mirror of
https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler.git
synced 2026-10-05 03:12:14 +00:00
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/PROWLER-1391-provider-contract-dynamic-discovery' into PROWLER-1771-public-dynamic-provider-class-resolver
# Conflicts: # prowler/providers/common/provider.py
This commit is contained in:
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ SENTRY_RELEASE=local
|
||||
NEXT_PUBLIC_SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT=${SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT}
|
||||
|
||||
#### Prowler release version ####
|
||||
NEXT_PUBLIC_PROWLER_RELEASE_VERSION=v5.29.0
|
||||
NEXT_PUBLIC_PROWLER_RELEASE_VERSION=v5.30.0
|
||||
|
||||
# Social login credentials
|
||||
SOCIAL_GOOGLE_OAUTH_CALLBACK_URL="${AUTH_URL}/api/auth/callback/google"
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ name = "prowler-api"
|
||||
package-mode = false
|
||||
# Needed for the SDK compatibility
|
||||
requires-python = ">=3.11,<3.13"
|
||||
version = "1.30.0"
|
||||
version = "1.31.0"
|
||||
|
||||
[tool.uv]
|
||||
# Transitive pins matching master to avoid silent drift; bump deliberately.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
openapi: 3.0.3
|
||||
info:
|
||||
title: Prowler API
|
||||
version: 1.30.0
|
||||
version: 1.31.0
|
||||
description: |-
|
||||
Prowler API specification.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Generated
+1
-1
@@ -4494,7 +4494,7 @@ dependencies = [
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "prowler-api"
|
||||
version = "1.30.0"
|
||||
version = "1.31.0"
|
||||
source = { virtual = "." }
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
{ name = "cartography" },
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ To update the environment file:
|
||||
Edit the `.env` file and change version values:
|
||||
|
||||
```env
|
||||
PROWLER_UI_VERSION="5.28.0"
|
||||
PROWLER_API_VERSION="5.28.0"
|
||||
PROWLER_UI_VERSION="5.29.0"
|
||||
PROWLER_API_VERSION="5.29.0"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
<Note>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -40,12 +40,6 @@ To install Prowler as a Python package, use `Python >= 3.10, <= 3.12`. Prowler i
|
||||
pip install prowler
|
||||
prowler -v
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
To upgrade Prowler to the latest version:
|
||||
|
||||
``` bash
|
||||
pip install --upgrade prowler
|
||||
```
|
||||
</Tab>
|
||||
<Tab title="Docker">
|
||||
_Requirements_:
|
||||
@@ -170,6 +164,68 @@ To install Prowler as a Python package, use `Python >= 3.10, <= 3.12`. Prowler i
|
||||
</Tab>
|
||||
</Tabs>
|
||||
|
||||
## Updating Prowler CLI
|
||||
|
||||
Upgrade Prowler CLI to the latest release using the same method chosen for installation:
|
||||
|
||||
<Tabs>
|
||||
<Tab title="pipx">
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
pipx upgrade prowler
|
||||
prowler -v
|
||||
```
|
||||
</Tab>
|
||||
<Tab title="pip">
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
pip install --upgrade prowler
|
||||
prowler -v
|
||||
```
|
||||
</Tab>
|
||||
<Tab title="Docker">
|
||||
Pull the desired image tag to fetch the latest version:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
docker pull toniblyx/prowler:latest
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
<Note>
|
||||
Replace `latest` with a specific release tag (for example, `stable` or `<x.y.z>`) to pin a version. Refer to the [Container Versions](#container-versions) section for the full list of available tags.
|
||||
</Note>
|
||||
</Tab>
|
||||
<Tab title="GitHub">
|
||||
Pull the latest changes and sync the environment:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
cd prowler
|
||||
git pull
|
||||
uv sync
|
||||
uv run python prowler-cli.py -v
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
<Note>
|
||||
To upgrade to a specific release, check out the corresponding tag before syncing: `git checkout <x.y.z>`.
|
||||
</Note>
|
||||
</Tab>
|
||||
<Tab title="Brew">
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
brew upgrade prowler
|
||||
prowler -v
|
||||
```
|
||||
</Tab>
|
||||
<Tab title="CloudShell">
|
||||
Both AWS CloudShell and Azure CloudShell install Prowler with `pipx`, so the upgrade command is the same:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
pipx upgrade prowler
|
||||
prowler -v
|
||||
```
|
||||
</Tab>
|
||||
</Tabs>
|
||||
|
||||
<Note>
|
||||
To install a specific version instead of the latest release, pin it explicitly. For example, with `pipx`: `pipx install prowler==<x.y.z>`, or with `pip`: `pip install prowler==<x.y.z>`. The available releases are listed in the [Releases GitHub section](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/releases).
|
||||
</Note>
|
||||
|
||||
## Container Versions
|
||||
|
||||
The available versions of Prowler CLI are the following:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -141,6 +141,45 @@ Choose one of the following installation methods:
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Updating Prowler MCP Server
|
||||
|
||||
When running Prowler MCP Server locally ("Option 2: Run Locally"), upgrade to the latest version using the same method chosen for installation. The hosted server (`https://mcp.prowler.com/mcp`) is always kept up to date by Prowler and requires no action.
|
||||
|
||||
<Tabs>
|
||||
<Tab title="Docker">
|
||||
Pull the latest image and restart the container:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
docker pull prowlercloud/prowler-mcp
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
<Note>
|
||||
Recreate any running container after pulling the new image so the updated version takes effect.
|
||||
</Note>
|
||||
</Tab>
|
||||
<Tab title="From Source">
|
||||
Pull the latest changes and sync the dependencies:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
cd prowler/mcp_server
|
||||
git pull
|
||||
uv sync
|
||||
uv run prowler-mcp --help
|
||||
```
|
||||
</Tab>
|
||||
<Tab title="Build Docker Image">
|
||||
Pull the latest source and rebuild the image:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
cd prowler/mcp_server
|
||||
git pull
|
||||
docker build -t prowler-mcp .
|
||||
```
|
||||
</Tab>
|
||||
</Tabs>
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Command Line Options
|
||||
|
||||
The Prowler MCP Server supports the following command-line arguments:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ All notable changes to the **Prowler SDK** are documented in this file.
|
||||
|
||||
### 🐞 Fixed
|
||||
|
||||
- Broken documentation URLs in Google Workspace check metadata [(#11405)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11405)
|
||||
- ENS RD 311/2022 (AWS) compliance mapping: `vpc_different_regions` was uncorrectly mapped under the `mp.com.4` family (Network segregation). That check is now mapped to a new `op.cont.2.aws.vpc.1` requirement under the Continuity of Service control [(#11372)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11372)
|
||||
- Compliance CSV row count now matches the UI per requirement by sourcing rows from the framework JSON's `requirement.Checks` instead of the stale `finding.compliance` snapshot [(#11370)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11370)
|
||||
- OpenStack provider exception codes moved from the `10000-10999` range, shared with the AlibabaCloud provider, to the free `17000-17999` range to keep error codes unambiguous [(#11382)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11382)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ class _MutableTimestamp:
|
||||
|
||||
timestamp = _MutableTimestamp(datetime.today())
|
||||
timestamp_utc = _MutableTimestamp(datetime.now(timezone.utc))
|
||||
prowler_version = "5.29.0"
|
||||
prowler_version = "5.30.0"
|
||||
html_logo_url = "https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/"
|
||||
square_logo_img = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/dc7d2d5aeb92fdf12e8604f42ef6472cd3e8e889/docs/img/prowler-logo-black.png"
|
||||
aws_logo = "https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/38561120/235953920-3e3fba08-0795-41dc-b480-9bea57db9f2e.png"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -438,7 +438,9 @@ class Compliance(BaseModel):
|
||||
# Built-in compliance from prowler/compliance/{provider}/
|
||||
available_compliance_framework_modules = list_compliance_modules()
|
||||
for compliance_framework in available_compliance_framework_modules:
|
||||
if provider in compliance_framework.name:
|
||||
# Match the provider segment exactly, not as a substring, so
|
||||
# e.g. `cloud` does not capture `cloudflare`.
|
||||
if compliance_framework.name.split(".")[-1] == provider:
|
||||
compliance_specification_dir_path = (
|
||||
f"{compliance_framework.module_finder.path}/{provider}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ and `prowler.providers.common.provider` without forming an import cycle.
