized API access**, **data exfiltration**, and **lateral movement** via the app's permissions.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/howto-create-service-principal-portal", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/application" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "az ad app credential reset --id --years 1", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. Sign in to Microsoft Entra admin center\n2. Go to Identity > Applications > App registrations\n3. Select the application with the expiring credential\n4. Go to Certificates & secrets\n5. Delete the expired credential\n6. Add a new credential with an appropriate expiration (recommended: 6-12 months)\n7. Update the consuming application with the new credential\n8. Consider migrating to managed identities or federated credentials where possible", + "Terraform": "" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Rotate app registration credentials before expiration. Set expiration to 6-12 months maximum. Prefer **managed identities** or **federated credentials** over secrets. Monitor credential expiry with Azure Monitor alerts or Microsoft Entra workbooks.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "identity-access" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "This check evaluates both password secrets and certificate credentials. Each credential is reported individually. Apps with no credentials are skipped." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired/entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired/entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5cbdf009a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired/entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.py @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +from datetime import datetime, timezone + +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Azure +from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_client import entra_client + +EXPIRY_WARNING_DAYS = 30 + + +class entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired(Check): + """ + Ensure Microsoft Entra ID app registration credentials are not expired or expiring soon. + + This check evaluates each app registration's password secrets and certificate credentials. A credential is reported individually and flagged when it is already expired, expiring within 30 days, or has no expiration date. Apps with no credentials are skipped. + + - PASS: The credential is valid for more than 30 days. + - FAIL: The credential is expired, expiring within 30 days, or has no expiration date. + """ + + def execute(self) -> Check_Report_Azure: + findings = [] + + for tenant_domain, apps in entra_client.app_registrations.items(): + for app_id, app in apps.items(): + if not app.credentials: + continue + + for credential in app.credentials: + report = Check_Report_Azure(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=app) + report.subscription = f"Tenant: {tenant_domain}" + report.resource_name = ( + f"{app.name} ({credential.credential_type}: " + f"{credential.display_name or 'unnamed'})" + ) + + if credential.end_date_time is None: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"App '{app.name}' has a {credential.credential_type} " + f"credential with no expiration date." + ) + else: + now = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + end = credential.end_date_time + if end.tzinfo is None: + end = end.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc) + if end <= now: + days_ago = (now - end).days + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"App '{app.name}' has a {credential.credential_type} " + f"credential that expired {days_ago} days ago." + ) + elif (end - now).days <= EXPIRY_WARNING_DAYS: + days_left = (end - now).days + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"App '{app.name}' has a {credential.credential_type} " + f"credential expiring in {days_left} days (within the " + f"{EXPIRY_WARNING_DAYS}-day rotation threshold); rotate it soon." + ) + else: + days_left = (end - now).days + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"App '{app.name}' has a {credential.credential_type} " + f"credential valid for {days_left} more days (beyond the " + f"{EXPIRY_WARNING_DAYS}-day rotation threshold)." + ) + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced/entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced/entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..11dfa6e85b --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced/entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +{ + "Provider": "azure", + "CheckID": "entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced", + "CheckTitle": "Strong authentication methods are enabled with registration enforcement", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "entra", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "high", + "ResourceType": "NotDefined", + "ResourceGroup": "IAM", + "Description": "**Microsoft Entra ID** authentication methods policy is evaluated for **strong authentication enforcement**. The check verifies that at least one strong method (Microsoft Authenticator, FIDO2, or X.509 Certificate) is enabled and that the MFA registration campaign is active to prompt users to enroll.", + "Risk": "Without strong authentication methods, the tenant relies on **passwords alone** or weak factors like SMS/voice. Password-only authentication enables **credential stuffing**, **phishing**, and **brute force** attacks. Without registration enforcement, users may never enroll in MFA even when it is available.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-methods-manage", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/how-to-nudge-authenticator-app" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. Sign in to Microsoft Entra admin center\n2. Go to Protection > Authentication methods > Policies\n3. Enable Microsoft Authenticator and/or FIDO2 security keys\n4. Go to Protection > Authentication methods > Registration campaign\n5. Set State to Enabled\n6. Configure included users/groups\n7. Consider disabling weak methods (SMS, Voice) after users migrate", + "Terraform": "" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Enable **Microsoft Authenticator** and **FIDO2 security keys** as authentication methods. Activate the **MFA registration campaign** to prompt users to register. Disable weak methods (SMS, voice) after migration. Use **Conditional Access** to require strong authentication for all users.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "identity-access" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "This check reports a single finding per tenant and passes only when both the MFA registration campaign is enabled and at least one strong method is enabled. Microsoft recommends phishing-resistant methods (FIDO2, certificate-based) over app-based push notifications." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced/entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced/entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..efdbcfa6a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced/entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced.py @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Azure +from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_client import entra_client + +# Methods considered strong (phishing-resistant or app-based MFA) +STRONG_METHODS = {"microsoftAuthenticator", "fido2", "x509Certificate"} + + +class entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced(Check): + """ + Ensure the Entra ID authentication methods policy enforces strong authentication. + + This check evaluates the tenant authentication methods policy and reports a single finding per tenant. Strong authentication is considered enforced only when BOTH conditions hold: + 1. The MFA registration campaign is enabled (users are prompted to register methods). + 2. At least one strong, phishing-resistant or app-based method (Microsoft Authenticator, FIDO2, or X.509 certificate) is enabled. + + - PASS: Both conditions hold. + - FAIL: One or both conditions are missing; the status extended names exactly what is missing. + """ + + def execute(self) -> Check_Report_Azure: + findings = [] + + for tenant_domain, policy in entra_client.authentication_methods_policy.items(): + if policy is None: + continue + + report = Check_Report_Azure(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=policy) + report.subscription = f"Tenant: {tenant_domain}" + report.resource_name = "Authentication Methods Policy" + report.resource_id = policy.id + + registration_enabled = policy.registration_enforcement_state == "enabled" + enabled_strong = [ + config.method_name + for config in policy.method_configurations + if config.state == "enabled" and config.method_name in STRONG_METHODS + ] + + if registration_enabled and enabled_strong: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Strong authentication is enforced for tenant {tenant_domain}: " + f"the MFA registration campaign is enabled and strong methods are " + f"enabled ({', '.join(enabled_strong)})." + ) + else: + issues = [] + if not registration_enabled: + issues.append("the MFA registration campaign is not enabled") + if not enabled_strong: + issues.append( + "no strong authentication methods (Microsoft Authenticator, " + "FIDO2, or X.509 Certificate) are enabled" + ) + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Strong authentication is not enforced for tenant " + f"{tenant_domain}: {'; '.join(issues)}." + ) + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_service.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_service.py index eb1d62ac11..e23f3cd34a 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_service.py +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_service.py @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ import asyncio from asyncio import gather +from datetime import datetime from typing import List, Optional from uuid import UUID @@ -49,6 +50,8 @@ class Entra(AzureService): self._get_named_locations(), self._get_directory_roles(), self._get_conditional_access_policy(), + self._get_app_registrations(), + self._get_authentication_methods_policy(), ) ) @@ -58,6 +61,8 @@ class Entra(AzureService): self.named_locations = attributes[3] self.directory_roles = attributes[4] self.conditional_access_policy = attributes[5] + self.app_registrations = attributes[6] + self.authentication_methods_policy = attributes[7] if created_loop: asyncio.set_event_loop(None) @@ -69,7 +74,12 @@ class Entra(AzureService): try: request_configuration = RequestConfiguration( query_parameters=UsersRequestBuilder.UsersRequestBuilderGetQueryParameters( - select=["id", "displayName", "accountEnabled"] + select=[ + "id", + "displayName", + "accountEnabled", + "signInActivity", + ] ) ) for tenant, client in self.clients.items(): @@ -82,6 +92,16 @@ class Entra(AzureService): try: while users_response: for user in getattr(users_response, "value", []) or []: + sign_in_activity = getattr(user, "sign_in_activity", None) + last_sign_in = ( + getattr( + sign_in_activity, + "last_sign_in_date_time", + None, + ) + if sign_in_activity + else None + ) users[tenant].update( { user.id: User( @@ -93,6 +113,7 @@ class Entra(AzureService): account_enabled=getattr( user, "account_enabled", True ), + last_sign_in=last_sign_in, ) } ) @@ -416,12 +437,142 @@ class Entra(AzureService): return conditional_access_policy + async def _get_app_registrations(self): + logger.info("Entra - Getting app registrations...") + app_registrations = {} + try: + for tenant, client in self.clients.items(): + app_registrations[tenant] = {} + apps_response = await client.applications.get() + + try: + while apps_response: + for app in getattr(apps_response, "value", []) or []: + credentials = [] + for cred in getattr(app, "password_credentials", []) or []: + credentials.append( + AppCredential( + display_name=getattr(cred, "display_name", "") + or "", + credential_type="password", + end_date_time=getattr( + cred, "end_date_time", None + ), + ) + ) + for cred in getattr(app, "key_credentials", []) or []: + credentials.append( + AppCredential( + display_name=getattr(cred, "display_name", "") + or "", + credential_type="certificate", + end_date_time=getattr( + cred, "end_date_time", None + ), + ) + ) + app_registrations[tenant][app.id] = AppRegistration( + id=app.id, + name=getattr(app, "display_name", "") or "", + credentials=credentials, + ) + + next_link = getattr(apps_response, "odata_next_link", None) + if not next_link: + break + apps_response = await client.applications.with_url( + next_link + ).get() + + except Exception as error: + logger.error( + f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + except Exception as error: + logger.error( + f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + + return app_registrations + + async def _get_authentication_methods_policy(self): + logger.info("Entra - Getting authentication methods policy...") + auth_methods_policy = {} + try: + for tenant, client in self.clients.items(): + policy_response = ( + await client.policies.authentication_methods_policy.get() + ) + + if not policy_response: + auth_methods_policy[tenant] = None + continue + + # Parse registration enforcement + reg_enforcement = getattr( + policy_response, "registration_enforcement", None + ) + reg_campaign = ( + getattr( + reg_enforcement, + "authentication_methods_registration_campaign", + None, + ) + if reg_enforcement + else None + ) + registration_enforcement_state = ( + getattr(reg_campaign, "state", None) if reg_campaign else None + ) + + # Parse authentication method configurations + method_configs = [] + for config in ( + getattr( + policy_response, + "authentication_method_configurations", + [], + ) + or [] + ): + odata_type = getattr(config, "odata_type", "") or "" + # Extract method name from odata_type + # e.g. "#microsoft.graph.microsoftAuthenticatorAuthenticationMethodConfiguration" + method_name = ( + odata_type.split(".")[-1].replace( + "AuthenticationMethodConfiguration", "" + ) + if odata_type + else getattr(config, "id", "unknown") + ) + method_configs.append( + AuthMethodConfig( + id=getattr(config, "id", "") or "", + method_name=method_name, + state=getattr(config, "state", "disabled") or "disabled", + ) + ) + + auth_methods_policy[tenant] = AuthMethodsPolicy( + id=getattr(policy_response, "id", "") or "", + registration_enforcement_state=registration_enforcement_state, + method_configurations=method_configs, + ) + + except Exception as error: + logger.error( + f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + + return auth_methods_policy + class User(BaseModel): id: str name: str is_mfa_capable: bool = False account_enabled: bool = True + last_sign_in: Optional[datetime] = None class DefaultUserRolePermissions(BaseModel): @@ -481,3 +632,27 @@ class ConditionalAccessPolicy(BaseModel): users: dict[str, List[str]] target_resources: dict[str, List[str]] access_controls: dict[str, List[str]] + + +class AppCredential(BaseModel): + display_name: str = "" + credential_type: str # "password" or "certificate" + end_date_time: Optional[datetime] = None + + +class AppRegistration(BaseModel): + id: str + name: str + credentials: List[AppCredential] = [] + + +class AuthMethodConfig(BaseModel): + id: str = "" + method_name: str + state: str = "disabled" # "enabled" or "disabled" + + +class AuthMethodsPolicy(BaseModel): + id: str = "" + registration_enforcement_state: Optional[str] = None # "enabled" or "disabled" + method_configurations: List[AuthMethodConfig] = [] diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_user_with_recent_sign_in/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_user_with_recent_sign_in/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_user_with_recent_sign_in/entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_user_with_recent_sign_in/entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..64ccb383a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_user_with_recent_sign_in/entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +{ + "Provider": "azure", + "CheckID": "entra_user_with_recent_sign_in", + "CheckTitle": "Enabled user has signed in within the last 90 days", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "entra", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "NotDefined", + "ResourceGroup": "IAM", + "Description": "**Microsoft Entra ID** enabled user accounts are evaluated for **recent sign-in activity**. Accounts that have not signed in for more than 90 days are flagged as stale. Stale accounts indicate orphaned identities that may have been abandoned after personnel changes, project completions, or role transitions without proper deprovisioning.", + "Risk": "Stale accounts retain **role assignments** and **group memberships**. Attackers target dormant accounts via **credential stuffing** and **password spraying** because owners are unlikely to notice anomalous activity. Compromise enables **lateral movement**, **data exfiltration**, and **persistence** while evading detection tuned to active users.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/signinactivity", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/concept-sign-ins" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "az rest --method patch --url https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/ --body '{\"accountEnabled\":false}'", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. Sign in to Microsoft Entra admin center\n2. Go to Identity > Users > All users\n3. Add filter: Sign-in activity > Last interactive sign-in date is before <90 days ago>\n4. Review each stale account with the account owner or manager\n5. Disable accounts confirmed as no longer needed\n6. After a grace period, delete disabled accounts\n7. Establish a recurring access review to automate this process", + "Terraform": "" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Implement **automated access reviews** in Entra ID to periodically review and remove stale accounts. Configure reviews to run quarterly, targeting all users or specific groups. Set auto-apply to disable accounts that are not confirmed by reviewers. For immediate remediation, filter users by last sign-in date and disable accounts inactive for more than 90 days after confirming with managers.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/entra_user_with_recent_sign_in" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "identity-access" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "The signInActivity resource requires Microsoft Entra ID P1 or P2 license. Tenants without this license will not have sign-in activity data available, and all users will be reported as never having signed in." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_user_with_recent_sign_in/entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_user_with_recent_sign_in/entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fa6d1af05d --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_user_with_recent_sign_in/entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.py @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +from datetime import datetime, timezone + +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Azure +from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_client import entra_client + +STALE_THRESHOLD_DAYS = 90 + + +class entra_user_with_recent_sign_in(Check): + """ + Ensure enabled Entra ID users have signed in within the last 90 days. + + This check evaluates each enabled user's last interactive sign-in to detect stale or dormant accounts that should be reviewed or deprovisioned. Sign-in activity requires Entra ID P1/P2 licensing. + + - PASS: The enabled user signed in within the last 90 days. + - FAIL: The enabled user has not signed in for more than 90 days, or has never signed in. + - FAIL (tenant-level): No sign-in activity data is available for any enabled user, indicating missing P1/P2 licensing or Graph permissions (reported once instead of flagging every user). + """ + + def execute(self) -> Check_Report_Azure: + findings = [] + + for tenant_domain, users in entra_client.users.items(): + enabled_users = {k: v for k, v in users.items() if v.account_enabled} + + if not enabled_users: + continue + + # If all enabled users are missing sign-in data, avoid claiming + # they never signed in. This usually indicates missing telemetry, + # often due to licensing or Graph permission limitations. + all_null = all(u.last_sign_in is None for u in enabled_users.values()) + if all_null: + first_user = next(iter(enabled_users.values())) + report = Check_Report_Azure( + metadata=self.metadata(), resource=first_user + ) + report.subscription = f"Tenant: {tenant_domain}" + report.resource_name = "Sign-in Activity Data" + count = len(enabled_users) + noun = "user" if count == 1 else "users" + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"No sign-in activity data available for any of the " + f"{count} enabled {noun}. This likely means the tenant " + f"is missing Entra ID P1/P2 licensing or the required " + f"Graph permissions to read sign-in activity." + ) + findings.append(report) + continue + + for user_domain_name, user in enabled_users.items(): + report = Check_Report_Azure(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=user) + report.subscription = f"Tenant: {tenant_domain}" + + if user.last_sign_in is None: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"User {user.name} has never signed in." + else: + last = user.last_sign_in + if last.tzinfo is None: + last = last.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc) + days_since = (datetime.now(timezone.utc) - last).days + if days_since > STALE_THRESHOLD_DAYS: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"User {user.name} has not signed in for {days_since} days." + ) + else: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"User {user.name} signed in {days_since} days ago." + ) + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/keyvault/keyvault_logging_enabled/keyvault_logging_enabled.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/azure/services/keyvault/keyvault_logging_enabled/keyvault_logging_enabled.metadata.json index 164a43b5da..241c95ec7f 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/azure/services/keyvault/keyvault_logging_enabled/keyvault_logging_enabled.metadata.json +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/keyvault/keyvault_logging_enabled/keyvault_logging_enabled.metadata.json @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ "Severity": "high", "ResourceType": "microsoft.keyvault/vaults", "ResourceGroup": "security", - "Description": "**Azure Key Vault** diagnostic settings capture **audit logs** (`AuditEvent`) when category groups `audit` and `allLogs` are enabled and routed to a supported destination. Logged events include management and data-plane operations on vaults, keys, secrets, and certificates.", + "Description": "**Azure Key Vault** diagnostic settings capture **audit logs** (`AuditEvent`) when the `AuditEvent` category is enabled, or when category groups `audit` and `allLogs` are enabled, and routed to a supported destination. Logged events include management and data-plane operations on vaults, keys, secrets, and certificates.", "Risk": "Without **Key Vault audit logging**, access and changes to keys, secrets, and certificates are untracked.\n\nAttackers can misuse keys to decrypt data, alter or delete crypto material, and evade detection-eroding **confidentiality** and **integrity** and delaying **incident response**.", "RelatedUrl": "", "AdditionalURLs": [ @@ -20,13 +20,13 @@ ], "Remediation": { "Code": { - "CLI": "az monitor diagnostic-settings create --name --resource --workspace --logs '[{\"categoryGroup\":\"audit\",\"enabled\":true},{\"categoryGroup\":\"allLogs\",\"enabled\":true}]'", - "NativeIaC": "```bicep\n// Enable Key Vault diagnostic settings with audit + allLogs\nparam keyVaultName string\nparam workspaceId string\n\nresource kv 'Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults@2023-07-01' existing = {\n name: keyVaultName\n}\n\nresource diag 'Microsoft.Insights/diagnosticSettings@2021-05-01-preview' = {\n name: ''\n scope: kv\n properties: {\n workspaceId: workspaceId\n logs: [\n {\n categoryGroup: 'audit' // critical: enables audit logs\n enabled: true // required to pass the check\n }\n {\n categoryGroup: 'allLogs' // critical: enables allLogs group\n enabled: true // required to pass the check\n }\n ]\n }\n}\n```", - "Other": "1. In Azure Portal, go to your Key Vault > Monitoring > Diagnostic settings\n2. Click Add diagnostic setting\n3. Under Category groups, select audit and allLogs\n4. Choose a destination (e.g., Send to Log Analytics workspace) and select the workspace\n5. Click Save", - "Terraform": "```hcl\n# Enable diagnostic settings on Key Vault with audit + allLogs\nresource \"azurerm_monitor_diagnostic_setting\" \"\" {\n name = \"\"\n target_resource_id = \"\" # Key Vault resource ID\n log_analytics_workspace_id = \"\" # Destination workspace ID\n\n enabled_log { # critical: audit category group\n category_group = \"audit\" # enables audit logs\n }\n enabled_log { # critical: allLogs category group\n category_group = \"allLogs\" # enables all logs\n }\n}\n```" + "CLI": "az monitor diagnostic-settings create --name --resource --workspace --logs '[{\"category\":\"AuditEvent\",\"enabled\":true}]'", + "NativeIaC": "```bicep\n// Enable Key Vault AuditEvent diagnostic logs\nparam keyVaultName string\nparam workspaceId string\n\nresource kv 'Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults@2023-07-01' existing = {\n name: keyVaultName\n}\n\nresource diag 'Microsoft.Insights/diagnosticSettings@2021-05-01-preview' = {\n name: ''\n scope: kv\n properties: {\n workspaceId: workspaceId\n logs: [\n {\n category: 'AuditEvent'\n enabled: true\n }\n ]\n }\n}\n```", + "Other": "1. In Azure Portal, go to your Key Vault > Monitoring > Diagnostic settings\n2. Click Add diagnostic setting\n3. Enable AuditEvent audit logs, or select the audit and allLogs category groups\n4. Choose a destination (e.g., Send to Log Analytics workspace) and select the workspace\n5. Click Save", + "Terraform": "```hcl\n# Enable AuditEvent diagnostic logs on Key Vault\nresource \"azurerm_monitor_diagnostic_setting\" \"\" {\n name = \"\"\n target_resource_id = \"\"\n log_analytics_workspace_id = \"\"\n\n enabled_log {\n category = \"AuditEvent\"\n }\n}\n```" }, "Recommendation": { - "Text": "Enable **diagnostic settings** to collect `AuditEvent` logs-covering category groups `audit` and `allLogs`-and send them to a central sink. Apply **least privilege** to log access, enforce secure **retention/immutability**, monitor with alerts for anomalous operations, and use **separation of duties** to prevent logging bypass.", + "Text": "Enable **diagnostic settings** to collect `AuditEvent` logs and send them to a central sink. Apply **least privilege** to log access, enforce secure **retention/immutability**, monitor with alerts for anomalous operations, and use **separation of duties** to prevent logging bypass.", "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/keyvault_logging_enabled" } }, diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/keyvault/keyvault_logging_enabled/keyvault_logging_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/keyvault/keyvault_logging_enabled/keyvault_logging_enabled.py index 68ef149cd7..ea80b920c5 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/azure/services/keyvault/keyvault_logging_enabled/keyvault_logging_enabled.py +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/keyvault/keyvault_logging_enabled/keyvault_logging_enabled.py @@ -16,14 +16,17 @@ class keyvault_logging_enabled(Check): report.status = "FAIL" report.status_extended = f"Key Vault {keyvault.name} in subscription {subscription_name} ({subscription_id}) does not have a diagnostic setting with audit logging." for diagnostic_setting in keyvault.monitor_diagnostic_settings or []: - has_audit = False + has_audit_category = False + has_audit_group = False has_all_logs = False for log in diagnostic_setting.logs: + if log.category == "AuditEvent" and log.enabled: + has_audit_category = True if log.category_group == "audit" and log.enabled: - has_audit = True + has_audit_group = True if log.category_group == "allLogs" and log.enabled: has_all_logs = True - if has_audit and has_all_logs: + if has_audit_category or (has_audit_group and has_all_logs): report.status = "PASS" report.status_extended = f"Key Vault {keyvault.name} in subscription {subscription_name} ({subscription_id}) has a diagnostic setting with audit logging." break diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled/mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled/mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1dac541283 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled/mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +{ + "Provider": "azure", + "CheckID": "mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled", + "CheckTitle": "MySQL flexible server has geo-redundant backup enabled", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "mysql", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "microsoft.dbformysql/flexibleservers", + "ResourceGroup": "database", + "Description": "**Azure MySQL Flexible Server** is evaluated for **geo-redundant backup**. Geo-redundant backup stores backup copies in a paired Azure region, enabling restore and recovery from a full regional outage.", + "Risk": "Without **geo-redundant backup**, a regional disaster can cause **permanent data loss**. Locally redundant backups only protect against storage hardware failures within the same region and cannot be restored if the primary region becomes unavailable.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/mysql/flexible-server/concepts-backup-restore", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/templates/microsoft.dbformysql/flexibleservers" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "az mysql flexible-server create --name --resource-group --location --geo-redundant-backup Enabled", + "NativeIaC": "```bicep\n// Bicep: MySQL Flexible Server with geo-redundant backup (set at creation)\nresource mysql 'Microsoft.DBforMySQL/flexibleServers@2023-12-30' = {\n name: ''\n location: ''\n properties: {\n backup: {\n geoRedundantBackup: 'Enabled' // CRITICAL: stores backups in the paired region\n }\n }\n}\n```", + "Other": "1. Geo-redundant backup must be configured when the server is created; it cannot be enabled on an existing server\n2. In the Azure portal, start creating a new Azure Database for MySQL flexible server\n3. On the Basics tab, under Compute + storage, open Configure server\n4. Set Geographically redundant backup to Enabled and save\n5. Finish creating the server and migrate workloads to it", + "Terraform": "```hcl\n# Terraform: MySQL Flexible Server with geo-redundant backup (set at creation)\nresource \"azurerm_mysql_flexible_server\" \"\" {\n name = \"\"\n resource_group_name = \"\"\n location = \"\"\n geo_redundant_backup_enabled = true # CRITICAL: stores backups in the paired region\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Enable **geo-redundant backup** on MySQL Flexible Servers so backups are replicated to the paired Azure region and can be restored during a regional outage. Because this is set at server creation, plan a migration for existing servers, and pair it with an appropriate backup retention period and periodic restore testing.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "resilience" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "Geo-redundant backup for Azure MySQL Flexible Server can only be configured at server creation time and cannot be changed afterwards." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled/mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled/mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5b1685354c --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled/mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.py @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Azure +from prowler.providers.azure.services.mysql.mysql_client import mysql_client + + +class mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled(Check): + """ + Ensure Azure MySQL Flexible Servers have geo-redundant backup enabled. + + This check evaluates whether each Azure MySQL Flexible Server stores backups in a paired Azure region, enabling recovery from a full regional outage. + + - PASS: The server has geo-redundant backup enabled (geo_redundant_backup is "Enabled"). + - FAIL: The server does not have geo-redundant backup enabled. + """ + + def execute(self) -> Check_Report_Azure: + findings = [] + for subscription_id, servers in mysql_client.flexible_servers.items(): + subscription_name = mysql_client.subscriptions.get( + subscription_id, subscription_id + ) + for server in servers.values(): + report = Check_Report_Azure(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=server) + report.subscription = subscription_id + if server.geo_redundant_backup == "Enabled": + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"Geo-redundant backup is enabled for server {server.name} in subscription {subscription_name} ({subscription_id})." + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"Geo-redundant backup is disabled for server {server.name} in subscription {subscription_name} ({subscription_id})." + findings.append(report) + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled/mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled/mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..22a9b93401 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled/mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +{ + "Provider": "azure", + "CheckID": "mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled", + "CheckTitle": "MySQL flexible server has high availability enabled", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "mysql", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "microsoft.dbformysql/flexibleservers", + "ResourceGroup": "database", + "Description": "**Azure MySQL Flexible Server** is evaluated for **high availability** mode. Zone-redundant or same-zone HA provisions a standby replica and provides automatic failover during planned and unplanned outages.", + "Risk": "Without **high availability**, a server or zone failure causes **downtime** until manual recovery or redeployment. Applications experience extended unavailability and potential data loss for in-flight transactions during unplanned outages.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/mysql/flexible-server/concepts-high-availability", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/templates/microsoft.dbformysql/flexibleservers" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "az mysql flexible-server update --name --resource-group --high-availability ZoneRedundant", + "NativeIaC": "```bicep\n// Bicep: MySQL Flexible Server with zone-redundant high availability\nresource mysql 'Microsoft.DBforMySQL/flexibleServers@2023-12-30' = {\n name: ''\n location: ''\n sku: {\n name: 'Standard_D2ds_v4'\n tier: 'GeneralPurpose'\n }\n properties: {\n highAvailability: {\n mode: 'ZoneRedundant' // CRITICAL: provisions a standby replica with automatic failover\n }\n }\n}\n```", + "Other": "1. In the Azure portal, open your Azure Database for MySQL flexible server\n2. Under Settings, select High availability\n3. Enable High availability and choose Zone redundant (or Same zone)\n4. Save (high availability requires the General Purpose or Business Critical tier)", + "Terraform": "```hcl\n# Terraform: MySQL Flexible Server with zone-redundant high availability\nresource \"azurerm_mysql_flexible_server\" \"\" {\n name = \"\"\n resource_group_name = \"\"\n location = \"\"\n sku_name = \"GP_Standard_D2ds_v4\"\n\n high_availability {\n mode = \"ZoneRedundant\" # CRITICAL: provisions a standby replica with automatic failover\n }\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Enable **high availability** (zone-redundant where supported, otherwise same-zone) on production MySQL Flexible Servers so a standby replica provides automatic failover. High availability requires the General Purpose or Business Critical tier; pair it with geo-redundant backup and periodic failover testing for full resilience.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "resilience" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "High availability for Azure MySQL Flexible Server requires the General Purpose or Business Critical compute tier and is not available on the Burstable tier." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled/mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled/mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e1f3054baf --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled/mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.py @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Azure +from prowler.providers.azure.services.mysql.mysql_client import mysql_client + + +class mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled(Check): + """ + Ensure Azure MySQL Flexible Servers have high availability enabled. + + This check evaluates whether each Azure MySQL Flexible Server is configured with high availability (zone-redundant or same-zone), providing automatic failover to a standby replica during outages. + + - PASS: The server has high availability enabled (high_availability_mode is set and not "Disabled"). + - FAIL: The server does not have high availability enabled. + """ + + def execute(self) -> Check_Report_Azure: + findings = [] + for subscription_id, servers in mysql_client.flexible_servers.items(): + subscription_name = mysql_client.subscriptions.get( + subscription_id, subscription_id + ) + for server in servers.values(): + report = Check_Report_Azure(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=server) + report.subscription = subscription_id + if ( + server.high_availability_mode is not None + and server.high_availability_mode != "Disabled" + ): + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"High availability is enabled for server {server.name} in subscription {subscription_name} ({subscription_id})." + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"High availability is disabled for server {server.name} in subscription {subscription_name} ({subscription_id})." + findings.append(report) + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_service.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_service.py index 565e14da01..b3a386a193 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_service.py +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_service.py @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass +from typing import Optional from azure.mgmt.rdbms.mysql_flexibleservers import MySQLManagementClient @@ -21,6 +22,8 @@ class MySQL(AzureService): servers_list = client.servers.list() servers.update({subscription_id: {}}) for server in servers_list: + backup = getattr(server, "backup", None) + ha = getattr(server, "high_availability", None) servers[subscription_id].update( { server.id: FlexibleServer( @@ -31,6 +34,10 @@ class MySQL(AzureService): configurations=self._get_configurations( client, server.id.split("/")[4], server.name ), + geo_redundant_backup=getattr( + backup, "geo_redundant_backup", None + ), + high_availability_mode=getattr(ha, "mode", None), ) } ) @@ -78,3 +85,5 @@ class FlexibleServer: location: str version: str configurations: dict[Configuration] + geo_redundant_backup: Optional[str] = None + high_availability_mode: Optional[str] = None diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/network/network_service.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/network/network_service.py index 0eb6144534..a924cf9609 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/azure/services/network/network_service.py +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/network/network_service.py @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ class Network(AzureService): self.bastion_hosts = self._get_bastion_hosts() self.network_watchers = self._get_network_watchers() self.public_ip_addresses = self._get_public_ip_addresses() + self.virtual_networks = self._get_virtual_networks() def _get_security_groups(self): logger.info("Network - Getting Network Security Groups...") @@ -203,6 +204,41 @@ class Network(AzureService): ) return public_ip_addresses + def _get_virtual_networks(self): + logger.info("Network - Getting Virtual Networks...") + virtual_networks = {} + for subscription, client in self.clients.items(): + try: + virtual_networks[subscription] = [] + vnet_list = client.virtual_networks.list_all() + for vnet in vnet_list: + subnets = [] + for subnet in getattr(vnet, "subnets", []) or []: + nsg = getattr(subnet, "network_security_group", None) + subnets.append( + VNetSubnet( + id=subnet.id, + name=subnet.name, + nsg_id=getattr(nsg, "id", None) if nsg else None, + ) + ) + virtual_networks[subscription].append( + VirtualNetwork( + id=vnet.id, + name=vnet.name, + location=vnet.location, + enable_ddos_protection=getattr( + vnet, "enable_ddos_protection", False + ), + subnets=subnets, + ) + ) + except Exception as error: + logger.error( + f"Subscription name: {subscription} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + return virtual_networks + @dataclass class BastionHost: @@ -261,3 +297,23 @@ class PublicIp: name: str location: str ip_address: str + + +@dataclass +class VNetSubnet: + id: str + name: str + nsg_id: Optional[str] = None + + +@dataclass +class VirtualNetwork: + id: str + name: str + location: str + enable_ddos_protection: bool = False + subnets: List[VNetSubnet] = None + + def __post_init__(self): + if self.subnets is None: + self.subnets = [] diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/network/network_subnet_nsg_associated/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/network/network_subnet_nsg_associated/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/network/network_subnet_nsg_associated/network_subnet_nsg_associated.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/azure/services/network/network_subnet_nsg_associated/network_subnet_nsg_associated.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..73cb41f886 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/network/network_subnet_nsg_associated/network_subnet_nsg_associated.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +{ + "Provider": "azure", + "CheckID": "network_subnet_nsg_associated", + "CheckTitle": "Subnet has a network security group associated", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "network", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "high", + "ResourceType": "microsoft.network/virtualnetworks/subnets", + "ResourceGroup": "network", + "Description": "**Azure Virtual Network** subnets are evaluated for **Network Security Group (NSG)** association. Each subnet should have an NSG to enforce inbound and outbound traffic filtering rules. Subnets without NSGs allow all traffic by default.", + "Risk": "Subnets without NSGs have **no network-level access control**. All inbound and outbound traffic is allowed by default, enabling **lateral movement**, **unauthorized access** to resources, and **data exfiltration** across the virtual network.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/network-security-groups-overview", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/tutorial-filter-network-traffic" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "az network vnet subnet update --resource-group --vnet-name --name --network-security-group ", + "NativeIaC": "```bicep\nresource vnet 'Microsoft.Network/virtualNetworks@2023-09-01' existing = {\n name: ''\n}\n\nresource subnet 'Microsoft.Network/virtualNetworks/subnets@2023-09-01' = {\n name: ''\n parent: vnet\n properties: {\n addressPrefix: '10.0.1.0/24'\n networkSecurityGroup: {\n id: '' // Critical: associates NSG with subnet\n }\n }\n}\n```", + "Other": "1. Sign in to Azure portal\n2. Go to Virtual networks and select the VNet\n3. Click on Subnets\n4. Select the subnet without an NSG\n5. Under Network security group, select an existing NSG or create a new one\n6. Click Save", + "Terraform": "```hcl\nresource \"azurerm_subnet_network_security_group_association\" \"\" {\n subnet_id = \"\" # Critical: associates NSG with subnet\n network_security_group_id = \"\"\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Associate a **Network Security Group** with every subnet. Create NSG rules following **least privilege** \u2014 deny all by default and allow only required traffic. Exclude Azure-managed subnets (GatewaySubnet, AzureFirewallSubnet, AzureBastionSubnet) which have their own security controls.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/network_subnet_nsg_associated" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "internet-exposed" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "This check excludes Azure-managed subnets (GatewaySubnet, AzureFirewallSubnet, AzureFirewallManagementSubnet, AzureBastionSubnet, RouteServerSubnet) which should not have custom NSGs." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/network/network_subnet_nsg_associated/network_subnet_nsg_associated.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/network/network_subnet_nsg_associated/network_subnet_nsg_associated.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..054f663351 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/network/network_subnet_nsg_associated/network_subnet_nsg_associated.py @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Azure +from prowler.providers.azure.services.network.network_client import network_client + +# Subnets that are managed by Azure and should not have custom NSGs +EXCLUDED_SUBNET_NAMES = { + "GatewaySubnet", + "AzureFirewallSubnet", + "AzureFirewallManagementSubnet", + "AzureBastionSubnet", + "RouteServerSubnet", +} + + +class network_subnet_nsg_associated(Check): + """ + Ensure every subnet has a Network Security Group (NSG) associated. + + This check evaluates whether each subnet in every virtual network has an NSG associated to enforce inbound and outbound traffic filtering. Azure-managed subnets (e.g. GatewaySubnet, AzureFirewallSubnet, AzureBastionSubnet) are excluded because they must not have custom NSGs. + + - PASS: The subnet has an NSG associated. + - FAIL: The subnet does not have an NSG associated. + """ + + def execute(self) -> Check_Report_Azure: + findings = [] + + for subscription_name, vnets in network_client.virtual_networks.items(): + for vnet in vnets: + for subnet in vnet.subnets: + if subnet.name in EXCLUDED_SUBNET_NAMES: + continue + + report = Check_Report_Azure(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=vnet) + report.subscription = subscription_name + report.resource_name = f"{vnet.name}/{subnet.name}" + report.resource_id = subnet.id + report.location = vnet.location + + if subnet.nsg_id: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Subnet '{subnet.name}' in VNet '{vnet.name}' " + f"has an NSG associated." + ) + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Subnet '{subnet.name}' in VNet '{vnet.name}' " + f"does not have an NSG associated." + ) + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/network/network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/network/network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/network/network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled/network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/azure/services/network/network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled/network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dfeef103c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/network/network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled/network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +{ + "Provider": "azure", + "CheckID": "network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled", + "CheckTitle": "Virtual network has Azure DDoS Network Protection enabled", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "network", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "microsoft.network/virtualnetworks", + "ResourceGroup": "network", + "Description": "**Azure Virtual Networks** are evaluated for **DDoS Network Protection**. When enabled, Azure DDoS Protection provides enhanced mitigation against volumetric, protocol, and application-layer DDoS attacks targeting resources deployed in the virtual network.", + "Risk": "Without DDoS protection, Azure resources are only covered by **DDoS Infrastructure Protection** (basic), which may not mitigate sophisticated or large-scale attacks. Successful DDoS attacks cause **service unavailability** and potential **data exposure** during failover.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ddos-protection/ddos-protection-overview" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "az network ddos-protection create --resource-group --name && az network vnet update --resource-group --name --ddos-protection-plan ", + "NativeIaC": "```bicep\nresource vnet 'Microsoft.Network/virtualNetworks@2023-09-01' = {\n name: ''\n location: ''\n properties: {\n addressSpace: { addressPrefixes: ['10.0.0.0/16'] }\n enableDdosProtection: true // Critical: enables DDoS Protection\n ddosProtectionPlan: { id: '' }\n }\n}\n```", + "Other": "1. Sign in to Azure portal\n2. Search for 'DDoS protection plans'\n3. Create a new DDoS protection plan\n4. Go to Virtual networks and select the target VNet\n5. Under DDoS protection, select 'Enable' and select the plan\n6. Click Save", + "Terraform": "```hcl\nresource \"azurerm_virtual_network\" \"\" {\n name = \"\"\n location = \"\"\n resource_group_name = \"\"\n address_space = [\"10.0.0.0/16\"]\n\n ddos_protection_plan {\n id = \"\" # Critical: associates DDoS Protection Plan\n enable = true\n }\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Enable **Azure DDoS Network Protection** on virtual networks hosting internet-facing workloads. Consider cost implications — DDoS Network Protection has a monthly charge per plan. Use **DDoS IP Protection** as a lower-cost alternative for individual public IPs.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "internet-exposed" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "Azure DDoS Network Protection has a monthly cost (~$2,944/month per plan). Consider whether the workload justifies this cost. Internal-only VNets without internet-facing resources may not need DDoS protection." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/network/network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled/network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/network/network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled/network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6a9a081fb7 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/network/network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled/network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled.py @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Azure +from prowler.providers.azure.services.network.network_client import network_client + + +class network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled(Check): + """ + Ensure Azure DDoS Network Protection is enabled on virtual networks. + + This check evaluates whether each virtual network has a DDoS protection plan associated, providing always-on traffic monitoring and adaptive mitigation against volumetric and protocol attacks. + + - PASS: The virtual network has DDoS protection enabled. + - FAIL: The virtual network does not have DDoS protection enabled. + """ + + def execute(self) -> Check_Report_Azure: + findings = [] + + for subscription_name, vnets in network_client.virtual_networks.items(): + for vnet in vnets: + report = Check_Report_Azure(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=vnet) + report.subscription = subscription_name + report.resource_name = vnet.name + report.resource_id = vnet.id + report.location = vnet.location + + if vnet.enable_ddos_protection: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Virtual network '{vnet.name}' has DDoS " + f"protection enabled." + ) + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Virtual network '{vnet.name}' does not have " + f"DDoS protection enabled." + ) + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled/postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled/postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7be125ecf2 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled/postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +{ + "Provider": "azure", + "CheckID": "postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled", + "CheckTitle": "PostgreSQL flexible server has geo-redundant backup enabled", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "postgresql", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "microsoft.dbforpostgresql/flexibleservers", + "ResourceGroup": "database", + "Description": "**Azure PostgreSQL Flexible Server** is evaluated for **geo-redundant backup**. Geo-redundant backup stores backup copies in a paired Azure region, enabling restore and cross-region disaster recovery.", + "Risk": "Without **geo-redundant backup**, a regional disaster can cause **permanent data loss**. Locally redundant backups only protect against storage hardware failures within the same region and cannot be restored if the primary region becomes unavailable.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/postgresql/flexible-server/concepts-backup-restore", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/templates/microsoft.dbforpostgresql/flexibleservers" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "az postgres flexible-server create --name --resource-group --location --geo-redundant-backup Enabled", + "NativeIaC": "```bicep\n// Bicep: PostgreSQL Flexible Server with geo-redundant backup (set at creation)\nresource postgresql 'Microsoft.DBforPostgreSQL/flexibleServers@2023-06-01-preview' = {\n name: ''\n location: ''\n properties: {\n backup: {\n geoRedundantBackup: 'Enabled' // CRITICAL: stores backups in the paired region\n }\n }\n}\n```", + "Other": "1. Geo-redundant backup must be configured when the server is created; it cannot be enabled on an existing server\n2. In the Azure portal, start creating a new Azure Database for PostgreSQL flexible server\n3. On the Basics tab, under Compute + storage, open Configure server\n4. Set Geographically redundant backup to Enabled and save\n5. Finish creating the server and migrate workloads to it", + "Terraform": "```hcl\n# Terraform: PostgreSQL Flexible Server with geo-redundant backup (set at creation)\nresource \"azurerm_postgresql_flexible_server\" \"\" {\n name = \"\"\n resource_group_name = \"\"\n location = \"\"\n geo_redundant_backup_enabled = true # CRITICAL: stores backups in the paired region\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Enable **geo-redundant backup** on PostgreSQL Flexible Servers so backups are replicated to the paired Azure region and can be restored during a regional outage. Because this is set at server creation, plan a migration for existing servers, and pair it with an appropriate backup retention period and periodic restore testing.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "resilience" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "Geo-redundant backup for Azure PostgreSQL Flexible Server can only be configured at server creation time and cannot be changed afterwards." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled/postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled/postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..94fdaa7a1c --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled/postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.py @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Azure +from prowler.providers.azure.services.postgresql.postgresql_client import ( + postgresql_client, +) + + +class postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled(Check): + """ + Ensure Azure PostgreSQL Flexible Servers have geo-redundant backup enabled. + + This check evaluates whether each Azure PostgreSQL Flexible Server stores backups in a paired Azure region, enabling cross-region disaster recovery. + + - PASS: The server has geo-redundant backup enabled (geo_redundant_backup is "Enabled"). + - FAIL: The server does not have geo-redundant backup enabled. + """ + + def execute(self) -> Check_Report_Azure: + findings = [] + for ( + subscription, + flexible_servers, + ) in postgresql_client.flexible_servers.items(): + subscription_name = postgresql_client.subscriptions.get( + subscription, subscription + ) + for server in flexible_servers: + report = Check_Report_Azure(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=server) + report.subscription = subscription + if server.geo_redundant_backup == "Enabled": + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"Flexible Postgresql server {server.name} from subscription {subscription_name} ({subscription}) has geo-redundant backup enabled." + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"Flexible Postgresql server {server.name} from subscription {subscription_name} ({subscription}) does not have geo-redundant backup enabled." + findings.append(report) + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled/postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled/postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..58b6588886 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled/postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +{ + "Provider": "azure", + "CheckID": "postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled", + "CheckTitle": "PostgreSQL flexible server has high availability enabled", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "postgresql", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "microsoft.dbforpostgresql/flexibleservers", + "ResourceGroup": "database", + "Description": "**Azure PostgreSQL Flexible Server** is evaluated for **high availability** mode. Zone-redundant or same-zone HA provisions a standby replica and provides automatic failover during planned and unplanned outages.", + "Risk": "Without **high availability**, a server or zone failure causes **downtime** until manual recovery or redeployment. Critical databases experience extended unavailability and potential data loss for in-flight transactions during unplanned outages.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/postgresql/flexible-server/concepts-high-availability", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/templates/microsoft.dbforpostgresql/flexibleservers" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "az postgres flexible-server update --name --resource-group --high-availability ZoneRedundant", + "NativeIaC": "```bicep\n// Bicep: PostgreSQL Flexible Server with zone-redundant high availability\nresource postgresql 'Microsoft.DBforPostgreSQL/flexibleServers@2023-06-01-preview' = {\n name: ''\n location: ''\n sku: {\n name: 'Standard_D2ds_v4'\n tier: 'GeneralPurpose'\n }\n properties: {\n highAvailability: {\n mode: 'ZoneRedundant' // CRITICAL: provisions a standby replica with automatic failover\n }\n }\n}\n```", + "Other": "1. In the Azure portal, open your Azure Database for PostgreSQL flexible server\n2. Under Settings, select High availability\n3. Enable High availability and choose Zone redundant (or Same zone)\n4. Save (high availability requires the General Purpose or Memory Optimized tier)", + "Terraform": "```hcl\n# Terraform: PostgreSQL Flexible Server with zone-redundant high availability\nresource \"azurerm_postgresql_flexible_server\" \"\" {\n name = \"\"\n resource_group_name = \"\"\n location = \"\"\n sku_name = \"GP_Standard_D2ds_v4\"\n\n high_availability {\n mode = \"ZoneRedundant\" # CRITICAL: provisions a standby replica with automatic failover\n }\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Enable **high availability** (zone-redundant where supported, otherwise same-zone) on production PostgreSQL Flexible Servers so a standby replica provides automatic failover. High availability requires the General Purpose or Memory Optimized tier; pair it with geo-redundant backup and periodic failover testing for full resilience.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "resilience" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "High availability for Azure PostgreSQL Flexible Server requires the General Purpose or Memory Optimized compute tier and is not available on the Burstable tier." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled/postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled/postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..14c69f591e --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled/postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.py @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Azure +from prowler.providers.azure.services.postgresql.postgresql_client import ( + postgresql_client, +) + + +class postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled(Check): + """ + Ensure Azure PostgreSQL Flexible Servers have high availability enabled. + + This check evaluates whether each Azure PostgreSQL Flexible Server is configured with high availability (zone-redundant or same-zone), providing automatic failover to a standby replica during outages. + + - PASS: The server has high availability enabled (high_availability_mode is set and not "Disabled"). + - FAIL: The server does not have high availability enabled. + """ + + def execute(self) -> Check_Report_Azure: + findings = [] + for ( + subscription, + flexible_servers, + ) in postgresql_client.flexible_servers.items(): + subscription_name = postgresql_client.subscriptions.get( + subscription, subscription + ) + for server in flexible_servers: + report = Check_Report_Azure(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=server) + report.subscription = subscription + if ( + server.high_availability_mode is not None + and server.high_availability_mode != "Disabled" + ): + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"Flexible Postgresql server {server.name} from subscription {subscription_name} ({subscription}) has high availability enabled." + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"Flexible Postgresql server {server.name} from subscription {subscription_name} ({subscription}) does not have high availability enabled." + findings.append(report) + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_service.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_service.py index 13081ad270..681c57a32c 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_service.py +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_service.py @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass +from typing import Optional +from azure.core.exceptions import ResourceNotFoundError from azure.mgmt.postgresqlflexibleservers import PostgreSQLManagementClient from prowler.lib.logger import logger @@ -20,56 +22,70 @@ class PostgreSQL(AzureService): flexible_servers.update({subscription: []}) flexible_servers_list = client.servers.list() for postgresql_server in flexible_servers_list: - resource_group = self._get_resource_group(postgresql_server.id) - # Fetch full server object once to extract multiple properties - server_details = client.servers.get( - resource_group, postgresql_server.name - ) - require_secure_transport = self._get_require_secure_transport( - subscription, resource_group, postgresql_server.name - ) - active_directory_auth = self._extract_active_directory_auth( - server_details - ) - entra_id_admins = self._get_entra_id_admins( - subscription, resource_group, postgresql_server.name - ) - log_checkpoints = self._get_log_checkpoints( - subscription, resource_group, postgresql_server.name - ) - log_disconnections = self._get_log_disconnections( - subscription, resource_group, postgresql_server.name - ) - log_connections = self._get_log_connections( - subscription, resource_group, postgresql_server.name - ) - connection_throttling = self._get_connection_throttling( - subscription, resource_group, postgresql_server.name - ) - log_retention_days = self._get_log_retention_days( - subscription, resource_group, postgresql_server.name - ) - firewall = self._get_firewall( - subscription, resource_group, postgresql_server.name - ) - location = server_details.location - flexible_servers[subscription].append( - Server( - id=postgresql_server.id, - name=postgresql_server.name, - resource_group=resource_group, - location=location, - require_secure_transport=require_secure_transport, - active_directory_auth=active_directory_auth, - entra_id_admins=entra_id_admins, - log_checkpoints=log_checkpoints, - log_connections=log_connections, - log_disconnections=log_disconnections, - connection_throttling=connection_throttling, - log_retention_days=log_retention_days, - firewall=firewall, + # Isolate each server: a failure collecting one server must + # not abort collection of the remaining servers in the + # subscription. + try: + resource_group = self._get_resource_group(postgresql_server.id) + # Fetch full server object once to extract multiple properties + server_details = client.servers.get( + resource_group, postgresql_server.name + ) + require_secure_transport = self._get_require_secure_transport( + subscription, resource_group, postgresql_server.name + ) + active_directory_auth = self._extract_active_directory_auth( + server_details + ) + entra_id_admins = self._get_entra_id_admins( + subscription, resource_group, postgresql_server.name + ) + log_checkpoints = self._get_log_checkpoints( + subscription, resource_group, postgresql_server.name + ) + log_disconnections = self._get_log_disconnections( + subscription, resource_group, postgresql_server.name + ) + log_connections = self._get_log_connections( + subscription, resource_group, postgresql_server.name + ) + connection_throttling = self._get_connection_throttling( + subscription, resource_group, postgresql_server.name + ) + log_retention_days = self._get_log_retention_days( + subscription, resource_group, postgresql_server.name + ) + firewall = self._get_firewall( + subscription, resource_group, postgresql_server.name + ) + location = server_details.location + backup = getattr(server_details, "backup", None) + ha = getattr(server_details, "high_availability", None) + flexible_servers[subscription].append( + Server( + id=postgresql_server.id, + name=postgresql_server.name, + resource_group=resource_group, + location=location, + require_secure_transport=require_secure_transport, + active_directory_auth=active_directory_auth, + entra_id_admins=entra_id_admins, + log_checkpoints=log_checkpoints, + log_connections=log_connections, + log_disconnections=log_disconnections, + connection_throttling=connection_throttling, + log_retention_days=log_retention_days, + firewall=firewall, + geo_redundant_backup=getattr( + backup, "geo_redundant_backup", None + ), + high_availability_mode=getattr(ha, "mode", None), + ) + ) + except Exception as error: + logger.error( + f"Subscription ID: {subscription} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" ) - ) except Exception as error: logger.error( f"Subscription ID: {subscription} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" @@ -149,15 +165,54 @@ class PostgreSQL(AzureService): ) return admin_list except Exception as e: - logger.error(f"Error getting Entra ID admins for {server_name}: {e}") + if "authentication is not enabled" in str(e): + # Expected when the server uses PostgreSQL authentication only + # (Entra/Azure AD auth disabled); not an error. + logger.warning( + f"Entra ID authentication is not enabled for {server_name}; skipping Entra ID admins." + ) + else: + logger.error(f"Error getting Entra ID admins for {server_name}: {e}") return [] - def _get_connection_throttling(self, subscription, resouce_group_name, server_name): + def _get_connection_throttling( + self, subscription: str, resouce_group_name: str, server_name: str + ) -> Optional[str]: + """Get the ``connection_throttle.enable`` setting for a flexible server. + + The ``connection_throttle.enable`` server parameter was removed in + PostgreSQL 16+, so it no longer exists on newer flexible servers. When + the parameter is genuinely absent the Azure SDK raises + ``ResourceNotFoundError`` (error code ``ConfigurationNotExists``); that + case is treated as "not enabled" and ``None`` is returned so collection + of the server can continue. + + Any other error (permissions, throttling, transient SDK failures) is + intentionally left to propagate: returning ``None`` for those would make + the downstream check report the server as having connection throttling + disabled, silently turning a collection failure into a security finding. + + Args: + subscription: Azure subscription identifier. + resouce_group_name: Resource group containing the server. + server_name: PostgreSQL flexible server name. + + Returns: + The uppercased throttling value, or ``None`` when the parameter does + not exist on the server. + + Raises: + ResourceNotFoundError is handled; any other exception propagates to + the caller so it can be surfaced as a collection failure. + """ client = self.clients[subscription] - connection_throttling = client.configurations.get( - resouce_group_name, server_name, "connection_throttle.enable" - ) - return connection_throttling.value.upper() + try: + connection_throttling = client.configurations.get( + resouce_group_name, server_name, "connection_throttle.enable" + ) + return connection_throttling.value.upper() + except ResourceNotFoundError: + return None def _get_log_retention_days(self, subscription, resouce_group_name, server_name): client = self.clients[subscription] @@ -214,6 +269,8 @@ class Server: log_checkpoints: str log_connections: str log_disconnections: str - connection_throttling: str - log_retention_days: str + connection_throttling: Optional[str] + log_retention_days: Optional[str] firewall: list[Firewall] + geo_redundant_backup: Optional[str] = None + high_availability_mode: Optional[str] = None diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/recovery/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/recovery/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_service.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_service.py index 16b5bc3248..38645219bd 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_service.py +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_service.py @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ class Recovery(AzureService): """ logger.info("Recovery - Getting Recovery Services vaults...") vaults_dict: dict[str, dict[str, BackupVault]] = {} + subscription_id = "unknown" try: vaults_dict: dict[str, dict[str, BackupVault]] = {} for subscription_id, client in self.clients.items(): @@ -66,21 +67,33 @@ class Recovery(AzureService): vaults_dict[subscription_id][vault_obj.id] = vault_obj except Exception as error: logger.error( - f"Subscription ID: {subscription_id} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + f"Subscription ID: {subscription_id} -- " + f"{error.__class__.__name__}" + f"[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" ) return vaults_dict class RecoveryBackup(AzureService): + """ + Service wrapper for Azure Recovery Services backup data. + + Collects the backup protected items and backup policies for each Recovery + Services vault discovered by the Recovery service. + """ + def __init__( - self, provider: AzureProvider, vaults: dict[str, dict[str, BackupVault]] + self, + provider: AzureProvider, + vaults: dict[str, dict[str, BackupVault]], ): super().__init__(RecoveryServicesBackupClient, provider) for subscription_id, vaults in vaults.items(): for vault in vaults.values(): - vault.backup_protected_items = self._get_backup_protected_items( + protected_items = self._get_backup_protected_items( subscription_id=subscription_id, vault=vault ) + vault.backup_protected_items = protected_items vault.backup_policies = self._get_backup_policies( subscription_id=subscription_id, vault=vault ) @@ -102,19 +115,22 @@ class RecoveryBackup(AzureService): ) for item in backup_protected_items: item_properties = getattr(item, "properties", None) + workload_type = None + backup_policy_id = None + if item_properties: + workload_type = item_properties.workload_type + backup_policy_id = item_properties.policy_id backup_protected_items_dict[item.id] = BackupItem( id=item.id, name=item.name, - workload_type=( - item_properties.workload_type if item_properties else None - ), - backup_policy_id=( - item_properties.policy_id if item_properties else None - ), + workload_type=workload_type, + backup_policy_id=backup_policy_id, ) except Exception as error: logger.error( - f"Subscription ID: {subscription_id} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + f"Subscription ID: {subscription_id} -- " + f"{error.__class__.__name__}" + f"[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" ) return backup_protected_items_dict @@ -126,40 +142,44 @@ class RecoveryBackup(AzureService): """ logger.info("Recovery - Getting backup policies...") backup_policies_dict: dict[str, BackupPolicy] = {} - unique_backup_policies: set[str] = set() try: - for item in vault.backup_protected_items.values(): - if item.backup_policy_id: - unique_backup_policies.add(item.backup_policy_id) - for policy_id in unique_backup_policies: - policy = self.clients[subscription_id].protection_policies.get( - vault_name=vault.name, - resource_group_name=vault.id.split("/")[4], - policy_name=policy_id.split("/")[-1], - ) - backup_policies_dict[policy_id] = BackupPolicy( + client = self.clients[subscription_id] + backup_policies = client.backup_policies.list( + vault_name=vault.name, + resource_group_name=vault.id.split("/")[4], + ) + for policy in backup_policies: + retention_days = self._get_backup_policy_retention_days(policy) + backup_policies_dict[policy.id] = BackupPolicy( id=policy.id, name=policy.name, - retention_days=getattr( - getattr( - getattr( - getattr( - getattr(policy, "properties", None), - "retention_policy", - None, - ), - "daily_schedule", - None, - ), - "retention_duration", - None, - ), - "count", - None, - ), + retention_days=retention_days, ) except Exception as error: logger.error( - f"Subscription ID: {subscription_id} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + f"Subscription ID: {subscription_id} -- " + f"{error.__class__.__name__}" + f"[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" ) return backup_policies_dict + + @staticmethod + def _get_backup_policy_retention_days(policy) -> Optional[int]: + """Return the daily retention duration count for a backup policy.""" + return getattr( + getattr( + getattr( + getattr( + getattr(policy, "properties", None), + "retention_policy", + None, + ), + "daily_schedule", + None, + ), + "retention_duration", + None, + ), + "count", + None, + ) diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate/recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate/recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..33f8516d1b --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate/recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +{ + "Provider": "azure", + "CheckID": "recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate", + "CheckTitle": "Recovery Services backup policy has at least 30 days retention", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "recovery", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "NotDefined", + "ResourceGroup": "storage", + "Description": "**Azure Recovery Services** backup policies are evaluated for adequate **daily retention**. Policies with fewer than 30 days of retention may not provide sufficient recovery points for incident investigation, compliance requirements, or ransomware recovery scenarios.", + "Risk": "Short retention periods limit the ability to recover from **delayed-discovery incidents** such as ransomware that encrypts backups over time, data corruption that propagates across backup cycles, or compliance investigations requiring historical data. Insufficient retention may violate regulatory requirements.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/backup/backup-azure-vm-backup-faq", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/backup/backup-azure-backup-faq" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "az backup policy set --resource-group --vault-name --name --policy @policy.json", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. Sign in to the Azure portal\n2. Go to Recovery Services vaults and select the vault\n3. Go to Backup policies\n4. Select the policy to modify\n5. Under Retention range, set Daily backup point retention to at least 30 days\n6. Click Save", + "Terraform": "" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Set daily backup retention to at least **30 days**. For production workloads, consider 90+ days. Configure **weekly, monthly, and yearly** retention points for long-term compliance. Use **immutable vaults** to prevent backup deletion by compromised admin accounts.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "forensics-ready" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "This check evaluates daily retention from the backup policy's retention_policy.daily_schedule.retention_duration.count. Policies without a daily schedule are flagged. The 30-day minimum aligns with common compliance requirements and incident response timelines." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate/recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate/recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b770f87a62 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate/recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate.py @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Azure +from prowler.providers.azure.services.recovery.recovery_client import recovery_client + +MINIMUM_RETENTION_DAYS = 30 + + +class recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate(Check): + """Check if vault backup policies retain backups for at least 30 days.""" + + def execute(self) -> list[Check_Report_Azure]: + """Execute the check across Recovery Services vault backup policies.""" + + findings = [] + + for subscription_name, vaults in recovery_client.vaults.items(): + for vault in vaults.values(): + if not vault.backup_policies: + report = Check_Report_Azure( + metadata=self.metadata(), resource=vault + ) + report.subscription = subscription_name + report.resource_name = vault.name + report.resource_id = vault.id + report.location = vault.location + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Recovery vault '{vault.name}' has no backup " + f"policies configured." + ) + findings.append(report) + continue + + for policy in vault.backup_policies.values(): + report = Check_Report_Azure( + metadata=self.metadata(), resource=vault + ) + report.subscription = subscription_name + report.resource_name = f"{vault.name}/{policy.name}" + report.resource_id = policy.id + report.location = vault.location + + if policy.retention_days is None: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Backup policy '{policy.name}' in vault " + f"'{vault.name}' has no daily retention configured." + ) + elif policy.retention_days < MINIMUM_RETENTION_DAYS: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Backup policy '{policy.name}' in vault " + f"'{vault.name}' has {policy.retention_days}-day " + f"retention (minimum: {MINIMUM_RETENTION_DAYS})." + ) + else: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Backup policy '{policy.name}' in vault " + f"'{vault.name}' has {policy.retention_days}-day " + f"retention." + ) + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_vault_has_protected_items/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_vault_has_protected_items/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_vault_has_protected_items/recovery_vault_has_protected_items.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_vault_has_protected_items/recovery_vault_has_protected_items.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..04e4405851 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_vault_has_protected_items/recovery_vault_has_protected_items.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +{ + "Provider": "azure", + "CheckID": "recovery_vault_has_protected_items", + "CheckTitle": "Recovery Services vault has backup protected items configured", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "recovery", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "microsoft.recoveryservices/vaults", + "ResourceGroup": "storage", + "Description": "**Azure Recovery Services** vaults are evaluated for **backup protected items**. A vault with no protected items indicates that no resources (VMs, databases, file shares) are configured for backup through this vault, potentially leaving critical workloads unprotected.", + "Risk": "Empty vaults represent a gap in **disaster recovery** coverage. Resources without backup protection face permanent data loss from accidental deletion, ransomware, corruption, or regional outages. The vault may have been provisioned but backup was never configured.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/backup/backup-azure-vms-first-look-arm", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/backup/backup-overview" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "az backup protection enable-for-vm --resource-group --vault-name --vm --policy-name DefaultPolicy", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. Sign in to the Azure portal\n2. Go to Recovery Services vaults and select the vault\n3. Click + Backup\n4. Select the workload type (Azure VM, SQL, File Share, etc.)\n5. Select the backup policy\n6. Choose the resources to protect\n7. Click Enable Backup", + "Terraform": "" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Configure **backup protection** for critical resources including VMs, databases, and file shares. Use **Azure Backup policies** with appropriate retention and frequency. If the vault is unused, consider deleting it to reduce resource sprawl.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/recovery_vault_has_protected_items" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "forensics-ready" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "This check reports on each Recovery Services vault individually. An empty vault is not necessarily a security risk if backups are managed through a different vault or Azure Backup center." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_vault_has_protected_items/recovery_vault_has_protected_items.py b/prowler/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_vault_has_protected_items/recovery_vault_has_protected_items.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6ebd9e5328 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_vault_has_protected_items/recovery_vault_has_protected_items.py @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Azure +from prowler.providers.azure.services.recovery.recovery_client import recovery_client + + +class recovery_vault_has_protected_items(Check): + """Check if Recovery Services vaults have protected backup items.""" + + def execute(self) -> list[Check_Report_Azure]: + """Execute the check across Recovery Services vaults.""" + + findings = [] + + for subscription_name, vaults in recovery_client.vaults.items(): + for vault in vaults.values(): + report = Check_Report_Azure(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=vault) + report.subscription = subscription_name + report.resource_name = vault.name + report.resource_id = vault.id + report.location = vault.location + + if vault.backup_protected_items: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Recovery Services vault '{vault.name}' has " + f"{len(vault.backup_protected_items)} protected items." + ) + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Recovery Services vault '{vault.name}' has no " + f"protected items configured." + ) + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/cloudflare/cloudflare_provider.py b/prowler/providers/cloudflare/cloudflare_provider.py index 48763df395..9c39839f5d 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/cloudflare/cloudflare_provider.py +++ b/prowler/providers/cloudflare/cloudflare_provider.py @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ class CloudflareProvider(Provider): """Cloudflare provider.""" _type: str = "cloudflare" + sdk_only: bool = False _session: CloudflareSession _identity: CloudflareIdentityInfo _audit_config: dict diff --git a/prowler/providers/common/arguments.py b/prowler/providers/common/arguments.py index 9e23274a90..2e4d9c8896 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/common/arguments.py +++ b/prowler/providers/common/arguments.py @@ -10,16 +10,43 @@ provider_arguments_lib_path = "lib.arguments.arguments" validate_provider_arguments_function = "validate_arguments" init_provider_arguments_function = "init_parser" +# Kept in sync with parser.py's argv normalisation; both consumers import this. +PROVIDER_ALIASES = { + "microsoft365": "m365", + "oci": "oraclecloud", +} + + +def _invoked_provider_from_argv(available_providers: Sequence[str]) -> Optional[str]: + """Return the provider name the user invoked, or None. + + Mirrors `ProwlerArgumentParser.parse()` resolution: only inspects + `sys.argv[1]`. Scanning the whole argv would misclassify + `prowler --output-directory stackit` as `stackit`. + """ + available = set(available_providers) + if len(sys.argv) < 2: + return "aws" if "aws" in available else None + first = sys.argv[1] + if first in ("-h", "--help", "-v", "--version"): + return None + if first.startswith("-"): + return "aws" if "aws" in available else None + normalized = PROVIDER_ALIASES.get(first, first) + return normalized if normalized in available else None + def init_providers_parser(self): - """init_providers_parser calls the provider init_parser function to load all the arguments and flags. Receives a ProwlerArgumentParser object""" - # We need to call the arguments parser for each provider + """Build the subparser of each available provider. + + Built-in load failures are captured silently on + `self._builtin_load_failures`; the warn/exit decision is deferred to + `enforce_invoked_provider_loaded()` because `parse(args=...)` can + override `sys.argv` after this function ran. + """ + self._builtin_load_failures = {} providers = Provider.get_available_providers() for provider in providers: - # Discriminate built-in vs external upfront via find_spec, so an - # ImportError from a transitive dependency missing inside a built-in - # arguments module surfaces clearly instead of being silently - # re-routed to the entry-point path (which only has external providers). if Provider.is_builtin(provider): try: getattr( @@ -28,21 +55,9 @@ def init_providers_parser(self): ), init_provider_arguments_function, )(self) - except ImportError as e: - logger.critical( - f"Failed to load arguments for built-in provider '{provider}'. " - f"Missing dependency: {e}. " - f"Ensure all required dependencies are installed." - ) - logger.debug("Full traceback:", exc_info=True) - sys.exit(1) except Exception as error: - logger.critical( - f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" - ) - sys.exit(1) + self._builtin_load_failures[provider] = error else: - # External provider — init_parser classmethod via entry point cls = Provider._load_ep_provider(provider) if cls and hasattr(cls, "init_parser"): try: @@ -53,6 +68,51 @@ def init_providers_parser(self): ) +def enforce_invoked_provider_loaded(self): + """Apply selective fail-loud over the failures captured at init time. + + Called by `ProwlerArgumentParser.parse()` AFTER argv normalisation so + the invoked provider matches what argparse will dispatch to — including + the case where `parse(args=...)` overrode the ambient `sys.argv`. + + Invoked + failed → critical + `sys.exit(1)`. Others → warning. + """ + failures = getattr(self, "_builtin_load_failures", {}) + if not failures: + return + invoked = _invoked_provider_from_argv(Provider.get_available_providers()) + for provider, error in failures.items(): + if provider == invoked: + continue + if isinstance(error, ImportError): + logger.warning( + f"Skipping built-in provider '{provider}' due to missing " + f"dependency: {error}. It will be unavailable in this " + f"invocation, but the CLI continues because you invoked a " + f"different provider." + ) + else: + logger.warning( + f"Skipping built-in provider '{provider}': " + f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + if invoked is None or invoked not in failures: + return + error = failures[invoked] + if isinstance(error, ImportError): + logger.critical( + f"Failed to load arguments for built-in provider '{invoked}'. " + f"Missing dependency: {error}. " + f"Ensure all required dependencies are installed." + ) + logger.debug("Full traceback:", exc_info=True) + else: + logger.critical( + f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + sys.exit(1) + + def validate_provider_arguments(arguments: Namespace) -> tuple[bool, str]: """validate_provider_arguments returns {True, "} if the provider arguments passed are valid and can be used together""" try: diff --git a/prowler/providers/common/models.py b/prowler/providers/common/models.py index 120cc1a374..84e71c4809 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/common/models.py +++ b/prowler/providers/common/models.py @@ -49,6 +49,16 @@ class ProviderOutputOptions: if updated_audit_config: provider._audit_config = updated_audit_config + # Secrets validation: --scan-secrets-validate opts into live validation + # of discovered secrets. Set the audit_config key directly so it applies + # even for providers whose default config does not declare it. + self.scan_secrets_validate = getattr(arguments, "scan_secrets_validate", False) + if self.scan_secrets_validate: + provider = Provider.get_global_provider() + audit_config = provider.audit_config or {} + audit_config["secrets_validate"] = True + provider._audit_config = audit_config + # Check output directory, if it is not created -> create it if self.output_directory and not self.fixer: if not isdir(self.output_directory): diff --git a/prowler/providers/common/provider.py b/prowler/providers/common/provider.py index 8bc7567795..e69f2cb1d5 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/common/provider.py +++ b/prowler/providers/common/provider.py @@ -142,6 +142,10 @@ class Provider(ABC): _cli_help_text: str = "" + # CLI/SDK-only provider, hidden from the app (API/UI). Defaults True; a + # provider opts into the app with ``sdk_only = False``. See get_app_providers(). + sdk_only: bool = True + @classmethod def from_cli_args(cls, arguments: Namespace, fixer_config: dict) -> "Provider": """Instantiate the provider from CLI arguments and return the instance. @@ -209,6 +213,65 @@ class Provider(ABC): f"{self.__class__.__name__} has not implemented get_mutelist_finding_args()" ) + @classmethod + def get_scan_arguments( + cls, + provider_uid: str, + secret: dict, + mutelist_content: Optional[dict] = None, + ) -> dict: + """Build the provider constructor kwargs from a stored uid and secret. + + This is the programmatic construction interface intended for callers + that will persist a provider as a single ``uid`` plus a ``secret`` dict + (e.g. the API), as opposed to the CLI which passes explicit per-provider + flags. + + The base implementation is a default: it passes the secret through, adds + the mutelist, and intentionally drops ``provider_uid``. The API consumes + this contract for external providers, so an external provider whose uid + is part of the scan scope (e.g. a subscription or project id) or that + renames/filters secret keys overrides this to inject the uid into the + right kwarg; until it does, the base default is not the final shape for + that provider. Built-in providers whose scope derives from the uid are + mapped on the API side and do not go through this method. + """ + kwargs = {**secret} + if mutelist_content is not None: + kwargs["mutelist_content"] = mutelist_content + return kwargs + + @classmethod + def get_connection_arguments(cls, provider_uid: str, secret: dict) -> dict: + """Build the ``test_connection`` kwargs from a stored uid and secret. + + Companion to :meth:`get_scan_arguments` for the connection check, which + often needs a different shape than the constructor. The base passes the + secret through and intentionally drops ``provider_uid``. An external + provider whose uid is part of the scope overrides this to add its + identity kwarg (and ``provider_id`` where its ``test_connection`` + expects it); built-in providers are mapped on the API side and do not go + through this method. + """ + return {**secret} + + @classmethod + def get_credentials_schema(cls) -> dict: + """Return the provider's credential schemas keyed by secret type. + + Maps each secret type the provider accepts (``"static"``, ``"role"`` or + ``"service_account"``) to the pydantic model that validates a secret of + that type. The provider declares which type each schema belongs to, so + the API validates a secret against the model for the secret type it is + created with and the chosen type stays bound to the shape it claims. + + Each model documents each field via ``Field(description=...)`` and + whether it is required (no default) or optional. An empty dict means no + schema is declared: the secret is accepted as an object and validated by + :meth:`test_connection`. + """ + return {} + def display_compliance_table( self, _findings: list, @@ -261,36 +324,16 @@ class Provider(ABC): @staticmethod def init_global_provider(arguments: Namespace) -> None: try: - # Discriminate built-in vs external upfront via find_spec, so an - # ImportError from a transitive dependency missing inside a - # built-in's own import chain surfaces clearly instead of being - # silently re-routed to the entry-point path. - provider_class = None - if Provider.is_builtin(arguments.provider): - # Built-in wins on provider-name collision. Plug-ins are - # first-class extenders (they can register new provider - # names) but cannot override existing built-ins — a security - # tool prefers fail-loud predictability over silent - # overrides. Surface the override so the user knows their - # plug-in is being ignored and can rename it. - # Match by name only — never ep.load() a shadowing plug-in. - if any( - ep.name == arguments.provider - for ep in importlib.metadata.entry_points(group="prowler.providers") - ): - logger.warning( - f"Plug-in provider '{arguments.provider}' registered " - f"via entry points is being IGNORED — a built-in with " - f"the same name exists. To use your plug-in, register " - f"it under a different name." - ) - provider_class_path = f"{providers_path}.{arguments.provider}.{arguments.provider}_provider" - provider_class_name = f"{arguments.provider.capitalize()}Provider" - try: - provider_class = getattr( - import_module(provider_class_path), provider_class_name - ) - except ImportError as e: + # Delegate class resolution to the public, side-effect-free + # resolver. init_global_provider owns the CLI-specific error + # handling: a missing transitive dep in a built-in becomes a + # logger.critical + sys.exit(1); a completely unknown provider + # re-raises so the outer try/except can sys.exit too. + try: + provider_class = Provider.get_class(arguments.provider) + except ImportError as e: + if Provider.is_builtin(arguments.provider): + # Built-in's transitive dependency is missing — loud CLI error. logger.critical( f"Failed to load built-in provider '{arguments.provider}'. " f"Missing dependency: {e}. " @@ -298,25 +341,28 @@ class Provider(ABC): ) logger.debug("Full traceback:", exc_info=True) sys.exit(1) - except AttributeError: - # Module exists but doesn't define the expected class — - # treat as external and try entry points. - provider_class = Provider._load_ep_provider(arguments.provider) - else: - provider_class = Provider._load_ep_provider(arguments.provider) + # Unknown or missing external provider — propagate so the + # outer try/except can handle it (sys.exit(1) via generic + # exception handler). + raise - if provider_class is None: - raise ImportError( - f"Provider '{arguments.provider}' not found as built-in or entry point" + # Built-in wins on name collision — warn that a same-named + # plug-in is ignored. This lives here (not in get_class) so + # that `prowler --help` and API callers that resolve a class + # without initialising a global provider do not see spurious + # warnings. Match by name only — never ep.load() a shadowing + # plug-in, or its module code would run during a built-in run. + if Provider.is_builtin(arguments.provider) and any( + ep.name == arguments.provider + for ep in importlib.metadata.entry_points(group="prowler.providers") + ): + logger.warning( + f"Plug-in provider '{arguments.provider}' registered " + f"via entry points is being IGNORED — a built-in with " + f"the same name exists. To use your plug-in, register " + f"it under a different name." ) - # Kept for downstream forks that may extend the dispatch below - # with their own custom built-in branches and reference this name. - # The upstream chain dispatches by `arguments.provider` directly. - provider_class_name = ( - f"{arguments.provider.capitalize()}Provider" # noqa: F841 - ) - fixer_config = load_and_validate_config_file( arguments.provider, arguments.fixer_config ) @@ -603,6 +649,16 @@ class Provider(ABC): mutelist_path=arguments.mutelist_file, fixer_config=fixer_config, ) + elif arguments.provider == "linode": + # Credentials are read from the LINODE_TOKEN env var by the + # provider itself; there are no credential CLI flags to + # avoid leaking secrets. + provider_class( + config_path=arguments.config_file, + mutelist_path=arguments.mutelist_file, + fixer_config=fixer_config, + regions=getattr(arguments, "region", None), + ) else: # Dynamic fallback: any external/custom provider. # Honor the from_cli_args type hint (-> Provider): if the @@ -644,6 +700,28 @@ class Provider(ABC): providers.add(ep.name) return sorted(providers) + @staticmethod + def get_app_providers() -> list[str]: + """Return the providers the app (API/UI) may expose: those with + ``sdk_only = False``. + + Counterpart of :meth:`get_available_providers`, which lists every + provider for the CLI. A provider whose class cannot be imported is + treated as ``sdk_only`` (excluded) so a broken plug-in never leaks in. + """ + app_providers = [] + for name in Provider.get_available_providers(): + try: + provider_class = Provider.get_class(name) + except Exception as error: + logger.warning( + f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + continue + if not getattr(provider_class, "sdk_only", True): + app_providers.append(name) + return app_providers + @staticmethod def is_tool_wrapper_provider(provider: str) -> bool: """Return True if the provider delegates scanning to an external tool. @@ -693,30 +771,69 @@ class Provider(ABC): Provider._ep_providers[name] = None return None + @staticmethod + def get_class(provider: str) -> type: + """Resolve the provider class for a name (built-in or entry-point). + + Does not call ``sys.exit`` and does not initialize the global + provider (it may populate the ``_ep_providers`` memoization cache). + Collision warnings are emitted by ``init_global_provider``, not here. + The caller handles errors (CLI exits; the API can return HTTP 400). + + Args: + provider: Provider name, e.g. ``"aws"`` or an external plug-in. + + Returns: + The provider class (a subclass of :class:`Provider`). + + Raises: + ImportError: If not found as built-in or entry point, a built-in's + transitive dependency is missing, or an entry point resolves to + an object that is not a subclass of :class:`Provider`. + """ + if Provider.is_builtin(provider): + provider_class_path = f"{providers_path}.{provider}.{provider}_provider" + provider_class_name = f"{provider.capitalize()}Provider" + # Let ImportError propagate — the caller decides whether to + # sys.exit (CLI) or return HTTP 400 (API). + module = import_module(provider_class_path) + try: + return getattr(module, provider_class_name) + except AttributeError as error: + # is_builtin already confirmed this is a built-in, so the + # module MUST define the expected class. A missing class is a + # broken built-in contract — raise rather than fall back to a + # same-named external plug-in, which would contradict + # is_builtin and silently return a foreign class. + raise ImportError( + f"Built-in provider '{provider}' module " + f"'{provider_class_path}' does not define expected class " + f"'{provider_class_name}'" + ) from error + + cls = Provider._load_ep_provider(provider) + if cls is None: + raise ImportError( + f"Provider '{provider}' not found as built-in or entry point" + ) + # ep.load() can return any object; enforce the public contract that + # get_class returns a Provider subclass. isinstance(cls, type) guards + # issubclass against a TypeError when cls is not a class at all. + if not (isinstance(cls, type) and issubclass(cls, Provider)): + raise ImportError( + f"Entry-point provider '{provider}' resolved to {cls!r}, " + f"which is not a subclass of Provider" + ) + return cls + @staticmethod def get_providers_help_text() -> dict: """Returns a dict of {provider_name: cli_help_text} for all available providers.""" help_text = {} for name in Provider.get_available_providers(): try: - # Try built-in first - module_path = f"{providers_path}.{name}.{name}_provider" - module = import_module(module_path) - cls = None - for attr_name in dir(module): - attr = getattr(module, attr_name) - if ( - isinstance(attr, type) - and issubclass(attr, Provider) - and attr is not Provider - ): - cls = attr - break - help_text[name] = getattr(cls, "_cli_help_text", "") if cls else "" - except ImportError: - # External provider — load via entry point - cls = Provider._load_ep_provider(name) - help_text[name] = getattr(cls, "_cli_help_text", "") if cls else "" + cls = Provider.get_class(name) + help_text[name] = getattr(cls, "_cli_help_text", "") except Exception as error: logger.warning( f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" diff --git a/prowler/providers/gcp/exceptions/exceptions.py b/prowler/providers/gcp/exceptions/exceptions.py index 5c5845951c..09cb642cba 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/gcp/exceptions/exceptions.py +++ b/prowler/providers/gcp/exceptions/exceptions.py @@ -34,11 +34,17 @@ class GCPBaseException(ProwlerException): "message": "Error loading Service Account Private Key credentials from dictionary", "remediation": "Check the dictionary and ensure it contains a Service Account Private Key.", }, + (3011, "GCPGetOrganizationProjectsError"): { + "message": "Error retrieving projects under the organization via the Cloud Asset API", + "remediation": "Ensure the Cloud Asset API is enabled in the credentials' project and that the principal has 'roles/cloudasset.viewer' bound at the organization level. See https://cloud.google.com/asset-inventory/docs/access-control.", + }, } def __init__(self, code, file=None, original_exception=None, message=None): provider = "GCP" - error_info = self.GCP_ERROR_CODES.get((code, self.__class__.__name__)) + # Copy the catalog entry so a custom message does not mutate the + # class-level GCP_ERROR_CODES shared across exception instances. + error_info = dict(self.GCP_ERROR_CODES.get((code, self.__class__.__name__))) if message: error_info["message"] = message super().__init__( @@ -104,3 +110,10 @@ class GCPLoadServiceAccountKeyFromDictError(GCPCredentialsError): super().__init__( 3010, file=file, original_exception=original_exception, message=message ) + + +class GCPGetOrganizationProjectsError(GCPBaseException): + def __init__(self, file=None, original_exception=None, message=None): + super().__init__( + 3011, file=file, original_exception=original_exception, message=message + ) diff --git a/prowler/providers/gcp/gcp_provider.py b/prowler/providers/gcp/gcp_provider.py index 5017b84c42..69ab9404ef 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/gcp/gcp_provider.py +++ b/prowler/providers/gcp/gcp_provider.py @@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ from prowler.providers.common.models import Audit_Metadata, Connection from prowler.providers.common.provider import Provider from prowler.providers.gcp.config import DEFAULT_RETRY_ATTEMPTS from prowler.providers.gcp.exceptions.exceptions import ( + GCPBaseException, + GCPGetOrganizationProjectsError, GCPInvalidProviderIdError, GCPLoadADCFromDictError, GCPLoadServiceAccountKeyFromDictError, @@ -59,6 +61,7 @@ class GcpProvider(Provider): """ _type: str = "gcp" + sdk_only: bool = False _session: Credentials _project_ids: list _excluded_project_ids: list @@ -621,10 +624,7 @@ class GcpProvider(Provider): credentials_file: str Returns: - dict[str, GCPProject] - - Usage: - >>> GcpProvider.get_projects(credentials=credentials, organization_id=organization_id) + dict of project_id and GCPProject object """ projects = {} try: @@ -632,7 +632,10 @@ class GcpProvider(Provider): try: # Initialize Cloud Asset Inventory API for recursive project retrieval asset_service = discovery.build( - "cloudasset", "v1", credentials=credentials + "cloudasset", + "v1", + credentials=credentials, + num_retries=DEFAULT_RETRY_ATTEMPTS, ) # Set the scope to the specified organization and filter for projects scope = f"organizations/{organization_id}" @@ -643,7 +646,7 @@ class GcpProvider(Provider): ) while request is not None: - response = request.execute() + response = request.execute(num_retries=DEFAULT_RETRY_ATTEMPTS) for asset in response.get("assets", []): # Extract labels and other project details @@ -688,13 +691,25 @@ class GcpProvider(Provider): ) except HttpError as http_error: if "Cloud Asset API has not been used" in str(http_error): - logger.error( - f"Projects cannot be retrieved from the Organization since Cloud Asset API has not been used before or it is disabled [{http_error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]. Enable it by visiting https://console.developers.google.com/apis/api/cloudasset.googleapis.com/ then retry." + message = ( + "Projects cannot be retrieved from the Organization since the Cloud Asset API " + "has not been used before or it is disabled. Enable it by visiting " + "https://console.developers.google.com/apis/api/cloudasset.googleapis.com/ then retry." ) else: - logger.error( - f"{http_error.__class__.__name__}[{http_error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {http_error}" + message = ( + f"Cloud Asset API call failed while listing projects under organization " + f"'{organization_id}': {http_error}. Ensure the credentials' principal has " + "'roles/cloudasset.viewer' bound at the organization level." ) + logger.critical( + f"{http_error.__class__.__name__}[{http_error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {message}" + ) + raise GCPGetOrganizationProjectsError( + file=__file__, + original_exception=http_error, + message=message, + ) else: try: # Initialize Cloud Resource Manager API for simple project listing @@ -781,8 +796,10 @@ class GcpProvider(Provider): labels={}, lifecycle_state="ACTIVE", ) - # If no projects were able to be accessed via API, add them manually from the credentials file - elif credentials_file: + # If no projects were able to be accessed via API, add them manually from the credentials file. + # Skip this fallback when an organization scan was explicitly requested: silently + # downgrading scope to the service account's home project hides permission errors. + elif credentials_file and not organization_id: with open(credentials_file, "r", encoding="utf-8") as file: project_id = json.load(file)["project_id"] # Handle empty or null project names @@ -798,6 +815,8 @@ class GcpProvider(Provider): labels={}, lifecycle_state="ACTIVE", ) + except GCPBaseException as gcp_error: + raise gcp_error except Exception as error: logger.critical( f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" diff --git a/prowler/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_client.py b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_client.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a252da1be7 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_client.py @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +from prowler.providers.common.provider import Provider +from prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_service import ( + CloudFunction, +) + +cloudfunction_client = CloudFunction(Provider.get_global_provider()) diff --git a/prowler/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc/cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc/cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..72c908bf80 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc/cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +{ + "Provider": "gcp", + "CheckID": "cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc", + "CheckTitle": "Cloud Function is connected to a VPC network", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "cloudfunction", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "cloudfunctions.googleapis.com/Function", + "Description": "Cloud Functions are attached to a **Serverless VPC Access connector** so egress traffic is routed through a private VPC network instead of the public internet.\n\nThe evaluation reviews each function's network configuration to confirm that a connector is configured.", + "Risk": "Without a VPC connector, Cloud Functions cannot privately reach internal resources such as `Cloud SQL`, `Memorystore`, or `GKE`, forcing those services to be exposed over public IPs. This expands the **attack surface**, weakens **confidentiality** of internal traffic, and breaks network segmentation controls required by most security frameworks.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://cloud.google.com/functions/docs/networking/connecting-vpc", + "https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/serverless-vpc-access" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "gcloud functions deploy --region= --vpc-connector=projects//locations//connectors/ --egress-settings=all-traffic", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. In Google Cloud Console, go to Cloud Functions\n2. Select the function and click Edit\n3. Under Connections, select the VPC connector for your network\n4. Set Egress settings to route all traffic through the VPC connector\n5. Save and redeploy the function", + "Terraform": "```hcl\nresource \"google_cloudfunctions2_function\" \"\" {\n name = \"\"\n location = \"us-central1\"\n\n service_config {\n vpc_connector = \"\" # Critical: routes egress through the VPC\n vpc_connector_egress_settings = \"ALL_TRAFFIC\"\n }\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Apply **defense in depth** by routing Cloud Function egress through a **Serverless VPC Access connector** when the function must reach internal resources.\n\nScope each connector to **least privilege** subnets so functions cannot reach unintended endpoints.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "trust-boundaries" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [ + "cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible", + "cloudsql_instance_public_ip", + "compute_instance_public_ip" + ], + "Notes": "A VPC connector must be created in the same region as the Cloud Function. This check only verifies that a connector is attached; it does not validate egress settings or connector configuration." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc/cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc.py b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc/cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3b28db7d8e --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc/cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc.py @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_GCP +from prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_client import ( + cloudfunction_client, +) + + +class cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc(Check): + """Check that Cloud Functions are attached to a Serverless VPC Access connector. + + Verifies that each active Cloud Function has a `vpcConnector` configured so + egress traffic flows through a private VPC network instead of the public + internet. Functions in non-`ACTIVE` states are skipped because their network + configuration is transient. + """ + + def execute(self) -> list[Check_Report_GCP]: + """Execute the VPC-connector check across all Cloud Functions. + + Returns: + A list of `Check_Report_GCP` findings, one per active Cloud + Function. Status is `PASS` when a `vpc_connector` is set and `FAIL` + otherwise. + """ + findings = [] + for function in cloudfunction_client.functions: + if function.state != "ACTIVE": + continue + report = Check_Report_GCP( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=function, + resource_id=function.name, + ) + if function.vpc_connector: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Cloud Function {function.name} is connected to a VPC via " + f"connector: {function.vpc_connector}." + ) + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"Cloud Function {function.name} is not connected to any VPC network." + findings.append(report) + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible/cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible/cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8c9247b2bd --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible/cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +{ + "Provider": "gcp", + "CheckID": "cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible", + "CheckTitle": "Cloud Function is not publicly invocable", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "cloudfunction", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "high", + "ResourceType": "cloudfunctions.googleapis.com/Function", + "Description": "Cloud Functions deny invocation to `allUsers` and `allAuthenticatedUsers`, so only **explicitly authorized identities or services** can trigger them.\n\nThe evaluation reviews each function's IAM policy bindings to confirm no public principals are granted invoker access.", + "Risk": "Publicly invocable Cloud Functions expose **business logic** to the internet and let any caller trigger execution. This enables **unauthorized data access** when the function returns sensitive output, **code execution** in shared environments, and **denial-of-wallet** attacks driven by uncontrolled invocation costs.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://cloud.google.com/functions/docs/securing/authenticating", + "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/overview" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "gcloud functions remove-iam-policy-binding --region= --member= --role=roles/cloudfunctions.invoker", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. In Google Cloud Console, go to Cloud Functions\n2. Select the function and open the Permissions tab\n3. Remove any binding with allUsers or allAuthenticatedUsers\n4. Grant invocation rights only to specific service accounts or user groups", + "Terraform": "```hcl\nresource \"google_cloudfunctions2_function_iam_binding\" \"\" {\n project = \"\"\n location = \"\"\n cloud_function = \"\"\n role = \"roles/cloudfunctions.invoker\"\n members = [\"serviceAccount:\"] # Critical: never include allUsers or allAuthenticatedUsers\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Apply **least privilege** to Cloud Function invocation: grant `roles/cloudfunctions.invoker` only to specific service accounts or groups.\n\nFor externally exposed functions, front them with **API Gateway** or **Cloud Endpoints** that enforce authentication and rate limiting.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "internet-exposed" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [ + "cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc", + "secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible", + "cloudstorage_bucket_public_access" + ], + "Notes": "This check evaluates function-level IAM policies. Organization policy constraints/iam.allowedPolicyMemberDomains can prevent public bindings at the org level." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible/cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible.py b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible/cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..14ee874f22 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible/cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible.py @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_GCP +from prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_client import ( + cloudfunction_client, +) + + +class cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible(Check): + """Check that Cloud Functions do not grant invocation rights to all users. + + Verifies that no active Cloud Function has an IAM binding granting access + to `allUsers` or `allAuthenticatedUsers`. Non-`ACTIVE` functions are + skipped because their IAM bindings are transient. + """ + + def execute(self) -> list[Check_Report_GCP]: + """Execute the public-access check across all Cloud Functions. + + Returns: + A list of `Check_Report_GCP` findings, one per active Cloud + Function. Status is `FAIL` when the function is invokable by + `allUsers` or `allAuthenticatedUsers` and `PASS` otherwise. + """ + findings = [] + for function in cloudfunction_client.functions: + if function.state != "ACTIVE": + continue + report = Check_Report_GCP( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=function, + resource_id=function.name, + ) + if function.publicly_accessible: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Cloud Function {function.name} is publicly invocable " + f"(allUsers or allAuthenticatedUsers IAM binding detected)." + ) + else: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Cloud Function {function.name} is not publicly accessible." + ) + findings.append(report) + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_service.py b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_service.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9905c98748 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_service.py @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +from typing import Optional + +from googleapiclient import discovery +from pydantic.v1 import BaseModel + +from prowler.lib.logger import logger +from prowler.providers.gcp.config import DEFAULT_RETRY_ATTEMPTS +from prowler.providers.gcp.gcp_provider import GcpProvider +from prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service import GCPService + + +class CloudFunction(GCPService): + """Cloud Functions v2 service client. + + Enumerates Cloud Functions across every accessible project and region + using the `cloudfunctions.googleapis.com` v2 API and exposes them through + the `functions` attribute. + """ + + def __init__(self, provider: GcpProvider) -> None: + """Initialize the service and preload Cloud Functions.""" + super().__init__("cloudfunctions", provider, api_version="v2") + self.functions = [] + self._run_client = None + self._get_functions() + self._get_functions_iam_policy() + + def _get_functions(self) -> None: + """Fetch Cloud Functions for every project and location.""" + for project_id in self.project_ids: + try: + locations = self.client.projects().locations() + locations_request = locations.list(name=f"projects/{project_id}") + while locations_request is not None: + locations_response = locations_request.execute( + num_retries=DEFAULT_RETRY_ATTEMPTS + ) + for location in locations_response.get("locations", []): + location_id = location["locationId"] + try: + functions = locations.functions() + request = functions.list( + parent=f"projects/{project_id}/locations/{location_id}" + ) + while request is not None: + response = request.execute( + num_retries=DEFAULT_RETRY_ATTEMPTS + ) + for fn in response.get("functions", []): + service_config = fn.get("serviceConfig", {}) + self.functions.append( + Function( + id=fn["name"], + name=fn["name"].split("/")[-1], + project_id=project_id, + location=location_id, + state=fn.get("state", "UNKNOWN"), + environment=fn.get("environment", "GEN_1"), + service=service_config.get("service"), + vpc_connector=service_config.get( + "vpcConnector" + ), + ) + ) + request = functions.list_next( + previous_request=request, + previous_response=response, + ) + except Exception as error: + logger.error( + f"{location_id} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + locations_request = locations.list_next( + previous_request=locations_request, + previous_response=locations_response, + ) + except Exception as error: + logger.error( + f"{project_id} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + + def _get_functions_iam_policy(self) -> None: + """Fetch IAM policy for every Cloud Function in parallel. + + For gen2 functions, IAM is delegated to the underlying Cloud Run + service, so a `run.googleapis.com` v2 client is required. + """ + if any(f.environment == "GEN_2" for f in self.functions): + self._run_client = discovery.build( + "run", + "v2", + credentials=self.credentials, + num_retries=DEFAULT_RETRY_ATTEMPTS, + ) + self.__threading_call__(self._get_function_iam_policy, self.functions) + + def _get_function_iam_policy(self, function: "Function") -> None: + """Mark a Cloud Function as publicly accessible when bound to `allUsers` or `allAuthenticatedUsers`. + + Cloud Functions gen2 delegates invocation IAM to its backing Cloud Run + service, so the binding is queried via the Run API. Gen1 functions are + queried through the Cloud Functions API directly. + """ + try: + if function.environment == "GEN_2" and function.service: + response = ( + self._run_client.projects() + .locations() + .services() + .getIamPolicy(resource=function.service) + .execute(num_retries=DEFAULT_RETRY_ATTEMPTS) + ) + else: + response = ( + self.client.projects() + .locations() + .functions() + .getIamPolicy(resource=function.id) + .execute( + http=self.__get_AuthorizedHttp_client__(), + num_retries=DEFAULT_RETRY_ATTEMPTS, + ) + ) + for binding in response.get("bindings", []): + members = binding.get("members", []) + if "allUsers" in members or "allAuthenticatedUsers" in members: + function.publicly_accessible = True + break + except Exception as error: + logger.error( + f"{function.location} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + + +class Function(BaseModel): + """Cloud Function resource consumed by GCP checks.""" + + id: str + name: str + project_id: str + location: str + state: str + environment: str = "GEN_1" + service: Optional[str] = None + vpc_connector: Optional[str] = None + publicly_accessible: bool = False diff --git a/prowler/providers/gcp/services/logging/logging_service.py b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/logging/logging_service.py index 3d5b0d1e79..7d8843584e 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/gcp/services/logging/logging_service.py +++ b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/logging/logging_service.py @@ -1,9 +1,12 @@ +import re + from pydantic.v1 import BaseModel from prowler.lib.logger import logger from prowler.providers.gcp.config import DEFAULT_RETRY_ATTEMPTS from prowler.providers.gcp.gcp_provider import GcpProvider from prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service import GCPService +from prowler.providers.gcp.services.monitoring.monitoring_service import Monitoring class Logging(GCPService): @@ -121,9 +124,86 @@ class Metric(BaseModel): bucket_name: str = "" +# A positive selector of the Admin Activity stream: a ``logName`` predicate +# (``:`` has-substring or ``=`` equals) or a ``log_id()`` call. Written verbose +# so each fragment stays legible; ``(?![a-z_])`` keeps a longer stream name +# (``.../activity_v2``) from impersonating Admin Activity. +_ACTIVITY_SELECTOR = re.compile( + r""" + (?: logName \s* [:=] \s* | log_id \s* \( \s* ) # logName: / logName= / log_id( + ["']? [^"'\s)]* # optional quote, then path prefix + cloudaudit\.googleapis\.com/activity (?![a-z_]) # the Admin Activity stream itself + """, + re.IGNORECASE | re.VERBOSE, +) + +# The same selector for *any* Cloud Audit stream (activity, data_access, +# system_event, policy, access_transparency, …). Used to strip the OR-combined +# audit clauses so we can prove nothing restrictive is left over. +_CLOUDAUDIT_SELECTOR = re.compile( + r""" + (?: logName \s* [:=] \s* | log_id \s* \( \s* ) # logName: / logName= / log_id( + ["']? [^"'\s)]* # optional quote, then path prefix + cloudaudit\.googleapis\.com/[a-z_]+ # any cloudaudit stream + ["']? \s* \)? # optional closing quote / paren + """, + re.IGNORECASE | re.VERBOSE, +) + +# Operators that exclude or narrow coverage. Any of these means we cannot prove +# the sink delivers the *whole* Admin Activity stream, so it is not credited. +_NEGATION_OR_RESTRICTION = re.compile( + r""" + \bNOT\b # NOT exclusion + | \bAND\b # AND conjunction (restriction) + | != | !: # "!=" / "!:" inequality + | (?:^|[\s(]) -\s* [A-Za-z_] # leading "-" exclusion operator + """, + re.IGNORECASE | re.VERBOSE, +) + + +def _sink_delivers_activity_logs(sink_filter: str) -> bool: + """True only when a sink's filter *provably* exports the full Admin Activity + audit stream (or everything). + + Crediting flips a child project to PASS on a CIS security control, so the + match is deliberately conservative: a false FAIL is safe, a false PASS is + not. A non-``"all"`` filter is credited only when + + 1. it positively selects the Admin Activity stream + (``logName:.../activity``, ``logName="...activity"`` or + ``log_id("...activity")``); + 2. it carries no operator that excludes or narrows the stream — ``NOT`` / + ``-`` / ``!=`` (negation) or ``AND`` (restriction); and + 3. nothing but ``OR``-combined Cloud Audit selectors remains once those are + stripped — an ``OR`` only widens coverage, but any leftover predicate + (``severity>=ERROR``, ``resource.type=...``) could narrow it. + + Sink filters encode the stream URL-encoded (``...%2Factivity``) or as a path + — normalize before matching. + """ + if not sink_filter or sink_filter.strip().lower() == "all": + return True + normalized = sink_filter.replace("%2F", "/").replace("%2f", "/") + # 1. The Admin Activity stream must be positively selected. + if not _ACTIVITY_SELECTOR.search(normalized): + return False + # 2. No operator may exclude or narrow that coverage. + if _NEGATION_OR_RESTRICTION.search(normalized): + return False + # 3. Only OR-combined audit selectors may remain — strip them and the OR + # glue; anything left is a predicate we cannot prove is full-coverage. + remainder = _CLOUDAUDIT_SELECTOR.sub(" ", normalized) + remainder = re.sub(r"\bOR\b|[()\s]", " ", remainder, flags=re.IGNORECASE) + return remainder.strip() == "" + + def get_projects_covered_by_aggregated_metric( - logging_client, monitoring_client, metric_filter -): + logging_client: Logging, + monitoring_client: Monitoring, + metric_filter: str, +) -> dict[str, str]: """Return {project_id: metric_name} for scanned projects whose logs are routed, via an organization-level sink with includeChildren=True, to a bucket that holds a bucket-scoped log metric matching ``metric_filter`` that has an alert policy. @@ -133,6 +213,10 @@ def get_projects_covered_by_aggregated_metric( every child project's logs into one bucket, where a single bucket-scoped metric + alert covers them all. Without crediting that, those child projects are falsely failed. Mirrors the org-sink handling already in ``logging_sink_created`` (#11355). + + A sink is credited when it exports everything (``filter == "all"``) or when its + filter carries the Admin Activity audit stream — the only stream the CIS metric + filters can match (see ``_sink_delivers_activity_logs``). """ # Buckets that hold a matching, alerted, bucket-scoped metric -> metric name. bucket_to_metric = {} @@ -155,7 +239,7 @@ def get_projects_covered_by_aggregated_metric( for sink in logging_client.sinks: if not getattr(sink, "include_children", False): continue - if getattr(sink, "filter", "all") != "all": + if not _sink_delivers_activity_logs(getattr(sink, "filter", "all")): continue for bucket, metric_name in bucket_to_metric.items(): # sink.destination e.g. "logging.googleapis.com/projects/.../buckets/X"; diff --git a/prowler/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_client.py b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_client.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dc18866cb3 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_client.py @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +from prowler.providers.common.provider import Provider +from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_service import ( + SecretManager, +) + +secretmanager_client = SecretManager(Provider.get_global_provider()) diff --git a/prowler/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible/secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible/secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9f1f4d3381 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible/secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +{ + "Provider": "gcp", + "CheckID": "secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible", + "CheckTitle": "Secret Manager secret is not publicly accessible", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "secretmanager", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "critical", + "ResourceType": "secretmanager.googleapis.com/Secret", + "Description": "Secret Manager secrets deny access to `allUsers` and `allAuthenticatedUsers`, so only **explicitly authorized identities** can read or use them.\n\nThe evaluation reviews each secret's IAM policy bindings to confirm no public principals are granted access.", + "Risk": "Granting public IAM access to a secret exposes credentials, API keys, certificates, or other sensitive values to any caller on the internet or any authenticated Google account. This compromises **confidentiality**, enables **lateral movement** with leaked credentials, and can trigger regulatory breaches under PCI-DSS, ISO 27001, and GDPR.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://cloud.google.com/secret-manager/docs/access-control", + "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/overview" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "gcloud secrets remove-iam-policy-binding --member= --role=roles/secretmanager.secretAccessor", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. In Google Cloud Console, go to Security > Secret Manager\n2. Select the secret and open the Permissions tab\n3. Remove any binding with allUsers or allAuthenticatedUsers\n4. Grant access only to required service accounts or groups", + "Terraform": "```hcl\nresource \"google_secret_manager_secret_iam_binding\" \"\" {\n secret_id = \"\"\n role = \"roles/secretmanager.secretAccessor\"\n members = [\"serviceAccount:\"] # Critical: never include allUsers or allAuthenticatedUsers\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Apply **least privilege** to Secret Manager: grant `roles/secretmanager.secretAccessor` only to the specific service accounts or groups that need to read each secret.\n\nUse **workload identity** for GKE workloads and rotate credentials regularly to limit blast radius when a binding is misconfigured.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "internet-exposed" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [ + "secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled", + "kms_key_not_publicly_accessible", + "cloudstorage_bucket_public_access" + ], + "Notes": "This check evaluates the secret-level IAM policy. Project-level IAM policies that may indirectly grant public access are not evaluated by this check." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible/secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible.py b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible/secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fb52a119fa --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible/secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible.py @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_GCP +from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_client import ( + secretmanager_client, +) + + +class secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible(Check): + """Check that Secret Manager secrets do not grant access to all users. + + Verifies that no Secret Manager secret has an IAM binding granting access + to `allUsers` or `allAuthenticatedUsers`. + """ + + def execute(self) -> list[Check_Report_GCP]: + """Execute the public-access check across all Secret Manager secrets. + + Returns: + A list of `Check_Report_GCP` findings, one per secret. Status is + `FAIL` when the secret is accessible to `allUsers` or + `allAuthenticatedUsers` and `PASS` otherwise. + """ + findings = [] + for secret in secretmanager_client.secrets: + report = Check_Report_GCP( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=secret, + resource_id=secret.name, + ) + if secret.publicly_accessible: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Secret {secret.name} is publicly accessible " + f"(allUsers or allAuthenticatedUsers IAM binding detected)." + ) + else: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Secret {secret.name} is not publicly accessible." + ) + findings.append(report) + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled/secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled/secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..09dd158b49 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled/secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +{ + "Provider": "gcp", + "CheckID": "secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled", + "CheckTitle": "Secret Manager secret is rotated every 90 days or less", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "secretmanager", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "secretmanager.googleapis.com/Secret", + "Description": "Secret Manager secrets have **automatic rotation** configured with a rotation period of `90` days or less and the next scheduled rotation has not been missed.\n\nThe evaluation reviews each secret's `rotation` settings to confirm both the period and the upcoming rotation time are within bounds.", + "Risk": "Without timely rotation, a leaked or compromised secret remains valid indefinitely, eroding **confidentiality** and widening the **blast radius** of any credential exposure. Stale secrets also bypass periodic re-authorization controls expected by frameworks such as PCI-DSS and ISO 27001.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://cloud.google.com/secret-manager/docs/rotation-recommendations", + "https://cloud.google.com/secret-manager/docs/reference/rest/v1/projects.secrets" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "gcloud secrets update --rotation-period=7776000s --next-rotation-time=", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. In Google Cloud Console, go to Security > Secret Manager\n2. Select the secret and click Edit secret\n3. Under Rotation, enable Automatic rotation with a period of 90 days or less\n4. Configure a Pub/Sub topic to receive rotation notifications\n5. Click Save", + "Terraform": "```hcl\nresource \"google_secret_manager_secret\" \"\" {\n secret_id = \"\"\n\n replication {\n auto {}\n }\n\n rotation {\n rotation_period = \"7776000s\" # Critical: enables rotation within 90 days\n next_rotation_time = \"\"\n }\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Enable **automatic rotation** for every Secret Manager secret with a period of `90` days or less.\n\nWire **Pub/Sub notifications** to trigger rotation logic and apply **defense in depth** by versioning each secret update so consumers can roll back without losing availability.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "secrets" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [ + "secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible", + "kms_key_rotation_enabled", + "iam_sa_user_managed_key_rotate_90_days" + ], + "Notes": "A secret without a rotationPeriod field has no automatic rotation configured and will be marked as FAIL. Rotation periods exceeding 90 days are also marked as FAIL." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled/secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled/secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..84d53e7f3a --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled/secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled.py @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +import datetime + +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_GCP +from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_client import ( + secretmanager_client, +) + + +class secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled(Check): + """ + Ensure Secret Manager secrets have automatic rotation configured within the max rotation period. + + - PASS: Secret has a rotation period within the maximum (default 90 days) and the next rotation is not overdue. + - FAIL: Secret has no rotation, the period exceeds the maximum, or the next rotation has been missed. + """ + + def execute(self) -> list[Check_Report_GCP]: + """Evaluate every Secret Manager secret's rotation configuration against the maximum rotation period.""" + findings = [] + + max_rotation_days = int( + getattr(secretmanager_client, "audit_config", {}).get( + "secretmanager_max_rotation_days", 90 + ) + ) + + for secret in secretmanager_client.secrets: + report = Check_Report_GCP( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=secret, + resource_id=secret.name, + ) + + rotation_seconds = None + if secret.rotation_period: + try: + rotation_seconds = float(secret.rotation_period[:-1]) + except (ValueError, IndexError): + rotation_seconds = None + + rotation_overdue = False + if rotation_seconds is not None and secret.next_rotation_time: + try: + parsed = secret.next_rotation_time.replace("Z", "+00:00") + next_rotation_time = datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(parsed) + rotation_overdue = next_rotation_time < datetime.datetime.now( + datetime.timezone.utc + ) + except (ValueError, AttributeError): + rotation_overdue = True + + max_rotation_seconds = max_rotation_days * 86400 + rotation_days = ( + int(rotation_seconds // 86400) if rotation_seconds is not None else None + ) + + if rotation_seconds is None: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Secret {secret.name} does not have automatic rotation enabled." + ) + elif rotation_seconds > max_rotation_seconds: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Secret {secret.name} has rotation enabled but the period " + f"({rotation_days} days) exceeds the {max_rotation_days}-day maximum." + ) + elif rotation_overdue: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Secret {secret.name} has rotation configured " + f"({rotation_days} days) but the scheduled rotation is overdue." + ) + else: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Secret {secret.name} has automatic rotation enabled " + f"with a period of {rotation_days} days." + ) + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_service.py b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_service.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ca01663083 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_service.py @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +from typing import Optional + +from pydantic.v1 import BaseModel + +from prowler.lib.logger import logger +from prowler.providers.gcp.config import DEFAULT_RETRY_ATTEMPTS +from prowler.providers.gcp.gcp_provider import GcpProvider +from prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service import GCPService + + +class SecretManager(GCPService): + """Secret Manager service client. + + Enumerates Secret Manager secrets across every accessible project using + the `secretmanager.googleapis.com` v1 API and exposes them through the + `secrets` attribute. + """ + + def __init__(self, provider: GcpProvider) -> None: + """Initialize the service and preload secrets with their IAM policies.""" + super().__init__("secretmanager", provider) + self.secrets = [] + self._get_secrets() + self._get_secrets_iam_policy() + + def _get_secrets(self) -> None: + """Fetch Secret Manager secrets for every project.""" + for project_id in self.project_ids: + try: + request = ( + self.client.projects() + .secrets() + .list(parent=f"projects/{project_id}") + ) + while request is not None: + response = request.execute(num_retries=DEFAULT_RETRY_ATTEMPTS) + for secret in response.get("secrets", []): + rotation = secret.get("rotation") or {} + self.secrets.append( + Secret( + id=secret["name"], + name=secret["name"].split("/")[-1], + project_id=project_id, + rotation_period=rotation.get("rotationPeriod"), + next_rotation_time=rotation.get("nextRotationTime"), + ) + ) + request = ( + self.client.projects() + .secrets() + .list_next(previous_request=request, previous_response=response) + ) + except Exception as error: + logger.error( + f"{project_id} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + + def _get_secrets_iam_policy(self) -> None: + """Fetch IAM policy for every Secret Manager secret in parallel.""" + self.__threading_call__(self._get_secret_iam_policy, self.secrets) + + def _get_secret_iam_policy(self, secret: "Secret") -> None: + """Mark a secret as publicly accessible when bound to `allUsers` or `allAuthenticatedUsers`.""" + try: + response = ( + self.client.projects() + .secrets() + .getIamPolicy(resource=secret.id) + .execute( + http=self.__get_AuthorizedHttp_client__(), + num_retries=DEFAULT_RETRY_ATTEMPTS, + ) + ) + for binding in response.get("bindings", []): + members = binding.get("members", []) + if "allUsers" in members or "allAuthenticatedUsers" in members: + secret.publicly_accessible = True + break + except Exception as error: + logger.error( + f"{secret.project_id} -- {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + + +class Secret(BaseModel): + """Secret Manager secret resource consumed by GCP checks.""" + + id: str + name: str + project_id: str + location: str = "global" + rotation_period: Optional[str] = None + next_rotation_time: Optional[str] = None + publicly_accessible: bool = False diff --git a/prowler/providers/github/github_provider.py b/prowler/providers/github/github_provider.py index 0f6e7f59ea..d832a93f98 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/github/github_provider.py +++ b/prowler/providers/github/github_provider.py @@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ class GithubProvider(Provider): """ _type: str = "github" + sdk_only: bool = False _auth_method: str = None MAX_REPO_LIST_LINES: int = 10_000 MAX_REPO_NAME_LENGTH: int = 500 diff --git a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled/repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled.py b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled/repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled.py index bf615a21b6..1f05035723 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled/repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled.py +++ b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled/repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled.py @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ class repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled(Check): report.status_extended = ( f"Repository {repo.name} does allow default branch deletion." ) + if repo.default_branch.branch_deletion_source == "ruleset_not_active": + report.status_extended = f"Repository {repo.name} has default branch deletion disabled in a ruleset, but the ruleset is not active." if not repo.default_branch.branch_deletion: report.status = "PASS" diff --git a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push/repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push/repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push.metadata.json index f774f204d0..2ef741d253 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push/repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push.metadata.json +++ b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push/repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push.metadata.json @@ -9,12 +9,13 @@ "Severity": "high", "ResourceType": "NotDefined", "ResourceGroup": "devops", - "Description": "**GitHub repository default branch** blocks **force pushes** through branch protection.\n\nEvaluates whether the default branch permits force pushes.", + "Description": "**GitHub repository default branch** blocks **force pushes** through branch protection.\n\nEvaluates whether the default branch permits force pushes. This protection can be enforced through classic **branch protection** or repository **rulesets**.", "Risk": "Allowing **force pushes on the default branch** erodes **integrity** and **auditability** by enabling history rewrites and deletion of commits. Attackers or insiders can inject unreviewed code, bypass reviews and status checks, and corrupt PRs, risking supply-chain compromise and reduced **availability**.", "RelatedUrl": "", "AdditionalURLs": [ "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/managing-a-branch-protection-rule", - "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/about-protected-branches#allow-force-pushes" + "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/about-protected-branches#allow-force-pushes", + "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-rulesets/about-rulesets" ], "Remediation": { "Code": { diff --git a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push/repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push.py b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push/repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push.py index 16eb7fa794..de61256080 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push/repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push.py +++ b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push/repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push.py @@ -26,6 +26,11 @@ class repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push(Check): report = CheckReportGithub(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=repo) report.status = "FAIL" report.status_extended = f"Repository {repo.name} does allow force pushes on default branch ({repo.default_branch.name})." + if ( + repo.default_branch.allow_force_pushes_source + == "ruleset_not_active" + ): + report.status_extended = f"Repository {repo.name} has force pushes disallowed in a ruleset on default branch ({repo.default_branch.name}), but the ruleset is not active." if not repo.default_branch.allow_force_pushes: report.status = "PASS" diff --git a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins/repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins/repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins.metadata.json index 70668adbc1..75c84dc752 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins/repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins.metadata.json +++ b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins/repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins.metadata.json @@ -9,12 +9,13 @@ "Severity": "high", "ResourceType": "NotDefined", "ResourceGroup": "devops", - "Description": "**GitHub repository default branch** applies **branch protection rules** to **administrators** via `enforce_admins`, holding admin pushes to the same requirements as other contributors (reviews, status checks, and push restrictions).", + "Description": "**GitHub repository default branch** applies **branch protection rules** to **administrators** via `enforce_admins`, holding admin pushes to the same requirements as other contributors (reviews, status checks, and push restrictions). This protection can be enforced through classic **branch protection** or repository **rulesets**.", "Risk": "Without admin enforcement, privileged users can bypass reviews and checks, enabling **unauthorized code changes**. A compromised admin token can inject backdoors, alter dependencies, or disable safeguards, undermining **integrity**, exposing secrets (**confidentiality**), and causing outages (**availability**).", "RelatedUrl": "", "AdditionalURLs": [ "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/managing-a-branch-protection-rule", - "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/about-protected-branches#do-not-allow-bypassing-the-above-settings" + "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/about-protected-branches#do-not-allow-bypassing-the-above-settings", + "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-rulesets/about-rulesets" ], "Remediation": { "Code": { diff --git a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins/repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins.py b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins/repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins.py index 0a70cf0aea..142f0a5b7b 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins/repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins.py +++ b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins/repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins.py @@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ class repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins(Check): report = CheckReportGithub(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=repo) report.status = "FAIL" report.status_extended = f"Repository {repo.name} does not enforce administrators to be subject to the same branch protection rules as other users." + if repo.default_branch.enforce_admins_source == "ruleset_not_active": + report.status_extended = f"Repository {repo.name} has a ruleset that would apply to administrators, but the ruleset is not active." if repo.default_branch.enforce_admins: report.status = "PASS" diff --git a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_protection_enabled/repository_default_branch_protection_enabled.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_protection_enabled/repository_default_branch_protection_enabled.metadata.json index 8f173e868f..dbefae6179 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_protection_enabled/repository_default_branch_protection_enabled.metadata.json +++ b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_protection_enabled/repository_default_branch_protection_enabled.metadata.json @@ -9,12 +9,13 @@ "Severity": "high", "ResourceType": "NotDefined", "ResourceGroup": "devops", - "Description": "**GitHub repository default branch** has **branch protection rules** enabled to restrict direct changes and require reviewed, validated merges. The evaluation determines whether the default branch enforces such rules.", + "Description": "**GitHub repository default branch** has **branch protection rules** enabled to restrict direct changes and require reviewed, validated merges. The evaluation determines whether the default branch enforces such rules. This protection can be enforced through classic **branch protection** or repository **rulesets**.", "Risk": "Without default-branch protection, changes can bypass reviews and checks, enabling:\n- Unauthorized direct pushes/force pushes\n- Malicious code injection and workflow tampering\n- Accidental deletions or unstable releases\nThis undermines code **integrity** and service **availability**.", "RelatedUrl": "", "AdditionalURLs": [ "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/managing-a-branch-protection-rule", - "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/about-protected-branches" + "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/about-protected-branches", + "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-rulesets/about-rulesets" ], "Remediation": { "Code": { diff --git a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_protection_enabled/repository_default_branch_protection_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_protection_enabled/repository_default_branch_protection_enabled.py index 1348018ee1..b305f5019a 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_protection_enabled/repository_default_branch_protection_enabled.py +++ b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_protection_enabled/repository_default_branch_protection_enabled.py @@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ class repository_default_branch_protection_enabled(Check): report = CheckReportGithub(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=repo) report.status = "FAIL" report.status_extended = f"Repository {repo.name} does not enforce branch protection on default branch ({repo.default_branch.name})." + if repo.default_branch.protected_source == "ruleset_not_active": + report.status_extended = f"Repository {repo.name} has a ruleset configured on default branch ({repo.default_branch.name}), but the ruleset is not active." if repo.default_branch.protected: report.status = "PASS" diff --git a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review/repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review/repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review.metadata.json index 465e61aad9..53f849271a 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review/repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review.metadata.json +++ b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review/repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review.metadata.json @@ -9,12 +9,13 @@ "Severity": "high", "ResourceType": "NotDefined", "ResourceGroup": "devops", - "Description": "**GitHub repository default branch** requires **Code Owners** approval for pull requests that modify paths declared in `CODEOWNERS`", + "Description": "**GitHub repository default branch** requires **Code Owners** approval for pull requests that modify paths declared in `CODEOWNERS`. This protection can be enforced through classic **branch protection** or repository **rulesets**.", "Risk": "Without required **Code Owners** review, non-owners can merge changes to sensitive code, undermining **integrity**.\nThis increases the chance of **malicious code injection**, hidden backdoors, or fragile changes that enable **data exfiltration** or cause outages, impacting confidentiality and availability.", "RelatedUrl": "", "AdditionalURLs": [ "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/about-protected-branches#require-review-from-code-owners", - "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/managing-a-branch-protection-rule" + "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/managing-a-branch-protection-rule", + "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-rulesets/about-rulesets" ], "Remediation": { "Code": { diff --git a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review/repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review.py b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review/repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review.py index 4c5b75010a..3b8a749961 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review/repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review.py +++ b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review/repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review.py @@ -30,6 +30,11 @@ class repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review(Check): else: report.status = "FAIL" report.status_extended = f"Repository {repo.name} does not require code owner approval for changes to owned code." + if ( + repo.default_branch.require_code_owner_reviews_source + == "ruleset_not_active" + ): + report.status_extended = f"Repository {repo.name} has code owner approval configured in a ruleset, but the ruleset is not active." findings.append(report) diff --git a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution/repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution/repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution.metadata.json index beaff24afb..c304ef26c1 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution/repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution.metadata.json +++ b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution/repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution.metadata.json @@ -9,12 +9,13 @@ "Severity": "medium", "ResourceType": "NotDefined", "ResourceGroup": "devops", - "Description": "**GitHub repository default branch** uses **branch protection** to require **conversation resolution** on pull requests (`Require conversation resolution before merging`).", + "Description": "**GitHub repository default branch** uses **branch protection** to require **conversation resolution** on pull requests (`Require conversation resolution before merging`). This protection can be enforced through classic **branch protection** or repository **rulesets**.", "Risk": "Unresolved threads let code with known concerns reach default, weakening **integrity** and **confidentiality**. Insecure changes or secrets may ship, enabling injection, auth bypass, or data exposure. **Availability** can suffer from regressions; review accountability is reduced.", "RelatedUrl": "", "AdditionalURLs": [ "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/managing-a-branch-protection-rule", - "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/about-protected-branches" + "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/about-protected-branches", + "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-rulesets/about-rulesets" ], "Remediation": { "Code": { diff --git a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution/repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution.py b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution/repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution.py index da33754cf5..9c25f8a14f 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution/repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution.py +++ b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution/repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution.py @@ -26,6 +26,11 @@ class repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution(Check): report = CheckReportGithub(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=repo) report.status = "FAIL" report.status_extended = f"Repository {repo.name} does not require conversation resolution on default branch ({repo.default_branch.name})." + if ( + repo.default_branch.conversation_resolution_source + == "ruleset_not_active" + ): + report.status_extended = f"Repository {repo.name} has conversation resolution configured in a ruleset on default branch ({repo.default_branch.name}), but the ruleset is not active." if repo.default_branch.conversation_resolution: report.status = "PASS" diff --git a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history/repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history/repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history.metadata.json index 215ab496aa..5ecb27ffc6 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history/repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history.metadata.json +++ b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history/repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history.metadata.json @@ -9,12 +9,13 @@ "Severity": "low", "ResourceType": "NotDefined", "ResourceGroup": "devops", - "Description": "**GitHub repository default branch** enforces `Require linear history`, blocking merge commits and allowing only `squash` or `rebase` merges", + "Description": "**GitHub repository default branch** enforces `Require linear history`, blocking merge commits and allowing only `squash` or `rebase` merges. This protection can be enforced through classic **branch protection** or repository **rulesets**.", "Risk": "Without a **linear history**, commit provenance is harder to verify, weakening **integrity** and **accountability**.\n\nMerge commits can obscure diffs entering the default branch, hindering audits and rollbacks, enabling unnoticed **malicious or unreviewed code**, and delaying incident response.", "RelatedUrl": "", "AdditionalURLs": [ "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/about-protected-branches#require-linear-history", - "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/managing-a-branch-protection-rule" + "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/managing-a-branch-protection-rule", + "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-rulesets/about-rulesets" ], "Remediation": { "Code": { diff --git a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history/repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history.py b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history/repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history.py index 29a0e51b51..86f944738c 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history/repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history.py +++ b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history/repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history.py @@ -26,6 +26,11 @@ class repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history(Check): report = CheckReportGithub(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=repo) report.status = "FAIL" report.status_extended = f"Repository {repo.name} does not require linear history on default branch ({repo.default_branch.name})." + if ( + repo.default_branch.required_linear_history_source + == "ruleset_not_active" + ): + report.status_extended = f"Repository {repo.name} has linear history configured in a ruleset on default branch ({repo.default_branch.name}), but the ruleset is not active." if repo.default_branch.required_linear_history: report.status = "PASS" diff --git a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals/repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals/repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals.metadata.json index dda4f25ea0..c7f07b1101 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals/repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals.metadata.json +++ b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals/repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals.metadata.json @@ -9,12 +9,13 @@ "Severity": "medium", "ResourceType": "NotDefined", "ResourceGroup": "devops", - "Description": "**GitHub repository default branch** enforces **required reviews** with a minimum of `2` approving reviews before a pull request can be merged.\n\nAssesses whether an approval threshold of at least `2` is configured for code changes targeting the default branch.", + "Description": "**GitHub repository default branch** enforces **required reviews** with a minimum of `2` approving reviews before a pull request can be merged.\n\nAssesses whether an approval threshold of at least `2` is configured for code changes targeting the default branch. This protection can be enforced through classic **branch protection** or repository **rulesets**.", "Risk": "Without multi-review approval on the default branch, a single actor can merge changes, degrading **integrity** and **accountability**. This enables:\n- supply-chain tampering or backdoors\n- introduction of exploitable bugs\n- bypass of change control via compromised accounts", "RelatedUrl": "", "AdditionalURLs": [ "https://docs.github.com/en/pull-requests/collaborating-with-pull-requests/reviewing-changes-in-pull-requests/approving-a-pull-request-with-required-reviews", - "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/about-protected-branches#require-pull-request-reviews-before-merging" + "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/about-protected-branches#require-pull-request-reviews-before-merging", + "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-rulesets/about-rulesets" ], "Remediation": { "Code": { diff --git a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals/repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals.py b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals/repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals.py index 6312b98d02..5ddf37e853 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals/repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals.py +++ b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals/repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals.py @@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ class repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals(Check): report = CheckReportGithub(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=repo) report.status = "FAIL" report.status_extended = f"Repository {repo.name} does not enforce at least 2 approvals for code changes." + if repo.default_branch.approval_count_source == "ruleset_not_active": + report.status_extended = f"Repository {repo.name} has at least 2 approvals configured in a ruleset, but the ruleset is not active." if repo.default_branch.approval_count >= 2: report.status = "PASS" diff --git a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits/repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits/repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits.metadata.json index d3d9c91806..9b045fc4e9 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits/repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits.metadata.json +++ b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits/repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits.metadata.json @@ -9,12 +9,13 @@ "Severity": "high", "ResourceType": "NotDefined", "ResourceGroup": "devops", - "Description": "**GitHub repository default branch** enforces **signed and verified commits** (`Require signed commits`), allowing only commits with valid cryptographic signatures to be pushed or merged.", + "Description": "**GitHub repository default branch** enforces **signed and verified commits** (`Require signed commits`), allowing only commits with valid cryptographic signatures to be pushed or merged. This protection can be enforced through classic **branch protection** or repository **rulesets**.", "Risk": "Without required signing, commit authorship can be spoofed and unverified changes added, impacting integrity.\n- Backdoor injection\n- History tampering and forged identities\n- Release pipeline abuse and supply-chain compromise", "RelatedUrl": "", "AdditionalURLs": [ "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/about-protected-branches#require-signed-commits", - "https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/managing-commit-signature-verification/about-commit-signature-verification" + "https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/managing-commit-signature-verification/about-commit-signature-verification", + "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-rulesets/about-rulesets" ], "Remediation": { "Code": { diff --git a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits/repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits.py b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits/repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits.py index 4b6aa3ae4c..110a7d4a1e 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits/repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits.py +++ b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits/repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits.py @@ -26,6 +26,11 @@ class repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits(Check): report = CheckReportGithub(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=repo) report.status = "FAIL" report.status_extended = f"Repository {repo.name} does not require signed commits on default branch ({repo.default_branch.name})." + if ( + repo.default_branch.require_signed_commits_source + == "ruleset_not_active" + ): + report.status_extended = f"Repository {repo.name} has signed commits configured in a ruleset on default branch ({repo.default_branch.name}), but the ruleset is not active." if repo.default_branch.require_signed_commits: report.status = "PASS" diff --git a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_status_checks_required/repository_default_branch_status_checks_required.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_status_checks_required/repository_default_branch_status_checks_required.metadata.json index 6d450fde33..d0799962ce 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_status_checks_required/repository_default_branch_status_checks_required.metadata.json +++ b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_status_checks_required/repository_default_branch_status_checks_required.metadata.json @@ -9,13 +9,14 @@ "Severity": "high", "ResourceType": "NotDefined", "ResourceGroup": "devops", - "Description": "**GitHub repository default branch** uses **required status checks**, indicating whether merges are gated by successful check results on pull requests", + "Description": "**GitHub repository default branch** uses **required status checks**, indicating whether merges are gated by successful check results on pull requests. This protection can be enforced through classic **branch protection** or repository **rulesets**.", "Risk": "Without required checks, unvetted commits can be merged, degrading code **integrity** and **availability**. Skipped or failing validations may introduce vulnerable dependencies, break builds, or allow malicious code, enabling supply-chain compromise and rapid propagation to production.", "RelatedUrl": "", "AdditionalURLs": [ "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/managing-a-branch-protection-rule", "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/about-protected-branches#require-status-checks-before-merging", - "https://docs.gearset.com/en/articles/2437757-managing-status-check-rules-in-github" + "https://docs.gearset.com/en/articles/2437757-managing-status-check-rules-in-github", + "https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-rulesets/about-rulesets" ], "Remediation": { "Code": { diff --git a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_status_checks_required/repository_default_branch_status_checks_required.py b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_status_checks_required/repository_default_branch_status_checks_required.py index e67b9def2c..f96d5b058d 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_status_checks_required/repository_default_branch_status_checks_required.py +++ b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_status_checks_required/repository_default_branch_status_checks_required.py @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ class repository_default_branch_status_checks_required(Check): report.status_extended = ( f"Repository {repo.name} does not enforce status checks." ) + if repo.default_branch.status_checks_source == "ruleset_not_active": + report.status_extended = f"Repository {repo.name} has status checks configured in a ruleset, but the ruleset is not active." if repo.default_branch.status_checks: report.status = "PASS" diff --git a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_service.py b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_service.py index 0201d199e4..fd8aa28662 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_service.py +++ b/prowler/providers/github/services/repository/repository_service.py @@ -202,15 +202,40 @@ class Repository(GithubService): return None - def _get_dismiss_stale_reviews_from_rulesets( + def _evaluate_default_branch_rulesets( self, repo, default_branch: str - ) -> tuple[Optional[bool], Optional[str]]: - """Evaluate dismiss-stale-review coverage from repository and parent rulesets.""" - rulesets = self._get_repository_rulesets(repo) - if rulesets is None: - return None, None + ) -> dict[str, tuple[Optional[int], str]]: + """Evaluate default-branch protection coverage provided by rulesets. - has_inactive_ruleset = False + Fetches the repository (and parent) rulesets once and walks every rule that + targets the default branch, mapping each ruleset rule to its equivalent classic + branch-protection attribute. + + Returns: + dict mapping a ``Branch`` attribute name to a ``(value, source)`` tuple where + ``source`` is ``"ruleset"`` (enforced by an active ruleset), ``"ruleset_not_active"`` + (configured by a ruleset that is not active) or absent when no ruleset addresses + the attribute. ``value`` is only meaningful for ``approval_count`` (the enforced + review count); for boolean attributes it is ``None`` and the caller derives the + value from ``source`` and the attribute polarity. + """ + result: dict[str, tuple[Optional[int], str]] = {} + rulesets = self._get_repository_rulesets(repo) + if not rulesets: + return result + + active: set[str] = set() + inactive: set[str] = set() + active_approval_count: Optional[int] = None + inactive_approval_count: Optional[int] = None + any_active_ruleset = False + any_inactive_ruleset = False + # A ruleset with no bypass actors applies to everyone, including administrators + # (the rulesets equivalent of "enforce admins"). A ruleset that has bypass actors + # would not apply to admins even if activated, so it must not drive the + # enforce-admins finding in either the active or the inactive case. + admins_enforced_active = False + admins_configured_inactive = False for ruleset in rulesets: if ruleset.get("target") != "branch": @@ -219,26 +244,119 @@ class Repository(GithubService): if not self._ruleset_targets_default_branch(ruleset, default_branch): continue + enforcement = ruleset.get("enforcement") + is_active = enforcement in {"active", "enabled"} + is_inactive = enforcement in {"disabled", "evaluate"} + if not (is_active or is_inactive): + continue + + has_no_bypass_actors = not (ruleset.get("bypass_actors") or []) + if is_active: + any_active_ruleset = True + if has_no_bypass_actors: + admins_enforced_active = True + else: + any_inactive_ruleset = True + if has_no_bypass_actors: + admins_configured_inactive = True + + bucket = active if is_active else inactive + for rule in ruleset.get("rules") or []: - if rule.get("type") != "pull_request": - continue + rule_type = rule.get("type") + params = rule.get("parameters") or {} - dismiss_stale_reviews = (rule.get("parameters") or {}).get( - "dismiss_stale_reviews_on_push" - ) - if dismiss_stale_reviews is not True: - continue + if rule_type == "required_linear_history": + bucket.add("required_linear_history") + elif rule_type == "required_signatures": + bucket.add("require_signed_commits") + elif rule_type == "required_status_checks": + # Only enforced when at least one status check is configured; + # an empty list (or just strict policy) requires nothing. + if params.get("required_status_checks"): + bucket.add("status_checks") + elif rule_type == "non_fast_forward": + # Presence of the rule disallows force pushes. + bucket.add("allow_force_pushes") + elif rule_type == "deletion": + # Presence of the rule disallows branch deletion. + bucket.add("branch_deletion") + elif rule_type == "pull_request": + bucket.add("require_pull_request") + if params.get("require_code_owner_review") is True: + bucket.add("require_code_owner_reviews") + if params.get("required_review_thread_resolution") is True: + bucket.add("conversation_resolution") + if params.get("dismiss_stale_reviews_on_push") is True: + bucket.add("dismiss_stale_reviews") + count = params.get("required_approving_review_count") + if isinstance(count, int): + if is_active: + active_approval_count = max( + active_approval_count or 0, count + ) + else: + inactive_approval_count = max( + inactive_approval_count or 0, count + ) - enforcement = ruleset.get("enforcement") - if enforcement in {"active", "enabled"}: - return True, "ruleset" - if enforcement in {"disabled", "evaluate"}: - has_inactive_ruleset = True + for concept in ( + "required_linear_history", + "require_signed_commits", + "status_checks", + "allow_force_pushes", + "branch_deletion", + "require_pull_request", + "require_code_owner_reviews", + "conversation_resolution", + "dismiss_stale_reviews", + ): + if concept in active: + result[concept] = (None, "ruleset") + elif concept in inactive: + result[concept] = (None, "ruleset_not_active") - if has_inactive_ruleset: - return False, "ruleset_not_active" + if active_approval_count is not None: + result["approval_count"] = (active_approval_count, "ruleset") + elif inactive_approval_count is not None: + result["approval_count"] = (inactive_approval_count, "ruleset_not_active") - return None, None + if any_active_ruleset: + result["protected"] = (None, "ruleset") + elif any_inactive_ruleset: + result["protected"] = (None, "ruleset_not_active") + + if admins_enforced_active: + result["enforce_admins"] = (None, "ruleset") + elif admins_configured_inactive: + result["enforce_admins"] = (None, "ruleset_not_active") + + return result + + @staticmethod + def _merge_ruleset_bool( + classic_value: Optional[bool], ruleset_source: Optional[str], good: bool = True + ) -> tuple[Optional[bool], Optional[str]]: + """Merge a boolean branch-protection attribute with its ruleset evaluation. + + Args: + classic_value: The value resolved from classic branch protection. + ruleset_source: ``"ruleset"``, ``"ruleset_not_active"`` or ``None``. + good: The compliant value for the attribute (``True`` for positive attributes, + ``False`` for inverted ones such as ``allow_force_pushes``). + + Returns: + A ``(value, source)`` tuple. Classic protection wins when it already satisfies + the control; otherwise an active ruleset enforces the compliant value, and an + inactive ruleset surfaces the non-compliant value with a ``"ruleset_not_active"`` + source so checks can explain the gap. + """ + classic_pass = classic_value == good + if ruleset_source == "ruleset": + return good, "ruleset" + if ruleset_source == "ruleset_not_active" and not classic_pass: + return (not good), "ruleset_not_active" + return classic_value, ("classic" if classic_pass else None) def _list_repositories(self): """ @@ -398,6 +516,17 @@ class Repository(GithubService): conversation_resolution = False dismiss_stale_reviews = False dismiss_stale_reviews_source = None + protected_source = None + require_pull_request_source = None + approval_count_source = None + required_linear_history_source = None + allow_force_pushes_source = None + branch_deletion_source = None + require_code_owner_reviews_source = None + require_signed_commits_source = None + status_checks_source = None + enforce_admins_source = None + conversation_resolution_source = None try: branch = repo.get_branch(default_branch) if branch.protected: @@ -458,20 +587,98 @@ class Repository(GithubService): f"{repo.full_name}: {error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" ) - if dismiss_stale_reviews is not None: + # Branch protection enforced through rulesets is equivalent to classic branch + # protection, so merge any ruleset coverage before reporting findings to avoid + # false positives for repositories that have migrated to rulesets. + if branch_protection is not None: + ruleset_eval = self._evaluate_default_branch_rulesets( + repo, default_branch + ) + + branch_protection, protected_source = self._merge_ruleset_bool( + branch_protection, ruleset_eval.get("protected", (None, None))[1] + ) + require_pr, require_pull_request_source = self._merge_ruleset_bool( + require_pr, + ruleset_eval.get("require_pull_request", (None, None))[1], + ) ( - ruleset_dismiss_stale_reviews, - ruleset_source, - ) = self._get_dismiss_stale_reviews_from_rulesets(repo, default_branch) - if ruleset_dismiss_stale_reviews: + required_linear_history, + required_linear_history_source, + ) = self._merge_ruleset_bool( + required_linear_history, + ruleset_eval.get("required_linear_history", (None, None))[1], + ) + ( + require_signed_commits, + require_signed_commits_source, + ) = self._merge_ruleset_bool( + require_signed_commits, + ruleset_eval.get("require_signed_commits", (None, None))[1], + ) + status_checks, status_checks_source = self._merge_ruleset_bool( + status_checks, ruleset_eval.get("status_checks", (None, None))[1] + ) + ( + require_code_owner_reviews, + require_code_owner_reviews_source, + ) = self._merge_ruleset_bool( + require_code_owner_reviews, + ruleset_eval.get("require_code_owner_reviews", (None, None))[1], + ) + ( + conversation_resolution, + conversation_resolution_source, + ) = self._merge_ruleset_bool( + conversation_resolution, + ruleset_eval.get("conversation_resolution", (None, None))[1], + ) + enforce_admins, enforce_admins_source = self._merge_ruleset_bool( + enforce_admins, + ruleset_eval.get("enforce_admins", (None, None))[1], + ) + allow_force_pushes, allow_force_pushes_source = ( + self._merge_ruleset_bool( + allow_force_pushes, + ruleset_eval.get("allow_force_pushes", (None, None))[1], + good=False, + ) + ) + branch_deletion, branch_deletion_source = self._merge_ruleset_bool( + branch_deletion, + ruleset_eval.get("branch_deletion", (None, None))[1], + good=False, + ) + + # Dismiss stale reviews keeps its dedicated handling so the classic source + # set above (when enabled) is preserved. + _, dismiss_source = ruleset_eval.get( + "dismiss_stale_reviews", (None, None) + ) + if dismiss_source == "ruleset": dismiss_stale_reviews = True dismiss_stale_reviews_source = "ruleset" elif ( - ruleset_source == "ruleset_not_active" and not dismiss_stale_reviews + dismiss_source == "ruleset_not_active" and not dismiss_stale_reviews ): dismiss_stale_reviews = False dismiss_stale_reviews_source = "ruleset_not_active" + # Approval count takes the strongest requirement between classic and rulesets. + approval_value, approval_source = ruleset_eval.get( + "approval_count", (None, None) + ) + if approval_source == "ruleset" and approval_value is not None: + if approval_value > approval_cnt: + approval_cnt = approval_value + approval_count_source = "ruleset" + elif ( + approval_source == "ruleset_not_active" + and (approval_value or 0) >= 2 + and approval_cnt < 2 + ): + approval_count_source = "ruleset_not_active" + secret_scanning_enabled = False dependabot_alerts_enabled = False try: @@ -517,17 +724,28 @@ class Repository(GithubService): default_branch=Branch( name=default_branch, protected=branch_protection, + protected_source=protected_source, default_branch=True, require_pull_request=require_pr, + require_pull_request_source=require_pull_request_source, approval_count=approval_cnt, + approval_count_source=approval_count_source, required_linear_history=required_linear_history, + required_linear_history_source=required_linear_history_source, allow_force_pushes=allow_force_pushes, + allow_force_pushes_source=allow_force_pushes_source, branch_deletion=branch_deletion, + branch_deletion_source=branch_deletion_source, status_checks=status_checks, + status_checks_source=status_checks_source, enforce_admins=enforce_admins, + enforce_admins_source=enforce_admins_source, conversation_resolution=conversation_resolution, + conversation_resolution_source=conversation_resolution_source, require_code_owner_reviews=require_code_owner_reviews, + require_code_owner_reviews_source=require_code_owner_reviews_source, require_signed_commits=require_signed_commits, + require_signed_commits_source=require_signed_commits_source, dismiss_stale_reviews=dismiss_stale_reviews, dismiss_stale_reviews_source=dismiss_stale_reviews_source, ), @@ -599,17 +817,28 @@ class Branch(BaseModel): name: str protected: Optional[bool] + protected_source: Optional[str] = None default_branch: bool require_pull_request: Optional[bool] + require_pull_request_source: Optional[str] = None approval_count: Optional[int] + approval_count_source: Optional[str] = None required_linear_history: Optional[bool] + required_linear_history_source: Optional[str] = None allow_force_pushes: Optional[bool] + allow_force_pushes_source: Optional[str] = None branch_deletion: Optional[bool] + branch_deletion_source: Optional[str] = None status_checks: Optional[bool] + status_checks_source: Optional[str] = None enforce_admins: Optional[bool] + enforce_admins_source: Optional[str] = None require_code_owner_reviews: Optional[bool] + require_code_owner_reviews_source: Optional[str] = None require_signed_commits: Optional[bool] + require_signed_commits_source: Optional[str] = None conversation_resolution: Optional[bool] + conversation_resolution_source: Optional[str] = None dismiss_stale_reviews: Optional[bool] dismiss_stale_reviews_source: Optional[str] = None diff --git a/prowler/providers/googleworkspace/googleworkspace_provider.py b/prowler/providers/googleworkspace/googleworkspace_provider.py index 4c431aa736..2a40a59ddf 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/googleworkspace/googleworkspace_provider.py +++ b/prowler/providers/googleworkspace/googleworkspace_provider.py @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ class GoogleworkspaceProvider(Provider): """ _type: str = "googleworkspace" + sdk_only: bool = False _session: GoogleWorkspaceSession _identity: GoogleWorkspaceIdentityInfo _domain_resource: GoogleWorkspaceResource diff --git a/prowler/providers/iac/iac_provider.py b/prowler/providers/iac/iac_provider.py index b91fdf070e..df9114e033 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/iac/iac_provider.py +++ b/prowler/providers/iac/iac_provider.py @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ from prowler.providers.common.provider import Provider class IacProvider(Provider): _type: str = "iac" + sdk_only: bool = False audit_metadata: Audit_Metadata def __init__( diff --git a/prowler/providers/image/image_provider.py b/prowler/providers/image/image_provider.py index b142240867..7a245e4125 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/image/image_provider.py +++ b/prowler/providers/image/image_provider.py @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ class ImageProvider(Provider): """ _type: str = "image" + sdk_only: bool = False FINDING_BATCH_SIZE: int = 100 MAX_IMAGE_LIST_LINES: int = 10_000 MAX_IMAGE_NAME_LENGTH: int = 500 diff --git a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/kubernetes_provider.py b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/kubernetes_provider.py index 2572b5be88..b350a18ebc 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/kubernetes_provider.py +++ b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/kubernetes_provider.py @@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ class KubernetesProvider(Provider): """ _type: str = "kubernetes" + sdk_only: bool = False _session: KubernetesSession _namespaces: list _audit_config: dict diff --git a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_cpu_limits_set/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_cpu_limits_set/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_cpu_limits_set/core_cpu_limits_set.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_cpu_limits_set/core_cpu_limits_set.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5831cb2abd --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_cpu_limits_set/core_cpu_limits_set.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +{ + "Provider": "kubernetes", + "CheckID": "core_cpu_limits_set", + "CheckTitle": "Pod containers have CPU limits set", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "core", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "KubernetesPod", + "Description": "Ensure CPU limits are set for containers to prevent noisy neighbors and resource exhaustion.", + "Risk": "Missing CPU limits can allow containers to consume unbounded CPU leading to performance issues.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/configuration/manage-resources-containers/" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "kubectl set resources deployment/ -n --containers= --limits=cpu=500m", + "NativeIaC": "# Example: set cpu limits in container resources\nresources:\n limits:\n cpu: \"500m\"", + "Other": "1. Edit the Pod/Deployment manifest and set `resources.limits.cpu` for each container.", + "Terraform": "" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Define CPU limits to bound a container's CPU usage and protect node stability.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/core_cpu_limits_set" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "resilience" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "Limits should be tuned per workload and monitored." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_cpu_limits_set/core_cpu_limits_set.py b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_cpu_limits_set/core_cpu_limits_set.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8f22fa6b28 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_cpu_limits_set/core_cpu_limits_set.py @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Kubernetes +from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_client import core_client + + +class core_cpu_limits_set(Check): + """Check whether regular pod containers have CPU limits configured.""" + + def execute(self) -> list[Check_Report_Kubernetes]: + """Execute the Kubernetes pod CPU limits check. + + Returns: + List of check reports for Kubernetes pods. + """ + findings = [] + for pod in core_client.pods.values(): + report = Check_Report_Kubernetes(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=pod) + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Pod {pod.name} regular containers have CPU limits configured." + ) + + for container in (pod.containers or {}).values(): + resources = container.resources or {} + limits = ( + resources.get("limits") if isinstance(resources, dict) else None + ) + cpu = limits.get("cpu") if limits and isinstance(limits, dict) else None + if not cpu: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"Pod {pod.name} container {container.name} does not have a CPU limit configured." + break + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_cpu_requests_set/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_cpu_requests_set/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_cpu_requests_set/core_cpu_requests_set.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_cpu_requests_set/core_cpu_requests_set.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9f3972e271 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_cpu_requests_set/core_cpu_requests_set.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +{ + "Provider": "kubernetes", + "CheckID": "core_cpu_requests_set", + "CheckTitle": "Pod containers have CPU requests set", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "core", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "KubernetesPod", + "Description": "Ensure CPU requests are set for containers to enable proper scheduling and resource guarantees.", + "Risk": "Missing CPU requests can lead to scheduling and resource contention issues.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/configuration/manage-resources-containers/" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "kubectl set resources deployment/ -n --containers= --requests=cpu=100m", + "NativeIaC": "# Example: set cpu requests in container resources\nresources:\n requests:\n cpu: \"100m\"", + "Other": "1. Edit the Pod/Deployment manifest and set `resources.requests.cpu` for each container.", + "Terraform": "" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Define sensible CPU requests to enable efficient scheduling and fair resource allocation.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/core_cpu_requests_set" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "resilience" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "Requests should be tuned per workload and cluster capacity." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_cpu_requests_set/core_cpu_requests_set.py b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_cpu_requests_set/core_cpu_requests_set.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6e7f9f8020 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_cpu_requests_set/core_cpu_requests_set.py @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Kubernetes +from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_client import core_client + + +class core_cpu_requests_set(Check): + """Check whether regular pod containers have CPU requests configured.""" + + def execute(self) -> list[Check_Report_Kubernetes]: + """Execute the Kubernetes pod CPU requests check. + + Returns: + List of check reports for Kubernetes pods. + """ + findings = [] + for pod in core_client.pods.values(): + report = Check_Report_Kubernetes(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=pod) + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Pod {pod.name} regular containers have CPU requests configured." + ) + + for container in (pod.containers or {}).values(): + resources = container.resources or {} + requests = ( + resources.get("requests") if isinstance(resources, dict) else None + ) + cpu = ( + requests.get("cpu") + if requests and isinstance(requests, dict) + else None + ) + if not cpu: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"Pod {pod.name} container {container.name} does not have a CPU request configured." + break + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_image_tag_fixed/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_image_tag_fixed/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_image_tag_fixed/core_image_tag_fixed.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_image_tag_fixed/core_image_tag_fixed.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3a395caad1 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_image_tag_fixed/core_image_tag_fixed.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +{ + "Provider": "kubernetes", + "CheckID": "core_image_tag_fixed", + "CheckTitle": "Container images use fixed tags", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "core", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "Pod", + "ResourceGroup": "container", + "Description": "**Kubernetes Pods** are evaluated for containers using images without a **fixed version tag**, such as `latest` or no tag at all, which results in unpredictable image versions being pulled.", + "Risk": "Using **`latest` or untagged images** breaks reproducibility and introduces risk:\n- Deployments may pull different image versions across nodes (integrity)\n- Rollbacks become unreliable when the exact image is unknown\n- Supply-chain attacks can inject malicious code via mutable tags\nCompromised or unexpected images can lead to **data breaches**, **lateral movement**, and **service disruption**.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/containers/images/", + "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/configuration/overview/#container-images" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "kubectl set image deployment/ =: -n \n# Example: kubectl set image deployment/nginx nginx=nginx:1.25.3 -n default\n# For maximum immutability, use an image digest instead: @sha256:", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. Open your Kubernetes UI (e.g., cloud provider console or Dashboard)\n2. Navigate to the failing workload (Deployment/StatefulSet/DaemonSet) or Pod and choose Edit YAML/Manifest\n3. Update the image field for each affected container to include a specific version tag or digest:\n - Example: change `nginx` or `nginx:latest` to `nginx:1.25.3` or `nginx@sha256:`\n4. Save changes (controllers will roll out new Pods). If it is a standalone Pod, delete and recreate it to apply the change", + "Terraform": "```hcl\nresource \"kubernetes_pod\" \"\" {\n metadata { name = \"\" }\n spec {\n container {\n name = \"\"\n image = \"nginx:1.25.3\" # Critical: use a fixed version tag, never 'latest' or untagged\n }\n }\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Pin all container images to a **specific version tag** or **digest** (`@sha256:...`) to ensure reproducible, auditable deployments.\n\n- Avoid `latest` and untagged images in production\n- Use **image digests** for maximum immutability\n- Enforce tag policies with **admission controllers** (e.g., OPA Gatekeeper, Kyverno)\n- Integrate image scanning into CI/CD pipelines for **defense in depth**", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/core_image_tag_fixed" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "container-security" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "Using fixed image tags ensures reproducible deployments and reduces supply-chain attack surface." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_image_tag_fixed/core_image_tag_fixed.py b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_image_tag_fixed/core_image_tag_fixed.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5167d09f2c --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_image_tag_fixed/core_image_tag_fixed.py @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Kubernetes +from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_client import core_client + + +def _has_fixed_image_tag(image: str) -> bool: + if "@" in image: + return True + + image_name = image.rsplit("/", 1)[-1] + if ":" not in image_name: + return False + + tag = image_name.rsplit(":", 1)[-1] + return bool(tag) and tag.lower() != "latest" + + +class core_image_tag_fixed(Check): + """Ensure that image tag is not set to latest or blank.""" + + def execute(self) -> list[Check_Report_Kubernetes]: + """Execute the check logic. + + Returns: + A list of reports containing the result of the check. + """ + findings = [] + for pod in core_client.pods.values(): + report = Check_Report_Kubernetes(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=pod) + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Pod {pod.name} has fixed image tags on all containers." + ) + + for containers in ( + pod.containers, + pod.init_containers, + pod.ephemeral_containers, + ): + for container in (containers or {}).values(): + image = container.image + if not _has_fixed_image_tag(image): + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"Pod {pod.name} has container {container.name} with image '{image}' that does not use a fixed tag." + break + if report.status == "FAIL": + break + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_liveness_probe_configured/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_liveness_probe_configured/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_liveness_probe_configured/core_liveness_probe_configured.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_liveness_probe_configured/core_liveness_probe_configured.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..668551bca4 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_liveness_probe_configured/core_liveness_probe_configured.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +{ + "Provider": "kubernetes", + "CheckID": "core_liveness_probe_configured", + "CheckTitle": "Pod containers have liveness probes configured", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "core", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "KubernetesPod", + "Description": "Ensure each regular pod container has a liveness probe configured to detect and restart unhealthy containers.", + "Risk": "Without liveness probes, failed containers may remain running causing degraded service or resource waste.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/configure-liveness-readiness-startup-probes/", + "https://sre.google/workbook/" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "kubectl patch deployment/ -n --type='json' -p='[{\"op\":\"add\",\"path\":\"/spec/template/spec/containers/0/livenessProbe\",\"value\":{\"httpGet\":{\"path\":\"/healthz\",\"port\":8080},\"initialDelaySeconds\":10,\"periodSeconds\":10}}]'", + "NativeIaC": "# Example: add a livenessProbe to your container spec\nlivenessProbe:\n httpGet:\n path: /healthz\n port: 8080\n initialDelaySeconds: 10\n periodSeconds: 10", + "Other": "1. Edit the Pod/Deployment manifest and add a `livenessProbe` to each container.\n2. Tune `initialDelaySeconds`, `periodSeconds` and failure thresholds to your app.", + "Terraform": "" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Add and tune liveness probes for containers to allow Kubernetes to detect and restart unhealthy containers.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/core_liveness_probe_configured" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "resilience" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "Presence of a probe is checked; adjust thresholds for app behavior to avoid false positives." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_liveness_probe_configured/core_liveness_probe_configured.py b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_liveness_probe_configured/core_liveness_probe_configured.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0bfbc618d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_liveness_probe_configured/core_liveness_probe_configured.py @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Kubernetes +from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_client import core_client + + +class core_liveness_probe_configured(Check): + """Check whether regular pod containers have liveness probes configured.""" + + def execute(self) -> list[Check_Report_Kubernetes]: + """Execute the Kubernetes pod liveness probe check. + + Returns: + List of check reports for Kubernetes pods. + """ + findings = [] + for pod in core_client.pods.values(): + report = Check_Report_Kubernetes(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=pod) + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"Pod {pod.name} has liveness probes configured for all regular containers." + + for container in (pod.containers or {}).values(): + if not container.liveness_probe: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"Pod {pod.name} container {container.name} does not have a liveness probe configured." + break + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_memory_limits_set/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_memory_limits_set/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_memory_limits_set/core_memory_limits_set.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_memory_limits_set/core_memory_limits_set.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8b9a121bf2 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_memory_limits_set/core_memory_limits_set.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +{ + "Provider": "kubernetes", + "CheckID": "core_memory_limits_set", + "CheckTitle": "Container memory limits are configured", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "core", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "Pod", + "ResourceGroup": "container", + "Description": "**Kubernetes Pods** are evaluated for containers without **memory limits** configured in `resources.limits.memory`, indicating unbounded memory consumption is permitted.", + "Risk": "Without **memory limits**, a single container can consume all available node memory, causing:\n- **OOM kills** of other workloads (availability)\n- Node instability and cascading failures\n- Noisy-neighbor problems in multi-tenant clusters\nAttackers exploiting a vulnerability can amplify impact by exhausting node resources, enabling **denial of service** across co-located workloads.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/configuration/manage-resources-containers/", + "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/manage-resources/memory-default-namespace/" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "kubectl set resources deployment/ -c --limits=memory= -n \n# Example: kubectl set resources deployment/nginx -c nginx --limits=memory=128Mi -n default", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. Open your Kubernetes UI (e.g., cloud provider console or Dashboard)\n2. Navigate to the failing workload (Deployment/StatefulSet/DaemonSet) or Pod and choose Edit YAML/Manifest\n3. Set resources.limits.memory for each affected container:\n - For controllers: spec.template.spec.containers[].resources.limits.memory\n - For standalone Pods: spec.containers[].resources.limits.memory\n4. Save changes (controllers will roll out new Pods). If it is a standalone Pod, delete and recreate it to apply the change", + "Terraform": "```hcl\nresource \"kubernetes_pod\" \"\" {\n metadata { name = \"\" }\n spec {\n container {\n name = \"\"\n image = \"\"\n resources {\n limits = {\n memory = \"128Mi\" # Critical: sets a memory ceiling to prevent unbounded consumption\n }\n }\n }\n }\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Set **memory limits** on every container to prevent unbounded consumption and protect node stability.\n\n- Start with observed usage plus headroom; tune with **VPA** recommendations\n- Combine with **LimitRanges** and **ResourceQuotas** at the namespace level for **defense in depth**\n- Monitor memory usage and OOMKill events to right-size limits over time", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/core_memory_limits_set" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "container-security" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "Memory limits prevent containers from consuming unbounded memory and protect node stability." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_memory_limits_set/core_memory_limits_set.py b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_memory_limits_set/core_memory_limits_set.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2fd623c8d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_memory_limits_set/core_memory_limits_set.py @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Kubernetes +from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_client import core_client + + +class core_memory_limits_set(Check): + """Ensure that memory limits are set on all containers.""" + + def execute(self) -> list[Check_Report_Kubernetes]: + """Execute the check logic. + + Returns: + A list of reports containing the result of the check. + """ + findings = [] + for pod in core_client.pods.values(): + report = Check_Report_Kubernetes(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=pod) + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Pod {pod.name} has memory limits set on all containers." + ) + + for container in (pod.containers or {}).values(): + resources = container.resources or {} + limits = ( + resources.get("limits") if isinstance(resources, dict) else None + ) + memory = ( + limits.get("memory") + if limits and isinstance(limits, dict) + else None + ) + if not memory: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"Pod {pod.name} does not have memory limits set on container {container.name}." + break + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_memory_requests_set/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_memory_requests_set/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_memory_requests_set/core_memory_requests_set.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_memory_requests_set/core_memory_requests_set.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1871884621 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_memory_requests_set/core_memory_requests_set.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +{ + "Provider": "kubernetes", + "CheckID": "core_memory_requests_set", + "CheckTitle": "Container memory requests are configured", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "core", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "Pod", + "ResourceGroup": "container", + "Description": "**Kubernetes Pods** are evaluated for containers without **memory requests** configured in `resources.requests.memory`, indicating the scheduler cannot guarantee memory allocation.", + "Risk": "Without **memory requests**, the scheduler cannot make informed placement decisions, leading to:\n- Overcommitted nodes that trigger **OOM kills** (availability)\n- Unpredictable performance under load\n- Inability to enforce **ResourceQuotas** effectively\nMissing requests weaken cluster stability and make capacity planning unreliable, increasing blast radius during incidents.