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...

11 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Prowler Bot 6df80a4890 chore(api): Update prowler dependency to v5.29 for release 5.29.0 (#11414)
Co-authored-by: prowler-bot <179230569+prowler-bot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-01 16:26:56 +02:00
Alejandro Bailo a769e37615 fix(ui): restore scheduled scan column (#11411) 2026-06-01 14:34:58 +02:00
Alejandro Bailo 9d2a8d9108 fix(ui): improve background glow contrast (#11409) 2026-06-01 14:25:23 +02:00
Alejandro Bailo e05519ff9f fix(ui): refine scans tabs and provider launch flow (#11407) 2026-06-01 12:34:11 +02:00
Pedro Martín 67b26072f8 docs(installation): add info about updating prowler (#11404) 2026-06-01 11:15:07 +02:00
lydiavilchez 2222082631 fix(googleworkspace): update metadata urls to point to official documentation (#11405) 2026-06-01 10:52:32 +02:00
Pepe Fagoaga 8b0cb4b981 chore: fix SDK changelog for v5.29 (#11392) 2026-05-29 18:23:36 +02:00
Pepe Fagoaga 9422eff8ab chore: changelog v5.29.0 (#11390)
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-29 17:29:52 +02:00
Br1an e3c4368d32 fix(azure): pass authority to credentials for sovereign clouds (#10284)
Co-authored-by: Hugo P.Brito <hugopbrit@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Hugo Pereira Brito <101209179+HugoPBrito@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-29 15:17:41 +02:00
OokaToru 2a641b39c8 chore(s3): deprecate s3_bucket_default_encryption check (#11230)
Co-authored-by: Hugo P.Brito <hugopbrit@gmail.com>
2026-05-29 14:41:52 +02:00
Alejandro Bailo 02b713572b test(ui): find scheduled scan e2e row in In Progress tab (#11385) 2026-05-29 10:55:16 +02:00
94 changed files with 1288 additions and 178 deletions
+2 -1
View File
@@ -2,11 +2,12 @@
All notable changes to the **Prowler API** are documented in this file.
## [1.30.0] (Prowler UNRELEASED)
## [1.30.0] (Prowler v5.29.0)
### 🔄 Changed
- Scan finding ingestion: bulk-resolve `Resource`/`ResourceTag` rows, replace per-mapping `SELECT FOR UPDATE` with deferred `ResourceTagMapping.bulk_create(ignore_conflicts=True)`, wrap each micro-batch in a single `rls_transaction`, and raise `SCAN_DB_BATCH_SIZE` to 1000 [(#11249)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11249)
- Faster `GET /api/v1/finding-groups/latest` aggregation on tenants where one recent scan holds most findings [(#11380)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11380)
---
+1 -1
View File
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ dependencies = [
"defusedxml==0.7.1",
"gunicorn==23.0.0",
"lxml==6.1.0",
"prowler @ git+https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler.git@master",
"prowler @ git+https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler.git@v5.29",
"psycopg2-binary==2.9.9",
"pytest-celery[redis] (==1.3.0)",
"sentry-sdk[django] (==2.56.0)",
Generated
+53 -3
View File
@@ -4410,8 +4410,8 @@ wheels = [
[[package]]
name = "prowler"
version = "5.27.0"
source = { git = "https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler.git?rev=master#0abbb7fc590eaf7de6ed354dd5a217bca261d2b0" }
version = "5.29.0"
source = { git = "https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler.git?rev=v5.29#a769e3761532d9332cb64078ef09ebf7ffb15292" }
dependencies = [
{ name = "alibabacloud-actiontrail20200706" },
{ name = "alibabacloud-credentials" },
@@ -4484,9 +4484,13 @@ dependencies = [
{ name = "pygithub" },
{ name = "python-dateutil" },
{ name = "pytz" },
{ name = "scaleway" },
{ name = "schema" },
{ name = "shodan" },
{ name = "slack-sdk" },
{ name = "stackit-core" },
{ name = "stackit-iaas" },
{ name = "stackit-resourcemanager" },
{ name = "tabulate" },
{ name = "tzlocal" },
{ name = "uuid6" },
@@ -4590,7 +4594,7 @@ requires-dist = [
{ name = "matplotlib", specifier = "==3.10.8" },
{ name = "neo4j", specifier = "==6.1.0" },
{ name = "openai", specifier = "==1.109.1" },
{ name = "prowler", git = "https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler.git?rev=master" },
{ name = "prowler", git = "https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler.git?rev=v5.29" },
{ name = "psycopg2-binary", specifier = "==2.9.9" },
{ name = "pytest-celery", extras = ["redis"], specifier = "==1.3.0" },
{ name = "reportlab", specifier = "==4.4.10" },
@@ -5526,6 +5530,52 @@ wheels = [
{ url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/49/4b/359f28a903c13438ef59ebeee215fb25da53066db67b305c125f1c6d2a25/sqlparse-0.5.5-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:12a08b3bf3eec877c519589833aed092e2444e68240a3577e8e26148acc7b1ba", size = 46138, upload-time = "2025-12-19T07:17:46.573Z" },
]
[[package]]
name = "stackit-core"
version = "0.2.0"
source = { registry = "https://pypi.org/simple" }
dependencies = [
{ name = "cryptography" },
{ name = "pydantic" },
{ name = "pyjwt" },
{ name = "requests" },
{ name = "urllib3" },
]
sdist = { url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/24/90/20f9ec7387eec4067cfd3d29055d0e2b5e1e0322c601a7f48125fd8ea35f/stackit_core-0.2.0.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:b8af91877cdb060d6969a303d8cf20bc0b33b345afd91f679c44a987381e2d47", size = 8987, upload-time = "2025-06-12T08:24:45.251Z" }
wheels = [
{ url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/ab/b4/7b53187ce68956870d864ccb9ccfb68066c9df9de1c9568fd2feb03c4504/stackit_core-0.2.0-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:04632fc6742790d08ddfcb7f2313e04d1254827397a80250f838a2f81b92645b", size = 10240, upload-time = "2025-06-12T08:24:44.214Z" },
]
[[package]]
name = "stackit-iaas"
version = "1.4.0"
source = { registry = "https://pypi.org/simple" }
dependencies = [
{ name = "pydantic" },
{ name = "python-dateutil" },
{ name = "requests" },
{ name = "stackit-core" },
]
sdist = { url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/52/07/24e65278300d5c3cb19cb1660bff924c80812cf8aad3e715f826bae5aa80/stackit_iaas-1.4.0.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:93523b23442350c7ebefd9129485c4c2a539f694a9c36a0f8edfaba9862057ea", size = 116236, upload-time = "2026-05-13T09:43:15.996Z" }
wheels = [
{ url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/08/51/2201164d7bfacf47539888c735f10f6320c188252384957aa1b23121a210/stackit_iaas-1.4.0-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:3f4a32321b57ac238f73e5d660c6428186b92cc0425c1f0783ba801e377149d9", size = 316588, upload-time = "2026-05-13T09:43:14.943Z" },
]
[[package]]
name = "stackit-resourcemanager"
version = "0.8.0"
source = { registry = "https://pypi.org/simple" }
dependencies = [
{ name = "pydantic" },
{ name = "python-dateutil" },
{ name = "requests" },
{ name = "stackit-core" },
]
sdist = { url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/23/2d/f458f18e48ed2b1c83df52cff7dbdfd5dd904fb2980ffd9385876e47bbd9/stackit_resourcemanager-0.8.0.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:f44542beab4130857f5a7f465cf02defeef657bdf63c1beeb3102f0ba3c003fe", size = 33943, upload-time = "2026-05-13T09:43:08.667Z" }
wheels = [
{ url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/c7/9c/38a74d0f7a89b4320f6d2366fb660638bda8860daa08748b12c713d84381/stackit_resourcemanager-0.8.0-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:dd04bb8353d041a137c4dcba190beabded7acfaff1bc98b218fce20a99389ebc", size = 81288, upload-time = "2026-05-13T09:43:07.81Z" },
]
[[package]]
name = "statsd"
version = "4.0.1"
@@ -40,12 +40,6 @@ To install Prowler as a Python package, use `Python >= 3.10, <= 3.12`. Prowler i
pip install prowler
prowler -v
```
To upgrade Prowler to the latest version:
``` bash
pip install --upgrade prowler
```
</Tab>
<Tab title="Docker">
_Requirements_:
@@ -170,6 +164,68 @@ To install Prowler as a Python package, use `Python >= 3.10, <= 3.12`. Prowler i
</Tab>
</Tabs>
## Updating Prowler CLI
Upgrade Prowler CLI to the latest release using the same method chosen for installation:
<Tabs>
<Tab title="pipx">
```bash
pipx upgrade prowler
prowler -v
```
</Tab>
<Tab title="pip">
```bash
pip install --upgrade prowler
prowler -v
```
</Tab>
<Tab title="Docker">
Pull the desired image tag to fetch the latest version:
```bash
docker pull toniblyx/prowler:latest
```
<Note>
Replace `latest` with a specific release tag (for example, `stable` or `<x.y.z>`) to pin a version. Refer to the [Container Versions](#container-versions) section for the full list of available tags.
</Note>
</Tab>
<Tab title="GitHub">
Pull the latest changes and sync the environment:
```bash
cd prowler
git pull
uv sync
uv run python prowler-cli.py -v
```
<Note>
To upgrade to a specific release, check out the corresponding tag before syncing: `git checkout <x.y.z>`.
</Note>
</Tab>
<Tab title="Brew">
```bash
brew upgrade prowler
prowler -v
```
</Tab>
<Tab title="CloudShell">
Both AWS CloudShell and Azure CloudShell install Prowler with `pipx`, so the upgrade command is the same:
```bash
pipx upgrade prowler
prowler -v
```
</Tab>
</Tabs>
<Note>
To install a specific version instead of the latest release, pin it explicitly. For example, with `pipx`: `pipx install prowler==<x.y.z>`, or with `pip`: `pip install prowler==<x.y.z>`. The available releases are listed in the [Releases GitHub section](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/releases).