|
||||
import importlib.metadata
|
||||
|
||||
from prowler.lib.check.external_tool_providers import EXTERNAL_TOOL_PROVIDERS
|
||||
from prowler.providers.common.builtin import is_builtin_provider
|
||||
|
||||
# Module-level cache for entry-point classes consulted by this helper.
|
||||
# Independent of `Provider._ep_providers` to keep this module leaf — the cost
|
||||
@@ -53,5 +54,9 @@ def is_tool_wrapper_provider(provider: str) -> bool:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if provider in EXTERNAL_TOOL_PROVIDERS:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
# Built-in wins: short-circuit before ep.load() so a same-name plug-in
|
||||
# cannot flip a built-in onto the tool-wrapper path or run its code.
|
||||
if is_builtin_provider(provider):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
cls = _load_ep_class(provider)
|
||||
return bool(cls and getattr(cls, "is_external_tool_provider", False))
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -289,9 +289,11 @@ class Provider(ABC):
|
||||
# plug-in is ignored. This lives here (not in get_class) so
|
||||
# that `prowler --help` and API callers that resolve a class
|
||||
# without initialising a global provider do not see spurious
|
||||
# warnings.
|
||||
if Provider.is_builtin(arguments.provider) and (
|
||||
Provider._load_ep_provider(arguments.provider) is not None
|
||||
# warnings. Match by name only — never ep.load() a shadowing
|
||||
# plug-in, or its module code would run during a built-in run.
|
||||
if Provider.is_builtin(arguments.provider) and any(
|
||||
ep.name == arguments.provider
|
||||
for ep in importlib.metadata.entry_points(group="prowler.providers")
|
||||
):
|
||||
logger.warning(
|
||||
f"Plug-in provider '{arguments.provider}' registered "
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "When external Google Groups access is enabled, users can access and participate in groups created **outside the organization**, potentially exposing them to **phishing, social engineering, or data leakage** through unmanaged external group communications.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/181865",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/advanced/turn-on-or-off-additional-google-services",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-3
@@ -13,9 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Without external invitation warnings, users may unintentionally include **external guests** in internal meetings, exposing **confidential meeting details**, agendas, and internal attendee lists to unauthorized parties. This is a common vector for inadvertent data leakage through everyday calendar actions.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/6329284",
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/calendar/set-google-calendar-sharing-options",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/calendar/allow-external-invitations-in-google-calendar-events",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-2
@@ -13,9 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Overly permissive external sharing of primary calendars exposes **sensitive meeting metadata** — titles, attendees, locations, and descriptions — to users outside the organization. This increases the risk of **information disclosure**, **social engineering**, and **targeted phishing** based on insights into organizational activities.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/60765",
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/calendar/set-google-calendar-sharing-options",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-2
@@ -13,9 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Overly permissive external sharing of secondary calendars exposes **project-specific or team-specific event details** to users outside the organization. Because secondary calendars often hold more targeted activities (e.g., product launches, internal reviews), unrestricted external sharing increases the risk of **information disclosure** and **competitive intelligence leakage**.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/60765",
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/calendar/set-google-calendar-sharing-options",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Unrestricted Chat app installation allows **unvetted third-party applications** to access user data including conversation content and organizational information. An attacker could distribute a malicious Chat app to **exfiltrate confidential data** or establish **persistent access** to internal communications.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/6089179",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/apps/manage-the-marketplace-app-allowlist-for-your-organization",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Enabled external file sharing allows users to send files containing **confidential information** to external parties through Chat. This creates a **data leakage** channel that bypasses DLP controls, particularly dangerous for organizations handling **regulated data** such as PII, PHI, or financial records.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9540647",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/chat/set-up-chat-for-your-organization",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Unrestricted external messaging allows users to communicate freely with **any external party**, increasing the risk of **data exfiltration** through conversation content and **social engineering attacks** from untrusted domains targeting internal users.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9540647",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/chat/set-up-chat-for-your-organization",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Unrestricted external spaces allow users to add **anyone from any domain** to persistent group conversations. This increases the risk of **confidential information exposure** in shared spaces and enables **unauthorized external access** to ongoing organizational discussions.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9540647",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/chat/set-up-chat-for-your-organization",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Exposed webhook URLs allow **unauthorized content injection** into Chat spaces. Attackers can send **fraudulent or misleading messages** that appear to come from trusted services, creating a vector for **social engineering** and **phishing** within internal communications.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/6089179",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/apps/manage-the-marketplace-app-allowlist-for-your-organization",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Unrestricted internal file sharing in Chat allows files with **sensitive information** to be distributed freely without passing through approved channels. This undermines **data governance** and **audit trail** requirements, making it harder to track data movement within the organization.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9540647",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/chat/set-up-chat-for-your-organization",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/prebuilt-administrator-roles",
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9011373"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/security-best-practices-for-administrator-accounts"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/prebuilt-administrator-roles",
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9011373"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/security-best-practices-for-administrator-accounts"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "If Access Checker suggests broader audiences or public visibility, users may **inadvertently widen access** to a file beyond the people they intended to share with. This is a common cause of unintentional internal or external over-sharing.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/60781",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-external-sharing-for-your-organization",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "When Drive for desktop is enabled, organizational files are **synchronized to local devices** and remain accessible if the device is lost, stolen, or compromised. Because Drive for desktop bypasses the central offline-access controls, this channel is a frequently overlooked path for sensitive data to leave organization-managed environments.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7491144",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/set-up-drive-for-desktop-for-your-organization",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Without external sharing warnings, users may unintentionally share **sensitive documents** with external recipients who are not entitled to the data. This is a common vector for inadvertent leakage of intellectual property, personally identifiable information, and confidential business data through routine Drive sharing.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/60781",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-external-sharing-for-your-organization",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "If external users can move files from internal shared drives into shared drives owned by another organization, the organization **loses authoritative control** over its own data. This is a frequently overlooked path for unintentional or malicious data exfiltration through shared drive collaboration.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/60781",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-external-sharing-for-your-organization",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Allowing users to publish Drive files to the web creates a path for **unbounded data exposure**. Sensitive documents, intellectual property, customer data, or internal communications can be made publicly accessible — and indexed by search engines — with a single click, often unintentionally.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/60781",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-external-sharing-for-your-organization",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "When users cannot create shared drives, they store collaborative content in their personal **My Drive** instead. When that user account is deleted, the data is also deleted, leading to **unintentional data loss** of organizationally significant information. Allowing shared drive creation makes data survivable across account lifecycle events.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7212025",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/users/answer/7212025",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "When viewers and commenters can download, print, or copy shared drive files, they can **bulk-extract sensitive content** — including intellectual property, personally identifiable information, and confidential business documents — using nothing more than read access. This is one of the most direct paths to data exfiltration through Drive.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7662202",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-shared-drives-as-an-admin",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "If shared drive managers can override organizational defaults, **unauthorized data exposure** can occur when a manager intentionally or accidentally weakens a shared drive's security posture (for example, allowing external members or enabling download for viewers).",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7662202",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-shared-drives-as-an-admin",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "If non-members can be added to files inside a shared drive, the **drive's membership becomes meaningless** as a security control. Sensitive content scoped to a specific team can be silently extended to users who were never granted access to the drive itself, leading to unintended information disclosure.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7662202",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-shared-drives-as-an-admin",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "When external sharing is unrestricted, users can share organizational content with **any external Google account**, including untrusted or unknown parties. Restricting sharing to allowlisted domains drastically reduces the surface area for accidental and malicious data exfiltration through Drive.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/60781",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-external-sharing-for-your-organization",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Allowlisted domains are still external. Users may not realize that even an allowlisted recipient is outside the organization, leading to **unintentional disclosure of sensitive content** to legitimate but external collaborators. A warning prompt at share time mitigates that without preventing the sharing itself.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/60781",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-external-sharing-for-your-organization",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Without protection against anomalous attachment types, users may receive **emails with unusual file formats** that are designed to bypass standard security filters. Attackers may use **uncommon file extensions or MIME types** to deliver malware that evades signature-based detection.