Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/PROWLER-1391-provider-contract-dynamic-discovery' into PROWLER-1771-public-dynamic-provider-class-resolver

# Conflicts:
#	prowler/providers/common/provider.py
This commit is contained in:
StylusFrost
2026-06-01 20:20:50 +02:00
95 changed files with 803 additions and 172 deletions
+1 -1
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@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ SENTRY_RELEASE=local
NEXT_PUBLIC_SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT=${SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT}
#### Prowler release version ####
NEXT_PUBLIC_PROWLER_RELEASE_VERSION=v5.29.0
NEXT_PUBLIC_PROWLER_RELEASE_VERSION=v5.30.0
# Social login credentials
SOCIAL_GOOGLE_OAUTH_CALLBACK_URL="${AUTH_URL}/api/auth/callback/google"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ name = "prowler-api"
package-mode = false
# Needed for the SDK compatibility
requires-python = ">=3.11,<3.13"
version = "1.30.0"
version = "1.31.0"
[tool.uv]
# Transitive pins matching master to avoid silent drift; bump deliberately.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
openapi: 3.0.3
info:
title: Prowler API
version: 1.30.0
version: 1.31.0
description: |-
Prowler API specification.
Generated
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4494,7 +4494,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "prowler-api"
version = "1.30.0"
version = "1.31.0"
source = { virtual = "." }
dependencies = [
{ name = "cartography" },
@@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ To update the environment file:
Edit the `.env` file and change version values:
```env
PROWLER_UI_VERSION="5.28.0"
PROWLER_API_VERSION="5.28.0"
PROWLER_UI_VERSION="5.29.0"
PROWLER_API_VERSION="5.29.0"
```
<Note>
@@ -40,12 +40,6 @@ To install Prowler as a Python package, use `Python >= 3.10, <= 3.12`. Prowler i
pip install prowler
prowler -v
```
To upgrade Prowler to the latest version:
``` bash
pip install --upgrade prowler
```
</Tab>
<Tab title="Docker">
_Requirements_:
@@ -170,6 +164,68 @@ To install Prowler as a Python package, use `Python >= 3.10, <= 3.12`. Prowler i
</Tab>
</Tabs>
## Updating Prowler CLI
Upgrade Prowler CLI to the latest release using the same method chosen for installation:
<Tabs>
<Tab title="pipx">
```bash
pipx upgrade prowler
prowler -v
```
</Tab>
<Tab title="pip">
```bash
pip install --upgrade prowler
prowler -v
```
</Tab>
<Tab title="Docker">
Pull the desired image tag to fetch the latest version:
```bash
docker pull toniblyx/prowler:latest
```
<Note>
Replace `latest` with a specific release tag (for example, `stable` or `<x.y.z>`) to pin a version. Refer to the [Container Versions](#container-versions) section for the full list of available tags.
</Note>
</Tab>
<Tab title="GitHub">
Pull the latest changes and sync the environment:
```bash
cd prowler
git pull
uv sync
uv run python prowler-cli.py -v
```
<Note>
To upgrade to a specific release, check out the corresponding tag before syncing: `git checkout <x.y.z>`.
</Note>
</Tab>
<Tab title="Brew">
```bash
brew upgrade prowler
prowler -v
```
</Tab>
<Tab title="CloudShell">
Both AWS CloudShell and Azure CloudShell install Prowler with `pipx`, so the upgrade command is the same:
```bash
pipx upgrade prowler
prowler -v
```
</Tab>
</Tabs>
<Note>
To install a specific version instead of the latest release, pin it explicitly. For example, with `pipx`: `pipx install prowler==<x.y.z>`, or with `pip`: `pip install prowler==<x.y.z>`. The available releases are listed in the [Releases GitHub section](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/releases).
</Note>
## Container Versions
The available versions of Prowler CLI are the following:
@@ -141,6 +141,45 @@ Choose one of the following installation methods:
---
## Updating Prowler MCP Server
When running Prowler MCP Server locally ("Option 2: Run Locally"), upgrade to the latest version using the same method chosen for installation. The hosted server (`https://mcp.prowler.com/mcp`) is always kept up to date by Prowler and requires no action.
<Tabs>
<Tab title="Docker">
Pull the latest image and restart the container:
```bash
docker pull prowlercloud/prowler-mcp
```
<Note>
Recreate any running container after pulling the new image so the updated version takes effect.
</Note>
</Tab>
<Tab title="From Source">
Pull the latest changes and sync the dependencies:
```bash
cd prowler/mcp_server
git pull
uv sync
uv run prowler-mcp --help
```
</Tab>
<Tab title="Build Docker Image">
Pull the latest source and rebuild the image:
```bash
cd prowler/mcp_server
git pull
docker build -t prowler-mcp .
```
</Tab>
</Tabs>
---
## Command Line Options
The Prowler MCP Server supports the following command-line arguments:
+1
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@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ All notable changes to the **Prowler SDK** are documented in this file.
### 🐞 Fixed
- Broken documentation URLs in Google Workspace check metadata [(#11405)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11405)
- ENS RD 311/2022 (AWS) compliance mapping: `vpc_different_regions` was uncorrectly mapped under the `mp.com.4` family (Network segregation). That check is now mapped to a new `op.cont.2.aws.vpc.1` requirement under the Continuity of Service control [(#11372)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11372)
- Compliance CSV row count now matches the UI per requirement by sourcing rows from the framework JSON's `requirement.Checks` instead of the stale `finding.compliance` snapshot [(#11370)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11370)
- OpenStack provider exception codes moved from the `10000-10999` range, shared with the AlibabaCloud provider, to the free `17000-17999` range to keep error codes unambiguous [(#11382)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11382)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ class _MutableTimestamp:
timestamp = _MutableTimestamp(datetime.today())
timestamp_utc = _MutableTimestamp(datetime.now(timezone.utc))
prowler_version = "5.29.0"
prowler_version = "5.30.0"
html_logo_url = "https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/"
square_logo_img = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/dc7d2d5aeb92fdf12e8604f42ef6472cd3e8e889/docs/img/prowler-logo-black.png"
aws_logo = "https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/38561120/235953920-3e3fba08-0795-41dc-b480-9bea57db9f2e.png"
+3 -1
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@@ -438,7 +438,9 @@ class Compliance(BaseModel):
# Built-in compliance from prowler/compliance/{provider}/
available_compliance_framework_modules = list_compliance_modules()
for compliance_framework in available_compliance_framework_modules:
if provider in compliance_framework.name:
# Match the provider segment exactly, not as a substring, so
# e.g. `cloud` does not capture `cloudflare`.
if compliance_framework.name.split(".")[-1] == provider:
compliance_specification_dir_path = (
f"{compliance_framework.module_finder.path}/{provider}"
)
+5
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ and `prowler.providers.common.provider` without forming an import cycle.