</Note>
## Container Versions
The available versions of Prowler CLI are the following:
@@ -141,6 +141,45 @@ Choose one of the following installation methods:
---
## Updating Prowler MCP Server
When running Prowler MCP Server locally ("Option 2: Run Locally"), upgrade to the latest version using the same method chosen for installation. The hosted server (`https://mcp.prowler.com/mcp`) is always kept up to date by Prowler and requires no action.
<Tabs>
<Tab title="Docker">
Pull the latest image and restart the container:
```bash
docker pull prowlercloud/prowler-mcp
```
<Note>
Recreate any running container after pulling the new image so the updated version takes effect.
</Note>
</Tab>
<Tab title="From Source">
Pull the latest changes and sync the dependencies:
```bash
cd prowler/mcp_server
git pull
uv sync
uv run prowler-mcp --help
```
</Tab>
<Tab title="Build Docker Image">
Pull the latest source and rebuild the image:
```bash
cd prowler/mcp_server
git pull
docker build -t prowler-mcp .
```
</Tab>
</Tabs>
---
## Command Line Options
The Prowler MCP Server supports the following command-line arguments:
+9 -3
View File
@@ -2,26 +2,32 @@
All notable changes to the **Prowler SDK** are documented in this file.
## [5.29.0] (Prowler UNRELEASED)
## [5.29.0] (Prowler v5.29.0)
### 🚀 Added
- `application` service for Okta provider with `application_admin_console_session_idle_timeout_15min`, `application_admin_console_mfa_required`, `application_admin_console_phishing_resistant_authentication`, `application_dashboard_mfa_required`, `application_dashboard_phishing_resistant_authentication`, and `application_authentication_policy_network_zone_enforced` checks [(#11358)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11358)
- AWS AI Security Framework compliance for AWS provider [(#11353)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11353)
- `storage_account_public_network_access_disabled` check for Azure provider and remapped the Azure CIS "Public Network Access is Disabled" requirements to it [(#11334)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11334)
- StackIT provider now authenticates with a service account key, either as a file path (`--stackit-service-account-key-path` / `STACKIT_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_KEY_PATH`) or as inline JSON content (`--stackit-service-account-key` / `STACKIT_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_KEY`, intended for CI/CD with a secret manager); the StackIT SDK refreshes access tokens internally, replacing the short-lived `STACKIT_API_TOKEN` flow [(#9237)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/9237)
- StackIT provider with service account key authentication [(#9237)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/9237)
- 8 Rules service checks for Google Workspace provider using the Cloud Identity Policy API [(#11379)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11379)
- 12 Security service checks for Google Workspace provider using the Cloud Identity Policy API [(#11356)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11356)
### ⚠️ Deprecated
- `s3_bucket_default_encryption` check for AWS provider since SSE-S3 is automatically applied to all S3 buckets by AWS as of January 5, 2023 and can no longer be disabled [(#11230)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11230)
### 🐞 Fixed
- Broken documentation URLs in Google Workspace check metadata [(#11405)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11405)
- ENS RD 311/2022 (AWS) compliance mapping: `vpc_different_regions` was uncorrectly mapped under the `mp.com.4` family (Network segregation). That check is now mapped to a new `op.cont.2.aws.vpc.1` requirement under the Continuity of Service control [(#11372)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11372)
- Compliance CSV row count now matches the UI per requirement by sourcing rows from the framework JSON's `requirement.Checks` instead of the stale `finding.compliance` snapshot [(#11370)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11370)
- OpenStack provider exception codes moved from the `10000-10999` range, shared with the AlibabaCloud provider, to the free `17000-17999` range to keep error codes unambiguous [(#11382)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11382)
- Azure provider authentication against sovereign clouds (`AzureChinaCloud`, `AzureUSGovernment`) [(#10284)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/10284)
---
## [5.28.1] (Prowler 5.28.1)
## [5.28.1] (Prowler v5.28.1)
### 🐞 Fixed
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{
"Provider": "aws",
"CheckID": "s3_bucket_default_encryption",
"CheckTitle": "S3 bucket has default server-side encryption (SSE) enabled",
"CheckTitle": "[DEPRECATED] S3 bucket has default server-side encryption (SSE) enabled",
"CheckType": [
"Software and Configuration Checks/AWS Security Best Practices",
"Software and Configuration Checks/Industry and Regulatory Standards/AWS Foundational Security Best Practices",
@@ -14,13 +14,11 @@
"Severity": "medium",
"ResourceType": "AwsS3Bucket",
"ResourceGroup": "storage",
"Description": "**Amazon S3 buckets** have a default **server-side encryption** setting that automatically encrypts new objects using `SSE-S3` or `SSE-KMS`. This evaluates whether a bucket has a default encryption configuration defined.",
"Description": "[DEPRECATED] **Amazon S3 buckets** have a default **server-side encryption** setting that automatically encrypts new objects using `SSE-S3` or `SSE-KMS`. This evaluates whether a bucket has a default encryption configuration defined.",
"Risk": "Without default encryption, older objects may remain unencrypted and new uploads won't be forced to use `SSE-KMS`. This reduces confidentiality and governance by limiting key audit logs, rotation, and cross-account controls, and increases exposure if data is copied, replicated, or accessed outside intended paths.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://docs.amazonaws.cn/en_us/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/bucket-encryption.html",
"https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-prevent-uploads-of-unencrypted-objects-to-amazon-s3/",
"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/us_en/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/default-encryption-faq.html"
"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/default-encryption-faq.html"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -39,5 +37,5 @@
],
"DependsOn": [],
"RelatedTo": [],
"Notes": ""
"Notes": "This check is being deprecated since AWS automatically applies SSE-S3 to every S3 bucket (both new buckets and previously-unencrypted existing buckets) as of January 5, 2023, and encryption can no longer be disabled. For SSE-KMS validation, use `s3_bucket_kms_encryption` instead."
}
+50 -9
View File
@@ -241,7 +241,10 @@ class AzureProvider(Provider):
azure_credentials = None
if tenant_id and client_id and client_secret:
azure_credentials = self.validate_static_credentials(
tenant_id=tenant_id, client_id=client_id, client_secret=client_secret
tenant_id=tenant_id,
client_id=client_id,
client_secret=client_secret,
region_config=self._region_config,
)
# Set up the Azure session
@@ -410,6 +413,9 @@ class AzureProvider(Provider):
authority=config["authority"],
base_url=config["base_url"],
credential_scopes=config["credential_scopes"],
graph_host=config["graph_host"],
graph_scope=config["graph_scope"],
logs_endpoint=config["logs_endpoint"],
)
except ArgumentTypeError as validation_error:
logger.error(
@@ -507,6 +513,7 @@ class AzureProvider(Provider):
tenant_id=azure_credentials["tenant_id"],
client_id=azure_credentials["client_id"],
client_secret=azure_credentials["client_secret"],
authority=region_config.authority,
)
return credentials
except ClientAuthenticationError as error:
@@ -579,7 +586,10 @@ class AzureProvider(Provider):
)
else:
try:
credentials = InteractiveBrowserCredential(tenant_id=tenant_id)
credentials = InteractiveBrowserCredential(
tenant_id=tenant_id,
authority=region_config.authority,
)
except Exception as error:
logger.critical(
"Failed to retrieve azure credentials using browser authentication"
@@ -662,6 +672,7 @@ class AzureProvider(Provider):
tenant_id=tenant_id,
client_id=client_id,
client_secret=client_secret,
region_config=region_config,
)
# Set up the Azure session
@@ -675,7 +686,11 @@ class AzureProvider(Provider):
region_config,
)
# Create a SubscriptionClient
subscription_client = SubscriptionClient(credentials)
subscription_client = SubscriptionClient(
credentials,
base_url=region_config.base_url,
credential_scopes=region_config.credential_scopes,
)
# Get info from the subscriptions
available_subscriptions = []
@@ -1039,7 +1054,11 @@ class AzureProvider(Provider):
}
"""
credentials = self.session
subscription_client = SubscriptionClient(credentials)
subscription_client = SubscriptionClient(
credentials,
base_url=self.region_config.base_url,
credential_scopes=self.region_config.credential_scopes,
)
locations = {}
for subscription_id, display_name in self._identity.subscriptions.items():
@@ -1084,7 +1103,10 @@ class AzureProvider(Provider):
@staticmethod
def validate_static_credentials(
tenant_id: str = None, client_id: str = None, client_secret: str = None
tenant_id: str = None,
client_id: str = None,
client_secret: str = None,
region_config: AzureRegionConfig = None,
) -> dict:
"""
Validates the static credentials for the Azure provider.
@@ -1093,6 +1115,9 @@ class AzureProvider(Provider):
tenant_id (str): The Azure Active Directory tenant ID.
client_id (str): The Azure client ID.
client_secret (str): The Azure client secret.
region_config (AzureRegionConfig): The region configuration used to
build the per-cloud login endpoint and Graph scope. Defaults to
the public-cloud configuration when not provided.
Raises:
AzureNotValidTenantIdError: If the provided Azure Tenant ID is not valid.
@@ -1129,8 +1154,13 @@ class AzureProvider(Provider):
message="The provided Azure Client Secret is not valid.",
)
if region_config is None:
region_config = AzureProvider.setup_region_config("AzureCloud")
try:
AzureProvider.verify_client(tenant_id, client_id, client_secret)
AzureProvider.verify_client(
tenant_id, client_id, client_secret, region_config
)
return {
"tenant_id": tenant_id,
"client_id": client_id,
@@ -1162,7 +1192,9 @@ class AzureProvider(Provider):
)
@staticmethod
def verify_client(tenant_id, client_id, client_secret) -> None:
def verify_client(
tenant_id, client_id, client_secret, region_config: AzureRegionConfig = None
) -> None:
"""
Verifies the Azure client credentials using the specified tenant ID, client ID, and client secret.