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7676854",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/set-up-rules-to-detect-harmful-attachments",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "With auto-forwarding enabled, an attacker who gains control of a user account can create **forwarding rules to exfiltrate** all incoming email to an external address. This can persist undetected and provide the attacker with continuous access to sensitive communications even after the account is recovered.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/2491924",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/let-users-automatically-forward-their-own-gmail-emails",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Without comprehensive mail storage, messages sent through other Google services (Calendar, Drive, etc.) may not be stored in Gmail and therefore **not subject to Vault retention policies**. This creates gaps in **compliance coverage**, **eDiscovery**, and **audit trails** that could violate regulatory requirements.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/3547347",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/set-up-comprehensive-mail-storage",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Without protection against domain spoofing based on similar domain names, users may receive **phishing emails from lookalike domains** (e.g., examp1e.com instead of example.com) that appear legitimate. This enables **credential theft, malware delivery, and business email compromise** attacks.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9157861",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/advanced-phishing-and-malware-protection",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Without protection against employee name spoofing, users may receive **emails that appear to come from colleagues or executives** but are actually from external attackers. This enables **business email compromise (BEC)**, **wire fraud**, and **social engineering attacks** that exploit trust relationships.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9157861",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/advanced-phishing-and-malware-protection",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Without protection against encrypted attachments from untrusted senders, users may receive **password-protected archives containing malware** that bypass standard content scanning. Attackers commonly use encrypted attachments to evade detection and deliver **ransomware, trojans, or other malicious payloads**.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7676854",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/set-up-rules-to-detect-harmful-attachments",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Without enhanced pre-delivery scanning, some **sophisticated phishing and malware** messages may pass through standard filters and be delivered to users. The additional scanning layer catches threats that the first-pass filters miss, reducing the organization's exposure to **zero-day phishing campaigns** and **targeted attacks**.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7380368",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/help-prevent-phishing-with-pre-delivery-message-scanning",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Without external image scanning, attackers can use **linked images to track email opens**, deliver **exploit payloads via image rendering vulnerabilities**, or use images as part of sophisticated **phishing schemes** that mimic legitimate communications.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7676854",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/advanced-phishing-and-malware-protection",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Without protection of groups from domain-spoofing emails, attackers can send **spoofed messages to group mailboxes** that appear to originate from the organization. Since groups distribute to many recipients, a single spoofed email can enable **mass phishing, social engineering, or misinformation** campaigns across the organization.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9157861",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/advanced-phishing-and-malware-protection",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Without protection against inbound domain spoofing, users may receive **emails that appear to come from their own organization** but are sent by external attackers. This enables **internal impersonation**, **phishing**, and **business email compromise** attacks that exploit trust in internal communications.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9157861",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/advanced-phishing-and-malware-protection",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "If users can delegate access to their mailbox, an attacker who compromises one account could silently delegate access to maintain persistent email surveillance. This also increases the risk of **insider threats** and **data exfiltration** through shared mailbox access.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7223765",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/let-users-delegate-access-to-a-gmail-account",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "With per-user outbound gateways enabled, users can route outbound email through **external SMTP servers**, bypassing organizational **email security controls**, **DLP policies**, and **audit logging**. This creates an unmonitored channel for data exfiltration and policy circumvention.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/176652",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/allow-per-user-outbound-gateways",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "With POP and IMAP enabled, users can access email through **legacy clients** that rely on simple password authentication, bypassing **multifactor authentication** and other modern security controls. This significantly increases the risk of **credential-based account compromise**.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/105694",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/sync/turn-pop-and-imap-on-or-off-for-users",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Without protection against script-bearing attachments from untrusted senders, users may receive **files containing malicious scripts** that can execute harmful code when opened. Attackers commonly use script attachments to deliver **malware, backdoors, or credential stealers**.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7676854",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/set-up-rules-to-detect-harmful-attachments",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Without shortened URL scanning, attackers can use **URL shortening services** to hide malicious destinations in phishing emails. Users cannot visually verify where the link leads, increasing the success rate of **phishing and credential harvesting** attacks.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7676854",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/advanced-phishing-and-malware-protection",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Without protection against unauthenticated emails, users may receive **spoofed or forged messages** that fail SPF and DKIM checks but are still delivered normally. This enables **phishing**, **spam**, and **impersonation attacks** that exploit the lack of sender verification.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9157861",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/advanced-phishing-and-malware-protection",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Without untrusted link warnings, users may click on **phishing links** or links to **malware distribution sites** without any warning. This significantly increases the success rate of **social engineering attacks** targeting the organization.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7676854",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/advanced-phishing-and-malware-protection",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Allowing any user to create groups with external members or incoming email from outside increases the risk of **unauthorized data sharing**, **spam delivery**, and **shadow IT** groups that bypass organizational controls.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/10308022",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/groups/what-you-get-with-groups-for-business",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Allowing external access to groups exposes **group names, descriptions, and membership** to anyone outside the organization, increasing the risk of **information disclosure** and enabling external parties to identify targets for **social engineering attacks**.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/10308022",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/groups/what-you-get-with-groups-for-business",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Allowing all organization users or anyone to view group conversations can lead to **information disclosure** of sensitive discussions, internal decisions, and confidential data shared within groups.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/10308022",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/groups/what-you-get-with-groups-for-business",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "Allowing unrestricted Marketplace app installation exposes the organization to **unvetted third-party applications** that may request broad OAuth scopes, potentially gaining access to **sensitive organizational data** including emails, documents, and calendar events without proper security review.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/6089179",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/apps/manage-the-marketplace-app-allowlist-for-your-organization",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/protect-your-business-with-2-step-verification",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/protect-your-business-with-2-step-verification",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/protect-users-with-the-advanced-protection-program",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/apps/control-which-apps-access-google-workspace-data",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/about-dlp",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/apps/control-which-apps-access-google-workspace-data",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/apps/control-access-to-less-secure-apps",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/protect-google-workspace-accounts-with-security-challenges",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/enforce-and-monitor-password-requirements-for-users",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/set-session-length-for-google-services",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/allow-super-administrators-to-recover-their-password",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/set-up-password-recovery-for-users",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
|
||||
"Risk": "When Google Sites is enabled, users can create websites that may **inadvertently expose internal information** to external parties. These sites can be difficult to track and manage, creating potential **data leakage vectors** outside the organization's standard content management controls.",
|
||||
"RelatedUrl": "",
|
||||
"AdditionalURLs": [
|
||||
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/182442",
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/advanced/turn-a-service-on-or-off-for-google-workspace-users",
|
||||
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"Remediation": {
|
||||
"Code": {
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ maintainers = [{name = "Prowler Engineering", email = "engineering@prowler.com"}
|
||||
name = "prowler"
|
||||
readme = "README.md"
|
||||
requires-python = ">=3.10,<3.13"
|
||||
version = "5.29.0"
|
||||
version = "5.30.0"
|
||||
|
||||
[project.scripts]
|
||||
prowler = "prowler.__main__:prowler"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -540,7 +540,9 @@ class TestCompliance:
|
||||
):
|
||||
object = mock.Mock()
|
||||
object.path = "/path/to/compliance"
|
||||
object.name = "framework1_aws"
|
||||
# list_compliance_modules yields dotted module names; get_bulk matches
|
||||
# the last segment exactly against the provider.
|
||||
object.name = "prowler.compliance.aws"
|
||||
mock_list_modules.return_value = [object]
|
||||
|
||||
mock_listdir.return_value = ["framework1_aws.json"]
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -70,6 +70,20 @@ class TestIsToolWrapperProvider:
|
||||
|
||||
assert is_tool_wrapper_provider("does-not-exist") is False
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("prowler.lib.check.tool_wrapper.importlib.metadata.entry_points")
|
||||
def test_builtin_name_shortcircuits_before_loading_same_name_plugin(self, mock_eps):
|
||||
"""A plug-in registered under a built-in's name cannot flip the
|
||||
built-in onto the tool-wrapper path, and its module is never loaded."""