import importlib.metadata
from prowler.lib.check.external_tool_providers import EXTERNAL_TOOL_PROVIDERS
from prowler.providers.common.builtin import is_builtin_provider
# Module-level cache for entry-point classes consulted by this helper.
# Independent of `Provider._ep_providers` to keep this module leaf — the cost
@@ -53,5 +54,9 @@ def is_tool_wrapper_provider(provider: str) -> bool:
"""
if provider in EXTERNAL_TOOL_PROVIDERS:
return True
# Built-in wins: short-circuit before ep.load() so a same-name plug-in
# cannot flip a built-in onto the tool-wrapper path or run its code.
if is_builtin_provider(provider):
return False
cls = _load_ep_class(provider)
return bool(cls and getattr(cls, "is_external_tool_provider", False))
+5 -3
View File
@@ -289,9 +289,11 @@ class Provider(ABC):
# plug-in is ignored. This lives here (not in get_class) so
# that `prowler --help` and API callers that resolve a class
# without initialising a global provider do not see spurious
# warnings.
if Provider.is_builtin(arguments.provider) and (
Provider._load_ep_provider(arguments.provider) is not None
# warnings. Match by name only — never ep.load() a shadowing
# plug-in, or its module code would run during a built-in run.
if Provider.is_builtin(arguments.provider) and any(
ep.name == arguments.provider
for ep in importlib.metadata.entry_points(group="prowler.providers")
):
logger.warning(
f"Plug-in provider '{arguments.provider}' registered "
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "When external Google Groups access is enabled, users can access and participate in groups created **outside the organization**, potentially exposing them to **phishing, social engineering, or data leakage** through unmanaged external group communications.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/181865",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/advanced/turn-on-or-off-additional-google-services",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,9 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without external invitation warnings, users may unintentionally include **external guests** in internal meetings, exposing **confidential meeting details**, agendas, and internal attendee lists to unauthorized parties. This is a common vector for inadvertent data leakage through everyday calendar actions.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/6329284",
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/calendar/set-google-calendar-sharing-options",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/calendar/allow-external-invitations-in-google-calendar-events",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,9 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Overly permissive external sharing of primary calendars exposes **sensitive meeting metadata** — titles, attendees, locations, and descriptions — to users outside the organization. This increases the risk of **information disclosure**, **social engineering**, and **targeted phishing** based on insights into organizational activities.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/60765",
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/calendar/set-google-calendar-sharing-options",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,9 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Overly permissive external sharing of secondary calendars exposes **project-specific or team-specific event details** to users outside the organization. Because secondary calendars often hold more targeted activities (e.g., product launches, internal reviews), unrestricted external sharing increases the risk of **information disclosure** and **competitive intelligence leakage**.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/60765",
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/calendar/set-google-calendar-sharing-options",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Unrestricted Chat app installation allows **unvetted third-party applications** to access user data including conversation content and organizational information. An attacker could distribute a malicious Chat app to **exfiltrate confidential data** or establish **persistent access** to internal communications.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/6089179",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/apps/manage-the-marketplace-app-allowlist-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Enabled external file sharing allows users to send files containing **confidential information** to external parties through Chat. This creates a **data leakage** channel that bypasses DLP controls, particularly dangerous for organizations handling **regulated data** such as PII, PHI, or financial records.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9540647",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/chat/set-up-chat-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Unrestricted external messaging allows users to communicate freely with **any external party**, increasing the risk of **data exfiltration** through conversation content and **social engineering attacks** from untrusted domains targeting internal users.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9540647",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/chat/set-up-chat-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Unrestricted external spaces allow users to add **anyone from any domain** to persistent group conversations. This increases the risk of **confidential information exposure** in shared spaces and enables **unauthorized external access** to ongoing organizational discussions.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9540647",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/chat/set-up-chat-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Exposed webhook URLs allow **unauthorized content injection** into Chat spaces. Attackers can send **fraudulent or misleading messages** that appear to come from trusted services, creating a vector for **social engineering** and **phishing** within internal communications.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/6089179",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/apps/manage-the-marketplace-app-allowlist-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Unrestricted internal file sharing in Chat allows files with **sensitive information** to be distributed freely without passing through approved channels. This undermines **data governance** and **audit trail** requirements, making it harder to track data movement within the organization.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9540647",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/chat/set-up-chat-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/prebuilt-administrator-roles",
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9011373"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/security-best-practices-for-administrator-accounts"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/prebuilt-administrator-roles",
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9011373"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/security-best-practices-for-administrator-accounts"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "If Access Checker suggests broader audiences or public visibility, users may **inadvertently widen access** to a file beyond the people they intended to share with. This is a common cause of unintentional internal or external over-sharing.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/60781",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-external-sharing-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "When Drive for desktop is enabled, organizational files are **synchronized to local devices** and remain accessible if the device is lost, stolen, or compromised. Because Drive for desktop bypasses the central offline-access controls, this channel is a frequently overlooked path for sensitive data to leave organization-managed environments.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7491144",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/set-up-drive-for-desktop-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without external sharing warnings, users may unintentionally share **sensitive documents** with external recipients who are not entitled to the data. This is a common vector for inadvertent leakage of intellectual property, personally identifiable information, and confidential business data through routine Drive sharing.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/60781",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-external-sharing-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "If external users can move files from internal shared drives into shared drives owned by another organization, the organization **loses authoritative control** over its own data. This is a frequently overlooked path for unintentional or malicious data exfiltration through shared drive collaboration.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/60781",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-external-sharing-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Allowing users to publish Drive files to the web creates a path for **unbounded data exposure**. Sensitive documents, intellectual property, customer data, or internal communications can be made publicly accessible — and indexed by search engines — with a single click, often unintentionally.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/60781",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-external-sharing-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "When users cannot create shared drives, they store collaborative content in their personal **My Drive** instead. When that user account is deleted, the data is also deleted, leading to **unintentional data loss** of organizationally significant information. Allowing shared drive creation makes data survivable across account lifecycle events.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7212025",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://support.google.com/a/users/answer/7212025",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "When viewers and commenters can download, print, or copy shared drive files, they can **bulk-extract sensitive content** — including intellectual property, personally identifiable information, and confidential business documents — using nothing more than read access. This is one of the most direct paths to data exfiltration through Drive.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7662202",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-shared-drives-as-an-admin",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "If shared drive managers can override organizational defaults, **unauthorized data exposure** can occur when a manager intentionally or accidentally weakens a shared drive's security posture (for example, allowing external members or enabling download for viewers).",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7662202",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-shared-drives-as-an-admin",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "If non-members can be added to files inside a shared drive, the **drive's membership becomes meaningless** as a security control. Sensitive content scoped to a specific team can be silently extended to users who were never granted access to the drive itself, leading to unintended information disclosure.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7662202",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-shared-drives-as-an-admin",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "When external sharing is unrestricted, users can share organizational content with **any external Google account**, including untrusted or unknown parties. Restricting sharing to allowlisted domains drastically reduces the surface area for accidental and malicious data exfiltration through Drive.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/60781",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-external-sharing-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Allowlisted domains are still external. Users may not realize that even an allowlisted recipient is outside the organization, leading to **unintentional disclosure of sensitive content** to legitimate but external collaborators. A warning prompt at share time mitigates that without preventing the sharing itself.