@@ -1170,6 +1202,9 @@ class AzureProvider(Provider):
tenant_id (str): The Azure Active Directory tenant ID.
client_id (str): The Azure client ID.
client_secret (str): The Azure client secret.
region_config (AzureRegionConfig): The region configuration used to
build the per-cloud login endpoint and Graph scope. Defaults to
the public-cloud configuration when not provided.
Raises:
AzureNotValidTenantIdError: If the provided Azure Tenant ID is not valid.
@@ -1179,7 +1214,13 @@ class AzureProvider(Provider):
Returns:
None
"""
url = f"https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenant_id}/oauth2/v2.0/token"
if region_config is None:
region_config = AzureProvider.setup_region_config("AzureCloud")
# `authority` is None for the public cloud and a bare host (e.g.
# `login.chinacloudapi.cn`) for sovereign clouds, mirroring the
# `AzureAuthorityHosts` constants used by azure-identity.
login_endpoint = region_config.authority or "login.microsoftonline.com"
url = f"https://{login_endpoint}/{tenant_id}/oauth2/v2.0/token"
headers = {
"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
"Accept": "application/json",
@@ -1188,7 +1229,7 @@ class AzureProvider(Provider):
"grant_type": "client_credentials",
"client_id": client_id,
"client_secret": client_secret,
"scope": "https://graph.microsoft.com/.default",
"scope": region_config.graph_scope,
}
response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, data=data).json()
if "access_token" not in response.keys() and "error_codes" in response.keys():
@@ -4,6 +4,18 @@ AZURE_CHINA_CLOUD = "https://management.chinacloudapi.cn"
AZURE_US_GOV_CLOUD = "https://management.usgovcloudapi.net"
AZURE_GENERIC_CLOUD = "https://management.azure.com"
AZURE_GENERIC_GRAPH_HOST = "https://graph.microsoft.com"
AZURE_CHINA_GRAPH_HOST = "https://microsoftgraph.chinacloudapi.cn"
AZURE_US_GOV_GRAPH_HOST = "https://graph.microsoft.us"
AZURE_GENERIC_GRAPH_SCOPE = f"{AZURE_GENERIC_GRAPH_HOST}/.default"
AZURE_CHINA_GRAPH_SCOPE = f"{AZURE_CHINA_GRAPH_HOST}/.default"
AZURE_US_GOV_GRAPH_SCOPE = f"{AZURE_US_GOV_GRAPH_HOST}/.default"
AZURE_GENERIC_LOGS_ENDPOINT = "https://api.loganalytics.io"
AZURE_CHINA_LOGS_ENDPOINT = "https://api.loganalytics.azure.cn"
AZURE_US_GOV_LOGS_ENDPOINT = "https://api.loganalytics.us"
def get_regions_config(region):
allowed_regions = {
@@ -11,16 +23,25 @@ def get_regions_config(region):
"authority": None,
"base_url": AZURE_GENERIC_CLOUD,
"credential_scopes": [AZURE_GENERIC_CLOUD + "/.default"],
"graph_host": AZURE_GENERIC_GRAPH_HOST,
"graph_scope": AZURE_GENERIC_GRAPH_SCOPE,
"logs_endpoint": AZURE_GENERIC_LOGS_ENDPOINT,
},
"AzureChinaCloud": {
"authority": AzureAuthorityHosts.AZURE_CHINA,
"base_url": AZURE_CHINA_CLOUD,
"credential_scopes": [AZURE_CHINA_CLOUD + "/.default"],
"graph_host": AZURE_CHINA_GRAPH_HOST,
"graph_scope": AZURE_CHINA_GRAPH_SCOPE,
"logs_endpoint": AZURE_CHINA_LOGS_ENDPOINT,
},
"AzureUSGovernment": {
"authority": AzureAuthorityHosts.AZURE_GOVERNMENT,
"base_url": AZURE_US_GOV_CLOUD,
"credential_scopes": [AZURE_US_GOV_CLOUD + "/.default"],
"graph_host": AZURE_US_GOV_GRAPH_HOST,
"graph_scope": AZURE_US_GOV_GRAPH_SCOPE,
"logs_endpoint": AZURE_US_GOV_LOGS_ENDPOINT,
},
}
return allowed_regions[region]
+30 -2
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor, as_completed
from kiota_authentication_azure.azure_identity_authentication_provider import (
AzureIdentityAuthenticationProvider,
)
from msgraph.graph_request_adapter import GraphRequestAdapter
from msgraph_core import GraphClientFactory
from prowler.lib.logger import logger
from prowler.providers.azure.azure_provider import AzureProvider
@@ -47,10 +53,32 @@ class AzureService:
clients = {}
try:
if "GraphServiceClient" in str(service):
clients.update({identity.tenant_domain: service(credentials=session)})
# GraphServiceClient(credentials, scopes=...) only customises the
# OAuth scope; the underlying httpx client's base URL stays at
# graph.microsoft.com. For sovereign clouds we must also point
# the HTTP transport at the per-cloud host, which is done by
# building a custom GraphRequestAdapter with a NationalClouds
# base URL.
auth_provider = AzureIdentityAuthenticationProvider(
session, scopes=[region_config.graph_scope]
)
http_client = GraphClientFactory.create_with_default_middleware(
host=region_config.graph_host
)
request_adapter = GraphRequestAdapter(auth_provider, client=http_client)
clients.update(
{identity.tenant_domain: service(request_adapter=request_adapter)}
)
elif "LogsQueryClient" in str(service):
for subscription_id, display_name in identity.subscriptions.items():
clients.update({subscription_id: service(credential=session)})
clients.update(
{
subscription_id: service(
credential=session,
endpoint=region_config.logs_endpoint,
)
}
)
else:
for subscription_id, display_name in identity.subscriptions.items():
clients.update(
+3
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ class AzureRegionConfig(BaseModel):
authority: Optional[str] = None
base_url: str = ""
credential_scopes: list = []
graph_host: str = "https://graph.microsoft.com"
graph_scope: str = "https://graph.microsoft.com/.default"
logs_endpoint: str = "https://api.loganalytics.io"
class AzureSubscription(BaseModel):
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "When external Google Groups access is enabled, users can access and participate in groups created **outside the organization**, potentially exposing them to **phishing, social engineering, or data leakage** through unmanaged external group communications.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/181865",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/advanced/turn-on-or-off-additional-google-services",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,9 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without external invitation warnings, users may unintentionally include **external guests** in internal meetings, exposing **confidential meeting details**, agendas, and internal attendee lists to unauthorized parties. This is a common vector for inadvertent data leakage through everyday calendar actions.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/6329284",
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/calendar/set-google-calendar-sharing-options",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/calendar/allow-external-invitations-in-google-calendar-events",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,9 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Overly permissive external sharing of primary calendars exposes **sensitive meeting metadata** — titles, attendees, locations, and descriptions — to users outside the organization. This increases the risk of **information disclosure**, **social engineering**, and **targeted phishing** based on insights into organizational activities.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/60765",
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/calendar/set-google-calendar-sharing-options",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,9 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Overly permissive external sharing of secondary calendars exposes **project-specific or team-specific event details** to users outside the organization. Because secondary calendars often hold more targeted activities (e.g., product launches, internal reviews), unrestricted external sharing increases the risk of **information disclosure** and **competitive intelligence leakage**.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/60765",
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/calendar/set-google-calendar-sharing-options",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Unrestricted Chat app installation allows **unvetted third-party applications** to access user data including conversation content and organizational information. An attacker could distribute a malicious Chat app to **exfiltrate confidential data** or establish **persistent access** to internal communications.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/6089179",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/apps/manage-the-marketplace-app-allowlist-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Enabled external file sharing allows users to send files containing **confidential information** to external parties through Chat. This creates a **data leakage** channel that bypasses DLP controls, particularly dangerous for organizations handling **regulated data** such as PII, PHI, or financial records.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9540647",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/chat/set-up-chat-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Unrestricted external messaging allows users to communicate freely with **any external party**, increasing the risk of **data exfiltration** through conversation content and **social engineering attacks** from untrusted domains targeting internal users.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9540647",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/chat/set-up-chat-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Unrestricted external spaces allow users to add **anyone from any domain** to persistent group conversations. This increases the risk of **confidential information exposure** in shared spaces and enables **unauthorized external access** to ongoing organizational discussions.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9540647",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/chat/set-up-chat-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Exposed webhook URLs allow **unauthorized content injection** into Chat spaces. Attackers can send **fraudulent or misleading messages** that appear to come from trusted services, creating a vector for **social engineering** and **phishing** within internal communications.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/6089179",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/apps/manage-the-marketplace-app-allowlist-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Unrestricted internal file sharing in Chat allows files with **sensitive information** to be distributed freely without passing through approved channels. This undermines **data governance** and **audit trail** requirements, making it harder to track data movement within the organization.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9540647",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/chat/set-up-chat-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/prebuilt-administrator-roles",
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9011373"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/security-best-practices-for-administrator-accounts"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/prebuilt-administrator-roles",
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9011373"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/security-best-practices-for-administrator-accounts"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "If Access Checker suggests broader audiences or public visibility, users may **inadvertently widen access** to a file beyond the people they intended to share with. This is a common cause of unintentional internal or external over-sharing.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/60781",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-external-sharing-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "When Drive for desktop is enabled, organizational files are **synchronized to local devices** and remain accessible if the device is lost, stolen, or compromised. Because Drive for desktop bypasses the central offline-access controls, this channel is a frequently overlooked path for sensitive data to leave organization-managed environments.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7491144",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/set-up-drive-for-desktop-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without external sharing warnings, users may unintentionally share **sensitive documents** with external recipients who are not entitled to the data. This is a common vector for inadvertent leakage of intellectual property, personally identifiable information, and confidential business data through routine Drive sharing.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/60781",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-external-sharing-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "If external users can move files from internal shared drives into shared drives owned by another organization, the organization **loses authoritative control** over its own data. This is a frequently overlooked path for unintentional or malicious data exfiltration through shared drive collaboration.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/60781",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-external-sharing-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Allowing users to publish Drive files to the web creates a path for **unbounded data exposure**. Sensitive documents, intellectual property, customer data, or internal communications can be made publicly accessible — and indexed by search engines — with a single click, often unintentionally.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/60781",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-external-sharing-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "When users cannot create shared drives, they store collaborative content in their personal **My Drive** instead. When that user account is deleted, the data is also deleted, leading to **unintentional data loss** of organizationally significant information. Allowing shared drive creation makes data survivable across account lifecycle events.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7212025",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://support.google.com/a/users/answer/7212025",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "When viewers and commenters can download, print, or copy shared drive files, they can **bulk-extract sensitive content** — including intellectual property, personally identifiable information, and confidential business documents — using nothing more than read access. This is one of the most direct paths to data exfiltration through Drive.