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/configuration/manage-resources-containers/", + "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/manage-resources/memory-default-namespace/" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "kubectl set resources deployment/ -c --requests=memory= -n \n# Example: kubectl set resources deployment/nginx -c nginx --requests=memory=64Mi -n default", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. Open your Kubernetes UI (e.g., cloud provider console or Dashboard)\n2. Navigate to the failing workload (Deployment/StatefulSet/DaemonSet) or Pod and choose Edit YAML/Manifest\n3. Set resources.requests.memory for each affected container:\n - For controllers: spec.template.spec.containers[].resources.requests.memory\n - For standalone Pods: spec.containers[].resources.requests.memory\n4. Save changes (controllers will roll out new Pods). If it is a standalone Pod, delete and recreate it to apply the change", + "Terraform": "```hcl\nresource \"kubernetes_pod\" \"\" {\n metadata { name = \"\" }\n spec {\n container {\n name = \"\"\n image = \"\"\n resources {\n requests = {\n memory = \"64Mi\" # Critical: guarantees memory for the scheduler to make informed placement\n }\n }\n }\n }\n}\n```" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Set **memory requests** on every container so the scheduler can guarantee memory allocation and place pods effectively.\n\n- Base requests on observed steady-state usage; use **VPA** for data-driven sizing\n- Enforce minimum requests via **LimitRanges** at the namespace level\n- Combine with **ResourceQuotas** for **defense in depth** against overcommitment", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/core_memory_requests_set" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "container-security" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "Memory requests enable the scheduler to guarantee memory allocation and prevent overcommitment." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_memory_requests_set/core_memory_requests_set.py b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_memory_requests_set/core_memory_requests_set.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a560365e32 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_memory_requests_set/core_memory_requests_set.py @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Kubernetes +from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_client import core_client + + +class core_memory_requests_set(Check): + """Ensure that memory requests are set on all containers.""" + + def execute(self) -> list[Check_Report_Kubernetes]: + """Execute the check logic. + + Returns: + A list of reports containing the result of the check. + """ + findings = [] + for pod in core_client.pods.values(): + report = Check_Report_Kubernetes(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=pod) + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Pod {pod.name} has memory requests set on all containers." + ) + + for container in (pod.containers or {}).values(): + resources = container.resources or {} + requests = ( + resources.get("requests") if isinstance(resources, dict) else None + ) + memory = ( + requests.get("memory") + if requests and isinstance(requests, dict) + else None + ) + if not memory: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"Pod {pod.name} does not have memory requests set on container {container.name}." + break + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_readiness_probe_configured/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_readiness_probe_configured/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_readiness_probe_configured/core_readiness_probe_configured.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_readiness_probe_configured/core_readiness_probe_configured.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5c61381064 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_readiness_probe_configured/core_readiness_probe_configured.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +{ + "Provider": "kubernetes", + "CheckID": "core_readiness_probe_configured", + "CheckTitle": "Regular pod containers have readiness probes configured", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "core", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "KubernetesPod", + "Description": "Ensure each regular pod container has a readiness probe configured to signal when it is ready to serve traffic.", + "Risk": "Without readiness probes, services may receive traffic before containers are ready, causing errors.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/configure-liveness-readiness-startup-probes/" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "kubectl patch deployment/ -n --type='json' -p='[{\"op\":\"add\",\"path\":\"/spec/template/spec/containers/0/readinessProbe\",\"value\":{\"httpGet\":{\"path\":\"/ready\",\"port\":8080},\"initialDelaySeconds\":5,\"periodSeconds\":5}}]'", + "NativeIaC": "# Example readiness probe\nreadinessProbe:\n httpGet:\n path: /ready\n port: 8080\n initialDelaySeconds: 5\n periodSeconds: 5", + "Other": "1. Add a `readinessProbe` to the container spec in Deployments/Pods.\n2. Ensure the probe accurately reflects service readiness.", + "Terraform": "" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Add readiness probes to prevent routing traffic to unready containers.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/core_readiness_probe_configured" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "resilience" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "Readiness and liveness probes serve different purposes; implement both where appropriate." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_readiness_probe_configured/core_readiness_probe_configured.py b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_readiness_probe_configured/core_readiness_probe_configured.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..847f9b4b97 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_readiness_probe_configured/core_readiness_probe_configured.py @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, Check_Report_Kubernetes +from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_client import core_client + + +class core_readiness_probe_configured(Check): + """Check whether regular pod containers have readiness probes configured.""" + + def execute(self) -> list[Check_Report_Kubernetes]: + """Execute the Kubernetes pod readiness probe check. + + Returns: + List of check reports for Kubernetes pods. + """ + findings = [] + for pod in core_client.pods.values(): + report = Check_Report_Kubernetes(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=pod) + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"Pod {pod.name} has readiness probes configured for all regular containers." + + for container in (pod.containers or {}).values(): + if not container.readiness_probe: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"Pod {pod.name} container {container.name} does not have a readiness probe configured." + break + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_service.py b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_service.py index e685140a87..b53a81779c 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_service.py +++ b/prowler/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_service.py @@ -27,45 +27,11 @@ class Core(KubernetesService): for namespace in self.namespaces: pods = self.client.list_namespaced_pod(namespace) for pod in pods.items: - pod_containers = {} - containers = pod.spec.containers if pod.spec.containers else [] - init_containers = ( - pod.spec.init_containers if pod.spec.init_containers else [] - ) - ephemeral_containers = ( + containers = self._build_containers(pod.spec.containers) + init_containers = self._build_containers(pod.spec.init_containers) + ephemeral_containers = self._build_containers( pod.spec.ephemeral_containers - if pod.spec.ephemeral_containers - else [] ) - for container in ( - containers + init_containers + ephemeral_containers - ): - pod_containers[container.name] = Container( - name=container.name, - image=container.image, - command=container.command if container.command else None, - ports=( - [ - {"containerPort": port.container_port} - for port in container.ports - ] - if container.ports - else None - ), - env=( - [ - {"name": env.name, "value": env.value} - for env in container.env - ] - if container.env - else None - ), - security_context=( - container.security_context.to_dict() - if container.security_context - else {} - ), - ) self.pods[pod.metadata.uid] = Pod( name=pod.metadata.name, uid=pod.metadata.uid, @@ -85,13 +51,56 @@ class Core(KubernetesService): if pod.spec.security_context else {} ), - containers=pod_containers, + containers=containers, + init_containers=init_containers, + ephemeral_containers=ephemeral_containers, ) except Exception as error: logger.error( f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" ) + @staticmethod + def _build_containers(containers) -> dict: + pod_containers = {} + for container in containers or []: + pod_containers[container.name] = Container( + name=container.name, + image=container.image, + command=container.command if container.command else None, + ports=( + [{"containerPort": port.container_port} for port in container.ports] + if container.ports + else None + ), + env=( + [{"name": env.name, "value": env.value} for env in container.env] + if container.env + else None + ), + security_context=( + container.security_context.to_dict() + if container.security_context + else {} + ), + resources=( + container.resources.to_dict() + if getattr(container, "resources", None) + else None + ), + liveness_probe=( + container.liveness_probe.to_dict() + if getattr(container, "liveness_probe", None) + else None + ), + readiness_probe=( + container.readiness_probe.to_dict() + if getattr(container, "readiness_probe", None) + else None + ), + ) + return pod_containers + def _list_config_maps(self): try: response = self.client.list_config_map_for_all_namespaces() @@ -156,6 +165,9 @@ class Container(BaseModel): ports: Optional[List[dict]] env: Optional[List[dict]] security_context: dict + resources: Optional[dict] = None + liveness_probe: Optional[dict] = None + readiness_probe: Optional[dict] = None class Pod(BaseModel): @@ -174,6 +186,8 @@ class Pod(BaseModel): host_network: Optional[bool] security_context: Optional[dict] containers: Optional[dict] + init_containers: Optional[dict] = None + ephemeral_containers: Optional[dict] = None class ConfigMap(BaseModel): diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/linode/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/exceptions/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/linode/exceptions/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/exceptions/exceptions.py b/prowler/providers/linode/exceptions/exceptions.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6c39f477db --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/exceptions/exceptions.py @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +from prowler.exceptions.exceptions import ProwlerException + + +# Exceptions codes from 18000 to 18099 are reserved for Linode exceptions +class LinodeBaseException(ProwlerException): + """Base class for Linode errors.""" + + LINODE_ERROR_CODES = { + (18000, "LinodeCredentialsError"): { + "message": "Linode credentials not found or invalid", + "remediation": "Provide a valid Personal Access Token for Linode via the LINODE_TOKEN environment variable.", + }, + (18001, "LinodeAuthenticationError"): { + "message": "Linode authentication failed", + "remediation": "Verify the Linode Personal Access Token and ensure it has the required scopes (linodes:read_only, firewalls:read_only, account:read_only).", + }, + (18002, "LinodeSessionError"): { + "message": "Linode session setup failed", + "remediation": "Review the Linode SDK initialization parameters and credentials.", + }, + (18003, "LinodeIdentityError"): { + "message": "Unable to retrieve Linode identity or account information", + "remediation": "Ensure the Personal Access Token allows access to the Linode account and profile APIs.", + }, + (18004, "LinodeMissingPermissionError"): { + "message": "Linode token is missing a required permission scope", + "remediation": "Grant the Personal Access Token the read-only scope required for the affected service (account:read_only, linodes:read_only, firewall:read_only).", + }, + (18005, "LinodeInvalidRegionError"): { + "message": "One or more requested Linode regions are invalid", + "remediation": "Pass a valid Linode region id to --region. See https://www.linode.com/global-infrastructure/ or the API /v4/regions endpoint for the current list.", + }, + } + + def __init__(self, code, file=None, original_exception=None, message=None): + provider = "Linode" + error_info = self.LINODE_ERROR_CODES.get((code, self.__class__.__name__)) + if error_info is None: + error_info = { + "message": message or "Unknown Linode error", + "remediation": "Check the Linode API documentation for more details.", + } + elif message: + error_info = error_info.copy() + error_info["message"] = message + super().__init__( + code=code, + source=provider, + file=file, + original_exception=original_exception, + error_info=error_info, + ) + + +class LinodeCredentialsError(LinodeBaseException): + """Exception for Linode credential errors.""" + + def __init__(self, file=None, original_exception=None, message=None): + super().__init__( + 18000, file=file, original_exception=original_exception, message=message + ) + + +class LinodeAuthenticationError(LinodeBaseException): + """Exception for Linode authentication errors.""" + + def __init__(self, file=None, original_exception=None, message=None): + super().__init__( + 18001, file=file, original_exception=original_exception, message=message + ) + + +class LinodeSessionError(LinodeBaseException): + """Exception for Linode session setup errors.""" + + def __init__(self, file=None, original_exception=None, message=None): + super().__init__( + 18002, file=file, original_exception=original_exception, message=message + ) + + +class LinodeIdentityError(LinodeBaseException): + """Exception for Linode identity errors.""" + + def __init__(self, file=None, original_exception=None, message=None): + super().__init__( + 18003, file=file, original_exception=original_exception, message=message + ) + + +class LinodeMissingPermissionError(LinodeBaseException): + """Exception for Linode missing permission scope errors.""" + + def __init__(self, file=None, original_exception=None, message=None): + super().__init__( + 18004, file=file, original_exception=original_exception, message=message + ) + + +class LinodeInvalidRegionError(LinodeBaseException): + """Exception for invalid Linode region filters.""" + + def __init__(self, file=None, original_exception=None, message=None): + super().__init__( + 18005, file=file, original_exception=original_exception, message=message + ) diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/lib/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/linode/lib/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/lib/arguments/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/linode/lib/arguments/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/lib/arguments/arguments.py b/prowler/providers/linode/lib/arguments/arguments.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b8af36dba9 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/lib/arguments/arguments.py @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +def init_parser(self): + """Init the Linode provider CLI parser.""" + linode_parser = self.subparsers.add_parser( + "linode", parents=[self.common_providers_parser], help="Linode Provider" + ) + + # Authentication + # Credentials are read exclusively from the standard Linode environment + # variable (LINODE_TOKEN) to avoid leaking secrets into shell history and + # process listings. There are no credential CLI flags. + + # Regions + regions_subparser = linode_parser.add_argument_group("Regions") + regions_subparser.add_argument( + "--region", + "--filter-region", + "-f", + nargs="+", + default=None, + metavar="REGION", + help="Linode region(s) to scan (e.g. eu-central us-east). Region-less " + "resources (account, networking) are always scanned. If omitted, all " + "regions are scanned.", + ) diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/lib/mutelist/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/linode/lib/mutelist/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/lib/mutelist/mutelist.py b/prowler/providers/linode/lib/mutelist/mutelist.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c7da04a58a --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/lib/mutelist/mutelist.py @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import CheckReportLinode +from prowler.lib.mutelist.mutelist import Mutelist +from prowler.lib.outputs.utils import unroll_dict, unroll_tags + + +class LinodeMutelist(Mutelist): + """Linode-specific mutelist helper.""" + + def is_finding_muted( + self, + finding: CheckReportLinode, + account_id: str, + ) -> bool: + """ + Check if a Linode finding is muted. + + Args: + finding: CheckReportLinode instance containing check metadata, region, resource info, and tags. + account_id: Linode account identifier. + + Returns: + True if the finding is muted, False otherwise. + """ + return self.is_muted( + account_id, + finding.check_metadata.CheckID, + finding.region or "global", + finding.resource_id or finding.resource_name, + unroll_dict(unroll_tags(finding.resource_tags)), + ) diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/lib/service/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/linode/lib/service/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/lib/service/service.py b/prowler/providers/linode/lib/service/service.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d1a9de65db --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/lib/service/service.py @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +import os +from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor, as_completed + +from prowler.lib.logger import logger +from prowler.providers.linode.exceptions.exceptions import LinodeMissingPermissionError +from prowler.providers.linode.linode_provider import LinodeProvider + +MAX_WORKERS = 10 + + +class LinodeService: + """Base class for Linode services to share provider context.""" + + def __init__(self, service: str, provider: LinodeProvider): + """ + Initialize the Linode service with provider context. + + Args: + service: The Linode service name (e.g., administration, compute, networking). + provider: LinodeProvider instance containing session, audit config, and fixer config. + """ + self.provider = provider + self.client = provider.session.client + self.audit_config = provider.audit_config + self.fixer_config = provider.fixer_config + self.service = service.lower() if not service.islower() else service + + self.thread_pool = ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=MAX_WORKERS) + + def _log_fetch_error( + self, resource_label: str, required_scope: str, error: Exception + ) -> None: + """Log a resource-fetch failure, distinguishing an insufficient-scope + (HTTP 401/403) error from a generic API error. + + This never raises: a single service's missing permission must not abort + the rest of the scan. When the token lacks the required scope, the log + names the exact scope to grant via ``LinodeMissingPermissionError``. + + Args: + resource_label: Human-readable resource name (e.g. "firewalls"). + required_scope: The Linode OAuth scope needed (e.g. "firewall:read_only"). + error: The exception raised by the SDK call. + """ + service_name = getattr(self, "service", "linode") + status = getattr(error, "status", None) + if status in (401, 403) or "not authorized to use this endpoint" in str(error): + logger.error( + str( + LinodeMissingPermissionError( + file=os.path.basename(__file__), + message=( + f"{service_name} - unable to list {resource_label}: the Linode " + f"token lacks the '{required_scope}' scope; skipping these checks." + ), + original_exception=error, + ) + ) + ) + else: + logger.error( + f"{service_name} - Error fetching {resource_label}: " + f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + + def __threading_call__(self, call, iterator): + """Execute a function across multiple items using threading.""" + items = list(iterator) if not isinstance(iterator, list) else iterator + + futures = {self.thread_pool.submit(call, item): item for item in items} + results = [] + + for future in as_completed(futures): + try: + result = future.result() + if result is not None: + results.append(result) + except Exception as error: + item = futures[future] + item_id = getattr(item, "id", str(item)) + logger.error( + f"{self.service} - Threading error processing {item_id}: " + f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + + return results diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/linode_provider.py b/prowler/providers/linode/linode_provider.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ab069fab3d --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/linode_provider.py @@ -0,0 +1,343 @@ +import logging +import os + +from colorama import Fore, Style +from linode_api4 import LinodeClient + +from prowler.config.config import ( + default_config_file_path, + get_default_mute_file_path, + load_and_validate_config_file, +) +from prowler.lib.logger import logger +from prowler.lib.utils.utils import print_boxes +from prowler.providers.common.models import Audit_Metadata, Connection +from prowler.providers.common.provider import Provider +from prowler.providers.linode.exceptions.exceptions import ( + LinodeAuthenticationError, + LinodeCredentialsError, + LinodeIdentityError, + LinodeInvalidRegionError, + LinodeSessionError, +) +from prowler.providers.linode.lib.mutelist.mutelist import LinodeMutelist +from prowler.providers.linode.models import ( + LinodeIdentityInfo, + LinodeSession, +) + + +class LinodeProvider(Provider): + """Linode provider.""" + + _type: str = "linode" + _session: LinodeSession + _identity: LinodeIdentityInfo + _audit_config: dict + _fixer_config: dict + _mutelist: LinodeMutelist + _regions: set + audit_metadata: Audit_Metadata + + def __init__( + self, + config_path: str = None, + config_content: dict | None = None, + fixer_config: dict | None = None, + mutelist_path: str = None, + mutelist_content: dict = None, + token: str = None, + regions: list = None, + ): + """ + Initializes the LinodeProvider instance. + + Args: + config_path (str): Path to the configuration file. + config_content (dict): Audit configuration content. + fixer_config (dict): Fixer configuration. + mutelist_path (str): Path to the mutelist file. + mutelist_content (dict): Mutelist content. + token (str): Linode Personal Access Token (falls back to LINODE_TOKEN env var). + regions (list): Region(s) to scan regional resources in. Region-less + resources are always scanned. ``None`` scans all regions. + + Raises: + LinodeCredentialsError: If no token is provided. + LinodeSessionError: If the Linode session cannot be established. + LinodeIdentityError: If user or account identity cannot be retrieved. + """ + logger.info("Instantiating Linode provider...") + + # Mute noisy HTTP client logs + logging.getLogger("urllib3").setLevel(logging.WARNING) + + if config_content: + self._audit_config = config_content + else: + if not config_path: + config_path = default_config_file_path + self._audit_config = load_and_validate_config_file(self._type, config_path) + + self._session = LinodeProvider.setup_session(token=token) + + # Region filter for regional resources, validated against the live + # Linode regions list. None means scan all regions. + self._regions = LinodeProvider.validate_regions(self._session, regions) + + self._identity = LinodeProvider.setup_identity(self._session) + + self._fixer_config = fixer_config if fixer_config is not None else {} + + if mutelist_content: + self._mutelist = LinodeMutelist(mutelist_content=mutelist_content) + else: + if not mutelist_path: + mutelist_path = get_default_mute_file_path(self.type) + self._mutelist = LinodeMutelist(mutelist_path=mutelist_path) + + Provider.set_global_provider(self) + + @property + def type(self): + return self._type + + @property + def session(self): + return self._session + + @property + def identity(self): + return self._identity + + @property + def audit_config(self): + return self._audit_config + + @property + def fixer_config(self): + return self._fixer_config + + @property + def mutelist(self) -> LinodeMutelist: + return self._mutelist + + @property + def regions(self): + """Set of regions to scan for regional resources, or None for all.""" + return self._regions + + def validate_arguments(self) -> None: + """Linode provider has no provider-specific arguments to validate.""" + return None + + @staticmethod + def setup_session(token: str = None) -> LinodeSession: + """Initialize Linode SDK client. + + Credentials can be provided as argument or read from environment variable: + - LINODE_TOKEN (Personal Access Token) + + Args: + token: Linode Personal Access Token (optional, falls back to env var). + + Returns: + LinodeSession: The initialized Linode session. + + Raises: + LinodeCredentialsError: If no credentials are provided. + LinodeSessionError: If session setup fails. + """ + token = token or os.environ.get("LINODE_TOKEN", "") + + if not token: + raise LinodeCredentialsError( + file=os.path.basename(__file__), + message="Linode credentials not found. Set the LINODE_TOKEN environment variable.", + ) + + try: + client = LinodeClient(token) + return LinodeSession(client=client, token=token) + except Exception as error: + logger.critical( + f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}] -- {error}" + ) + raise LinodeSessionError( + file=os.path.basename(__file__), + original_exception=error, + ) + + @staticmethod + def validate_regions(session: LinodeSession, regions: list = None): + """Validate the requested regions against the live Linode regions list. + + The ``/v4/regions`` endpoint is public, so this works regardless of the + token's scope. Validating against the live list (instead of a static + file) avoids rejecting newly added Linode regions. + + Args: + session: The Linode session. + regions: The region ids requested via --region (or None). + + Returns: + The validated set of region ids, or None when no filter is given. + + Raises: + LinodeInvalidRegionError: If any requested region id is unknown. + """ + if not regions: + return None + + requested = set(regions) + try: + available = {region.id for region in session.client.regions()} + except Exception as error: + # Do not block a scan if the regions list cannot be fetched. + logger.warning( + f"Unable to validate Linode regions: {error}. " + "Proceeding with the requested regions without validation." + ) + return requested + + invalid = requested - available + if invalid: + raise LinodeInvalidRegionError( + file=os.path.basename(__file__), + message=( + f"Invalid Linode region(s): {', '.join(sorted(invalid))}. " + f"Valid regions are: {', '.join(sorted(available))}." + ), + ) + return requested + + @staticmethod + def setup_identity(session: LinodeSession) -> LinodeIdentityInfo: + """Fetch user and account metadata for Linode. + + The authenticated user's profile is retrieved first to validate the + token. Any valid token can read its own profile, so a failure here + (for example a ``401 Invalid Token``) means the credentials are invalid + and the scan is aborted instead of silently returning empty results. + + Args: + session: The Linode session. + + Returns: + LinodeIdentityInfo: The identity information. + + Raises: + LinodeAuthenticationError: If the token is invalid. + LinodeIdentityError: If identity setup fails unexpectedly. + """ + try: + client = session.client + username = None + email = None + account_id = None + + # Validate the token by reading the authenticated user's profile. + # A failure here means the credentials are invalid, so abort. + try: + profile = client.profile() + username = profile.username + email = profile.email + except Exception as error: + logger.critical( + f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}] -- {error}" + ) + raise LinodeAuthenticationError( + file=os.path.basename(__file__), + original_exception=error, + ) + + # The account endpoint requires the account:read_only scope. A + # token without that scope is still valid, so continue without the + # account ID instead of failing the scan. + try: + account = client.account() + account_id = getattr(account, "euuid", None) + except Exception as error: + logger.warning( + f"Unable to retrieve Linode account info: {error}. Continuing without account ID." + ) + + return LinodeIdentityInfo( + username=username, + email=email, + account_id=account_id, + ) + except LinodeAuthenticationError: + raise + except Exception as error: + logger.critical( + f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}] -- {error}" + ) + raise LinodeIdentityError( + file=os.path.basename(__file__), + original_exception=error, + ) + + def print_credentials(self) -> None: + report_title = ( + f"{Style.BRIGHT}Using the Linode credentials below:{Style.RESET_ALL}" + ) + report_lines = [] + + report_lines.append( + f"Authentication: {Fore.YELLOW}Personal Access Token{Style.RESET_ALL}" + ) + + if self.identity.username: + report_lines.append( + f"Username: {Fore.YELLOW}{self.identity.username}{Style.RESET_ALL}" + ) + + if self.identity.email: + report_lines.append( + f"Email: {Fore.YELLOW}{self.identity.email}{Style.RESET_ALL}" + ) + + if self.identity.account_id: + report_lines.append( + f"Account ID: {Fore.YELLOW}{self.identity.account_id}{Style.RESET_ALL}" + ) + + print_boxes(report_lines, report_title) + + @staticmethod + def test_connection( + token: str = None, + raise_on_exception: bool = True, + ) -> Connection: + """Test connection to Linode. + + Args: + token: Linode Personal Access Token. + raise_on_exception: Flag indicating whether to raise an exception if the connection fails. + + Returns: + Connection: Connection object with is_connected status. + """ + try: + session = LinodeProvider.setup_session(token=token) + # Validate by fetching profile + session.client.profile() + return Connection(is_connected=True) + except LinodeCredentialsError as error: + logger.error( + f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + if raise_on_exception: + raise + return Connection(is_connected=False, error=error) + except Exception as error: + logger.error( + f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + if raise_on_exception: + raise LinodeAuthenticationError( + file=os.path.basename(__file__), + original_exception=error, + ) + return Connection(is_connected=False, error=error) diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/models.py b/prowler/providers/linode/models.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8e41e881a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/models.py @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +from typing import Any, Optional + +from pydantic import BaseModel + +from prowler.config.config import output_file_timestamp +from prowler.providers.common.models import ProviderOutputOptions + + +class LinodeSession(BaseModel): + """Linode session information.""" + + client: Any + token: Optional[str] = None + + +class LinodeIdentityInfo(BaseModel): + """Linode identity and scoping information.""" + + username: Optional[str] = None + email: Optional[str] = None + account_id: Optional[str] = None + + +class LinodeOutputOptions(ProviderOutputOptions): + """Customize output filenames for Linode scans.""" + + def __init__(self, arguments, bulk_checks_metadata, identity: LinodeIdentityInfo): + super().__init__(arguments, bulk_checks_metadata) + if ( + not hasattr(arguments, "output_filename") + or arguments.output_filename is None + ): + account_fragment = identity.account_id or identity.username or "linode" + self.output_filename = ( + f"prowler-output-{account_fragment}-{output_file_timestamp}" + ) + else: + self.output_filename = arguments.output_filename diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/administration/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/administration/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/administration/administration_client.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/administration/administration_client.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..99a242e9ee --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/administration/administration_client.py @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +from prowler.providers.common.provider import Provider +from prowler.providers.linode.services.administration.administration_service import ( + AdministrationService, +) + +administration_client = AdministrationService(Provider.get_global_provider()) diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/administration/administration_service.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/administration/administration_service.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7704cf11b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/administration/administration_service.py @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +from typing import List + +from pydantic import BaseModel + +from prowler.lib.logger import logger +from prowler.providers.linode.lib.service.service import LinodeService + + +class User(BaseModel): + """Model for a Linode account user.""" + + username: str + email: str = "" + tfa_enabled: bool = False + restricted: bool = False + + +class AdministrationService(LinodeService): + """Service to interact with Linode Account Users.""" + + def __init__(self, provider): + super().__init__("administration", provider) + self.users: List[User] = [] + self._describe_users() + + def _describe_users(self): + """Fetch all Linode account users.""" + try: + raw_users = self.client.account.users() + for user in raw_users: + try: + self.users.append( + User( + username=getattr(user, "username", "") or "", + email=getattr(user, "email", "") or "", + tfa_enabled=getattr(user, "tfa_enabled", False) or False, + restricted=getattr(user, "restricted", False) or False, + ) + ) + except Exception as error: + logger.error( + f"account - Error processing user {getattr(user, 'username', 'unknown')}: " + f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + except Exception as error: + self._log_fetch_error("account users", "account:read_only", error) diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/administration/administration_user_2fa_enabled/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/administration/administration_user_2fa_enabled/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/administration/administration_user_2fa_enabled/administration_user_2fa_enabled.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/linode/services/administration/administration_user_2fa_enabled/administration_user_2fa_enabled.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c16e26f56d --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/administration/administration_user_2fa_enabled/administration_user_2fa_enabled.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +{ + "Provider": "linode", + "CheckID": "administration_user_2fa_enabled", + "CheckTitle": "Linode account user has two-factor authentication enabled", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "administration", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "high", + "ResourceType": "NotDefined", + "ResourceGroup": "IAM", + "Description": "**Linode account users** are assessed for **two-factor authentication (2FA)** enablement. 2FA adds a second verification factor (a TOTP code or security key) on top of the password, so a stolen or guessed password alone is not enough to sign in to the **Linode Cloud Manager**.", + "Risk": "Without **2FA**, a single compromised password — through phishing, credential stuffing, or brute force — grants an attacker full access to the user's Linode account. This can lead to **data exfiltration**, destruction of instances and backups, and resource abuse for **cryptomining**, impacting **confidentiality**, **integrity**, and **availability**.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://techdocs.akamai.com/cloud-computing/docs/manage-2fa" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. Log in to the Linode Cloud Manager\n2. Navigate to My Profile > Login & Authentication\n3. Under Security Settings, configure all 3 security questions\n4. Enable Two-Factor Authentication", + "Terraform": "" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Enable `2FA` for all Linode account users. Use an authenticator app (`TOTP`) for the second factor and store backup codes securely.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/administration_user_2fa_enabled" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "identity-access" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "" +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/administration/administration_user_2fa_enabled/administration_user_2fa_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/administration/administration_user_2fa_enabled/administration_user_2fa_enabled.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2bb2c92729 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/administration/administration_user_2fa_enabled/administration_user_2fa_enabled.py @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, CheckReportLinode +from prowler.providers.linode.services.administration.administration_client import ( + administration_client, +) + + +class administration_user_2fa_enabled(Check): + """Check if Linode account users have two-factor authentication enabled.""" + + def execute(self) -> list[CheckReportLinode]: + """Execute the administration_user_2fa_enabled check. + + Iterates over all account users and checks whether two-factor + authentication is enabled. + + Returns: + list[CheckReportLinode]: A list of findings for each user. + """ + findings = [] + + for user in administration_client.users: + report = CheckReportLinode( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=user, + resource_name=user.username, + resource_id=user.username, + region="global", + ) + + if user.tfa_enabled: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"User '{user.username}' has two-factor authentication enabled." + ) + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"User '{user.username}' does not have two-factor authentication enabled." + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_client.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_client.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8dc03fa36d --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_client.py @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +from prowler.providers.common.provider import Provider +from prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_service import ComputeService + +compute_client = ComputeService(Provider.get_global_provider()) diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_backups_enabled/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_backups_enabled/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_backups_enabled/compute_instance_backups_enabled.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_backups_enabled/compute_instance_backups_enabled.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b425e5c5b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_backups_enabled/compute_instance_backups_enabled.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +{ + "Provider": "linode", + "CheckID": "compute_instance_backups_enabled", + "CheckTitle": "Linode Instance has the Backup service enabled", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "compute", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "NotDefined", + "ResourceGroup": "compute", + "Description": "**Linode instances** are assessed for enrollment in the **Linode Backup service**, which performs automatic daily and weekly snapshots of an instance's disks. Without it enabled, there is no managed recovery point to restore from after a data-loss event.", + "Risk": "With the **Backup service** disabled, there is no automated recovery point for the instance. Accidental deletion, **ransomware**, disk corruption, or operator error can result in **permanent data loss** and extended **downtime**, directly impacting **availability** and data **integrity**.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://techdocs.akamai.com/cloud-computing/docs/enable-backups", + "https://techdocs.akamai.com/cloud-computing/docs/create-a-compute-instance#configure-additional-options" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "linode-cli linodes backups-enable ", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. Log in to the Linode Cloud Manager\n2. Select the Linode instance\n3. Navigate to the Backups tab\n4. Click 'Enable Backups'", + "Terraform": "" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Enable the `Linode Backup service` on this instance to ensure automated recovery points are available. Consider supplementing it with manual snapshots before critical changes.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/compute_instance_backups_enabled" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "resilience" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "" +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_backups_enabled/compute_instance_backups_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_backups_enabled/compute_instance_backups_enabled.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c7ae903fbf --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_backups_enabled/compute_instance_backups_enabled.py @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, CheckReportLinode +from prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_client import compute_client + + +class compute_instance_backups_enabled(Check): + """Check if Linode instances have the Backup service enabled.""" + + def execute(self) -> list[CheckReportLinode]: + """Execute the compute_instance_backups_enabled check. + + Iterates over all Linode instances and checks whether the Backup + service is enabled. + + Returns: + list[CheckReportLinode]: A list of findings for each instance. + """ + findings = [] + + for instance in compute_client.instances: + report = CheckReportLinode( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=instance, + resource_name=instance.label, + resource_id=str(instance.id), + region=instance.region, + ) + report.resource_tags = instance.tags + + if instance.backups_enabled: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Instance {instance.label} has the Backup service enabled." + ) + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"Instance {instance.label} does not have the Backup service enabled." + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled/compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled/compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..878030dc25 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled/compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +{ + "Provider": "linode", + "CheckID": "compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled", + "CheckTitle": "Linode Instance has disk encryption enabled", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "compute", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "high", + "ResourceType": "NotDefined", + "ResourceGroup": "compute", + "Description": "**Linode instances** are assessed for **disk encryption** status. Disk encryption protects **data at rest** on the instance's underlying disks, keeping stored data unreadable without the encryption keys even if the physical media is accessed.", + "Risk": "Without **disk encryption**, data at rest on the instance's disks is stored unprotected. This increases the risk of **data exposure** through physical access to decommissioned or stolen storage media, or via certain **hypervisor-level** vulnerabilities, compromising the **confidentiality** of sensitive data.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://techdocs.akamai.com/cloud-computing/docs/local-disk-encryption", + "https://techdocs.akamai.com/cloud-computing/docs/create-a-compute-instance#enable-or-disable-disk-encryption" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. Disk encryption must be enabled at instance creation time or by rebuilding the instance\n2. Create a new instance with disk_encryption set to 'enabled'\n3. Migrate data from the unencrypted instance to the new encrypted instance", + "Terraform": "" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Enable `disk encryption` for this instance. Because it cannot be toggled on existing instances, rebuild or migrate to a new instance with encryption enabled.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "encryption" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "" +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled/compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled/compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..abe364d0b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled/compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled.py @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, CheckReportLinode +from prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_client import compute_client + + +class compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled(Check): + """Check if Linode instances have disk encryption enabled.""" + + def execute(self) -> list[CheckReportLinode]: + """Execute the compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled check. + + Iterates over all Linode instances and checks whether disk encryption + is enabled. + + Returns: + list[CheckReportLinode]: A list of findings for each instance. + """ + findings = [] + + for instance in compute_client.instances: + report = CheckReportLinode( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=instance, + resource_name=instance.label, + resource_id=str(instance.id), + region=instance.region, + ) + report.resource_tags = instance.tags + + if instance.disk_encryption == "enabled": + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Instance {instance.label} has disk encryption enabled." + ) + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Instance {instance.label} does not have disk encryption enabled." + ) + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_watchdog_enabled/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_watchdog_enabled/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_watchdog_enabled/compute_instance_watchdog_enabled.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_watchdog_enabled/compute_instance_watchdog_enabled.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..42e3c8f46f --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_watchdog_enabled/compute_instance_watchdog_enabled.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +{ + "Provider": "linode", + "CheckID": "compute_instance_watchdog_enabled", + "CheckTitle": "Linode Instance has Watchdog (Lassie) enabled", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "compute", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "NotDefined", + "ResourceGroup": "compute", + "Description": "**Linode instances** are assessed for **Watchdog (Lassie)** status. Watchdog is Linode's automatic recovery feature that monitors an instance and reboots it if it powers off unexpectedly, helping maintain availability without manual intervention.", + "Risk": "With **Watchdog (Lassie)** disabled, an instance that crashes or shuts down unexpectedly stays offline until it is manually restarted. This prolongs **downtime**, delays detection of availability incidents, and weakens the **availability** of services running on the instance.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://techdocs.akamai.com/cloud-computing/docs/recover-from-unexpected-shutdowns-with-lassie" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "linode-cli linodes update --watchdog_enabled true", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. Log in to the Linode Cloud Manager\n2. Select the Linode instance\n3. Navigate to the Settings tab\n4. Enable the Shutdown Watchdog (Lassie) toggle", + "Terraform": "" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Enable `Watchdog (Lassie)` on this instance to automatically recover from unexpected shutdowns and improve availability protection.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/compute_instance_watchdog_enabled" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "resilience" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [], + "Notes": "" +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_watchdog_enabled/compute_instance_watchdog_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_watchdog_enabled/compute_instance_watchdog_enabled.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..498deb970c --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_watchdog_enabled/compute_instance_watchdog_enabled.py @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, CheckReportLinode +from prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_client import compute_client + + +class compute_instance_watchdog_enabled(Check): + """Check if Linode instances have Watchdog (Lassie) enabled.""" + + def execute(self) -> list[CheckReportLinode]: + """Execute the compute_instance_watchdog_enabled check. + + Iterates over all Linode instances and checks whether Watchdog + (Lassie) is enabled. + + Returns: + list[CheckReportLinode]: A list of findings for each instance. + """ + findings = [] + + for instance in compute_client.instances: + report = CheckReportLinode( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=instance, + resource_name=instance.label, + resource_id=str(instance.id), + region=instance.region, + ) + report.resource_tags = instance.tags + + if instance.watchdog_enabled: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Instance {instance.label} has Watchdog (Lassie) enabled." + ) + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"Instance {instance.label} does not have Watchdog (Lassie) enabled." + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_service.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_service.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..51d38aa834 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_service.py @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +from typing import List + +from pydantic import BaseModel + +from prowler.lib.logger import logger +from prowler.providers.linode.lib.service.service import LinodeService + + +class Instance(BaseModel): + """Model for a Linode Instance.""" + + id: int + label: str + region: str + status: str + backups_enabled: bool = False + disk_encryption: str = "disabled" # "enabled" or "disabled" + watchdog_enabled: bool = False + tags: List[str] = [] + + +class ComputeService(LinodeService): + """Service to interact with Linode Instances.""" + + def __init__(self, provider): + super().__init__("compute", provider) + self.instances: List[Instance] = [] + self._describe_instances() + + def _describe_instances(self): + """Fetch all Linode instances with firewall and IP details.""" + # Optional --region filter. None scans all regions. Region-less services + # do not call this, so they are always scanned. + regions_filter = getattr(getattr(self, "provider", None), "regions", None) + try: + raw_instances = self.client.linode.instances() + for inst in raw_instances: + try: + region = ( + inst.region.id + if hasattr(inst.region, "id") + else str(inst.region) + ) + if regions_filter and region not in regions_filter: + continue + + # Get backup status + backups_enabled = False + try: + backups = getattr(inst, "backups", None) + if backups: + backups_enabled = getattr(backups, "enabled", False) + except Exception as error: + logger.warning( + f"instance - Unable to fetch backup status for instance " + f"{inst.id}: {error}" + ) + + # Get disk encryption status + disk_encryption = "disabled" + try: + de = getattr(inst, "disk_encryption", None) + if de: + disk_encryption = str(de) + except Exception as error: + logger.warning( + f"instance - Unable to fetch disk encryption status for " + f"instance {inst.id}: {error}" + ) + + # Get watchdog status + watchdog_enabled = False + try: + watchdog_enabled = getattr(inst, "watchdog_enabled", False) + except Exception as error: + logger.warning( + f"instance - Unable to fetch watchdog status for instance " + f"{inst.id}: {error}" + ) + + self.instances.append( + Instance( + id=inst.id, + label=inst.label or f"linode-{inst.id}", + region=region, + status=inst.status or "unknown", + backups_enabled=backups_enabled, + disk_encryption=disk_encryption, + watchdog_enabled=watchdog_enabled, + tags=inst.tags or [], + ) + ) + except Exception as error: + logger.error( + f"instance - Error processing instance {inst.id}: " + f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + except Exception as error: + self._log_fetch_error("instances", "linodes:read_only", error) diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_client.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_client.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0f0406048b --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_client.py @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +from prowler.providers.common.provider import Provider +from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_service import ( + NetworkingService, +) + +networking_client = NetworkingService(Provider.get_global_provider()) diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices/networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices/networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..475601e5b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices/networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +{ + "Provider": "linode", + "CheckID": "networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices", + "CheckTitle": "Linode Cloud Firewall is assigned to devices", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "networking", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "NotDefined", + "ResourceGroup": "network", + "Description": "**Linode Cloud Firewalls** are checked to verify each one is attached to at least one device, such as a **Linode instance** or **NodeBalancer**. A firewall only filters traffic for the resources it is assigned to, so an unassigned firewall enforces no protection at all.", + "Risk": "An **unassigned firewall** provides no protection to running workloads, leaving their network exposure governed only by default behavior. This commonly signals a **misconfigured control** where operators assume traffic is filtered when it is not, raising the risk of **unauthorized network access** to unprotected instances.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://techdocs.akamai.com/cloud-computing/docs/apply-firewall-rules-to-a-service" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. Log in to the Linode Cloud Manager\n2. Navigate to Firewalls\n3. Select the associated firewall\n4. Click on either the Linodes or Nodebalancers tab and add those devices to the firewall", + "Terraform": "" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Attach each firewall to applicable Linode devices, such as `Linodes` or `NodeBalancers`, to enforce intended network controls.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "internet-exposed" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [ + "networking_firewall_status_enabled" + ], + "Notes": "" +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices/networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices/networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f245dd168e --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices/networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices.py @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, CheckReportLinode +from prowler.lib.logger import logger +from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_client import ( + networking_client, +) + + +class networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices(Check): + """Check if Linode Cloud Firewalls are assigned to at least one device.""" + + def execute(self) -> list[CheckReportLinode]: + """Execute the networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices check. + + Iterates over all Cloud Firewalls and checks whether each one is + assigned to at least one device. + + Returns: + list[CheckReportLinode]: A list of findings for each firewall. + """ + findings = [] + + for fw in networking_client.firewalls: + # When the device count could not be determined (the devices fetch + # failed) skip the firewall instead of reporting a false FAIL. + if fw.attached_devices_count is None: + logger.warning( + f"firewall - Skipping firewall '{fw.label}' ({fw.id}): " + "device assignment could not be determined." + ) + continue + + report = CheckReportLinode( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=fw, + resource_name=fw.label, + resource_id=str(fw.id), + region="global", + ) + report.resource_tags = fw.tags + + if fw.attached_devices_count > 0: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"Firewall '{fw.label}' is assigned to {fw.attached_devices_count} device(s)." + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Firewall '{fw.label}' is not assigned to any device." + ) + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop/networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop/networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..16f0666f7d --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop/networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +{ + "Provider": "linode", + "CheckID": "networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop", + "CheckTitle": "Linode Cloud Firewall default inbound policy is DROP", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "networking", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "high", + "ResourceType": "NotDefined", + "ResourceGroup": "network", + "Description": "**Linode Cloud Firewalls** apply a **default inbound policy** to ingress traffic that does not match any explicit rule. This check verifies the default is set to `DROP`, enforcing a **default-deny** posture so that only traffic intentionally permitted by a rule is allowed in.", + "Risk": "When the default inbound policy is `ACCEPT` instead of `DROP`, any traffic not explicitly denied by a rule is permitted. This **default-allow** posture can silently expose services, management ports, and unintended endpoints to the internet, enlarging the attack surface and increasing the risk of **unauthorized access**.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://techdocs.akamai.com/cloud-computing/docs/manage-firewall-rules" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. Log in to the Linode Cloud Manager\n2. Navigate to Firewalls\n3. Select the associated firewall\n4. In the Rules tab, set the default inbound policy to DROP", + "Terraform": "" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Set the default inbound policy to `DROP` and allow only explicitly required inbound traffic.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "internet-exposed" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [ + "networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured" + ], + "Notes": "" +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop/networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop/networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2f5c8cb6c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop/networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop.py @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, CheckReportLinode +from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_client import ( + networking_client, +) + + +class networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop(Check): + """Check if Linode Cloud Firewall default inbound policy is DROP.""" + + def execute(self) -> list[CheckReportLinode]: + """Execute the networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop check. + + Iterates over all Cloud Firewalls and checks whether the default + inbound policy is DROP. + + Returns: + list[CheckReportLinode]: A list of findings for each firewall. + """ + findings = [] + + for fw in networking_client.firewalls: + report = CheckReportLinode( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=fw, + resource_name=fw.label, + resource_id=str(fw.id), + region="global", + ) + report.resource_tags = fw.tags + + if fw.inbound_policy == "DROP": + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Firewall '{fw.label}' has default inbound policy set to DROP." + ) + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"Firewall '{fw.label}' has default inbound policy set to {fw.inbound_policy}." + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop/networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop/networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5de3985464 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop/networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +{ + "Provider": "linode", + "CheckID": "networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop", + "CheckTitle": "Linode Cloud Firewall default outbound policy is DROP", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "networking", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "high", + "ResourceType": "NotDefined", + "ResourceGroup": "network", + "Description": "**Linode Cloud Firewalls** apply a **default outbound policy** to egress traffic that matches no explicit rule. This check verifies the default is set to `DROP`, enforcing **default-deny egress** so that only approved outbound connections are allowed to leave the instance.", + "Risk": "An outbound default of `ACCEPT` permits unrestricted egress from the instance. If a host is compromised, this eases **data exfiltration** and **command-and-control (C2)** communication and lets malware reach arbitrary external endpoints, harming **confidentiality** and enabling lateral movement.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://techdocs.akamai.com/cloud-computing/docs/manage-firewall-rules" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. Log in to the Linode Cloud Manager\n2. Navigate to Firewalls\n3. Select the associated firewall\n4. In the Rules tab, set the default outbound policy to DROP", + "Terraform": "" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Set the default outbound policy to `DROP` and allow only explicit outbound destinations and services.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "internet-exposed" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [ + "networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured" + ], + "Notes": "" +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop/networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop/networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..011693aee9 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop/networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop.py @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, CheckReportLinode +from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_client import ( + networking_client, +) + + +class networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop(Check): + """Check if Linode Cloud Firewall default outbound policy is DROP.""" + + def execute(self) -> list[CheckReportLinode]: + """Execute the networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop check. + + Iterates over all Cloud Firewalls and checks whether the default + outbound policy is DROP. + + Returns: + list[CheckReportLinode]: A list of findings for each firewall. + """ + findings = [] + + for fw in networking_client.firewalls: + report = CheckReportLinode( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=fw, + resource_name=fw.label, + resource_id=str(fw.id), + region="global", + ) + report.resource_tags = fw.tags + + if fw.outbound_policy == "DROP": + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Firewall '{fw.label}' has default outbound policy set to DROP." + ) + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = f"Firewall '{fw.label}' has default outbound policy set to {fw.outbound_policy}." + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured/networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured/networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5e54dc6241 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured/networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +{ + "Provider": "linode", + "CheckID": "networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured", + "CheckTitle": "Linode Cloud Firewall inbound rules are configured", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "networking", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "low", + "ResourceType": "NotDefined", + "ResourceGroup": "network", + "Description": "**Linode Cloud Firewalls** are checked to determine whether explicit **inbound rules** are configured. Defined ingress rules express the intended allow-list of sources, ports, and protocols instead of relying solely on the firewall's default policy.", + "Risk": "Without explicit **inbound rules**, ingress filtering depends entirely on the default policy and no intentional allow-list is documented. This makes the firewall's behavior ambiguous and harder to audit, raising the chance of **overly permissive access** or gaps in the protection operators expect.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://techdocs.akamai.com/cloud-computing/docs/manage-firewall-rules" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. Log in to the Linode Cloud Manager\n2. Navigate to Firewalls\n3. Select the associated firewall\n4. Click Add an Inbound Rule in the Rules tab", + "Terraform": "" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Configure explicit `inbound rules` to define allowed ingress sources, ports, and protocols and enforce expected security boundaries.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "internet-exposed" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [ + "networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop" + ], + "Notes": "" +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured/networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured/networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9eba9ddeb6 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured/networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured.py @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, CheckReportLinode +from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_client import ( + networking_client, +) + + +class networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured(Check): + """Check if Linode Cloud Firewall has inbound rules configured.""" + + def execute(self) -> list[CheckReportLinode]: + """Execute the networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured check. + + Iterates over all Cloud Firewalls and checks whether at least one + explicit inbound rule is configured. + + Returns: + list[CheckReportLinode]: A list of findings for each firewall. + """ + findings = [] + + for fw in networking_client.firewalls: + report = CheckReportLinode( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=fw, + resource_name=fw.label, + resource_id=str(fw.id), + region="global", + ) + report.resource_tags = fw.tags + + if len(fw.inbound_rules) == 0: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Firewall '{fw.label}' has no inbound rules configured." + ) + else: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"Firewall '{fw.label}' has {len(fw.inbound_rules)} inbound rule(s) configured." + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured/networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured/networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9bedf854cc --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured/networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +{ + "Provider": "linode", + "CheckID": "networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured", + "CheckTitle": "Linode Cloud Firewall outbound rules are configured", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "networking", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "low", + "ResourceType": "NotDefined", + "ResourceGroup": "network", + "Description": "**Linode Cloud Firewalls** are checked to determine whether explicit **outbound rules** are configured. Defined egress rules express which destinations, ports, and protocols an instance is permitted to reach, rather than depending only on the firewall's default policy.", + "Risk": "Without explicit **outbound rules**, egress behavior depends solely on the default policy and no intended destination allow-list exists. Unconstrained or undocumented egress complicates auditing and can enable **data exfiltration** or connections to malicious endpoints if a host is compromised.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://techdocs.akamai.com/cloud-computing/docs/manage-firewall-rules" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. Log in to the Linode Cloud Manager\n2. Navigate to Firewalls\n3. Select the associated firewall\n4. Click Add an Outbound Rule in the Rules tab", + "Terraform": "" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Configure explicit `outbound rules` to control allowed egress destinations, ports, and protocols.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "internet-exposed" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [ + "networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop" + ], + "Notes": "" +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured/networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured/networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1d97dca075 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured/networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured.py @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, CheckReportLinode +from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_client import ( + networking_client, +) + + +class networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured(Check): + """Check if Linode Cloud Firewall has outbound rules configured.""" + + def execute(self) -> list[CheckReportLinode]: + """Execute the networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured check. + + Iterates over all Cloud Firewalls and checks whether at least one + explicit outbound rule is configured. + + Returns: + list[CheckReportLinode]: A list of findings for each firewall. + """ + findings = [] + + for fw in networking_client.firewalls: + report = CheckReportLinode( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=fw, + resource_name=fw.label, + resource_id=str(fw.id), + region="global", + ) + report.resource_tags = fw.tags + + if len(fw.outbound_rules) == 0: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Firewall '{fw.label}' has no outbound rules configured." + ) + else: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"Firewall '{fw.label}' has {len(fw.outbound_rules)} outbound rule(s) configured." + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_status_enabled/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_status_enabled/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_status_enabled/networking_firewall_status_enabled.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_status_enabled/networking_firewall_status_enabled.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dd1e760d4c --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_status_enabled/networking_firewall_status_enabled.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +{ + "Provider": "linode", + "CheckID": "networking_firewall_status_enabled", + "CheckTitle": "Linode Cloud Firewall status is enabled", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "networking", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "high", + "ResourceType": "NotDefined", + "ResourceGroup": "network", + "Description": "**Linode Cloud Firewalls** can be in an `enabled` or `disabled` state. This check verifies the firewall status is `enabled`, because a firewall must be active for its inbound and outbound policies and rules to actually filter network traffic.", + "Risk": "A `disabled` firewall enforces **none** of its configured rules or default policies, leaving attached instances with no network filtering. This can unexpectedly expose management ports and services to the internet, significantly increasing the risk of **unauthorized access** and exploitation.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://techdocs.akamai.com/cloud-computing/docs/update-cloud-firewall-status" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. Log in to the Linode Cloud Manager\n2. Navigate to Firewalls\n3. Click on the Enable button from the options corresponding to the firewall whose status you would like to update", + "Terraform": "" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Enable `Linode Cloud Firewalls` so configured network filtering controls are actively enforced.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/networking_firewall_status_enabled" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "internet-exposed" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [ + "networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices" + ], + "Notes": "" +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_status_enabled/networking_firewall_status_enabled.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_status_enabled/networking_firewall_status_enabled.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..603a088bd0 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_status_enabled/networking_firewall_status_enabled.py @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, CheckReportLinode +from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_client import ( + networking_client, +) + + +class networking_firewall_status_enabled(Check): + """Check if Linode Cloud Firewalls are enabled.""" + + def execute(self) -> list[CheckReportLinode]: + """Execute the networking_firewall_status_enabled check. + + Iterates over all Cloud Firewalls and checks whether each one has + an enabled status. + + Returns: + list[CheckReportLinode]: A list of findings for each firewall. + """ + findings = [] + + for fw in networking_client.firewalls: + report = CheckReportLinode( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=fw, + resource_name=fw.label, + resource_id=str(fw.id), + region="global", + ) + report.resource_tags = fw.tags + + if fw.status == "enabled": + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"Firewall '{fw.label}' is enabled." + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Firewall '{fw.label}' is not enabled (status: {fw.status})." + ) + + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_service.py b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_service.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..97f811a98a --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_service.py @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +from typing import List, Optional + +from pydantic import BaseModel + +from prowler.lib.logger import logger +from prowler.providers.linode.lib.service.service import LinodeService + + +class FirewallRule(BaseModel): + """Model for a single firewall rule.""" + + protocol: str = "TCP" + ports: str = "" # e.g. "22", "1-65535", "" + addresses_ipv4: List[str] = [] + addresses_ipv6: List[str] = [] + action: str = "ACCEPT" # ACCEPT or DROP + label: str = "" + + +class Firewall(BaseModel): + """Model for a Linode Cloud Firewall.""" + + id: int + label: str + status: str + inbound_rules: List[FirewallRule] = [] + outbound_rules: List[FirewallRule] = [] + inbound_policy: str + outbound_policy: str + # None means the device count could not be determined (fetch failed), as + # opposed to 0 which means the firewall genuinely has no devices attached. + attached_devices_count: Optional[int] = None + tags: List[str] = [] + + +class NetworkingService(LinodeService): + """Service to interact with Linode Cloud Firewalls.""" + + def __init__(self, provider): + super().__init__("networking", provider) + self.firewalls: List[Firewall] = [] + self._describe_firewalls() + + def _describe_firewalls(self): + """Fetch all Linode Cloud Firewalls with their rules.""" + try: + raw_firewalls = self.client.networking.firewalls() + for fw in raw_firewalls: + try: + inbound_rules = [] + outbound_rules = [] + inbound_policy = "" + outbound_policy = "" + attached_devices_count = None + + try: + attached_devices_count = len(fw.devices) + except Exception as error: + logger.warning( + f"firewall - Unable to fetch devices for firewall {fw.id}: {error}" + ) + + try: + # linode_api4 Firewall objects expose rules as a mapped object. + rules = fw.rules + inbound_policy = getattr(rules, "inbound_policy", "") + outbound_policy = getattr(rules, "outbound_policy", "") + inbound = getattr(rules, "inbound", []) + outbound = getattr(rules, "outbound", []) + + for rule in inbound: + addresses = getattr(rule, "addresses", None) + inbound_rules.append( + FirewallRule( + protocol=( + getattr(rule, "protocol", None) or "TCP" + ).upper(), + ports=getattr(rule, "ports", "") or "", + addresses_ipv4=getattr(addresses, "ipv4", []) or [], + addresses_ipv6=getattr(addresses, "ipv6", []) or [], + action=( + getattr(rule, "action", None) or "ACCEPT" + ).upper(), + label=getattr(rule, "label", "") or "", + ) + ) + for rule in outbound: + addresses = getattr(rule, "addresses", None) + outbound_rules.append( + FirewallRule( + protocol=( + getattr(rule, "protocol", None) or "TCP" + ).upper(), + ports=getattr(rule, "ports", "") or "", + addresses_ipv4=getattr(addresses, "ipv4", []) or [], + addresses_ipv6=getattr(addresses, "ipv6", []) or [], + action=( + getattr(rule, "action", None) or "ACCEPT" + ).upper(), + label=getattr(rule, "label", "") or "", + ) + ) + except Exception as error: + logger.warning( + f"firewall - Unable to fetch rules for firewall {fw.id}: {error}" + ) + + self.firewalls.append( + Firewall( + id=fw.id, + label=fw.label or f"firewall-{fw.id}", + status=fw.status or "unknown", + inbound_rules=inbound_rules, + outbound_rules=outbound_rules, + inbound_policy=inbound_policy, + outbound_policy=outbound_policy, + attached_devices_count=attached_devices_count, + tags=fw.tags or [], + ) + ) + except Exception as error: + logger.error( + f"firewall - Error processing firewall {fw.id}: " + f"{error.__class__.__name__}[{error.__traceback__.tb_lineno}]: {error}" + ) + except Exception as error: + self._log_fetch_error("firewalls", "firewall:read_only", error) diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/m365_provider.py b/prowler/providers/m365/m365_provider.py index 0454d85f3d..040e390658 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/m365/m365_provider.py +++ b/prowler/providers/m365/m365_provider.py @@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ class M365Provider(Provider): """ _type: str = "m365" + sdk_only: bool = False _session: DefaultAzureCredential # Must be used besides being named for Azure _identity: M365IdentityInfo _audit_config: dict diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops/entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops/entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c352854003 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops/entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +{ + "Provider": "m365", + "CheckID": "entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops", + "CheckTitle": "Conditional Access Policy explicitly targets Azure DevOps", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "entra", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "NotDefined", + "ResourceGroup": "IAM", + "Description": "Microsoft Entra **Conditional Access** is verified to have at least one **enabled** policy that explicitly includes the **Azure DevOps** cloud application. Policies targeting **All** cloud apps do not satisfy this check because the goal is to verify that Azure DevOps has been deliberately considered.", + "Risk": "Without an explicit Conditional Access policy for Azure DevOps, organizations may rely on broad policies that do not account for Azure DevOps-specific access patterns such as CLI, IDE plug-ins, PAT-based workflows, source code access, build pipelines, secrets, and service connections.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/conditionalaccesspolicy?view=graph-rest-1.0", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/conditionalaccessapplications?view=graph-rest-1.0", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/devops/organizations/accounts/manage-conditional-access", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/entra/entra-id/governance/verify-first-party-apps-sign-in" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. Navigate to the Microsoft Entra admin center (https://entra.microsoft.com).\n2. Expand **Protection** > **Conditional Access** and select **Policies**.\n3. Create or edit a policy for Azure DevOps.\n4. Under **Target resources**, select **Include** > **Select apps** and choose **Azure DevOps**.\n5. Configure the required grant or session controls for your organization.\n6. Set the policy to **Report-only** until validated, then enable it.", + "Terraform": "" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Create and enable a Conditional Access policy that explicitly includes the Azure DevOps cloud application, then configure the appropriate access controls for your organization.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "identity-access", + "trust-boundaries", + "e3" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [ + "entra_conditional_access_policy_all_apps_all_users" + ], + "Notes": "Azure DevOps Services uses appId 499b84ac-1321-427f-aa17-267ca6975798." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops/entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops.py b/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops/entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f1e874fc91 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops/entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops.py @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +"""Check if a Conditional Access policy explicitly targets Azure DevOps.""" + +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, CheckReportM365 +from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_client import entra_client +from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_service import ( + ConditionalAccessPolicyState, +) + +AZURE_DEVOPS_APP_ID = "499b84ac-1321-427f-aa17-267ca6975798" + + +class entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops(Check): + """Check that an enabled Conditional Access policy explicitly targets Azure DevOps.""" + + def execute(self) -> list[CheckReportM365]: + """Execute the check for explicit Azure DevOps targeting. + + Returns: + A list of reports containing the result of the check. + """ + findings = [] + report = CheckReportM365( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource={}, + resource_name="Conditional Access Policies", + resource_id="conditionalAccessPolicies", + ) + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + "No enabled Conditional Access Policy explicitly targets Azure DevOps." + ) + + for policy in entra_client.conditional_access_policies.values(): + if policy.state != ConditionalAccessPolicyState.ENABLED: + continue + + if not policy.conditions.application_conditions: + continue + + if ( + AZURE_DEVOPS_APP_ID + not in policy.conditions.application_conditions.included_applications + ): + continue + + report = CheckReportM365( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=policy, + resource_name=policy.display_name, + resource_id=policy.id, + ) + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = f"Conditional Access Policy {policy.display_name} explicitly targets Azure DevOps." + break + + findings.append(report) + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..42b3acaeb6 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +{ + "Provider": "m365", + "CheckID": "entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references", + "CheckTitle": "Conditional Access policies must not reference deleted users, groups, or roles", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "entra", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "NotDefined", + "ResourceGroup": "IAM", + "Description": "Every object identifier referenced by any Conditional Access policy under conditions.users (includeUsers, excludeUsers, includeGroups, excludeGroups, includeRoles, excludeRoles) must resolve to an existing Microsoft Entra object. This check audits all Conditional Access policies regardless of state and reports any whose user, group, or role references no longer resolve in the directory.", + "Risk": "When a user, group, or directory role referenced by a Conditional Access policy stops resolving (account or group deleted, role template removed), the reference becomes orphaned. include* references silently shrink the policy's enforcement scope; exclude* references can cause the policy to evaluate unexpectedly. This is a common root cause of MFA-not-applied incidents.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/conditionalaccesspolicy?view=graph-rest-1.0", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/conditionalaccessusers?view=graph-rest-1.0", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/user-get?view=graph-rest-1.0", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/group-get?view=graph-rest-1.0", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/unifiedroledefinition-get?view=graph-rest-1.0", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/concept-conditional-access-users-groups" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center (https://entra.microsoft.com)\n2. Navigate to Protection > Conditional Access > Policies\n3. Open each policy reported by this check\n4. Under Assignments > Users, remove every user, group, or role identifier reported as deleted\n5. Save the policy and re-run the audit\n6. For ongoing hygiene, audit Conditional Access policies after any bulk user/group/role cleanup", + "Terraform": "" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Audit each Conditional Access policy quarterly and remove references to deleted users, groups, or directory roles. Stale references in include collections silently shrink enforcement scope; stale references in exclude collections can cause policies to behave unexpectedly. Treat both as misconfigurations regardless of policy state.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "identity-access", + "e3" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [ + "entra_conditional_access_policy_directory_sync_account_excluded" + ], + "Notes": "The check runs against all Conditional Access policies regardless of state (enabled, disabled, enabledForReportingButNotEnforced) — stale references in disabled policies are a misconfiguration that becomes live the moment the policy is re-enabled. Only HTTP 404 responses flag an identifier as deleted (FAIL). Transient Graph errors (5xx, throttling, insufficient permissions) are not treated as deletions; a policy whose references could not be resolved for those reasons is reported as MANUAL so it is not silently considered clean." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references.py b/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e5c5eff389 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references.py @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, CheckReportM365 +from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_client import entra_client +from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_service import ( + CONDITIONAL_ACCESS_SENTINEL_IDS, + ConditionalAccessPolicyState, +) + + +class entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references(Check): + """ + Ensure Conditional Access policies do not reference deleted directory objects. + + Stale references to deleted users, groups, or directory roles silently change + the runtime behavior of a Conditional Access policy: include* references + shrink enforcement scope, exclude* references can change exemption logic. + Either way, the policy stops behaving the way the operator believes it does. + + The directory-object existence check runs once at service init time and is + cached on the entra client. This check reads from that cache and reports any + policy whose users/groups/roles inclusion or exclusion collections name an + identifier that no longer resolves in Microsoft Entra ID. + + Identifiers whose Graph lookup failed with a non-404 error (5xx, throttling, + insufficient permissions) are cached separately: they could not be verified + as present or deleted, so the policy is reported as MANUAL rather than being + silently treated as clean. + + - PASS: The policy references no deleted users, groups, or roles. + - FAIL: The policy references at least one deleted user, group, or role. + - MANUAL: At least one referenced identifier could not be resolved due to a + transient Graph error, so the policy could not be fully evaluated. + """ + + def execute(self) -> list[CheckReportM365]: + findings = [] + unresolved = entra_client.unresolved_directory_object_references + errored = entra_client.errored_directory_object_references + + for policy_id, policy in entra_client.conditional_access_policies.items(): + report = CheckReportM365( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource=policy, + resource_name=policy.display_name, + resource_id=policy_id, + ) + + orphans = self._collect_references_in(policy, unresolved) + unverified = self._collect_references_in(policy, errored) + + if orphans: + # A confirmed deletion takes precedence over unverified ones. + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = self._format_failure( + policy.display_name, orphans, unverified, policy.state + ) + elif unverified: + # Nothing confirmed deleted, but we could not verify every + # reference — do not claim the policy is clean. + report.status = "MANUAL" + report.status_extended = self._format_manual( + policy.display_name, unverified + ) + else: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Conditional Access policy {policy.display_name} references no " + f"deleted directory objects." + ) + + findings.append(report) + + return findings + + @staticmethod + def _collect_references_in(policy, id_set): + """Walk the six identifier collections and return references in ``id_set``. + + Args: + policy: The Conditional Access policy to inspect. + id_set: Set of ``(type, id)`` pairs to match references against. + + Returns: + list[tuple[str, str, str]]: ``(type, id, side)`` tuples where + ``type`` is one of ``user|group|role``, ``id`` is the Graph + identifier, and ``side`` is one of ``include|exclude``. + """ + if not policy.conditions or not policy.conditions.user_conditions: + return [] + + uc = policy.conditions.user_conditions + collections = ( + ("user", "include", uc.included_users), + ("user", "exclude", uc.excluded_users), + ("group", "include", uc.included_groups), + ("group", "exclude", uc.excluded_groups), + ("role", "include", uc.included_roles), + ("role", "exclude", uc.excluded_roles), + ) + + matches = [] + for type_, side, identifiers in collections: + for identifier in identifiers: + if identifier in CONDITIONAL_ACCESS_SENTINEL_IDS: + continue + if (type_, identifier) in id_set: + matches.append((type_, identifier, side)) + return matches + + @staticmethod + def _group_by_type(references): + """Group ``(type, id, side)`` references into a deterministic message part.""" + by_type = {"user": [], "group": [], "role": []} + for type_, identifier, side in references: + by_type[type_].append(f"{identifier} ({side})") + + parts = [] + for type_ in ("user", "group", "role"): + if by_type[type_]: + joined = ", ".join(sorted(by_type[type_])) + parts.append(f"{type_}s: {joined}") + return "; ".join(parts) + + @classmethod + def _format_failure(cls, display_name, orphans, unverified, state=None): + # Surface report-only mode explicitly: the stale references are not yet + # enforced, but become live the moment the policy is turned on. + report_only = ( + " The policy is in report-only mode, so these references are not " + "enforced yet but will take effect once it is enabled." + if state == ConditionalAccessPolicyState.ENABLED_FOR_REPORTING + else "" + ) + + # If some references also could not be resolved, say so rather than + # implying the rest of the policy is fully clean. + unverified_note = ( + f" Additionally, {len(unverified)} reference(s) could not be verified " + f"due to transient Microsoft Graph errors." + if unverified + else "" + ) + + return ( + f"Conditional Access policy {display_name} references " + f"{len(orphans)} deleted directory object(s) — " + f"{cls._group_by_type(orphans)}.{report_only}{unverified_note}" + ) + + @classmethod + def _format_manual(cls, display_name, unverified): + return ( + f"Conditional Access policy {display_name} could not be fully evaluated: " + f"{len(unverified)} reference(s) could not be resolved due to transient " + f"Microsoft Graph errors (5xx, throttling, or insufficient permissions) — " + f"{cls._group_by_type(unverified)}. Re-run the scan or review the policy " + f"manually." + ) diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..35c80b8054 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +{ + "Provider": "m365", + "CheckID": "entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps", + "CheckTitle": "Conditional Access exclusions are covered by another policy (no exclusion gaps)", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "entra", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "NotDefined", + "ResourceGroup": "IAM", + "Description": "Verifies that every object excluded from an enabled Microsoft Entra **Conditional Access** policy (users, groups, roles, or applications) is still included by at least one enabled policy, so the exclusion keeps a compensating control. The Directory Synchronization Accounts role and confirmed emergency access (break glass) accounts are treated as intentional and not reported.", + "Risk": "An object excluded from a Conditional Access policy but never included by any other enabled policy sits completely outside Conditional Access enforcement. This creates a silent **MFA bypass** and **lateral movement** path: a principal exempted as a one-off remains permanently uncontrolled if no compensating policy covers it.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/plan-conditional-access", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/conditionalaccesspolicy?view=graph-rest-1.0", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/conditionalaccessusers?view=graph-rest-1.0", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/security-emergency-access" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. Navigate to Protection > Conditional Access > Policies in the Microsoft Entra admin center.\n2. For each object reported as an exclusion gap, decide whether the exclusion is still required.\n3. If the exclusion must stay, add the object to the Include scope of another enabled Conditional Access policy that enforces compensating controls (for example MFA).\n4. If the exclusion is no longer required, remove it so the object falls back under the original policy.\n5. Re-run the check to confirm no exclusion gaps remain.", + "Terraform": "" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Ensure every object excluded from a Conditional Access policy is included by at least one other enabled policy that applies compensating controls. Reserve exclusions for break-glass accounts and the Directory Synchronization Accounts role, and review exclusion lists regularly so that exempted principals never drift outside Conditional Access enforcement.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "identity-access" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [ + "entra_conditional_access_policy_directory_sync_account_excluded", + "entra_emergency_access_exclusion" + ], + "Notes": "Covers user, group, role, and application exclusions. Platform and location exclusions are out of scope because they are scoping conditions rather than principals removed from enforcement. Service-principal exclusions require additional fields on the ConditionalAccessPolicy service model." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps.py b/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0974581759 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps.py @@ -0,0 +1,262 @@ +"""Check that Conditional Access exclusions do not create coverage gaps.""" + +from collections import Counter, defaultdict + +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, CheckReportM365 +from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_client import entra_client +from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_service import ( + ConditionalAccessGrantControl, + ConditionalAccessPolicyState, +) + +# Directory Synchronization Accounts built-in role template ID. Prowler enforces +# excluding this role (see entra_conditional_access_policy_directory_sync_account_excluded); +# it is intended to have no fallback, so it never counts as a gap here. +DIRECTORY_SYNC_ROLE_TEMPLATE_ID = "d29b2b05-8046-44ba-8758-1e26182fcf32" + + +class entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps(Check): + """Check that objects excluded from Conditional Access policies remain covered. + + Excluding a principal from a Conditional Access (CA) policy is only safe when + that principal is still covered by *some* enabled CA policy that enforces + compensating controls. An object excluded everywhere and included nowhere + sits completely outside CA enforcement, which is how MFA bypass and lateral + movement against admin accounts happen in real incidents. + + For every enabled CA policy this check walks each exclusion collection and + verifies the excluded object is still in scope of another enabled policy: one + that includes it (explicitly, or via the "All" wildcard) and does not itself + exclude it. A wildcard belonging to the policy that excludes the object does + not count, so a one-off exclusion with no compensating policy is reported as + a gap. + + Only principals and target apps are evaluated (users, groups, roles, + applications). Platform and location exclusions are scoping conditions rather + than principals removed from enforcement, so they are out of scope. + + - PASS: Every excluded object stays in scope of another enabled policy, or no + enabled policy uses any exclusion. + - FAIL: At least one excluded object is in scope of no other enabled policy. + """ + + # (label, conditions attribute, included attr, excluded attr, wildcard token). + # The wildcard token, when present in an include collection, scopes a policy + # to every object of that type. Groups and roles have no wildcard: they are + # always explicit identifiers and transitive group/role expansion is out of + # scope for v1, so an excluded group/role is only "covered" when the same + # identifier is explicitly included by another enabled policy. + _COLLECTIONS = [ + ("users", "user_conditions", "included_users", "excluded_users", "All"), + ("groups", "user_conditions", "included_groups", "excluded_groups", None), + ("roles", "user_conditions", "included_roles", "excluded_roles", None), + ( + "applications", + "application_conditions", + "included_applications", + "excluded_applications", + "All", + ), + ] + + def execute(self) -> list[CheckReportM365]: + """Execute the Conditional Access exclusion-gap check. + + Returns: + list[CheckReportM365]: A single-element list with the aggregate result. + """ + report = CheckReportM365( + metadata=self.metadata(), + resource={}, + resource_name="Conditional Access Policies", + resource_id="conditionalAccessPolicies", + ) + + enabled_policies = [ + policy + for policy in entra_client.conditional_access_policies.values() + if policy.state == ConditionalAccessPolicyState.ENABLED + ] + + if not enabled_policies: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + "No enabled Conditional Access policies found; " + "no exclusion coverage gaps are possible." + ) + return [report] + + emergency_users, emergency_groups = self._emergency_access_objects() + + # gaps: type label -> set of excluded object IDs with no compensating policy + gaps = defaultdict(set) + any_exclusion = False + + for policy in enabled_policies: + for ( + label, + conditions_attr, + included_attr, + excluded_attr, + wildcard, + ) in self._COLLECTIONS: + conditions = getattr(policy.conditions, conditions_attr) + if not conditions: + continue + for object_id in getattr(conditions, excluded_attr): + any_exclusion = True + if self._is_expected_exclusion( + label, object_id, emergency_users, emergency_groups + ): + continue + if not self._is_covered( + object_id, + conditions_attr, + included_attr, + excluded_attr, + wildcard, + enabled_policies, + ): + gaps[label].add(object_id) + + if not any_exclusion: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + "No enabled Conditional Access policy uses exclusions; " + "no coverage gaps are possible." + ) + return [report] + + if not gaps: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + "Every object excluded from an enabled Conditional Access policy is " + "still in scope of another enabled policy, so a compensating control " + "remains in effect." + ) + return [report] + + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + "Conditional Access exclusion gaps found " + f"({self._format_gaps(gaps, self._build_name_index())}). These objects " + "are excluded but in scope of no other enabled policy, leaving them " + "outside CA enforcement." + ) + return [report] + + def _build_name_index(self) -> dict: + """Map excluded object IDs to display names per type, for readable findings. + + Users, groups, and applications resolve to their display name; roles have + no loaded name catalog, so role template IDs are shown as-is. Unresolved + IDs (for example deleted principals still referenced by a policy) fall + back to the raw identifier. + """ + users = { + uid: user.name + for uid, user in (getattr(entra_client, "users", {}) or {}).items() + if getattr(user, "name", None) + } + groups = { + group.id: group.name + for group in (getattr(entra_client, "groups", []) or []) + if getattr(group, "name", None) + } + applications = { + sp.app_id: sp.name + for sp in (getattr(entra_client, "service_principals", {}) or {}).values() + if getattr(sp, "app_id", None) and getattr(sp, "name", None) + } + return {"users": users, "groups": groups, "applications": applications} + + def _is_covered( + self, + object_id, + conditions_attr, + included_attr, + excluded_attr, + wildcard, + enabled_policies, + ) -> bool: + """Return True if any enabled policy keeps ``object_id`` in scope. + + A policy keeps the object in scope when it includes it —explicitly or via + the type's wildcard token— and does not also exclude it. The wildcard of a + policy that itself excludes the object does not count, which is what makes + a one-off exclusion with no compensating policy a real gap. + """ + for policy in enabled_policies: + conditions = getattr(policy.conditions, conditions_attr) + if not conditions: + continue + if object_id in getattr(conditions, excluded_attr): + continue + included = getattr(conditions, included_attr) + if object_id in included or (wildcard is not None and wildcard in included): + return True + return False + + def _emergency_access_objects(self) -> tuple[set, set]: + """Return user and group IDs that act as emergency access (break-glass). + + Objects excluded from *every* enabled (enforced) Conditional Access policy + with a Block grant control are intended, compensating gaps and must not be + reported here. Only ENABLED policies count: report-only policies are not + enforced, so including them would dilute the "excluded everywhere" check + and could hide a genuine break-glass account (consistent with execute()). + """ + blocking_policies = [ + policy + for policy in entra_client.conditional_access_policies.values() + if policy.state == ConditionalAccessPolicyState.ENABLED + and ConditionalAccessGrantControl.BLOCK + in policy.grant_controls.built_in_controls + ] + if not blocking_policies: + return set(), set() + + total = len(blocking_policies) + excluded_users = Counter() + excluded_groups = Counter() + for policy in blocking_policies: + user_conditions = policy.conditions.user_conditions + if not user_conditions: + continue + for user_id in user_conditions.excluded_users: + excluded_users[user_id] += 1 + for group_id in user_conditions.excluded_groups: + excluded_groups[group_id] += 1 + + emergency_users = {uid for uid, n in excluded_users.items() if n == total} + emergency_groups = {gid for gid, n in excluded_groups.items() if n == total} + return emergency_users, emergency_groups + + def _is_expected_exclusion( + self, label, object_id, emergency_users, emergency_groups + ) -> bool: + """Exclusions that are intentional by design and must not count as gaps.""" + if label == "roles" and object_id == DIRECTORY_SYNC_ROLE_TEMPLATE_ID: + return True + if label == "users" and object_id in emergency_users: + return True + if label == "groups" and object_id in emergency_groups: + return True + return False + + def _format_gaps(self, gaps, name_index) -> str: + """Render the orphaned objects grouped by type, by display name when known. + + Each ID is shown as its display name when resolvable; unresolved IDs (and + all roles, which have no name catalog) fall back to the raw identifier. + """ + parts = [] + for label in ("users", "groups", "roles", "applications"): + if label not in gaps: + continue + names = name_index.get(label, {}) + rendered = sorted( + names.get(object_id, object_id) for object_id in gaps[label] + ) + parts.append(f"{label}: {', '.join(rendered)}") + return " | ".join(parts) diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked/__init__.py b/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked/entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked/entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked.metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0cc14e2965 --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked/entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked.metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +{ + "Provider": "m365", + "CheckID": "entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked", + "CheckTitle": "Microsoft Entra directory sync must block object takeover (soft- and hard-matching)", + "CheckType": [], + "ServiceName": "entra", + "SubServiceName": "", + "ResourceIdTemplate": "", + "Severity": "medium", + "ResourceType": "NotDefined", + "ResourceGroup": "IAM", + "Description": "When on-premises directory synchronization is enabled, both blockSoftMatchEnabled and blockCloudObjectTakeoverThroughHardMatchEnabled must be true. Without these blocks, an attacker who can write to on-premises AD can craft an object that matches a privileged cloud account and take it over.", + "Risk": "An attacker with write access to on-premises Active Directory can create an object whose UPN, SMTP address, or ImmutableID matches an existing cloud-only account (e.g. Global Administrator). When the sync engine processes this object, it merges the on-premises identity into the cloud account, effectively granting the attacker full control of that privileged account.", + "RelatedUrl": "", + "AdditionalURLs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/onpremisesdirectorysynchronization?view=graph-rest-1.0", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/onpremisesdirectorysynchronizationfeature?view=graph-rest-1.0", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/how-to-connect-syncservice-features" + ], + "Remediation": { + "Code": { + "CLI": "", + "NativeIaC": "", + "Other": "1. Open Microsoft Entra admin center\n2. Navigate to Identity > Hybrid management > Microsoft Entra Connect > Connect Sync\n3. Enable 'Block soft match' and 'Block cloud object takeover through hard match'\n4. Alternatively, use Microsoft Graph API to set both features to true on the onPremisesDirectorySynchronization resource", + "Terraform": "" + }, + "Recommendation": { + "Text": "Enable both blockSoftMatchEnabled and blockCloudObjectTakeoverThroughHardMatchEnabled on the on-premises directory synchronization configuration. These should remain enabled permanently except during time-boxed migration windows.", + "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked" + } + }, + "Categories": [ + "identity-access", + "e3" + ], + "DependsOn": [], + "RelatedTo": [ + "entra_password_hash_sync_enabled", + "entra_seamless_sso_disabled" + ], + "Notes": "This check only applies to hybrid tenants with on-premises directory synchronization enabled. Cloud-only tenants receive a PASS since the attack path does not exist." +} diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked/entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked.py b/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked/entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d1f00a70ff --- /dev/null +++ b/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked/entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked.py @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +from typing import List + +from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, CheckReportM365 +from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_client import entra_client + + +class entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked(Check): + """Check that directory sync blocks object takeover via soft-match and hard-match. + + When on-premises directory synchronization is enabled, an attacker who can + write to on-premises AD can craft an object that matches a privileged cloud + account and take it over. Both blockSoftMatchEnabled and + blockCloudObjectTakeoverThroughHardMatchEnabled must be true to prevent this. + + The attack path only exists on hybrid tenants, so the tenant's + organization.onPremisesSyncEnabled is evaluated first. Microsoft Graph + returns an onPremisesSynchronization object (with all features disabled) even + for cloud-only tenants, so the directory sync features must not be evaluated + unless on-premises synchronization is actually enabled. + + - PASS: The tenant is cloud-only, or both block flags are enabled. + - FAIL: On-premises sync is enabled and either block flag is disabled. + - MANUAL: On-premises sync is enabled but the settings cannot be read + (insufficient permissions) or were not returned by Microsoft Graph. + """ + + def execute(self) -> List[CheckReportM365]: + findings = [] + + organizations = entra_client.organizations or [] + on_premises_sync_enabled = any( + organization.on_premises_sync_enabled for organization in organizations + ) + + # Cloud-only tenant: the object takeover attack path does not exist, so + # the directory sync features are not evaluated even if Microsoft Graph + # returns an (all-disabled) onPremisesSynchronization object. + if organizations and not on_premises_sync_enabled: + for organization in organizations: + report = CheckReportM365( + self.metadata(), + resource=organization, + resource_id=organization.id, + resource_name=organization.name, + ) + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Entra organization {organization.name} is cloud-only " + "(no on-premises sync), object takeover protection is not " + "applicable." + ) + findings.append(report) + return findings + + # Hybrid tenant but the directory sync settings could not be read. + if entra_client.directory_sync_error: + for organization in organizations: + report = CheckReportM365( + self.metadata(), + resource=organization, + resource_id=organization.id, + resource_name=organization.name, + ) + report.status = "MANUAL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Cannot verify object takeover protection for " + f"{organization.name}: {entra_client.directory_sync_error}." + ) + findings.append(report) + return findings + + for sync_settings in entra_client.directory_sync_settings: + report = CheckReportM365( + self.metadata(), + resource=sync_settings, + resource_id=sync_settings.id, + resource_name=f"Directory Sync {sync_settings.id}", + ) + + disabled_flags = [] + if not sync_settings.block_soft_match_enabled: + disabled_flags.append("blockSoftMatchEnabled") + if not sync_settings.block_cloud_object_takeover_through_hard_match_enabled: + disabled_flags.append("blockCloudObjectTakeoverThroughHardMatchEnabled") + + if not disabled_flags: + report.status = "PASS" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Entra directory sync {sync_settings.id} blocks both soft-match " + "and hard-match object takeover." + ) + else: + report.status = "FAIL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Entra directory sync {sync_settings.id} does not block object " + f"takeover: {', '.join(disabled_flags)} disabled." + ) + + findings.append(report) + + # Hybrid tenant that reported on-premises sync but returned no settings. + if not entra_client.directory_sync_settings: + for organization in organizations: + report = CheckReportM365( + self.metadata(), + resource=organization, + resource_id=organization.id, + resource_name=organization.name, + ) + report.status = "MANUAL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Entra organization {organization.name} has on-premises sync " + "enabled, but no directory sync settings were returned. Review " + "the tenant configuration manually." + ) + findings.append(report) + + return findings diff --git a/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_service.py b/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_service.py index 20f2dbf3a3..bbaa80edcc 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_service.py +++ b/prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_service.py @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import json from asyncio import gather from datetime import datetime, timezone from enum import Enum -from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Tuple +from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Set, Tuple from uuid import UUID from kiota_abstractions.base_request_configuration import RequestConfiguration @@ -18,6 +18,12 @@ from prowler.lib.logger import logger from prowler.providers.m365.lib.service.service import M365Service from prowler.providers.m365.m365_provider import M365Provider +# Sentinel identifiers used in Conditional Access ``conditions.users`` +# collections that do not correspond to real directory objects and must not be +# resolved against Graph. Shared by the resolver below and the check that reads +# its result. +CONDITIONAL_ACCESS_SENTINEL_IDS = {"All", "None", "GuestsOrExternalUsers"} + class Entra(M365Service): """ @@ -110,6 +116,23 @@ class Entra(M365Service): self.app_registrations: Dict[str, "AppRegistration"] = attributes[11] self.user_accounts_status = {} + # Resolve directory-object identifiers referenced by Conditional Access + # policies. This runs as a separate phase because it depends on the + # main gather having populated ``conditional_access_policies`` first. + # The result is cached on the instance so sync checks can read it + # without issuing Graph calls of their own. ``unresolved`` holds ids + # confirmed deleted (HTTP 404); ``errored`` holds ids whose lookup + # failed for any other reason (5xx, throttling, permission) and could + # therefore be neither confirmed present nor confirmed deleted. + self.unresolved_directory_object_references: Set[Tuple[str, str]] + self.errored_directory_object_references: Set[Tuple[str, str]] + ( + self.unresolved_directory_object_references, + self.errored_directory_object_references, + ) = loop.run_until_complete( + self._resolve_directory_object_references(self.conditional_access_policies) + ) + if created_loop: asyncio.set_event_loop(None) loop.close() @@ -791,6 +814,16 @@ class Entra(M365Service): features, "seamless_sso_enabled", False ) or False, + block_soft_match_enabled=getattr( + features, "block_soft_match_enabled", False + ) + or False, + block_cloud_object_takeover_through_hard_match_enabled=getattr( + features, + "block_cloud_object_takeover_through_hard_match_enabled", + False, + ) + or False, ) ) except ODataError as error: @@ -1369,6 +1402,130 @@ OAuthAppInfo ) return app_registrations + async def _resolve_directory_object_references( + self, + policies: Dict[str, "ConditionalAccessPolicy"], + ) -> Tuple[Set[Tuple[str, str]], Set[Tuple[str, str]]]: + """Resolve every user/group/role identifier referenced by CA policies. + + Walks the inclusion/exclusion collections of every loaded Conditional + Access policy, deduplicates the resulting identifiers per type, and + queries Microsoft Graph for each one. Identifiers that return HTTP 404 + are reported as deleted. Non-404 errors (5xx, throttling, permission, + transient network failures) are reported as unresolvable: they must not + be flagged as deletions, but they must also not be silently treated as + clean resolutions, so the downstream check surfaces them as MANUAL. + + The sentinel values ``All``, ``None``, and ``GuestsOrExternalUsers`` + are not directory identifiers and are excluded before any Graph call. + + Args: + policies: Conditional Access policies keyed by policy ID. + + Returns: + Tuple[Set[Tuple[str, str]], Set[Tuple[str, str]]]: A pair of + ``(type, identifier)`` sets. The first holds identifiers that + failed to resolve via Graph with HTTP 404 (deleted); the second + holds identifiers whose lookup failed for any other reason and + could be neither confirmed present nor confirmed deleted. + """ + logger.info( + "Entra - Resolving directory-object references in Conditional " + "Access policies..." + ) + + ids_by_type: Dict[str, Set[str]] = { + "user": set(), + "group": set(), + "role": set(), + } + + for policy in policies.values(): + if not getattr(policy, "conditions", None): + continue + user_conditions = getattr(policy.conditions, "user_conditions", None) + if user_conditions is None: + continue + for ident in (user_conditions.included_users or []) + ( + user_conditions.excluded_users or [] + ): + if ident and ident not in CONDITIONAL_ACCESS_SENTINEL_IDS: + ids_by_type["user"].add(ident) + for ident in (user_conditions.included_groups or []) + ( + user_conditions.excluded_groups or [] + ): + if ident and ident not in CONDITIONAL_ACCESS_SENTINEL_IDS: + ids_by_type["group"].add(ident) + for ident in (user_conditions.included_roles or []) + ( + user_conditions.excluded_roles or [] + ): + if ident and ident not in CONDITIONAL_ACCESS_SENTINEL_IDS: + ids_by_type["role"].add(ident) + + unresolved: Set[Tuple[str, str]] = set() + errored: Set[Tuple[str, str]] = set() + + # Resolve types in parallel; within a type, walk identifiers serially + # to keep concurrent Graph calls bounded and avoid throttling. + await gather( + self._resolve_identifiers_for_type( + "user", ids_by_type["user"], unresolved, errored + ), + self._resolve_identifiers_for_type( + "group", ids_by_type["group"], unresolved, errored + ), + self._resolve_identifiers_for_type( + "role", ids_by_type["role"], unresolved, errored + ), + ) + return unresolved, errored + + async def _resolve_identifiers_for_type( + self, + type_: str, + identifiers: Set[str], + unresolved: Set[Tuple[str, str]], + errored: Set[Tuple[str, str]], + ) -> None: + """Resolve a set of identifiers of a given type, mutating the result sets. + + Only HTTP 404 (or ``Request_ResourceNotFound``) responses add to + ``unresolved``. Every other error (5xx, throttling, permission, or an + unexpected exception) is logged and added to ``errored`` so the check + can report it as unverified instead of silently treating it as clean. + """ + for identifier in identifiers: + try: + if type_ == "user": + await self.client.users.by_user_id(identifier).get() + elif type_ == "group": + await self.client.groups.by_group_id(identifier).get() + elif type_ == "role": + await self.client.role_management.directory.role_definitions.by_unified_role_definition_id( + identifier + ).get() + else: + continue + except ODataError as error: + status_code = getattr(error, "response_status_code", None) + error_code = getattr(error.error, "code", None) if error.error else None + if status_code == 404 or error_code == "Request_ResourceNotFound": + unresolved.add((type_, identifier)) + else: + errored.add((type_, identifier)) + logger.warning( + f"Entra - Could not resolve {type_} '{identifier}' for " + f"Conditional Access reference check: " + f"{error.__class__.__name__}: {error}" + ) + except Exception as error: + errored.add((type_, identifier)) + logger.warning( + f"Entra - Unexpected error resolving {type_} '{identifier}' " + f"for Conditional Access reference check: " + f"{error.__class__.__name__}: {error}" + ) + class ConditionalAccessPolicyState(Enum): ENABLED = "enabled" @@ -1637,6 +1794,8 @@ class DirectorySyncSettings(BaseModel): id: str password_sync_enabled: bool = False seamless_sso_enabled: bool = False + block_soft_match_enabled: bool = False + block_cloud_object_takeover_through_hard_match_enabled: bool = False class AuthenticationMethodConfiguration(BaseModel): diff --git a/prowler/providers/mongodbatlas/mongodbatlas_provider.py b/prowler/providers/mongodbatlas/mongodbatlas_provider.py index c40f1ced6e..07ff6f86cc 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/mongodbatlas/mongodbatlas_provider.py +++ b/prowler/providers/mongodbatlas/mongodbatlas_provider.py @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ class MongodbatlasProvider(Provider): """ _type: str = "mongodbatlas" + sdk_only: bool = False _session: MongoDBAtlasSession _identity: MongoDBAtlasIdentityInfo _audit_config: dict diff --git a/prowler/providers/okta/okta_provider.py b/prowler/providers/okta/okta_provider.py index 8859507ec7..f046dd2e35 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/okta/okta_provider.py +++ b/prowler/providers/okta/okta_provider.py @@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ class OktaProvider(Provider): """ _type: str = "okta" + sdk_only: bool = False _auth_method: str = None _session: OktaSession _identity: OktaIdentityInfo diff --git a/prowler/providers/openstack/openstack_provider.py b/prowler/providers/openstack/openstack_provider.py index e81a399478..e11c4f7909 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/openstack/openstack_provider.py +++ b/prowler/providers/openstack/openstack_provider.py @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ class OpenstackProvider(Provider): """OpenStack provider responsible for bootstrapping the SDK session.""" _type: str = "openstack" + sdk_only: bool = False _session: OpenStackSession _identity: OpenStackIdentityInfo _audit_config: dict diff --git a/prowler/providers/openstack/services/blockstorage/blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data/blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/openstack/services/blockstorage/blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data/blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data.metadata.json index 597d3ab4d4..bd83049d82 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/openstack/services/blockstorage/blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data/blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data.metadata.json +++ b/prowler/providers/openstack/services/blockstorage/blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data/blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data.metadata.json @@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ "RelatedTo": [ "blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data" ], - "Notes": "This check uses the detect-secrets library to scan for credentials. May produce false positives on metadata keys containing secret-like keywords. Findings should be reviewed manually. The audit_config allows configuring secrets_ignore_patterns to exclude specific patterns and detect_secrets_plugins to customize detection." + "Notes": "This check uses Kingfisher to scan for credentials. May produce false positives on metadata keys containing secret-like keywords. Findings should be reviewed manually. The audit_config allows configuring secrets_ignore_patterns to exclude specific patterns." } diff --git a/prowler/providers/openstack/services/blockstorage/blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data/blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data.py b/prowler/providers/openstack/services/blockstorage/blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data/blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data.py index 95de628871..51e25bc5eb 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/openstack/services/blockstorage/blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data/blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data.py +++ b/prowler/providers/openstack/services/blockstorage/blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data/blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data.py @@ -2,7 +2,11 @@ import json from typing import List from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, CheckReportOpenStack -from prowler.lib.utils.utils import detect_secrets_scan +from prowler.lib.utils.utils import ( + SecretsScanError, + annotate_verified_secrets, + detect_secrets_scan_batch, +) from prowler.providers.openstack.services.blockstorage.blockstorage_client import ( blockstorage_client, ) @@ -16,30 +20,42 @@ class blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data(Check): secrets_ignore_patterns = blockstorage_client.audit_config.get( "secrets_ignore_patterns", [] ) + validate = blockstorage_client.audit_config.get("secrets_validate", False) + snapshots = list(blockstorage_client.snapshots) - for snapshot in blockstorage_client.snapshots: + # Collect one payload per snapshot (its metadata) and scan them all in + # batched Kingfisher invocations instead of one subprocess per snapshot. + def payloads(): + for index, snapshot in enumerate(snapshots): + if snapshot.metadata: + yield index, json.dumps(dict(snapshot.metadata), indent=2) + + scan_error = None + try: + batch_results = detect_secrets_scan_batch( + payloads(), excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, validate=validate + ) + except SecretsScanError as error: + batch_results = {} + scan_error = error + + for index, snapshot in enumerate(snapshots): report = CheckReportOpenStack(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=snapshot) report.status = "PASS" report.status_extended = f"Snapshot {snapshot.name} ({snapshot.id}) metadata does not contain sensitive data." if snapshot.metadata: - # Build metadata dict and parallel list of keys - dump_metadata = {} - original_metadata_keys = [] - for key, value in snapshot.metadata.items(): - dump_metadata[key] = value - original_metadata_keys.append(key) - - # Convert metadata dict to JSON string for detect-secrets scanning - metadata_json = json.dumps(dump_metadata, indent=2) - detect_secrets_output = detect_secrets_scan( - data=metadata_json, - excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, - detect_secrets_plugins=blockstorage_client.audit_config.get( - "detect_secrets_plugins" - ), - ) - + if scan_error: + report.status = "MANUAL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Could not scan snapshot {snapshot.name} ({snapshot.id}) " + f"metadata for secrets: {scan_error}; manual review is " + "required." + ) + findings.append(report) + continue + original_metadata_keys = list(snapshot.metadata.keys()) + detect_secrets_output = batch_results.get(index) if detect_secrets_output: # Map line numbers back to metadata keys using the parallel list # Line numbering: line 1 = "{", line 2 = first key-value, etc. @@ -54,6 +70,7 @@ class blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data(Check): ) report.status = "FAIL" report.status_extended = f"Snapshot {snapshot.name} ({snapshot.id}) metadata contains potential secrets -> {secrets_string}." + annotate_verified_secrets(report, detect_secrets_output) else: report.status_extended = f"Snapshot {snapshot.name} ({snapshot.id}) has no metadata (no sensitive data exposure risk)." diff --git a/prowler/providers/openstack/services/blockstorage/blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data/blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/openstack/services/blockstorage/blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data/blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data.metadata.json index ec17ee02d1..79874db214 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/openstack/services/blockstorage/blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data/blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data.metadata.json +++ b/prowler/providers/openstack/services/blockstorage/blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data/blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data.metadata.json @@ -34,5 +34,5 @@ ], "DependsOn": [], "RelatedTo": [], - "Notes": "This check uses the detect-secrets library to scan for credentials. May produce false positives on metadata keys containing secret-like keywords. Findings should be reviewed manually. The audit_config allows configuring secrets_ignore_patterns to exclude specific patterns and detect_secrets_plugins to customize detection." + "Notes": "This check uses Kingfisher to scan for credentials. May produce false positives on metadata keys containing secret-like keywords. Findings should be reviewed manually. The audit_config allows configuring secrets_ignore_patterns to exclude specific patterns." } diff --git a/prowler/providers/openstack/services/blockstorage/blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data/blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data.py b/prowler/providers/openstack/services/blockstorage/blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data/blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data.py index 1bfa84c3df..48e064642a 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/openstack/services/blockstorage/blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data/blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data.py +++ b/prowler/providers/openstack/services/blockstorage/blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data/blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data.py @@ -2,7 +2,11 @@ import json from typing import List from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, CheckReportOpenStack -from prowler.lib.utils.utils import detect_secrets_scan +from prowler.lib.utils.utils import ( + SecretsScanError, + annotate_verified_secrets, + detect_secrets_scan_batch, +) from prowler.providers.openstack.services.blockstorage.blockstorage_client import ( blockstorage_client, ) @@ -16,30 +20,41 @@ class blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data(Check): secrets_ignore_patterns = blockstorage_client.audit_config.get( "secrets_ignore_patterns", [] ) + validate = blockstorage_client.audit_config.get("secrets_validate", False) + volumes = list(blockstorage_client.volumes) - for volume in blockstorage_client.volumes: + # Collect one payload per volume (its metadata) and scan them all in + # batched Kingfisher invocations instead of one subprocess per volume. + def payloads(): + for index, volume in enumerate(volumes): + if volume.metadata: + yield index, json.dumps(dict(volume.metadata), indent=2) + + scan_error = None + try: + batch_results = detect_secrets_scan_batch( + payloads(), excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, validate=validate + ) + except SecretsScanError as error: + batch_results = {} + scan_error = error + + for index, volume in enumerate(volumes): report = CheckReportOpenStack(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=volume) report.status = "PASS" report.status_extended = f"Volume {volume.name} ({volume.id}) metadata does not contain sensitive data." if volume.metadata: - # Build metadata dict and parallel list of keys - dump_metadata = {} - original_metadata_keys = [] - for key, value in volume.metadata.items(): - dump_metadata[key] = value - original_metadata_keys.append(key) - - # Convert metadata dict to JSON string for detect-secrets scanning - metadata_json = json.dumps(dump_metadata, indent=2) - detect_secrets_output = detect_secrets_scan( - data=metadata_json, - excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, - detect_secrets_plugins=blockstorage_client.audit_config.get( - "detect_secrets_plugins" - ), - ) - + if scan_error: + report.status = "MANUAL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Could not scan volume {volume.name} ({volume.id}) metadata " + f"for secrets: {scan_error}; manual review is required." + ) + findings.append(report) + continue + original_metadata_keys = list(volume.metadata.keys()) + detect_secrets_output = batch_results.get(index) if detect_secrets_output: # Map line numbers back to metadata keys using the parallel list # Line numbering: line 1 = "{", line 2 = first key-value, etc. @@ -54,6 +69,7 @@ class blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data(Check): ) report.status = "FAIL" report.status_extended = f"Volume {volume.name} ({volume.id}) metadata contains potential secrets -> {secrets_string}." + annotate_verified_secrets(report, detect_secrets_output) else: report.status_extended = f"Volume {volume.name} ({volume.id}) has no metadata (no sensitive data exposure risk)." diff --git a/prowler/providers/openstack/services/compute/compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data/compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/openstack/services/compute/compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data/compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data.metadata.json index 015a00986d..c7f3e41f8e 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/openstack/services/compute/compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data/compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data.metadata.json +++ b/prowler/providers/openstack/services/compute/compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data/compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data.metadata.json @@ -34,5 +34,5 @@ ], "DependsOn": [], "RelatedTo": [], - "Notes": "This check uses the detect-secrets library to scan for credentials. May produce false positives on metadata keys containing secret-like keywords. Findings should be reviewed manually. The audit_config allows configuring secrets_ignore_patterns to exclude specific patterns and detect_secrets_plugins to customize detection. Metadata is world-readable within instance via 169.254.169.254." + "Notes": "This check uses Kingfisher to scan for credentials. May produce false positives on metadata keys containing secret-like keywords. Findings should be reviewed manually. The audit_config allows configuring secrets_ignore_patterns to exclude specific patterns. Metadata is world-readable within instance via 169.254.169.254." } diff --git a/prowler/providers/openstack/services/compute/compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data/compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data.py b/prowler/providers/openstack/services/compute/compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data/compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data.py index 5df151c939..0627862da9 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/openstack/services/compute/compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data/compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data.py +++ b/prowler/providers/openstack/services/compute/compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data/compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data.py @@ -2,7 +2,11 @@ import json from typing import List from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, CheckReportOpenStack -from prowler.lib.utils.utils import detect_secrets_scan +from prowler.lib.utils.utils import ( + SecretsScanError, + annotate_verified_secrets, + detect_secrets_scan_batch, +) from prowler.providers.openstack.services.compute.compute_client import compute_client @@ -14,30 +18,42 @@ class compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data(Check): secrets_ignore_patterns = compute_client.audit_config.get( "secrets_ignore_patterns", [] ) + validate = compute_client.audit_config.get("secrets_validate", False) + instances = list(compute_client.instances) - for instance in compute_client.instances: + # Collect one payload per instance (its metadata) and scan them all in + # batched Kingfisher invocations instead of one subprocess per instance. + def payloads(): + for index, instance in enumerate(instances): + if instance.metadata: + yield index, json.dumps(dict(instance.metadata), indent=2) + + scan_error = None + try: + batch_results = detect_secrets_scan_batch( + payloads(), excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, validate=validate + ) + except SecretsScanError as error: + batch_results = {} + scan_error = error + + for index, instance in enumerate(instances): report = CheckReportOpenStack(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=instance) report.status = "PASS" report.status_extended = f"Instance {instance.name} ({instance.id}) metadata does not contain sensitive data." if instance.metadata: - # Build metadata dict and parallel list of keys (similar to AWS ECS pattern) - dump_metadata = {} - original_metadata_keys = [] - for key, value in instance.metadata.items(): - dump_metadata[key] = value - original_metadata_keys.append(key) - - # Convert metadata dict to JSON string for detect-secrets scanning - metadata_json = json.dumps(dump_metadata, indent=2) - detect_secrets_output = detect_secrets_scan( - data=metadata_json, - excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, - detect_secrets_plugins=compute_client.audit_config.get( - "detect_secrets_plugins" - ), - ) - + if scan_error: + report.status = "MANUAL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Could not scan instance {instance.name} ({instance.id}) " + f"metadata for secrets: {scan_error}; manual review is " + "required." + ) + findings.append(report) + continue + original_metadata_keys = list(instance.metadata.keys()) + detect_secrets_output = batch_results.get(index) if detect_secrets_output: # Map line numbers back to metadata keys using the parallel list # Line numbering: line 1 = "{", line 2 = first key-value, etc. @@ -45,11 +61,14 @@ class compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data(Check): [ f"{secret['type']} in metadata key '{original_metadata_keys[secret['line_number'] - 2]}'" for secret in detect_secrets_output - if secret["line_number"] - 2 < len(original_metadata_keys) + if 0 + <= secret["line_number"] - 2 + < len(original_metadata_keys) ] ) report.status = "FAIL" report.status_extended = f"Instance {instance.name} ({instance.id}) metadata contains potential secrets -> {secrets_string}." + annotate_verified_secrets(report, detect_secrets_output) else: report.status_extended = f"Instance {instance.name} ({instance.id}) has no metadata (no sensitive data exposure risk)." diff --git a/prowler/providers/openstack/services/objectstorage/objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data/objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data.metadata.json b/prowler/providers/openstack/services/objectstorage/objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data/objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data.metadata.json index b3a39bd3f8..37e7563c27 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/openstack/services/objectstorage/objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data/objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data.metadata.json +++ b/prowler/providers/openstack/services/objectstorage/objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data/objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data.metadata.json @@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ ], "DependsOn": [], "RelatedTo": [], - "Notes": "This check uses the detect-secrets library to scan for credentials. May produce false positives on metadata keys containing secret-like keywords. Findings should be reviewed manually. The audit_config allows configuring secrets_ignore_patterns to exclude specific patterns and detect_secrets_plugins to customize detection." + "Notes": "This check uses Kingfisher to scan for credentials. May produce false positives on metadata keys containing secret-like keywords. Findings should be reviewed manually. The audit_config allows configuring secrets_ignore_patterns to exclude specific patterns." } diff --git a/prowler/providers/openstack/services/objectstorage/objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data/objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data.py b/prowler/providers/openstack/services/objectstorage/objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data/objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data.py index 94d281bf32..549be81046 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/openstack/services/objectstorage/objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data/objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data.py +++ b/prowler/providers/openstack/services/objectstorage/objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data/objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data.py @@ -2,7 +2,11 @@ import json from typing import List from prowler.lib.check.models import Check, CheckReportOpenStack -from prowler.lib.utils.utils import detect_secrets_scan +from prowler.lib.utils.utils import ( + SecretsScanError, + annotate_verified_secrets, + detect_secrets_scan_batch, +) from prowler.providers.openstack.services.objectstorage.objectstorage_client import ( objectstorage_client, ) @@ -16,8 +20,26 @@ class objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data(Check): secrets_ignore_patterns = objectstorage_client.audit_config.get( "secrets_ignore_patterns", [] ) + validate = objectstorage_client.audit_config.get("secrets_validate", False) + containers = list(objectstorage_client.containers) - for container in objectstorage_client.containers: + # Collect one payload per container (its metadata) and scan them all in + # batched Kingfisher invocations instead of one subprocess per container. + def payloads(): + for index, container in enumerate(containers): + if container.metadata: + yield index, json.dumps(dict(container.metadata), indent=2) + + scan_error = None + try: + batch_results = detect_secrets_scan_batch( + payloads(), excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, validate=validate + ) + except SecretsScanError as error: + batch_results = {} + scan_error = error + + for index, container in enumerate(containers): report = CheckReportOpenStack(metadata=self.metadata(), resource=container) report.status = "PASS" report.status_extended = ( @@ -25,23 +47,16 @@ class objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data(Check): ) if container.metadata: - # Build metadata dict and parallel list of keys - dump_metadata = {} - original_metadata_keys = [] - for key, value in container.metadata.items(): - dump_metadata[key] = value - original_metadata_keys.append(key) - - # Convert metadata dict to JSON string for detect-secrets scanning - metadata_json = json.dumps(dump_metadata, indent=2) - detect_secrets_output = detect_secrets_scan( - data=metadata_json, - excluded_secrets=secrets_ignore_patterns, - detect_secrets_plugins=objectstorage_client.audit_config.get( - "detect_secrets_plugins" - ), - ) - + if scan_error: + report.status = "MANUAL" + report.status_extended = ( + f"Could not scan container {container.name} metadata for " + f"secrets: {scan_error}; manual review is required." + ) + findings.append(report) + continue + original_metadata_keys = list(container.metadata.keys()) + detect_secrets_output = batch_results.get(index) if detect_secrets_output: # Map line numbers back to metadata keys using the parallel list # Line numbering: line 1 = "{", line 2 = first key-value, etc. @@ -56,6 +71,7 @@ class objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data(Check): ) report.status = "FAIL" report.status_extended = f"Container {container.name} metadata contains potential secrets -> {secrets_string}." + annotate_verified_secrets(report, detect_secrets_output) else: report.status_extended = f"Container {container.name} has no metadata (no sensitive data exposure risk)." diff --git a/prowler/providers/oraclecloud/oraclecloud_provider.py b/prowler/providers/oraclecloud/oraclecloud_provider.py index 5aa959d985..b498bbb502 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/oraclecloud/oraclecloud_provider.py +++ b/prowler/providers/oraclecloud/oraclecloud_provider.py @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ class OraclecloudProvider(Provider): """ _type: str = "oraclecloud" + sdk_only: bool = False _identity: OCIIdentityInfo _session: OCISession _audit_config: dict diff --git a/prowler/providers/vercel/vercel_provider.py b/prowler/providers/vercel/vercel_provider.py index 54ab4627a9..3de89becbe 100644 --- a/prowler/providers/vercel/vercel_provider.py +++ b/prowler/providers/vercel/vercel_provider.py @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ class VercelProvider(Provider): """Vercel provider.""" _type: str = "vercel" + sdk_only: bool = False _session: VercelSession _identity: VercelIdentityInfo _audit_config: dict diff --git a/pyproject.toml b/pyproject.toml index 41fec77a42..a645bd0d10 100644 --- a/pyproject.toml +++ b/pyproject.toml @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ requires = ["hatchling"] [dependency-groups] dev = [ "bandit==1.8.3", - "black==25.1.0", + "black==26.3.1", "coverage==7.6.12", "docker==7.1.0", "filelock==3.20.3", @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ dev = [ "openapi-spec-validator==0.7.1", "prek==0.3.9", "pylint==3.3.4", - "pytest==8.3.5", + "pytest==9.0.3", "pytest-cov==6.0.0", "pytest-env==1.1.5", "pytest-randomly==3.16.0", @@ -32,10 +32,10 @@ classifiers = [ "Programming Language :: Python :: 3", "Programming Language :: Python :: 3.10", "Programming Language :: Python :: 3.11", - "Programming Language :: Python :: 3.12" + "Programming Language :: Python :: 3.12", + "Programming Language :: Python :: 3.13" ] dependencies = [ - "awsipranges==0.3.3", "alive-progress==3.3.0", "azure-identity==1.21.0", "azure-keyvault-keys==4.10.0", @@ -72,16 +72,17 @@ dependencies = [ "dash==3.1.1", "dash-bootstrap-components==2.0.3", "defusedxml==0.7.1", - "detect-secrets==1.5.0", "dulwich==1.2.5", "google-api-python-client==2.163.0", "google-auth-httplib2==0.2.0", "jsonschema==4.23.0", + "kingfisher-bin==1.104.0", "kubernetes==32.0.1", + "linode-api4==5.45.0", "markdown==3.10.2", - "microsoft-kiota-abstractions==1.9.2", + "microsoft-kiota-abstractions==1.9.9", + "numpy==2.2.6", "msgraph-sdk==1.55.0", - "numpy==2.0.2", "okta==3.4.2", "openstacksdk==4.2.0", "pandas==2.2.3", @@ -100,7 +101,7 @@ dependencies = [ "tabulate==0.9.0", "tzlocal==5.3.1", "uuid6==2024.7.10", - "py-iam-expand==0.1.0", + "py-iam-expand==0.3.0", "h2==4.3.0", "oci==2.169.0", "alibabacloud_credentials==1.0.3", @@ -123,8 +124,8 @@ license = "Apache-2.0" maintainers = [{name = "Prowler Engineering", email = "engineering@prowler.com"}] name = "prowler" readme = "README.md" -requires-python = ">=3.10,<3.13" -version = "5.31.0" +requires-python = ">=3.10,<3.14" +version = "5.32.0" [project.scripts] prowler = "prowler.__main__:prowler" @@ -162,7 +163,7 @@ constraint-dependencies = [ "aenum==3.1.17", "aiofiles==24.1.0", "aiohappyeyeballs==2.6.1", - "aiohttp==3.13.5", + "aiohttp==3.14.0", "aiosignal==1.4.0", "alibabacloud-actiontrail20200706==2.4.1", "alibabacloud-credentials==1.0.3", @@ -205,7 +206,7 @@ constraint-dependencies = [ "azure-core==1.41.0", "azure-mgmt-core==1.6.0", "bandit==1.8.3", - "black==25.1.0", + "black==26.3.1", "blinker==1.9.0", "certifi==2026.4.22", "cffi==2.0.0", @@ -218,6 +219,7 @@ constraint-dependencies = [ "coverage==7.6.12", "darabonba-core==1.0.5", "decorator==5.2.1", + "deprecated==1.3.1", "dill==0.4.1", "distro==1.9.0", "dnspython==2.8.0", @@ -267,12 +269,12 @@ constraint-dependencies = [ "markupsafe==3.0.3", "mccabe==0.7.0", "mdurl==0.1.2", - "microsoft-kiota-authentication-azure==1.9.2", - "microsoft-kiota-http==1.9.2", - "microsoft-kiota-serialization-form==1.9.2", - "microsoft-kiota-serialization-json==1.9.2", - "microsoft-kiota-serialization-multipart==1.9.2", - "microsoft-kiota-serialization-text==1.9.2", + "microsoft-kiota-authentication-azure==1.9.9", + "microsoft-kiota-http==1.9.9", + "microsoft-kiota-serialization-form==1.9.9", + "microsoft-kiota-serialization-json==1.9.9", + "microsoft-kiota-serialization-multipart==1.9.9", + "microsoft-kiota-serialization-text==1.9.9", "mock==5.2.0", "moto==5.1.11", "mpmath==1.3.0", @@ -300,6 +302,7 @@ constraint-dependencies = [ "platformdirs==4.9.6", "plotly==6.7.0", "pluggy==1.6.0", + "polling==0.3.2", "prek==0.3.9", "propcache==0.5.2", "proto-plus==1.28.0", @@ -320,11 +323,12 @@ constraint-dependencies = [ "pynacl==1.6.2", "pyopenssl==26.2.0", "pyparsing==3.3.2", - "pytest==8.3.5", + "pytest==9.0.3", "pytest-cov==6.0.0", "pytest-env==1.1.5", "pytest-randomly==3.16.0", "pytest-xdist==3.6.1", + "pytokens==0.4.1", "pywin32==311", "pyyaml==6.0.3", "referencing==0.36.2", @@ -364,3 +368,13 @@ constraint-dependencies = [ "zstd==1.5.7.3" ] override-dependencies = ["okta==3.4.2"] + +[tool.vulture] +# Suppress known false positives. The CI command only passes --exclude and +# --min-confidence on the CLI, so ignore_names from here still applies (vulture +# only overrides the keys set on the CLI). +# - mock_* : pytest fixtures injected as test params but unused in the body +# (e.g. mock_sensitive_args in tests/lib/cli/redact_test.py) +# - view : DRF BasePermission.has_object_permission(self, request, view, obj) +# framework-required signature param in skills/django-drf template assets +ignore_names = ["mock_*", "view"] diff --git a/scripts/development/dev-local.sh b/scripts/development/dev-local.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000000..d193b81532 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/development/dev-local.sh @@ -0,0 +1,558 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env bash +# +# Local dev for Prowler API + worker. +# Postgres / Valkey / Neo4j run in Docker via docker-compose-dev.yml; +# Django and Celery run natively. +# +# Quick start: +# make dev-setup first-time bootstrap (deps, migrations, fixtures) +# make dev launch api + worker + postgres logs in tmux +# make dev-attach attach to the tmux session in the current terminal pane +# make dev-launch use fixed ports and attach interactive local dev +# make dev-stop stop everything: tmux + stop + remove containers +# make dev-clean remove stopped containers only (data preserved) +# make dev-wipe full nuke: kill + clean + delete ./_data/ +# +# Agent / non-interactive usage: 'make dev' is idempotent, runs +# everything detached, blocks until the API answers HTTP, and ends with +# parseable key=value lines (api_url=, api_log=, worker_log=, +# postgres_log=, attach_cmd=, stop_cmd=). +# Every pane is teed ANSI-stripped to _data/logs/{api,worker,postgres}.log +# (truncated per run), so logs are readable with tail -f, no tmux needed. +# +# 'attach' attaches to tmux inside the current terminal pane. +# +# Inside the tmux session "prowler-dev-" the prefix key is Ctrl+b. After it: +# d detach (everything keeps running; reattach: make dev-attach) +# move between panes +# z zoom current pane (toggle) +# [ scrollback mode (q to exit) +# x kill current pane (asks for confirmation) +# & kill current window +# :kill-session end the whole session +# +# How to stop everything from inside tmux: +# 1) Ctrl+b then d detach back to your shell +# 2) make dev-stop tears down tmux + containers +# Alternative without detaching: open a new tmux window with Ctrl+b then c +# and run make dev-stop there; the session will close itself. +# +# Stop just the python procs (keep containers up to skip a slow neo4j boot next time): +# ./scripts/development/dev-local.sh down +# +set -euo pipefail + +SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)" +REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)" +cd "$REPO_ROOT" + +path_hash() { + if command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then + printf '%s' "$REPO_ROOT" | shasum | awk '{print substr($1, 1, 8)}' + else + printf '%s' "$REPO_ROOT" | cksum | awk '{print $1}' + fi +} + +compose_project_default() { + local base hash + base="$(basename "$REPO_ROOT" | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]' | sed -E 's/[^a-z0-9_-]+/-/g; s/^-+//; s/-+$//')" + hash="$(path_hash)" + printf '%s-%s' "${base:-prowler}" "$hash" +} + +export COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME="${COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME:-$(compose_project_default)}" + +if [ -f .env ]; then + set -a + # shellcheck disable=SC1091 + . ./.env + set +a +fi + +export POSTGRES_HOST=localhost +export POSTGRES_PORT="${POSTGRES_PORT:-5432}" +export VALKEY_HOST=localhost +export VALKEY_PORT="${VALKEY_PORT:-6379}" +export VALKEY_SCHEME="${VALKEY_SCHEME:-redis}" +export NEO4J_HOST=localhost +export NEO4J_PORT="${NEO4J_PORT:-7687}" +export NEO4J_HTTP_PORT="${NEO4J_HTTP_PORT:-7474}" +export DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE=config.django.devel +export DJANGO_DEBUG="${DJANGO_DEBUG:-True}" +export DJANGO_PORT="${DJANGO_PORT:-8080}" +export DJANGO_LOGGING_FORMATTER="${DJANGO_LOGGING_FORMATTER:-human_readable}" +export DJANGO_LOGGING_LEVEL="${DJANGO_LOGGING_LEVEL:-info}" +export DJANGO_MANAGE_DB_PARTITIONS="${DJANGO_MANAGE_DB_PARTITIONS:-False}" + +if docker compose version >/dev/null 2>&1; then + COMPOSE=(docker compose) +else + COMPOSE=(docker-compose) +fi +COMPOSE_FILE="docker-compose-dev.yml" + +log() { printf '\033[1;34m→\033[0m %s\n' "$*"; } +ok() { printf '\033[1;32m✓\033[0m %s\n' "$*"; } +warn() { printf '\033[1;33m!\033[0m %s\n' "$*"; } + +require_uv() { + if ! command -v uv >/dev/null 2>&1; then + warn "uv not found in PATH. Install: https://docs.astral.sh/uv/getting-started/installation/" + exit 1 + fi +} + +services_up() { + log "Starting postgres + valkey + neo4j via Docker (waits for healthchecks)..." + "${COMPOSE[@]}" -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" up -d --wait postgres valkey neo4j + ok "Services ready: pg:${POSTGRES_PORT} / valkey:${VALKEY_PORT} / neo4j:${NEO4J_PORT} / neo4j-http:${NEO4J_HTTP_PORT}" +} + +kill_tmux_session() { + command -v tmux >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 0 + if tmux has-session -t "$TMUX_SESSION" 2>/dev/null; then + log "Killing tmux session '$TMUX_SESSION'" + tmux kill-session -t "$TMUX_SESSION" + fi +} + +tmux_pane_count() { + tmux list-panes -t "$TMUX_SESSION:" 2>/dev/null | wc -l | tr -d ' ' +} + +# Tee a tmux pane's output to _data/logs/.log so non-interactive +# consumers (scripts, agents) can follow the stack without attaching. +# ANSI codes are stripped; the file is truncated on session creation so +# its content always matches the current run. +pipe_pane_log() { + local pane="$1" name="$2" + local logfile="$REPO_ROOT/_data/logs/$name.log" + : > "$logfile" + tmux pipe-pane -t "$pane" -o "perl -pe 'BEGIN{\$|=1} s/\\e\\[[0-9;?]*[A-Za-z]//g' >> '$logfile'" +} + +# Stop native dev processes (api/worker/beat) launched outside tmux. Scoped by +# cwd under REPO_ROOT so other prowler clones running their own stacks are not +# touched. +kill_native_procs() { + command -v pgrep >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 0 + command -v lsof >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 0 + + local pids="" pid pcwd pat + for pat in "manage.py runserver" "celery -A config.celery worker" "celery -A config.celery beat"; do + while IFS= read -r pid; do + [ -n "$pid" ] || continue + pcwd="$(lsof -a -d cwd -p "$pid" 2>/dev/null | awk 'NR>1 {print $NF; exit}')" + case "$pcwd" in + "$REPO_ROOT"|"$REPO_ROOT"/*) pids="$pids $pid" ;; + esac + done < <(pgrep -f "$pat" 2>/dev/null) + done + + pids="$(printf '%s\n' "$pids" | tr ' ' '\n' | sed '/^$/d' | sort -u | xargs)" + [ -z "$pids" ] && return 0 + + log "Stopping native dev procs ($pids) under $REPO_ROOT" + # shellcheck disable=SC2086 + kill -TERM $pids 2>/dev/null || true + sleep 0.5 + # shellcheck disable=SC2086 + kill -KILL $pids 2>/dev/null || true +} + +services_down() { + kill_tmux_session + kill_native_procs + log "Stopping postgres + valkey + neo4j..." + "${COMPOSE[@]}" -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" stop postgres valkey neo4j +} + +services_status() { + "${COMPOSE[@]}" -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" ps postgres valkey neo4j +} + +deps() { + require_uv + log "uv sync (api/)..." + (cd api && uv sync) +} + +migrate() { + require_uv + log "Applying migrations (admin DB)..." + ( + cd api/src/backend + uv run python manage.py check_and_fix_socialaccount_sites_migration --database admin + uv run python manage.py migrate --database admin + ) + ok "Migrations applied" +} + +fixtures() { + require_uv + log "Loading dev fixtures..." + ( + cd api/src/backend + for fixture in api/fixtures/dev/*.json; do + [ -f "$fixture" ] || continue + echo " loading $(basename "$fixture")" + uv run python manage.py loaddata "$fixture" --database admin + done + ) + ok "Fixtures loaded" +} + +api_run() { + require_uv + log "Starting Django API on [::]:${DJANGO_PORT} (IPv4 + IPv6 dual-stack)" + cd api/src/backend + exec uv run python manage.py runserver "[::]:${DJANGO_PORT}" +} + +worker_run() { + require_uv + log "Starting Celery worker" + cd api/src/backend + exec uv run python -m celery -A config.celery worker \ + -l "${DJANGO_LOGGING_LEVEL}" \ + -Q celery,scans,scan-reports,deletion,backfill,overview,integrations,compliance,attack-paths-scans \ + -E +} + +beat_run() { + require_uv + log "Starting Celery beat (DatabaseScheduler)" + cd api/src/backend + exec uv run python -m celery -A config.celery beat \ + -l "${DJANGO_LOGGING_LEVEL}" \ + --scheduler django_celery_beat.schedulers:DatabaseScheduler +} + +TMUX_SESSION="prowler-dev-${COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME}" +SCRIPT_PATH="$REPO_ROOT/scripts/development/dev-local.sh" + +require_tmux() { + if ! command -v tmux >/dev/null 2>&1; then + warn "tmux not installed. Run: brew install tmux" + exit 1 + fi +} + +remove_repo_compose_containers() { + command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 0 + local ids + ids="$( + docker ps -aq 2>/dev/null \ + | while IFS= read -r id; do + docker inspect --format '{{.ID}} {{index .Config.Labels "com.docker.compose.project.working_dir"}}' "$id" 2>/dev/null || true + done \ + | awk -v repo="$REPO_ROOT" '$2 == repo {print $1}' + )" + [ -n "$ids" ] || return 0 + warn "Removing existing Docker containers for this repo before launch" + # shellcheck disable=SC2086 + docker rm -f $ids >/dev/null +} + +remove_docker_containers_on_ports() { + command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 0 + local all_ids ids_to_remove="" id port published_ports + all_ids="$(docker ps -aq 2>/dev/null || true)" + [ -n "$all_ids" ] || return 0 + + for id in $all_ids; do + published_ports="$(docker inspect --format '{{range $containerPort, $bindings := .HostConfig.PortBindings}}{{range $bindings}}{{.HostPort}}{{"\n"}}{{end}}{{end}}' "$id" 2>/dev/null || true)" + [ -n "$published_ports" ] || continue + for port in "$@"; do + if printf '%s\n' "$published_ports" | grep -qx "$port"; then + ids_to_remove="$ids_to_remove $id" + break + fi + done + done + + ids_to_remove="$(printf '%s\n' "$ids_to_remove" | tr ' ' '\n' | sed '/^$/d' | sort -u | xargs)" + [ -n "$ids_to_remove" ] || return 0 + warn "Removing Docker containers publishing fixed dev ports: $ids_to_remove" + # shellcheck disable=SC2086 + docker rm -f $ids_to_remove >/dev/null +} + +kill_listeners_on_ports() { + command -v lsof >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 0 + local pids="" port port_pids + for port in "$@"; do + port_pids="$(lsof -nP -tiTCP:"$port" -sTCP:LISTEN 2>/dev/null || true)" + [ -n "$port_pids" ] && pids="$pids $port_pids" + done + + pids="$(printf '%s\n' "$pids" | tr ' ' '\n' | sed '/^$/d' | sort -u | xargs)" + [ -n "$pids" ] || return 0 + warn "Killing local processes listening on fixed dev ports: $pids" + # shellcheck disable=SC2086 + kill -TERM $pids 2>/dev/null || true + sleep 0.5 + # shellcheck disable=SC2086 + kill -KILL $pids 2>/dev/null || true +} + +clear_dev_port_conflicts() { + local ports=("$DJANGO_PORT" "$POSTGRES_PORT" "$VALKEY_PORT" "$NEO4J_PORT" "$NEO4J_HTTP_PORT") + log "Ensuring fixed dev ports are free: api:${DJANGO_PORT} pg:${POSTGRES_PORT} valkey:${VALKEY_PORT} neo4j:${NEO4J_PORT} neo4j-http:${NEO4J_HTTP_PORT}" + remove_docker_containers_on_ports "${ports[@]}" + kill_listeners_on_ports "${ports[@]}" +} + +# Block until the API answers HTTP on DJANGO_PORT (any status code counts). +wait_for_api() { + local timeout="${1:-90}" waited=0 + log "Waiting for API on :${DJANGO_PORT} (timeout ${timeout}s)..." + until curl -s -o /dev/null --max-time 2 "http://localhost:${DJANGO_PORT}/"; do + waited=$((waited + 1)) + if [ "$waited" -ge "$timeout" ]; then + warn "API not responding after ${timeout}s. Check _data/logs/api.log" + return 1 + fi + sleep 1 + done + ok "API responding on :${DJANGO_PORT}" +} + +needs_db_bootstrap() { + ! "${COMPOSE[@]}" -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" exec -T postgres \ + psql -U prowler -d prowler_db -c 'select 1' >/dev/null 2>&1 +} + +bootstrap_db_if_needed() { + if needs_db_bootstrap; then + warn "App DB user not ready. Bootstrapping (deps + migrate + fixtures)..." + deps + migrate + fixtures + ok "DB bootstrap complete" + fi +} + +all_run() { + require_tmux + require_uv + services_up + bootstrap_db_if_needed + + # Wrap a command so it auto-runs as the pane's foreground process and, on + # exit (e.g. Ctrl+C), drops into the user's login shell instead of closing. + # Avoids the `send-keys` race where keys arrive before zsh+starship are ready. + local user_shell="${SHELL:-/bin/zsh}" + pane_cmd() { + printf 'bash -c %q' "$1; exec ${user_shell}" + } + local api_cmd worker_cmd pg_cmd + api_cmd="$(pane_cmd "$SCRIPT_PATH api")" + worker_cmd="$(pane_cmd "$SCRIPT_PATH worker")" + pg_cmd="$(pane_cmd "${COMPOSE[*]} -f $COMPOSE_FILE logs -f postgres")" + + # If a tmux server is already running (e.g. another project's session), new + # sessions inherit THAT server's env, not the launcher shell's env. Pass our + # overrides explicitly so each pane sees the right project name, ports, etc. + local -a env_args=() + local var + for var in COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME \ + POSTGRES_HOST POSTGRES_PORT \ + VALKEY_HOST VALKEY_PORT VALKEY_SCHEME \ + NEO4J_HOST NEO4J_PORT NEO4J_HTTP_PORT \ + DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE DJANGO_DEBUG DJANGO_PORT \ + DJANGO_LOGGING_FORMATTER DJANGO_LOGGING_LEVEL \ + DJANGO_MANAGE_DB_PARTITIONS; do + env_args+=(-e "${var}=${!var-}") + done + + local expected_panes=3 + + if tmux has-session -t "$TMUX_SESSION" 2>/dev/null; then + local current_panes + current_panes="$(tmux_pane_count)" + if [ "$current_panes" -lt "$expected_panes" ]; then + warn "Session '$TMUX_SESSION' has $current_panes pane(s), expected $expected_panes. Rebuilding it." + tmux kill-session -t "$TMUX_SESSION" + else + log "Session '$TMUX_SESSION' already exists" + fi + fi + + if ! tmux has-session -t "$TMUX_SESSION" 2>/dev/null; then + log "Creating tmux session '$TMUX_SESSION' (api / worker / db logs)" + tmux new-session -d -s "$TMUX_SESSION" -n services -c "$REPO_ROOT" "${env_args[@]}" "$api_cmd" + tmux split-window -t "$TMUX_SESSION:0.0" -v -p 50 -c "$REPO_ROOT" "${env_args[@]}" "$worker_cmd" + tmux split-window -t "$TMUX_SESSION:0.1" -h -p 50 -c "$REPO_ROOT" "${env_args[@]}" "$pg_cmd" + tmux select-pane -t "$TMUX_SESSION:0.0" + tmux set-option -t "$TMUX_SESSION" -g mouse on >/dev/null + tmux set-option -t "$TMUX_SESSION" -g bell-action none >/dev/null + tmux set-option -t "$TMUX_SESSION" -g visual-bell off >/dev/null + tmux set-option -t "$TMUX_SESSION" -g monitor-bell off >/dev/null + tmux set-option -t "$TMUX_SESSION" -g monitor-activity off >/dev/null + tmux set-option -t "$TMUX_SESSION" -g visual-activity off >/dev/null + tmux set-option -t "$TMUX_SESSION" -g activity-action none >/dev/null + tmux set-option -t "$TMUX_SESSION" -g silence-action none >/dev/null + tmux bind-key -T copy-mode MouseDragEnd1Pane send-keys -X copy-pipe-and-cancel "pbcopy" 2>/dev/null + tmux bind-key -T copy-mode-vi MouseDragEnd1Pane send-keys -X copy-pipe-and-cancel "pbcopy" 2>/dev/null + tmux set-option -t "$TMUX_SESSION" -g status-right " API:${DJANGO_PORT} | DB:${POSTGRES_PORT} | Broker:${VALKEY_PORT} " >/dev/null + + mkdir -p "$REPO_ROOT/_data/logs" + pipe_pane_log "$TMUX_SESSION:0.0" api + pipe_pane_log "$TMUX_SESSION:0.1" worker + pipe_pane_log "$TMUX_SESSION:0.2" postgres + fi + + wait_for_api 90 + + ok "Dev stack ready (detached)" + cat </dev/null; then + warn "No session '$TMUX_SESSION'. Starting it with: $0 all" + all_run + else + local current_panes + current_panes="$(tmux_pane_count)" + if [ "$current_panes" -lt 3 ]; then + warn "Session '$TMUX_SESSION' only has $current_panes pane(s). Rebuilding with db logs." + tmux kill-session -t "$TMUX_SESSION" + all_run + fi + fi + if [ -n "${TMUX:-}" ]; then + tmux switch-client -t "$TMUX_SESSION" + else + tmux attach-session -t "$TMUX_SESSION" + fi +} + +clean_run() { + log "Removing stopped containers from the compose project..." + "${COMPOSE[@]}" -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" rm -f + ok "Stopped containers removed (data volumes under ./_data/ untouched)" +} + +wipe_run() { + warn "DESTRUCTIVE: this will tear down everything AND delete ./_data/" + warn " postgres database, valkey state, neo4j graph, api jwt keys - all gone." + warn " Next start will require 'make dev-setup' from scratch." + kill_run + if [ -d ./_data ]; then + log "Removing ./_data/ ..." + rm -rf ./_data + fi + ok "Wipe complete. Run 'make dev-setup' for a fresh environment." +} + +kill_run() { + kill_tmux_session + services_down + clean_run + ok "Dev stack stopped (tmux killed, containers stopped + removed)" +} + +launch_run() { + require_uv + kill_tmux_session + remove_repo_compose_containers + clear_dev_port_conflicts + + log "Launching dev stack in tmux inside the current terminal" + log " api:${DJANGO_PORT} pg:${POSTGRES_PORT} valkey:${VALKEY_PORT} neo4j:${NEO4J_PORT} neo4j-http:${NEO4J_HTTP_PORT}" + all_run + attach_run +} + +setup() { + services_up + deps + migrate + fixtures + ok "Setup complete." + cat < + +One-window dev (tmux inside the terminal): + all api + worker + postgres logs in 3 panes (detached, + blocks until API responds, + ends with parseable api_url= / *_log= / attach_cmd= / stop_cmd= lines) + attach Reattach to the existing dev session + Attaches tmux inside the current terminal pane. + Pane output is also written to _data/logs/{api,worker,postgres}.log + (ANSI-stripped, truncated per run) - usable without attaching + kill Stop tmux + stop containers + remove them (full teardown) + launch Use fixed ports, clear conflicts, then run 'all' and attach tmux + +Platform support: + macOS Supported + Linux Should work when Docker, tmux, and uv are available + Windows Requires script changes before it can be supported + +State (containers postgres + valkey + neo4j): + up Start postgres + valkey + neo4j (waits for healthchecks) + down Stop tmux + postgres + valkey + neo4j (keeps containers around) + status Show container status + clean Remove all stopped containers in the project (data volumes preserved) + wipe Full nuke: kill + clean + delete ./_data/ + +Python (native, foreground - usually launched via 'all'): + api Run Django API (runserver) + worker Run Celery worker + beat Run Celery beat scheduler + +One-shots: + setup up + deps + migrate + fixtures (first-time / fresh DB) + deps uv sync inside api/ + migrate Apply migrations to admin DB + fixtures Load dev fixtures + +Typical flow: + make dev-setup # first time only + make dev # daily dev + make dev-stop # when done +EOF +} + +case "${1:-help}" in + all) shift; if [ "$#" -gt 0 ]; then warn "'all $*' is not supported. Use: $0 all"; exit 1; fi; all_run ;; + attach) attach_run ;; + kill) kill_run ;; + launch) launch_run ;; + clean) clean_run ;; + wipe) wipe_run ;; + up) services_up ;; + down) services_down ;; + status) services_status ;; + api) api_run ;; + worker) worker_run ;; + beat) beat_run ;; + setup) setup ;; + deps) deps ;; + migrate) migrate ;; + fixtures) fixtures ;; + help|-h|--help|*) usage ;; +esac diff --git a/skills/prowler-attack-paths-query/SKILL.md b/skills/prowler-attack-paths-query/SKILL.md index 6dad976983..9fedff4472 100644 --- a/skills/prowler-attack-paths-query/SKILL.md +++ b/skills/prowler-attack-paths-query/SKILL.md @@ -2,13 +2,14 @@ name: prowler-attack-paths-query description: > Creates Prowler Attack Paths openCypher queries using the Cartography schema as the source of truth - for node labels, properties, and relationships. Also covers Prowler-specific additions (Internet node, - ProwlerFinding, internal isolation labels) and $provider_uid scoping for predefined queries. + for node labels, properties, and relationships. Covers Prowler-specific additions (Internet node, + ProwlerFinding, internal isolation labels), $provider_uid scoping, and list-property item nodes + with typed `HAS_*` edges that run efficiently on both Neo4j and Amazon Neptune sinks. Trigger: When creating or updating Attack Paths queries. license: Apache-2.0 metadata: author: prowler-cloud - version: "2.0" + version: "3.0" scope: [root, api] auto_invoke: - "Creating Attack Paths queries" @@ -19,36 +20,30 @@ allowed-tools: Read, Edit, Write, Glob, Grep, Bash, WebFetch, Task ## Overview -Attack Paths queries are openCypher queries that analyze cloud infrastructure graphs (ingested via Cartography) to detect security risks like privilege escalation paths, network exposure, and misconfigurations. - -Queries are written in **openCypher Version 9** for compatibility with both Neo4j and Amazon Neptune. +Attack Paths queries are read-only openCypher queries over a Cartography-ingested cloud graph that detect privilege escalation chains, network exposure, and other graph-shaped security risks. Queries are written in openCypher Version 9 so they run on both Neo4j and Amazon Neptune sinks. --- ## Two query audiences -This skill covers two types of queries with different isolation mechanisms: +| | Predefined queries | Custom queries | +| ------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Where they live | `api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/queries/{provider}.py` | User-supplied via the custom query API endpoint | +| Provider isolation | `AWSAccount {id: $provider_uid}` anchor + path connectivity | Automatic `_Provider_{uuid}` label injection by `cypher_sanitizer.py` | +| What to write | Chain every MATCH from the `aws` variable | Plain Cypher, no isolation boilerplate | +| Internal labels | Never use | Never use (system-injected) | -| | Predefined queries | Custom queries | -|---|---|---| -| **Where they live** | `api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/queries/{provider}.py` | User/LLM-supplied via the custom query API endpoint | -| **Provider isolation** | `AWSAccount {id: $provider_uid}` anchor + path connectivity | Automatic `_Provider_{uuid}` label injection via `cypher_sanitizer.py` | -| **What to write** | Chain every MATCH from the `aws` variable | Plain Cypher, no isolation boilerplate needed | -| **Internal labels** | Never use (`_ProviderResource`, `_Tenant_*`, `_Provider_*`) | Never use (injected automatically by the system) | +**Predefined queries**: every node must be reachable from the `AWSAccount` root via graph traversal. That is the isolation boundary. -**For predefined queries**: every node must be reachable from the `AWSAccount` root via graph traversal. This is the isolation boundary. - -**For custom queries**: write natural Cypher without isolation concerns. The query runner injects a `_Provider_{uuid}` label into every node pattern before execution, and a post-query filter catches edge cases. +**Custom queries**: write natural Cypher. The runner injects a `_Provider_{uuid}` label into every node pattern, and a post-query filter handles edge cases. --- -## Input Sources +## Input sources -Queries can be created from: +Two sources for new queries: -1. **pathfinding.cloud ID** (e.g., `ECS-001`, `GLUE-001`) - - Reference: https://github.com/DataDog/pathfinding.cloud - - The aggregated `paths.json` is too large for WebFetch. Use Bash: +1. **pathfinding.cloud ID** (e.g. `ECS-001`, `GLUE-001`), the Datadog research catalogue. The aggregated `paths.json` is too large for WebFetch: ```bash # Fetch a single path by ID @@ -64,28 +59,24 @@ Queries can be created from: | jq -r '.[] | select(.id | startswith("ecs")) | "\(.id): \(.name)"' ``` - If `jq` is not available, use `python3 -c "import json,sys; ..."` as a fallback. + If `jq` is unavailable, use `python3 -c "import json,sys; ..."`. -2. **Natural language description** from the user +2. **Natural language description** from the requester. --- -## Query Structure +## Query structure ### Provider scoping parameter -One parameter is injected automatically by the query runner: +| Parameter | Property | Used on | Purpose | +| --------------- | -------- | ------------ | -------------------------------------- | +| `$provider_uid` | `id` | `AWSAccount` | Scopes the query to a specific account | -| Parameter | Property it matches | Used on | Purpose | -| --------------- | ------------------- | ------------ | -------------------------------- | -| `$provider_uid` | `id` | `AWSAccount` | Scopes to a specific AWS account | - -All other nodes are isolated by path connectivity from the `AWSAccount` anchor. +The runner binds `$provider_uid` automatically. Every other node is isolated by path connectivity from the `AWSAccount` anchor. ### Imports -All query files start with these imports: - ```python from api.attack_paths.queries.types import ( AttackPathsQueryAttribution, @@ -95,29 +86,33 @@ from api.attack_paths.queries.types import ( from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL ``` -The `PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL` constant (value: `"ProwlerFinding"`) is used via f-string interpolation in all queries. Never hardcode the label string. +Always use `PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL` via f-string interpolation, never hardcode `"ProwlerFinding"`. -### Privilege escalation sub-patterns +### Definition fields -There are four distinct privilege escalation patterns. Choose based on the attack type: +- **id**: kebab-case `{provider}-{description}`, e.g. `aws-ec2-privesc-passrole-iam`. +- **name**: short, human-friendly label. Sourced queries append the reference ID: `"EC2 Instance Launch with Privileged Role (EC2-001)"`. +- **short_description**: one sentence, no technical permissions. +- **description**: full technical explanation, plain text. +- **provider**: `aws`, `azure`, `gcp`, `kubernetes`, or `github`. +- **cypher**: f-string Cypher body. Literal `{` / `}` are escaped as `{{` / `}}`. +- **parameters**: `parameters=[]` if none. +- **attribution**: optional `AttackPathsQueryAttribution(text, link)` for sourced queries. `link` uses the lowercase ID. -| Sub-pattern | Target | `path_target` shape | Example | -|---|---|---|---| -| Self-escalation | Principal's own policies | `(aws)--(target_policy:AWSPolicy)--(principal)` | IAM-001 | -| Lateral to user | Other IAM users | `(aws)--(target_user:AWSUser)` | IAM-002 | -| Assume-role lateral | Assumable roles | `(aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)<-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]-(principal)` | IAM-014 | -| PassRole + service | Service-trusting roles | `(aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(...)` | EC2-001 | +Append the constant to the `{PROVIDER}_QUERIES` list at the bottom of the provider file. -#### Self-escalation (e.g., IAM-001) +--- -The principal modifies resources attached to itself. `path_target` loops back to `principal`: +## Predefined query template + +The canonical shape combines a principal walk, an optional target walk, deduplicated nodes, and a typed finding overlay: ```python AWS_{QUERY_NAME} = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( id="aws-{kebab-case-name}", - name="{Human-friendly label} ({REFERENCE_ID})", - short_description="{Brief explanation, no technical permissions.}", - description="{Detailed description of the attack vector and impact.}", + name="{Label} ({REFERENCE_ID})", + short_description="{One sentence.}", + description="{Full technical explanation.}", attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution( text="pathfinding.cloud - {REFERENCE_ID} - {permission}", link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/{reference_id_lowercase}", @@ -125,29 +120,27 @@ AWS_{QUERY_NAME} = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( provider="aws", cypher=f""" // Find principals with {permission} - MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) - WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = '{permission_lowercase}' - OR toLower(action) = '{service}:*' - OR action = '*' - ) + MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}}) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) + WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['{permission_lowercase}', '{service}:*'] + OR act.value = '*' + WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal - // Find target resources attached to the same principal + // Target resources attached to the same principal (sub-patterns below) MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_policy:AWSPolicy)--(principal) WHERE target_policy.arn CONTAINS $provider_uid - AND any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_policy.arn CONTAINS resource - ) + MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) + WHERE res.value = '*' + OR target_policy.arn CONTAINS res.value + WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths UNWIND paths AS p UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr """, @@ -155,158 +148,145 @@ AWS_{QUERY_NAME} = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( ) ``` -#### Other sub-pattern `path_target` shapes +Key points: -The other 3 sub-patterns share the same `path_principal`, deduplication tail, and RETURN as self-escalation. Only the `path_target` MATCH differs: +- The principal walk types the `POLICY` and `STATEMENT` hops. Both are low-fan-out (each principal has a handful of policies; each policy a handful of statements), so the typed edge lets the planner cost a cheap inline filter. +- The `(aws)--` hub hops stay anonymous. `AWSAccount` is a high-degree node that fans out to every principal, role, policy, and resource in the account; typing those edges forces the planner to enumerate from the hub and collapses performance on multi-tenant Neptune. +- Other relationship types appear only where the file's existing queries already use one (`TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL`, `STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW`, `MEMBER_AWS_GROUP`, `HAS_EXECUTION_ROLE`). +- The finding probe is typed `:HAS_FINDING` and left undirected. The type lets Neptune apply an inline edge filter; the lack of direction matches the convention of the rest of the file. +- Collapse duplicate rows after each permission gate with `WITH DISTINCT`, carrying only the variables needed by later clauses. +- Each `HAS_*` traversal is its own `MATCH` clause with a `WHERE` on the child item node. `WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target` precedes `collect(path...)` to dedupe the row multiplication produced by the joins. +- The `RETURN` shape `paths, dpf, dpfr` is the contract the serializer and visualiser depend on. Do not change it. + +--- + +## Privilege escalation sub-patterns + +Four `path_target` shapes cover the common attack types. Each shares the canonical template's `path_principal`, deduplication tail, and `RETURN`; only the `path_target` MATCH and its resource predicate differ. + +| Sub-pattern | Target | `path_target` shape | Example | +| ------------------- | ------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------- | +| Self-escalation | Principal's own policies | `(aws)--(target_policy:AWSPolicy)--(principal)` | IAM-001 | +| Lateral to user | Other IAM users | `(aws)--(target_user:AWSUser)` | IAM-002 | +| Assume-role lateral | Assumable roles | `(aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]-(principal)` | IAM-014 | +| PassRole + service | Service-trusting roles | `(aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]-(:AWSPrincipal {arn: '{service}.amazonaws.com'})` | EC2-001 | + +**Multi-permission queries** (e.g. PassRole plus a service-create action) add permission gates before `path_target`. Reuse the per-query counter for new variables (`act2`, `policy2`, `stmt2`) and collapse rows after each gate: ```cypher -// Lateral to user (e.g., IAM-002) - targets other IAM users -MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_user:AWSUser) -WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE resource = '*' OR target_user.arn CONTAINS resource OR resource CONTAINS target_user.name) - -// Assume-role lateral (e.g., IAM-014) - targets roles the principal can assume -MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)<-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]-(principal) -WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE resource = '*' OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name) - -// PassRole + service (e.g., EC2-001) - targets roles trusting a service -MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {arn: '{service}.amazonaws.com'}) -WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE resource = '*' OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name) +MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(policy2:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement {effect: 'Allow'}) +MATCH (stmt2)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) +WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['service:*', 'service:createsomething'] + OR act2.value = '*' +WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, stmt2, path_principal ``` -**Multi-permission**: PassRole queries require a second permission. Add `MATCH (principal)--(policy2:AWSPolicy)--(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement)` with its own WHERE before `path_target`, then check BOTH `stmt.resource` AND `stmt2.resource` against the target. See IAM-015 or EC2-001 in `aws.py` for examples. +If a permission is an existence-only gate whose statement resource is not checked later, keep the policy and statement anonymous and carry only the variables still needed: -### Network exposure pattern +```cypher +MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(:AWSPolicyStatement {effect: 'Allow'})-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act3:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) +WHERE toLower(act3.value) IN ['service:*', 'service:othersomething'] + OR act3.value = '*' +WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal +``` -The Internet node is reached via `CAN_ACCESS` through the already-scoped resource, not via a standalone lookup: +When all matching principals can target the same independent resource set, collect principal paths before expanding targets instead of creating one row per principal-target pair: + +```cypher +WITH aws, collect(DISTINCT path_principal) AS principal_paths +MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target) +WITH principal_paths + collect(DISTINCT path_target) AS paths +``` + +Statements that constrain a target are still checked via `HAS_RESOURCE` traversals (`res`, `res2`). See IAM-015 or EC2-001 in `aws.py`. + +--- + +## Network exposure pattern + +The Internet node is reached via `CAN_ACCESS` through an already-scoped resource, never as a standalone lookup: ```python -AWS_{QUERY_NAME} = AttackPathsQueryDefinition( - id="aws-{kebab-case-name}", - name="{Human-friendly label}", - short_description="{Brief explanation.}", - description="{Detailed description.}", - provider="aws", - cypher=f""" - // Match exposed resources (MUST chain from `aws`) - MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(resource:EC2Instance) - WHERE resource.exposed_internet = true +cypher=f""" + // Resource scoped through the account anchor + MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(resource:EC2Instance) + WHERE resource.exposed_internet = true - // Internet node reached via path connectivity through the resource - OPTIONAL MATCH (internet:Internet)-[can_access:CAN_ACCESS]->(resource) + // Internet node reached via path connectivity through the resource + OPTIONAL MATCH (internet:Internet)-[can_access:CAN_ACCESS]->(resource) - WITH collect(path) AS paths, head(collect(internet)) AS internet, collect(can_access) AS can_access - UNWIND paths AS p - UNWIND nodes(p) AS n + WITH collect(path) AS paths, head(collect(internet)) AS internet, collect(can_access) AS can_access + UNWIND paths AS p + UNWIND nodes(p) AS n - WITH paths, internet, can_access, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes - UNWIND unique_nodes AS n - OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) + WITH paths, internet, can_access, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes + UNWIND unique_nodes AS n + OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) - RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr, - internet, can_access - """, - parameters=[], -) + RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr, + internet, can_access +""" ``` -### Register in query list - -Add to the `{PROVIDER}_QUERIES` list at the bottom of the file: - -```python -AWS_QUERIES: list[AttackPathsQueryDefinition] = [ - # ... existing queries ... - AWS_{NEW_QUERY_NAME}, # Add here -] -``` +The `CAN_ACCESS` edge stays typed and directed (`-[:CAN_ACCESS]->`); that is its canonical sync-time orientation. --- -## Step-by-step creation process +## List-typed properties as child nodes -### 1. Read the queries module +Some Cartography node properties carry a list of values: `AWSPolicyStatement.action`, `AWSPolicyStatement.resource`, `KMSKey.encryption_algorithms`, `CloudFrontDistribution.aliases`, and many others. The graph models each such property as a set of child item nodes connected to the parent by a typed edge. Queries reach the values by traversing the edge; the parent does not carry the list as a single field. -**FIRST**, read all files in the queries module to understand the structure, type definitions, registration, and existing style: +### Naming convention -```text -api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/queries/ -├── __init__.py # Module exports -├── types.py # AttackPathsQueryDefinition, AttackPathsQueryParameterDefinition -├── registry.py # Query registry logic -└── {provider}.py # Provider-specific queries (e.g., aws.py) +For a list-typed parent property the sink stores: + +- **Child label**: `Item`. Example: `AWSPolicyStatement.resource` → `AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem`. +- **Edge type**: `HAS_`. Example: `resource` → `HAS_RESOURCE`. +- **Child property**: `value` (a single scalar string) for scalar-list properties. For list-of-dict properties (rare; for example `SecretsManagerSecretVersion.tags`) the child carries the dict keys as named fields per the catalog's `field_map`. + +### Variable naming for child-item matches + +`aws.py` uses a per-query counter for each `HAS_*` traversal so chained matches stay unambiguous: + +| Edge | First | Second | Third | +| ----------------- | ------ | ------- | ------- | +| `HAS_ACTION` | `act` | `act2` | `act3` | +| `HAS_RESOURCE` | `res` | `res2` | `res3` | +| `HAS_NOTACTION` | `nact` | `nact2` | `nact3` | +| `HAS_NOTRESOURCE` | `nres` | `nres2` | `nres3` | + +The counter resets at the top of every query. + +### Example - action match + +Find statements that grant `iam:PassRole`, `iam:*`, or `*`. Traverse the `HAS_ACTION` edge in its own `MATCH` clause and apply the predicate in the attached `WHERE`: + +```cypher +MATCH (stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {effect: 'Allow'}) +MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) +WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:passrole', 'iam:*'] + OR act.value = '*' ``` -**DO NOT** use generic templates. Match the exact style of existing queries in the file. +The literal-action list is case-folded with `toLower(act.value)` because IAM authors mix case (`iam:PassRole`, `iam:passrole`); the `*` wildcard never lower-cases. -### 2. Fetch and consult the Cartography schema +### Example - resource ARN match -**This is the most important step.** Every node label, property, and relationship in the query must exist in the Cartography schema for the pinned version. Do not guess or rely on memory. +Find statements whose resource can target a specific role: -Check `api/pyproject.toml` for the Cartography dependency, then fetch the schema: - -```bash -grep cartography api/pyproject.toml +```cypher +MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole) +MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem) +WHERE res.value = '*' + OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name + OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value ``` -Build the schema URL (ALWAYS use the specific tag, not master/main): +Three predicates cover the cases: full wildcard (`*`), pattern containing the role name (`arn:aws:iam::*:role/admin*`), and pattern that is a prefix or component of the actual ARN. -```text -# Git dependency (prowler-cloud/cartography@0.126.1): -https://raw.githubusercontent.com/prowler-cloud/cartography/refs/tags/0.126.1/docs/root/modules/{provider}/schema.md +### Catalog of list properties -# PyPI dependency (cartography = "^0.126.0"): -https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cartography-cncf/cartography/refs/tags/0.126.0/docs/root/modules/{provider}/schema.md -``` - -Read the schema to discover available node labels, properties, and relationships for the target resources. Internal labels (`_ProviderResource`, `_AWSResource`, `_Tenant_*`, `_Provider_*`) exist for isolation but should never appear in queries. - -### 4. Create query definition - -Use the appropriate pattern (privilege escalation or network exposure) with: - -- **id**: `{provider}-{kebab-case-description}` -- **name**: Short, human-friendly label. For sourced queries, append the reference ID: `"EC2 Instance Launch with Privileged Role (EC2-001)"`. -- **short_description**: Brief explanation, no technical permissions. -- **description**: Full technical explanation. Plain text only. -- **provider**: Provider identifier (aws, azure, gcp, kubernetes, github) -- **cypher**: The openCypher query with proper escaping -- **parameters**: Optional list of user-provided parameters (`parameters=[]` if none) -- **attribution**: Optional `AttackPathsQueryAttribution(text, link)` for sourced queries. The `text` includes source, reference ID, and permissions. The `link` uses a lowercase ID. Omit for non-sourced queries. - -### 5. Add query to provider list - -Add the constant to the `{PROVIDER}_QUERIES` list. - ---- - -## Query naming conventions - -### Query ID - -```text -{provider}-{category}-{description} -``` - -Examples: `aws-ec2-privesc-passrole-iam`, `aws-ec2-instances-internet-exposed` - -### Query constant name - -```text -{PROVIDER}_{CATEGORY}_{DESCRIPTION} -``` - -Examples: `AWS_EC2_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_IAM`, `AWS_EC2_INSTANCES_INTERNET_EXPOSED` - ---- - -## Query categories - -| Category | Description | Example | -| -------------------- | ------------------------------ | ------------------------- | -| Basic Resource | List resources with properties | RDS instances, S3 buckets | -| Network Exposure | Internet-exposed resources | EC2 with public IPs | -| Privilege Escalation | IAM privilege escalation paths | PassRole + RunInstances | -| Data Access | Access to sensitive data | EC2 with S3 access | +The provider catalog lives in `api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/provider_config.py` (`AWS_NORMALIZED_LISTS`). Beyond policy statements it includes KMS algorithms, ECS container-definition lists (`entry_point`, `command`, `links`, `dns_servers`, ...), CloudFront aliases, Inspector finding URL and vulnerability lists, RDS event-subscription categories, and others. To query a list property that is not in the catalog, add an entry there first so the sync layer materialises it. --- @@ -315,53 +295,42 @@ Examples: `AWS_EC2_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_IAM`, `AWS_EC2_INSTANCES_INTERNET_EXPOSED` ### Match account and principal ```cypher -MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {id: $provider_uid})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)--(policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement) +MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {id: $provider_uid})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {effect: 'Allow'}) ``` -### Check IAM action permissions +The `(aws)--(principal)` hop stays anonymous; the `POLICY` and `STATEMENT` hops are typed. + +### Roles trusting a service ```cypher -WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow' - AND any(action IN stmt.action WHERE - toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole' - OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*' - OR action = '*' - ) +MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]-(:AWSPrincipal {arn: 'ec2.amazonaws.com'}) ``` -### Find roles trusting a service +### Roles a principal can assume ```cypher -MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]->(:AWSPrincipal {arn: 'ec2.amazonaws.com'}) +MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]-(principal) ``` -### Find roles the principal can assume +### JSON-encoded properties -Note the arrow direction - `STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW` points from the role to the principal: +Object-typed Cartography properties (most notably `condition` on `AWSPolicyStatement` and `S3PolicyStatement`) are stored as JSON-encoded strings, e.g. `'{"StringEquals":{"aws:SourceAccount":"123456789012"}}'`. There is no JSON parser at query time, so use `CONTAINS` for substring checks: ```cypher -MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)<-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]-(principal) +WHERE stmt.condition CONTAINS '"aws:SourceAccount"' ``` -### Check resource scope - -```cypher -WHERE any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE - resource = '*' - OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource - OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name -) -``` +For structured inspection, fetch the rows and parse in Python. Cypher cannot navigate JSON object keys. ### Internet node via path connectivity -The Internet node is reached through `CAN_ACCESS` relationships to already-scoped resources. No standalone lookup needed: - ```cypher OPTIONAL MATCH (internet:Internet)-[can_access:CAN_ACCESS]->(resource) ``` -### Multi-label OR (match multiple resource types) +`resource` must already be bound by the account-anchored pattern above. + +### Multi-label OR (multiple resource types) ```cypher MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {id: $provider_uid})-[r]-(x)-[q]-(y) @@ -373,7 +342,7 @@ WHERE (x:EC2PrivateIp AND x.public_ip = $ip) ### Include Prowler findings -Deduplicate nodes before the ProwlerFinding lookup to avoid redundant OPTIONAL MATCH calls on nodes that appear in multiple paths: +Deduplicate nodes before the typed finding probe to avoid one `OPTIONAL MATCH` per path-occurrence of the same node: ```cypher WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths @@ -382,12 +351,12 @@ UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n -OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) +OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr ``` -For network exposure queries, aggregate the internet node and relationship alongside paths: +For network-exposure queries, aggregate the Internet node and its edge alongside paths: ```cypher WITH collect(path) AS paths, head(collect(internet)) AS internet, collect(can_access) AS can_access @@ -396,7 +365,7 @@ UNWIND nodes(p) AS n WITH paths, internet, can_access, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes UNWIND unique_nodes AS n -OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) +OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}}) RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr, internet, can_access @@ -406,22 +375,22 @@ RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr, ## Prowler-specific labels and relationships -These are added by the sync task, not part of the Cartography schema. For all other node labels, properties, and relationships, **always consult the Cartography schema** (see step 2 below). +Added by the sync task, not part of the Cartography schema. For everything else, consult the pinned Cartography schema (see "Creation steps"). -| Label/Relationship | Description | -| ---------------------- | -------------------------------------------------- | -| `ProwlerFinding` | Finding node (`status`, `severity`, `check_id`) | -| `Internet` | Internet sentinel node | -| `CAN_ACCESS` | Internet-to-resource exposure (relationship) | -| `HAS_FINDING` | Resource-to-finding link (relationship) | -| `TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL` | Role trust relationship | -| `STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW` | Can assume role (direction: role -> principal) | +| Label / Relationship | Description | +| ---------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------- | +| `ProwlerFinding` | Finding node (`status`, `severity`, `check_id`) | +| `Internet` | Internet sentinel node | +| `CAN_ACCESS` | `(Internet)-[:CAN_ACCESS]->(resource)` exposure edge | +| `HAS_FINDING` | `(resource)-[:HAS_FINDING]->(:ProwlerFinding)` finding link | +| `TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL` | Role trust relationship | +| `STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW` | Can assume role | --- ## Parameters -For queries requiring user input: +For queries that take user input: ```python parameters=[ @@ -438,50 +407,83 @@ parameters=[ --- -## Best practices +## openCypher compatibility -1. **Chain all MATCHes from the root account node**: Every `MATCH` clause must connect to the `aws` variable (or another variable already bound to the account's subgraph). An unanchored `MATCH` would return nodes from all providers. +Queries must run on both Neo4j and Amazon Neptune. Avoid these constructs: - ```cypher - // WRONG: matches ALL AWSRoles across all providers - MATCH (role:AWSRole) WHERE role.name = 'admin' +| Feature | Use instead | +| --------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| APOC procedures (`apoc.*`) | Real nodes and relationships in the graph | +| Neptune extensions | Standard openCypher | +| `reduce()` | `UNWIND` + `collect()` | +| `FOREACH` | `WITH` + `UNWIND` + `SET` | +| Regex `=~` | `toLower()` + exact match, or `STARTS WITH` / `CONTAINS` | +| `CALL () { UNION }` | Multi-label `OR` in `WHERE` (see pattern above) | +| `any(x IN list ...)` | `size([x IN list WHERE pred]) > 0` | +| `all(x IN list ...)` | `size([x IN list WHERE pred]) = size(list)` | +| `none(x IN list ...)` | `size([x IN list WHERE pred]) = 0` | +| `EXISTS { MATCH (pattern) WHERE pred }` | Standalone `MATCH (pattern)` + `WHERE pred`; precede the downstream `collect(path...)` with `WITH DISTINCT ` to dedupe the joins | - // CORRECT: scoped to the specific account's subgraph - MATCH (aws)--(role:AWSRole) WHERE role.name = 'admin' - ``` - - **Exception**: A second-permission MATCH like `MATCH (principal)--(policy2:AWSPolicy)--(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement)` is safe because `principal` is already bound to the account's subgraph by the first MATCH. It does not need to chain from `aws` again. - -2. **Include Prowler findings**: Always add `OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}})` with `collect(DISTINCT pf)`. - -3. **Comment the query purpose**: Add inline comments explaining each MATCH clause. - -4. **Never use internal labels in queries**: `_ProviderResource`, `_AWSResource`, `_Tenant_*`, `_Provider_*` are for system isolation. They should never appear in predefined or custom query text. - -6. **Internet node uses path connectivity**: Reach it via `OPTIONAL MATCH (internet:Internet)-[can_access:CAN_ACCESS]->(resource)` where `resource` is already scoped by the account anchor. No standalone lookup. +For list-typed properties in the catalog (action, resource, and so on), traverse the `HAS_*` edges to the child item nodes via the multi-`MATCH` shape shown in "List-typed properties as child nodes". The parent node does not carry the list as a single field, so `split(...)` and comma-string predicates do not apply. --- -## openCypher compatibility +## Best practices -Queries must be written in **openCypher Version 9** for compatibility with both Neo4j and Amazon Neptune. +1. **Chain every MATCH from the account anchor.** An unanchored `MATCH (role:AWSRole)` returns roles from every provider in the graph; `MATCH (aws)--(role:AWSRole)` is scoped. A second-permission MATCH like `MATCH (principal)--(policy2:AWSPolicy)--(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement)` is safe because `principal` is already bound to the account's subgraph. +2. **Type the finding probe.** Always `OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}})`. The type lets Neptune apply an inline edge filter; an untyped probe scans every incident edge of high-degree nodes. +3. **Comment each MATCH.** One inline `// ...` line per clause explaining its role. +4. **Never use internal labels.** `_ProviderResource`, `_AWSResource`, `_Tenant_*`, `_Provider_*` are system isolation labels and must not appear in query text (predefined or custom). +5. **Reach the Internet node through path connectivity** via `(internet:Internet)-[:CAN_ACCESS]->(resource)`, never as a standalone match. +6. **Preserve the `RETURN` contract.** `paths, dpf, dpfr` for the standard shape; add `internet, can_access` for network-exposure queries. The serializer and visualiser depend on these names. -### Avoid these (not in openCypher spec) +--- -| Feature | Use instead | -| -------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------ | -| APOC procedures (`apoc.*`) | Real nodes and relationships in the graph | -| Neptune extensions | Standard openCypher | -| `reduce()` function | `UNWIND` + `collect()` | -| `FOREACH` clause | `WITH` + `UNWIND` + `SET` | -| Regex operator (`=~`) | `toLower()` + exact match, or `CONTAINS`/`STARTS WITH`. One legacy query uses `=~` - do not add new usages | -| `CALL () { UNION }` | Multi-label OR in WHERE (see patterns section) | +## Naming conventions + +- **ID**: kebab-case `{provider}-{category}-{description}`, e.g. `aws-ec2-privesc-passrole-iam`. +- **Constant**: SHOUTING*SNAKE_CASE `{PROVIDER}*{CATEGORY}\_{DESCRIPTION}`, e.g. `AWS_EC2_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_IAM`. + +--- + +## Creation steps + +1. **Read the queries module first** to match the existing style: + + ```text + api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/queries/ + ├── __init__.py + ├── types.py # dataclass definitions + ├── registry.py + └── {provider}.py + ``` + +2. **Fetch the Cartography schema for the pinned version.** Do not guess labels, properties, or relationships. Read the dependency pin: + + ```bash + grep cartography api/pyproject.toml + ``` + + Then fetch the schema for that exact tag: + + ```text + # Git pin (prowler-cloud/cartography@): + https://raw.githubusercontent.com/prowler-cloud/cartography/refs/tags//docs/root/modules/{provider}/schema.md + + # PyPI pin (cartography==): + https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cartography-cncf/cartography/refs/tags//docs/root/modules/{provider}/schema.md + ``` + +3. **Build the query** using the canonical predefined template plus the appropriate sub-pattern (privilege escalation or network exposure). For list-typed properties (action/resource/etc.), traverse the exploded child nodes via `[:HAS_ACTION]->(:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem)` etc. (see "List-typed properties as child nodes" and the `AWS_NORMALIZED_LISTS` catalog). + +4. **Register** the constant in the `{PROVIDER}_QUERIES` list at the bottom of the provider file. --- ## Reference -- **pathfinding.cloud**: https://github.com/DataDog/pathfinding.cloud (use `curl | jq`, not WebFetch) -- **Cartography schema**: `https://raw.githubusercontent.com/{org}/cartography/refs/tags/{version}/docs/root/modules/{provider}/schema.md` -- **Neptune openCypher compliance**: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/neptune/latest/userguide/feature-opencypher-compliance.html -- **openCypher spec**: https://github.com/opencypher/openCypher +- **pathfinding.cloud**: https://github.com/DataDog/pathfinding.cloud (use `curl | jq`; the aggregated `paths.json` is too large for WebFetch). +- **Cartography schema** (per pinned tag): `https://raw.githubusercontent.com/{org}/cartography/refs/tags/{tag}/docs/root/modules/{provider}/schema.md`. +- **Neptune openCypher compliance**: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/neptune/latest/userguide/feature-opencypher-compliance.html. +- **openCypher spec**: https://github.com/opencypher/openCypher. +- **Sync converter** (`tasks/jobs/attack_paths/sync.py`): list-typed node properties listed in `tasks/jobs/attack_paths/provider_config.py::AWS_NORMALIZED_LISTS` are materialised as child item nodes + `HAS_*` edges. Properties that are not in the catalog are serialised to a comma-delimited string and emit a one-time warning. Dict-typed properties become JSON strings. Same shape on both sinks. diff --git a/skills/prowler-tour/SKILL.md b/skills/prowler-tour/SKILL.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8511581a47 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/prowler-tour/SKILL.md @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +--- +name: prowler-tour +description: > + Keeps product-tour definitions aligned with the UI features they describe. + Trigger: When modifying UI components that have associated tours, editing tour + definition files, or renaming data-tour-id attributes. +license: Apache-2.0 +metadata: + author: prowler-cloud + version: "1.0" + scope: [root, ui] + auto_invoke: + - "Editing a UI file containing data-tour-id attributes" + - "Adding, updating, or removing a tour definition (*.tour.ts)" + - "Renaming or removing a data-tour-id attribute value" + - "Changing button labels or section headings on a tour-covered page" + - "Restructuring routes or layouts covered by a tour" +allowed-tools: Read, Glob, Grep +--- + +# prowler-tour + +**Report-only.