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/60781",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/drive/manage-external-sharing-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without protection against anomalous attachment types, users may receive **emails with unusual file formats** that are designed to bypass standard security filters. Attackers may use **uncommon file extensions or MIME types** to deliver malware that evades signature-based detection.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7676854",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/set-up-rules-to-detect-harmful-attachments",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "With auto-forwarding enabled, an attacker who gains control of a user account can create **forwarding rules to exfiltrate** all incoming email to an external address. This can persist undetected and provide the attacker with continuous access to sensitive communications even after the account is recovered.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/2491924",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/let-users-automatically-forward-their-own-gmail-emails",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without comprehensive mail storage, messages sent through other Google services (Calendar, Drive, etc.) may not be stored in Gmail and therefore **not subject to Vault retention policies**. This creates gaps in **compliance coverage**, **eDiscovery**, and **audit trails** that could violate regulatory requirements.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/3547347",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/set-up-comprehensive-mail-storage",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without protection against domain spoofing based on similar domain names, users may receive **phishing emails from lookalike domains** (e.g., examp1e.com instead of example.com) that appear legitimate. This enables **credential theft, malware delivery, and business email compromise** attacks.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9157861",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/advanced-phishing-and-malware-protection",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without protection against employee name spoofing, users may receive **emails that appear to come from colleagues or executives** but are actually from external attackers. This enables **business email compromise (BEC)**, **wire fraud**, and **social engineering attacks** that exploit trust relationships.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9157861",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/advanced-phishing-and-malware-protection",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without protection against encrypted attachments from untrusted senders, users may receive **password-protected archives containing malware** that bypass standard content scanning. Attackers commonly use encrypted attachments to evade detection and deliver **ransomware, trojans, or other malicious payloads**.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7676854",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/set-up-rules-to-detect-harmful-attachments",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without enhanced pre-delivery scanning, some **sophisticated phishing and malware** messages may pass through standard filters and be delivered to users. The additional scanning layer catches threats that the first-pass filters miss, reducing the organization's exposure to **zero-day phishing campaigns** and **targeted attacks**.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7380368",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/help-prevent-phishing-with-pre-delivery-message-scanning",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without external image scanning, attackers can use **linked images to track email opens**, deliver **exploit payloads via image rendering vulnerabilities**, or use images as part of sophisticated **phishing schemes** that mimic legitimate communications.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7676854",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/advanced-phishing-and-malware-protection",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without protection of groups from domain-spoofing emails, attackers can send **spoofed messages to group mailboxes** that appear to originate from the organization. Since groups distribute to many recipients, a single spoofed email can enable **mass phishing, social engineering, or misinformation** campaigns across the organization.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9157861",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/advanced-phishing-and-malware-protection",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without protection against inbound domain spoofing, users may receive **emails that appear to come from their own organization** but are sent by external attackers. This enables **internal impersonation**, **phishing**, and **business email compromise** attacks that exploit trust in internal communications.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9157861",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/advanced-phishing-and-malware-protection",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "If users can delegate access to their mailbox, an attacker who compromises one account could silently delegate access to maintain persistent email surveillance. This also increases the risk of **insider threats** and **data exfiltration** through shared mailbox access.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7223765",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/let-users-delegate-access-to-a-gmail-account",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "With per-user outbound gateways enabled, users can route outbound email through **external SMTP servers**, bypassing organizational **email security controls**, **DLP policies**, and **audit logging**. This creates an unmonitored channel for data exfiltration and policy circumvention.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/176652",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/allow-per-user-outbound-gateways",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "With POP and IMAP enabled, users can access email through **legacy clients** that rely on simple password authentication, bypassing **multifactor authentication** and other modern security controls. This significantly increases the risk of **credential-based account compromise**.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/105694",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/sync/turn-pop-and-imap-on-or-off-for-users",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without protection against script-bearing attachments from untrusted senders, users may receive **files containing malicious scripts** that can execute harmful code when opened. Attackers commonly use script attachments to deliver **malware, backdoors, or credential stealers**.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7676854",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/set-up-rules-to-detect-harmful-attachments",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without shortened URL scanning, attackers can use **URL shortening services** to hide malicious destinations in phishing emails. Users cannot visually verify where the link leads, increasing the success rate of **phishing and credential harvesting** attacks.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7676854",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/advanced-phishing-and-malware-protection",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without protection against unauthenticated emails, users may receive **spoofed or forged messages** that fail SPF and DKIM checks but are still delivered normally. This enables **phishing**, **spam**, and **impersonation attacks** that exploit the lack of sender verification.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/9157861",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/advanced-phishing-and-malware-protection",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Without untrusted link warnings, users may click on **phishing links** or links to **malware distribution sites** without any warning. This significantly increases the success rate of **social engineering attacks** targeting the organization.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/7676854",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/advanced-phishing-and-malware-protection",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Allowing any user to create groups with external members or incoming email from outside increases the risk of **unauthorized data sharing**, **spam delivery**, and **shadow IT** groups that bypass organizational controls.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/10308022",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/groups/what-you-get-with-groups-for-business",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Allowing external access to groups exposes **group names, descriptions, and membership** to anyone outside the organization, increasing the risk of **information disclosure** and enabling external parties to identify targets for **social engineering attacks**.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/10308022",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/groups/what-you-get-with-groups-for-business",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Allowing all organization users or anyone to view group conversations can lead to **information disclosure** of sensitive discussions, internal decisions, and confidential data shared within groups.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/10308022",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/groups/what-you-get-with-groups-for-business",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "Allowing unrestricted Marketplace app installation exposes the organization to **unvetted third-party applications** that may request broad OAuth scopes, potentially gaining access to **sensitive organizational data** including emails, documents, and calendar events without proper security review.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/6089179",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/apps/manage-the-marketplace-app-allowlist-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/protect-your-business-with-2-step-verification",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/protect-your-business-with-2-step-verification",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/protect-users-with-the-advanced-protection-program",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/apps/control-which-apps-access-google-workspace-data",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/about-dlp",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/apps/control-which-apps-access-google-workspace-data",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/apps/control-access-to-less-secure-apps",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/protect-google-workspace-accounts-with-security-challenges",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/enforce-and-monitor-password-requirements-for-users",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/security/set-session-length-for-google-services",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/allow-super-administrators-to-recover-their-password",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/set-up-password-recovery-for-users",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
"Risk": "When Google Sites is enabled, users can create websites that may **inadvertently expose internal information** to external parties. These sites can be difficult to track and manage, creating potential **data leakage vectors** outside the organization's standard content management controls.",
"RelatedUrl": "",
"AdditionalURLs": [
"https://support.google.com/a/answer/182442",
"https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
"https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/users/advanced/turn-a-service-on-or-off-for-google-workspace-users",
"https://docs.cloud.google.com/identity/docs/concepts/supported-policy-api-settings"
],
"Remediation": {
"Code": {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ maintainers = [{name = "Prowler Engineering", email = "engineering@prowler.com"}
name = "prowler"
readme = "README.md"
requires-python = ">=3.10,<3.13"
version = "5.29.0"
version = "5.30.0"
[project.scripts]
prowler = "prowler.__main__:prowler"
+3 -1
View File
@@ -540,7 +540,9 @@ class TestCompliance:
):
object = mock.Mock()
object.path = "/path/to/compliance"
object.name = "framework1_aws"
