docs(m365): highlight key terms in check Risk descriptions (#12156)

prowler/changelog.d/m365-risk-field-formatting.changed.md

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Highlighted key security terms in the Risk description of 8 existing M365 checks

prowler/providers/m365/services/defender/defender_antispam_connection_filter_policy_safe_list_off/defender_antispam_connection_filter_policy_safe_list_off.metadata.json

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
   "ResourceType": "NotDefined",
   "ResourceGroup": "security",
   "Description": "**Microsoft Defender for Office 365 connection filter policy** safe list setting is evaluated. When enabled, mail from Microsoft-managed IPs skips spam filtering and some sender authentication. The finding indicates whether this implicit bypass is turned off.",
-  "Risk": "With the safe list on, inbound mail can bypass SPF/DKIM/DMARC and spam heuristics, allowing spoofed or phishing messages to reach inboxes. This risks credential theft (confidentiality), enables account takeover and tampering (integrity), and may lead to malware-driven outages (availability).",
+  "Risk": "With the safe list on, inbound mail can bypass SPF/DKIM/DMARC and spam heuristics, allowing spoofed or **phishing** messages to reach inboxes. This risks credential theft (confidentiality), enables account takeover and tampering (integrity), and may lead to malware-driven outages (availability).",
   "RelatedUrl": "",
   "AdditionalURLs": [
     "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/connection-filter-policies-configure",

prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_device_registration_mfa_required/entra_conditional_access_policy_device_registration_mfa_required.metadata.json

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
   "ResourceType": "NotDefined",
   "ResourceGroup": "IAM",
   "Description": "Microsoft Entra **Conditional Access** policies can require **multifactor authentication (MFA)** for **device registration** operations.\n\nThis control ensures users must complete MFA before **registering or joining devices** to the directory, reducing the likelihood that compromised credentials can be used to register rogue devices.",
-  "Risk": "Without MFA for device registration, attackers with stolen credentials could register unauthorized devices into the directory, gain persistence, and bypass compliance-based Conditional Access protections that rely on trusted device state.",
+  "Risk": "Without **MFA** for device registration, attackers with stolen credentials could register unauthorized devices into the directory, gain persistence, and bypass compliance-based **Conditional Access** protections that rely on trusted device state.",
   "RelatedUrl": "",
   "AdditionalURLs": [
     "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/policy-all-users-device-registration",

prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_directory_sync_account_excluded/entra_conditional_access_policy_directory_sync_account_excluded.metadata.json

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
   "ResourceType": "NotDefined",
   "ResourceGroup": "IAM",
   "Description": "Conditional Access policies scoped to **all users** and **all cloud applications** are evaluated to confirm the **Directory Synchronization Accounts** role is explicitly excluded. The Microsoft Entra Connect Sync Account does not support multifactor authentication, so it must be excluded from restrictive policies to maintain directory synchronization.",
-  "Risk": "If the Directory Synchronization Accounts role is not excluded from Conditional Access policies requiring MFA or blocking access, the Entra Connect Sync Account will be unable to authenticate. This breaks hybrid identity synchronization between on-premises Active Directory and Entra ID, potentially causing authentication failures and identity inconsistencies.",
+  "Risk": "If the Directory Synchronization Accounts role is not excluded from **Conditional Access** policies requiring **MFA** or blocking access, the Entra Connect Sync Account will be unable to authenticate. This breaks hybrid identity synchronization between **on-premises** Active Directory and Entra ID, potentially causing authentication failures and identity inconsistencies.",
   "RelatedUrl": "",
   "AdditionalURLs": [
     "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/howto-conditional-access-policy-all-users-mfa",

prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops/entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops.metadata.json

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
   "ResourceType": "NotDefined",
   "ResourceGroup": "IAM",
   "Description": "Microsoft Entra **Conditional Access** is verified to have at least one **enabled** policy that explicitly includes the **Azure DevOps** cloud application. Policies targeting **All** cloud apps do not satisfy this check because the goal is to verify that Azure DevOps has been deliberately considered.",
-  "Risk": "Without an explicit Conditional Access policy for Azure DevOps, organizations may rely on broad policies that do not account for Azure DevOps-specific access patterns such as CLI, IDE plug-ins, PAT-based workflows, source code access, build pipelines, secrets, and service connections.",
+  "Risk": "Without an explicit **Conditional Access** policy for Azure DevOps, organizations may rely on broad policies that do not account for Azure DevOps-specific access patterns such as CLI, IDE plug-ins, PAT-based workflows, source code access, build pipelines, secrets, and service connections.",
   "RelatedUrl": "",
   "AdditionalURLs": [
     "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/conditionalaccesspolicy?view=graph-rest-1.0",

prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references/entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references.metadata.json

