* [Core, mod_commands] Interface allowlist (#3086)
* [core] Add interface allowlist to gate module app/api registration
Adds an optional, presence-activated allowlist in switch.conf.xml that
controls which modules may register application / api / json_api /
chat-application interfaces. With no <interface-allowlist> configured
nothing is enforced; when at least one <allow> entry is present, only
listed interfaces register at load time and all others are refused (the
module still loads and switch_loadable_module_process still returns
SUCCESS -- the blocked interface is simply never exposed).
Entries match at three levels of precision:
mod_commands - whole module
mod_commands.system - any interface named "system"
mod_commands.system.api - a specific type (app|api|json_api|chat_app)
Enforcement lives in switch_loadable_module_process() so every module, at
boot and at runtime `load`, is subject to the same policy. This gives
operators a way to disable the "system"/"spawn" shell-exec API commands
(and equivalents) system-wide.
Also adds the `interface_allowlist_dump [modules] [plain]` API, which
walks the loaded modules and prints their interfaces in the allowlist key
format so the current state can be captured and pruned offline into config.
* [mod_commands] Add tests for the interface allowlist
New test_interface_allowlist boots the core with an active
<interface-allowlist> (conf_interface_allowlist/) that permits only a
couple of mod_commands interfaces, then loads mod_commands and verifies:
- listed commands register and run (status, version) while unlisted and
shell-exec commands are refused (system, spawn, uptime) -- refusal
surfaces as switch_api_execute returning FALSE / command-not-found,
with the command function never invoked;
- a "module.name.type" entry gates by type: the API "status" loads while
the JSON API of the same name stays blocked;
- interface_allowlist_dump prints the config format in its xml, modules
and plain variants, and reflects module capabilities (system appears in
the dump even though it was blocked from registering).
* [config] Fix interior -- in interface-allowlist comment breaking XML parse
The explanatory comment used -- as em-dash pairs. The XML parser treats
-- inside a comment as the comment close, causing an "unclosed <!--"
error that prevents the whole freeswitch.xml from parsing (boot and
reloadxml both fail). Replace the -- pairs with ordinary punctuation.
* update .gitignore
* [core] Warn when interface-allowlist section is present but parses no entries
Co-authored-by: Chris Rienzo <chris@signalwire.com>
* Merge commit from fork
Add `switch_stun_packet_verify_integrity()`, an HMAC-SHA1
MESSAGE-INTEGRITY verifier that is const and non-mutating: it runs
over a private copy of the pristine network-order packet, so the
caller's buffer and byte order stay untouched, and walks attributes
with its own unsigned bounded helper `stun_wire_attr_bounds()`
instead of the host-order iterator macros. A trailing
MESSAGE-INTEGRITY-SHA256 or FINGERPRINT after MESSAGE-INTEGRITY is
tolerated; any other trailing attribute is rejected.
Gate it in `handle_ice()` behind `ice->verify_integrity`: verify
before any ICE state is touched, keyed by message type (local
`ice->pass` for a request, remote `ice->rpass` for a response or
error response), and drop on failure. Keepalive indications carry no
MESSAGE-INTEGRITY and are ignored.
`ice->verify_integrity` is read from the `ice_verify_message_integrity`
channel variable in `switch_rtp_activate_ice()` and defaults off, so
receive-path behavior is unchanged unless it is enabled. Adds unit
tests in `tests/unit/switch_stun.c`.
* Merge commit from fork
* [core] Verify DTLS client cert against SDP fingerprint (server role)
Add opt-in verification of the client certificate when FreeSWITCH is
the DTLS server, mirroring the binding the client role already performs
on the server certificate: match the peer certificate against the SDP
`a=fingerprint` in `dtls_state_setup()`.
Selected per call by the `rtp_dtls_client_cert_verify_mode` channel
variable (`dtls_client_cert_verify_t`). An unset variable keeps the
default `DTLS_CLIENT_CERT_VERIFY_NONE`, so existing behavior is
unchanged:
- `none`: the server does not request a client certificate.
- `fingerprint`: request it (`SSL_VERIFY_PEER` + `dtls_accept_any_cert`)
and require its fingerprint to match the SDP value; a self-signed
certificate is accepted at the TLS layer and the match provides
authenticity.
- `full`: additionally let OpenSSL enforce the certificate chain.
An unrecognized mode string falls back to `fingerprint` (fail closed)
with a warning.
The mode is set per `SSL` object in `switch_rtp_add_dtls()`. Verification
fails (`DS_FAIL`, no SRTP keys derived) when the client presents no
certificate, its fingerprint does not match, or the peer advertised no
usable `a=fingerprint`: `get_evp_by_name()` returns `NULL` for a missing
or empty hash type and `switch_core_cert_extract_fingerprint()` rejects a
`NULL` algorithm rather than passing it to `X509_digest()`.
