docs(mcp): name both verifying key settings

docker-compose-dev.yml

@@ -194,12 +194,16 @@ services:
       dockerfile: Dockerfile
     environment:
       - PROWLER_MCP_TRANSPORT_MODE=http
+      # The API generates this key pair on first boot; reading the public half
+      # here is what lets the MCP server verify token signatures.
+      - DJANGO_TOKEN_VERIFYING_KEY_FILE=/home/prowler/.config/prowler-api/jwt_public.pem
     env_file:
       - path: .env
         required: false
     ports:
       - "8000:8000"
     volumes:
+      - ./_data/api:/home/prowler/.config/prowler-api:ro
       - ./mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server:/app/prowler_mcp_server
       - ./mcp_server/pyproject.toml:/app/pyproject.toml
       - ./mcp_server/entrypoint.sh:/app/entrypoint.sh

docker-compose.yml

@@ -175,6 +175,11 @@ services:
     restart: unless-stopped
     environment:
       - PROWLER_MCP_TRANSPORT_MODE=http
+      # The API generates this key pair on first boot; reading the public half
+      # here is what lets the MCP server verify token signatures.
+      - DJANGO_TOKEN_VERIFYING_KEY_FILE=/home/prowler/.config/prowler-api/jwt_public.pem
+    volumes:
+      - "./_data/api:/home/prowler/.config/prowler-api:ro"
     env_file:
       - path: .env
         required: false

docs/getting-started/installation/prowler-mcp.mdx

@@ -222,6 +222,21 @@ Configure the server using environment variables:
 | `PROWLER_API_KEY` | Prowler API key | Only for STDIO mode | - |
 | `API_BASE_URL` | Custom Prowler API endpoint | No | `https://api.prowler.com/api/v1` |
 | `PROWLER_MCP_TRANSPORT_MODE` | Default transport mode (overwritten by `--transport` argument) | No | `stdio` |
+| `DJANGO_TOKEN_VERIFYING_KEY` | Prowler API RS256 public key, used in HTTP mode to verify the signature of the bearer token. Escaped newlines (`\n`) are accepted so it fits in an env file | Recommended for HTTP mode | - |
+| `DJANGO_TOKEN_VERIFYING_KEY_FILE` | Path to that same public key on disk, read when `DJANGO_TOKEN_VERIFYING_KEY` is empty | No | - |
+
+<Warning>
+In HTTP mode, without either of the two variables above the MCP server only
+checks that the bearer token is readable and unexpired, not that its signature
+is valid. The Prowler API still verifies every forwarded token, so a forged one
+is refused one hop later, but the MCP server will have acted on it first. Set
+one of them.
+
+Docker Compose wires this up already: the API writes the pair to
+`_data/api/jwt_public.pem` on first boot, and the `mcp-server` service mounts
+that directory read-only with `DJANGO_TOKEN_VERIFYING_KEY_FILE` pointing at it.
+A deployment that does not use Compose has to supply the public key itself.
+</Warning>
 
 <CodeGroup>
 ```bash macOS/Linux

mcp_server/README.md

@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ Deploy your own remote MCP server:
 
 - Full control over deployment
 - Requires Python 3.12+ or Docker
+- Set `DJANGO_TOKEN_VERIFYING_KEY` to the Prowler API's JWT public key (PEM, `\n`-escaped newlines allowed), or `DJANGO_TOKEN_VERIFYING_KEY_FILE` to a file holding it, so the server verifies the signature of user tokens before forwarding them; with neither set only their expiration is checked
 
 See the [Installation Guide](https://docs.prowler.com/getting-started/installation/prowler-mcp) for complete instructions.
 

mcp_server/changelog.d/mcp-jwt-signature-verification.security.md

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+JWT signatures in HTTP transport mode are verified against the Prowler API RS256 public key when DJANGO_TOKEN_VERIFYING_KEY or its file path is configured, refusing forged, alg none and HMAC-keyed tokens, and falling back to the previous expiration-only check when neither is set

mcp_server/prowler_mcp_server/prowler_app/utils/auth.py

@@ -1,14 +1,25 @@
 import base64
 import json
 import os
+import pathlib
 from datetime import datetime
 
+import jwt
 from fastmcp.server.dependencies import get_http_headers
 
 from prowler_mcp_server import __version__
 from prowler_mcp_server.lib.errors import CredentialError
 from prowler_mcp_server.lib.logger import logger
 
+# The Prowler API signs its JWTs with RS256. Pinning the list keeps a token that
+# declares `alg: none`, or an HMAC algorithm keyed with the public key, out.