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7662202",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-shared-drives-as-an-admin",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "If shared drive managers can override organizational defaults, **unauthorized data exposure** can occur when a manager intentionally or accidentally weakens a shared drive's security posture (for example, allowing external members or enabling download for viewers).",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7662202",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-shared-drives-as-an-admin",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "If non-members can be added to files inside a shared drive, the **drive's membership becomes meaningless** as a security control. Sensitive content scoped to a specific team can be silently extended to users who were never granted access to the drive itself, leading to unintended information disclosure.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7662202",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-shared-drives-as-an-admin",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "When external sharing is unrestricted, users can share organizational content with **any external Google account**, including untrusted or unknown parties. Restricting sharing to allowlisted domains drastically reduces the surface area for accidental and malicious data exfiltration through Drive.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/60781",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-external-sharing-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Allowlisted domains are still external. Users may not realize that even an allowlisted recipient is outside the organization, leading to **unintentional disclosure of sensitive content** to legitimate but external collaborators. A warning prompt at share time mitigates that without preventing the sharing itself.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/60781",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-external-sharing-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without protection against anomalous attachment types, users may receive **emails with unusual file formats** that are designed to bypass standard security filters. Attackers may use **uncommon file extensions or MIME types** to deliver malware that evades signature-based detection.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7676854",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/set-up-rules-to-detect-harmful-attachments",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "With auto-forwarding enabled, an attacker who gains control of a user account can create **forwarding rules to exfiltrate** all incoming email to an external address. This can persist undetected and provide the attacker with continuous access to sensitive communications even after the account is recovered.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/2491924",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/let-users-automatically-forward-their-own-gmail-emails",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without comprehensive mail storage, messages sent through other Google services (Calendar, Drive, etc.) may not be stored in Gmail and therefore **not subject to Vault retention policies**. This creates gaps in **compliance coverage**, **eDiscovery**, and **audit trails** that could violate regulatory requirements.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/3547347",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/set-up-comprehensive-mail-storage",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without protection against domain spoofing based on similar domain names, users may receive **phishing emails from lookalike domains** (e.g., examp1e.com instead of example.com) that appear legitimate. This enables **credential theft, malware delivery, and business email compromise** attacks.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9157861",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/advanced-phishing-and-malware-protection",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without protection against employee name spoofing, users may receive **emails that appear to come from colleagues or executives** but are actually from external attackers. This enables **business email compromise (BEC)**, **wire fraud**, and **social engineering attacks** that exploit trust relationships.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9157861",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/advanced-phishing-and-malware-protection",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without protection against encrypted attachments from untrusted senders, users may receive **password-protected archives containing malware** that bypass standard content scanning. Attackers commonly use encrypted attachments to evade detection and deliver **ransomware, trojans, or other malicious payloads**.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7676854",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/set-up-rules-to-detect-harmful-attachments",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without enhanced pre-delivery scanning, some **sophisticated phishing and malware** messages may pass through standard filters and be delivered to users. The additional scanning layer catches threats that the first-pass filters miss, reducing the organization's exposure to **zero-day phishing campaigns** and **targeted attacks**.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7380368",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/help-prevent-phishing-with-pre-delivery-message-scanning",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without external image scanning, attackers can use **linked images to track email opens**, deliver **exploit payloads via image rendering vulnerabilities**, or use images as part of sophisticated **phishing schemes** that mimic legitimate communications.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7676854",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/advanced-phishing-and-malware-protection",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without protection of groups from domain-spoofing emails, attackers can send **spoofed messages to group mailboxes** that appear to originate from the organization. Since groups distribute to many recipients, a single spoofed email can enable **mass phishing, social engineering, or misinformation** campaigns across the organization.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9157861",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/advanced-phishing-and-malware-protection",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without protection against inbound domain spoofing, users may receive **emails that appear to come from their own organization** but are sent by external attackers. This enables **internal impersonation**, **phishing**, and **business email compromise** attacks that exploit trust in internal communications.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9157861",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/advanced-phishing-and-malware-protection",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "If users can delegate access to their mailbox, an attacker who compromises one account could silently delegate access to maintain persistent email surveillance. This also increases the risk of **insider threats** and **data exfiltration** through shared mailbox access.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7223765",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/let-users-delegate-access-to-a-gmail-account",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "With per-user outbound gateways enabled, users can route outbound email through **external SMTP servers**, bypassing organizational **email security controls**, **DLP policies**, and **audit logging**. This creates an unmonitored channel for data exfiltration and policy circumvention.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/176652",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/allow-per-user-outbound-gateways",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "With POP and IMAP enabled, users can access email through **legacy clients** that rely on simple password authentication, bypassing **multifactor authentication** and other modern security controls. This significantly increases the risk of **credential-based account compromise**.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/105694",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/sync/turn-pop-and-imap-on-or-off-for-users",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without protection against script-bearing attachments from untrusted senders, users may receive **files containing malicious scripts** that can execute harmful code when opened. Attackers commonly use script attachments to deliver **malware, backdoors, or credential stealers**.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7676854",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/set-up-rules-to-detect-harmful-attachments",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without shortened URL scanning, attackers can use **URL shortening services** to hide malicious destinations in phishing emails. Users cannot visually verify where the link leads, increasing the success rate of **phishing and credential harvesting** attacks.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7676854",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/advanced-phishing-and-malware-protection",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without protection against unauthenticated emails, users may receive **spoofed or forged messages** that fail SPF and DKIM checks but are still delivered normally. This enables **phishing**, **spam**, and **impersonation attacks** that exploit the lack of sender verification.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9157861",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/advanced-phishing-and-malware-protection",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without untrusted link warnings, users may click on **phishing links** or links to **malware distribution sites** without any warning. This significantly increases the success rate of **social engineering attacks** targeting the organization.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7676854",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/advanced-phishing-and-malware-protection",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Allowing any user to create groups with external members or incoming email from outside increases the risk of **unauthorized data sharing**, **spam delivery**, and **shadow IT** groups that bypass organizational controls.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/10308022",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/groups/what-you-get-with-groups-for-business",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Allowing external access to groups exposes **group names, descriptions, and membership** to anyone outside the organization, increasing the risk of **information disclosure** and enabling external parties to identify targets for **social engineering attacks**.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/10308022",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/groups/what-you-get-with-groups-for-business",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Allowing all organization users or anyone to view group conversations can lead to **information disclosure** of sensitive discussions, internal decisions, and confidential data shared within groups.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/10308022",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/groups/what-you-get-with-groups-for-business",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Allowing unrestricted Marketplace app installation exposes the organization to **unvetted third-party applications** that may request broad OAuth scopes, potentially gaining access to **sensitive organizational data** including emails, documents, and calendar events without proper security review.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/6089179",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/apps/manage-the-marketplace-app-allowlist-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/protect-your-business-with-2-step-verification",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/protect-your-business-with-2-step-verification",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/protect-users-with-the-advanced-protection-program",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/apps/control-which-apps-access-google-workspace-data",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/about-dlp",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/apps/control-which-apps-access-google-workspace-data",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/apps/control-access-to-less-secure-apps",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/protect-google-workspace-accounts-with-security-challenges",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/enforce-and-monitor-password-requirements-for-users",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/set-session-length-for-google-services",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/allow-super-administrators-to-recover-their-password",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/set-up-password-recovery-for-users",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "When Google Sites is enabled, users can create websites that may **inadvertently expose internal information** to external parties. These sites can be difficult to track and manage, creating potential **data leakage vectors** outside the organization's standard content management controls.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/182442",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/advanced/turn-a-service-on-or-off-for-google-workspace-users",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -725,6 +725,300 @@ class TestAzureProviderSetupIdentitySubscriptions:
}
class TestAzureProviderSovereignCloudSupport:
"""Sovereign-cloud authentication coverage across AzureCloud,
AzureChinaCloud and AzureUSGovernment for every authentication code path
Prowler exposes. Pinned to issue #8425."""
