mirror of
https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler.git
synced 2026-07-24 13:01:56 +00:00
initial version
This commit is contained in:
Andoni A.
@@ -336,6 +336,370 @@ _QUERY_DEFINITIONS: dict[str, list[AttackPathsQueryDefinition]] = {
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),
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],
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),
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# =====================================================================
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# Privilege Escalation Queries (based on pathfinding.cloud research)
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# Reference: https://github.com/DataDog/pathfinding.cloud
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# =====================================================================
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AttackPathsQueryDefinition(
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id="aws-iam-privesc-create-policy-version",
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name="Privilege Escalation: iam:CreatePolicyVersion",
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description="Detect principals with iam:CreatePolicyVersion permission who can modify policies attached to themselves or others, enabling privilege escalation by creating a new policy version with elevated permissions. This is a self-escalation path (pathfinding.cloud: iam-001).",
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provider="aws",
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cypher="""
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// Find principals with iam:CreatePolicyVersion permission
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MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {id: $provider_uid})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)
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// Find policies attached to the principal
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MATCH path_attached = (principal)--(attached_policy:AWSPolicy)
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WHERE attached_policy.type = 'Customer Managed'
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// Find policy statements that grant iam:CreatePolicyVersion
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MATCH path_perms = (principal)--(perms_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement)
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WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow'
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AND (
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any(action IN stmt.action WHERE
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toLower(action) = 'iam:createpolicyversion'
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OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*'
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OR action = '*'
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)
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)
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// Check resource constraints - can they modify the attached policy?
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AND (
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any(resource IN stmt.resource WHERE
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resource = '*'
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OR attached_policy.arn CONTAINS resource
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OR resource CONTAINS attached_policy.name
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)
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)
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// Create a virtual "Escalation" node to visualize the attack outcome
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CALL apoc.create.vNode(['PrivilegeEscalation'], {
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id: 'privesc-' + principal.arn,
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name: 'Effective Administrator',
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technique: 'iam:CreatePolicyVersion',
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severity: 'CRITICAL',
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reference: 'https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/iam-001'
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})
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YIELD node AS escalation_outcome
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CALL apoc.create.vRelationship(principal, 'CAN_ESCALATE_TO', {
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via: 'iam:CreatePolicyVersion',
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target_policy: attached_policy.arn
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}, escalation_outcome)
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YIELD rel AS escalation_rel
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UNWIND nodes(path_principal) + nodes(path_attached) + nodes(path_perms) as n
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OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:ProwlerFinding)
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WHERE pf.status = 'FAIL'
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RETURN path_principal, path_attached, path_perms,
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escalation_outcome, escalation_rel,
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collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr
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""",
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parameters=[],
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),
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AttackPathsQueryDefinition(
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id="aws-iam-privesc-attach-role-policy-assume-role",
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name="Privilege Escalation: iam:AttachRolePolicy + sts:AssumeRole",
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description="Detect principals who can both attach policies to roles AND assume those roles. This two-step attack allows modifying a role's permissions then assuming it to gain elevated access. This is a principal-access escalation path (pathfinding.cloud: iam-014).",
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provider="aws",
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cypher="""
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// Find principals in the account
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MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {id: $provider_uid})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)
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// Find statements granting iam:AttachRolePolicy
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MATCH path_attach = (principal)--(attach_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_attach:AWSPolicyStatement)
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WHERE stmt_attach.effect = 'Allow'
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AND any(action IN stmt_attach.action WHERE
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toLower(action) = 'iam:attachrolepolicy'
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OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*'
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OR action = '*'
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)