# list_compliance_modules yields dotted module names; get_bulk matches
# the last segment exactly against the provider.
object.name = "prowler.compliance.aws"
mock_list_modules.return_value = [object]
mock_listdir.return_value = ["framework1_aws.json"]
+14
View File
@@ -70,6 +70,20 @@ class TestIsToolWrapperProvider:
assert is_tool_wrapper_provider("does-not-exist") is False
@patch("prowler.lib.check.tool_wrapper.importlib.metadata.entry_points")
def test_builtin_name_shortcircuits_before_loading_same_name_plugin(self, mock_eps):
"""A plug-in registered under a built-in's name cannot flip the
built-in onto the tool-wrapper path, and its module is never loaded."""
from prowler.lib.check.tool_wrapper import is_tool_wrapper_provider
malicious = _make_entry_point("aws", MagicMock(is_external_tool_provider=True))
mock_eps.return_value = [malicious]
# `aws` is a built-in, so classification short-circuits to False...
assert is_tool_wrapper_provider("aws") is False
# ...and the shadowing plug-in's code is never executed via ep.load().
malicious.load.assert_not_called()
class TestLoadEpClass:
"""_load_ep_class: cache, broken plug-ins, no-match."""
+77 -10
View File
@@ -663,22 +663,25 @@ class TestProviderInitialization:
@patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.logger")
@patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.load_and_validate_config_file")
@patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider._load_ep_provider")
@patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.importlib.metadata.entry_points")
@patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.import_module")
@patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.is_builtin")
def test_init_global_provider_warns_when_plugin_shadowed_by_builtin(
self, mock_is_builtin, mock_import, mock_load_ep, mock_config, mock_logger
self, mock_is_builtin, mock_import, mock_entry_points, mock_config, mock_logger
):
"""Regression guard: when a plug-in registers a provider name that
collides with a built-in, the BUILT-IN wins and a warning is emitted
naming the shadowed plug-in. Matches the precedence enforced by
`_resolve_check_module` and `CheckMetadata.get_bulk` for checks. See
PR #10700 review (HugoPBrito).
naming the shadowed plug-in. Shadow detection matches by entry-point
name only — the plug-in is never `ep.load()`-ed just to warn, so its
module code cannot run during a built-in run. See PR #10700 review
(HugoPBrito, Alan-TheGentleman).
"""
# Simulate a built-in `aws` that exists, AND a plug-in registered
# under the same `aws` name via entry points.
mock_is_builtin.return_value = True
mock_load_ep.return_value = FakeExternalProvider # plug-in shadow
shadow_ep = MagicMock()
shadow_ep.name = "aws" # plug-in shadowing the built-in name
mock_entry_points.return_value = [shadow_ep]
mock_import.return_value = MagicMock(
AwsProvider=MagicMock(side_effect=lambda **_kw: None)
)
@@ -723,6 +726,8 @@ class TestProviderInitialization:
]
assert warning_msgs, "expected a warning about the shadowed plug-in 'aws'"
assert "IGNORED" in warning_msgs[0]
# Shadow detected by name only — plug-in code never executed to warn
shadow_ep.load.assert_not_called()
# ===========================================================================
@@ -1354,6 +1359,63 @@ class TestCompliance:
assert "dup_framework" in bulk
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"provider, framework_segments",
[
# `cloud` is a substring of THREE built-in modules at once.
("cloud", ["alibabacloud", "cloudflare", "oraclecloud"]),
("git", ["github"]),
("work", ["googleworkspace"]),
("open", ["openstack"]),
],
)
@patch("prowler.lib.check.compliance_models.importlib.metadata.entry_points")
@patch("prowler.lib.check.compliance_models.list_compliance_modules")
def test_compliance_get_bulk_matches_provider_segment_exactly(
self, mock_list_modules, mock_ep, provider, framework_segments
):
"""Regression: a provider whose name is a substring of one or more
framework modules must NOT load them. The old `provider in name`
check captured overlapping built-ins (e.g. `cloud` matched
alibabacloud, cloudflare and oraclecloud). See PR #10700 review
(Alan-TheGentleman).
"""
import json
import os
import tempfile
from prowler.lib.check.compliance_models import Compliance
mock_ep.return_value = []
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
# The substring path the old code would have read from.
os.mkdir(os.path.join(tmpdir, provider))
json_data = {
"Framework": "Custom",
"Name": f"Should not load for '{provider}'",
"Version": "1.0",
"Provider": provider,
"Description": "Test",
"Requirements": [],
}
with open(os.path.join(tmpdir, provider, "wrong.json"), "w") as f:
json.dump(json_data, f)
modules = []
for segment in framework_segments:
module = MagicMock()
module.name = f"prowler.compliance.{segment}"
module.module_finder.path = tmpdir
modules.append(module)
mock_list_modules.return_value = modules
bulk = Compliance.get_bulk(provider)
# Exact-segment match: the provider is not any of these modules.
assert "wrong" not in bulk
assert bulk == {}
# ===========================================================================
# 7. Parser
@@ -2104,11 +2166,11 @@ class TestGetClass:
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------
@patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.load_and_validate_config_file")
@patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider._load_ep_provider")
@patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.importlib.metadata.entry_points")
@patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.import_module")
@patch("prowler.providers.common.provider.Provider.is_builtin")
def test_init_global_provider_emits_collision_warning_for_builtin_ep_shadow(
self, mock_is_builtin, mock_import, mock_load_ep, mock_config, caplog
self, mock_is_builtin, mock_import, mock_entry_points, mock_config, caplog
):
"""init_global_provider (not get_class) emits the collision warning
when a built-in provider has a same-named entry-point plug-in registered.