** This skill never edits tour files or UI files; it inspects +the change, reports drift it finds between tours and the covered UI, and +recommends actions for the developer to apply. + +## Early-exit rule + +Run this check first. Most UI edits are not tour-related — exit cheaply. + +1. Glob `ui/lib/tours/*.tour.ts`. +2. For each tour, check whether any `coversFiles` glob pattern matches any + file in the current change. +3. If no tour matches, respond **exactly**: + + > No tour affected — skipping alignment check + + and exit. Do not proceed to the checklist. +4. If at least one tour matches, continue to "Drift checklist" for that tour. + +## Drift checklist + +For each affected tour, evaluate every item. Skip items that obviously do +not apply, but list explicitly which items were checked. + +1. **Orphan selectors** — every step's `target` (which composes to + `data-tour-id="-"`) must resolve to a real element + in the codebase. Grep `ui/` for the expected attribute value; report + any step whose target is missing. +2. **Renamed selectors** — a `data-tour-id` attribute was edited in this + change. Match it back to any tour step referencing the old value. +3. **Outdated copy** — a popover `title`/`description` references a button + label, heading, or term that no longer exists on the covered page. +4. **Obsolete steps** — a step describes a section, panel, or workflow + that was removed. +5. **Missing steps** — a new feature was added on the covered surface + without a corresponding step (e.g. a new panel, a new primary action, + a new wizard stage). +6. **Reordered flow** — the user's path through the feature changed (e.g. + query builder moved before scan selection) and the step order no + longer reflects it. + +## Version-bump decision tree + +Apply per tour after listing drift: + +- **NO bump** when the change is cosmetic. Examples: fix a typo, soften + copy, rename a `data-tour-id` selector while keeping the same step, + swap one screenshot for another, tighten wording. +- **BUMP `version`** when the user-visible flow changes materially. + Examples: a new step was added or removed; the order changed; an + anchored target was retargeted to a different panel; the tour now + covers a new feature on the surface. + +When in doubt, ask: "Would a user who already saw the previous version +miss something useful by not seeing this one?" If yes, bump. + +## Output format + +When emitting a report, follow the exact structure in +`references/output-format.md`. The structure is mandatory because the +report is consumed downstream and tolerates no field reordering. + +## What this skill MUST NOT do + +- Do not edit `*.tour.ts` files. This skill is report-only. +- Do not edit UI files to add or rename `data-tour-id` attributes. +- Do not invent new tours. Authoring a new tour is a separate, deliberate + decision — the developer makes it, not the skill. +- Do not flag drift in tours whose `coversFiles` do not match any file + in the current change. Stick to the early-exit rule. + +## See also + +- `references/output-format.md` — exact report template (read when + emitting a report). +- `references/tours-architecture.md` — code map for the tour abstraction + under `ui/lib/tours/`. +- `assets/tour-template.ts` — boilerplate for authoring a new `*.tour.ts`. diff --git a/skills/prowler-tour/assets/tour-template.ts b/skills/prowler-tour/assets/tour-template.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cc264a4678 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/prowler-tour/assets/tour-template.ts @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +// @ts-nocheck -- template only; resolves once copied into `ui/lib/tours/` +/** + * Tour template — copy this file to `ui/lib/tours/.tour.ts` and + * fill in the placeholders. See `references/tours-architecture.md` for the + * design context. + * + * Conventions: + * - Declare via `defineTour({...})` (NOT `: TourDefinition`) so TS + * preserves the literal union of `target` values. `useDriverTour` uses + * that union to validate `stepHandlers` keys and `waitForStep` args. + * - `id` is kebab-case and unique across all tours. + * - Anchored steps reference DOM via `data-tour-id="-"`; + * the hook composes the CSS selector automatically. + * - `coversFiles` lists the globs that describe the tour's surface; the + * `prowler-tour` skill consumes this to decide whether to evaluate + * drift on a given change. + * - Material flow changes bump `version`; cosmetic edits do not. + */ +import { + defineTour, + TOUR_STEP_ALIGNMENTS, + TOUR_STEP_SIDES, +} from "@/lib/tours/tour-types"; + +export const yourTour = defineTour({ + id: "your-tour-id", + version: 1, + coversFiles: [ + // List the UI files this tour describes, using globs under `ui/`. + // Example: "ui/app/(prowler)/your-feature/**" + ], + steps: [ + { + // Modal step — no anchor. Use for intros, outros, and any step + // that does not point at a specific DOM element. + title: "Welcome", + description: "Short, plain-English description.", + }, + { + // Anchored step. The hook resolves + // `[data-tour-id="your-tour-id-step-name"]` lazily, so the element + // can be conditionally rendered as long as it exists when the step + // becomes active. + target: "step-name", + side: TOUR_STEP_SIDES.BOTTOM, + align: TOUR_STEP_ALIGNMENTS.START, + title: "Where the action is", + description: "Tell the user what to look at here and why.", + }, + ], +}); diff --git a/skills/prowler-tour/references/output-format.md b/skills/prowler-tour/references/output-format.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ecd82c4d8e --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/prowler-tour/references/output-format.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +# Tour Alignment Report — output format + +The report is consumed downstream. Field names, order, and headings are +load-bearing — do not rename, reorder, or omit them. + +## Template + +```text +## Tour Alignment Report +**Tour:** `@v` +**Files touched:** + +### Drift detected +- + +### Recommended actions +1. + +### Version bump verdict +- — +``` + +## Rules + +- One report per affected tour. If multiple tours are affected, separate + reports with a `---` line. +- If no drift is detected for an affected tour, still emit the report: + put "No drift detected." under "Drift detected" and "None required." + under "Recommended actions". The verdict line is still mandatory. +- The verdict is exactly one of `BUMP` or `NO bump` — see the + version-bump decision tree in `SKILL.md`. diff --git a/skills/prowler-tour/references/tours-architecture.md b/skills/prowler-tour/references/tours-architecture.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9a5c8f49e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/prowler-tour/references/tours-architecture.md @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +# Tours Architecture + +The product-tour abstraction lives under [`ui/lib/tours/`](../../../ui/lib/tours/). +This skill operates on tour definitions that follow this architecture. + +## Code map + +| File | Purpose | +|---|---| +| `ui/lib/tours/tour-types.ts` | Public type surface: `TourDefinition`, `TourStep`, `TourId`, `TourCompletionRecord`, completion-state const map. Also exports `defineTour(...)` — the required authoring helper that preserves literal step `target`s so `useDriverTour` can type-check `stepHandlers` keys and `waitForStep` arguments. | +| `ui/lib/tours/tour-config.ts` | `baseDriverConfig`, `getDriverConfig(theme, overrides?)`, overlay-color map. | +| `ui/lib/tours/store/tour-completion-store.ts` | Persistence interface — the swap point for future API adapters. | +| `ui/lib/tours/store/local-storage-adapter.ts` | The only adapter in the PoC. Key format: `prowler.tour..v`. | +| `ui/lib/tours/use-driver-tour.ts` | React hook. Initializes driver.js, derives `overlayColor` from `useTheme()`, persists completion. | +| `ui/lib/tours/.tour.ts` | One file per tour. Declared via `defineTour({...})` (not `: TourDefinition`) and imported by the page that opts the user in. | +| `ui/styles/tours.css` | `.driver-popover.prowler-theme` — every color resolved via `var(--...)` from `globals.css`. | + +## Selector convention + +Tour steps anchor via `data-tour-id="-"`. The hook +composes the CSS selector at runtime; tour authors only provide the step +name in `step.target`. Class-based, ID-based, structural selectors are +forbidden — they couple tours to styling decisions that legitimately +change. + +## Identity and versioning + +A tour is `{ id, version }`. The localStorage key composes both. A +**material content change** bumps `version`; cosmetic edits do not. The +decision tree lives in the parent SKILL.md. + +## Persistence scope + +Per-user, cross-tenant. A user who completed `attack-paths@v1` in tenant +A does not see the tour again in tenant B, even if they can access the +feature there. The future `UserTourState` model (documented in +`design.md`, not built) is FK to `User`, not `Membership`. + +## Drift = #1 risk + +Without the maintenance skill + the optional CI gate +(`ui/scripts/check-tour-alignment.mjs`), tours decay silently as the +covered UI evolves. The parent SKILL.md enumerates the six drift +categories the skill checks for. diff --git a/tests/config/config_test.py b/tests/config/config_test.py index 2a7aecd330..365efbc0c9 100644 --- a/tests/config/config_test.py +++ b/tests/config/config_test.py @@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ class Test_Config: with open(json_path, "w") as f: json.dump({"Framework": "CIS", "Provider": "aws"}, f) - mock_dirs.return_value = {"aws": tmpdir} + mock_dirs.return_value = {"aws": [tmpdir]} frameworks = get_available_compliance_frameworks("aws") @@ -497,6 +497,32 @@ class Test_Config: f"{frameworks.count('cis_2.0_aws')} occurrences in: {frameworks}" ) + @mock.patch("prowler.config.config._get_ep_compliance_dirs") + def test_get_available_compliance_frameworks_merges_multiple_ep_dirs_same_provider( + self, mock_dirs + ): + """Frameworks from every package contributing the same provider must + surface, not just the last directory discovered.""" + import json + import tempfile + + with ( + tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as pkg_a, + tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as pkg_b, + ): + with open(os.path.join(pkg_a, "cis_1.0_template.json"), "w") as f: + json.dump({"Framework": "CIS", "Provider": "template"}, f) + with open(os.path.join(pkg_b, "nis2_1.0_template.json"), "w") as f: + json.dump({"Framework": "NIS2", "Provider": "template"}, f) + + # Two packages register `prowler.compliance` with the same name. + mock_dirs.return_value = {"template": [pkg_a, pkg_b]} + + frameworks = get_available_compliance_frameworks("template") + + assert "cis_1.0_template" in frameworks + assert "nis2_1.0_template" in frameworks + def test_load_and_validate_config_file_aws(self): path = pathlib.Path(os.path.dirname(os.path.realpath(__file__))) config_test_file = f"{path}/fixtures/config.yaml" diff --git a/tests/config/schema/__init__.py b/tests/config/schema/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/tests/config/schema/aws_schema_test.py b/tests/config/schema/aws_schema_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..787cb4c03e --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/config/schema/aws_schema_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +"""AWS-specific schema coverage — the biggest provider, with the richest +constraint surface (CIDRs, account IDs, port ranges, enums, thresholds).""" + +import pytest + +from prowler.config.scan_config_schema import SCAN_CONFIG_SCHEMA +from prowler.config.schema.aws import AWSProviderConfig +from prowler.config.schema.validator import validate_provider_config + + +def _validate(raw): + return validate_provider_config("aws", raw, AWSProviderConfig) + + +RESOURCE_LIMIT_KEYS = [ + "max_scanned_resources_per_service", + "max_ebs_snapshots", + "max_backup_recovery_points", + "max_cloudwatch_log_groups", + "max_lambda_functions", + "max_ecs_task_definitions", + "max_codeartifact_packages", +] + + +class Test_AWS_Resource_Limits: + @pytest.mark.parametrize("key", RESOURCE_LIMIT_KEYS) + def test_positive_values_round_trip(self, key): + assert _validate({key: 100}) == {key: 100} + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("key", RESOURCE_LIMIT_KEYS) + def test_null_values_round_trip(self, key): + assert _validate({key: None}) == {key: None} + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("key", RESOURCE_LIMIT_KEYS) + def test_zero_disable_sentinel_round_trips(self, key): + assert _validate({key: 0}) == {key: 0} + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("key", RESOURCE_LIMIT_KEYS) + def test_numeric_strings_are_coerced_to_int(self, key): + assert _validate({key: "100"}) == {key: 100} + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("key", RESOURCE_LIMIT_KEYS) + def test_disable_sentinel_minus_one_round_trips(self, key): + assert _validate({key: -1}) == {key: -1} + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("key", RESOURCE_LIMIT_KEYS) + @pytest.mark.parametrize("value", [True, False]) + def test_booleans_are_dropped_not_coerced_to_int(self, key, value): + assert _validate({key: value}) == {} + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("key", RESOURCE_LIMIT_KEYS) + def test_invalid_strings_are_dropped(self, key): + assert _validate({key: "not-an-int"}) == {} + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("key", RESOURCE_LIMIT_KEYS) + def test_keys_are_exposed_in_scan_config_schema(self, key): + assert key in SCAN_CONFIG_SCHEMA["properties"]["aws"]["properties"] + + +class Test_AWS_Threat_Detection_Thresholds: + """All threat detection thresholds are documented as fractions in 0..1. + The biggest risk of mistyping them is silently disabling the check.""" + + @pytest.mark.parametrize( + "key", + [ + "threat_detection_privilege_escalation_threshold", + "threat_detection_enumeration_threshold", + "threat_detection_llm_jacking_threshold", + ], + ) + def test_valid_boundary_values(self, key): + assert _validate({key: 0.0}) == {key: 0.0} + assert _validate({key: 1.0}) == {key: 1.0} + assert _validate({key: 0.5}) == {key: 0.5} + + @pytest.mark.parametrize( + "key", + [ + "threat_detection_privilege_escalation_threshold", + "threat_detection_enumeration_threshold", + "threat_detection_llm_jacking_threshold", + ], + ) + def test_invalid_values_are_dropped(self, key): + # 20 instead of 0.2 — would never trigger + assert _validate({key: 20}) == {} + # negative + assert _validate({key: -0.1}) == {} + # string + assert _validate({key: "high"}) == {} + + +class Test_AWS_Trusted_Account_Ids: + def test_valid_twelve_digit_ids(self): + ids = ["123456789012", "098765432109"] + assert _validate({"trusted_account_ids": ids}) == {"trusted_account_ids": ids} + + def test_empty_list_is_valid(self): + assert _validate({"trusted_account_ids": []}) == {"trusted_account_ids": []} + + def test_short_id_is_dropped(self): + assert _validate({"trusted_account_ids": ["12345"]}) == {} + + def test_non_numeric_id_is_dropped(self): + assert _validate({"trusted_account_ids": ["1234abcd5678"]}) == {} + + def test_id_with_dashes_is_dropped(self): + # Some users format account IDs as "1234-5678-9012" + assert _validate({"trusted_account_ids": ["1234-5678-9012"]}) == {} + + +class Test_AWS_Trusted_Ips: + def test_single_ipv4_address(self): + assert _validate({"trusted_ips": ["1.2.3.4"]}) == {"trusted_ips": ["1.2.3.4"]} + + def test_ipv4_cidr(self): + assert _validate({"trusted_ips": ["10.0.0.0/8"]}) == { + "trusted_ips": ["10.0.0.0/8"] + } + + def test_ipv6_address(self): + assert _validate({"trusted_ips": ["2001:db8::1"]}) == { + "trusted_ips": ["2001:db8::1"] + } + + def test_ipv6_cidr(self): + assert _validate({"trusted_ips": ["2001:db8::/32"]}) == { + "trusted_ips": ["2001:db8::/32"] + } + + def test_mixed_list(self): + ips = ["1.2.3.4", "10.0.0.0/8", "2001:db8::1"] + assert _validate({"trusted_ips": ips}) == {"trusted_ips": ips} + + def test_garbage_entry_is_dropped(self): + assert _validate({"trusted_ips": ["definitely-not-an-ip"]}) == {} + + def test_cidr_with_host_bits_is_accepted(self): + # We use strict=False so "10.0.0.5/8" is accepted. This matches the + # behaviour of most security tools and avoids surprising users who + # paste real-world allowlists with non-canonical CIDR notation. + assert _validate({"trusted_ips": ["10.0.0.5/8"]}) == { + "trusted_ips": ["10.0.0.5/8"] + } + + +class Test_AWS_Ports: + def test_valid_ports_in_range(self): + ports = [25, 80, 443, 65535, 1] + assert _validate({"ec2_high_risk_ports": ports}) == { + "ec2_high_risk_ports": ports + } + + def test_port_zero_is_dropped(self): + # Port 0 is reserved and not a valid security signal. + assert _validate({"ec2_high_risk_ports": [0]}) == {} + + def test_out_of_range_port_is_dropped(self): + assert _validate({"ec2_high_risk_ports": [70000]}) == {} + + def test_negative_port_is_dropped(self): + assert _validate({"ec2_high_risk_ports": [-1]}) == {} + + +class Test_AWS_Enums: + @pytest.mark.parametrize("level", ["CRITICAL", "HIGH", "MEDIUM", "LOW"]) + def test_valid_severity_levels(self, level): + assert _validate({"ecr_repository_vulnerability_minimum_severity": level}) == { + "ecr_repository_vulnerability_minimum_severity": level + } + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("level", ["critical", "Medium", "ANY", "", "X"]) + def test_invalid_severity_levels_are_dropped(self, level): + assert _validate({"ecr_repository_vulnerability_minimum_severity": level}) == {} + + +class Test_AWS_Booleans: + @pytest.mark.parametrize( + "key", + [ + "mute_non_default_regions", + "verify_premium_support_plans", + "check_rds_instance_replicas", + ], + ) + def test_true_and_false_round_trip(self, key): + assert _validate({key: True}) == {key: True} + assert _validate({key: False}) == {key: False} + + def test_yaml_style_boolean_coercion(self): + # YAML can produce Python str "true"/"yes" if the user quoted it. + # Pydantic v2 deterministically coerces "yes"/"no"/"true"/"false" to a + # real bool in lax mode, so the value is normalized rather than passed + # through as a string (which would be dangerous for + # verify_premium_support_plans). + out = _validate({"verify_premium_support_plans": "yes"}) + assert "verify_premium_support_plans" in out + assert isinstance(out["verify_premium_support_plans"], bool) + assert out["verify_premium_support_plans"] is True + + +class Test_AWS_Full_Default_Config_Round_Trips: + """Loading the real shipped defaults through the schema must produce + exactly the same dict. This is the regression sentinel for backwards + compatibility.""" + + def test_full_default_config_round_trip(self): + # Subset that mirrors the shipped config.yaml semantics. + raw = { + "mute_non_default_regions": False, + "disallowed_regions": ["me-south-1", "me-central-1"], + "max_unused_access_keys_days": 45, + "max_ec2_instance_age_in_days": 180, + "trusted_account_ids": [], + "trusted_ips": [], + "ecr_repository_vulnerability_minimum_severity": "MEDIUM", + "threat_detection_privilege_escalation_threshold": 0.2, + "threat_detection_enumeration_threshold": 0.3, + "threat_detection_llm_jacking_threshold": 0.4, + "ec2_high_risk_ports": [25, 110, 8088], + } + assert _validate(raw) == raw diff --git a/tests/config/schema/bounds_test.py b/tests/config/schema/bounds_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4d8d49bab2 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/config/schema/bounds_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,378 @@ +"""Boundary tests for the safety bounds added on top of the upstream schemas. + +Each parametrised case checks (a) the min and max values are accepted and +(b) one step outside the range is rejected. Custom validators (semver, +EKS minor, dotted version, port range, account IDs, IPs) get focused +positive/negative tests. + +Tests use the public adapter ``prowler.config.scan_config_schema``: a +schema violation surfaces as a list of ``{"path", "message"}`` entries. +This keeps the contract the Prowler App backend depends on under test. +""" + +import pytest + +from prowler.config.scan_config_schema import validate_scan_config + + +def _has_error_for(errors: list[dict], path_substr: str) -> bool: + return any(path_substr in e["path"] for e in errors) + + +# Each tuple: (provider, key, min_allowed, max_allowed) +INT_BOUND_CASES = [ + # AWS + ("aws", "max_unused_access_keys_days", 30, 180), + ("aws", "max_console_access_days", 30, 180), + ("aws", "max_unused_sagemaker_access_days", 7, 180), + ("aws", "max_security_group_rules", 1, 1000), + ("aws", "max_ec2_instance_age_in_days", 1, 1095), + ("aws", "recommended_cdk_bootstrap_version", 1, 100), + ("aws", "max_idle_disconnect_timeout_in_seconds", 60, 1800), + ("aws", "max_disconnect_timeout_in_seconds", 60, 3600), + ("aws", "max_session_duration_seconds", 600, 86400), + ("aws", "lambda_min_azs", 1, 6), + ("aws", "threat_detection_privilege_escalation_minutes", 5, 43200), + ("aws", "threat_detection_enumeration_minutes", 5, 43200), + ("aws", "threat_detection_llm_jacking_minutes", 5, 43200), + ("aws", "days_to_expire_threshold", 7, 365), + ("aws", "elb_min_azs", 1, 6), + ("aws", "elbv2_min_azs", 1, 6), + ("aws", "minimum_snapshot_retention_period", 1, 35), + ("aws", "max_days_secret_unused", 7, 365), + ("aws", "max_days_secret_unrotated", 1, 180), + ("aws", "min_kinesis_stream_retention_hours", 24, 8760), + # Azure + ("azure", "vm_backup_min_daily_retention_days", 7, 9999), + ("azure", "apim_threat_detection_llm_jacking_minutes", 5, 43200), + # GCP + ("gcp", "mig_min_zones", 1, 5), + ("gcp", "max_snapshot_age_days", 1, 1095), + ("gcp", "max_unused_account_days", 30, 365), + ("gcp", "storage_min_retention_days", 1, 3650), + # Kubernetes + ("kubernetes", "audit_log_maxbackup", 2, 1000), + ("kubernetes", "audit_log_maxsize", 10, 10000), + ("kubernetes", "audit_log_maxage", 7, 3650), + # M365 + ("m365", "sign_in_frequency", 1, 168), + ("m365", "recommended_mailtips_large_audience_threshold", 5, 10000), + ("m365", "audit_log_age", 30, 3650), + # GitHub + ("github", "inactive_not_archived_days_threshold", 30, 3650), + # MongoDB Atlas + ("mongodbatlas", "max_service_account_secret_validity_hours", 1, 720), + # Cloudflare + ("cloudflare", "max_retries", 0, 10), + # Vercel + ("vercel", "days_to_expire_threshold", 7, 365), + ("vercel", "stale_token_threshold_days", 30, 3650), + ("vercel", "stale_invitation_threshold_days", 7, 365), + ("vercel", "max_owner_percentage", 1, 50), + ("vercel", "max_owners", 1, 1000), + # Okta + ("okta", "okta_max_session_idle_minutes", 1, 1440), + ("okta", "okta_max_session_lifetime_minutes", 1, 43200), + ("okta", "okta_admin_console_idle_timeout_max_minutes", 1, 1440), + ("okta", "okta_user_inactivity_max_days", 1, 3650), + # Alibaba Cloud + ("alibabacloud", "max_cluster_check_days", 1, 365), + ("alibabacloud", "max_console_access_days", 30, 180), + ("alibabacloud", "min_log_retention_days", 1, 3650), + ("alibabacloud", "min_rds_audit_retention_days", 1, 3650), + # OpenStack + ("openstack", "image_sharing_threshold", 1, 1000), +] + + +FLOAT_THRESHOLD_FIELDS = [ + ("aws", "threat_detection_privilege_escalation_threshold"), + ("aws", "threat_detection_enumeration_threshold"), + ("aws", "threat_detection_llm_jacking_threshold"), + ("azure", "apim_threat_detection_llm_jacking_threshold"), +] + + +class TestIntegerBounds: + """Each int field accepts both ends of its range and rejects ±1 outside.""" + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("provider, key, lo, hi", INT_BOUND_CASES) + def test_min_accepted(self, provider, key, lo, hi): + assert validate_scan_config({provider: {key: lo}}) == [] + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("provider, key, lo, hi", INT_BOUND_CASES) + def test_max_accepted(self, provider, key, lo, hi): + assert validate_scan_config({provider: {key: hi}}) == [] + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("provider, key, lo, hi", INT_BOUND_CASES) + def test_below_min_rejected(self, provider, key, lo, hi): + errors = validate_scan_config({provider: {key: lo - 1}}) + assert _has_error_for(errors, f"{provider}.{key}"), errors + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("provider, key, lo, hi", INT_BOUND_CASES) + def test_above_max_rejected(self, provider, key, lo, hi): + errors = validate_scan_config({provider: {key: hi + 1}}) + assert _has_error_for(errors, f"{provider}.{key}"), errors + + +class TestFloatThresholds: + """Threshold floats must stay within 0..1 inclusive.""" + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("provider, key", FLOAT_THRESHOLD_FIELDS) + def test_zero_and_one_accepted(self, provider, key): + assert validate_scan_config({provider: {key: 0.0}}) == [] + assert validate_scan_config({provider: {key: 1.0}}) == [] + assert validate_scan_config({provider: {key: 0.5}}) == [] + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("provider, key", FLOAT_THRESHOLD_FIELDS) + def test_negative_rejected(self, provider, key): + errors = validate_scan_config({provider: {key: -0.01}}) + assert _has_error_for(errors, f"{provider}.{key}") + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("provider, key", FLOAT_THRESHOLD_FIELDS) + def test_above_one_rejected(self, provider, key): + errors = validate_scan_config({provider: {key: 1.01}}) + assert _has_error_for(errors, f"{provider}.{key}") + + +class TestCloudWatchRetention: + """`log_group_retention_days` only accepts the AWS-approved enum values.""" + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("value", [1, 7, 30, 365, 731, 3653]) + def test_valid_values_accepted(self, value): + assert validate_scan_config({"aws": {"log_group_retention_days": value}}) == [] + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("value", [0, 2, 42, 500, 999, 4000]) + def test_invalid_values_rejected(self, value): + errors = validate_scan_config({"aws": {"log_group_retention_days": value}}) + assert _has_error_for(errors, "aws.log_group_retention_days") + + +class TestSemverValidator: + """AWS Fargate platform versions: X.Y.Z.""" + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("value", ["1.4.0", "1.0.0", "0.0.1", "10.20.30"]) + def test_accepts_semver(self, value): + assert ( + validate_scan_config({"aws": {"fargate_linux_latest_version": value}}) == [] + ) + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("value", ["1.4", "1", "v1.4.0", "1.4.0-beta", "a.b.c", ""]) + def test_rejects_non_semver(self, value): + errors = validate_scan_config({"aws": {"fargate_linux_latest_version": value}}) + assert _has_error_for(errors, "aws.fargate_linux_latest_version") + + +class TestEksVersionValidator: + """`eks_cluster_oldest_version_supported` expects MAJOR.MINOR.""" + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("value", ["1.28", "1.29", "1.30", "2.0"]) + def test_accepts_minor(self, value): + assert ( + validate_scan_config( + {"aws": {"eks_cluster_oldest_version_supported": value}} + ) + == [] + ) + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("value", ["1.28.0", "v1.28", "1", "1.x", ""]) + def test_rejects_invalid(self, value): + errors = validate_scan_config( + {"aws": {"eks_cluster_oldest_version_supported": value}} + ) + assert _has_error_for(errors, "aws.eks_cluster_oldest_version_supported") + + +class TestEksLogTypesEnum: + """Only the documented log types are accepted.""" + + def test_full_enum_accepted(self): + assert ( + validate_scan_config( + { + "aws": { + "eks_required_log_types": [ + "api", + "audit", + "authenticator", + "controllerManager", + "scheduler", + ] + } + } + ) + == [] + ) + + def test_unknown_type_rejected(self): + errors = validate_scan_config( + {"aws": {"eks_required_log_types": ["api", "telemetry"]}} + ) + assert _has_error_for(errors, "aws.eks_required_log_types") + + +class TestAzureDottedVersion: + """App Service versions accept 'X' and 'X.Y' but not 'X.Y.Z' or junk.""" + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("value", ["8.2", "3.12", "17"]) + def test_accepts(self, value): + assert validate_scan_config({"azure": {"php_latest_version": value}}) == [] + assert validate_scan_config({"azure": {"python_latest_version": value}}) == [] + assert validate_scan_config({"azure": {"java_latest_version": value}}) == [] + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("value", ["8.2.0", "v8", "8.x", ""]) + def test_rejects(self, value): + errors = validate_scan_config({"azure": {"php_latest_version": value}}) + assert _has_error_for(errors, "azure.php_latest_version") + + +class TestAzureTlsLiteralEnum: + """Only TLS 1.2 and 1.3 are tolerated by the recommended list.""" + + def test_accepted_versions(self): + assert ( + validate_scan_config( + {"azure": {"recommended_minimal_tls_versions": ["1.2", "1.3"]}} + ) + == [] + ) + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("value", ["1.0", "1.1", "2.0", ""]) + def test_unknown_version_rejected(self, value): + errors = validate_scan_config( + {"azure": {"recommended_minimal_tls_versions": [value]}} + ) + assert _has_error_for(errors, "azure.recommended_minimal_tls_versions") + + +class TestAzureRiskLevelLiteral: + """Defender attack-path risk level is a closed enum.""" + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("value", ["Low", "Medium", "High", "Critical"]) + def test_accepted(self, value): + assert ( + validate_scan_config( + {"azure": {"defender_attack_path_minimal_risk_level": value}} + ) + == [] + ) + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("value", ["low", "CRITICAL", "Severe", ""]) + def test_rejected(self, value): + errors = validate_scan_config( + {"azure": {"defender_attack_path_minimal_risk_level": value}} + ) + assert _has_error_for(errors, "azure.defender_attack_path_minimal_risk_level") + + +class TestECRSeverityLiteral: + """ECR severity is a closed enum (with INFORMATIONAL allowed).""" + + @pytest.mark.parametrize( + "value", + ["CRITICAL", "HIGH", "MEDIUM", "LOW", "INFORMATIONAL"], + ) + def test_accepted(self, value): + assert ( + validate_scan_config( + {"aws": {"ecr_repository_vulnerability_minimum_severity": value}} + ) + == [] + ) + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("value", ["URGENT", "low", "Crit", ""]) + def test_rejected(self, value): + errors = validate_scan_config( + {"aws": {"ecr_repository_vulnerability_minimum_severity": value}} + ) + assert _has_error_for( + errors, "aws.ecr_repository_vulnerability_minimum_severity" + ) + + +class TestPortRangeValidator: + """Each entry of `ec2_high_risk_ports` must be 1..65535 (0 is reserved).""" + + def test_valid_ports(self): + assert ( + validate_scan_config({"aws": {"ec2_high_risk_ports": [1, 22, 8080, 65535]}}) + == [] + ) + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("value", [-1, 0, 65536, 99999]) + def test_invalid_port_rejected(self, value): + errors = validate_scan_config({"aws": {"ec2_high_risk_ports": [80, value]}}) + assert _has_error_for(errors, "aws.ec2_high_risk_ports") + + +class TestAccountIdsValidator: + """AWS account IDs are 12-digit strings.""" + + def test_valid(self): + assert ( + validate_scan_config( + {"aws": {"trusted_account_ids": ["123456789012", "098765432109"]}} + ) + == [] + ) + + @pytest.mark.parametrize( + "value", ["12345", "12345678901", "1234567890123", "12345678901a"] + ) + def test_invalid_rejected(self, value): + errors = validate_scan_config({"aws": {"trusted_account_ids": [value]}}) + assert _has_error_for(errors, "aws.trusted_account_ids") + + +class TestTrustedIpsValidator: + """Trusted IPs accept IPv4, IPv6, and CIDR; reject junk.""" + + @pytest.mark.parametrize( + "value", + ["1.2.3.4", "10.0.0.0/8", "2001:db8::1", "2001:db8::/32"], + ) + def test_valid(self, value): + assert validate_scan_config({"aws": {"trusted_ips": [value]}}) == [] + + @pytest.mark.parametrize( + "value", ["not.an.ip", "1.2.3.300", "10.0.0.0/40", "::ffff:::"] + ) + def test_invalid_rejected(self, value): + errors = validate_scan_config({"aws": {"trusted_ips": [value]}}) + assert _has_error_for(errors, "aws.trusted_ips") + + +class TestAdapterRobustness: + """Top-level adapter behaviour the Prowler App backend depends on.""" + + def test_non_dict_payload(self): + errors = validate_scan_config([1, 2, 3]) + assert len(errors) == 1 + assert errors[0]["path"] == "" + + def test_unknown_provider_section_tolerated(self): + # additionalProperties: True at the root level by design. + assert validate_scan_config({"newprovider": {"foo": "bar"}}) == [] + + def test_unknown_key_tolerated_by_pydantic_extra_allow(self): + # ProviderConfigBase has extra="allow" for forward compatibility. + assert validate_scan_config({"aws": {"completely_new_knob": 1}}) == [] + + def test_provider_section_must_be_mapping(self): + errors = validate_scan_config({"aws": "not a mapping"}) + assert _has_error_for(errors, "aws") + + def test_multiple_errors_surfaced(self): + errors = validate_scan_config( + { + "aws": { + "max_unused_access_keys_days": 5, # below min 30 + "max_security_group_rules": 99999, # above max 1000 + "ec2_high_risk_ports": [80, 70000], # port out of range + } + } + ) + # All three should surface independently. + assert _has_error_for(errors, "aws.max_unused_access_keys_days") + assert _has_error_for(errors, "aws.max_security_group_rules") + assert _has_error_for(errors, "aws.ec2_high_risk_ports") diff --git a/tests/config/schema/loader_integration_test.py b/tests/config/schema/loader_integration_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fa995fb9df --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/config/schema/loader_integration_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +"""End-to-end tests that exercise the real ``load_and_validate_config_file`` +through a temp YAML file. Anything that breaks here would break the actual +``prowler aws -c …`` code path.""" + +import logging +import os +import pathlib +from typing import Callable + +import pytest + +from prowler.config.config import load_and_validate_config_file + + +@pytest.fixture +def write_config(tmp_path: pathlib.Path) -> Callable[[str], str]: + def _write(content: str) -> str: + path = tmp_path / "config.yaml" + path.write_text(content) + return str(path) + + return _write + + +class Test_Loader_With_Schema_Integration: + def test_shipped_default_config_loads_without_warnings(self, caplog): + """The default ``prowler/config/config.yaml`` must round-trip every + provider WITHOUT emitting any schema warnings. If this fails, + someone added a key to the YAML without updating the schema.""" + repo_root = pathlib.Path(os.path.dirname(os.path.realpath(__file__))).parents[2] + shipped = repo_root / "prowler" / "config" / "config.yaml" + with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="prowler"): + for provider in [ + "aws", + "azure", + "gcp", + "kubernetes", + "m365", + "github", + "mongodbatlas", + "cloudflare", + "vercel", + ]: + cfg = load_and_validate_config_file(provider, str(shipped)) + # Provider always exists in the shipped file → non-empty. + assert cfg, f"{provider} returned an empty config" + + offending = [ + r.getMessage() + for r in caplog.records + if "prowler.config[" in r.getMessage() + ] + assert not offending, ( + "Shipped config.yaml triggered schema warnings — schema or YAML out of sync:\n" + + "\n".join(offending) + ) + + def test_user_config_with_bad_threshold_falls_back(self, write_config, caplog): + path = write_config( + "aws:\n" + " threat_detection_privilege_escalation_threshold: 5.0\n" + " lambda_min_azs: 2\n" + ) + with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="prowler"): + cfg = load_and_validate_config_file("aws", path) + assert cfg == {"lambda_min_azs": 2} + assert any( + "threat_detection_privilege_escalation_threshold" in r.getMessage() + for r in caplog.records + ) + + def test_old_format_config_still_works(self, write_config): + # Old format = flat keys, no provider header. + path = write_config( + "max_ec2_instance_age_in_days: 90\n" + "ecr_repository_vulnerability_minimum_severity: HIGH\n" + ) + cfg = load_and_validate_config_file("aws", path) + assert cfg == { + "max_ec2_instance_age_in_days": 90, + "ecr_repository_vulnerability_minimum_severity": "HIGH", + } + + def test_unknown_keys_pass_through_via_loader(self, write_config): + path = write_config( + "aws:\n" " third_party_plugin_setting: hello\n" " lambda_min_azs: 2\n" + ) + cfg = load_and_validate_config_file("aws", path) + assert cfg == { + "third_party_plugin_setting": "hello", + "lambda_min_azs": 2, + } + + def test_quoted_numeric_is_coerced_via_loader(self, write_config): + # YAML quotes the number: ``"180"`` arrives as a Python str. + # The schema must coerce it to int so downstream comparisons work. + path = write_config('aws:\n max_ec2_instance_age_in_days: "180"\n') + cfg = load_and_validate_config_file("aws", path) + assert cfg == {"max_ec2_instance_age_in_days": 180} + assert isinstance(cfg["max_ec2_instance_age_in_days"], int) + + def test_invalid_yaml_shape_list_as_string_drops_key(self, write_config, caplog): + path = write_config( + "aws:\n" + " disallowed_regions: me-south-1\n" # forgot list dashes + " lambda_min_azs: 2\n" + ) + with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="prowler"): + cfg = load_and_validate_config_file("aws", path) + assert cfg == {"lambda_min_azs": 2} + assert any("disallowed_regions" in r.getMessage() for r in caplog.records) + + def test_other_providers_unaffected_by_aws_block(self, write_config): + path = write_config( + "aws:\n max_ec2_instance_age_in_days: 90\n" "gcp:\n mig_min_zones: 5\n" + ) + assert load_and_validate_config_file("aws", path) == { + "max_ec2_instance_age_in_days": 90 + } + assert load_and_validate_config_file("gcp", path) == {"mig_min_zones": 5} + + def test_missing_provider_block_returns_empty(self, write_config): + path = write_config("aws:\n max_ec2_instance_age_in_days: 90\n") + assert load_and_validate_config_file("azure", path) == {} diff --git a/tests/config/schema/other_providers_schema_test.py b/tests/config/schema/other_providers_schema_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c3fc0605c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/config/schema/other_providers_schema_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,200 @@ +"""Smaller-provider schema coverage. One happy path + one invalid path +per field is enough to lock in the contract; the validator behaviour +itself is covered exhaustively in validator_test.py.""" + +import pytest + +from prowler.config.schema.registry import SCHEMAS +from prowler.config.schema.validator import validate_provider_config + + +def _validate(provider, raw): + return validate_provider_config(provider, raw, SCHEMAS[provider]) + + +class Test_Azure_Schema: + @pytest.mark.parametrize("level", ["Low", "Medium", "High", "Critical"]) + def test_defender_risk_level_valid_values(self, level): + assert _validate( + "azure", {"defender_attack_path_minimal_risk_level": level} + ) == {"defender_attack_path_minimal_risk_level": level} + + def test_defender_risk_level_lowercase_dropped(self): + # Case matters: the matching check uses Title-case comparison. + assert ( + _validate("azure", {"defender_attack_path_minimal_risk_level": "high"}) + == {} + ) + + def test_apim_threshold_in_range(self): + out = _validate("azure", {"apim_threat_detection_llm_jacking_threshold": 0.1}) + assert out == {"apim_threat_detection_llm_jacking_threshold": 0.1} + + def test_apim_threshold_out_of_range(self): + out = _validate("azure", {"apim_threat_detection_llm_jacking_threshold": 1.5}) + assert out == {} + + def test_vm_backup_retention_must_be_positive(self): + assert _validate("azure", {"vm_backup_min_daily_retention_days": 7}) == { + "vm_backup_min_daily_retention_days": 7 + } + assert _validate("azure", {"vm_backup_min_daily_retention_days": 0}) == {} + assert _validate("azure", {"vm_backup_min_daily_retention_days": -1}) == {} + + +class Test_GCP_Schema: + def test_valid_values_round_trip(self): + raw = { + "mig_min_zones": 2, + "max_snapshot_age_days": 90, + "max_unused_account_days": 180, + "storage_min_retention_days": 90, + } + assert _validate("gcp", raw) == raw + + def test_zero_zone_count_dropped(self): + assert _validate("gcp", {"mig_min_zones": 0}) == {} + + +class Test_Kubernetes_Schema: + def test_valid_values_round_trip(self): + raw = { + "audit_log_maxbackup": 10, + "audit_log_maxsize": 100, + "audit_log_maxage": 30, + } + assert _validate("kubernetes", raw) == raw + + def test_negative_audit_log_dropped(self): + assert _validate("kubernetes", {"audit_log_maxage": -1}) == {} + + +class Test_M365_Schema: + def test_valid_values_round_trip(self): + raw = { + "sign_in_frequency": 4, + "recommended_mailtips_large_audience_threshold": 25, + "audit_log_age": 90, + } + assert _validate("m365", raw) == raw + + def test_negative_audit_log_age_dropped(self): + assert _validate("m365", {"audit_log_age": -10}) == {} + + +class Test_GitHub_Schema: + def test_valid_threshold(self): + assert _validate("github", {"inactive_not_archived_days_threshold": 180}) == { + "inactive_not_archived_days_threshold": 180 + } + + def test_zero_threshold_dropped(self): + assert _validate("github", {"inactive_not_archived_days_threshold": 0}) == {} + + +class Test_MongoDBAtlas_Schema: + def test_valid(self): + assert _validate( + "mongodbatlas", {"max_service_account_secret_validity_hours": 8} + ) == {"max_service_account_secret_validity_hours": 8} + + def test_invalid_negative(self): + assert ( + _validate("mongodbatlas", {"max_service_account_secret_validity_hours": -1}) + == {} + ) + + +class Test_Cloudflare_Schema: + def test_zero_retries_allowed(self): + # 0 is explicitly documented as "disable retries" in config.yaml. + assert _validate("cloudflare", {"max_retries": 0}) == {"max_retries": 0} + + def test_positive_retries_allowed(self): + assert _validate("cloudflare", {"max_retries": 3}) == {"max_retries": 3} + + def test_negative_retries_dropped(self): + assert _validate("cloudflare", {"max_retries": -1}) == {} + + +class Test_Vercel_Schema: + def test_owner_percentage_in_range(self): + assert _validate("vercel", {"max_owner_percentage": 20}) == { + "max_owner_percentage": 20 + } + assert _validate("vercel", {"max_owner_percentage": 1}) == { + "max_owner_percentage": 1 + } + assert _validate("vercel", {"max_owner_percentage": 50}) == { + "max_owner_percentage": 50 + } + + def test_owner_percentage_over_max_dropped(self): + # Tightened to 1..50 — anything above (incl. previous 100) is dropped. + assert _validate("vercel", {"max_owner_percentage": 51}) == {} + assert _validate("vercel", {"max_owner_percentage": 150}) == {} + + def test_owner_percentage_zero_or_negative_dropped(self): + # 0 is no longer a valid configuration (defeats PoLP signal). + assert _validate("vercel", {"max_owner_percentage": 0}) == {} + assert _validate("vercel", {"max_owner_percentage": -1}) == {} + + def test_full_default_config_round_trip(self): + raw = { + "stable_branches": ["main", "master"], + "days_to_expire_threshold": 7, + "stale_token_threshold_days": 90, + "stale_invitation_threshold_days": 30, + "max_owner_percentage": 20, + "max_owners": 3, + "secret_suffixes": ["_KEY", "_SECRET", "_TOKEN"], + } + assert _validate("vercel", raw) == raw + + +class Test_Okta_Schema: + def test_valid_values_round_trip(self): + raw = { + "okta_max_session_idle_minutes": 15, + "okta_max_session_lifetime_minutes": 18 * 60, + "okta_admin_console_idle_timeout_max_minutes": 15, + "okta_user_inactivity_max_days": 35, + "okta_dod_approved_ca_issuer_patterns": [r"\bOU=DoD\b", r"\bOU=ECA\b"], + } + assert _validate("okta", raw) == raw + + def test_zero_idle_minutes_dropped(self): + assert _validate("okta", {"okta_max_session_idle_minutes": 0}) == {} + + def test_negative_inactivity_days_dropped(self): + assert _validate("okta", {"okta_user_inactivity_max_days": -1}) == {} + + +class Test_AlibabaCloud_Schema: + def test_valid_values_round_trip(self): + raw = { + "max_cluster_check_days": 7, + "max_console_access_days": 90, + "min_log_retention_days": 365, + "min_rds_audit_retention_days": 180, + } + assert _validate("alibabacloud", raw) == raw + + def test_zero_cluster_check_days_dropped(self): + assert _validate("alibabacloud", {"max_cluster_check_days": 0}) == {} + + def test_console_access_below_min_dropped(self): + # 30 is the documented floor; anything below produces false positives. + assert _validate("alibabacloud", {"max_console_access_days": 29}) == {} + + +class Test_OpenStack_Schema: + def test_valid_values_round_trip(self): + raw = { + "image_sharing_threshold": 5, + "secrets_ignore_patterns": ["AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}"], + } + assert _validate("openstack", raw) == raw + + def test_zero_threshold_dropped(self): + assert _validate("openstack", {"image_sharing_threshold": 0}) == {} diff --git a/tests/config/schema/validator_test.py b/tests/config/schema/validator_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..398a0d10e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/config/schema/validator_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +"""Behavioural tests for ``validate_provider_config``. + +The validator is the gatekeeper for every provider schema: its job is to +keep backwards-compatible behaviour (no exceptions, drop only the bad +keys) while loudly logging type mistakes. +""" + +import logging + +import pytest + +from prowler.config.schema.aws import AWSProviderConfig +from prowler.config.schema.registry import SCHEMAS +from prowler.config.schema.validator import validate_provider_config + + +class Test_Validate_Provider_Config_Contract: + """Generic invariants that must hold for any schema.""" + + def test_returns_empty_dict_when_raw_is_not_a_dict(self): + assert validate_provider_config("aws", None, AWSProviderConfig) == {} + assert validate_provider_config("aws", "string", AWSProviderConfig) == {} + assert validate_provider_config("aws", 42, AWSProviderConfig) == {} + assert validate_provider_config("aws", [], AWSProviderConfig) == {} + + def test_returns_raw_unchanged_when_no_schema_registered(self): + raw = {"anything": "goes", "even": [1, 2, 3]} + assert validate_provider_config("mystery_provider", raw, None) == raw + + def test_unknown_keys_pass_through_for_plugin_compatibility(self): + # Third-party plugins inject arbitrary keys; the schema must NOT + # filter them. This is the contract that lets the plugin ecosystem + # keep working when we add validation. + raw = {"plugin_custom_key": "foo", "lambda_min_azs": 2} + assert validate_provider_config("aws", raw, AWSProviderConfig) == { + "plugin_custom_key": "foo", + "lambda_min_azs": 2, + } + + def test_empty_dict_returns_empty_dict(self): + assert validate_provider_config("aws", {}, AWSProviderConfig) == {} + + def test_known_valid_value_passes_through_unchanged(self): + raw = {"max_ec2_instance_age_in_days": 180} + assert validate_provider_config("aws", raw, AWSProviderConfig) == { + "max_ec2_instance_age_in_days": 180 + } + + +class Test_Validate_Provider_Config_Coercion: + """Pydantic v2 coerces common type-mistakes automatically. We want to + keep that behaviour so quoted numerics in user configs ``Just Work``.""" + + def test_string_numeric_is_coerced_to_int(self): + out = validate_provider_config( + "aws", {"max_ec2_instance_age_in_days": "180"}, AWSProviderConfig + ) + assert out == {"max_ec2_instance_age_in_days": 180} + assert isinstance(out["max_ec2_instance_age_in_days"], int) + + def test_string_numeric_is_coerced_to_float(self): + out = validate_provider_config( + "aws", + {"threat_detection_privilege_escalation_threshold": "0.4"}, + AWSProviderConfig, + ) + assert out == {"threat_detection_privilege_escalation_threshold": 0.4} + + +class Test_Validate_Provider_Config_Drops_Invalid_Keys: + """When a field fails validation, only that key is dropped from the + returned dict. The rest of the user's config is preserved so the + consumer's ``audit_config.get(key, default)`` falls back to its own + built-in default for the offending field and uses user values for + everything else.""" + + def test_out_of_range_threshold_is_dropped(self, caplog): + with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING): + out = validate_provider_config( + "aws", + { + "threat_detection_privilege_escalation_threshold": 2.0, + "lambda_min_azs": 2, + }, + AWSProviderConfig, + ) + assert out == {"lambda_min_azs": 2} + assert any( + "threat_detection_privilege_escalation_threshold" in r.getMessage() + for r in caplog.records + ) + + def test_invalid_enum_is_dropped(self): + out = validate_provider_config( + "aws", + {"ecr_repository_vulnerability_minimum_severity": "medum"}, + AWSProviderConfig, + ) + assert out == {} + + def test_wrong_shape_list_as_string_is_dropped(self): + # Classic YAML mistake: ``disallowed_regions: me-south-1`` without dashes. + # Pydantic refuses to silently treat a str as a single-element list, + # which is exactly the safety guarantee we want. + out = validate_provider_config( + "aws", + {"disallowed_regions": "me-south-1", "lambda_min_azs": 2}, + AWSProviderConfig, + ) + assert out == {"lambda_min_azs": 2} + + def test_negative_positive_int_is_dropped(self): + out = validate_provider_config( + "aws", {"max_ec2_instance_age_in_days": -1}, AWSProviderConfig + ) + assert out == {} + + def test_zero_is_dropped_for_strictly_positive_field(self): + # max_ec2_instance_age_in_days is gt=0. Zero would silently cause every + # instance to FAIL the age check. + out = validate_provider_config( + "aws", {"max_ec2_instance_age_in_days": 0}, AWSProviderConfig + ) + assert out == {} + + def test_multiple_invalid_keys_yield_multiple_warnings(self, caplog): + with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING): + out = validate_provider_config( + "aws", + { + "max_ec2_instance_age_in_days": "nope", + "ecr_repository_vulnerability_minimum_severity": "medum", + "valid_extra_key": "kept", + }, + AWSProviderConfig, + ) + assert out == {"valid_extra_key": "kept"} + messages = " ".join(r.getMessage() for r in caplog.records) + assert "max_ec2_instance_age_in_days" in messages + assert "ecr_repository_vulnerability_minimum_severity" in messages + + def test_warning_message_includes_provider_and_field(self, caplog): + with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING): + validate_provider_config( + "aws", + {"threat_detection_privilege_escalation_threshold": 5.0}, + AWSProviderConfig, + ) + assert any( + "prowler.config[aws.threat_detection_privilege_escalation_threshold]" + in r.getMessage() + for r in caplog.records + ) + + +class Test_Schemas_Registry: + """Every provider mentioned in the YAML config must have a schema.""" + + @pytest.mark.parametrize( + "provider", + [ + "aws", + "azure", + "gcp", + "kubernetes", + "m365", + "github", + "mongodbatlas", + "cloudflare", + "vercel", + ], + ) + def test_schema_registered_for_provider(self, provider): + assert provider in SCHEMAS + assert SCHEMAS[provider] is not None diff --git a/tests/lib/check/compliance_config_constraint_model_test.py b/tests/lib/check/compliance_config_constraint_model_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..48f67fd504 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/lib/check/compliance_config_constraint_model_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +"""Validation coverage for the ConfigRequirements schema. + +``Compliance_Requirement_ConfigConstraint`` is the model behind every +``ConfigRequirements`` entry in the compliance framework JSONs. These tests pin +the operator vocabulary, the value-typing rules (notably that booleans are not +coerced to integers), and that constraints survive the legacy → universal +adaptation used by the App backend and the OCSF/table outputs. +""" + +import json +import pathlib + +import pytest +from pydantic.v1 import ValidationError + +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import ( + Compliance, + Compliance_Requirement_ConfigConstraint, + adapt_legacy_to_universal, +) + +_REPO_ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3] +_CIS_6_0 = _REPO_ROOT / "prowler" / "compliance" / "aws" / "cis_6.0_aws.json" + + +def _load_cis(): + """Load the CIS 6.0 AWS framework JSON via a context manager.""" + with open(_CIS_6_0, encoding="utf-8") as f: + return json.load(f) + + +class Test_Compliance_Requirement_ConfigConstraint: + @pytest.mark.parametrize( + "operator,value", + [ + ("lte", 45), + ("gte", 365), + ("eq", False), + ("in", [1, 2, 3]), + ("subset", ["1.2", "1.3"]), + ("superset", ["RSA-1024", "P-192"]), + ], + ) + def test_valid_operators(self, operator, value): + c = Compliance_Requirement_ConfigConstraint( + Check="some_check", ConfigKey="some_key", Operator=operator, Value=value + ) + assert c.Operator == operator + assert c.Value == value + + def test_invalid_operator_rejected(self): + with pytest.raises(ValidationError): + Compliance_Requirement_ConfigConstraint( + Check="c", ConfigKey="k", Operator="between", Value=1 + ) + + @pytest.mark.parametrize( + "operator,value", + [ + # numeric operators reject non-numeric / boolean values + ("gte", [1, 2]), + ("lte", ["45"]), + ("gte", True), + # set/list operators reject scalars + ("subset", 5), + ("superset", "x"), + ("in", 1), + # eq rejects lists + ("eq", [1, 2]), + ], + ) + def test_value_type_inconsistent_with_operator_rejected(self, operator, value): + # A mistyped Value would otherwise be silently treated as "not satisfied" + # at runtime, forcing a spurious config-not-valid FAIL. + with pytest.raises(ValidationError): + Compliance_Requirement_ConfigConstraint( + Check="c", ConfigKey="k", Operator=operator, Value=value + ) + + def test_boolean_value_not_coerced_to_int(self): + # ``mute_non_default_regions == false`` must stay a bool, not become 0. + c = Compliance_Requirement_ConfigConstraint( + Check="securityhub_enabled", + ConfigKey="mute_non_default_regions", + Operator="eq", + Value=False, + ) + assert c.Value is False + assert isinstance(c.Value, bool) + + def test_list_value_preserved_for_set_operators(self): + c = Compliance_Requirement_ConfigConstraint( + Check="c", ConfigKey="k", Operator="subset", Value=["1.2", "1.3"] + ) + assert isinstance(c.Value, list) + assert c.Value == ["1.2", "1.3"] + + def test_missing_required_fields_rejected(self): + with pytest.raises(ValidationError): + Compliance_Requirement_ConfigConstraint(Check="c", ConfigKey="k") + + def test_provider_defaults_to_none(self): + # Single-provider frameworks omit Provider; it is optional. + c = Compliance_Requirement_ConfigConstraint( + Check="c", ConfigKey="k", Operator="eq", Value=False + ) + assert c.Provider is None + + def test_provider_scopes_constraint(self): + # Universal frameworks tag each constraint with the provider it applies to. + c = Compliance_Requirement_ConfigConstraint( + Check="securityhub_enabled", + Provider="aws", + ConfigKey="mute_non_default_regions", + Operator="eq", + Value=False, + ) + assert c.Provider == "aws" + + +class Test_ConfigRequirements_On_Compliance: + def test_requirements_without_constraints_default_to_none(self): + compliance = Compliance(**_load_cis()) + # Requirement without configurable checks → ConfigRequirements is None. + no_constraint = [r for r in compliance.Requirements if not r.ConfigRequirements] + assert no_constraint + assert no_constraint[0].ConfigRequirements is None + + def test_requirement_with_constraints_parses(self): + compliance = Compliance(**_load_cis()) + with_constraint = [r for r in compliance.Requirements if r.ConfigRequirements] + assert with_constraint, "cis_6.0_aws should declare ConfigRequirements" + constraint = with_constraint[0].ConfigRequirements[0] + assert isinstance(constraint, Compliance_Requirement_ConfigConstraint) + assert constraint.Check + assert constraint.Operator in {"lte", "gte", "eq", "in", "subset", "superset"} + + +class Test_Adapt_Legacy_To_Universal: + def test_config_requirements_carried_to_universal(self): + legacy = Compliance(**_load_cis()) + universal = adapt_legacy_to_universal(legacy) + + legacy_with = {r.Id for r in legacy.Requirements if r.ConfigRequirements} + universal_with = {r.id for r in universal.requirements if r.config_requirements} + assert legacy_with == universal_with + assert universal_with, "expected at least one requirement with constraints" + + # The constraint payload survives as the typed constraint model with the + # same fields (``Provider`` is carried through too, ``None`` for + # single-provider frameworks like CIS AWS). + sample = next(r for r in universal.requirements if r.config_requirements) + entry = sample.config_requirements[0] + assert isinstance(entry, Compliance_Requirement_ConfigConstraint) + assert set(entry.dict()) == { + "Check", + "Provider", + "ConfigKey", + "Operator", + "Value", + } + assert entry.Provider is None + + def test_requirements_without_constraints_are_none_in_universal(self): + legacy = Compliance(**_load_cis()) + universal = adapt_legacy_to_universal(legacy) + without = [r for r in universal.requirements if not r.config_requirements] + assert without + assert without[0].config_requirements is None diff --git a/tests/lib/check/compliance_config_eval_test.py b/tests/lib/check/compliance_config_eval_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4acec9bb4c --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/lib/check/compliance_config_eval_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,408 @@ +from types import SimpleNamespace +from unittest.mock import patch + +import pytest + +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import ( + CONFIG_NOT_VALID_PREFIX, + accumulate_group_status, + accumulate_overview_status, + apply_config_status, + build_requirement_config_status, + evaluate_config_constraints, + get_effective_status, + get_scan_audit_config, + get_scan_provider_type, + resolve_requirement_config_status, +) + +CONSTRAINTS = [ + { + "Check": "iam_user_accesskey_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_access_keys_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45, + } +] + + +class Test_evaluate_config_constraints: + def test_no_constraints_is_compliant(self): + assert evaluate_config_constraints(None, {}) == (True, "") + assert evaluate_config_constraints([], {"x": 1}) == (True, "") + + def test_config_absent_assumes_default_ok(self): + # Key not explicitly set → default assumed adequate. + is_ok, reason = evaluate_config_constraints(CONSTRAINTS, {}) + assert is_ok is True + assert reason == "" + + def test_none_audit_config_is_compliant(self): + assert evaluate_config_constraints(CONSTRAINTS, None) == (True, "") + + def test_lte_satisfied(self): + assert evaluate_config_constraints( + CONSTRAINTS, {"max_unused_access_keys_days": 45} + ) == (True, "") + + def test_lte_violated(self): + is_ok, reason = evaluate_config_constraints( + CONSTRAINTS, {"max_unused_access_keys_days": 120} + ) + assert is_ok is False + # Product-facing message: names the check, the applied value, what the + # requirement needs and how to fix it, in plain language. + assert reason.startswith(CONFIG_NOT_VALID_PREFIX) + assert "iam_user_accesskey_unused" in reason + assert "max_unused_access_keys_days" in reason + assert "set to 120" in reason + assert "45 or lower" in reason + + def test_gte_operator(self): + c = [{"Check": "c", "ConfigKey": "k", "Operator": "gte", "Value": 10}] + assert evaluate_config_constraints(c, {"k": 10})[0] is True + assert evaluate_config_constraints(c, {"k": 9})[0] is False + + def test_eq_operator(self): + c = [{"Check": "c", "ConfigKey": "k", "Operator": "eq", "Value": "HIGH"}] + assert evaluate_config_constraints(c, {"k": "HIGH"})[0] is True + assert evaluate_config_constraints(c, {"k": "LOW"})[0] is False + + def test_in_operator(self): + c = [{"Check": "c", "ConfigKey": "k", "Operator": "in", "Value": [1, 2, 3]}] + assert evaluate_config_constraints(c, {"k": 2})[0] is True + assert evaluate_config_constraints(c, {"k": 9})[0] is False + + def test_subset_operator_allowlist(self): + # Allowlist config: applied list must stay within the secure baseline. + c = [ + { + "Check": "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_minimal_tls_versions", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": ["1.2", "1.3"], + } + ] + assert ( + evaluate_config_constraints( + c, {"recommended_minimal_tls_versions": ["1.2", "1.3"]} + )[0] + is True + ) + # Stricter (subset) still passes. + assert ( + evaluate_config_constraints( + c, {"recommended_minimal_tls_versions": ["1.3"]} + )[0] + is True + ) + # Widening with a weaker value breaks it. + is_ok, reason = evaluate_config_constraints( + c, {"recommended_minimal_tls_versions": ["1.0", "1.2", "1.3"]} + ) + assert is_ok is False + assert "recommended_minimal_tls_versions" in reason + + def test_superset_operator_denylist(self): + # Denylist config: applied list must keep covering the forbidden baseline. + c = [ + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": ["RSA-1024", "P-192"], + } + ] + assert ( + evaluate_config_constraints( + c, {"insecure_key_algorithms": ["RSA-1024", "P-192"]} + )[0] + is True + ) + # Extra forbidden values are fine. + assert ( + evaluate_config_constraints( + c, {"insecure_key_algorithms": ["RSA-1024", "P-192", "P-224"]} + )[0] + is True + ) + # Removing a forbidden value breaks it. + assert ( + evaluate_config_constraints(c, {"insecure_key_algorithms": ["P-192"]})[0] + is False + ) + + def test_subset_superset_non_list_not_satisfied(self): + sub = [{"Check": "c", "ConfigKey": "k", "Operator": "subset", "Value": ["a"]}] + sup = [{"Check": "c", "ConfigKey": "k", "Operator": "superset", "Value": ["a"]}] + # A scalar applied value cannot satisfy a set constraint. + assert evaluate_config_constraints(sub, {"k": "a"})[0] is False + assert evaluate_config_constraints(sup, {"k": "a"})[0] is False + + def test_mismatched_types_not_satisfied(self): + assert ( + evaluate_config_constraints( + CONSTRAINTS, {"max_unused_access_keys_days": "x"} + )[0] + is False + ) + + def test_multiple_constraints_first_violation_reported(self): + constraints = [ + {"Check": "a", "ConfigKey": "k1", "Operator": "lte", "Value": 45}, + {"Check": "b", "ConfigKey": "k2", "Operator": "lte", "Value": 45}, + ] + is_ok, reason = evaluate_config_constraints(constraints, {"k1": 45, "k2": 90}) + assert is_ok is False + # The first violation (check "b", key "k2", applied 90) is the one reported. + assert "k2" in reason + assert "set to 90" in reason + + +class Test_provider_scoping: + # An AWS-scoped constraint on a config key whose value is too loose. + AWS_CONSTRAINT = [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": False, + } + ] + + def test_applies_when_provider_matches(self): + is_ok, _ = evaluate_config_constraints( + self.AWS_CONSTRAINT, {"mute_non_default_regions": True}, "aws" + ) + assert is_ok is False + + def test_skipped_when_provider_differs(self): + # Same loose value, but scanning GCP → the AWS constraint must not fire. + is_ok, reason = evaluate_config_constraints( + self.AWS_CONSTRAINT, {"mute_non_default_regions": True}, "gcp" + ) + assert is_ok is True + assert reason == "" + + def test_none_provider_type_disables_scoping(self): + # Without a known provider every constraint is evaluated (legacy default). + is_ok, _ = evaluate_config_constraints( + self.AWS_CONSTRAINT, {"mute_non_default_regions": True}, None + ) + assert is_ok is False + + def test_provider_match_is_case_insensitive(self): + # A constraint authored as "AWS" must still scope to the "aws" scan, + # not be silently bypassed by a casing mismatch. + constraint = [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "Provider": "AWS", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": False, + } + ] + is_ok, _ = evaluate_config_constraints( + constraint, {"mute_non_default_regions": True}, "aws" + ) + assert is_ok is False + + def test_untagged_constraint_applies_to_any_provider(self): + # Single-provider frameworks omit Provider → always evaluated. + is_ok, _ = evaluate_config_constraints( + CONSTRAINTS, {"max_unused_access_keys_days": 120}, "aws" + ) + assert is_ok is False + + +# A constraint forcing FAIL when the applied value is too loose. +REGION_CONSTRAINT = [ + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": False, + } +] + + +def _legacy_req(req_id, constraints=None): + """Fake legacy Compliance_Requirement (``Id`` / ``ConfigRequirements``).""" + return SimpleNamespace(Id=req_id, ConfigRequirements=constraints) + + +def _universal_req(req_id, constraints=None): + """Fake UniversalComplianceRequirement (``id`` / ``config_requirements``).""" + return SimpleNamespace(id=req_id, config_requirements=constraints) + + +class Test_build_requirement_config_status: + def test_only_requirements_with_constraints_included(self): + reqs = [_legacy_req("1", CONSTRAINTS), _legacy_req("2", None)] + status = build_requirement_config_status( + reqs, {"max_unused_access_keys_days": 120} + ) + assert set(status) == {"1"} + assert status["1"][0] is False + + def test_supports_universal_requirements(self): + reqs = [_universal_req("u1", REGION_CONSTRAINT)] + status = build_requirement_config_status( + reqs, {"mute_non_default_regions": True} + ) + assert status["u1"][0] is False + + def test_compliant_when_config_satisfied(self): + reqs = [_legacy_req("1", CONSTRAINTS)] + status = build_requirement_config_status( + reqs, {"max_unused_access_keys_days": 30} + ) + assert status["1"] == (True, "") + + +class Test_resolve_requirement_config_status: + def test_memoises_by_requirement_id(self): + cache = {} + req = _legacy_req("1", CONSTRAINTS) + first = resolve_requirement_config_status( + req, {"max_unused_access_keys_days": 120}, cache + ) + assert cache["1"] is first + assert first[0] is False + # A different audit_config is ignored once cached (intended for one build). + second = resolve_requirement_config_status(req, {}, cache) + assert second is first + + def test_requirement_without_constraints_is_ok(self): + cache = {} + req = _legacy_req("1", None) + assert resolve_requirement_config_status(req, {}, cache) == (True, "") + + +class Test_accumulate_overview_status: + def test_fail_wins_over_earlier_pass(self): + p, f, m = set(), set(), set() + accumulate_overview_status(0, "PASS", p, f, m) + accumulate_overview_status(0, "FAIL", p, f, m) + assert (p, f, m) == (set(), {0}, set()) + + def test_pass_after_fail_does_not_double_count(self): + p, f, m = set(), set(), set() + accumulate_overview_status(0, "FAIL", p, f, m) + accumulate_overview_status(0, "PASS", p, f, m) + assert (p, f, m) == (set(), {0}, set()) + + def test_pass_only(self): + p, f, m = set(), set(), set() + accumulate_overview_status(0, "PASS", p, f, m) + assert (p, f, m) == ({0}, set(), set()) + + def test_muted(self): + p, f, m = set(), set(), set() + accumulate_overview_status(0, "Muted", p, f, m) + assert (p, f, m) == (set(), set(), {0}) + + +class Test_accumulate_group_status: + def test_first_status_counted(self): + counts = {"FAIL": 0, "PASS": 0, "Muted": 0} + seen = {} + accumulate_group_status(0, "PASS", counts, seen) + assert counts == {"FAIL": 0, "PASS": 1, "Muted": 0} + assert seen == {0: "PASS"} + + def test_pass_upgraded_to_fail(self): + counts = {"FAIL": 0, "PASS": 0, "Muted": 0} + seen = {} + accumulate_group_status(0, "PASS", counts, seen) + accumulate_group_status(0, "FAIL", counts, seen) + assert counts == {"FAIL": 1, "PASS": 0, "Muted": 0} + assert seen == {0: "FAIL"} + + def test_fail_not_downgraded_by_later_pass(self): + counts = {"FAIL": 0, "PASS": 0, "Muted": 0} + seen = {} + accumulate_group_status(0, "FAIL", counts, seen) + accumulate_group_status(0, "PASS", counts, seen) + assert counts == {"FAIL": 1, "PASS": 0, "Muted": 0} + + def test_same_index_not_double_counted(self): + counts = {"FAIL": 0, "PASS": 0, "Muted": 0} + seen = {} + accumulate_group_status(0, "PASS", counts, seen) + accumulate_group_status(0, "PASS", counts, seen) + assert counts["PASS"] == 1 + + def test_works_with_fail_pass_only_counts(self): + # Level-style counts (no "Muted" key) used by CIS / split tables. + counts = {"FAIL": 0, "PASS": 0} + seen = {} + accumulate_group_status(0, "PASS", counts, seen) + accumulate_group_status(0, "FAIL", counts, seen) + assert counts == {"FAIL": 1, "PASS": 0} + + def test_muted_on_fail_pass_only_counts_raises(self): + # Level-style callers only ever pass PASS/FAIL (they guard on + # ``not finding.muted``). Passing "Muted" to a Muted-less counts must + # fail loudly rather than silently create a bogus key. + counts = {"FAIL": 0, "PASS": 0} + with pytest.raises(KeyError): + accumulate_group_status(0, "Muted", counts, {}) + + +class Test_apply_config_status: + def test_none_config_status_keeps_finding(self): + assert apply_config_status("PASS", "ext", None) == ("PASS", "ext") + + def test_compliant_keeps_finding(self): + assert apply_config_status("PASS", "ext", (True, "")) == ("PASS", "ext") + + def test_invalid_config_forces_fail_and_prepends_reason(self): + # The reason already carries the full product-facing message; it is + # prepended verbatim to the finding's extended status. + reason = f"{CONFIG_NOT_VALID_PREFIX} bad config" + status, extended = apply_config_status("PASS", "ext", (False, reason)) + assert status == "FAIL" + assert extended.startswith(CONFIG_NOT_VALID_PREFIX) + assert reason in extended + assert "ext" in extended + + +class Test_get_effective_status: + def test_none_and_compliant_keep_status(self): + assert get_effective_status("PASS", None) == "PASS" + assert get_effective_status("PASS", (True, "")) == "PASS" + + def test_invalid_config_forces_fail(self): + assert get_effective_status("PASS", (False, "reason")) == "FAIL" + + +class Test_get_scan_audit_config: + def test_returns_empty_without_global_provider(self): + # No global provider set → get_global_provider() returns None → + # ``None.audit_config`` raises AttributeError → safe empty mapping. + with patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=None, + ): + assert get_scan_audit_config() == {} + + +class Test_get_scan_provider_type: + def test_returns_empty_when_no_global_provider(self): + # No global provider set → get_global_provider() returns None → + # ``None.type`` raises AttributeError → scoping disabled (empty string). + with patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=None, + ): + assert get_scan_provider_type() == "" + + def test_returns_global_provider_type(self): + with patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=SimpleNamespace(type="aws"), + ): + assert get_scan_provider_type() == "aws" diff --git a/tests/lib/check/compliance_config_requirements_data_test.py b/tests/lib/check/compliance_config_requirements_data_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3b3ba5757f --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/lib/check/compliance_config_requirements_data_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,191 @@ +"""Data-integrity tests for every ``ConfigRequirements`` declared in the shipped +compliance framework JSONs. + +These guard the ~700 constraints added across the frameworks against drift: +- every constraint is well-formed (valid operator, value typed for its operator), +- every constraint targets a check the requirement actually maps (no orphans), +- the region-mute invariant holds (every requirement mapping a region-scoped + check carries the ``mute_non_default_regions == false`` constraint), +- every framework still parses through its model. +""" + +import glob +import json +import pathlib + +import pytest + +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance, ComplianceFramework + +_REPO_ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3] +_COMPLIANCE_DIR = _REPO_ROOT / "prowler" / "compliance" + +_VALID_OPERATORS = {"lte", "gte", "eq", "in", "subset", "superset"} +# Checks whose result is untrustworthy when non-default regions are muted. +_REGION_CHECKS = { + "accessanalyzer_enabled", + "config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", + "drs_job_exist", + "guardduty_delegated_admin_enabled_all_regions", + "guardduty_is_enabled", + "securityhub_enabled", +} + +_ALL_FILES = sorted(glob.glob(str(_COMPLIANCE_DIR / "**" / "*.json"), recursive=True)) + + +def _load(path): + with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as f: + return json.load(f) + + +def _requirements(data): + return data.get("Requirements") or data.get("requirements") or [] + + +def _req_id(req): + return req.get("Id") or req.get("id") + + +def _req_checks(req): + ch = req.get("Checks", req.get("checks")) + checks = set() + if isinstance(ch, dict): + for v in ch.values(): + checks |= set(v or []) + elif isinstance(ch, list): + checks |= set(ch) + return checks + + +def _req_constraints(req): + return req.get("ConfigRequirements") or req.get("config_requirements") or [] + + +def _iter_constraints(): + """Yield (file, req_id, checks, constraint) for every constraint shipped.""" + for path in _ALL_FILES: + data = _load(path) + for req in _requirements(data): + checks = _req_checks(req) + for c in _req_constraints(req): + yield pathlib.Path(path).name, _req_id(req), checks, c + + +_ALL_CONSTRAINTS = list(_iter_constraints()) + + +def test_there_are_constraints_to_validate(): + # Guards against the iteration silently finding nothing (e.g. path change). + assert len(_ALL_CONSTRAINTS) > 100 + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "fname,req_id,checks,constraint", + _ALL_CONSTRAINTS, + ids=[f"{f}:{r}:{c['Check']}" for f, r, _, c in _ALL_CONSTRAINTS], +) +class Test_Constraint_Wellformed: + def test_has_required_keys(self, fname, req_id, checks, constraint): + required = {"Check", "ConfigKey", "Operator", "Value"} + # ``Provider`` is optional (universal frameworks set it, single-provider + # ones omit it); no other key is allowed. + assert required <= set(constraint) <= required | { + "Provider" + }, f"{fname}:{req_id} malformed constraint {constraint}" + + def test_operator_valid(self, fname, req_id, checks, constraint): + assert constraint["Operator"] in _VALID_OPERATORS + + def test_check_is_mapped_by_requirement(self, fname, req_id, checks, constraint): + # No orphan constraints: the target check must be one the requirement runs. + assert constraint["Check"] in checks, ( + f"{fname}:{req_id} constraint targets {constraint['Check']} " + f"which the requirement does not map" + ) + + def test_value_type_matches_operator(self, fname, req_id, checks, constraint): + op, val = constraint["Operator"], constraint["Value"] + if op in ("subset", "superset", "in"): + assert isinstance(val, list), f"{fname}:{req_id} {op} needs a list value" + elif op in ("lte", "gte"): + # Numeric threshold; bool is not a valid threshold even though it is + # an int subclass. + assert isinstance(val, (int, float)) and not isinstance( + val, bool + ), f"{fname}:{req_id} {op} needs a numeric value, got {val!r}" + elif op == "eq": + assert isinstance( + val, (bool, int, float, str) + ), f"{fname}:{req_id} eq needs a scalar value" + + +class Test_Region_Mute_Invariant: + """Every requirement mapping a region-scoped check must carry the + ``mute_non_default_regions == false`` constraint for it.""" + + def test_region_checks_always_constrained(self): + gaps = [] + for path in _ALL_FILES: + data = _load(path) + for req in _requirements(data): + checks = _req_checks(req) + constrained = { + c["Check"] + for c in _req_constraints(req) + if c["ConfigKey"] == "mute_non_default_regions" + } + for region_check in checks & _REGION_CHECKS: + if region_check not in constrained: + gaps.append( + f"{pathlib.Path(path).name}:{_req_id(req)}:{region_check}" + ) + assert not gaps, f"region-mute constraint missing for: {gaps}" + + def test_region_mute_constraints_use_eq_false(self): + for fname, req_id, _checks, c in _ALL_CONSTRAINTS: + if c["ConfigKey"] == "mute_non_default_regions": + assert ( + c["Operator"] == "eq" and c["Value"] is False + ), f"{fname}:{req_id} region-mute must be eq false" + + +class Test_Universal_Provider_Scoping: + """Universal (multi-provider) frameworks map checks per provider, so every + constraint must declare which provider it scopes to and that provider must + actually map the targeted check. Without this a constraint authored for one + provider's check would wrongly apply to scans of every other provider.""" + + def test_multiprovider_constraints_declare_consistent_provider(self): + gaps = [] + for path in _ALL_FILES: + data = _load(path) + for req in _requirements(data): + ch = req.get("Checks", req.get("checks")) + # Only universal frameworks key their checks by provider. + if not isinstance(ch, dict): + continue + for c in _req_constraints(req): + provider = c.get("Provider") + if not provider: + gaps.append( + f"{pathlib.Path(path).name}:{_req_id(req)}:" + f"{c['Check']} missing Provider" + ) + elif c["Check"] not in set(ch.get(provider, [])): + gaps.append( + f"{pathlib.Path(path).name}:{_req_id(req)}:" + f"{c['Check']} not mapped under provider {provider}" + ) + assert not gaps, f"universal constraints with bad Provider: {gaps}" + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "path", _ALL_FILES, ids=[pathlib.Path(p).name for p in _ALL_FILES] +) +def test_every_framework_parses_with_constraints(path): + data = _load(path) + if "Requirements" in data: + Compliance(**data) + else: + ComplianceFramework.parse_obj(data) diff --git a/tests/lib/check/mitre_config_requirements_test.py b/tests/lib/check/mitre_config_requirements_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ef3b33a17f --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/lib/check/mitre_config_requirements_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +"""Regression coverage for ConfigRequirements on MITRE requirements. + +``mitre_attack_aws.json`` declares ``ConfigRequirements`` on its requirements, +but ``Mitre_Requirement`` historically did not define the field, so Pydantic +silently dropped the constraints during MITRE parsing and the config validation +logic never saw them. These tests prove the constraints survive parsing and that +a violated MITRE config requirement forces the compliance result to FAIL through +the universal output path. +""" + +from datetime import datetime, timezone +from types import SimpleNamespace +from unittest.mock import patch + +from py_ocsf_models.objects.compliance_status import StatusID as ComplianceStatusID + +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import ( + Compliance, + Mitre_Requirement, + adapt_legacy_to_universal, +) +from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.universal.ocsf_compliance import ( + OCSFComplianceOutput, +) + +_MODULE = "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider" + + +def _mitre_compliance(check_id): + """A minimal one-requirement MITRE framework with a config constraint.""" + return Compliance( + Framework="MITRE-ATTACK", + Name="MITRE ATT&CK", + Provider="AWS", + Version="", + Description="Test MITRE framework", + Requirements=[ + { + "Name": "Test Technique", + "Id": "T9999", + "Tactics": ["initial-access"], + "SubTechniques": [], + "Platforms": ["AWS"], + "Description": "Requirement T9999", + "TechniqueURL": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T9999", + "Checks": [check_id], + "ConfigRequirements": [ + { + "Check": check_id, + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": False, + } + ], + "Attributes": [ + { + "AWSService": "service", + "Category": "category", + "Value": "value", + "Comment": "comment", + } + ], + } + ], + ) + + +def _finding(check_id, status="PASS", provider="aws"): + finding = SimpleNamespace() + finding.provider = provider + finding.account_uid = "123456789012" + finding.account_name = "test-account" + finding.account_organization_uid = "org-123" + finding.account_organization_name = "test-org" + finding.region = "us-east-1" + finding.status = status + finding.status_extended = f"{check_id} is {status}" + finding.resource_uid = f"arn:aws:iam::123456789012:{check_id}" + finding.resource_name = check_id + finding.resource_details = "details" + finding.resource_metadata = {} + finding.resource_tags = {"Name": "test"} + finding.partition = "aws" + finding.muted = False + finding.check_id = check_id + finding.uid = "test-finding-uid" + finding.timestamp = datetime(2025, 1, 15, 12, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc) + finding.prowler_version = "5.0.0" + finding.metadata = SimpleNamespace( + CheckID=check_id, + CheckTitle=f"Title for {check_id}", + Description=f"Description for {check_id}", + Severity="medium", + ServiceName="iam", + ResourceType="aws-iam-role", + ) + return finding + + +class Test_Mitre_Config_Requirements: + def test_config_requirements_survive_mitre_parsing(self): + """Real mitre_attack_aws.json constraints must not be dropped on parse.""" + compliance = Compliance.parse_file( + "prowler/compliance/aws/mitre_attack_aws.json" + ) + requirement = next(r for r in compliance.Requirements if r.Id == "T1190") + assert isinstance(requirement, Mitre_Requirement) + assert requirement.ConfigRequirements + # And they propagate through the legacy -> universal adapter unchanged. + universal = adapt_legacy_to_universal(compliance) + universal_requirement = next( + r for r in universal.requirements if r.id == "T1190" + ) + assert universal_requirement.config_requirements + assert len(universal_requirement.config_requirements) == len( + requirement.ConfigRequirements + ) + + def test_violating_mitre_config_forces_fail(self): + """A PASS finding becomes FAIL when the MITRE config constraint is violated.""" + check_id = "drs_job_exist" + framework = adapt_legacy_to_universal(_mitre_compliance(check_id)) + findings = [_finding(check_id, "PASS")] + with patch(_MODULE) as mock_gp: + mock_gp.return_value.audit_config = {"mute_non_default_regions": True} + out = OCSFComplianceOutput( + findings=findings, framework=framework, provider="aws" + ) + event = out.data[0] + assert event.compliance.status_id == ComplianceStatusID.Fail + assert event.status_code == "FAIL" + assert "Configuration not valid" in event.message + # The nested Check object keeps the real (raw) finding status. + assert event.compliance.checks[0].status == "PASS" + + def test_valid_mitre_config_keeps_pass(self): + check_id = "drs_job_exist" + framework = adapt_legacy_to_universal(_mitre_compliance(check_id)) + findings = [_finding(check_id, "PASS")] + with patch(_MODULE) as mock_gp: + mock_gp.return_value.audit_config = {"mute_non_default_regions": False} + out = OCSFComplianceOutput( + findings=findings, framework=framework, provider="aws" + ) + event = out.data[0] + assert event.compliance.status_id == ComplianceStatusID.Pass + assert event.status_code == "PASS" + assert "Configuration not valid" not in event.message diff --git a/tests/lib/cli/parser_test.py b/tests/lib/cli/parser_test.py index cd602a3a61..94b6ad2b4d 100644 --- a/tests/lib/cli/parser_test.py +++ b/tests/lib/cli/parser_test.py @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ prowler_command = "prowler" # capsys # https://docs.pytest.org/en/7.1.x/how-to/capture-stdout-stderr.html -prowler_default_usage_error = "usage: prowler [-h] [--version] {aws,azure,gcp,kubernetes,m365,github,googleworkspace,okta,nhn,mongodbatlas,oraclecloud,alibabacloud,cloudflare,openstack,scaleway,stackit,vercel,dashboard,iac,image,llm} ..." +prowler_default_usage_error = "usage: prowler [-h] [--version] {aws,azure,gcp,kubernetes,m365,github,googleworkspace,okta,nhn,mongodbatlas,oraclecloud,alibabacloud,cloudflare,openstack,scaleway,stackit,vercel,linode,dashboard,iac,image,llm} ..." def mock_get_available_providers(): @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ def mock_get_available_providers(): "cloudflare", "openstack", "stackit", + "linode", ] diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/asd_essential_eight/asd_essential_eight_table_test.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/asd_essential_eight/asd_essential_eight_table_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6382dc1d2c --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/asd_essential_eight/asd_essential_eight_table_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +import re +from types import SimpleNamespace + +from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.asd_essential_eight.asd_essential_eight import ( + get_asd_essential_eight_table, +) + + +def _make_finding(check_id, status="PASS", muted=False): + return SimpleNamespace( + check_metadata=SimpleNamespace(CheckID=check_id), + status=status, + muted=muted, + ) + + +def _make_compliance(provider, sections, framework="ASD-Essential-Eight"): + """Build a per-check compliance covering the given sections.""" + return SimpleNamespace( + Framework=framework, + Provider=provider, + Requirements=[ + SimpleNamespace(Attributes=[SimpleNamespace(Section=section)]) + for section in sections + ], + ) + + +class TestASDEssentialEightTable: + """Test cases verifying multi-section counting and provider-column attribution for the ASD Essential Eight compliance table.""" + + def test_multi_section_fail_not_undercounted(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """A single FAIL check mapped to several sections must show FAIL(1) in + every section, not just the first one seen.""" + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", ["IAM", "Logging"])] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace(Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", ["IAM"])]), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL"), + _make_finding("check_b", "PASS"), + ] + + get_asd_essential_eight_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "asd_essential_eight_aws", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + # Both IAM and Logging must report FAIL(1); before the fix Logging was + # undercounted because the per-section count was gated by the global + # dedup list. + assert captured.out.count("FAIL(1)") == 2 + + def test_multi_section_muted_not_undercounted(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """A single MUTED check mapped to several sections must increase the + per-section Muted count in every section, not only the first one.""" + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", ["IAM", "Logging"])] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace(Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", ["IAM"])]), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL", muted=True), + # A real FAIL is needed so the results table is rendered at all. + _make_finding("check_b", "FAIL"), + ] + + get_asd_essential_eight_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "asd_essential_eight_aws", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + plain = re.sub(r"\x1b\[[0-9;]*m", "", captured.out) + # The muted check belongs to both IAM and Logging, so the Muted column + # must read 1 in both rows. + muted_cells = re.findall(r"│\s*1\s*│\s*$", plain, flags=re.MULTILINE) + assert len(muted_cells) == 2 + + def test_provider_column_not_leaked_from_other_framework(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """The Provider column must come from the matched ASD-Essential-Eight + compliance, never from a different framework that happens to be the last + entry in the check's compliance list.""" + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance("aws", ["IAM"]), + _make_compliance( + "leaked_provider", ["Other"], framework="OtherFramework" + ), + ] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance("aws", ["IAM"]), + _make_compliance( + "leaked_provider", ["Other"], framework="OtherFramework" + ), + ] + ), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL"), + _make_finding("check_b", "PASS"), + ] + + get_asd_essential_eight_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "asd_essential_eight_aws", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + assert "aws" in captured.out + # The provider of the unrelated trailing framework must NOT leak into + # the rendered table. + assert "leaked_provider" not in captured.out diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/c5/__init__.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/c5/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/c5/c5_table_test.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/c5/c5_table_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c423f5af0b --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/c5/c5_table_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +import re +from types import SimpleNamespace + +from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.c5.c5 import get_c5_table + + +def _make_finding(check_id, status="PASS", muted=False): + return SimpleNamespace( + check_metadata=SimpleNamespace(CheckID=check_id), + status=status, + muted=muted, + ) + + +def _make_compliance(provider, sections, framework="C5"): + """Build a per-check compliance covering the given sections.""" + return SimpleNamespace( + Framework=framework, + Provider=provider, + Requirements=[ + SimpleNamespace(Attributes=[SimpleNamespace(Section=section)]) + for section in sections + ], + ) + + +class TestC5Table: + """Verify multi-section counting and provider-column attribution for the compliance table.""" + + def test_multi_section_fail_not_undercounted(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """A single FAIL check mapped to several sections must show FAIL(1) in + every section, not just the first one seen.""" + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", ["IAM", "Logging"])] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace(Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", ["IAM"])]), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL"), + _make_finding("check_b", "PASS"), + ] + + get_c5_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "c5_aws", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + # Both IAM and Logging must report FAIL(1); before the fix Logging was + # undercounted because the per-section count was gated by the global + # dedup list. + assert captured.out.count("FAIL(1)") == 2 + + def test_multi_section_muted_not_undercounted(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """A single MUTED check mapped to several sections must increase the + per-section Muted count in every section, not only the first one.""" + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", ["IAM", "Logging"])] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace(Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", ["IAM"])]), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL", muted=True), + # A real FAIL is needed so the results table is rendered at all. + _make_finding("check_b", "FAIL"), + ] + + get_c5_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "c5_aws", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + plain = re.sub(r"\x1b\[[0-9;]*m", "", captured.out) + # The muted check belongs to both IAM and Logging, so the Muted column + # must read 1 in both rows. + muted_cells = re.findall(r"│\s*1\s*│\s*$", plain, flags=re.MULTILINE) + assert len(muted_cells) == 2 + + def test_provider_column_not_leaked_from_other_framework(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """The Provider column must come from the matched C5 compliance, never + from a different framework that happens to be the last entry in the + check's compliance list.""" + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance("aws", ["IAM"]), + _make_compliance( + "leaked_provider", ["Other"], framework="OtherFramework" + ), + ] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance("aws", ["IAM"]), + _make_compliance( + "leaked_provider", ["Other"], framework="OtherFramework" + ), + ] + ), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL"), + _make_finding("check_b", "PASS"), + ] + + get_c5_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "c5_aws", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + assert "aws" in captured.out + # The provider of the unrelated trailing framework must NOT leak into + # the rendered table. + assert "leaked_provider" not in captured.out diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/ccc/ccc_table_test.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/ccc/ccc_table_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f647aff3d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/ccc/ccc_table_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +import re +from types import SimpleNamespace + +from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.ccc.ccc import get_ccc_table + + +def _make_finding(check_id, status="PASS", muted=False): + return SimpleNamespace( + check_metadata=SimpleNamespace(CheckID=check_id), + status=status, + muted=muted, + ) + + +def _make_compliance(provider, sections, framework="CCC"): + """Build a per-check compliance covering the given sections.""" + return SimpleNamespace( + Framework=framework, + Provider=provider, + Requirements=[ + SimpleNamespace(Attributes=[SimpleNamespace(Section=section)]) + for section in sections + ], + ) + + +class TestCCCTable: + """Test cases verifying multi-section counting and provider-column attribution for the compliance table.""" + + def test_multi_section_fail_not_undercounted(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """A single FAIL check mapped to several sections must show FAIL(1) in + every section, not just the first one seen.""" + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", ["IAM", "Logging"])] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace(Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", ["IAM"])]), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL"), + _make_finding("check_b", "PASS"), + ] + + get_ccc_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "ccc_aws", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + # Both IAM and Logging must report FAIL(1); before the fix Logging was + # undercounted because the per-section count was gated by the global + # dedup list. + assert captured.out.count("FAIL(1)") == 2 + + def test_multi_section_muted_not_undercounted(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """A single MUTED check mapped to several sections must increase the + per-section Muted count in every section, not only the first one.""" + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", ["IAM", "Logging"])] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace(Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", ["IAM"])]), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL", muted=True), + # A real FAIL is needed so the results table is rendered at all. + _make_finding("check_b", "FAIL"), + ] + + get_ccc_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "ccc_aws", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + plain = re.sub(r"\x1b\[[0-9;]*m", "", captured.out) + # The muted check belongs to both IAM and Logging, so the Muted column + # must read 1 in both rows. + muted_cells = re.findall(r"│\s*1\s*│\s*$", plain, flags=re.MULTILINE) + assert len(muted_cells) == 2 + + def test_provider_column_not_leaked_from_other_framework(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """The Provider column must come from the matched CCC compliance, never + from a different framework that happens to be the last entry in the + check's compliance list.""" + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance("aws", ["IAM"]), + _make_compliance( + "leaked_provider", ["Other"], framework="OtherFramework" + ), + ] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance("aws", ["IAM"]), + _make_compliance( + "leaked_provider", ["Other"], framework="OtherFramework" + ), + ] + ), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL"), + _make_finding("check_b", "PASS"), + ] + + get_ccc_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "ccc_aws", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + assert "aws" in captured.out + # The provider of the unrelated trailing framework must NOT leak into + # the rendered table. + assert "leaked_provider" not in captured.out diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_7_0_m365_test.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_7_0_m365_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4fbebb49f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_7_0_m365_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +import json +from pathlib import Path + +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import ( + CIS_Requirement_Attribute_AssessmentStatus, + CIS_Requirement_Attribute_Profile, + Compliance, +) + +PROWLER_ROOT = Path(__file__).parents[5] / "prowler" +FRAMEWORK_PATH = PROWLER_ROOT / "compliance" / "m365" / "cis_7.0_m365.json" +M365_SERVICES_PATH = PROWLER_ROOT / "providers" / "m365" / "services" + +VALID_PROFILES = {p.value for p in CIS_Requirement_Attribute_Profile} +VALID_STATUSES = {s.value for s in CIS_Requirement_Attribute_AssessmentStatus} + + +def _existing_m365_checks() -> set: + return { + metadata.stem.replace(".metadata", "") + for metadata in M365_SERVICES_PATH.rglob("*.metadata.json") + } + + +class TestCIS7_0_M365: + def test_framework_is_discoverable(self): + frameworks = Compliance.get_bulk("m365") + assert "cis_7.0_m365" in frameworks + + def test_framework_metadata(self): + framework = Compliance.get_bulk("m365")["cis_7.0_m365"] + assert framework.Framework == "CIS" + assert framework.Provider == "M365" + assert framework.Version == "7.0" + assert framework.Name == "CIS Microsoft 365 Foundations Benchmark v7.0.0" + assert len(framework.Requirements) == 160 + + def test_requirement_ids_are_unique(self): + framework = Compliance.get_bulk("m365")["cis_7.0_m365"] + ids = [req.Id for req in framework.Requirements] + assert len(ids) == len(set(ids)) + + def test_each_requirement_has_one_attribute_with_section(self): + framework = Compliance.get_bulk("m365")["cis_7.0_m365"] + for req in framework.Requirements: + assert len(req.Attributes) == 1, f"{req.Id} must have exactly one attribute" + attribute = req.Attributes[0] + assert attribute.Section, f"{req.Id} has an empty Section" + assert attribute.Profile in VALID_PROFILES + assert attribute.AssessmentStatus in VALID_STATUSES + + def test_all_mapped_checks_exist(self): + # Every check referenced by the framework must resolve to a real M365 check, + # otherwise the requirement would never be evaluated. + existing = _existing_m365_checks() + framework = json.loads(FRAMEWORK_PATH.read_text()) + unknown = { + check + for req in framework["Requirements"] + for check in req["Checks"] + if check not in existing + } + assert ( + not unknown + ), f"Framework references unknown M365 checks: {sorted(unknown)}" diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_aws_config_requirements_test.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_aws_config_requirements_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..28cc3d2e1a --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_aws_config_requirements_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +"""Integration coverage for requirement-level config validation in the CIS AWS +CSV output. Requirement CIS 6.0 AWS 2.11 maps two configurable checks; when the +scan config is looser than the requirement demands, the requirement row must be +FAIL even if the underlying finding is PASS. The applied config is read from the +active provider's ``audit_config``.""" + +import json +import pathlib +from types import SimpleNamespace +from unittest.mock import patch + +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance +from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.cis.cis_aws import AWSCIS + +_REPO_ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[5] +_CIS_6_0 = _REPO_ROOT / "prowler" / "compliance" / "aws" / "cis_6.0_aws.json" + + +def _load_cis_60() -> Compliance: + return Compliance(**json.load(open(_CIS_6_0))) + + +def _finding(check_id: str, status: str): + return SimpleNamespace( + provider="aws", + account_uid="123456789012", + region="us-east-1", + check_id=check_id, + status=status, + status_extended=f"{check_id} {status}", + resource_uid="arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/bob", + resource_name="bob", + muted=False, + ) + + +def _rows_for(requirement_id, findings, audit_config): + with patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider" + ) as mock_gp: + mock_gp.return_value.audit_config = audit_config + out = AWSCIS(findings=findings, compliance=_load_cis_60(), file_path=None) + return [r for r in out._data if r.Requirements_Id == requirement_id] + + +class Test_CIS_AWS_Config_Requirements: + def test_loose_config_forces_requirement_fail(self): + findings = [_finding("iam_user_accesskey_unused", "PASS")] + rows = _rows_for("2.11", findings, {"max_unused_access_keys_days": 120}) + assert rows, "expected a row for requirement 2.11" + assert all(r.Status == "FAIL" for r in rows) + assert all("Configuration not valid" in r.StatusExtended for r in rows) + + def test_valid_config_keeps_finding_status(self): + findings = [_finding("iam_user_accesskey_unused", "PASS")] + rows = _rows_for("2.11", findings, {"max_unused_access_keys_days": 45}) + assert rows + assert all(r.Status == "PASS" for r in rows) + assert all("Configuration not valid" not in r.StatusExtended for r in rows) + + def test_absent_config_assumes_default_ok(self): + findings = [_finding("iam_user_accesskey_unused", "PASS")] + rows = _rows_for("2.11", findings, {}) + assert rows + assert all(r.Status == "PASS" for r in rows) + + def test_other_requirements_unaffected(self): + # A finding for a check without ConfigRequirements keeps its status even + # when the config is loose for a different requirement. + findings = [_finding("iam_rotate_access_key_90_days", "PASS")] + rows = _rows_for("2.13", findings, {"max_unused_access_keys_days": 120}) + assert rows + assert all(r.Status == "PASS" for r in rows) + + def test_region_mute_constraint_forces_fail(self): + # Requirement 5.16 maps securityhub_enabled with a + # mute_non_default_regions == false constraint: muting non-default + # regions makes the PASS untrustworthy, so the row must be FAIL. + findings = [_finding("securityhub_enabled", "PASS")] + rows = _rows_for("5.16", findings, {"mute_non_default_regions": True}) + assert rows, "expected a row for requirement 5.16" + assert all(r.Status == "FAIL" for r in rows) + assert all("Configuration not valid" in r.StatusExtended for r in rows) + + def test_region_mute_constraint_default_passes(self): + findings = [_finding("securityhub_enabled", "PASS")] + rows = _rows_for("5.16", findings, {"mute_non_default_regions": False}) + assert rows + assert all(r.Status == "PASS" for r in rows) diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_azure_config_requirements_test.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_azure_config_requirements_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a34402ec77 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_azure_config_requirements_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +"""Integration coverage for the ``subset`` set-operator in a CSV output. + +CIS Azure 5.0 requirement 9.1.3 maps ``storage_smb_channel_encryption_with_secure_algorithm`` +with a ``recommended_smb_channel_encryption_algorithms subset ["AES-256-GCM"]`` +constraint: widening the allowlist with a weaker algorithm makes the PASS +untrustworthy, so the requirement row must be FAIL. Exercises the shared override +path through a per-provider CSV class (not just OCSF).""" + +import json +import pathlib +from types import SimpleNamespace +from unittest.mock import patch + +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance +from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.cis.cis_azure import AzureCIS + +_REPO_ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[5] +_CIS_5_0_AZURE = _REPO_ROOT / "prowler" / "compliance" / "azure" / "cis_5.0_azure.json" +_REQUIREMENT_ID = "9.1.3" +_CHECK = "storage_smb_channel_encryption_with_secure_algorithm" + + +def _load(): + return Compliance(**json.load(open(_CIS_5_0_AZURE))) + + +def _finding(check_id, status): + return SimpleNamespace( + provider="azure", + account_uid="00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000", + region="eastus", + check_id=check_id, + status=status, + status_extended=f"{check_id} {status}", + resource_uid="/subscriptions/x/storageAccounts/sa", + resource_name="sa", + muted=False, + ) + + +def _rows_for(audit_config): + findings = [_finding(_CHECK, "PASS")] + with patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider" + ) as mock_gp: + mock_gp.return_value.audit_config = audit_config + out = AzureCIS(findings=findings, compliance=_load(), file_path=None) + return [r for r in out._data if r.Requirements_Id == _REQUIREMENT_ID] + + +class Test_CIS_Azure_Subset_Constraint: + def test_widened_allowlist_forces_fail(self): + rows = _rows_for( + { + "recommended_smb_channel_encryption_algorithms": [ + "AES-128-CCM", + "AES-256-GCM", + ] + } + ) + assert rows, f"expected a row for requirement {_REQUIREMENT_ID}" + assert all(r.Status == "FAIL" for r in rows) + assert all("Configuration not valid" in r.StatusExtended for r in rows) + + def test_secure_allowlist_keeps_pass(self): + rows = _rows_for( + {"recommended_smb_channel_encryption_algorithms": ["AES-256-GCM"]} + ) + assert rows + assert all(r.Status == "PASS" for r in rows) + + def test_absent_config_keeps_pass(self): + rows = _rows_for({}) + assert rows + assert all(r.Status == "PASS" for r in rows) diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_table_test.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_table_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c47e1387a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/cis/cis_table_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +import re +from types import SimpleNamespace + +from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.cis.cis import get_cis_table + + +def _strip_ansi(text): + return re.sub(r"\x1b\[[0-9;]*m", "", text) + + +def _make_finding(check_id, status="PASS", muted=False): + return SimpleNamespace( + check_metadata=SimpleNamespace(CheckID=check_id), + status=status, + muted=muted, + ) + + +def _attr(section, profile="Level 1"): + return SimpleNamespace(Section=section, Profile=profile) + + +def _make_compliance(provider, attributes, version="1.4", framework="CIS"): + """Build a per-check CIS compliance with the given (section, profile) attrs.""" + return SimpleNamespace( + Framework=framework, + Version=version, + Provider=provider, + Requirements=[SimpleNamespace(Attributes=attributes)], + ) + + +def _make_compliance_multi_req(provider, attributes, version="1.4", framework="CIS"): + """Build a per-check CIS compliance where each attr is its own requirement, + simulating a check that appears in several requirements.""" + return SimpleNamespace( + Framework=framework, + Version=version, + Provider=provider, + Requirements=[SimpleNamespace(Attributes=[attr]) for attr in attributes], + ) + + +class TestCISTable: + """Verify multi-section counting and provider-column attribution for the CIS compliance table.""" + + def test_muted_multi_section_not_undercounted(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """A single MUTED finding mapped to several sections must increment the + per-section Muted column for every section, not only the first seen. + + CIS counts FAIL/PASS through Level 1/Level 2 buckets, so only the Muted + per-section count was affected by the undercount bug. + """ + bulk_metadata = { + # check_a is muted and belongs to two sections at once. + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance("aws", [_attr("1 IAM"), _attr("2 Logging")]) + ] + ), + # A real (non-muted) finding so the table is rendered. + "check_b": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", [_attr("1 IAM")])] + ), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL", muted=True), + _make_finding("check_b", "PASS"), + ] + + get_cis_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "cis_1.4_aws", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + plain = _strip_ansi(captured.out) + # Both section rows must carry a Muted count of 1 in their last cell. + # Before the fix only the first section seen got incremented. + muted_one_rows = re.findall(r"│\s*1\s*│\s*$", plain, flags=re.MULTILINE) + assert len(muted_one_rows) == 2 + + def test_same_section_level_not_double_counted(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """A single finding whose check maps to several requirements that share + the same section and profile must count once for that section/level, + not once per requirement (FAIL(1), never FAIL(2)).""" + bulk_metadata = { + # check_a is a single FAIL mapped to two requirements, both in the + # same section "1 IAM" and the same profile "Level 1". + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance_multi_req("aws", [_attr("1 IAM"), _attr("1 IAM")]) + ] + ), + # A second finding in another section so the table renders. + "check_b": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", [_attr("2 Logging")])] + ), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL"), + _make_finding("check_b", "PASS"), + ] + + get_cis_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "cis_1.4_aws", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + plain = _strip_ansi(captured.out) + # The "1 IAM" row must show FAIL(1) for Level 1, never FAIL(2). + assert "FAIL(1)" in plain + assert "FAIL(2)" not in plain + + def test_provider_column_not_leaked_from_other_framework(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """The Provider column must come from the matched CIS compliance, not + from a different framework that trails it in the compliance list.""" + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance("aws", [_attr("1 IAM")]), + _make_compliance( + "gcp", [_attr("Other")], framework="OtherFramework" + ), + ] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance("aws", [_attr("1 IAM")]), + _make_compliance( + "gcp", [_attr("Other")], framework="OtherFramework" + ), + ] + ), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL"), + _make_finding("check_b", "PASS"), + ] + + get_cis_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "cis_1.4_aws", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + assert "aws" in captured.out + # The trailing unrelated framework's provider must not leak in. + assert "gcp" not in captured.out diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/config_status_dispatch_coverage_test.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/config_status_dispatch_coverage_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a4f09551a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/config_status_dispatch_coverage_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,168 @@ +"""End-to-end coverage: every shipped framework that declares ``ConfigRequirements`` +must apply the config-status override through the *real* table dispatcher. + +The companion ``config_status_renderer_coverage_test`` proves no renderer file +ignores the override. This test closes the other half of the gap that let +``okta_idaas_stig`` ship ConfigRequirements its renderers never applied: it walks +every per-provider compliance JSON that declares constraints, routes a synthetic +PASS finding through ``display_compliance_table`` exactly as a scan would, and +asserts the requirement is forced to FAIL when the scan's config is too loose. + +It runs each framework twice — once with a config that *violates* the first +constraint and once with a config that *satisfies* it — and asserts the violating +run reports strictly more failures. Comparing the two runs is language-neutral +(only the parenthesised counts are read, never the localized PASS/FAIL labels) and +self-checking (a renderer that ignored the override would report equal counts). + +Universal (multi-provider) frameworks render through a different path and are +covered by ``universal/universal_table_config_requirements_test.py``. +""" + +import glob +import io +import json +import pathlib +import re +import tempfile +from contextlib import redirect_stdout +from types import SimpleNamespace +from unittest.mock import patch + +import pytest + +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance +from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.compliance import display_compliance_table + +_REPO_ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[4] +_COMPLIANCE_DIR = _REPO_ROOT / "prowler" / "compliance" + +# Per-provider JSONs live in a provider subdir; top-level files are universal. +_PROVIDER_JSONS = sorted(glob.glob(str(_COMPLIANCE_DIR / "*" / "*.json"))) + + +def _first_constraint(data): + """Return ``(check, config_key, operator, value)`` of the first declared + constraint, or ``None`` when the framework declares none.""" + for requirement in data.get("Requirements", []): + constraints = requirement.get("ConfigRequirements") + if constraints: + c = constraints[0] + return c["Check"], c["ConfigKey"], c["Operator"], c["Value"] + return None + + +def _violating_value(operator, value): + """A config value that breaks the constraint (forces the requirement FAIL).""" + if operator == "lte": + return value + 1 + if operator == "gte": + return value - 1 + if operator == "eq": + if isinstance(value, bool): + return not value + if isinstance(value, (int, float)): + return value + 1 + return f"{value}__violates__" + if operator == "in": + return "__not_in_allowed_set__" + if operator == "subset": + return list(value) + ["__extra_not_allowed__"] + if operator == "superset": + return [] + raise AssertionError(f"unhandled operator {operator}") + + +def _satisfying_value(operator, value): + """A config value that satisfies the constraint (requirement keeps its status).""" + if operator in ("lte", "gte", "eq"): + return value + if operator == "in": + return value[0] + if operator == "subset": + return list(value) + if operator == "superset": + return list(value) + raise AssertionError(f"unhandled operator {operator}") + + +def _fail_count(findings, bulk, name, provider, applied_config): + """Render the framework table with ``applied_config`` and return the FAIL + count from the overview, or ``None`` when the table renders nothing.""" + + def _not_implemented(*_a, **_k): + raise NotImplementedError + + fake_provider = SimpleNamespace( + audit_config=applied_config, + type=provider, + display_compliance_table=_not_implemented, + ) + buffer = io.StringIO() + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: + with patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=fake_provider, + ): + with redirect_stdout(buffer): + display_compliance_table(findings, bulk, name, "output", tmp, False) + plain = re.sub(r"\x1b\[[0-9;]*m", "", buffer.getvalue()) + # The overview's first parenthesised count is always the FAIL tally, in + # every renderer and every locale (only the label is translated). + counts = re.findall(r"\(\s*(\d+)\s*\)", plain) + return int(counts[0]) if counts else None + + +def _frameworks_with_constraints(): + for path in _PROVIDER_JSONS: + with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as f: + data = json.load(f) + if _first_constraint(data): + name = pathlib.Path(path).stem + yield pytest.param(path, data, id=name) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("path, data", list(_frameworks_with_constraints())) +def test_framework_constraints_force_fail_through_dispatcher(path, data): + provider = pathlib.Path(path).parent.name + name = pathlib.Path(path).stem + check, config_key, operator, value = _first_constraint(data) + compliance = Compliance(**data) + + def _finding(): + return SimpleNamespace( + check_metadata=SimpleNamespace(CheckID=check), + check_id=check, + status="PASS", + muted=False, + ) + + # Two findings: the renderers only print the table when more than one + # finding maps to the framework. + findings = [_finding(), _finding()] + bulk = {check: SimpleNamespace(Compliance=[compliance])} + + strict = _fail_count( + findings, bulk, name, provider, {config_key: _satisfying_value(operator, value)} + ) + loose = _fail_count( + findings, bulk, name, provider, {config_key: _violating_value(operator, value)} + ) + + if strict is None and loose is None: + # The framework's renderer gates rendering on its name/version and does + # not paint a table for this framework id. There is no status to assert + # here; the renderer itself is still proven config-aware by + # config_status_renderer_coverage_test. Surfaced rather than silently + # passed so the skip is visible. + pytest.skip(f"{name}: renderer paints no table for this framework id") + + assert strict == 0, ( + f"{name}: PASS findings reported {strict} failures with a compliant " + "config; the control run should be clean." + ) + assert loose and loose > 0, ( + f"{name}: a PASS finding whose requirement maps {check} ran with " + f"{config_key} too loose for the constraint ({operator} {value}) was NOT " + "forced to FAIL. The framework declares ConfigRequirements its renderer " + "fails to apply — wire it through the config-status helpers." + ) diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/config_status_renderer_coverage_test.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/config_status_renderer_coverage_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ac0981c941 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/config_status_renderer_coverage_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +"""Guard that every dedicated compliance renderer applies the config-status rule. + +Declaring ``ConfigRequirements`` in a framework JSON is inert unless the renderer +that builds its output actually evaluates them. A requirement whose configurable +checks ran with a config too loose to trust must be forced to FAIL; that override +lives in ``prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval`` and every renderer that +emits a finding's status (CSV transform, CLI table, OCSF) must route through it. + +This test statically asserts the invariant: any renderer that reads a finding's +raw ``status`` must also reference one of the config-status helpers. It mirrors +the manual audit that caught ``okta_idaas_stig`` shipping ConfigRequirements that +its CSV and table renderers never applied, so the gap cannot silently reopen. +""" + +import pathlib + +import pytest + +_REPO_ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[4] +_RENDERER_DIR = _REPO_ROOT / "prowler" / "lib" / "outputs" / "compliance" + +# Base/dispatch modules that orchestrate renderers but never emit a status row. +_EXCLUDED_BASENAMES = { + "__init__.py", + "models.py", + "compliance.py", + "compliance_check.py", + "compliance_output.py", +} + +# Any one of these, present in the source, means the renderer wires the override. +_CONFIG_STATUS_HELPERS = ( + "apply_config_status", + "build_requirement_config_status", + "resolve_requirement_config_status", + "get_effective_status", +) + +# A renderer builds its output from the finding's raw status via one of these. +_RAW_STATUS_MARKERS = ("finding.status", "finding.status_extended") + + +def _renderer_sources(): + for path in sorted(_RENDERER_DIR.glob("**/*.py")): + if path.name in _EXCLUDED_BASENAMES or "__pycache__" in path.parts: + continue + yield path + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "renderer_path", + [ + pytest.param(p, id=str(p.relative_to(_RENDERER_DIR))) + for p in _renderer_sources() + ], +) +def test_renderer_emitting_status_applies_config_status(renderer_path): + source = renderer_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + + uses_raw_status = any(marker in source for marker in _RAW_STATUS_MARKERS) + if not uses_raw_status: + pytest.skip("renderer does not emit a finding's raw status") + + applies_config_status = any(helper in source for helper in _CONFIG_STATUS_HELPERS) + assert applies_config_status, ( + f"{renderer_path.relative_to(_REPO_ROOT)} emits a finding's raw status but " + "never applies the config-status override. Route it through " + "apply_config_status / build_requirement_config_status (CSV/OCSF) or " + "resolve_requirement_config_status / get_effective_status (CLI table), " + "otherwise its ConfigRequirements are silently ignored." + ) diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/ens/ens_aws_config_requirements_test.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/ens/ens_aws_config_requirements_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b09d9bc0b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/ens/ens_aws_config_requirements_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +"""Integration coverage proving the shared requirement-level config validation +is applied beyond CIS. ENS RD2022 AWS requirement ``op.exp.1.aws.cfg.1`` maps +``config_recorder_all_regions_enabled`` with a ``mute_non_default_regions == +false`` constraint; muting non-default regions makes a PASS untrustworthy, so +the requirement row must be FAIL even when the finding PASSes. The applied +config is read from the active provider's ``audit_config``.""" + +import json +import pathlib +from types import SimpleNamespace +from unittest.mock import patch + +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance +from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.ens.ens_aws import AWSENS + +_REPO_ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[5] +_ENS = _REPO_ROOT / "prowler" / "compliance" / "aws" / "ens_rd2022_aws.json" +_REQUIREMENT_ID = "op.exp.1.aws.cfg.1" + + +def _load_ens() -> Compliance: + return Compliance(**json.load(open(_ENS))) + + +def _finding(check_id: str, status: str): + return SimpleNamespace( + provider="aws", + account_uid="123456789012", + region="us-east-1", + check_id=check_id, + status=status, + status_extended=f"{check_id} {status}", + resource_uid="arn:aws:config:us-east-1:123456789012:recorder/default", + resource_name="default", + muted=False, + ) + + +def _rows_for(requirement_id, findings, audit_config): + with patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider" + ) as mock_gp: + mock_gp.return_value.audit_config = audit_config + out = AWSENS(findings=findings, compliance=_load_ens(), file_path=None) + return [r for r in out._data if r.Requirements_Id == requirement_id] + + +class Test_ENS_AWS_Config_Requirements: + def test_region_mute_constraint_forces_fail(self): + findings = [_finding("config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", "PASS")] + rows = _rows_for(_REQUIREMENT_ID, findings, {"mute_non_default_regions": True}) + assert rows, f"expected a row for requirement {_REQUIREMENT_ID}" + assert all(r.Status == "FAIL" for r in rows) + assert all("Configuration not valid" in r.StatusExtended for r in rows) + + def test_default_config_keeps_finding_status(self): + findings = [_finding("config_recorder_all_regions_enabled", "PASS")] + rows = _rows_for(_REQUIREMENT_ID, findings, {}) + assert rows + assert all(r.Status == "PASS" for r in rows) + assert all("Configuration not valid" not in r.StatusExtended for r in rows) diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/ens/ens_table_test.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/ens/ens_table_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2373885dbc --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/ens/ens_table_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,235 @@ +import re +from types import SimpleNamespace + +from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.ens.ens import get_ens_table + + +def _strip_ansi(text): + return re.sub(r"\x1b\[[0-9;]*m", "", text) + + +def _make_finding(check_id, status="PASS", muted=False): + return SimpleNamespace( + check_metadata=SimpleNamespace(CheckID=check_id), + status=status, + muted=muted, + ) + + +def _attr(marco, categoria, tipo="requisito", nivel="alto"): + return SimpleNamespace(Marco=marco, Categoria=categoria, Tipo=tipo, Nivel=nivel) + + +def _make_compliance(provider, attributes, framework="ENS"): + """Build a per-check ENS compliance with the given marco/categoria attrs.""" + return SimpleNamespace( + Framework=framework, + Provider=provider, + Requirements=[SimpleNamespace(Attributes=attributes)], + ) + + +class TestENSTable: + """Test cases for ENS compliance table rendering. + + Verify multi-marco counting and provider-column attribution for the + compliance table. + """ + + def test_no_cumple_marked_in_every_marco(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """A single failing finding mapped to several marcos must mark every + one of them as NO CUMPLE, not only the first marco seen.""" + bulk_metadata = { + # check_a fails and belongs to two distinct marcos/categorias. + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance( + "aws", + [ + _attr("operacional", "control de acceso"), + _attr("organizativo", "politica de seguridad"), + ], + ) + ] + ), + # A passing finding so the overview total reaches 2. + "check_b": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance("aws", [_attr("operacional", "control de acceso")]) + ] + ), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL"), + _make_finding("check_b", "PASS"), + ] + + get_ens_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "ens_rd2022_aws", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + plain = _strip_ansi(captured.out) + # Both marco rows the failing finding maps to must read NO CUMPLE. + # Before the fix only the first marco was marked, the second stayed + # CUMPLE. Anchor the assertion to the actual marco rows (not the + # overview header line which also mentions NO CUMPLE). + op_row = [ + line + for line in plain.splitlines() + if "operacional/control de acceso" in line + ] + org_row = [ + line + for line in plain.splitlines() + if "organizativo/politica de seguridad" in line + ] + assert len(op_row) == 1 and "NO CUMPLE" in op_row[0] + assert len(org_row) == 1 and "NO CUMPLE" in org_row[0] + + def test_recomendacion_does_not_set_no_cumple(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """A FAIL on a 'recomendacion' attribute must not flip a marco to + NO CUMPLE (this path is intentionally excluded from the fix).""" + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance( + "aws", + [ + _attr( + "operacional", "control de acceso", tipo="recomendacion" + ) + ], + ) + ] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance("aws", [_attr("organizativo", "politica")]) + ] + ), + # A regular (non-recomendacion) check so the results table renders + # at least one marco row and the assertion below is not vacuous. + "check_c": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance("aws", [_attr("operacional", "continuidad")]) + ] + ), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL"), + _make_finding("check_b", "PASS"), + _make_finding("check_c", "PASS"), + ] + + get_ens_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "ens_rd2022_aws", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + plain = _strip_ansi(captured.out) + # The recomendacion FAIL must not appear as a NO CUMPLE marco row in the + # results table (the overview header line is allowed to mention it). + marco_rows = [ + line + for line in plain.splitlines() + if "operacional" in line or "organizativo" in line + ] + # Guard against a vacuous pass: the table must actually render rows. + assert marco_rows + assert all("NO CUMPLE" not in line for line in marco_rows) + + def test_muted_multi_marco_not_undercounted(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """A single MUTED finding mapped to several marcos must increment the + per-marco Muted column for every marco, not only the first seen.""" + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance( + "aws", + [ + _attr("operacional", "control de acceso"), + _attr("organizativo", "politica de seguridad"), + ], + ) + ] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance("aws", [_attr("operacional", "control de acceso")]) + ] + ), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL", muted=True), + _make_finding("check_b", "FAIL"), + ] + + get_ens_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "ens_rd2022_aws", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + plain = _strip_ansi(captured.out) + # Both marco rows the muted finding maps to must report a Muted count of + # 1 in their last cell. + muted_one_rows = re.findall(r"│\s*1\s*│\s*$", plain, flags=re.MULTILINE) + assert len(muted_one_rows) == 2 + + def test_provider_column_not_leaked_from_other_framework(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """The Proveedor column must come from the matched ENS compliance, not + from a different framework that trails it in the compliance list.""" + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance( + "aws", [_attr("operacional", "control de acceso")] + ), + _make_compliance( + "gcp", [_attr("x", "y")], framework="OtherFramework" + ), + ] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance( + "aws", [_attr("operacional", "control de acceso")] + ), + _make_compliance( + "gcp", [_attr("x", "y")], framework="OtherFramework" + ), + ] + ), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL"), + _make_finding("check_b", "PASS"), + ] + + get_ens_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "ens_rd2022_aws", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + assert "aws" in captured.out + assert "gcp" not in captured.out diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/kisa_ismsp/__init__.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/kisa_ismsp/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/kisa_ismsp/kisa_ismsp_table_test.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/kisa_ismsp/kisa_ismsp_table_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..be0fe25ad5 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/kisa_ismsp/kisa_ismsp_table_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +import re +from types import SimpleNamespace + +from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.kisa_ismsp.kisa_ismsp import get_kisa_ismsp_table + +# The generator matches a compliance when its Framework starts with "KISA" and +# its Version is contained in the compliance_framework argument. +COMPLIANCE_FRAMEWORK = "kisa-isms-p-2023_aws" + + +def _make_finding(check_id, status="PASS", muted=False): + return SimpleNamespace( + check_metadata=SimpleNamespace(CheckID=check_id), + status=status, + muted=muted, + ) + + +def _make_compliance( + provider, sections, framework="KISA-ISMS-P", version="kisa-isms-p-2023" +): + """Build a per-check compliance covering the given sections.""" + return SimpleNamespace( + Framework=framework, + Version=version, + Provider=provider, + Requirements=[ + SimpleNamespace(Attributes=[SimpleNamespace(Section=section)]) + for section in sections + ], + ) + + +class TestKISAISMSPTable: + """Verify multi-section counting and provider-column attribution for the KISA ISMS-P compliance table.""" + + def test_multi_section_fail_not_undercounted(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """A single FAIL check mapped to several sections must show FAIL(1) in + every section, not just the first one seen.""" + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", ["IAM", "Logging"])] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace(Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", ["IAM"])]), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL"), + _make_finding("check_b", "PASS"), + ] + + get_kisa_ismsp_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + COMPLIANCE_FRAMEWORK, + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + # Both IAM and Logging must report FAIL(1); before the fix Logging was + # undercounted because the per-section count was gated by the global + # dedup list. + assert captured.out.count("FAIL(1)") == 2 + + def test_multi_section_muted_not_undercounted(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """A single MUTED check mapped to several sections must increase the + per-section Muted count in every section, not only the first one.""" + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", ["IAM", "Logging"])] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace(Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", ["IAM"])]), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL", muted=True), + # A real FAIL is needed so the results table is rendered at all. + _make_finding("check_b", "FAIL"), + ] + + get_kisa_ismsp_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + COMPLIANCE_FRAMEWORK, + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + plain = re.sub(r"\x1b\[[0-9;]*m", "", captured.out) + # The muted check belongs to both IAM and Logging, so the Muted column + # must read 1 in both rows. + muted_cells = re.findall(r"│\s*1\s*│\s*$", plain, flags=re.MULTILINE) + assert len(muted_cells) == 2 + + def test_provider_column_not_leaked_from_other_framework(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """The Provider column must come from the matched KISA compliance, never + from a different framework that happens to be the last entry in the + check's compliance list.""" + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance("aws", ["IAM"]), + _make_compliance( + "leaked_provider", ["Other"], framework="OtherFramework" + ), + ] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance("aws", ["IAM"]), + _make_compliance( + "leaked_provider", ["Other"], framework="OtherFramework" + ), + ] + ), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL"), + _make_finding("check_b", "PASS"), + ] + + get_kisa_ismsp_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + COMPLIANCE_FRAMEWORK, + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + assert "aws" in captured.out + # The provider of the unrelated trailing framework must NOT leak into + # the rendered table. + assert "leaked_provider" not in captured.out diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/mitre_attack/__init__.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/mitre_attack/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/mitre_attack/mitre_attack_table_test.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/mitre_attack/mitre_attack_table_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3bd69b44e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/mitre_attack/mitre_attack_table_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +import re +from types import SimpleNamespace + +from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.mitre_attack.mitre_attack import ( + get_mitre_attack_table, +) + +# The generator matches a compliance when "MITRE-ATTACK" is in its Framework and +# its Version is contained in the compliance_framework argument. +COMPLIANCE_FRAMEWORK = "mitre_attack_aws" + + +def _make_finding(check_id, status="PASS", muted=False): + return SimpleNamespace( + check_metadata=SimpleNamespace(CheckID=check_id), + status=status, + muted=muted, + ) + + +def _make_compliance( + provider, tactics, framework="MITRE-ATTACK", version="mitre_attack" +): + """Build a per-check compliance covering the given tactics.""" + return SimpleNamespace( + Framework=framework, + Version=version, + Provider=provider, + Requirements=[SimpleNamespace(Tactics=tactics)], + ) + + +class TestMitreAttackTable: + """Test multi-section counting and provider-column attribution for the compliance table.""" + + def test_multi_tactic_fail_not_undercounted(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """A single FAIL check mapped to several tactics must show FAIL(1) in + every tactic, not just the first one seen.""" + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", ["Persistence", "Execution"])] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", ["Persistence"])] + ), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL"), + _make_finding("check_b", "PASS"), + ] + + get_mitre_attack_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + COMPLIANCE_FRAMEWORK, + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + # Both Persistence and Execution must report FAIL(1); before the fix + # Execution was undercounted because the per-tactic count was gated by + # the global dedup list. + assert captured.out.count("FAIL(1)") == 2 + + def test_multi_tactic_muted_not_undercounted(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """A single MUTED check mapped to several tactics must increase the + per-tactic Muted count in every tactic, not only the first one.""" + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", ["Persistence", "Execution"])] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", ["Persistence"])] + ), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL", muted=True), + # A second finding is needed so the table is rendered at all. + _make_finding("check_b", "FAIL"), + ] + + get_mitre_attack_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + COMPLIANCE_FRAMEWORK, + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + plain = re.sub(r"\x1b\[[0-9;]*m", "", captured.out) + # The muted check belongs to both Persistence and Execution, so the + # Muted column must read 1 in both rows. + muted_cells = re.findall(r"│\s*1\s*│\s*$", plain, flags=re.MULTILINE) + assert len(muted_cells) == 2 + + def test_provider_column_not_leaked_from_other_framework(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """The Provider column must come from the matched MITRE-ATTACK + compliance, never from a different framework that happens to be the last + entry in the check's compliance list.""" + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance("aws", ["Persistence"]), + _make_compliance( + "leaked_provider", ["Other"], framework="OtherFramework" + ), + ] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance("aws", ["Persistence"]), + _make_compliance( + "leaked_provider", ["Other"], framework="OtherFramework" + ), + ] + ), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL"), + _make_finding("check_b", "PASS"), + ] + + get_mitre_attack_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + COMPLIANCE_FRAMEWORK, + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + assert "aws" in captured.out + # The provider of the unrelated trailing framework must NOT leak into + # the rendered table. + assert "leaked_provider" not in captured.out diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/okta_idaas_stig/__init__.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/okta_idaas_stig/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/okta_idaas_stig/okta_idaas_stig_okta_test.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/okta_idaas_stig/okta_idaas_stig_okta_test.py index fa616c906e..a6a0267851 100644 --- a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/okta_idaas_stig/okta_idaas_stig_okta_test.py +++ b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/okta_idaas_stig/okta_idaas_stig_okta_test.py @@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ from unittest import mock from freezegun import freeze_time from mock import patch +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval import CONFIG_NOT_VALID_PREFIX +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import ( + Compliance_Requirement_ConfigConstraint, +) from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.okta_idaas_stig.models import OktaIDaaSSTIGModel from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.okta_idaas_stig.okta_idaas_stig_okta import ( OktaIDaaSSTIG, @@ -137,3 +141,52 @@ class TestOktaIDaaSSTIG: expected_csv = f"PROVIDER;DESCRIPTION;ORGANIZATIONDOMAIN;ASSESSMENTDATE;REQUIREMENTS_ID;REQUIREMENTS_NAME;REQUIREMENTS_DESCRIPTION;REQUIREMENTS_ATTRIBUTES_SECTION;REQUIREMENTS_ATTRIBUTES_SEVERITY;REQUIREMENTS_ATTRIBUTES_RULEID;REQUIREMENTS_ATTRIBUTES_STIGID;REQUIREMENTS_ATTRIBUTES_CCI;REQUIREMENTS_ATTRIBUTES_CHECKTEXT;REQUIREMENTS_ATTRIBUTES_FIXTEXT;STATUS;STATUSEXTENDED;RESOURCEID;RESOURCENAME;CHECKID;MUTED;FRAMEWORK;NAME\r\nokta;Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Security Technical Implementation Guide (STIG) for Okta Identity as a Service (IDaaS).;{OKTA_ORG_DOMAIN};{datetime.now()};OKTA-APP-000020;Okta must log out a session after a 15-minute period of inactivity.;A session timeout lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate vicinity of the information system.;CAT II (Medium);medium;SV-273186r1098825_rule;OKTA-APP-000020;['CCI-000057', 'CCI-001133'];Verify the Global Session Policy logs out a session after 15 minutes of inactivity.;From the Admin Console configure the Global Session Policy idle timeout to 15 minutes.;PASS;;okta-global-session-policy;Default Policy;signon_global_session_idle_timeout_15min;False;Okta-IDaaS-STIG;DISA Okta Identity as a Service (IDaaS) STIG V1R2\r\nokta;Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Security Technical Implementation Guide (STIG) for Okta Identity as a Service (IDaaS).;;{datetime.now()};OKTA-APP-000650;Okta must enforce a minimum 15-character password length.;The shorter the password, the lower the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised.;CAT II (Medium);medium;SV-273209r1098894_rule;OKTA-APP-000650;['CCI-000205'];Verify the password policy enforces a minimum length of 15 characters.;From the Admin Console set the minimum password length to 15 characters.;MANUAL;Manual check;manual_check;Manual check;manual;False;Okta-IDaaS-STIG;DISA Okta Identity as a Service (IDaaS) STIG V1R2\r\n" assert content == expected_csv + + def test_config_status_override_forces_fail(self): + """A PASS finding whose requirement declares a ConfigRequirements + constraint the scan's config violates must be reported as FAIL in the + CSV, with the config-not-valid reason prepended to StatusExtended.""" + # Inject a config constraint on the first requirement (idle timeout must + # be <= 15 minutes) without mutating the shared fixture. + compliance = OKTA_IDAAS_STIG_OKTA.copy(deep=True) + compliance.Requirements[0].ConfigRequirements = [ + Compliance_Requirement_ConfigConstraint( + Check="signon_global_session_idle_timeout_15min", + ConfigKey="okta_max_session_idle_minutes", + Operator="lte", + Value=15, + ) + ] + findings = [ + generate_finding_output( + provider="okta", + account_uid=OKTA_ORG_DOMAIN, + account_name=OKTA_ORG_DOMAIN, + region="global", + service_name="signon", + status="PASS", + status_extended="Idle timeout is configured.", + check_id="signon_global_session_idle_timeout_15min", + resource_uid="okta-global-session-policy", + resource_name="Default Policy", + compliance={"Okta-IDaaS-STIG-1R2": ["OKTA-APP-000020"]}, + ) + ] + + # The scan applied a 30-minute idle timeout, too loose for the 15-minute + # requirement, so the PASS must be overridden to FAIL. + with ( + patch( + "prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval.get_scan_audit_config", + return_value={"okta_max_session_idle_minutes": 30}, + ), + patch( + "prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval.get_scan_provider_type", + return_value="okta", + ), + ): + output = OktaIDaaSSTIG(findings, compliance) + + output_data = output.data[0] + assert output_data.Status == "FAIL" + assert output_data.StatusExtended.startswith(CONFIG_NOT_VALID_PREFIX) diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/okta_idaas_stig/okta_idaas_stig_table_test.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/okta_idaas_stig/okta_idaas_stig_table_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0dd353760b --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/okta_idaas_stig/okta_idaas_stig_table_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,211 @@ +from types import SimpleNamespace +from unittest.mock import patch + +from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.okta_idaas_stig.okta_idaas_stig import ( + get_okta_idaas_stig_table, +) + + +def _make_finding(check_id, status="PASS", muted=False): + return SimpleNamespace( + check_metadata=SimpleNamespace(CheckID=check_id), + check_id=check_id, + status=status, + muted=muted, + ) + + +def _make_compliance( + provider, + sections, + framework="Okta-IDaaS-STIG", + checks=None, + config_requirements=None, +): + """Build a per-check compliance covering the given sections. + + ``checks`` and ``config_requirements`` let a section's requirement declare + the checks it owns and the config constraints that gate it, so the table's + config-status override can be exercised. + """ + return SimpleNamespace( + Framework=framework, + Provider=provider, + Requirements=[ + SimpleNamespace( + Id=f"REQ-{section}", + Checks=list(checks or []), + ConfigRequirements=list(config_requirements or []), + Attributes=[SimpleNamespace(Section=section)], + ) + for section in sections + ], + ) + + +class TestOktaIDaaSSTIGTable: + """Test cases for Okta IDaaS STIG compliance table rendering.""" + + def test_multi_section_fail_not_undercounted(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """A single FAIL check mapped to several sections must show FAIL(1) in + every section, not just the first one seen.""" + bulk_metadata = { + # check_a belongs to two sections at once. + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[_make_compliance("okta", ["IAM", "Logging"])] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace(Compliance=[_make_compliance("okta", ["IAM"])]), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL"), + _make_finding("check_b", "PASS"), + ] + + get_okta_idaas_stig_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "okta_idaas_stig_1r2", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + # Both IAM and Logging must report FAIL(1); before the fix Logging + # was undercounted and rendered as plain PASS. + assert captured.out.count("FAIL(1)") == 2 + + def test_multi_section_muted_not_undercounted(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """A single MUTED check mapped to several sections must increase the + per-section Muted count in every section, not only the first one.""" + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[_make_compliance("okta", ["IAM", "Logging"])] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace(Compliance=[_make_compliance("okta", ["IAM"])]), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL", muted=True), + # A real FAIL is needed so the results table is rendered at all. + _make_finding("check_b", "FAIL"), + ] + + get_okta_idaas_stig_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "okta_idaas_stig_1r2", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + # The muted check belongs to both IAM and Logging, so the Muted column + # must read 1 in both rows. Before the fix only the first section seen + # was incremented, leaving the second at 0. + # Strip ANSI color codes before counting the bare values per row. + import re + + plain = re.sub(r"\x1b\[[0-9;]*m", "", captured.out) + # Each section row ends with its Muted value in its own cell; both rows + # must carry a Muted count of 1. + muted_cells = re.findall(r"│\s*1\s*│\s*$", plain, flags=re.MULTILINE) + assert len(muted_cells) == 2 + + def test_provider_column_not_leaked_from_other_framework(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """The Provider column must come from the matched Okta-IDaaS-STIG + compliance, never from a different framework that happens to be the + last entry in the check's compliance list.""" + # check_a maps to Okta-IDaaS-STIG (provider "okta") but its compliance + # list ends with a *different* framework whose provider is "aws". With + # the bug the leaked loop variable made the table render "aws". + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance("okta", ["IAM"]), + _make_compliance("aws", ["Other"], framework="OtherFramework"), + ] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance("okta", ["IAM"]), + _make_compliance("aws", ["Other"], framework="OtherFramework"), + ] + ), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL"), + _make_finding("check_b", "PASS"), + ] + + get_okta_idaas_stig_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "okta_idaas_stig_1r2", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + assert "okta" in captured.out + # The provider of the unrelated trailing framework must NOT leak into + # the rendered table. + assert "aws" not in captured.out + + def test_config_status_override_forces_fail(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """A configurable check that PASSes but ran with a config too loose for + its requirement must be forced to FAIL in the table, honouring the + requirement's ConfigRequirements. Without the override check_a would be + PASS and no results table would render at all.""" + constraint = { + "Check": "check_a", + "ConfigKey": "okta_max_session_idle_minutes", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 15, + } + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance( + "okta", + ["IAM"], + checks=["check_a"], + config_requirements=[constraint], + ) + ] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[_make_compliance("okta", ["Logging"])] + ), + } + # Both checks PASS on their own; the scan applied a 30-minute idle + # timeout, which is too loose for the 15-minute requirement. + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "PASS"), + _make_finding("check_b", "PASS"), + ] + + with ( + patch( + "prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.okta_idaas_stig.okta_idaas_stig.get_scan_audit_config", + return_value={"okta_max_session_idle_minutes": 30}, + ), + patch( + "prowler.lib.check.compliance_config_eval.get_scan_provider_type", + return_value="okta", + ), + ): + get_okta_idaas_stig_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "okta_idaas_stig_1r2", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + # check_a was forced to FAIL by the config override, so its section + # (IAM) must report FAIL(1). + assert "FAIL(1)" in captured.out diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/__init__.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_table_test.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_table_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d754395dc3 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/prowler_threatscore/prowler_threatscore_table_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +import re +from types import SimpleNamespace +from unittest import mock + +from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.prowler_threatscore.prowler_threatscore import ( + get_prowler_threatscore_table, +) + +# Patch target for the Compliance.get_bulk lookup used to render pillars without +# findings; the tests don't exercise that path so it returns nothing. +COMPLIANCE_PATH = ( + "prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.prowler_threatscore.prowler_threatscore.Compliance" +) + + +def _make_finding(check_id, status="PASS", muted=False): + return SimpleNamespace( + check_metadata=SimpleNamespace(CheckID=check_id), + status=status, + muted=muted, + ) + + +def _make_compliance(provider, pillars, framework="ProwlerThreatScore"): + """Build a per-check compliance covering the given pillars (Section).""" + return SimpleNamespace( + Framework=framework, + Provider=provider, + Requirements=[ + SimpleNamespace( + Attributes=[SimpleNamespace(Section=pillar, LevelOfRisk=5, Weight=100)] + ) + for pillar in pillars + ], + ) + + +class TestProwlerThreatScoreTable: + """Verify multi-section counting and provider-column attribution for the compliance table.""" + + def test_multi_pillar_fail_not_undercounted(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """A single FAIL check mapped to several pillars must show FAIL(1) in + every pillar, not just the first one seen.""" + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", ["IAM", "Encryption"])] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace(Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", ["IAM"])]), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL"), + _make_finding("check_b", "PASS"), + ] + + with mock.patch(COMPLIANCE_PATH) as compliance_mock: + compliance_mock.get_bulk.return_value = {} + get_prowler_threatscore_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "prowler_threatscore_aws", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + # Both IAM and Encryption must report FAIL(1); before the fix Encryption + # was undercounted because the per-pillar count was gated by the global + # dedup list. + assert captured.out.count("FAIL(1)") == 2 + + def test_multi_pillar_muted_not_undercounted(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """A single MUTED check mapped to several pillars must increase the + per-pillar Muted count in every pillar, not only the first one.""" + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", ["IAM", "Encryption"])] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace(Compliance=[_make_compliance("aws", ["IAM"])]), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL", muted=True), + # A real FAIL is needed so the results table is rendered at all. + _make_finding("check_b", "FAIL"), + ] + + with mock.patch(COMPLIANCE_PATH) as compliance_mock: + compliance_mock.get_bulk.return_value = {} + get_prowler_threatscore_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "prowler_threatscore_aws", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + plain = re.sub(r"\x1b\[[0-9;]*m", "", captured.out) + # The muted check belongs to both IAM and Encryption, so the Muted + # column must read 1 in both rows. + muted_cells = re.findall(r"│\s*1\s*│\s*$", plain, flags=re.MULTILINE) + assert len(muted_cells) == 2 + + def test_provider_column_not_leaked_from_other_framework(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """The Provider column must come from the matched ProwlerThreatScore + compliance, never from a different framework that happens to be the last + entry in the check's compliance list.""" + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance("aws", ["IAM"]), + _make_compliance( + "leaked_provider", ["Other"], framework="OtherFramework" + ), + ] + ), + "check_b": SimpleNamespace( + Compliance=[ + _make_compliance("aws", ["IAM"]), + _make_compliance( + "leaked_provider", ["Other"], framework="OtherFramework" + ), + ] + ), + } + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL"), + _make_finding("check_b", "PASS"), + ] + + with mock.patch(COMPLIANCE_PATH) as compliance_mock: + compliance_mock.get_bulk.return_value = {} + get_prowler_threatscore_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "prowler_threatscore_aws", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + assert "aws" in captured.out + # The provider of the unrelated trailing framework must NOT leak into + # the rendered table. + assert "leaked_provider" not in captured.out diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/ocsf_compliance_config_requirements_test.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/ocsf_compliance_config_requirements_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c846385d88 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/ocsf_compliance_config_requirements_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,191 @@ +"""Integration coverage for ConfigRequirements in the OCSF compliance output. + +OCSF is the universal output path every framework renders through, so it is the +natural place to exercise the requirement-level config override end to end across +all operators. When a requirement's configurable check ran with a config too +loose to trust, the Compliance status must be FAIL (even on a PASS finding) and +the message must carry the ``Configuration not valid`` marker. The Check status keeps +the real finding status. +""" + +from datetime import datetime, timezone +from types import SimpleNamespace +from unittest.mock import patch + +import pytest +from py_ocsf_models.objects.compliance_status import StatusID as ComplianceStatusID + +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import ( + ComplianceFramework, + OutputsConfig, + TableConfig, + UniversalComplianceRequirement, +) +from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.universal.ocsf_compliance import ( + OCSFComplianceOutput, +) + +_MODULE = "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider" + + +def _finding(check_id, status="PASS", provider="aws"): + finding = SimpleNamespace() + finding.provider = provider + finding.account_uid = "123456789012" + finding.account_name = "test-account" + finding.account_email = "" + finding.account_organization_uid = "org-123" + finding.account_organization_name = "test-org" + finding.account_tags = {"env": "test"} + finding.region = "us-east-1" + finding.status = status + finding.status_extended = f"{check_id} is {status}" + finding.resource_uid = f"arn:aws:iam::123456789012:{check_id}" + finding.resource_name = check_id + finding.resource_details = "details" + finding.resource_metadata = {} + finding.resource_tags = {"Name": "test"} + finding.partition = "aws" + finding.muted = False + finding.check_id = check_id + finding.uid = "test-finding-uid" + finding.timestamp = datetime(2025, 1, 15, 12, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc) + finding.prowler_version = "5.0.0" + finding.compliance = {} + finding.metadata = SimpleNamespace( + Provider=provider, + CheckID=check_id, + CheckTitle=f"Title for {check_id}", + CheckType=["test-type"], + Description=f"Description for {check_id}", + Severity="medium", + ServiceName="iam", + ResourceType="aws-iam-role", + Risk="risk", + RelatedUrl="https://example.com", + Remediation=SimpleNamespace( + Recommendation=SimpleNamespace(Text="Fix", Url="https://fix.com"), + ), + DependsOn=[], + RelatedTo=[], + Categories=["test"], + Notes="", + AdditionalURLs=[], + ) + return finding + + +def _framework(check_id, constraint): + req = UniversalComplianceRequirement( + id="REQ-1", + description="Requirement REQ-1", + attributes={}, + checks={"aws": [check_id]}, + config_requirements=[constraint], + ) + return ComplianceFramework( + framework="TestFW", + name="Test Framework", + provider="AWS", + version="1.0", + description="Test framework", + requirements=[req], + attributes_metadata=None, + outputs=OutputsConfig(table_config=TableConfig(group_by="Section")), + ) + + +def _run(check_id, constraint, audit_config): + fw = _framework(check_id, constraint) + findings = [_finding(check_id, "PASS")] + with patch(_MODULE) as mock_gp: + mock_gp.return_value.audit_config = audit_config + out = OCSFComplianceOutput(findings=findings, framework=fw, provider="aws") + return out.data[0] + + +# (check, constraint, violating_config, valid_config) +_CASES = [ + ( + "securityhub_enabled", + { + "Check": "securityhub_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": False, + }, + {"mute_non_default_regions": True}, + {"mute_non_default_regions": False}, + ), + ( + "iam_user_accesskey_unused", + { + "Check": "iam_user_accesskey_unused", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_access_keys_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45, + }, + {"max_unused_access_keys_days": 120}, + {"max_unused_access_keys_days": 30}, + ), + ( + "cloudwatch_log_group_retention_policy_specific_days_enabled", + { + "Check": "cloudwatch_log_group_retention_policy_specific_days_enabled", + "ConfigKey": "log_group_retention_days", + "Operator": "gte", + "Value": 365, + }, + {"log_group_retention_days": 90}, + {"log_group_retention_days": 365}, + ), + ( + "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", + { + "Check": "sqlserver_recommended_minimal_tls_version", + "ConfigKey": "recommended_minimal_tls_versions", + "Operator": "subset", + "Value": ["1.2", "1.3"], + }, + {"recommended_minimal_tls_versions": ["1.0", "1.2", "1.3"]}, + {"recommended_minimal_tls_versions": ["1.3"]}, + ), + ( + "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + { + "Check": "acm_certificates_with_secure_key_algorithms", + "ConfigKey": "insecure_key_algorithms", + "Operator": "superset", + "Value": ["RSA-1024", "P-192"], + }, + {"insecure_key_algorithms": ["P-192"]}, + {"insecure_key_algorithms": ["RSA-1024", "P-192"]}, + ), +] + + +class Test_OCSF_Config_Requirements: + @pytest.mark.parametrize( + "check,constraint,bad,ok", + _CASES, + ids=[c[1]["Operator"] for c in _CASES], + ) + def test_violating_config_fails_requirement(self, check, constraint, bad, ok): + cf = _run(check, constraint, bad) + assert cf.compliance.status_id == ComplianceStatusID.Fail + assert "Configuration not valid" in cf.message + + @pytest.mark.parametrize( + "check,constraint,bad,ok", + _CASES, + ids=[c[1]["Operator"] for c in _CASES], + ) + def test_valid_config_keeps_pass(self, check, constraint, bad, ok): + cf = _run(check, constraint, ok) + assert cf.compliance.status_id == ComplianceStatusID.Pass + assert "Configuration not valid" not in cf.message + + def test_absent_config_assumes_default_ok(self): + check, constraint, _bad, _ok = _CASES[0] + cf = _run(check, constraint, {}) + assert cf.compliance.status_id == ComplianceStatusID.Pass diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/ocsf_compliance_status_scoping_test.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/ocsf_compliance_status_scoping_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8408868296 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/ocsf_compliance_status_scoping_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +"""Top-level status consistency and provider scoping for the OCSF output. + +Two regressions are covered here: + +1. The event's top-level ``status_code``/``status_detail`` must reflect the + effective (config-aware) status, so a config-invalid PASS cannot produce an + event where ``compliance.status_id`` says FAIL while ``status_code`` still + says PASS. The nested Check object keeps the raw finding status. +2. Provider scoping: an Azure-scoped constraint must never affect an AWS output + even when the global provider would otherwise be relied upon. +""" + +from datetime import datetime, timezone +from types import SimpleNamespace +from unittest.mock import patch + +from py_ocsf_models.objects.compliance_status import StatusID as ComplianceStatusID + +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import ( + ComplianceFramework, + OutputsConfig, + TableConfig, + UniversalComplianceRequirement, +) +from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.universal.ocsf_compliance import ( + OCSFComplianceOutput, +) + +_MODULE = "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider" + + +def _finding(check_id, status="PASS", provider="aws"): + finding = SimpleNamespace() + finding.provider = provider + finding.account_uid = "123456789012" + finding.account_name = "test-account" + finding.account_organization_uid = "org-123" + finding.account_organization_name = "test-org" + finding.region = "us-east-1" + finding.status = status + finding.status_extended = f"{check_id} is {status}" + finding.resource_uid = f"arn:aws:iam::123456789012:{check_id}" + finding.resource_name = check_id + finding.resource_details = "details" + finding.resource_metadata = {} + finding.resource_tags = {"Name": "test"} + finding.partition = "aws" + finding.muted = False + finding.check_id = check_id + finding.uid = "test-finding-uid" + finding.timestamp = datetime(2025, 1, 15, 12, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc) + finding.prowler_version = "5.0.0" + finding.metadata = SimpleNamespace( + CheckID=check_id, + CheckTitle=f"Title for {check_id}", + Description=f"Description for {check_id}", + Severity="medium", + ServiceName="iam", + ResourceType="aws-iam-role", + ) + return finding + + +def _framework(constraint, provider="AWS", check_provider="aws"): + req = UniversalComplianceRequirement( + id="REQ-1", + description="Requirement REQ-1", + attributes={}, + checks={check_provider: ["check_a"]}, + config_requirements=[constraint], + ) + return ComplianceFramework( + framework="TestFW", + name="Test Framework", + provider=provider, + version="1.0", + description="Test framework", + requirements=[req], + attributes_metadata=None, + outputs=OutputsConfig(table_config=TableConfig(group_by="Section")), + ) + + +def _run(framework, audit_config, provider="aws", status="PASS"): + findings = [_finding("check_a", status, provider)] + with patch(_MODULE) as mock_gp: + mock_gp.return_value.audit_config = audit_config + mock_gp.return_value.type = provider + out = OCSFComplianceOutput( + findings=findings, framework=framework, provider=provider + ) + return out.data[0] + + +_CONSTRAINT = { + "Check": "check_a", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_access_keys_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45, +} + + +class Test_OCSF_TopLevel_Status: + def test_config_invalid_pass_forces_toplevel_fail(self): + event = _run(_framework(_CONSTRAINT), {"max_unused_access_keys_days": 120}) + # Top-level and nested compliance status agree: both FAIL. + assert event.compliance.status_id == ComplianceStatusID.Fail + assert event.status_code == "FAIL" + assert "Configuration not valid" in event.status_detail + assert event.status_detail == event.message + # The nested Check preserves the raw finding result. + assert event.compliance.checks[0].status == "PASS" + + def test_valid_config_keeps_toplevel_pass(self): + event = _run(_framework(_CONSTRAINT), {"max_unused_access_keys_days": 30}) + assert event.compliance.status_id == ComplianceStatusID.Pass + assert event.status_code == "PASS" + assert "Configuration not valid" not in event.status_detail + + +class Test_OCSF_Provider_Scoping: + def test_azure_constraint_does_not_affect_aws_output(self): + constraint = {**_CONSTRAINT, "Provider": "azure"} + event = _run( + _framework(constraint), {"max_unused_access_keys_days": 120}, provider="aws" + ) + assert event.compliance.status_id == ComplianceStatusID.Pass + assert event.status_code == "PASS" + assert "Configuration not valid" not in event.status_detail diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/universal_output_config_requirements_test.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/universal_output_config_requirements_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dd83dad575 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/universal_output_config_requirements_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +"""Coverage for ConfigRequirements + provider scoping in the universal CSV. + +The universal CSV must apply the same effective-status logic as the OCSF/table +outputs: a config-invalid PASS is reported as FAIL instead of leaking the raw +finding status. Provider scoping must also hold, so a constraint scoped to +another provider (e.g. Azure) never affects this provider's output (e.g. AWS). +""" + +from types import SimpleNamespace +from unittest.mock import patch + +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import ( + AttributeMetadata, + ComplianceFramework, + OutputsConfig, + TableConfig, + UniversalComplianceRequirement, +) +from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.universal.universal_output import ( + UniversalComplianceOutput, +) + +_MODULE = "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider" + + +def _make_finding(check_id, status="PASS", provider="aws"): + finding = SimpleNamespace() + finding.provider = provider + finding.account_uid = "123456789012" + finding.account_name = "test-account" + finding.region = "us-east-1" + finding.status = status + finding.status_extended = f"{check_id} is {status}" + finding.resource_uid = f"arn:aws:iam::123456789012:{check_id}" + finding.resource_name = check_id + finding.muted = False + finding.check_id = check_id + finding.metadata = SimpleNamespace(Provider=provider, CheckID=check_id) + finding.compliance = {} + return finding + + +def _make_framework(constraint, provider="AWS", check_provider="aws"): + req = UniversalComplianceRequirement( + id="1.1", + description="test requirement", + attributes={"Section": "IAM"}, + checks={check_provider: ["check_a"]}, + config_requirements=[constraint], + ) + return ComplianceFramework( + framework="TestFW", + name="Test Framework", + provider=provider, + version="1.0", + description="Test framework", + requirements=[req], + attributes_metadata=[AttributeMetadata(key="Section", type="str")], + outputs=OutputsConfig(table_config=TableConfig(group_by="Section")), + ) + + +def _run(framework, audit_config, provider="aws", status="PASS"): + findings = [_make_finding("check_a", status, provider)] + with patch(_MODULE) as mock_gp: + mock_gp.return_value.audit_config = audit_config + mock_gp.return_value.type = provider + out = UniversalComplianceOutput( + findings=findings, framework=framework, provider=provider + ) + return out.data[0].dict() + + +class Test_Universal_CSV_Config_Requirements: + _CONSTRAINT = { + "Check": "check_a", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_access_keys_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45, + } + + def test_violating_config_forces_fail(self): + fw = _make_framework(self._CONSTRAINT) + row = _run(fw, {"max_unused_access_keys_days": 120}) + assert row["Status"] == "FAIL" + assert "Configuration not valid" in row["StatusExtended"] + + def test_valid_config_keeps_pass(self): + fw = _make_framework(self._CONSTRAINT) + row = _run(fw, {"max_unused_access_keys_days": 30}) + assert row["Status"] == "PASS" + assert "Configuration not valid" not in row["StatusExtended"] + + def test_absent_config_assumes_default_ok(self): + fw = _make_framework(self._CONSTRAINT) + row = _run(fw, {}) + assert row["Status"] == "PASS" + + +class Test_Universal_CSV_Provider_Scoping: + def test_azure_constraint_does_not_affect_aws_output(self): + """An Azure-scoped constraint must not force an AWS output to FAIL.""" + constraint = { + "Check": "check_a", + "ConfigKey": "max_unused_access_keys_days", + "Operator": "lte", + "Value": 45, + "Provider": "azure", + } + fw = _make_framework(constraint) + # Even with a config that *would* violate the constraint, the AWS output + # must keep PASS because the constraint is scoped to Azure. + row = _run(fw, {"max_unused_access_keys_days": 120}, provider="aws") + assert row["Status"] == "PASS" + assert "Configuration not valid" not in row["StatusExtended"] diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/universal_table_config_requirements_test.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/universal_table_config_requirements_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3ac8dc6d8b --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/universal_table_config_requirements_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +"""Integration coverage for ConfigRequirements in the console table generators. + +The table generators aggregate pass/fail counts, so a requirement whose config +is too loose must count its (otherwise PASS) finding as FAIL. Driven through the +universal table renderer, which backs the table output for every framework using +the shared ``get_effective_status`` helper.""" + +from types import SimpleNamespace +from unittest.mock import patch + +from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import ( + ComplianceFramework, + OutputsConfig, + TableConfig, + UniversalComplianceRequirement, +) +from prowler.lib.outputs.compliance.universal.universal_table import get_universal_table + +_MODULE = "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider" +_CHECK = "securityhub_enabled" + + +def _finding(status="PASS"): + return SimpleNamespace( + check_metadata=SimpleNamespace(CheckID=_CHECK), status=status, muted=False + ) + + +# The overview table is only printed when there is more than one finding, so the +# tests use two PASS findings (both mapping the constrained check). +_FINDINGS = [_finding("PASS"), _finding("PASS")] + + +def _framework(): + req = UniversalComplianceRequirement( + id="1.1", + description="region check", + attributes={"Section": "Monitoring"}, + checks={"aws": [_CHECK]}, + config_requirements=[ + { + "Check": _CHECK, + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": False, + } + ], + ) + return ComplianceFramework( + framework="TestFW", + name="Test Framework", + provider="AWS", + version="1.0", + description="Test", + requirements=[req], + outputs=OutputsConfig(table_config=TableConfig(group_by="Section")), + ) + + +def _render(audit_config, capsys, output_directory): + with patch(_MODULE) as mock_gp: + mock_gp.return_value.audit_config = audit_config + get_universal_table( + findings=_FINDINGS, + bulk_checks_metadata={}, + compliance_framework_name="testfw_1.0_aws", + output_filename="out", + output_directory=str(output_directory), + compliance_overview=False, + framework=_framework(), + provider="aws", + ) + return capsys.readouterr().out + + +class Test_Universal_Table_Config_Requirements: + def test_violating_config_counts_pass_finding_as_fail(self, capsys, tmp_path): + out = _render({"mute_non_default_regions": True}, capsys, tmp_path) + assert "FAIL(2)" in out + assert "PASS(2)" not in out + + def test_valid_config_keeps_pass_count(self, capsys, tmp_path): + out = _render({"mute_non_default_regions": False}, capsys, tmp_path) + assert "PASS(2)" in out + assert "FAIL(2)" not in out + + def test_absent_config_keeps_pass_count(self, capsys, tmp_path): + out = _render({}, capsys, tmp_path) + assert "PASS(2)" in out + assert "FAIL(2)" not in out + + +def _framework_two_requirements(): + """Same check evidences two requirements; only one carries a guardrail. + + Drives the double-count scenario: with the config violated, the shared + finding is FAIL for the constrained requirement and PASS for the other, so + its index would land in both pass and fail counts without FAIL precedence. + """ + constrained = UniversalComplianceRequirement( + id="1.1", + description="region check", + attributes={"Section": "Monitoring"}, + checks={"aws": [_CHECK]}, + config_requirements=[ + { + "Check": _CHECK, + "Provider": "aws", + "ConfigKey": "mute_non_default_regions", + "Operator": "eq", + "Value": False, + } + ], + ) + unconstrained = UniversalComplianceRequirement( + id="2.1", + description="other check", + attributes={"Section": "Logging"}, + checks={"aws": [_CHECK]}, + ) + return ComplianceFramework( + framework="TestFW", + name="Test Framework", + provider="AWS", + version="1.0", + description="Test", + requirements=[constrained, unconstrained], + outputs=OutputsConfig(table_config=TableConfig(group_by="Section")), + ) + + +class Test_Universal_Table_Multi_Requirement_Dedup: + def test_finding_in_two_requirements_counted_once_with_fail_precedence( + self, capsys, tmp_path + ): + # mute=True violates the constrained requirement → each shared PASS + # finding must be counted once as FAIL in the overview, not double + # counted as both PASS and FAIL across the two requirements it maps. + with patch(_MODULE) as mock_gp: + mock_gp.return_value.audit_config = {"mute_non_default_regions": True} + mock_gp.return_value.type = "aws" + get_universal_table( + findings=_FINDINGS, + bulk_checks_metadata={}, + compliance_framework_name="testfw_1.0_aws", + output_filename="out", + output_directory=str(tmp_path), + compliance_overview=True, + framework=_framework_two_requirements(), + provider="aws", + ) + out = capsys.readouterr().out + # Two findings, each counted once as FAIL → 100% FAIL, 0 PASS. + assert "(2) FAIL" in out + assert "(0) PASS" in out diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/universal_table_test.py b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/universal_table_test.py index 7598c43c8b..abe3d0c3d0 100644 --- a/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/universal_table_test.py +++ b/tests/lib/outputs/compliance/universal/universal_table_test.py @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +import re from types import SimpleNamespace from unittest.mock import MagicMock @@ -26,6 +27,10 @@ def _make_finding(check_id, status="PASS", muted=False): return finding +def _strip_ansi(text): + return re.sub(r"\x1b\[[0-9;]*m", "", text) + + def _make_framework(requirements, table_config, provider="AWS"): return ComplianceFramework( framework="TestFW", @@ -39,6 +44,8 @@ def _make_framework(requirements, table_config, provider="AWS"): class TestBuildRequirementCheckMap: + """Test cases for building the requirement-to-check map of a framework.""" + def test_basic(self): reqs = [ UniversalComplianceRequirement( @@ -103,6 +110,8 @@ class TestBuildRequirementCheckMap: class TestGetGroupKey: + """Test cases for resolving the group key of a requirement.""" + def test_normal_field(self): req = UniversalComplianceRequirement( id="1.1", @@ -124,7 +133,9 @@ class TestGetGroupKey: class TestGroupedMode: - def test_grouped_rendering(self, capsys): + """Test cases for grouped-mode universal compliance table rendering.""" + + def test_grouped_rendering(self, capsys, tmp_path): reqs = [ UniversalComplianceRequirement( id="1.1", @@ -156,7 +167,7 @@ class TestGroupedMode: bulk_metadata, "test_fw", "output", - "/tmp", + str(tmp_path), False, framework=fw, ) @@ -167,9 +178,118 @@ class TestGroupedMode: assert "PASS" in captured.out assert "FAIL" in captured.out + def test_grouped_multi_section_no_undercount(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """A single check mapped to several sections must be counted in + every section it belongs to, not only the first one seen.""" + reqs = [ + UniversalComplianceRequirement( + id="1.1", + description="test", + attributes={"Section": "IAM"}, + checks={"aws": ["check_a", "check_b"]}, + ), + UniversalComplianceRequirement( + id="2.1", + description="test2", + attributes={"Section": "Logging"}, + checks={"aws": ["check_a"]}, + ), + ] + tc = TableConfig(group_by="Section") + fw = _make_framework(reqs, tc) + + # check_a (FAIL) belongs to both IAM and Logging sections; check_b + # (PASS, IAM only) is added so the overview total reaches 2 and the + # results table is rendered. + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL"), + _make_finding("check_b", "PASS"), + ] + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": MagicMock(Compliance=[]), + "check_b": MagicMock(Compliance=[]), + } + + get_universal_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "test_fw", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + framework=fw, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + plain = _strip_ansi(captured.out) + # Both the IAM and Logging rows must report FAIL(1). Before the fix the + # second section seen (Logging) was undercounted to FAIL(0) and rendered + # as PASS. Anchor each occurrence to its own table row so an unrelated + # "FAIL(1)" elsewhere cannot mask an undercount. + iam_row = [ + line for line in plain.splitlines() if "IAM" in line and "FAIL(1)" in line + ] + logging_row = [ + line + for line in plain.splitlines() + if "Logging" in line and "FAIL(1)" in line + ] + assert len(iam_row) == 1 + assert len(logging_row) == 1 + + def test_grouped_multi_section_muted_not_undercounted(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """A single MUTED finding mapped to several groups must be counted in + the per-group Muted column of every group it belongs to.""" + reqs = [ + UniversalComplianceRequirement( + id="1.1", + description="test", + attributes={"Section": "IAM"}, + checks={"aws": ["check_a", "check_b"]}, + ), + UniversalComplianceRequirement( + id="2.1", + description="test2", + attributes={"Section": "Logging"}, + checks={"aws": ["check_a"]}, + ), + ] + tc = TableConfig(group_by="Section") + fw = _make_framework(reqs, tc) + + # check_a is MUTED and belongs to both IAM and Logging; check_b is a + # plain FAIL so the overview total reaches 2 and the table is rendered. + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL", muted=True), + _make_finding("check_b", "FAIL"), + ] + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": MagicMock(Compliance=[]), + "check_b": MagicMock(Compliance=[]), + } + + get_universal_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "test_fw", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + framework=fw, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + plain = _strip_ansi(captured.out) + # The muted finding belongs to both sections, so both the IAM row and + # the Logging row must carry a Muted count of 1 in their last cell. + muted_one_rows = re.findall(r"│\s*1\s*│\s*$", plain, flags=re.MULTILINE) + assert len(muted_one_rows) == 2 + class TestSplitMode: - def test_split_rendering(self, capsys): + """Test cases for split-mode universal compliance table rendering.""" + + def test_split_rendering(self, capsys, tmp_path): reqs = [ UniversalComplianceRequirement( id="1.1", @@ -204,7 +324,7 @@ class TestSplitMode: bulk_metadata, "test_fw", "output", - "/tmp", + str(tmp_path), False, framework=fw, ) @@ -214,9 +334,119 @@ class TestSplitMode: assert "Level 1" in captured.out assert "Level 2" in captured.out + def test_split_muted_multi_section_not_undercounted(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """In split mode a single MUTED finding mapped to several groups must + be counted in the Muted column of every group it belongs to.""" + reqs = [ + UniversalComplianceRequirement( + id="1.1", + description="test", + attributes={"Section": "Storage", "Profile": "Level 1"}, + checks={"aws": ["check_a", "check_b"]}, + ), + UniversalComplianceRequirement( + id="2.1", + description="test2", + attributes={"Section": "Logging", "Profile": "Level 1"}, + checks={"aws": ["check_a"]}, + ), + ] + tc = TableConfig( + group_by="Section", + split_by=SplitByConfig(field="Profile", values=["Level 1", "Level 2"]), + ) + fw = _make_framework(reqs, tc) + + # check_a is MUTED and belongs to both Storage and Logging; check_b is a + # plain FAIL so the table is rendered. + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL", muted=True), + _make_finding("check_b", "FAIL"), + ] + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": MagicMock(Compliance=[]), + "check_b": MagicMock(Compliance=[]), + } + + get_universal_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "test_fw", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + framework=fw, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + plain = _strip_ansi(captured.out) + # Both section rows must carry a Muted count of 1 (last cell). Before the + # fix only the first group seen incremented Muted, leaving the other 0. + muted_one_rows = re.findall(r"│\s*1\s*│\s*$", plain, flags=re.MULTILINE) + assert len(muted_one_rows) == 2 + + def test_split_same_group_value_not_double_counted(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """A single finding whose check maps to several requirements that share + the same group and split value must count once for that group/split, + not once per requirement (FAIL(1), never FAIL(2)).""" + reqs = [ + # check_a appears in two requirements, both Storage / Level 1. + UniversalComplianceRequirement( + id="1.1", + description="test", + attributes={"Section": "Storage", "Profile": "Level 1"}, + checks={"aws": ["check_a"]}, + ), + UniversalComplianceRequirement( + id="1.2", + description="test2", + attributes={"Section": "Storage", "Profile": "Level 1"}, + checks={"aws": ["check_a"]}, + ), + # A second group so the table renders with more than one finding. + UniversalComplianceRequirement( + id="2.1", + description="test3", + attributes={"Section": "Logging", "Profile": "Level 1"}, + checks={"aws": ["check_b"]}, + ), + ] + tc = TableConfig( + group_by="Section", + split_by=SplitByConfig(field="Profile", values=["Level 1", "Level 2"]), + ) + fw = _make_framework(reqs, tc) + + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL"), + _make_finding("check_b", "PASS"), + ] + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": MagicMock(Compliance=[]), + "check_b": MagicMock(Compliance=[]), + } + + get_universal_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "test_fw", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + framework=fw, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + plain = _strip_ansi(captured.out) + # The Storage row must show FAIL(1) for Level 1, never FAIL(2). + assert "FAIL(1)" in plain + assert "FAIL(2)" not in plain + class TestScoredMode: - def test_scored_rendering(self, capsys): + """Test cases for scored-mode universal compliance table rendering.""" + + def test_scored_rendering(self, capsys, tmp_path): reqs = [ UniversalComplianceRequirement( id="1.1", @@ -251,7 +481,7 @@ class TestScoredMode: bulk_metadata, "test_fw", "output", - "/tmp", + str(tmp_path), False, framework=fw, ) @@ -261,9 +491,68 @@ class TestScoredMode: assert "Score" in captured.out assert "Threat Score" in captured.out + def test_scored_multi_section_fail_not_undercounted(self, capsys, tmp_path): + """In scored mode a single FAIL finding mapped to several groups must + show FAIL(1) in every group it belongs to, not only the first one.""" + reqs = [ + UniversalComplianceRequirement( + id="1.1", + description="test", + attributes={"Section": "IAM", "LevelOfRisk": 5, "Weight": 100}, + checks={"aws": ["check_a", "check_b"]}, + ), + UniversalComplianceRequirement( + id="2.1", + description="test2", + attributes={"Section": "Logging", "LevelOfRisk": 3, "Weight": 50}, + checks={"aws": ["check_a"]}, + ), + ] + tc = TableConfig( + group_by="Section", + scoring=ScoringConfig(risk_field="LevelOfRisk", weight_field="Weight"), + ) + fw = _make_framework(reqs, tc) + + # check_a (FAIL) belongs to both IAM and Logging; check_b (PASS, IAM + # only) raises the overview total to 2 so the table is rendered. + findings = [ + _make_finding("check_a", "FAIL"), + _make_finding("check_b", "PASS"), + ] + bulk_metadata = { + "check_a": MagicMock(Compliance=[]), + "check_b": MagicMock(Compliance=[]), + } + + get_universal_table( + findings, + bulk_metadata, + "test_fw", + "output", + str(tmp_path), + False, + framework=fw, + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + plain = _strip_ansi(captured.out) + iam_row = [ + line for line in plain.splitlines() if "IAM" in line and "FAIL(1)" in line + ] + logging_row = [ + line + for line in plain.splitlines() + if "Logging" in line and "FAIL(1)" in line + ] + assert len(iam_row) == 1 + assert len(logging_row) == 1 + class TestCustomLabels: - def test_ens_spanish_labels(self, capsys): + """Test cases for custom-label universal compliance table rendering.""" + + def test_ens_spanish_labels(self, capsys, tmp_path): reqs = [ UniversalComplianceRequirement( id="1.1", @@ -300,7 +589,7 @@ class TestCustomLabels: bulk_metadata, "test_fw", "output", - "/tmp", + str(tmp_path), False, framework=fw, ) @@ -311,7 +600,9 @@ class TestCustomLabels: class TestMultiProviderDictChecks: - def test_only_aws_checks_matched(self, capsys): + """Test cases for multi-provider dict checks in the universal table.""" + + def test_only_aws_checks_matched(self, capsys, tmp_path): """With dict checks and provider='aws', only AWS checks match findings.""" reqs = [ UniversalComplianceRequirement( @@ -352,7 +643,7 @@ class TestMultiProviderDictChecks: bulk_metadata, "multi_cloud", "output", - "/tmp", + str(tmp_path), False, framework=fw, provider="aws", @@ -366,7 +657,9 @@ class TestMultiProviderDictChecks: class TestNoTableConfig: - def test_returns_early_without_table_config(self, capsys): + """Test cases for the universal table when no table config is present.""" + + def test_returns_early_without_table_config(self, capsys, tmp_path): fw = ComplianceFramework( framework="TestFW", name="Test", @@ -374,11 +667,11 @@ class TestNoTableConfig: description="Test", requirements=[], ) - get_universal_table([], {}, "test", "out", "/tmp", False, framework=fw) + get_universal_table([], {}, "test", "out", str(tmp_path), False, framework=fw) captured = capsys.readouterr() assert captured.out == "" - def test_returns_early_without_framework(self, capsys): - get_universal_table([], {}, "test", "out", "/tmp", False, framework=None) + def test_returns_early_without_framework(self, capsys, tmp_path): + get_universal_table([], {}, "test", "out", str(tmp_path), False, framework=None) captured = capsys.readouterr() assert captured.out == "" diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/finding_test.py b/tests/lib/outputs/finding_test.py index 0f1cb14e25..f843cb8f00 100644 --- a/tests/lib/outputs/finding_test.py +++ b/tests/lib/outputs/finding_test.py @@ -761,6 +761,87 @@ class TestFinding: assert finding_output.metadata.Severity == Severity.high assert finding_output.metadata.ResourceType == "mock_resource_type" + def _build_linode_check_output(self): + check_output = MagicMock() + check_output.resource_id = "12345" + check_output.resource_name = "test-instance" + check_output.resource_details = "" + check_output.resource_tags = {} + check_output.region = "us-east" + check_output.status = Status.PASS + check_output.status_extended = "Instance is compliant" + check_output.muted = False + check_output.check_metadata = mock_check_metadata(provider="linode") + check_output.resource = {} + check_output.compliance = {} + return check_output + + def test_generate_output_linode(self): + """Test Linode output generation when the account ID is available.""" + from prowler.providers.linode.models import LinodeIdentityInfo + + provider = MagicMock() + provider.type = "linode" + provider.identity = LinodeIdentityInfo( + username="admin", + email="admin@example.com", + account_id="E1AF1B6C-1111-2222-3333-444455556666", + ) + + check_output = self._build_linode_check_output() + output_options = MagicMock() + output_options.unix_timestamp = False + + finding_output = Finding.generate_output(provider, check_output, output_options) + + assert finding_output.provider == "linode" + assert finding_output.auth_method == "api_token" + assert finding_output.account_uid == "E1AF1B6C-1111-2222-3333-444455556666" + assert finding_output.account_name == "admin" + + def test_generate_output_linode_without_account_id_falls_back_to_username(self): + """account_uid is required; when account_id is None it must fall back to + the username so findings are never silently dropped.""" + from prowler.providers.linode.models import LinodeIdentityInfo + + provider = MagicMock() + provider.type = "linode" + provider.identity = LinodeIdentityInfo( + username="admin", + email="admin@example.com", + account_id=None, + ) + + check_output = self._build_linode_check_output() + output_options = MagicMock() + output_options.unix_timestamp = False + + finding_output = Finding.generate_output(provider, check_output, output_options) + + # Must not raise a ValidationError and must use the username fallback + assert finding_output.account_uid == "admin" + + def test_generate_output_linode_without_account_id_or_username(self): + """When neither account_id nor username/email is available, account_uid + falls back to the literal provider name.""" + from prowler.providers.linode.models import LinodeIdentityInfo + + provider = MagicMock() + provider.type = "linode" + provider.identity = LinodeIdentityInfo( + username=None, + email=None, + account_id=None, + ) + + check_output = self._build_linode_check_output() + output_options = MagicMock() + output_options.unix_timestamp = False + + finding_output = Finding.generate_output(provider, check_output, output_options) + + assert finding_output.account_uid == "linode" + def test_generate_output_iac_remote(self): # Mock provider provider = MagicMock() diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/jira/jira_test.py b/tests/lib/outputs/jira/jira_test.py index 788d6ba7c9..76352cb297 100644 --- a/tests/lib/outputs/jira/jira_test.py +++ b/tests/lib/outputs/jira/jira_test.py @@ -339,6 +339,88 @@ class TestJiraIntegration: with pytest.raises(JiraRefreshTokenError): self.jira_integration.refresh_access_token() + @patch("prowler.lib.outputs.jira.jira.requests.post") + @patch.object(Jira, "get_cloud_id", return_value="test_cloud_id") + def test_get_auth_sends_timeout(self, mock_get_cloud_id, mock_post): + """get_auth must pass a request timeout to avoid hanging on an unresponsive Jira.""" + # To disable vulture + mock_get_cloud_id = mock_get_cloud_id + + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.status_code = 200 + mock_response.json.return_value = { + "access_token": "test_access_token", + "refresh_token": "test_refresh_token", + "expires_in": 3600, + } + mock_post.return_value = mock_response + + self.jira_integration.get_auth("test_auth_code") + + assert mock_post.call_args.kwargs["timeout"] == Jira.REQUEST_TIMEOUT + + @patch("prowler.lib.outputs.jira.jira.requests.get") + def test_get_cloud_id_sends_timeout(self, mock_get): + """get_cloud_id (OAuth path) must pass a request timeout.""" + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.status_code = 200 + mock_response.json.return_value = [{"id": "test_cloud_id"}] + mock_get.return_value = mock_response + + self.jira_integration.get_cloud_id("test_access_token") + + assert mock_get.call_args.kwargs["timeout"] == Jira.REQUEST_TIMEOUT + + @patch("prowler.lib.outputs.jira.jira.requests.get") + def test_get_cloud_id_basic_auth_sends_timeout(self, mock_get): + """get_cloud_id (basic-auth tenant_info path) must pass a request timeout.""" + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.status_code = 200 + mock_response.json.return_value = {"cloudId": "test_cloud_id"} + mock_get.return_value = mock_response + + self.jira_integration_basic_auth.get_cloud_id(domain=self.domain) + + assert mock_get.call_args.kwargs["timeout"] == Jira.REQUEST_TIMEOUT + + @patch("prowler.lib.outputs.jira.jira.requests.post") + def test_refresh_access_token_sends_timeout(self, mock_post): + """refresh_access_token must pass a request timeout.""" + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.status_code = 200 + mock_response.json.return_value = { + "access_token": "new_access_token", + "refresh_token": "new_refresh_token", + "expires_in": 3600, + } + mock_post.return_value = mock_response + + self.jira_integration.refresh_access_token() + + assert mock_post.call_args.kwargs["timeout"] == Jira.REQUEST_TIMEOUT + + @patch.object(Jira, "get_access_token", return_value="valid_access_token") + @patch.object( + Jira, "cloud_id", new_callable=PropertyMock, return_value="test_cloud_id" + ) + @patch("prowler.lib.outputs.jira.jira.requests.get") + def test_get_projects_sends_timeout( + self, mock_get, mock_cloud_id, mock_get_access_token + ): + """get_projects must pass a request timeout.""" + # To disable vulture + mock_cloud_id = mock_cloud_id + mock_get_access_token = mock_get_access_token + + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.status_code = 200 + mock_response.json.return_value = [{"key": "PROJ1", "name": "Project One"}] + mock_get.return_value = mock_response + + self.jira_integration.get_projects() + + assert mock_get.call_args.kwargs["timeout"] == Jira.REQUEST_TIMEOUT + @patch.object(Jira, "get_auth", return_value=None) @patch.object( Jira, diff --git a/tests/lib/outputs/outputs_test.py b/tests/lib/outputs/outputs_test.py index 87901bd290..ca18717847 100644 --- a/tests/lib/outputs/outputs_test.py +++ b/tests/lib/outputs/outputs_test.py @@ -51,9 +51,7 @@ class TestOutputs: def test_parse_html_string(self): string = "CISA: your-systems-3, your-data-1, your-data-2 | CIS-1.4: 2.1.1 | CIS-1.5: 2.1.1 | GDPR: article_32 | AWS-Foundational-Security-Best-Practices: s3 | HIPAA: 164_308_a_1_ii_b, 164_308_a_4_ii_a, 164_312_a_2_iv, 164_312_c_1, 164_312_c_2, 164_312_e_2_ii | GxP-21-CFR-Part-11: 11.10-c, 11.30 | GxP-EU-Annex-11: 7.1-data-storage-damage-protection | NIST-800-171-Revision-2: 3_3_8, 3_5_10, 3_13_11, 3_13_16 | NIST-800-53-Revision-4: sc_28 | NIST-800-53-Revision-5: au_9_3, cm_6_a, cm_9_b, cp_9_d, cp_9_8, pm_11_b, sc_8_3, sc_8_4, sc_13_a, sc_16_1, sc_28_1, si_19_4 | ENS-RD2022: mp.si.2.aws.s3.1 | NIST-CSF-1.1: ds_1 | RBI-Cyber-Security-Framework: annex_i_1_3 | FFIEC: d3-pc-am-b-12 | PCI-3.2.1: s3 | FedRamp-Moderate-Revision-4: sc-13, sc-28 | FedRAMP-Low-Revision-4: sc-13 | KISA-ISMS-P-2023: 2.6.1 | KISA-ISMS-P-2023-korean: 2.6.1" - assert ( - parse_html_string(string) - == """ + assert parse_html_string(string) == """ •CISA: your-systems-3, your-data-1, your-data-2 •CIS-1.4: 2.1.1 @@ -94,7 +92,6 @@ class TestOutputs: •KISA-ISMS-P-2023-korean: 2.6.1 """ - ) def test_unroll_tags(self): dict_list = [ diff --git a/tests/lib/resource_limit_test.py b/tests/lib/resource_limit_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ad2f3a292f --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/lib/resource_limit_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +from prowler.lib.resource_limit import ( + get_resource_scan_limit, + iter_limited_paginator_items, + limit_resources, +) + + +class FakePaginator: + def __init__(self, pages): + self.pages = pages + self.paginate_calls = [] + self.pages_requested = 0 + + def paginate(self, **kwargs): + self.paginate_calls.append(kwargs) + for page in self.pages: + self.pages_requested += 1 + yield page + + +class Test_limit_resources: + def test_no_limit_returns_all_in_order(self): + resources = ["PASS", "FAIL", "PASS"] + + result = list(limit_resources(iter(resources), None)) + + assert result == ["PASS", "FAIL", "PASS"] + + +class Test_iter_limited_paginator_items: + def test_positive_limit_stops_without_page_size(self): + paginator = FakePaginator( + [ + {"Items": [1, 2]}, + {"Items": [3, 4]}, + {"Items": [5]}, + ] + ) + + result = list(iter_limited_paginator_items(paginator, "Items", 3)) + + assert result == [1, 2, 3] + assert paginator.paginate_calls == [{}] + assert paginator.pages_requested == 2 + + def test_absurd_limit_is_not_sent_as_page_size(self): + paginator = FakePaginator([{"Items": [1, 2]}]) + + result = list(iter_limited_paginator_items(paginator, "Items", 200000)) + + assert result == [1, 2] + assert paginator.paginate_calls == [{}] + + def test_operation_parameters_are_forwarded_unchanged(self): + paginator = FakePaginator([{"Snapshots": ["snapshot"]}]) + + result = list( + iter_limited_paginator_items( + paginator, + "Snapshots", + 1, + OwnerIds=["self"], + ) + ) + + assert result == ["snapshot"] + assert paginator.paginate_calls == [{"OwnerIds": ["self"]}] + + def test_item_filter_limits_selected_items_only(self): + paginator = FakePaginator( + [ + {"Items": [{"arn": "skip"}, {"arn": "first"}]}, + {"Items": [{"arn": "second"}, {"arn": "third"}]}, + ] + ) + + result = list( + iter_limited_paginator_items( + paginator, + "Items", + 2, + item_filter=lambda item: item["arn"] != "skip", + ) + ) + + assert result == [{"arn": "first"}, {"arn": "second"}] + assert paginator.pages_requested == 2 + + def test_limit_zero_or_negative_is_unlimited(self): + resources = list(range(5)) + + assert list(limit_resources(iter(resources), 0)) == resources + assert list(limit_resources(iter(resources), -3)) == resources + + def test_positive_limit_stops_after_selected_resources(self): + pulled = [] + + def gen(): + for i in range(1000): + pulled.append(i) + yield i + + result = list(limit_resources(gen(), 100)) + + assert result == list(range(100)) + assert len(pulled) == 100 + + def test_does_not_reorder_or_inspect_resource_status(self): + resources = ["PASS", "FAIL", "PASS", "FAIL"] + + result = list(limit_resources(iter(resources), 3)) + + assert result == ["PASS", "FAIL", "PASS"] + + +class Test_get_resource_scan_limit: + def test_per_service_override_wins(self): + config = { + "max_scanned_resources_per_service": 100, + "max_ecs_task_definitions": 25, + } + assert get_resource_scan_limit(config, "max_ecs_task_definitions") == 25 + + def test_falls_back_to_global_default(self): + config = {"max_scanned_resources_per_service": 50} + assert get_resource_scan_limit(config, "max_ecs_task_definitions") == 50 + + def test_null_per_service_override_falls_back_to_global_default(self): + config = { + "max_scanned_resources_per_service": 50, + "max_ecs_task_definitions": None, + } + + assert get_resource_scan_limit(config, "max_ecs_task_definitions") == 50 + + def test_default_is_unlimited_when_unset(self): + assert get_resource_scan_limit({}, "max_ecs_task_definitions") is None + + def test_null_per_service_override_falls_back_to_unlimited_global_default(self): + config = {"max_ecs_task_definitions": None} + + assert get_resource_scan_limit(config, "max_ecs_task_definitions") is None + + def test_non_positive_means_unlimited(self): + assert ( + get_resource_scan_limit( + {"max_scanned_resources_per_service": 0}, "max_lambda_functions" + ) + is None + ) + assert ( + get_resource_scan_limit( + {"max_lambda_functions": -1}, "max_lambda_functions" + ) + is None + ) diff --git a/tests/lib/utils/utils_test.py b/tests/lib/utils/utils_test.py index c8db5a62d0..c3340704de 100644 --- a/tests/lib/utils/utils_test.py +++ b/tests/lib/utils/utils_test.py @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ import os +import subprocess import tempfile from datetime import datetime from time import mktime @@ -7,7 +8,8 @@ import pytest from mock import patch from prowler.lib.utils.utils import ( - detect_secrets_scan, + SecretsScanError, + detect_secrets_scan_batch, file_exists, get_file_permissions, hash_sha512, @@ -20,6 +22,95 @@ from prowler.lib.utils.utils import ( ) +def _fake_kingfisher_run(output_content=None, returncode=0, stderr=""): + """Build a ``subprocess.run`` replacement that mimics a Kingfisher call. + + When ``output_content`` is given it is written to the ``--output`` path from + the command (so the reader sees realistic file content); the call returns a + CompletedProcess with the requested ``returncode``/``stderr``. + """ + + def _run(command, *_args, **_kwargs): + if output_content is not None: + output_path = command[command.index("--output") + 1] + with open(output_path, "w") as output_file: + output_file.write(output_content) + return subprocess.CompletedProcess( + command, returncode, stdout="", stderr=stderr + ) + + return _run + + +def _fake_kingfisher_run_with_findings(findings): + """Build a ``subprocess.run`` replacement that emits crafted findings. + + Each entry in ``findings`` is a ``(payload_index, line)`` pair: the finding + is mapped back to the temp file named ``str(payload_index)`` (the basename + ``_scan_batch_chunk`` writes per payload) and given the requested ``line`` + value (omitted entirely when ``line`` is the sentinel ``_OMIT``). Returns a + success exit code so only the finding shape is under test. + """ + + def _run(command, *_args, **_kwargs): + output_path = command[command.index("--output") + 1] + entries = [] + for payload_index, line in findings: + finding = {"path": str(payload_index), "snippet": "secret"} + if line is not _OMIT: + finding["line"] = line + entries.append({"finding": finding, "rule": {"name": "Generic Secret"}}) + import json as _json + + with open(output_path, "w") as output_file: + output_file.write(_json.dumps({"findings": entries})) + return subprocess.CompletedProcess(command, 200, stdout="", stderr="") + + return _run + + +_OMIT = object() + + +class Test_detect_secrets_scan_batch_invalid_line: + """Kingfisher's ``line`` is consumed as a trusted 1-based index by checks + (e.g. CloudWatch ``events[line_number - 1]``). A malformed line must fail + closed as SecretsScanError, never return a finding with a bad index.""" + + @pytest.mark.parametrize( + "line", + [_OMIT, None, "2", 0, -1, 5, True], + ids=["missing", "none", "string", "zero", "negative", "out_of_range", "bool"], + ) + def test_invalid_line_raises(self, line): + # Payload "data" is a single line, so any line other than 1 is invalid. + with patch( + "prowler.lib.utils.utils.subprocess.run", + side_effect=_fake_kingfisher_run_with_findings([(0, line)]), + ): + with pytest.raises(SecretsScanError) as exc: + detect_secrets_scan_batch({"a": "data"}) + assert "invalid line number" in str(exc.value) + + def test_valid_line_is_returned(self): + # A valid in-range line must still pass through to the caller. + with patch( + "prowler.lib.utils.utils.subprocess.run", + side_effect=_fake_kingfisher_run_with_findings([(0, 1)]), + ): + results = detect_secrets_scan_batch({"a": "data"}) + assert results["a"][0]["line_number"] == 1 + + def test_one_invalid_line_aborts_the_whole_scan(self): + # Even mixed with a valid finding, a single invalid line fails closed. + with patch( + "prowler.lib.utils.utils.subprocess.run", + side_effect=_fake_kingfisher_run_with_findings([(0, 1), (1, 0)]), + ): + with pytest.raises(SecretsScanError): + detect_secrets_scan_batch({"a": "data", "b": "data"}) + + class Test_utils_open_file: def test_open_read_file(self): temp_data_file = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False) @@ -108,75 +199,108 @@ class Test_utils_validate_ip_address: assert not validate_ip_address("Not an IP") -class Test_detect_secrets_scan: - def test_detect_secrets_scan_data(self): - data = "password=password" - secrets_detected = detect_secrets_scan(data=data, excluded_secrets=[]) - assert type(secrets_detected) is list - assert len(secrets_detected) == 1 - assert "filename" in secrets_detected[0] - assert "hashed_secret" in secrets_detected[0] - assert "is_verified" in secrets_detected[0] - assert secrets_detected[0]["line_number"] == 1 - assert secrets_detected[0]["type"] == "Secret Keyword" - - def test_detect_secrets_scan_no_secrets_data(self): - data = "" - assert detect_secrets_scan(data=data) is None - - def test_detect_secrets_scan_file_with_secrets(self): - temp_data_file = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False) - temp_data_file.write(b"password=password") - temp_data_file.seek(0) - secrets_detected = detect_secrets_scan( - file=temp_data_file.name, excluded_secrets=[] +class Test_detect_secrets_scan_batch: + def test_batch_returns_findings_per_key(self): + results = detect_secrets_scan_batch( + { + "a": 'password = "Tr0ub4dor3xKq9vLmZ"', + "b": "just a normal config = value", + } ) - assert type(secrets_detected) is list - assert len(secrets_detected) == 1 - assert "filename" in secrets_detected[0] - assert "hashed_secret" in secrets_detected[0] - assert "is_verified" in secrets_detected[0] - assert secrets_detected[0]["line_number"] == 1 - assert secrets_detected[0]["type"] == "Secret Keyword" - os.remove(temp_data_file.name) + assert "a" in results + assert results["a"][0]["type"] == "Generic Password" + # keys without findings are omitted + assert "b" not in results - def test_detect_secrets_scan_file_no_secrets(self): - temp_data_file = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False) - temp_data_file.write(b"no secrets") - temp_data_file.seek(0) - assert detect_secrets_scan(file=temp_data_file.name) is None - os.remove(temp_data_file.name) + def test_batch_no_dedup_reports_identical_secret_in_each_key(self): + # The same secret in two payloads must be reported for both (matches + # scanning each payload individually). + secret = "token = eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.dozjgNryP4J3jVmNHl0w5N_XgL0n3I9PlFUP0THsR8U" + results = detect_secrets_scan_batch({"a": secret, "b": secret}) + assert "a" in results + assert "b" in results - def test_detect_secrets_using_regex(self): - data = "MYSQL_ALLOW_EMPTY_PASSWORD=password" - secrets_detected = detect_secrets_scan( - data=data, excluded_secrets=[".*password"] + def test_batch_excluded_secrets_filters(self): + results = detect_secrets_scan_batch( + {"a": 'DB_ALLOW_EMPTY_PASSWORD = "Tr0ub4dor3xKq9vLmZ"'}, + excluded_secrets=[".*ALLOW_EMPTY_PASSWORD.*"], ) - assert secrets_detected is None + assert results == {} - def test_detect_secrets_using_regex_file(self): - temp_data_file = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False) - temp_data_file.write(b"MYSQL_ALLOW_EMPTY_PASSWORD=password") - temp_data_file.seek(0) - secrets_detected = detect_secrets_scan( - file=temp_data_file.name, excluded_secrets=[".