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// Find statements granting sts:AssumeRole
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MATCH path_assume = (principal)--(assume_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_assume:AWSPolicyStatement)
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WHERE stmt_assume.effect = 'Allow'
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AND any(action IN stmt_assume.action WHERE
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toLower(action) = 'sts:assumerole'
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OR toLower(action) = 'sts:*'
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OR action = '*'
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)
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// Find target roles that the principal can both modify AND assume
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MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)
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WHERE target_role.arn CONTAINS $provider_uid
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// Can attach policy to this role
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AND any(resource IN stmt_attach.resource WHERE
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resource = '*'
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OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource
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OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name
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)
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// Can assume this role
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AND any(resource IN stmt_assume.resource WHERE
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resource = '*'
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OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource
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OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name
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)
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// Create visualization of the escalation path
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CALL apoc.create.vNode(['PrivilegeEscalation'], {
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id: 'privesc-' + principal.arn + '-via-' + target_role.name,
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name: 'Effective Administrator',
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technique: 'iam:AttachRolePolicy + sts:AssumeRole',
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severity: 'CRITICAL',
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reference: 'https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/iam-014'
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})
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YIELD node AS escalation_outcome
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CALL apoc.create.vRelationship(principal, 'CAN_MODIFY', {
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via: 'iam:AttachRolePolicy'
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}, target_role)
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YIELD rel AS modify_rel
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CALL apoc.create.vRelationship(target_role, 'CAN_BE_ASSUMED_BY', {
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via: 'sts:AssumeRole'
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}, escalation_outcome)
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YIELD rel AS assume_rel
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UNWIND nodes(path_principal) + nodes(path_attach) + nodes(path_assume) + nodes(path_target) as n
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OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:ProwlerFinding)
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WHERE pf.status = 'FAIL'
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RETURN path_principal, path_attach, path_assume, path_target,
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escalation_outcome, modify_rel, assume_rel,
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collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr
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""",
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parameters=[],
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),
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AttackPathsQueryDefinition(
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id="aws-iam-privesc-passrole-ec2",
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name="Privilege Escalation: iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances",
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description="Detect principals who can launch EC2 instances with privileged IAM roles attached. This allows gaining the permissions of the passed role by accessing the EC2 instance metadata service. This is a new-passrole escalation path (pathfinding.cloud: ec2-001).",
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provider="aws",
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cypher="""
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// Find principals in the account
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MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {id: $provider_uid})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)
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// Find statements granting iam:PassRole
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MATCH path_passrole = (principal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement)
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WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow'
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AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE
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toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole'
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OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*'
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OR action = '*'
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)
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// Find statements granting ec2:RunInstances
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MATCH path_ec2 = (principal)--(ec2_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_ec2:AWSPolicyStatement)
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WHERE stmt_ec2.effect = 'Allow'
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AND any(action IN stmt_ec2.action WHERE
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toLower(action) = 'ec2:runinstances'
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OR toLower(action) = 'ec2:*'
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OR action = '*'
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)
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// Find roles that trust EC2 service (can be passed to EC2)
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MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)
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WHERE target_role.arn CONTAINS $provider_uid
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// Check if principal can pass this role
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AND any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE
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resource = '*'
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OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource
