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fix(network): scope the outbound host check to Prowler App
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@@ -613,19 +613,27 @@ Using Public Cloud credentials can limit Keystone API access, so the command abo
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### Private Keystone Endpoints
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Most OpenStack deployments keep Keystone on an internal network. By default Prowler rejects an `auth_url` that resolves to a non-public address, as an SSRF defense, and the check runs before the SDK connects — on both the connection test and the scan. To scan a private cloud, declare the trusted ranges:
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Most OpenStack deployments keep Keystone on an internal network, which is the normal case rather than the exception.
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**Prowler CLI scans a private cloud with no extra configuration:**
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```console
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export PROWLER_ALLOWED_PRIVATE_NETWORKS="10.20.0.0/16,192.168.65.254/32"
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export OS_AUTH_URL="https://keystone.internal:5000/v3"
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prowler openstack
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```
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The value is a comma-separated list of IPs and CIDRs. A resolved address inside an allowlisted range is permitted; every other non-public address stays blocked, so link-local (`169.254.169.254`), loopback and the rest of the internal network remain protected. Malformed entries are rejected, and a non-empty allowlist is logged as a relaxed security control. When unset, only public addresses are reachable.
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On the CLI the operator supplies the `auth_url` themselves, so there is nothing to defend against and the check below does not apply.
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The variable is read by the process that runs the scan:
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**Prowler App rejects an `auth_url` that resolves to a non-public address**, as an SSRF defense, before the SDK connects and on both the connection test and the scan. There the URL arrives from a tenant and the worker must not be used to reach the internal network it runs in. To scan a private cloud from Prowler App, declare the trusted ranges:
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```console
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PROWLER_ALLOWED_PRIVATE_NETWORKS="10.20.0.0/16,192.168.65.254/32"
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```
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The value is a comma-separated list of IPs and CIDRs. A resolved address inside an allowlisted range is permitted; every other non-public address stays blocked, so link-local (`169.254.169.254`), loopback and the rest of the internal network remain protected. Malformed entries are rejected, and a non-empty allowlist is logged as a relaxed security control.
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The scan runs in the worker, not the API, so the variable has to reach the worker:
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- **CLI**: export it in the shell running `prowler`.
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- **Docker Compose**: set it in the root `.env`; it reaches the worker through the shared environment file.
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- **Helm**: add it under `api.djangoConfig`, which is rendered into the API ConfigMap that the worker inherits through `envFrom`.
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@@ -635,7 +643,7 @@ api:
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PROWLER_ALLOWED_PRIVATE_NETWORKS: "10.20.0.0/16"
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```
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In Prowler App the scan runs in the worker, not the API, so setting the variable only on the API container has no effect. The same variable applies to the Kubernetes and IaC providers. The Image provider has its own, `PROWLER_IMAGE_PROVIDER_ALLOWED_PRIVATE_NETWORKS`.
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Setting it only on the API container has no effect. The same variable applies to the Kubernetes and IaC providers. The Image provider has its own, `PROWLER_IMAGE_PROVIDER_ALLOWED_PRIVATE_NETWORKS`.
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## Next Steps
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