@@ -2117,13 +2179,16 @@ class TestGetClass:
the warning responsibility moved OUT of get_class and INTO
init_global_provider, so users still see the message on CLI invocation
but prowler --help and API calls (which never hit init_global_provider)
do not spuriously emit it.
do not spuriously emit it. The shadow is detected by entry-point name
only — the plug-in is never loaded to warn.
"""
import logging
import types
mock_is_builtin.return_value = True
mock_load_ep.return_value = FakeExternalProvider # plug-in shadow
shadow_ep = MagicMock()
shadow_ep.name = "aws" # plug-in shadowing the built-in name
mock_entry_points.return_value = [shadow_ep]
fake_module = types.ModuleType("fake_builtin_module")
fake_module.AwsProvider = MagicMock(side_effect=lambda **_kw: None)
@@ -2169,3 +2234,5 @@ class TestGetClass:
"init_global_provider must emit the collision warning when a "
"same-named EP plug-in exists for a built-in provider"
)
# Shadow detected by name only — the plug-in is never loaded to warn.
shadow_ep.load.assert_not_called()
+9
View File
@@ -34,4 +34,13 @@ describe("providers page", () => {
expect(source).toContain("size: 160");
expect(source).toContain("size: 140");
});
it("keeps the CLI import banner gated by the Cloud environment", () => {
const currentDir = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
const pagePath = path.join(currentDir, "page.tsx");
const source = readFileSync(pagePath, "utf8");
expect(source).toContain("NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV");
expect(source).toContain("{isCloudEnvironment && <CliImportBanner");
});
});
+3
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { Suspense } from "react";
import { ProvidersAccountsView } from "@/components/providers";
import { SkeletonTableProviders } from "@/components/providers/table";
import { CliImportBanner } from "@/components/scans";
import { Skeleton } from "@/components/shadcn/skeleton/skeleton";
import { ContentLayout } from "@/components/ui";
import { FilterTransitionWrapper } from "@/contexts";
@@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ export default async function Providers({
}) {
const resolvedSearchParams = await searchParams;
const activeTab = getProviderTab(resolvedSearchParams.tab);
const isCloudEnvironment = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV === "true";
// Exclude `tab` from the Suspense key so switching tabs doesn't re-suspend
const { tab: _, ...paramsWithoutTab } = resolvedSearchParams || {};
@@ -26,6 +28,7 @@ export default async function Providers({
return (
<ContentLayout title="Providers" icon="lucide:cloud-cog">
{isCloudEnvironment && <CliImportBanner className="mb-6" />}
<FilterTransitionWrapper>
<ProviderPageTabs
activeTab={activeTab}
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import type { ComponentProps } from "react";
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import { useProviderWizardStore } from "@/store/provider-wizard/store";
import { SCAN_JOBS_TAB } from "@/types";
import { LaunchStep } from "./launch-step";
@@ -81,5 +82,9 @@ describe("LaunchStep", () => {
title: "Scan Launched",
}),
);
const toastPayload = toastMock.mock.calls[0]?.[0];
expect(toastPayload.action.props.children.props.href).toBe(
`/scans?tab=${SCAN_JOBS_TAB.ACTIVE}`,
);
});
});
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import { Spinner } from "@/components/shadcn/spinner/spinner";
import { TreeStatusIcon } from "@/components/shadcn/tree-view/tree-status-icon";
import { ToastAction, useToast } from "@/components/ui";
import { useProviderWizardStore } from "@/store/provider-wizard/store";
import { SCAN_JOBS_TAB } from "@/types";
import { TREE_ITEM_STATUS } from "@/types/tree";
import {
@@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ export function LaunchStep({
: "Single scan launched successfully.",
action: (
<ToastAction altText="Go to scans" asChild>
<Link href="/scans">Go to scans</Link>
<Link href={`/scans?tab=${SCAN_JOBS_TAB.ACTIVE}`}>Go to scans</Link>
</ToastAction>
),
});
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
import { render, screen } from "@testing-library/react";
import userEvent from "@testing-library/user-event";
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import { DOCS_URLS } from "@/lib/external-urls";
import { CliImportBanner } from "./cli-import-banner";
const STORAGE_KEY = "prowler:cli-import-banner-dismissed";
const localStorageMock = (() => {
let store: Record<string, string> = {};
return {
getItem: vi.fn((key: string) => store[key] ?? null),
setItem: vi.fn((key: string, value: string) => {
store[key] = value;
}),
removeItem: vi.fn((key: string) => {
delete store[key];
}),
clear: vi.fn(() => {
store = {};
}),
get length() {
return Object.keys(store).length;
},
key: vi.fn((index: number) => Object.keys(store)[index] ?? null),
};
})();
Object.defineProperty(window, "localStorage", {
value: localStorageMock,
writable: true,
});
describe("CliImportBanner", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
localStorageMock.clear();
vi.clearAllMocks();
});
it("renders the banner when not dismissed", () => {
render(<CliImportBanner />);
expect(
screen.getByText(/Import findings from Prowler CLI/),
).toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("renders a link to the documentation", () => {
render(<CliImportBanner />);
const link = screen.getByRole("link", { name: "Learn more" });
expect(link).toHaveAttribute("href", DOCS_URLS.FINDINGS_INGESTION);
expect(link).toHaveAttribute("target", "_blank");
expect(link).toHaveAttribute("rel", "noopener noreferrer");
});
it("does not render when previously dismissed", () => {
localStorageMock.setItem(STORAGE_KEY, "true");
const { container } = render(<CliImportBanner />);
expect(container).toBeEmptyDOMElement();
});
it("dismisses the banner and persists to localStorage on close", async () => {
const user = userEvent.setup();
render(<CliImportBanner />);
const closeButton = screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Close" });
await user.click(closeButton);
expect(
screen.queryByText(/Import findings from Prowler CLI/),
).not.toBeInTheDocument();
expect(localStorageMock.setItem).toHaveBeenCalledWith(STORAGE_KEY, "true");
});
it("renders with role='alert'", () => {
render(<CliImportBanner />);
expect(screen.getByRole("alert")).toBeInTheDocument();
});
});
+49
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
"use client";
import { Upload } from "lucide-react";
import Link from "next/link";
import { useState } from "react";