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OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name
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)
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// Check if target role has elevated permissions (optional, for severity assessment)
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OPTIONAL MATCH (target_role)--(role_policy:AWSPolicy)--(role_stmt:AWSPolicyStatement)
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WHERE role_stmt.effect = 'Allow'
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AND (
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any(action IN role_stmt.action WHERE action = '*')
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OR any(action IN role_stmt.action WHERE toLower(action) = 'iam:*')
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)
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// Create visualization
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CALL apoc.create.vNode(['EC2Instance'], {
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id: 'potential-ec2-' + principal.arn,
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name: 'New EC2 Instance',
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description: 'Attacker-controlled EC2 with privileged role'
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})
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YIELD node AS ec2_node
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CALL apoc.create.vNode(['PrivilegeEscalation'], {
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id: 'privesc-ec2-' + principal.arn + '-' + target_role.name,
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name: CASE WHEN role_stmt IS NOT NULL THEN 'Effective Administrator' ELSE 'Elevated Access' END,
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technique: 'iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances',
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severity: CASE WHEN role_stmt IS NOT NULL THEN 'CRITICAL' ELSE 'HIGH' END,
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reference: 'https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/ec2-001'
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})
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YIELD node AS escalation_outcome
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CALL apoc.create.vRelationship(principal, 'CAN_LAUNCH', {
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via: 'ec2:RunInstances + iam:PassRole'
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}, ec2_node)
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YIELD rel AS launch_rel
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CALL apoc.create.vRelationship(ec2_node, 'ASSUMES_ROLE', {}, target_role)
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YIELD rel AS assumes_rel
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CALL apoc.create.vRelationship(target_role, 'GRANTS_ACCESS', {}, escalation_outcome)
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YIELD rel AS grants_rel
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UNWIND nodes(path_principal) + nodes(path_passrole) + nodes(path_ec2) + nodes(path_target) as n
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OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:ProwlerFinding)
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WHERE pf.status = 'FAIL'
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RETURN path_principal, path_passrole, path_ec2, path_target,
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ec2_node, escalation_outcome, launch_rel, assumes_rel, grants_rel,
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collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr
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""",
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parameters=[],
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),
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AttackPathsQueryDefinition(
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id="aws-iam-privesc-passrole-lambda",
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name="Privilege Escalation: iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction + lambda:InvokeFunction",
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description="Detect principals who can create Lambda functions with privileged IAM roles and invoke them. This allows executing code with the permissions of the passed role. This is a new-passrole escalation path (pathfinding.cloud: lambda-001).",
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provider="aws",
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cypher="""
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// Find principals in the account
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MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {id: $provider_uid})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)
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// Find statements granting iam:PassRole
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MATCH path_passrole = (principal)--(passrole_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_passrole:AWSPolicyStatement)
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WHERE stmt_passrole.effect = 'Allow'
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AND any(action IN stmt_passrole.action WHERE
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toLower(action) = 'iam:passrole'
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OR toLower(action) = 'iam:*'
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OR action = '*'
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)
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// Find statements granting lambda:CreateFunction
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MATCH path_create = (principal)--(create_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_create:AWSPolicyStatement)
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WHERE stmt_create.effect = 'Allow'
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AND any(action IN stmt_create.action WHERE
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toLower(action) = 'lambda:createfunction'
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OR toLower(action) = 'lambda:*'
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OR action = '*'
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)
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// Find statements granting lambda:InvokeFunction
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MATCH path_invoke = (principal)--(invoke_policy:AWSPolicy)--(stmt_invoke:AWSPolicyStatement)
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WHERE stmt_invoke.effect = 'Allow'
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AND any(action IN stmt_invoke.action WHERE
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toLower(action) = 'lambda:invokefunction'
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OR toLower(action) = 'lambda:*'
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OR action = '*'
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)
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// Find roles that can be passed (ideally those trusting Lambda service)
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MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)
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WHERE target_role.arn CONTAINS $provider_uid
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AND any(resource IN stmt_passrole.resource WHERE