|
||||
from prowler.lib.check.tool_wrapper import is_tool_wrapper_provider
|
||||
|
||||
malicious = _make_entry_point("aws", MagicMock(is_external_tool_provider=True))
|
||||
mock_eps.return_value = [malicious]
|
||||
|
||||
# `aws` is a built-in, so classification short-circuits to False...
|
||||
assert is_tool_wrapper_provider("aws") is False
|
||||
# ...and the shadowing plug-in's code is never executed via ep.load().
|
||||
malicious.load.assert_not_called()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestLoadEpClass:
|
||||
"""_load_ep_class: cache, broken plug-ins, no-match."""
|
||||
|
||||
+77
-10
@@ -663,22 +663,25 @@ class TestProviderInitialization:
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.logger")
|
||||
@patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.load_and_validate_config_file")
|
||||
@patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider._load_ep_provider")
|
||||
@patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.importlib.metadata.entry_points")
|
||||
@patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.import_module")
|
||||
@patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.is_builtin")
|
||||
def test_init_global_provider_warns_when_plugin_shadowed_by_builtin(
|
||||
self, mock_is_builtin, mock_import, mock_load_ep, mock_config, mock_logger
|
||||
self, mock_is_builtin, mock_import, mock_entry_points, mock_config, mock_logger
|
||||
):
|
||||
"""Regression guard: when a plug-in registers a provider name that
|
||||
collides with a built-in, the BUILT-IN wins and a warning is emitted
|
||||
naming the shadowed plug-in. Matches the precedence enforced by
|
||||
`_resolve_check_module` and `CheckMetadata.get_bulk` for checks. See
|
||||
PR #10700 review (HugoPBrito).
|
||||
naming the shadowed plug-in. Shadow detection matches by entry-point
|
||||
name only — the plug-in is never `ep.load()`-ed just to warn, so its
|
||||
module code cannot run during a built-in run. See PR #10700 review
|
||||
(HugoPBrito, Alan-TheGentleman).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
# Simulate a built-in `aws` that exists, AND a plug-in registered
|
||||
# under the same `aws` name via entry points.
|
||||
mock_is_builtin.return_value = True
|
||||
mock_load_ep.return_value = FakeExternalProvider # plug-in shadow
|
||||
shadow_ep = MagicMock()
|
||||
shadow_ep.name = "aws" # plug-in shadowing the built-in name
|
||||
mock_entry_points.return_value = [shadow_ep]
|
||||
mock_import.return_value = MagicMock(
|
||||
AwsProvider=MagicMock(side_effect=lambda **_kw: None)
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -723,6 +726,8 @@ class TestProviderInitialization:
|
||||
]
|
||||
assert warning_msgs, "expected a warning about the shadowed plug-in 'aws'"
|
||||
assert "IGNORED" in warning_msgs[0]
|
||||
# Shadow detected by name only — plug-in code never executed to warn
|
||||
shadow_ep.load.assert_not_called()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ===========================================================================
|
||||
@@ -1354,6 +1359,63 @@ class TestCompliance:
|
||||
|
||||
assert "dup_framework" in bulk
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
||||
"provider, framework_segments",
|
||||
[
|
||||
# `cloud` is a substring of THREE built-in modules at once.
|
||||
("cloud", ["alibabacloud", "cloudflare", "oraclecloud"]),
|
||||
("git", ["github"]),
|
||||
("work", ["googleworkspace"]),
|
||||
("open", ["openstack"]),
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
@patch("prowler.lib.check.compliance_models.importlib.metadata.entry_points")
|
||||
@patch("prowler.lib.check.compliance_models.list_compliance_modules")
|
||||
def test_compliance_get_bulk_matches_provider_segment_exactly(
|
||||
self, mock_list_modules, mock_ep, provider, framework_segments
|
||||
):
|
||||
"""Regression: a provider whose name is a substring of one or more
|
||||
framework modules must NOT load them. The old `provider in name`
|
||||
check captured overlapping built-ins (e.g. `cloud` matched
|
||||
alibabacloud, cloudflare and oraclecloud). See PR #10700 review
|
||||
(Alan-TheGentleman).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
|
||||
from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance
|
||||
|
||||
mock_ep.return_value = []
|
||||
|
||||
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
|
||||
# The substring path the old code would have read from.
|
||||
os.mkdir(os.path.join(tmpdir, provider))
|
||||
json_data = {
|
||||
"Framework": "Custom",
|
||||
"Name": f"Should not load for '{provider}'",
|
||||
"Version": "1.0",
|
||||
"Provider": provider,
|
||||
"Description": "Test",
|
||||
"Requirements": [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
with open(os.path.join(tmpdir, provider, "wrong.json"), "w") as f:
|
||||
json.dump(json_data, f)
|
||||
|
||||
modules = []
|
||||
for segment in framework_segments:
|
||||
module = MagicMock()
|
||||
module.name = f"prowler.compliance.{segment}"
|
||||
module.module_finder.path = tmpdir
|
||||
modules.append(module)
|
||||
mock_list_modules.return_value = modules
|
||||
|
||||
bulk = Compliance.get_bulk(provider)
|
||||
|
||||
# Exact-segment match: the provider is not any of these modules.
|
||||
assert "wrong" not in bulk
|
||||
assert bulk == {}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ===========================================================================
|
||||
# 7. Parser
|
||||
@@ -2104,11 +2166,11 @@ class TestGetClass:
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.load_and_validate_config_file")
|
||||
@patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider._load_ep_provider")
|
||||
@patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.importlib.metadata.entry_points")
|
||||
@patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.import_module")
|
||||
@patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.is_builtin")
|
||||
def test_init_global_provider_emits_collision_warning_for_builtin_ep_shadow(
|
||||
self, mock_is_builtin, mock_import, mock_load_ep, mock_config, caplog
|
||||
self, mock_is_builtin, mock_import, mock_entry_points, mock_config, caplog
|
||||
):
|
||||
"""init_global_provider (not get_class) emits the collision warning
|
||||
when a built-in provider has a same-named entry-point plug-in registered.
|
||||
@@ -2117,13 +2179,16 @@ class TestGetClass:
|
||||
the warning responsibility moved OUT of get_class and INTO
|
||||
init_global_provider, so users still see the message on CLI invocation
|
||||
but prowler --help and API calls (which never hit init_global_provider)
|
||||
do not spuriously emit it.
|
||||
do not spuriously emit it. The shadow is detected by entry-point name
|
||||
only — the plug-in is never loaded to warn.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import logging
|
||||
import types
|
||||
|
||||
mock_is_builtin.return_value = True
|
||||
mock_load_ep.return_value = FakeExternalProvider # plug-in shadow
|
||||
shadow_ep = MagicMock()
|
||||
shadow_ep.name = "aws" # plug-in shadowing the built-in name
|
||||
mock_entry_points.return_value = [shadow_ep]
|
||||
|
||||
fake_module = types.ModuleType("fake_builtin_module")
|
||||
fake_module.AwsProvider = MagicMock(side_effect=lambda **_kw: None)
|
||||
@@ -2169,3 +2234,5 @@ class TestGetClass:
|
||||
"init_global_provider must emit the collision warning when a "
|
||||
"same-named EP plug-in exists for a built-in provider"
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Shadow detected by name only — the plug-in is never loaded to warn.