*password"] - ) - assert secrets_detected is None - os.remove(temp_data_file.name) + def test_batch_chunking_maps_all_keys(self): + payloads = {f"k{i}": f'password = "S3cr3tV4lu3xy{i}z"' for i in range(5)} + results = detect_secrets_scan_batch(payloads, chunk_size=2) + assert sorted(results.keys()) == ["k0", "k1", "k2", "k3", "k4"] - def test_detect_secrets_secrets_using_regex(self): - data = "MYSQL_ALLOW_EMPTY_PASSWORD=password, MYSQL_PASSWORD=password" - # Update the regex to exclude only the exact key "MYSQL_ALLOW_EMPTY_PASSWORD" - secrets_detected = detect_secrets_scan( - data=data, excluded_secrets=["^MYSQL_ALLOW_EMPTY_PASSWORD$"] + def test_batch_empty_payloads(self): + assert detect_secrets_scan_batch({}) == {} + + def test_batch_accepts_iterable_of_pairs(self): + results = detect_secrets_scan_batch( + iter([("x", 'password = "Tr0ub4dor3xKq9vLmZ"')]) ) - assert type(secrets_detected) is list - assert len(secrets_detected) == 1 - assert "filename" in secrets_detected[0] - assert "hashed_secret" in secrets_detected[0] - assert "is_verified" in secrets_detected[0] - assert secrets_detected[0]["line_number"] == 1 - assert secrets_detected[0]["type"] == "Secret Keyword" + assert "x" in results + + +class Test_detect_secrets_scan_batch_failures: + """A scanner failure must surface as SecretsScanError, never as empty + results (which a caller would read as 'no secrets found').""" + + def test_non_zero_exit_code_raises(self): + with patch( + "prowler.lib.utils.utils.subprocess.run", + side_effect=_fake_kingfisher_run(returncode=1, stderr="boom"), + ): + with pytest.raises(SecretsScanError) as exc: + detect_secrets_scan_batch({"a": "data"}) + assert "exited with code 1" in str(exc.value) + assert "boom" in str(exc.value) + + def test_timeout_raises(self): + with patch( + "prowler.lib.utils.utils.subprocess.run", + side_effect=subprocess.TimeoutExpired(cmd="kingfisher", timeout=300), + ): + with pytest.raises(SecretsScanError) as exc: + detect_secrets_scan_batch({"a": "data"}) + assert "timed out" in str(exc.value) + + def test_malformed_json_output_raises(self): + with patch( + "prowler.lib.utils.utils.subprocess.run", + side_effect=_fake_kingfisher_run( + output_content="{not valid json", returncode=0 + ), + ): + with pytest.raises(SecretsScanError): + detect_secrets_scan_batch({"a": "data"}) + + def test_missing_binary_raises(self): + with patch( + "prowler.lib.utils.utils.subprocess.run", + side_effect=FileNotFoundError("kingfisher binary not found"), + ): + with pytest.raises(SecretsScanError): + detect_secrets_scan_batch({"a": "data"}) + + def test_empty_output_is_not_a_failure(self): + # Empty output means the scan ran and found nothing; it must NOT raise. + with patch( + "prowler.lib.utils.utils.subprocess.run", + side_effect=_fake_kingfisher_run(output_content="", returncode=0), + ): + assert detect_secrets_scan_batch({"a": "data"}) == {} + + def test_failure_in_any_chunk_aborts_the_whole_scan(self): + # A failure in any chunk must abort the whole scan, not silently return + # partial results from the chunks that happened to succeed first. + payloads = {f"k{i}": "data" for i in range(4)} + with patch( + "prowler.lib.utils.utils.subprocess.run", + side_effect=_fake_kingfisher_run(returncode=2, stderr="boom"), + ): + with pytest.raises(SecretsScanError): + detect_secrets_scan_batch(payloads, chunk_size=2) class Test_hash_sha512: diff --git a/tests/providers/alibabacloud/services/ram/ram_password_policy_number/ram_password_policy_number_test.py b/tests/providers/alibabacloud/services/ram/ram_password_policy_number/ram_password_policy_number_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cc9b9ab35e --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/alibabacloud/services/ram/ram_password_policy_number/ram_password_policy_number_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from tests.providers.alibabacloud.alibabacloud_fixtures import ( + set_mocked_alibabacloud_provider, +) + + +class TestRamPasswordPolicyNumber: + def test_numbers_not_required_fails(self): + ram_client = mock.MagicMock() + ram_client.audited_account = "1234567890" + ram_client.region = "cn-hangzhou" + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_alibabacloud_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.alibabacloud.services.ram.ram_password_policy_number.ram_password_policy_number.ram_client", + new=ram_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.alibabacloud.services.ram.ram_password_policy_number.ram_password_policy_number import ( + ram_password_policy_number, + ) + from prowler.providers.alibabacloud.services.ram.ram_service import ( + PasswordPolicy, + ) + + ram_client.password_policy = PasswordPolicy(require_numbers=False) + + check = ram_password_policy_number() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + + def test_numbers_required_passes(self): + ram_client = mock.MagicMock() + ram_client.audited_account = "1234567890" + ram_client.region = "cn-hangzhou" + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_alibabacloud_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.alibabacloud.services.ram.ram_password_policy_number.ram_password_policy_number.ram_client", + new=ram_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.alibabacloud.services.ram.ram_password_policy_number.ram_password_policy_number import ( + ram_password_policy_number, + ) + from prowler.providers.alibabacloud.services.ram.ram_service import ( + PasswordPolicy, + ) + + ram_client.password_policy = PasswordPolicy(require_numbers=True) + + check = ram_password_policy_number() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/lib/ip_ranges/ip_ranges_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/lib/ip_ranges/ip_ranges_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bce53165d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/aws/lib/ip_ranges/ip_ranges_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +import json +import urllib.error +from ipaddress import IPv4Network, IPv6Network, ip_address +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +from prowler.providers.aws.lib.ip_ranges.ip_ranges import get_public_ip_networks + +URLOPEN_TARGET = "prowler.providers.aws.lib.ip_ranges.ip_ranges.urllib.request.urlopen" + +SAMPLE_RANGES = { + "prefixes": [ + {"ip_prefix": "54.152.0.0/16", "service": "AMAZON"}, + {"ip_prefix": "3.5.140.0/22", "service": "S3"}, + ], + "ipv6_prefixes": [ + {"ipv6_prefix": "2600:1f00::/24", "service": "AMAZON"}, + ], +} + + +def mock_urlopen(payload): + response = MagicMock() + response.read.return_value = json.dumps(payload).encode() + context_manager = MagicMock() + context_manager.__enter__.return_value = response + context_manager.__exit__.return_value = False + return context_manager + + +class TestGetPublicIPNetworks: + def test_parses_ipv4_and_ipv6_prefixes(self): + with patch(URLOPEN_TARGET, return_value=mock_urlopen(SAMPLE_RANGES)): + networks = get_public_ip_networks() + + assert networks == [ + IPv4Network("54.152.0.0/16"), + IPv4Network("3.5.140.0/22"), + IPv6Network("2600:1f00::/24"), + ] + + def test_known_aws_ip_is_contained(self): + with patch(URLOPEN_TARGET, return_value=mock_urlopen(SAMPLE_RANGES)): + networks = get_public_ip_networks() + + assert any(ip_address("54.152.12.70") in network for network in networks) + + def test_external_ip_is_not_contained(self): + with patch(URLOPEN_TARGET, return_value=mock_urlopen(SAMPLE_RANGES)): + networks = get_public_ip_networks() + + assert not any(ip_address("17.5.7.3") in network for network in networks) + + def test_empty_payload_returns_empty_list(self): + with patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.lib.ip_ranges.ip_ranges.urllib.request.urlopen", + return_value=mock_urlopen({}), + ): + networks = get_public_ip_networks() + + assert networks == [] + + def test_prefixes_missing_cidr_are_skipped(self): + payload = { + "prefixes": [{"ip_prefix": "10.0.0.0/8"}, {"service": "EC2"}], + "ipv6_prefixes": [{"service": "AMAZON"}], + } + with patch(URLOPEN_TARGET, return_value=mock_urlopen(payload)): + networks = get_public_ip_networks() + + assert networks == [IPv4Network("10.0.0.0/8")] + + def test_urlopen_failure_returns_empty_list(self): + with patch(URLOPEN_TARGET, side_effect=urllib.error.URLError("boom")): + networks = get_public_ip_networks() + + assert networks == [] + + def test_timeout_returns_empty_list(self): + with patch(URLOPEN_TARGET, side_effect=TimeoutError("timed out")): + networks = get_public_ip_networks() + + assert networks == [] + + def test_invalid_json_returns_empty_list(self): + response = MagicMock() + response.read.return_value = b"not json" + context_manager = MagicMock() + context_manager.__enter__.return_value = response + context_manager.__exit__.return_value = False + with patch(URLOPEN_TARGET, return_value=context_manager): + networks = get_public_ip_networks() + + assert networks == [] + + def test_malformed_cidr_is_skipped(self): + payload = { + "prefixes": [ + {"ip_prefix": "300.0.0.0/8"}, + {"ip_prefix": "10.0.0.0/8"}, + ], + "ipv6_prefixes": [ + {"ipv6_prefix": "2600::/129"}, + {"ipv6_prefix": "2600:1f00::/24"}, + ], + } + with patch(URLOPEN_TARGET, return_value=mock_urlopen(payload)): + networks = get_public_ip_networks() + + assert networks == [ + IPv4Network("10.0.0.0/8"), + IPv6Network("2600:1f00::/24"), + ] diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/acmpca/acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm/acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/acmpca/acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm/acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1685115755 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/acmpca/acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm/acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from prowler.providers.aws.services.acmpca.acmpca_service import CertificateAuthority +from tests.providers.aws.utils import ( + AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER, + AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + set_mocked_aws_provider, +) + +CA_ID = "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012" +CA_ARN = f"arn:aws:acm-pca:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:certificate-authority/{CA_ID}" + + +def _build_client(certificate_authorities, audit_config=None): + acmpca_client = mock.MagicMock() + acmpca_client.certificate_authorities = certificate_authorities + acmpca_client.audit_config = audit_config or {} + return acmpca_client + + +def _ca(key_algorithm: str, status: str = "ACTIVE"): + return CertificateAuthority( + arn=CA_ARN, + id=CA_ID, + region=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + status=status, + type="SUBORDINATE", + usage_mode="GENERAL_PURPOSE", + key_algorithm=key_algorithm, + signing_algorithm="ML_DSA_65" if "ML_DSA" in key_algorithm else "SHA256WITHRSA", + ) + + +class Test_acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm: + def test_no_cas(self): + acmpca_client = _build_client({}) + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.acmpca.acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm.acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm.acmpca_client", + new=acmpca_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.acmpca.acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm.acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm import ( + acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm, + ) + + check = acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_ml_dsa_65(self): + acmpca_client = _build_client({CA_ARN: _ca("ML_DSA_65")}) + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.acmpca.acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm.acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm.acmpca_client", + new=acmpca_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.acmpca.acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm.acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm import ( + acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm, + ) + + check = acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert "ML_DSA_65" in result[0].status_extended + assert result[0].resource_id == CA_ID + assert result[0].resource_arn == CA_ARN + + def test_rsa_2048_fails(self): + acmpca_client = _build_client({CA_ARN: _ca("RSA_2048")}) + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.acmpca.acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm.acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm.acmpca_client", + new=acmpca_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.acmpca.acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm.acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm import ( + acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm, + ) + + check = acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "RSA_2048" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_deleted_ca_skipped(self): + acmpca_client = _build_client({CA_ARN: _ca("RSA_2048", status="DELETED")}) + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.acmpca.acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm.acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm.acmpca_client", + new=acmpca_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.acmpca.acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm.acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm import ( + acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm, + ) + + check = acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_configurable_allowlist(self): + acmpca_client = _build_client( + {CA_ARN: _ca("RSA_2048")}, + audit_config={"acmpca_pqc_key_algorithms": ["ML_DSA_65", "RSA_2048"]}, + ) + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.acmpca.acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm.acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm.acmpca_client", + new=acmpca_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.acmpca.acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm.acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm import ( + acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm, + ) + + check = acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/acmpca/acmpca_service_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/acmpca/acmpca_service_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..024df5e5a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/acmpca/acmpca_service_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +from unittest.mock import patch + +import botocore +from moto import mock_aws + +from prowler.providers.aws.services.acmpca.acmpca_service import ( + ACMPCA, + CertificateAuthority, +) +from tests.providers.aws.utils import ( + AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER, + AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + set_mocked_aws_provider, +) + +CA_ID = "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012" +CA_ARN = f"arn:aws:acm-pca:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:certificate-authority/{CA_ID}" + +make_api_call = botocore.client.BaseClient._make_api_call + + +def mock_make_api_call(self, operation_name, kwarg): + if operation_name == "ListCertificateAuthorities": + return { + "CertificateAuthorities": [ + { + "Arn": CA_ARN, + "Status": "ACTIVE", + "Type": "SUBORDINATE", + "UsageMode": "GENERAL_PURPOSE", + "CertificateAuthorityConfiguration": { + "KeyAlgorithm": "ML_DSA_65", + "SigningAlgorithm": "ML_DSA_65", + }, + } + ] + } + if operation_name == "ListTags": + assert kwarg["CertificateAuthorityArn"] == CA_ARN + return {"Tags": [{"Key": "Environment", "Value": "test"}]} + return make_api_call(self, operation_name, kwarg) + + +class Test_ACMPCA_Service: + @mock_aws + def test_service(self): + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + acmpca = ACMPCA(aws_provider) + assert acmpca.service == "acm-pca" + + @patch("botocore.client.BaseClient._make_api_call", new=mock_make_api_call) + @mock_aws + def test_list_certificate_authorities(self): + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + acmpca = ACMPCA(aws_provider) + assert len(acmpca.certificate_authorities) == 1 + ca = acmpca.certificate_authorities[CA_ARN] + assert isinstance(ca, CertificateAuthority) + assert ca.id == CA_ID + assert ca.region == AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 + assert ca.status == "ACTIVE" + assert ca.type == "SUBORDINATE" + assert ca.key_algorithm == "ML_DSA_65" + assert ca.signing_algorithm == "ML_DSA_65" + assert ca.tags == [{"Key": "Environment", "Value": "test"}] diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/apigateway/apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled/apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/apigateway/apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled/apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6d460be32e --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/apigateway/apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled/apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,243 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from moto import mock_aws + +from prowler.providers.aws.services.apigateway.apigateway_service import DomainName +from tests.providers.aws.utils import ( + AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + set_mocked_aws_provider, +) + +DOMAIN_NAME = "api.example.com" +DOMAIN_ARN = f"arn:aws:apigateway:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}::/domainnames/{DOMAIN_NAME}" + + +def _build_client(security_policy: str): + apigw_client = mock.MagicMock() + apigw_client.audit_config = {} + apigw_client.domain_names = [ + DomainName( + name=DOMAIN_NAME, + arn=DOMAIN_ARN, + region=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + security_policy=security_policy, + ) + ] + return apigw_client + + +class Test_apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled: + @mock_aws + def test_no_domains(self): + apigw_client = mock.MagicMock() + apigw_client.audit_config = {} + apigw_client.domain_names = [] + + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ): + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.apigateway.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.apigateway_client", + new=apigw_client, + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.apigateway.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled import ( + apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled, + ) + + check = apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 0 + + @mock_aws + def test_tls13_only_policy_fails_by_default(self): + apigw_client = _build_client("SecurityPolicy_TLS13_1_3_2025_09") + + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ): + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.apigateway.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.apigateway_client", + new=apigw_client, + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.apigateway.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled import ( + apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled, + ) + + check = apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "SecurityPolicy_TLS13_1_3_2025_09" in result[0].status_extended + assert "not in the post-quantum allowlist" in result[0].status_extended + assert result[0].resource_id == DOMAIN_NAME + assert result[0].resource_arn == DOMAIN_ARN + assert result[0].region == AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 + + @mock_aws + def test_alternate_pq_policy(self): + apigw_client = _build_client("SecurityPolicy_TLS13_1_2_PQ_2025_09") + + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ): + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.apigateway.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.apigateway_client", + new=apigw_client, + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.apigateway.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled import ( + apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled, + ) + + check = apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + "SecurityPolicy_TLS13_1_2_PQ_2025_09" in result[0].status_extended + ) + + @mock_aws + def test_legacy_tls_1_2(self): + apigw_client = _build_client("TLS_1_2") + + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ): + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.apigateway.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.apigateway_client", + new=apigw_client, + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.apigateway.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled import ( + apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled, + ) + + check = apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "TLS_1_2" in result[0].status_extended + assert "not in the post-quantum allowlist" in result[0].status_extended + + @mock_aws + def test_missing_security_policy(self): + apigw_client = _build_client("") + + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ): + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.apigateway.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.apigateway_client", + new=apigw_client, + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.apigateway.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled import ( + apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled, + ) + + check = apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "" in result[0].status_extended + + @mock_aws + def test_configurable_allowlist(self): + apigw_client = _build_client("TLS_1_2") + apigw_client.audit_config = { + "apigateway_pqc_tls_allowed_policies": [ + "TLS_1_2", + ] + } + + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ): + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.apigateway.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.apigateway_client", + new=apigw_client, + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.apigateway.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled import ( + apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled, + ) + + check = apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + + @mock_aws + def test_null_config_uses_default_allowlist(self): + apigw_client = _build_client("SecurityPolicy_TLS13_1_2_PQ_2025_09") + apigw_client.audit_config = { + "apigateway_pqc_tls_allowed_policies": None, + } + + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ): + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.apigateway.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.apigateway_client", + new=apigw_client, + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.apigateway.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled import ( + apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled, + ) + + check = apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + + @mock_aws + def test_non_iterable_config_uses_default_allowlist(self): + apigw_client = _build_client("SecurityPolicy_TLS13_1_2_PQ_2025_09") + apigw_client.audit_config = { + "apigateway_pqc_tls_allowed_policies": 123, + } + + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ): + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.apigateway.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.apigateway_client", + new=apigw_client, + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.apigateway.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled.apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled import ( + apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled, + ) + + check = apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/apigateway/apigateway_service_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/apigateway/apigateway_service_test.py index 9396693ec3..c153af2871 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/apigateway/apigateway_service_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/apigateway/apigateway_service_test.py @@ -206,3 +206,26 @@ class Test_APIGateway_Service: assert list(apigateway.rest_apis[0].resources[1].resource_methods.values()) == [ "AWS_IAM" ] + + # Test APIGateway _get_domain_names + @mock_aws + def test_get_domain_names(self): + apigateway_client = client("apigateway", region_name=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1) + + apigateway_client.create_domain_name( + domainName="api.example.com", + securityPolicy="SecurityPolicy_TLS13_1_3_2025_09", + ) + + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + apigateway = APIGateway(aws_provider) + + assert len(apigateway.domain_names) == 1 + domain = apigateway.domain_names[0] + assert domain.name == "api.example.com" + assert domain.region == AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 + assert domain.security_policy == "SecurityPolicy_TLS13_1_3_2025_09" + assert ( + domain.arn + == f"arn:aws:apigateway:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}::/domainnames/api.example.com" + ) diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/autoscaling/autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration/autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/autoscaling/autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration/autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration_test.py index 1005761834..ec45b89a49 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/autoscaling/autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration/autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/autoscaling/autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration/autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration_test.py @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ class Test_autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration: InstanceType="t1.micro", KeyName="the_keys", SecurityGroups=["default", "default2"], - UserData="DB_PASSWORD=foobar123", + UserData='DB_PASSWORD="Tr0ub4dor3xKq9vLmZ"', ) launch_configuration_arn = autoscaling_client.describe_launch_configurations( LaunchConfigurationNames=[launch_configuration_name] @@ -341,7 +341,9 @@ class Test_autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration: check = autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration() result = check.execute() - assert len(result) == 0 + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "MANUAL" + assert "Could not decode User Data" in result[0].status_extended @mock_aws def test_one_autoscaling_file_invalid_gzip_error(self): @@ -381,4 +383,6 @@ class Test_autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration: check = autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration() result = check.execute() - assert len(result) == 0 + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "MANUAL" + assert "Could not decode User Data" in result[0].status_extended diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/autoscaling/autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration/fixtures/fixture b/tests/providers/aws/services/autoscaling/autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration/fixtures/fixture index 2fb5138932..c591954ab4 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/autoscaling/autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration/fixtures/fixture +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/autoscaling/autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration/fixtures/fixture @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -DB_PASSWORD=foobar123 +DB_PASSWORD="Tr0ub4dor3xKq9vLmZ" DB_USER=foo -API_KEY=12345abcd -SERVICE_PASSWORD=bbaabb45 +API_KEY=s3rv1c3Acc0untS3cr3tV4lu3x9 +SERVICE_PASSWORD="Xy9zPq2wKmRtVbN4" diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/autoscaling/autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration/fixtures/fixture.gz b/tests/providers/aws/services/autoscaling/autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration/fixtures/fixture.gz index 6120fcfbc4..15e68af70e 100644 Binary files a/tests/providers/aws/services/autoscaling/autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration/fixtures/fixture.gz and b/tests/providers/aws/services/autoscaling/autoscaling_find_secrets_ec2_launch_configuration/fixtures/fixture.gz differ diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/awslambda/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/awslambda/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code_test.py index 5f97082c1b..e6399eb3ce 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/awslambda/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/awslambda/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code_test.py @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ LAMBDA_FUNCTION_RUNTIME = "nodejs4.3" LAMBDA_FUNCTION_ARN = f"arn:aws:lambda:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:function/{LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME}" LAMBDA_FUNCTION_CODE_WITH_SECRETS = """ def lambda_handler(event, context): - db_password = "test-password" + db_password = "Tr0ub4dor3xKq9vLmZ" print("custom log event") return event """ @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ class Test_awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code: assert result[0].status == "FAIL" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == f"Potential secret found in Lambda function {LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME} code -> lambda_function.py: Secret Keyword on line 3." + == f"Potential secret found in Lambda function {LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME} code -> lambda_function.py: Generic Password on line 3." ) assert result[0].resource_tags == [] @@ -201,3 +201,35 @@ class Test_awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code: == f"No secrets found in Lambda function {LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME} code." ) assert result[0].resource_tags == [] + + def test_scan_failure_reports_manual_not_pass(self): + from prowler.lib.utils.utils import SecretsScanError + + lambda_client = mock.MagicMock + lambda_client.functions = {LAMBDA_FUNCTION_ARN: create_lambda_function()} + lambda_client._get_function_code = mock_get_function_codewith_secrets + lambda_client.audit_config = {"secrets_ignore_patterns": []} + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_aws_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.awslambda.awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code.awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code.awslambda_client", + new=lambda_client, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.awslambda.awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code.awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code.detect_secrets_scan_batch", + side_effect=SecretsScanError("Kingfisher exited with code 1"), + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.awslambda.awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code.awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code import ( + awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code, + ) + + check = awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "MANUAL" + assert "Could not scan" in result[0].status_extended diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/awslambda/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/awslambda/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables_test.py index 6ae517dfe2..f7ba14a7d3 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/awslambda/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/awslambda/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables/awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables_test.py @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ class Test_awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables: arn=function_arn, region=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, runtime=function_runtime, - environment={"db_password": "test-password"}, + environment={"db_password": "Tr0ub4dor3xKq9vLmZ"}, ) } @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ class Test_awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables: assert result[0].status == "FAIL" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == f"Potential secret found in Lambda function {function_name} variables -> Secret Keyword in variable db_password." + == f"Potential secret found in Lambda function {function_name} variables -> Generic Password in variable db_password." ) assert result[0].resource_tags == [] @@ -145,7 +145,69 @@ class Test_awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables: arn=function_arn, region=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, runtime=function_runtime, - environment={"db_password": "srv://admin:pass@db"}, + environment={ + "db_password": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.dozjgNryP4J3jVmNHl0w5N_XgL0n3I9PlFUP0THsR8U" + }, + ) + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_aws_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.awslambda.awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables.awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables.awslambda_client", + new=lambda_client, + ), + ): + # Test Check + from prowler.providers.aws.services.awslambda.awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables.awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables import ( + awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables, + ) + + check = awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].region == AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 + assert result[0].resource_id == function_name + assert result[0].resource_arn == function_arn + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + # Kingfisher reports both the generic keyword rule and the JWT rule + # for the same value; their order is not guaranteed, so assert on + # presence rather than a fixed concatenation order. + assert result[0].status_extended.startswith( + f"Potential secret found in Lambda function {function_name} variables -> " + ) + assert ( + "Generic Password in variable db_password" in result[0].status_extended + ) + assert ( + "JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded) in variable db_password" + in result[0].status_extended + ) + assert result[0].resource_tags == [] + + def test_function_secrets_in_variables_telegram_token(self): + lambda_client = mock.MagicMock + function_name = "test-lambda" + function_runtime = "nodejs4.3" + function_arn = f"arn:aws:lambda:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:function/{function_name}" + lambda_client.audit_config = {"secrets_ignore_patterns": []} + lambda_client.functions = { + "function_name": Function( + name=function_name, + security_groups=[], + arn=function_arn, + region=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + runtime=function_runtime, + environment={ + # The Telegram bot-token rule is no longer enabled in + # Kingfisher's built-in ruleset, so a detectable JWT + # is used to keep this token-in-variable case meaningful. + "TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.dozjgNryP4J3jVmNHl0w5N_XgL0n3I9PlFUP0THsR8U" + }, ) } @@ -174,16 +236,22 @@ class Test_awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables: assert result[0].status == "FAIL" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == f"Potential secret found in Lambda function {function_name} variables -> Secret Keyword in variable db_password, Basic Auth Credentials in variable db_password." + == f"Potential secret found in Lambda function {function_name} variables -> JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded) in variable TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN." ) assert result[0].resource_tags == [] - def test_function_secrets_in_variables_telegram_token(self): + def test_function_with_verified_secret(self): + from prowler.lib.check.models import Severity + lambda_client = mock.MagicMock function_name = "test-lambda" function_runtime = "nodejs4.3" function_arn = f"arn:aws:lambda:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:function/{function_name}" - lambda_client.audit_config = {"secrets_ignore_patterns": []} + lambda_client.audit_config = { + "secrets_ignore_patterns": [], + "secrets_validate": True, + } + lambda_client.functions = { "function_name": Function( name=function_name, @@ -191,19 +259,35 @@ class Test_awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables: arn=function_arn, region=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, runtime=function_runtime, - environment={"TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN": "telegram-token"}, + environment={"db_password": "test-value"}, ) } with ( mock.patch( "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", - return_value=set_mocked_aws_provider(), + return_value=set_mocked_aws_provider( + audit_config={"secrets_validate": True} + ), ), mock.patch( "prowler.providers.aws.services.awslambda.awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables.awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables.awslambda_client", new=lambda_client, ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.awslambda.awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables.awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables.detect_secrets_scan_batch", + return_value={ + 0: [ + { + "type": "JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded)", + "line_number": 2, + "filename": "data", + "hashed_secret": "x", + "is_verified": True, + } + ] + }, + ) as mock_scan, ): # Test Check from prowler.providers.aws.services.awslambda.awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables.awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables import ( @@ -213,16 +297,13 @@ class Test_awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables: check = awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables() result = check.execute() + # The check must forward secrets_validate from the config to the scan. + assert mock_scan.call_args.kwargs.get("validate") is True assert len(result) == 1 - assert result[0].region == AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].check_metadata.Severity == Severity.critical + assert "confirmed to be live" in result[0].status_extended assert result[0].resource_id == function_name - assert result[0].resource_arn == function_arn - assert result[0].status == "PASS" - assert ( - result[0].status_extended - == f"No secrets found in Lambda function {function_name} variables." - ) - assert result[0].resource_tags == [] def test_function_no_secrets_in_variables(self): lambda_client = mock.MagicMock @@ -270,3 +351,48 @@ class Test_awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables: == f"No secrets found in Lambda function {function_name} variables." ) assert result[0].resource_tags == [] + + def test_scan_failure_reports_manual_not_pass(self): + # A scanner failure must not be treated as "no secrets found". + from prowler.lib.utils.utils import SecretsScanError + + lambda_client = mock.MagicMock + function_name = "test-lambda" + function_arn = f"arn:aws:lambda:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:function/{function_name}" + lambda_client.audit_config = {"secrets_ignore_patterns": []} + lambda_client.functions = { + "function_name": Function( + name=function_name, + security_groups=[], + arn=function_arn, + region=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + runtime="nodejs4.3", + environment={"db_password": "test-value"}, + ) + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_aws_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.awslambda.awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables.awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables.awslambda_client", + new=lambda_client, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.awslambda.awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables.awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables.detect_secrets_scan_batch", + side_effect=SecretsScanError("Kingfisher exited with code 1"), + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.awslambda.awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables.awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables import ( + awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables, + ) + + check = awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_variables() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "MANUAL" + assert "Could not scan" in result[0].status_extended + assert "manual review is required" in result[0].status_extended diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/awslambda/awslambda_service_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/awslambda/awslambda_service_test.py index 412c944d8b..302b99d109 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/awslambda/awslambda_service_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/awslambda/awslambda_service_test.py @@ -6,10 +6,16 @@ from re import search from unittest.mock import patch import mock +import pytest from boto3 import client, resource +from botocore.client import ClientError from moto import mock_aws -from prowler.providers.aws.services.awslambda.awslambda_service import AuthType, Lambda +from prowler.providers.aws.services.awslambda.awslambda_service import ( + AuthType, + Function, + Lambda, +) from tests.providers.aws.utils import ( AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER, AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, @@ -85,6 +91,367 @@ class Test_Lambda_Service: awslambda = Lambda(set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1])) assert awslambda.service == "lambda" + def test_function_limit_selects_latest_functions_for_analysis(self): + awslambda = Lambda.__new__(Lambda) + awslambda.functions = { + "old": Function( + name="old", + arn="old", + security_groups=[], + last_modified="2024-01-01T00:00:00.000+0000", + region=AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, + ), + "new": Function( + name="new", + arn="new", + security_groups=[], + last_modified="2024-01-02T00:00:00.000+0000", + region=AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, + ), + } + awslambda.function_limit = 1 + + awslambda._select_functions_for_analysis() + + assert list(awslambda.functions) == ["new"] + + def test_function_limit_selects_global_latest_across_regions(self): + class FakePaginator: + def __init__(self, functions): + self.functions = functions + + def paginate(self, **kwargs): + assert "PageSize" not in kwargs + return [{"Functions": self.functions}] + + class FakeLambdaClient: + def __init__(self, region, functions): + self.region = region + self.functions = functions + + def get_paginator(self, name): + assert name == "list_functions" + return FakePaginator(self.functions) + + awslambda = Lambda.__new__(Lambda) + awslambda.functions = {} + awslambda.security_groups_in_use = set() + awslambda.regions_with_functions = set() + awslambda.function_limit = 1 + awslambda.audit_resources = [] + old_client = FakeLambdaClient( + AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, + [ + { + "FunctionName": "old", + "FunctionArn": "arn:aws:lambda:eu-west-1:123456789012:function:old", + "LastModified": "2024-01-01T00:00:00.000+0000", + } + ], + ) + new_client = FakeLambdaClient( + AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + [ + { + "FunctionName": "new", + "FunctionArn": "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:123456789012:function:new", + "LastModified": "2024-01-02T00:00:00.000+0000", + } + ], + ) + + awslambda._list_functions(old_client) + awslambda._list_functions(new_client) + awslambda._select_functions_for_analysis() + + assert [function.name for function in awslambda.functions.values()] == ["new"] + + def test_function_limit_keeps_complete_auxiliary_indexes(self): + class FakePaginator: + def __init__(self, functions): + self.functions = functions + + def paginate(self, **kwargs): + assert "PageSize" not in kwargs + return [{"Functions": self.functions}] + + class FakeLambdaClient: + region = AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 + + def get_paginator(self, name): + assert name == "list_functions" + return FakePaginator( + [ + { + "FunctionName": "old", + "FunctionArn": ( + f"arn:aws:lambda:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:" + f"{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:function:old" + ), + "LastModified": "2024-01-01T00:00:00.000+0000", + "VpcConfig": {"SecurityGroupIds": ["sg-old"]}, + }, + { + "FunctionName": "new", + "FunctionArn": ( + f"arn:aws:lambda:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:" + f"{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:function:new" + ), + "LastModified": "2024-01-02T00:00:00.000+0000", + "VpcConfig": {"SecurityGroupIds": ["sg-new"]}, + }, + ] + ) + + awslambda = Lambda.__new__(Lambda) + awslambda.functions = {} + awslambda.security_groups_in_use = set() + awslambda.regions_with_functions = set() + awslambda.function_limit = 1 + awslambda.audit_resources = [] + + awslambda._list_functions(FakeLambdaClient()) + awslambda._select_functions_for_analysis() + + assert [function.name for function in awslambda.functions.values()] == ["new"] + assert awslambda.security_groups_in_use == {"sg-old", "sg-new"} + assert awslambda.regions_with_functions == {AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1} + + def test_list_event_source_mappings_uses_selected_functions_as_api_scope(self): + class FakePaginator: + def __init__(self): + self.paginate_calls = [] + + def paginate(self, **kwargs): + self.paginate_calls.append(kwargs) + function_name = kwargs["FunctionName"] + return [ + { + "EventSourceMappings": [ + { + "UUID": f"{function_name}-mapping", + "FunctionArn": ( + f"arn:aws:lambda:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:" + f"{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:function:{function_name}:1" + ), + "EventSourceArn": "arn:aws:sqs:queue", + "State": "Enabled", + "BatchSize": 10, + } + ] + } + ] + + class FakeLambdaClient: + region = AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 + + def __init__(self): + self.paginator = FakePaginator() + + def get_paginator(self, name): + assert name == "list_event_source_mappings" + return self.paginator + + selected_arn = ( + f"arn:aws:lambda:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:" + f"{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:function:selected" + ) + other_region_arn = ( + f"arn:aws:lambda:{AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1}:" + f"{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:function:other-region" + ) + awslambda = Lambda.__new__(Lambda) + awslambda.function_limit = 1 + awslambda.functions = { + selected_arn: Function( + name="selected", + arn=selected_arn, + security_groups=[], + region=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + ), + other_region_arn: Function( + name="other-region", + arn=other_region_arn, + security_groups=[], + region=AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, + ), + } + regional_client = FakeLambdaClient() + + awslambda._list_event_source_mappings(regional_client) + + assert regional_client.paginator.paginate_calls == [ + {"FunctionName": "selected"} + ] + assert len(awslambda.functions[selected_arn].event_source_mappings) == 1 + assert ( + awslambda.functions[selected_arn].event_source_mappings[0].uuid + == "selected-mapping" + ) + assert not awslambda.functions[other_region_arn].event_source_mappings + + def test_list_event_source_mappings_keeps_unlimited_regional_api_scope(self): + class FakePaginator: + def __init__(self): + self.paginate_calls = [] + + def paginate(self, **kwargs): + self.paginate_calls.append(kwargs) + return [ + { + "EventSourceMappings": [ + { + "UUID": "selected-mapping", + "FunctionArn": selected_arn, + "EventSourceArn": "arn:aws:sqs:queue", + "State": "Enabled", + } + ] + } + ] + + class FakeLambdaClient: + region = AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 + + def __init__(self): + self.paginator = FakePaginator() + + def get_paginator(self, name): + assert name == "list_event_source_mappings" + return self.paginator + + selected_arn = ( + f"arn:aws:lambda:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:" + f"{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:function:selected" + ) + awslambda = Lambda.__new__(Lambda) + awslambda.function_limit = None + awslambda.functions = { + selected_arn: Function( + name="selected", + arn=selected_arn, + security_groups=[], + region=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + ) + } + regional_client = FakeLambdaClient() + + awslambda._list_event_source_mappings(regional_client) + + assert regional_client.paginator.paginate_calls == [{}] + assert len(awslambda.functions[selected_arn].event_source_mappings) == 1 + + def test_list_event_source_mappings_continues_after_invalid_parameter_value(self): + class FakePaginator: + def paginate(self, **kwargs): + function_name = kwargs["FunctionName"] + if function_name == "deleted": + raise ClientError( + { + "Error": { + "Code": "InvalidParameterValueException", + "Message": "Function no longer exists", + } + }, + "ListEventSourceMappings", + ) + return [ + { + "EventSourceMappings": [ + { + "UUID": f"{function_name}-mapping", + "FunctionArn": ( + f"arn:aws:lambda:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:" + f"{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:function:{function_name}" + ), + "EventSourceArn": "arn:aws:sqs:queue", + "State": "Enabled", + } + ] + } + ] + + class FakeLambdaClient: + region = AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 + + def get_paginator(self, name): + assert name == "list_event_source_mappings" + return FakePaginator() + + deleted_arn = ( + f"arn:aws:lambda:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:" + f"{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:function:deleted" + ) + remaining_arn = ( + f"arn:aws:lambda:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:" + f"{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:function:remaining" + ) + awslambda = Lambda.__new__(Lambda) + awslambda.function_limit = 2 + awslambda.functions = { + deleted_arn: Function( + name="deleted", + arn=deleted_arn, + security_groups=[], + region=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + ), + remaining_arn: Function( + name="remaining", + arn=remaining_arn, + security_groups=[], + region=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + ), + } + + awslambda._list_event_source_mappings(FakeLambdaClient()) + + assert not awslambda.functions[deleted_arn].event_source_mappings + assert len(awslambda.functions[remaining_arn].event_source_mappings) == 1 + assert ( + awslambda.functions[remaining_arn].event_source_mappings[0].uuid + == "remaining-mapping" + ) + + def test_list_event_source_mappings_raises_non_transient_client_error(self): + class FakePaginator: + def paginate(self, **kwargs): + raise ClientError( + { + "Error": { + "Code": "AccessDeniedException", + "Message": "Access denied", + } + }, + "ListEventSourceMappings", + ) + + class FakeLambdaClient: + region = AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 + + def get_paginator(self, name): + assert name == "list_event_source_mappings" + return FakePaginator() + + function_arn = ( + f"arn:aws:lambda:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:" + f"{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:function:selected" + ) + awslambda = Lambda.__new__(Lambda) + awslambda.function_limit = 1 + awslambda.functions = { + function_arn: Function( + name="selected", + arn=function_arn, + security_groups=[], + region=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + ) + } + + with pytest.raises(ClientError) as error: + awslambda._list_event_source_mappings(FakeLambdaClient()) + + assert error.value.response["Error"]["Code"] == "AccessDeniedException" + @mock_aws def test_list_functions(self): # Create IAM Lambda Role @@ -253,3 +620,63 @@ class Test_Lambda_Service: f"{tmp_dir_name}/{files_in_zip[0]}", "r" ) as lambda_code_file: assert lambda_code_file.read() == LAMBDA_FUNCTION_CODE + + @mock_aws + def test_function_limit_exposes_only_selected_functions(self): + lambda_client = client("lambda", region_name=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1) + iam_client = client("iam", region_name=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1) + iam_role = iam_client.create_role( + RoleName="test-role", + AssumeRolePolicyDocument="{}", + )["Role"]["Arn"] + for name in ("function-1", "function-2"): + lambda_client.create_function( + FunctionName=name, + Runtime="python3.7", + Role=iam_role, + Handler="lambda_function.lambda_handler", + Code={"ZipFile": create_zip_file().read()}, + PackageType="ZIP", + ) + awslambda = Lambda( + set_mocked_aws_provider( + audited_regions=[AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1], + audit_config={"max_lambda_functions": 1}, + ) + ) + + assert len(awslambda.functions) == 1 + + @mock_aws + def test_get_function_code_fetches_only_selected_functions(self): + lambda_client = client("lambda", region_name=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1) + iam_client = client("iam", region_name=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1) + iam_role = iam_client.create_role( + RoleName="test-role", + AssumeRolePolicyDocument="{}", + )["Role"]["Arn"] + for name in ("function-1", "function-2"): + lambda_client.create_function( + FunctionName=name, + Runtime="python3.7", + Role=iam_role, + Handler="lambda_function.lambda_handler", + Code={"ZipFile": create_zip_file().read()}, + PackageType="ZIP", + ) + awslambda = Lambda( + set_mocked_aws_provider( + audited_regions=[AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1], + audit_config={"max_lambda_functions": 1}, + ) + ) + fetched = [] + + def fetch_function_code(function_name, _function_region): + fetched.append(function_name) + return mock.MagicMock() + + awslambda._fetch_function_code = fetch_function_code + + assert len(list(awslambda._get_function_code())) == 1 + assert len(fetched) == 1 diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/backup/backup_service_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/backup/backup_service_test.py index d4a7be392f..5894a62bda 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/backup/backup_service_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/backup/backup_service_test.py @@ -1,11 +1,16 @@ from datetime import datetime +from types import SimpleNamespace from unittest.mock import patch import botocore from boto3 import client from moto import mock_aws -from prowler.providers.aws.services.backup.backup_service import Backup +from prowler.providers.aws.services.backup.backup_service import ( + Backup, + BackupVault, + RecoveryPoint, +) from tests.providers.aws.utils import ( AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER, AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, @@ -292,3 +297,248 @@ class TestBackupService: assert backup.recovery_points[0].backup_vault_region == "eu-west-1" assert backup.recovery_points[0].tags == [] assert backup.recovery_points[0].encrypted is True + + def test_recovery_point_limit_bounds_tag_calls_to_selected_points(self): + class FakePaginator: + def paginate(self, **kwargs): + return [ + { + "RecoveryPoints": [ + { + "RecoveryPointArn": "arn:aws:backup:eu-west-1:123456789012:recovery-point:new", + "IsEncrypted": True, + "CreationDate": datetime(2024, 1, 2), + }, + { + "RecoveryPointArn": "arn:aws:backup:eu-west-1:123456789012:recovery-point:old", + "IsEncrypted": True, + "CreationDate": datetime(2024, 1, 1), + }, + ] + } + ] + + class FakeBackupClient: + def __init__(self): + self.tag_calls = [] + + def get_paginator(self, name): + assert name == "list_recovery_points_by_backup_vault" + return FakePaginator() + + def list_tags(self, **kwargs): + self.tag_calls.append(kwargs["ResourceArn"]) + return {"Tags": {}} + + regional_client = FakeBackupClient() + backup = Backup.__new__(Backup) + backup.backup_vaults = [ + BackupVault( + arn="arn:aws:backup:eu-west-1:123456789012:backup-vault:vault", + name="vault", + region=AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, + encryption="", + recovery_points=2, + locked=False, + ) + ] + backup.recovery_points = [] + backup.recovery_point_limit = 1 + backup.regional_clients = {AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1: regional_client} + + backup._list_recovery_points() + backup._select_recovery_points_for_analysis() + for recovery_point in backup.recovery_points: + backup._list_tags(recovery_point) + + assert [rp.id for rp in backup.recovery_points] == ["new"] + assert regional_client.tag_calls == [ + "arn:aws:backup:eu-west-1:123456789012:recovery-point:new" + ] + + def test_recovery_point_limit_selects_global_newest_across_vaults(self): + class FakePaginator: + def __init__(self, recovery_points_by_vault): + self.recovery_points_by_vault = recovery_points_by_vault + + def paginate(self, **kwargs): + assert "PageSize" not in kwargs + return [ + { + "RecoveryPoints": self.recovery_points_by_vault[ + kwargs["BackupVaultName"] + ] + } + ] + + class FakeBackupClient: + def __init__(self, recovery_points_by_vault): + self.recovery_points_by_vault = recovery_points_by_vault + + def get_paginator(self, name): + assert name == "list_recovery_points_by_backup_vault" + return FakePaginator(self.recovery_points_by_vault) + + backup = Backup.__new__(Backup) + backup.recovery_point_limit = 1 + backup.recovery_points = [] + backup.backup_vaults = [ + BackupVault( + arn="arn:aws:backup:eu-west-1:123456789012:backup-vault:old-vault", + name="old-vault", + region=AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, + encryption="", + recovery_points=1, + locked=False, + ), + BackupVault( + arn="arn:aws:backup:eu-west-1:123456789012:backup-vault:new-vault", + name="new-vault", + region=AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, + encryption="", + recovery_points=1, + locked=False, + ), + ] + backup.regional_clients = { + AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1: FakeBackupClient( + { + "old-vault": [ + { + "RecoveryPointArn": "arn:aws:backup:eu-west-1:123456789012:recovery-point:old", + "IsEncrypted": True, + "CreationDate": datetime(2024, 1, 1), + } + ], + "new-vault": [ + { + "RecoveryPointArn": "arn:aws:backup:eu-west-1:123456789012:recovery-point:new", + "IsEncrypted": True, + "CreationDate": datetime(2024, 1, 2), + } + ], + } + ) + } + + backup._list_recovery_points() + backup._select_recovery_points_for_analysis() + + assert [rp.id for rp in backup.recovery_points] == ["new"] + + def test_recovery_point_limit_exposes_only_selected_resources(self): + backup = Backup.__new__(Backup) + backup.recovery_point_limit = 2 + backup.recovery_points = [] + backup.backup_vaults = [ + BackupVault( + arn="arn", + name="vault", + region="eu-west-1", + encryption="", + recovery_points=3, + locked=False, + ) + ] + + class Paginator: + def paginate(self, **_kwargs): + return [ + { + "RecoveryPoints": [ + { + "RecoveryPointArn": f"arn:aws:backup:eu-west-1:123456789012:recovery-point:{i}", + "IsEncrypted": True, + } + for i in range(3) + ] + } + ] + + backup.regional_clients = { + "eu-west-1": SimpleNamespace(get_paginator=lambda _: Paginator()) + } + tagged = [] + + def list_tags(recovery_point): + tagged.append(recovery_point.arn) + + backup._list_tags = list_tags + + backup._list_recovery_points() + backup._select_recovery_points_for_analysis() + for recovery_point in backup.recovery_points: + backup._list_tags(recovery_point) + + assert len(backup.recovery_points) == 2 + assert len(tagged) == 2 + + def test_recovery_point_limit_uses_deterministic_tie_breaker(self): + backup = Backup.__new__(Backup) + backup.recovery_point_limit = 2 + backup.recovery_points = [ + RecoveryPoint( + arn="arn:aws:backup:us-east-1:123456789012:recovery-point:z", + id="z", + region="us-east-1", + backup_vault_name="vault-b", + encrypted=True, + backup_vault_region="us-east-1", + ), + RecoveryPoint( + arn="arn:aws:backup:eu-west-1:123456789012:recovery-point:b", + id="b", + region="eu-west-1", + backup_vault_name="vault-b", + encrypted=True, + backup_vault_region="eu-west-1", + ), + RecoveryPoint( + arn="arn:aws:backup:eu-west-1:123456789012:recovery-point:a", + id="a", + region="eu-west-1", + backup_vault_name="vault-a", + encrypted=True, + backup_vault_region="eu-west-1", + ), + ] + + backup._select_recovery_points_for_analysis() + + assert [rp.id for rp in backup.recovery_points] == ["a", "b"] + + def test_recovery_point_limit_keeps_newest_before_tie_breaker(self): + backup = Backup.__new__(Backup) + backup.recovery_point_limit = 2 + backup.recovery_points = [ + RecoveryPoint( + arn="arn:aws:backup:eu-west-1:123456789012:recovery-point:older-a", + id="older-a", + region="eu-west-1", + backup_vault_name="vault-a", + encrypted=True, + backup_vault_region="eu-west-1", + creation_date=datetime(2024, 1, 1), + ), + RecoveryPoint( + arn="arn:aws:backup:us-east-1:123456789012:recovery-point:newer-z", + id="newer-z", + region="us-east-1", + backup_vault_name="vault-z", + encrypted=True, + backup_vault_region="us-east-1", + creation_date=datetime(2024, 1, 2), + ), + RecoveryPoint( + arn="arn:aws:backup:eu-west-1:123456789012:recovery-point:missing-date", + id="missing-date", + region="eu-west-1", + backup_vault_name="vault-a", + encrypted=True, + backup_vault_region="eu-west-1", + ), + ] + + backup._select_recovery_points_for_analysis() + + assert [rp.id for rp in backup.recovery_points] == ["newer-z", "older-a"] diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/bedrock/bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled/bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/bedrock/bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled/bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled_test.py index 4630ad25a0..8c45a9d56b 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/bedrock/bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled/bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/bedrock/bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled/bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled_test.py @@ -227,6 +227,72 @@ class Test_bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled: assert result[0].region == AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 assert result[0].resource_tags == [] + def test_cloudwatch_logging_uses_complete_log_group_index(self): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.bedrock.bedrock_service import ( + LoggingConfiguration, + ) + from prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudwatch.cloudwatch_service import ( + LogGroup, + ) + + bedrock_client = mock.MagicMock() + bedrock_client.logging_configurations = { + AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1: LoggingConfiguration( + enabled=True, + cloudwatch_log_group="Test", + ) + } + bedrock_client._get_model_invocation_logging_arn_template.return_value = ( + "arn:aws:bedrock:us-east-1:123456789012:model-invocation-logging" + ) + + logs_client = mock.MagicMock() + logs_client.audited_partition = "aws" + logs_client.audited_account = "123456789012" + logs_client.log_groups = {} + logs_client.all_log_groups = { + "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:123456789012:log-group:Test:*": LogGroup( + arn="arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:123456789012:log-group:Test:*", + name="Test", + retention_days=30, + never_expire=False, + kms_id=None, + region=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + ) + } + + s3_client = mock.MagicMock() + s3_client.audited_partition = "aws" + s3_client.buckets = {} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.bedrock.bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled.bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled.bedrock_client", + new=bedrock_client, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.bedrock.bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled.bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled.logs_client", + new=logs_client, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.bedrock.bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled.bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled.s3_client", + new=s3_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.bedrock.bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled.bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled import ( + bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled, + ) + + check = bedrock_model_invocation_logs_encryption_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Bedrock Model Invocation logs are not encrypted in CloudWatch Log Group: Test." + ) + @mock_aws def test_s3_and_cloudwatch_logging_encrypted(self): logs_client = client("logs", region_name=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1) diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/cloudformation/cloudformation_stack_outputs_find_secrets/cloudformation_stack_outputs_find_secrets_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/cloudformation/cloudformation_stack_outputs_find_secrets/cloudformation_stack_outputs_find_secrets_test.py index 6b8d0d9b15..ad9d277788 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/cloudformation/cloudformation_stack_outputs_find_secrets/cloudformation_stack_outputs_find_secrets_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/cloudformation/cloudformation_stack_outputs_find_secrets/cloudformation_stack_outputs_find_secrets_test.py @@ -38,7 +38,10 @@ class Test_cloudformation_stack_outputs_find_secrets: Stack( arn="arn:aws:cloudformation:eu-west-1:123456789012:stack/Test-Stack/796c8d26-b390-41d7-a23c-0702c4e78b60", name=stack_name, - outputs=["DB_PASSWORD:foobar123", "ENV:DEV"], + outputs=[ + "DB_KEY:eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.dozjgNryP4J3jVmNHl0w5N_XgL0n3I9PlFUP0THsR8U", + "ENV:DEV", + ], region=AWS_REGION, ) ] @@ -66,7 +69,7 @@ class Test_cloudformation_stack_outputs_find_secrets: assert result[0].status == "FAIL" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == f"Potential secret found in CloudFormation Stack {stack_name} Outputs -> Secret Keyword in Output 1." + == f"Potential secret found in CloudFormation Stack {stack_name} Outputs -> JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded) in Output 1." ) assert result[0].resource_id == "Test-Stack" assert ( diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/cloudfront/cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled/cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/cloudfront/cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled/cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5170d5538d --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/cloudfront/cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled/cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +import sys +from unittest import mock + +from prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudfront.cloudfront_service import ( + Distribution, + Origin, +) +from tests.providers.aws.utils import ( + AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER, + AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + set_mocked_aws_provider, +) + +DISTRIBUTION_ID = "E27LVI50CSW06W" +DISTRIBUTION_ARN = ( + f"arn:aws:cloudfront::{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:distribution/{DISTRIBUTION_ID}" +) +REGION = "us-east-1" +CHECK_MODULE = "prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudfront.cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled.cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled" +CLIENT_MODULE = "prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudfront.cloudfront_client" + + +def _clear_cloudfront_modules(): + sys.modules.pop(CHECK_MODULE, None) + sys.modules.pop(CLIENT_MODULE, None) + + +def _build_distribution( + *, + minimum_protocol_version: str, + default_certificate: bool = False, +): + return Distribution( + arn=DISTRIBUTION_ARN, + id=DISTRIBUTION_ID, + region=REGION, + origins=[ + Origin( + id="o1", + domain_name="origin.example.com", + origin_protocol_policy="https-only", + origin_ssl_protocols=["TLSv1.2"], + ) + ], + origin_failover=False, + minimum_protocol_version=minimum_protocol_version, + default_certificate=default_certificate, + ) + + +def _build_client(distributions: dict, audit_config: dict | None = None): + cloudfront_client = mock.MagicMock() + cloudfront_client.distributions = distributions + cloudfront_client.audit_config = audit_config or {} + return cloudfront_client + + +def _execute_check(cloudfront_client): + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + _clear_cloudfront_modules() + + try: + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudfront.cloudfront_service.CloudFront", + return_value=cloudfront_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudfront.cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled.cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled import ( + cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled, + ) + + check = cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled() + return check.execute() + finally: + _clear_cloudfront_modules() + + +class Test_cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled: + def test_no_distributions(self): + cloudfront_client = _build_client({}) + + result = _execute_check(cloudfront_client) + + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_pq_policy_tls13_2025(self): + cloudfront_client = _build_client( + { + DISTRIBUTION_ID: _build_distribution( + minimum_protocol_version="TLSv1.3_2025" + ) + } + ) + + result = _execute_check(cloudfront_client) + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert "TLSv1.3_2025" in result[0].status_extended + assert result[0].resource_id == DISTRIBUTION_ID + assert result[0].resource_arn == DISTRIBUTION_ARN + + def test_classical_tls12_2021(self): + cloudfront_client = _build_client( + { + DISTRIBUTION_ID: _build_distribution( + minimum_protocol_version="TLSv1.2_2021" + ) + } + ) + + result = _execute_check(cloudfront_client) + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "TLSv1.2_2021" in result[0].status_extended + assert "not in the post-quantum allowlist" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_default_cloudfront_certificate(self): + cloudfront_client = _build_client( + { + DISTRIBUTION_ID: _build_distribution( + minimum_protocol_version="TLSv1", + default_certificate=True, + ) + } + ) + + result = _execute_check(cloudfront_client) + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "default CloudFront certificate" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_configurable_allowlist(self): + cloudfront_client = _build_client( + { + DISTRIBUTION_ID: _build_distribution( + minimum_protocol_version="TLSv1.2_2021" + ) + }, + audit_config={ + "cloudfront_pqc_min_protocol_versions": [ + "TLSv1.3_2025", + "TLSv1.2_2021", + ] + }, + ) + + result = _execute_check(cloudfront_client) + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/cloudfront/cloudfront_service_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/cloudfront/cloudfront_service_test.py index 4c0a9b349e..5dd6f712a7 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/cloudfront/cloudfront_service_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/cloudfront/cloudfront_service_test.py @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ def example_distribution_config(ref): "ViewerCertificate": { "SSLSupportMethod": "static-ip", "Certificate": "arn:aws:acm:us-east-1:123456789012:certificate/12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012", + "MinimumProtocolVersion": "TLSv1.3_2025", }, "Comment": "an optional comment that's not actually optional", "Enabled": False, @@ -234,6 +235,7 @@ class Test_CloudFront_Service: ] SSL_SUPPORT_METHOD = SSLSupportMethod.sni_only CERTIFICATE = "arn:aws:acm:us-east-1:123456789012:certificate/12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012" + MINIMUM_PROTOCOL_VERSION = "TLSv1.3_2025" cloudfront = mock.MagicMock cloudfront.distributions = { @@ -249,6 +251,7 @@ class Test_CloudFront_Service: tags=TAGS, ssl_support_method=SSL_SUPPORT_METHOD, certificate=CERTIFICATE, + minimum_protocol_version=MINIMUM_PROTOCOL_VERSION, ) } @@ -288,6 +291,10 @@ class Test_CloudFront_Service: == DEFAULT_CACHE_CONFIG.field_level_encryption_id ) assert cloudfront.distributions[DISTRIBUTION_ID].tags == TAGS + assert ( + cloudfront.distributions[DISTRIBUTION_ID].minimum_protocol_version + == MINIMUM_PROTOCOL_VERSION + ) def test_get_log_delivery_sources_with_active_delivery(self): from tests.providers.aws.utils import AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/cloudwatch/cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs/cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/cloudwatch/cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs/cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs_test.py index e9eb00175b..afa082b35d 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/cloudwatch/cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs/cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/cloudwatch/cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs/cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs_test.py @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ class Test_cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs: logEvents=[ { "timestamp": timestamp, - "message": "password = password123", + "message": 'password = "Tr0ub4dor3xKq9vLmZ"', } ], ) @@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ class Test_cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs: assert result[0].status == "FAIL" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == f"Potential secrets found in log group test in log stream test stream at {dttimestamp} - Secret Keyword on line 1." + == f"Potential secrets found in log group test in log stream test stream at {dttimestamp} - Generic Password on line 1." ) assert result[0].resource_id == "test" assert ( @@ -222,3 +222,323 @@ class Test_cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs: result = check.execute() assert len(result) == 0 + + @mock_aws + def test_cloudwatch_multiline_event_all_secrets_ignored_is_pass(self): + # Regression: a multiline event whose secrets are all dropped by the + # rescan (e.g. filtered by secrets_ignore_patterns) must NOT produce a + # FAIL with no actual secret evidence. + logs_client = client("logs", region_name=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1) + logs_client.create_log_group(logGroupName="test", tags={"test": "test"}) + logs_client.create_log_stream(logGroupName="test", logStreamName="test stream") + logs_client.put_log_events( + logGroupName="test", + logStreamName="test stream", + logEvents=[ + { + "timestamp": timestamp, + # Valid JSON so the rescan expands it to multiple lines. + "message": '{"api_key": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE", "note": "x"}', + } + ], + ) + from prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudwatch.cloudwatch_service import Logs + + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider( + [AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1] + ) + + from prowler.providers.common.models import Audit_Metadata + + aws_provider.audit_metadata = Audit_Metadata( + services_scanned=0, + expected_checks=["cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs"], + completed_checks=0, + audit_progress=0, + ) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudwatch.cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs.cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs.logs_client", + new=Logs(aws_provider), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudwatch.cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs.cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs.detect_secrets_scan_batch", + side_effect=[ + # Phase 1: stream flagged on its single (multiline) event. + { + ("test", "test stream"): [ + { + "type": "AWS Access Key", + "line_number": 1, + "filename": "data", + "hashed_secret": "x", + "is_verified": False, + } + ] + }, + # Phase 3: rescan drops everything (all secrets ignored). + {}, + ], + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudwatch.cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs.cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs import ( + cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs, + ) + + check = cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert result[0].status_extended == "No secrets found in test log group." + + @mock_aws + def test_cloudwatch_scan_failure_reports_manual(self): + # A scanner failure on the stream scan must surface as MANUAL, not PASS. + from prowler.lib.utils.utils import SecretsScanError + + logs_client = client("logs", region_name=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1) + logs_client.create_log_group(logGroupName="test", tags={"test": "test"}) + logs_client.create_log_stream(logGroupName="test", logStreamName="test stream") + logs_client.put_log_events( + logGroupName="test", + logStreamName="test stream", + logEvents=[{"timestamp": timestamp, "message": "some log line"}], + ) + from prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudwatch.cloudwatch_service import Logs + + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider( + [AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1] + ) + + from prowler.providers.common.models import Audit_Metadata + + aws_provider.audit_metadata = Audit_Metadata( + services_scanned=0, + expected_checks=["cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs"], + completed_checks=0, + audit_progress=0, + ) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudwatch.cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs.cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs.logs_client", + new=Logs(aws_provider), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudwatch.cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs.cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs.detect_secrets_scan_batch", + side_effect=SecretsScanError("Kingfisher exited with code 1"), + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudwatch.cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs.cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs import ( + cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs, + ) + + check = cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "MANUAL" + assert "Could not scan" in result[0].status_extended + + @mock_aws + def test_two_multiline_events_same_timestamp_do_not_collide(self): + # Regression: a CloudWatch stream can hold several events sharing one + # millisecond timestamp. The multiline rescan must be keyed per event + # (not only per timestamp), otherwise the later event's payload + # overwrites the earlier one and secret evidence is lost. + log_group_arn = ( + f"arn:aws:logs:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:123456789012:log-group:test:*" + ) + logs_client = client("logs", region_name=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1) + logs_client.create_log_group(logGroupName="test", tags={"test": "test"}) + logs_client.create_log_stream(logGroupName="test", logStreamName="test stream") + # Two distinct multiline (valid JSON) events at the same timestamp. + logs_client.put_log_events( + logGroupName="test", + logStreamName="test stream", + logEvents=[ + { + "timestamp": timestamp, + "message": '{"api_key": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE", "note": "a"}', + }, + { + "timestamp": timestamp, + "message": '{"secret": "AKIAI44QH8DHBEXAMPLE", "note": "b"}', + }, + ], + ) + from prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudwatch.cloudwatch_service import Logs + + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider( + [AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1] + ) + + from prowler.providers.common.models import Audit_Metadata + + aws_provider.audit_metadata = Audit_Metadata( + services_scanned=0, + expected_checks=["cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs"], + completed_checks=0, + audit_progress=0, + ) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudwatch.cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs.cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs.logs_client", + new=Logs(aws_provider), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudwatch.cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs.cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs.detect_secrets_scan_batch", + side_effect=[ + # Phase 1: both events flagged (one secret on each line). + { + (log_group_arn, "test stream"): [ + { + "type": "AWS Access Key", + "line_number": 1, + "filename": "data", + "hashed_secret": "a", + "is_verified": False, + }, + { + "type": "AWS Access Key", + "line_number": 2, + "filename": "data", + "hashed_secret": "b", + "is_verified": False, + }, + ] + }, + # Phase 3: each event is rescanned under its own key. If the + # keys collided, only one of these would survive. + { + ( + log_group_arn, + "test stream", + dttimestamp, + 0, + ): [ + { + "type": "AWS Access Key", + "line_number": 2, + "filename": "data", + "hashed_secret": "a", + "is_verified": False, + } + ], + ( + log_group_arn, + "test stream", + dttimestamp, + 1, + ): [ + { + "type": "AWS Access Key", + "line_number": 2, + "filename": "data", + "hashed_secret": "b", + "is_verified": False, + } + ], + }, + ], + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudwatch.cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs.cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs import ( + cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs, + ) + + check = cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + # Both events' secrets must be reported, not just the last one. + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Potential secrets found in log group test in log stream test stream at {dttimestamp} - AWS Access Key on line 2." + ) + + @mock_aws + def test_same_group_and_stream_names_in_two_regions_do_not_collide(self): + # Regression: log group and stream names are not unique across regions, + # so the per-stream key must be region-aware (ARN-based). Otherwise the + # secret found in one region would be reused for the same-named group in + # another region, producing a false FAIL. + group_name = "shared-name" + stream_name = "shared stream" + + us_client = client("logs", region_name=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1) + us_client.create_log_group(logGroupName=group_name) + us_client.create_log_stream(logGroupName=group_name, logStreamName=stream_name) + us_client.put_log_events( + logGroupName=group_name, + logStreamName=stream_name, + logEvents=[ + { + "timestamp": timestamp, + "message": 'password = "Tr0ub4dor3xKq9vLmZ"', + } + ], + ) + + eu_client = client("logs", region_name=AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1) + eu_client.create_log_group(logGroupName=group_name) + eu_client.create_log_stream(logGroupName=group_name, logStreamName=stream_name) + eu_client.put_log_events( + logGroupName=group_name, + logStreamName=stream_name, + logEvents=[{"timestamp": timestamp, "message": "just a normal log line"}], + ) + + from prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudwatch.cloudwatch_service import Logs + + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider( + [AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1] + ) + + from prowler.providers.common.models import Audit_Metadata + + aws_provider.audit_metadata = Audit_Metadata( + services_scanned=0, + expected_checks=["cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs"], + completed_checks=0, + audit_progress=0, + ) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudwatch.cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs.cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs.logs_client", + new=Logs(aws_provider), + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudwatch.cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs.cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs import ( + cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs, + ) + + check = cloudwatch_log_group_no_secrets_in_logs() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 2 + by_region = {report.region: report for report in result} + # Only the region with the real secret must FAIL. + assert by_region[AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1].status == "FAIL" + assert by_region[AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1].status == "PASS" diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/cloudwatch/cloudwatch_service_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/cloudwatch/cloudwatch_service_test.py index 33d4bde7d7..3d2d53ffa0 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/cloudwatch/cloudwatch_service_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/cloudwatch/cloudwatch_service_test.py @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ from moto import mock_aws from prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudwatch.cloudwatch_service import ( CloudWatch, + LogGroup, Logs, ) from prowler.providers.aws.services.cloudwatch.lib.metric_filters import ( @@ -188,7 +189,9 @@ class Test_CloudWatch_Service: arn = f"arn:aws:logs:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:log-group:/log-group/test:*" logs = Logs(aws_provider) assert len(logs.log_groups) == 1 + assert len(logs.all_log_groups) == 1 assert arn in logs.log_groups + assert arn in logs.all_log_groups assert logs.log_groups[arn].name == "/log-group/test" assert logs.log_groups[arn].retention_days == 400 assert logs.log_groups[arn].kms_id == "test_kms_id" @@ -212,7 +215,9 @@ class Test_CloudWatch_Service: arn = f"arn:aws:logs:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:log-group:/log-group/test:*" logs = Logs(aws_provider) assert len(logs.log_groups) == 1 + assert len(logs.all_log_groups) == 1 assert arn in logs.log_groups + assert arn in logs.all_log_groups assert logs.log_groups[arn].name == "/log-group/test" assert logs.log_groups[arn].never_expire # Since it never expires we don't use the retention_days @@ -221,6 +226,190 @@ class Test_CloudWatch_Service: assert logs.log_groups[arn].region == AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 assert logs.log_groups[arn].tags == [{}] + def test_log_group_limit_exposes_only_selected_resources(self): + class FakeLogsClient: + def __init__(self): + self.filter_calls = [] + + def filter_log_events(self, **kwargs): + self.filter_calls.append(kwargs["logGroupName"]) + return {"events": []} + + regional_client = FakeLogsClient() + logs = Logs.__new__(Logs) + logs.log_group_limit = 1 + logs._log_groups_hydrated = set() + logs.regional_clients = {AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1: regional_client} + logs.events_per_log_group_threshold = 1000 + logs.log_groups = { + f"arn:{i}": LogGroup( + arn=f"arn:{i}", + name=f"log-{i}", + retention_days=30, + never_expire=False, + kms_id=None, + creation_time=i, + region=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + ) + for i in range(3) + } + tagged = [] + + def list_tags(log_group): + tagged.append(log_group.arn) + + logs._list_tags_for_resource = list_tags + + logs._select_log_groups_for_analysis() + for log_group in logs.log_groups.values(): + logs._list_tags_for_resource(log_group) + logs._get_log_events(log_group) + + assert list(logs.log_groups) == ["arn:2"] + assert tagged == ["arn:2"] + assert regional_client.filter_calls == ["log-2"] + + def test_log_group_limit_selects_global_newest_across_regions(self): + class FakePaginator: + def __init__(self, log_groups): + self.log_groups = log_groups + + def paginate(self, **kwargs): + assert "PageSize" not in kwargs + return [{"logGroups": self.log_groups}] + + class FakeLogsClient: + def __init__(self, region, log_groups): + self.region = region + self.log_groups = log_groups + + def get_paginator(self, name): + assert name == "describe_log_groups" + return FakePaginator(self.log_groups) + + logs = Logs.__new__(Logs) + logs.all_log_groups = {} + logs.log_groups = {} + logs.log_group_limit = 1 + logs.audit_resources = [] + + logs._describe_log_groups( + FakeLogsClient( + "eu-west-1", + [ + { + "arn": "arn:aws:logs:eu-west-1:123456789012:log-group:old:*", + "logGroupName": "old", + "creationTime": 1, + } + ], + ) + ) + logs._describe_log_groups( + FakeLogsClient( + AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + [ + { + "arn": "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:123456789012:log-group:new:*", + "logGroupName": "new", + "creationTime": 2, + } + ], + ) + ) + logs._select_log_groups_for_analysis() + + assert [log_group.name for log_group in logs.log_groups.values()] == ["new"] + assert [log_group.name for log_group in logs.all_log_groups.values()] == [ + "old", + "new", + ] + + def test_metric_filters_use_complete_log_group_index(self): + class FakePaginator: + def paginate(self): + return [ + { + "metricFilters": [ + { + "filterName": "test-filter", + "filterPattern": "test-pattern", + "logGroupName": "old", + "metricTransformations": [ + {"metricName": "test-metric"} + ], + } + ] + } + ] + + class FakeLogsClient: + region = AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 + + def get_paginator(self, name): + assert name == "describe_metric_filters" + return FakePaginator() + + logs = Logs.__new__(Logs) + old_log_group = LogGroup( + arn="arn:old", + name="old", + retention_days=30, + never_expire=False, + kms_id=None, + creation_time=1, + region=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + ) + logs.audited_partition = "aws" + logs.audited_account = AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER + logs.audit_resources = [] + logs.metric_filters = [] + logs.log_groups = {} + logs.all_log_groups = {old_log_group.arn: old_log_group} + logs._log_groups_hydrated = set() + logs._list_tags_for_resource = lambda log_group: None + + logs._describe_metric_filters(FakeLogsClient()) + + assert len(logs.metric_filters) == 1 + assert logs.metric_filters[0].log_group == old_log_group + + def test_log_group_collection_recovers_all_log_groups_after_access_denied(self): + class FakePaginator: + def paginate(self): + return [ + { + "logGroups": [ + { + "arn": "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:123456789012:log-group:success:*", + "logGroupName": "success", + "creationTime": 1, + } + ] + } + ] + + class FakeLogsClient: + region = AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 + + def get_paginator(self, name): + assert name == "describe_log_groups" + return FakePaginator() + + logs = Logs.__new__(Logs) + logs.all_log_groups = None + logs.log_groups = None + logs.audit_resources = [] + + logs._describe_log_groups(FakeLogsClient()) + + assert list(logs.all_log_groups) == [ + "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:123456789012:log-group:success:*" + ] + assert list(logs.log_groups) == [ + "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:123456789012:log-group:success:*" + ] + class Test_build_metric_filter_pattern: @pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_operator", ["==", "~=", "<", "<>", ">=", ""]) diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/codeartifact/codeartifact_service_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/codeartifact/codeartifact_service_test.py index 99325dd2ea..50af85b767 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/codeartifact/codeartifact_service_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/codeartifact/codeartifact_service_test.py @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +from types import SimpleNamespace from unittest.mock import patch import botocore @@ -6,6 +7,7 @@ from prowler.providers.aws.services.codeartifact.codeartifact_service import ( CodeArtifact, LatestPackageVersionStatus, OriginInformationValues, + Repository, RestrictionValues, ) from tests.providers.aws.utils import ( @@ -208,6 +210,104 @@ class Test_CodeArtifact_Service: == OriginInformationValues.INTERNAL ) + def test_package_limit_bounds_package_version_lookups_to_selected_packages(self): + class FakePaginator: + def paginate(self, **kwargs): + return [ + { + "packages": [ + { + "format": "pypi", + "package": "first-package", + "originConfiguration": { + "restrictions": { + "publish": "ALLOW", + "upstream": "ALLOW", + } + }, + }, + { + "format": "pypi", + "package": "second-package", + "originConfiguration": { + "restrictions": { + "publish": "ALLOW", + "upstream": "ALLOW", + } + }, + }, + ] + } + ] + + class FakeCodeArtifactClient: + def __init__(self): + self.version_calls = [] + + def get_paginator(self, name): + assert name == "list_packages" + return FakePaginator() + + def list_package_versions(self, **kwargs): + self.version_calls.append(kwargs["package"]) + return { + "versions": [ + { + "version": "1.0.0", + "status": "Published", + "origin": {"originType": "INTERNAL"}, + } + ] + } + + regional_client = FakeCodeArtifactClient() + codeartifact = CodeArtifact.__new__(CodeArtifact) + codeartifact.repositories = { + TEST_REPOSITORY_ARN: Repository( + name="test-repository", + arn=TEST_REPOSITORY_ARN, + domain_name="test-domain", + domain_owner=AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER, + region=AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, + ) + } + codeartifact._packages_listed = set() + codeartifact.package_limit = 1 + codeartifact.regional_clients = {AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1: regional_client} + + pairs = list(codeartifact._load_packages_for_analysis()) + + assert [package.name for _, package in pairs] == ["first-package"] + assert regional_client.version_calls == ["first-package"] + + def test_package_limit_exposes_only_selected_packages(self): + codeartifact = CodeArtifact.__new__(CodeArtifact) + codeartifact.package_limit = 2 + codeartifact._packages_listed = set() + repository = Repository( + name="repository", + arn="repo", + domain_name="domain", + domain_owner=AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER, + region=AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, + ) + codeartifact.repositories = {repository.arn: repository} + enriched = [] + + def iter_repository_packages(repository, limit=None): + for index in range(3): + if limit is not None and index >= limit: + return + enriched.append(index) + yield SimpleNamespace(name=f"package-{index}") + + codeartifact._iter_repository_packages = iter_repository_packages + + packages = list(codeartifact._load_packages_for_analysis()) + + assert [package.name for _, package in packages] == ["package-0", "package-1"] + assert enriched == [0, 1] + def mock_make_api_call_no_namespace(self, operation_name, kwarg): """Mock for packages without a namespace to exercise the else branch""" diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/codebuild/codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables/codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/codebuild/codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables/codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables_test.py index c08d1c8bb3..8060f7db59 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/codebuild/codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables/codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/codebuild/codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables/codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables_test.py @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@ from unittest import mock -from tests.providers.aws.utils import AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER, AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 +from tests.providers.aws.utils import ( + AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER, + AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + set_mocked_aws_provider, +) class Test_codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables: @@ -202,7 +206,11 @@ class Test_codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables: environment_variables=[ { "name": "AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID", - "value": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE", + # Realistic fake secret that Kingfisher detects. The classic + # "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE" placeholder is suppressed by + # Kingfisher and its AWS Access Key rule is not enabled, so a + # detectable provider secret is used instead. + "value": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.dozjgNryP4J3jVmNHl0w5N_XgL0n3I9PlFUP0THsR8U", "type": "PLAINTEXT", } ], @@ -231,15 +239,100 @@ class Test_codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables: assert len(result) == 1 assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + # The JWT paired with a "KEY" variable name yields both a + # JWT and a Generic API Key finding; order is non-deterministic. + assert result[0].status_extended.startswith( + "CodeBuild project SensitiveProject has sensitive environment plaintext credentials in variables:" + ) assert ( - result[0].status_extended - == "CodeBuild project SensitiveProject has sensitive environment plaintext credentials in variables: AWS Access Key in variable AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID." + "JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded) in variable AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID" + in result[0].status_extended + ) + assert ( + "Generic API Key in variable AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID" + in result[0].status_extended ) assert result[0].region == AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 assert result[0].resource_id == "SensitiveProject" assert result[0].resource_arn == project_arn assert result[0].resource_tags == [] + def test_project_with_verified_secret(self): + from prowler.lib.check.models import Severity + + codebuild_client = mock.MagicMock() + + from prowler.providers.aws.services.codebuild.codebuild_service import Project + + project_arn = f"arn:aws:codebuild:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:project/SensitiveProject" + codebuild_client.projects = { + project_arn: Project( + name="SensitiveProject", + arn=project_arn, + region=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + last_invoked_time=None, + buildspec=None, + environment_variables=[ + { + "name": "EXAMPLE_VAR", + "value": "ExampleValue", + "type": "PLAINTEXT", + } + ], + tags=[], + ) + } + + codebuild_client.audit_config = { + "excluded_sensitive_environment_variables": [], + "secrets_validate": True, + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_aws_provider( + audit_config={"secrets_validate": True} + ), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.codebuild.codebuild_service.Codebuild", + codebuild_client, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.codebuild.codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables.codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables.codebuild_client", + codebuild_client, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.codebuild.codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables.codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables.detect_secrets_scan_batch", + return_value={ + (0, 0): [ + { + "type": "JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded)", + "line_number": 1, + "filename": "data", + "hashed_secret": "x", + "is_verified": True, + } + ] + }, + ) as mock_scan, + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.codebuild.codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables.codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables import ( + codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables, + ) + + check = codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables() + result = check.execute() + + # The check must forward secrets_validate from the config to the scan. + assert mock_scan.call_args.kwargs.get("validate") is True + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].check_metadata.Severity == Severity.critical + assert "confirmed to be live" in result[0].status_extended + assert result[0].resource_id == "SensitiveProject" + def test_project_with_sensitive_plaintext_credentials_exluded(self): codebuild_client = mock.MagicMock @@ -373,12 +466,12 @@ class Test_codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables: environment_variables=[ { "name": "AWS_DUMB_ACCESS_KEY", - "value": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE", + "value": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.dozjgNryP4J3jVmNHl0w5N_XgL0n3I9PlFUP0THsR8U", "type": "PLAINTEXT", }, { "name": "AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID", - "value": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE", + "value": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.dozjgNryP4J3jVmNHl0w5N_XgL0n3I9PlFUP0THsR8U", "type": "PLAINTEXT", }, ], @@ -409,10 +502,21 @@ class Test_codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables: assert len(result) == 1 assert result[0].status == "FAIL" - assert ( - result[0].status_extended - == "CodeBuild project SensitiveProject has sensitive environment plaintext credentials in variables: AWS Access Key in variable AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID." + # AWS_DUMB_ACCESS_KEY is excluded, so only AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID is + # scanned; its JWT + "KEY" name yields both a JWT and a + # Generic API Key finding with non-deterministic order. + assert result[0].status_extended.startswith( + "CodeBuild project SensitiveProject has sensitive environment plaintext credentials in variables:" ) + assert ( + "JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded) in variable AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID" + in result[0].status_extended + ) + assert ( + "Generic API Key in variable AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID" + in result[0].status_extended + ) + assert "AWS_DUMB_ACCESS_KEY" not in result[0].status_extended assert result[0].region == AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 assert result[0].resource_id == "SensitiveProject" assert result[0].resource_arn == project_arn @@ -434,12 +538,12 @@ class Test_codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables: environment_variables=[ { "name": "AWS_DUMB_ACCESS_KEY", - "value": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE", + "value": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.dozjgNryP4J3jVmNHl0w5N_XgL0n3I9PlFUP0THsR8U", "type": "PLAINTEXT", }, { "name": "AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID", - "value": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE", + "value": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.dozjgNryP4J3jVmNHl0w5N_XgL0n3I9PlFUP0THsR8U", "type": "PLAINTEXT", }, ], @@ -468,11 +572,80 @@ class Test_codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables: assert len(result) == 1 assert result[0].status == "FAIL" - assert ( - result[0].status_extended - == "CodeBuild project SensitiveProject has sensitive environment plaintext credentials in variables: AWS Access Key in variable AWS_DUMB_ACCESS_KEY, AWS Access Key in variable AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID." + # Both variables hold a JWT and have "KEY" in their name, so + # each yields a JWT and a Generic API Key finding; order is + # non-deterministic. + assert result[0].status_extended.startswith( + "CodeBuild project SensitiveProject has sensitive environment plaintext credentials in variables:" ) + for var_name in ("AWS_DUMB_ACCESS_KEY", "AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID"): + assert ( + f"JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded) in variable {var_name}" + in result[0].status_extended + ) + assert ( + f"Generic API Key in variable {var_name}" + in result[0].status_extended + ) assert result[0].region == AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 assert result[0].resource_id == "SensitiveProject" assert result[0].resource_arn == project_arn assert result[0].resource_tags == [] + + def test_scan_failure_reports_manual(self): + from prowler.lib.utils.utils import SecretsScanError + + codebuild_client = mock.MagicMock() + from prowler.providers.aws.services.codebuild.codebuild_service import Project + + project_arn = f"arn:aws:codebuild:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:project/SensitiveProject" + codebuild_client.projects = { + project_arn: Project( + name="SensitiveProject", + arn=project_arn, + region=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + last_invoked_time=None, + buildspec=None, + environment_variables=[ + { + "name": "EXAMPLE_VAR", + "value": "ExampleValue", + "type": "PLAINTEXT", + } + ], + tags=[], + ) + } + codebuild_client.audit_config = { + "excluded_sensitive_environment_variables": [], + "secrets_ignore_patterns": [], + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_aws_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.codebuild.codebuild_service.Codebuild", + codebuild_client, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.codebuild.codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables.codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables.codebuild_client", + codebuild_client, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.codebuild.codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables.codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables.detect_secrets_scan_batch", + side_effect=SecretsScanError("Kingfisher exited with code 1"), + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.codebuild.codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables.codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables import ( + codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables, + ) + + check = codebuild_project_no_secrets_in_variables() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "MANUAL" + assert "Could not scan" in result[0].status_extended diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/codepipeline/codepipeline_project_repo_private/codepipeline_project_repo_private_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/codepipeline/codepipeline_project_repo_private/codepipeline_project_repo_private_test.py index d0d1057307..bf27c29632 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/codepipeline/codepipeline_project_repo_private/codepipeline_project_repo_private_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/codepipeline/codepipeline_project_repo_private/codepipeline_project_repo_private_test.py @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +import ssl import urllib.error import urllib.request from unittest import mock @@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ class Test_codepipeline_project_repo_private: "Connection": {"ProviderType": "GitHub"} } - def mock_urlopen_side_effect(req, context=None): + def mock_urlopen_side_effect(req, **kwargs): raise urllib.error.HTTPError( url="", code=404, msg="", hdrs={}, fp=None ) @@ -145,7 +146,7 @@ class Test_codepipeline_project_repo_private: mock_response.getcode.return_value = 200 mock_response.geturl.return_value = f"https://github.com/{repo_id}" - def mock_urlopen_side_effect(req, context=None): + def mock_urlopen_side_effect(req, **kwargs): if "github.com" in req.get_full_url(): return mock_response raise urllib.error.HTTPError( @@ -172,6 +173,145 @@ class Test_codepipeline_project_repo_private: assert result[0].resource_tags == [] assert result[0].region == AWS_REGION + def test_pipeline_repo_ssl_verification_failure(self): + """Test that a TLS certificate verification failure is treated as private. + When the probe cannot verify the server certificate (e.g. a MITM + presenting a forged certificate), the repository must not be reported + as public. + """ + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION]), + ): + codepipeline_client = mock.MagicMock + pipeline_name = "test-pipeline" + pipeline_arn = f"arn:aws:codepipeline:{AWS_REGION}:{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:pipeline/{pipeline_name}" + connection_arn = f"arn:aws:codestar-connections:{AWS_REGION}:{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:connection/test-connection" + repo_id = "prowler-cloud/prowler-private" + + codepipeline_client.pipelines = { + pipeline_arn: Pipeline( + name=pipeline_name, + arn=pipeline_arn, + region=AWS_REGION, + source=Source( + type="CodeStarSourceConnection", + repository_id=repo_id, + configuration={ + "FullRepositoryId": repo_id, + "ConnectionArn": connection_arn, + }, + ), + tags=[], + ) + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.codepipeline.codepipeline_service.CodePipeline", + codepipeline_client, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.codepipeline.codepipeline_project_repo_private.codepipeline_project_repo_private.codepipeline_client", + codepipeline_client, + ), + mock.patch("boto3.client") as mock_client, + mock.patch("urllib.request.urlopen") as mock_urlopen, + ): + mock_connection = mock_client.return_value + mock_connection.get_connection.return_value = { + "Connection": {"ProviderType": "GitHub"} + } + + def mock_urlopen_side_effect(req, **kwargs): + raise ssl.SSLError("certificate verify failed") + + mock_urlopen.side_effect = mock_urlopen_side_effect + + from prowler.providers.aws.services.codepipeline.codepipeline_project_repo_private.codepipeline_project_repo_private import ( + codepipeline_project_repo_private, + ) + + check = codepipeline_project_repo_private() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"CodePipeline {pipeline_name} source repository {repo_id} is private." + ) + + def test_pipeline_repo_probe_verifies_certificate_and_sets_timeout(self): + """Test the probe never disables certificate verification and sets a timeout. + Regression test for the SSL verification bypass: the check must not use + an unverified SSL context, and every request must carry a timeout. + """ + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION]), + ): + codepipeline_client = mock.MagicMock + pipeline_name = "test-pipeline" + pipeline_arn = f"arn:aws:codepipeline:{AWS_REGION}:{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:pipeline/{pipeline_name}" + connection_arn = f"arn:aws:codestar-connections:{AWS_REGION}:{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:connection/test-connection" + repo_id = "prowler-cloud/prowler-private" + + codepipeline_client.pipelines = { + pipeline_arn: Pipeline( + name=pipeline_name, + arn=pipeline_arn, + region=AWS_REGION, + source=Source( + type="CodeStarSourceConnection", + repository_id=repo_id, + configuration={ + "FullRepositoryId": repo_id, + "ConnectionArn": connection_arn, + }, + ), + tags=[], + ) + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.codepipeline.codepipeline_service.CodePipeline", + codepipeline_client, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.codepipeline.codepipeline_project_repo_private.codepipeline_project_repo_private.codepipeline_client", + codepipeline_client, + ), + mock.patch("boto3.client") as mock_client, + mock.patch("urllib.request.urlopen") as mock_urlopen, + mock.patch("ssl._create_unverified_context") as mock_unverified, + ): + mock_connection = mock_client.return_value + mock_connection.get_connection.return_value = { + "Connection": {"ProviderType": "GitHub"} + } + + def mock_urlopen_side_effect(req, **kwargs): + raise urllib.error.HTTPError( + url="", code=404, msg="", hdrs={}, fp=None + ) + + mock_urlopen.side_effect = mock_urlopen_side_effect + + from prowler.providers.aws.services.codepipeline.codepipeline_project_repo_private.codepipeline_project_repo_private import ( + HTTP_TIMEOUT, + codepipeline_project_repo_private, + ) + + check = codepipeline_project_repo_private() + check.execute() + + mock_unverified.assert_not_called() + assert mock_urlopen.call_count > 0 + for call in mock_urlopen.call_args_list: + assert call.kwargs.get("timeout") == HTTP_TIMEOUT + def test_pipeline_public_gitlab_repo(self): """Test detection of public GitLab repository in CodePipeline. Tests that the check correctly identifies a public GitLab repository @@ -225,7 +365,7 @@ class Test_codepipeline_project_repo_private: mock_response.getcode.return_value = 200 mock_response.geturl.return_value = f"https://gitlab.com/{repo_id}" - def mock_urlopen_side_effect(req, context=None): + def mock_urlopen_side_effect(req, **kwargs): if "gitlab.com" in req.get_full_url(): return mock_response raise urllib.error.HTTPError( diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_instance_secrets_user_data/ec2_instance_secrets_user_data_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_instance_secrets_user_data/ec2_instance_secrets_user_data_test.py index 0e8d303fe0..a2f2dc705a 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_instance_secrets_user_data/ec2_instance_secrets_user_data_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_instance_secrets_user_data/ec2_instance_secrets_user_data_test.py @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ class Test_ec2_instance_secrets_user_data: ImageId=EXAMPLE_AMI_ID, MinCount=1, MaxCount=1, - UserData="DB_PASSWORD=foobar123", + UserData='DB_PASSWORD="Tr0ub4dor3xKq9vLmZ"', )[0] from prowler.providers.aws.services.ec2.ec2_service import EC2 @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ class Test_ec2_instance_secrets_user_data: assert result[0].status == "FAIL" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == f"Potential secret found in EC2 instance {instance.id} User Data -> Secret Keyword on line 1." + == f"Potential secret found in EC2 instance {instance.id} User Data -> Generic Password on line 1." ) assert result[0].resource_id == instance.id assert ( @@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ class Test_ec2_instance_secrets_user_data: assert result[0].status == "FAIL" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == f"Potential secret found in EC2 instance {instance.id} User Data -> Secret Keyword on line 1, Hex High Entropy String on line 3, Secret Keyword on line 3, Secret Keyword on line 4." + == f"Potential secret found in EC2 instance {instance.id} User Data -> Generic Password on line 1, JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded) on line 3, Generic Password on line 4." ) assert result[0].resource_id == instance.id assert ( @@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ class Test_ec2_instance_secrets_user_data: assert result[0].status == "FAIL" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == f"Potential secret found in EC2 instance {instance.id} User Data -> Secret Keyword on line 1, Hex High Entropy String on line 3, Secret Keyword on line 3, Secret Keyword on line 4." + == f"Potential secret found in EC2 instance {instance.id} User Data -> Generic Password on line 1, JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded) on line 3, Generic Password on line 4." ) assert result[0].resource_id == instance.id assert ( @@ -337,6 +337,64 @@ class Test_ec2_instance_secrets_user_data: assert result[0].resource_tags is None assert result[0].region == AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 + @mock_aws + def test_one_ec2_with_verified_secret(self): + from prowler.lib.check.models import Severity + + ec2 = resource("ec2", region_name=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1) + instance = ec2.create_instances( + ImageId=EXAMPLE_AMI_ID, + MinCount=1, + MaxCount=1, + UserData='STRIPE_KEY="eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.dozjgNryP4J3jVmNHl0w5N_XgL0n3I9PlFUP0THsR8U"', + )[0] + + from prowler.providers.aws.services.ec2.ec2_service import EC2 + + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider( + [AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1], + audit_config={"secrets_validate": True}, + ) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.ec2.ec2_instance_secrets_user_data.ec2_instance_secrets_user_data.ec2_client", + new=EC2(aws_provider), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.ec2.ec2_instance_secrets_user_data.ec2_instance_secrets_user_data.detect_secrets_scan_batch", + return_value={ + 0: [ + { + "type": "JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded)", + "line_number": 1, + "filename": "data", + "hashed_secret": "x", + "is_verified": True, + } + ] + }, + ) as mock_scan, + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.ec2.ec2_instance_secrets_user_data.ec2_instance_secrets_user_data import ( + ec2_instance_secrets_user_data, + ) + + check = ec2_instance_secrets_user_data() + result = check.execute() + + # The check must forward secrets_validate from the config to the scan. + assert mock_scan.call_args.kwargs.get("validate") is True + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].check_metadata.Severity == Severity.critical + assert "confirmed to be live" in result[0].status_extended + assert result[0].resource_id == instance.id + @mock_aws def test_one_secrets_with_unicode_error(self): invalid_utf8_bytes = b"\xc0\xaf" @@ -368,4 +426,50 @@ class Test_ec2_instance_secrets_user_data: check = ec2_instance_secrets_user_data() result = check.execute() - assert len(result) == 0 + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "MANUAL" + assert "Could not decode User Data" in result[0].status_extended + + @mock_aws + def test_scan_failure_reports_manual(self): + from prowler.lib.utils.utils import SecretsScanError + + ec2 = resource("ec2", region_name=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1) + instance = ec2.create_instances( + ImageId=EXAMPLE_AMI_ID, + MinCount=1, + MaxCount=1, + UserData='password = "Tr0ub4dor3xKq9vLmZ"', + )[0] + + from prowler.providers.aws.services.ec2.ec2_service import EC2 + + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider( + [AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1] + ) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.ec2.ec2_instance_secrets_user_data.ec2_instance_secrets_user_data.ec2_client", + new=EC2(aws_provider), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.ec2.ec2_instance_secrets_user_data.ec2_instance_secrets_user_data.detect_secrets_scan_batch", + side_effect=SecretsScanError("Kingfisher exited with code 1"), + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.ec2.ec2_instance_secrets_user_data.ec2_instance_secrets_user_data import ( + ec2_instance_secrets_user_data, + ) + + check = ec2_instance_secrets_user_data() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "MANUAL" + assert "Could not scan" in result[0].status_extended + assert result[0].resource_id == instance.id diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_instance_secrets_user_data/fixtures/fixture b/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_instance_secrets_user_data/fixtures/fixture index 2fb5138932..528ff40f8f 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_instance_secrets_user_data/fixtures/fixture +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_instance_secrets_user_data/fixtures/fixture @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -DB_PASSWORD=foobar123 +DB_PASSWORD="Tr0ub4dor3xKq9vLmZ" DB_USER=foo -API_KEY=12345abcd -SERVICE_PASSWORD=bbaabb45 +STRIPE_TOKEN=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.dozjgNryP4J3jVmNHl0w5N_XgL0n3I9PlFUP0THsR8U +SERVICE_PASSWORD="Xy9zPq2wKmRtVbN4" diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_instance_secrets_user_data/fixtures/fixture.gz b/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_instance_secrets_user_data/fixtures/fixture.gz index 6120fcfbc4..859b38cb62 100644 Binary files a/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_instance_secrets_user_data/fixtures/fixture.gz and b/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_instance_secrets_user_data/fixtures/fixture.gz differ diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_launch_template_no_secrets/ec2_launch_template_no_secrets_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_launch_template_no_secrets/ec2_launch_template_no_secrets_test.py index 0430ca5cae..dab6debb6b 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_launch_template_no_secrets/ec2_launch_template_no_secrets_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_launch_template_no_secrets/ec2_launch_template_no_secrets_test.py @@ -29,7 +29,9 @@ def mock_make_api_call(self, operation_name, kwarg): "VersionNumber": 123, "LaunchTemplateData": { "UserData": b64encode( - "DB_PASSWORD=foobar123".encode(encoding_format_utf_8) + 'DB_PASSWORD="Tr0ub4dor3xKq9vLmZ"'.encode( + encoding_format_utf_8 + ) ).decode(encoding_format_utf_8), "NetworkInterfaces": [{"AssociatePublicIpAddress": True}], }, @@ -164,7 +166,7 @@ class Test_ec2_launch_template_no_secrets: assert result[0].status == "FAIL" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == "Potential secret found in User Data for EC2 Launch Template tester1 in template versions: Version 123: Secret Keyword on line 1." + == "Potential secret found in User Data for EC2 Launch Template tester1 in template versions: Version 123: Generic Password on line 1." ) assert result[0].resource_id == "lt-1234567890" assert result[0].region == AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 @@ -212,7 +214,7 @@ class Test_ec2_launch_template_no_secrets: ) ec2_client.launch_templates = [launch_template] - ec2_client.audit_config = {"detect_secrets_plugins": None} + ec2_client.audit_config = {} with ( mock.patch( @@ -236,7 +238,7 @@ class Test_ec2_launch_template_no_secrets: assert result[0].status == "FAIL" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == f"Potential secret found in User Data for EC2 Launch Template {launch_template_name} in template versions: Version 1: Secret Keyword on line 1, Hex High Entropy String on line 3, Secret Keyword on line 3, Secret Keyword on line 4, Version 2: Secret Keyword on line 1, Hex High Entropy String on line 3, Secret Keyword on line 3, Secret Keyword on line 4." + == f"Potential secret found in User Data for EC2 Launch Template {launch_template_name} in template versions: Version 1: Generic Password on line 1, JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded) on line 3, Generic Password on line 4, Version 2: Generic Password on line 1, JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded) on line 3, Generic Password on line 4." ) assert result[0].resource_id == launch_template_id assert result[0].region == AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 @@ -290,7 +292,7 @@ class Test_ec2_launch_template_no_secrets: ) ec2_client.launch_templates = [launch_template] - ec2_client.audit_config = {"detect_secrets_plugins": None} + ec2_client.audit_config = {} with ( mock.patch( @@ -314,7 +316,7 @@ class Test_ec2_launch_template_no_secrets: assert result[0].status == "FAIL" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == f"Potential secret found in User Data for EC2 Launch Template {launch_template_name} in template versions: Version 1: Secret Keyword on line 1, Hex High Entropy String on line 3, Secret Keyword on line 3, Secret Keyword on line 4." + == f"Potential secret found in User Data for EC2 Launch Template {launch_template_name} in template versions: Version 1: Generic Password on line 1, JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded) on line 3, Generic Password on line 4." ) assert result[0].resource_id == launch_template_id assert result[0].region == AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 @@ -358,7 +360,7 @@ class Test_ec2_launch_template_no_secrets: ) ec2_client.launch_templates = [launch_template] - ec2_client.audit_config = {"detect_secrets_plugins": None} + ec2_client.audit_config = {} with ( mock.patch( @@ -382,7 +384,7 @@ class Test_ec2_launch_template_no_secrets: assert result[0].status == "FAIL" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == f"Potential secret found in User Data for EC2 Launch Template {launch_template_name} in template versions: Version 1: Secret Keyword on line 1, Hex High Entropy String on line 3, Secret Keyword on line 3, Secret Keyword on line 4." + == f"Potential secret found in User Data for EC2 Launch Template {launch_template_name} in template versions: Version 1: Generic Password on line 1, JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded) on line 3, Generic Password on line 4." ) assert result[0].resource_id == launch_template_id assert result[0].region == AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 @@ -391,6 +393,81 @@ class Test_ec2_launch_template_no_secrets: ) assert result[0].resource_tags == [] + def test_one_launch_template_with_verified_secret(self): + from prowler.lib.check.models import Severity + + ec2_client = mock.MagicMock() + launch_template_name = "tester" + launch_template_id = "lt-1234567890" + launch_template_arn = ( + f"arn:aws:ec2:us-east-1:123456789012:launch-template/{launch_template_id}" + ) + + launch_template_data = TemplateData( + user_data=b64encode( + "This is some user_data".encode(encoding_format_utf_8) + ).decode(encoding_format_utf_8), + associate_public_ip_address=True, + ) + + launch_template_versions = [ + LaunchTemplateVersion( + version_number=1, + template_data=launch_template_data, + ), + ] + + launch_template = LaunchTemplate( + name=launch_template_name, + id=launch_template_id, + arn=launch_template_arn, + region=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + versions=launch_template_versions, + ) + + ec2_client.launch_templates = [launch_template] + ec2_client.audit_config = {"secrets_validate": True} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=ec2_client, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.ec2.ec2_launch_template_no_secrets.ec2_launch_template_no_secrets.ec2_client", + new=ec2_client, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.ec2.ec2_launch_template_no_secrets.ec2_launch_template_no_secrets.detect_secrets_scan_batch", + return_value={ + (0, 0): [ + { + "type": "JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded)", + "line_number": 1, + "filename": "data", + "hashed_secret": "x", + "is_verified": True, + } + ] + }, + ) as mock_scan, + ): + # Test Check + from prowler.providers.aws.services.ec2.ec2_launch_template_no_secrets.ec2_launch_template_no_secrets import ( + ec2_launch_template_no_secrets, + ) + + check = ec2_launch_template_no_secrets() + result = check.execute() + + # The check must forward secrets_validate from the config to the scan. + assert mock_scan.call_args.kwargs.get("validate") is True + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].check_metadata.Severity == Severity.critical + assert "confirmed to be live" in result[0].status_extended + assert result[0].resource_id == launch_template_id + @mock_aws def test_one_launch_template_without_user_data(self): launch_template_name = "tester" @@ -506,7 +583,7 @@ class Test_ec2_launch_template_no_secrets: launch_template_secrets, launch_template_no_secrets, ] - ec2_client.audit_config = {"detect_secrets_plugins": None} + ec2_client.audit_config = {} with ( mock.patch( @@ -530,7 +607,7 @@ class Test_ec2_launch_template_no_secrets: assert result[0].status == "FAIL" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == f"Potential secret found in User Data for EC2 Launch Template {launch_template_name1} in template versions: Version 1: Secret Keyword on line 1, Hex High Entropy String on line 3, Secret Keyword on line 3, Secret Keyword on line 4." + == f"Potential secret found in User Data for EC2 Launch Template {launch_template_name1} in template versions: Version 1: Generic Password on line 1, JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded) on line 3, Generic Password on line 4." ) assert result[0].resource_id == launch_template_id1 assert result[0].region == AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 @@ -593,10 +670,10 @@ class Test_ec2_launch_template_no_secrets: result = check.execute() assert len(result) == 1 - assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert result[0].status == "MANUAL" assert ( - result[0].status_extended - == f"No secrets found in User Data of any version for EC2 Launch Template {launch_template_name}." + f"Could not decode User Data for EC2 Launch Template {launch_template_name}" + in result[0].status_extended ) assert result[0].resource_id == launch_template_id assert result[0].region == AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_launch_template_no_secrets/fixtures/fixture b/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_launch_template_no_secrets/fixtures/fixture index 2fb5138932..528ff40f8f 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_launch_template_no_secrets/fixtures/fixture +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_launch_template_no_secrets/fixtures/fixture @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -DB_PASSWORD=foobar123 +DB_PASSWORD="Tr0ub4dor3xKq9vLmZ" DB_USER=foo -API_KEY=12345abcd -SERVICE_PASSWORD=bbaabb45 +STRIPE_TOKEN=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.dozjgNryP4J3jVmNHl0w5N_XgL0n3I9PlFUP0THsR8U +SERVICE_PASSWORD="Xy9zPq2wKmRtVbN4" diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_launch_template_no_secrets/fixtures/fixture.gz b/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_launch_template_no_secrets/fixtures/fixture.gz index 6120fcfbc4..859b38cb62 100644 Binary files a/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_launch_template_no_secrets/fixtures/fixture.gz and b/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_launch_template_no_secrets/fixtures/fixture.gz differ diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_securitygroup_not_used/ec2_securitygroup_not_used_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_securitygroup_not_used/ec2_securitygroup_not_used_test.py index d1b77b9f8b..b959f4b257 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_securitygroup_not_used/ec2_securitygroup_not_used_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_securitygroup_not_used/ec2_securitygroup_not_used_test.py @@ -14,6 +14,57 @@ EXAMPLE_AMI_ID = "ami-12c6146b" class Test_ec2_securitygroup_not_used: + def test_ec2_sg_used_by_lambda_outside_selected_analysis_limit(self): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.ec2.ec2_service import SecurityGroup + + sg_id = "sg-limited-out" + sg_name = "lambda-sg" + security_group = SecurityGroup( + name=sg_name, + region=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + arn=f"arn:aws:ec2:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:security-group/{sg_id}", + id=sg_id, + vpc_id="vpc-test", + associated_sgs=[], + network_interfaces=[], + ingress_rules=[], + egress_rules=[], + tags=[], + ) + ec2_client = mock.MagicMock() + ec2_client.security_groups = {security_group.arn: security_group} + awslambda_client = mock.MagicMock() + awslambda_client.functions = {} + awslambda_client.security_groups_in_use = {sg_id} + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.ec2.ec2_securitygroup_not_used.ec2_securitygroup_not_used.ec2_client", + new=ec2_client, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.ec2.ec2_securitygroup_not_used.ec2_securitygroup_not_used.awslambda_client", + new=awslambda_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.ec2.ec2_securitygroup_not_used.ec2_securitygroup_not_used import ( + ec2_securitygroup_not_used, + ) + + result = ec2_securitygroup_not_used().execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Security group {sg_name} ({sg_id}) it is being used." + ) + @mock_aws def test_ec2_default_sgs(self): # Create EC2 Mocked Resources diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_service_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_service_test.py index aca200dd61..1302952e95 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_service_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/ec2/ec2_service_test.py @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ from freezegun import freeze_time from moto import mock_aws from prowler.config.config import encoding_format_utf_8 -from prowler.providers.aws.services.ec2.ec2_service import EC2 +from prowler.providers.aws.services.ec2.ec2_service import EC2, Snapshot from tests.providers.aws.utils import ( AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER, AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, @@ -103,6 +103,99 @@ class Test_EC2_Service: ec2 = EC2(aws_provider) assert ec2.audited_account == AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER + def test_snapshot_limit_bounds_public_attribute_calls_to_latest_selected(self): + class FakeEC2Client: + def __init__(self): + self.calls = [] + + def describe_snapshot_attribute(self, **kwargs): + self.calls.append(kwargs["SnapshotId"]) + return {"CreateVolumePermissions": []} + + regional_client = FakeEC2Client() + ec2 = EC2.__new__(EC2) + ec2.snapshots = [ + Snapshot( + id="snap-old", + arn="arn:aws:ec2:eu-west-1:123456789012:snapshot/snap-old", + region=AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, + encrypted=True, + start_time=datetime(2024, 1, 1), + volume="vol-old", + ), + Snapshot( + id="snap-new", + arn="arn:aws:ec2:eu-west-1:123456789012:snapshot/snap-new", + region=AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, + encrypted=True, + start_time=datetime(2024, 1, 2), + volume="vol-new", + ), + ] + ec2.snapshot_limit = 1 + ec2.regional_clients = {AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1: regional_client} + + ec2._select_snapshots_for_analysis() + for snapshot in ec2.snapshots: + ec2._determine_public_snapshots(snapshot) + + assert [snapshot.id for snapshot in ec2.snapshots] == ["snap-new"] + assert regional_client.calls == ["snap-new"] + + def test_snapshot_limit_preserves_volume_index_and_selects_global_latest(self): + class FakePaginator: + def __init__(self, snapshots): + self.snapshots = snapshots + + def paginate(self, **kwargs): + assert "PageSize" not in kwargs + return [{"Snapshots": self.snapshots}] + + class FakeEC2Client: + def __init__(self, region, snapshots): + self.region = region + self.snapshots = snapshots + + def get_paginator(self, name): + assert name == "describe_snapshots" + return FakePaginator(self.snapshots) + + ec2 = EC2.__new__(EC2) + ec2.snapshots = [] + ec2.volumes_with_snapshots = {} + ec2.regions_with_snapshots = {} + ec2.snapshot_limit = 1 + ec2.audit_resources = [] + ec2.audited_partition = "aws" + ec2.audited_account = AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER + old_client = FakeEC2Client( + AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, + [ + { + "SnapshotId": "snap-old", + "VolumeId": "vol-old", + "StartTime": datetime(2024, 1, 1), + } + ], + ) + new_client = FakeEC2Client( + AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + [ + { + "SnapshotId": "snap-new", + "VolumeId": "vol-new", + "StartTime": datetime(2024, 1, 2), + } + ], + ) + + ec2._describe_snapshots(old_client) + ec2._describe_snapshots(new_client) + ec2._select_snapshots_for_analysis() + + assert ec2.volumes_with_snapshots == {"vol-old": True, "vol-new": True} + assert [snapshot.id for snapshot in ec2.snapshots] == ["snap-new"] + # Test EC2 Describe Instances @mock_aws @freeze_time(MOCK_DATETIME) @@ -346,6 +439,24 @@ class Test_EC2_Service: assert not snapshot.encrypted assert snapshot.public + @mock_aws + def test_snapshot_limit_exposes_only_selected_snapshots(self): + ec2_client = client("ec2", region_name=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1) + ec2_resource = resource("ec2", region_name=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1) + volume_id = ec2_resource.create_volume( + AvailabilityZone="us-east-1a", + Size=80, + VolumeType="gp2", + ).id + for _ in range(3): + ec2_client.create_snapshot(VolumeId=volume_id) + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider( + [AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1], audit_config={"max_ebs_snapshots": 1} + ) + ec2 = EC2(aws_provider) + + assert len(ec2.snapshots) == 1 + # Test EC2 Instance User Data @mock_aws def test_get_instance_user_data(self): diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/ecs/ecs_service_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/ecs/ecs_service_test.py index b472e94b88..0427113867 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/ecs/ecs_service_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/ecs/ecs_service_test.py @@ -3,7 +3,11 @@ from unittest.mock import patch import botocore from prowler.providers.aws.services.ecs.ecs_service import ECS -from tests.providers.aws.utils import AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, set_mocked_aws_provider +from tests.providers.aws.utils import ( + AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, + AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + set_mocked_aws_provider, +) make_api_call = botocore.client.BaseClient._make_api_call @@ -115,6 +119,23 @@ def mock_generate_regional_clients(provider, service): return {AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1: regional_client} +def mock_generate_multi_region_clients(provider, service): + eu_west_1_client = provider._session.current_session.client( + service, region_name=AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1 + ) + eu_west_1_client.region = AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1 + + us_east_1_client = provider._session.current_session.client( + service, region_name=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 + ) + us_east_1_client.region = AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 + + return { + AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1: eu_west_1_client, + AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1: us_east_1_client, + } + + @patch( "prowler.providers.aws.aws_provider.AwsProvider.generate_regional_clients", new=mock_generate_regional_clients, @@ -139,7 +160,6 @@ class Test_ECS_Service: ecs = ECS(aws_provider) assert ecs.session.__class__.__name__ == "Session" - # Test list ECS task definitions @patch("botocore.client.BaseClient._make_api_call", new=mock_make_api_call) def test_list_task_definitions(self): aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1]) @@ -201,6 +221,169 @@ class Test_ECS_Service: .readonly_rootfilesystem ) + def test_task_definitions_are_loaded_once_for_analysis(self): + describe_calls = [] + list_calls = [] + + def counting_make_api_call(self, operation_name, kwarg): + if operation_name == "ListTaskDefinitions": + list_calls.append(kwarg) + return { + "taskDefinitionArns": [ + f"arn:aws:ecs:eu-west-1:123456789012:task-definition/fam:{i}" + for i in (3, 2, 1) + ] + } + if operation_name == "DescribeTaskDefinition": + describe_calls.append(kwarg["taskDefinition"]) + return { + "taskDefinition": { + "containerDefinitions": [], + "networkMode": "bridge", + "pidMode": "", + "tags": [], + } + } + return make_api_call(self, operation_name, kwarg) + + with patch( + "botocore.client.BaseClient._make_api_call", new=counting_make_api_call + ): + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1]) + ecs = ECS(aws_provider) + + assert [td.revision for td in ecs.task_definitions.values()] == [ + "3", + "2", + "1", + ] + assert list_calls == [{"sort": "DESC"}] + assert len(describe_calls) == 3 + + def test_task_definition_limit_exposes_only_selected_resources(self): + describe_calls = [] + + def counting_make_api_call(self, operation_name, kwarg): + if operation_name == "ListTaskDefinitions": + return { + "taskDefinitionArns": [ + f"arn:aws:ecs:eu-west-1:123456789012:task-definition/fam:{i}" + for i in (3, 2, 1) + ] + } + if operation_name == "DescribeTaskDefinition": + describe_calls.append(kwarg["taskDefinition"]) + return { + "taskDefinition": { + "containerDefinitions": [], + "networkMode": "bridge", + "pidMode": "", + "tags": [], + } + } + return make_api_call(self, operation_name, kwarg) + + with patch( + "botocore.client.BaseClient._make_api_call", new=counting_make_api_call + ): + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider( + [AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1], audit_config={"max_ecs_task_definitions": 2} + ) + ecs = ECS(aws_provider) + + assert [td.revision for td in ecs.task_definitions.values()] == ["3", "2"] + assert len(describe_calls) == 2 + + def test_task_definition_limit_bounds_describe_calls(self): + describe_calls = [] + + def counting_make_api_call(self, operation_name, kwarg): + if operation_name == "ListTaskDefinitions": + return { + "taskDefinitionArns": [ + f"arn:aws:ecs:eu-west-1:123456789012:task-definition/fam:{i}" + for i in (3, 2, 1) + ] + } + if operation_name == "DescribeTaskDefinition": + describe_calls.append(kwarg["taskDefinition"]) + return { + "taskDefinition": { + "containerDefinitions": [], + "networkMode": "bridge", + "pidMode": "", + "tags": [], + } + } + return mock_make_api_call(self, operation_name, kwarg) + + with patch( + "botocore.client.BaseClient._make_api_call", new=counting_make_api_call + ): + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider( + [AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1], audit_config={"max_ecs_task_definitions": 1} + ) + ecs = ECS(aws_provider) + + assert [td.revision for td in ecs.task_definitions.values()] == ["3"] + assert describe_calls == [ + "arn:aws:ecs:eu-west-1:123456789012:task-definition/fam:3" + ] + + def test_task_definition_limit_does_not_starve_later_regions(self): + describe_calls = [] + + def counting_make_api_call(self, operation_name, kwarg): + region = self.meta.region_name + if operation_name == "ListTaskDefinitions": + task_definition_revisions = { + AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1: (3, 2, 1), + AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1: (9,), + }[region] + return { + "taskDefinitionArns": [ + f"arn:aws:ecs:{region}:123456789012:task-definition/fam:{revision}" + for revision in task_definition_revisions + ] + } + if operation_name == "DescribeTaskDefinition": + describe_calls.append(kwarg["taskDefinition"]) + return { + "taskDefinition": { + "containerDefinitions": [], + "networkMode": "bridge", + "pidMode": "", + "tags": [], + } + } + if operation_name == "ListClusters": + return {"clusterArns": []} + return mock_make_api_call(self, operation_name, kwarg) + + with ( + patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.aws_provider.AwsProvider.generate_regional_clients", + new=mock_generate_multi_region_clients, + ), + patch( + "botocore.client.BaseClient._make_api_call", new=counting_make_api_call + ), + ): + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider( + [AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1], + audit_config={"max_ecs_task_definitions": 2}, + ) + ecs = ECS(aws_provider) + + assert [td.region for td in ecs.task_definitions.values()] == [ + AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, + AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + ] + assert set(describe_calls) == { + "arn:aws:ecs:eu-west-1:123456789012:task-definition/fam:3", + "arn:aws:ecs:us-east-1:123456789012:task-definition/fam:9", + } + # Test list ECS clusters @patch("botocore.client.BaseClient._make_api_call", new=mock_make_api_call) def test_list_clusters(self): diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/ecs/ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets/ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/ecs/ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets/ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets_test.py index 24c27ccf0b..753c00b0ef 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/ecs/ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets/ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/ecs/ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets/ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets_test.py @@ -11,9 +11,17 @@ CONTAINER_NAME = "test-container" ENV_VAR_NAME_NO_SECRETS = "host" ENV_VAR_VALUE_NO_SECRETS = "localhost:1234" ENV_VAR_NAME_WITH_KEYWORD = "DB_PASSWORD" -ENV_VAR_VALUE_WITH_SECRETS = "srv://admin:pass@db" +# Realistic fake secrets that Kingfisher actually detects (placeholders such as +# the previous "srv://admin:pass@db" basic-auth URL are no longer flagged). +# A JWT fires on any line of the dumped JSON (even when followed by a +# trailing comma); a keyword-named variable additionally fires the generic +# keyword rule when it is the last entry in the dump. +ENV_VAR_VALUE_WITH_SECRETS = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.dozjgNryP4J3jVmNHl0w5N_XgL0n3I9PlFUP0THsR8U" ENV_VAR_NAME_WITH_KEYWORD2 = "DATABASE_PASSWORD" -ENV_VAR_VALUE_WITH_SECRETS2 = "srv://admin:password@database" +ENV_VAR_VALUE_WITH_SECRETS2 = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiI5ODc2NTQzMjEwIiwibmFtZSI6IkphbmUifQ.s5LqY8mC2pX1vN0bQwReTyUiOpAsDfGhJkLzXcVbNm0" +# Generic password/secret assignment value (detected only on the last entry of +# the JSON dump, where there is no trailing comma after the value). +ENV_VAR_VALUE_GENERIC_SECRET = "Tr0ub4dor3xKq9vLmZ" class Test_ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets: @@ -143,7 +151,7 @@ class Test_ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets: assert result[0].status == "FAIL" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == f"Potential secrets found in ECS task definition {TASK_NAME} with revision {TASK_REVISION}: Secrets in container test-container -> Basic Auth Credentials on the environment variable host." + == f"Potential secrets found in ECS task definition {TASK_NAME} with revision {TASK_REVISION}: Secrets in container test-container -> JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded) on the environment variable host." ) assert result[0].resource_id == f"{TASK_NAME}:{TASK_REVISION}" assert result[0].resource_arn == task_arn @@ -167,7 +175,7 @@ class Test_ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets: "environment": [ { "name": ENV_VAR_NAME_WITH_KEYWORD, - "value": ENV_VAR_VALUE_NO_SECRETS, + "value": ENV_VAR_VALUE_GENERIC_SECRET, } ], } @@ -198,7 +206,7 @@ class Test_ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets: assert result[0].status == "FAIL" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == f"Potential secrets found in ECS task definition {TASK_NAME} with revision {TASK_REVISION}: Secrets in container test-container -> Secret Keyword on the environment variable DB_PASSWORD." + == f"Potential secrets found in ECS task definition {TASK_NAME} with revision {TASK_REVISION}: Secrets in container test-container -> Generic Password on the environment variable DB_PASSWORD." ) assert result[0].resource_id == f"{TASK_NAME}:{TASK_REVISION}" assert result[0].resource_arn == task_arn @@ -251,9 +259,20 @@ class Test_ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets: result = check.execute() assert len(result) == 1 assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + # The keyword-named variable holding a real secret triggers both the + # generic keyword rule and the JWT rule on the same line. + # Kingfisher emits same-line findings in a non-deterministic order, so + # assert both are present without pinning their order. + assert result[0].status_extended.startswith( + f"Potential secrets found in ECS task definition {TASK_NAME} with revision {TASK_REVISION}: Secrets in container test-container -> " + ) assert ( - result[0].status_extended - == f"Potential secrets found in ECS task definition {TASK_NAME} with revision {TASK_REVISION}: Secrets in container test-container -> Secret Keyword on the environment variable DB_PASSWORD, Basic Auth Credentials on the environment variable DB_PASSWORD." + "JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded) on the environment variable DB_PASSWORD" + in result[0].status_extended + ) + assert ( + "Generic Password on the environment variable DB_PASSWORD" + in result[0].status_extended ) assert result[0].resource_id == f"{TASK_NAME}:{TASK_REVISION}" assert result[0].resource_arn == task_arn @@ -310,9 +329,23 @@ class Test_ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets: result = check.execute() assert len(result) == 1 assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + # DB_PASSWORD holds a JWT under a keyword name, so it fires + # both the JWT rule and the generic keyword rule on the + # same line (non-deterministic order); host holds a second JWT. + assert result[0].status_extended.startswith( + f"Potential secrets found in ECS task definition {TASK_NAME} with revision {TASK_REVISION}: Secrets in container test-container -> " + ) assert ( - result[0].status_extended - == f"Potential secrets found in ECS task definition {TASK_NAME} with revision {TASK_REVISION}: Secrets in container test-container -> Secret Keyword on the environment variable DB_PASSWORD, Basic Auth Credentials on the environment variable DB_PASSWORD, Basic Auth Credentials on the environment variable host." + "JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded) on the environment variable DB_PASSWORD" + in result[0].status_extended + ) + assert ( + "Generic Password on the environment variable DB_PASSWORD" + in result[0].status_extended + ) + assert ( + "JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded) on the environment variable host" + in result[0].status_extended ) assert result[0].resource_id == f"{TASK_NAME}:{TASK_REVISION}" assert result[0].resource_arn == task_arn @@ -340,7 +373,7 @@ class Test_ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets: }, { "name": ENV_VAR_NAME_WITH_KEYWORD2, - "value": ENV_VAR_VALUE_WITH_SECRETS2, + "value": ENV_VAR_VALUE_GENERIC_SECRET, }, ], } @@ -369,9 +402,24 @@ class Test_ecs_task_definitions_no_environment_secrets: result = check.execute() assert len(result) == 1 assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + # DB_PASSWORD holds a JWT under a keyword name, so it fires + # both the JWT and the generic keyword rule on the same line + # (non-deterministic order); DATABASE_PASSWORD fires the generic + # keyword rule on its own line. + assert result[0].status_extended.startswith( + f"Potential secrets found in ECS task definition {TASK_NAME} with revision {TASK_REVISION}: Secrets in container test-container -> " + ) assert ( - result[0].status_extended - == f"Potential secrets found in ECS task definition {TASK_NAME} with revision {TASK_REVISION}: Secrets in container test-container -> Secret Keyword on the environment variable DB_PASSWORD, Basic Auth Credentials on the environment variable DB_PASSWORD, Basic Auth Credentials on the environment variable DATABASE_PASSWORD, Secret Keyword on the environment variable DATABASE_PASSWORD." + "JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded) on the environment variable DB_PASSWORD" + in result[0].status_extended + ) + assert ( + "Generic Password on the environment variable DB_PASSWORD" + in result[0].status_extended + ) + assert ( + "Generic Password on the environment variable DATABASE_PASSWORD" + in result[0].status_extended ) assert result[0].resource_id == f"{TASK_NAME}:{TASK_REVISION}" assert result[0].resource_arn == task_arn diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/inspector2/inspector2_is_enabled/inspector2_is_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/inspector2/inspector2_is_enabled/inspector2_is_enabled_test.py index 2ea7702cd3..66eb2ceaa3 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/inspector2/inspector2_is_enabled/inspector2_is_enabled_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/inspector2/inspector2_is_enabled/inspector2_is_enabled_test.py @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +from types import SimpleNamespace from unittest import mock from prowler.providers.aws.services.inspector2.inspector2_service import Inspector @@ -13,6 +14,65 @@ FINDING_ARN = ( class Test_inspector2_is_enabled: + def test_lambda_disabled_with_region_hidden_by_function_analysis_limit(self): + inspector2_client = mock.MagicMock() + inspector2_client.provider = SimpleNamespace(scan_unused_services=False) + inspector2_client.inspectors = [ + Inspector( + id=AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER, + arn=f"arn:aws:inspector2:{AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1}:{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:inspector2", + status="ENABLED", + ec2_status="ENABLED", + ecr_status="ENABLED", + lambda_status="DISABLED", + lambda_code_status="ENABLED", + region=AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, + ) + ] + awslambda_client = mock.MagicMock() + awslambda_client.functions = {} + awslambda_client.regions_with_functions = {AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1} + ec2_client = mock.MagicMock() + ec2_client.instances = [] + ecr_client = mock.MagicMock() + ecr_client.registries = {AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1: SimpleNamespace(repositories=[])} + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1]) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.inspector2.inspector2_is_enabled.inspector2_is_enabled.inspector2_client", + new=inspector2_client, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.inspector2.inspector2_is_enabled.inspector2_is_enabled.awslambda_client", + new=awslambda_client, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.inspector2.inspector2_is_enabled.inspector2_is_enabled.ec2_client", + new=ec2_client, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.inspector2.inspector2_is_enabled.inspector2_is_enabled.ecr_client", + new=ecr_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.inspector2.inspector2_is_enabled.inspector2_is_enabled import ( + inspector2_is_enabled, + ) + + result = inspector2_is_enabled().execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Inspector2 is not enabled for the following services: Lambda." + ) + def test_inspector2_disabled(self): # Mock the inspector2 client inspector2_client = mock.MagicMock diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/rolesanywhere/rolesanywhere_service_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/rolesanywhere/rolesanywhere_service_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d21d4e20b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/rolesanywhere/rolesanywhere_service_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +from unittest.mock import patch + +import botocore +from moto import mock_aws + +from prowler.providers.aws.services.rolesanywhere.rolesanywhere_service import ( + RolesAnywhere, + TrustAnchor, +) +from tests.providers.aws.utils import ( + AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER, + AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + set_mocked_aws_provider, +) + +TA_ID = "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555" +TA_ARN = f"arn:aws:rolesanywhere:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:trust-anchor/{TA_ID}" +PCA_ARN = f"arn:aws:acm-pca:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:certificate-authority/abc" + +make_api_call = botocore.client.BaseClient._make_api_call + + +def mock_make_api_call(self, operation_name, kwarg): + if operation_name == "ListTrustAnchors": + return { + "trustAnchors": [ + { + "trustAnchorArn": TA_ARN, + "trustAnchorId": TA_ID, + "name": "pqc-trust", + "enabled": True, + "source": { + "sourceType": "AWS_ACM_PCA", + "sourceData": {"acmPcaArn": PCA_ARN}, + }, + } + ] + } + if operation_name == "ListTagsForResource": + return {"tags": [{"key": "Environment", "value": "test"}]} + return make_api_call(self, operation_name, kwarg) + + +def mock_make_api_call_tags_failure(self, operation_name, kwarg): + if operation_name == "ListTagsForResource": + raise botocore.exceptions.ClientError( + { + "Error": { + "Code": "AccessDeniedException", + "Message": "Access denied", + } + }, + operation_name, + ) + return mock_make_api_call(self, operation_name, kwarg) + + +class Test_RolesAnywhere_Service: + @mock_aws + def test_service(self): + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + rolesanywhere = RolesAnywhere(aws_provider) + assert rolesanywhere.service == "rolesanywhere" + + @patch("botocore.client.BaseClient._make_api_call", new=mock_make_api_call) + @mock_aws + def test_list_trust_anchors(self): + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + rolesanywhere = RolesAnywhere(aws_provider) + assert len(rolesanywhere.trust_anchors) == 1 + ta = rolesanywhere.trust_anchors[TA_ARN] + assert isinstance(ta, TrustAnchor) + assert ta.id == TA_ID + assert ta.name == "pqc-trust" + assert ta.enabled is True + assert ta.source_type == "AWS_ACM_PCA" + assert ta.acm_pca_arn == PCA_ARN + assert ta.region == AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 + assert ta.tags == [{"key": "Environment", "value": "test"}] + + @patch( + "botocore.client.BaseClient._make_api_call", new=mock_make_api_call_tags_failure + ) + @mock_aws + def test_list_trust_anchors_continues_when_tags_fail(self): + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + rolesanywhere = RolesAnywhere(aws_provider) + assert len(rolesanywhere.trust_anchors) == 1 + ta = rolesanywhere.trust_anchors[TA_ARN] + assert isinstance(ta, TrustAnchor) + assert ta.id == TA_ID + assert ta.tags == [] diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/rolesanywhere/rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki/rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/rolesanywhere/rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki/rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2038fdde57 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/rolesanywhere/rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki/rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,203 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from prowler.providers.aws.services.acmpca.acmpca_service import CertificateAuthority +from prowler.providers.aws.services.rolesanywhere.rolesanywhere_service import ( + TrustAnchor, +) +from tests.providers.aws.utils import ( + AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER, + AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + set_mocked_aws_provider, +) + +TA_ID = "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555" +TA_NAME = "pqc-trust" +TA_ARN = f"arn:aws:rolesanywhere:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:trust-anchor/{TA_ID}" +PCA_ID = "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012" +PCA_ARN = f"arn:aws:acm-pca:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:certificate-authority/{PCA_ID}" + + +def _trust_anchor(*, source_type: str, acm_pca_arn: str = ""): + return TrustAnchor( + arn=TA_ARN, + id=TA_ID, + name=TA_NAME, + region=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + enabled=True, + source_type=source_type, + acm_pca_arn=acm_pca_arn, + ) + + +def _ca(key_algorithm: str, status: str = "ACTIVE"): + return CertificateAuthority( + arn=PCA_ARN, + id=PCA_ID, + region=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + status=status, + type="SUBORDINATE", + usage_mode="GENERAL_PURPOSE", + key_algorithm=key_algorithm, + signing_algorithm=( + key_algorithm if "ML_DSA" in key_algorithm else "SHA256WITHRSA" + ), + ) + + +def _build_clients(trust_anchors, certificate_authorities=None, audit_config=None): + ra_client = mock.MagicMock() + ra_client.trust_anchors = trust_anchors + ra_client.audit_config = audit_config or {} + pca_client = mock.MagicMock() + pca_client.certificate_authorities = certificate_authorities or {} + return ra_client, pca_client + + +def _patched(ra_client, pca_client): + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + return [ + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.rolesanywhere.rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki.rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki.rolesanywhere_client", + new=ra_client, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.rolesanywhere.rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki.rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki.acmpca_client", + new=pca_client, + ), + ] + + +def _enter(patches): + from contextlib import ExitStack + + stack = ExitStack() + for p in patches: + stack.enter_context(p) + return stack + + +class Test_rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki: + def test_no_trust_anchors(self): + ra_client, pca_client = _build_clients({}) + with _enter(_patched(ra_client, pca_client)): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.rolesanywhere.rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki.rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki import ( + rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki, + ) + + result = rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki().execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_pca_backed_pqc(self): + ra_client, pca_client = _build_clients( + {TA_ARN: _trust_anchor(source_type="AWS_ACM_PCA", acm_pca_arn=PCA_ARN)}, + certificate_authorities={PCA_ARN: _ca("ML_DSA_65")}, + ) + with _enter(_patched(ra_client, pca_client)): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.rolesanywhere.rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki.rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki import ( + rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki, + ) + + result = rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki().execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert "ML_DSA_65" in result[0].status_extended + assert result[0].resource_id == TA_ID + assert result[0].resource_arn == TA_ARN + + def test_pca_backed_custom_allowlist_pqc(self): + ra_client, pca_client = _build_clients( + {TA_ARN: _trust_anchor(source_type="AWS_ACM_PCA", acm_pca_arn=PCA_ARN)}, + certificate_authorities={PCA_ARN: _ca("CUSTOM_PQC")}, + audit_config={"rolesanywhere_pqc_pca_key_algorithms": ["CUSTOM_PQC"]}, + ) + with _enter(_patched(ra_client, pca_client)): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.rolesanywhere.rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki.rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki import ( + rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki, + ) + + result = rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki().execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert "CUSTOM_PQC" in result[0].status_extended + assert result[0].resource_id == TA_ID + assert result[0].resource_arn == TA_ARN + + def test_custom_allowlist_replaces_default(self): + ra_client, pca_client = _build_clients( + {TA_ARN: _trust_anchor(source_type="AWS_ACM_PCA", acm_pca_arn=PCA_ARN)}, + certificate_authorities={PCA_ARN: _ca("ML_DSA_65")}, + audit_config={"rolesanywhere_pqc_pca_key_algorithms": ["ML_DSA_87"]}, + ) + with _enter(_patched(ra_client, pca_client)): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.rolesanywhere.rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki.rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki import ( + rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki, + ) + + result = rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki().execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "ML_DSA_65" in result[0].status_extended + assert "not post-quantum (ML-DSA)" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_pca_backed_rsa(self): + ra_client, pca_client = _build_clients( + {TA_ARN: _trust_anchor(source_type="AWS_ACM_PCA", acm_pca_arn=PCA_ARN)}, + certificate_authorities={PCA_ARN: _ca("RSA_2048")}, + ) + with _enter(_patched(ra_client, pca_client)): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.rolesanywhere.rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki.rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki import ( + rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki, + ) + + result = rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki().execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "RSA_2048" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_pca_backed_inactive_pqc_ca(self): + ra_client, pca_client = _build_clients( + {TA_ARN: _trust_anchor(source_type="AWS_ACM_PCA", acm_pca_arn=PCA_ARN)}, + certificate_authorities={PCA_ARN: _ca("ML_DSA_65", status="DISABLED")}, + ) + with _enter(_patched(ra_client, pca_client)): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.rolesanywhere.rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki.rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki import ( + rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki, + ) + + result = rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki().execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "DISABLED status" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_pca_not_in_inventory(self): + ra_client, pca_client = _build_clients( + {TA_ARN: _trust_anchor(source_type="AWS_ACM_PCA", acm_pca_arn=PCA_ARN)}, + certificate_authorities={}, + ) + with _enter(_patched(ra_client, pca_client)): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.rolesanywhere.rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki.rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki import ( + rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki, + ) + + result = rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki().execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "could not be inspected" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_certificate_bundle_source(self): + ra_client, pca_client = _build_clients( + {TA_ARN: _trust_anchor(source_type="CERTIFICATE_BUNDLE")}, + ) + with _enter(_patched(ra_client, pca_client)): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.rolesanywhere.rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki.rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki import ( + rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki, + ) + + result = rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki().execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "CERTIFICATE_BUNDLE" in result[0].status_extended diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/ssm/ssm_document_secrets/ssm_document_secrets_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/ssm/ssm_document_secrets/ssm_document_secrets_test.py index 24f0a1fdd1..9fc6de4762 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/ssm/ssm_document_secrets/ssm_document_secrets_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/ssm/ssm_document_secrets/ssm_document_secrets_test.py @@ -27,13 +27,13 @@ class Test_ssm_documents_secrets: document_name = "test-document" document_arn = f"arn:aws:ssm:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:document/{document_name}" ssm_client.audited_account = AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER - ssm_client.audit_config = {"detect_secrets_plugins": None} + ssm_client.audit_config = {} ssm_client.documents = { document_name: Document( arn=document_arn, name=document_name, region=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, - content={"db_password": "test-password"}, + content={"db_password": "Tr0ub4dor3xKq9vLmZ"}, account_owners=[], ) } @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ class Test_ssm_documents_secrets: assert result[0].status == "FAIL" assert ( result[0].status_extended - == f"Potential secret found in SSM Document {document_name} -> Secret Keyword on line 2." + == f"Potential secret found in SSM Document {document_name} -> Generic Password on line 2." ) def test_document_no_secrets(self): diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/stepfunctions/stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk/stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/stepfunctions/stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk/stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..44ec8f03c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/stepfunctions/stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk/stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +from datetime import datetime +from unittest.mock import patch + +import pytest +from moto import mock_aws + +from prowler.providers.aws.services.stepfunctions.stepfunctions_service import ( + EncryptionConfiguration, + EncryptionType, + StateMachine, + StepFunctions, +) +from tests.providers.aws.utils import set_mocked_aws_provider + +AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1 = "eu-west-1" +STATE_MACHINE_ID = "state-machine-12345" +STATE_MACHINE_ARN = f"arn:aws:states:{AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1}:123456789012:stateMachine:{STATE_MACHINE_ID}" +KMS_KEY_ARN = "arn:aws:kms:eu-west-1:123456789012:key/some-key-id" + + +def create_state_machine(name, encryption_configuration): + """Create a mock StateMachine instance for use in tests. + + Args: + name (str): The display name of the state machine. + encryption_configuration (Optional[EncryptionConfiguration]): The encryption + configuration to assign to the state machine, or None. + + Returns: + StateMachine: A StateMachine instance pre-populated with test constants. + """ + return StateMachine( + id=STATE_MACHINE_ID, + arn=STATE_MACHINE_ARN, + name=name, + region=AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1, + encryption_configuration=encryption_configuration, + tags=[], + status="ACTIVE", + definition="{}", + role_arn="arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/step-functions-role", + type="STANDARD", + creation_date=datetime.now(), + ) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "state_machines, expected_count, expected_status, expected_status_extended", + [ + # No state machines , no findings + ({}, 0, None, None), + # AWS-owned key (default) , FAIL + ( + { + STATE_MACHINE_ARN: create_state_machine( + "TestStateMachine", + EncryptionConfiguration( + type=EncryptionType.AWS_OWNED_KEY, + kms_key_id=None, + kms_data_key_reuse_period_seconds=None, + ), + ) + }, + 1, + "FAIL", + "Step Functions state machine TestStateMachine is not encrypted at rest with a customer-managed KMS key.", + ), + # No encryption configuration (None) , FAIL + ( + { + STATE_MACHINE_ARN: create_state_machine( + "TestStateMachine", + None, + ) + }, + 1, + "FAIL", + "Step Functions state machine TestStateMachine is not encrypted at rest with a customer-managed KMS key.", + ), + # Customer-managed KMS key , PASS + ( + { + STATE_MACHINE_ARN: create_state_machine( + "TestStateMachine", + EncryptionConfiguration( + type=EncryptionType.CUSTOMER_MANAGED_KMS_KEY, + kms_key_id=KMS_KEY_ARN, + kms_data_key_reuse_period_seconds=300, + ), + ) + }, + 1, + "PASS", + "Step Functions state machine TestStateMachine is encrypted at rest with a customer-managed KMS key.", + ), + ], +) +@mock_aws(config={"stepfunctions": {"execute_state_machine": True}}) +def test_stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk( + state_machines, + expected_count, + expected_status, + expected_status_extended, +): + """Test stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk check across multiple scenarios. + + Parametrized test cases cover: + - No state machines present (empty findings). + - State machine using the default AWS-owned key (FAIL). + - State machine with no encryption configuration set (FAIL). + - State machine using a customer-managed KMS key (PASS). + + Args: + state_machines (dict): Mapping of ARN to StateMachine used to mock the service client. + expected_count (int): Expected number of findings returned by the check. + expected_status (Optional[str]): Expected status of the finding, or None if no findings. + expected_status_extended (Optional[str]): Expected status_extended message, or None. + """ + mocked_aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1]) + stepfunctions_client = StepFunctions(mocked_aws_provider) + stepfunctions_client.state_machines = state_machines + + with patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.stepfunctions.stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk.stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk.stepfunctions_client", + new=stepfunctions_client, + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.stepfunctions.stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk.stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk import ( + stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk, + ) + + check = stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == expected_count + + if expected_count == 1: + assert result[0].status == expected_status + assert result[0].status_extended == expected_status_extended + assert result[0].resource_id == STATE_MACHINE_ID + assert result[0].resource_arn == STATE_MACHINE_ARN + assert result[0].region == AWS_REGION_EU_WEST_1 + assert result[0].resource == state_machines[STATE_MACHINE_ARN] diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/stepfunctions/stepfunctions_statemachine_no_secrets_in_definition/stepfunctions_statemachine_no_secrets_in_definition_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/stepfunctions/stepfunctions_statemachine_no_secrets_in_definition/stepfunctions_statemachine_no_secrets_in_definition_test.py index 628525e542..1b1fa1bfca 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/stepfunctions/stepfunctions_statemachine_no_secrets_in_definition/stepfunctions_statemachine_no_secrets_in_definition_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/stepfunctions/stepfunctions_statemachine_no_secrets_in_definition/stepfunctions_statemachine_no_secrets_in_definition_test.py @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ class Test_stepfunctions_statemachine_no_secrets_in_definition: arn=statemachine_arn, name="TestStateMachine", status=StateMachineStatus.ACTIVE, - definition='{"Comment": "Example with secret", "StartAt": "MyTask", "States": {"MyTask": {"Type": "Task", "Parameters": {"api_key": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"}, "End": true}}}', + definition='{"Comment": "Example with secret", "StartAt": "MyTask", "States": {"MyTask": {"Type": "Task", "Parameters": {"api_key": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.dozjgNryP4J3jVmNHl0w5N_XgL0n3I9PlFUP0THsR8U"}, "End": true}}}', region=AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, type=StateMachineType.STANDARD, creation_date=datetime.now(), diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/transfer/transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled/transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/transfer/transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled/transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d1a098f0ad --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/transfer/transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled/transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,215 @@ +from unittest import mock +from unittest.mock import patch + +import botocore +from moto import mock_aws + +from tests.providers.aws.utils import ( + AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER, + AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + set_mocked_aws_provider, +) + +SERVER_ID = "s-01234567890abcdef" +SERVER_ARN = ( + f"arn:aws:transfer:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:server/{SERVER_ID}" +) + +make_api_call = botocore.client.BaseClient._make_api_call + + +def _make_describe_server_mock(security_policy_name: str): + def _mock(self, operation_name, kwarg): + if operation_name == "ListServers": + return { + "Servers": [ + { + "Arn": SERVER_ARN, + "ServerId": SERVER_ID, + } + ] + } + if operation_name == "DescribeServer": + return { + "Server": { + "Arn": SERVER_ARN, + "ServerId": SERVER_ID, + "Protocols": ["SFTP"], + "SecurityPolicyName": security_policy_name, + } + } + return make_api_call(self, operation_name, kwarg) + + return _mock + + +mock_pqc = _make_describe_server_mock("TransferSecurityPolicy-2025-03") +mock_fips_pqc = _make_describe_server_mock("TransferSecurityPolicy-FIPS-2025-03") +mock_classical = _make_describe_server_mock("TransferSecurityPolicy-2024-01") +mock_no_policy = _make_describe_server_mock("") + + +class Test_transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled: + @mock_aws + def test_no_servers(self): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.transfer.transfer_service import Transfer + + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ): + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.transfer.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled.transfer_client", + new=Transfer(aws_provider), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.transfer.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled import ( + transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled, + ) + + check = transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 0 + + @patch("botocore.client.BaseClient._make_api_call", new=mock_pqc) + @mock_aws + def test_pq_policy(self): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.transfer.transfer_service import Transfer + + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ): + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.transfer.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled.transfer_client", + new=Transfer(aws_provider), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.transfer.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled import ( + transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled, + ) + + check = transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert "TransferSecurityPolicy-2025-03" in result[0].status_extended + assert result[0].resource_id == SERVER_ID + assert result[0].resource_arn == SERVER_ARN + assert result[0].region == AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 + + @patch("botocore.client.BaseClient._make_api_call", new=mock_fips_pqc) + @mock_aws + def test_fips_pq_policy(self): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.transfer.transfer_service import Transfer + + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ): + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.transfer.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled.transfer_client", + new=Transfer(aws_provider), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.transfer.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled import ( + transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled, + ) + + check = transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert "FIPS-2025-03" in result[0].status_extended + + @patch("botocore.client.BaseClient._make_api_call", new=mock_classical) + @mock_aws + def test_classical_policy(self): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.transfer.transfer_service import Transfer + + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ): + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.transfer.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled.transfer_client", + new=Transfer(aws_provider), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.transfer.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled import ( + transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled, + ) + + check = transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "TransferSecurityPolicy-2024-01" in result[0].status_extended + assert "does not enable post-quantum" in result[0].status_extended + + @patch("botocore.client.BaseClient._make_api_call", new=mock_no_policy) + @mock_aws + def test_missing_policy(self): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.transfer.transfer_service import Transfer + + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ): + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.transfer.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled.transfer_client", + new=Transfer(aws_provider), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.transfer.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled import ( + transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled, + ) + + check = transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "" in result[0].status_extended + + @patch("botocore.client.BaseClient._make_api_call", new=mock_classical) + @mock_aws + def test_configurable_allowlist(self): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.transfer.transfer_service import Transfer + + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider( + [AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1], + audit_config={ + "transfer_pqc_ssh_allowed_policies": [ + "TransferSecurityPolicy-2025-03", + "TransferSecurityPolicy-2024-01", + ] + }, + ) + + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ): + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.transfer.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled.transfer_client", + new=Transfer(aws_provider), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.transfer.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled.transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled import ( + transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled, + ) + + check = transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/transfer/transfer_service_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/transfer/transfer_service_test.py index 61a963ab09..7a08e66c92 100644 --- a/tests/providers/aws/services/transfer/transfer_service_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/transfer/transfer_service_test.py @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ def mock_make_api_call(self, operation_name, kwarg): "Arn": SERVER_ARN, "ServerId": SERVER_ID, "Protocols": ["SFTP"], + "SecurityPolicyName": "TransferSecurityPolicy-2025-03", "Tags": [{"Key": "key", "Value": "value"}], } } @@ -83,3 +84,7 @@ class Test_transfer_service: assert transfer.servers[SERVER_ARN].region == "us-east-1" assert transfer.servers[SERVER_ARN].tags == [{"Key": "key", "Value": "value"}] assert transfer.servers[SERVER_ARN].protocols[0] == Protocol.SFTP + assert ( + transfer.servers[SERVER_ARN].security_policy_name + == "TransferSecurityPolicy-2025-03" + ) diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/waf/waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled/__init__.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/waf/waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/tests/providers/aws/services/waf/waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled/waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/aws/services/waf/waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled/waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..14b71e8f52 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/aws/services/waf/waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled/waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,199 @@ +from unittest import mock +from unittest.mock import patch + +import botocore +from moto import mock_aws + +from tests.providers.aws.utils import ( + AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER, + AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1, + set_mocked_aws_provider, +) + +WEB_ACL_ID = "test-web-acl-id" +WEB_ACL_NAME = "test-web-acl-name" +WEB_ACL_ARN = f"arn:aws:waf-regional:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:webacl/{WEB_ACL_ID}" +FIREHOSE_ARN = f"arn:aws:firehose:{AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1}:{AWS_ACCOUNT_NUMBER}:deliverystream/aws-waf-logs-regional" + +# Original botocore _make_api_call function +orig = botocore.client.BaseClient._make_api_call + + +def _base_waf_regional_calls(operation_name, kwarg): + """Return responses for WAFRegional API calls that are common across all test scenarios. + + Args: + operation_name (str): The name of the botocore operation being called. + kwarg (dict): The keyword arguments passed to the API call. + + Returns: + dict or None: The mocked API response if the operation is handled, otherwise None. + """ + unused_operations = [ + "ListRules", + "GetRule", + "ListRuleGroups", + "ListActivatedRulesInRuleGroup", + "ListResourcesForWebACL", + ] + if operation_name in unused_operations: + return {} + if operation_name == "GetChangeToken": + return {"ChangeToken": "my-change-token"} + if operation_name == "ListWebACLs": + return {"WebACLs": [{"WebACLId": WEB_ACL_ID, "Name": WEB_ACL_NAME}]} + if operation_name == "GetWebACL": + return {"WebACL": {"Rules": []}} + return None + + +def mock_make_api_call_logging_enabled(self, operation_name, kwarg): + """Mock botocore API calls with logging enabled on the Regional Web ACL. + + Args: + self: The botocore client instance. + operation_name (str): The name of the botocore operation being called. + kwarg (dict): The keyword arguments passed to the API call. + + Returns: + dict: The mocked API response. + """ + base = _base_waf_regional_calls(operation_name, kwarg) + if base is not None: + return base + if operation_name == "GetLoggingConfiguration": + return { + "LoggingConfiguration": { + "ResourceArn": WEB_ACL_ARN, + "LogDestinationConfigs": [FIREHOSE_ARN], + "RedactedFields": [], + "ManagedByFirewallManager": False, + } + } + return orig(self, operation_name, kwarg) + + +def mock_make_api_call_logging_disabled(self, operation_name, kwarg): + """Mock botocore API calls with logging disabled on the Regional Web ACL. + + Args: + self: The botocore client instance. + operation_name (str): The name of the botocore operation being called. + kwarg (dict): The keyword arguments passed to the API call. + + Returns: + dict: The mocked API response. + """ + base = _base_waf_regional_calls(operation_name, kwarg) + if base is not None: + return base + if operation_name == "GetLoggingConfiguration": + return { + "LoggingConfiguration": { + "ResourceArn": WEB_ACL_ARN, + "LogDestinationConfigs": [], + "RedactedFields": [], + "ManagedByFirewallManager": False, + } + } + return orig(self, operation_name, kwarg) + + +class Test_waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled: + """Tests for the waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled check.""" + + @mock_aws + def test_no_waf(self): + """Test that no findings are returned when no Regional Web ACLs exist.""" + from prowler.providers.aws.services.waf.waf_service import WAFRegional + + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ): + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.waf.waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled.waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled.wafregional_client", + new=WAFRegional(aws_provider), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.waf.waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled.waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled import ( + waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled, + ) + + check = waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 0 + + @patch( + "botocore.client.BaseClient._make_api_call", + new=mock_make_api_call_logging_disabled, + ) + @mock_aws + def test_waf_regional_webacl_logging_disabled(self): + """Test that a FAIL finding is returned when logging is disabled on a Regional Web ACL.""" + from prowler.providers.aws.services.waf.waf_service import WAFRegional + + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ): + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.waf.waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled.waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled.wafregional_client", + new=WAFRegional(aws_provider), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.waf.waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled.waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled import ( + waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled, + ) + + check = waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"AWS WAF Regional Web ACL {WEB_ACL_NAME} does not have logging enabled." + ) + assert result[0].resource_id == WEB_ACL_ID + assert result[0].resource_arn == WEB_ACL_ARN + assert result[0].region == AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 + + @patch( + "botocore.client.BaseClient._make_api_call", + new=mock_make_api_call_logging_enabled, + ) + @mock_aws + def test_waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled(self): + """Test that a PASS finding is returned when logging is enabled on a Regional Web ACL.""" + from prowler.providers.aws.services.waf.waf_service import WAFRegional + + aws_provider = set_mocked_aws_provider([AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1]) + + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=aws_provider, + ): + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.aws.services.waf.waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled.waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled.wafregional_client", + new=WAFRegional(aws_provider), + ): + from prowler.providers.aws.services.waf.waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled.waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled import ( + waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled, + ) + + check = waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"AWS WAF Regional Web ACL {WEB_ACL_NAME} does have logging enabled." + ) + assert result[0].resource_id == WEB_ACL_ID + assert result[0].resource_arn == WEB_ACL_ARN + assert result[0].region == AWS_REGION_US_EAST_1 diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled/aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled/aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b7c2ac3bd9 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled/aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +from unittest import mock + +import pytest + +from prowler.providers.azure.services.aks.aks_service import Cluster +from tests.providers.azure.azure_fixtures import ( + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID, + set_mocked_azure_provider, +) + + +def build_cluster(auto_upgrade_channel): + return Cluster( + id="/sub/rg/cluster1", + name="test-cluster", + public_fqdn="test.azmk8s.io", + private_fqdn=None, + network_policy=None, + agent_pool_profiles=[], + rbac_enabled=True, + location="eastus", + auto_upgrade_channel=auto_upgrade_channel, + ) + + +class Test_aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled: + def test_no_subscriptions(self): + aks_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.aks.aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled.aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled.aks_client", + new=aks_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.aks.aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled.aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled import ( + aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled, + ) + + aks_client.clusters = {} + + check = aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_pass(self): + aks_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.aks.aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled.aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled.aks_client", + new=aks_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.aks.aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled.aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled import ( + aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled, + ) + + cluster = build_cluster(auto_upgrade_channel="stable") + aks_client.clusters = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: {cluster.id: cluster}} + + check = aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("auto_upgrade_channel", [None, "", "none", "None"]) + def test_fail(self, auto_upgrade_channel): + aks_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.aks.aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled.aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled.aks_client", + new=aks_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.aks.aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled.aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled import ( + aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled, + ) + + cluster = build_cluster(auto_upgrade_channel=auto_upgrade_channel) + aks_client.clusters = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: {cluster.id: cluster}} + + check = aks_cluster_auto_upgrade_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled/aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled/aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a209a50199 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled/aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +from importlib import import_module +from unittest import mock +from uuid import uuid4 + +import pytest + +from prowler.providers.azure.services.aks.aks_service import Cluster +from tests.providers.azure.azure_fixtures import ( + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID, + set_mocked_azure_provider, +) + +CHECK_MODULE = ( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.aks.aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled." + "aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled" +) +CHECK_CLIENT_PATCH = f"{CHECK_MODULE}.aks_client" + + +def get_check_class(): + return import_module(CHECK_MODULE).aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled + + +def build_cluster(azure_monitor_enabled): + return Cluster( + id=str(uuid4()), + name="test-cluster", + public_fqdn="test.azmk8s.io", + private_fqdn=None, + network_policy=None, + agent_pool_profiles=[], + rbac_enabled=True, + location="eastus", + azure_monitor_enabled=azure_monitor_enabled, + ) + + +class Test_aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled: + def test_no_subscriptions(self): + aks_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + CHECK_CLIENT_PATCH, + new=aks_client, + ), + ): + aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled = get_check_class() + + aks_client.clusters = {} + + check = aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_pass(self): + aks_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + CHECK_CLIENT_PATCH, + new=aks_client, + ), + ): + aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled = get_check_class() + + cluster = build_cluster(azure_monitor_enabled=True) + aks_client.clusters = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: {cluster.id: cluster}} + + check = aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Cluster 'test-cluster' has Azure Monitor managed Prometheus metrics enabled." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "test-cluster" + assert result[0].resource_id == cluster.id + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + assert result[0].location == "eastus" + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("azure_monitor_enabled", [False, None]) + def test_fail(self, azure_monitor_enabled): + aks_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + CHECK_CLIENT_PATCH, + new=aks_client, + ), + ): + aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled = get_check_class() + + cluster = build_cluster(azure_monitor_enabled=azure_monitor_enabled) + aks_client.clusters = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: {cluster.id: cluster}} + + check = aks_cluster_azure_monitor_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Cluster 'test-cluster' does not have Azure Monitor managed Prometheus metrics enabled." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "test-cluster" + assert result[0].resource_id == cluster.id + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + assert result[0].location == "eastus" diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_defender_enabled/aks_cluster_defender_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_defender_enabled/aks_cluster_defender_enabled_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0575b67a4a --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_defender_enabled/aks_cluster_defender_enabled_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +from importlib import import_module +from unittest import mock +from uuid import uuid4 + +import pytest + +from prowler.providers.azure.services.aks.aks_service import Cluster +from tests.providers.azure.azure_fixtures import ( + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID, + set_mocked_azure_provider, +) + +CHECK_MODULE = ( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.aks.aks_cluster_defender_enabled." + "aks_cluster_defender_enabled" +) +CHECK_CLIENT_PATCH = f"{CHECK_MODULE}.aks_client" + + +def get_check_class(): + return import_module(CHECK_MODULE).aks_cluster_defender_enabled + + +def build_cluster(defender_enabled): + return Cluster( + id=str(uuid4()), + name="test-cluster", + public_fqdn="test.azmk8s.io", + private_fqdn=None, + network_policy=None, + agent_pool_profiles=[], + rbac_enabled=True, + location="eastus", + defender_enabled=defender_enabled, + ) + + +class Test_aks_cluster_defender_enabled: + def test_no_subscriptions(self): + aks_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + CHECK_CLIENT_PATCH, + new=aks_client, + ), + ): + aks_cluster_defender_enabled = get_check_class() + + aks_client.clusters = {} + + check = aks_cluster_defender_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_pass(self): + aks_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + CHECK_CLIENT_PATCH, + new=aks_client, + ), + ): + aks_cluster_defender_enabled = get_check_class() + + cluster = build_cluster(defender_enabled=True) + aks_client.clusters = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: {cluster.id: cluster}} + + check = aks_cluster_defender_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Cluster 'test-cluster' has Defender for Containers enabled." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "test-cluster" + assert result[0].resource_id == cluster.id + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + assert result[0].location == "eastus" + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("defender_enabled", [False, None, "true"]) + def test_fail(self, defender_enabled): + aks_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + CHECK_CLIENT_PATCH, + new=aks_client, + ), + ): + aks_cluster_defender_enabled = get_check_class() + + cluster = build_cluster(defender_enabled=defender_enabled) + aks_client.clusters = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: {cluster.id: cluster}} + + check = aks_cluster_defender_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Cluster 'test-cluster' does not have Defender for " + "Containers enabled." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "test-cluster" + assert result[0].resource_id == cluster.id + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + assert result[0].location == "eastus" diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled/aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled/aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a4c63dc172 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/aks/aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled/aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +from importlib import import_module +from unittest import mock +from uuid import uuid4 + +import pytest + +from prowler.providers.azure.services.aks.aks_service import Cluster +from tests.providers.azure.azure_fixtures import ( + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID, + set_mocked_azure_provider, +) + +CHECK_MODULE = ( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.aks.aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled." + "aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled" +) +CHECK_CLIENT_PATCH = f"{CHECK_MODULE}.aks_client" + + +def get_check_class(): + return import_module(CHECK_MODULE).aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled + + +def build_cluster(local_accounts_disabled): + return Cluster( + id=str(uuid4()), + name="test-cluster", + public_fqdn="test.azmk8s.io", + private_fqdn=None, + network_policy=None, + agent_pool_profiles=[], + rbac_enabled=True, + location="eastus", + local_accounts_disabled=local_accounts_disabled, + ) + + +class Test_aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled: + def test_no_subscriptions(self): + aks_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + CHECK_CLIENT_PATCH, + new=aks_client, + ), + ): + aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled = get_check_class() + + aks_client.clusters = {} + + check = aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_pass(self): + aks_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + CHECK_CLIENT_PATCH, + new=aks_client, + ), + ): + aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled = get_check_class() + + cluster = build_cluster(local_accounts_disabled=True) + aks_client.clusters = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: {cluster.id: cluster}} + + check = aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Cluster 'test-cluster' has local accounts disabled." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "test-cluster" + assert result[0].resource_id == cluster.id + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + assert result[0].location == "eastus" + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("local_accounts_disabled", [False, None]) + def test_fail(self, local_accounts_disabled): + aks_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + CHECK_CLIENT_PATCH, + new=aks_client, + ), + ): + aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled = get_check_class() + + cluster = build_cluster(local_accounts_disabled=local_accounts_disabled) + aks_client.clusters = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: {cluster.id: cluster}} + + check = aks_cluster_local_accounts_disabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Cluster 'test-cluster' has local accounts enabled." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "test-cluster" + assert result[0].resource_id == cluster.id + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + assert result[0].location == "eastus" diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled/cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled/cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8b4330d64c --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled/cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from tests.providers.azure.azure_fixtures import ( + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID, + set_mocked_azure_provider, +) + + +class Test_cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled: + def test_no_subscriptions(self): + cosmosdb_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled.cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled.cosmosdb_client", + new=cosmosdb_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled.cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled import ( + cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled, + ) + + cosmosdb_client.accounts = {} + + check = cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_pass(self): + cosmosdb_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled.cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled.cosmosdb_client", + new=cosmosdb_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled.cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled import ( + cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_service import ( + Account, + ) + + cosmosdb_client.accounts = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [ + Account( + id="/subscriptions/sub1/resourceGroups/rg1/providers/Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts/test-account", + name="test-account", + kind="GlobalDocumentDB", + type="Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts", + tags={}, + is_virtual_network_filter_enabled=False, + location="eastus", + private_endpoint_connections=[], + disable_local_auth=False, + enable_automatic_failover=True, + ) + ] + } + + check = cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + + def test_fail(self): + cosmosdb_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled.cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled.cosmosdb_client", + new=cosmosdb_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled.cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled import ( + cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_service import ( + Account, + ) + + cosmosdb_client.accounts = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [ + Account( + id="/subscriptions/sub1/resourceGroups/rg1/providers/Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts/test-account", + name="test-account", + kind="GlobalDocumentDB", + type="Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts", + tags={}, + is_virtual_network_filter_enabled=False, + location="eastus", + private_endpoint_connections=[], + disable_local_auth=False, + enable_automatic_failover=False, + ) + ] + } + + check = cosmosdb_account_automatic_failover_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous/cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous/cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0cc282485b --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous/cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from tests.providers.azure.azure_fixtures import ( + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID, + set_mocked_azure_provider, +) + + +class Test_cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous: + def test_no_subscriptions(self): + cosmosdb_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous.cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous.cosmosdb_client", + new=cosmosdb_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous.cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous import ( + cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous, + ) + + cosmosdb_client.accounts = {} + + check = cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_pass(self): + cosmosdb_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous.cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous.cosmosdb_client", + new=cosmosdb_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous.cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous import ( + cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_service import ( + Account, + ) + + cosmosdb_client.accounts = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [ + Account( + id="/subscriptions/sub1/resourceGroups/rg1/providers/Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts/test-account", + name="test-account", + kind="GlobalDocumentDB", + type="Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts", + tags={}, + is_virtual_network_filter_enabled=False, + location="eastus", + private_endpoint_connections=[], + disable_local_auth=False, + backup_policy_type="Continuous", + ) + ] + } + + check = cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + + def test_fail_periodic(self): + cosmosdb_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous.cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous.cosmosdb_client", + new=cosmosdb_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous.cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous import ( + cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_service import ( + Account, + ) + + cosmosdb_client.accounts = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [ + Account( + id="/subscriptions/sub1/resourceGroups/rg1/providers/Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts/test-account", + name="test-account", + kind="GlobalDocumentDB", + type="Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts", + tags={}, + is_virtual_network_filter_enabled=False, + location="eastus", + private_endpoint_connections=[], + disable_local_auth=False, + backup_policy_type="Periodic", + ) + ] + } + + check = cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + + def test_fail_no_backup_policy(self): + cosmosdb_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous.cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous.cosmosdb_client", + new=cosmosdb_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous.cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous import ( + cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_service import ( + Account, + ) + + cosmosdb_client.accounts = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [ + Account( + id="/subscriptions/sub1/resourceGroups/rg1/providers/Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts/test-account", + name="test-account", + kind="GlobalDocumentDB", + type="Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts", + tags={}, + is_virtual_network_filter_enabled=False, + location="eastus", + private_endpoint_connections=[], + disable_local_auth=False, + backup_policy_type=None, + ) + ] + } + + check = cosmosdb_account_backup_policy_continuous() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version/cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version/cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b14c08f697 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version/cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,209 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from tests.providers.azure.azure_fixtures import ( + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID, + set_mocked_azure_provider, +) + + +class Test_cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version: + def test_no_subscriptions(self): + cosmosdb_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version.cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version.cosmosdb_client", + new=cosmosdb_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version.cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version import ( + cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version, + ) + + cosmosdb_client.accounts = {} + + check = cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_pass_tls12(self): + cosmosdb_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version.cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version.cosmosdb_client", + new=cosmosdb_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version.cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version import ( + cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_service import ( + Account, + ) + + cosmosdb_client.accounts = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [ + Account( + id="/subscriptions/sub1/resourceGroups/rg1/providers/Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts/test-account", + name="test-account", + kind="GlobalDocumentDB", + type="Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts", + tags={}, + is_virtual_network_filter_enabled=False, + location="eastus", + private_endpoint_connections=[], + disable_local_auth=False, + minimal_tls_version="Tls12", + ) + ] + } + + check = cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert result[0].status_extended == ( + f"CosmosDB account test-account from subscription " + f"{AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID} enforces TLS 1.2 or higher." + ) + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + + def test_pass_tls13(self): + cosmosdb_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version.cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version.cosmosdb_client", + new=cosmosdb_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version.cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version import ( + cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_service import ( + Account, + ) + + cosmosdb_client.accounts = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [ + Account( + id="/subscriptions/sub1/resourceGroups/rg1/providers/Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts/test-account", + name="test-account", + kind="GlobalDocumentDB", + type="Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts", + tags={}, + is_virtual_network_filter_enabled=False, + location="eastus", + private_endpoint_connections=[], + disable_local_auth=False, + minimal_tls_version="Tls13", + ) + ] + } + + check = cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + + def test_fail_tls11(self): + cosmosdb_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version.cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version.cosmosdb_client", + new=cosmosdb_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version.cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version import ( + cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_service import ( + Account, + ) + + cosmosdb_client.accounts = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [ + Account( + id="/subscriptions/sub1/resourceGroups/rg1/providers/Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts/test-account", + name="test-account", + kind="GlobalDocumentDB", + type="Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts", + tags={}, + is_virtual_network_filter_enabled=False, + location="eastus", + private_endpoint_connections=[], + disable_local_auth=False, + minimal_tls_version="Tls11", + ) + ] + } + + check = cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].status_extended == ( + f"CosmosDB account test-account from subscription " + f"{AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID} does not enforce TLS 1.2 or higher." + ) + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + + def test_fail_no_tls_version(self): + cosmosdb_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version.cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version.cosmosdb_client", + new=cosmosdb_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version.cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version import ( + cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_service import ( + Account, + ) + + cosmosdb_client.accounts = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [ + Account( + id="/subscriptions/sub1/resourceGroups/rg1/providers/Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts/test-account", + name="test-account", + kind="GlobalDocumentDB", + type="Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts", + tags={}, + is_virtual_network_filter_enabled=False, + location="eastus", + private_endpoint_connections=[], + disable_local_auth=False, + minimal_tls_version=None, + ) + ] + } + + check = cosmosdb_account_minimum_tls_version() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled/cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled/cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..60297d6138 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/cosmosdb/cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled/cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,210 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from tests.providers.azure.azure_fixtures import ( + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID, + set_mocked_azure_provider, +) + + +class Test_cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled: + def test_no_subscriptions(self): + cosmosdb_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled.cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled.cosmosdb_client", + new=cosmosdb_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled.cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled import ( + cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled, + ) + + cosmosdb_client.accounts = {} + + check = cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_pass_disabled(self): + cosmosdb_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled.cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled.cosmosdb_client", + new=cosmosdb_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled.cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled import ( + cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_service import ( + Account, + ) + + cosmosdb_client.accounts = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [ + Account( + id="/subscriptions/sub1/resourceGroups/rg1/providers/Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts/test-account", + name="test-account", + kind="GlobalDocumentDB", + type="Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts", + tags={}, + is_virtual_network_filter_enabled=False, + location="eastus", + private_endpoint_connections=[], + disable_local_auth=False, + public_network_access="Disabled", + ) + ] + } + + check = cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert result[0].status_extended == ( + f"CosmosDB account test-account from subscription " + f"{AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID} has public network access disabled." + ) + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + + def test_pass_secured_by_perimeter(self): + cosmosdb_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled.cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled.cosmosdb_client", + new=cosmosdb_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled.cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled import ( + cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_service import ( + Account, + ) + + cosmosdb_client.accounts = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [ + Account( + id="/subscriptions/sub1/resourceGroups/rg1/providers/Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts/test-account", + name="test-account", + kind="GlobalDocumentDB", + type="Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts", + tags={}, + is_virtual_network_filter_enabled=False, + location="eastus", + private_endpoint_connections=[], + disable_local_auth=False, + public_network_access="SecuredByPerimeter", + ) + ] + } + + check = cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + + def test_fail_enabled(self): + cosmosdb_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled.cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled.cosmosdb_client", + new=cosmosdb_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled.cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled import ( + cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_service import ( + Account, + ) + + cosmosdb_client.accounts = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [ + Account( + id="/subscriptions/sub1/resourceGroups/rg1/providers/Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts/test-account", + name="test-account", + kind="GlobalDocumentDB", + type="Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts", + tags={}, + is_virtual_network_filter_enabled=False, + location="eastus", + private_endpoint_connections=[], + disable_local_auth=False, + public_network_access="Enabled", + ) + ] + } + + check = cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].status_extended == ( + f"CosmosDB account test-account from subscription " + f"{AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID} does not have public network access " + f"disabled (current value: 'Enabled')." + ) + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + + def test_fail_no_public_network_access(self): + cosmosdb_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled.cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled.cosmosdb_client", + new=cosmosdb_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled.cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled import ( + cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.cosmosdb.cosmosdb_service import ( + Account, + ) + + cosmosdb_client.accounts = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [ + Account( + id="/subscriptions/sub1/resourceGroups/rg1/providers/Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts/test-account", + name="test-account", + kind="GlobalDocumentDB", + type="Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts", + tags={}, + is_virtual_network_filter_enabled=False, + location="eastus", + private_endpoint_connections=[], + disable_local_auth=False, + public_network_access=None, + ) + ] + } + + check = cosmosdb_account_public_network_access_disabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_service_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_service_test.py index 69651f2235..f663d81fe2 100644 --- a/tests/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_service_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_service_test.py @@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ def mock_databricks_get_workspaces(_): id="test-workspace-id", name="test-workspace", location="eastus", + public_network_access="Disabled", + no_public_ip_enabled=True, custom_managed_vnet_id="test-vnet-id", managed_disk_encryption=ManagedDiskEncryption( key_name="test-key", @@ -53,6 +55,8 @@ class Test_Databricks_Service: assert workspace.id == "test-workspace-id" assert workspace.name == "test-workspace" assert workspace.location == "eastus" + assert workspace.public_network_access == "Disabled" + assert workspace.no_public_ip_enabled is True assert workspace.custom_managed_vnet_id == "test-vnet-id" assert ( workspace.managed_disk_encryption.