+JWT_ALGORITHMS = ["RS256"]
+
+VERIFYING_KEY_FILE_ENV = "DJANGO_TOKEN_VERIFYING_KEY_FILE"
+
+# Tolerated clock drift between the API that issues a token and this server.
+JWT_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS = 30
+
 
 class ProwlerAppAuth:
     """Handles authentication for Prowler API using API keys or JWT tokens."""
@@ -17,12 +28,20 @@ class ProwlerAppAuth:
         self,
         mode: str = os.getenv("PROWLER_MCP_TRANSPORT_MODE", "stdio"),
         base_url: str = os.getenv("API_BASE_URL", "https://api.prowler.com/api/v1"),
+        jwt_verifying_key: str | None = os.getenv("DJANGO_TOKEN_VERIFYING_KEY"),
     ):
         self.base_url = base_url.rstrip("/")
         logger.info(f"Using Prowler API base URL: {self.base_url}")
         self.mode = mode
         self.access_token: str | None = None
         self.api_key: str | None = None
+        # Env files cannot hold a multi-line PEM, so the same escaped-newline
+        # form the API accepts for this variable is accepted here.
+        self.jwt_verifying_key = (
+            jwt_verifying_key.replace("\\n", "\n").strip() or None
+            if jwt_verifying_key
+            else None
+        ) or self._read_verifying_key_file()
 
         if mode == "stdio":  # STDIO mode
             # PROWLER_API_KEY is the current variable; PROWLER_APP_API_KEY is kept
@@ -36,16 +55,15 @@ class ProwlerAppAuth:
 
             if not self.api_key.startswith("pk_"):
                 raise ValueError("Prowler API key format is incorrect")
+        elif mode == "http" and not self.jwt_verifying_key:
+            logger.warning(
+                f"Neither DJANGO_TOKEN_VERIFYING_KEY nor {VERIFYING_KEY_FILE_ENV} is "
+                "set: JWT signatures will not be verified by the MCP server, only "
+                "their expiration"
+            )
 
     def _parse_jwt(self, token: str) -> dict | None:
-        """Parse JWT token and return payload
-
-        Args:
-            token: JWT token to parse
-
-        Returns:
-            Parsed JWT payload, or None if parsing fails
-        """
+        """Decode a JWT payload without verifying it; None if it is unreadable."""
         if not token:
             return None
 
@@ -75,6 +93,59 @@ class ProwlerAppAuth:
             logger.warning(f"Failed to parse JWT token: {e}")
             return None
 
+    @staticmethod
+    def _read_verifying_key_file() -> str | None:
+        """Public key from DJANGO_TOKEN_VERIFYING_KEY_FILE, which compose mounts from the API."""
+        path = os.getenv(VERIFYING_KEY_FILE_ENV, "").strip()
+        if not path:
+            return None
+        try:
+            return pathlib.Path(path).read_text().strip() or None
+        except OSError as error:
+            logger.warning(
+                f"Could not read {VERIFYING_KEY_FILE_ENV} at {path}: {error}"
+            )
+            return None
+
+    def _verify_jwt(self, token: str) -> dict:
+        """Verify the signature and standard time claims; raise CredentialError otherwise."""
+        try:
+            return jwt.decode(
+                token,
+                self.jwt_verifying_key,
+                algorithms=JWT_ALGORITHMS,
+                # The API's audience is deployment-specific and unknown here; the
+                # API checks it on every forwarded request.
+                options={"require": ["exp"], "verify_aud": False},
+                # The API and this server may sit on hosts with drifting clocks,
+                # and iat is only checked once a verifying key is configured.
+                leeway=JWT_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS,
+            )
+        except jwt.ExpiredSignatureError:
+            raise CredentialError("The token has expired")
+        except jwt.PyJWTError as e:
+            logger.warning(f"Rejected JWT: {type(e).__name__}: {e}")
+            raise CredentialError("The token could not be verified")
+
+    def _check_jwt_expiration(self, token: str) -> None:
+        """Fallback when no verifying key is configured: readable and not expired."""