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resource = '*'
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OR target_role.arn CONTAINS resource
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OR resource CONTAINS target_role.name
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)
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// Check if target role has elevated permissions
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OPTIONAL MATCH (target_role)--(role_policy:AWSPolicy)--(role_stmt:AWSPolicyStatement)
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WHERE role_stmt.effect = 'Allow'
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AND (
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any(action IN role_stmt.action WHERE action = '*')
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OR any(action IN role_stmt.action WHERE toLower(action) = 'iam:*')
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)
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// Create visualization
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CALL apoc.create.vNode(['LambdaFunction'], {
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id: 'potential-lambda-' + principal.arn,
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name: 'New Lambda Function',
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description: 'Attacker-controlled Lambda with privileged role'
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})
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YIELD node AS lambda_node
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CALL apoc.create.vNode(['PrivilegeEscalation'], {
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id: 'privesc-lambda-' + principal.arn + '-' + target_role.name,
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name: CASE WHEN role_stmt IS NOT NULL THEN 'Effective Administrator' ELSE 'Elevated Access' END,
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technique: 'iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction + lambda:InvokeFunction',
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severity: CASE WHEN role_stmt IS NOT NULL THEN 'CRITICAL' ELSE 'HIGH' END,
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reference: 'https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/lambda-001'
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})
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YIELD node AS escalation_outcome
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CALL apoc.create.vRelationship(principal, 'CAN_CREATE_AND_INVOKE', {
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via: 'lambda:CreateFunction + lambda:InvokeFunction + iam:PassRole'
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}, lambda_node)
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YIELD rel AS create_rel
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CALL apoc.create.vRelationship(lambda_node, 'EXECUTES_AS', {}, target_role)
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YIELD rel AS executes_rel
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CALL apoc.create.vRelationship(target_role, 'GRANTS_ACCESS', {}, escalation_outcome)
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YIELD rel AS grants_rel
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UNWIND nodes(path_principal) + nodes(path_passrole) + nodes(path_create) + nodes(path_invoke) + nodes(path_target) as n
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OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:ProwlerFinding)
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WHERE pf.status = 'FAIL'
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RETURN path_principal, path_passrole, path_create, path_invoke, path_target,
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lambda_node, escalation_outcome, create_rel, executes_rel, grants_rel,
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collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr
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""",
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parameters=[],
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),
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AttackPathsQueryDefinition(
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id="aws-iam-privesc-role-chain",
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name="Privilege Escalation: Role Assumption Chains to Admin",
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description="Detect multi-hop role assumption chains where a principal can reach an administrative role through one or more intermediate role assumptions. This traces STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW relationships to find paths to privileged roles.",
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provider="aws",
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cypher="""
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// Find principals in the account
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MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {id: $provider_uid})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)
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// Find role assumption chains (1-5 hops) to roles with elevated permissions
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MATCH path_chain = (principal)-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW*1..5]->(target_role:AWSRole)
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// Target role must have administrative permissions
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MATCH path_admin = (target_role)--(admin_policy:AWSPolicy)--(admin_stmt:AWSPolicyStatement)
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WHERE admin_stmt.effect = 'Allow'
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AND (
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any(action IN admin_stmt.action WHERE action = '*')
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OR any(action IN admin_stmt.action WHERE toLower(action) = 'iam:*')
|
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OR any(action IN admin_stmt.action WHERE toLower(action) CONTAINS 'admin')
|
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)
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// Calculate chain length for visualization
|
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WITH principal, target_role, path_principal, path_chain, path_admin,
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length(path_chain) as chain_length,
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[node in nodes(path_chain) | node.name] as chain_nodes
|
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// Create escalation outcome visualization
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CALL apoc.create.vNode(['PrivilegeEscalation'], {
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id: 'privesc-chain-' + principal.arn + '-' + target_role.name,
|
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name: 'Effective Administrator',
|
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technique: 'sts:AssumeRole chain (' + toString(chain_length) + ' hops)',
|
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severity: CASE WHEN chain_length = 1 THEN 'CRITICAL' ELSE 'HIGH' END,
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chain_length: chain_length,
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chain_path: chain_nodes,
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reference: 'https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/sts-001'