__class__.__name__ diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled/databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled/databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a7903770c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled/databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +from unittest import mock +from uuid import uuid4 + +from prowler.providers.azure.services.databricks.databricks_service import ( + DatabricksWorkspace, +) +from tests.providers.azure.azure_fixtures import ( + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY, + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID, + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME, + set_mocked_azure_provider, +) + + +class Test_databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled: + def test_databricks_no_workspaces(self): + databricks_client = mock.MagicMock + databricks_client.subscriptions = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME + } + databricks_client.workspaces = {} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.databricks.databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled.databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled.databricks_client", + new=databricks_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.databricks.databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled.databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled import ( + databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled, + ) + + check = databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_disabled(self): + workspace_id = str(uuid4()) + workspace_name = "test-workspace" + databricks_client = mock.MagicMock + databricks_client.subscriptions = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME + } + databricks_client.workspaces = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: { + workspace_id: DatabricksWorkspace( + id=workspace_id, + name=workspace_name, + location="eastus", + no_public_ip_enabled=False, + ) + } + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.databricks.databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled.databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled.databricks_client", + new=databricks_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.databricks.databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled.databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled import ( + databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled, + ) + + check = databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Databricks workspace {workspace_name} in subscription {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY} does not have secure cluster connectivity (no public IP) enabled." + ) + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + assert result[0].resource_name == workspace_name + assert result[0].resource_id == workspace_id + assert result[0].location == "eastus" + + def test_databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled(self): + workspace_id = str(uuid4()) + workspace_name = "test-workspace" + databricks_client = mock.MagicMock + databricks_client.subscriptions = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME + } + databricks_client.workspaces = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: { + workspace_id: DatabricksWorkspace( + id=workspace_id, + name=workspace_name, + location="eastus", + no_public_ip_enabled=True, + ) + } + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.databricks.databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled.databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled.databricks_client", + new=databricks_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.databricks.databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled.databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled import ( + databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled, + ) + + check = databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Databricks workspace {workspace_name} in subscription {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY} has secure cluster connectivity (no public IP) enabled." + ) + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + assert result[0].resource_name == workspace_name + assert result[0].resource_id == workspace_id + assert result[0].location == "eastus" + + def test_databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_not_reported(self): + workspace_id = str(uuid4()) + workspace_name = "test-workspace" + databricks_client = mock.MagicMock + databricks_client.subscriptions = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME + } + databricks_client.workspaces = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: { + workspace_id: DatabricksWorkspace( + id=workspace_id, + name=workspace_name, + location="eastus", + no_public_ip_enabled=None, + ) + } + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.databricks.databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled.databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled.databricks_client", + new=databricks_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.databricks.databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled.databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled import ( + databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled, + ) + + check = databricks_workspace_no_public_ip_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "MANUAL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Databricks workspace {workspace_name} in subscription {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY} does not expose secure cluster connectivity (no public IP) settings (for example, serverless workspaces have no public-IP cluster nodes); verify the network configuration manually." + ) + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + assert result[0].resource_name == workspace_name + assert result[0].resource_id == workspace_id + assert result[0].location == "eastus" diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled/databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled/databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7d39d38760 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/databricks/databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled/databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +from unittest import mock +from uuid import uuid4 + +from prowler.providers.azure.services.databricks.databricks_service import ( + DatabricksWorkspace, +) +from tests.providers.azure.azure_fixtures import ( + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY, + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID, + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME, + set_mocked_azure_provider, +) + + +class Test_databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled: + def test_databricks_no_workspaces(self): + databricks_client = mock.MagicMock + databricks_client.subscriptions = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME + } + databricks_client.workspaces = {} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.databricks.databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled.databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled.databricks_client", + new=databricks_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.databricks.databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled.databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled import ( + databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled, + ) + + check = databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_databricks_workspace_public_network_access_enabled(self): + workspace_id = str(uuid4()) + workspace_name = "test-workspace" + databricks_client = mock.MagicMock + databricks_client.subscriptions = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME + } + databricks_client.workspaces = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: { + workspace_id: DatabricksWorkspace( + id=workspace_id, + name=workspace_name, + location="eastus", + public_network_access="Enabled", + ) + } + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.databricks.databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled.databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled.databricks_client", + new=databricks_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.databricks.databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled.databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled import ( + databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled, + ) + + check = databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Databricks workspace {workspace_name} in subscription {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY} has public network access enabled." + ) + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + assert result[0].resource_name == workspace_name + assert result[0].resource_id == workspace_id + assert result[0].location == "eastus" + + def test_databricks_workspace_public_network_access_not_set(self): + workspace_id = str(uuid4()) + workspace_name = "test-workspace" + databricks_client = mock.MagicMock + databricks_client.subscriptions = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME + } + databricks_client.workspaces = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: { + workspace_id: DatabricksWorkspace( + id=workspace_id, + name=workspace_name, + location="eastus", + public_network_access=None, + ) + } + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.databricks.databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled.databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled.databricks_client", + new=databricks_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.databricks.databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled.databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled import ( + databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled, + ) + + check = databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Databricks workspace {workspace_name} in subscription {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY} has public network access enabled." + ) + + def test_databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled(self): + workspace_id = str(uuid4()) + workspace_name = "test-workspace" + databricks_client = mock.MagicMock + databricks_client.subscriptions = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME + } + databricks_client.workspaces = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: { + workspace_id: DatabricksWorkspace( + id=workspace_id, + name=workspace_name, + location="eastus", + public_network_access="Disabled", + ) + } + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.databricks.databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled.databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled.databricks_client", + new=databricks_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.databricks.databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled.databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled import ( + databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled, + ) + + check = databricks_workspace_public_network_access_disabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Databricks workspace {workspace_name} in subscription {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY} has public network access disabled." + ) + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + assert result[0].resource_name == workspace_name + assert result[0].resource_id == workspace_id + assert result[0].location == "eastus" diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/defender/defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on/defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/defender/defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on/defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b81d10d31d --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/defender/defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on/defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +from unittest import mock +from uuid import uuid4 + +from prowler.providers.azure.services.defender.defender_service import Pricing +from tests.providers.azure.azure_fixtures import ( + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY, + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID, + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME, + set_mocked_azure_provider, +) + + +class Test_defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on: + def test_defender_no_cspm(self): + defender_client = mock.MagicMock + defender_client.subscriptions = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME} + defender_client.pricings = {} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.defender.defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on.defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.defender.defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on.defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on import ( + defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on, + ) + + check = defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_defender_cspm_pricing_tier_not_standard(self): + resource_id = str(uuid4()) + defender_client = mock.MagicMock + defender_client.subscriptions = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME} + defender_client.pricings = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: { + "CloudPosture": Pricing( + resource_id=resource_id, + resource_name="Defender plan CSPM", + pricing_tier="Free", + free_trial_remaining_time=0, + ) + } + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.defender.defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on.defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.defender.defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on.defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on import ( + defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on, + ) + + check = defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Defender plan CSPM from subscription {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY} is set to OFF (pricing tier not standard)." + ) + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender plan CSPM" + assert result[0].resource_id == resource_id + + def test_defender_cspm_pricing_tier_standard(self): + resource_id = str(uuid4()) + defender_client = mock.MagicMock + defender_client.subscriptions = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME} + defender_client.pricings = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: { + "CloudPosture": Pricing( + resource_id=resource_id, + resource_name="Defender plan CSPM", + pricing_tier="Standard", + free_trial_remaining_time=0, + ) + } + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.defender.defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on.defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on.defender_client", + new=defender_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.defender.defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on.defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on import ( + defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on, + ) + + check = defender_ensure_defender_cspm_is_on() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Defender plan CSPM from subscription {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY} is set to ON (pricing tier standard)." + ) + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + assert result[0].resource_name == "Defender plan CSPM" + assert result[0].resource_id == resource_id diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired/entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired/entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..89fa5bac16 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired/entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,269 @@ +from datetime import datetime, timezone, timedelta +from unittest import mock +from uuid import uuid4 + +from tests.providers.azure.azure_fixtures import DOMAIN, set_mocked_azure_provider + + +class Test_entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired: + def test_entra_no_tenants(self): + entra_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired import ( + entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired, + ) + + entra_client.app_registrations = {} + + check = entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_entra_app_no_credentials(self): + entra_client = mock.MagicMock + app_id = str(uuid4()) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired import ( + entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_service import ( + AppRegistration, + ) + + app = AppRegistration(id=app_id, name="no-creds-app", credentials=[]) + entra_client.app_registrations = {DOMAIN: {app_id: app}} + + check = entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_entra_app_credential_expired(self): + entra_client = mock.MagicMock + app_id = str(uuid4()) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired import ( + entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_service import ( + AppCredential, + AppRegistration, + ) + + app = AppRegistration( + id=app_id, + name="expired-app", + credentials=[ + AppCredential( + display_name="old-secret", + credential_type="password", + end_date_time=datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=30), + ) + ], + ) + entra_client.app_registrations = {DOMAIN: {app_id: app}} + + check = entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "expired" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_entra_app_credential_expiring_soon(self): + entra_client = mock.MagicMock + app_id = str(uuid4()) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired import ( + entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_service import ( + AppCredential, + AppRegistration, + ) + + app = AppRegistration( + id=app_id, + name="expiring-soon-app", + credentials=[ + AppCredential( + display_name="expiring-cert", + credential_type="certificate", + end_date_time=datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=15), + ) + ], + ) + entra_client.app_registrations = {DOMAIN: {app_id: app}} + + check = entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "expiring in" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_entra_app_credential_no_expiration(self): + entra_client = mock.MagicMock + app_id = str(uuid4()) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired import ( + entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_service import ( + AppCredential, + AppRegistration, + ) + + app = AppRegistration( + id=app_id, + name="no-expiry-app", + credentials=[ + AppCredential( + display_name="forever-secret", + credential_type="password", + end_date_time=None, + ) + ], + ) + entra_client.app_registrations = {DOMAIN: {app_id: app}} + + check = entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "no expiration" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_entra_app_credential_valid(self): + entra_client = mock.MagicMock + app_id = str(uuid4()) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired import ( + entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_service import ( + AppCredential, + AppRegistration, + ) + + app = AppRegistration( + id=app_id, + name="healthy-app", + credentials=[ + AppCredential( + display_name="good-secret", + credential_type="password", + end_date_time=datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=180), + ) + ], + ) + entra_client.app_registrations = {DOMAIN: {app_id: app}} + + check = entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert "more days" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_entra_app_multiple_credentials_mixed(self): + entra_client = mock.MagicMock + app_id = str(uuid4()) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired.entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired import ( + entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_service import ( + AppCredential, + AppRegistration, + ) + + app = AppRegistration( + id=app_id, + name="mixed-app", + credentials=[ + AppCredential( + display_name="expired-one", + credential_type="password", + end_date_time=datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=10), + ), + AppCredential( + display_name="valid-one", + credential_type="certificate", + end_date_time=datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=200), + ), + ], + ) + entra_client.app_registrations = {DOMAIN: {app_id: app}} + + check = entra_app_registration_credential_not_expired() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + statuses = {r.status for r in result} + assert "FAIL" in statuses + assert "PASS" in statuses diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced/entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced/entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e3102bf3e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced/entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,205 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from tests.providers.azure.azure_fixtures import DOMAIN, set_mocked_azure_provider + +CHECK_MODULE = ( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.entra." + "entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced." + "entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced" +) + + +class Test_entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced: + def test_entra_no_tenants(self): + entra_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch(f"{CHECK_MODULE}.entra_client", new=entra_client), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced.entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced import ( + entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced, + ) + + entra_client.authentication_methods_policy = {} + + check = entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_entra_policy_none(self): + entra_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch(f"{CHECK_MODULE}.entra_client", new=entra_client), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced.entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced import ( + entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced, + ) + + entra_client.authentication_methods_policy = {DOMAIN: None} + + check = entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_entra_registration_enabled_strong_method_enabled(self): + entra_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch(f"{CHECK_MODULE}.entra_client", new=entra_client), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced.entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced import ( + entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_service import ( + AuthMethodConfig, + AuthMethodsPolicy, + ) + + policy = AuthMethodsPolicy( + id="authMethodsPolicy", + registration_enforcement_state="enabled", + method_configurations=[ + AuthMethodConfig( + id="MicrosoftAuthenticator", + method_name="microsoftAuthenticator", + state="enabled", + ), + AuthMethodConfig(id="Sms", method_name="sms", state="enabled"), + ], + ) + entra_client.authentication_methods_policy = {DOMAIN: policy} + + check = entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert result[0].resource_name == "Authentication Methods Policy" + assert result[0].resource_id == "authMethodsPolicy" + assert "is enforced" in result[0].status_extended + assert "microsoftAuthenticator" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_entra_registration_disabled_no_strong_methods(self): + entra_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch(f"{CHECK_MODULE}.entra_client", new=entra_client), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced.entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced import ( + entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_service import ( + AuthMethodConfig, + AuthMethodsPolicy, + ) + + policy = AuthMethodsPolicy( + id="authMethodsPolicy", + registration_enforcement_state="disabled", + method_configurations=[ + AuthMethodConfig(id="Sms", method_name="sms", state="enabled"), + AuthMethodConfig(id="Voice", method_name="voice", state="enabled"), + ], + ) + entra_client.authentication_methods_policy = {DOMAIN: policy} + + check = entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "is not enforced" in result[0].status_extended + assert "registration campaign is not enabled" in result[0].status_extended + assert "no strong authentication methods" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_entra_registration_disabled_strong_method_enabled(self): + entra_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch(f"{CHECK_MODULE}.entra_client", new=entra_client), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced.entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced import ( + entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_service import ( + AuthMethodConfig, + AuthMethodsPolicy, + ) + + policy = AuthMethodsPolicy( + id="authMethodsPolicy", + registration_enforcement_state="disabled", + method_configurations=[ + AuthMethodConfig(id="Fido2", method_name="fido2", state="enabled"), + ], + ) + entra_client.authentication_methods_policy = {DOMAIN: policy} + + check = entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced() + result = check.execute() + # Strong method present but registration campaign off -> not enforced + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "registration campaign is not enabled" in result[0].status_extended + assert "no strong authentication methods" not in result[0].status_extended + + def test_entra_multiple_strong_methods(self): + entra_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch(f"{CHECK_MODULE}.entra_client", new=entra_client), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced.entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced import ( + entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_service import ( + AuthMethodConfig, + AuthMethodsPolicy, + ) + + policy = AuthMethodsPolicy( + id="authMethodsPolicy", + registration_enforcement_state="enabled", + method_configurations=[ + AuthMethodConfig( + id="MicrosoftAuthenticator", + method_name="microsoftAuthenticator", + state="enabled", + ), + AuthMethodConfig(id="Fido2", method_name="fido2", state="enabled"), + AuthMethodConfig( + id="x509", method_name="x509Certificate", state="enabled" + ), + ], + ) + entra_client.authentication_methods_policy = {DOMAIN: policy} + + check = entra_authentication_methods_policy_strong_auth_enforced() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert "microsoftAuthenticator" in result[0].status_extended + assert "fido2" in result[0].status_extended diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_service_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_service_test.py index 75ef4f98c4..ebd2b790ab 100644 --- a/tests/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_service_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_service_test.py @@ -294,6 +294,7 @@ def test_azure_entra__get_users_handles_pagination(): "id", "displayName", "accountEnabled", + "signInActivity", ] with_url_mock.assert_called_once_with("next-link") registration_details_builder.get.assert_awaited() diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_user_with_recent_sign_in/entra_user_with_recent_sign_in_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_user_with_recent_sign_in/entra_user_with_recent_sign_in_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f940cf232c --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/entra/entra_user_with_recent_sign_in/entra_user_with_recent_sign_in_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,321 @@ +from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone +from unittest import mock +from uuid import uuid4 + +from tests.providers.azure.azure_fixtures import DOMAIN, set_mocked_azure_provider + + +class Test_entra_user_with_recent_sign_in: + def test_entra_no_tenants(self): + entra_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in import ( + entra_user_with_recent_sign_in, + ) + + entra_client.users = {} + + check = entra_user_with_recent_sign_in() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_entra_user_disabled(self): + entra_client = mock.MagicMock + user_id = str(uuid4()) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_service import User + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in import ( + entra_user_with_recent_sign_in, + ) + + user = User( + id=user_id, + name="disabled-user", + account_enabled=False, + last_sign_in=None, + ) + + entra_client.users = {DOMAIN: {f"disabled-user@{DOMAIN}": user}} + + check = entra_user_with_recent_sign_in() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_entra_user_never_signed_in(self): + entra_client = mock.MagicMock + user_id = str(uuid4()) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_service import User + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in import ( + entra_user_with_recent_sign_in, + ) + + user = User( + id=user_id, + name="never-signed-in", + account_enabled=True, + last_sign_in=None, + ) + + entra_client.users = {DOMAIN: {f"never-signed-in@{DOMAIN}": user}} + + check = entra_user_with_recent_sign_in() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "No sign-in activity data available" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_entra_single_user_no_sign_in_data_reports_telemetry_gap(self): + entra_client = mock.MagicMock + user_id = str(uuid4()) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_service import User + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in import ( + entra_user_with_recent_sign_in, + ) + + user = User( + id=user_id, + name="single-user", + account_enabled=True, + last_sign_in=None, + ) + + entra_client.users = {DOMAIN: {f"single-user@{DOMAIN}": user}} + + check = entra_user_with_recent_sign_in() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "No sign-in activity data available" in result[0].status_extended + assert "1 enabled user" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_entra_user_stale_sign_in(self): + entra_client = mock.MagicMock + user_id = str(uuid4()) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_service import User + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in import ( + entra_user_with_recent_sign_in, + ) + + user = User( + id=user_id, + name="stale-user", + account_enabled=True, + last_sign_in=datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=120), + ) + + entra_client.users = {DOMAIN: {f"stale-user@{DOMAIN}": user}} + + check = entra_user_with_recent_sign_in() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "120 days" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_entra_user_recent_sign_in(self): + entra_client = mock.MagicMock + user_id = str(uuid4()) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_service import User + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in import ( + entra_user_with_recent_sign_in, + ) + + user = User( + id=user_id, + name="active-user", + account_enabled=True, + last_sign_in=datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=10), + ) + + entra_client.users = {DOMAIN: {f"active-user@{DOMAIN}": user}} + + check = entra_user_with_recent_sign_in() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert "10 days ago" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_entra_all_users_no_sign_in_data_license_issue(self): + entra_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_service import User + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in import ( + entra_user_with_recent_sign_in, + ) + + # Multiple enabled users, ALL with no sign-in data = license issue + users = {} + for i in range(5): + uid = str(uuid4()) + users[f"user{i}@{DOMAIN}"] = User( + id=uid, + name=f"user{i}", + account_enabled=True, + last_sign_in=None, + ) + + entra_client.users = {DOMAIN: users} + + check = entra_user_with_recent_sign_in() + result = check.execute() + # Should produce 1 finding (license warning), not 5 individual FAILs + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "Entra ID P1/P2 licensing" in result[0].status_extended + assert "5 enabled users" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_entra_user_never_signed_in_when_telemetry_exists_for_tenant(self): + entra_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_service import User + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in import ( + entra_user_with_recent_sign_in, + ) + + active_user = User( + id=str(uuid4()), + name="active-user", + account_enabled=True, + last_sign_in=datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=5), + ) + never_user = User( + id=str(uuid4()), + name="never-user", + account_enabled=True, + last_sign_in=None, + ) + + entra_client.users = { + DOMAIN: { + f"active-user@{DOMAIN}": active_user, + f"never-user@{DOMAIN}": never_user, + } + } + + check = entra_user_with_recent_sign_in() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + assert any( + r.status == "PASS" and "5 days ago" in r.status_extended for r in result + ) + assert any( + r.status == "FAIL" and "never signed in" in r.status_extended + for r in result + ) + + def test_entra_user_boundary_90_days(self): + entra_client = mock.MagicMock + user_id = str(uuid4()) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_service import User + from prowler.providers.azure.services.entra.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in.entra_user_with_recent_sign_in import ( + entra_user_with_recent_sign_in, + ) + + user = User( + id=user_id, + name="boundary-user", + account_enabled=True, + last_sign_in=datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=90), + ) + + entra_client.users = {DOMAIN: {f"boundary-user@{DOMAIN}": user}} + + check = entra_user_with_recent_sign_in() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert "90 days ago" in result[0].status_extended diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/keyvault/keyvault_logging_enabled/keyvault_logging_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/keyvault/keyvault_logging_enabled/keyvault_logging_enabled_test.py index 2fff845a7d..6050263af3 100644 --- a/tests/providers/azure/services/keyvault/keyvault_logging_enabled/keyvault_logging_enabled_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/keyvault/keyvault_logging_enabled/keyvault_logging_enabled_test.py @@ -244,6 +244,158 @@ class Test_keyvault_logging_enabled: assert result[0].resource_name == "name_keyvault" assert result[0].resource_id == "id" + def test_diagnostic_setting_with_audit_event_category_logging(self): + keyvault_client = mock.MagicMock + keyvault_client.subscriptions = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.monitor.monitor_service.Monitor", + new=mock.MagicMock(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.keyvault.keyvault_logging_enabled.keyvault_logging_enabled.keyvault_client", + new=keyvault_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.keyvault.keyvault_logging_enabled.keyvault_logging_enabled import ( + keyvault_logging_enabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.keyvault.keyvault_service import ( + KeyVaultInfo, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.monitor.monitor_service import ( + DiagnosticSetting, + ) + + keyvault_client.key_vaults = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [ + KeyVaultInfo( + id="id", + name="name_keyvault", + location="westeurope", + resource_group="resource_group", + properties=VaultProperties( + tenant_id="tenantid", + sku="sku", + enable_rbac_authorization=False, + ), + keys=[], + secrets=[], + monitor_diagnostic_settings=[ + DiagnosticSetting( + id="id/ds1", + logs=[ + mock.MagicMock( + category_group=None, + category="AuditEvent", + enabled=True, + ), + mock.MagicMock( + category_group=None, + category="AzurePolicyEvaluationDetails", + enabled=False, + ), + ], + storage_account_name="sa1", + storage_account_id="sa_id1", + name="ds_audit_event", + ), + ], + ), + ] + } + check = keyvault_logging_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Key Vault name_keyvault in subscription {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY} has a diagnostic setting with audit logging." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "name_keyvault" + assert result[0].resource_id == "id" + + def test_diagnostic_setting_with_audit_event_category_disabled(self): + keyvault_client = mock.MagicMock + keyvault_client.subscriptions = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.monitor.monitor_service.Monitor", + new=mock.MagicMock(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.keyvault.keyvault_logging_enabled.keyvault_logging_enabled.keyvault_client", + new=keyvault_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.keyvault.keyvault_logging_enabled.keyvault_logging_enabled import ( + keyvault_logging_enabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.keyvault.keyvault_service import ( + KeyVaultInfo, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.monitor.monitor_service import ( + DiagnosticSetting, + ) + + keyvault_client.key_vaults = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [ + KeyVaultInfo( + id="id", + name="name_keyvault", + location="westeurope", + resource_group="resource_group", + properties=VaultProperties( + tenant_id="tenantid", + sku="sku", + enable_rbac_authorization=False, + ), + keys=[], + secrets=[], + monitor_diagnostic_settings=[ + DiagnosticSetting( + id="id/ds1", + logs=[ + mock.MagicMock( + category_group=None, + category="AuditEvent", + enabled=False, + ), + mock.MagicMock( + category_group=None, + category="AzurePolicyEvaluationDetails", + enabled=False, + ), + ], + storage_account_name="sa1", + storage_account_id="sa_id1", + name="ds_audit_event_disabled", + ), + ], + ), + ] + } + check = keyvault_logging_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Key Vault name_keyvault in subscription {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY} does not have a diagnostic setting with audit logging." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == "name_keyvault" + assert result[0].resource_id == "id" + def test_multiple_diagnostic_settings_one_compliant(self): keyvault_client = mock.MagicMock keyvault_client.subscriptions = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME} diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled/mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled/mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c5e1f27de2 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled/mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +from unittest import mock +from uuid import uuid4 + +from prowler.providers.azure.services.mysql.mysql_service import FlexibleServer +from tests.providers.azure.azure_fixtures import ( + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY, + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID, + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME, + set_mocked_azure_provider, +) + + +class Test_mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled: + def test_mysql_no_subscriptions(self): + mysql_client = mock.MagicMock + mysql_client.subscriptions = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME} + mysql_client.flexible_servers = {} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.mysql.mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.mysql_client", + new=mysql_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.mysql.mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled import ( + mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled, + ) + + check = mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_mysql_geo_redundant_backup_disabled(self): + server_id = str(uuid4()) + server_name = "test-server" + mysql_client = mock.MagicMock + mysql_client.subscriptions = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME} + mysql_client.flexible_servers = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: { + server_id: FlexibleServer( + resource_id=server_id, + name=server_name, + location="eastus", + version="8.0", + configurations={}, + geo_redundant_backup="Disabled", + ) + } + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.mysql.mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.mysql_client", + new=mysql_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.mysql.mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled import ( + mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled, + ) + + check = mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Geo-redundant backup is disabled for server {server_name} in subscription {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY}." + ) + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + assert result[0].resource_name == server_name + assert result[0].resource_id == server_id + assert result[0].location == "eastus" + + def test_mysql_geo_redundant_backup_enabled(self): + server_id = str(uuid4()) + server_name = "test-server" + mysql_client = mock.MagicMock + mysql_client.subscriptions = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME} + mysql_client.flexible_servers = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: { + server_id: FlexibleServer( + resource_id=server_id, + name=server_name, + location="eastus", + version="8.0", + configurations={}, + geo_redundant_backup="Enabled", + ) + } + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.mysql.mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.mysql_client", + new=mysql_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.mysql.mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled import ( + mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled, + ) + + check = mysql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Geo-redundant backup is enabled for server {server_name} in subscription {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY}." + ) + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + assert result[0].resource_name == server_name + assert result[0].resource_id == server_id + assert result[0].location == "eastus" diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled/mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled/mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c1084ec47b --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/mysql/mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled/mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,166 @@ +from unittest import mock +from uuid import uuid4 + +from prowler.providers.azure.services.mysql.mysql_service import FlexibleServer +from tests.providers.azure.azure_fixtures import ( + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY, + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID, + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME, + set_mocked_azure_provider, +) + + +class Test_mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled: + def test_mysql_no_subscriptions(self): + mysql_client = mock.MagicMock + mysql_client.subscriptions = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME} + mysql_client.flexible_servers = {} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.mysql.mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.mysql_client", + new=mysql_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.mysql.mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled import ( + mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled, + ) + + check = mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_mysql_high_availability_disabled(self): + server_id = str(uuid4()) + server_name = "test-server" + mysql_client = mock.MagicMock + mysql_client.subscriptions = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME} + mysql_client.flexible_servers = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: { + server_id: FlexibleServer( + resource_id=server_id, + name=server_name, + location="eastus", + version="8.0", + configurations={}, + high_availability_mode="Disabled", + ) + } + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.mysql.mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.mysql_client", + new=mysql_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.mysql.mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled import ( + mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled, + ) + + check = mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"High availability is disabled for server {server_name} in subscription {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY}." + ) + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + assert result[0].resource_name == server_name + assert result[0].resource_id == server_id + assert result[0].location == "eastus" + + def test_mysql_high_availability_not_set(self): + server_id = str(uuid4()) + server_name = "test-server" + mysql_client = mock.MagicMock + mysql_client.subscriptions = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME} + mysql_client.flexible_servers = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: { + server_id: FlexibleServer( + resource_id=server_id, + name=server_name, + location="eastus", + version="8.0", + configurations={}, + high_availability_mode=None, + ) + } + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.mysql.mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.mysql_client", + new=mysql_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.mysql.mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled import ( + mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled, + ) + + check = mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"High availability is disabled for server {server_name} in subscription {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY}." + ) + + def test_mysql_high_availability_enabled(self): + server_id = str(uuid4()) + server_name = "test-server" + mysql_client = mock.MagicMock + mysql_client.subscriptions = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME} + mysql_client.flexible_servers = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: { + server_id: FlexibleServer( + resource_id=server_id, + name=server_name, + location="eastus", + version="8.0", + configurations={}, + high_availability_mode="ZoneRedundant", + ) + } + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.mysql.mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.mysql_client", + new=mysql_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.mysql.mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled import ( + mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled, + ) + + check = mysql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"High availability is enabled for server {server_name} in subscription {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY}." + ) + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + assert result[0].resource_name == server_name + assert result[0].resource_id == server_id + assert result[0].location == "eastus" diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/network/network_subnet_nsg_associated/network_subnet_nsg_associated_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/network/network_subnet_nsg_associated/network_subnet_nsg_associated_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4166c6f968 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/network/network_subnet_nsg_associated/network_subnet_nsg_associated_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,188 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from tests.providers.azure.azure_fixtures import ( + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID, + set_mocked_azure_provider, +) + +VNET_ID = f"/subscriptions/{AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID}/resourceGroups/rg1/providers/Microsoft.Network/virtualNetworks/test-vnet" +SUBNET_ID = f"{VNET_ID}/subnets/test-subnet" +NSG_ID = f"/subscriptions/{AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID}/resourceGroups/rg1/providers/Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/test-nsg" + + +class Test_network_subnet_nsg_associated: + def test_no_subscriptions(self): + network_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.network.network_subnet_nsg_associated.network_subnet_nsg_associated.network_client", + new=network_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.network.network_subnet_nsg_associated.network_subnet_nsg_associated import ( + network_subnet_nsg_associated, + ) + + network_client.virtual_networks = {} + + check = network_subnet_nsg_associated() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_subnet_with_nsg(self): + network_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.network.network_subnet_nsg_associated.network_subnet_nsg_associated.network_client", + new=network_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.network.network_service import ( + VirtualNetwork, + VNetSubnet, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.network.network_subnet_nsg_associated.network_subnet_nsg_associated import ( + network_subnet_nsg_associated, + ) + + vnet = VirtualNetwork( + id=VNET_ID, + name="test-vnet", + location="eastus", + subnets=[VNetSubnet(id=SUBNET_ID, name="test-subnet", nsg_id=NSG_ID)], + ) + network_client.virtual_networks = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [vnet]} + + check = network_subnet_nsg_associated() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + + def test_subnet_without_nsg(self): + network_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.network.network_subnet_nsg_associated.network_subnet_nsg_associated.network_client", + new=network_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.network.network_service import ( + VirtualNetwork, + VNetSubnet, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.network.network_subnet_nsg_associated.network_subnet_nsg_associated import ( + network_subnet_nsg_associated, + ) + + vnet = VirtualNetwork( + id=VNET_ID, + name="test-vnet", + location="eastus", + subnets=[VNetSubnet(id=SUBNET_ID, name="app-subnet", nsg_id=None)], + ) + network_client.virtual_networks = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [vnet]} + + check = network_subnet_nsg_associated() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + + def test_gateway_subnet_excluded(self): + network_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.network.network_subnet_nsg_associated.network_subnet_nsg_associated.network_client", + new=network_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.network.network_service import ( + VirtualNetwork, + VNetSubnet, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.network.network_subnet_nsg_associated.network_subnet_nsg_associated import ( + network_subnet_nsg_associated, + ) + + vnet = VirtualNetwork( + id=VNET_ID, + name="test-vnet", + location="eastus", + subnets=[ + VNetSubnet( + id=f"{VNET_ID}/subnets/GatewaySubnet", + name="GatewaySubnet", + nsg_id=None, + ) + ], + ) + network_client.virtual_networks = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [vnet]} + + check = network_subnet_nsg_associated() + result = check.execute() + # GatewaySubnet should be excluded + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_mixed_subnets(self): + network_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.network.network_subnet_nsg_associated.network_subnet_nsg_associated.network_client", + new=network_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.network.network_service import ( + VirtualNetwork, + VNetSubnet, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.network.network_subnet_nsg_associated.network_subnet_nsg_associated import ( + network_subnet_nsg_associated, + ) + + vnet = VirtualNetwork( + id=VNET_ID, + name="test-vnet", + location="eastus", + subnets=[ + VNetSubnet(id=f"{VNET_ID}/subnets/app", name="app", nsg_id=NSG_ID), + VNetSubnet(id=f"{VNET_ID}/subnets/db", name="db", nsg_id=None), + VNetSubnet( + id=f"{VNET_ID}/subnets/GatewaySubnet", + name="GatewaySubnet", + nsg_id=None, + ), + ], + ) + network_client.virtual_networks = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [vnet]} + + check = network_subnet_nsg_associated() + result = check.execute() + # 2 results: app (PASS) + db (FAIL), GatewaySubnet excluded + assert len(result) == 2 + statuses = {r.status for r in result} + assert "PASS" in statuses + assert "FAIL" in statuses diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/network/network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled/network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/network/network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled/network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f37d3eb781 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/network/network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled/network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from tests.providers.azure.azure_fixtures import ( + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID, + set_mocked_azure_provider, +) + +VNET_ID = f"/subscriptions/{AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID}/resourceGroups/rg1/providers/Microsoft.Network/virtualNetworks/test-vnet" + + +class Test_network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled: + def test_no_subscriptions(self): + network_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.network.network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled.network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled.network_client", + new=network_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.network.network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled.network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled import ( + network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled, + ) + + network_client.virtual_networks = {} + + check = network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_ddos_enabled(self): + network_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.network.network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled.network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled.network_client", + new=network_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.network.network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled.network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled import ( + network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.network.network_service import ( + VirtualNetwork, + ) + + vnet = VirtualNetwork( + id=VNET_ID, + name="test-vnet", + location="eastus", + enable_ddos_protection=True, + ) + network_client.virtual_networks = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [vnet]} + + check = network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + + def test_ddos_disabled(self): + network_client = mock.MagicMock + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.network.network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled.network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled.network_client", + new=network_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.network.network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled.network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled import ( + network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.network.network_service import ( + VirtualNetwork, + ) + + vnet = VirtualNetwork( + id=VNET_ID, + name="test-vnet", + location="eastus", + enable_ddos_protection=False, + ) + network_client.virtual_networks = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [vnet]} + + check = network_vnet_ddos_protection_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled/postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled/postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..db0291c989 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled/postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +from unittest import mock +from uuid import uuid4 + +from prowler.providers.azure.services.postgresql.postgresql_service import Server +from tests.providers.azure.azure_fixtures import ( + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY, + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID, + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME, + set_mocked_azure_provider, +) + + +def _make_server(server_id, server_name, geo_redundant_backup): + return Server( + id=server_id, + name=server_name, + resource_group="resource_group", + location="eastus", + require_secure_transport="ON", + active_directory_auth="Enabled", + entra_id_admins=[], + log_checkpoints="ON", + log_connections="ON", + log_disconnections="ON", + connection_throttling="ON", + log_retention_days="3", + firewall=[], + geo_redundant_backup=geo_redundant_backup, + ) + + +class Test_postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled: + def test_no_postgresql_flexible_servers(self): + postgresql_client = mock.MagicMock + postgresql_client.subscriptions = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME + } + postgresql_client.flexible_servers = {} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.postgresql.postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.postgresql_client", + new=postgresql_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.postgresql.postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled import ( + postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled, + ) + + check = postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_postgresql_geo_redundant_backup_disabled(self): + server_id = str(uuid4()) + server_name = "test-server" + postgresql_client = mock.MagicMock + postgresql_client.subscriptions = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME + } + postgresql_client.flexible_servers = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [_make_server(server_id, server_name, "Disabled")] + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.postgresql.postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.postgresql_client", + new=postgresql_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.postgresql.postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled import ( + postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled, + ) + + check = postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Flexible Postgresql server {server_name} from subscription {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY} does not have geo-redundant backup enabled." + ) + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + assert result[0].resource_name == server_name + assert result[0].resource_id == server_id + assert result[0].location == "eastus" + + def test_postgresql_geo_redundant_backup_enabled(self): + server_id = str(uuid4()) + server_name = "test-server" + postgresql_client = mock.MagicMock + postgresql_client.subscriptions = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME + } + postgresql_client.flexible_servers = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [_make_server(server_id, server_name, "Enabled")] + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.postgresql.postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.postgresql_client", + new=postgresql_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.postgresql.postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled.postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled import ( + postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled, + ) + + check = postgresql_flexible_server_geo_redundant_backup_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Flexible Postgresql server {server_name} from subscription {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY} has geo-redundant backup enabled." + ) + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + assert result[0].resource_name == server_name + assert result[0].resource_id == server_id + assert result[0].location == "eastus" diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled/postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled/postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..190c8629ce --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled/postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,168 @@ +from unittest import mock +from uuid import uuid4 + +from prowler.providers.azure.services.postgresql.postgresql_service import Server +from tests.providers.azure.azure_fixtures import ( + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY, + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID, + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME, + set_mocked_azure_provider, +) + + +def _make_server(server_id, server_name, high_availability_mode): + return Server( + id=server_id, + name=server_name, + resource_group="resource_group", + location="eastus", + require_secure_transport="ON", + active_directory_auth="Enabled", + entra_id_admins=[], + log_checkpoints="ON", + log_connections="ON", + log_disconnections="ON", + connection_throttling="ON", + log_retention_days="3", + firewall=[], + high_availability_mode=high_availability_mode, + ) + + +class Test_postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled: + def test_no_postgresql_flexible_servers(self): + postgresql_client = mock.MagicMock + postgresql_client.subscriptions = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME + } + postgresql_client.flexible_servers = {} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.postgresql.postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.postgresql_client", + new=postgresql_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.postgresql.postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled import ( + postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled, + ) + + check = postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_postgresql_high_availability_disabled(self): + server_id = str(uuid4()) + server_name = "test-server" + postgresql_client = mock.MagicMock + postgresql_client.subscriptions = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME + } + postgresql_client.flexible_servers = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [_make_server(server_id, server_name, "Disabled")] + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.postgresql.postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.postgresql_client", + new=postgresql_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.postgresql.postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled import ( + postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled, + ) + + check = postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Flexible Postgresql server {server_name} from subscription {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY} does not have high availability enabled." + ) + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + assert result[0].resource_name == server_name + assert result[0].resource_id == server_id + assert result[0].location == "eastus" + + def test_postgresql_high_availability_not_set(self): + server_id = str(uuid4()) + server_name = "test-server" + postgresql_client = mock.MagicMock + postgresql_client.subscriptions = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME + } + postgresql_client.flexible_servers = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [_make_server(server_id, server_name, None)] + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.postgresql.postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.postgresql_client", + new=postgresql_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.postgresql.postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled import ( + postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled, + ) + + check = postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Flexible Postgresql server {server_name} from subscription {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY} does not have high availability enabled." + ) + + def test_postgresql_high_availability_enabled(self): + server_id = str(uuid4()) + server_name = "test-server" + postgresql_client = mock.MagicMock + postgresql_client.subscriptions = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_NAME + } + postgresql_client.flexible_servers = { + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: [ + _make_server(server_id, server_name, "ZoneRedundant") + ] + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.postgresql.postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.postgresql_client", + new=postgresql_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.postgresql.postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled.postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled import ( + postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled, + ) + + check = postgresql_flexible_server_high_availability_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Flexible Postgresql server {server_name} from subscription {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_DISPLAY} has high availability enabled." + ) + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + assert result[0].resource_name == server_name + assert result[0].resource_id == server_id + assert result[0].location == "eastus" diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_service_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_service_test.py index f36b5675ec..f372de8844 100644 --- a/tests/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_service_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/postgresql/postgresql_service_test.py @@ -1,4 +1,7 @@ -from unittest.mock import patch +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +import pytest +from azure.core.exceptions import HttpResponseError, ResourceNotFoundError from prowler.providers.azure.services.postgresql.postgresql_service import ( EntraIdAdmin, @@ -115,6 +118,44 @@ class Test_SqlServer_Service: == "ON" ) + def test_get_connection_throttling_missing_parameter_returns_none(self): + # PostgreSQL v18 removed the "connection_throttle.enable" parameter; when + # it is genuinely absent the Azure SDK raises ResourceNotFoundError, and + # the service treats that as "not enabled" (quiet None) instead of + # aborting the whole subscription's server inventory. + postgresql = PostgreSQL(set_mocked_azure_provider()) + mock_client = MagicMock() + mock_client.configurations.get.side_effect = ResourceNotFoundError( + "The configuration 'connection_throttle.enable' does not exist for " + "server version 18." + ) + postgresql.clients[AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID] = mock_client + with patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.postgresql.postgresql_service.logger" + ) as mock_logger: + result = postgresql._get_connection_throttling( + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID, "resource_group", "server_name" + ) + assert result is None + mock_logger.error.assert_not_called() + + def test_get_connection_throttling_unexpected_error_propagates(self): + # Any other failure (permissions, throttling, transient API errors) must + # NOT be swallowed into None: that would make the downstream check report + # the server as having throttling disabled, hiding a collection failure + # as a security finding. The error propagates so the per-server handler + # in _get_flexible_servers can record it as a collection failure. + postgresql = PostgreSQL(set_mocked_azure_provider()) + mock_client = MagicMock() + mock_client.configurations.get.side_effect = HttpResponseError( + "(AuthorizationFailed) permission denied" + ) + postgresql.clients[AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID] = mock_client + with pytest.raises(HttpResponseError): + postgresql._get_connection_throttling( + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID, "resource_group", "server_name" + ) + def test_get_log_retention_days(self): postgesql = PostgreSQL(set_mocked_azure_provider()) assert ( @@ -138,6 +179,45 @@ class Test_SqlServer_Service: assert admins[0].principal_name == "Test Admin User" assert admins[0].object_id == "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111" + def test_get_entra_id_admins_aad_not_enabled_logs_warning(self): + # A server using PostgreSQL authentication only (Entra/Azure AD auth + # disabled) is an expected state; it should be logged as a warning, not + # an error, and return an empty admin list. + postgresql = PostgreSQL(set_mocked_azure_provider()) + mock_client = MagicMock() + mock_client.administrators.list_by_server.side_effect = Exception( + "Azure AD authentication is not enabled for the given server" + ) + postgresql.clients[AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID] = mock_client + with patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.postgresql.postgresql_service.logger" + ) as mock_logger: + result = postgresql._get_entra_id_admins( + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID, "resource_group", "server_name" + ) + assert result == [] + mock_logger.warning.assert_called_once() + mock_logger.error.assert_not_called() + + def test_get_entra_id_admins_unexpected_error_logs_error(self): + # Any other failure (permissions, throttling, transient API errors) is a + # genuine problem and must still be logged as an error. + postgresql = PostgreSQL(set_mocked_azure_provider()) + mock_client = MagicMock() + mock_client.administrators.list_by_server.side_effect = Exception( + "Some unexpected failure" + ) + postgresql.clients[AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID] = mock_client + with patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.postgresql.postgresql_service.logger" + ) as mock_logger: + result = postgresql._get_entra_id_admins( + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID, "resource_group", "server_name" + ) + assert result == [] + mock_logger.error.assert_called_once() + mock_logger.warning.assert_not_called() + def test_get_firewall(self): postgesql = PostgreSQL(set_mocked_azure_provider()) assert ( @@ -161,3 +241,126 @@ class Test_SqlServer_Service: postgesql.flexible_servers[AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID][0].firewall[0].end_ip == "end_ip" ) + + +def _make_server(name): + server = MagicMock() + server.id = ( + f"/subscriptions/{AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID}/resourceGroups/rg/providers/" + f"Microsoft.DBforPostgreSQL/flexibleServers/{name}" + ) + server.name = name + return server + + +class Test_PostgreSQL_Service_Resilience: + """Collecting one flexible server must never abort collection of the rest of + the subscription (regression: a missing/failing per-server configuration + lookup silently dropped every remaining server).""" + + def _build_service_with_client(self, mock_client): + # Skip the real network call during construction, then run the real + # collection against the mocked management client. + with patch.object(PostgreSQL, "_get_flexible_servers", return_value={}): + postgresql = PostgreSQL(set_mocked_azure_provider()) + postgresql.clients = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: mock_client} + return postgresql + + def test_missing_connection_throttle_config_still_collects_server(self): + # The "connection_throttle.enable" parameter was removed in PostgreSQL + # 16+, so the lookup raises ConfigurationNotExists on newer servers. + dev = _make_server("dev") + prd = _make_server("prd") + + mock_client = MagicMock() + mock_client.servers.list.return_value = [dev, prd] + server_details = MagicMock() + server_details.location = "westeurope" + mock_client.servers.get.return_value = server_details + mock_client.administrators.list_by_server.return_value = [] + mock_client.firewall_rules.list_by_server.return_value = [] + + def configurations_get(resource_group, server_name, key): + if key == "connection_throttle.enable" and server_name == "prd": + # Azure raises ResourceNotFoundError (ConfigurationNotExists) + # when the parameter does not exist on the server. + raise ResourceNotFoundError( + "(ConfigurationNotExists) The configuration " + "'connection_throttle.enable' does not exist for prd server " + "version 18." + ) + return MagicMock(value="ON") + + mock_client.configurations.get.side_effect = configurations_get + + postgresql = self._build_service_with_client(mock_client) + servers = postgresql._get_flexible_servers() + + names = sorted(server.name for server in servers[AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID]) + assert names == ["dev", "prd"] + prd_server = next(s for s in servers[AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID] if s.name == "prd") + assert prd_server.connection_throttling is None + dev_server = next(s for s in servers[AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID] if s.name == "dev") + assert dev_server.connection_throttling == "ON" + + def test_unexpected_throttling_error_is_not_silently_collected(self): + # An unexpected failure reading "connection_throttle.enable" (e.g. a + # permission, throttling, or transient SDK error) must NOT be turned + # into connection_throttling=None: that would make the downstream check + # report the server as having throttling disabled, hiding a collection + # failure as a security finding. Only ResourceNotFoundError (the + # parameter genuinely missing) is treated as "not enabled"; anything + # else isolates to that server, which is dropped rather than fabricated. + ok = _make_server("ok") + denied = _make_server("denied") + + mock_client = MagicMock() + mock_client.servers.list.return_value = [ok, denied] + server_details = MagicMock() + server_details.location = "westeurope" + mock_client.servers.get.return_value = server_details + mock_client.administrators.list_by_server.return_value = [] + mock_client.firewall_rules.list_by_server.return_value = [] + + def configurations_get(resource_group, server_name, key): + if key == "connection_throttle.enable" and server_name == "denied": + raise HttpResponseError("(AuthorizationFailed) permission denied") + return MagicMock(value="ON") + + mock_client.configurations.get.side_effect = configurations_get + + postgresql = self._build_service_with_client(mock_client) + servers = postgresql._get_flexible_servers() + + collected = servers[AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID] + # The server whose throttling lookup failed unexpectedly is dropped, + # not collected with a fabricated connection_throttling=None. + assert [server.name for server in collected] == ["ok"] + assert all(server.connection_throttling is not None for server in collected) + + def test_one_server_hard_failure_does_not_drop_others(self): + # A failure unrelated to a guarded getter (here, fetching the server + # details) must isolate to that server, not the whole subscription. + ok = _make_server("ok") + broken = _make_server("broken") + + mock_client = MagicMock() + mock_client.servers.list.return_value = [broken, ok] + mock_client.administrators.list_by_server.return_value = [] + mock_client.firewall_rules.list_by_server.return_value = [] + mock_client.configurations.get.return_value = MagicMock(value="ON") + + def servers_get(resource_group, server_name): + if server_name == "broken": + raise Exception("boom: transient failure fetching server details") + details = MagicMock() + details.location = "westeurope" + return details + + mock_client.servers.get.side_effect = servers_get + + postgresql = self._build_service_with_client(mock_client) + servers = postgresql._get_flexible_servers() + + names = [server.name for server in servers[AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID]] + assert names == ["ok"] diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_service_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_service_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..93dcad1e38 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_service_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +from types import SimpleNamespace +from unittest import mock + +from prowler.providers.azure.services.recovery.recovery_service import ( + BackupVault, + RecoveryBackup, +) +from tests.providers.azure.azure_fixtures import AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + +VAULT_ID = ( + f"/subscriptions/{AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID}/resourceGroups/rg1/" + "providers/Microsoft.RecoveryServices/vaults/test-vault" +) +POLICY_ID = f"{VAULT_ID}/backupPolicies/ShortPolicy" + + +class BackupClientFake: + def __init__(self, policies): + self.backup_policies = mock.MagicMock() + self.backup_policies.list.return_value = policies + + +class Test_RecoveryBackup_Service: + def test_get_backup_policies_lists_unprotected_vault_policies(self): + policy = SimpleNamespace( + id=POLICY_ID, + name="ShortPolicy", + properties=SimpleNamespace( + retention_policy=SimpleNamespace( + daily_schedule=SimpleNamespace( + retention_duration=SimpleNamespace(count=7) + ) + ) + ), + ) + client = BackupClientFake(policies=[policy]) + vault = BackupVault( + id=VAULT_ID, + name="test-vault", + location="eastus", + backup_protected_items={}, + ) + recovery_backup = object.__new__(RecoveryBackup) + recovery_backup.clients = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: client} + + backup_policies = recovery_backup._get_backup_policies( + subscription_id=AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID, + vault=vault, + ) + + client.backup_policies.list.assert_called_once_with( + vault_name="test-vault", + resource_group_name="rg1", + ) + assert list(backup_policies) == [POLICY_ID] + assert backup_policies[POLICY_ID].name == "ShortPolicy" + assert backup_policies[POLICY_ID].retention_days == 7 diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate/recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate/recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..56c7e3f5da --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate/recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,191 @@ +from unittest import mock +from tests.providers.azure.azure_fixtures import ( + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID, + set_mocked_azure_provider, +) + +VAULT_ID = f"/subscriptions/{AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID}/resourceGroups/rg1/providers/Microsoft.RecoveryServices/vaults/test-vault" +POLICY_ID = f"{VAULT_ID}/backupPolicies/DefaultPolicy" + + +class Test_recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate: + def test_no_subscriptions(self): + recovery_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.recovery.recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate.recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate.recovery_client", + new=recovery_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.recovery.recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate.recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate import ( + recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate, + ) + + recovery_client.vaults = {} + + check = recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_vault_no_policies(self): + recovery_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.recovery.recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate.recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate.recovery_client", + new=recovery_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.recovery.recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate.recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate import ( + recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.recovery.recovery_service import ( + BackupVault, + ) + + vault = BackupVault( + id=VAULT_ID, + name="test-vault", + location="eastus", + backup_policies={}, + ) + recovery_client.vaults = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: {VAULT_ID: vault}} + + check = recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "has no backup policies configured" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_policy_adequate_retention(self): + recovery_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.recovery.recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate.recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate.recovery_client", + new=recovery_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.recovery.recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate.recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate import ( + recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.recovery.recovery_service import ( + BackupPolicy, + BackupVault, + ) + + vault = BackupVault( + id=VAULT_ID, + name="test-vault", + location="eastus", + backup_policies={ + POLICY_ID: BackupPolicy( + id=POLICY_ID, + name="DefaultPolicy", + retention_days=90, + ) + }, + ) + recovery_client.vaults = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: {VAULT_ID: vault}} + + check = recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert "90-day" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_policy_insufficient_retention(self): + recovery_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.recovery.recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate.recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate.recovery_client", + new=recovery_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.recovery.recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate.recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate import ( + recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.recovery.recovery_service import ( + BackupPolicy, + BackupVault, + ) + + vault = BackupVault( + id=VAULT_ID, + name="test-vault", + location="eastus", + backup_policies={ + POLICY_ID: BackupPolicy( + id=POLICY_ID, + name="ShortPolicy", + retention_days=7, + ) + }, + ) + recovery_client.vaults = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: {VAULT_ID: vault}} + + check = recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "7-day" in result[0].status_extended + assert "minimum: 30" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_policy_no_retention_configured(self): + recovery_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.recovery.recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate.recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate.recovery_client", + new=recovery_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.recovery.recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate.recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate import ( + recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.recovery.recovery_service import ( + BackupPolicy, + BackupVault, + ) + + vault = BackupVault( + id=VAULT_ID, + name="test-vault", + location="eastus", + backup_policies={ + POLICY_ID: BackupPolicy( + id=POLICY_ID, + name="NoRetentionPolicy", + retention_days=None, + ) + }, + ) + recovery_client.vaults = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: {VAULT_ID: vault}} + + check = recovery_vault_backup_policy_retention_adequate() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "no daily retention" in result[0].status_extended diff --git a/tests/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_vault_has_protected_items/recovery_vault_has_protected_items_test.py b/tests/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_vault_has_protected_items/recovery_vault_has_protected_items_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c9f8aa27b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/azure/services/recovery/recovery_vault_has_protected_items/recovery_vault_has_protected_items_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from tests.providers.azure.azure_fixtures import ( + AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID, + set_mocked_azure_provider, +) + +VAULT_ID = f"/subscriptions/{AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID}/resourceGroups/rg1/providers/Microsoft.RecoveryServices/vaults/test-vault" + + +class Test_recovery_vault_has_protected_items: + def test_no_subscriptions(self): + recovery_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.recovery.recovery_vault_has_protected_items.recovery_vault_has_protected_items.recovery_client", + new=recovery_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.recovery.recovery_vault_has_protected_items.recovery_vault_has_protected_items import ( + recovery_vault_has_protected_items, + ) + + recovery_client.vaults = {} + + check = recovery_vault_has_protected_items() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_vault_with_protected_items(self): + recovery_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.recovery.recovery_vault_has_protected_items.recovery_vault_has_protected_items.recovery_client", + new=recovery_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.recovery.recovery_vault_has_protected_items.recovery_vault_has_protected_items import ( + recovery_vault_has_protected_items, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.recovery.recovery_service import ( + BackupItem, + BackupVault, + ) + + vault = BackupVault( + id=VAULT_ID, + name="test-vault", + location="eastus", + backup_protected_items={ + "item1": BackupItem( + id="item1", + name="vm-backup", + workload_type=None, + ) + }, + ) + recovery_client.vaults = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: {VAULT_ID: vault}} + + check = recovery_vault_has_protected_items() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert "1 protected items" in result[0].status_extended + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + assert result[0].resource_id == VAULT_ID + assert result[0].resource_name == "test-vault" + assert result[0].location == "eastus" + + def test_vault_empty(self): + recovery_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_azure_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.azure.services.recovery.recovery_vault_has_protected_items.recovery_vault_has_protected_items.recovery_client", + new=recovery_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.azure.services.recovery.recovery_vault_has_protected_items.recovery_vault_has_protected_items import ( + recovery_vault_has_protected_items, + ) + from prowler.providers.azure.services.recovery.recovery_service import ( + BackupVault, + ) + + vault = BackupVault( + id=VAULT_ID, + name="empty-vault", + location="westeurope", + backup_protected_items={}, + ) + recovery_client.vaults = {AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID: {VAULT_ID: vault}} + + check = recovery_vault_has_protected_items() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "no protected items" in result[0].status_extended + assert result[0].subscription == AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID + assert result[0].resource_id == VAULT_ID + assert result[0].resource_name == "empty-vault" + assert result[0].location == "westeurope" diff --git a/tests/providers/external/test_dynamic_provider_loading.py b/tests/providers/external/test_dynamic_provider_loading.py index eefde19545..ed367ad518 100644 --- a/tests/providers/external/test_dynamic_provider_loading.py +++ b/tests/providers/external/test_dynamic_provider_loading.py @@ -344,6 +344,84 @@ class TestProviderDiscovery: assert help_text["nohelptext"] == "" +class TestSdkOnly: + """The ``sdk_only`` flag (default True) and Provider.get_app_providers.""" + + def test_base_contract_defaults_to_sdk_only(self): + # The default must be True so nothing leaks into the app implicitly. + assert Provider.sdk_only is True + + def test_external_provider_without_flag_is_sdk_only(self): + # FakeExternalProvider does not override the flag -> inherits True. + assert FakeExternalProvider.sdk_only is True + + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_class") + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_available_providers") + def test_get_app_providers_filters_out_sdk_only( + self, mock_available, mock_get_class + ): + app_cls = type("AppProvider", (Provider,), {"sdk_only": False}) + sdk_cls = type("SdkProvider", (Provider,), {"sdk_only": True}) + mock_available.return_value = ["appone", "sdkone", "apptwo"] + mock_get_class.side_effect = lambda name: { + "appone": app_cls, + "sdkone": sdk_cls, + "apptwo": app_cls, + }[name] + + app_providers = Provider.get_app_providers() + + assert app_providers == ["appone", "apptwo"] + + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_class") + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_available_providers") + def test_get_app_providers_excludes_provider_that_fails_to_load( + self, mock_available, mock_get_class + ): + # A provider whose class cannot be imported is treated as sdk_only + # (excluded) so a broken plug-in never leaks into the app. + app_cls = type("AppProvider", (Provider,), {"sdk_only": False}) + mock_available.return_value = ["appone", "broken"] + + def _get_class(name): + if name == "broken": + raise ImportError("missing transitive dep") + return app_cls + + mock_get_class.side_effect = _get_class + + assert Provider.get_app_providers() == ["appone"] + + def test_app_exposed_builtins_declare_sdk_only_false(self): + # The providers implemented end-to-end in the API/UI must opt in. + app_providers = set(Provider.get_app_providers()) + for name in ( + "aws", + "azure", + "gcp", + "kubernetes", + "m365", + "github", + "mongodbatlas", + "iac", + "oraclecloud", + "alibabacloud", + "cloudflare", + "openstack", + "image", + "googleworkspace", + "vercel", + "okta", + ): + assert name in app_providers, f"{name} should be exposed to the app" + + def test_sdk_only_builtins_are_hidden_from_app(self): + # Built-ins not implemented in the API stay SDK-only via the default. + app_providers = set(Provider.get_app_providers()) + for name in ("llm", "nhn", "scaleway", "stackit"): + assert name not in app_providers, f"{name} must be hidden from the app" + + class TestIsToolWrapperProvider: """Tests for Provider.is_tool_wrapper_provider — the helper that combines the built-in EXTERNAL_TOOL_PROVIDERS frozenset with the is_external_tool_provider @@ -417,17 +495,19 @@ class TestIsBuiltinProvider: class TestInitProvidersParserBuiltinDependencyFailure: - """Tests the critical behavior fix: when a built-in provider's arguments - module exists but its imports fail (e.g. boto3 not installed), we must - fail loudly with a clear message — not silently fall through to entry - points as if the provider were external.""" + """Selective fail-loud: init captures failures silently, enforce emits + warning for non-invoked and exits for the invoked broken provider.""" + @patch("sys.argv", ["prowler", "aws"]) @patch("prowler.providers.common.arguments.Provider.is_builtin") @patch("prowler.providers.common.arguments.import_module") def test_builtin_with_missing_transitive_dep_fails_loudly( self, mock_import, mock_is_builtin ): - from prowler.providers.common.arguments import init_providers_parser + from prowler.providers.common.arguments import ( + enforce_invoked_provider_loaded, + init_providers_parser, + ) mock_is_builtin.return_value = True mock_import.side_effect = ImportError("No module named 'boto3'") @@ -435,14 +515,14 @@ class TestInitProvidersParserBuiltinDependencyFailure: parser = MagicMock() parser._providers = ["aws"] - with ( - patch( - "prowler.providers.common.arguments.Provider.get_available_providers", - return_value=["aws"], - ), - pytest.raises(SystemExit), + with patch( + "prowler.providers.common.arguments.Provider.get_available_providers", + return_value=["aws"], ): init_providers_parser(parser) + assert "aws" in parser._builtin_load_failures + with pytest.raises(SystemExit): + enforce_invoked_provider_loaded(parser) @patch("prowler.providers.common.arguments.Provider.is_builtin") @patch("prowler.providers.common.arguments.Provider._load_ep_provider") @@ -466,6 +546,290 @@ class TestInitProvidersParserBuiltinDependencyFailure: ext_cls.init_parser.assert_called_once_with(parser) + @patch("sys.argv", ["prowler", "aws"]) + @patch("prowler.providers.common.arguments.Provider.is_builtin") + @patch("prowler.providers.common.arguments.import_module") + def test_unrelated_builtin_failure_does_not_abort_when_other_provider_invoked( + self, mock_import, mock_is_builtin + ): + """Broken stackit + invoked aws → warning, no abort.""" + from prowler.providers.common.arguments import ( + enforce_invoked_provider_loaded, + init_providers_parser, + ) + + mock_is_builtin.return_value = True + aws_module = MagicMock() + + def import_side_effect(module_path): + if "stackit" in module_path: + raise ImportError("No module named 'stackit.objectstorage'") + return aws_module + + mock_import.side_effect = import_side_effect + + parser = MagicMock() + + with patch( + "prowler.providers.common.arguments.Provider.get_available_providers", + return_value=["aws", "stackit"], + ): + init_providers_parser(parser) + assert "stackit" in parser._builtin_load_failures + enforce_invoked_provider_loaded(parser) + + aws_module.init_parser.assert_called_once_with(parser) + + @patch("sys.argv", ["prowler", "-h"]) + @patch("prowler.providers.common.arguments.Provider.is_builtin") + @patch("prowler.providers.common.arguments.import_module") + def test_no_provider_invoked_failure_does_not_abort( + self, mock_import, mock_is_builtin + ): + """`prowler -h` + broken built-in → warning, help still renders.""" + from prowler.providers.common.arguments import ( + enforce_invoked_provider_loaded, + init_providers_parser, + ) + + mock_is_builtin.return_value = True + mock_import.side_effect = ImportError("No module named 'stackit.objectstorage'") + + parser = MagicMock() + + with patch( + "prowler.providers.common.arguments.Provider.get_available_providers", + return_value=["stackit"], + ): + init_providers_parser(parser) + enforce_invoked_provider_loaded(parser) + + @patch("sys.argv", ["prowler", "microsoft365"]) + @patch("prowler.providers.common.arguments.Provider.is_builtin") + @patch("prowler.providers.common.arguments.import_module") + def test_invoked_microsoft365_alias_still_triggers_fail_loud( + self, mock_import, mock_is_builtin + ): + """Alias `microsoft365 → m365` must be normalised before matching.""" + from prowler.providers.common.arguments import ( + enforce_invoked_provider_loaded, + init_providers_parser, + ) + + mock_is_builtin.return_value = True + mock_import.side_effect = ImportError("No module named 'msgraph'") + + parser = MagicMock() + + with patch( + "prowler.providers.common.arguments.Provider.get_available_providers", + return_value=["m365"], + ): + init_providers_parser(parser) + with pytest.raises(SystemExit): + enforce_invoked_provider_loaded(parser) + + @patch("sys.argv", ["prowler", "oci"]) + @patch("prowler.providers.common.arguments.Provider.is_builtin") + @patch("prowler.providers.common.arguments.import_module") + def test_invoked_oci_alias_still_triggers_fail_loud( + self, mock_import, mock_is_builtin + ): + """Alias `oci → oraclecloud` must be normalised before matching.""" + from prowler.providers.common.arguments import ( + enforce_invoked_provider_loaded, + init_providers_parser, + ) + + mock_is_builtin.return_value = True + mock_import.side_effect = ImportError("No module named 'oci'") + + parser = MagicMock() + + with patch( + "prowler.providers.common.arguments.Provider.get_available_providers", + return_value=["oraclecloud"], + ): + init_providers_parser(parser) + with pytest.raises(SystemExit): + enforce_invoked_provider_loaded(parser) + + @patch("sys.argv", ["prowler", "--output-directory", "stackit"]) + @patch("prowler.providers.common.arguments.Provider.is_builtin") + @patch("prowler.providers.common.arguments.import_module") + def test_flag_value_matching_provider_name_not_treated_as_invoked( + self, mock_import, mock_is_builtin + ): + """Flag-first invocation → invoked is 'aws' (default), not the flag's value.""" + from prowler.providers.common.arguments import ( + enforce_invoked_provider_loaded, + init_providers_parser, + ) + + mock_is_builtin.return_value = True + aws_module = MagicMock() + + def import_side_effect(module_path): + if "stackit" in module_path: + raise ImportError("No module named 'stackit.objectstorage'") + return aws_module + + mock_import.side_effect = import_side_effect + + parser = MagicMock() + + with patch( + "prowler.providers.common.arguments.Provider.get_available_providers", + return_value=["aws", "stackit"], + ): + init_providers_parser(parser) + enforce_invoked_provider_loaded(parser) + + aws_module.init_parser.assert_called_once_with(parser) + + @patch("sys.argv", ["prowler", "aws"]) + @patch("prowler.providers.common.arguments.Provider.is_builtin") + @patch("prowler.providers.common.arguments.import_module") + def test_invoked_builtin_non_import_error_fails_loudly( + self, mock_import, mock_is_builtin + ): + """Non-ImportError in invoked provider → still fail-loud.""" + from prowler.providers.common.arguments import ( + enforce_invoked_provider_loaded, + init_providers_parser, + ) + + mock_is_builtin.return_value = True + mock_import.side_effect = RuntimeError("Unexpected error in aws init_parser") + + parser = MagicMock() + + with patch( + "prowler.providers.common.arguments.Provider.get_available_providers", + return_value=["aws"], + ): + init_providers_parser(parser) + with pytest.raises(SystemExit): + enforce_invoked_provider_loaded(parser) + + @patch("sys.argv", ["prowler", "aws"]) + @patch("prowler.providers.common.arguments.Provider.is_builtin") + @patch("prowler.providers.common.arguments.import_module") + def test_unrelated_builtin_non_import_error_does_not_abort( + self, mock_import, mock_is_builtin + ): + """Non-ImportError in unrelated provider → warning, no abort.""" + from prowler.providers.common.arguments import ( + enforce_invoked_provider_loaded, + init_providers_parser, + ) + + mock_is_builtin.return_value = True + aws_module = MagicMock() + + def import_side_effect(module_path): + if "stackit" in module_path: + raise RuntimeError("Unexpected error in stackit init_parser") + return aws_module + + mock_import.side_effect = import_side_effect + + parser = MagicMock() + + with patch( + "prowler.providers.common.arguments.Provider.get_available_providers", + return_value=["aws", "stackit"], + ): + init_providers_parser(parser) + enforce_invoked_provider_loaded(parser) + + aws_module.init_parser.assert_called_once_with(parser) + + +class TestParseArgsOverrideAlignment: + """Regression: `parse(args=...)` overrides sys.argv AFTER __init__ ran; + the selective fail-loud must read argv at enforce time, not init time.""" + + def test_enforce_reads_current_sys_argv_not_init_time_sys_argv(self): + """Init with argv=['prowler','-h'] (no provider) captures stackit + failure silently. Enforce with argv=['prowler','stackit'] must + fail-loud — proving alignment under parse(args=...).""" + from prowler.providers.common.arguments import ( + enforce_invoked_provider_loaded, + init_providers_parser, + ) + + def import_side_effect(path): + if "stackit" in path: + raise ImportError("No module named 'stackit.objectstorage'") + return MagicMock() + + parser = MagicMock() + + with ( + patch( + "prowler.providers.common.arguments.Provider.is_builtin", + return_value=True, + ), + patch( + "prowler.providers.common.arguments.Provider.get_available_providers", + return_value=["aws", "stackit"], + ), + patch( + "prowler.providers.common.arguments.import_module", + side_effect=import_side_effect, + ), + ): + # Phase 1: __init__ with ambient argv = ['prowler', '-h'] + with patch("sys.argv", ["prowler", "-h"]): + init_providers_parser(parser) + # Failure captured silently — no SystemExit during init + assert "stackit" in parser._builtin_load_failures + + # Phase 2: parse(args=...) overrode sys.argv → stackit invoked + with patch("sys.argv", ["prowler", "stackit"]): + with pytest.raises(SystemExit): + enforce_invoked_provider_loaded(parser) + + def test_enforce_reads_current_sys_argv_for_no_invocation(self): + """Inverse: init's argv invokes stackit, but parse(args=['prowler', + '-h']) overrides. Enforce must NOT fail-loud.""" + from prowler.providers.common.arguments import ( + enforce_invoked_provider_loaded, + init_providers_parser, + ) + + def import_side_effect(path): + if "stackit" in path: + raise ImportError("No module named 'stackit.objectstorage'") + return MagicMock() + + parser = MagicMock() + + with ( + patch( + "prowler.providers.common.arguments.Provider.is_builtin", + return_value=True, + ), + patch( + "prowler.providers.common.arguments.Provider.get_available_providers", + return_value=["aws", "stackit"], + ), + patch( + "prowler.providers.common.arguments.import_module", + side_effect=import_side_effect, + ), + ): + # Phase 1: __init__ with ambient argv pretending stackit invoked + with patch("sys.argv", ["prowler", "stackit"]): + init_providers_parser(parser) + assert "stackit" in parser._builtin_load_failures + + # Phase 2: parse(args=['prowler', '-h']) overrode sys.argv → + # no provider invoked anymore → enforce must NOT exit + with patch("sys.argv", ["prowler", "-h"]): + enforce_invoked_provider_loaded(parser) + class TestInitGlobalProviderBuiltinDependencyFailure: """Same contract as TestInitProvidersParserBuiltinDependencyFailure but @@ -502,18 +866,22 @@ class TestInitGlobalProviderBuiltinDependencyFailure: assert cls is None @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.import_module") + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.is_builtin") @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_available_providers") - def test_get_providers_help_text_builtin_path(self, mock_providers, mock_import): + def test_get_providers_help_text_builtin_path( + self, mock_providers, mock_is_builtin, mock_import + ): """get_providers_help_text reads _cli_help_text from a built-in provider module.""" import types mock_providers.return_value = ["fakebuiltin"] + mock_is_builtin.return_value = True mock_cls = type( - "FakeBuiltinProvider", (Provider,), {"_cli_help_text": "Built-in Help"} + "FakebuiltinProvider", (Provider,), {"_cli_help_text": "Built-in Help"} ) mock_module = types.ModuleType("fake_module") - mock_module.FakeBuiltinProvider = mock_cls + mock_module.FakebuiltinProvider = mock_cls mock_import.return_value = mock_module help_text = Provider.get_providers_help_text() @@ -1166,7 +1534,7 @@ class TestCompliance: dirs = _get_ep_compliance_dirs() - assert dirs["fakeexternal"] == "/path/to/compliance" + assert dirs["fakeexternal"] == ["/path/to/compliance"] @patch("prowler.config.config.importlib.metadata.entry_points") def test_get_ep_compliance_dirs_file_fallback(self, mock_ep): @@ -1182,7 +1550,7 @@ class TestCompliance: dirs = _get_ep_compliance_dirs() - assert dirs["ext"] == "/path/to/compliance" + assert dirs["ext"] == ["/path/to/compliance"] @patch("prowler.config.config.importlib.metadata.entry_points") def test_get_ep_compliance_dirs_handles_load_exception(self, mock_ep): @@ -1212,7 +1580,7 @@ class TestCompliance: with open(json_path, "w") as f: json.dump({"Framework": "Custom", "Provider": "ext"}, f) - mock_dirs.return_value = {"ext": tmpdir} + mock_dirs.return_value = {"ext": [tmpdir]} frameworks = get_available_compliance_frameworks("ext") @@ -1878,6 +2246,37 @@ class TestDispatchFallbacks: class TestBaseContractDefaults: """Tests for Provider base class default implementations.""" + def test_get_scan_arguments_passes_secret_through(self): + """Base get_scan_arguments returns the secret unchanged when no mutelist.""" + kwargs = FakeProviderNoHelpText.get_scan_arguments("uid", {"token": "x"}) + + assert kwargs == {"token": "x"} + + def test_get_scan_arguments_adds_mutelist_content(self): + """Base get_scan_arguments adds mutelist_content when provided.""" + kwargs = FakeProviderNoHelpText.get_scan_arguments( + "uid", {"token": "x"}, {"Mutelist": {}} + ) + + assert kwargs == {"token": "x", "mutelist_content": {"Mutelist": {}}} + + def test_get_scan_arguments_preserves_empty_mutelist_content(self): + """Base get_scan_arguments passes an explicit empty mutelist through so it + is not mistaken for an absent mutelist that triggers provider defaults.""" + kwargs = FakeProviderNoHelpText.get_scan_arguments("uid", {"token": "x"}, {}) + + assert kwargs == {"token": "x", "mutelist_content": {}} + + def test_get_connection_arguments_passes_secret_through(self): + """Base get_connection_arguments returns the secret unchanged.""" + kwargs = FakeProviderNoHelpText.get_connection_arguments("uid", {"token": "x"}) + + assert kwargs == {"token": "x"} + + def test_get_credentials_schema_defaults_to_empty(self): + """Base get_credentials_schema declares no schema by default.""" + assert FakeProviderNoHelpText.get_credentials_schema() == {} + def test_from_cli_args_raises_not_implemented(self): """Base Provider.from_cli_args raises NotImplementedError.""" with pytest.raises(NotImplementedError): @@ -2137,3 +2536,340 @@ class TestComplianceTableDispatch: mock_generic.assert_called_once() Provider._global = None + + +# =========================================================================== +# 12. Provider.get_class — Public side-effect-free class resolver +# =========================================================================== + + +class TestGetClass: + """Tests for Provider.get_class(provider) — the public, side-effect-free + class resolver that unblocks the Django API and other callers that need + a provider class without triggering CLI side-effects (sys.exit, global + provider mutation).""" + + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + # T1: Built-in provider resolves to correct class + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + + def test_get_class_builtin_returns_correct_class(self): + """get_class('aws') returns AwsProvider — identity check.""" + from prowler.providers.aws.aws_provider import AwsProvider + + cls = Provider.get_class("aws") + + assert cls is AwsProvider + + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + # T2: External entry-point provider resolves + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.importlib.metadata.entry_points") + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.is_builtin") + def test_get_class_external_ep_returns_class(self, mock_is_builtin, mock_ep): + """get_class resolves an external entry-point provider and returns that class.""" + mock_is_builtin.return_value = False + mock_ep.return_value = [ + _make_entry_point( + "fakeexternal", "pkg:FakeExternalProvider", "prowler.providers" + ), + ] + mock_ep.return_value[0].load.return_value = FakeExternalProvider + + cls = Provider.get_class("fakeexternal") + + assert cls is FakeExternalProvider + + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + # T3: Unknown provider raises, does NOT call sys.exit + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.importlib.metadata.entry_points") + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.is_builtin") + def test_get_class_unknown_raises_and_does_not_sys_exit( + self, mock_is_builtin, mock_ep + ): + """get_class raises for an unknown provider and never calls sys.exit.""" + mock_is_builtin.return_value = False + mock_ep.return_value = [] + + # Assert ImportError specifically to enforce the public API contract + # (not a broad Exception). SystemExit belongs in init_global_provider's + # wrapper, not in the pure resolver. + with pytest.raises(ImportError): + Provider.get_class("totally_unknown_xyz_provider") + + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + # T4: get_class is PURE for built-ins — no collision warning, no EP call + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.logger") + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider._load_ep_provider") + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.import_module") + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.is_builtin") + def test_get_class_builtin_with_ep_shadow_is_pure( + self, mock_is_builtin, mock_import, mock_load_ep, mock_logger + ): + """get_class for a built-in with a same-named EP is PURE: + - returns the built-in class + - does NOT emit a collision warning + - does NOT call _load_ep_provider (so _ep_providers cache stays empty for + this key, proving no side-effect) + """ + import types + + mock_is_builtin.return_value = True + mock_load_ep.return_value = FakeExternalProvider # plug-in shadow present + + fake_module = types.ModuleType("fake_builtin_module") + fake_builtin_cls = type("AwsProvider", (Provider,), {"_type": "aws"}) + fake_module.AwsProvider = fake_builtin_cls + mock_import.return_value = fake_module + + cls = Provider.get_class("aws") + + # Built-in class returned + assert cls is fake_builtin_cls + # No collision warning emitted — that is now init_global_provider's job + warning_msgs = [ + call.args[0] + for call in mock_logger.warning.call_args_list + if call.args and "IGNORED" in call.args[0] + ] + assert not warning_msgs, ( + "get_class must NOT emit a collision warning; " + "init_global_provider owns that responsibility" + ) + # _load_ep_provider must NOT have been called for the built-in path + mock_load_ep.assert_not_called() + # _ep_providers cache must not contain 'aws' (no side-effect) + assert "aws" not in Provider._ep_providers + + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + # T4b: Built-in module missing its expected class raises ImportError + # and does NOT fall back to a same-named entry point + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider._load_ep_provider") + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.import_module") + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.is_builtin") + def test_get_class_builtin_missing_class_raises_importerror( + self, mock_is_builtin, mock_import, mock_load_ep + ): + """When is_builtin is True but the module does not define the expected + provider class, get_class raises ImportError and does NOT fall back to a + same-named entry point — falling back would contradict is_builtin and + silently return a foreign class.""" + import types + + mock_is_builtin.return_value = True + # Module imports fine but lacks the expected `Provider` attribute. + empty_module = types.ModuleType("empty_builtin_module") + mock_import.return_value = empty_module + + with pytest.raises(ImportError): + Provider.get_class("aws") + + # Must NOT fall back to entry points for a (broken) built-in. + mock_load_ep.assert_not_called() + + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + # T4c: Entry point resolving to a non-Provider class raises ImportError + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.importlib.metadata.entry_points") + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.is_builtin") + def test_get_class_external_ep_not_provider_subclass_raises_importerror( + self, mock_is_builtin, mock_ep + ): + """When an entry point resolves to an object that is not a Provider + subclass, get_class raises ImportError instead of returning it, so the + public contract (a Provider subclass) is enforced rather than trusted.""" + + class NotAProvider: + pass + + mock_is_builtin.return_value = False + mock_ep.return_value = [ + _make_entry_point("rogue", "pkg:NotAProvider", "prowler.providers"), + ] + mock_ep.return_value[0].load.return_value = NotAProvider + + with pytest.raises(ImportError): + Provider.get_class("rogue") + + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + # T4d: Contract — every built-in provider stays resolvable via get_class + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + + @pytest.mark.parametrize( + "provider", + [ + name + for name in Provider.get_available_providers() + if Provider.is_builtin(name) + ], + ) + def test_get_class_resolves_every_builtin_provider(self, provider): + """Contract test over all built-in providers: each one must remain + resolvable through get_class and return a Provider subclass whose name + follows the `{Capitalized}Provider` convention. This pins the naming + convention as the built-in resolution contract, so a future provider + that breaks it fails here instead of silently at runtime in a caller + (e.g. the API).""" + cls = Provider.get_class(provider) + + assert isinstance(cls, type) and issubclass(cls, Provider) + assert cls.__name__ == f"{provider.capitalize()}Provider" + + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + # T5: Regression — init_global_provider still resolves external correctly + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.load_and_validate_config_file") + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider._load_ep_provider") + def test_init_global_provider_still_resolves_external_via_get_class( + self, mock_load_ep, mock_config + ): + """Regression: init_global_provider continues to work for external providers + after the class-resolution block is delegated to get_class. + + 'fakepure' is not a built-in, so is_builtin() returns False and get_class + takes the entry-point path. This verifies the FakePureContractProvider path + (pure from_cli_args returning an instance) still works — i.e., + init_global_provider correctly wires the returned instance as global provider. + """ + mock_load_ep.return_value = FakePureContractProvider + mock_config.return_value = {} + + args = Namespace( + provider="fakepure", + fixer_config="config.yaml", + config_file="config.yaml", + ) + + Provider._global = None + Provider.init_global_provider(args) + + assert isinstance(Provider._global, FakePureContractProvider) + Provider._global = None + + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + # T6: Regression — get_providers_help_text returns same text after refactor + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider._load_ep_provider") + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_available_providers") + def test_get_providers_help_text_identical_after_refactor_external( + self, mock_providers, mock_load_ep + ): + """get_providers_help_text returns identical _cli_help_text for an external + provider both before and after the refactor to use get_class internally.""" + mock_providers.return_value = ["fakeexternal"] + mock_load_ep.return_value = FakeExternalProvider + + help_text = Provider.get_providers_help_text() + + # Must match the known _cli_help_text on FakeExternalProvider + assert help_text["fakeexternal"] == "Fake External Provider" + + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.import_module") + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.is_builtin") + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_available_providers") + def test_get_providers_help_text_identical_after_refactor_builtin( + self, mock_providers, mock_is_builtin, mock_import + ): + """get_providers_help_text returns identical _cli_help_text for a built-in + provider both before and after the refactor to use get_class internally. + is_builtin is mocked to True so get_class takes the built-in import path.""" + import types + + mock_providers.return_value = ["fakebuiltin"] + mock_is_builtin.return_value = True + mock_cls = type( + "FakebuiltinProvider", (Provider,), {"_cli_help_text": "Built-in Help"} + ) + mock_module = types.ModuleType("fake_module") + mock_module.FakebuiltinProvider = mock_cls + mock_import.return_value = mock_module + + help_text = Provider.get_providers_help_text() + + assert help_text["fakebuiltin"] == "Built-in Help" + + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + # T7: init_global_provider emits collision warning (not get_class) + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.load_and_validate_config_file") + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.importlib.metadata.entry_points") + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.import_module") + @patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.is_builtin") + def test_init_global_provider_emits_collision_warning_for_builtin_ep_shadow( + self, mock_is_builtin, mock_import, mock_entry_points, mock_config, caplog + ): + """init_global_provider (not get_class) emits the collision warning + when a built-in provider has a same-named entry-point plug-in registered. + + This is the counterpart to test_get_class_builtin_with_ep_shadow_is_pure: + the warning responsibility moved OUT of get_class and INTO + init_global_provider, so users still see the message on CLI invocation + but prowler --help and API calls (which never hit init_global_provider) + do not spuriously emit it. The shadow is detected by entry-point name + only — the plug-in is never loaded to warn. + """ + import logging + import types + + mock_is_builtin.return_value = True + shadow_ep = MagicMock() + shadow_ep.name = "aws" # plug-in shadowing the built-in name + mock_entry_points.return_value = [shadow_ep] + + fake_module = types.ModuleType("fake_builtin_module") + fake_module.AwsProvider = MagicMock(side_effect=lambda **_kw: None) + mock_import.return_value = fake_module + mock_config.return_value = {} + + args = Namespace( + provider="aws", + fixer_config="config.yaml", + config_file="config.yaml", + aws_retries_max_attempts=3, + role=None, + session_duration=None, + external_id=None, + role_session_name=None, + mfa=None, + profile=None, + region=None, + excluded_region=None, + organizations_role=None, + scan_unused_services=False, + resource_tag=None, + resource_arn=None, + mutelist_file=None, + ) + + Provider._global = None + with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="prowler"): + try: + Provider.init_global_provider(args) + except BaseException: + # AwsProvider mock is fake; dispatch may fail — only the + # warning emitted BEFORE dispatch matters here. + pass + Provider._global = None + + collision_warnings = [ + r.message + for r in caplog.records + if "Plug-in provider 'aws'" in r.message and "IGNORED" in r.message + ] + assert collision_warnings, ( + "init_global_provider must emit the collision warning when a " + "same-named EP plug-in exists for a built-in provider" + ) + # Shadow detected by name only — the plug-in is never loaded to warn. + shadow_ep.load.assert_not_called() diff --git a/tests/providers/gcp/gcp_provider_test.py b/tests/providers/gcp/gcp_provider_test.py index 7d2bea9f88..2e80ac7899 100644 --- a/tests/providers/gcp/gcp_provider_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/gcp/gcp_provider_test.py @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ from prowler.config.config import ( ) from prowler.providers.common.models import Connection from prowler.providers.gcp.exceptions.exceptions import ( + GCPGetOrganizationProjectsError, GCPInvalidProviderIdError, GCPNoAccesibleProjectsError, GCPTestConnectionError, @@ -91,6 +92,7 @@ class TestGCPProvider: "shodan_api_key": None, "max_unused_account_days": 180, "storage_min_retention_days": 90, + "secretmanager_max_rotation_days": 90, "mig_min_zones": 2, "max_snapshot_age_days": 90, } @@ -1077,3 +1079,66 @@ class TestGCPProvider: assert gcp_provider.skip_api_check is True mocked_is_api_active.assert_not_called() + + def test_get_projects_organization_id_permission_denied_raises(self): + """When --organization-id is set and the Cloud Asset API returns a 403, + get_projects must raise GCPGetOrganizationProjectsError instead of + silently falling back to the service account's home project. + + Regression test for https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/issues/11250. + """ + from googleapiclient.errors import HttpError + + forbidden_response = MagicMock(status=403, reason="Forbidden") + http_error = HttpError( + resp=forbidden_response, + content=b'{"error": {"code": 403, "message": "Permission denied on resource organization"}}', + uri="https://cloudasset.googleapis.com/v1/organizations/123:listAssets", + ) + + asset_service = MagicMock() + asset_service.assets.return_value.list.return_value.execute.side_effect = ( + http_error + ) + + with patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.gcp_provider.discovery.build", + return_value=asset_service, + ): + with pytest.raises(GCPGetOrganizationProjectsError): + GcpProvider.get_projects( + credentials=MagicMock(), + organization_id="test-organization-id", + credentials_file="test_credentials_file", + ) + + def test_get_projects_organization_id_cloud_asset_api_disabled_raises(self): + """When --organization-id is set and the Cloud Asset API is disabled, + get_projects must raise GCPGetOrganizationProjectsError with the + enable-API remediation rather than swallowing the error.""" + from googleapiclient.errors import HttpError + + disabled_response = MagicMock(status=403, reason="Forbidden") + http_error = HttpError( + resp=disabled_response, + content=b'{"error": {"message": "Cloud Asset API has not been used in project 123 before or it is disabled."}}', + uri="https://cloudasset.googleapis.com/v1/organizations/123:listAssets", + ) + + asset_service = MagicMock() + asset_service.assets.return_value.list.return_value.execute.side_effect = ( + http_error + ) + + with patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.gcp_provider.discovery.build", + return_value=asset_service, + ): + with pytest.raises(GCPGetOrganizationProjectsError) as exc_info: + GcpProvider.get_projects( + credentials=MagicMock(), + organization_id="test-organization-id", + credentials_file="test_credentials_file", + ) + + assert "Cloud Asset API" in str(exc_info.value) diff --git a/tests/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/__init__.py b/tests/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/tests/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc/__init__.py b/tests/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/tests/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc/cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc_test.py b/tests/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc/cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8428e56d86 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc/cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,208 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from tests.providers.gcp.gcp_fixtures import ( + GCP_PROJECT_ID, + GCP_US_CENTER1_LOCATION, + set_mocked_gcp_provider, +) + +_CHECK_PATH = ( + "prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction." + "cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc.cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc" +) +_CLIENT_PATH = f"{_CHECK_PATH}.cloudfunction_client" + + +def _function_id(name: str) -> str: + return ( + f"projects/{GCP_PROJECT_ID}/locations/{GCP_US_CENTER1_LOCATION}" + f"/functions/{name}" + ) + + +class Test_cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc: + def test_no_functions(self): + cloudfunction_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_gcp_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + _CLIENT_PATH, + new=cloudfunction_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc.cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc import ( + cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc, + ) + + cloudfunction_client.functions = [] + + check = cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_function_with_vpc_connector(self): + cloudfunction_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_gcp_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + _CLIENT_PATH, + new=cloudfunction_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc.cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc import ( + cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc, + ) + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_service import ( + Function, + ) + + connector = ( + f"projects/{GCP_PROJECT_ID}/locations/{GCP_US_CENTER1_LOCATION}" + f"/connectors/my-connector" + ) + cloudfunction_client.functions = [ + Function( + id=_function_id("fn-vpc"), + name="fn-vpc", + project_id=GCP_PROJECT_ID, + location=GCP_US_CENTER1_LOCATION, + state="ACTIVE", + vpc_connector=connector, + ) + ] + + check = cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Cloud Function fn-vpc is connected to a VPC via connector: {connector}." + ) + assert result[0].resource_id == "fn-vpc" + assert result[0].resource_name == "fn-vpc" + assert result[0].location == GCP_US_CENTER1_LOCATION + assert result[0].project_id == GCP_PROJECT_ID + + def test_function_without_vpc_connector(self): + cloudfunction_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_gcp_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + _CLIENT_PATH, + new=cloudfunction_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc.cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc import ( + cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc, + ) + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_service import ( + Function, + ) + + cloudfunction_client.functions = [ + Function( + id=_function_id("fn-public"), + name="fn-public", + project_id=GCP_PROJECT_ID, + location=GCP_US_CENTER1_LOCATION, + state="ACTIVE", + vpc_connector=None, + ) + ] + + check = cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Cloud Function fn-public is not connected to any VPC network." + ) + assert result[0].resource_id == "fn-public" + assert result[0].resource_name == "fn-public" + assert result[0].location == GCP_US_CENTER1_LOCATION + assert result[0].project_id == GCP_PROJECT_ID + + def test_function_with_empty_vpc_connector(self): + cloudfunction_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_gcp_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + _CLIENT_PATH, + new=cloudfunction_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc.cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc import ( + cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc, + ) + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_service import ( + Function, + ) + + cloudfunction_client.functions = [ + Function( + id=_function_id("fn-empty"), + name="fn-empty", + project_id=GCP_PROJECT_ID, + location=GCP_US_CENTER1_LOCATION, + state="ACTIVE", + vpc_connector="", + ) + ] + + check = cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + + def test_inactive_function_skipped(self): + cloudfunction_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_gcp_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + _CLIENT_PATH, + new=cloudfunction_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc.cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc import ( + cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc, + ) + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_service import ( + Function, + ) + + cloudfunction_client.functions = [ + Function( + id=_function_id("fn-deploy"), + name="fn-deploy", + project_id=GCP_PROJECT_ID, + location=GCP_US_CENTER1_LOCATION, + state="DEPLOYING", + vpc_connector=None, + ) + ] + + check = cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 diff --git a/tests/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible/__init__.py b/tests/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/tests/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible/cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible_test.py b/tests/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible/cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..615890bd58 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible/cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,216 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from tests.providers.gcp.gcp_fixtures import ( + GCP_PROJECT_ID, + GCP_US_CENTER1_LOCATION, + set_mocked_gcp_provider, +) + +_CHECK_PATH = ( + "prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction." + "cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible." + "cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible" +) +_CLIENT_PATH = f"{_CHECK_PATH}.cloudfunction_client" + + +def _function_id(name: str) -> str: + return ( + f"projects/{GCP_PROJECT_ID}/locations/{GCP_US_CENTER1_LOCATION}" + f"/functions/{name}" + ) + + +class Test_cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible: + def test_no_functions(self): + cloudfunction_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_gcp_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + _CLIENT_PATH, + new=cloudfunction_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible.cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible import ( + cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible, + ) + + cloudfunction_client.functions = [] + + check = cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_function_private(self): + cloudfunction_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_gcp_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + _CLIENT_PATH, + new=cloudfunction_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible.cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible import ( + cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible, + ) + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_service import ( + Function, + ) + + cloudfunction_client.functions = [ + Function( + id=_function_id("fn-private"), + name="fn-private", + project_id=GCP_PROJECT_ID, + location=GCP_US_CENTER1_LOCATION, + state="ACTIVE", + publicly_accessible=False, + ) + ] + + check = cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Cloud Function fn-private is not publicly accessible." + ) + assert result[0].resource_id == "fn-private" + assert result[0].resource_name == "fn-private" + assert result[0].location == GCP_US_CENTER1_LOCATION + assert result[0].project_id == GCP_PROJECT_ID + + def test_function_publicly_accessible(self): + cloudfunction_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_gcp_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + _CLIENT_PATH, + new=cloudfunction_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible.cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible import ( + cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible, + ) + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_service import ( + Function, + ) + + cloudfunction_client.functions = [ + Function( + id=_function_id("fn-public"), + name="fn-public", + project_id=GCP_PROJECT_ID, + location=GCP_US_CENTER1_LOCATION, + state="ACTIVE", + publicly_accessible=True, + ) + ] + + check = cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].status_extended == ( + "Cloud Function fn-public is publicly invocable " + "(allUsers or allAuthenticatedUsers IAM binding detected)." + ) + assert result[0].resource_id == "fn-public" + assert result[0].resource_name == "fn-public" + assert result[0].location == GCP_US_CENTER1_LOCATION + assert result[0].project_id == GCP_PROJECT_ID + + def test_multiple_functions_mixed(self): + cloudfunction_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_gcp_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + _CLIENT_PATH, + new=cloudfunction_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible.cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible import ( + cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible, + ) + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_service import ( + Function, + ) + + cloudfunction_client.functions = [ + Function( + id=_function_id("fn-private"), + name="fn-private", + project_id=GCP_PROJECT_ID, + location=GCP_US_CENTER1_LOCATION, + state="ACTIVE", + publicly_accessible=False, + ), + Function( + id=_function_id("fn-public"), + name="fn-public", + project_id=GCP_PROJECT_ID, + location=GCP_US_CENTER1_LOCATION, + state="ACTIVE", + publicly_accessible=True, + ), + ] + + check = cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + + by_id = {r.resource_id: r for r in result} + assert by_id["fn-private"].status == "PASS" + assert by_id["fn-public"].status == "FAIL" + + def test_inactive_function_skipped(self): + cloudfunction_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_gcp_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + _CLIENT_PATH, + new=cloudfunction_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible.cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible import ( + cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible, + ) + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_service import ( + Function, + ) + + cloudfunction_client.functions = [ + Function( + id=_function_id("fn-deleting"), + name="fn-deleting", + project_id=GCP_PROJECT_ID, + location=GCP_US_CENTER1_LOCATION, + state="DELETING", + publicly_accessible=True, + ) + ] + + check = cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 diff --git a/tests/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_service_test.py b/tests/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_service_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d97b80336b --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/gcp/services/cloudfunction/cloudfunction_service_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,319 @@ +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +from prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_service import ( + CloudFunction, +) +from tests.providers.gcp.gcp_fixtures import ( + GCP_PROJECT_ID, + mock_is_api_active, + set_mocked_gcp_provider, +) + +_LOCATION_ID = "us-central1" +_FUNCTION_NAME = "my-function" +_FUNCTION_ID = ( + f"projects/{GCP_PROJECT_ID}/locations/{_LOCATION_ID}/functions/{_FUNCTION_NAME}" +) +_RUN_SERVICE = ( + f"projects/{GCP_PROJECT_ID}/locations/{_LOCATION_ID}/services/{_FUNCTION_NAME}" +) +_CONNECTOR = ( + f"projects/{GCP_PROJECT_ID}/locations/{_LOCATION_ID}/connectors/my-connector" +) + + +def _make_cloudfunction_client(functions_list, iam_bindings=None): + """Return a mock GCP API client for the Cloud Functions v2 service.""" + client = MagicMock() + + client.projects().locations().list().execute.return_value = { + "locations": [{"locationId": _LOCATION_ID}] + } + client.projects().locations().list_next.return_value = None + + client.projects().locations().functions().list().execute.return_value = { + "functions": functions_list + } + client.projects().locations().functions().list_next.return_value = None + + iam_response = {"bindings": iam_bindings or []} + + def mock_get_iam_policy(resource): + rv = MagicMock() + rv.execute.return_value = iam_response + return rv + + client.projects().locations().functions().getIamPolicy = mock_get_iam_policy + + return client + + +def _make_run_client(iam_bindings=None): + """Return a mock Cloud Run v2 client for gen2 IAM policy lookups.""" + client = MagicMock() + iam_response = {"bindings": iam_bindings or []} + + def mock_get_iam_policy(resource): + rv = MagicMock() + rv.execute.return_value = iam_response + return rv + + client.projects().locations().services().getIamPolicy = mock_get_iam_policy + return client + + +class TestCloudFunctionService: + def test_get_functions_with_vpc_connector(self): + def mock_api_client(*args, **kwargs): + return _make_cloudfunction_client( + functions_list=[ + { + "name": _FUNCTION_ID, + "state": "ACTIVE", + "environment": "GEN_2", + "serviceConfig": { + "service": _RUN_SERVICE, + "vpcConnector": _CONNECTOR, + }, + } + ] + ) + + with ( + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service.GCPService.__is_api_active__", + new=mock_is_api_active, + ), + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service.GCPService.__generate_client__", + new=mock_api_client, + ), + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_service.discovery.build", + return_value=_make_run_client(), + ), + ): + cf_client = CloudFunction( + set_mocked_gcp_provider(project_ids=[GCP_PROJECT_ID]) + ) + + assert len(cf_client.functions) == 1 + fn = cf_client.functions[0] + assert fn.id == _FUNCTION_ID + assert fn.name == _FUNCTION_NAME + assert fn.project_id == GCP_PROJECT_ID + assert fn.location == _LOCATION_ID + assert fn.state == "ACTIVE" + assert fn.environment == "GEN_2" + assert fn.service == _RUN_SERVICE + assert fn.vpc_connector == _CONNECTOR + assert fn.publicly_accessible is False + + def test_get_functions_without_vpc_connector(self): + def mock_api_client(*args, **kwargs): + return _make_cloudfunction_client( + functions_list=[ + { + "name": f"projects/{GCP_PROJECT_ID}/locations/{_LOCATION_ID}/functions/no-vpc-func", + "state": "ACTIVE", + "environment": "GEN_2", + "serviceConfig": { + "service": f"projects/{GCP_PROJECT_ID}/locations/{_LOCATION_ID}/services/no-vpc-func", + }, + } + ] + ) + + with ( + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service.GCPService.__is_api_active__", + new=mock_is_api_active, + ), + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service.GCPService.__generate_client__", + new=mock_api_client, + ), + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_service.discovery.build", + return_value=_make_run_client(), + ), + ): + cf_client = CloudFunction( + set_mocked_gcp_provider(project_ids=[GCP_PROJECT_ID]) + ) + + assert len(cf_client.functions) == 1 + fn = cf_client.functions[0] + assert fn.name == "no-vpc-func" + assert fn.vpc_connector is None + assert fn.publicly_accessible is False + + def test_get_functions_iam_policy_gen2_all_users(self): + """Gen2 functions: allUsers binding lives on the Cloud Run service.""" + + def mock_api_client(*args, **kwargs): + return _make_cloudfunction_client( + functions_list=[ + { + "name": _FUNCTION_ID, + "state": "ACTIVE", + "environment": "GEN_2", + "serviceConfig": {"service": _RUN_SERVICE}, + } + ] + ) + + run_client = _make_run_client( + iam_bindings=[ + { + "role": "roles/run.invoker", + "members": ["allUsers"], + } + ] + ) + + with ( + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service.GCPService.__is_api_active__", + new=mock_is_api_active, + ), + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service.GCPService.__generate_client__", + new=mock_api_client, + ), + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_service.discovery.build", + return_value=run_client, + ), + ): + cf_client = CloudFunction( + set_mocked_gcp_provider(project_ids=[GCP_PROJECT_ID]) + ) + + assert len(cf_client.functions) == 1 + assert cf_client.functions[0].publicly_accessible is True + + def test_get_functions_iam_policy_gen2_all_authenticated_users(self): + def mock_api_client(*args, **kwargs): + return _make_cloudfunction_client( + functions_list=[ + { + "name": _FUNCTION_ID, + "state": "ACTIVE", + "environment": "GEN_2", + "serviceConfig": {"service": _RUN_SERVICE}, + } + ] + ) + + run_client = _make_run_client( + iam_bindings=[ + { + "role": "roles/run.invoker", + "members": ["allAuthenticatedUsers"], + } + ] + ) + + with ( + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service.GCPService.__is_api_active__", + new=mock_is_api_active, + ), + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service.GCPService.__generate_client__", + new=mock_api_client, + ), + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_service.discovery.build", + return_value=run_client, + ), + ): + cf_client = CloudFunction( + set_mocked_gcp_provider(project_ids=[GCP_PROJECT_ID]) + ) + + assert len(cf_client.functions) == 1 + assert cf_client.functions[0].publicly_accessible is True + + def test_get_functions_iam_policy_gen2_not_public(self): + def mock_api_client(*args, **kwargs): + return _make_cloudfunction_client( + functions_list=[ + { + "name": _FUNCTION_ID, + "state": "ACTIVE", + "environment": "GEN_2", + "serviceConfig": {"service": _RUN_SERVICE}, + } + ] + ) + + run_client = _make_run_client( + iam_bindings=[ + { + "role": "roles/run.invoker", + "members": ["serviceAccount:sa@project.iam.gserviceaccount.com"], + } + ] + ) + + with ( + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service.GCPService.__is_api_active__", + new=mock_is_api_active, + ), + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service.GCPService.__generate_client__", + new=mock_api_client, + ), + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.services.cloudfunction.cloudfunction_service.discovery.build", + return_value=run_client, + ), + ): + cf_client = CloudFunction( + set_mocked_gcp_provider(project_ids=[GCP_PROJECT_ID]) + ) + + assert len(cf_client.functions) == 1 + assert cf_client.functions[0].publicly_accessible is False + + def test_get_functions_iam_policy_gen1_all_users(self): + """Gen1 functions: IAM binding lives on the Cloud Functions resource itself.""" + + def mock_api_client(*args, **kwargs): + return _make_cloudfunction_client( + functions_list=[ + { + "name": _FUNCTION_ID, + "state": "ACTIVE", + "environment": "GEN_1", + "serviceConfig": {}, + } + ], + iam_bindings=[ + { + "role": "roles/cloudfunctions.invoker", + "members": ["allUsers"], + } + ], + ) + + with ( + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service.GCPService.__is_api_active__", + new=mock_is_api_active, + ), + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service.GCPService.__generate_client__", + new=mock_api_client, + ), + ): + cf_client = CloudFunction( + set_mocked_gcp_provider(project_ids=[GCP_PROJECT_ID]) + ) + + assert len(cf_client.functions) == 1 + assert cf_client.functions[0].environment == "GEN_1" + assert cf_client.functions[0].publicly_accessible is True diff --git a/tests/providers/gcp/services/logging/logging_service_test.py b/tests/providers/gcp/services/logging/logging_service_test.py index 72e18eddbb..e466a17314 100644 --- a/tests/providers/gcp/services/logging/logging_service_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/gcp/services/logging/logging_service_test.py @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch +import pytest + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.logging.logging_service import Logging from tests.providers.gcp.gcp_fixtures import ( GCP_PROJECT_ID, @@ -291,6 +293,93 @@ class TestGetProjectsCoveredByAggregatedMetric: ) assert self._run(logging_client, monitoring_client) == {} + def test_not_covered_when_sink_filter_omits_activity_stream(self): + """A sink that routes cloudaudit streams but NOT Admin Activity (here, + data_access only) does not deliver the entries the CIS metric filters + match, so it must not be credited — right service, wrong stream.""" + logging_client, monitoring_client = self._clients( + sink_filter="logName: /logs/cloudaudit.googleapis.com%2Fdata_access" + ) + assert self._run(logging_client, monitoring_client) == {} + + def test_covered_when_sink_filter_carries_activity_stream_encoded(self): + """A sink filtered to the cloudaudit streams (URL-encoded logName form, + as returned by the Logging API) delivers every Admin Activity entry the + CIS metric filters can match, so it must be credited.""" + logging_client, monitoring_client = self._clients( + sink_filter=( + "logName: /logs/cloudaudit.googleapis.com%2Factivity OR " + "logName: /logs/cloudaudit.googleapis.com%2Fdata_access" + ) + ) + assert self._run(logging_client, monitoring_client) == { + GCP_PROJECT_ID: "central-metric" + } + + def test_covered_when_sink_filter_carries_activity_stream_plain(self): + logging_client, monitoring_client = self._clients( + sink_filter='logName="projects/p/logs/cloudaudit.googleapis.com/activity"' + ) + assert self._run(logging_client, monitoring_client) == { + GCP_PROJECT_ID: "central-metric" + } + + @pytest.mark.parametrize( + "sink_filter", + [ + # --- Negation: the stream is named but excluded. --- + 'NOT logName:"projects/p/logs/cloudaudit.googleapis.com%2Factivity"', + '-logName:"projects/p/logs/cloudaudit.googleapis.com%2Factivity"', + 'NOT log_id("cloudaudit.googleapis.com/activity")', + # "!=" inequality (and its spaced form) excludes the stream. + 'logName!="projects/p/logs/cloudaudit.googleapis.com%2Factivity"', + 'logName != "projects/p/logs/cloudaudit.googleapis.com/activity"', + # Activity negated inside a compound filter. + 'resource.type="gce_instance" AND ' + 'NOT logName:"projects/p/logs/cloudaudit.googleapis.com%2Factivity"', + # --- Restriction: the stream is named but AND-narrowed, so only a + # subset of Admin Activity entries reaches the bucket. --- + 'logName:"projects/p/logs/cloudaudit.googleapis.com%2Factivity" ' + 'AND resource.type="gce_instance"', + 'log_id("cloudaudit.googleapis.com/activity") ' + 'AND resource.type="gce_instance"', + 'logName="projects/p/logs/cloudaudit.googleapis.com/activity" ' + "AND severity>=ERROR", + 'logName:"projects/p/logs/cloudaudit.googleapis.com%2Factivity" ' + 'AND protoPayload.methodName="SetIamPolicy"', + # --- OR-ed with a non-audit predicate: fail closed, since we credit + # only unions of provable Cloud Audit stream selectors. --- + 'logName:"projects/p/logs/cloudaudit.googleapis.com%2Factivity" ' + "OR severity>=ERROR", + ], + ) + def test_not_covered_when_sink_filter_negated_or_restrictive(self, sink_filter): + """A filter that names the Admin Activity stream but negates, narrows, or + mixes in an unprovable predicate is not credited — we credit only filters + we can prove deliver every Admin Activity entry the CIS metrics match.""" + logging_client, monitoring_client = self._clients(sink_filter=sink_filter) + assert self._run(logging_client, monitoring_client) == {} + + def test_covered_when_activity_logname_has_hyphenated_path(self): + """A hyphen in the project path must not be mistaken for the ``-`` (NOT) + negation operator — the activity stream is still delivered.""" + logging_client, monitoring_client = self._clients( + sink_filter='logName="projects/my-project/logs/cloudaudit.googleapis.com/activity"' + ) + assert self._run(logging_client, monitoring_client) == { + GCP_PROJECT_ID: "central-metric" + } + + def test_covered_when_sink_filter_uses_log_id_selector(self): + """The ``log_id()`` form is an equivalent positive full-coverage selector + of the Admin Activity stream and is credited like the ``logName`` form.""" + logging_client, monitoring_client = self._clients( + sink_filter='log_id("cloudaudit.googleapis.com/activity")' + ) + assert self._run(logging_client, monitoring_client) == { + GCP_PROJECT_ID: "central-metric" + } + def test_not_covered_when_sink_destination_bucket_differs(self): logging_client, monitoring_client = self._clients( sink_destination="logging.googleapis.com/projects/x/locations/eu/buckets/other" diff --git a/tests/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/__init__.py b/tests/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/tests/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible/__init__.py b/tests/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/tests/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible/secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible_test.py b/tests/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible/secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f925966f3c --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible/secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from tests.providers.gcp.gcp_fixtures import ( + GCP_PROJECT_ID, + set_mocked_gcp_provider, +) + +_CHECK_PATH = ( + "prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager." + "secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible." + "secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible" +) +_CLIENT_PATH = f"{_CHECK_PATH}.secretmanager_client" + + +def _secret_id(name: str) -> str: + return f"projects/{GCP_PROJECT_ID}/secrets/{name}" + + +class Test_secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible: + def test_no_secrets(self): + secretmanager_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_gcp_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + _CLIENT_PATH, + new=secretmanager_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible.secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible import ( + secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible, + ) + + secretmanager_client.secrets = [] + + check = secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_secret_private(self): + secretmanager_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_gcp_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + _CLIENT_PATH, + new=secretmanager_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible.secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible import ( + secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible, + ) + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_service import ( + Secret, + ) + + secretmanager_client.secrets = [ + Secret( + id=_secret_id("secret-private"), + name="secret-private", + project_id=GCP_PROJECT_ID, + publicly_accessible=False, + ) + ] + + check = secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Secret secret-private is not publicly accessible." + ) + assert result[0].resource_id == "secret-private" + assert result[0].resource_name == "secret-private" + assert result[0].location == "global" + assert result[0].project_id == GCP_PROJECT_ID + + def test_secret_publicly_accessible(self): + secretmanager_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_gcp_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + _CLIENT_PATH, + new=secretmanager_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible.secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible import ( + secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible, + ) + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_service import ( + Secret, + ) + + secretmanager_client.secrets = [ + Secret( + id=_secret_id("secret-public"), + name="secret-public", + project_id=GCP_PROJECT_ID, + publicly_accessible=True, + ) + ] + + check = secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].status_extended == ( + "Secret secret-public is publicly accessible " + "(allUsers or allAuthenticatedUsers IAM binding detected)." + ) + assert result[0].resource_id == "secret-public" + assert result[0].resource_name == "secret-public" + assert result[0].location == "global" + assert result[0].project_id == GCP_PROJECT_ID + + def test_multiple_secrets_mixed(self): + secretmanager_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_gcp_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + _CLIENT_PATH, + new=secretmanager_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible.secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible import ( + secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible, + ) + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_service import ( + Secret, + ) + + secretmanager_client.secrets = [ + Secret( + id=_secret_id("secret-private"), + name="secret-private", + project_id=GCP_PROJECT_ID, + publicly_accessible=False, + ), + Secret( + id=_secret_id("secret-public"), + name="secret-public", + project_id=GCP_PROJECT_ID, + publicly_accessible=True, + ), + ] + + check = secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 2 + + by_id = {r.resource_id: r for r in result} + assert by_id["secret-private"].status == "PASS" + assert by_id["secret-public"].status == "FAIL" diff --git a/tests/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled/__init__.py b/tests/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 diff --git a/tests/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled/secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled/secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..497dd7428b --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled/secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,385 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from tests.providers.gcp.gcp_fixtures import ( + GCP_PROJECT_ID, + set_mocked_gcp_provider, +) + +_CHECK_PATH = ( + "prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager." + "secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled." + "secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled" +) +_CLIENT_PATH = f"{_CHECK_PATH}.secretmanager_client" + + +def _secret_id(name: str) -> str: + return f"projects/{GCP_PROJECT_ID}/secrets/{name}" + + +class Test_secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled: + def test_no_secrets(self): + secretmanager_client = mock.MagicMock() + secretmanager_client.audit_config = {"secretmanager_max_rotation_days": 90} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_gcp_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + _CLIENT_PATH, + new=secretmanager_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled.secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled import ( + secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled, + ) + + secretmanager_client.secrets = [] + + check = secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_rotation_within_90_days_pass(self): + secretmanager_client = mock.MagicMock() + secretmanager_client.audit_config = {"secretmanager_max_rotation_days": 90} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_gcp_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + _CLIENT_PATH, + new=secretmanager_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled.secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled import ( + secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_service import ( + Secret, + ) + + secretmanager_client.secrets = [ + Secret( + id=_secret_id("secret-rotated"), + name="secret-rotated", + project_id=GCP_PROJECT_ID, + rotation_period="7776000s", + ) + ] + + check = secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Secret secret-rotated has automatic rotation enabled with a period of 90 days." + ) + assert result[0].resource_id == "secret-rotated" + assert result[0].resource_name == "secret-rotated" + assert result[0].location == "global" + assert result[0].project_id == GCP_PROJECT_ID + + def test_rotation_period_exceeds_max_fail(self): + secretmanager_client = mock.MagicMock() + secretmanager_client.audit_config = {"secretmanager_max_rotation_days": 90} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_gcp_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + _CLIENT_PATH, + new=secretmanager_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled.secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled import ( + secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_service import ( + Secret, + ) + + secretmanager_client.secrets = [ + Secret( + id=_secret_id("secret-stale"), + name="secret-stale", + project_id=GCP_PROJECT_ID, + rotation_period="9504000s", + ) + ] + + check = secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "exceeds the 90-day maximum" in result[0].status_extended + assert result[0].resource_id == "secret-stale" + + def test_rotation_period_one_second_over_max_fail(self): + """90 days + 1 second must fail — comparison is on seconds, not floored days.""" + secretmanager_client = mock.MagicMock() + secretmanager_client.audit_config = {"secretmanager_max_rotation_days": 90} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_gcp_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + _CLIENT_PATH, + new=secretmanager_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled.secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled import ( + secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_service import ( + Secret, + ) + + # 90 days = 7_776_000 seconds. Add 1 second. + secretmanager_client.secrets = [ + Secret( + id=_secret_id("secret-90d-plus-1s"), + name="secret-90d-plus-1s", + project_id=GCP_PROJECT_ID, + rotation_period="7776001s", + ) + ] + + check = secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "exceeds the 90-day maximum" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_no_rotation_fail(self): + secretmanager_client = mock.MagicMock() + secretmanager_client.audit_config = {"secretmanager_max_rotation_days": 90} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_gcp_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + _CLIENT_PATH, + new=secretmanager_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled.secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled import ( + secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_service import ( + Secret, + ) + + secretmanager_client.secrets = [ + Secret( + id=_secret_id("secret-no-rotation"), + name="secret-no-rotation", + project_id=GCP_PROJECT_ID, + rotation_period=None, + ) + ] + + check = secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Secret secret-no-rotation does not have automatic rotation enabled." + ) + + def test_fractional_seconds_period_pass(self): + secretmanager_client = mock.MagicMock() + secretmanager_client.audit_config = {"secretmanager_max_rotation_days": 90} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_gcp_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + _CLIENT_PATH, + new=secretmanager_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled.secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled import ( + secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_service import ( + Secret, + ) + + secretmanager_client.secrets = [ + Secret( + id=_secret_id("secret-fractional"), + name="secret-fractional", + project_id=GCP_PROJECT_ID, + rotation_period="2592000.500000000s", + ) + ] + + check = secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + + def test_sub_day_rotation_period_pass(self): + secretmanager_client = mock.MagicMock() + secretmanager_client.audit_config = {"secretmanager_max_rotation_days": 90} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_gcp_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + _CLIENT_PATH, + new=secretmanager_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled.secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled import ( + secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_service import ( + Secret, + ) + + secretmanager_client.secrets = [ + Secret( + id=_secret_id("secret-sub-day"), + name="secret-sub-day", + project_id=GCP_PROJECT_ID, + rotation_period="3600s", + ) + ] + + check = secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + + def test_overdue_next_rotation_fail(self): + secretmanager_client = mock.MagicMock() + secretmanager_client.audit_config = {"secretmanager_max_rotation_days": 90} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_gcp_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + _CLIENT_PATH, + new=secretmanager_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled.secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled import ( + secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_service import ( + Secret, + ) + + secretmanager_client.secrets = [ + Secret( + id=_secret_id("secret-overdue"), + name="secret-overdue", + project_id=GCP_PROJECT_ID, + rotation_period="7776000s", + next_rotation_time="2020-01-01T00:00:00Z", + ) + ] + + check = secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "overdue" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_invalid_rotation_period_format_fail(self): + """Unparseable rotation_period falls back to None → FAIL with no-rotation message.""" + secretmanager_client = mock.MagicMock() + secretmanager_client.audit_config = {"secretmanager_max_rotation_days": 90} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_gcp_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + _CLIENT_PATH, + new=secretmanager_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled.secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled import ( + secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_service import ( + Secret, + ) + + secretmanager_client.secrets = [ + Secret( + id=_secret_id("secret-bad-period"), + name="secret-bad-period", + project_id=GCP_PROJECT_ID, + rotation_period="not-a-duration", + ) + ] + + check = secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Secret secret-bad-period does not have automatic rotation enabled." + ) + + def test_invalid_next_rotation_time_fail_closed(self): + """Unparseable next_rotation_time fails closed → FAIL as overdue.""" + secretmanager_client = mock.MagicMock() + secretmanager_client.audit_config = {"secretmanager_max_rotation_days": 90} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_gcp_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + _CLIENT_PATH, + new=secretmanager_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled.secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled import ( + secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled, + ) + from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_service import ( + Secret, + ) + + secretmanager_client.secrets = [ + Secret( + id=_secret_id("secret-bad-timestamp"), + name="secret-bad-timestamp", + project_id=GCP_PROJECT_ID, + rotation_period="7776000s", + next_rotation_time="not-a-timestamp", + ) + ] + + check = secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "overdue" in result[0].status_extended diff --git a/tests/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_service_test.py b/tests/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_service_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f393b10a59 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/gcp/services/secretmanager/secretmanager_service_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,231 @@ +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +from prowler.providers.gcp.services.secretmanager.secretmanager_service import ( + SecretManager, +) +from tests.providers.gcp.gcp_fixtures import ( + GCP_PROJECT_ID, + mock_is_api_active, + set_mocked_gcp_provider, +) + + +def _make_secretmanager_client(secrets_list, iam_bindings=None): + """Return a mock GCP API client for the Secret Manager service.""" + client = MagicMock() + + client.projects().secrets().list().execute.return_value = {"secrets": secrets_list} + client.projects().secrets().list_next.return_value = None + + iam_response = {"bindings": iam_bindings or []} + + def mock_get_iam_policy(resource): + rv = MagicMock() + rv.execute.return_value = iam_response + return rv + + client.projects().secrets().getIamPolicy = mock_get_iam_policy + + return client + + +class TestSecretManagerService: + def test_get_secrets(self): + def mock_api_client(*args, **kwargs): + return _make_secretmanager_client( + secrets_list=[ + { + "name": f"projects/{GCP_PROJECT_ID}/secrets/my-secret", + } + ] + ) + + with ( + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service.GCPService.__is_api_active__", + new=mock_is_api_active, + ), + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service.GCPService.__generate_client__", + new=mock_api_client, + ), + ): + sm_client = SecretManager( + set_mocked_gcp_provider(project_ids=[GCP_PROJECT_ID]) + ) + + assert len(sm_client.secrets) == 1 + secret = sm_client.secrets[0] + assert secret.name == "my-secret" + assert secret.id == f"projects/{GCP_PROJECT_ID}/secrets/my-secret" + assert secret.project_id == GCP_PROJECT_ID + assert secret.location == "global" + assert secret.rotation_period is None + assert secret.next_rotation_time is None + assert secret.publicly_accessible is False + + def test_get_secrets_with_rotation(self): + def mock_api_client(*args, **kwargs): + return _make_secretmanager_client( + secrets_list=[ + { + "name": f"projects/{GCP_PROJECT_ID}/secrets/secret-with-rotation", + "rotation": { + "rotationPeriod": "7776000s", + "nextRotationTime": "2026-09-01T00:00:00Z", + }, + } + ] + ) + + with ( + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service.GCPService.__is_api_active__", + new=mock_is_api_active, + ), + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service.GCPService.__generate_client__", + new=mock_api_client, + ), + ): + sm_client = SecretManager( + set_mocked_gcp_provider(project_ids=[GCP_PROJECT_ID]) + ) + + assert len(sm_client.secrets) == 1 + secret = sm_client.secrets[0] + assert secret.name == "secret-with-rotation" + assert secret.rotation_period == "7776000s" + assert secret.next_rotation_time == "2026-09-01T00:00:00Z" + + def test_get_secrets_with_null_rotation(self): + """API returning explicit `rotation: null` must not break enumeration.""" + + def mock_api_client(*args, **kwargs): + return _make_secretmanager_client( + secrets_list=[ + { + "name": f"projects/{GCP_PROJECT_ID}/secrets/null-rotation", + "rotation": None, + } + ] + ) + + with ( + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service.GCPService.__is_api_active__", + new=mock_is_api_active, + ), + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service.GCPService.__generate_client__", + new=mock_api_client, + ), + ): + sm_client = SecretManager( + set_mocked_gcp_provider(project_ids=[GCP_PROJECT_ID]) + ) + + assert len(sm_client.secrets) == 1 + secret = sm_client.secrets[0] + assert secret.name == "null-rotation" + assert secret.rotation_period is None + assert secret.next_rotation_time is None + + def test_get_secrets_iam_policy_all_users(self): + def mock_api_client(*args, **kwargs): + return _make_secretmanager_client( + secrets_list=[ + { + "name": f"projects/{GCP_PROJECT_ID}/secrets/public-secret", + } + ], + iam_bindings=[ + { + "role": "roles/secretmanager.secretAccessor", + "members": ["allUsers"], + } + ], + ) + + with ( + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service.GCPService.__is_api_active__", + new=mock_is_api_active, + ), + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service.GCPService.__generate_client__", + new=mock_api_client, + ), + ): + sm_client = SecretManager( + set_mocked_gcp_provider(project_ids=[GCP_PROJECT_ID]) + ) + + assert len(sm_client.secrets) == 1 + assert sm_client.secrets[0].publicly_accessible is True + + def test_get_secrets_iam_policy_all_authenticated_users(self): + def mock_api_client(*args, **kwargs): + return _make_secretmanager_client( + secrets_list=[ + { + "name": f"projects/{GCP_PROJECT_ID}/secrets/auth-users-secret", + } + ], + iam_bindings=[ + { + "role": "roles/secretmanager.secretAccessor", + "members": ["allAuthenticatedUsers"], + } + ], + ) + + with ( + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service.GCPService.__is_api_active__", + new=mock_is_api_active, + ), + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service.GCPService.__generate_client__", + new=mock_api_client, + ), + ): + sm_client = SecretManager( + set_mocked_gcp_provider(project_ids=[GCP_PROJECT_ID]) + ) + + assert len(sm_client.secrets) == 1 + assert sm_client.secrets[0].publicly_accessible is True + + def test_get_secrets_iam_policy_not_public(self): + def mock_api_client(*args, **kwargs): + return _make_secretmanager_client( + secrets_list=[ + { + "name": f"projects/{GCP_PROJECT_ID}/secrets/private-secret", + } + ], + iam_bindings=[ + { + "role": "roles/secretmanager.secretAccessor", + "members": ["user:alice@example.com"], + } + ], + ) + + with ( + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service.GCPService.__is_api_active__", + new=mock_is_api_active, + ), + patch( + "prowler.providers.gcp.lib.service.service.GCPService.__generate_client__", + new=mock_api_client, + ), + ): + sm_client = SecretManager( + set_mocked_gcp_provider(project_ids=[GCP_PROJECT_ID]) + ) + + assert len(sm_client.secrets) == 1 + assert sm_client.secrets[0].publicly_accessible is False diff --git a/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled/repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled_test.py b/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled/repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled_test.py index b4d385fdf1..c57393b314 100644 --- a/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled/repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled/repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled_test.py @@ -155,3 +155,123 @@ class Test_repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled_test: result[0].status_extended == f"Repository {repo_name} does deny default branch deletion." ) + + def test_active_ruleset_passes(self): + repository_client = mock.MagicMock + repo_name = "repo1" + default_branch = Branch( + name="main", + protected=False, + default_branch=True, + require_pull_request=False, + approval_count=0, + required_linear_history=False, + allow_force_pushes=True, + branch_deletion=False, + branch_deletion_source="ruleset", + status_checks=False, + enforce_admins=False, + require_code_owner_reviews=False, + require_signed_commits=False, + conversation_resolution=False, + ) + now = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + + repository_client.repositories = { + 1: Repo( + id=1, + name=repo_name, + owner="account-name", + full_name="account-name/repo1", + default_branch=default_branch, + private=False, + archived=False, + pushed_at=now, + securitymd=False, + codeowners_exists=False, + secret_scanning_enabled=False, + dependabot_alerts_enabled=False, + delete_branch_on_merge=False, + ), + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_github_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled.repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled.repository_client", + new=repository_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled.repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled import ( + repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled, + ) + + check = repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + + def test_inactive_ruleset_fails(self): + repository_client = mock.MagicMock + repo_name = "repo1" + default_branch = Branch( + name="main", + protected=False, + default_branch=True, + require_pull_request=False, + approval_count=0, + required_linear_history=False, + allow_force_pushes=True, + branch_deletion=True, + branch_deletion_source="ruleset_not_active", + status_checks=False, + enforce_admins=False, + require_code_owner_reviews=False, + require_signed_commits=False, + conversation_resolution=False, + ) + now = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + + repository_client.repositories = { + 1: Repo( + id=1, + name=repo_name, + owner="account-name", + full_name="account-name/repo1", + default_branch=default_branch, + private=False, + archived=False, + pushed_at=now, + securitymd=False, + codeowners_exists=False, + secret_scanning_enabled=False, + dependabot_alerts_enabled=False, + delete_branch_on_merge=False, + ), + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_github_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled.repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled.repository_client", + new=repository_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled.repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled import ( + repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled, + ) + + check = repository_default_branch_deletion_disabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Repository {repo_name} has default branch deletion disabled in a ruleset, but the ruleset is not active." + ) diff --git a/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push/repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push_test.py b/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push/repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push_test.py index b35393764e..81ab6bf0cc 100644 --- a/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push/repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push/repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push_test.py @@ -149,3 +149,119 @@ class Test_repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push_test: result[0].status_extended == f"Repository {repo_name} does deny force pushes on default branch ({default_branch})." ) + + def test_active_ruleset_passes(self): + repository_client = mock.MagicMock + repo_name = "repo1" + default_branch = "main" + repository_client.repositories = { + 1: Repo( + id=1, + name=repo_name, + owner="account-name", + full_name="account-name/repo1", + default_branch=Branch( + name=default_branch, + protected=True, + default_branch=True, + require_pull_request=True, + approval_count=1, + required_linear_history=True, + allow_force_pushes=False, + allow_force_pushes_source="ruleset", + branch_deletion=False, + status_checks=True, + enforce_admins=True, + require_code_owner_reviews=True, + require_signed_commits=True, + conversation_resolution=True, + ), + private=False, + archived=False, + pushed_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + securitymd=True, + codeowners_exists=True, + secret_scanning_enabled=True, + dependabot_alerts_enabled=True, + delete_branch_on_merge=True, + ), + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_github_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push.repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push.repository_client", + new=repository_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push.repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push import ( + repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push, + ) + + check = repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + + def test_inactive_ruleset_fails(self): + repository_client = mock.MagicMock + repo_name = "repo1" + default_branch = "main" + repository_client.repositories = { + 1: Repo( + id=1, + name=repo_name, + owner="account-name", + full_name="account-name/repo1", + default_branch=Branch( + name=default_branch, + protected=False, + default_branch=True, + require_pull_request=False, + approval_count=0, + required_linear_history=False, + allow_force_pushes=True, + allow_force_pushes_source="ruleset_not_active", + branch_deletion=True, + status_checks=False, + enforce_admins=False, + require_code_owner_reviews=False, + require_signed_commits=False, + conversation_resolution=False, + ), + private=False, + archived=False, + pushed_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + securitymd=False, + codeowners_exists=False, + secret_scanning_enabled=False, + dependabot_alerts_enabled=False, + delete_branch_on_merge=False, + ), + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_github_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push.repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push.repository_client", + new=repository_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push.repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push import ( + repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push, + ) + + check = repository_default_branch_disallows_force_push() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Repository {repo_name} has force pushes disallowed in a ruleset on default branch ({default_branch}), but the ruleset is not active." + ) diff --git a/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins/repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins_test.py b/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins/repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins_test.py index 296c3d78e5..fbc7e22d68 100644 --- a/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins/repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins/repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins_test.py @@ -149,3 +149,119 @@ class Test_repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins_test: result[0].status_extended == f"Repository {repo_name} does enforce administrators to be subject to the same branch protection rules as other users." ) + + def test_active_ruleset_passes(self): + repository_client = mock.MagicMock + repo_name = "repo1" + default_branch = "main" + repository_client.repositories = { + 1: Repo( + id=1, + name=repo_name, + owner="account-name", + full_name="account-name/repo1", + default_branch=Branch( + name=default_branch, + protected=True, + default_branch=True, + require_pull_request=True, + approval_count=1, + required_linear_history=True, + allow_force_pushes=False, + branch_deletion=False, + status_checks=True, + enforce_admins=True, + enforce_admins_source="ruleset", + require_code_owner_reviews=True, + require_signed_commits=True, + conversation_resolution=True, + ), + private=False, + archived=False, + pushed_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + securitymd=True, + codeowners_exists=True, + secret_scanning_enabled=True, + dependabot_alerts_enabled=True, + delete_branch_on_merge=True, + ), + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_github_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins.repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins.repository_client", + new=repository_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins.repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins import ( + repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins, + ) + + check = repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + + def test_inactive_ruleset_fails(self): + repository_client = mock.MagicMock + repo_name = "repo1" + default_branch = "main" + repository_client.repositories = { + 1: Repo( + id=1, + name=repo_name, + owner="account-name", + full_name="account-name/repo1", + default_branch=Branch( + name=default_branch, + protected=False, + default_branch=True, + require_pull_request=False, + approval_count=0, + required_linear_history=False, + allow_force_pushes=True, + branch_deletion=True, + status_checks=False, + enforce_admins=False, + enforce_admins_source="ruleset_not_active", + require_code_owner_reviews=False, + require_signed_commits=False, + conversation_resolution=False, + ), + private=False, + archived=False, + pushed_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + securitymd=False, + codeowners_exists=False, + secret_scanning_enabled=False, + dependabot_alerts_enabled=False, + delete_branch_on_merge=False, + ), + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_github_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins.repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins.repository_client", + new=repository_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins.repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins import ( + repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins, + ) + + check = repository_default_branch_protection_applies_to_admins() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Repository {repo_name} has a ruleset that would apply to administrators, but the ruleset is not active." + ) diff --git a/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_protection_enabled/repository_default_branch_protection_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_protection_enabled/repository_default_branch_protection_enabled_test.py index 67bce91575..5fce4e7553 100644 --- a/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_protection_enabled/repository_default_branch_protection_enabled_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_protection_enabled/repository_default_branch_protection_enabled_test.py @@ -149,3 +149,119 @@ class Test_repository_default_branch_protection_enabled_test: result[0].status_extended == f"Repository {repo_name} does enforce branch protection on default branch ({default_branch})." ) + + def test_active_ruleset_passes(self): + repository_client = mock.MagicMock + repo_name = "repo1" + default_branch = "main" + repository_client.repositories = { + 1: Repo( + id=1, + name=repo_name, + owner="account-name", + full_name="account-name/repo1", + default_branch=Branch( + name=default_branch, + protected=True, + protected_source="ruleset", + default_branch=True, + require_pull_request=True, + approval_count=1, + required_linear_history=True, + allow_force_pushes=False, + branch_deletion=False, + status_checks=True, + enforce_admins=True, + require_code_owner_reviews=True, + require_signed_commits=True, + conversation_resolution=True, + ), + private=False, + archived=False, + pushed_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + securitymd=True, + codeowners_exists=True, + secret_scanning_enabled=True, + dependabot_alerts_enabled=True, + delete_branch_on_merge=True, + ), + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_github_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_protection_enabled.repository_default_branch_protection_enabled.repository_client", + new=repository_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_protection_enabled.repository_default_branch_protection_enabled import ( + repository_default_branch_protection_enabled, + ) + + check = repository_default_branch_protection_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + + def test_inactive_ruleset_fails(self): + repository_client = mock.MagicMock + repo_name = "repo1" + default_branch = "main" + repository_client.repositories = { + 1: Repo( + id=1, + name=repo_name, + owner="account-name", + full_name="account-name/repo1", + default_branch=Branch( + name=default_branch, + protected=False, + protected_source="ruleset_not_active", + default_branch=True, + require_pull_request=False, + approval_count=0, + required_linear_history=False, + allow_force_pushes=True, + branch_deletion=True, + status_checks=False, + enforce_admins=False, + require_code_owner_reviews=False, + require_signed_commits=False, + conversation_resolution=False, + ), + private=False, + archived=False, + pushed_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + securitymd=False, + codeowners_exists=False, + secret_scanning_enabled=False, + dependabot_alerts_enabled=False, + delete_branch_on_merge=False, + ), + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_github_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_protection_enabled.repository_default_branch_protection_enabled.repository_client", + new=repository_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_protection_enabled.repository_default_branch_protection_enabled import ( + repository_default_branch_protection_enabled, + ) + + check = repository_default_branch_protection_enabled() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Repository {repo_name} has a ruleset configured on default branch ({default_branch}), but the ruleset is not active." + ) diff --git a/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review/repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review_test.py b/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review/repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review_test.py index ab3d579b75..fc52676845 100644 --- a/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review/repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review/repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review_test.py @@ -147,3 +147,117 @@ class Test_repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review: result[0].status_extended == f"Repository {repo_name} requires code owner approval for changes to owned code." ) + + def test_active_ruleset_passes(self): + repository_client = mock.MagicMock + repo_name = "repo1" + repository_client.repositories = { + 1: Repo( + id=1, + name=repo_name, + owner="account-name", + full_name="account-name/repo1", + default_branch=Branch( + name="main", + protected=True, + default_branch=True, + require_pull_request=True, + approval_count=1, + required_linear_history=True, + allow_force_pushes=False, + branch_deletion=False, + status_checks=True, + enforce_admins=True, + require_code_owner_reviews=True, + require_code_owner_reviews_source="ruleset", + require_signed_commits=True, + conversation_resolution=True, + ), + private=False, + archived=False, + pushed_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + securitymd=True, + codeowners_exists=True, + secret_scanning_enabled=True, + dependabot_alerts_enabled=True, + delete_branch_on_merge=True, + ), + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_github_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review.repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review.repository_client", + new=repository_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review.repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review import ( + repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review, + ) + + check = repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + + def test_inactive_ruleset_fails(self): + repository_client = mock.MagicMock + repo_name = "repo1" + repository_client.repositories = { + 1: Repo( + id=1, + name=repo_name, + owner="account-name", + full_name="account-name/repo1", + default_branch=Branch( + name="main", + protected=False, + default_branch=True, + require_pull_request=False, + approval_count=0, + required_linear_history=False, + allow_force_pushes=True, + branch_deletion=True, + status_checks=False, + enforce_admins=False, + require_code_owner_reviews=False, + require_code_owner_reviews_source="ruleset_not_active", + require_signed_commits=False, + conversation_resolution=False, + ), + private=False, + archived=False, + pushed_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + securitymd=True, + codeowners_exists=False, + secret_scanning_enabled=False, + dependabot_alerts_enabled=False, + delete_branch_on_merge=False, + ), + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_github_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review.repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review.repository_client", + new=repository_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review.repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review import ( + repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review, + ) + + check = repository_default_branch_requires_codeowners_review() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Repository {repo_name} has code owner approval configured in a ruleset, but the ruleset is not active." + ) diff --git a/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution/repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution_test.py b/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution/repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution_test.py index 8f5a82bbd8..d283fd1b26 100644 --- a/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution/repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution/repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution_test.py @@ -149,3 +149,119 @@ class Test_repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution_test: result[0].status_extended == f"Repository {repo_name} does require conversation resolution on default branch ({default_branch})." ) + + def test_active_ruleset_passes(self): + repository_client = mock.MagicMock + repo_name = "repo1" + default_branch = "main" + repository_client.repositories = { + 1: Repo( + id=1, + name=repo_name, + owner="account-name", + full_name="account-name/repo1", + default_branch=Branch( + name=default_branch, + protected=True, + default_branch=True, + require_pull_request=True, + approval_count=1, + required_linear_history=True, + allow_force_pushes=False, + branch_deletion=False, + status_checks=True, + enforce_admins=True, + require_code_owner_reviews=True, + require_signed_commits=True, + conversation_resolution=True, + conversation_resolution_source="ruleset", + ), + private=False, + archived=False, + pushed_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + securitymd=True, + codeowners_exists=True, + secret_scanning_enabled=True, + dependabot_alerts_enabled=True, + delete_branch_on_merge=True, + ), + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_github_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution.repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution.repository_client", + new=repository_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution.repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution import ( + repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution, + ) + + check = repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + + def test_inactive_ruleset_fails(self): + repository_client = mock.MagicMock + repo_name = "repo1" + default_branch = "main" + repository_client.repositories = { + 1: Repo( + id=1, + name=repo_name, + owner="account-name", + full_name="account-name/repo1", + default_branch=Branch( + name=default_branch, + protected=False, + default_branch=True, + require_pull_request=False, + approval_count=0, + required_linear_history=False, + allow_force_pushes=True, + branch_deletion=True, + status_checks=False, + enforce_admins=False, + require_code_owner_reviews=False, + require_signed_commits=False, + conversation_resolution=False, + conversation_resolution_source="ruleset_not_active", + ), + private=False, + archived=False, + pushed_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + securitymd=False, + codeowners_exists=False, + secret_scanning_enabled=False, + dependabot_alerts_enabled=False, + delete_branch_on_merge=False, + ), + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_github_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution.repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution.repository_client", + new=repository_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution.repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution import ( + repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution, + ) + + check = repository_default_branch_requires_conversation_resolution() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Repository {repo_name} has conversation resolution configured in a ruleset on default branch ({default_branch}), but the ruleset is not active." + ) diff --git a/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history/repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history_test.py b/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history/repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history_test.py index b072396804..99c6abcd29 100644 --- a/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history/repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history/repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history_test.py @@ -149,3 +149,119 @@ class Test_repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history_test: result[0].status_extended == f"Repository {repo_name} does require linear history on default branch ({default_branch})." ) + + def test_active_ruleset_passes(self): + repository_client = mock.MagicMock + repo_name = "repo1" + default_branch = "main" + repository_client.repositories = { + 1: Repo( + id=1, + name=repo_name, + owner="account-name", + full_name="account-name/repo1", + default_branch=Branch( + name=default_branch, + protected=True, + default_branch=True, + require_pull_request=True, + approval_count=1, + required_linear_history=True, + required_linear_history_source="ruleset", + allow_force_pushes=False, + branch_deletion=False, + status_checks=True, + enforce_admins=True, + require_code_owner_reviews=True, + require_signed_commits=True, + conversation_resolution=True, + ), + private=False, + archived=False, + pushed_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + securitymd=True, + codeowners_exists=True, + secret_scanning_enabled=True, + dependabot_alerts_enabled=True, + delete_branch_on_merge=True, + ), + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_github_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history.repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history.repository_client", + new=repository_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history.repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history import ( + repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history, + ) + + check = repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + + def test_inactive_ruleset_fails(self): + repository_client = mock.MagicMock + repo_name = "repo1" + default_branch = "main" + repository_client.repositories = { + 1: Repo( + id=1, + name=repo_name, + owner="account-name", + full_name="account-name/repo1", + default_branch=Branch( + name=default_branch, + protected=False, + default_branch=True, + require_pull_request=False, + approval_count=0, + required_linear_history=False, + required_linear_history_source="ruleset_not_active", + allow_force_pushes=True, + branch_deletion=True, + status_checks=False, + enforce_admins=False, + require_code_owner_reviews=False, + require_signed_commits=False, + conversation_resolution=False, + ), + private=False, + archived=False, + pushed_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + securitymd=False, + codeowners_exists=False, + secret_scanning_enabled=False, + dependabot_alerts_enabled=False, + delete_branch_on_merge=False, + ), + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_github_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history.repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history.repository_client", + new=repository_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history.repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history import ( + repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history, + ) + + check = repository_default_branch_requires_linear_history() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Repository {repo_name} has linear history configured in a ruleset on default branch ({default_branch}), but the ruleset is not active." + ) diff --git a/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals/repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals_test.py b/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals/repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals_test.py index ddb9e89df6..72fb5470a8 100644 --- a/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals/repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals/repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals_test.py @@ -207,3 +207,117 @@ class Test_repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals: result[0].status_extended == f"Repository {repo_name} does enforce at least 2 approvals for code changes." ) + + def test_active_ruleset_passes(self): + repository_client = mock.MagicMock + repo_name = "repo1" + repository_client.repositories = { + 1: Repo( + id=1, + name=repo_name, + owner="account-name", + full_name="account-name/repo1", + default_branch=Branch( + name="main", + protected=True, + default_branch=True, + require_pull_request=True, + approval_count=2, + approval_count_source="ruleset", + required_linear_history=False, + allow_force_pushes=True, + branch_deletion=True, + status_checks=False, + enforce_admins=False, + require_code_owner_reviews=False, + require_signed_commits=False, + conversation_resolution=False, + ), + private=False, + archived=False, + pushed_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + securitymd=True, + codeowners_exists=False, + secret_scanning_enabled=False, + dependabot_alerts_enabled=False, + delete_branch_on_merge=False, + ), + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_github_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals.repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals.repository_client", + new=repository_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals.repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals import ( + repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals, + ) + + check = repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + + def test_inactive_ruleset_fails(self): + repository_client = mock.MagicMock + repo_name = "repo1" + repository_client.repositories = { + 1: Repo( + id=1, + name=repo_name, + owner="account-name", + full_name="account-name/repo1", + default_branch=Branch( + name="main", + protected=False, + default_branch=True, + require_pull_request=True, + approval_count=0, + approval_count_source="ruleset_not_active", + required_linear_history=False, + allow_force_pushes=True, + branch_deletion=True, + status_checks=False, + enforce_admins=False, + require_code_owner_reviews=False, + require_signed_commits=False, + conversation_resolution=False, + ), + private=False, + archived=False, + pushed_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + securitymd=False, + codeowners_exists=False, + secret_scanning_enabled=False, + dependabot_alerts_enabled=False, + delete_branch_on_merge=False, + ), + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_github_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals.repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals.repository_client", + new=repository_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals.repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals import ( + repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals, + ) + + check = repository_default_branch_requires_multiple_approvals() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Repository {repo_name} has at least 2 approvals configured in a ruleset, but the ruleset is not active." + ) diff --git a/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits/repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits_test.py b/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits/repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits_test.py index 5785dd2a14..0f6f0112a7 100644 --- a/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits/repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits/repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits_test.py @@ -149,3 +149,119 @@ class Test_repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits: result[0].status_extended == f"Repository {repo_name} does require signed commits on default branch ({default_branch})." ) + + def test_active_ruleset_passes(self): + repository_client = mock.MagicMock + repo_name = "repo1" + default_branch = "main" + repository_client.repositories = { + 1: Repo( + id=1, + name=repo_name, + owner="account-name", + full_name="account-name/repo1", + default_branch=Branch( + name=default_branch, + protected=True, + default_branch=True, + require_pull_request=True, + approval_count=1, + required_linear_history=True, + allow_force_pushes=False, + branch_deletion=False, + status_checks=True, + enforce_admins=True, + require_code_owner_reviews=True, + require_signed_commits=True, + require_signed_commits_source="ruleset", + conversation_resolution=True, + ), + private=False, + archived=False, + pushed_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + securitymd=True, + codeowners_exists=True, + secret_scanning_enabled=True, + dependabot_alerts_enabled=True, + delete_branch_on_merge=True, + ), + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_github_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits.repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits.repository_client", + new=repository_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits.repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits import ( + repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits, + ) + + check = repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + + def test_inactive_ruleset_fails(self): + repository_client = mock.MagicMock + repo_name = "repo1" + default_branch = "main" + repository_client.repositories = { + 1: Repo( + id=1, + name=repo_name, + owner="account-name", + full_name="account-name/repo1", + default_branch=Branch( + name=default_branch, + protected=False, + default_branch=True, + require_pull_request=False, + approval_count=0, + required_linear_history=False, + allow_force_pushes=True, + branch_deletion=True, + status_checks=False, + enforce_admins=False, + require_code_owner_reviews=False, + require_signed_commits=False, + require_signed_commits_source="ruleset_not_active", + conversation_resolution=False, + ), + private=False, + archived=False, + pushed_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + securitymd=False, + codeowners_exists=False, + secret_scanning_enabled=False, + dependabot_alerts_enabled=False, + delete_branch_on_merge=False, + ), + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_github_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits.repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits.repository_client", + new=repository_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits.repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits import ( + repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits, + ) + + check = repository_default_branch_requires_signed_commits() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Repository {repo_name} has signed commits configured in a ruleset on default branch ({default_branch}), but the ruleset is not active." + ) diff --git a/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_status_checks_required/repository_default_branch_status_checks_required_test.py b/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_status_checks_required/repository_default_branch_status_checks_required_test.py index 1ec8acc3e0..da36b36865 100644 --- a/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_status_checks_required/repository_default_branch_status_checks_required_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_default_branch_status_checks_required/repository_default_branch_status_checks_required_test.py @@ -151,3 +151,121 @@ class Test_repository_default_branch_status_checks_required_test: result[0].status_extended == f"Repository {repo_name} does enforce status checks." ) + + def test_active_ruleset_passes(self): + repository_client = mock.MagicMock + repo_name = "repo1" + default_branch = "main" + repository_client.repositories = { + 1: Repo( + id=1, + name=repo_name, + owner="account-name", + full_name="account-name/repo1", + private=False, + default_branch=Branch( + name=default_branch, + protected=False, + default_branch=True, + require_pull_request=False, + approval_count=0, + required_linear_history=False, + allow_force_pushes=True, + branch_deletion=True, + status_checks=True, + status_checks_source="ruleset", + enforce_admins=False, + require_code_owner_reviews=False, + require_signed_commits=False, + conversation_resolution=False, + ), + status_checks=True, + archived=False, + pushed_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + securitymd=True, + codeowners_exists=False, + secret_scanning_enabled=False, + dependabot_alerts_enabled=False, + delete_branch_on_merge=False, + ), + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_github_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_status_checks_required.repository_default_branch_status_checks_required.repository_client", + new=repository_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_status_checks_required.repository_default_branch_status_checks_required import ( + repository_default_branch_status_checks_required, + ) + + check = repository_default_branch_status_checks_required() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + + def test_inactive_ruleset_fails(self): + repository_client = mock.MagicMock + repo_name = "repo1" + default_branch = "main" + repository_client.repositories = { + 1: Repo( + id=1, + name=repo_name, + owner="account-name", + full_name="account-name/repo1", + default_branch=Branch( + name=default_branch, + protected=False, + default_branch=True, + require_pull_request=False, + approval_count=0, + required_linear_history=False, + allow_force_pushes=True, + branch_deletion=True, + status_checks=False, + status_checks_source="ruleset_not_active", + enforce_admins=False, + require_code_owner_reviews=False, + require_signed_commits=False, + conversation_resolution=False, + ), + status_checks=False, + archived=False, + pushed_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), + private=False, + securitymd=False, + codeowners_exists=False, + secret_scanning_enabled=False, + dependabot_alerts_enabled=False, + delete_branch_on_merge=False, + ), + } + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_github_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_status_checks_required.repository_default_branch_status_checks_required.repository_client", + new=repository_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.github.services.repository.repository_default_branch_status_checks_required.repository_default_branch_status_checks_required import ( + repository_default_branch_status_checks_required, + ) + + check = repository_default_branch_status_checks_required() + result = check.execute() + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Repository {repo_name} has status checks configured in a ruleset, but the ruleset is not active." + ) diff --git a/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_service_test.py b/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_service_test.py index 97924cbbd8..d0f3573e49 100644 --- a/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_service_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/github/services/repository/repository_service_test.py @@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ class Test_Repository_ErrorHandling: assert "Rate limit exceeded" in str(mock_logger.error.call_args) -class Test_Repository_DismissStaleReviewsRulesets: +class Test_Repository_BranchProtectionRulesets: def setup_method(self): self.repository_service = Repository.