|
||||
shadow_ep.load.assert_not_called()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -34,4 +34,13 @@ describe("providers page", () => {
|
||||
expect(source).toContain("size: 160");
|
||||
expect(source).toContain("size: 140");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("keeps the CLI import banner gated by the Cloud environment", () => {
|
||||
const currentDir = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
|
||||
const pagePath = path.join(currentDir, "page.tsx");
|
||||
const source = readFileSync(pagePath, "utf8");
|
||||
|
||||
expect(source).toContain("NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV");
|
||||
expect(source).toContain("{isCloudEnvironment && <CliImportBanner");
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { Suspense } from "react";
|
||||
|
||||
import { ProvidersAccountsView } from "@/components/providers";
|
||||
import { SkeletonTableProviders } from "@/components/providers/table";
|
||||
import { CliImportBanner } from "@/components/scans";
|
||||
import { Skeleton } from "@/components/shadcn/skeleton/skeleton";
|
||||
import { ContentLayout } from "@/components/ui";
|
||||
import { FilterTransitionWrapper } from "@/contexts";
|
||||
@@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ export default async function Providers({
|
||||
}) {
|
||||
const resolvedSearchParams = await searchParams;
|
||||
const activeTab = getProviderTab(resolvedSearchParams.tab);
|
||||
const isCloudEnvironment = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV === "true";
|
||||
|
||||
// Exclude `tab` from the Suspense key so switching tabs doesn't re-suspend
|
||||
const { tab: _, ...paramsWithoutTab } = resolvedSearchParams || {};
|
||||
@@ -26,6 +28,7 @@ export default async function Providers({
|
||||
|
||||
return (
|
||||
<ContentLayout title="Providers" icon="lucide:cloud-cog">
|
||||
{isCloudEnvironment && <CliImportBanner className="mb-6" />}
|
||||
<FilterTransitionWrapper>
|
||||
<ProviderPageTabs
|
||||
activeTab={activeTab}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import type { ComponentProps } from "react";
|
||||
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
|
||||
|
||||
import { useProviderWizardStore } from "@/store/provider-wizard/store";
|
||||
import { SCAN_JOBS_TAB } from "@/types";
|
||||
|
||||
import { LaunchStep } from "./launch-step";
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -81,5 +82,9 @@ describe("LaunchStep", () => {
|
||||
title: "Scan Launched",
|
||||
}),
|
||||
);
|
||||
const toastPayload = toastMock.mock.calls[0]?.[0];
|
||||
expect(toastPayload.action.props.children.props.href).toBe(
|
||||
`/scans?tab=${SCAN_JOBS_TAB.ACTIVE}`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import { Spinner } from "@/components/shadcn/spinner/spinner";
|
||||
import { TreeStatusIcon } from "@/components/shadcn/tree-view/tree-status-icon";
|
||||
import { ToastAction, useToast } from "@/components/ui";
|
||||
import { useProviderWizardStore } from "@/store/provider-wizard/store";
|
||||
import { SCAN_JOBS_TAB } from "@/types";
|
||||
import { TREE_ITEM_STATUS } from "@/types/tree";
|
||||
|
||||
import {
|
||||
@@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ export function LaunchStep({
|
||||
: "Single scan launched successfully.",
|
||||
action: (
|
||||
<ToastAction altText="Go to scans" asChild>
|
||||
<Link href="/scans">Go to scans</Link>
|
||||
<Link href={`/scans?tab=${SCAN_JOBS_TAB.ACTIVE}`}>Go to scans</Link>
|
||||
</ToastAction>
|
||||
),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
|
||||
import { render, screen } from "@testing-library/react";
|
||||
import userEvent from "@testing-library/user-event";
|
||||
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
|
||||
|
||||
import { DOCS_URLS } from "@/lib/external-urls";
|
||||
|
||||
import { CliImportBanner } from "./cli-import-banner";
|
||||
|
||||
const STORAGE_KEY = "prowler:cli-import-banner-dismissed";
|
||||
|
||||
const localStorageMock = (() => {
|
||||
let store: Record<string, string> = {};
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
getItem: vi.fn((key: string) => store[key] ?? null),
|
||||
setItem: vi.fn((key: string, value: string) => {
|
||||
store[key] = value;
|
||||
}),
|
||||
removeItem: vi.fn((key: string) => {
|
||||
delete store[key];
|
||||
}),
|
||||
clear: vi.fn(() => {
|
||||
store = {};
|
||||
}),
|
||||
get length() {
|
||||
return Object.keys(store).length;
|
||||
},
|
||||
key: vi.fn((index: number) => Object.keys(store)[index] ?? null),
|
||||
};
|
||||
})();
|
||||
|
||||
Object.defineProperty(window, "localStorage", {
|
||||
value: localStorageMock,
|
||||
writable: true,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("CliImportBanner", () => {
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
localStorageMock.clear();
|
||||
vi.clearAllMocks();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("renders the banner when not dismissed", () => {
|
||||
render(<CliImportBanner />);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
screen.getByText(/Import findings from Prowler CLI/),
|
||||
).toBeInTheDocument();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("renders a link to the documentation", () => {
|
||||
render(<CliImportBanner />);
|
||||
|
||||
const link = screen.getByRole("link", { name: "Learn more" });
|
||||
|
||||
expect(link).toHaveAttribute("href", DOCS_URLS.FINDINGS_INGESTION);
|
||||
expect(link).toHaveAttribute("target", "_blank");
|
||||
expect(link).toHaveAttribute("rel", "noopener noreferrer");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("does not render when previously dismissed", () => {
|
||||
localStorageMock.setItem(STORAGE_KEY, "true");
|
||||
|
||||
const { container } = render(<CliImportBanner />);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(container).toBeEmptyDOMElement();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("dismisses the banner and persists to localStorage on close", async () => {
|
||||
const user = userEvent.setup();
|
||||
|
||||
render(<CliImportBanner />);
|
||||
|
||||
const closeButton = screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Close" });
|
||||
|
||||
await user.click(closeButton);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
screen.queryByText(/Import findings from Prowler CLI/),
|
||||
).not.toBeInTheDocument();
|
||||
expect(localStorageMock.setItem).toHaveBeenCalledWith(STORAGE_KEY, "true");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("renders with role='alert'", () => {
|
||||
render(<CliImportBanner />);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(screen.getByRole("alert")).toBeInTheDocument();
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
|
||||
"use client";
|
||||
|
||||
import { Upload } from "lucide-react";
|
||||
import Link from "next/link";
|
||||
import { useState } from "react";
|
||||
|
||||
import { Alert, AlertTitle } from "@/components/shadcn";
|
||||
import { useMountEffect } from "@/hooks/use-mount-effect";
|
||||
import { DOCS_URLS } from "@/lib/external-urls";
|
||||
import { cn } from "@/lib/utils";
|
||||
|
||||
const STORAGE_KEY = "prowler:cli-import-banner-dismissed";
|
||||
|
||||
export const CliImportBanner = ({ className }: { className?: string }) => {
|
||||
const [isVisible, setIsVisible] = useState<boolean | null>(null);
|
||||
|
||||
useMountEffect(() => {
|
||||
const isDismissed = localStorage.getItem(STORAGE_KEY) === "true";
|
||||
setIsVisible(!isDismissed);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const handleClose = () => {
|
||||
localStorage.setItem(STORAGE_KEY, "true");
|
||||
setIsVisible(false);
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
if (isVisible === null || !isVisible) return null;
|
||||
|
||||
return (
|
||||
<Alert
|
||||
variant="info"
|
||||
onClose={handleClose}
|
||||
className={cn("animate-fade-in", className)}
|
||||
>
|
||||
<Upload />
|
||||
<AlertTitle>
|
||||
Import findings from Prowler CLI —{" "}
|
||||
<Link
|
||||