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})
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YIELD node AS escalation_outcome
|
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|
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CALL apoc.create.vRelationship(target_role, 'GRANTS_ADMIN', {
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hops: chain_length
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}, escalation_outcome)
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YIELD rel AS admin_rel
|
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|
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UNWIND nodes(path_principal) + nodes(path_chain) + nodes(path_admin) as n
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OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr]-(pf:ProwlerFinding)
|
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WHERE pf.status = 'FAIL'
|
||||
|
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RETURN path_principal, path_chain, path_admin,
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escalation_outcome, admin_rel,
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chain_length, chain_nodes,
|
||||
collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr
|
||||
ORDER BY chain_length ASC
|
||||
""",
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||||
parameters=[],
|
||||
),
|
||||
],
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||||
}
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||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
services:
|
||||
api-dev:
|
||||
hostname: "prowler-api"
|
||||
image: prowler-api-dev
|
||||
# image: prowler-api-dev
|
||||
build:
|
||||
context: ./api
|
||||
dockerfile: Dockerfile
|
||||
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ services:
|
||||
retries: 10
|
||||
|
||||
worker-dev:
|
||||
image: prowler-api-dev
|
||||
# image: prowler-api-dev
|
||||
build:
|
||||
context: ./api
|
||||
dockerfile: Dockerfile
|
||||
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ services:
|
||||
- "worker"
|
||||
|
||||
worker-beat:
|
||||
image: prowler-api-dev
|
||||
# image: prowler-api-dev
|
||||
build:
|
||||
context: ./api
|
||||
dockerfile: Dockerfile
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -42,10 +42,10 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"section": "dependencies",
|
||||
"name": "@langchain/core",
|
||||
"from": "0.3.77",
|
||||
"to": "0.3.78",
|
||||
"from": "0.3.78",
|
||||
"to": "0.3.77",
|
||||
"strategy": "installed",
|
||||
"generatedAt": "2025-11-03T07:43:34.628Z"
|
||||
"generatedAt": "2026-01-07T08:46:39.109Z"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"section": "dependencies",
|
||||
|
||||
Generated
+48
-7
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
|
||||
"react-hook-form": "7.62.0",
|
||||
"react-markdown": "10.1.0",
|
||||
"recharts": "2.15.4",
|
||||
"require-in-the-middle": "8.0.1",
|
||||
"rss-parser": "3.13.0",
|
||||
"server-only": "0.0.1",
|
||||
"sharp": "0.33.5",
|
||||
@@ -5273,7 +5274,6 @@
|
||||
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@opentelemetry/instrumentation/-/instrumentation-0.203.0.tgz",
|
||||
"integrity": "sha512-ke1qyM+3AK2zPuBPb6Hk/GCsc5ewbLvPNkEuELx/JmANeEp6ZjnZ+wypPAJSucTw0wvCGrUaibDSdcrGFoWxKQ==",
|
||||
"license": "Apache-2.0",
|
||||
"peer": true,
|
||||
"dependencies": {
|
||||
"@opentelemetry/api-logs": "0.203.0",
|
||||
"import-in-the-middle": "^1.8.1",
|
||||
@@ -5495,6 +5495,20 @@
|
||||
"@opentelemetry/api": "^1.3.0"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"node_modules/@opentelemetry/instrumentation-ioredis/node_modules/require-in-the-middle": {
|
||||
"version": "7.5.2",
|
||||
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/require-in-the-middle/-/require-in-the-middle-7.5.2.tgz",
|
||||
"integrity": "sha512-gAZ+kLqBdHarXB64XpAe2VCjB7rIRv+mU8tfRWziHRJ5umKsIHN2tLLv6EtMw7WCdP19S0ERVMldNvxYCHnhSQ==",
|
||||
"license": "MIT",
|
||||
"dependencies": {
|
||||
"debug": "^4.3.5",
|
||||
"module-details-from-path": "^1.0.3",
|
||||
"resolve": "^1.22.8"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"engines": {
|
||||
"node": ">=8.6.0"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"node_modules/@opentelemetry/instrumentation-kafkajs": {
|
||||
"version": "0.13.0",
|
||||
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@opentelemetry/instrumentation-kafkajs/-/instrumentation-kafkajs-0.13.0.tgz",
|
||||
@@ -5696,6 +5710,20 @@
|
||||
"@opentelemetry/api": "^1.7.0"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"node_modules/@opentelemetry/instrumentation/node_modules/require-in-the-middle": {
|
||||
"version": "7.5.2",
|
||||
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/require-in-the-middle/-/require-in-the-middle-7.5.2.tgz",
|
||||
"integrity": "sha512-gAZ+kLqBdHarXB64XpAe2VCjB7rIRv+mU8tfRWziHRJ5umKsIHN2tLLv6EtMw7WCdP19S0ERVMldNvxYCHnhSQ==",
|
||||
"license": "MIT",
|
||||
"dependencies": {
|
||||
"debug": "^4.3.5",
|
||||
"module-details-from-path": "^1.0.3",
|
||||
"resolve": "^1.22.8"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"engines": {
|
||||
"node": ">=8.6.0"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"node_modules/@opentelemetry/redis-common": {
|
||||
"version": "0.38.2",
|
||||
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@opentelemetry/redis-common/-/redis-common-0.38.2.tgz",
|
||||
@@ -5848,6 +5876,20 @@
|
||||
"@opentelemetry/api": "^1.3.0"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"node_modules/@prisma/instrumentation/node_modules/require-in-the-middle": {
|
||||
"version": "7.5.2",
|
||||
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/require-in-the-middle/-/require-in-the-middle-7.5.2.tgz",
|
||||
"integrity": "sha512-gAZ+kLqBdHarXB64XpAe2VCjB7rIRv+mU8tfRWziHRJ5umKsIHN2tLLv6EtMw7WCdP19S0ERVMldNvxYCHnhSQ==",
|
||||
"license": "MIT",
|
||||
"dependencies": {
|
||||
"debug": "^4.3.5",
|
||||
"module-details-from-path": "^1.0.3",
|
||||
"resolve": "^1.22.8"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"engines": {
|
||||
"node": ">=8.6.0"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"node_modules/@prisma/instrumentation/node_modules/semver": {
|
||||
"version": "7.7.3",
|
||||
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/semver/-/semver-7.7.3.tgz",
|
||||
@@ -22881,17 +22923,16 @@
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"node_modules/require-in-the-middle": {
|
||||
"version": "7.5.2",
|
||||
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/require-in-the-middle/-/require-in-the-middle-7.5.2.tgz",
|
||||
"integrity": "sha512-gAZ+kLqBdHarXB64XpAe2VCjB7rIRv+mU8tfRWziHRJ5umKsIHN2tLLv6EtMw7WCdP19S0ERVMldNvxYCHnhSQ==",
|
||||
"version": "8.0.1",
|
||||
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/require-in-the-middle/-/require-in-the-middle-8.0.1.tgz",
|
||||
"integrity": "sha512-QT7FVMXfWOYFbeRBF6nu+I6tr2Tf3u0q8RIEjNob/heKY/nh7drD/k7eeMFmSQgnTtCzLDcCu/XEnpW2wk4xCQ==",
|
||||
"license": "MIT",
|
||||
"dependencies": {
|
||||
"debug": "^4.3.5",
|
||||
"module-details-from-path": "^1.0.3",
|
||||
"resolve": "^1.22.8"
|
||||
"module-details-from-path": "^1.0.3"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"engines": {
|
||||
"node": ">=8.6.0"
|
||||
"node": ">=9.3.0 || >=8.10.0 <9.0.0"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"node_modules/resolve": {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@
|
||||
"react-hook-form": "7.62.0",
|
||||
"react-markdown": "10.1.0",
|
||||
"recharts": "2.15.4",
|
||||
"require-in-the-middle": "8.0.1",
|
||||
"rss-parser": "3.13.0",
|
||||
"server-only": "0.0.1",
|
||||
"sharp": "0.33.5",
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user