REGION_CASES = [
(
"AzureCloud",
None,
"https://management.azure.com",
["https://management.azure.com/.default"],
"https://graph.microsoft.com/.default",
"https://api.loganalytics.io",
"login.microsoftonline.com",
),
(
"AzureChinaCloud",
"login.chinacloudapi.cn",
"https://management.chinacloudapi.cn",
["https://management.chinacloudapi.cn/.default"],
"https://microsoftgraph.chinacloudapi.cn/.default",
"https://api.loganalytics.azure.cn",
"login.chinacloudapi.cn",
),
(
"AzureUSGovernment",
"login.microsoftonline.us",
"https://management.usgovcloudapi.net",
["https://management.usgovcloudapi.net/.default"],
"https://graph.microsoft.us/.default",
"https://api.loganalytics.us",
"login.microsoftonline.us",
),
]
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"region,authority,base_url,credential_scopes,graph_scope,logs_endpoint,_login_endpoint",
REGION_CASES,
)
def test_setup_region_config_per_cloud(
self,
region,
authority,
base_url,
credential_scopes,
graph_scope,
logs_endpoint,
_login_endpoint,
):
config = AzureProvider.setup_region_config(region)
# graph_host mirrors graph_scope without the `/.default` suffix; we
# derive it here to avoid threading a separate parameter through every
# parametrized test in this class.
expected_graph_host = graph_scope.removesuffix("/.default")
assert config == AzureRegionConfig(
name=region,
authority=authority,
base_url=base_url,
credential_scopes=credential_scopes,
graph_host=expected_graph_host,
graph_scope=graph_scope,
logs_endpoint=logs_endpoint,
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"region,authority,_base_url,_credential_scopes,_graph_scope,_logs_endpoint,_login_endpoint",
REGION_CASES,
)
def test_setup_session_static_credentials_passes_authority(
self,
region,
authority,
_base_url,
_credential_scopes,
_graph_scope,
_logs_endpoint,
_login_endpoint,
):
with patch(
"prowler.providers.azure.azure_provider.ClientSecretCredential"
) as mock_client_secret_credential:
azure_credentials = {
"tenant_id": str(uuid4()),
"client_id": str(uuid4()),
"client_secret": "fake-secret-value",
}
region_config = AzureProvider.setup_region_config(region)
AzureProvider.setup_session(
az_cli_auth=False,
sp_env_auth=False,
browser_auth=False,
managed_identity_auth=False,
tenant_id=azure_credentials["tenant_id"],
azure_credentials=azure_credentials,
region_config=region_config,
)
mock_client_secret_credential.assert_called_once_with(
tenant_id=azure_credentials["tenant_id"],
client_id=azure_credentials["client_id"],
client_secret=azure_credentials["client_secret"],
authority=authority,
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"region,authority,_base_url,_credential_scopes,_graph_scope,_logs_endpoint,_login_endpoint",
REGION_CASES,
)
def test_setup_session_browser_auth_passes_authority(
self,
region,
authority,
_base_url,
_credential_scopes,
_graph_scope,
_logs_endpoint,
_login_endpoint,
):
with patch(
"prowler.providers.azure.azure_provider.InteractiveBrowserCredential"
) as mock_interactive_browser_credential:
tenant_id = str(uuid4())
region_config = AzureProvider.setup_region_config(region)
AzureProvider.setup_session(
az_cli_auth=False,
sp_env_auth=False,
browser_auth=True,
managed_identity_auth=False,
tenant_id=tenant_id,
azure_credentials=None,
region_config=region_config,
)
mock_interactive_browser_credential.assert_called_once_with(
tenant_id=tenant_id,
authority=authority,
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"region,authority,_base_url,_credential_scopes,_graph_scope,_logs_endpoint,_login_endpoint",
REGION_CASES,
)
def test_setup_session_default_credential_passes_authority(
self,
region,
authority,
_base_url,
_credential_scopes,
_graph_scope,
_logs_endpoint,
_login_endpoint,
):
with patch(
"prowler.providers.azure.azure_provider.DefaultAzureCredential"
) as mock_default_credential:
region_config = AzureProvider.setup_region_config(region)
AzureProvider.setup_session(
az_cli_auth=True,
sp_env_auth=False,
browser_auth=False,
managed_identity_auth=False,
tenant_id=None,
azure_credentials=None,
region_config=region_config,
)
_, called_kwargs = mock_default_credential.call_args
assert called_kwargs["authority"] == authority
assert called_kwargs["exclude_cli_credential"] is False
assert called_kwargs["exclude_environment_credential"] is True
assert called_kwargs["exclude_managed_identity_credential"] is True
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"region,_authority,_base_url,_credential_scopes,graph_scope,_logs_endpoint,login_endpoint",
REGION_CASES,
)
def test_verify_client_uses_per_cloud_endpoints(
self,
region,
_authority,
_base_url,
_credential_scopes,
graph_scope,
_logs_endpoint,
login_endpoint,
):
tenant_id = str(uuid4())
client_id = str(uuid4())
client_secret = "fake-secret"
region_config = AzureProvider.setup_region_config(region)
with patch("prowler.providers.azure.azure_provider.requests.post") as mock_post:
mock_post.return_value = MagicMock()
mock_post.return_value.json.return_value = {"access_token": "fake-token"}
AzureProvider.verify_client(
tenant_id, client_id, client_secret, region_config
)
mock_post.assert_called_once()
args, kwargs = mock_post.call_args
assert args[0] == (
f"https://{login_endpoint}/{tenant_id}/oauth2/v2.0/token"
)
assert kwargs["data"]["scope"] == graph_scope
assert kwargs["data"]["client_id"] == client_id
assert kwargs["data"]["client_secret"] == client_secret
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"region,_authority,base_url,credential_scopes,_graph_scope,_logs_endpoint,_login_endpoint",
REGION_CASES,
)
def test_test_connection_passes_base_url_to_subscription_client(
self,
region,
_authority,
base_url,
credential_scopes,
_graph_scope,
_logs_endpoint,
_login_endpoint,
):
subscription_client_instance = MagicMock()
subscription_client_instance.subscriptions = MagicMock()
subscription_client_instance.subscriptions.list = MagicMock(return_value=[])
subscription_client_class = MagicMock(return_value=subscription_client_instance)
with (
patch(
"prowler.providers.azure.azure_provider.AzureProvider.setup_session"
) as mock_setup_session,
patch(
"prowler.providers.azure.azure_provider.SubscriptionClient",
subscription_client_class,
),
):
mock_setup_session.return_value = MagicMock()
AzureProvider.test_connection(
az_cli_auth=True,
region=region,
raise_on_exception=False,
)
subscription_client_class.assert_called_once()
_, kwargs = subscription_client_class.call_args
assert kwargs["base_url"] == base_url
assert kwargs["credential_scopes"] == credential_scopes
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"region,_authority,base_url,credential_scopes,_graph_scope,_logs_endpoint,_login_endpoint",
REGION_CASES,
)
def test_get_locations_passes_base_url_to_subscription_client(
self,
region,
_authority,
base_url,
credential_scopes,
_graph_scope,
_logs_endpoint,
_login_endpoint,
):
subscription_client_instance = MagicMock()
subscription_client_instance.subscriptions = MagicMock()
subscription_client_instance.subscriptions.list_locations = MagicMock(
return_value=[]
)
subscription_client_class = MagicMock(return_value=subscription_client_instance)
with (
patch.object(AzureProvider, "__init__", return_value=None),
patch(
"prowler.providers.azure.azure_provider.SubscriptionClient",
subscription_client_class,
),
):
azure_provider = AzureProvider()
azure_provider._session = MagicMock()
azure_provider._region_config = AzureProvider.setup_region_config(region)
azure_provider._identity = AzureIdentityInfo(subscriptions={})
azure_provider.get_locations()
subscription_client_class.assert_called_once()
_, kwargs = subscription_client_class.call_args
assert kwargs["base_url"] == base_url
assert kwargs["credential_scopes"] == credential_scopes
class TestAzureProviderSetupIdentityEventLoop:
"""Regression for the Celery worker scenario where
asyncio.get_event_loop() raised "There is no current event loop in
@@ -2,8 +2,17 @@ from azure.identity import AzureAuthorityHosts
from prowler.providers.azure.lib.regions.regions import (
AZURE_CHINA_CLOUD,
AZURE_CHINA_GRAPH_HOST,
AZURE_CHINA_GRAPH_SCOPE,
AZURE_CHINA_LOGS_ENDPOINT,
AZURE_GENERIC_CLOUD,
AZURE_GENERIC_GRAPH_HOST,
AZURE_GENERIC_GRAPH_SCOPE,
AZURE_GENERIC_LOGS_ENDPOINT,
AZURE_US_GOV_CLOUD,
AZURE_US_GOV_GRAPH_HOST,
AZURE_US_GOV_GRAPH_SCOPE,
AZURE_US_GOV_LOGS_ENDPOINT,
get_regions_config,
)
@@ -20,16 +29,25 @@ class Test_azure_regions:
"authority": None,
"base_url": AZURE_GENERIC_CLOUD,
"credential_scopes": [AZURE_GENERIC_CLOUD + "/.default"],
"graph_host": AZURE_GENERIC_GRAPH_HOST,
"graph_scope": AZURE_GENERIC_GRAPH_SCOPE,
"logs_endpoint": AZURE_GENERIC_LOGS_ENDPOINT,
},
"AzureChinaCloud": {
"authority": AzureAuthorityHosts.AZURE_CHINA,
"base_url": AZURE_CHINA_CLOUD,
"credential_scopes": [AZURE_CHINA_CLOUD + "/.default"],
"graph_host": AZURE_CHINA_GRAPH_HOST,
"graph_scope": AZURE_CHINA_GRAPH_SCOPE,
"logs_endpoint": AZURE_CHINA_LOGS_ENDPOINT,
},
"AzureUSGovernment": {
"authority": AzureAuthorityHosts.AZURE_GOVERNMENT,
"base_url": AZURE_US_GOV_CLOUD,
"credential_scopes": [AZURE_US_GOV_CLOUD + "/.default"],
"graph_host": AZURE_US_GOV_GRAPH_HOST,
"graph_scope": AZURE_US_GOV_GRAPH_SCOPE,
"logs_endpoint": AZURE_US_GOV_LOGS_ENDPOINT,
},
}
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
import pytest
from prowler.providers.azure.lib.service.service import AzureService
from prowler.providers.azure.models import AzureIdentityInfo, AzureRegionConfig
REGION_CASES = [
(
"AzureCloud",
"https://graph.microsoft.com",
"https://graph.microsoft.com/.default",
"https://api.loganalytics.io",
),
(
"AzureChinaCloud",
"https://microsoftgraph.chinacloudapi.cn",
"https://microsoftgraph.chinacloudapi.cn/.default",
"https://api.loganalytics.azure.cn",
),
(
"AzureUSGovernment",
"https://graph.microsoft.us",
"https://graph.microsoft.us/.default",
"https://api.loganalytics.us",
),
]
def _identity_and_session():
identity = AzureIdentityInfo(
tenant_domain="tenant.onmicrosoft.com",
subscriptions={"sub-1": "Subscription 1"},
)
session = MagicMock()
return identity, session
class TestAzureServiceSovereignClouds:
"""Cover __set_clients__ kwargs for the Graph and Logs clients across the
three sovereign clouds — these are the two service slots in service.py
that historically defaulted to public-cloud endpoints."""