href={DOCS_URLS.FINDINGS_INGESTION}
|
||||
target="_blank"
|
||||
rel="noopener noreferrer"
|
||||
className="font-normal underline underline-offset-2"
|
||||
>
|
||||
Learn more
|
||||
</Link>
|
||||
</AlertTitle>
|
||||
</Alert>
|
||||
);
|
||||
};
|
||||
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
|
||||
export * from "./auto-refresh";
|
||||
export * from "./cli-import-banner";
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
|
||||
import { render, screen } from "@testing-library/react";
|
||||
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
|
||||
|
||||
import { SCAN_JOBS_TAB } from "@/types";
|
||||
|
||||
import { ScansFilterBar } from "./scans-filter-bar";
|
||||
|
||||
vi.mock("@/components/filters/provider-account-selectors", () => ({
|
||||
ProviderAccountSelectors: () => <div>Provider account selectors</div>,
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
vi.mock("@/components/shadcn", () => ({
|
||||
Select: ({ children }: { children: React.ReactNode }) => (
|
||||
<div>{children}</div>
|
||||
),
|
||||
SelectContent: ({ children }: { children: React.ReactNode }) => (
|
||||
<div>{children}</div>
|
||||
),
|
||||
SelectItem: ({
|
||||
children,
|
||||
value,
|
||||
}: {
|
||||
children: React.ReactNode;
|
||||
value: string;
|
||||
}) => <div data-value={value}>{children}</div>,
|
||||
SelectTrigger: ({ children, ...props }: React.ComponentProps<"button">) => (
|
||||
<button {...props}>{children}</button>
|
||||
),
|
||||
SelectValue: ({ placeholder }: { placeholder: string }) => (
|
||||
<span>{placeholder}</span>
|
||||
),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
const defaultProps = {
|
||||
providers: [],
|
||||
scheduleType: "all",
|
||||
scanStatus: "all",
|
||||
showStatusFilter: false,
|
||||
onScheduleTypeChange: vi.fn(),
|
||||
onScanStatusChange: vi.fn(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
describe("ScansFilterBar", () => {
|
||||
it("hides the type filter on the scheduled tab", () => {
|
||||
// Given
|
||||
render(
|
||||
<ScansFilterBar {...defaultProps} activeTab={SCAN_JOBS_TAB.SCHEDULED} />,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// Then
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
screen.queryByRole("button", { name: /all types/i }),
|
||||
).not.toBeInTheDocument();
|
||||
expect(screen.getByText("Provider account selectors")).toBeInTheDocument();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("shows the type filter outside the scheduled tab", () => {
|
||||
// Given
|
||||
render(
|
||||
<ScansFilterBar {...defaultProps} activeTab={SCAN_JOBS_TAB.COMPLETED} />,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// Then
|
||||
expect(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /all types/i })).toBeVisible();
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import {
|
||||
SelectTrigger,
|
||||
SelectValue,
|
||||
} from "@/components/shadcn";
|
||||
import type { ScanJobsTab } from "@/types";
|
||||
import { SCAN_JOBS_TAB, type ScanJobsTab } from "@/types";
|
||||
import type { ProviderProps } from "@/types/providers";
|
||||
|
||||
import {
|
||||
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ export function ScansFilterBar({
|
||||
const isCloudEnvironment = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV === "true";
|
||||
const triggerFilterOptions = getScanTriggerFilterOptions(isCloudEnvironment);
|
||||
const statusFilterOptions = getScanStatusFilterOptions(activeTab);
|
||||
const showScheduleTypeFilter = activeTab !== SCAN_JOBS_TAB.SCHEDULED;
|
||||
|
||||
return (
|
||||
<>
|
||||
@@ -52,18 +53,20 @@ export function ScansFilterBar({
|
||||
accountSelectorClassName={filterItemClass}
|
||||
/>
|
||||
|
||||
<Select value={scheduleType} onValueChange={onScheduleTypeChange}>
|
||||
<SelectTrigger aria-label="All Types" className={filterItemClass}>
|
||||
<SelectValue placeholder="All Types" />
|
||||
</SelectTrigger>
|
||||
<SelectContent>
|
||||
{triggerFilterOptions.map((option) => (
|
||||
<SelectItem key={option.value} value={option.value}>
|
||||
{option.label}
|
||||
</SelectItem>
|
||||
))}
|
||||
</SelectContent>
|
||||
</Select>
|
||||
{showScheduleTypeFilter && (
|
||||
<Select value={scheduleType} onValueChange={onScheduleTypeChange}>
|
||||
<SelectTrigger aria-label="All Types" className={filterItemClass}>
|
||||
<SelectValue placeholder="All Types" />
|
||||
</SelectTrigger>
|
||||
<SelectContent>
|
||||
{triggerFilterOptions.map((option) => (
|
||||
<SelectItem key={option.value} value={option.value}>
|
||||
{option.label}
|
||||
</SelectItem>
|
||||
))}
|
||||
</SelectContent>
|
||||
</Select>
|
||||
)}
|
||||
|
||||
{showStatusFilter && (
|
||||
<Select value={scanStatus} onValueChange={onScanStatusChange}>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,6 +16,32 @@ const { scansFilterBarSpy } = vi.hoisted(() => ({
|
||||
scansFilterBarSpy: vi.fn(),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
const localStorageMock = (() => {
|
||||
let store: Record<string, string> = {};
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
getItem: vi.fn((key: string) => store[key] ?? null),
|
||||
setItem: vi.fn((key: string, value: string) => {
|
||||
store[key] = value;
|
||||
}),
|
||||
removeItem: vi.fn((key: string) => {
|
||||
delete store[key];
|
||||
}),
|
||||
clear: vi.fn(() => {
|
||||
store = {};
|
||||
}),
|
||||
get length() {
|
||||
return Object.keys(store).length;
|
||||
},
|
||||
key: vi.fn((index: number) => Object.keys(store)[index] ?? null),
|
||||
};
|
||||
})();
|
||||
|
||||
Object.defineProperty(window, "localStorage", {
|
||||
value: localStorageMock,
|
||||
writable: true,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
vi.mock("next/navigation", () => ({
|
||||
usePathname: () => "/scans",
|
||||
useRouter: () => ({
|
||||
@@ -120,6 +146,7 @@ describe("ScansPageShell", () => {
|
||||
afterEach(() => {
|
||||
vi.unstubAllEnvs();
|
||||
vi.clearAllMocks();
|
||||
localStorageMock.clear();
|
||||
searchParamsValue.current = "";
|
||||
useScansStore.getState().closeLaunchScanModal();
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -191,6 +218,36 @@ describe("ScansPageShell", () => {
|
||||
expect(screen.getByRole("combobox", { name: /all types/i })).toBeVisible();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("shows the CLI import banner in Cloud", () => {
|
||||
vi.stubEnv("NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV", "true");
|
||||
|
||||
render(
|
||||
<ScansPageShell providers={providers} hasManageScansPermission>
|
||||
<div>Scans table</div>
|
||||
</ScansPageShell>,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(screen.getByRole("alert")).toHaveTextContent(
|
||||
/import findings from prowler cli/i,
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(screen.getByRole("link", { name: /learn more/i })).toHaveAttribute(
|
||||
"href",
|
||||
"https://docs.prowler.com/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-import-findings",
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("hides the CLI import banner outside Cloud", () => {
|
||||
vi.stubEnv("NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV", "false");
|
||||
|
||||
render(
|
||||
<ScansPageShell providers={providers} hasManageScansPermission>
|
||||
<div>Scans table</div>
|
||||
</ScansPageShell>,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(screen.queryByRole("alert")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("keeps launch scan with filters and mutelist with tabs", () => {
|
||||
vi.stubEnv("NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV", "false");
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -332,4 +389,22 @@ describe("ScansPageShell", () => {
|
||||
expect(calledUrl).toContain("tab=active");
|
||||
expect(calledUrl).not.toContain("filter%5Bstate__in%5D");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("clears type filter when switching to scheduled scans", async () => {
|
||||
vi.stubEnv("NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV", "false");