__new__(Repository) self.repository_service.provider = set_mocked_github_provider() @@ -550,6 +550,27 @@ class Test_Repository_DismissStaleReviewsRulesets: ], } + def _build_ruleset( + self, + *, + enforcement, + include, + rules, + bypass_actors=None, + ruleset_id=201, + ): + return { + "id": ruleset_id, + "name": "Branch protection ruleset", + "target": "branch", + "source_type": "Repository", + "source": "owner1/repo1", + "enforcement": enforcement, + "bypass_actors": bypass_actors or [], + "conditions": {"ref_name": {"include": include, "exclude": []}}, + "rules": rules, + } + def test_process_repository_uses_classic_branch_protection(self): repo = self._build_repo(branch_protected=True, dismiss_stale_reviews=True) repos = {} @@ -606,3 +627,320 @@ class Test_Repository_DismissStaleReviewsRulesets: assert ( repos[1].default_branch.dismiss_stale_reviews_source == "ruleset_not_active" ) + + def test_ruleset_non_fast_forward_disallows_force_push(self): + repo = self._build_repo( + branch_protected=False, + ruleset_details=[ + self._build_ruleset( + enforcement="active", + include=["~DEFAULT_BRANCH"], + rules=[{"type": "non_fast_forward"}], + ) + ], + ) + repos = {} + + self.repository_service._process_repository(repo, repos) + + assert repos[1].default_branch.allow_force_pushes is False + assert repos[1].default_branch.allow_force_pushes_source == "ruleset" + + def test_ruleset_non_fast_forward_inactive_keeps_force_push_allowed(self): + repo = self._build_repo( + branch_protected=False, + ruleset_details=[ + self._build_ruleset( + enforcement="disabled", + include=["~DEFAULT_BRANCH"], + rules=[{"type": "non_fast_forward"}], + ) + ], + ) + repos = {} + + self.repository_service._process_repository(repo, repos) + + assert repos[1].default_branch.allow_force_pushes is True + assert repos[1].default_branch.allow_force_pushes_source == "ruleset_not_active" + + def test_classic_protection_takes_precedence_over_inactive_ruleset(self): + # Classic protection already disallows force pushes, so an inactive ruleset + # must not downgrade the result. + repo = self._build_repo( + branch_protected=True, + ruleset_details=[ + self._build_ruleset( + enforcement="disabled", + include=["~DEFAULT_BRANCH"], + rules=[{"type": "non_fast_forward"}], + ) + ], + ) + repos = {} + + self.repository_service._process_repository(repo, repos) + + assert repos[1].default_branch.allow_force_pushes is False + assert repos[1].default_branch.allow_force_pushes_source == "classic" + + def test_ruleset_required_signatures_requires_signed_commits(self): + repo = self._build_repo( + branch_protected=False, + ruleset_details=[ + self._build_ruleset( + enforcement="active", + include=["~DEFAULT_BRANCH"], + rules=[{"type": "required_signatures"}], + ) + ], + ) + repos = {} + + self.repository_service._process_repository(repo, repos) + + assert repos[1].default_branch.require_signed_commits is True + assert repos[1].default_branch.require_signed_commits_source == "ruleset" + + def test_ruleset_required_linear_history(self): + repo = self._build_repo( + branch_protected=False, + ruleset_details=[ + self._build_ruleset( + enforcement="active", + include=["~DEFAULT_BRANCH"], + rules=[{"type": "required_linear_history"}], + ) + ], + ) + repos = {} + + self.repository_service._process_repository(repo, repos) + + assert repos[1].default_branch.required_linear_history is True + assert repos[1].default_branch.required_linear_history_source == "ruleset" + + def test_ruleset_required_status_checks(self): + repo = self._build_repo( + branch_protected=False, + ruleset_details=[ + self._build_ruleset( + enforcement="active", + include=["~DEFAULT_BRANCH"], + rules=[ + { + "type": "required_status_checks", + "parameters": { + "required_status_checks": [{"context": "ci/build"}], + "strict_required_status_checks_policy": True, + }, + } + ], + ) + ], + ) + repos = {} + + self.repository_service._process_repository(repo, repos) + + assert repos[1].default_branch.status_checks is True + assert repos[1].default_branch.status_checks_source == "ruleset" + + def test_ruleset_required_status_checks_without_configured_checks(self): + # A required_status_checks rule with an empty list enforces nothing, so it + # must not be treated as a passing status-checks requirement. + repo = self._build_repo( + branch_protected=False, + ruleset_details=[ + self._build_ruleset( + enforcement="active", + include=["~DEFAULT_BRANCH"], + rules=[ + { + "type": "required_status_checks", + "parameters": { + "required_status_checks": [], + "strict_required_status_checks_policy": True, + }, + } + ], + ) + ], + ) + repos = {} + + self.repository_service._process_repository(repo, repos) + + assert repos[1].default_branch.status_checks is False + assert repos[1].default_branch.status_checks_source is None + + def test_ruleset_deletion_disables_branch_deletion(self): + repo = self._build_repo( + branch_protected=False, + ruleset_details=[ + self._build_ruleset( + enforcement="active", + include=["~DEFAULT_BRANCH"], + rules=[{"type": "deletion"}], + ) + ], + ) + repos = {} + + self.repository_service._process_repository(repo, repos) + + assert repos[1].default_branch.branch_deletion is False + assert repos[1].default_branch.branch_deletion_source == "ruleset" + + def test_active_ruleset_marks_default_branch_protected(self): + repo = self._build_repo( + branch_protected=False, + ruleset_details=[ + self._build_ruleset( + enforcement="active", + include=["~DEFAULT_BRANCH"], + rules=[{"type": "non_fast_forward"}], + ) + ], + ) + repos = {} + + self.repository_service._process_repository(repo, repos) + + assert repos[1].default_branch.protected is True + assert repos[1].default_branch.protected_source == "ruleset" + + def test_ruleset_pull_request_parameters_map_to_attributes(self): + repo = self._build_repo( + branch_protected=False, + ruleset_details=[ + self._build_ruleset( + enforcement="active", + include=["~DEFAULT_BRANCH"], + rules=[ + { + "type": "pull_request", + "parameters": { + "dismiss_stale_reviews_on_push": False, + "require_code_owner_review": True, + "require_last_push_approval": False, + "required_approving_review_count": 2, + "required_review_thread_resolution": True, + }, + } + ], + ) + ], + ) + repos = {} + + self.repository_service._process_repository(repo, repos) + + branch = repos[1].default_branch + assert branch.require_pull_request is True + assert branch.require_pull_request_source == "ruleset" + assert branch.require_code_owner_reviews is True + assert branch.require_code_owner_reviews_source == "ruleset" + assert branch.conversation_resolution is True + assert branch.conversation_resolution_source == "ruleset" + assert branch.approval_count == 2 + assert branch.approval_count_source == "ruleset" + + def test_inactive_ruleset_approval_count_is_fail_signal(self): + repo = self._build_repo( + branch_protected=False, + ruleset_details=[ + self._build_ruleset( + enforcement="disabled", + include=["~DEFAULT_BRANCH"], + rules=[ + { + "type": "pull_request", + "parameters": { + "required_approving_review_count": 2, + }, + } + ], + ) + ], + ) + repos = {} + + self.repository_service._process_repository(repo, repos) + + assert repos[1].default_branch.approval_count == 0 + assert repos[1].default_branch.approval_count_source == "ruleset_not_active" + + def test_active_ruleset_without_bypass_actors_applies_to_admins(self): + repo = self._build_repo( + branch_protected=False, + ruleset_details=[ + self._build_ruleset( + enforcement="active", + include=["~DEFAULT_BRANCH"], + rules=[{"type": "non_fast_forward"}], + bypass_actors=[], + ) + ], + ) + repos = {} + + self.repository_service._process_repository(repo, repos) + + assert repos[1].default_branch.enforce_admins is True + assert repos[1].default_branch.enforce_admins_source == "ruleset" + + def test_active_ruleset_with_bypass_actors_does_not_apply_to_admins(self): + repo = self._build_repo( + branch_protected=False, + ruleset_details=[ + self._build_ruleset( + enforcement="active", + include=["~DEFAULT_BRANCH"], + rules=[{"type": "non_fast_forward"}], + bypass_actors=[ + { + "actor_id": 1, + "actor_type": "RepositoryRole", + "bypass_mode": "always", + } + ], + ) + ], + ) + repos = {} + + self.repository_service._process_repository(repo, repos) + + # Admins can bypass, so the rulesets do not enforce protection for them. + assert repos[1].default_branch.enforce_admins is False + assert repos[1].default_branch.enforce_admins_source is None + + def test_inactive_ruleset_with_bypass_actors_is_not_admin_fail_signal(self): + # A disabled ruleset that has bypass actors would not apply to admins even if + # activated, so it must not raise the enforce-admins ruleset_not_active signal. + repo = self._build_repo( + branch_protected=False, + ruleset_details=[ + self._build_ruleset( + enforcement="disabled", + include=["~DEFAULT_BRANCH"], + rules=[{"type": "non_fast_forward"}], + bypass_actors=[ + { + "actor_id": 1, + "actor_type": "RepositoryRole", + "bypass_mode": "always", + } + ], + ) + ], + ) + repos = {} + + self.repository_service._process_repository(repo, repos) + + assert repos[1].default_branch.enforce_admins is False + assert repos[1].default_branch.enforce_admins_source is None + # The branch is still reported as protected-but-inactive regardless of bypass. + assert repos[1].default_branch.protected_source == "ruleset_not_active" diff --git a/tests/providers/kubernetes/services/core/conftest.py b/tests/providers/kubernetes/services/core/conftest.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9b0becd33c --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/kubernetes/services/core/conftest.py @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +import importlib +from unittest import mock + +from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_service import Container, Pod +from tests.providers.kubernetes.kubernetes_fixtures import ( + set_mocked_kubernetes_provider, +) + + +def make_container( + name="app", + image="nginx:1.25", + resources=None, + liveness_probe=None, + readiness_probe=None, +): + return Container( + name=name, + image=image, + command=None, + ports=None, + env=None, + security_context={}, + resources=resources, + liveness_probe=liveness_probe, + readiness_probe=readiness_probe, + ) + + +def make_pod( + containers=None, + init_containers=None, + ephemeral_containers=None, + name="test-pod", + uid="test-pod-uid", +): + return Pod( + name=name, + uid=uid, + namespace="default", + labels=None, + annotations=None, + node_name=None, + service_account=None, + status_phase="Running", + pod_ip="10.0.0.1", + host_ip="192.168.1.1", + host_pid=False, + host_ipc=False, + host_network=False, + security_context={}, + containers=containers or {}, + init_containers=init_containers or {}, + ephemeral_containers=ephemeral_containers or {}, + ) + + +def make_core_client(pods): + core_client = mock.MagicMock() + core_client.pods = pods + return core_client + + +def run_check(module_path, class_name, core_client): + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_kubernetes_provider(), + ), + mock.patch(f"{module_path}.core_client", new=core_client), + ): + check_module = importlib.import_module(module_path) + check = getattr(check_module, class_name)() + return check.execute() diff --git a/tests/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_cpu_limits_set/core_cpu_limits_set_test.py b/tests/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_cpu_limits_set/core_cpu_limits_set_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..41663daab3 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_cpu_limits_set/core_cpu_limits_set_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +from tests.providers.kubernetes.services.core.conftest import ( + make_container, + make_core_client, + make_pod, + run_check, +) + +MODULE = ( + "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_cpu_limits_set.core_cpu_limits_set" +) +CLASS = "core_cpu_limits_set" + + +class TestCoreCpuLimitsSet: + def test_no_resources(self): + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({})) + + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_cpu_limit_set_pass(self): + pod = make_pod( + containers={"app": make_container(resources={"limits": {"cpu": "500m"}})} + ) + + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({pod.uid: pod})) + + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Pod test-pod regular containers have CPU limits configured." + ) + + def test_cpu_limit_missing_fail(self): + pod = make_pod(containers={"app": make_container(resources=None)}) + + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({pod.uid: pod})) + + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Pod test-pod container app does not have a CPU limit configured." + ) + + def test_empty_cpu_limit_fail(self): + pod = make_pod( + containers={"app": make_container(resources={"limits": {"cpu": ""}})} + ) + + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({pod.uid: pod})) + + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + + def test_mixed_regular_containers_fail(self): + pod = make_pod( + containers={ + "app": make_container( + name="app", resources={"limits": {"cpu": "500m"}} + ), + "sidecar": make_container(name="sidecar", resources={"limits": {}}), + } + ) + + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({pod.uid: pod})) + + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Pod test-pod container sidecar does not have a CPU limit configured." + ) + + def test_init_and_ephemeral_containers_ignored(self): + pod = make_pod( + containers={"app": make_container(resources={"limits": {"cpu": "500m"}})}, + init_containers={"init": make_container(name="init", resources=None)}, + ephemeral_containers={ + "debug": make_container(name="debug", resources=None) + }, + ) + + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({pod.uid: pod})) + + assert result[0].status == "PASS" diff --git a/tests/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_cpu_requests_set/core_cpu_requests_set_test.py b/tests/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_cpu_requests_set/core_cpu_requests_set_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..47fcec1b1e --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_cpu_requests_set/core_cpu_requests_set_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +from tests.providers.kubernetes.services.core.conftest import ( + make_container, + make_core_client, + make_pod, + run_check, +) + +MODULE = "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_cpu_requests_set.core_cpu_requests_set" +CLASS = "core_cpu_requests_set" + + +class TestCoreCpuRequestsSet: + def test_no_resources(self): + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({})) + + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_cpu_request_set_pass(self): + pod = make_pod( + containers={"app": make_container(resources={"requests": {"cpu": "100m"}})} + ) + + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({pod.uid: pod})) + + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Pod test-pod regular containers have CPU requests configured." + ) + + def test_cpu_request_missing_fail(self): + pod = make_pod(containers={"app": make_container(resources={})}) + + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({pod.uid: pod})) + + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Pod test-pod container app does not have a CPU request configured." + ) + + def test_empty_cpu_request_fail(self): + pod = make_pod( + containers={"app": make_container(resources={"requests": {"cpu": ""}})} + ) + + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({pod.uid: pod})) + + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + + def test_mixed_regular_containers_fail(self): + pod = make_pod( + containers={ + "app": make_container( + name="app", resources={"requests": {"cpu": "100m"}} + ), + "sidecar": make_container(name="sidecar", resources=None), + } + ) + + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({pod.uid: pod})) + + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Pod test-pod container sidecar does not have a CPU request configured." + ) + + def test_init_and_ephemeral_containers_ignored(self): + pod = make_pod( + containers={"app": make_container(resources={"requests": {"cpu": "100m"}})}, + init_containers={"init": make_container(name="init", resources=None)}, + ephemeral_containers={ + "debug": make_container(name="debug", resources=None) + }, + ) + + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({pod.uid: pod})) + + assert result[0].status == "PASS" diff --git a/tests/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_image_tag_fixed/core_image_tag_fixed_test.py b/tests/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_image_tag_fixed/core_image_tag_fixed_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a5e62e8157 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_image_tag_fixed/core_image_tag_fixed_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,572 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_service import Container, Pod +from tests.providers.kubernetes.kubernetes_fixtures import ( + set_mocked_kubernetes_provider, +) +from tests.providers.kubernetes.services.core.conftest import ( + make_container, + make_core_client, + make_pod, + run_check, +) + +MODULE = "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_image_tag_fixed.core_image_tag_fixed" +CLASS = "core_image_tag_fixed" + + +class Test_core_image_tag_fixed: + def test_no_pods(self): + core_client = mock.MagicMock() + core_client.pods = {} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_kubernetes_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_image_tag_fixed.core_image_tag_fixed.core_client", + new=core_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_image_tag_fixed.core_image_tag_fixed import ( + core_image_tag_fixed, + ) + + check = core_image_tag_fixed() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_image_tag_fixed(self): + container = Container( + name="test-container", + image="nginx:1.25.3", + command=None, + ports=None, + env=None, + security_context={}, + resources=None, + ) + + pod = Pod( + name="test-pod", + uid="test-uid-1234", + namespace="default", + labels=None, + annotations=None, + node_name=None, + service_account=None, + status_phase="Running", + pod_ip="10.0.0.1", + host_ip="192.168.1.1", + host_pid=None, + host_ipc=None, + host_network=False, + security_context={}, + containers={"test-container": container}, + ) + + core_client = mock.MagicMock() + core_client.pods = {"test-uid-1234": pod} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_kubernetes_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_image_tag_fixed.core_image_tag_fixed.core_client", + new=core_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_image_tag_fixed.core_image_tag_fixed import ( + core_image_tag_fixed, + ) + + check = core_image_tag_fixed() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert result[0].status_extended == ( + "Pod test-pod has fixed image tags on all containers." + ) + assert result[0].resource_id == "test-uid-1234" + assert result[0].resource_name == "test-pod" + + def test_pod_without_containers(self): + pod = Pod( + name="test-pod", + uid="test-uid-1234", + namespace="default", + labels=None, + annotations=None, + node_name=None, + service_account=None, + status_phase="Running", + pod_ip="10.0.0.1", + host_ip="192.168.1.1", + host_pid=None, + host_ipc=None, + host_network=False, + security_context={}, + containers=None, + ) + + core_client = mock.MagicMock() + core_client.pods = {"test-uid-1234": pod} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_kubernetes_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_image_tag_fixed.core_image_tag_fixed.core_client", + new=core_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_image_tag_fixed.core_image_tag_fixed import ( + core_image_tag_fixed, + ) + + check = core_image_tag_fixed() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert result[0].status_extended == ( + "Pod test-pod has fixed image tags on all containers." + ) + + def test_image_tag_latest(self): + container = Container( + name="test-container", + image="nginx:latest", + command=None, + ports=None, + env=None, + security_context={}, + resources=None, + ) + + pod = Pod( + name="test-pod", + uid="test-uid-1234", + namespace="default", + labels=None, + annotations=None, + node_name=None, + service_account=None, + status_phase="Running", + pod_ip="10.0.0.1", + host_ip="192.168.1.1", + host_pid=None, + host_ipc=None, + host_network=False, + security_context={}, + containers={"test-container": container}, + ) + + core_client = mock.MagicMock() + core_client.pods = {"test-uid-1234": pod} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_kubernetes_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_image_tag_fixed.core_image_tag_fixed.core_client", + new=core_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_image_tag_fixed.core_image_tag_fixed import ( + core_image_tag_fixed, + ) + + check = core_image_tag_fixed() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "does not use a fixed tag" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_image_tag_blank(self): + container = Container( + name="test-container", + image="nginx", + command=None, + ports=None, + env=None, + security_context={}, + resources=None, + ) + + pod = Pod( + name="test-pod", + uid="test-uid-1234", + namespace="default", + labels=None, + annotations=None, + node_name=None, + service_account=None, + status_phase="Running", + pod_ip="10.0.0.1", + host_ip="192.168.1.1", + host_pid=None, + host_ipc=None, + host_network=False, + security_context={}, + containers={"test-container": container}, + ) + + core_client = mock.MagicMock() + core_client.pods = {"test-uid-1234": pod} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_kubernetes_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_image_tag_fixed.core_image_tag_fixed.core_client", + new=core_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_image_tag_fixed.core_image_tag_fixed import ( + core_image_tag_fixed, + ) + + check = core_image_tag_fixed() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "does not use a fixed tag" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_image_with_digest(self): + container = Container( + name="test-container", + image="nginx@sha256:abc123def456", + command=None, + ports=None, + env=None, + security_context={}, + resources=None, + ) + + pod = Pod( + name="test-pod", + uid="test-uid-1234", + namespace="default", + labels=None, + annotations=None, + node_name=None, + service_account=None, + status_phase="Running", + pod_ip="10.0.0.1", + host_ip="192.168.1.1", + host_pid=None, + host_ipc=None, + host_network=False, + security_context={}, + containers={"test-container": container}, + ) + + core_client = mock.MagicMock() + core_client.pods = {"test-uid-1234": pod} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_kubernetes_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_image_tag_fixed.core_image_tag_fixed.core_client", + new=core_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_image_tag_fixed.core_image_tag_fixed import ( + core_image_tag_fixed, + ) + + check = core_image_tag_fixed() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + + def test_image_with_registry_port_and_no_tag(self): + container = Container( + name="test-container", + image="localhost:5000/nginx", + command=None, + ports=None, + env=None, + security_context={}, + resources=None, + ) + + pod = Pod( + name="test-pod", + uid="test-uid-1234", + namespace="default", + labels=None, + annotations=None, + node_name=None, + service_account=None, + status_phase="Running", + pod_ip="10.0.0.1", + host_ip="192.168.1.1", + host_pid=None, + host_ipc=None, + host_network=False, + security_context={}, + containers={"test-container": container}, + ) + + core_client = mock.MagicMock() + core_client.pods = {"test-uid-1234": pod} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_kubernetes_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_image_tag_fixed.core_image_tag_fixed.core_client", + new=core_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_image_tag_fixed.core_image_tag_fixed import ( + core_image_tag_fixed, + ) + + check = core_image_tag_fixed() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "does not use a fixed tag" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_image_tag_uppercase_latest(self): + container = Container( + name="test-container", + image="nginx:Latest", + command=None, + ports=None, + env=None, + security_context={}, + resources=None, + ) + + pod = Pod( + name="test-pod", + uid="test-uid-1234", + namespace="default", + labels=None, + annotations=None, + node_name=None, + service_account=None, + status_phase="Running", + pod_ip="10.0.0.1", + host_ip="192.168.1.1", + host_pid=None, + host_ipc=None, + host_network=False, + security_context={}, + containers={"test-container": container}, + ) + + core_client = mock.MagicMock() + core_client.pods = {"test-uid-1234": pod} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_kubernetes_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_image_tag_fixed.core_image_tag_fixed.core_client", + new=core_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_image_tag_fixed.core_image_tag_fixed import ( + core_image_tag_fixed, + ) + + check = core_image_tag_fixed() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "does not use a fixed tag" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_image_with_empty_tag(self): + container = Container( + name="test-container", + image="nginx:", + command=None, + ports=None, + env=None, + security_context={}, + resources=None, + ) + + pod = Pod( + name="test-pod", + uid="test-uid-1234", + namespace="default", + labels=None, + annotations=None, + node_name=None, + service_account=None, + status_phase="Running", + pod_ip="10.0.0.1", + host_ip="192.168.1.1", + host_pid=None, + host_ipc=None, + host_network=False, + security_context={}, + containers={"test-container": container}, + ) + + core_client = mock.MagicMock() + core_client.pods = {"test-uid-1234": pod} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_kubernetes_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_image_tag_fixed.core_image_tag_fixed.core_client", + new=core_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_image_tag_fixed.core_image_tag_fixed import ( + core_image_tag_fixed, + ) + + check = core_image_tag_fixed() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "does not use a fixed tag" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_mixed_containers_fails_on_first_unfixed_image(self): + fixed_container = Container( + name="fixed-container", + image="nginx:1.25.3", + command=None, + ports=None, + env=None, + security_context={}, + resources=None, + ) + latest_container = Container( + name="latest-container", + image="busybox:latest", + command=None, + ports=None, + env=None, + security_context={}, + resources=None, + ) + + pod = Pod( + name="test-pod", + uid="test-uid-1234", + namespace="default", + labels=None, + annotations=None, + node_name=None, + service_account=None, + status_phase="Running", + pod_ip="10.0.0.1", + host_ip="192.168.1.1", + host_pid=None, + host_ipc=None, + host_network=False, + security_context={}, + containers={ + "fixed-container": fixed_container, + "latest-container": latest_container, + }, + ) + + core_client = mock.MagicMock() + core_client.pods = {"test-uid-1234": pod} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_kubernetes_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_image_tag_fixed.core_image_tag_fixed.core_client", + new=core_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_image_tag_fixed.core_image_tag_fixed import ( + core_image_tag_fixed, + ) + + check = core_image_tag_fixed() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].status_extended == ( + "Pod test-pod has container latest-container with image 'busybox:latest' that does not use a fixed tag." + ) + + def test_init_container_image_tag_latest(self): + pod = make_pod( + containers={"app": make_container(image="nginx:1.25.3")}, + init_containers={ + "init": make_container(name="init", image="busybox:latest") + }, + ) + + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({pod.uid: pod})) + + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].status_extended == ( + "Pod test-pod has container init with image 'busybox:latest' that does not use a fixed tag." + ) + + def test_ephemeral_container_image_tag_blank(self): + pod = make_pod( + containers={"app": make_container(image="nginx:1.25.3")}, + ephemeral_containers={ + "debug": make_container(name="debug", image="busybox") + }, + ) + + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({pod.uid: pod})) + + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].status_extended == ( + "Pod test-pod has container debug with image 'busybox' that does not use a fixed tag." + ) + + def test_init_and_ephemeral_image_tags_fixed_without_regular_containers(self): + pod = make_pod( + containers=None, + init_containers={"init": make_container(name="init", image="busybox:1.36")}, + ephemeral_containers={ + "debug": make_container(name="debug", image="debug@sha256:abc123") + }, + ) + + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({pod.uid: pod})) + + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert result[0].status_extended == ( + "Pod test-pod has fixed image tags on all containers." + ) diff --git a/tests/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_liveness_probe_configured/core_liveness_probe_configured_test.py b/tests/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_liveness_probe_configured/core_liveness_probe_configured_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cc2d1915a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_liveness_probe_configured/core_liveness_probe_configured_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +from tests.providers.kubernetes.services.core.conftest import ( + make_container, + make_core_client, + make_pod, + run_check, +) + +MODULE = "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_liveness_probe_configured.core_liveness_probe_configured" +CLASS = "core_liveness_probe_configured" + + +class TestCoreLivenessProbeConfigured: + def test_no_resources(self): + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({})) + + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_liveness_probe_configured_pass(self): + pod = make_pod( + containers={"app": make_container(liveness_probe={"http_get": {}})} + ) + + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({pod.uid: pod})) + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Pod test-pod has liveness probes configured for all regular containers." + ) + + def test_liveness_probe_missing_fail(self): + pod = make_pod(containers={"app": make_container(liveness_probe=None)}) + + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({pod.uid: pod})) + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Pod test-pod container app does not have a liveness probe configured." + ) + + def test_empty_liveness_probe_fail(self): + pod = make_pod(containers={"app": make_container(liveness_probe={})}) + + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({pod.uid: pod})) + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Pod test-pod container app does not have a liveness probe configured." + ) + + def test_mixed_regular_containers_fail(self): + pod = make_pod( + containers={ + "app": make_container(name="app", liveness_probe={"http_get": {}}), + "sidecar": make_container(name="sidecar", liveness_probe=None), + } + ) + + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({pod.uid: pod})) + + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Pod test-pod container sidecar does not have a liveness probe configured." + ) + + def test_init_and_ephemeral_containers_ignored(self): + pod = make_pod( + containers={"app": make_container(liveness_probe={"http_get": {}})}, + init_containers={"init": make_container(name="init", liveness_probe=None)}, + ephemeral_containers={ + "debug": make_container(name="debug", liveness_probe=None) + }, + ) + + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({pod.uid: pod})) + + assert result[0].status == "PASS" diff --git a/tests/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_memory_limits_set/core_memory_limits_set_test.py b/tests/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_memory_limits_set/core_memory_limits_set_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f3e37ae7f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_memory_limits_set/core_memory_limits_set_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,313 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_service import Container, Pod +from tests.providers.kubernetes.kubernetes_fixtures import ( + set_mocked_kubernetes_provider, +) + + +class Test_core_memory_limits_set: + def test_no_pods(self): + core_client = mock.MagicMock() + core_client.pods = {} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_kubernetes_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_memory_limits_set.core_memory_limits_set.core_client", + new=core_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_memory_limits_set.core_memory_limits_set import ( + core_memory_limits_set, + ) + + check = core_memory_limits_set() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_memory_limits_set(self): + container = Container( + name="test-container", + image="nginx:1.25.3", + command=None, + ports=None, + env=None, + security_context={}, + resources={ + "limits": {"memory": "128Mi", "cpu": "500m"}, + "requests": {"memory": "64Mi", "cpu": "250m"}, + }, + ) + + pod = Pod( + name="test-pod", + uid="test-uid-1234", + namespace="default", + labels=None, + annotations=None, + node_name=None, + service_account=None, + status_phase="Running", + pod_ip="10.0.0.1", + host_ip="192.168.1.1", + host_pid=None, + host_ipc=None, + host_network=False, + security_context={}, + containers={"test-container": container}, + ) + + core_client = mock.MagicMock() + core_client.pods = {"test-uid-1234": pod} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_kubernetes_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_memory_limits_set.core_memory_limits_set.core_client", + new=core_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_memory_limits_set.core_memory_limits_set import ( + core_memory_limits_set, + ) + + check = core_memory_limits_set() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert result[0].status_extended == ( + "Pod test-pod has memory limits set on all containers." + ) + assert result[0].resource_id == "test-uid-1234" + assert result[0].resource_name == "test-pod" + + def test_memory_limits_set_with_no_containers(self): + pod = Pod( + name="test-pod", + uid="test-uid-1234", + namespace="default", + labels=None, + annotations=None, + node_name=None, + service_account=None, + status_phase="Running", + pod_ip="10.0.0.1", + host_ip="192.168.1.1", + host_pid=None, + host_ipc=None, + host_network=False, + security_context={}, + containers=None, + ) + + core_client = mock.MagicMock() + core_client.pods = {"test-uid-1234": pod} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_kubernetes_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_memory_limits_set.core_memory_limits_set.core_client", + new=core_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_memory_limits_set.core_memory_limits_set import ( + core_memory_limits_set, + ) + + check = core_memory_limits_set() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert result[0].status_extended == ( + "Pod test-pod has memory limits set on all containers." + ) + + def test_memory_limits_not_set(self): + container = Container( + name="test-container", + image="nginx:1.25.3", + command=None, + ports=None, + env=None, + security_context={}, + resources=None, + ) + + pod = Pod( + name="test-pod", + uid="test-uid-1234", + namespace="default", + labels=None, + annotations=None, + node_name=None, + service_account=None, + status_phase="Running", + pod_ip="10.0.0.1", + host_ip="192.168.1.1", + host_pid=None, + host_ipc=None, + host_network=False, + security_context={}, + containers={"test-container": container}, + ) + + core_client = mock.MagicMock() + core_client.pods = {"test-uid-1234": pod} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_kubernetes_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_memory_limits_set.core_memory_limits_set.core_client", + new=core_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_memory_limits_set.core_memory_limits_set import ( + core_memory_limits_set, + ) + + check = core_memory_limits_set() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].status_extended == ( + "Pod test-pod does not have memory limits set on container test-container." + ) + + def test_memory_limits_missing_memory_key(self): + container = Container( + name="test-container", + image="nginx:1.25.3", + command=None, + ports=None, + env=None, + security_context={}, + resources={ + "limits": {"cpu": "500m"}, + "requests": {"memory": "64Mi"}, + }, + ) + + pod = Pod( + name="test-pod", + uid="test-uid-1234", + namespace="default", + labels=None, + annotations=None, + node_name=None, + service_account=None, + status_phase="Running", + pod_ip="10.0.0.1", + host_ip="192.168.1.1", + host_pid=None, + host_ipc=None, + host_network=False, + security_context={}, + containers={"test-container": container}, + ) + + core_client = mock.MagicMock() + core_client.pods = {"test-uid-1234": pod} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_kubernetes_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_memory_limits_set.core_memory_limits_set.core_client", + new=core_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_memory_limits_set.core_memory_limits_set import ( + core_memory_limits_set, + ) + + check = core_memory_limits_set() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + + def test_mixed_containers_fails_on_missing_memory_limit(self): + limited_container = Container( + name="limited-container", + image="nginx:1.25.3", + command=None, + ports=None, + env=None, + security_context={}, + resources={"limits": {"memory": "128Mi"}}, + ) + unlimited_container = Container( + name="unlimited-container", + image="busybox:1.36", + command=None, + ports=None, + env=None, + security_context={}, + resources={"requests": {"memory": "64Mi"}}, + ) + + pod = Pod( + name="test-pod", + uid="test-uid-1234", + namespace="default", + labels=None, + annotations=None, + node_name=None, + service_account=None, + status_phase="Running", + pod_ip="10.0.0.1", + host_ip="192.168.1.1", + host_pid=None, + host_ipc=None, + host_network=False, + security_context={}, + containers={ + "limited-container": limited_container, + "unlimited-container": unlimited_container, + }, + ) + + core_client = mock.MagicMock() + core_client.pods = {"test-uid-1234": pod} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_kubernetes_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_memory_limits_set.core_memory_limits_set.core_client", + new=core_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_memory_limits_set.core_memory_limits_set import ( + core_memory_limits_set, + ) + + check = core_memory_limits_set() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].status_extended == ( + "Pod test-pod does not have memory limits set on container unlimited-container." + ) diff --git a/tests/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_memory_requests_set/core_memory_requests_set_test.py b/tests/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_memory_requests_set/core_memory_requests_set_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8da3225abd --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_memory_requests_set/core_memory_requests_set_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,313 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_service import Container, Pod +from tests.providers.kubernetes.kubernetes_fixtures import ( + set_mocked_kubernetes_provider, +) + + +class Test_core_memory_requests_set: + def test_no_pods(self): + core_client = mock.MagicMock() + core_client.pods = {} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_kubernetes_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_memory_requests_set.core_memory_requests_set.core_client", + new=core_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_memory_requests_set.core_memory_requests_set import ( + core_memory_requests_set, + ) + + check = core_memory_requests_set() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_memory_requests_set(self): + container = Container( + name="test-container", + image="nginx:1.25.3", + command=None, + ports=None, + env=None, + security_context={}, + resources={ + "limits": {"memory": "128Mi", "cpu": "500m"}, + "requests": {"memory": "64Mi", "cpu": "250m"}, + }, + ) + + pod = Pod( + name="test-pod", + uid="test-uid-1234", + namespace="default", + labels=None, + annotations=None, + node_name=None, + service_account=None, + status_phase="Running", + pod_ip="10.0.0.1", + host_ip="192.168.1.1", + host_pid=None, + host_ipc=None, + host_network=False, + security_context={}, + containers={"test-container": container}, + ) + + core_client = mock.MagicMock() + core_client.pods = {"test-uid-1234": pod} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_kubernetes_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_memory_requests_set.core_memory_requests_set.core_client", + new=core_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_memory_requests_set.core_memory_requests_set import ( + core_memory_requests_set, + ) + + check = core_memory_requests_set() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert result[0].status_extended == ( + "Pod test-pod has memory requests set on all containers." + ) + assert result[0].resource_id == "test-uid-1234" + assert result[0].resource_name == "test-pod" + + def test_memory_requests_set_with_no_containers(self): + pod = Pod( + name="test-pod", + uid="test-uid-1234", + namespace="default", + labels=None, + annotations=None, + node_name=None, + service_account=None, + status_phase="Running", + pod_ip="10.0.0.1", + host_ip="192.168.1.1", + host_pid=None, + host_ipc=None, + host_network=False, + security_context={}, + containers=None, + ) + + core_client = mock.MagicMock() + core_client.pods = {"test-uid-1234": pod} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_kubernetes_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_memory_requests_set.core_memory_requests_set.core_client", + new=core_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_memory_requests_set.core_memory_requests_set import ( + core_memory_requests_set, + ) + + check = core_memory_requests_set() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert result[0].status_extended == ( + "Pod test-pod has memory requests set on all containers." + ) + + def test_memory_requests_not_set(self): + container = Container( + name="test-container", + image="nginx:1.25.3", + command=None, + ports=None, + env=None, + security_context={}, + resources=None, + ) + + pod = Pod( + name="test-pod", + uid="test-uid-1234", + namespace="default", + labels=None, + annotations=None, + node_name=None, + service_account=None, + status_phase="Running", + pod_ip="10.0.0.1", + host_ip="192.168.1.1", + host_pid=None, + host_ipc=None, + host_network=False, + security_context={}, + containers={"test-container": container}, + ) + + core_client = mock.MagicMock() + core_client.pods = {"test-uid-1234": pod} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_kubernetes_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_memory_requests_set.core_memory_requests_set.core_client", + new=core_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_memory_requests_set.core_memory_requests_set import ( + core_memory_requests_set, + ) + + check = core_memory_requests_set() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].status_extended == ( + "Pod test-pod does not have memory requests set on container test-container." + ) + + def test_memory_requests_missing_memory_key(self): + container = Container( + name="test-container", + image="nginx:1.25.3", + command=None, + ports=None, + env=None, + security_context={}, + resources={ + "limits": {"memory": "128Mi"}, + "requests": {"cpu": "250m"}, + }, + ) + + pod = Pod( + name="test-pod", + uid="test-uid-1234", + namespace="default", + labels=None, + annotations=None, + node_name=None, + service_account=None, + status_phase="Running", + pod_ip="10.0.0.1", + host_ip="192.168.1.1", + host_pid=None, + host_ipc=None, + host_network=False, + security_context={}, + containers={"test-container": container}, + ) + + core_client = mock.MagicMock() + core_client.pods = {"test-uid-1234": pod} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_kubernetes_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_memory_requests_set.core_memory_requests_set.core_client", + new=core_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_memory_requests_set.core_memory_requests_set import ( + core_memory_requests_set, + ) + + check = core_memory_requests_set() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + + def test_mixed_containers_fails_on_missing_memory_request(self): + requested_container = Container( + name="requested-container", + image="nginx:1.25.3", + command=None, + ports=None, + env=None, + security_context={}, + resources={"requests": {"memory": "64Mi"}}, + ) + unrequested_container = Container( + name="unrequested-container", + image="busybox:1.36", + command=None, + ports=None, + env=None, + security_context={}, + resources={"limits": {"memory": "128Mi"}}, + ) + + pod = Pod( + name="test-pod", + uid="test-uid-1234", + namespace="default", + labels=None, + annotations=None, + node_name=None, + service_account=None, + status_phase="Running", + pod_ip="10.0.0.1", + host_ip="192.168.1.1", + host_pid=None, + host_ipc=None, + host_network=False, + security_context={}, + containers={ + "requested-container": requested_container, + "unrequested-container": unrequested_container, + }, + ) + + core_client = mock.MagicMock() + core_client.pods = {"test-uid-1234": pod} + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_kubernetes_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_memory_requests_set.core_memory_requests_set.core_client", + new=core_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_memory_requests_set.core_memory_requests_set import ( + core_memory_requests_set, + ) + + check = core_memory_requests_set() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].status_extended == ( + "Pod test-pod does not have memory requests set on container unrequested-container." + ) diff --git a/tests/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_readiness_probe_configured/core_readiness_probe_configured_test.py b/tests/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_readiness_probe_configured/core_readiness_probe_configured_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ca316545ae --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/kubernetes/services/core/core_readiness_probe_configured/core_readiness_probe_configured_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +from tests.providers.kubernetes.services.core.conftest import ( + make_container, + make_core_client, + make_pod, + run_check, +) + +MODULE = "prowler.providers.kubernetes.services.core.core_readiness_probe_configured.core_readiness_probe_configured" +CLASS = "core_readiness_probe_configured" + + +class TestCoreReadinessProbeConfigured: + def test_no_resources(self): + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({})) + + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_readiness_probe_configured_pass(self): + pod = make_pod( + containers={"app": make_container(readiness_probe={"http_get": {}})} + ) + + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({pod.uid: pod})) + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Pod test-pod has readiness probes configured for all regular containers." + ) + + def test_readiness_probe_missing_fail(self): + pod = make_pod(containers={"app": make_container(readiness_probe=None)}) + + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({pod.uid: pod})) + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Pod test-pod container app does not have a readiness probe configured." + ) + + def test_empty_readiness_probe_fail(self): + pod = make_pod(containers={"app": make_container(readiness_probe={})}) + + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({pod.uid: pod})) + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Pod test-pod container app does not have a readiness probe configured." + ) + + def test_mixed_regular_containers_fail(self): + pod = make_pod( + containers={ + "app": make_container(name="app", readiness_probe={"http_get": {}}), + "sidecar": make_container(name="sidecar", readiness_probe=None), + } + ) + + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({pod.uid: pod})) + + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Pod test-pod container sidecar does not have a readiness probe configured." + ) + + def test_init_and_ephemeral_containers_ignored(self): + pod = make_pod( + containers={"app": make_container(readiness_probe={"http_get": {}})}, + init_containers={"init": make_container(name="init", readiness_probe=None)}, + ephemeral_containers={ + "debug": make_container(name="debug", readiness_probe=None) + }, + ) + + result = run_check(MODULE, CLASS, make_core_client({pod.uid: pod})) + + assert result[0].status == "PASS" diff --git a/tests/providers/linode/lib/mutelist/fixtures/linode_mutelist.yaml b/tests/providers/linode/lib/mutelist/fixtures/linode_mutelist.yaml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..60a3edef84 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/linode/lib/mutelist/fixtures/linode_mutelist.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +Mutelist: + Accounts: + "E1AF1B6C-1111-2222-3333-444455556666": + Checks: + "administration_user_2fa_enabled": + Regions: + - "*" + Resources: + - "admin" diff --git a/tests/providers/linode/lib/mutelist/linode_mutelist_test.py b/tests/providers/linode/lib/mutelist/linode_mutelist_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f122e5bcae --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/linode/lib/mutelist/linode_mutelist_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +from unittest.mock import MagicMock + +import yaml + +from prowler.providers.linode.lib.mutelist.mutelist import LinodeMutelist + +MUTELIST_FIXTURE_PATH = ( + "tests/providers/linode/lib/mutelist/fixtures/linode_mutelist.yaml" +) + + +class Test_linode_mutelist: + def test_get_mutelist_file_from_local_file(self): + mutelist = LinodeMutelist(mutelist_path=MUTELIST_FIXTURE_PATH) + + with open(MUTELIST_FIXTURE_PATH) as f: + mutelist_fixture = yaml.safe_load(f)["Mutelist"] + + assert mutelist.mutelist == mutelist_fixture + assert mutelist.mutelist_file_path == MUTELIST_FIXTURE_PATH + + def test_get_mutelist_file_from_local_file_non_existent(self): + mutelist_path = "tests/providers/linode/lib/mutelist/fixtures/not_present" + mutelist = LinodeMutelist(mutelist_path=mutelist_path) + + assert mutelist.mutelist == {} + assert mutelist.mutelist_file_path == mutelist_path + + def test_validate_mutelist_not_valid_key(self): + with open(MUTELIST_FIXTURE_PATH) as f: + mutelist_fixture = yaml.safe_load(f)["Mutelist"] + + mutelist_fixture["Accounts1"] = mutelist_fixture["Accounts"] + del mutelist_fixture["Accounts"] + + mutelist = LinodeMutelist(mutelist_content=mutelist_fixture) + + assert len(mutelist.validate_mutelist(mutelist_fixture)) == 0 + assert mutelist.mutelist == {} + assert mutelist.mutelist_file_path is None + + def test_is_finding_muted(self): + mutelist_content = { + "Accounts": { + "E1AF1B6C-1111-2222-3333-444455556666": { + "Checks": { + "administration_user_2fa_enabled": { + "Regions": ["*"], + "Resources": ["admin"], + } + } + } + } + } + + mutelist = LinodeMutelist(mutelist_content=mutelist_content) + + finding = MagicMock() + finding.check_metadata = MagicMock() + finding.check_metadata.CheckID = "administration_user_2fa_enabled" + finding.status = "FAIL" + finding.region = "global" + finding.resource_id = "admin" + finding.resource_name = "admin" + finding.resource_tags = [] + + assert mutelist.is_finding_muted( + finding, "E1AF1B6C-1111-2222-3333-444455556666" + ) + + def test_is_finding_not_muted(self): + mutelist_content = { + "Accounts": { + "E1AF1B6C-1111-2222-3333-444455556666": { + "Checks": { + "administration_user_2fa_enabled": { + "Regions": ["*"], + "Resources": ["other-user"], + } + } + } + } + } + + mutelist = LinodeMutelist(mutelist_content=mutelist_content) + + finding = MagicMock() + finding.check_metadata = MagicMock() + finding.check_metadata.CheckID = "administration_user_2fa_enabled" + finding.status = "FAIL" + finding.region = "global" + finding.resource_id = "admin" + finding.resource_name = "admin" + finding.resource_tags = [] + + assert not mutelist.is_finding_muted( + finding, "E1AF1B6C-1111-2222-3333-444455556666" + ) diff --git a/tests/providers/linode/linode_fixtures.py b/tests/providers/linode/linode_fixtures.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5786ffe881 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/linode/linode_fixtures.py @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +from unittest.mock import MagicMock + +from prowler.providers.linode.models import ( + LinodeIdentityInfo, + LinodeSession, +) + +# Linode Identity +USERNAME = "admin" +EMAIL = "admin@example.com" +ACCOUNT_ID = "E1AF1B6C-1111-2222-3333-444455556666" + +# Linode Credentials +TOKEN = "fake-linode-token-for-testing" + + +def set_mocked_linode_provider( + username: str = USERNAME, + email: str = EMAIL, + account_id: str = ACCOUNT_ID, +): + """Return a mocked LinodeProvider with identity and session set.""" + provider = MagicMock() + provider.type = "linode" + provider.identity = LinodeIdentityInfo( + username=username, + email=email, + account_id=account_id, + ) + provider.session = LinodeSession( + client=MagicMock(), + token=TOKEN, + ) + return provider diff --git a/tests/providers/linode/linode_metadata_test.py b/tests/providers/linode/linode_metadata_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9409c468af --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/linode/linode_metadata_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest + +from prowler.lib.check.models import CheckMetadata + +EXPECTED_SERVICE_NAMES = { + "administration": "administration", + "compute": "compute", + "networking": "networking", +} + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "metadata_file", + sorted(Path("prowler/providers/linode").glob("services/**/*.metadata.json")), +) +def test_linode_check_metadata_is_valid(metadata_file): + metadata = CheckMetadata.parse_file(metadata_file) + assert metadata.Provider == "linode" + assert metadata.CheckID == metadata_file.stem.replace(".metadata", "") + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "metadata_file", + sorted(Path("prowler/providers/linode").glob("services/**/*.metadata.json")), +) +def test_linode_checks_metadata_use_canonical_hub_urls(metadata_file): + metadata = CheckMetadata.parse_file(metadata_file) + url = metadata.Remediation.Recommendation.Url + assert not url.startswith( + "https://hub.prowler.com/checks/linode/" + ), f"{metadata_file}: non-canonical hub URL {url}" + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "metadata_file", + sorted(Path("prowler/providers/linode").glob("services/**/*.metadata.json")), +) +def test_linode_check_metadata_uses_product_area_service_names(metadata_file): + metadata = CheckMetadata.parse_file(metadata_file) + service_folder = metadata_file.relative_to( + Path("prowler/providers/linode/services") + ).parts[0] + + assert metadata.ServiceName == EXPECTED_SERVICE_NAMES[service_folder] diff --git a/tests/providers/linode/linode_provider_test.py b/tests/providers/linode/linode_provider_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..67df6ccc20 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/linode/linode_provider_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +import os +from unittest import mock + +import pytest + +from prowler.providers.linode.exceptions.exceptions import ( + LinodeAuthenticationError, + LinodeCredentialsError, + LinodeInvalidRegionError, +) +from prowler.providers.linode.linode_provider import LinodeProvider +from prowler.providers.linode.models import LinodeIdentityInfo, LinodeSession +from tests.providers.linode.linode_fixtures import ( + ACCOUNT_ID, + EMAIL, + TOKEN, + USERNAME, +) + + +class TestLinodeProvider_setup_session: + def test_missing_token_raises_credentials_error(self): + with mock.patch.dict(os.environ, {"LINODE_TOKEN": ""}, clear=False): + os.environ.pop("LINODE_TOKEN", None) + with pytest.raises(LinodeCredentialsError): + LinodeProvider.setup_session() + + def test_returns_session_with_token(self): + session = LinodeProvider.setup_session(token=TOKEN) + assert isinstance(session, LinodeSession) + assert session.token == TOKEN + assert session.client is not None + + def test_reads_token_from_env(self): + with mock.patch.dict(os.environ, {"LINODE_TOKEN": TOKEN}, clear=False): + session = LinodeProvider.setup_session() + assert session.token == TOKEN + + +class TestLinodeProvider_setup_identity: + def _build_session(self): + client = mock.MagicMock() + return LinodeSession(client=client, token=TOKEN) + + def test_resolves_identity_from_profile_and_account(self): + session = self._build_session() + profile = mock.MagicMock() + profile.username = USERNAME + profile.email = EMAIL + session.client.profile.return_value = profile + + account = mock.MagicMock() + account.euuid = ACCOUNT_ID + session.client.account.return_value = account + + identity = LinodeProvider.setup_identity(session) + + assert isinstance(identity, LinodeIdentityInfo) + assert identity.username == USERNAME + assert identity.email == EMAIL + assert identity.account_id == ACCOUNT_ID + + def test_invalid_token_raises_authentication_error(self): + # An invalid token fails the profile call (any valid token can read its + # own profile), so the scan must abort instead of returning empty data. + session = self._build_session() + session.client.profile.side_effect = Exception("[401] Invalid Token") + + with pytest.raises(LinodeAuthenticationError): + LinodeProvider.setup_identity(session) + + def test_identity_with_account_failure_still_returns(self): + session = self._build_session() + profile = mock.MagicMock() + profile.username = USERNAME + profile.email = EMAIL + session.client.profile.return_value = profile + session.client.account.side_effect = Exception("forbidden") + + identity = LinodeProvider.setup_identity(session) + + assert identity.username == USERNAME + assert identity.email == EMAIL + assert identity.account_id is None + + +class TestLinodeProvider_test_connection: + def test_successful_connection(self): + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.linode_provider.LinodeProvider.setup_session" + ) as mock_session: + session = mock.MagicMock() + session.client.profile.return_value = mock.MagicMock() + mock_session.return_value = session + + conn = LinodeProvider.test_connection(token=TOKEN, raise_on_exception=False) + + assert conn.is_connected is True + + def test_missing_credentials(self): + with mock.patch.dict(os.environ, {"LINODE_TOKEN": ""}, clear=False): + os.environ.pop("LINODE_TOKEN", None) + conn = LinodeProvider.test_connection(token=None, raise_on_exception=False) + assert conn.is_connected is False + + def test_connection_failure_raises_when_requested(self): + with mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.linode_provider.LinodeProvider.setup_session" + ) as mock_session: + mock_session.side_effect = LinodeCredentialsError( + file="test", message="No token" + ) + with pytest.raises(LinodeCredentialsError): + LinodeProvider.test_connection(token=None, raise_on_exception=True) + + +class TestLinodeProvider_validate_regions: + def _session_with_regions(self, region_ids): + client = mock.MagicMock() + client.regions.return_value = [mock.MagicMock(id=rid) for rid in region_ids] + return LinodeSession(client=client, token=TOKEN) + + def test_no_regions_returns_none(self): + session = self._session_with_regions(["eu-central", "us-east"]) + assert LinodeProvider.validate_regions(session, None) is None + + def test_valid_regions_returns_set(self): + session = self._session_with_regions(["eu-central", "us-east", "ap-south"]) + result = LinodeProvider.validate_regions(session, ["eu-central", "us-east"]) + assert result == {"eu-central", "us-east"} + + def test_invalid_region_raises(self): + session = self._session_with_regions(["eu-central", "us-east"]) + with pytest.raises(LinodeInvalidRegionError): + LinodeProvider.validate_regions(session, ["eu-central", "nonexistent"]) + + def test_regions_api_failure_does_not_block(self): + # If the public regions list cannot be fetched, the scan proceeds with + # the requested regions instead of failing. + client = mock.MagicMock() + client.regions.side_effect = Exception("regions API error") + session = LinodeSession(client=client, token=TOKEN) + + result = LinodeProvider.validate_regions(session, ["eu-central"]) + + assert result == {"eu-central"} diff --git a/tests/providers/linode/services/administration/administration_user_2fa_enabled/administration_user_2fa_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/linode/services/administration/administration_user_2fa_enabled/administration_user_2fa_enabled_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a4e77c662a --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/linode/services/administration/administration_user_2fa_enabled/administration_user_2fa_enabled_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from prowler.providers.linode.services.administration.administration_service import ( + User, +) +from tests.providers.linode.linode_fixtures import set_mocked_linode_provider + + +class Test_administration_user_2fa_enabled: + def test_no_users(self): + administration_client = mock.MagicMock() + administration_client.users = [] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.administration.administration_user_2fa_enabled.administration_user_2fa_enabled.administration_client", + new=administration_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.administration.administration_user_2fa_enabled.administration_user_2fa_enabled import ( + administration_user_2fa_enabled, + ) + + check = administration_user_2fa_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_user_with_2fa(self): + administration_client = mock.MagicMock() + administration_client.users = [ + User( + username="admin", + email="admin@example.com", + tfa_enabled=True, + restricted=False, + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.administration.administration_user_2fa_enabled.administration_user_2fa_enabled.administration_client", + new=administration_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.administration.administration_user_2fa_enabled.administration_user_2fa_enabled import ( + administration_user_2fa_enabled, + ) + + check = administration_user_2fa_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert result[0].resource_name == "admin" + assert result[0].resource_id == "admin" + + def test_user_without_2fa(self): + administration_client = mock.MagicMock() + administration_client.users = [ + User( + username="dev-user", + email="dev@example.com", + tfa_enabled=False, + restricted=True, + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.administration.administration_user_2fa_enabled.administration_user_2fa_enabled.administration_client", + new=administration_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.administration.administration_user_2fa_enabled.administration_user_2fa_enabled import ( + administration_user_2fa_enabled, + ) + + check = administration_user_2fa_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].resource_name == "dev-user" + assert result[0].resource_id == "dev-user" diff --git a/tests/providers/linode/services/administration/linode_administration_service_test.py b/tests/providers/linode/services/administration/linode_administration_service_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b8393c073a --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/linode/services/administration/linode_administration_service_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +from linode_api4.errors import ApiError + +from prowler.providers.linode.services.administration.administration_service import ( + AdministrationService, +) + + +def _mock_user(username="admin", email="admin@example.com", tfa=True, restricted=False): + user = MagicMock() + user.username = username + user.email = email + user.tfa_enabled = tfa + user.restricted = restricted + return user + + +def _build_service(account_users_return=None, account_users_side_effect=None): + """Build an AdministrationService with an isolated mock client.""" + service = object.__new__(AdministrationService) + service.users = [] + + # Build isolated mock hierarchy for client.account.users() + # Must explicitly create the users callable as a fresh MagicMock + # because check tests contaminate MagicMock class with users=[...] + users_callable = MagicMock() + if account_users_side_effect: + users_callable.side_effect = account_users_side_effect + else: + users_callable.return_value = account_users_return or [] + + account_mock = MagicMock() + account_mock.users = users_callable + + client_mock = MagicMock() + client_mock.account = account_mock + service.client = client_mock + return service + + +class TestLinodeAdministrationService: + def test_describe_users_parses_correctly(self): + mock_users = [ + _mock_user("admin", "admin@example.com", True, False), + _mock_user("reader", "reader@example.com", False, True), + ] + + service = _build_service(account_users_return=mock_users) + service._describe_users() + + assert len(service.users) == 2 + assert service.users[0].username == "admin" + assert service.users[0].tfa_enabled is True + assert service.users[1].username == "reader" + assert service.users[1].restricted is True + + def test_describe_users_handles_empty_list(self): + service = _build_service(account_users_return=[]) + service._describe_users() + + assert len(service.users) == 0 + + def test_describe_users_handles_api_error(self): + service = _build_service(account_users_side_effect=Exception("API error")) + service._describe_users() + + assert len(service.users) == 0 + + def test_describe_users_handles_null_fields(self): + """A user with null tfa_enabled/email must still be included with safe + defaults instead of being dropped by a ValidationError.""" + user = MagicMock() + user.username = "partial" + user.email = None + user.tfa_enabled = None + user.restricted = None + + service = _build_service(account_users_return=[user]) + service._describe_users() + + assert len(service.users) == 1 + assert service.users[0].username == "partial" + assert service.users[0].email == "" + assert service.users[0].tfa_enabled is False + assert service.users[0].restricted is False + + def test_describe_users_missing_scope_logs_permission_error(self): + error = ApiError( + "Your OAuth token is not authorized to use this endpoint.", status=401 + ) + service = _build_service(account_users_side_effect=error) + + with patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.lib.service.service.logger" + ) as logger_mock: + service._describe_users() + + assert len(service.users) == 0 + logged = " ".join(str(c) for c in logger_mock.error.call_args_list) + assert "LinodeMissingPermissionError" in logged + assert "account:read_only" in logged diff --git a/tests/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_backups_enabled/compute_instance_backups_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_backups_enabled/compute_instance_backups_enabled_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..93e19fa6b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_backups_enabled/compute_instance_backups_enabled_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_service import ( + Instance, +) +from tests.providers.linode.linode_fixtures import set_mocked_linode_provider + + +class Test_compute_instance_backups_enabled: + def test_no_instances(self): + compute_client = mock.MagicMock() + compute_client.instances = [] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_instance_backups_enabled.compute_instance_backups_enabled.compute_client", + new=compute_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_instance_backups_enabled.compute_instance_backups_enabled import ( + compute_instance_backups_enabled, + ) + + check = compute_instance_backups_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_compute_instance_backups_enabled(self): + compute_client = mock.MagicMock() + compute_client.instances = [ + Instance( + id=12345, + label="ubuntu-eu-central", + region="us-east", + status="running", + backups_enabled=True, + tags=[], + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_instance_backups_enabled.compute_instance_backups_enabled.compute_client", + new=compute_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_instance_backups_enabled.compute_instance_backups_enabled import ( + compute_instance_backups_enabled, + ) + + check = compute_instance_backups_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert result[0].resource_id == "12345" + assert result[0].resource_name == "ubuntu-eu-central" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Instance ubuntu-eu-central has the Backup service enabled." + ) + + def test_instance_backups_disabled(self): + compute_client = mock.MagicMock() + compute_client.instances = [ + Instance( + id=12345, + label="ubuntu-eu-central", + region="us-east", + status="running", + backups_enabled=False, + tags=[], + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_instance_backups_enabled.compute_instance_backups_enabled.compute_client", + new=compute_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_instance_backups_enabled.compute_instance_backups_enabled import ( + compute_instance_backups_enabled, + ) + + check = compute_instance_backups_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].resource_id == "12345" + assert result[0].resource_name == "ubuntu-eu-central" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Instance ubuntu-eu-central does not have the Backup service enabled." + ) diff --git a/tests/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled/compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled/compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d5023d2f94 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled/compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_service import ( + Instance, +) +from tests.providers.linode.linode_fixtures import set_mocked_linode_provider + + +class Test_compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled: + def test_no_instances(self): + compute_client = mock.MagicMock() + compute_client.instances = [] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled.compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled.compute_client", + new=compute_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled.compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled import ( + compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled, + ) + + check = compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled(self): + compute_client = mock.MagicMock() + compute_client.instances = [ + Instance( + id=12345, + label="ubuntu-eu-central", + region="us-east", + status="running", + disk_encryption="enabled", + tags=[], + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled.compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled.compute_client", + new=compute_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled.compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled import ( + compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled, + ) + + check = compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert result[0].resource_id == "12345" + assert result[0].resource_name == "ubuntu-eu-central" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Instance ubuntu-eu-central has disk encryption enabled." + ) + + def test_instance_disk_encryption_disabled(self): + compute_client = mock.MagicMock() + compute_client.instances = [ + Instance( + id=12345, + label="ubuntu-eu-central", + region="us-east", + status="running", + disk_encryption="disabled", + tags=[], + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled.compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled.compute_client", + new=compute_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled.compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled import ( + compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled, + ) + + check = compute_instance_disk_encryption_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].resource_id == "12345" + assert result[0].resource_name == "ubuntu-eu-central" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Instance ubuntu-eu-central does not have disk encryption enabled." + ) diff --git a/tests/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_watchdog_enabled/compute_instance_watchdog_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_watchdog_enabled/compute_instance_watchdog_enabled_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..db5ddaacd0 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/linode/services/compute/compute_instance_watchdog_enabled/compute_instance_watchdog_enabled_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_service import ( + Instance, +) +from tests.providers.linode.linode_fixtures import set_mocked_linode_provider + + +class Test_compute_instance_watchdog_enabled: + def test_no_instances(self): + compute_client = mock.MagicMock() + compute_client.instances = [] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_instance_watchdog_enabled.compute_instance_watchdog_enabled.compute_client", + new=compute_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_instance_watchdog_enabled.compute_instance_watchdog_enabled import ( + compute_instance_watchdog_enabled, + ) + + check = compute_instance_watchdog_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_compute_instance_watchdog_enabled(self): + compute_client = mock.MagicMock() + compute_client.instances = [ + Instance( + id=12345, + label="ubuntu-eu-central", + region="us-east", + status="running", + watchdog_enabled=True, + tags=[], + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_instance_watchdog_enabled.compute_instance_watchdog_enabled.compute_client", + new=compute_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_instance_watchdog_enabled.compute_instance_watchdog_enabled import ( + compute_instance_watchdog_enabled, + ) + + check = compute_instance_watchdog_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert result[0].resource_id == "12345" + assert result[0].resource_name == "ubuntu-eu-central" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Instance ubuntu-eu-central has Watchdog (Lassie) enabled." + ) + + def test_instance_watchdog_disabled(self): + compute_client = mock.MagicMock() + compute_client.instances = [ + Instance( + id=12345, + label="ubuntu-eu-central", + region="us-east", + status="running", + watchdog_enabled=False, + tags=[], + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_instance_watchdog_enabled.compute_instance_watchdog_enabled.compute_client", + new=compute_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_instance_watchdog_enabled.compute_instance_watchdog_enabled import ( + compute_instance_watchdog_enabled, + ) + + check = compute_instance_watchdog_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].resource_id == "12345" + assert result[0].resource_name == "ubuntu-eu-central" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "Instance ubuntu-eu-central does not have Watchdog (Lassie) enabled." + ) diff --git a/tests/providers/linode/services/compute/linode_compute_service_test.py b/tests/providers/linode/services/compute/linode_compute_service_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..09b1a54e84 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/linode/services/compute/linode_compute_service_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +from linode_api4.errors import ApiError + +from prowler.providers.linode.services.compute.compute_service import ( + ComputeService, +) + + +def _mock_instance( + id=1, + label="my-instance", + region="us-east", + status="running", + backups_enabled=True, + disk_encryption="enabled", + watchdog_enabled=True, + tags=None, +): + inst = MagicMock() + inst.id = id + inst.label = label + region_mock = MagicMock() + region_mock.id = region + inst.region = region_mock + inst.status = status + backups = MagicMock() + backups.enabled = backups_enabled + inst.backups = backups + inst.disk_encryption = disk_encryption + inst.watchdog_enabled = watchdog_enabled + inst.tags = tags or [] + return inst + + +def _build_service(linode_instances_return=None, linode_instances_side_effect=None): + """Build a ComputeService with an isolated mock client.""" + service = object.__new__(ComputeService) + service.instances = [] + + # Build isolated mock hierarchy for client.linode.instances() + # Must explicitly create the instances callable as a fresh MagicMock + # because check tests contaminate MagicMock class with instances=[...] + instances_callable = MagicMock() + if linode_instances_side_effect: + instances_callable.side_effect = linode_instances_side_effect + else: + instances_callable.return_value = linode_instances_return or [] + + linode_mock = MagicMock() + linode_mock.instances = instances_callable + + client_mock = MagicMock() + client_mock.linode = linode_mock + service.client = client_mock + return service + + +class TestLinodeComputeService: + def test_describe_instances_parses_correctly(self): + mock_instances = [ + _mock_instance(id=1, label="web-1", region="us-east"), + _mock_instance(id=2, label="db-1", region="eu-west", backups_enabled=False), + ] + + service = _build_service(linode_instances_return=mock_instances) + service._describe_instances() + + assert len(service.instances) == 2 + assert service.instances[0].label == "web-1" + assert service.instances[0].region == "us-east" + assert service.instances[0].backups_enabled is True + assert service.instances[1].label == "db-1" + assert service.instances[1].backups_enabled is False + + def test_describe_instances_handles_empty_list(self): + service = _build_service(linode_instances_return=[]) + service._describe_instances() + + assert len(service.instances) == 0 + + def test_describe_instances_handles_api_error(self): + service = _build_service(linode_instances_side_effect=Exception("API error")) + service._describe_instances() + + assert len(service.instances) == 0 + + def test_describe_instances_missing_scope_logs_permission_error(self): + error = ApiError( + "Your OAuth token is not authorized to use this endpoint.", status=401 + ) + service = _build_service(linode_instances_side_effect=error) + + with patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.lib.service.service.logger" + ) as logger_mock: + service._describe_instances() + + assert len(service.instances) == 0 + logged = " ".join(str(c) for c in logger_mock.error.call_args_list) + assert "LinodeMissingPermissionError" in logged + assert "linodes:read_only" in logged + + def test_describe_instances_disk_encryption(self): + mock_instances = [ + _mock_instance(id=1, disk_encryption="enabled"), + _mock_instance(id=2, disk_encryption="disabled"), + ] + + service = _build_service(linode_instances_return=mock_instances) + service._describe_instances() + + assert service.instances[0].disk_encryption == "enabled" + assert service.instances[1].disk_encryption == "disabled" + + def test_describe_instances_region_filter_keeps_only_matching(self): + mock_instances = [ + _mock_instance(id=1, label="eu", region="eu-central"), + _mock_instance(id=2, label="us", region="us-east"), + _mock_instance(id=3, label="eu-2", region="eu-central"), + ] + service = _build_service(linode_instances_return=mock_instances) + service.provider = MagicMock() + service.provider.regions = {"eu-central"} + + service._describe_instances() + + assert len(service.instances) == 2 + assert {i.label for i in service.instances} == {"eu", "eu-2"} + assert all(i.region == "eu-central" for i in service.instances) + + def test_describe_instances_no_region_filter_keeps_all(self): + mock_instances = [ + _mock_instance(id=1, region="eu-central"), + _mock_instance(id=2, region="us-east"), + ] + service = _build_service(linode_instances_return=mock_instances) + service.provider = MagicMock() + service.provider.regions = None + + service._describe_instances() + + assert len(service.instances) == 2 diff --git a/tests/providers/linode/services/networking/linode_networking_service_test.py b/tests/providers/linode/services/networking/linode_networking_service_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cd4f43f423 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/linode/services/networking/linode_networking_service_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,193 @@ +from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch + +from linode_api4.errors import ApiError + +from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_service import ( + NetworkingService, +) + + +def _mock_rule( + protocol="TCP", ports="22", ipv4=None, ipv6=None, action="ACCEPT", label="" +): + rule = MagicMock() + rule.protocol = protocol + rule.ports = ports + rule.action = action + rule.label = label + addresses = MagicMock() + addresses.ipv4 = ipv4 or [] + addresses.ipv6 = ipv6 or [] + rule.addresses = addresses + return rule + + +def _mock_firewall( + id=1, label="my-fw", status="enabled", inbound=None, outbound=None, tags=None +): + fw = MagicMock() + fw.id = id + fw.label = label + fw.status = status + fw.tags = tags or [] + rules = MagicMock() + rules.inbound = inbound or [] + rules.outbound = outbound or [] + rules.inbound_policy = "DROP" + rules.outbound_policy = "DROP" + fw.rules = rules + return fw + + +def _build_service( + networking_firewalls_return=None, networking_firewalls_side_effect=None +): + """Build a NetworkingService instance with a properly isolated mock client.""" + service = object.__new__(NetworkingService) + service.firewalls = [] + + firewalls_callable = MagicMock() + if networking_firewalls_side_effect: + firewalls_callable.side_effect = networking_firewalls_side_effect + else: + firewalls_callable.return_value = networking_firewalls_return or [] + + networking_mock = MagicMock() + networking_mock.firewalls = firewalls_callable + + client_mock = MagicMock() + client_mock.networking = networking_mock + service.client = client_mock + return service + + +class TestLinodeNetworkingService: + def test_describe_firewalls_parses_correctly(self): + inbound_rules = [ + _mock_rule("TCP", "22", ipv4=["192.168.1.0/24"]), + _mock_rule("TCP", "443", ipv4=["0.0.0.0/0"]), + ] + mock_fws = [ + _mock_firewall(id=1, label="prod-fw", inbound=inbound_rules), + ] + + service = _build_service(networking_firewalls_return=mock_fws) + service._describe_firewalls() + + assert len(service.firewalls) == 1 + assert service.firewalls[0].label == "prod-fw" + assert len(service.firewalls[0].inbound_rules) == 2 + assert service.firewalls[0].inbound_rules[0].ports == "22" + assert service.firewalls[0].inbound_rules[0].addresses_ipv4 == [ + "192.168.1.0/24" + ] + assert service.firewalls[0].inbound_rules[1].addresses_ipv4 == ["0.0.0.0/0"] + + def test_describe_firewalls_handles_empty_list(self): + service = _build_service(networking_firewalls_return=[]) + service._describe_firewalls() + + assert len(service.firewalls) == 0 + + def test_describe_firewalls_handles_api_error(self): + service = _build_service( + networking_firewalls_side_effect=Exception("API error") + ) + service._describe_firewalls() + + assert len(service.firewalls) == 0 + + def test_describe_firewalls_missing_scope_logs_permission_error(self): + error = ApiError( + "Your OAuth token is not authorized to use this endpoint.", status=401 + ) + service = _build_service(networking_firewalls_side_effect=error) + + with patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.lib.service.service.logger" + ) as logger_mock: + service._describe_firewalls() + + assert len(service.firewalls) == 0 + logged = " ".join(str(c) for c in logger_mock.error.call_args_list) + assert "LinodeMissingPermissionError" in logged + assert "firewall:read_only" in logged + + def test_describe_firewalls_device_fetch_error_yields_none_count(self): + """A devices fetch failure must leave attached_devices_count as None + (undetermined) rather than 0, to avoid a false 'not assigned' FAIL.""" + + class _NoDevicesFw: + id = 5 + label = "no-devices-fw" + status = "enabled" + tags = [] + + @property + def devices(self): + raise Exception("devices API error") + + @property + def rules(self): + r = MagicMock() + r.inbound = [] + r.outbound = [] + r.inbound_policy = "DROP" + r.outbound_policy = "DROP" + return r + + service = _build_service(networking_firewalls_return=[_NoDevicesFw()]) + service._describe_firewalls() + + assert len(service.firewalls) == 1 + assert service.firewalls[0].attached_devices_count is None + + def test_describe_firewalls_handles_null_rule_fields(self): + """Rule fields returned as explicit null must fall back to defaults + instead of raising a ValidationError that drops the whole firewall.""" + rule = MagicMock() + rule.protocol = None + rule.ports = None + rule.action = None + rule.label = None + addresses = MagicMock() + addresses.ipv4 = None + addresses.ipv6 = None + rule.addresses = addresses + + mock_fws = [_mock_firewall(id=6, label="null-rule-fw", inbound=[rule])] + + service = _build_service(networking_firewalls_return=mock_fws) + service._describe_firewalls() + + assert len(service.firewalls) == 1 + parsed = service.firewalls[0].inbound_rules[0] + assert parsed.protocol == "TCP" + assert parsed.action == "ACCEPT" + assert parsed.ports == "" + assert parsed.addresses_ipv4 == [] + assert parsed.addresses_ipv6 == [] + assert parsed.label == "" + + def test_describe_firewalls_handles_rules_fetch_error(self): + """Firewall is still added even if rules fail to load.""" + + class _BrokenFw: + id = 1 + label = "broken-fw" + status = "enabled" + tags = [] + devices = [] + + @property + def rules(self): + raise Exception("rules API error") + + fw = _BrokenFw() + + service = _build_service(networking_firewalls_return=[fw]) + service._describe_firewalls() + + assert len(service.firewalls) == 1 + assert service.firewalls[0].label == "broken-fw" + assert len(service.firewalls[0].inbound_rules) == 0 diff --git a/tests/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices/networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices_test.py b/tests/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices/networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..72d8a9f454 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices/networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_service import Firewall +from tests.providers.linode.linode_fixtures import set_mocked_linode_provider + + +class Test_networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices: + def test_no_firewalls(self): + networking_client = mock.MagicMock() + networking_client.firewalls = [] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices.networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices.networking_client", + new=networking_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices.networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices import ( + networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices, + ) + + check = networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_firewall_assigned(self): + networking_client = mock.MagicMock() + networking_client.firewalls = [ + Firewall( + id=100, + label="assigned-fw", + status="enabled", + inbound_rules=[], + outbound_rules=[], + inbound_policy="DROP", + outbound_policy="DROP", + attached_devices_count=2, + tags=[], + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices.networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices.networking_client", + new=networking_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices.networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices import ( + networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices, + ) + + check = networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert result[0].resource_id == "100" + assert result[0].resource_name == "assigned-fw" + + def test_firewall_not_assigned(self): + networking_client = mock.MagicMock() + networking_client.firewalls = [ + Firewall( + id=101, + label="unassigned-fw", + status="enabled", + inbound_rules=[], + outbound_rules=[], + inbound_policy="DROP", + outbound_policy="DROP", + attached_devices_count=0, + tags=[], + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices.networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices.networking_client", + new=networking_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices.networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices import ( + networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices, + ) + + check = networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].resource_id == "101" + assert result[0].resource_name == "unassigned-fw" + + def test_firewall_device_count_undetermined_is_skipped(self): + # attached_devices_count is None when the devices fetch failed; the + # firewall must be skipped rather than reported as a false FAIL. + networking_client = mock.MagicMock() + networking_client.firewalls = [ + Firewall( + id=102, + label="undetermined-fw", + status="enabled", + inbound_rules=[], + outbound_rules=[], + inbound_policy="DROP", + outbound_policy="DROP", + attached_devices_count=None, + tags=[], + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices.networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices.networking_client", + new=networking_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices.networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices import ( + networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices, + ) + + check = networking_firewall_assigned_to_devices() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 0 diff --git a/tests/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop/networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop_test.py b/tests/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop/networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1543a45656 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop/networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_service import Firewall +from tests.providers.linode.linode_fixtures import set_mocked_linode_provider + + +class Test_networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop: + def test_no_firewalls(self): + networking_client = mock.MagicMock() + networking_client.firewalls = [] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop.networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop.networking_client", + new=networking_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop.networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop import ( + networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop, + ) + + check = networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_inbound_policy_drop(self): + networking_client = mock.MagicMock() + networking_client.firewalls = [ + Firewall( + id=100, + label="drop-fw", + status="enabled", + inbound_rules=[], + outbound_rules=[], + inbound_policy="DROP", + outbound_policy="DROP", + attached_devices_count=1, + tags=[], + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop.networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop.networking_client", + new=networking_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop.networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop import ( + networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop, + ) + + check = networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert result[0].resource_id == "100" + assert result[0].resource_name == "drop-fw" + + def test_inbound_policy_accept(self): + networking_client = mock.MagicMock() + networking_client.firewalls = [ + Firewall( + id=101, + label="accept-fw", + status="enabled", + inbound_rules=[], + outbound_rules=[], + inbound_policy="ACCEPT", + outbound_policy="DROP", + attached_devices_count=1, + tags=[], + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop.networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop.networking_client", + new=networking_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop.networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop import ( + networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop, + ) + + check = networking_firewall_default_inbound_policy_drop() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].resource_id == "101" + assert result[0].resource_name == "accept-fw" diff --git a/tests/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop/networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop_test.py b/tests/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop/networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5a586d710c --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop/networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_service import Firewall +from tests.providers.linode.linode_fixtures import set_mocked_linode_provider + + +class Test_networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop: + def test_no_firewalls(self): + networking_client = mock.MagicMock() + networking_client.firewalls = [] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop.networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop.networking_client", + new=networking_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop.networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop import ( + networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop, + ) + + check = networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_outbound_policy_drop(self): + networking_client = mock.MagicMock() + networking_client.firewalls = [ + Firewall( + id=100, + label="drop-fw", + status="enabled", + inbound_rules=[], + outbound_rules=[], + inbound_policy="DROP", + outbound_policy="DROP", + attached_devices_count=1, + tags=[], + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop.networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop.networking_client", + new=networking_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop.networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop import ( + networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop, + ) + + check = networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert result[0].resource_id == "100" + assert result[0].resource_name == "drop-fw" + + def test_outbound_policy_accept(self): + networking_client = mock.MagicMock() + networking_client.firewalls = [ + Firewall( + id=101, + label="accept-fw", + status="enabled", + inbound_rules=[], + outbound_rules=[], + inbound_policy="DROP", + outbound_policy="ACCEPT", + attached_devices_count=1, + tags=[], + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop.networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop.networking_client", + new=networking_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop.networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop import ( + networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop, + ) + + check = networking_firewall_default_outbound_policy_drop() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].resource_id == "101" + assert result[0].resource_name == "accept-fw" diff --git a/tests/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured/networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured_test.py b/tests/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured/networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9b8272c2f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured/networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_service import ( + Firewall, + FirewallRule, +) +from tests.providers.linode.linode_fixtures import set_mocked_linode_provider + + +class Test_networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured: + def test_no_firewalls(self): + networking_client = mock.MagicMock() + networking_client.firewalls = [] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured.networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured.networking_client", + new=networking_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured.networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured import ( + networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured, + ) + + check = networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_inbound_rules_empty(self): + networking_client = mock.MagicMock() + networking_client.firewalls = [ + Firewall( + id=100, + label="empty-inbound-fw", + status="enabled", + inbound_rules=[], + outbound_rules=[], + inbound_policy="DROP", + outbound_policy="DROP", + attached_devices_count=1, + tags=[], + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured.networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured.networking_client", + new=networking_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured.networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured import ( + networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured, + ) + + check = networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].resource_id == "100" + assert result[0].resource_name == "empty-inbound-fw" + + def test_inbound_rules_not_empty(self): + networking_client = mock.MagicMock() + networking_client.firewalls = [ + Firewall( + id=101, + label="non-empty-inbound-fw", + status="enabled", + inbound_rules=[ + FirewallRule( + protocol="TCP", + ports="443", + addresses_ipv4=["0.0.0.0/0"], + addresses_ipv6=[], + action="ACCEPT", + label="allow-https", + ) + ], + outbound_rules=[], + inbound_policy="DROP", + outbound_policy="DROP", + attached_devices_count=1, + tags=[], + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured.networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured.networking_client", + new=networking_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured.networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured import ( + networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured, + ) + + check = networking_firewall_inbound_rules_configured() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert result[0].resource_id == "101" + assert result[0].resource_name == "non-empty-inbound-fw" diff --git a/tests/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured/networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured_test.py b/tests/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured/networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..658569c940 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured/networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_service import ( + Firewall, + FirewallRule, +) +from tests.providers.linode.linode_fixtures import set_mocked_linode_provider + + +class Test_networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured: + def test_no_firewalls(self): + networking_client = mock.MagicMock() + networking_client.firewalls = [] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured.networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured.networking_client", + new=networking_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured.networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured import ( + networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured, + ) + + check = networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_outbound_rules_empty(self): + networking_client = mock.MagicMock() + networking_client.firewalls = [ + Firewall( + id=100, + label="empty-outbound-fw", + status="enabled", + inbound_rules=[], + outbound_rules=[], + inbound_policy="DROP", + outbound_policy="DROP", + attached_devices_count=1, + tags=[], + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured.networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured.networking_client", + new=networking_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured.networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured import ( + networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured, + ) + + check = networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].resource_id == "100" + assert result[0].resource_name == "empty-outbound-fw" + + def test_outbound_rules_not_empty(self): + networking_client = mock.MagicMock() + networking_client.firewalls = [ + Firewall( + id=101, + label="non-empty-outbound-fw", + status="enabled", + inbound_rules=[], + outbound_rules=[ + FirewallRule( + protocol="TCP", + ports="443", + addresses_ipv4=["0.0.0.0/0"], + addresses_ipv6=[], + action="ACCEPT", + label="allow-https-egress", + ) + ], + inbound_policy="DROP", + outbound_policy="DROP", + attached_devices_count=1, + tags=[], + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured.networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured.networking_client", + new=networking_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured.networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured import ( + networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured, + ) + + check = networking_firewall_outbound_rules_configured() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert result[0].resource_id == "101" + assert result[0].resource_name == "non-empty-outbound-fw" diff --git a/tests/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_status_enabled/networking_firewall_status_enabled_test.py b/tests/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_status_enabled/networking_firewall_status_enabled_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..632d94ca2e --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/linode/services/networking/networking_firewall_status_enabled/networking_firewall_status_enabled_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_service import Firewall +from tests.providers.linode.linode_fixtures import set_mocked_linode_provider + + +class Test_networking_firewall_status_enabled: + def test_no_firewalls(self): + networking_client = mock.MagicMock() + networking_client.firewalls = [] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_status_enabled.networking_firewall_status_enabled.networking_client", + new=networking_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_status_enabled.networking_firewall_status_enabled import ( + networking_firewall_status_enabled, + ) + + check = networking_firewall_status_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_firewall_enabled(self): + networking_client = mock.MagicMock() + networking_client.firewalls = [ + Firewall( + id=100, + label="enabled-fw", + status="enabled", + inbound_rules=[], + outbound_rules=[], + inbound_policy="DROP", + outbound_policy="DROP", + attached_devices_count=1, + tags=[], + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_status_enabled.networking_firewall_status_enabled.networking_client", + new=networking_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_status_enabled.networking_firewall_status_enabled import ( + networking_firewall_status_enabled, + ) + + check = networking_firewall_status_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert result[0].resource_id == "100" + assert result[0].resource_name == "enabled-fw" + + def test_firewall_disabled(self): + networking_client = mock.MagicMock() + networking_client.firewalls = [ + Firewall( + id=101, + label="disabled-fw", + status="disabled", + inbound_rules=[], + outbound_rules=[], + inbound_policy="DROP", + outbound_policy="DROP", + attached_devices_count=1, + tags=[], + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_linode_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_status_enabled.networking_firewall_status_enabled.networking_client", + new=networking_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.linode.services.networking.networking_firewall_status_enabled.networking_firewall_status_enabled import ( + networking_firewall_status_enabled, + ) + + check = networking_firewall_status_enabled() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].resource_id == "101" + assert result[0].resource_name == "disabled-fw" diff --git a/tests/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops/entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops_test.py b/tests/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops/entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c120034e1e --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops/entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,191 @@ +from unittest import mock +from uuid import uuid4 + +from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_service import ( + ApplicationsConditions, + ConditionalAccessGrantControl, + ConditionalAccessPolicyState, + Conditions, + GrantControlOperator, + GrantControls, + PersistentBrowser, + SessionControls, + SignInFrequency, + SignInFrequencyInterval, + UsersConditions, +) +from tests.providers.m365.m365_fixtures import DOMAIN, set_mocked_m365_provider + +CHECK_MODULE_PATH = "prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops.entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops" + +AZURE_DEVOPS_APP_ID = "499b84ac-1321-427f-aa17-267ca6975798" + + +def _make_session_controls(): + """Return default session controls for test policies.""" + return SessionControls( + persistent_browser=PersistentBrowser(is_enabled=False, mode="always"), + sign_in_frequency=SignInFrequency( + is_enabled=False, + frequency=None, + type=None, + interval=SignInFrequencyInterval.EVERY_TIME, + ), + ) + + +def _make_conditions(included_applications=None): + """Return Conditions with the given included applications.""" + return Conditions( + application_conditions=ApplicationsConditions( + included_applications=included_applications or ["All"], + excluded_applications=[], + included_user_actions=[], + ), + user_conditions=UsersConditions( + included_groups=[], + excluded_groups=[], + included_users=["All"], + excluded_users=[], + included_roles=[], + excluded_roles=[], + ), + client_app_types=[], + user_risk_levels=[], + ) + + +def _make_grant_controls(): + """Return default grant controls for test policies.""" + return GrantControls( + built_in_controls=[ConditionalAccessGrantControl.MFA], + operator=GrantControlOperator.AND, + authentication_strength=None, + ) + + +def _make_policy(state, included_applications=None, display_name="Azure DevOps Policy"): + """Return a ConditionalAccessPolicy for tests.""" + from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_service import ( + ConditionalAccessPolicy, + ) + + return ConditionalAccessPolicy( + id=str(uuid4()), + display_name=display_name, + conditions=_make_conditions(included_applications=included_applications), + grant_controls=_make_grant_controls(), + session_controls=_make_session_controls(), + state=state, + ) + + +class Test_entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops: + def _run_check(self, policies): + entra_client = mock.MagicMock + entra_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + entra_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + f"{CHECK_MODULE_PATH}.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops.entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops import ( + entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops, + ) + + entra_client.conditional_access_policies = policies + + check = entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops() + return check.execute() + + def test_no_conditional_access_policies(self): + result = self._run_check({}) + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "No enabled Conditional Access Policy explicitly targets Azure DevOps." + ) + assert result[0].resource == {} + assert result[0].resource_name == "Conditional Access Policies" + assert result[0].resource_id == "conditionalAccessPolicies" + assert result[0].location == "global" + + def test_enabled_policy_targets_azure_devops(self): + policy = _make_policy( + ConditionalAccessPolicyState.ENABLED, + included_applications=[AZURE_DEVOPS_APP_ID], + ) + result = self._run_check({policy.id: policy}) + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Conditional Access Policy {policy.display_name} explicitly targets Azure DevOps." + ) + assert result[0].resource_name == policy.display_name + assert result[0].resource_id == policy.id + + def test_enabled_policy_targets_all_apps_only(self): + policy = _make_policy( + ConditionalAccessPolicyState.ENABLED, included_applications=["All"] + ) + result = self._run_check({policy.id: policy}) + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "No enabled Conditional Access Policy explicitly targets Azure DevOps." + ) + + def test_disabled_policy_targets_azure_devops(self): + policy = _make_policy( + ConditionalAccessPolicyState.DISABLED, + included_applications=[AZURE_DEVOPS_APP_ID], + ) + result = self._run_check({policy.id: policy}) + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "No enabled Conditional Access Policy explicitly targets Azure DevOps." + ) + + def test_report_only_policy_targets_azure_devops(self): + policy = _make_policy( + ConditionalAccessPolicyState.ENABLED_FOR_REPORTING, + included_applications=[AZURE_DEVOPS_APP_ID], + ) + result = self._run_check({policy.id: policy}) + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == "No enabled Conditional Access Policy explicitly targets Azure DevOps." + ) + + def test_multiple_policies_one_targets_azure_devops(self): + non_matching = _make_policy( + ConditionalAccessPolicyState.ENABLED, + included_applications=["All"], + display_name="All Apps Policy", + ) + matching = _make_policy( + ConditionalAccessPolicyState.ENABLED, + included_applications=["some-other-app", AZURE_DEVOPS_APP_ID], + display_name="Dedicated Azure DevOps Policy", + ) + result = self._run_check({non_matching.id: non_matching, matching.id: matching}) + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert result[0].resource_id == matching.id + assert ( + result[0].status_extended + == f"Conditional Access Policy {matching.display_name} explicitly targets Azure DevOps." + ) diff --git a/tests/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references_test.py b/tests/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6d3e7786cf --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,466 @@ +from unittest import mock +from uuid import uuid4 + +from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_service import ( + ApplicationsConditions, + ConditionalAccessPolicy, + ConditionalAccessPolicyState, + Conditions, + GrantControlOperator, + GrantControls, + PersistentBrowser, + SessionControls, + SignInFrequency, + UsersConditions, +) +from tests.providers.m365.m365_fixtures import DOMAIN, set_mocked_m365_provider + + +def _make_policy( + *, + display_name="Test Policy", + state=ConditionalAccessPolicyState.ENABLED, + included_users=None, + excluded_users=None, + included_groups=None, + excluded_groups=None, + included_roles=None, + excluded_roles=None, +): + """Build a ConditionalAccessPolicy with the minimum fields required by the model.""" + policy_id = str(uuid4()) + policy = ConditionalAccessPolicy( + id=policy_id, + display_name=display_name, + conditions=Conditions( + application_conditions=ApplicationsConditions( + included_applications=[], + excluded_applications=[], + included_user_actions=[], + ), + user_conditions=UsersConditions( + included_users=included_users or [], + excluded_users=excluded_users or [], + included_groups=included_groups or [], + excluded_groups=excluded_groups or [], + included_roles=included_roles or [], + excluded_roles=excluded_roles or [], + ), + client_app_types=[], + ), + grant_controls=GrantControls( + built_in_controls=[], + operator=GrantControlOperator.OR, + authentication_strength=None, + ), + session_controls=SessionControls( + persistent_browser=PersistentBrowser(is_enabled=False, mode=""), + sign_in_frequency=SignInFrequency( + is_enabled=False, frequency=None, type=None, interval=None + ), + ), + state=state, + ) + return policy_id, policy + + +def _entra_client_mock(): + client = mock.MagicMock() + client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + # Default to clean resolution; individual tests override as needed. + client.unresolved_directory_object_references = set() + client.errored_directory_object_references = set() + return client + + +CHECK_MODULE = ( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.entra." + "entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references." + "entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references.entra_client" +) + + +class Test_entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references: + def test_no_policies(self): + """No Conditional Access policies in tenant: no findings.""" + entra_client = _entra_client_mock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch(CHECK_MODULE, new=entra_client), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references import ( + entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references, + ) + + entra_client.conditional_access_policies = {} + entra_client.unresolved_directory_object_references = set() + + check = entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 0 + + def test_sentinel_only_references_pass(self): + """Policy with only sentinel values ('All', 'GuestsOrExternalUsers') passes.""" + entra_client = _entra_client_mock() + policy_id, policy = _make_policy( + display_name="MFA For All", + included_users=["All"], + excluded_users=["GuestsOrExternalUsers"], + ) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch(CHECK_MODULE, new=entra_client), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references import ( + entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references, + ) + + entra_client.conditional_access_policies = {policy_id: policy} + entra_client.unresolved_directory_object_references = set() + + check = entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert ( + "references no deleted directory objects" in result[0].status_extended + ) + assert result[0].resource_id == policy_id + assert result[0].resource_name == "MFA For All" + + def test_all_references_resolve_pass(self): + """Policy with real identifiers, none in the unresolved set: PASS.""" + entra_client = _entra_client_mock() + live_user = str(uuid4()) + live_group = str(uuid4()) + policy_id, policy = _make_policy( + display_name="Targeted Policy", + included_users=[live_user], + included_groups=[live_group], + ) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch(CHECK_MODULE, new=entra_client), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references import ( + entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references, + ) + + entra_client.conditional_access_policies = {policy_id: policy} + entra_client.unresolved_directory_object_references = set() + + check = entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + + def test_deleted_user_in_include_fails(self): + """Policy referencing a deleted user in includeUsers fails with type+side reported.""" + entra_client = _entra_client_mock() + deleted_user = str(uuid4()) + policy_id, policy = _make_policy( + display_name="Require MFA", + included_users=[deleted_user], + ) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch(CHECK_MODULE, new=entra_client), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references import ( + entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references, + ) + + entra_client.conditional_access_policies = {policy_id: policy} + entra_client.unresolved_directory_object_references = { + ("user", deleted_user) + } + + check = entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "1 deleted directory object(s)" in result[0].status_extended + assert "users:" in result[0].status_extended + assert deleted_user in result[0].status_extended + assert "(include)" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_deleted_group_in_exclude_fails(self): + """Policy referencing a deleted group in excludeGroups fails with exclude side reported.""" + entra_client = _entra_client_mock() + deleted_group = str(uuid4()) + policy_id, policy = _make_policy( + display_name="Block Legacy Auth", + included_users=["All"], + excluded_groups=[deleted_group], + ) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch(CHECK_MODULE, new=entra_client), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references import ( + entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references, + ) + + entra_client.conditional_access_policies = {policy_id: policy} + entra_client.unresolved_directory_object_references = { + ("group", deleted_group) + } + + check = entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "groups:" in result[0].status_extended + assert "(exclude)" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_deleted_role_in_disabled_policy_still_fails(self): + """Disabled policy with a stale role reference still FAILs (per spec).""" + entra_client = _entra_client_mock() + deleted_role = str(uuid4()) + policy_id, policy = _make_policy( + display_name="Legacy Admin Policy", + state=ConditionalAccessPolicyState.DISABLED, + included_roles=[deleted_role], + ) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch(CHECK_MODULE, new=entra_client), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references import ( + entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references, + ) + + entra_client.conditional_access_policies = {policy_id: policy} + entra_client.unresolved_directory_object_references = { + ("role", deleted_role) + } + + check = entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "roles:" in result[0].status_extended + assert deleted_role in result[0].status_extended + + def test_orphans_grouped_by_type_across_collections(self): + """A single policy with orphans of every type aggregates them grouped by type.""" + entra_client = _entra_client_mock() + deleted_user = str(uuid4()) + deleted_group = str(uuid4()) + deleted_role = str(uuid4()) + policy_id, policy = _make_policy( + display_name="Composite Policy", + included_users=[deleted_user], + excluded_groups=[deleted_group], + included_roles=[deleted_role], + ) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch(CHECK_MODULE, new=entra_client), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references import ( + entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references, + ) + + entra_client.conditional_access_policies = {policy_id: policy} + entra_client.unresolved_directory_object_references = { + ("user", deleted_user), + ("group", deleted_group), + ("role", deleted_role), + } + + check = entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "3 deleted directory object(s)" in result[0].status_extended + assert "users:" in result[0].status_extended + assert "groups:" in result[0].status_extended + assert "roles:" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_report_only_policy_failure_notes_mode(self): + """A report-only policy with an orphan FAILs and flags the not-yet-enforced state.""" + entra_client = _entra_client_mock() + deleted_user = str(uuid4()) + policy_id, policy = _make_policy( + display_name="Report Only MFA", + state=ConditionalAccessPolicyState.ENABLED_FOR_REPORTING, + included_users=[deleted_user], + ) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch(CHECK_MODULE, new=entra_client), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references import ( + entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references, + ) + + entra_client.conditional_access_policies = {policy_id: policy} + entra_client.unresolved_directory_object_references = { + ("user", deleted_user) + } + + check = entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "report-only mode" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_unverified_reference_is_manual(self): + """A reference that errored (non-404) yields MANUAL, not PASS.""" + entra_client = _entra_client_mock() + errored_group = str(uuid4()) + policy_id, policy = _make_policy( + display_name="Throttled Lookup Policy", + included_users=["All"], + excluded_groups=[errored_group], + ) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch(CHECK_MODULE, new=entra_client), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references import ( + entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references, + ) + + entra_client.conditional_access_policies = {policy_id: policy} + entra_client.unresolved_directory_object_references = set() + entra_client.errored_directory_object_references = { + ("group", errored_group) + } + + check = entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "MANUAL" + assert "could not be fully evaluated" in result[0].status_extended + assert errored_group in result[0].status_extended + + def test_orphan_takes_precedence_over_unverified(self): + """A confirmed deletion FAILs even when another reference is unverified.""" + entra_client = _entra_client_mock() + deleted_user = str(uuid4()) + errored_group = str(uuid4()) + policy_id, policy = _make_policy( + display_name="Mixed Policy", + included_users=[deleted_user], + excluded_groups=[errored_group], + ) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch(CHECK_MODULE, new=entra_client), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references import ( + entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references, + ) + + entra_client.conditional_access_policies = {policy_id: policy} + entra_client.unresolved_directory_object_references = { + ("user", deleted_user) + } + entra_client.errored_directory_object_references = { + ("group", errored_group) + } + + check = entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "1 deleted directory object(s)" in result[0].status_extended + assert "could not be verified" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_multiple_policies_mixed(self): + """Two policies: one clean, one with an orphan. Distinct PASS/FAIL findings.""" + entra_client = _entra_client_mock() + deleted_user = str(uuid4()) + + clean_id, clean_policy = _make_policy( + display_name="Clean Policy", + included_users=["All"], + ) + dirty_id, dirty_policy = _make_policy( + display_name="Stale Reference Policy", + excluded_users=[deleted_user], + ) + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch(CHECK_MODULE, new=entra_client), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references import ( + entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references, + ) + + entra_client.conditional_access_policies = { + clean_id: clean_policy, + dirty_id: dirty_policy, + } + entra_client.unresolved_directory_object_references = { + ("user", deleted_user) + } + + check = entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 2 + + clean_result = next(r for r in result if r.resource_id == clean_id) + dirty_result = next(r for r in result if r.resource_id == dirty_id) + + assert clean_result.status == "PASS" + assert dirty_result.status == "FAIL" + assert "(exclude)" in dirty_result.status_extended diff --git a/tests/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps_test.py b/tests/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..30629c2a29 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,424 @@ +import re +from unittest import mock +from uuid import uuid4 + +from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_service import ( + ApplicationsConditions, + ConditionalAccessGrantControl, + ConditionalAccessPolicy, + ConditionalAccessPolicyState, + Conditions, + GrantControlOperator, + GrantControls, + PersistentBrowser, + PlatformConditions, + SessionControls, + SignInFrequency, + SignInFrequencyInterval, + UsersConditions, +) +from tests.providers.m365.m365_fixtures import DOMAIN, set_mocked_m365_provider + +CHECK_PATH = "prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps" +DIRECTORY_SYNC_ROLE_TEMPLATE_ID = "d29b2b05-8046-44ba-8758-1e26182fcf32" + + +def _policy( + display_name="Policy", + state=ConditionalAccessPolicyState.ENABLED, + included_users=None, + excluded_users=None, + included_groups=None, + excluded_groups=None, + included_roles=None, + excluded_roles=None, + included_applications=None, + excluded_applications=None, + include_platforms=None, + exclude_platforms=None, + block=False, +) -> ConditionalAccessPolicy: + """Build a fully-populated ConditionalAccessPolicy for tests. + + Args: + display_name: Policy display name. + state: Policy state (default ENABLED). + included_users: Included user IDs, or None. + excluded_users: Excluded user IDs, or None. + included_groups: Included group IDs, or None. + excluded_groups: Excluded group IDs, or None. + included_roles: Included role template IDs, or None. + excluded_roles: Excluded role template IDs, or None. + included_applications: Included application IDs, or None. + excluded_applications: Excluded application IDs, or None. + include_platforms: Included platform names, or None. + exclude_platforms: Excluded platform names, or None. + block: Whether the policy uses a Block grant control (default False). + + Returns: + A ConditionalAccessPolicy instance with the specified conditions. + """ + return ConditionalAccessPolicy( + id=str(uuid4()), + display_name=display_name, + conditions=Conditions( + application_conditions=ApplicationsConditions( + included_applications=included_applications or [], + excluded_applications=excluded_applications or [], + included_user_actions=[], + ), + user_conditions=UsersConditions( + included_groups=included_groups or [], + excluded_groups=excluded_groups or [], + included_users=included_users or [], + excluded_users=excluded_users or [], + included_roles=included_roles or [], + excluded_roles=excluded_roles or [], + ), + platform_conditions=PlatformConditions( + include_platforms=include_platforms or [], + exclude_platforms=exclude_platforms or [], + ), + ), + grant_controls=GrantControls( + built_in_controls=( + [ConditionalAccessGrantControl.BLOCK] + if block + else [ConditionalAccessGrantControl.MFA] + ), + operator=GrantControlOperator.AND, + authentication_strength=None, + ), + session_controls=SessionControls( + persistent_browser=PersistentBrowser(is_enabled=False, mode="always"), + sign_in_frequency=SignInFrequency( + is_enabled=False, + frequency=None, + type=None, + interval=SignInFrequencyInterval.EVERY_TIME, + ), + ), + state=state, + ) + + +def _run( + policies: list[ConditionalAccessPolicy], + users=None, + groups=None, + service_principals=None, +) -> list: + """Run the check with a mocked entra_client holding the given policies. + + Args: + policies: ConditionalAccessPolicy objects to inject into the mocked client. + users: Optional id -> User mapping used to resolve display names. + groups: Optional list of Group objects used to resolve display names. + service_principals: Optional id -> ServicePrincipal mapping for app names. + + Returns: + The list of check report objects returned by ``execute()``. + """ + entra_client = mock.MagicMock() + entra_client.audited_tenant = "audited_tenant" + entra_client.audited_domain = DOMAIN + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch(f"{CHECK_PATH}.entra_client", new=entra_client), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps.entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps import ( + entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps, + ) + + entra_client.conditional_access_policies = {p.id: p for p in policies} + entra_client.users = users or {} + entra_client.groups = groups or [] + entra_client.service_principals = service_principals or {} + check = entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps() + return check.execute() + + +class Test_entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps: + """Tests for the Conditional Access exclusion-gap check. + + Verifies that objects excluded from enabled Conditional Access policies stay + in scope of another enabled policy (explicitly or via the type's wildcard), + with the directory-sync role and break-glass accounts treated as intended + exclusions. + """ + + def test_no_policies(self): + result = _run([]) + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert "No enabled Conditional Access policies" in result[0].status_extended + assert result[0].resource == {} + assert result[0].resource_name == "Conditional Access Policies" + assert result[0].resource_id == "conditionalAccessPolicies" + assert result[0].location == "global" + + def test_only_disabled_policies(self): + result = _run( + [ + _policy( + state=ConditionalAccessPolicyState.DISABLED, + included_users=["All"], + excluded_users=["user-1"], + ) + ] + ) + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert "No enabled Conditional Access policies" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_report_only_policies_out_of_scope(self): + # An exclusion in a report-only policy must not be evaluated. + result = _run( + [ + _policy( + state=ConditionalAccessPolicyState.ENABLED_FOR_REPORTING, + included_users=["All"], + excluded_users=["orphan-user"], + ) + ] + ) + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert "No enabled Conditional Access policies" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_no_exclusions_used(self): + result = _run([_policy(included_users=["All"], included_applications=["All"])]) + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert "no coverage gaps are possible" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_exclusion_covered_by_another_policy(self): + # Policy A excludes user-1; Policy B includes user-1 explicitly -> covered. + result = _run( + [ + _policy( + display_name="A", included_users=["All"], excluded_users=["user-1"] + ), + _policy(display_name="B", included_users=["user-1"]), + ] + ) + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert "compensating control" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_user_exclusion_gap(self): + # user-1 is excluded but never included anywhere -> FAIL. + result = _run( + [ + _policy( + display_name="A", included_users=["All"], excluded_users=["user-1"] + ) + ] + ) + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "users: user-1" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_gap_reports_display_name_when_resolvable(self): + # A resolvable user shows its display name; an unresolved user (e.g. + # deleted but still referenced) falls back to its raw ID. + from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_service import User + + result = _run( + [ + _policy( + display_name="A", + included_users=["All"], + excluded_users=["user-1", "ghost-2"], + ) + ], + users={ + "user-1": User( + id="user-1", + name="Alice Admin", + on_premises_sync_enabled=False, + ) + }, + ) + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "Alice Admin" in result[0].status_extended + assert "user-1" not in result[0].status_extended + # Unresolved ID still surfaces as the raw identifier. + assert "ghost-2" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_group_and_role_gaps_reported_by_type(self): + result = _run( + [ + _policy( + display_name="P", + included_users=["All"], + excluded_groups=["group-x"], + excluded_roles=["role-y"], + ) + ] + ) + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "groups: group-x" in result[0].status_extended + assert "roles: role-y" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_application_exclusion_gap(self): + result = _run( + [ + _policy( + display_name="AppPolicy", + included_applications=["All"], + excluded_applications=["app-123"], + ) + ] + ) + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "applications: app-123" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_application_exclusion_covered(self): + result = _run( + [ + _policy( + display_name="A", + included_applications=["All"], + excluded_applications=["app-123"], + ), + _policy(display_name="B", included_applications=["app-123"]), + ] + ) + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + + def test_exclusion_covered_by_all_wildcard_in_another_policy(self): + # Policy A excludes user-1; Policy B targets "All" users and does NOT + # exclude user-1, so user-1 stays in scope of B -> covered -> PASS. + # The "All" wildcard of the policy that excludes the user (A) must not + # count, but the wildcard of an unrelated policy (B) does. + result = _run( + [ + _policy( + display_name="A", + included_users=["All"], + excluded_users=["user-1"], + ), + _policy(display_name="B", included_users=["All"]), + ] + ) + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert "compensating control" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_exclusion_only_wildcard_is_self_excluding_is_gap(self): + # The only "All" users policy is the one that excludes user-1, and no + # other policy covers user-1 -> real gap -> FAIL. This is the case + # #11375's global-union "All" handling would have wrongly passed. + result = _run( + [ + _policy( + display_name="A", + included_users=["All"], + excluded_users=["user-1"], + ), + _policy( + display_name="B", + included_users=["All"], + excluded_users=["user-1"], + ), + ] + ) + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "users: user-1" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_platform_exclusions_are_ignored(self): + # Platform exclusions are scoping conditions, not principals removed from + # enforcement, so they are out of scope even with no covering policy. + result = _run( + [ + _policy( + display_name="MDM", + included_users=["All"], + exclude_platforms=["android", "ios", "macos", "linux"], + ) + ] + ) + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + + def test_directory_sync_role_exclusion_skipped(self): + # Dir-sync role excluded with no fallback must NOT be a gap. + result = _run( + [ + _policy( + display_name="P", + included_users=["All"], + excluded_roles=[DIRECTORY_SYNC_ROLE_TEMPLATE_ID], + ) + ] + ) + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert "compensating control" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_emergency_access_user_exclusion_skipped(self): + # A break-glass user excluded from EVERY enabled blocking policy is an + # intended gap and must not be reported. + emergency = "breakglass-user" + result = _run( + [ + _policy( + display_name="Block1", + block=True, + included_users=["All"], + excluded_users=[emergency], + ), + _policy( + display_name="Block2", + block=True, + included_users=["All"], + excluded_users=[emergency], + ), + ] + ) + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert "compensating control" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_emergency_access_ignores_report_only_blocking_policy(self): + # A break-glass user excluded from every ENABLED blocking policy is an + # intended gap, even if a report-only (non-enforced) blocking policy that + # does NOT exclude them also exists. Report-only policies must not dilute + # the emergency determination. + emergency = "breakglass-user" + result = _run( + [ + _policy( + display_name="Block1", + block=True, + included_users=["All"], + excluded_users=[emergency], + ), + _policy( + display_name="Block2", + block=True, + included_users=["All"], + excluded_users=[emergency], + ), + _policy( + display_name="ReportOnlyBlock", + block=True, + state=ConditionalAccessPolicyState.ENABLED_FOR_REPORTING, + included_users=["All"], + ), + ] + ) + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert "compensating control" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_mixed_gap_and_covered(self): + # user-1 covered, user-2 orphaned -> FAIL listing only user-2. + result = _run( + [ + _policy( + display_name="A", + included_users=["All"], + excluded_users=["user-1", "user-2"], + ), + _policy(display_name="B", included_users=["user-1"]), + ] + ) + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "user-2" in result[0].status_extended + # user-1 is covered, so it must not appear as a gap (whitespace-robust). + assert not re.search(r"\busers:\s*user-1\b", result[0].status_extended) diff --git a/tests/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked/entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked_test.py b/tests/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked/entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked_test.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6c8696da55 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked/entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked_test.py @@ -0,0 +1,339 @@ +from unittest import mock + +from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_service import ( + DirectorySyncSettings, + Organization, +) +from tests.providers.m365.m365_fixtures import set_mocked_m365_provider + +CHECK_MODULE = ( + "prowler.providers.m365.services.entra." + "entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked." + "entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked" +) + + +def _hybrid_org(): + return Organization( + id="org-001", + name="Hybrid Org", + on_premises_sync_enabled=True, + ) + + +def _cloud_only_org(): + return Organization( + id="org-001", + name="Cloud Only Org", + on_premises_sync_enabled=False, + ) + + +class Test_entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked: + def test_both_blocks_enabled(self): + """PASS when both soft-match and hard-match blocks are enabled.""" + entra_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + f"{CHECK_MODULE}.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked.entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked import ( + entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked, + ) + + entra_client.directory_sync_settings = [ + DirectorySyncSettings( + id="sync-001", + block_soft_match_enabled=True, + block_cloud_object_takeover_through_hard_match_enabled=True, + ) + ] + entra_client.directory_sync_error = None + entra_client.organizations = [_hybrid_org()] + + check = entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert "blocks both soft-match and hard-match" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_soft_match_disabled(self): + """FAIL when soft-match block is disabled on a hybrid tenant.""" + entra_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + f"{CHECK_MODULE}.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked.entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked import ( + entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked, + ) + + entra_client.directory_sync_settings = [ + DirectorySyncSettings( + id="sync-001", + block_soft_match_enabled=False, + block_cloud_object_takeover_through_hard_match_enabled=True, + ) + ] + entra_client.directory_sync_error = None + entra_client.organizations = [_hybrid_org()] + + check = entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "blockSoftMatchEnabled" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_hard_match_disabled(self): + """FAIL when hard-match block is disabled on a hybrid tenant.""" + entra_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + f"{CHECK_MODULE}.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked.entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked import ( + entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked, + ) + + entra_client.directory_sync_settings = [ + DirectorySyncSettings( + id="sync-001", + block_soft_match_enabled=True, + block_cloud_object_takeover_through_hard_match_enabled=False, + ) + ] + entra_client.directory_sync_error = None + entra_client.organizations = [_hybrid_org()] + + check = entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert ( + "blockCloudObjectTakeoverThroughHardMatchEnabled" + in result[0].status_extended + ) + + def test_both_blocks_disabled(self): + """FAIL when both blocks are disabled on a hybrid tenant.""" + entra_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + f"{CHECK_MODULE}.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked.entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked import ( + entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked, + ) + + entra_client.directory_sync_settings = [ + DirectorySyncSettings( + id="sync-001", + block_soft_match_enabled=False, + block_cloud_object_takeover_through_hard_match_enabled=False, + ) + ] + entra_client.directory_sync_error = None + entra_client.organizations = [_hybrid_org()] + + check = entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert "blockSoftMatchEnabled" in result[0].status_extended + assert ( + "blockCloudObjectTakeoverThroughHardMatchEnabled" + in result[0].status_extended + ) + + def test_cloud_only_tenant(self): + """PASS when tenant is cloud-only and no sync object is returned.""" + entra_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + f"{CHECK_MODULE}.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked.entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked import ( + entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked, + ) + + entra_client.directory_sync_settings = [] + entra_client.directory_sync_error = None + entra_client.organizations = [_cloud_only_org()] + + check = entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert "cloud-only" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_cloud_only_tenant_with_sync_object_returned(self): + """PASS for cloud-only tenants even when Graph returns a sync object. + + Microsoft Graph returns an onPremisesSynchronization object (with all + features disabled) for cloud-only tenants. The check must not treat the + disabled flags as a FAIL when on-premises sync is not enabled. + """ + entra_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + f"{CHECK_MODULE}.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked.entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked import ( + entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked, + ) + + entra_client.directory_sync_settings = [ + DirectorySyncSettings( + id="tenant-id", + password_sync_enabled=False, + seamless_sso_enabled=False, + block_soft_match_enabled=False, + block_cloud_object_takeover_through_hard_match_enabled=False, + ) + ] + entra_client.directory_sync_error = None + entra_client.organizations = [_cloud_only_org()] + + check = entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert "cloud-only" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_permission_error_hybrid(self): + """MANUAL when permissions are insufficient for a hybrid tenant.""" + entra_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + f"{CHECK_MODULE}.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked.entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked import ( + entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked, + ) + + entra_client.directory_sync_settings = [] + entra_client.directory_sync_error = "Insufficient privileges" + entra_client.organizations = [_hybrid_org()] + + check = entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "MANUAL" + assert "Cannot verify" in result[0].status_extended + assert "Insufficient privileges" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_permission_error_cloud_only(self): + """PASS when settings cannot be read but the tenant is cloud-only.""" + entra_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + f"{CHECK_MODULE}.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked.entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked import ( + entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked, + ) + + entra_client.directory_sync_settings = [] + entra_client.directory_sync_error = "Insufficient privileges" + entra_client.organizations = [_cloud_only_org()] + + check = entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "PASS" + assert "cloud-only" in result[0].status_extended + + def test_hybrid_no_settings_returned(self): + """MANUAL when a hybrid tenant returns no directory sync settings.""" + entra_client = mock.MagicMock() + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_m365_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + f"{CHECK_MODULE}.entra_client", + new=entra_client, + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.m365.services.entra.entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked.entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked import ( + entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked, + ) + + entra_client.directory_sync_settings = [] + entra_client.directory_sync_error = None + entra_client.organizations = [_hybrid_org()] + + check = entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "MANUAL" + assert ( + "no directory sync settings were returned" in result[0].status_extended + ) diff --git a/tests/providers/m365/services/entra/microsoft365_entra_service_test.py b/tests/providers/m365/services/entra/microsoft365_entra_service_test.py index 4643ea93cc..ba6247c7bd 100644 --- a/tests/providers/m365/services/entra/microsoft365_entra_service_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/m365/services/entra/microsoft365_entra_service_test.py @@ -878,3 +878,189 @@ class Test_Entra_Service: assert merged.password_credentials[0].key_id == "cred-app" assert merged.password_credentials[0].display_name == "app-level-secret" assert merged.password_credentials[0].is_active() + + def test__resolve_identifiers_for_type_flags_only_404(self): + """Only HTTP 404 / Request_ResourceNotFound mark an id as deleted. + + Transient errors (5xx, throttling) and successful resolutions must + never be added to the unresolved set — that is the contract the check + relies on to avoid false positives during Graph outages. + """ + from msgraph.generated.models.o_data_errors.main_error import MainError + from msgraph.generated.models.o_data_errors.o_data_error import ODataError + + deleted_by_status = "deleted-status-404" + deleted_by_code = "deleted-code-rnf" + transient = "transient-503" + live = "live-user" + + error_404 = ODataError() + error_404.response_status_code = 404 + error_404.error = None # status code alone is enough + + error_rnf = ODataError() + error_rnf.response_status_code = None + error_rnf.error = MainError() + error_rnf.error.code = "Request_ResourceNotFound" + + error_503 = ODataError() + error_503.response_status_code = 503 + error_503.error = MainError() + error_503.error.code = "ServiceUnavailable" + + user_builders = { + deleted_by_status: SimpleNamespace(get=AsyncMock(side_effect=error_404)), + deleted_by_code: SimpleNamespace(get=AsyncMock(side_effect=error_rnf)), + transient: SimpleNamespace(get=AsyncMock(side_effect=error_503)), + live: SimpleNamespace(get=AsyncMock(return_value=SimpleNamespace(id=live))), + } + + entra_service = Entra.__new__(Entra) + entra_service.client = SimpleNamespace( + users=SimpleNamespace( + by_user_id=MagicMock(side_effect=lambda uid: user_builders[uid]) + ) + ) + + unresolved = set() + errored = set() + asyncio.run( + entra_service._resolve_identifiers_for_type( + "user", set(user_builders), unresolved, errored + ) + ) + + assert unresolved == { + ("user", deleted_by_status), + ("user", deleted_by_code), + } + # The transient 503 must be recorded as errored (unverified), never as + # deleted and never silently dropped. + assert errored == {("user", transient)} + + def test__resolve_identifiers_for_type_role_uses_role_definitions_endpoint(self): + """A deleted role is resolved against the roleDefinitions endpoint.""" + from msgraph.generated.models.o_data_errors.o_data_error import ODataError + + deleted_role = "deleted-role-id" + + error_404 = ODataError() + error_404.response_status_code = 404 + error_404.error = None + + by_role_id = MagicMock( + return_value=SimpleNamespace(get=AsyncMock(side_effect=error_404)) + ) + + entra_service = Entra.__new__(Entra) + entra_service.client = SimpleNamespace( + role_management=SimpleNamespace( + directory=SimpleNamespace( + role_definitions=SimpleNamespace( + by_unified_role_definition_id=by_role_id + ) + ) + ) + ) + + unresolved = set() + errored = set() + asyncio.run( + entra_service._resolve_identifiers_for_type( + "role", {deleted_role}, unresolved, errored + ) + ) + + assert unresolved == {("role", deleted_role)} + assert errored == set() + by_role_id.assert_called_once_with(deleted_role) + + def test__resolve_directory_object_references_skips_sentinels_and_dedups(self): + """End-to-end resolver: sentinels are never queried, ids are deduped + across policies, and only deleted ids land in the unresolved set.""" + from msgraph.generated.models.o_data_errors.o_data_error import ODataError + + deleted_user = "deleted-user-id" + live_user = "live-user-id" + deleted_group = "deleted-group-id" + errored_group = "errored-group-id" + + def _user_conditions(**kwargs): + base = { + "included_users": [], + "excluded_users": [], + "included_groups": [], + "excluded_groups": [], + "included_roles": [], + "excluded_roles": [], + } + base.update(kwargs) + return SimpleNamespace(**base) + + def _policy(user_conditions): + return SimpleNamespace( + conditions=SimpleNamespace(user_conditions=user_conditions) + ) + + policies = { + "policy-a": _policy( + _user_conditions( + included_users=["All", deleted_user, live_user], + excluded_groups=[deleted_group, errored_group], + ) + ), + # Same deleted_user referenced again — must be resolved only once. + "policy-b": _policy( + _user_conditions( + included_users=[deleted_user], + excluded_users=["GuestsOrExternalUsers"], + ) + ), + # Policy without user conditions must be skipped without error. + "policy-c": SimpleNamespace( + conditions=SimpleNamespace(user_conditions=None) + ), + } + + error_404 = ODataError() + error_404.response_status_code = 404 + error_404.error = None + + error_503 = ODataError() + error_503.response_status_code = 503 + error_503.error = None + + user_builders = { + deleted_user: SimpleNamespace(get=AsyncMock(side_effect=error_404)), + live_user: SimpleNamespace( + get=AsyncMock(return_value=SimpleNamespace(id=live_user)) + ), + } + group_builders = { + deleted_group: SimpleNamespace(get=AsyncMock(side_effect=error_404)), + errored_group: SimpleNamespace(get=AsyncMock(side_effect=error_503)), + } + by_user_id = MagicMock(side_effect=lambda uid: user_builders[uid]) + by_group_id = MagicMock(side_effect=lambda gid: group_builders[gid]) + + entra_service = Entra.__new__(Entra) + entra_service.client = SimpleNamespace( + users=SimpleNamespace(by_user_id=by_user_id), + groups=SimpleNamespace(by_group_id=by_group_id), + ) + + unresolved, errored = asyncio.run( + entra_service._resolve_directory_object_references(policies) + ) + + assert unresolved == { + ("user", deleted_user), + ("group", deleted_group), + } + # The 503 group is unverified, not deleted — it lands in errored. + assert errored == {("group", errored_group)} + # Sentinels are filtered before any Graph call; only the two real user + # ids are queried, and the deduped deleted_user is queried exactly once. + queried_users = {call.args[0] for call in by_user_id.call_args_list} + assert queried_users == {deleted_user, live_user} + assert user_builders[deleted_user].get.await_count == 1 diff --git a/tests/providers/openstack/openstack_provider_test.py b/tests/providers/openstack/openstack_provider_test.py index 654d109134..b36fcd97a5 100644 --- a/tests/providers/openstack/openstack_provider_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/openstack/openstack_provider_test.py @@ -631,8 +631,7 @@ class TestOpenstackProviderCloudsYaml: def test_clouds_yaml_explicit_file_path(self, tmp_path): """Test loading clouds.yaml from an explicit file path.""" clouds_yaml = tmp_path / "clouds.yaml" - clouds_yaml.write_text( - """ + clouds_yaml.write_text(""" clouds: test-cloud: auth: @@ -644,8 +643,7 @@ clouds: project_domain_name: YamlProjectDomain region_name: RegionOne identity_api_version: 3 -""" - ) +""") mock_connection = MagicMock() mock_connection.authorize.return_value = None @@ -681,8 +679,7 @@ clouds: def test_clouds_yaml_with_explicit_cloud_name(self, tmp_path): """Test loading clouds.yaml with an explicit cloud name.""" clouds_yaml = tmp_path / "clouds.yaml" - clouds_yaml.write_text( - """ + clouds_yaml.write_text(""" clouds: default-cloud: auth: @@ -692,8 +689,7 @@ clouds: project_id: default-project-id region_name: RegionOne identity_api_version: 3 -""" - ) +""") mock_connection = MagicMock() mock_connection.authorize.return_value = None @@ -719,8 +715,7 @@ clouds: def test_clouds_yaml_file_without_cloud_name(self, tmp_path): """Test error when clouds.yaml file is provided without cloud name.""" clouds_yaml = tmp_path / "clouds.yaml" - clouds_yaml.write_text( - """ + clouds_yaml.write_text(""" clouds: test-cloud: auth: @@ -729,8 +724,7 @@ clouds: password: test-password project_id: test-project-id region_name: RegionOne -""" - ) +""") with pytest.raises(OpenStackInvalidConfigError) as excinfo: OpenstackProvider(clouds_yaml_file=str(clouds_yaml)) @@ -750,8 +744,7 @@ clouds: def test_clouds_yaml_cloud_not_found(self, tmp_path): """Test error when specified cloud is not in clouds.yaml.""" clouds_yaml = tmp_path / "clouds.yaml" - clouds_yaml.write_text( - """ + clouds_yaml.write_text(""" clouds: existing-cloud: auth: @@ -760,8 +753,7 @@ clouds: password: test-password project_id: test-project-id region_name: RegionOne -""" - ) +""") with pytest.raises(OpenStackCloudNotFoundError) as excinfo: OpenstackProvider( @@ -774,8 +766,7 @@ clouds: def test_clouds_yaml_missing_required_fields(self, tmp_path): """Test error when clouds.yaml is missing required fields.""" clouds_yaml = tmp_path / "clouds.yaml" - clouds_yaml.write_text( - """ + clouds_yaml.write_text(""" clouds: incomplete-cloud: auth: @@ -783,8 +774,7 @@ clouds: username: test-user # Missing password and other required fields region_name: RegionOne -""" - ) +""") with pytest.raises(OpenStackInvalidConfigError) as excinfo: OpenstackProvider( @@ -798,16 +788,14 @@ clouds: def test_clouds_yaml_malformed_yaml(self, tmp_path): """Test error when clouds.yaml is malformed.""" clouds_yaml = tmp_path / "clouds.yaml" - clouds_yaml.write_text( - """ + clouds_yaml.write_text(""" clouds: malformed-cloud: auth: auth_url: https://openstack.example.com:5000/v3 username: test-user - invalid: yaml: structure -""" - ) +""") with pytest.raises(OpenStackInvalidConfigError): OpenstackProvider( @@ -818,8 +806,7 @@ clouds: def test_clouds_yaml_with_project_name(self, tmp_path): """Test clouds.yaml using project_name instead of project_id.""" clouds_yaml = tmp_path / "clouds.yaml" - clouds_yaml.write_text( - """ + clouds_yaml.write_text(""" clouds: test-cloud: auth: @@ -831,8 +818,7 @@ clouds: project_domain_name: Default region_name: RegionOne identity_api_version: 3 -""" - ) +""") mock_connection = MagicMock() mock_connection.authorize.return_value = None @@ -863,8 +849,7 @@ clouds: monkeypatch.setenv("OS_REGION_NAME", "EnvRegion") clouds_yaml = tmp_path / "clouds.yaml" - clouds_yaml.write_text( - """ + clouds_yaml.write_text(""" clouds: test-cloud: auth: @@ -874,8 +859,7 @@ clouds: project_id: yaml-project-id region_name: YamlRegion identity_api_version: 3 -""" - ) +""") mock_connection = MagicMock() mock_connection.authorize.return_value = None @@ -902,8 +886,7 @@ clouds: def test_test_connection_with_clouds_yaml(self, tmp_path): """Test static test_connection method with clouds.yaml.""" clouds_yaml = tmp_path / "clouds.yaml" - clouds_yaml.write_text( - """ + clouds_yaml.write_text(""" clouds: test-cloud: auth: @@ -913,8 +896,7 @@ clouds: project_id: test-project-id region_name: RegionOne identity_api_version: 3 -""" - ) +""") mock_connection = MagicMock() mock_connection.authorize.return_value = None @@ -950,8 +932,7 @@ clouds: def test_test_connection_clouds_yaml_cloud_not_found(self, tmp_path): """Test test_connection error when cloud is not in clouds.yaml.""" clouds_yaml = tmp_path / "clouds.yaml" - clouds_yaml.write_text( - """ + clouds_yaml.write_text(""" clouds: existing-cloud: auth: @@ -960,8 +941,7 @@ clouds: password: test-password project_id: test-project-id region_name: RegionOne -""" - ) +""") connection_result = OpenstackProvider.test_connection( clouds_yaml_file=str(clouds_yaml), @@ -1139,8 +1119,7 @@ clouds: def test_clouds_yaml_file_with_regions_list(self, tmp_path): """Test loading clouds.yaml file with regions list.""" clouds_yaml = tmp_path / "clouds.yaml" - clouds_yaml.write_text( - """ + clouds_yaml.write_text(""" clouds: test-cloud: auth: @@ -1152,8 +1131,7 @@ clouds: - RegionOne - RegionTwo identity_api_version: 3 -""" - ) +""") mock_connection = MagicMock() mock_connection.authorize.return_value = None @@ -1177,8 +1155,7 @@ clouds: def test_clouds_yaml_file_with_both_regions_raises_error(self, tmp_path): """Test that clouds.yaml file with both region_name and regions raises error.""" clouds_yaml = tmp_path / "clouds.yaml" - clouds_yaml.write_text( - """ + clouds_yaml.write_text(""" clouds: test-cloud: auth: @@ -1191,8 +1168,7 @@ clouds: - RegionOne - RegionTwo identity_api_version: 3 -""" - ) +""") with pytest.raises(OpenStackAmbiguousRegionError): OpenstackProvider( @@ -1203,8 +1179,7 @@ clouds: def test_clouds_yaml_file_with_no_region_raises_error(self, tmp_path): """Test that clouds.yaml file with neither region_name nor regions raises error.""" clouds_yaml = tmp_path / "clouds.yaml" - clouds_yaml.write_text( - """ + clouds_yaml.write_text(""" clouds: test-cloud: auth: @@ -1213,8 +1188,7 @@ clouds: password: test-password project_id: test-project-id identity_api_version: 3 -""" - ) +""") with pytest.raises(OpenStackNoRegionError): OpenstackProvider( diff --git a/tests/providers/openstack/services/blockstorage/blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data/blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data_test.py b/tests/providers/openstack/services/blockstorage/blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data/blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data_test.py index 6be9ac48f5..85b97da0a2 100644 --- a/tests/providers/openstack/services/blockstorage/blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data/blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/openstack/services/blockstorage/blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data/blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data_test.py @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ from unittest import mock +from prowler.lib.check.models import Severity from prowler.providers.openstack.services.blockstorage.blockstorage_service import ( SnapshotResource, ) @@ -141,7 +142,7 @@ class Test_blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data: status="available", size=50, volume_id="vol-1", - metadata={"db_password": "supersecret123"}, + metadata={"db_password": "Tr0ub4dor3xKq9vLmZ"}, project_id=OPENSTACK_PROJECT_ID, region=OPENSTACK_REGION, ) @@ -179,7 +180,9 @@ class Test_blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data: status="available", size=50, volume_id="vol-1", - metadata={"api_key": "sk-1234567890"}, + metadata={ + "api_key": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.dozjgNryP4J3jVmNHl0w5N_XgL0n3I9PlFUP0THsR8U" + }, project_id=OPENSTACK_PROJECT_ID, region=OPENSTACK_REGION, ) @@ -223,7 +226,9 @@ class Test_blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data: status="available", size=50, volume_id="vol-1", - metadata={"ssh_key": "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"}, + metadata={ + "ssh_key": "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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\nkYW6eCnRzPcmBqex6Vuw4w==\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n" + }, project_id=OPENSTACK_PROJECT_ID, region=OPENSTACK_REGION, ) @@ -277,7 +282,7 @@ class Test_blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data: status="available", size=50, volume_id="vol-2", - metadata={"admin_password": "secret123"}, + metadata={"admin_password": "Tr0ub4dor3xKq9vLmZ"}, project_id=OPENSTACK_PROJECT_ID, region=OPENSTACK_REGION, ), @@ -318,7 +323,7 @@ class Test_blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data: metadata={ "environment": "production", "application": "web-app", - "db_password": "supersecret123", + "db_password": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.dozjgNryP4J3jVmNHl0w5N_XgL0n3I9PlFUP0THsR8U", "region": "us-east", }, project_id=OPENSTACK_PROJECT_ID, @@ -348,3 +353,57 @@ class Test_blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data: # Verify the secret is correctly attributed to 'db_password' key assert "in metadata key 'db_password'" in result[0].status_extended assert result[0].resource_id == "snap-6" + + def test_snapshot_verified_secret_escalates_to_critical(self): + """Test that a confirmed live secret escalates the finding to CRITICAL (FAIL).""" + blockstorage_client = mock.MagicMock() + blockstorage_client.audit_config = {"secrets_validate": True} + blockstorage_client.snapshots = [ + SnapshotResource( + id="snap-verified", + name="Verified Secret", + status="available", + size=50, + volume_id="vol-1", + metadata={"api_key": "placeholder"}, + project_id=OPENSTACK_PROJECT_ID, + region=OPENSTACK_REGION, + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_openstack_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.openstack.services.blockstorage.blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data.blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data.blockstorage_client", + new=blockstorage_client, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.openstack.services.blockstorage.blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data.blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data.detect_secrets_scan_batch", + return_value={ + 0: [ + { + "type": "JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded)", + "line_number": 2, + "filename": "data", + "hashed_secret": "x", + "is_verified": True, + } + ] + }, + ) as mock_scan, + ): + from prowler.providers.openstack.services.blockstorage.blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data.blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data import ( + blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data, + ) + + check = blockstorage_snapshot_metadata_sensitive_data() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].check_metadata.Severity == Severity.critical + assert "confirmed to be live" in result[0].status_extended + assert mock_scan.call_args.kwargs.get("validate") is True diff --git a/tests/providers/openstack/services/blockstorage/blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data/blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data_test.py b/tests/providers/openstack/services/blockstorage/blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data/blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data_test.py index e12babb23c..80927e2f9d 100644 --- a/tests/providers/openstack/services/blockstorage/blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data/blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/openstack/services/blockstorage/blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data/blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data_test.py @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ from unittest import mock +from prowler.lib.check.models import Severity from prowler.providers.openstack.services.blockstorage.blockstorage_service import ( VolumeResource, ) @@ -159,7 +160,7 @@ class Test_blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data: is_bootable=False, is_multiattach=False, attachments=[], - metadata={"db_password": "supersecret123"}, + metadata={"db_password": "Tr0ub4dor3xKq9vLmZ"}, availability_zone="nova", snapshot_id="", source_volume_id="", @@ -204,7 +205,9 @@ class Test_blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data: is_bootable=False, is_multiattach=False, attachments=[], - metadata={"api_key": "sk-1234567890"}, + metadata={ + "api_key": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.dozjgNryP4J3jVmNHl0w5N_XgL0n3I9PlFUP0THsR8U" + }, availability_zone="nova", snapshot_id="", source_volume_id="", @@ -255,7 +258,9 @@ class Test_blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data: is_bootable=False, is_multiattach=False, attachments=[], - metadata={"ssh_key": "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"}, + metadata={ + "ssh_key": "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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\nkYW6eCnRzPcmBqex6Vuw4w==\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n" + }, availability_zone="nova", snapshot_id="", source_volume_id="", @@ -323,7 +328,7 @@ class Test_blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data: is_bootable=False, is_multiattach=False, attachments=[], - metadata={"admin_password": "secret123"}, + metadata={"admin_password": "Tr0ub4dor3xKq9vLmZ"}, availability_zone="nova", snapshot_id="", source_volume_id="", @@ -371,7 +376,7 @@ class Test_blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data: metadata={ "environment": "production", "application": "web-app", - "db_password": "supersecret123", + "db_password": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.dozjgNryP4J3jVmNHl0w5N_XgL0n3I9PlFUP0THsR8U", "region": "us-east", }, availability_zone="nova", @@ -404,3 +409,64 @@ class Test_blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data: # Verify the secret is correctly attributed to 'db_password' key assert "in metadata key 'db_password'" in result[0].status_extended assert result[0].resource_id == "vol-6" + + def test_volume_verified_secret_escalates_to_critical(self): + """Test that a confirmed live secret escalates the finding to CRITICAL (FAIL).""" + blockstorage_client = mock.MagicMock() + blockstorage_client.audit_config = {"secrets_validate": True} + blockstorage_client.volumes = [ + VolumeResource( + id="vol-verified", + name="Verified Secret", + status="in-use", + size=100, + volume_type="standard", + is_encrypted=False, + is_bootable=False, + is_multiattach=False, + attachments=[], + metadata={"api_key": "placeholder"}, + availability_zone="nova", + snapshot_id="", + source_volume_id="", + project_id=OPENSTACK_PROJECT_ID, + region=OPENSTACK_REGION, + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_openstack_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.openstack.services.blockstorage.blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data.blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data.blockstorage_client", + new=blockstorage_client, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.openstack.services.blockstorage.blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data.blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data.detect_secrets_scan_batch", + return_value={ + 0: [ + { + "type": "JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded)", + "line_number": 2, + "filename": "data", + "hashed_secret": "x", + "is_verified": True, + } + ] + }, + ) as mock_scan, + ): + from prowler.providers.openstack.services.blockstorage.blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data.blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data import ( + blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data, + ) + + check = blockstorage_volume_metadata_sensitive_data() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].check_metadata.Severity == Severity.critical + assert "confirmed to be live" in result[0].status_extended + assert mock_scan.call_args.kwargs.get("validate") is True diff --git a/tests/providers/openstack/services/compute/compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data/compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data_test.py b/tests/providers/openstack/services/compute/compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data/compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data_test.py index 174a8ab83f..daaffffb1f 100644 --- a/tests/providers/openstack/services/compute/compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data/compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/openstack/services/compute/compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data/compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data_test.py @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ from unittest import mock +from prowler.lib.check.models import Severity from prowler.providers.openstack.services.compute.compute_service import ComputeInstance from tests.providers.openstack.openstack_fixtures import ( OPENSTACK_PROJECT_ID, @@ -181,7 +182,7 @@ class Test_compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data: private_v6="", networks={}, has_config_drive=False, - metadata={"db_password": "supersecret123"}, + metadata={"db_password": "Tr0ub4dor3xKq9vLmZ"}, user_data="", trusted_image_certificates=[], ) @@ -233,7 +234,9 @@ class Test_compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data: private_v6="", networks={}, has_config_drive=False, - metadata={"api_key": "sk-1234567890"}, + metadata={ + "api_key": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.dozjgNryP4J3jVmNHl0w5N_XgL0n3I9PlFUP0THsR8U" + }, user_data="", trusted_image_certificates=[], ) @@ -349,7 +352,9 @@ class Test_compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data: private_v6="", networks={}, has_config_drive=False, - metadata={"ssh_key": "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"}, + metadata={ + "ssh_key": "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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\nkYW6eCnRzPcmBqex6Vuw4w==\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n" + }, user_data="", trusted_image_certificates=[], ) @@ -431,7 +436,7 @@ class Test_compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data: private_v6="", networks={}, has_config_drive=False, - metadata={"admin_password": "secret123"}, + metadata={"admin_password": "Tr0ub4dor3xKq9vLmZ"}, user_data="", trusted_image_certificates=[], ), @@ -486,7 +491,7 @@ class Test_compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data: metadata={ "environment": "production", "application": "web-app", - "db_password": "supersecret123", + "db_password": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.dozjgNryP4J3jVmNHl0w5N_XgL0n3I9PlFUP0THsR8U", "region": "us-east", }, user_data="", @@ -544,7 +549,7 @@ class Test_compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data: has_config_drive=False, metadata={ "first_key": "safe_value", - "api_key": "sk-1234567890abcdef", + "api_key": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.dozjgNryP4J3jVmNHl0w5N_XgL0n3I9PlFUP0THsR8U", "third_key": "also_safe", }, user_data="", @@ -574,3 +579,128 @@ class Test_compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data: # Verify the secret is correctly attributed to 'api_key' key (second in order) assert "in metadata key 'api_key'" in result[0].status_extended assert result[0].resource_id == "instance-8" + + def test_instance_verified_secret_escalates_to_critical(self): + """Test that a confirmed live secret escalates the finding to CRITICAL (FAIL).""" + compute_client = mock.MagicMock() + compute_client.audit_config = {"secrets_validate": True} + compute_client.instances = [ + ComputeInstance( + id="instance-verified", + name="Verified Secret", + status="ACTIVE", + flavor_id="flavor-1", + security_groups=["default"], + region=OPENSTACK_REGION, + project_id=OPENSTACK_PROJECT_ID, + is_locked=False, + locked_reason="", + key_name="", + user_id="", + access_ipv4="", + access_ipv6="", + public_v4="", + public_v6="", + private_v4="", + private_v6="", + networks={}, + has_config_drive=False, + metadata={"api_key": "placeholder"}, + user_data="", + trusted_image_certificates=[], + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_openstack_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.openstack.services.compute.compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data.compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data.compute_client", + new=compute_client, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.openstack.services.compute.compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data.compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data.detect_secrets_scan_batch", + return_value={ + 0: [ + { + "type": "JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded)", + "line_number": 2, + "filename": "data", + "hashed_secret": "x", + "is_verified": True, + } + ] + }, + ) as mock_scan, + ): + from prowler.providers.openstack.services.compute.compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data.compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data import ( + compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data, + ) + + check = compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].check_metadata.Severity == Severity.critical + assert "confirmed to be live" in result[0].status_extended + assert mock_scan.call_args.kwargs.get("validate") is True + + def test_scan_failure_reports_manual(self): + from prowler.lib.utils.utils import SecretsScanError + + compute_client = mock.MagicMock() + compute_client.audit_config = {"secrets_ignore_patterns": []} + compute_client.instances = [ + ComputeInstance( + id="instance-scan-fail", + name="Scan Fail", + status="ACTIVE", + flavor_id="flavor-1", + security_groups=["default"], + region=OPENSTACK_REGION, + project_id=OPENSTACK_PROJECT_ID, + is_locked=False, + locked_reason="", + key_name="", + user_id="", + access_ipv4="", + access_ipv6="", + public_v4="", + public_v6="", + private_v4="", + private_v6="", + networks={}, + has_config_drive=False, + metadata={"api_key": "placeholder"}, + user_data="", + trusted_image_certificates=[], + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_openstack_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.openstack.services.compute.compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data.compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data.compute_client", + new=compute_client, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.openstack.services.compute.compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data.compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data.detect_secrets_scan_batch", + side_effect=SecretsScanError("Kingfisher exited with code 1"), + ), + ): + from prowler.providers.openstack.services.compute.compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data.compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data import ( + compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data, + ) + + check = compute_instance_metadata_sensitive_data() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "MANUAL" + assert "Could not scan" in result[0].status_extended diff --git a/tests/providers/openstack/services/objectstorage/objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data/objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data_test.py b/tests/providers/openstack/services/objectstorage/objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data/objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data_test.py index 6cae6432c7..eb92274232 100644 --- a/tests/providers/openstack/services/objectstorage/objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data/objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data_test.py +++ b/tests/providers/openstack/services/objectstorage/objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data/objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data_test.py @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ from unittest import mock +from prowler.lib.check.models import Severity from prowler.providers.openstack.services.objectstorage.objectstorage_service import ( ObjectStorageContainer, ) @@ -157,7 +158,7 @@ class Test_objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data: history_location="", sync_to="", sync_key="", - metadata={"db_password": "supersecret123"}, + metadata={"db_password": "Tr0ub4dor3xKq9vLmZ"}, ) ] @@ -217,7 +218,7 @@ class Test_objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data: history_location="", sync_to="", sync_key="", - metadata={"admin_password": "secret123"}, + metadata={"admin_password": "Tr0ub4dor3xKq9vLmZ"}, ), ] @@ -241,3 +242,63 @@ class Test_objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data: assert len(result) == 2 assert len([r for r in result if r.status == "PASS"]) == 1 assert len([r for r in result if r.status == "FAIL"]) == 1 + + def test_container_verified_secret_escalates_to_critical(self): + """Test that a confirmed live secret escalates the finding to CRITICAL (FAIL).""" + objectstorage_client = mock.MagicMock() + objectstorage_client.audit_config = {"secrets_validate": True} + objectstorage_client.containers = [ + ObjectStorageContainer( + id="container-verified", + name="verified-secret", + region=OPENSTACK_REGION, + project_id=OPENSTACK_PROJECT_ID, + object_count=0, + bytes_used=0, + read_ACL="", + write_ACL="", + versioning_enabled=False, + versions_location="", + history_location="", + sync_to="", + sync_key="", + metadata={"api_key": "placeholder"}, + ) + ] + + with ( + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.get_global_provider", + return_value=set_mocked_openstack_provider(), + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.openstack.services.objectstorage.objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data.objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data.objectstorage_client", + new=objectstorage_client, + ), + mock.patch( + "prowler.providers.openstack.services.objectstorage.objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data.objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data.detect_secrets_scan_batch", + return_value={ + 0: [ + { + "type": "JSON Web Token (base64url-encoded)", + "line_number": 2, + "filename": "data", + "hashed_secret": "x", + "is_verified": True, + } + ] + }, + ) as mock_scan, + ): + from prowler.providers.openstack.services.objectstorage.objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data.objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data import ( + objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data, + ) + + check = objectstorage_container_metadata_sensitive_data() + result = check.execute() + + assert len(result) == 1 + assert result[0].status == "FAIL" + assert result[0].check_metadata.Severity == Severity.critical + assert "confirmed to be live" in result[0].status_extended + assert mock_scan.call_args.kwargs.get("validate") is True diff --git a/ui/.pre-commit-config.yaml b/ui/.pre-commit-config.yaml index eab333ceea..3bc0c3b5e6 100644 --- a/ui/.pre-commit-config.yaml +++ b/ui/.pre-commit-config.yaml @@ -1,5 +1,10 @@ orphan: true +# Hooks run on commit only by default; +# NOTE: default_stages does NOT override a hook's manifest stages, so fixers shipping pre-push in their +# manifest need an explicit stages: ["pre-commit"] below to stay off push. +default_stages: [pre-commit] + repos: - repo: local hooks: diff --git a/ui/.prettierignore b/ui/.prettierignore index 5377d96f2d..8b679ff005 100644 --- a/ui/.prettierignore +++ b/ui/.prettierignore @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ build/ coverage/ dist/ esm/ +CHANGELOG.md # Generated files next-env.d.ts diff --git a/ui/AGENTS.md b/ui/AGENTS.md index 38af45860f..7c06cc56b1 100644 --- a/ui/AGENTS.md +++ b/ui/AGENTS.md @@ -14,40 +14,46 @@ > - [`playwright`](../skills/playwright/SKILL.md) - Page Object Model, selectors > - [`vitest`](../skills/vitest/SKILL.md) - Unit testing with React Testing Library > - [`tdd`](../skills/tdd/SKILL.md) - TDD workflow (MANDATORY for UI tasks) +> - [`prowler-tour`](../skills/prowler-tour/SKILL.md) - Keep product-tour definitions aligned with the UI ## Auto-invoke Skills When performing these actions, ALWAYS invoke the corresponding skill FIRST: -| Action | Skill | -| -------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------- | -| Add changelog entry for a PR or feature | `prowler-changelog` | -| App Router / Server Actions | `nextjs-16` | -| Building AI chat features | `ai-sdk-5` | -| Committing changes | `prowler-commit` | -| Create PR that requires changelog entry | `prowler-changelog` | -| Creating Zod schemas | `zod-4` | -| Creating a git commit | `prowler-commit` | -| Creating/modifying Prowler UI components | `prowler-ui` | -| Fixing bug | `tdd` | -| Implementing feature | `tdd` | -| Modifying component | `tdd` | -| Refactoring code | `tdd` | -| Review changelog format and conventions | `prowler-changelog` | -| Testing hooks or utilities | `vitest` | -| Update CHANGELOG.md in any component | `prowler-changelog` | -| Using Zustand stores | `zustand-5` | -| Working on Prowler UI structure (actions/adapters/types/hooks) | `prowler-ui` | -| Working on task | `tdd` | -| Working with Prowler UI test helpers/pages | `prowler-test-ui` | -| Working with Tailwind classes | `tailwind-4` | -| Writing Playwright E2E tests | `playwright` | -| Writing Prowler UI E2E tests | `prowler-test-ui` | -| Writing React component tests | `vitest` | -| Writing React components | `react-19` | -| Writing TypeScript types/interfaces | `typescript` | -| Writing Vitest tests | `vitest` | -| Writing unit tests for UI | `vitest` | +| Action | Skill | +| ----------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------- | +| Add changelog entry for a PR or feature | `prowler-changelog` | +| Adding, updating, or removing a tour definition (\*.tour.ts) | `prowler-tour` | +| App Router / Server Actions | `nextjs-16` | +| Building AI chat features | `ai-sdk-5` | +| Changing button labels or section headings on a tour-covered page | `prowler-tour` | +| Committing changes | `prowler-commit` | +| Create PR that requires changelog entry | `prowler-changelog` | +| Creating Zod schemas | `zod-4` | +| Creating a git commit | `prowler-commit` | +| Creating/modifying Prowler UI components | `prowler-ui` | +| Editing a UI file containing data-tour-id attributes | `prowler-tour` | +| Fixing bug | `tdd` | +| Implementing feature | `tdd` | +| Modifying component | `tdd` | +| Refactoring code | `tdd` | +| Renaming or removing a data-tour-id attribute value | `prowler-tour` | +| Restructuring routes or layouts covered by a tour | `prowler-tour` | +| Review changelog format and conventions | `prowler-changelog` | +| Testing hooks or utilities | `vitest` | +| Update CHANGELOG.md in any component | `prowler-changelog` | +| Using Zustand stores | `zustand-5` | +| Working on Prowler UI structure (actions/adapters/types/hooks) | `prowler-ui` | +| Working on task | `tdd` | +| Working with Prowler UI test helpers/pages | `prowler-test-ui` | +| Working with Tailwind classes | `tailwind-4` | +| Writing Playwright E2E tests | `playwright` | +| Writing Prowler UI E2E tests | `prowler-test-ui` | +| Writing React component tests | `vitest` | +| Writing React components | `react-19` | +| Writing TypeScript types/interfaces | `typescript` | +| Writing Vitest tests | `vitest` | +| Writing unit tests for UI | `vitest` | --- diff --git a/ui/CHANGELOG.md b/ui/CHANGELOG.md index a7a7f75774..e77057779d 100644 --- a/ui/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/ui/CHANGELOG.md @@ -2,6 +2,45 @@ All notable changes to the **Prowler UI** are documented in this file. +## [1.32.0] (Prowler UNRELEASED) + +### 🚀 Added + +- Add `Scan Configuration` menu item under the Configuration menu (only available in Prowler Cloud) [(#11695)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11695) +- Scan configuration management page (`/scan-configurations`) to create, edit, and manage scan configurations with live YAML validation against the server JSON Schema (only available in Prowler Cloud) [(#11695)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11695) +- Surface an "invalid scan configuration" note on compliance requirements that fail solely because the applied scan config does not meet them [(#11695)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11695) +- Filter the Overview, Findings, Resources, Scans, and Providers views by provider group [(#11659)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11659) +- CIS Controls v8.1 compliance support, including its detail view and report mapping [(#11700)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11700) + +--- + +## [1.31.1] (Prowler v5.31.1) + +### 🔄 Changed + +- Schedule Scans provider table and launch flows now use provider schedule fields, restore OSS daily scheduling, default to the next local scan hour, and clarify provider selection in launch scan [(#11684)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11684) + +--- + +## [1.31.0] (Prowler v5.31.0) + +### 🚀 Added + +- Controlled `402` and `403` Server Action error messages for alert seed and mutation flows [(#11629)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11629) + +### 🐞 Fixed + +- Attack Paths now shows distinct messages while a scan is queued, running, or building its graph — plus a separate "couldn't load scans" error — instead of always showing "No scans available" [(#11512)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11512) +- Radio button no longer shifts vertically when selected [(#11608)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11608) +- Handle rename DORA to DORA_2022_2554 to follow the naming _ in compliance frameworks [(#11551)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11551) + +### 🔐 Security + +- Bump vulnerable `Next.js`, React, AI SDK, `postcss`, `hono`, `qs`, `esbuild`, and Alpine OpenSSL packages (`libcrypto3` and `libssl3`) [(#11581)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11581) +- Bump transitive `dompurify` from 3.4.2 to 3.4.10, patching XSS sanitization bypass advisories [(#11636)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11636) + +--- + ## [1.30.1] (Prowler v5.30.1) ### 🐞 Fixed @@ -9,6 +48,14 @@ All notable changes to the **Prowler UI** are documented in this file. - Threat Map no longer shows an empty map for accounts that only have Okta or Google Workspace scans [(#11542)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11542) - Compliance attributes requests now pass the selected scan, so multi-provider universal frameworks (e.g. CSA CCM) load the check IDs of the scan's provider and Azure/GCP requirement details show their findings instead of appearing empty [(#11546)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11546) +### 🔄 Changed + +- Public SaaS config (Sentry, Google Tag Manager, API base/docs URL) now resolves at container runtime instead of build time; self-hosted deployments set the UI config through the new `UI_`-prefixed env vars (`UI_API_BASE_URL`, `UI_API_DOCS_URL`, `UI_GOOGLE_TAG_MANAGER_ID`, `UI_SENTRY_DSN`, `UI_SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT`), with the previous `NEXT_PUBLIC_*` names still honored as a deprecated fallback [(#11500)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11500) + +### 🐞 Fixed + +- `ui/.env` template now lists only the canonical `UI_SENTRY_DSN` and `UI_SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT` names; the deprecated `NEXT_PUBLIC_SENTRY_DSN` and `NEXT_PUBLIC_SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT` entries have been removed [(#11500)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11500) + --- ## [1.30.0] (Prowler v5.30.0) diff --git a/ui/Dockerfile b/ui/Dockerfile index 047df1171b..86673ba046 100644 --- a/ui/Dockerfile +++ b/ui/Dockerfile @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ FROM node:24.13.0-alpine@sha256:cd6fb7efa6490f039f3471a189214d5f548c11df1ff9e5b1 LABEL maintainer="https://github.com/prowler-cloud" -# Enable corepack for pnpm -RUN corepack enable +# Patch Alpine OpenSSL runtime packages before all stages inherit the base image. +RUN apk upgrade --no-cache libcrypto3 libssl3 && corepack enable # Install dependencies only when needed FROM base AS deps @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ WORKDIR /app # Install dependencies based on the preferred package manager COPY package.json pnpm-lock.yaml pnpm-workspace.yaml ./ COPY scripts ./scripts +ENV NODE_OPTIONS=--max-old-space-size=4096 RUN corepack install && pnpm install --frozen-lockfile @@ -35,12 +36,8 @@ RUN corepack install ENV NEXT_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=1 ARG NEXT_PUBLIC_PROWLER_RELEASE_VERSION ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_PROWLER_RELEASE_VERSION=${NEXT_PUBLIC_PROWLER_RELEASE_VERSION} -ARG NEXT_PUBLIC_GOOGLE_TAG_MANAGER_ID -ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_GOOGLE_TAG_MANAGER_ID=${NEXT_PUBLIC_GOOGLE_TAG_MANAGER_ID} -ARG NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL -ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL=${NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL} -ARG NEXT_PUBLIC_API_DOCS_URL -ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_API_DOCS_URL=${NEXT_PUBLIC_API_DOCS_URL} + +# GTM / API base+docs URLs are runtime container env (prod stage), not build ARGs. RUN pnpm run build @@ -77,6 +74,12 @@ EXPOSE 3000 ENV PORT=3000 ENV HOSTNAME="0.0.0.0" +# Runtime configuration is read by `node server.js` at container start and is +# NOT baked into the image. Supply it via your orchestrator (docker-compose, +# Helm/K8s): +# - required: UI_API_BASE_URL, AUTH_URL, AUTH_SECRET (missing ⇒ fail fast at boot) +# - optional: UI_API_DOCS_URL, UI_GOOGLE_TAG_MANAGER_ID, UI_SENTRY_DSN, UI_SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT +# - reserved: POSTHOG_KEY, POSTHOG_HOST, REO_DEV_CLIENT_ID (no consumer yet) # server.js is created by next build from the standalone output # https://nextjs.org/docs/pages/api-reference/next-config-js/output CMD ["node", "server.js"] diff --git a/ui/__tests__/msw/handlers/attack-paths.ts b/ui/__tests__/msw/handlers/attack-paths.ts index 39076666dd..7c76fa574b 100644 --- a/ui/__tests__/msw/handlers/attack-paths.ts +++ b/ui/__tests__/msw/handlers/attack-paths.ts @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import type { QueryResultAttributes, } from "@/types/attack-paths"; -const API = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL; +const API = process.env.UI_API_BASE_URL; type JsonApiErrorBody = { errors: Array<{ detail: string; status: string }>; diff --git a/ui/actions/finding-groups/finding-groups.ts b/ui/actions/finding-groups/finding-groups.ts index bf5df80aae..faa697cf32 100644 --- a/ui/actions/finding-groups/finding-groups.ts +++ b/ui/actions/finding-groups/finding-groups.ts @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { redirect } from "next/navigation"; +import type { FindingsFilterParam } from "@/actions/findings/findings-filters"; import { apiBaseUrl, composeSort, @@ -15,7 +16,6 @@ import { } from "@/lib"; import { appendSanitizedProviderFilters } from "@/lib/provider-filters"; import { handleApiResponse } from "@/lib/server-actions-helper"; -import { FilterParam } from "@/types/filters"; /** * Maps filter[search] to filter[check_title__icontains] for finding-groups. @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ function mapSearchFilter( * finding-group resources sub-endpoint. These must be stripped before * calling the resources API to avoid empty results. */ -const FINDING_GROUP_RESOURCE_UNSUPPORTED_FILTERS: FilterParam[] = [ +const FINDING_GROUP_RESOURCE_UNSUPPORTED_FILTERS: FindingsFilterParam[] = [ "filter[service__in]", "filter[scan__in]", "filter[scan_id]", @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ function normalizeFindingGroupResourceFilters( Object.entries(filters).filter( ([key]) => !FINDING_GROUP_RESOURCE_UNSUPPORTED_FILTERS.includes( - key as FilterParam, + key as FindingsFilterParam, ), ), ); diff --git a/ui/actions/findings/findings-filters.ts b/ui/actions/findings/findings-filters.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..268d71e7cd --- /dev/null +++ b/ui/actions/findings/findings-filters.ts @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +import { FILTER_FIELD, FilterParam } from "@/types/filters"; + +/** Findings-only filter fields not shared with other views. */ +// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unused-vars +const FINDINGS_EXTRA_FIELD = { + DELTA_IN: "delta__in", + SCAN_EXACT: "scan", + SCAN_ID: "scan_id", + SCAN_ID_IN: "scan_id__in", + INSERTED_AT: "inserted_at", + INSERTED_AT_GTE: "inserted_at__gte", + INSERTED_AT_LTE: "inserted_at__lte", + MUTED: "muted", +} as const; + +type FindingsExtraField = + (typeof FINDINGS_EXTRA_FIELD)[keyof typeof FINDINGS_EXTRA_FIELD]; + +/** + * URL filter param keys the findings view supports, e.g. `filter[severity__in]`. + * Composed from the shared fields it uses plus a few findings-only extras + * (alternate scan/date/delta forms not used by other views). + */ +export type FindingsFilterParam = FilterParam< + // findings uses provider_id, not provider_uid + | (typeof FILTER_FIELD)[ + | "PROVIDER_TYPE" + | "PROVIDER_ID" + | "PROVIDER_GROUPS" + | "REGION" + | "SERVICE" + | "SEVERITY" + | "STATUS" + | "DELTA" + | "RESOURCE_TYPE" + | "CATEGORY" + | "RESOURCE_GROUPS" + | "SCAN"] + | FindingsExtraField +>; diff --git a/ui/actions/manage-groups/manage-groups.test.ts b/ui/actions/manage-groups/manage-groups.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c016832a1f --- /dev/null +++ b/ui/actions/manage-groups/manage-groups.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest"; + +const { + fetchMock, + getAuthHeadersMock, + handleApiErrorMock, + handleApiResponseMock, +} = vi.hoisted(() => ({ + fetchMock: vi.fn(), + getAuthHeadersMock: vi.fn(), + handleApiErrorMock: vi.fn(), + handleApiResponseMock: vi.fn(), +})); + +vi.mock("next/cache", () => ({ + revalidatePath: vi.fn(), +})); + +vi.mock("next/navigation", () => ({ + redirect: vi.fn(), +})); + +vi.mock("@/lib", () => ({ + apiBaseUrl: "https://api.example.com/api/v1", + getAuthHeaders: getAuthHeadersMock, + getErrorMessage: vi.fn(), +})); + +vi.mock("@/lib/server-actions-helper", () => ({ + handleApiError: handleApiErrorMock, + handleApiResponse: handleApiResponseMock, +})); + +import { getAllProviderGroups } from "./manage-groups"; + +const makeGroup = (id: string, name: string) => ({ + type: "provider-groups" as const, + id, + attributes: { name, inserted_at: "", updated_at: "" }, + relationships: { + providers: { meta: { count: 0 }, data: [] }, + roles: { meta: { count: 0 }, data: [] }, + }, + links: { self: "" }, +}); + +const makePage = ( + data: ReturnType[], + page: number, + pages: number, +) => ({ + links: { first: "", last: "", next: null, prev: null }, + data, + meta: { pagination: { page, pages, count: data.length } }, +}); + +describe("getAllProviderGroups", () => { + beforeEach(() => { + vi.clearAllMocks(); + vi.stubGlobal("fetch", fetchMock); + getAuthHeadersMock.mockResolvedValue({ Authorization: "Bearer token" }); + fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(new Response(null, { status: 200 })); + }); + + it("merges every page into a single response with collapsed pagination", async () => { + handleApiResponseMock + .mockResolvedValueOnce( + makePage( + [makeGroup("g1", "Group 1"), makeGroup("g2", "Group 2")], + 1, + 2, + ), + ) + .mockResolvedValueOnce(makePage([makeGroup("g3", "Group 3")], 2, 2)); + + const result = await getAllProviderGroups(); + + expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2); + expect(result?.data.map((group) => group.id)).toEqual(["g1", "g2", "g3"]); + expect(result?.meta.pagination).toMatchObject({ + page: 1, + pages: 1, + count: 3, + }); + }); + + it("stops after the first page when there is only one page", async () => { + handleApiResponseMock.mockResolvedValueOnce( + makePage([makeGroup("g1", "Group 1")], 1, 1), + ); + + const result = await getAllProviderGroups(); + + expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1); + expect(result?.data).toHaveLength(1); + }); + + it("returns undefined when the first page has no data", async () => { + handleApiResponseMock.mockResolvedValueOnce(makePage([], 1, 1)); + + const result = await getAllProviderGroups(); + + expect(result).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + it("returns undefined when the request throws", async () => { + fetchMock.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error("network down")); + + const result = await getAllProviderGroups(); + + expect(result).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + it("returns undefined when a later page resolves to an error payload", async () => { + handleApiResponseMock + .mockResolvedValueOnce(makePage([makeGroup("g1", "Group 1")], 1, 2)) + .mockResolvedValueOnce({ error: "Forbidden", status: 403 }); + + const result = await getAllProviderGroups(); + + expect(result).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + it("returns undefined instead of a truncated list when the max-page cap is hit", async () => { + // Given an API that always reports more pages than the 50-page safety cap + handleApiResponseMock.mockImplementation((response: Response) => { + void response; + return Promise.resolve(makePage([makeGroup("g", "Group")], 1, 9999)); + }); + + // When fetching every page + const result = await getAllProviderGroups(); + + // Then it must not return a partial/truncated list; bail out instead + expect(result).toBeUndefined(); + expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(50); + }); +}); diff --git a/ui/actions/manage-groups/manage-groups.ts b/ui/actions/manage-groups/manage-groups.ts index 933dabbdbc..c916a89d39 100644 --- a/ui/actions/manage-groups/manage-groups.ts +++ b/ui/actions/manage-groups/manage-groups.ts @@ -51,6 +51,87 @@ export const getProviderGroups = async ({ } }; +/** + * Fetches all provider groups by iterating through every page. + * Used to populate filter dropdowns (e.g. the Provider Group selector) without + * the pagination cap that `getProviderGroups` applies for the management table. + */ +export const getAllProviderGroups = async (): Promise< + ProviderGroupsResponse | undefined +> => { + const pageSize = 100; // Larger page size to minimize API calls + const maxPages = 50; // Safety limit: 50 pages × 100 = 5000 groups max + let currentPage = 1; + const allGroups: ProviderGroupsResponse["data"] = []; + let lastResponse: ProviderGroupsResponse | undefined; + let hasMorePages = true; + + try { + const headers = await getAuthHeaders({ contentType: false }); + while (hasMorePages && currentPage <= maxPages) { + const url = new URL(`${apiBaseUrl}/provider-groups`); + url.searchParams.append("page[number]", currentPage.toString()); + url.searchParams.append("page[size]", pageSize.toString()); + + const response = await fetch(url.toString(), { headers }); + const data = (await handleApiResponse(response)) as + | ProviderGroupsResponse + | { error: string; status?: number } + | undefined; + + // A later page resolving to an API error payload must abort rather than + // be treated as "no more pages", which would silently truncate groups. + if (data && "error" in data) { + console.error("Error fetching all provider groups:", data.error); + return undefined; + } + + if (!data?.data || data.data.length === 0) { + hasMorePages = false; + continue; + } + + allGroups.push(...data.data); + lastResponse = data; + + const totalPages = data.meta?.pagination?.pages || 1; + if (currentPage >= totalPages) { + hasMorePages = false; + } else { + currentPage++; + } + } + + if (hasMorePages && currentPage > maxPages) { + console.error( + `Error fetching all provider groups: exceeded max page limit (${maxPages})`, + ); + return undefined; + } + + if (lastResponse) { + return { + ...lastResponse, + data: allGroups, + meta: { + ...lastResponse.meta, + pagination: { + ...lastResponse.meta?.pagination, + page: 1, + pages: 1, + count: allGroups.length, + }, + }, + }; + } + + return undefined; + } catch (error) { + console.error("Error fetching all provider groups:", error); + return undefined; + } +}; + export const getProviderGroupInfoById = async (providerGroupId: string) => { const headers = await getAuthHeaders({ contentType: false }); const url = new URL(`${apiBaseUrl}/provider-groups/${providerGroupId}`); diff --git a/ui/actions/overview/overview-filters.ts b/ui/actions/overview/overview-filters.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..186977f9ce --- /dev/null +++ b/ui/actions/overview/overview-filters.ts @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +import { FILTER_FIELD, FilterParam } from "@/types/filters"; + +/** + * URL filter param keys the overview dashboard scopes its widgets by. Overview has + * no single action; its widgets read these keys from the URL filters. + */ +export type OverviewFilterParam = FilterParam< + (typeof FILTER_FIELD)["PROVIDER_TYPE" | "PROVIDER_ID" | "PROVIDER_GROUPS"] +>; + +/** The `filter[...]` keys overview widgets read from the URL. */ +export const OVERVIEW_FILTER_PARAM = { + PROVIDER_TYPE: `filter[${FILTER_FIELD.PROVIDER_TYPE}]`, + PROVIDER_ID: `filter[${FILTER_FIELD.PROVIDER_ID}]`, + PROVIDER_GROUPS: `filter[${FILTER_FIELD.PROVIDER_GROUPS}]`, +} as const satisfies Record; diff --git a/ui/actions/providers/providers-filters.ts b/ui/actions/providers/providers-filters.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..71184c0b81 --- /dev/null +++ b/ui/actions/providers/providers-filters.ts @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +import { FILTER_FIELD, FilterParam } from "@/types/filters"; +import { PROVIDERS_PAGE_FILTER } from "@/types/providers-table"; + +/** + * URL filter param keys the providers list supports, e.g. `filter[provider__in]`. + * Provider scope plus its providers-only extras (`provider__in` API param, + * `connected` status). + */ +export type ProvidersFilterParam = FilterParam< + | (typeof FILTER_FIELD)["PROVIDER_TYPE" | "PROVIDER_GROUPS" | "PROVIDER_UID"] + | (typeof PROVIDERS_PAGE_FILTER)["PROVIDER" | "STATUS"] +>; + +/** `filter[...]` keys used when mapping the provider-type filter to the API param. */ +export const PROVIDERS_FILTER_PARAM = { + PROVIDER: `filter[${PROVIDERS_PAGE_FILTER.PROVIDER}]`, + PROVIDER_TYPE: `filter[${PROVIDERS_PAGE_FILTER.PROVIDER_TYPE}]`, +} as const satisfies Record; diff --git a/ui/actions/resources/resources-filters.ts b/ui/actions/resources/resources-filters.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..01132943a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/ui/actions/resources/resources-filters.ts @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +import { FILTER_FIELD, FilterParam } from "@/types/filters"; + +/** Resources-only filter fields not shared with other views. */ +// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unused-vars +const RESOURCES_EXTRA_FIELD = { + TYPE: "type__in", + GROUPS: "groups__in", +} as const; + +type ResourcesExtraField = + (typeof RESOURCES_EXTRA_FIELD)[keyof typeof RESOURCES_EXTRA_FIELD]; + +/** + * URL filter param keys the resources view supports, e.g. `filter[type__in]`. + * The shared core plus its resources-only dimensions (`type__in`, `groups__in`). + */ +export type ResourcesFilterParam = FilterParam< + | (typeof FILTER_FIELD)[ + | "PROVIDER_TYPE" + | "PROVIDER_ID" + | "PROVIDER_GROUPS" + | "REGION" + | "SERVICE"] + | ResourcesExtraField +>; diff --git a/ui/actions/resources/resources.test.ts b/ui/actions/resources/resources.test.ts index cbdb0b1296..d8c5d75456 100644 --- a/ui/actions/resources/resources.test.ts +++ b/ui/actions/resources/resources.test.ts @@ -28,6 +28,10 @@ import { vi.mock("@/lib", () => ({ apiBaseUrl: "https://api.example.com/api/v1", getAuthHeaders: getAuthHeadersMock, + GENERIC_SERVER_ERROR_MESSAGE: + "Server is temporarily unavailable. Please try again in a few minutes.", + sanitizeErrorMessage: (message: string, fallback: string) => + / { }); }); + it("returns a generic error when a gateway returns HTML", async () => { + // Given + const mockResponse = new Response( + "502 Bad Gateway