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"_region,graph_host,graph_scope,_logs_endpoint",
REGION_CASES,
)
def test_set_clients_graph_uses_per_cloud_host_scope_and_adapter(
self, _region, graph_host, graph_scope, _logs_endpoint
):
graph_service = MagicMock()
graph_service.__str__ = MagicMock(return_value="GraphServiceClient")
region_config = AzureRegionConfig(
graph_host=graph_host,
graph_scope=graph_scope,
logs_endpoint=_logs_endpoint,
)
identity, session = _identity_and_session()
with (
patch.object(AzureService, "__init__", return_value=None),
patch(
"prowler.providers.azure.lib.service.service.AzureIdentityAuthenticationProvider"
) as mock_auth_provider_cls,
patch(
"prowler.providers.azure.lib.service.service.GraphClientFactory"
) as mock_factory,
patch(
"prowler.providers.azure.lib.service.service.GraphRequestAdapter"
) as mock_adapter_cls,
):
service = AzureService.__new__(AzureService)
service.__set_clients__(identity, session, graph_service, region_config)
mock_auth_provider_cls.assert_called_once_with(session, scopes=[graph_scope])
mock_factory.create_with_default_middleware.assert_called_once_with(
host=graph_host
)
mock_adapter_cls.assert_called_once_with(
mock_auth_provider_cls.return_value,
client=mock_factory.create_with_default_middleware.return_value,
)
graph_service.assert_called_once_with(
request_adapter=mock_adapter_cls.return_value
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"_region,_graph_host,_graph_scope,logs_endpoint",
REGION_CASES,
)
def test_set_clients_logs_passes_per_cloud_endpoint(
self, _region, _graph_host, _graph_scope, logs_endpoint
):
logs_service = MagicMock()
logs_service.__str__ = MagicMock(return_value="LogsQueryClient")
region_config = AzureRegionConfig(
graph_host=_graph_host,
graph_scope=_graph_scope,
logs_endpoint=logs_endpoint,
)
identity, session = _identity_and_session()
with patch.object(AzureService, "__init__", return_value=None):
service = AzureService.__new__(AzureService)
service.__set_clients__(identity, session, logs_service, region_config)
logs_service.assert_called_once_with(credential=session, endpoint=logs_endpoint)
+2 -2
View File
@@ -2,11 +2,11 @@
All notable changes to the **Prowler UI** are documented in this file.
## [1.29.0] (Prowler UNRELEASED)
## [1.29.0] (Prowler v5.29.0)
### 🚀 Added
- New Scan Jobs view with specific In Progress, Completed, Scheduled tabs [(#11258)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11258)
- Restyle `Scan Jobs` view with specific In Progress, Completed, Scheduled tabs [(#11258)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11258)
### 🔄 Changed
+9
View File
@@ -34,4 +34,13 @@ describe("providers page", () => {
expect(source).toContain("size: 160");
expect(source).toContain("size: 140");
});
it("keeps the CLI import banner gated by the Cloud environment", () => {
const currentDir = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
const pagePath = path.join(currentDir, "page.tsx");
const source = readFileSync(pagePath, "utf8");
expect(source).toContain("NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV");
expect(source).toContain("{isCloudEnvironment && <CliImportBanner");
});
});
+3
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { Suspense } from "react";
import { ProvidersAccountsView } from "@/components/providers";
import { SkeletonTableProviders } from "@/components/providers/table";
import { CliImportBanner } from "@/components/scans";
import { Skeleton } from "@/components/shadcn/skeleton/skeleton";
import { ContentLayout } from "@/components/ui";
import { FilterTransitionWrapper } from "@/contexts";
@@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ export default async function Providers({
}) {
const resolvedSearchParams = await searchParams;
const activeTab = getProviderTab(resolvedSearchParams.tab);
const isCloudEnvironment = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV === "true";
// Exclude `tab` from the Suspense key so switching tabs doesn't re-suspend
const { tab: _, ...paramsWithoutTab } = resolvedSearchParams || {};
@@ -26,6 +28,7 @@ export default async function Providers({
return (
<ContentLayout title="Providers" icon="lucide:cloud-cog">
{isCloudEnvironment && <CliImportBanner className="mb-6" />}
<FilterTransitionWrapper>
<ProviderPageTabs
activeTab={activeTab}
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import type { ComponentProps } from "react";
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import { useProviderWizardStore } from "@/store/provider-wizard/store";
import { SCAN_JOBS_TAB } from "@/types";
import { LaunchStep } from "./launch-step";
@@ -81,5 +82,9 @@ describe("LaunchStep", () => {
title: "Scan Launched",
}),
);
const toastPayload = toastMock.mock.calls[0]?.[0];
expect(toastPayload.action.props.children.props.href).toBe(
`/scans?tab=${SCAN_JOBS_TAB.ACTIVE}`,
);
});
});
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import { Spinner } from "@/components/shadcn/spinner/spinner";
import { TreeStatusIcon } from "@/components/shadcn/tree-view/tree-status-icon";
import { ToastAction, useToast } from "@/components/ui";
import { useProviderWizardStore } from "@/store/provider-wizard/store";
import { SCAN_JOBS_TAB } from "@/types";
import { TREE_ITEM_STATUS } from "@/types/tree";
import {
@@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ export function LaunchStep({
: "Single scan launched successfully.",
action: (
<ToastAction altText="Go to scans" asChild>
<Link href="/scans">Go to scans</Link>
<Link href={`/scans?tab=${SCAN_JOBS_TAB.ACTIVE}`}>Go to scans</Link>
</ToastAction>
),
});
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
import { render, screen } from "@testing-library/react";
import userEvent from "@testing-library/user-event";
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import { DOCS_URLS } from "@/lib/external-urls";
import { CliImportBanner } from "./cli-import-banner";
const STORAGE_KEY = "prowler:cli-import-banner-dismissed";
const localStorageMock = (() => {
let store: Record<string, string> = {};
return {
getItem: vi.fn((key: string) => store[key] ?? null),
setItem: vi.fn((key: string, value: string) => {
store[key] = value;
}),
removeItem: vi.fn((key: string) => {
delete store[key];
}),
clear: vi.fn(() => {
store = {};
}),
get length() {
return Object.keys(store).length;
},
key: vi.fn((index: number) => Object.keys(store)[index] ?? null),
};
})();
Object.defineProperty(window, "localStorage", {
value: localStorageMock,
writable: true,
});
describe("CliImportBanner", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
localStorageMock.clear();
vi.clearAllMocks();
});
it("renders the banner when not dismissed", () => {
render(<CliImportBanner />);
expect(
screen.getByText(/Import findings from Prowler CLI/),
).toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("renders a link to the documentation", () => {
render(<CliImportBanner />);
const link = screen.getByRole("link", { name: "Learn more" });
expect(link).toHaveAttribute("href", DOCS_URLS.FINDINGS_INGESTION);
expect(link).toHaveAttribute("target", "_blank");
expect(link).toHaveAttribute("rel", "noopener noreferrer");
});
it("does not render when previously dismissed", () => {
localStorageMock.setItem(STORAGE_KEY, "true");
const { container } = render(<CliImportBanner />);
expect(container).toBeEmptyDOMElement();
});
it("dismisses the banner and persists to localStorage on close", async () => {
const user = userEvent.setup();
render(<CliImportBanner />);
const closeButton = screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Close" });
await user.click(closeButton);
expect(
screen.queryByText(/Import findings from Prowler CLI/),
).not.toBeInTheDocument();
expect(localStorageMock.setItem).toHaveBeenCalledWith(STORAGE_KEY, "true");
});
it("renders with role='alert'", () => {
render(<CliImportBanner />);
expect(screen.getByRole("alert")).toBeInTheDocument();
});
});
+49
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
"use client";
import { Upload } from "lucide-react";
import Link from "next/link";
import { useState } from "react";
import { Alert, AlertTitle } from "@/components/shadcn";
import { useMountEffect } from "@/hooks/use-mount-effect";
import { DOCS_URLS } from "@/lib/external-urls";
import { cn } from "@/lib/utils";
const STORAGE_KEY = "prowler:cli-import-banner-dismissed";
export const CliImportBanner = ({ className }: { className?: string }) => {
const [isVisible, setIsVisible] = useState<boolean | null>(null);
useMountEffect(() => {
const isDismissed = localStorage.getItem(STORAGE_KEY) === "true";
setIsVisible(!isDismissed);
});
const handleClose = () => {
localStorage.setItem(STORAGE_KEY, "true");
setIsVisible(false);
};
if (isVisible === null || !isVisible) return null;
return (
<Alert
variant="info"
onClose={handleClose}
className={cn("animate-fade-in", className)}
>
<Upload />
<AlertTitle>
Import findings from Prowler CLI {" "}
<Link
href={DOCS_URLS.FINDINGS_INGESTION}
target="_blank"
rel="noopener noreferrer"
className="font-normal underline underline-offset-2"
>
Learn more
</Link>
</AlertTitle>
</Alert>
);
};
+1
View File
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
export * from "./auto-refresh";
export * from "./cli-import-banner";
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
import { render, screen } from "@testing-library/react";
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import { SCAN_JOBS_TAB } from "@/types";