import { Alert, AlertTitle } from "@/components/shadcn";
import { useMountEffect } from "@/hooks/use-mount-effect";
import { DOCS_URLS } from "@/lib/external-urls";
import { cn } from "@/lib/utils";
const STORAGE_KEY = "prowler:cli-import-banner-dismissed";
export const CliImportBanner = ({ className }: { className?: string }) => {
const [isVisible, setIsVisible] = useState<boolean | null>(null);
useMountEffect(() => {
const isDismissed = localStorage.getItem(STORAGE_KEY) === "true";
setIsVisible(!isDismissed);
});
const handleClose = () => {
localStorage.setItem(STORAGE_KEY, "true");
setIsVisible(false);
};
if (isVisible === null || !isVisible) return null;
return (
<Alert
variant="info"
onClose={handleClose}
className={cn("animate-fade-in", className)}
>
<Upload />
<AlertTitle>
Import findings from Prowler CLI —{" "}
<Link
href={DOCS_URLS.FINDINGS_INGESTION}
target="_blank"
rel="noopener noreferrer"
className="font-normal underline underline-offset-2"
>
Learn more
</Link>
</AlertTitle>
</Alert>
);
};
+1
View File
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
export * from "./auto-refresh";
export * from "./cli-import-banner";
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
import { render, screen } from "@testing-library/react";
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import { SCAN_JOBS_TAB } from "@/types";
import { ScansFilterBar } from "./scans-filter-bar";
vi.mock("@/components/filters/provider-account-selectors", () => ({
ProviderAccountSelectors: () => <div>Provider account selectors</div>,
}));
vi.mock("@/components/shadcn", () => ({
Select: ({ children }: { children: React.ReactNode }) => (
<div>{children}</div>
),
SelectContent: ({ children }: { children: React.ReactNode }) => (
<div>{children}</div>
),
SelectItem: ({
children,
value,
}: {
children: React.ReactNode;
value: string;
}) => <div data-value={value}>{children}</div>,
SelectTrigger: ({ children, ...props }: React.ComponentProps<"button">) => (
<button {...props}>{children}</button>
),
SelectValue: ({ placeholder }: { placeholder: string }) => (
<span>{placeholder}</span>
),
}));
const defaultProps = {
providers: [],
scheduleType: "all",
scanStatus: "all",
showStatusFilter: false,
onScheduleTypeChange: vi.fn(),
onScanStatusChange: vi.fn(),
};
describe("ScansFilterBar", () => {
it("hides the type filter on the scheduled tab", () => {
// Given
render(
<ScansFilterBar {...defaultProps} activeTab={SCAN_JOBS_TAB.SCHEDULED} />,
);
// Then
expect(
screen.queryByRole("button", { name: /all types/i }),
).not.toBeInTheDocument();
expect(screen.getByText("Provider account selectors")).toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("shows the type filter outside the scheduled tab", () => {
// Given
render(
<ScansFilterBar {...defaultProps} activeTab={SCAN_JOBS_TAB.COMPLETED} />,
);
// Then
expect(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /all types/i })).toBeVisible();
});
});
+16 -13
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import {
SelectTrigger,
SelectValue,
} from "@/components/shadcn";
import type { ScanJobsTab } from "@/types";
import { SCAN_JOBS_TAB, type ScanJobsTab } from "@/types";
import type { ProviderProps } from "@/types/providers";
import {
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ export function ScansFilterBar({
const isCloudEnvironment = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV === "true";
const triggerFilterOptions = getScanTriggerFilterOptions(isCloudEnvironment);
const statusFilterOptions = getScanStatusFilterOptions(activeTab);
const showScheduleTypeFilter = activeTab !== SCAN_JOBS_TAB.SCHEDULED;
return (
<>
@@ -52,18 +53,20 @@ export function ScansFilterBar({
accountSelectorClassName={filterItemClass}
/>
<Select value={scheduleType} onValueChange={onScheduleTypeChange}>
<SelectTrigger aria-label="All Types" className={filterItemClass}>
<SelectValue placeholder="All Types" />
</SelectTrigger>
<SelectContent>
{triggerFilterOptions.map((option) => (
<SelectItem key={option.value} value={option.value}>
{option.label}
</SelectItem>
))}
</SelectContent>
</Select>
{showScheduleTypeFilter && (
<Select value={scheduleType} onValueChange={onScheduleTypeChange}>
<SelectTrigger aria-label="All Types" className={filterItemClass}>
<SelectValue placeholder="All Types" />
</SelectTrigger>
<SelectContent>
{triggerFilterOptions.map((option) => (
<SelectItem key={option.value} value={option.value}>
{option.label}
</SelectItem>
))}
</SelectContent>
</Select>
)}
{showStatusFilter && (
<Select value={scanStatus} onValueChange={onScanStatusChange}>
@@ -16,6 +16,32 @@ const { scansFilterBarSpy } = vi.hoisted(() => ({
scansFilterBarSpy: vi.fn(),
}));
const localStorageMock = (() => {
let store: Record<string, string> = {};
return {
getItem: vi.fn((key: string) => store[key] ?? null),
setItem: vi.fn((key: string, value: string) => {
store[key] = value;
}),
removeItem: vi.fn((key: string) => {
delete store[key];
}),
clear: vi.fn(() => {
store = {};
}),
get length() {
return Object.keys(store).length;
},
key: vi.fn((index: number) => Object.keys(store)[index] ?? null),
};
})();
Object.defineProperty(window, "localStorage", {
value: localStorageMock,
writable: true,
});
vi.mock("next/navigation", () => ({
usePathname: () => "/scans",
useRouter: () => ({
@@ -120,6 +146,7 @@ describe("ScansPageShell", () => {
afterEach(() => {
vi.unstubAllEnvs();
vi.clearAllMocks();
localStorageMock.clear();
searchParamsValue.current = "";
useScansStore.getState().closeLaunchScanModal();
});
@@ -191,6 +218,36 @@ describe("ScansPageShell", () => {
expect(screen.getByRole("combobox", { name: /all types/i })).toBeVisible();
});
it("shows the CLI import banner in Cloud", () => {
vi.stubEnv("NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV", "true");
render(
<ScansPageShell providers={providers} hasManageScansPermission>
<div>Scans table</div>
</ScansPageShell>,
);
expect(screen.getByRole("alert")).toHaveTextContent(
/import findings from prowler cli/i,
);
expect(screen.getByRole("link", { name: /learn more/i })).toHaveAttribute(
"href",
"https://docs.prowler.com/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-import-findings",
);
});
it("hides the CLI import banner outside Cloud", () => {
vi.stubEnv("NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV", "false");
render(
<ScansPageShell providers={providers} hasManageScansPermission>
<div>Scans table</div>
</ScansPageShell>,
);
expect(screen.queryByRole("alert")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("keeps launch scan with filters and mutelist with tabs", () => {