`conf/vanilla/vars.xml` documents the knob as a disabled example. Tests
in `tests/unit/switch_rtp.c` cover matching, mismatched, absent-cert,
absent-fingerprint, `none`, and unrecognized-mode cases.
---------
Co-authored-by: Andrey Volk <andywolk@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Chris Rienzo <chris@signalwire.com>
`read_packet()` passed a peer-supplied `Content-Length` straight to
`switch_zmalloc(body, clen + 1)`. Huge values drove `calloc` failure
and `switch_zmalloc` `abort()`-ed the daemon.
- Cap `Content-Length` at 16 MiB; reject negatives.
- Destroy the partially-built `*event` at the new rejection site and
at the existing body-recv failure path so callers don't leak it.
- Add `test_mod_event_socket` covering `INT_MAX`, above-cap,
negative, `atoi`-overflow, zero, and valid-non-zero-body cases.
Add `switch_stun_packet_verify_integrity()`, an HMAC-SHA1
MESSAGE-INTEGRITY verifier that is const and non-mutating: it runs
over a private copy of the pristine network-order packet, so the
caller's buffer and byte order stay untouched, and walks attributes
with its own unsigned bounded helper `stun_wire_attr_bounds()`
instead of the host-order iterator macros. A trailing
MESSAGE-INTEGRITY-SHA256 or FINGERPRINT after MESSAGE-INTEGRITY is
tolerated; any other trailing attribute is rejected.
Gate it in `handle_ice()` behind `ice->verify_integrity`: verify
before any ICE state is touched, keyed by message type (local
`ice->pass` for a request, remote `ice->rpass` for a response or
error response), and drop on failure. Keepalive indications carry no
MESSAGE-INTEGRITY and are ignored.
`ice->verify_integrity` is read from the `ice_verify_message_integrity`
channel variable in `switch_rtp_activate_ice()` and defaults off, so
receive-path behavior is unchanged unless it is enabled. Adds unit
tests in `tests/unit/switch_stun.c`.
A swig 4.1 regeneration dropped several hand-patched wrapper edits.
Express them (and the rest) as SWIG typemaps in `freeswitch.i` so they
survive reswig. `make reswig` now produces the final wrapper directly;
`hack.diff` and its `patch` step are removed.
Restored regressions:
- `setLUA(L)` on returned `Session`: a hangup hook or input callback on
a script-created `freeswitch.Session()` no longer crashes the process
- binary-safe `Stream::read` (`lua_pushlstring`)
Also moved to typemaps:
- `Dbh`/`JSON` self-pointer guards (`%typemap(check)`), now covering
every wrapper including four the hand-patch missed
- type-table isolation (`#define SWIG_TYPE_TABLE mod_lua`)
* [libesl] Validate `Content-Length` in `esl_recv_event`.
`atol()` accepted negative values, allowing a remote ESL peer to cause
a one-byte heap underwrite (`Content-Length: -1`) or NULL-pointer
dereference (`Content-Length: -2`, since `esl_assert` compiles out
under `NDEBUG`). Reject negative and oversized values, and check
`malloc` failure instead of relying on `assert`.
Cap at `ESL_MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH` (16 MiB).
* [libesl] Add test_recv_event.
Lower `CJSON_NESTING_LIMIT` from upstream default 1000 to 64 via
`SWITCH_AM_CFLAGS` / `SWITCH_AM_CXXFLAGS`. The mutually recursive
`parse_value`/`parse_array`/`parse_object` chain in cJSON consumes
~2 stack frames per nesting level, which can overflow worker
threads running on `SWITCH_THREAD_STACKSIZE` (240 KB).
In `check_auth()` the userauth branch committed request `userVariables`,
`JPFLAG_RESUME_CALL`, identity fields, `<user><params>`/`<variables>`,
`dialplan`, and `context` to `jsock` *before* the password compare. On
mismatch only `jsock->uid` was reverted; the rest persisted on the
socket and leaked into outbound/inbound INVITE setup and `jsapi`/event
publishes.
Restructure so the gate runs first: pre-scan `<user><params>` into
locals, compare, and on mismatch return FALSE with no `jsock` writes.
Identity/vars commits and `<user><params>`/`<variables>` persistence
move past the gate. Blind-reg short-circuit and
`req_params`/`x_user` ownership preserved on every exit; success-path
writes are bit-for-bit equivalent.
Side cleanups:
- "Login sucessful" → "Login successful" typo;
- success log WARNING → NOTICE;
- the spurious WARNING "Login sucessful" no longer fires on bad-password
attempts that located the user in the directory;
`process_jrpc()` called `set_session_id()` before `check_auth()`, so an
unauthenticated client could insert its jsock into `jsock_hash` under a
foreign `sessid` and have `attach_jsock()` evict the prior owner
(`verto.punt` + `detach_calls()` + `drop=1`) with no identity check.