import { ScansFilterBar } from "./scans-filter-bar";
vi.mock("@/components/filters/provider-account-selectors", () => ({
ProviderAccountSelectors: () => <div>Provider account selectors</div>,
}));
vi.mock("@/components/shadcn", () => ({
Select: ({ children }: { children: React.ReactNode }) => (
<div>{children}</div>
),
SelectContent: ({ children }: { children: React.ReactNode }) => (
<div>{children}</div>
),
SelectItem: ({
children,
value,
}: {
children: React.ReactNode;
value: string;
}) => <div data-value={value}>{children}</div>,
SelectTrigger: ({ children, ...props }: React.ComponentProps<"button">) => (
<button {...props}>{children}</button>
),
SelectValue: ({ placeholder }: { placeholder: string }) => (
<span>{placeholder}</span>
),
}));
const defaultProps = {
providers: [],
scheduleType: "all",
scanStatus: "all",
showStatusFilter: false,
onScheduleTypeChange: vi.fn(),
onScanStatusChange: vi.fn(),
};
describe("ScansFilterBar", () => {
it("hides the type filter on the scheduled tab", () => {
// Given
render(
<ScansFilterBar {...defaultProps} activeTab={SCAN_JOBS_TAB.SCHEDULED} />,
);
// Then
expect(
screen.queryByRole("button", { name: /all types/i }),
).not.toBeInTheDocument();
expect(screen.getByText("Provider account selectors")).toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("shows the type filter outside the scheduled tab", () => {
// Given
render(
<ScansFilterBar {...defaultProps} activeTab={SCAN_JOBS_TAB.COMPLETED} />,
);
// Then
expect(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /all types/i })).toBeVisible();
});
});
+16 -13
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import {
SelectTrigger,
SelectValue,
} from "@/components/shadcn";
import type { ScanJobsTab } from "@/types";
import { SCAN_JOBS_TAB, type ScanJobsTab } from "@/types";
import type { ProviderProps } from "@/types/providers";
import {
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ export function ScansFilterBar({
const isCloudEnvironment = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV === "true";
const triggerFilterOptions = getScanTriggerFilterOptions(isCloudEnvironment);
const statusFilterOptions = getScanStatusFilterOptions(activeTab);
const showScheduleTypeFilter = activeTab !== SCAN_JOBS_TAB.SCHEDULED;
return (
<>
@@ -52,18 +53,20 @@ export function ScansFilterBar({
accountSelectorClassName={filterItemClass}
/>
<Select value={scheduleType} onValueChange={onScheduleTypeChange}>
<SelectTrigger aria-label="All Types" className={filterItemClass}>
<SelectValue placeholder="All Types" />
</SelectTrigger>
<SelectContent>
{triggerFilterOptions.map((option) => (
<SelectItem key={option.value} value={option.value}>
{option.label}
</SelectItem>
))}
</SelectContent>
</Select>
{showScheduleTypeFilter && (
<Select value={scheduleType} onValueChange={onScheduleTypeChange}>
<SelectTrigger aria-label="All Types" className={filterItemClass}>
<SelectValue placeholder="All Types" />
</SelectTrigger>
<SelectContent>
{triggerFilterOptions.map((option) => (
<SelectItem key={option.value} value={option.value}>
{option.label}
</SelectItem>
))}
</SelectContent>
</Select>
)}
{showStatusFilter && (
<Select value={scanStatus} onValueChange={onScanStatusChange}>
@@ -16,6 +16,32 @@ const { scansFilterBarSpy } = vi.hoisted(() => ({
scansFilterBarSpy: vi.fn(),
}));
const localStorageMock = (() => {
let store: Record<string, string> = {};
return {
getItem: vi.fn((key: string) => store[key] ?? null),
setItem: vi.fn((key: string, value: string) => {
store[key] = value;
}),
removeItem: vi.fn((key: string) => {
delete store[key];
}),
clear: vi.fn(() => {
store = {};
}),
get length() {
return Object.keys(store).length;
},
key: vi.fn((index: number) => Object.keys(store)[index] ?? null),
};
})();
Object.defineProperty(window, "localStorage", {
value: localStorageMock,
writable: true,
});
vi.mock("next/navigation", () => ({
usePathname: () => "/scans",
useRouter: () => ({
@@ -120,6 +146,7 @@ describe("ScansPageShell", () => {
afterEach(() => {
vi.unstubAllEnvs();
vi.clearAllMocks();
localStorageMock.clear();
searchParamsValue.current = "";
useScansStore.getState().closeLaunchScanModal();
});
@@ -191,6 +218,36 @@ describe("ScansPageShell", () => {
expect(screen.getByRole("combobox", { name: /all types/i })).toBeVisible();
});
it("shows the CLI import banner in Cloud", () => {
vi.stubEnv("NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV", "true");
render(
<ScansPageShell providers={providers} hasManageScansPermission>
<div>Scans table</div>
</ScansPageShell>,
);
expect(screen.getByRole("alert")).toHaveTextContent(
/import findings from prowler cli/i,
);
expect(screen.getByRole("link", { name: /learn more/i })).toHaveAttribute(
"href",
"https://docs.prowler.com/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-import-findings",
);
});
it("hides the CLI import banner outside Cloud", () => {
vi.stubEnv("NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV", "false");
render(
<ScansPageShell providers={providers} hasManageScansPermission>
<div>Scans table</div>
</ScansPageShell>,
);
expect(screen.queryByRole("alert")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("keeps launch scan with filters and mutelist with tabs", () => {
vi.stubEnv("NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV", "false");
@@ -332,4 +389,22 @@ describe("ScansPageShell", () => {
expect(calledUrl).toContain("tab=active");
expect(calledUrl).not.toContain("filter%5Bstate__in%5D");
});
it("clears type filter when switching to scheduled scans", async () => {
vi.stubEnv("NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV", "false");
searchParamsValue.current = "tab=completed&filter%5Btrigger%5D=manual";
const user = userEvent.setup();
render(
<ScansPageShell providers={providers} hasManageScansPermission>
<div>Scans table</div>
</ScansPageShell>,
);
await user.click(screen.getByRole("tab", { name: /scheduled/i }));
const calledUrl = pushMock.mock.calls.at(-1)?.[0] as string;
expect(calledUrl).toContain("tab=scheduled");
expect(calledUrl).not.toContain("filter%5Btrigger%5D");
});
});
+4
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import { useScansStore } from "@/store";
import { SCAN_JOBS_TAB, SCAN_TAB_LABELS, type ScanJobsTab } from "@/types";
import type { ProviderProps } from "@/types/providers";
import { CliImportBanner } from "./cli-import-banner";
import { LaunchScanModal } from "./launch-scan-modal";
import { ScansFilterBar } from "./scans-filter-bar";
import { useScansFilters } from "./use-scans-filters";
@@ -53,6 +54,7 @@ export function ScansPageShell({
const hasConnectedProviders = providers.some(
(provider) => provider.attributes.connection.connected === true,
);
const isCloudEnvironment = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV === "true";
const launchDisabled = !hasManageScansPermission || !hasConnectedProviders;
const launchOpen = isLaunchScanModalOpen || urlLaunchOpen;
@@ -104,6 +106,8 @@ export function ScansPageShell({
</Button>
</div>
{isCloudEnvironment && <CliImportBanner />}
<Tabs
value={filters.activeTab}
onValueChange={filters.setTab}
@@ -1,9 +1,22 @@
import { render, screen } from "@testing-library/react";
import userEvent from "@testing-library/user-event";
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import { ScansProvidersEmptyState } from "./scans-providers-empty-state";
const { replaceMock, searchParamsValue } = vi.hoisted(() => ({
replaceMock: vi.fn(),
searchParamsValue: { current: "" },
}));
vi.mock("next/navigation", () => ({
usePathname: () => "/scans",
useRouter: () => ({
replace: replaceMock,
}),
useSearchParams: () => new URLSearchParams(searchParamsValue.current),
}));
vi.mock("@/components/providers/wizard", () => ({
ProviderWizardModal: ({ open }: { open: boolean }) =>
open ? <div role="dialog">Provider wizard</div> : null,
@@ -14,6 +27,11 @@ vi.mock("./no-providers-connected", () => ({
}));
describe("ScansProvidersEmptyState", () => {
afterEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
searchParamsValue.current = "";
});
it("shows the add provider message and opens the provider wizard", async () => {
const user = userEvent.setup();
@@ -28,6 +46,25 @@ describe("ScansProvidersEmptyState", () => {
expect(screen.getByRole("dialog")).toHaveTextContent("Provider wizard");
});
it("clears the launch scan URL intent before opening the provider wizard", async () => {
// Given
searchParamsValue.current = "tab=completed&launchScan=true";
const user = userEvent.setup();
render(<ScansProvidersEmptyState thereIsNoProviders />);
// When
await user.click(
screen.getByRole("button", { name: /open add provider modal/i }),
);
// Then
expect(replaceMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith("/scans?tab=completed", {
scroll: false,
});
expect(screen.getByRole("dialog")).toHaveTextContent("Provider wizard");
});
it("shows the no connected providers message", () => {
render(<ScansProvidersEmptyState thereIsNoProviders={false} />);
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
"use client";
import { usePathname, useRouter, useSearchParams } from "next/navigation";
import { useState } from "react";
import { ProviderWizardModal } from "@/components/providers/wizard";
import { LAUNCH_SCAN_SEARCH_PARAM } from "@/lib/scans-navigation";
import { NoProvidersAdded } from "./no-providers-added";
import { NoProvidersConnected } from "./no-providers-connected";
@@ -14,12 +16,28 @@ interface ScansProvidersEmptyStateProps {
export function ScansProvidersEmptyState({