vi.stubEnv("NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV", "false");
@@ -332,4 +389,22 @@ describe("ScansPageShell", () => {
expect(calledUrl).toContain("tab=active");
expect(calledUrl).not.toContain("filter%5Bstate__in%5D");
});
it("clears type filter when switching to scheduled scans", async () => {
vi.stubEnv("NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV", "false");
searchParamsValue.current = "tab=completed&filter%5Btrigger%5D=manual";
const user = userEvent.setup();
render(
<ScansPageShell providers={providers} hasManageScansPermission>
<div>Scans table</div>
</ScansPageShell>,
);
await user.click(screen.getByRole("tab", { name: /scheduled/i }));
const calledUrl = pushMock.mock.calls.at(-1)?.[0] as string;
expect(calledUrl).toContain("tab=scheduled");
expect(calledUrl).not.toContain("filter%5Btrigger%5D");
});
});
+4
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import { useScansStore } from "@/store";
import { SCAN_JOBS_TAB, SCAN_TAB_LABELS, type ScanJobsTab } from "@/types";
import type { ProviderProps } from "@/types/providers";
import { CliImportBanner } from "./cli-import-banner";
import { LaunchScanModal } from "./launch-scan-modal";
import { ScansFilterBar } from "./scans-filter-bar";
import { useScansFilters } from "./use-scans-filters";
@@ -53,6 +54,7 @@ export function ScansPageShell({
const hasConnectedProviders = providers.some(
(provider) => provider.attributes.connection.connected === true,
);
const isCloudEnvironment = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV === "true";
const launchDisabled = !hasManageScansPermission || !hasConnectedProviders;
const launchOpen = isLaunchScanModalOpen || urlLaunchOpen;
@@ -104,6 +106,8 @@ export function ScansPageShell({
</Button>
</div>
{isCloudEnvironment && <CliImportBanner />}
<Tabs
value={filters.activeTab}
onValueChange={filters.setTab}
@@ -1,9 +1,22 @@
import { render, screen } from "@testing-library/react";
import userEvent from "@testing-library/user-event";
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import { ScansProvidersEmptyState } from "./scans-providers-empty-state";
const { replaceMock, searchParamsValue } = vi.hoisted(() => ({
replaceMock: vi.fn(),
searchParamsValue: { current: "" },
}));
vi.mock("next/navigation", () => ({
usePathname: () => "/scans",
useRouter: () => ({
replace: replaceMock,
}),
useSearchParams: () => new URLSearchParams(searchParamsValue.current),
}));
vi.mock("@/components/providers/wizard", () => ({
ProviderWizardModal: ({ open }: { open: boolean }) =>
open ? <div role="dialog">Provider wizard</div> : null,
@@ -14,6 +27,11 @@ vi.mock("./no-providers-connected", () => ({
}));
describe("ScansProvidersEmptyState", () => {
afterEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
searchParamsValue.current = "";
});
it("shows the add provider message and opens the provider wizard", async () => {
const user = userEvent.setup();
@@ -28,6 +46,25 @@ describe("ScansProvidersEmptyState", () => {
expect(screen.getByRole("dialog")).toHaveTextContent("Provider wizard");
});
it("clears the launch scan URL intent before opening the provider wizard", async () => {
// Given
searchParamsValue.current = "tab=completed&launchScan=true";
const user = userEvent.setup();
render(<ScansProvidersEmptyState thereIsNoProviders />);
// When
await user.click(
screen.getByRole("button", { name: /open add provider modal/i }),
);
// Then
expect(replaceMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith("/scans?tab=completed", {
scroll: false,
});
expect(screen.getByRole("dialog")).toHaveTextContent("Provider wizard");
});
it("shows the no connected providers message", () => {
render(<ScansProvidersEmptyState thereIsNoProviders={false} />);
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
"use client";
import { usePathname, useRouter, useSearchParams } from "next/navigation";
import { useState } from "react";
import { ProviderWizardModal } from "@/components/providers/wizard";
import { LAUNCH_SCAN_SEARCH_PARAM } from "@/lib/scans-navigation";
import { NoProvidersAdded } from "./no-providers-added";
import { NoProvidersConnected } from "./no-providers-connected";
@@ -14,12 +16,28 @@ interface ScansProvidersEmptyStateProps {
export function ScansProvidersEmptyState({
thereIsNoProviders,
}: ScansProvidersEmptyStateProps) {
const pathname = usePathname();
const router = useRouter();
const searchParams = useSearchParams();
const [isProviderWizardOpen, setIsProviderWizardOpen] = useState(false);
const openProviderWizard = () => {
if (searchParams.has(LAUNCH_SCAN_SEARCH_PARAM)) {
const params = new URLSearchParams(searchParams.toString());
params.delete(LAUNCH_SCAN_SEARCH_PARAM);
const query = params.toString();
router.replace(query ? `${pathname}?${query}` : pathname, {
scroll: false,
});
}
setIsProviderWizardOpen(true);
};
return (
<>
{thereIsNoProviders ? (
<NoProvidersAdded onOpenWizard={() => setIsProviderWizardOpen(true)} />
<NoProvidersAdded onOpenWizard={openProviderWizard} />
) : (
<NoProvidersConnected />
)}
+12
View File
@@ -94,6 +94,18 @@ describe("scans.utils", () => {
});
});
it("excludes trigger filters from scheduled scans", () => {
expect(
getScanJobsUserFilters({
tab: "scheduled",
"filter[trigger]": "manual",
"filter[provider_uid]": "123456789012",
}),
).toEqual({
"filter[provider_uid]": "123456789012",
});
});
it("formats scan labels and durations for table display", () => {
expect(getScanAlias(makeScan(""))).toBe("-");
expect(getScanAlias(makeScan("Daily scheduled scan", "scheduled"))).toBe(
+6
View File
@@ -77,8 +77,14 @@ function isSearchParamValue(value: unknown): value is string | string[] {
export function getScanJobsUserFilters(
searchParams: SearchParamsProps,
): Record<string, string | string[]> {
const tab = getScanJobsTab(searchParams.tab);
return Object.entries(searchParams).reduce<Record<string, string | string[]>>(
(filters, [key, value]) => {
if (tab === SCAN_JOBS_TAB.SCHEDULED && key === "filter[trigger]") {
return filters;
}
if (
key.startsWith("filter[") &&
!isScanStateFilterKey(key) &&
@@ -81,6 +81,17 @@ const makeCompletedScan = (): ScanProps => ({
},
});
const makeScheduledScan = (): ScanProps => ({
...makeCompletedScan(),
attributes: {
...makeCompletedScan().attributes,
trigger: "scheduled",
state: "scheduled",
scheduled_at: "2026-01-01T10:00:00Z",
next_scan_at: "2026-01-02T10:00:00Z",
},
});
const renderCell = (
columnId: string,
scan: ScanProps,
@@ -137,7 +148,6 @@ describe("getScanJobsColumns", () => {