|
||||
searchParamsValue.current = "tab=completed&filter%5Btrigger%5D=manual";
|
||||
const user = userEvent.setup();
|
||||
|
||||
render(
|
||||
<ScansPageShell providers={providers} hasManageScansPermission>
|
||||
<div>Scans table</div>
|
||||
</ScansPageShell>,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
await user.click(screen.getByRole("tab", { name: /scheduled/i }));
|
||||
|
||||
const calledUrl = pushMock.mock.calls.at(-1)?.[0] as string;
|
||||
expect(calledUrl).toContain("tab=scheduled");
|
||||
expect(calledUrl).not.toContain("filter%5Btrigger%5D");
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import { useScansStore } from "@/store";
|
||||
import { SCAN_JOBS_TAB, SCAN_TAB_LABELS, type ScanJobsTab } from "@/types";
|
||||
import type { ProviderProps } from "@/types/providers";
|
||||
|
||||
import { CliImportBanner } from "./cli-import-banner";
|
||||
import { LaunchScanModal } from "./launch-scan-modal";
|
||||
import { ScansFilterBar } from "./scans-filter-bar";
|
||||
import { useScansFilters } from "./use-scans-filters";
|
||||
@@ -53,6 +54,7 @@ export function ScansPageShell({
|
||||
const hasConnectedProviders = providers.some(
|
||||
(provider) => provider.attributes.connection.connected === true,
|
||||
);
|
||||
const isCloudEnvironment = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV === "true";
|
||||
const launchDisabled = !hasManageScansPermission || !hasConnectedProviders;
|
||||
const launchOpen = isLaunchScanModalOpen || urlLaunchOpen;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -104,6 +106,8 @@ export function ScansPageShell({
|
||||
</Button>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
{isCloudEnvironment && <CliImportBanner />}
|
||||
|
||||
<Tabs
|
||||
value={filters.activeTab}
|
||||
onValueChange={filters.setTab}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,9 +1,22 @@
|
||||
import { render, screen } from "@testing-library/react";
|
||||
import userEvent from "@testing-library/user-event";
|
||||
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
|
||||
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
|
||||
|
||||
import { ScansProvidersEmptyState } from "./scans-providers-empty-state";
|
||||
|
||||
const { replaceMock, searchParamsValue } = vi.hoisted(() => ({
|
||||
replaceMock: vi.fn(),
|
||||
searchParamsValue: { current: "" },
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
vi.mock("next/navigation", () => ({
|
||||
usePathname: () => "/scans",
|
||||
useRouter: () => ({
|
||||
replace: replaceMock,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
useSearchParams: () => new URLSearchParams(searchParamsValue.current),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
vi.mock("@/components/providers/wizard", () => ({
|
||||
ProviderWizardModal: ({ open }: { open: boolean }) =>
|
||||
open ? <div role="dialog">Provider wizard</div> : null,
|
||||
@@ -14,6 +27,11 @@ vi.mock("./no-providers-connected", () => ({
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
describe("ScansProvidersEmptyState", () => {
|
||||
afterEach(() => {
|
||||
vi.clearAllMocks();
|
||||
searchParamsValue.current = "";
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("shows the add provider message and opens the provider wizard", async () => {
|
||||
const user = userEvent.setup();
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -28,6 +46,25 @@ describe("ScansProvidersEmptyState", () => {
|
||||
expect(screen.getByRole("dialog")).toHaveTextContent("Provider wizard");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("clears the launch scan URL intent before opening the provider wizard", async () => {
|
||||
// Given
|
||||
searchParamsValue.current = "tab=completed&launchScan=true";
|
||||
const user = userEvent.setup();
|
||||
|
||||
render(<ScansProvidersEmptyState thereIsNoProviders />);
|
||||
|
||||
// When
|
||||
await user.click(
|
||||
screen.getByRole("button", { name: /open add provider modal/i }),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// Then
|
||||
expect(replaceMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith("/scans?tab=completed", {
|
||||
scroll: false,
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(screen.getByRole("dialog")).toHaveTextContent("Provider wizard");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("shows the no connected providers message", () => {
|
||||
render(<ScansProvidersEmptyState thereIsNoProviders={false} />);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
|
||||
"use client";
|
||||
|
||||
import { usePathname, useRouter, useSearchParams } from "next/navigation";
|
||||
import { useState } from "react";
|
||||
|
||||
import { ProviderWizardModal } from "@/components/providers/wizard";
|
||||
import { LAUNCH_SCAN_SEARCH_PARAM } from "@/lib/scans-navigation";
|
||||
|
||||
import { NoProvidersAdded } from "./no-providers-added";
|
||||
import { NoProvidersConnected } from "./no-providers-connected";
|
||||
@@ -14,12 +16,28 @@ interface ScansProvidersEmptyStateProps {
|
||||
export function ScansProvidersEmptyState({
|
||||
thereIsNoProviders,
|
||||
}: ScansProvidersEmptyStateProps) {
|
||||
const pathname = usePathname();
|
||||
const router = useRouter();
|
||||
const searchParams = useSearchParams();
|
||||
const [isProviderWizardOpen, setIsProviderWizardOpen] = useState(false);
|
||||
|
||||
const openProviderWizard = () => {
|
||||
if (searchParams.has(LAUNCH_SCAN_SEARCH_PARAM)) {
|
||||
const params = new URLSearchParams(searchParams.toString());
|
||||
params.delete(LAUNCH_SCAN_SEARCH_PARAM);
|
||||
const query = params.toString();
|
||||
router.replace(query ? `${pathname}?${query}` : pathname, {
|
||||
scroll: false,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
setIsProviderWizardOpen(true);
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
return (
|
||||
<>
|
||||
{thereIsNoProviders ? (
|
||||
<NoProvidersAdded onOpenWizard={() => setIsProviderWizardOpen(true)} />
|
||||
<NoProvidersAdded onOpenWizard={openProviderWizard} />
|
||||
) : (
|
||||
<NoProvidersConnected />
|
||||
)}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -94,6 +94,18 @@ describe("scans.utils", () => {
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("excludes trigger filters from scheduled scans", () => {
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
getScanJobsUserFilters({
|
||||
tab: "scheduled",
|
||||
"filter[trigger]": "manual",
|
||||
"filter[provider_uid]": "123456789012",
|
||||
}),
|
||||
).toEqual({
|
||||
"filter[provider_uid]": "123456789012",
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("formats scan labels and durations for table display", () => {
|
||||
expect(getScanAlias(makeScan(""))).toBe("-");
|
||||
expect(getScanAlias(makeScan("Daily scheduled scan", "scheduled"))).toBe(
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -77,8 +77,14 @@ function isSearchParamValue(value: unknown): value is string | string[] {
|
||||
export function getScanJobsUserFilters(
|
||||
searchParams: SearchParamsProps,
|
||||
): Record<string, string | string[]> {
|
||||
const tab = getScanJobsTab(searchParams.tab);
|
||||
|
||||
return Object.entries(searchParams).reduce<Record<string, string | string[]>>(
|
||||
(filters, [key, value]) => {
|
||||
if (tab === SCAN_JOBS_TAB.SCHEDULED && key === "filter[trigger]") {
|
||||
return filters;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (
|
||||
key.startsWith("filter[") &&
|
||||
!isScanStateFilterKey(key) &&
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -81,6 +81,17 @@ const makeCompletedScan = (): ScanProps => ({
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const makeScheduledScan = (): ScanProps => ({
|
||||
...makeCompletedScan(),
|
||||
attributes: {
|
||||
...makeCompletedScan().attributes,
|
||||
trigger: "scheduled",
|
||||
state: "scheduled",
|
||||
scheduled_at: "2026-01-01T10:00:00Z",
|
||||
next_scan_at: "2026-01-02T10:00:00Z",
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const renderCell = (