+        payload = self._parse_jwt(token)
+        if not payload:
+            raise CredentialError("The token is not a readable JWT")
+
+        # `exp` is a numeric date in the spec, so a missing or non-numeric one
+        # makes the token unusable rather than merely stale -- comparing it
+        # would raise a TypeError and leave the failure masked as unclassified.
+        exp = payload.get("exp")
+        if isinstance(exp, bool) or not isinstance(exp, (int, float)):
+            raise CredentialError(
+                "The token carries no readable 'exp' expiration claim"
+            )
+
+        now = int(datetime.now().timestamp())
+        if exp <= now:
+            raise CredentialError("The token has expired")
+
     async def authenticate(self) -> str:
         """Authenticate and return token (API key for STDIO, API key or JWT for HTTP)."""
         if self.mode == "http":
@@ -98,27 +169,13 @@ class ProwlerAppAuth:
             if token.startswith("pk_"):
                 # API key - no expiration check needed
                 return token
+
+            if self.jwt_verifying_key:
+                self._verify_jwt(token)
             else:
-                # JWT token - validate and check expiration
-                payload = self._parse_jwt(token)
-                if not payload:
-                    raise CredentialError("The token is not a readable JWT")
+                self._check_jwt_expiration(token)
 
-                # Check if token is expired. `exp` is a numeric date in the
-                # spec, so a missing or non-numeric one makes the token
-                # unusable rather than merely stale -- comparing it would raise
-                # a TypeError and leave the failure masked as unclassified.
-                exp = payload.get("exp")
-                if isinstance(exp, bool) or not isinstance(exp, (int, float)):
-                    raise CredentialError(
-                        "The token carries no readable 'exp' expiration claim"
-                    )
-
-                now = int(datetime.now().timestamp())
-                if exp <= now:
-                    raise CredentialError("The token has expired")
-
-                return token
+            return token
         else:
             # PROWLER_MCP_TRANSPORT_MODE holds something this server does not
             # support. Nothing about a call caused it and nothing about a call

mcp_server/pyproject.toml

@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ dev = [
 [project]
 dependencies = [
   "fastmcp==3.4.5",
-  "httpx==0.28.1"
+  "httpx==0.28.1",
+  "pyjwt[crypto]==2.14.0"
 ]
 description = "MCP server for Prowler ecosystem"
 name = "prowler-mcp"
@@ -74,8 +75,6 @@ extend-select = [
 ]
 
 [tool.uv]
-package = true
-
 # Transitive pins fastmcp does not raise on its own; each carries a known HIGH.
 constraint-dependencies = [
   "cryptography==50.0.0",
@@ -84,3 +83,4 @@ constraint-dependencies = [
   "pyjwt==2.14.0",
   "python-multipart==0.0.30"
 ]
+package = true

mcp_server/tests/helpers/tokens.py

@@ -1,34 +1,99 @@
 """Obviously-fake credentials for tests.
 
 Deliberately unrealistic so repository secret scanning does not flag them. Never
-put a value here that could be mistaken for a real key.
+put a value here that could be mistaken for a real key. The RSA key pairs below
+are generated fresh on every import and never leave the test process.
 """
 
 import base64
+import hashlib
+import hmac
 import json
 import time
 
+import jwt
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa
+
 # Prowler API keys are recognised by their `pk_` prefix; anything else is rejected.
 FAKE_API_KEY = "pk_fake_api_key_for_unit_testing_only"
 FAKE_LEGACY_API_KEY = "pk_fake_legacy_api_key_for_unit_testing_only"
 MALFORMED_API_KEY = "not_a_prowler_api_key"
 
 
-def fake_jwt(expires_in: int = 3600, **claims: object) -> str:
-    """Mint an unsigned JWT whose ``exp`` is ``expires_in`` seconds from now.
+def _generate_rsa_pem_pair() -> tuple[str, str]:
+    """Return a (private, public) PEM pair shaped like the API's generated keys."""
+    private_key = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048)
+    private_pem = private_key.private_bytes(
+        encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
+        format=serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8,
+        encryption_algorithm=serialization.NoEncryption(),
+    ).decode()
+    public_pem = (
+        private_key.public_key()
+        .public_bytes(
+            encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
+            format=serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
+        )
+        .decode()
+    )
+    return private_pem, public_pem
 
-    Pass a negative ``expires_in`` for an already-expired token.
 
-    ``ProwlerAppAuth._parse_jwt`` only base64url-decodes the payload and reads
-    ``exp`` -- it never verifies the signature, because the Prowler API is what
-    validates the token. A placeholder signature is therefore enough, and avoids
-    adding a JWT library just for tests.