    502 Bad Gateway

    ", + { + status: 502, + statusText: "Bad Gateway", + headers: { "content-type": "text/html" }, + }, + ); + fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(mockResponse); + + // When + const result = await getResourceEvents("resource-123"); + + // Then + expect(result).toEqual({ + error: + "Server is temporarily unavailable. Please try again in a few minutes.", + status: 502, + }); + }); + it("returns generic error when fetch throws", async () => { // Given fetchMock.mockRejectedValue(new Error("Network failure")); diff --git a/ui/actions/resources/resources.ts b/ui/actions/resources/resources.ts index 8af2576852..3ab84efa4f 100644 --- a/ui/actions/resources/resources.ts +++ b/ui/actions/resources/resources.ts @@ -4,7 +4,13 @@ import { redirect } from "next/navigation"; import { getLatestFindings } from "@/actions/findings"; import { listOrganizationsSafe } from "@/actions/organizations/organizations"; -import { apiBaseUrl, FINDINGS_FILTERED_SORT, getAuthHeaders } from "@/lib"; +import { + apiBaseUrl, + FINDINGS_FILTERED_SORT, + GENERIC_SERVER_ERROR_MESSAGE, + getAuthHeaders, + sanitizeErrorMessage, +} from "@/lib"; import { appendSanitizedProviderTypeFilters } from "@/lib/provider-filters"; import { handleApiResponse } from "@/lib/server-actions-helper"; import { OrganizationResource } from "@/types/organizations"; @@ -193,22 +199,27 @@ export const getResourceEvents = async ( if (!response.ok) { const rawText = await response.text().catch(() => ""); + const contentType = + response.headers.get("content-type")?.toLowerCase() || ""; const defaultError = "An error occurred while fetching events."; + const fallbackError = contentType.includes("text/html") + ? GENERIC_SERVER_ERROR_MESSAGE + : response.statusText || defaultError; try { const errorData = rawText ? JSON.parse(rawText) : null; + const errorMessage = + errorData?.errors?.[0]?.detail || + errorData?.error || + errorData?.message || + rawText || + fallbackError; return { - error: - errorData?.errors?.[0]?.detail || - errorData?.error || - errorData?.message || - rawText || - response.statusText || - defaultError, + error: sanitizeErrorMessage(String(errorMessage), fallbackError), status: response.status, }; } catch { return { - error: rawText || response.statusText || defaultError, + error: sanitizeErrorMessage(rawText || fallbackError, fallbackError), status: response.status, }; } diff --git a/ui/actions/scan-configurations/index.ts b/ui/actions/scan-configurations/index.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d9631969df --- /dev/null +++ b/ui/actions/scan-configurations/index.ts @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +export * from "./scan-configurations"; diff --git a/ui/actions/scan-configurations/scan-configurations.ts b/ui/actions/scan-configurations/scan-configurations.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1ecdb3256b --- /dev/null +++ b/ui/actions/scan-configurations/scan-configurations.ts @@ -0,0 +1,345 @@ +"use server"; + +import yaml from "js-yaml"; +import { revalidatePath } from "next/cache"; +import { z } from "zod"; + +import { apiBaseUrl, getAuthHeaders } from "@/lib/helper"; +import { scanConfigurationFormSchema } from "@/types/formSchemas"; +import { + DeleteScanConfigurationActionState, + ScanConfigurationActionState, + ScanConfigurationData, + ScanConfigurationErrors, + ScanConfigurationRequestBody, +} from "@/types/scan-configurations"; + +const SCAN_CONFIGURATION_PATH = "/scan-configurations"; + +// Scan Configuration IDs are UUIDs. Validate before interpolating into request +// URLs so a malformed/crafted value can't inject path segments (SSRF / path +// injection). +const scanConfigurationIdSchema = z.uuid(); + +const parseConfiguration = (value: string): Record => { + // Backend (YamlOrJsonField) accepts either a YAML string or a JSON object. + // We parse client-side so failures surface as form errors, not 500s. + const parsed = yaml.load(value); + if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== "object" || Array.isArray(parsed)) { + throw new Error("Configuration must be a mapping with provider sections."); + } + return parsed as Record; +}; + +const collectProviderIds = (formData: FormData): string[] => { + return formData + .getAll("provider_ids") + .map((v) => String(v)) + .filter(Boolean); +}; + +export const createScanConfiguration = async ( + _prevState: ScanConfigurationActionState, + formData: FormData, +): Promise => { + const headers = await getAuthHeaders({ contentType: true }); + const formDataObject = { + name: formData.get("name"), + configuration: formData.get("configuration"), + provider_ids: collectProviderIds(formData), + }; + + const validated = scanConfigurationFormSchema.safeParse(formDataObject); + if (!validated.success) { + const fieldErrors = validated.error.flatten().fieldErrors; + return { + errors: { + name: fieldErrors?.name?.[0], + configuration: fieldErrors?.configuration?.[0], + provider_ids: fieldErrors?.provider_ids?.[0], + }, + }; + } + + const { name, configuration, provider_ids } = validated.data; + + let parsedConfig: Record; + try { + parsedConfig = parseConfiguration(configuration); + } catch (e) { + return { + errors: { + configuration: + e instanceof Error ? e.message : "Failed to parse configuration", + }, + }; + } + + try { + const url = new URL(`${apiBaseUrl}/scan-configurations`); + const bodyData: ScanConfigurationRequestBody = { + data: { + type: "scan-configurations", + attributes: { + name, + configuration: parsedConfig, + provider_ids, + }, + }, + }; + const response = await fetch(url.toString(), { + method: "POST", + headers, + body: JSON.stringify(bodyData), + }); + + if (!response.ok) { + const errorData = await response.json().catch(() => ({})); + const detail = + errorData?.errors?.[0]?.detail || + errorData?.message || + `Failed to create Scan Configuration: ${response.statusText}`; + const pointer = errorData?.errors?.[0]?.source?.pointer as + | string + | undefined; + const errors: ScanConfigurationErrors = {}; + if (pointer?.includes("name")) errors.name = detail; + else if (pointer?.includes("configuration")) + errors.configuration = detail; + else if (pointer?.includes("provider_ids")) errors.provider_ids = detail; + else errors.general = detail; + return { errors }; + } + + const data = await response.json(); + revalidatePath(SCAN_CONFIGURATION_PATH); + return { + success: "Scan Configuration created successfully!", + data: data.data as ScanConfigurationData, + }; + } catch (error) { + console.error("Error creating Scan Configuration:", error); + return { + errors: { + general: + error instanceof Error + ? error.message + : "Error creating Scan Configuration. Please try again.", + }, + }; + } +}; + +export const updateScanConfiguration = async ( + _prevState: ScanConfigurationActionState, + formData: FormData, +): Promise => { + const id = formData.get("id"); + if (!id) { + return { + errors: { general: "Scan Configuration ID is required for update" }, + }; + } + const idResult = scanConfigurationIdSchema.safeParse(String(id)); + if (!idResult.success) { + return { errors: { general: "Invalid Scan Configuration ID" } }; + } + const validId = idResult.data; + const headers = await getAuthHeaders({ contentType: true }); + const formDataObject = { + name: formData.get("name"), + configuration: formData.get("configuration"), + provider_ids: collectProviderIds(formData), + }; + + const validated = scanConfigurationFormSchema.safeParse(formDataObject); + if (!validated.success) { + const fieldErrors = validated.error.flatten().fieldErrors; + return { + errors: { + name: fieldErrors?.name?.[0], + configuration: fieldErrors?.configuration?.[0], + provider_ids: fieldErrors?.provider_ids?.[0], + }, + }; + } + + const { name, configuration, provider_ids } = validated.data; + + let parsedConfig: Record; + try { + parsedConfig = parseConfiguration(configuration); + } catch (e) { + return { + errors: { + configuration: + e instanceof Error ? e.message : "Failed to parse configuration", + }, + }; + } + + try { + const url = new URL(`${apiBaseUrl}/scan-configurations/${validId}`); + const bodyData: ScanConfigurationRequestBody = { + data: { + type: "scan-configurations", + id: validId, + attributes: { + name, + configuration: parsedConfig, + provider_ids, + }, + }, + }; + const response = await fetch(url.toString(), { + method: "PATCH", + headers, + body: JSON.stringify(bodyData), + }); + + if (!response.ok) { + const errorData = await response.json().catch(() => ({})); + const detail = + errorData?.errors?.[0]?.detail || + errorData?.message || + `Failed to update Scan Configuration: ${response.statusText}`; + return { errors: { general: detail } }; + } + + const data = await response.json(); + revalidatePath(SCAN_CONFIGURATION_PATH); + return { + success: "Scan Configuration updated successfully!", + data: data.data as ScanConfigurationData, + }; + } catch (error) { + console.error("Error updating Scan Configuration:", error); + return { + errors: { + general: + error instanceof Error + ? error.message + : "Error updating Scan Configuration. Please try again.", + }, + }; + } +}; + +export const getScanConfigurationSchema = async (): Promise | null> => { + const headers = await getAuthHeaders({ contentType: false }); + const url = new URL(`${apiBaseUrl}/scan-configurations/schema`); + try { + const response = await fetch(url.toString(), { + method: "GET", + headers, + }); + if (!response.ok) { + throw new Error( + `Failed to fetch Scan Configuration schema: ${response.statusText}`, + ); + } + const json = await response.json(); + const schema = json?.data?.attributes?.schema as + | Record + | undefined; + return schema ?? null; + } catch (error) { + console.error("Error fetching Scan Configuration schema:", error); + return null; + } +}; + +export const listScanConfigurations = async (): Promise< + ScanConfigurationData[] +> => { + const headers = await getAuthHeaders({ contentType: false }); + const url = new URL(`${apiBaseUrl}/scan-configurations`); + + try { + const response = await fetch(url.toString(), { + method: "GET", + headers, + }); + if (!response.ok) { + throw new Error( + `Failed to list Scan Configurations: ${response.statusText}`, + ); + } + const json = await response.json(); + return (json.data || []) as ScanConfigurationData[]; + } catch (error) { + // Re-throw so callers can distinguish a fetch/auth failure from an empty + // result. Collapsing errors into `[]` would render a false "no scan + // configurations" state and overwrite the table on a failed refresh. + console.error("Error listing Scan Configurations:", error); + throw error; + } +}; + +export const getScanConfiguration = async ( + id: string, +): Promise => { + const idResult = scanConfigurationIdSchema.safeParse(id); + if (!idResult.success) return undefined; + const headers = await getAuthHeaders({ contentType: false }); + const url = new URL(`${apiBaseUrl}/scan-configurations/${idResult.data}`); + + try { + const response = await fetch(url.toString(), { + method: "GET", + headers, + }); + if (!response.ok) return undefined; + const json = await response.json(); + return json.data as ScanConfigurationData; + } catch (error) { + console.error("Error fetching Scan Configuration:", error); + return undefined; + } +}; + +export const deleteScanConfiguration = async ( + _prevState: DeleteScanConfigurationActionState, + formData: FormData, +): Promise => { + const headers = await getAuthHeaders({ contentType: true }); + const id = formData.get("id"); + if (!id) { + return { + errors: { general: "Scan Configuration ID is required for deletion" }, + }; + } + const idResult = scanConfigurationIdSchema.safeParse(String(id)); + if (!idResult.success) { + return { errors: { general: "Invalid Scan Configuration ID" } }; + } + try { + const url = new URL(`${apiBaseUrl}/scan-configurations/${idResult.data}`); + const response = await fetch(url.toString(), { + method: "DELETE", + headers, + }); + if (!response.ok) { + const errorData = await response.json().catch(() => ({})); + throw new Error( + errorData.errors?.[0]?.detail || + `Failed to delete Scan Configuration: ${response.statusText}`, + ); + } + revalidatePath(SCAN_CONFIGURATION_PATH); + return { success: "Scan Configuration deleted successfully!" }; + } catch (error) { + console.error("Error deleting Scan Configuration:", error); + return { + errors: { + general: + error instanceof Error + ? error.message + : "Error deleting Scan Configuration. Please try again.", + }, + }; + } +}; diff --git a/ui/actions/scans/scans-filters.ts b/ui/actions/scans/scans-filters.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..19958e9fa5 --- /dev/null +++ b/ui/actions/scans/scans-filters.ts @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +import { FILTER_FIELD, FilterParam } from "@/types/filters"; + +/** + * Provider filter fields used to match/clear synthetic pending scan rows — the + * `__in` forms (shared with real scan rows) plus the exact forms, and the + * provider-group `__in` form so pending rows honor the group filter too. + */ +export const SCANS_PROVIDER_FILTER_FIELD = { + PROVIDER_IN: FILTER_FIELD.PROVIDER, + PROVIDER: "provider", + PROVIDER_TYPE_IN: FILTER_FIELD.PROVIDER_TYPE, + PROVIDER_TYPE: "provider_type", + PROVIDER_GROUPS_IN: FILTER_FIELD.PROVIDER_GROUPS, +} as const; + +/** Scans-only filter fields not shared with other views. */ +// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unused-vars +const SCANS_EXTRA_FIELD = { + STATE: "state__in", + TRIGGER: "trigger", +} as const; + +type ScansExtraField = + (typeof SCANS_EXTRA_FIELD)[keyof typeof SCANS_EXTRA_FIELD]; + +/** + * URL filter param keys the scans view supports, e.g. `filter[state__in]`. + * Provider scope (scans filters accounts by provider id) including provider + * groups and the exact pending-row provider forms, plus the scans-only dimensions. + */ +export type ScansFilterParam = FilterParam< + | (typeof SCANS_PROVIDER_FILTER_FIELD)[keyof typeof SCANS_PROVIDER_FILTER_FIELD] + | ScansExtraField +>; diff --git a/ui/actions/scans/scans.test.ts b/ui/actions/scans/scans.test.ts index ae82ba860d..a7f7fd0c7e 100644 --- a/ui/actions/scans/scans.test.ts +++ b/ui/actions/scans/scans.test.ts @@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ const { vi.mock("@/lib", () => ({ apiBaseUrl: "https://api.example.com/api/v1", + GENERIC_SERVER_ERROR_MESSAGE: + "Server is temporarily unavailable. Please try again in a few minutes.", getAuthHeaders: getAuthHeadersMock, getErrorMessage: (error: unknown) => error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error), @@ -28,7 +30,7 @@ vi.mock("@/lib/sentry-breadcrumbs", () => ({ addScanOperation: vi.fn(), })); -import { launchOrganizationScans } from "./scans"; +import { getExportsZip, launchOrganizationScans } from "./scans"; describe("launchOrganizationScans", () => { beforeEach(() => { @@ -69,3 +71,34 @@ describe("launchOrganizationScans", () => { expect(result.failureCount).toBe(0); }); }); + +describe("getExportsZip", () => { + beforeEach(() => { + vi.clearAllMocks(); + vi.stubGlobal("fetch", fetchMock); + getAuthHeadersMock.mockResolvedValue({ Authorization: "Bearer token" }); + }); + + it("returns a generic server error when the report endpoint returns HTML", async () => { + // Given + fetchMock.mockResolvedValue( + new Response( + "502 Bad Gateway