thereIsNoProviders,
}: ScansProvidersEmptyStateProps) {
const pathname = usePathname();
const router = useRouter();
const searchParams = useSearchParams();
const [isProviderWizardOpen, setIsProviderWizardOpen] = useState(false);
const openProviderWizard = () => {
if (searchParams.has(LAUNCH_SCAN_SEARCH_PARAM)) {
const params = new URLSearchParams(searchParams.toString());
params.delete(LAUNCH_SCAN_SEARCH_PARAM);
const query = params.toString();
router.replace(query ? `${pathname}?${query}` : pathname, {
scroll: false,
});
}
setIsProviderWizardOpen(true);
};
return (
<>
{thereIsNoProviders ? (
<NoProvidersAdded onOpenWizard={() => setIsProviderWizardOpen(true)} />
<NoProvidersAdded onOpenWizard={openProviderWizard} />
) : (
<NoProvidersConnected />
)}
+12
View File
@@ -94,6 +94,18 @@ describe("scans.utils", () => {
});
});
it("excludes trigger filters from scheduled scans", () => {
expect(
getScanJobsUserFilters({
tab: "scheduled",
"filter[trigger]": "manual",
"filter[provider_uid]": "123456789012",
}),
).toEqual({
"filter[provider_uid]": "123456789012",
});
});
it("formats scan labels and durations for table display", () => {
expect(getScanAlias(makeScan(""))).toBe("-");
expect(getScanAlias(makeScan("Daily scheduled scan", "scheduled"))).toBe(
+6
View File
@@ -77,8 +77,14 @@ function isSearchParamValue(value: unknown): value is string | string[] {
export function getScanJobsUserFilters(
searchParams: SearchParamsProps,
): Record<string, string | string[]> {
const tab = getScanJobsTab(searchParams.tab);
return Object.entries(searchParams).reduce<Record<string, string | string[]>>(
(filters, [key, value]) => {
if (tab === SCAN_JOBS_TAB.SCHEDULED && key === "filter[trigger]") {
return filters;
}
if (
key.startsWith("filter[") &&
!isScanStateFilterKey(key) &&
@@ -81,6 +81,17 @@ const makeCompletedScan = (): ScanProps => ({
},
});
const makeScheduledScan = (): ScanProps => ({
...makeCompletedScan(),
attributes: {
...makeCompletedScan().attributes,
trigger: "scheduled",
state: "scheduled",
scheduled_at: "2026-01-01T10:00:00Z",
next_scan_at: "2026-01-02T10:00:00Z",
},
});
const renderCell = (
columnId: string,
scan: ScanProps,
@@ -137,7 +148,6 @@ describe("getScanJobsColumns", () => {
"account",
"scanInfo",
"scanSchedule",
"nextScan",
"actions",
]);
});
@@ -163,4 +173,19 @@ describe("getScanJobsColumns", () => {
expect(screen.getByText("1 min 13 sec")).toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("labels the completed scan schedule column as Type", () => {
renderHeader(SCAN_JOBS_TAB.COMPLETED, "scanSchedule");
expect(screen.getByText("Type")).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(screen.queryByText("Schedule")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("keeps the scheduled column without repeating the scheduled label in each row", () => {
renderHeader(SCAN_JOBS_TAB.SCHEDULED, "scanSchedule");
renderCell("scanSchedule", makeScheduledScan(), SCAN_JOBS_TAB.SCHEDULED);
expect(screen.getByText("Schedule")).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(screen.queryByText("Scheduled")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
});
});
+17 -19
View File
@@ -39,13 +39,25 @@ const scanInfoColumn: ColumnDef<ScanProps> = {
cell: ({ row }) => <ScanInfoCell scan={row.original} />,
};
const scanScheduleColumn: ColumnDef<ScanProps> = {
const getScanScheduleColumn = (title: string): ColumnDef<ScanProps> => ({
id: "scanSchedule",
accessorFn: (row) => row.attributes.trigger,
header: ({ column }) => (
<DataTableColumnHeader column={column} title="Schedule" param="trigger" />
<DataTableColumnHeader column={column} title={title} param="trigger" />
),
cell: ({ row }) => <ScheduleCell scan={row.original} />,
});
const scheduledScanScheduleColumn: ColumnDef<ScanProps> = {
id: "scanSchedule",
accessorFn: (row) => row.attributes.scheduled_at,
header: ({ column }) => (
<DataTableColumnHeader column={column} title="Schedule" />
),
cell: ({ row }) => (
<DateWithTime dateTime={row.original.attributes.scheduled_at} showTime />
),
enableSorting: false,
};
const resourcesColumn: ColumnDef<ScanProps> = {
@@ -86,7 +98,7 @@ const activeColumns = (): ColumnDef<ScanProps>[] => [
cell: ({ row }) => <ProgressCell scan={row.original} />,
enableSorting: false,
},
scanScheduleColumn,
getScanScheduleColumn("Schedule"),
{
id: "launched",
header: ({ column }) => (
@@ -118,7 +130,7 @@ const completedColumns = (): ColumnDef<ScanProps>[] => [
cell: ({ row }) => <StatusBadge status={row.original.attributes.state} />,
enableSorting: false,
},
scanScheduleColumn,
getScanScheduleColumn("Type"),
{
id: "scanDate",
accessorFn: (row) => row.attributes.completed_at,
@@ -139,7 +151,7 @@ const completedColumns = (): ColumnDef<ScanProps>[] => [
const scheduledColumns = (): ColumnDef<ScanProps>[] => [
accountColumn,
scanInfoColumn,
scanScheduleColumn,
scheduledScanScheduleColumn,
/*
* TODO: Restore this column when the API exposes the last completed scan date for this schedule.
* {
@@ -153,20 +165,6 @@ const scheduledColumns = (): ColumnDef<ScanProps>[] => [
* enableSorting: false,
* },
*/
{
id: "nextScan",
accessorFn: (row) => row.attributes.next_scan_at,
header: ({ column }) => (
<DataTableColumnHeader
column={column}
title="Next Run"
param="next_scan_at"
/>
),
cell: ({ row }) => (
<DateWithTime dateTime={row.original.attributes.next_scan_at} />
),
},
actionsColumn,
];
+9 -3
View File
@@ -46,13 +46,19 @@ export function useScansFilters(): UseScansFiltersReturn {
router.push(`${pathname}?${params.toString()}`, { scroll: false });
};
const setTab = (tab: string) =>
updateParams({
const setTab = (tab: string) => {
const isScheduledTab = tab === SCAN_JOBS_TAB.SCHEDULED;
const updates: Record<string, string | null> = {
tab,
sort: null,
"filter[state]": null,
"filter[state__in]": null,
});
};
if (isScheduledTab) updates["filter[trigger]"] = null;
updateParams(updates);
};
const setScheduleType = (value: string) =>
updateParams({ "filter[trigger]": value });
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
import { render, screen } from "@testing-library/react";
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import MainLayout from "./main-layout";
vi.mock("@/hooks/use-sidebar", () => ({
useSidebar: vi.fn(),
}));
vi.mock("@/hooks/use-store", () => ({
useStore: () => ({
getOpenState: () => true,
settings: { disabled: false },
}),
}));
vi.mock("../sidebar/sidebar", () => ({
Sidebar: () => <aside data-testid="sidebar" />,
}));
describe("MainLayout", () => {
it("renders subdued background glows for side-nav contrast", () => {
render(
<MainLayout>
<div>Page content</div>
</MainLayout>,
);
const topGlow =
screen.getByTestId("sidebar").previousElementSibling
?.previousElementSibling;
const bottomGlow = screen.getByTestId("sidebar").previousElementSibling;
expect(topGlow).toHaveClass("h-[120%]", "w-[160%]", "opacity-[7%]");
expect(bottomGlow).toHaveClass("h-[50%]", "w-[50%]", "opacity-[7%]");
});
});
+2 -2
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@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ export default function MainLayout({
<div className="relative flex h-dvh items-center justify-center overflow-hidden">
{/* Top-left gradient halo */}
<div
className="pointer-events-none fixed top-0 left-0 z-0 size-[600px] opacity-20 blur-3xl"
className="pointer-events-none fixed top-0 left-0 z-0 h-[120%] w-[160%] opacity-[7%] blur-3xl"
style={{
background: "linear-gradient(90deg, #31E59F 0%, #60E0EC 100%)",
transform: "translate(-50%, -50%)",
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ export default function MainLayout({
{/* Bottom-right gradient halo */}
<div
className="pointer-events-none fixed right-0 bottom-0 z-0 size-[600px] opacity-20 blur-3xl"
className="pointer-events-none fixed right-0 bottom-0 z-0 h-[50%] w-[50%] opacity-[7%] blur-3xl"
style={{
background: "linear-gradient(90deg, #31E59F 0%, #60E0EC 100%)",
transform: "translate(50%, 50%)",
+2
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import { IntegrationType } from "../types/integrations";
export const DOCS_URLS = {
FINDINGS_ANALYSIS:
"https://docs.prowler.com/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app#step-8:-analyze-the-findings",
FINDINGS_INGESTION:
"https://docs.prowler.com/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-import-findings",
AWS_ORGANIZATIONS:
"https://docs.prowler.com/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-cloud-aws-organizations",
ALERTS: "https://docs.prowler.com/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-alerts",
+7 -3
View File
@@ -171,9 +171,13 @@ export class ScansPage extends BasePage {
// 1. The provider exists in the table (by account ID/UID)
// 2. The scan name field contains "scheduled scan"
// Scheduled scans live in the Scheduled tab; /scans defaults to Completed,
// which would show an empty-state card (no table) in a fresh environment.
await this.gotoTab("scheduled");
// Adding a provider first creates a scheduled-trigger scan in the
// AVAILABLE state (the immediate first run), which the tabbed view lists
// under "In Progress" — not "Scheduled" (that tab only shows state=scheduled,
// a later run created asynchronously). /scans defaults to Completed, which
// would show an empty-state card (no table) in a fresh environment, so
// navigate to the active tab where this row actually appears.
await this.gotoTab("active");
await this.verifyPageLoaded();
// Find a row that contains the account ID (provider UID in Provider column)