+# The pair the MCP server under test trusts, and an unrelated pair an attacker
+# could hold. Module-level so the 2048-bit generation runs once per session.
+JWT_SIGNING_KEY, JWT_VERIFYING_KEY = _generate_rsa_pem_pair()
+ROGUE_JWT_SIGNING_KEY, _ = _generate_rsa_pem_pair()
+
+
+def _jwt_payload(expires_in: int, claims: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
+    """The claim set the Prowler API issues, so the verifier sees a realistic token."""
+    now = int(time.time())
+    return {
+        "typ": "access",
+        "iss": "https://api.testing.invalid",
+        "aud": "https://api.testing.invalid",
+        "iat": now,
+        "exp": now + expires_in,
+        "jti": "0f0f0f0f0f0f4f0f8f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f",
+        "sub": "00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000000",
+        "tenant_id": "00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001",
+        **claims,
+    }
+
+
+def fake_jwt(
+    expires_in: int = 3600,
+    *,
+    signing_key: str = JWT_SIGNING_KEY,
+    **claims: object,
+) -> str:
+    """Mint an RS256 JWT whose ``exp`` is ``expires_in`` seconds from now.
+
+    Pass a negative ``expires_in`` for an already-expired token, or
+    ``signing_key=ROGUE_JWT_SIGNING_KEY`` for one the server must not trust.
+    """
+    return jwt.encode(_jwt_payload(expires_in, claims), signing_key, algorithm="RS256")
+
+
+def unsigned_jwt(expires_in: int = 3600, **claims: object) -> str:
+    """Mint a JWT declaring ``alg: none`` with an empty signature segment."""
+    return jwt.encode(_jwt_payload(expires_in, claims), key=None, algorithm="none")
+
+
+def hmac_jwt_keyed_with(secret: str, expires_in: int = 3600, **claims: object) -> str:
+    """Mint an HS256 JWT keyed with ``secret``, e.g. the server's public key.
+
+    Built by hand because ``jwt.encode`` refuses a PEM as an HMAC secret, which
+    is exactly the algorithm-confusion token the server must refuse too.
     """
 
-    def _segment(payload: dict[str, object]) -> str:
-        raw = json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
-        return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).decode().rstrip("=")
+    def _segment(data: bytes) -> str:
+        return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).decode().rstrip("=")
 
-    header = _segment({"alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT"})
-    body = _segment({"exp": int(time.time()) + expires_in, **claims})
-    return f"{header}.{body}.fake-signature-not-verified"
+    header = _segment(json.dumps({"alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT"}).encode())
+    body = _segment(json.dumps(_jwt_payload(expires_in, claims)).encode())
+    signature = hmac.new(
+        secret.encode(), f"{header}.{body}".encode(), hashlib.sha256
+    ).digest()
+    return f"{header}.{body}.{_segment(signature)}"

mcp_server/tests/prowler_app/utils/test_auth.py

@@ -1,19 +1,30 @@
 """Tests for Prowler API authentication.
 
-Reference for later branches: ``ProwlerAppAuth`` resolves its ``mode`` and
-``base_url`` in default arguments, which Python evaluates once at module import.
-``monkeypatch.setenv`` therefore has no effect on them -- always pass ``mode=``
-and ``base_url=`` explicitly, as these tests do.
+Reference for later branches: ``ProwlerAppAuth`` resolves its ``mode``,
+``base_url`` and ``jwt_verifying_key`` in default arguments, which Python
+evaluates once at module import. ``monkeypatch.setenv`` therefore has no effect
+on them -- always pass them explicitly, as these tests do.
 """
 
 import base64
 import json
+import time
 
+import jwt
 import pytest
 
 from prowler_mcp_server.lib.errors import CredentialError
 from prowler_mcp_server.prowler_app.utils.auth import ProwlerAppAuth
-from tests.helpers.tokens import FAKE_API_KEY, MALFORMED_API_KEY, fake_jwt
+from tests.helpers.tokens import (
+    FAKE_API_KEY,
+    JWT_SIGNING_KEY,
+    JWT_VERIFYING_KEY,
+    MALFORMED_API_KEY,
+    ROGUE_JWT_SIGNING_KEY,
+    fake_jwt,
+    hmac_jwt_keyed_with,
+    unsigned_jwt,
+)
 
 
 async def test_stdio_mode_reads_the_api_key_from_the_environment():
@@ -41,7 +52,7 @@ async def test_http_mode_accepts_a_bearer_api_key(http_request_headers):
     """In HTTP transport the token comes from the request's Authorization header."""