"account",
"scanInfo",
"scanSchedule",
"nextScan",
"actions",
]);
});
@@ -163,4 +173,19 @@ describe("getScanJobsColumns", () => {
expect(screen.getByText("1 min 13 sec")).toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("labels the completed scan schedule column as Type", () => {
renderHeader(SCAN_JOBS_TAB.COMPLETED, "scanSchedule");
expect(screen.getByText("Type")).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(screen.queryByText("Schedule")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("keeps the scheduled column without repeating the scheduled label in each row", () => {
renderHeader(SCAN_JOBS_TAB.SCHEDULED, "scanSchedule");
renderCell("scanSchedule", makeScheduledScan(), SCAN_JOBS_TAB.SCHEDULED);
expect(screen.getByText("Schedule")).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(screen.queryByText("Scheduled")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
});
});
+17 -19
View File
@@ -39,13 +39,25 @@ const scanInfoColumn: ColumnDef<ScanProps> = {
cell: ({ row }) => <ScanInfoCell scan={row.original} />,
};
const scanScheduleColumn: ColumnDef<ScanProps> = {
const getScanScheduleColumn = (title: string): ColumnDef<ScanProps> => ({
id: "scanSchedule",
accessorFn: (row) => row.attributes.trigger,
header: ({ column }) => (
<DataTableColumnHeader column={column} title="Schedule" param="trigger" />
<DataTableColumnHeader column={column} title={title} param="trigger" />
),
cell: ({ row }) => <ScheduleCell scan={row.original} />,
});
const scheduledScanScheduleColumn: ColumnDef<ScanProps> = {
id: "scanSchedule",
accessorFn: (row) => row.attributes.scheduled_at,
header: ({ column }) => (
<DataTableColumnHeader column={column} title="Schedule" />
),
cell: ({ row }) => (
<DateWithTime dateTime={row.original.attributes.scheduled_at} showTime />
),
enableSorting: false,
};
const resourcesColumn: ColumnDef<ScanProps> = {
@@ -86,7 +98,7 @@ const activeColumns = (): ColumnDef<ScanProps>[] => [
cell: ({ row }) => <ProgressCell scan={row.original} />,
enableSorting: false,
},
scanScheduleColumn,
getScanScheduleColumn("Schedule"),
{
id: "launched",
header: ({ column }) => (
@@ -118,7 +130,7 @@ const completedColumns = (): ColumnDef<ScanProps>[] => [
cell: ({ row }) => <StatusBadge status={row.original.attributes.state} />,
enableSorting: false,
},
scanScheduleColumn,
getScanScheduleColumn("Type"),
{
id: "scanDate",
accessorFn: (row) => row.attributes.completed_at,
@@ -139,7 +151,7 @@ const completedColumns = (): ColumnDef<ScanProps>[] => [
const scheduledColumns = (): ColumnDef<ScanProps>[] => [
accountColumn,
scanInfoColumn,
scanScheduleColumn,
scheduledScanScheduleColumn,
/*
* TODO: Restore this column when the API exposes the last completed scan date for this schedule.
* {
@@ -153,20 +165,6 @@ const scheduledColumns = (): ColumnDef<ScanProps>[] => [
* enableSorting: false,
* },
*/
{
id: "nextScan",
accessorFn: (row) => row.attributes.next_scan_at,
header: ({ column }) => (
<DataTableColumnHeader
column={column}
title="Next Run"
param="next_scan_at"
/>
),
cell: ({ row }) => (
<DateWithTime dateTime={row.original.attributes.next_scan_at} />
),
},
actionsColumn,
];
+9 -3
View File
@@ -46,13 +46,19 @@ export function useScansFilters(): UseScansFiltersReturn {
router.push(`${pathname}?${params.toString()}`, { scroll: false });
};
const setTab = (tab: string) =>
updateParams({
const setTab = (tab: string) => {
const isScheduledTab = tab === SCAN_JOBS_TAB.SCHEDULED;
const updates: Record<string, string | null> = {
tab,
sort: null,
"filter[state]": null,
"filter[state__in]": null,
});
};
if (isScheduledTab) updates["filter[trigger]"] = null;
updateParams(updates);
};
const setScheduleType = (value: string) =>
updateParams({ "filter[trigger]": value });
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
import { render, screen } from "@testing-library/react";
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import MainLayout from "./main-layout";
vi.mock("@/hooks/use-sidebar", () => ({
useSidebar: vi.fn(),
}));
vi.mock("@/hooks/use-store", () => ({
useStore: () => ({
getOpenState: () => true,
settings: { disabled: false },
}),
}));
vi.mock("../sidebar/sidebar", () => ({
Sidebar: () => <aside data-testid="sidebar" />,
}));
describe("MainLayout", () => {
it("renders subdued background glows for side-nav contrast", () => {
render(
<MainLayout>
<div>Page content</div>
</MainLayout>,
);
const topGlow =
screen.getByTestId("sidebar").previousElementSibling
?.previousElementSibling;
const bottomGlow = screen.getByTestId("sidebar").previousElementSibling;
expect(topGlow).toHaveClass("h-[120%]", "w-[160%]", "opacity-[7%]");
expect(bottomGlow).toHaveClass("h-[50%]", "w-[50%]", "opacity-[7%]");
});
});
+2 -2
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ export default function MainLayout({
<div className="relative flex h-dvh items-center justify-center overflow-hidden">
{/* Top-left gradient halo */}
<div
className="pointer-events-none fixed top-0 left-0 z-0 size-[600px] opacity-20 blur-3xl"
className="pointer-events-none fixed top-0 left-0 z-0 h-[120%] w-[160%] opacity-[7%] blur-3xl"
style={{
background: "linear-gradient(90deg, #31E59F 0%, #60E0EC 100%)",
transform: "translate(-50%, -50%)",
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ export default function MainLayout({
{/* Bottom-right gradient halo */}
<div
className="pointer-events-none fixed right-0 bottom-0 z-0 size-[600px] opacity-20 blur-3xl"
className="pointer-events-none fixed right-0 bottom-0 z-0 h-[50%] w-[50%] opacity-[7%] blur-3xl"
style={{
background: "linear-gradient(90deg, #31E59F 0%, #60E0EC 100%)",
transform: "translate(50%, 50%)",
+2
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import { IntegrationType } from "../types/integrations";
export const DOCS_URLS = {
FINDINGS_ANALYSIS:
"https://docs.prowler.com/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app#step-8:-analyze-the-findings",
FINDINGS_INGESTION:
"https://docs.prowler.com/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-import-findings",
AWS_ORGANIZATIONS:
"https://docs.prowler.com/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-cloud-aws-organizations",
ALERTS: "https://docs.prowler.com/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-alerts",
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@@ -3241,7 +3241,7 @@ wheels = [
[[package]]
name = "prowler"
version = "5.29.0"
version = "5.30.0"
source = { editable = "." }
dependencies = [
{ name = "alibabacloud-actiontrail20200706" },