Move the bind past the auth gate; `JPFLAG_INIT` now means "jsock is
bound", not "first frame seen". Additionally, `attach_jsock()` refuses
the bind when prior and new jsock are authed under different `uid`s,
replying `CODE_AUTH_FAILED` "Session in use". Same-uid reconnect and
no-auth profile binds are unchanged.
Unchecked `atoi()` on declared payload size let a client
request up to `INT_MAX`, forcing the server to write ~20 GB
per request via the download phase. Short `#` frames also
triggered OOB reads on `s[1..3]`.
- Gate `#` branch on `JPFLAG_AUTHED`.
- Cap declared size at 10 MiB (`VERTO_SPEED_TEST_MAX_SIZE`).
- Replace `atoi()` with bounded `strtol()`.
- Require `bytes >= 4` before indexing `s[1..3]`.
Cap `Content-Length` at `HTTP_POST_MAX_BODY` (10 MiB) and size the
allocation to the actual body length (`content_length + 1` for
the trailing NUL).
Also fix `WS_BLOCK` units — `kws_raw_read` takes ms, set to 10000.
Route IPv6 writes in `switch_stun_packet_attribute_add_binded_address`
and `switch_stun_packet_attribute_add_xor_binded_address` through
`switch_stun_ipv6_t` (16-byte `address[]`) instead of `switch_stun_ip_t`
(4-byte `uint32_t address`).
Add IPv4/IPv6 unit tests for both encoders.
Co-authored-by: Andrey Volk <andywolk@gmail.com>
Implement SIP 603+ (ATIS-1000099) support for FCC analytics-based call blocking compliance.
Detection:
- Detect incoming 603+ responses by checking "Network Blocked" phrase
and "v=analytics1;" in the `Reason` header text
- Set `sip_603plus_reason` channel variable on both legs for CDR visibility
Passthrough control:
- `sip_603plus_passthrough=true`: forward 603+ phrase and Reason header
- `sip_603plus_passthrough=false`: strip `Reason` header, send clean `603 Decline`
- Not set: existing behavior preserved
- Works independently of `disable_q850_reason` for selective forwarding
`sofia_process_dispatch_event_in_thread` allocated `td` from a memory pool,
then `sofia_msg_thread_run_once` destroyed that same pool after processing
the event — leaving `td` dangling when the thread pool worker accessed it.
Allocate `td` with `switch_zmalloc` (`td->alloc = 1`) so the worker frees it
safely after the function returns. Remove the now-unused `pool` field from
`sofia_dispatch_event_t`.
`switch_core_session_thread_pool_launch()` allocated the thread data (`td`)
from the session pool. However, `switch_core_session_thread()` destroys
the session pool before returning, leaving td as a dangling pointer.
The worker then accesses `td->running` and `td->pool` — a use-after-free
that crashes under memory pressure when the freed pool is reused.
Allocate `td` with `switch_zmalloc()` and set `td->alloc = 1` so the worker frees it
after the task completes. This ensures `td` outlives the session pool
destruction.
Changes:
- Snapshot `erl_errno` after `ei_xreceive_msg_tmo()` — outbound `ei_*` calls in the same loop iteration clobber the thread-local errno before the listener checks it, causing wrong exit decisions and misleading logs.
- Fix `switch_size_t ` cast of `int` in `ei_link`* — `(switch_size_t *)&index` reads/writes 8 bytes through a 4-byte `int` on LP64. Use a real `switch_size_t` local.
- Dispatch `ERL_NEWER_REFERENCE_EXT` — newer OTP encodes refs with this tag; spawn replies from modern nodes were silently dropped to the default branch.
- Handle `ERL_EXIT2` — processes killed via `erlang:exit/2` arrive with this tag, not `ERL_EXIT`. Without it, sessions stayed attached to dead Erlang pids.
- Modernize `-spec` syntax in `freeswitch.erl` — old `-spec(F/N :: (...))` form was removed in OTP 21+; module no longer compiled.
- Fix multiple memory issues:
- `ei_hash_ref()`: replace unbounded `sprintf` with `snprintf` + shared `EI_HASH_REF_LEN`.
- `handle_msg_sendevent` / `handle_msg_sendmsg`: free the heap `value` on `ei_decode_string` failure; remove dead `if (!fail)` branches.
- `listener_main_loop`: free `buf`/`rbuf` on the two `handle_msg` early-exit paths.
- `erlang_sendmsg_function` app: move `ei_x_new_with_version` past arg validation and add `ei_x_free` at the end.