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
   "ResourceType": "NotDefined",
   "ResourceGroup": "IAM",
   "Description": "Every object identifier referenced by any Conditional Access policy under conditions.users (includeUsers, excludeUsers, includeGroups, excludeGroups, includeRoles, excludeRoles) must resolve to an existing Microsoft Entra object. This check audits all Conditional Access policies regardless of state and reports any whose user, group, or role references no longer resolve in the directory.",
-  "Risk": "When a user, group, or directory role referenced by a Conditional Access policy stops resolving (account or group deleted, role template removed), the reference becomes orphaned. include* references silently shrink the policy's enforcement scope; exclude* references can cause the policy to evaluate unexpectedly. This is a common root cause of MFA-not-applied incidents.",
+  "Risk": "When a user, group, or directory role referenced by a **Conditional Access** policy stops resolving (account or group deleted, role template removed), the reference becomes orphaned. include* references silently shrink the policy's enforcement scope; exclude* references can cause the policy to evaluate unexpectedly. This is a common root cause of **MFA**-not-applied incidents.",
   "RelatedUrl": "",
   "AdditionalURLs": [
     "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/conditionalaccesspolicy?view=graph-rest-1.0",

prowler/providers/m365/services/entra/entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked/entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked.metadata.json

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
   "ResourceType": "NotDefined",
   "ResourceGroup": "IAM",
   "Description": "When on-premises directory synchronization is enabled, both blockSoftMatchEnabled and blockCloudObjectTakeoverThroughHardMatchEnabled must be true. Without these blocks, an attacker who can write to on-premises AD can craft an object that matches a privileged cloud account and take it over.",
-  "Risk": "An attacker with write access to on-premises Active Directory can create an object whose UPN, SMTP address, or ImmutableID matches an existing cloud-only account (e.g. Global Administrator). When the sync engine processes this object, it merges the on-premises identity into the cloud account, effectively granting the attacker full control of that privileged account.",
+  "Risk": "An attacker with write access to **on-premises** Active Directory can create an object whose UPN, SMTP address, or ImmutableID matches an existing cloud-only account (e.g. **Global Administrator**). When the sync engine processes this object, it merges the on-premises identity into the cloud account, effectively granting the attacker full control of that privileged account.",
   "RelatedUrl": "",
   "AdditionalURLs": [
     "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/onpremisesdirectorysynchronization?view=graph-rest-1.0",

prowler/providers/m365/services/intune/intune_device_compliance_policy_unassigned_devices_not_compliant_by_default/intune_device_compliance_policy_unassigned_devices_not_compliant_by_default.metadata.json

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
   "ResourceType": "NotDefined",
   "ResourceGroup": "security",
   "Description": "Intune has a built-in Device Compliance Policy that governs how devices without an explicit compliance policy are treated. When the default behavior marks those devices as Compliant, unmanaged devices can be treated as compliant and gain access to corporate resources. This check verifies the default is set to Not compliant (secureByDefault = true).",
-  "Risk": "If the built-in policy marks devices without a compliance policy as Compliant, those devices can bypass Conditional Access policies requiring device compliance, granting unauthorized access to corporate resources from unmanaged or non-compliant endpoints.",
+  "Risk": "If the built-in policy marks devices without a compliance policy as Compliant, those devices can bypass **Conditional Access** policies requiring device compliance, granting unauthorized access to corporate resources from unmanaged or non-compliant endpoints.",
   "RelatedUrl": "",
   "AdditionalURLs": [
     "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/intune-deviceconfig-devicemanagementsettings?view=graph-rest-1.0"

prowler/providers/m365/services/teams/teams_meeting_presenters_restricted/teams_meeting_presenters_restricted.metadata.json

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
   "ResourceType": "NotDefined",
   "ResourceGroup": "collaboration",
   "Description": "**Teams meeting policy** sets the default `Who can present` to **only organizers and co-organizers** in the org-wide policy.\n\nThis evaluates whether attendees are limited to the attendee role by default rather than joining as presenters.",
-  "Risk": "Allowing everyone to present enables unsolicited screen sharing and content uploads, causing data exposure (confidentiality), misleading or altered information during sessions (integrity), and meeting takeovers or disruptions (availability). External participants can exploit this to distribute phishing links or malware.",
+  "Risk": "Allowing everyone to present enables unsolicited screen sharing and content uploads, causing data exposure (confidentiality), misleading or altered information during sessions (integrity), and meeting takeovers or disruptions (availability). External participants can exploit this to distribute **phishing** links or malware.",
   "RelatedUrl": "",
   "AdditionalURLs": [
     "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoftteams/meeting-who-present-request-control"