    502 Bad Gateway

    ", + { + status: 502, + statusText: "Bad Gateway", + headers: { "content-type": "text/html" }, + }, + ), + ); + + // When + const result = await getExportsZip("scan-123"); + + // Then + expect(result).toEqual({ + error: + "Server is temporarily unavailable. Please try again in a few minutes.", + }); + }); +}); diff --git a/ui/actions/scans/scans.ts b/ui/actions/scans/scans.ts index 318004ea96..5a6ddb7a29 100644 --- a/ui/actions/scans/scans.ts +++ b/ui/actions/scans/scans.ts @@ -3,7 +3,12 @@ import { revalidatePath } from "next/cache"; import { redirect } from "next/navigation"; -import { apiBaseUrl, getAuthHeaders, getErrorMessage } from "@/lib"; +import { + apiBaseUrl, + GENERIC_SERVER_ERROR_MESSAGE, + getAuthHeaders, + getErrorMessage, +} from "@/lib"; import { COMPLIANCE_REPORT_DISPLAY_NAMES, type ComplianceReportType, @@ -15,6 +20,7 @@ import { } from "@/lib/provider-filters"; import { addScanOperation } from "@/lib/sentry-breadcrumbs"; import { handleApiError, handleApiResponse } from "@/lib/server-actions-helper"; +import { SCAN_STATES } from "@/types/attack-paths"; const ORGANIZATION_SCAN_CONCURRENCY_LIMIT = 5; export const getScans = async ({ @@ -64,6 +70,10 @@ export const getScansByState = async () => { "filter[provider_type__in]", sanitizeProviderTypesCsv(), ); + // Only need to know whether at least one completed scan exists; filter server-side + // and cap to a single row so the answer is correct regardless of total scan count. + url.searchParams.append("filter[state]", SCAN_STATES.COMPLETED); + url.searchParams.append("page[size]", "1"); try { const response = await fetch(url.toString(), { @@ -157,18 +167,20 @@ export const scheduleDaily = async (formData: FormData) => { const url = new URL(`${apiBaseUrl}/schedules/daily`); + const body = { + data: { + type: "daily-schedules", + attributes: { + provider_id: providerId, + }, + }, + }; + try { const response = await fetch(url.toString(), { method: "POST", headers, - body: JSON.stringify({ - data: { - type: "daily-schedules", - attributes: { - provider_id: providerId, - }, - }, - }), + body: JSON.stringify(body), }); return handleApiResponse(response, "/scans"); @@ -244,6 +256,27 @@ export const launchOrganizationScans = async ( return summary; }; +async function getScanReportErrorMessage( + response: Response, + fallbackMessage: string, +): Promise { + const contentType = response.headers.get("content-type")?.toLowerCase() || ""; + + if (contentType.includes("text/html")) { + return GENERIC_SERVER_ERROR_MESSAGE; + } + + const errorData = await response.json().catch(() => null); + + return ( + errorData?.errors?.[0]?.detail || + errorData?.errors?.detail || + errorData?.error || + errorData?.message || + (response.status >= 500 ? GENERIC_SERVER_ERROR_MESSAGE : fallbackMessage) + ); +} + export const updateScan = async (formData: FormData) => { const headers = await getAuthHeaders({ contentType: true }); @@ -295,11 +328,11 @@ export const getExportsZip = async (scanId: string) => { } if (!response.ok) { - const errorData = await response.json(); - throw new Error( - errorData?.errors?.detail || + await getScanReportErrorMessage( + response, "Unable to fetch scan report. Contact support if the issue continues.", + ), ); } @@ -370,10 +403,11 @@ const _fetchScanBinary = async ( } if (!response.ok) { - const errorData = await response.json().catch(() => ({})); throw new Error( - errorData?.errors?.detail || + await getScanReportErrorMessage( + response, `Unable to retrieve ${errorLabel}. Contact support if the issue continues.`, + ), ); } diff --git a/ui/actions/schedules/index.ts b/ui/actions/schedules/index.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7e6e7b459a --- /dev/null +++ b/ui/actions/schedules/index.ts @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +export * from "./schedules"; diff --git a/ui/actions/schedules/schedules.test.ts b/ui/actions/schedules/schedules.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3122430f83 --- /dev/null +++ b/ui/actions/schedules/schedules.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,265 @@ +import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest"; + +import { + SCHEDULE_FREQUENCY, + type ScheduleUpdatePayload, +} from "@/types/schedules"; + +const { + fetchMock, + getAuthHeadersMock, + handleApiErrorMock, + handleApiResponseMock, + revalidatePathMock, +} = vi.hoisted(() => ({ + fetchMock: vi.fn(), + getAuthHeadersMock: vi.fn(), + handleApiErrorMock: vi.fn(), + handleApiResponseMock: vi.fn(), + revalidatePathMock: vi.fn(), +})); + +vi.mock("next/cache", () => ({ + revalidatePath: revalidatePathMock, +})); + +vi.mock("@/lib", () => ({ + apiBaseUrl: "https://api.example.com/api/v1", + getAuthHeaders: getAuthHeadersMock, +})); + +vi.mock("@/lib/server-actions-helper", () => ({ + handleApiError: handleApiErrorMock, + handleApiResponse: handleApiResponseMock, +})); + +import { + getSchedule, + getSchedulesPage, + removeSchedule, + updateSchedule, + updateSchedulesBulk, +} from "./schedules"; + +const PROVIDER_ID = "1795f636-37e6-42f6-b158-d4faaa64e0fc"; +const SECOND_PROVIDER_ID = "9b7fae7d-5e72-49fe-8b0b-5bff5930db1a"; + +const payload = { + scan_enabled: true, + scan_frequency: SCHEDULE_FREQUENCY.DAILY, + scan_hour: 12, + scan_timezone: "Europe/Madrid", + scan_interval_hours: null, + scan_day_of_week: null, + scan_day_of_month: null, +}; + +describe("schedule write actions revalidate only on success", () => { + beforeEach(() => { + vi.stubGlobal("fetch", fetchMock); + getAuthHeadersMock.mockResolvedValue({ Authorization: "Bearer token" }); + fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(new Response(null, { status: 204 })); + handleApiErrorMock.mockReturnValue({ error: "Failed" }); + }); + + it("revalidates /scans and /providers after a successful update", async () => { + handleApiResponseMock.mockResolvedValue({ success: true }); + + await updateSchedule(PROVIDER_ID, payload); + + expect(revalidatePathMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith("/scans"); + expect(revalidatePathMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith("/providers"); + }); + + it("posts the JSON:API bulk schedule payload", async () => { + handleApiResponseMock.mockResolvedValue({ + data: { + type: "schedules-bulk", + attributes: { + updated: [PROVIDER_ID, SECOND_PROVIDER_ID], + failed: [], + }, + }, + }); + + await updateSchedulesBulk([PROVIDER_ID, SECOND_PROVIDER_ID], payload); + + expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith( + "https://api.example.com/api/v1/schedules/bulk", + expect.objectContaining({ + method: "POST", + headers: { Authorization: "Bearer token" }, + body: JSON.stringify({ + data: { + type: "schedules-bulk", + attributes: { + schedule: payload, + provider_ids: [PROVIDER_ID, SECOND_PROVIDER_ID], + }, + }, + }), + }), + ); + }); + + it("rejects invalid bulk provider ids without issuing a request", async () => { + expect( + await updateSchedulesBulk([PROVIDER_ID, "../users/me"], payload), + ).toEqual({ + error: "Invalid provider ids.", + }); + expect(await updateSchedulesBulk([], payload)).toEqual({ + error: "Invalid provider ids.", + }); + expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); + }); + + it("rejects invalid bulk schedule payloads without issuing a request", async () => { + const invalidPayload = { + ...payload, + scan_hour: "12", + } as unknown as ScheduleUpdatePayload; + + expect( + await updateSchedulesBulk( + [PROVIDER_ID, SECOND_PROVIDER_ID], + invalidPayload, + ), + ).toEqual({ + error: "Invalid schedule payload.", + }); + expect(getAuthHeadersMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); + expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); + }); + + it("normalizes bulk auth header errors", async () => { + const authError = new Error("Session expired"); + getAuthHeadersMock.mockRejectedValue(authError); + + expect( + await updateSchedulesBulk([PROVIDER_ID, SECOND_PROVIDER_ID], payload), + ).toEqual({ error: "Failed" }); + expect(handleApiErrorMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(authError); + expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); + }); + + it("revalidates /scans and /providers after a partial bulk success", async () => { + handleApiResponseMock.mockResolvedValue({ + data: { + type: "schedules-bulk", + attributes: { + updated: [PROVIDER_ID], + failed: [{ provider_id: SECOND_PROVIDER_ID, error: "Denied" }], + }, + }, + }); + + const result = await updateSchedulesBulk( + [PROVIDER_ID, SECOND_PROVIDER_ID], + payload, + ); + + expect(result.data?.attributes?.updated).toEqual([PROVIDER_ID]); + expect(result.data?.attributes?.failed).toHaveLength(1); + expect(revalidatePathMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith("/scans"); + expect(revalidatePathMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith("/providers"); + }); + + it("does not revalidate when the bulk update returns an error result", async () => { + handleApiResponseMock.mockResolvedValue({ error: "Bulk rejected" }); + + await updateSchedulesBulk([PROVIDER_ID, SECOND_PROVIDER_ID], payload); + + expect(revalidatePathMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); + }); + + it("does not revalidate when the update returns an error result", async () => { + handleApiResponseMock.mockResolvedValue({ error: "Schedule rejected" }); + + await updateSchedule(PROVIDER_ID, payload); + + expect(revalidatePathMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); + }); + + it("revalidates /scans and /providers after a successful delete", async () => { + handleApiResponseMock.mockResolvedValue({ success: true }); + + await removeSchedule(PROVIDER_ID); + + expect(revalidatePathMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith("/scans"); + expect(revalidatePathMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith("/providers"); + }); + + it("does not revalidate when the delete returns an error result", async () => { + handleApiResponseMock.mockResolvedValue({ error: "Not allowed" }); + + await removeSchedule(PROVIDER_ID); + + expect(revalidatePathMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); + }); + + it("rejects non-UUID provider ids without issuing a request", async () => { + const malicious = "../users/me"; + + expect(await getSchedule(malicious)).toEqual({ + error: "Invalid provider id.", + }); + expect(await updateSchedule(malicious, payload)).toEqual({ + error: "Invalid provider id.", + }); + expect(await removeSchedule(malicious)).toEqual({ + error: "Invalid provider id.", + }); + expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); + }); +}); + +describe("getSchedulesPage delegates pagination to the endpoint", () => { + beforeEach(() => { + vi.stubGlobal("fetch", fetchMock); + getAuthHeadersMock.mockResolvedValue({ Authorization: "Bearer token" }); + fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(new Response(null, { status: 200 })); + handleApiErrorMock.mockReturnValue({ error: "Failed" }); + }); + + it("requests only configured schedules with native pagination and include", async () => { + handleApiResponseMock.mockResolvedValue({ + data: [], + included: [], + meta: { pagination: { page: 2, pages: 4, count: 35 } }, + }); + + const result = await getSchedulesPage({ + page: 2, + pageSize: 10, + sort: "next_scan_at", + filters: { "filter[provider_type__in]": "aws,azure" }, + }); + + const calledUrl = new URL(fetchMock.mock.calls[0][0] as string); + expect(calledUrl.pathname).toBe("/api/v1/schedules"); + expect(calledUrl.searchParams.get("filter[configured]")).toBe("true"); + expect(calledUrl.searchParams.get("include")).toBe("provider"); + expect(calledUrl.searchParams.get("page[number]")).toBe("2"); + expect(calledUrl.searchParams.get("page[size]")).toBe("10"); + expect(calledUrl.searchParams.get("sort")).toBe("next_scan_at"); + expect(calledUrl.searchParams.get("filter[provider_type__in]")).toBe( + "aws,azure", + ); + // meta is propagated verbatim so the table paginates natively. + expect(result?.meta?.pagination?.count).toBe(35); + }); + + it("normalizes array filter values into a CSV param", async () => { + handleApiResponseMock.mockResolvedValue({ data: [], meta: {} }); + + await getSchedulesPage({ + filters: { "filter[provider__in]": ["id-1", "id-2"] }, + }); + + const calledUrl = new URL(fetchMock.mock.calls[0][0] as string); + expect(calledUrl.searchParams.get("filter[provider__in]")).toBe( + "id-1,id-2", + ); + }); +}); diff --git a/ui/actions/schedules/schedules.ts b/ui/actions/schedules/schedules.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..63ef862b3c --- /dev/null +++ b/ui/actions/schedules/schedules.ts @@ -0,0 +1,214 @@ +"use server"; + +import { revalidatePath } from "next/cache"; +import { z } from "zod"; + +import { apiBaseUrl, getAuthHeaders } from "@/lib"; +import { scheduleUpdatePayloadSchema } from "@/lib/schedules"; +import { handleApiError, handleApiResponse } from "@/lib/server-actions-helper"; +import type { + ScheduleProps, + SchedulesBulkResponse, + ScheduleUpdatePayload, +} from "@/types/schedules"; + +// SSRF guard: the id is interpolated into the request URL, so only UUIDs pass. +const providerIdSchema = z.uuid(); + +function parseProviderId(providerId: string): string | null { + const parsed = providerIdSchema.safeParse(providerId); + return parsed.success ? parsed.data : null; +} + +function parseProviderIds(providerIds: string[]): string[] | null { + if (providerIds.length === 0) return null; + + const ids = providerIds.map(parseProviderId); + return ids.every((id): id is string => id !== null) ? ids : null; +} + +function revalidateScheduleViews() { + revalidatePath("/scans"); + revalidatePath("/providers"); +} + +export const getSchedule = async (providerId: string) => { + const id = parseProviderId(providerId); + if (!id) return { error: "Invalid provider id." }; + + const headers = await getAuthHeaders({ contentType: false }); + const url = new URL(`${apiBaseUrl}/schedules/${id}`); + url.searchParams.set("include", "provider"); + + try { + const response = await fetch(url.toString(), { headers }); + + return handleApiResponse(response); + } catch (error) { + return handleApiError(error); + } +}; + +/** + * Lists every schedule (one per provider), following pagination — the backend + * has no multi-provider filter. + */ +export const getSchedules = async () => { + const headers = await getAuthHeaders({ contentType: false }); + const schedules: ScheduleProps[] = []; + const MAX_PAGES = 20; + + try { + for (let page = 1; page <= MAX_PAGES; page++) { + const url = new URL(`${apiBaseUrl}/schedules`); + url.searchParams.set("page[number]", String(page)); + url.searchParams.set("page[size]", "100"); + + const response = await fetch(url.toString(), { headers }); + + const result = await handleApiResponse(response); + if (result?.error) return result; + + schedules.push(...(result?.data ?? [])); + + const totalPages = result?.meta?.pagination?.pages ?? 1; + if (page >= totalPages) break; + } + + return { data: schedules }; + } catch (error) { + return handleApiError(error); + } +}; + +/** Fetches one page of configured schedules for the Scheduled tab, with native pagination. */ +export const getSchedulesPage = async ({ + page = 1, + pageSize = 10, + sort = "", + filters = {}, +}: { + page?: number; + pageSize?: number; + sort?: string; + filters?: Record; +} = {}) => { + const headers = await getAuthHeaders({ contentType: false }); + const url = new URL(`${apiBaseUrl}/schedules`); + + url.searchParams.set("filter[configured]", "true"); + url.searchParams.set("include", "provider"); + url.searchParams.set("page[number]", String(page)); + url.searchParams.set("page[size]", String(pageSize)); + if (sort) url.searchParams.set("sort", sort); + + for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(filters)) { + const normalized = Array.isArray(value) ? value.join(",") : value; + if (normalized) url.searchParams.set(key, normalized); + } + + try { + const response = await fetch(url.toString(), { headers }); + + return handleApiResponse(response); + } catch (error) { + return handleApiError(error); + } +}; + +export const updateSchedule = async ( + providerId: string, + payload: ScheduleUpdatePayload, +) => { + const id = parseProviderId(providerId); + if (!id) return { error: "Invalid provider id." }; + + const headers = await getAuthHeaders({ contentType: true }); + const url = new URL(`${apiBaseUrl}/schedules/${id}`); + + const body = { + data: { + type: "schedules", + id, + attributes: payload, + }, + }; + + try { + const response = await fetch(url.toString(), { + method: "PATCH", + headers, + body: JSON.stringify(body), + }); + + const result = await handleApiResponse(response); + if (!result?.error) { + revalidateScheduleViews(); + } + return result; + } catch (error) { + return handleApiError(error); + } +}; + +export const updateSchedulesBulk = async ( + providerIds: string[], + payload: ScheduleUpdatePayload, +): Promise => { + const ids = parseProviderIds(providerIds); + if (!ids) return { error: "Invalid provider ids." }; + + const parsedPayload = scheduleUpdatePayloadSchema.safeParse(payload); + if (!parsedPayload.success) return { error: "Invalid schedule payload." }; + + try { + const headers = await getAuthHeaders({ contentType: true }); + const url = new URL(`${apiBaseUrl}/schedules/bulk`); + const body = { + data: { + type: "schedules-bulk", + attributes: { + schedule: parsedPayload.data, + provider_ids: ids, + }, + }, + }; + + const response = await fetch(url.toString(), { + method: "POST", + headers, + body: JSON.stringify(body), + }); + + const result = (await handleApiResponse(response)) as SchedulesBulkResponse; + if (!result?.error) { + revalidateScheduleViews(); + } + return result; + } catch (error) { + return handleApiError(error); + } +}; + +export const removeSchedule = async (providerId: string) => { + const id = parseProviderId(providerId); + if (!id) return { error: "Invalid provider id." }; + + const headers = await getAuthHeaders({ contentType: true }); + const url = new URL(`${apiBaseUrl}/schedules/${id}`); + + try { + const response = await fetch(url.toString(), { + method: "DELETE", + headers, + }); + + const result = await handleApiResponse(response); + if (!result?.error) { + revalidateScheduleViews(); + } + return result; + } catch (error) { + return handleApiError(error); + } +}; diff --git a/ui/app/(auth)/alerts/confirm/confirm-alert-recipient.test.ts b/ui/app/(auth)/alerts/confirm/confirm-alert-recipient.test.ts index d95966e680..41118bd6e2 100644 --- a/ui/app/(auth)/alerts/confirm/confirm-alert-recipient.test.ts +++ b/ui/app/(auth)/alerts/confirm/confirm-alert-recipient.test.ts @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ const lastFetchCall = (): { url: string; init: RequestInit } => { describe("confirmAlertRecipient", () => { beforeEach(() => { vi.stubGlobal("fetch", fetchMock); - vi.stubEnv("NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL", "https://api.example.com/api/v1"); + vi.stubEnv("UI_API_BASE_URL", "https://api.example.com/api/v1"); fetchMock.mockResolvedValue( new Response( JSON.stringify({ @@ -104,7 +104,8 @@ describe("confirmAlertRecipient", () => { }); it("returns the fallback message when the API base URL is missing", async () => { - // Given + // Given - neither the new name nor its legacy fallback is set + vi.stubEnv("UI_API_BASE_URL", ""); vi.stubEnv("NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL", ""); // When @@ -120,6 +121,21 @@ describe("confirmAlertRecipient", () => { expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); }); + it("falls back to the deprecated NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL when UI_API_BASE_URL is unset", async () => { + // Given - only the legacy name is configured + vi.stubEnv("UI_API_BASE_URL", undefined); + vi.stubEnv("NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL", "https://legacy.example.com/api/v1"); + + // When + const result = await confirmAlertRecipient("token-1"); + + // Then + expect(result.ok).toBe(true); + expect(lastFetchCall().url).toBe( + "https://legacy.example.com/api/v1/alerts/recipients/confirm?token=token-1", + ); + }); + it("returns the fallback message when the request fails", async () => { // Given fetchMock.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error("network down")); diff --git a/ui/app/(auth)/alerts/confirm/confirm-alert-recipient.ts b/ui/app/(auth)/alerts/confirm/confirm-alert-recipient.ts index b567bb4124..19e9216339 100644 --- a/ui/app/(auth)/alerts/confirm/confirm-alert-recipient.ts +++ b/ui/app/(auth)/alerts/confirm/confirm-alert-recipient.ts @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +import { readEnv } from "@/lib/runtime-env"; + interface AlertConfirmApiResponse { state?: string; message?: string; @@ -41,7 +43,7 @@ const toState = (payload: unknown): string => { export const confirmAlertRecipient = async ( token?: string, ): Promise => { - const apiBaseUrl = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL; + const apiBaseUrl = readEnv("UI_API_BASE_URL", "NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL"); if (!apiBaseUrl) { return { ok: false, diff --git a/ui/app/(auth)/alerts/unsubscribe/unsubscribe-alert-recipient.test.ts b/ui/app/(auth)/alerts/unsubscribe/unsubscribe-alert-recipient.test.ts index 8a595fa63e..508625b4be 100644 --- a/ui/app/(auth)/alerts/unsubscribe/unsubscribe-alert-recipient.test.ts +++ b/ui/app/(auth)/alerts/unsubscribe/unsubscribe-alert-recipient.test.ts @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ const lastFetchCall = (): { url: string; init: RequestInit } => { describe("unsubscribeAlertRecipient", () => { beforeEach(() => { vi.stubGlobal("fetch", fetchMock); - vi.stubEnv("NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL", "https://api.example.com/api/v1"); + vi.stubEnv("UI_API_BASE_URL", "https://api.example.com/api/v1"); fetchMock.mockResolvedValue( new Response( JSON.stringify({ @@ -102,4 +102,37 @@ describe("unsubscribeAlertRecipient", () => { "https://api.example.com/api/v1/alerts/recipients/unsubscribe", ); }); + + it("returns the fallback message when the API base URL is missing", async () => { + // Given - neither the new name nor its legacy fallback is set + vi.stubEnv("UI_API_BASE_URL", ""); + vi.stubEnv("NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL", ""); + + // When + const result = await unsubscribeAlertRecipient("token-1"); + + // Then + expect(result).toEqual({ + ok: false, + state: "missing_api_base_url", + message: + "We could not process this unsubscribe link. Please try again later.", + }); + expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); + }); + + it("falls back to the deprecated NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL when UI_API_BASE_URL is unset", async () => { + // Given - only the legacy name is configured + vi.stubEnv("UI_API_BASE_URL", undefined); + vi.stubEnv("NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL", "https://legacy.example.com/api/v1"); + + // When + const result = await unsubscribeAlertRecipient("token-1"); + + // Then + expect(result.ok).toBe(true); + expect(lastFetchCall().url).toBe( + "https://legacy.example.com/api/v1/alerts/recipients/unsubscribe?token=token-1", + ); + }); }); diff --git a/ui/app/(auth)/alerts/unsubscribe/unsubscribe-alert-recipient.ts b/ui/app/(auth)/alerts/unsubscribe/unsubscribe-alert-recipient.ts index af64165a1e..8c3a4e2a79 100644 --- a/ui/app/(auth)/alerts/unsubscribe/unsubscribe-alert-recipient.ts +++ b/ui/app/(auth)/alerts/unsubscribe/unsubscribe-alert-recipient.ts @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +import { readEnv } from "@/lib/runtime-env"; + interface AlertUnsubscribeApiResponse { state?: string; message?: string; @@ -41,7 +43,7 @@ const toState = (payload: unknown): string => { export const unsubscribeAlertRecipient = async ( token?: string, ): Promise => { - const apiBaseUrl = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL; + const apiBaseUrl = readEnv("UI_API_BASE_URL", "NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL"); if (!apiBaseUrl) { return { ok: false, diff --git a/ui/app/(auth)/layout.tsx b/ui/app/(auth)/layout.tsx index 07fe3a60c3..79a4ce4e89 100644 --- a/ui/app/(auth)/layout.tsx +++ b/ui/app/(auth)/layout.tsx @@ -2,12 +2,15 @@ import "@/styles/globals.css"; import { GoogleTagManager } from "@next/third-parties/google"; import { Metadata, Viewport } from "next"; +import { connection } from "next/server"; import { ReactNode, Suspense } from "react"; +import { RuntimePublicConfig } from "@/components/runtime-config/runtime-public-config"; import { NavigationProgress, Toaster } from "@/components/ui"; import { fontSans } from "@/config/fonts"; import { siteConfig } from "@/config/site"; import { cn } from "@/lib"; +import { readEnv } from "@/lib/runtime-env"; import { Providers } from "../providers"; @@ -29,10 +32,27 @@ export const viewport: Viewport = { ], }; -export default function AuthLayout({ children }: { children: ReactNode }) { +export default async function AuthLayout({ + children, +}: { + children: ReactNode; +}) { + // Force dynamic rendering so the read below resolves from the container env + // at request time rather than being snapshotted at build (independent of the + // island's own connection() call). + await connection(); + + // Server-side runtime read. Empty/unset id ⇒ GoogleTagManager is not mounted + const gtmId = readEnv( + "UI_GOOGLE_TAG_MANAGER_ID", + "NEXT_PUBLIC_GOOGLE_TAG_MANAGER_ID", + ); + return ( - + + + {children} - + {gtmId && } diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/_components/accounts-selector.test.tsx b/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/_components/accounts-selector.test.tsx index 19c63cf3d2..e69d0427ee 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/_components/accounts-selector.test.tsx +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/_components/accounts-selector.test.tsx @@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ import { render, screen, within } from "@testing-library/react"; import userEvent from "@testing-library/user-event"; import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest"; +import { FILTER_FIELD } from "@/types/filters"; + import { AccountsSelector } from "./accounts-selector"; const multiSelectContentSpy = vi.fn(); @@ -145,9 +147,24 @@ describe("AccountsSelector", () => { placeholder: "Search Providers...", emptyMessage: "No Providers found.", }); + expect(screen.getByText("All Providers")).toBeInTheDocument(); expect(screen.getByText("Production AWS")).toBeInTheDocument(); }); + it("supports contextual placeholder and empty-selection copy", () => { + render( + , + ); + + expect(screen.getByText("Select a Provider")).toBeInTheDocument(); + expect(screen.getByText("No provider selected")).toBeInTheDocument(); + }); + it("allows disabling search explicitly", () => { render(); @@ -170,7 +187,10 @@ describe("AccountsSelector", () => { it("can use provider UID values for pages whose API filters by provider_uid__in", () => { render( - , + , ); expect( diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/_components/accounts-selector.tsx b/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/_components/accounts-selector.tsx index 0c389febb7..ab5c27fd6c 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/_components/accounts-selector.tsx +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/_components/accounts-selector.tsx @@ -17,28 +17,24 @@ import { MultiSelectValue, } from "@/components/shadcn/select/multiselect"; import { useUrlFilters } from "@/hooks/use-url-filters"; +import { type AccountFilterKey, FILTER_FIELD } from "@/types/filters"; import { getProviderDisplayName, type ProviderProps, type ProviderType, } from "@/types/providers"; -const ACCOUNT_SELECTOR_FILTER = { - PROVIDER_ID: "provider_id__in", - PROVIDER_UID: "provider_uid__in", -} as const; - -type AccountSelectorFilter = - (typeof ACCOUNT_SELECTOR_FILTER)[keyof typeof ACCOUNT_SELECTOR_FILTER]; - /** Common props shared by both batch and instant modes. */ interface AccountsSelectorBaseProps { providers: ProviderProps[]; search?: MultiSelectSearchProp; - filterKey?: AccountSelectorFilter; + filterKey?: AccountFilterKey; id?: string; disabledValues?: string[]; closeOnSelect?: boolean; + placeholder?: string; + emptySelectionLabel?: string; + clearSelectionLabel?: string; } /** Batch mode: caller controls both pending state and notification callback (all-or-nothing). */ @@ -72,7 +68,7 @@ export function AccountsSelector({ providers, onBatchChange, selectedValues, - filterKey = ACCOUNT_SELECTOR_FILTER.PROVIDER_ID, + filterKey = FILTER_FIELD.PROVIDER_ID, id = "accounts-selector", disabledValues = [], search = { @@ -80,6 +76,9 @@ export function AccountsSelector({ emptyMessage: "No Providers found.", }, closeOnSelect = false, + placeholder = "All Providers", + emptySelectionLabel = "All selected", + clearSelectionLabel = "Select All", }: AccountsSelectorProps) { const searchParams = useSearchParams(); const { navigateWithParams } = useUrlFilters(); @@ -92,7 +91,7 @@ export function AccountsSelector({ const visibleProviders = providers; const getProviderValue = (provider: ProviderProps) => - filterKey === ACCOUNT_SELECTOR_FILTER.PROVIDER_UID + filterKey === FILTER_FIELD.PROVIDER_UID ? provider.attributes.uid : provider.id; const disabledValuesSet = new Set(disabledValues); @@ -170,7 +169,7 @@ export function AccountsSelector({ onOpenChange={closeOnSelect ? setSelectorOpen : undefined} > - {selectedLabel() || } + {selectedLabel() || } {visibleProviders.length > 0 ? ( @@ -194,7 +193,9 @@ export function AccountsSelector({ } }} > - {selectedIds.length === 0 ? "All selected" : "Select All"} + {selectedIds.length === 0 + ? emptySelectionLabel + : clearSelectionLabel} {visibleProviders.map((p) => { const value = getProviderValue(p); diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/_lib/provider-scope.test.ts b/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/_lib/provider-scope.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3071f84837 --- /dev/null +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/_lib/provider-scope.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest"; + +import { ProviderProps } from "@/types/providers"; + +import { + filterProvidersByScope, + parseFilterIds, + scopeProvidersByGroup, +} from "./provider-scope"; + +const makeProvider = ( + id: string, + provider: string, + groupIds: string[] = [], +): ProviderProps => + ({ + id, + attributes: { provider }, + relationships: { + provider_groups: { + data: groupIds.map((gid) => ({ type: "provider-groups", id: gid })), + }, + }, + }) as unknown as ProviderProps; + +describe("parseFilterIds", () => { + it("returns an empty array for undefined", () => { + // Given / When / Then + expect(parseFilterIds(undefined)).toEqual([]); + }); + + it("returns an empty array for an empty string", () => { + // Given an empty param value (e.g. "filter[provider_groups__in]=") + // When / Then it must not produce a [""] match + expect(parseFilterIds("")).toEqual([]); + }); + + it("drops whitespace-only and empty segments", () => { + // Given a blank/whitespace value + // When / Then + expect(parseFilterIds(" ")).toEqual([]); + expect(parseFilterIds(",")).toEqual([]); + expect(parseFilterIds("a,,b")).toEqual(["a", "b"]); + }); + + it("splits and trims comma-separated ids", () => { + expect(parseFilterIds(" a , b ")).toEqual(["a", "b"]); + }); + + it("normalizes array param values", () => { + expect(parseFilterIds(["a", "", "b"])).toEqual(["a", "b"]); + }); +}); + +describe("scopeProvidersByGroup", () => { + const providers = [ + makeProvider("p1", "aws", ["g1"]), + makeProvider("p2", "gcp", ["g2"]), + makeProvider("p3", "azure", []), + ]; + + it("returns every provider when no group is selected", () => { + expect(scopeProvidersByGroup(providers, [])).toEqual(providers); + }); + + it("keeps only providers that belong to a selected group", () => { + // When scoping to g1 + const result = scopeProvidersByGroup(providers, ["g1"]); + + // Then only the g1 member remains + expect(result.map((p) => p.id)).toEqual(["p1"]); + }); + + it("excludes providers with no group memberships", () => { + expect(scopeProvidersByGroup(providers, ["g2"]).map((p) => p.id)).toEqual([ + "p2", + ]); + }); +}); + +describe("filterProvidersByScope", () => { + const providers = [ + makeProvider("p1", "aws", ["g1"]), + makeProvider("p2", "gcp", ["g1"]), + makeProvider("p3", "aws", ["g2"]), + makeProvider("p4", "azure", []), + ]; + + it("returns every provider when no dimension is set", () => { + const result = filterProvidersByScope(providers, { + providerIds: [], + providerTypes: [], + providerGroupIds: [], + }); + + expect(result).toEqual(providers); + }); + + it("filters by provider id", () => { + const result = filterProvidersByScope(providers, { + providerIds: ["p2"], + providerTypes: [], + providerGroupIds: [], + }); + + expect(result.map((p) => p.id)).toEqual(["p2"]); + }); + + it("filters by provider type case-insensitively", () => { + const result = filterProvidersByScope(providers, { + providerIds: [], + providerTypes: ["AWS"], + providerGroupIds: [], + }); + + expect(result.map((p) => p.id)).toEqual(["p1", "p3"]); + }); + + it("filters by provider group", () => { + const result = filterProvidersByScope(providers, { + providerIds: [], + providerTypes: [], + providerGroupIds: ["g1"], + }); + + expect(result.map((p) => p.id)).toEqual(["p1", "p2"]); + }); + + it("composes group AND type (the risk-plot regression)", () => { + // Given both a group and a type filter are active + // When combining group g1 with type aws + const result = filterProvidersByScope(providers, { + providerIds: [], + providerTypes: ["aws"], + providerGroupIds: ["g1"], + }); + + // Then only providers matching BOTH survive (p1), not all aws or all g1 + expect(result.map((p) => p.id)).toEqual(["p1"]); + }); + + it("composes id AND group", () => { + // p3 is aws/g2; selecting it together with group g1 yields nothing + const result = filterProvidersByScope(providers, { + providerIds: ["p3"], + providerTypes: [], + providerGroupIds: ["g1"], + }); + + expect(result).toEqual([]); + }); + + it("composes all three dimensions", () => { + const result = filterProvidersByScope(providers, { + providerIds: ["p1", "p2"], + providerTypes: ["aws"], + providerGroupIds: ["g1"], + }); + + expect(result.map((p) => p.id)).toEqual(["p1"]); + }); +}); diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/_lib/provider-scope.ts b/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/_lib/provider-scope.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..49973b201b --- /dev/null +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/_lib/provider-scope.ts @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +import { ProviderProps } from "@/types/providers"; + +export interface ProviderScopeFilters { + providerIds: string[]; + providerTypes: string[]; + providerGroupIds: string[]; +} + +/** + * Normalize a comma-separated filter param into trimmed, non-empty ids. + * Guards against blank values (e.g. an empty "filter[...]=" param) so they are + * treated as "no filter" instead of matching against an empty-string id. + */ +export const parseFilterIds = ( + value: string | string[] | undefined, +): string[] => { + if (value === undefined) return []; + const raw = Array.isArray(value) ? value.join(",") : value; + return raw + .split(",") + .map((id) => id.trim()) + .filter((id) => id.length > 0); +}; + +const belongsToGroup = (provider: ProviderProps, groupIds: string[]): boolean => + provider.relationships.provider_groups?.data?.some((group) => + groupIds.includes(group.id), + ) ?? false; + +/** + * Keep only providers belonging to one of the selected groups. An empty group + * list means "no group filter" and returns every provider unchanged. + */ +export const scopeProvidersByGroup = ( + providers: ProviderProps[], + groupIds: string[], +): ProviderProps[] => + groupIds.length === 0 + ? providers + : providers.filter((p) => belongsToGroup(p, groupIds)); + +/** + * Filter providers by every active scope dimension (id, type, group) combined + * with AND. Each empty dimension is skipped, so a provider is kept only when it + * satisfies all the filters that are actually set. + */ +export const filterProvidersByScope = ( + providers: ProviderProps[], + { providerIds, providerTypes, providerGroupIds }: ProviderScopeFilters, +): ProviderProps[] => { + const normalizedTypes = providerTypes.map((type) => type.toLowerCase()); + + return providers.filter((provider) => { + if (providerIds.length > 0 && !providerIds.includes(provider.id)) { + return false; + } + if ( + normalizedTypes.length > 0 && + !normalizedTypes.includes(provider.attributes.provider.toLowerCase()) + ) { + return false; + } + if ( + providerGroupIds.length > 0 && + !belongsToGroup(provider, providerGroupIds) + ) { + return false; + } + return true; + }); +}; diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/graphs-tabs/risk-pipeline-view/risk-pipeline-view.ssr.tsx b/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/graphs-tabs/risk-pipeline-view/risk-pipeline-view.ssr.tsx index b8479432e6..2a4b100379 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/graphs-tabs/risk-pipeline-view/risk-pipeline-view.ssr.tsx +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/graphs-tabs/risk-pipeline-view/risk-pipeline-view.ssr.tsx @@ -3,11 +3,16 @@ import { getFindingsBySeverity, SeverityByProviderType, } from "@/actions/overview"; +import { OVERVIEW_FILTER_PARAM } from "@/actions/overview/overview-filters"; import { getAllProviders } from "@/actions/providers"; import { SankeyChart } from "@/components/graphs/sankey-chart"; import { SearchParamsProps } from "@/types"; import { pickFilterParams } from "../../_lib/filter-params"; +import { + parseFilterIds, + scopeProvidersByGroup, +} from "../../_lib/provider-scope"; export async function RiskPipelineViewSSR({ searchParams, @@ -16,27 +21,31 @@ export async function RiskPipelineViewSSR({ }) { const filters = pickFilterParams(searchParams); - const providerTypeFilter = filters["filter[provider_type__in]"]; - const providerIdFilter = filters["filter[provider_id__in]"]; + const providerTypeFilter = filters[OVERVIEW_FILTER_PARAM.PROVIDER_TYPE]; + const providerIdFilter = filters[OVERVIEW_FILTER_PARAM.PROVIDER_ID]; + const providerGroupsFilter = filters[OVERVIEW_FILTER_PARAM.PROVIDER_GROUPS]; // Fetch providers list to know account types const providersListResponse = await getAllProviders(); const allProviders = providersListResponse?.data || []; + // Scope the provider set to the selected groups so we enumerate only their + // provider types below (the per-type API calls also carry the group filter). + const selectedGroupIds = parseFilterIds(providerGroupsFilter); + const scopedProviders = scopeProvidersByGroup(allProviders, selectedGroupIds); + // Build severityByProviderType based on filters const severityByProviderType: SeverityByProviderType = {}; let selectedProviderTypes: string[] | undefined; if (providerIdFilter) { // Case: Accounts are selected - group by provider type and make parallel calls - const selectedAccountIds = String(providerIdFilter) - .split(",") - .map((id) => id.trim()); + const selectedAccountIds = parseFilterIds(providerIdFilter); // Group selected accounts by provider type const accountsByType: Record = {}; for (const accountId of selectedAccountIds) { - const provider = allProviders.find((p) => p.id === accountId); + const provider = scopedProviders.find((p) => p.id === accountId); if (provider) { const type = provider.attributes.provider.toLowerCase(); if (!accountsByType[type]) { @@ -70,9 +79,9 @@ export async function RiskPipelineViewSSR({ } } else if (providerTypeFilter) { // Case: Provider types are selected - make parallel calls for each type - selectedProviderTypes = String(providerTypeFilter) - .split(",") - .map((t) => t.trim().toLowerCase()); + selectedProviderTypes = parseFilterIds(providerTypeFilter).map((type) => + type.toLowerCase(), + ); const severityPromises = selectedProviderTypes.map(async (providerType) => { const response = await getFindingsBySeverity({ @@ -93,9 +102,10 @@ export async function RiskPipelineViewSSR({ } } } else { - // Case: No filters - get all provider types and make parallel calls + // Case: No account/type filter - enumerate provider types (scoped to the + // selected groups when a group filter is active) and make parallel calls. const allProviderTypes = Array.from( - new Set(allProviders.map((p) => p.attributes.provider.toLowerCase())), + new Set(scopedProviders.map((p) => p.attributes.provider.toLowerCase())), ); const severityPromises = allProviderTypes.map(async (providerType) => { diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/graphs-tabs/risk-plot/risk-plot.ssr.tsx b/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/graphs-tabs/risk-plot/risk-plot.ssr.tsx index 887eb7a5d5..1f4d3625d4 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/graphs-tabs/risk-plot/risk-plot.ssr.tsx +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/graphs-tabs/risk-plot/risk-plot.ssr.tsx @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ import { Info } from "lucide-react"; +import { OVERVIEW_FILTER_PARAM } from "@/actions/overview/overview-filters"; import { adaptToRiskPlotData, getProvidersRiskData, @@ -8,6 +9,10 @@ import { getAllProviders } from "@/actions/providers"; import { SearchParamsProps } from "@/types"; import { pickFilterParams } from "../../_lib/filter-params"; +import { + filterProvidersByScope, + parseFilterIds, +} from "../../_lib/provider-scope"; import { RiskPlotClient } from "./risk-plot-client"; export async function RiskPlotSSR({ @@ -17,31 +22,19 @@ export async function RiskPlotSSR({ }) { const filters = pickFilterParams(searchParams); - const providerTypeFilter = filters["filter[provider_type__in]"]; - const providerIdFilter = filters["filter[provider_id__in]"]; - // Fetch all providers const providersListResponse = await getAllProviders(); const allProviders = providersListResponse?.data || []; - // Filter providers based on search params - let filteredProviders = allProviders; - - if (providerIdFilter) { - // Filter by specific provider IDs - const selectedIds = String(providerIdFilter) - .split(",") - .map((id) => id.trim()); - filteredProviders = allProviders.filter((p) => selectedIds.includes(p.id)); - } else if (providerTypeFilter) { - // Filter by provider types - const selectedTypes = String(providerTypeFilter) - .split(",") - .map((t) => t.trim().toLowerCase()); - filteredProviders = allProviders.filter((p) => - selectedTypes.includes(p.attributes.provider.toLowerCase()), - ); - } + // Compose every active provider-scope filter with AND so combining e.g. a + // group and a type narrows to providers matching both. + const filteredProviders = filterProvidersByScope(allProviders, { + providerIds: parseFilterIds(filters[OVERVIEW_FILTER_PARAM.PROVIDER_ID]), + providerTypes: parseFilterIds(filters[OVERVIEW_FILTER_PARAM.PROVIDER_TYPE]), + providerGroupIds: parseFilterIds( + filters[OVERVIEW_FILTER_PARAM.PROVIDER_GROUPS], + ), + }); // No providers to show if (filteredProviders.length === 0) { diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/severity-over-time/_components/finding-severity-over-time.tsx b/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/severity-over-time/_components/finding-severity-over-time.tsx index 9e0802d4ff..b65b6a21f0 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/severity-over-time/_components/finding-severity-over-time.tsx +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/_overview/severity-over-time/_components/finding-severity-over-time.tsx @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { useRouter, useSearchParams } from "next/navigation"; import { useState } from "react"; +import { OVERVIEW_FILTER_PARAM } from "@/actions/overview/overview-filters"; import { getSeverityTrendsByTimeRange } from "@/actions/overview/severity-trends"; import { LineChart } from "@/components/graphs/line-chart"; import { LineConfig, LineDataPoint } from "@/components/graphs/types"; @@ -42,10 +43,16 @@ export const FindingSeverityOverTime = ({ const getActiveProviderFilters = (): Record => { const filters: Record = {}; - const providerType = searchParams.get("filter[provider_type__in]"); - const providerId = searchParams.get("filter[provider_id__in]"); - if (providerType) filters["filter[provider_type__in]"] = providerType; - if (providerId) filters["filter[provider_id__in]"] = providerId; + const providerType = searchParams.get(OVERVIEW_FILTER_PARAM.PROVIDER_TYPE); + const providerId = searchParams.get(OVERVIEW_FILTER_PARAM.PROVIDER_ID); + const providerGroups = searchParams.get( + OVERVIEW_FILTER_PARAM.PROVIDER_GROUPS, + ); + if (providerType) + filters[OVERVIEW_FILTER_PARAM.PROVIDER_TYPE] = providerType; + if (providerId) filters[OVERVIEW_FILTER_PARAM.PROVIDER_ID] = providerId; + if (providerGroups) + filters[OVERVIEW_FILTER_PARAM.PROVIDER_GROUPS] = providerGroups; return filters; }; diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/alerts/_components/__tests__/alert-form-modal.test.tsx b/ui/app/(prowler)/alerts/_components/__tests__/alert-form-modal.test.tsx index be336be2a7..026ba439f1 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/alerts/_components/__tests__/alert-form-modal.test.tsx +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/alerts/_components/__tests__/alert-form-modal.test.tsx @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import { } from "@/app/(prowler)/alerts/_types"; import type { ProviderProps } from "@/types/providers"; +import { ALERTS_PERMISSION_ERROR } from "../../_lib/alert-errors"; import { AlertFormModal } from "../alert-form-modal"; const recipientsActionMocks = vi.hoisted(() => ({ @@ -701,6 +702,53 @@ describe("AlertFormModal", () => { expect(errorMessage).toHaveClass("text-text-error-primary"); }); + it("should clear the preview error when save shows the form error", async () => { + // Given + const user = userEvent.setup(); + alertsActionMocks.seedAlertRule.mockResolvedValue({ + error: "No alert-compatible filters", + }); + mockRecipientsList(); + renderCreateModal({ editingAlert: createEditingAlert() }); + + // When + await user.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /^test$/i })); + expect(await screen.findByText("Test result")).toBeVisible(); + await user.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /^save$/i })); + + // Then + await waitFor(() => + expect(screen.queryByText("Test result")).not.toBeInTheDocument(), + ); + expect( + screen.getAllByText( + "Apply at least one alert-compatible Findings filter.", + ), + ).toHaveLength(1); + }); + + it("should show the manage alerts permission error when save seed is forbidden", async () => { + // Given + const user = userEvent.setup(); + alertsActionMocks.seedAlertRule.mockResolvedValue({ + error: "You do not have permission to perform this action.", + status: 403, + }); + mockRecipientsList(); + renderCreateModal({ editingAlert: createEditingAlert() }); + + // When + await user.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /^save$/i })); + + // Then + expect(await screen.findByText(ALERTS_PERMISSION_ERROR)).toBeVisible(); + expect( + screen.queryByText( + "Apply at least one alert-compatible Findings filter.", + ), + ).not.toBeInTheDocument(); + }); + it("should hydrate advanced edit mode filters and normalize them on save", async () => { // Given const user = userEvent.setup(); diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/alerts/_components/__tests__/alerts-manager.test.tsx b/ui/app/(prowler)/alerts/_components/__tests__/alerts-manager.test.tsx index 1ee2c67302..c8a6c9fb61 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/alerts/_components/__tests__/alerts-manager.test.tsx +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/alerts/_components/__tests__/alerts-manager.test.tsx @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ import { render, screen, waitFor } from "@testing-library/react"; import userEvent from "@testing-library/user-event"; -import { isValidElement, type ReactNode } from "react"; +import { isValidElement, type ReactNode, useState } from "react"; import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest"; import { @@ -8,7 +8,12 @@ import { ALERT_TRIGGER_KINDS, type AlertRule, } from "@/app/(prowler)/alerts/_types"; +import type { + AlertFormSubmitResult, + AlertFormValues, +} from "@/app/(prowler)/alerts/_types/alert-form"; +import { ALERTS_PERMISSION_ERROR } from "../../_lib/alert-errors"; import { AlertsManager } from "../alerts-manager"; const actionMocks = vi.hoisted(() => ({ @@ -96,12 +101,32 @@ vi.mock("../alert-form-modal", () => ({ open, editingAlert, onOpenChange, + onSubmit, }: { open: boolean; editingAlert?: AlertRule | null; onOpenChange: (open: boolean) => void; - }) => - open ? ( + onSubmit: (values: AlertFormValues) => Promise; + }) => { + const [error, setError] = useState(null); + + const submit = async () => { + const result = await onSubmit({ + name: "Updated alert", + description: "", + method: "email", + frequency: ALERT_TRIGGER_KINDS.AFTER_SCAN, + condition: { + op: ALERT_AGGREGATE_OPS.ANY, + filter: { severity: ["critical"] }, + }, + recipientEmails: [], + enabled: true, + }); + setError(result.ok ? null : (result.error ?? null)); + }; + + return open ? (
    ({ + {editingAlert?.attributes.name} + {error &&

    {error}

    }
    - ) : null, + ) : null; + }, })); vi.mock("../alerts-empty-state", () => ({ @@ -259,6 +289,38 @@ describe("AlertsManager", () => { }); }); + it("shows a manage alerts permission message for edit 403 errors", async () => { + // Given + const user = userEvent.setup(); + const alert = makeAlert(true); + actionMocks.updateAlert.mockResolvedValue({ + error: "You do not have permission to perform this action.", + status: 403, + }); + render( + , + ); + + // When + await user.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /submit alert/i })); + + // Then + expect(await screen.findByText(ALERTS_PERMISSION_ERROR)).toBeVisible(); + expect(toastMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); + }); + it("shows a success toast after disabling an alert", async () => { // Given const user = userEvent.setup(); @@ -281,6 +343,32 @@ describe("AlertsManager", () => { ); }); + it("shows a manage alerts permission toast for disable 403 errors", async () => { + // Given + const user = userEvent.setup(); + const alert = makeAlert(true); + actionMocks.disableAlert.mockResolvedValue({ + error: "You do not have permission to perform this action.", + status: 403, + }); + renderManager([alert]); + + // When + await user.click( + screen.getByRole("button", { name: /actions for enabled alert/i }), + ); + await user.click(screen.getByRole("menuitem", { name: /disable/i })); + + // Then + await waitFor(() => + expect(toastMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ + variant: "destructive", + title: "Alert update failed", + description: ALERTS_PERMISSION_ERROR, + }), + ); + }); + it("shows a success toast after enabling an alert", async () => { // Given const user = userEvent.setup(); diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/alerts/_components/alert-form-modal.tsx b/ui/app/(prowler)/alerts/_components/alert-form-modal.tsx index e3529d4056..8a9effd890 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/alerts/_components/alert-form-modal.tsx +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/alerts/_components/alert-form-modal.tsx @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ import { getEmptyAlertFormDefaults, getFindingsFiltersFromAlertCondition, } from "../_lib/alert-adapter"; +import { getAlertMutationError } from "../_lib/alert-errors"; import { alertFormSchema } from "../_lib/alert-form-schema"; import type { AlertFormSubmitResult, @@ -408,7 +409,7 @@ const AlertFormModalContent = ({ if (seedResult?.error) { setPreview({ status: "error", - error: ALERT_SEED_ERROR, + error: getAlertMutationError(seedResult, ALERT_SEED_ERROR), }); return; } @@ -451,7 +452,10 @@ const AlertFormModalContent = ({ ? await seedAlertRule(pendingFilters) : null; if (seedResult?.error) { - setErrors({ root: ALERT_SEED_ERROR }); + setPreview(null); + setErrors({ + root: getAlertMutationError(seedResult, ALERT_SEED_ERROR), + }); return; } diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/alerts/_components/alerts-manager.tsx b/ui/app/(prowler)/alerts/_components/alerts-manager.tsx index 0c69225b5e..e29a0651c2 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/alerts/_components/alerts-manager.tsx +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/alerts/_components/alerts-manager.tsx @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import type { ScanEntity } from "@/types"; import type { ProviderProps } from "@/types/providers"; import { toAlertPayload } from "../_lib/alert-adapter"; +import { getAlertMutationError } from "../_lib/alert-errors"; import type { AlertFormSubmitResult, AlertFormValues, @@ -108,7 +109,12 @@ export const AlertsManager = ({ } const payload = toAlertPayload(values); const result = await updateAlert(editingAlert.id, payload); - if (result?.error) return { ok: false, error: result.error }; + if (result?.error) { + return { + ok: false, + error: getAlertMutationError(result), + }; + } toast({ title: "Alert updated", description: result.data.attributes.name, @@ -127,7 +133,7 @@ export const AlertsManager = ({ toast({ variant: "destructive", title: "Alert update failed", - description: result.error, + description: getAlertMutationError(result), }); return; } @@ -147,7 +153,7 @@ export const AlertsManager = ({ toast({ variant: "destructive", title: "Alert delete failed", - description: result.error, + description: getAlertMutationError(result), }); return; } diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/alerts/_lib/alert-errors.ts b/ui/app/(prowler)/alerts/_lib/alert-errors.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a921338066 --- /dev/null +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/alerts/_lib/alert-errors.ts @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +import { + ACTION_ERROR_STATUS, + getActionErrorMessage, +} from "@/lib/action-errors"; + +export const ALERTS_PERMISSION_ERROR = + "You don't have permission to manage alerts. Ask an administrator to update your role."; + +interface AlertActionErrorResult { + error: string; + status?: number; +} + +export const getAlertMutationError = ( + result: AlertActionErrorResult, + fallback = result.error, +): string => + getActionErrorMessage( + { ...result, error: fallback }, + { + messages: { + [ACTION_ERROR_STATUS.FORBIDDEN]: ALERTS_PERMISSION_ERROR, + }, + }, + ); diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_components/attack-paths-status-panel.test.tsx b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_components/attack-paths-status-panel.test.tsx new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..20210a3126 --- /dev/null +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_components/attack-paths-status-panel.test.tsx @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +import { fireEvent, render, screen } from "@testing-library/react"; +import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest"; + +import { ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES } from "../_lib/get-attack-paths-view-state"; +import { AttackPathsStatusPanel } from "./attack-paths-status-panel"; + +describe("AttackPathsStatusPanel", () => { + it("renders the no-scans message with a link to Scan Jobs", () => { + render( + , + ); + expect(screen.getByText(/no scans available/i)).toBeInTheDocument(); + expect( + screen.getByRole("link", { name: /go to scan jobs/i }), + ).toHaveAttribute("href", "/scans"); + }); + + it("renders the scan-pending message", () => { + render( + , + ); + expect(screen.getByText(/scan in progress/i)).toBeInTheDocument(); + }); + + it("renders the graph-building message with progress", () => { + render( + , + ); + expect( + screen.getByText(/preparing attack paths data/i), + ).toBeInTheDocument(); + expect(screen.getByText(/45%/)).toBeInTheDocument(); + }); + + it("renders the no-graph-data message", () => { + render( + , + ); + expect(screen.getByText(/no attack paths data/i)).toBeInTheDocument(); + }); + + it("renders the error message and calls onRetry when Retry is clicked", () => { + const onRetry = vi.fn(); + render( + , + ); + expect(screen.getByText(/couldn.t load scans/i)).toBeInTheDocument(); + fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /retry/i })); + expect(onRetry).toHaveBeenCalledOnce(); + }); + + it("renders nothing for the ready state", () => { + const { container } = render( + , + ); + expect(container).toBeEmptyDOMElement(); + }); +}); diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_components/attack-paths-status-panel.tsx b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_components/attack-paths-status-panel.tsx new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..89db0dbfd2 --- /dev/null +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_components/attack-paths-status-panel.tsx @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +import Link from "next/link"; + +import { Button } from "@/components/shadcn"; +import { StatusAlert } from "@/components/shared/status-alert"; + +import { + ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES, + type AttackPathsViewState, +} from "../_lib/get-attack-paths-view-state"; + +interface AttackPathsStatusPanelProps { + state: AttackPathsViewState; + progress?: number; + onRetry?: () => void; +} + +/** + * Full-page status message shown whenever the Attack Paths graph is not yet + * queryable. The page renders the normal workflow instead once `state` is + * `READY` (this component renders nothing for `READY`/`LOADING`). + */ +export const AttackPathsStatusPanel = ({ + state, + progress = 0, + onRetry, +}: AttackPathsStatusPanelProps) => { + if (state === ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES.ERROR) { + return ( + + Something went wrong loading your scans. + {onRetry ? ( + + ) : null} + + ); + } + + if (state === ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES.NO_SCANS) { + return ( + + + You need to run a scan before you can analyze attack paths.{" "} + + Go to Scan Jobs + + + + ); + } + + if (state === ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES.SCAN_PENDING) { + return ( + + + Your scan is queued. Attack Paths will be available once it completes. + + + ); + } + + if (state === ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES.GRAPH_BUILDING) { + return ( + + + We're building the graph from your latest scan ({progress}%). + This will be ready shortly. + + + ); + } + + if (state === ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES.NO_GRAPH_DATA) { + return ( + + This scan didn't produce Attack Paths data. + + ); + } + + return null; +}; diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_components/query-execution-error.tsx b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_components/query-execution-error.tsx index 084bcf6e16..b451cf58f6 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_components/query-execution-error.tsx +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_components/query-execution-error.tsx @@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ -import { CircleAlert } from "lucide-react"; - -import { Alert, AlertDescription, AlertTitle } from "@/components/shadcn"; +import { StatusAlert } from "@/components/shared/status-alert"; interface QueryExecutionErrorProps { error: string; @@ -14,17 +12,17 @@ export const QueryExecutionError = ({ description, }: QueryExecutionErrorProps) => { return ( - - - {title} - - {description ?

    {description}

    : null} -
    - 
    -            {error}
-
    -
    -     -     + + {description ?

    {description}

    : null} +
    + 
    +          {error}
+
    +
    +     ); }; diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_components/scan-list-table.test.tsx b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_components/scan-list-table.test.tsx index 4aec4b97d3..5ec29558ff 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_components/scan-list-table.test.tsx +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_components/scan-list-table.test.tsx @@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ vi.mock("@/components/ui/table", () => ({ data, metadata, controlledPage, + getRowAttributes, }: { columns: Array<{ id?: string; @@ -74,6 +75,10 @@ vi.mock("@/components/ui/table", () => ({ }; }; controlledPage: number; + getRowAttributes?: (row: { + index: number; + original: AttackPathScan; + }) => Record; }) => (
    {metadata.pagination.count} Total Entries @@ -95,8 +100,8 @@ vi.mock("@/components/ui/table", () => ({ - {data.map((row) => ( - + {data.map((row, index) => ( + {columns.map((column, index) => ( {column.cell @@ -176,6 +181,20 @@ describe("ScanListTable", () => { ); }); + it("anchors the attack paths scan tour to the first visible scan row", () => { + render( + , + ); + + const firstRow = screen + .getAllByRole("radio", { + name: "Select scan", + })[0] + .closest("tr"); + + expect(firstRow).toHaveAttribute("data-tour-id", "attack-paths-scan-list"); + }); + it("enables the radio button for a failed scan when graph data is ready", async () => { const user = userEvent.setup(); const failedScan: AttackPathScan = { diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_components/scan-list-table.tsx b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_components/scan-list-table.tsx index 00a330810f..dd532f9ed6 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_components/scan-list-table.tsx +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_components/scan-list-table.tsx @@ -295,6 +295,9 @@ export const ScanListTable = ({ scans }: ScanListTableProps) => { handleSelectScan(row.original.id); } }} + getRowAttributes={(row) => + row.index === 0 ? { "data-tour-id": "attack-paths-scan-list" } : {} + } enableRowSelection rowSelection={getSelectedRowSelection(paginatedScans, selectedScanId)} /> diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_hooks/index.ts b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_hooks/index.ts index eec8e5f81a..c30edb519c 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_hooks/index.ts +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_hooks/index.ts @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +export { useAttackPathScans } from "./use-attack-path-scans"; export { useGraphState } from "./use-graph-state"; export { useQueryBuilder } from "./use-query-builder"; export { useWizardState } from "./use-wizard-state"; diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_hooks/use-attack-path-scans.ts b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_hooks/use-attack-path-scans.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5957e175d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_hooks/use-attack-path-scans.ts @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +"use client"; + +import { useRef, useState } from "react"; + +import { getAttackPathScans } from "@/actions/attack-paths"; +import { useMountEffect } from "@/hooks/use-mount-effect"; +import type { AttackPathScan } from "@/types/attack-paths"; + +export interface UseAttackPathScansOptions { + /** + * Invoked once the initial load resolves with no scan whose graph data is + * ready (including empty results or a fetch failure). The page passes a + * redirect only during onboarding replay; an established user gets `undefined` + * and stays on the page. + */ + onNoReadyScan?: () => void; +} + +export interface UseAttackPathScansResult { + scans: AttackPathScan[]; + scansLoading: boolean; + loadError: boolean; + refreshScans: () => Promise; + retryLoadScans: () => Promise; +} + +/** + * `useData`-style hook owning the Attack Paths scan list. The direct + * `useEffect` (via `useMountEffect`) lives here, not in the component: the + * project forbids `useEffect` in components, but a reusable data hook is the + * sanctioned place for a mount-time fetch when no fetching library is wired up. + */ +export function useAttackPathScans( + options: UseAttackPathScansOptions = {}, +): UseAttackPathScansResult { + const { onNoReadyScan } = options; + + const [scans, setScans] = useState([]); + const [scansLoading, setScansLoading] = useState(true); + const [loadError, setLoadError] = useState(false); + const mountedRef = useRef(true); + + // Silent background refresh for auto-refresh: never flips loading/error, so it + // can't disrupt the visible view if it fails. + const refreshScans = async () => { + try { + const scansData = await getAttackPathScans(); + if (scansData?.data) { + setScans(scansData.data); + } + } catch (error) { + console.error("Failed to refresh scans:", error); + } + }; + + // Full (re)load: drives loading + error state. Runs on mount and is reused by + // the error view's Retry action. A successful empty result (`{ data: [] }`) is + // not an error; only a missing payload or a thrown request is. + const loadScans = async () => { + setScansLoading(true); + setLoadError(false); + try { + const scansData = await getAttackPathScans(); + if (!mountedRef.current) return; + if (scansData?.data) { + setScans(scansData.data); + if (!scansData.data.some((scan) => scan.attributes.graph_data_ready)) { + onNoReadyScan?.(); + } + } else { + setScans([]); + setLoadError(true); + onNoReadyScan?.(); + } + } catch (error) { + if (!mountedRef.current) return; + console.error("Failed to load scans:", error); + setScans([]); + setLoadError(true); + onNoReadyScan?.(); + } finally { + if (mountedRef.current) setScansLoading(false); + } + }; + + useMountEffect(() => { + mountedRef.current = true; + void loadScans(); + + return () => { + mountedRef.current = false; + }; + }); + + return { + scans, + scansLoading, + loadError, + refreshScans, + retryLoadScans: loadScans, + }; +} diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_lib/get-attack-paths-view-state.test.ts b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_lib/get-attack-paths-view-state.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c6722021ed --- /dev/null +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_lib/get-attack-paths-view-state.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest"; + +import type { AttackPathScan, ScanState } from "@/types/attack-paths"; + +import { + ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES, + getAttackPathsViewState, + getGraphBuildingProgress, + isScanInFlight, +} from "./get-attack-paths-view-state"; + +const scan = ( + state: ScanState, + graph_data_ready: boolean, + progress = 0, +): AttackPathScan => ({ + type: "attack-paths-scans", + id: `${state}-${String(graph_data_ready)}-${progress}`, + attributes: { + state, + progress, + graph_data_ready, + provider_alias: "Provider", + provider_type: "aws", + provider_uid: "123456789012", + inserted_at: "2026-04-21T10:00:00Z", + started_at: "2026-04-21T10:00:00Z", + completed_at: null, + duration: null, + }, + relationships: { + provider: { data: { type: "providers", id: "p" } }, + scan: { data: { type: "scans", id: "s" } }, + task: { data: { type: "tasks", id: "t" } }, + }, +}); + +describe("getAttackPathsViewState", () => { + it("returns loading while scans are loading, regardless of other inputs", () => { + expect( + getAttackPathsViewState({ + scansLoading: true, + loadError: true, + scans: [], + }), + ).toBe(ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES.LOADING); + }); + + it("returns error on load failure (error wins over empty scans)", () => { + expect( + getAttackPathsViewState({ + scansLoading: false, + loadError: true, + scans: [], + }), + ).toBe(ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES.ERROR); + }); + + it("returns no-scans for an empty list", () => { + expect( + getAttackPathsViewState({ + scansLoading: false, + loadError: false, + scans: [], + }), + ).toBe(ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES.NO_SCANS); + }); + + it("returns ready when any provider has a queryable graph", () => { + expect( + getAttackPathsViewState({ + scansLoading: false, + loadError: false, + scans: [scan("executing", false, 50), scan("completed", true, 100)], + }), + ).toBe(ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES.READY); + }); + + it("returns graph-building when none ready and some scan is executing (wins over scheduled)", () => { + expect( + getAttackPathsViewState({ + scansLoading: false, + loadError: false, + scans: [scan("scheduled", false), scan("executing", false, 30)], + }), + ).toBe(ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES.GRAPH_BUILDING); + }); + + it("returns scan-pending when none ready and some scan is scheduled/available", () => { + expect( + getAttackPathsViewState({ + scansLoading: false, + loadError: false, + scans: [scan("scheduled", false)], + }), + ).toBe(ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES.SCAN_PENDING); + expect( + getAttackPathsViewState({ + scansLoading: false, + loadError: false, + scans: [scan("available", false)], + }), + ).toBe(ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES.SCAN_PENDING); + }); + + it("returns no-graph-data when none ready and all scans are terminal", () => { + expect( + getAttackPathsViewState({ + scansLoading: false, + loadError: false, + scans: [scan("completed", false), scan("failed", false)], + }), + ).toBe(ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES.NO_GRAPH_DATA); + }); +}); + +describe("isScanInFlight", () => { + it("is true for an available scan (created, not yet scheduled)", () => { + expect(isScanInFlight([scan("available", false)])).toBe(true); + }); + + it("is true for scheduled and executing scans", () => { + expect(isScanInFlight([scan("scheduled", false)])).toBe(true); + expect(isScanInFlight([scan("executing", false, 40)])).toBe(true); + }); + + it("is false when every scan is in a terminal state", () => { + expect( + isScanInFlight([scan("completed", true), scan("failed", false)]), + ).toBe(false); + }); + + it("is false for an empty list", () => { + expect(isScanInFlight([])).toBe(false); + }); +}); + +describe("getGraphBuildingProgress", () => { + it("returns the max progress among executing scans", () => { + expect( + getGraphBuildingProgress([ + scan("executing", false, 30), + scan("executing", false, 70), + scan("scheduled", false, 99), + ]), + ).toBe(70); + }); + + it("returns 0 when no scan is executing", () => { + expect(getGraphBuildingProgress([scan("scheduled", false, 50)])).toBe(0); + }); +}); diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_lib/get-attack-paths-view-state.ts b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_lib/get-attack-paths-view-state.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0e734304f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/_lib/get-attack-paths-view-state.ts @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +import type { AttackPathScan, ScanState } from "@/types/attack-paths"; +import { SCAN_STATES } from "@/types/attack-paths"; + +// In-flight = scan still progressing toward a graph. AVAILABLE is the default +// state of a new scan. Shared by the deriver and polling so they can't diverge. +const IN_FLIGHT_SCAN_STATES: ScanState[] = [ + SCAN_STATES.AVAILABLE, + SCAN_STATES.SCHEDULED, + SCAN_STATES.EXECUTING, +]; + +export const isScanInFlight = (scans: AttackPathScan[]): boolean => + scans.some((s) => IN_FLIGHT_SCAN_STATES.includes(s.attributes.state)); + +export const ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES = { + LOADING: "loading", + ERROR: "error", + NO_SCANS: "no-scans", + SCAN_PENDING: "scan-pending", + GRAPH_BUILDING: "graph-building", + NO_GRAPH_DATA: "no-graph-data", + READY: "ready", +} as const; + +export type AttackPathsViewState = + (typeof ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES)[keyof typeof ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES]; + +interface GetAttackPathsViewStateInput { + scansLoading: boolean; + loadError: boolean; + scans: AttackPathScan[]; +} + +/** + * Single source of truth for what the Attack Paths page shows. The full-page + * message owns every "not queryable yet" state; the workflow renders only once + * at least one provider's graph is ready. + */ +export const getAttackPathsViewState = ({ + scansLoading, + loadError, + scans, +}: GetAttackPathsViewStateInput): AttackPathsViewState => { + if (scansLoading) return ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES.LOADING; + if (loadError) return ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES.ERROR; + if (scans.length === 0) return ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES.NO_SCANS; + + if (scans.some((s) => s.attributes.graph_data_ready)) { + return ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES.READY; + } + if (scans.some((s) => s.attributes.state === SCAN_STATES.EXECUTING)) { + return ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES.GRAPH_BUILDING; + } + // EXECUTING returned above; an in-flight scan here is AVAILABLE/SCHEDULED. + if (isScanInFlight(scans)) { + return ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES.SCAN_PENDING; + } + return ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES.NO_GRAPH_DATA; +}; + +/** Highest progress among scans whose graph is actively building. */ +export const getGraphBuildingProgress = (scans: AttackPathScan[]): number => + scans + .filter((s) => s.attributes.state === SCAN_STATES.EXECUTING) + .reduce((max, s) => Math.max(max, s.attributes.progress), 0); diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/attack-paths-page.browser.test.tsx b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/attack-paths-page.browser.test.tsx index 9e455a4b6d..bc2cf36331 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/attack-paths-page.browser.test.tsx +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/attack-paths-page.browser.test.tsx @@ -75,6 +75,31 @@ describe("loading the page", () => { }); }); +describe("waiting states", () => { + test("a pending scan shows the scan-in-progress message", async ({ + mountWith, + }) => { + const graph = await mountWith(fixtures.scanPending()); + expect(await graph.emptyStateMessage()).toMatch(/scan in progress/i); + }); + + test("a building graph shows the preparing message with progress", async ({ + mountWith, + }) => { + const graph = await mountWith(fixtures.graphBuilding()); + const message = await graph.emptyStateMessage(); + expect(message).toMatch(/preparing attack paths data/i); + expect(message).toMatch(/45%/); + }); + + test("a completed scan with no graph shows the no-data message", async ({ + mountWith, + }) => { + const graph = await mountWith(fixtures.noGraphData()); + expect(await graph.emptyStateMessage()).toMatch(/no attack paths data/i); + }); +}); + describe("running a query", () => { test("the graph renders with a background, a minimap, and a viewport", async ({ mountWith, diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/attack-paths-page.fixtures.ts b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/attack-paths-page.fixtures.ts index 37e2170355..41089af527 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/attack-paths-page.fixtures.ts +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/attack-paths-page.fixtures.ts @@ -143,6 +143,52 @@ export const emptyScans = (): PageFixture => ({ queryResult: null, }); +export const scanPending = (): PageFixture => ({ + scans: [ + buildScan(TYPICAL_SCAN_ID, { + state: "scheduled", + progress: 0, + graph_data_ready: false, + completed_at: null, + duration: null, + }), + ], + scanId: TYPICAL_SCAN_ID, + queries: [], + queryId: DEFAULT_QUERY_ID, + queryResult: null, +}); + +export const graphBuilding = (): PageFixture => ({ + scans: [ + buildScan(TYPICAL_SCAN_ID, { + state: "executing", + progress: 45, + graph_data_ready: false, + completed_at: null, + duration: null, + }), + ], + scanId: TYPICAL_SCAN_ID, + queries: [], + queryId: DEFAULT_QUERY_ID, + queryResult: null, +}); + +export const noGraphData = (): PageFixture => ({ + scans: [ + buildScan(TYPICAL_SCAN_ID, { + state: "completed", + progress: 100, + graph_data_ready: false, + }), + ], + scanId: TYPICAL_SCAN_ID, + queries: [], + queryId: DEFAULT_QUERY_ID, + queryResult: null, +}); + export const emptyGraph = (): PageFixture => ({ scans: [buildScan(TYPICAL_SCAN_ID)], scanId: TYPICAL_SCAN_ID, @@ -269,6 +315,9 @@ export const edgeCases = (): PageFixture => { export const fixtures = { typical, emptyScans, + scanPending, + graphBuilding, + noGraphData, emptyGraph, singleNode, findingsOnly, diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/attack-paths-page.test.tsx b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/attack-paths-page.test.tsx deleted file mode 100644 index 8b91c3fb6e..0000000000 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/attack-paths-page.test.tsx +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ -import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; -import path from "node:path"; -import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; - -import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest"; - -describe("AttackPathsPage", () => { - const currentDir = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)); - const filePath = path.join(currentDir, "attack-paths-page.tsx"); - const source = readFileSync(filePath, "utf8"); - - it("keeps the page description without rendering a duplicate Attack Paths heading", () => { - // Then - expect(source).not.toContain(">\n Attack Paths\n "); - expect(source).toContain( - "Select a scan, build a query, and visualize Attack Paths in your", - ); - }); -}); diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/attack-paths-page.tsx b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/attack-paths-page.tsx index 992fdee5ef..6bcf03d082 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/attack-paths-page.tsx +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/(workflow)/query-builder/attack-paths-page.tsx @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ "use client"; -import { ArrowLeft, Info, Maximize2 } from "lucide-react"; -import Link from "next/link"; -import { useSearchParams } from "next/navigation"; +import { ArrowLeft, Maximize2 } from "lucide-react"; +import { usePathname, useRouter, useSearchParams } from "next/navigation"; import { Suspense, useEffect, useRef, useState } from "react"; import { FormProvider } from "react-hook-form"; @@ -10,19 +9,14 @@ import { buildAttackPathQueries, executeCustomQuery, executeQuery, - getAttackPathScans, getAvailableQueries, } from "@/actions/attack-paths"; import { adaptQueryResultToGraphData } from "@/actions/attack-paths/query-result.adapter"; import { FindingDetailDrawer } from "@/components/findings/table"; +import { PageReady } from "@/components/onboarding"; import { useFindingDetails } from "@/components/resources/table/use-finding-details"; import { AutoRefresh } from "@/components/scans"; -import { - Alert, - AlertDescription, - AlertTitle, - Button, -} from "@/components/shadcn"; +import { Button } from "@/components/shadcn"; import { Dialog, DialogContent, @@ -31,11 +25,21 @@ import { DialogTitle, DialogTrigger, } from "@/components/shadcn/dialog"; +import { StatusAlert } from "@/components/shared/status-alert"; import { useToast } from "@/components/ui"; +import { useMountEffect } from "@/hooks/use-mount-effect"; +import { isCloud } from "@/lib/shared/env"; +import { + attackPathsTour, + type AttackPathsTourTarget, + pickDemoQuery, + pickDemoScan, +} from "@/lib/tours/attack-paths.tour"; +import { attackPathsEmptyTour } from "@/lib/tours/attack-paths-empty.tour"; +import { advanceActiveTour, useDriverTour } from "@/lib/tours/use-driver-tour"; import type { AttackPathQuery, AttackPathQueryError, - AttackPathScan, GraphNode, } from "@/types/attack-paths"; import { ATTACK_PATH_QUERY_IDS, SCAN_STATES } from "@/types/attack-paths"; @@ -52,24 +56,42 @@ import { QuerySelector, ScanListTable, } from "./_components"; +import { AttackPathsStatusPanel } from "./_components/attack-paths-status-panel"; import type { GraphHandle } from "./_components/graph/attack-path-graph"; +import { useAttackPathScans } from "./_hooks/use-attack-path-scans"; import { useGraphState } from "./_hooks/use-graph-state"; import { useQueryBuilder } from "./_hooks/use-query-builder"; import { exportGraphAsPNG } from "./_lib"; +import { + ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES, + getAttackPathsViewState, + getGraphBuildingProgress, + isScanInFlight, +} from "./_lib/get-attack-paths-view-state"; + +const SCROLL_CONTAINER_CLASS = + "minimal-scrollbar rounded-large shadow-small border-border-neutral-secondary bg-bg-neutral-secondary relative z-0 flex w-full flex-col gap-4 overflow-auto border p-4"; -/** - * Attack Paths - * Allows users to select a scan, build a query, and visualize the attack path graph - */ export default function AttackPathsPage() { const searchParams = useSearchParams(); + const pathname = usePathname(); + const router = useRouter(); const scanId = searchParams.get("scanId"); + // Onboarding tours are Cloud-only. + const onboardingEnabled = isCloud(); + const isAttackPathsReplay = + onboardingEnabled && searchParams.get("onboarding") === "attack-paths"; const graphState = useGraphState(); const finding = useFindingDetails(); const { toast } = useToast(); - const [scansLoading, setScansLoading] = useState(true); - const [scans, setScans] = useState([]); + const { scans, scansLoading, loadError, refreshScans, retryLoadScans } = + useAttackPathScans({ + onNoReadyScan: isAttackPathsReplay + ? () => router.push("/scans?onboarding=view-first-scan") + : undefined, + }); + const [queriesLoading, setQueriesLoading] = useState(true); const [queriesError, setQueriesError] = useState(null); const [isFullscreenOpen, setIsFullscreenOpen] = useState(false); @@ -81,10 +103,64 @@ export default function AttackPathsPage() { const [queries, setQueries] = useState([]); - // Use custom hook for query builder form state and validation const queryBuilder = useQueryBuilder(queries); - // Reset graph state when component mounts + const hasReadyScan = scans.some((scan) => scan.attributes.graph_data_ready); + const hasNoScans = scans.length === 0; + + useDriverTour(attackPathsEmptyTour, { + // Gate on !loadError: the empty-scans CTA anchor only renders in the + // NO_SCANS view-state, not in the ERROR state (which also has scans === []). + enabled: onboardingEnabled && !scansLoading && !loadError && hasNoScans, + }); + + const { start: startAttackPathsTour } = useDriverTour( + attackPathsTour, + { + enabled: onboardingEnabled && !scansLoading && hasReadyScan, + autoOpen: !isAttackPathsReplay, + // Page owns tour auto-open; OnboardingSequenceBanner is the sole Continue/Skip control. + // pickDemoScan/pickDemoQuery policy lives in attack-paths.tour.ts. + stepHandlers: { + "scan-list": { + onNext: async ({ waitForStep }) => { + const selected = pickDemoScan(scans); + if (!selected) return; + const params = new URLSearchParams(searchParams.toString()); + params.set("scanId", selected.id); + router.push(`${pathname}?${params.toString()}`); + await waitForStep("query-selector"); + }, + }, + "query-selector": { + onNext: async ({ waitForStep }) => { + const selected = pickDemoQuery(queries); + if (!selected) return; + queryBuilder.handleQueryChange(selected.id); + await waitForStep("execute-button"); + }, + }, + }, + }, + ); + + // Onboarding replay entry: start the tour once and strip the `onboarding` + // param. Invoked from , which mounts only when the + // replay conditions hold — so `useMountEffect` fires it exactly once and the + // old `replayStartedRef` run-once guard is gone. + const startAttackPathsReplay = () => { + startAttackPathsTour(); + + const params = new URLSearchParams(searchParams.toString()); + params.delete("onboarding"); + const query = params.toString(); + window.history.replaceState( + null, + "", + query ? `${pathname}?${query}` : pathname, + ); + }; + useEffect(() => { if (!hasResetRef.current) { hasResetRef.current = true; @@ -92,39 +168,14 @@ export default function AttackPathsPage() { } }, [graphState]); - // Reset graph state when scan changes useEffect(() => { graphState.resetGraph(); }, [scanId]); // eslint-disable-line react-hooks/exhaustive-deps -- reset on scanId change only - // Load available scans on mount - useEffect(() => { - const loadScans = async () => { - setScansLoading(true); - try { - const scansData = await getAttackPathScans(); - if (scansData?.data) { - setScans(scansData.data); - } else { - setScans([]); - } - } catch (error) { - console.error("Failed to load scans:", error); - setScans([]); - } finally { - setScansLoading(false); - } - }; + // Poll while a scan is in flight so the page auto-advances when the graph is ready. + const hasScanInFlight = isScanInFlight(scans); - loadScans(); - }, []); - - // Check if there's an executing scan for auto-refresh - const hasExecutingScan = scans.some( - (scan) => - scan.attributes.state === SCAN_STATES.EXECUTING || - scan.attributes.state === SCAN_STATES.SCHEDULED, - ); + const viewState = getAttackPathsViewState({ scansLoading, loadError, scans }); // Detect if the selected scan is showing data from a previous cycle const selectedScan = scans.find((scan) => scan.id === scanId); @@ -133,19 +184,6 @@ export default function AttackPathsPage() { selectedScan.attributes.graph_data_ready && selectedScan.attributes.state !== SCAN_STATES.COMPLETED; - // Callback to refresh scans (used by AutoRefresh component) - const refreshScans = async () => { - try { - const scansData = await getAttackPathScans(); - if (scansData?.data) { - setScans(scansData.data); - } - } catch (error) { - console.error("Failed to refresh scans:", error); - } - }; - - // Load available queries on mount useEffect(() => { const loadQueries = async () => { if (!scanId) { @@ -205,7 +243,6 @@ export default function AttackPathsPage() { return; } - // Validate form before executing query const isValid = await queryBuilder.form.trigger(); if (!isValid) { showErrorToast( @@ -215,6 +252,9 @@ export default function AttackPathsPage() { return; } + // The tour's execute step is autoAdvance: the real Execute click moves it forward. + advanceActiveTour(); + graphState.startLoading(); graphState.setError(null); @@ -257,7 +297,6 @@ export default function AttackPathsPage() { variant: "default", }); - // Scroll to graph after successful query execution setTimeout(() => { graphContainerRef.current?.scrollIntoView({ behavior: "smooth", @@ -297,13 +336,9 @@ export default function AttackPathsPage() { } findingNavigationInFlightRef.current = true; - // Findings skip the intermediate node-details modal. The finding drawer - // is the useful destination, so open it directly from the graph click. + // Open finding drawer directly, bypassing the node-details modal. graphState.enterFilteredView(node.id); - // enterFilteredView stores the filtered node as selected so the graph can - // highlight it. Clear the selection right after for findings so the node - // details modal does not open before the finding drawer. - graphState.selectNode(null); + graphState.selectNode(null); // clear so node-details modal doesn't open first void handleViewFinding(String(node.properties?.id || node.id)); return; } @@ -368,14 +403,19 @@ export default function AttackPathsPage() { return (
    - {/* Auto-refresh scans when there's an executing scan */} - {/* Page introduction */} -
    + {isAttackPathsReplay && !scansLoading && hasReadyScan && ( + + )} + + {/* Enables the navbar replay icon once the initial scan load resolves. */} + {!scansLoading && } + +

    Select a scan, build a query, and visualize Attack Paths in your infrastructure. @@ -386,48 +426,44 @@ export default function AttackPathsPage() {

    - {scansLoading ? ( -
    + {viewState === ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES.LOADING ? ( +

    Loading scans...

    - ) : scans.length === 0 ? ( - - - No scans available - - - You need to run a scan before you can analyze attack paths.{" "} - - Go to Scan Jobs - - - - + ) : viewState === ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES.NO_SCANS ? ( + // Keep the empty-scans tour anchor: attackPathsEmptyTour targets + // data-tour-id="attack-paths-empty-scans-cta". The panel's NO_SCANS + // render is the same "No scans available" + Go to Scan Jobs CTA. +
    + +
    + ) : viewState !== ATTACK_PATHS_VIEW_STATES.READY ? ( + ) : ( <> - {/* Scans Table */} Loading scans...
    }> - {/* Banner: viewing data from a previous scan cycle */} {isViewingPreviousCycleData && ( - - - Viewing data from a previous scan - - This scan is currently{" "} - {selectedScan.attributes.state === SCAN_STATES.EXECUTING - ? `running (${selectedScan.attributes.progress}%)` - : selectedScan.attributes.state} - . The graph data shown is from the last completed cycle. - - + + This scan is currently{" "} + {selectedScan.attributes.state === SCAN_STATES.EXECUTING + ? `running (${selectedScan.attributes.progress}%)` + : selectedScan.attributes.state} + . The graph data shown is from the last completed cycle. + )} - {/* Query Builder Section - shown only after selecting a scan */} {scanId && ( -
    +
    {queriesLoading ? (

    Loading queries...

    ) : queriesError ? ( @@ -438,11 +474,13 @@ export default function AttackPathsPage() { ) : ( <> - +
    + +
    {queryBuilder.selectedQueryData && ( -
    +
    )} - {/* Graph Visualization (Full Width) */} {(graphState.loading || (graphState.data && graphState.data.nodes && graphState.data.nodes.length > 0)) && ( -
    +
    {graphState.loading ? ( ) : graphState.data && graphState.data.nodes && graphState.data.nodes.length > 0 ? ( <> - {/* Info message and controls */}
    {graphState.isFilteredView ? (
    @@ -537,7 +576,6 @@ export default function AttackPathsPage() {
    )} - {/* Graph controls and fullscreen button together */}
    graphRef.current?.zoomIn()} @@ -546,7 +584,6 @@ export default function AttackPathsPage() { onExport={() => handleGraphExport("main")} /> - {/* Fullscreen button */}
    - {/* Graph in the middle */}
    - {/* Legend below */}
    ); } + +interface AttackPathsReplayTriggerProps { + onReplay: () => void; +} + +// Conditional-mount trigger: the parent renders this only when the replay +// should start. The microtask keeps driver.js/flushSync outside React's +// mount lifecycle while still running before the next browser task. +function AttackPathsReplayTrigger({ onReplay }: AttackPathsReplayTriggerProps) { + useMountEffect(() => { + let cancelled = false; + + queueMicrotask(() => { + if (!cancelled) onReplay(); + }); + + return () => { + cancelled = true; + }; + }); + + return null; +} diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/layout.tsx b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/layout.tsx index 5ff93faab2..3a9a90b6d1 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/layout.tsx +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/attack-paths/layout.tsx @@ -6,7 +6,11 @@ export default function AttackPathsLayout({ children: React.ReactNode; }) { return ( - + {children} ); diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/compliance/page.tsx b/ui/app/(prowler)/compliance/page.tsx index a67509bed1..d4ee609a0c 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/compliance/page.tsx +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/compliance/page.tsx @@ -46,16 +46,26 @@ export default async function Compliance({ }); if (!scansData?.data) { - return ; + return ( + + + + ); } - // Process scans with provider information from included data const expandedScansData: ExpandedScanData[] = scansData.data .filter((scan: ScanProps) => scan.relationships?.provider?.data?.id) .map((scan: ScanProps) => { const providerId = scan.relationships!.provider!.data!.id; - // Find the provider data in the included array const providerData = scansData.included?.find( (item: { type: string; id: string }) => item.type === "providers" && item.id === providerId, @@ -76,15 +86,20 @@ export default async function Compliance({ }) .filter(Boolean) as ExpandedScanData[]; - // Use scanId from URL, or select the first scan if not provided const scanIdParam = resolvedSearchParams.scanId; const scanIdFromUrl = Array.isArray(scanIdParam) ? scanIdParam[0] : scanIdParam; const selectedScanId: string | null = scanIdFromUrl || expandedScansData[0]?.id || null; + const onboardingAction = selectedScanId + ? { flowId: "view-compliance" } + : { + flowId: "view-compliance", + fallbackFlowId: "view-first-scan", + useFallback: true, + }; - // Find the selected scan const selectedScan = expandedScansData.find( (scan) => scan.id === selectedScanId, ); @@ -100,7 +115,6 @@ export default async function Compliance({ } : undefined; - // Fetch metadata if we have a selected scan const metadataInfoData = selectedScanId ? await getComplianceOverviewMetadataInfo({ filters: { @@ -111,7 +125,6 @@ export default async function Compliance({ const uniqueRegions = metadataInfoData?.data?.attributes?.regions || []; - // Fetch ThreatScore data from API if we have a selected scan let threatScoreData = null; if (selectedScanId && typeof selectedScanId === "string") { const threatScoreResponse = await getThreatScore({ @@ -128,10 +141,13 @@ export default async function Compliance({ } return ( - + {selectedScanId ? ( <> - {/* Row 1: Filters */}
    - {/* Row 2: ThreatScore card — full width, horizontal */} {threatScoreData && typeof selectedScanId === "string" && selectedScan && ( @@ -155,7 +170,6 @@ export default async function Compliance({
    )} - {/* Row 3: Compliance grid with client-side search */} { const regionFilter = searchParams["filter[region__in]"]?.toString() || ""; - // Only fetch compliance data if we have a valid scanId const compliancesData = scanId && scanId.trim() !== "" ? await getCompliancesOverview({ @@ -207,7 +220,6 @@ const SSRComplianceGrid = async ({ a.attributes.framework.localeCompare(b.attributes.framework), ); - // Check if the response contains no data if ( !compliancesData || !compliancesData.data || @@ -225,7 +237,6 @@ const SSRComplianceGrid = async ({ ); } - // Handle errors returned by the API if (compliancesData?.errors?.length > 0) { return ( @@ -235,10 +246,7 @@ const SSRComplianceGrid = async ({ ); } - // Compute the set of latest CIS variants per provider once, so each card - // can gate its PDF button without re-parsing on every render. The backend - // only generates a CIS PDF for the latest version per provider, so any - // other CIS card must not expose the PDF download button. + // Backend only generates CIS PDFs for the latest version per provider. const latestCisIds = pickLatestCisPerProvider( compliancesData.data.map( (compliance: ComplianceOverviewData) => compliance.id, diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/findings/page.tsx b/ui/app/(prowler)/findings/page.tsx index 7ff9780292..96c1ca05dc 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/findings/page.tsx +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/findings/page.tsx @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import { getLatestFindingGroups, } from "@/actions/finding-groups"; import { getLatestMetadataInfo, getMetadataInfo } from "@/actions/findings"; +import { getAllProviderGroups } from "@/actions/manage-groups/manage-groups"; import { getAllProviders } from "@/actions/providers"; import { getScan, getScans } from "@/actions/scans"; import { SeedFromFindingsButton } from "@/app/(prowler)/alerts/_components"; @@ -36,8 +37,9 @@ export default async function Findings({ const { encodedSort } = extractSortAndKey(resolvedSearchParams); const { filters, query } = extractFiltersAndQuery(resolvedSearchParams); - const [providersData, scansData] = await Promise.all([ + const [providersData, providerGroupsData, scansData] = await Promise.all([ getAllProviders(), + getAllProviderGroups(), getScans({ pageSize: 50 }), ]); @@ -59,7 +61,6 @@ export default async function Findings({ filters: resolvedFilters, }); - // Extract unique regions, services, categories, groups from the new endpoint const uniqueRegions = metadataInfoData?.data?.attributes?.regions || []; const uniqueServices = metadataInfoData?.data?.attributes?.services || []; const uniqueResourceTypes = @@ -67,7 +68,6 @@ export default async function Findings({ const uniqueCategories = metadataInfoData?.data?.attributes?.categories || []; const uniqueGroups = metadataInfoData?.data?.attributes?.groups || []; - // Extract scan UUIDs with "completed" state and more than one resource const completedScans = scansData?.data?.filter( (scan: ScanProps) => scan.attributes.state === "completed" && @@ -76,6 +76,14 @@ export default async function Findings({ const completedScanIds = completedScans?.map((scan: ScanProps) => scan.id) || []; + const onboardingAction = + completedScanIds.length > 0 + ? { flowId: "explore-findings" } + : { + flowId: "explore-findings", + fallbackFlowId: "view-first-scan", + useFallback: true, + }; const scanDetails = createScanDetailsMapping( completedScans || [], @@ -84,11 +92,16 @@ export default async function Findings({ const alertsEnabled = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV === "true"; return ( - +
    g.id).join(","); return ( diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/layout.tsx b/ui/app/(prowler)/layout.tsx index 958dfc80d6..2554ab02b9 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/layout.tsx +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/layout.tsx @@ -2,16 +2,25 @@ import "@/styles/globals.css"; import * as Sentry from "@sentry/nextjs"; import { Metadata, Viewport } from "next"; -import { ReactNode } from "react"; +import { ReactNode, Suspense } from "react"; import { getProviders } from "@/actions/providers"; +import { getScansByState } from "@/actions/scans/scans"; +import { + OnboardingCheckpointWatcher, + OnboardingGate, + OnboardingSequenceBanner, +} from "@/components/onboarding"; +import { RuntimePublicConfig } from "@/components/runtime-config/runtime-public-config"; import MainLayout from "@/components/ui/main-layout/main-layout"; import { NavigationProgress } from "@/components/ui/navigation-progress"; import { Toaster } from "@/components/ui/toast"; import { fontSans } from "@/config/fonts"; import { siteConfig } from "@/config/site"; +import { isCloud } from "@/lib/shared/env"; import { cn } from "@/lib/utils"; import { StoreInitializer } from "@/store/ui/store-initializer"; +import { SCAN_STATES } from "@/types/attack-paths"; import { Providers } from "../providers"; @@ -41,12 +50,36 @@ export default async function RootLayout({ }: { children: ReactNode; }) { - const providersData = await getProviders({ page: 1, pageSize: 1 }); - const hasProviders = !!(providersData?.data && providersData.data.length > 0); + // Onboarding is Cloud-only; skip its fetches and orchestrators in OSS. + const onboardingEnabled = isCloud(); + + // Fail-open: unknown scan state is treated as "has data" so the banner never blocks + // progression on a fetch error. + let hasCompletedScan = true; + // Tri-state: true = has providers, false = zero providers, undefined = fetch failed (gate fails open). + let hasProviders: boolean | undefined = false; + + if (onboardingEnabled) { + const [providersData, scansByState] = await Promise.all([ + getProviders({ page: 1, pageSize: 1 }), + getScansByState(), + ]); + hasCompletedScan = Array.isArray(scansByState?.data) + ? scansByState.data.some( + (scan: { attributes?: { state?: string } }) => + scan.attributes?.state === SCAN_STATES.COMPLETED, + ) + : true; + hasProviders = Array.isArray(providersData?.data) + ? providersData.data.length > 0 + : undefined; + } return ( - + + + - - + {/* Suspense contains the useSearchParams() CSR bailout so statically + prerendered pages don't fail the build (matches the auth layout). */} + + + + {/* Store uses boolean; gate receives tri-state to fail open on fetch errors. */} + + {onboardingEnabled && ( + <> + + {/* Single mount point so the watcher survives post-connect navigation. */} + + {/* Persistent banner shown only while a guided sequence is active. */} + + + )} {children} diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/page.tsx b/ui/app/(prowler)/page.tsx index 99f152b4e4..1b31732ca6 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/page.tsx +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/page.tsx @@ -1,7 +1,9 @@ import { Suspense } from "react"; +import { getAllProviderGroups } from "@/actions/manage-groups/manage-groups"; import { getAllProviders } from "@/actions/providers"; import { ProviderAccountSelectors } from "@/components/filters/provider-account-selectors"; +import { ProviderGroupSelector } from "@/components/filters/provider-group-selector"; import { ContentLayout } from "@/components/ui"; import { SearchParamsProps } from "@/types"; @@ -38,12 +40,16 @@ export default async function Home({ searchParams: Promise; }) { const resolvedSearchParams = await searchParams; - const providersData = await getAllProviders(); + const [providersData, providerGroupsData] = await Promise.all([ + getAllProviders(), + getAllProviderGroups(), + ]); return (
    +
    diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/providers/page.tsx b/ui/app/(prowler)/providers/page.tsx index 0ec08e5e11..72b0af9d7f 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/providers/page.tsx +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/providers/page.tsx @@ -22,12 +22,22 @@ export default async function Providers({ const activeTab = getProviderTab(resolvedSearchParams.tab); const isCloudEnvironment = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV === "true"; - // Exclude `tab` from the Suspense key so switching tabs doesn't re-suspend - const { tab: _, ...paramsWithoutTab } = resolvedSearchParams || {}; - const searchParamsKey = JSON.stringify(paramsWithoutTab); + // Exclude `tab` and `onboarding` from the key: tab switches must not re-suspend, + // and `onboarding` is ephemeral (stripped via history.replaceState) — keeping it + // would remount ProvidersAccountsView and reset the wizard mid-flow. + const { + tab: _tab, + onboarding: _onboarding, + ...stableParams + } = resolvedSearchParams || {}; + const searchParamsKey = JSON.stringify(stableParams); return ( - + {isCloudEnvironment && } { return (
    - {/* ProviderTypeSelector */} - {/* Organizations filter */} - {/* Provider Groups filter */} - {/* Status filter */} - {/* Action buttons */}
    @@ -113,6 +118,7 @@ const ProvidersTabContent = async ({ isCloud={process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV === "true"} filters={providersView.filters} providers={providersView.providers} + providerGroups={providersView.providerGroups} metadata={providersView.metadata} rows={providersView.rows} /> diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/providers/providers-page.utils.test.ts b/ui/app/(prowler)/providers/providers-page.utils.test.ts index 335b672af2..4c712ff081 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/providers/providers-page.utils.test.ts +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/providers/providers-page.utils.test.ts @@ -14,16 +14,34 @@ const scansActionsMock = vi.hoisted(() => ({ getScans: vi.fn(), })); +const schedulesActionsMock = vi.hoisted(() => ({ + getSchedules: vi.fn(), +})); + +const manageGroupsActionsMock = vi.hoisted(() => ({ + getAllProviderGroups: vi.fn(), +})); + vi.mock("@/actions/providers", () => providersActionsMock); vi.mock( "@/actions/organizations/organizations", () => organizationsActionsMock, ); vi.mock("@/actions/scans", () => scansActionsMock); +vi.mock("@/actions/schedules", () => schedulesActionsMock); +vi.mock("@/actions/manage-groups/manage-groups", () => manageGroupsActionsMock); import { SearchParamsProps } from "@/types"; import { ProvidersApiResponse } from "@/types/providers"; -import { ProvidersProviderRow } from "@/types/providers-table"; +import { + isProvidersOrganizationRow, + ProvidersProviderRow, +} from "@/types/providers-table"; +import { + SCHEDULE_FREQUENCY, + type ScheduleAttributes, + type ScheduleProps, +} from "@/types/schedules"; import { buildProvidersTableRows, @@ -156,6 +174,33 @@ const toProviderRow = ( }, }); +const buildSchedule = ( + providerId: string, + overrides: Partial = {}, +): ScheduleProps => ({ + type: "schedules", + id: providerId, + attributes: { + scan_enabled: true, + scan_frequency: SCHEDULE_FREQUENCY.DAILY, + scan_hour: 9, + scan_timezone: "Europe/Madrid", + scan_interval_hours: null, + scan_day_of_week: null, + scan_day_of_month: null, + ...overrides, + }, + relationships: { + provider: { data: { type: "providers", id: providerId } }, + }, +}); + +const findProviderRow = ( + rows: { id: string }[], + providerId: string, +): ProvidersProviderRow | undefined => + rows.find((row) => row.id === providerId) as ProvidersProviderRow | undefined; + describe("buildProvidersTableRows", () => { it("returns a flat providers table for OSS", () => { // Given @@ -606,13 +651,73 @@ describe("buildProvidersTableRows", () => { // Then expect(rows).toHaveLength(1); - expect(rows[0].rowType).toBe(PROVIDERS_ROW_TYPE.ORGANIZATION); - expect(rows[0].subRows).toHaveLength(2); + const orgRow = rows[0]; + expect(isProvidersOrganizationRow(orgRow)).toBe(true); + if (!isProvidersOrganizationRow(orgRow)) { + throw new Error("Expected organization row"); + } + expect(orgRow.subRows).toHaveLength(2); expect( - rows[0].subRows?.every( + orgRow.subRows?.every( (row) => row.rowType === PROVIDERS_ROW_TYPE.PROVIDER, ), ).toBe(true); + expect(orgRow.providerIds).toEqual(["provider-1", "provider-2"]); + }); + + it("keeps organization relationship provider ids even when providers are not in the visible page", () => { + // Given + const providers = [ + toProviderRow(providersResponse.data[0], { + relationships: { + ...providersResponse.data[0].relationships, + organization: { + data: null, + }, + }, + }), + ]; + + // When + const rows = buildProvidersTableRows({ + providers, + organizations: [ + { + id: "org-1", + type: "organizations", + attributes: { + name: "Large Organization", + org_type: "aws", + external_id: "o-large", + metadata: {}, + root_external_id: "r-large", + }, + relationships: { + providers: { + data: [ + { type: "providers", id: "provider-1" }, + { type: "providers", id: "provider-not-in-page" }, + ], + }, + organizational_units: { + data: [], + }, + }, + }, + ], + organizationUnits: [], + isCloud: true, + }); + + // Then + expect(rows).toHaveLength(1); + const orgRow = rows[0]; + expect(isProvidersOrganizationRow(orgRow)).toBe(true); + if (!isProvidersOrganizationRow(orgRow)) { + throw new Error("Expected organization row"); + } + expect(orgRow.subRows).toHaveLength(1); + expect(orgRow.providerIds).toEqual(["provider-1", "provider-not-in-page"]); }); }); @@ -751,4 +856,197 @@ describe("loadProvidersAccountsViewData", () => { viewData.rows.every((row) => row.rowType === PROVIDERS_ROW_TYPE.PROVIDER), ).toBe(true); }); + + it("surfaces the real cadence (not a hardcoded label) from a configured schedule with no materialized scan yet", async () => { + // Given — provider-1 has a WEEKLY schedule but the backend has not yet + // created a Scan row (the gap between configuring and the first fire). + providersActionsMock.getProviders.mockResolvedValue(providersResponse); + providersActionsMock.getAllProviders.mockResolvedValue(providersResponse); + scansActionsMock.getScans.mockResolvedValue({ data: [] }); + schedulesActionsMock.getSchedules.mockResolvedValue({ + data: [ + buildSchedule("provider-1", { + scan_frequency: SCHEDULE_FREQUENCY.WEEKLY, + scan_hour: 9, + scan_day_of_week: 1, + }), + ], + }); + + // When + const viewData = await loadProvidersAccountsViewData({ + searchParams: {} satisfies SearchParamsProps, + isCloud: false, + }); + + // Then — the row carries the Weekly cadence, not "Daily". + const providerRow = findProviderRow(viewData.rows, "provider-1"); + expect(providerRow?.hasSchedule).toBe(true); + expect(providerRow?.scheduleSummary?.cadence).toBe("Weekly on Monday"); + expect(findProviderRow(viewData.rows, "provider-2")?.hasSchedule).toBe( + false, + ); + expect( + findProviderRow(viewData.rows, "provider-2")?.scheduleSummary, + ).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + it("uses provider schedule attributes as authoritative when scan_hour is null", async () => { + // Given — provider-1 still has a materialized scheduled scan row, but the + // provider payload says the schedule was removed. + providersActionsMock.getProviders.mockResolvedValue({ + ...providersResponse, + data: [ + { + ...providersResponse.data[0], + attributes: { + ...providersResponse.data[0].attributes, + scan_enabled: true, + scan_frequency: SCHEDULE_FREQUENCY.DAILY, + scan_hour: null, + scan_timezone: "UTC", + scan_interval_hours: null, + scan_day_of_week: null, + scan_day_of_month: null, + next_scan_at: null, + last_scan_at: null, + }, + }, + providersResponse.data[1], + ], + }); + providersActionsMock.getAllProviders.mockResolvedValue(providersResponse); + scansActionsMock.getScans.mockResolvedValue({ + data: [ + { + type: "scans", + id: "scan-1", + attributes: { trigger: "scheduled", state: "scheduled" }, + relationships: { + provider: { data: { type: "providers", id: "provider-1" } }, + }, + }, + ], + }); + schedulesActionsMock.getSchedules.mockResolvedValue({ + data: [buildSchedule("provider-1", { scan_hour: 9 })], + }); + + // When + const viewData = await loadProvidersAccountsViewData({ + searchParams: {} satisfies SearchParamsProps, + isCloud: false, + }); + + // Then + const providerRow = findProviderRow(viewData.rows, "provider-1"); + expect(providerRow?.hasSchedule).toBe(false); + expect(providerRow?.scheduleSummary).toBeUndefined(); + expect(providerRow?.lastScanAt).toBeNull(); + }); + + it("builds provider schedule and last scan values from the provider payload", async () => { + // Given + providersActionsMock.getProviders.mockResolvedValue({ + ...providersResponse, + data: [ + { + ...providersResponse.data[0], + attributes: { + ...providersResponse.data[0].attributes, + scan_enabled: true, + scan_frequency: SCHEDULE_FREQUENCY.MONTHLY, + scan_hour: 8, + scan_timezone: "Europe/Madrid", + scan_interval_hours: null, + scan_day_of_week: null, + scan_day_of_month: 24, + next_scan_at: "2026-06-24T06:00:00Z", + last_scan_at: "2026-06-23T06:00:00Z", + }, + }, + providersResponse.data[1], + ], + }); + providersActionsMock.getAllProviders.mockResolvedValue(providersResponse); + scansActionsMock.getScans.mockResolvedValue({ data: [] }); + schedulesActionsMock.getSchedules.mockResolvedValue({ error: "Not found" }); + + // When + const viewData = await loadProvidersAccountsViewData({ + searchParams: {} satisfies SearchParamsProps, + isCloud: false, + }); + + // Then + const providerRow = findProviderRow(viewData.rows, "provider-1"); + expect(providerRow?.hasSchedule).toBe(true); + expect(providerRow?.scheduleSummary?.cadence).toBe("Monthly on the 24th"); + expect(providerRow?.scheduleSummary?.nextScanAt).toBe( + "2026-06-24T06:00:00Z", + ); + expect(providerRow?.lastScanAt).toBe("2026-06-23T06:00:00Z"); + }); + + it("ignores paused or unconfigured schedules", async () => { + // Given — provider-1 paused (disabled), provider-2 never configured. + providersActionsMock.getProviders.mockResolvedValue(providersResponse); + providersActionsMock.getAllProviders.mockResolvedValue(providersResponse); + scansActionsMock.getScans.mockResolvedValue({ data: [] }); + schedulesActionsMock.getSchedules.mockResolvedValue({ + data: [ + buildSchedule("provider-1", { scan_enabled: false, scan_hour: 9 }), + buildSchedule("provider-2", { scan_enabled: true, scan_hour: null }), + ], + }); + + // When + const viewData = await loadProvidersAccountsViewData({ + searchParams: {} satisfies SearchParamsProps, + isCloud: false, + }); + + // Then + expect(findProviderRow(viewData.rows, "provider-1")?.hasSchedule).toBe( + false, + ); + expect(findProviderRow(viewData.rows, "provider-2")?.hasSchedule).toBe( + false, + ); + }); + + it("does not infer provider schedules from materialized scans when /schedules is unavailable", async () => { + // Given — /schedules errors, and provider-1 still has a materialized + // scheduled scan. That scan is historical execution state, not schedule + // configuration. + providersActionsMock.getProviders.mockResolvedValue(providersResponse); + providersActionsMock.getAllProviders.mockResolvedValue(providersResponse); + scansActionsMock.getScans.mockResolvedValue({ + data: [ + { + type: "scans", + id: "scan-1", + attributes: { trigger: "scheduled", state: "scheduled" }, + relationships: { + provider: { data: { type: "providers", id: "provider-1" } }, + }, + }, + ], + }); + schedulesActionsMock.getSchedules.mockResolvedValue({ error: "Not found" }); + + // When + const viewData = await loadProvidersAccountsViewData({ + searchParams: {} satisfies SearchParamsProps, + isCloud: false, + }); + + // Then — only provider scan_* fields or /schedules can mark a schedule. + expect(findProviderRow(viewData.rows, "provider-1")?.hasSchedule).toBe( + false, + ); + expect(findProviderRow(viewData.rows, "provider-2")?.hasSchedule).toBe( + false, + ); + }); }); diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/providers/providers-page.utils.ts b/ui/app/(prowler)/providers/providers-page.utils.ts index db79452709..52a56c4fe0 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/providers/providers-page.utils.ts +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/providers/providers-page.utils.ts @@ -1,13 +1,21 @@ +import { getAllProviderGroups } from "@/actions/manage-groups/manage-groups"; import { listOrganizationsSafe, listOrganizationUnitsSafe, } from "@/actions/organizations/organizations"; import { getAllProviders, getProviders } from "@/actions/providers"; -import { getScans } from "@/actions/scans"; +import { PROVIDERS_FILTER_PARAM } from "@/actions/providers/providers-filters"; +import { getSchedules } from "@/actions/schedules"; import { extractFiltersAndQuery, extractSortAndKey, } from "@/lib/helper-filters"; +import { + buildProviderScheduleSummary, + buildScheduleAttributesFromProvider, + buildSchedulesByProviderId, + isScheduleConfigured, +} from "@/lib/schedules"; import { FilterEntity, FilterOption, @@ -27,7 +35,8 @@ import { ProvidersTableRow, ProvidersTableRowsInput, } from "@/types/providers-table"; -import { SCAN_TRIGGER, ScanProps } from "@/types/scans"; +import { ScanScheduleSummary } from "@/types/scans"; +import { ScheduleAttributes } from "@/types/schedules"; const PROVIDERS_STATUS_MAPPING = [ { @@ -107,42 +116,62 @@ const createProviderGroupLookup = ( return lookup; }; -const ACTIVE_SCAN_STATES = new Set(["scheduled", "available", "executing"]); +// A schedule is backed by the Provider row itself, so its `/schedules` entry +// exists before the first scheduled Scan is materialized — only enabled, +// configured ones carry a displayable cadence summary. +const buildProviderScheduleSummaryFor = ( + attributes: ScheduleAttributes | undefined, + now: Date, +): ScanScheduleSummary | undefined => + attributes && attributes.scan_enabled && isScheduleConfigured(attributes) + ? buildProviderScheduleSummary(attributes, now) + : undefined; -const buildScheduledProviderIds = (scans: ScanProps[]): Set => { - const scheduled = new Set(); - - for (const scan of scans) { - if ( - scan.attributes.trigger === SCAN_TRIGGER.SCHEDULED && - ACTIVE_SCAN_STATES.has(scan.attributes.state) - ) { - const providerId = scan.relationships.provider?.data?.id; - if (providerId) { - scheduled.add(providerId); - } - } +const getProviderLastScanAt = ( + provider: ProvidersApiResponse["data"][number], +): string | null => { + if ( + Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(provider.attributes, "last_scan_at") + ) { + return provider.attributes.last_scan_at ?? null; } - return scheduled; + return provider.attributes.connection.last_checked_at ?? null; }; const enrichProviders = ( - providersResponse?: ProvidersApiResponse, - scheduledProviderIds?: Set, + providersResponse: ProvidersApiResponse | undefined, + schedulesByProviderId: Record, ): ProvidersProviderRow[] => { const providerGroupLookup = createProviderGroupLookup(providersResponse); + const now = new Date(); - return (providersResponse?.data ?? []).map((provider) => ({ - ...provider, - rowType: PROVIDERS_ROW_TYPE.PROVIDER, - groupNames: - provider.relationships.provider_groups.data.map( - (providerGroup: { id: string }) => - providerGroupLookup.get(providerGroup.id) ?? "Unknown Group", - ) ?? [], - hasSchedule: scheduledProviderIds?.has(provider.id) ?? false, - })); + return (providersResponse?.data ?? []).map((provider) => { + const providerScheduleAttributes = buildScheduleAttributesFromProvider( + provider.attributes, + ); + const scheduleAttributes = + providerScheduleAttributes ?? schedulesByProviderId[provider.id]; + const scheduleSummary = buildProviderScheduleSummaryFor( + scheduleAttributes, + now, + ); + + return { + ...provider, + rowType: PROVIDERS_ROW_TYPE.PROVIDER, + groupNames: + provider.relationships.provider_groups.data.map( + (providerGroup: { id: string }) => + providerGroupLookup.get(providerGroup.id) ?? "Unknown Group", + ) ?? [], + // Provider scan_* fields are authoritative when present; otherwise we + // only fall back to the /schedules resource, never materialized scans. + hasSchedule: scheduleSummary !== undefined, + scheduleSummary, + lastScanAt: getProviderLastScanAt(provider), + }; + }); }; const createOrganizationRow = ({ @@ -152,6 +181,7 @@ const createOrganizationRow = ({ externalId, organizationId, parentExternalId, + providerIds, subRows, }: { externalId: string | null; @@ -160,6 +190,7 @@ const createOrganizationRow = ({ name: string; organizationId: string | null; parentExternalId: string | null; + providerIds: string[]; subRows: ProvidersTableRow[]; }): ProvidersOrganizationRow => ({ id, @@ -169,7 +200,8 @@ const createOrganizationRow = ({ externalId, organizationId, parentExternalId, - providerCount: countProviderRows(subRows), + providerCount: providerIds.length, + providerIds, subRows, }); @@ -203,14 +235,14 @@ function getProviderRowsByIds({ .filter((provider): provider is ProvidersProviderRow => Boolean(provider)); } -function countProviderRows(rows: ProvidersTableRow[]): number { - return rows.reduce((total, row) => { - if (row.rowType === PROVIDERS_ROW_TYPE.PROVIDER) { - return total + 1; - } +function dedupeIds(ids: string[]): string[] { + return Array.from(new Set(ids)); +} - return total + countProviderRows(row.subRows); - }, 0); +function collectOrganizationRowProviderIds( + rows: ProvidersOrganizationRow[], +): string[] { + return dedupeIds(rows.flatMap((row) => row.providerIds)); } function getOrganizationUnitRelationshipId( @@ -277,6 +309,13 @@ function buildOrganizationUnitRows({ ? providerRowsFromRelationships : (providersByOrganizationUnitId.get(organizationUnit.id) ?? []); const subRows = [...childOrganizationUnitRows, ...providerRows]; + const directProviderIds = + providerRowsFromRelationships.length > 0 + ? getRelationshipProviderIds(organizationUnit.relationships) + : providerRows.map((provider) => provider.id); + const childProviderIds = collectOrganizationRowProviderIds( + childOrganizationUnitRows, + ); return createOrganizationRow({ groupKind: PROVIDERS_GROUP_KIND.ORGANIZATION_UNIT, @@ -285,10 +324,13 @@ function buildOrganizationUnitRows({ externalId: organizationUnit.attributes.external_id, organizationId, parentExternalId: organizationUnit.attributes.parent_external_id, + providerIds: dedupeIds([...childProviderIds, ...directProviderIds]), subRows, }); }) - .filter((organizationUnitRow) => organizationUnitRow.subRows.length > 0); + .filter( + (organizationUnitRow) => organizationUnitRow.providerIds.length > 0, + ); } export function buildProvidersTableRows({ @@ -387,6 +429,12 @@ export function buildProvidersTableRows({ (provider) => !providersInOus.has(provider.id), ); const subRows = [...organizationProviders, ...organizationUnitRows]; + const directProviderIds = + organizationProvidersFromRelationships.length > 0 + ? getRelationshipProviderIds(organization.relationships) + : organizationProviders.map((provider) => provider.id); + const organizationUnitProviderIds = + collectOrganizationRowProviderIds(organizationUnitRows); return createOrganizationRow({ groupKind: PROVIDERS_GROUP_KIND.ORGANIZATION, @@ -395,10 +443,14 @@ export function buildProvidersTableRows({ externalId: organization.attributes.external_id, organizationId: organization.id, parentExternalId: organization.attributes.root_external_id, + providerIds: dedupeIds([ + ...directProviderIds, + ...organizationUnitProviderIds, + ]), subRows, }); }) - .filter((organizationRow) => organizationRow.subRows.length > 0); + .filter((organizationRow) => organizationRow.providerIds.length > 0); const assignedProviderIds = new Set(); @@ -434,13 +486,12 @@ export async function loadProvidersAccountsViewData({ // Map provider_type__in (used by ProviderTypeSelector) to provider__in (API param) const providerTypeFilter = - providerFilters[`filter[${PROVIDERS_PAGE_FILTER.PROVIDER_TYPE}]`]; + providerFilters[PROVIDERS_FILTER_PARAM.PROVIDER_TYPE]; if (providerTypeFilter) { - providerFilters[`filter[${PROVIDERS_PAGE_FILTER.PROVIDER}]`] = - providerTypeFilter; + providerFilters[PROVIDERS_FILTER_PARAM.PROVIDER] = providerTypeFilter; } - delete providerFilters[`filter[${PROVIDERS_PAGE_FILTER.PROVIDER_TYPE}]`]; + delete providerFilters[PROVIDERS_FILTER_PARAM.PROVIDER_TYPE]; const emptyOrganizationsResponse: OrganizationListResponse = { data: [], @@ -452,7 +503,8 @@ export async function loadProvidersAccountsViewData({ const [ providersResponse, allProvidersResponse, - scansResponse, + allProviderGroupsResponse, + schedulesResponse, organizationsResponse, organizationUnitsResponse, ] = await Promise.all([ @@ -468,16 +520,11 @@ export async function loadProvidersAccountsViewData({ // Unfiltered fetch for ProviderTypeSelector — only needs distinct types; // TODO: Replace with a dedicated lightweight endpoint when available. resolveActionResult(getAllProviders()), - // Fetch active scheduled scans to determine daily schedule per provider - resolveActionResult( - getScans({ - pageSize: 500, - filters: { - "filter[trigger]": SCAN_TRIGGER.SCHEDULED, - "filter[state__in]": "scheduled,available", - }, - }), - ), + // Unfiltered fetch for the Provider Group selector dropdown. + resolveActionResult(getAllProviderGroups()), + // Fetch configured schedules as a fallback when provider scan_* fields are + // absent (best-effort: typically empty in OSS). + resolveActionResult(getSchedules()), isCloud ? listOrganizationsSafe() : Promise.resolve(emptyOrganizationsResponse), @@ -486,13 +533,11 @@ export async function loadProvidersAccountsViewData({ : Promise.resolve(emptyOrganizationUnitsResponse), ]); - const scheduledProviderIds = buildScheduledProviderIds( - scansResponse?.data ?? [], - ); + const schedulesByProviderId = buildSchedulesByProviderId(schedulesResponse); const orgs = organizationsResponse?.data ?? []; const ous = organizationUnitsResponse?.data ?? []; - const providers = enrichProviders(providersResponse, scheduledProviderIds); + const providers = enrichProviders(providersResponse, schedulesByProviderId); const rows = buildProvidersTableRows({ isCloud, @@ -505,6 +550,7 @@ export async function loadProvidersAccountsViewData({ filters: createProvidersFilters(), metadata: providersResponse?.meta, providers: allProvidersResponse?.data ?? [], + providerGroups: allProviderGroupsResponse?.data ?? [], rows, }; } diff --git a/ui/app/(prowler)/resources/page.tsx b/ui/app/(prowler)/resources/page.tsx index fb7e5ab63d..9c9227160c 100644 --- a/ui/app/(prowler)/resources/page.tsx +++ b/ui/app/(prowler)/resources/page.tsx @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ import { Suspense } from "react"; +import { getAllProviderGroups } from "@/actions/manage-groups/manage-groups"; import { getAllProviders } from "@/actions/providers"; import { getLatestMetadataInfo, @@ -37,19 +38,23 @@ export default async function Resources({ const initialResourceId = resolvedSearchParams.resourceId?.toString(); - const [metadataInfoData, providersData, resourceByIdData] = await Promise.all( - [ - (hasDateOrScan ? getMetadataInfo : getLatestMetadataInfo)({ - query, - filters: outputFilters, - sort: encodedSort, - }), - getAllProviders(), - initialResourceId - ? getResourceById(initialResourceId, { include: ["provider"] }) - : Promise.resolve(undefined), - ], - ); + const [ + metadataInfoData, + providersData, + providerGroupsData, + resourceByIdData, + ] = await Promise.all([ + (hasDateOrScan ? getMetadataInfo : getLatestMetadataInfo)({ + query, + filters: outputFilters, + sort: encodedSort, + }), + getAllProviders(), + getAllProviderGroups(), + initialResourceId + ? getResourceById(initialResourceId, { include: ["provider"] }) + : Promise.resolve(undefined), + ]); const processedResource = resourceByIdData?.data ? (() => { @@ -80,6 +85,7 @@ export default async function Resources({
    void; + richProviders: ProviderProps[]; + existingConfigs: ScanConfigurationData[]; + config: ScanConfigurationData | null; + schema: Record | null; +} + +interface ScanConfigurationFormProps { + onClose: (saved: boolean) => void; + richProviders: ProviderProps[]; + existingConfigs: ScanConfigurationData[]; + config: ScanConfigurationData | null; + schema: Record | null; +} + +// `provider_ids` has a zod `.default([])`, so the resolver's input and output +// types differ — type the form with both so RHF and zodResolver line up. +type ScanConfigurationFormInput = z.input; +type ScanConfigurationFormValues = z.output; + +const MAX_ERRORS_SHOWN = 10; + +function ScanConfigurationForm({ + onClose, + richProviders, + existingConfigs, + config, + schema, +}: ScanConfigurationFormProps) { + const isEdit = !!config; + const { toast } = useToast(); + const errorPanelRef = useRef(null); + + // The form is remounted every time the modal opens (Radix unmounts the + // dialog content on close), so deriving the defaults from `config` here is + // enough to reset the form — no `useEffect` needed. + const form = useForm< + ScanConfigurationFormInput, + unknown, + ScanConfigurationFormValues + >({ + resolver: zodResolver(scanConfigurationFormSchema), + defaultValues: config + ? { + name: config.attributes.name, + configuration: convertToYaml(config.attributes.configuration || ""), + provider_ids: config.attributes.providers || [], + } + : { name: "", configuration: "", provider_ids: [] }, + }); + + const configText = form.watch("configuration") || ""; + const selectedProviders = form.watch("provider_ids") || []; + + // Real-time validation against the server schema (ranges/enums). Kept out of + // form state because it's derived purely from the current YAML text — skip it + // while the field is empty so we don't flag an error before the user types. + const yamlValidation = configText.trim() + ? validateScanConfigurationPayload(configText, schema) + : { isValid: true, errors: [] }; + + // A provider can only be attached to one config at a time. We exclude + // providers that are owned by *other* configs from the selector so the user + // can't double-attach them. (AccountsSelector doesn't expose a per-option + // disabled state, so filtering out is the cleanest contract here.) + const ownerByProvider = new Map(); + for (const c of existingConfigs) { + if (config && c.id === config.id) continue; + for (const pid of c.attributes.providers || []) { + ownerByProvider.set(pid, c.attributes.name); + } + } + const selectableProviders = richProviders.filter( + (p) => !ownerByProvider.has(p.id), + ); + const lockedCount = richProviders.length - selectableProviders.length; + + const onSubmit = form.handleSubmit(async (values) => { + // The inline panel already lists every schema/syntax error in real time, so + // we don't duplicate them in a toast — just bring the panel into view. + if (yamlValidation.errors.length > 0) { + errorPanelRef.current?.scrollIntoView({ + behavior: "smooth", + block: "center", + }); + return; + } + + const formData = new FormData(); + formData.append("name", values.name.trim()); + formData.append("configuration", values.configuration); + values.provider_ids.forEach((pid) => { + formData.append("provider_ids", pid); + }); + if (config) { + formData.append("id", config.id); + } + + try { + const result = config + ? await updateScanConfiguration(null, formData) + : await createScanConfiguration(null, formData); + + if (result?.success) { + toast({ + title: isEdit + ? "Scan Configuration updated" + : "Scan Configuration created", + description: result.success, + }); + onClose(true); + return; + } + + // Field-level errors render inline next to each input; only a general + // error (no field to anchor it to) falls back to a toast. + const errors = result?.errors || {}; + if (errors.name) form.setError("name", { message: errors.name }); + if (errors.configuration) + form.setError("configuration", { message: errors.configuration }); + if (errors.provider_ids) + form.setError("provider_ids", { message: errors.provider_ids }); + if (errors.general) { + toast({ + variant: "destructive", + title: "Oops! Something went wrong", + description: errors.general, + }); + } + } catch (e) { + toast({ + variant: "destructive", + title: "Oops! Something went wrong", + description: + e instanceof Error ? e.message : "Unexpected error. Please retry.", + }); + } + }); + + const isSubmitting = form.formState.isSubmitting; + const nameError = form.formState.errors.name?.message; + const configError = form.formState.errors.configuration?.message; + const providersError = form.formState.errors.provider_ids?.message; + + return ( +
    + + Name + + {nameError && {nameError}} + + + + + Configuration (YAML) + +

    + Follows the structure of{" "} + + prowler/config/config.yaml + + . Allowed ranges and enums come from the server schema; invalid values + are listed below in real time. +

    +