|
||||
columnId: string,
|
||||
scan: ScanProps,
|
||||
@@ -137,7 +148,6 @@ describe("getScanJobsColumns", () => {
|
||||
"account",
|
||||
"scanInfo",
|
||||
"scanSchedule",
|
||||
"nextScan",
|
||||
"actions",
|
||||
]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -163,4 +173,19 @@ describe("getScanJobsColumns", () => {
|
||||
|
||||
expect(screen.getByText("1 min 13 sec")).toBeInTheDocument();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("labels the completed scan schedule column as Type", () => {
|
||||
renderHeader(SCAN_JOBS_TAB.COMPLETED, "scanSchedule");
|
||||
|
||||
expect(screen.getByText("Type")).toBeInTheDocument();
|
||||
expect(screen.queryByText("Schedule")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("keeps the scheduled column without repeating the scheduled label in each row", () => {
|
||||
renderHeader(SCAN_JOBS_TAB.SCHEDULED, "scanSchedule");
|
||||
renderCell("scanSchedule", makeScheduledScan(), SCAN_JOBS_TAB.SCHEDULED);
|
||||
|
||||
expect(screen.getByText("Schedule")).toBeInTheDocument();
|
||||
expect(screen.queryByText("Scheduled")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -39,13 +39,25 @@ const scanInfoColumn: ColumnDef<ScanProps> = {
|
||||
cell: ({ row }) => <ScanInfoCell scan={row.original} />,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const scanScheduleColumn: ColumnDef<ScanProps> = {
|
||||
const getScanScheduleColumn = (title: string): ColumnDef<ScanProps> => ({
|
||||
id: "scanSchedule",
|
||||
accessorFn: (row) => row.attributes.trigger,
|
||||
header: ({ column }) => (
|
||||
<DataTableColumnHeader column={column} title="Schedule" param="trigger" />
|
||||
<DataTableColumnHeader column={column} title={title} param="trigger" />
|
||||
),
|
||||
cell: ({ row }) => <ScheduleCell scan={row.original} />,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const scheduledScanScheduleColumn: ColumnDef<ScanProps> = {
|
||||
id: "scanSchedule",
|
||||
accessorFn: (row) => row.attributes.scheduled_at,
|
||||
header: ({ column }) => (
|
||||
<DataTableColumnHeader column={column} title="Schedule" />
|
||||
),
|
||||
cell: ({ row }) => (
|
||||
<DateWithTime dateTime={row.original.attributes.scheduled_at} showTime />
|
||||
),
|
||||
enableSorting: false,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const resourcesColumn: ColumnDef<ScanProps> = {
|
||||
@@ -86,7 +98,7 @@ const activeColumns = (): ColumnDef<ScanProps>[] => [
|
||||
cell: ({ row }) => <ProgressCell scan={row.original} />,
|
||||
enableSorting: false,
|
||||
},
|
||||
scanScheduleColumn,
|
||||
getScanScheduleColumn("Schedule"),
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: "launched",
|
||||
header: ({ column }) => (
|
||||
@@ -118,7 +130,7 @@ const completedColumns = (): ColumnDef<ScanProps>[] => [
|
||||
cell: ({ row }) => <StatusBadge status={row.original.attributes.state} />,
|
||||
enableSorting: false,
|
||||
},
|
||||
scanScheduleColumn,
|
||||
getScanScheduleColumn("Type"),
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: "scanDate",
|
||||
accessorFn: (row) => row.attributes.completed_at,
|
||||
@@ -139,7 +151,7 @@ const completedColumns = (): ColumnDef<ScanProps>[] => [
|
||||
const scheduledColumns = (): ColumnDef<ScanProps>[] => [
|
||||
accountColumn,
|
||||
scanInfoColumn,
|
||||
scanScheduleColumn,
|
||||
scheduledScanScheduleColumn,
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* TODO: Restore this column when the API exposes the last completed scan date for this schedule.
|
||||
* {
|
||||
@@ -153,20 +165,6 @@ const scheduledColumns = (): ColumnDef<ScanProps>[] => [
|
||||
* enableSorting: false,
|
||||
* },
|
||||
*/
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: "nextScan",
|
||||
accessorFn: (row) => row.attributes.next_scan_at,
|
||||
header: ({ column }) => (
|
||||
<DataTableColumnHeader
|
||||
column={column}
|
||||
title="Next Run"
|
||||
param="next_scan_at"
|
||||
/>
|
||||
),
|
||||
cell: ({ row }) => (
|
||||
<DateWithTime dateTime={row.original.attributes.next_scan_at} />
|
||||
),
|
||||
},
|
||||
actionsColumn,
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -46,13 +46,19 @@ export function useScansFilters(): UseScansFiltersReturn {
|
||||
router.push(`${pathname}?${params.toString()}`, { scroll: false });
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const setTab = (tab: string) =>
|
||||
updateParams({
|
||||
const setTab = (tab: string) => {
|
||||
const isScheduledTab = tab === SCAN_JOBS_TAB.SCHEDULED;
|
||||
const updates: Record<string, string | null> = {
|
||||
tab,
|
||||
sort: null,
|
||||
"filter[state]": null,
|
||||
"filter[state__in]": null,
|
||||
});
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
if (isScheduledTab) updates["filter[trigger]"] = null;
|
||||
|
||||
updateParams(updates);
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const setScheduleType = (value: string) =>
|
||||
updateParams({ "filter[trigger]": value });
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
|
||||
import { render, screen } from "@testing-library/react";
|
||||
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
|
||||
|
||||
import MainLayout from "./main-layout";
|
||||
|
||||
vi.mock("@/hooks/use-sidebar", () => ({
|
||||
useSidebar: vi.fn(),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
vi.mock("@/hooks/use-store", () => ({
|
||||
useStore: () => ({
|
||||
getOpenState: () => true,
|
||||
settings: { disabled: false },
|
||||
}),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
vi.mock("../sidebar/sidebar", () => ({
|
||||
Sidebar: () => <aside data-testid="sidebar" />,
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
describe("MainLayout", () => {
|
||||
it("renders subdued background glows for side-nav contrast", () => {
|
||||
render(
|
||||
<MainLayout>
|
||||
<div>Page content</div>
|
||||
</MainLayout>,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
const topGlow =
|
||||
screen.getByTestId("sidebar").previousElementSibling
|
||||
?.previousElementSibling;
|
||||
const bottomGlow = screen.getByTestId("sidebar").previousElementSibling;
|
||||
|
||||
expect(topGlow).toHaveClass("h-[120%]", "w-[160%]", "opacity-[7%]");
|
||||
expect(bottomGlow).toHaveClass("h-[50%]", "w-[50%]", "opacity-[7%]");
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ export default function MainLayout({
|
||||
<div className="relative flex h-dvh items-center justify-center overflow-hidden">
|
||||
{/* Top-left gradient halo */}
|
||||
<div
|
||||
className="pointer-events-none fixed top-0 left-0 z-0 size-[600px] opacity-20 blur-3xl"
|
||||
className="pointer-events-none fixed top-0 left-0 z-0 h-[120%] w-[160%] opacity-[7%] blur-3xl"
|
||||
style={{
|
||||
background: "linear-gradient(90deg, #31E59F 0%, #60E0EC 100%)",
|
||||
transform: "translate(-50%, -50%)",
|
||||
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ export default function MainLayout({
|
||||
|
||||
{/* Bottom-right gradient halo */}
|
||||
<div
|
||||
className="pointer-events-none fixed right-0 bottom-0 z-0 size-[600px] opacity-20 blur-3xl"
|
||||
className="pointer-events-none fixed right-0 bottom-0 z-0 h-[50%] w-[50%] opacity-[7%] blur-3xl"
|
||||
style={{
|
||||
background: "linear-gradient(90deg, #31E59F 0%, #60E0EC 100%)",
|
||||
transform: "translate(50%, 50%)",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import { IntegrationType } from "../types/integrations";
|
||||
export const DOCS_URLS = {
|
||||
FINDINGS_ANALYSIS:
|
||||
"https://docs.prowler.com/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app#step-8:-analyze-the-findings",
|
||||
FINDINGS_INGESTION:
|
||||
"https://docs.prowler.com/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-import-findings",
|
||||
AWS_ORGANIZATIONS:
|
||||
"https://docs.prowler.com/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-cloud-aws-organizations",
|
||||
ALERTS: "https://docs.prowler.com/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-alerts",
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user