     http_request_headers(authorization=f"Bearer {FAKE_API_KEY}")
 
-    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(mode="http")
+    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(mode="http", jwt_verifying_key=JWT_VERIFYING_KEY)
 
     assert await auth.get_valid_token() == FAKE_API_KEY
 
@@ -62,7 +73,7 @@ async def test_http_mode_accepts_a_lowercase_bearer_scheme(http_request_headers)
     """Authentication scheme names are case-insensitive (RFC 7235)."""
     http_request_headers(authorization=f"bearer {FAKE_API_KEY}")
 
-    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(mode="http")
+    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(mode="http", jwt_verifying_key=JWT_VERIFYING_KEY)
 
     assert await auth.get_valid_token() == FAKE_API_KEY
 
@@ -72,7 +83,7 @@ async def test_http_mode_strips_only_the_scheme_prefix(http_request_headers):
     token = f"{FAKE_API_KEY}_Bearer_suffix"
     http_request_headers(authorization=f"Bearer {token}")
 
-    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(mode="http")
+    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(mode="http", jwt_verifying_key=JWT_VERIFYING_KEY)
 
     assert await auth.get_valid_token() == token
 
@@ -83,12 +94,176 @@ async def test_http_mode_rejects_an_authorization_header_without_a_token(
     """A bare scheme carries no credential to authenticate with."""
     http_request_headers(authorization="Bearer   ")
 
-    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(mode="http")
+    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(mode="http", jwt_verifying_key=JWT_VERIFYING_KEY)
 
     with pytest.raises(CredentialError, match="'Bearer <token>' form"):
         await auth.get_valid_token()
 
 
+# ------------------------------------------------- JWT with a verifying key
+
+
+async def test_http_mode_accepts_a_jwt_signed_by_the_api_key_pair(
+    http_request_headers,
+):
+    """A token signed with the private half of the configured key pair passes."""
+    token = fake_jwt()
+    http_request_headers(authorization=f"Bearer {token}")
+
+    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(mode="http", jwt_verifying_key=JWT_VERIFYING_KEY)
+
+    assert await auth.get_valid_token() == token
+
+
+async def test_http_mode_rejects_a_jwt_with_a_forged_signature(http_request_headers):
+    """A well-formed, unexpired token signed by another key pair is refused."""
+    token = fake_jwt(signing_key=ROGUE_JWT_SIGNING_KEY)
+    http_request_headers(authorization=f"Bearer {token}")
+
+    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(mode="http", jwt_verifying_key=JWT_VERIFYING_KEY)
+
+    with pytest.raises(CredentialError, match="could not be verified"):
+        await auth.get_valid_token()
+
+
+async def test_http_mode_reads_the_verifying_key_from_a_file(
+    http_request_headers, monkeypatch, tmp_path
+):
+    """Compose mounts the API's public key; reading it is what enables verification."""
+    key_file = tmp_path / "jwt_public.pem"
+    key_file.write_text(JWT_VERIFYING_KEY)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("DJANGO_TOKEN_VERIFYING_KEY_FILE", str(key_file))
+    http_request_headers(authorization=f"Bearer {fake_jwt()}")
+
+    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(mode="http", jwt_verifying_key=None)
+
+    assert auth.jwt_verifying_key == JWT_VERIFYING_KEY.strip()
+    assert await auth.get_valid_token()
+
+
+async def test_http_mode_rejects_a_forged_jwt_when_the_key_comes_from_a_file(
+    http_request_headers, monkeypatch, tmp_path
+):
+    key_file = tmp_path / "jwt_public.pem"
+    key_file.write_text(JWT_VERIFYING_KEY)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("DJANGO_TOKEN_VERIFYING_KEY_FILE", str(key_file))
+    http_request_headers(
+        authorization=f"Bearer {fake_jwt(signing_key=ROGUE_JWT_SIGNING_KEY)}"
+    )
+
+    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(mode="http", jwt_verifying_key=None)
+
+    with pytest.raises(CredentialError, match="could not be verified"):
+        await auth.get_valid_token()
+
+
+async def test_http_mode_ignores_an_unreadable_verifying_key_file(
+    http_request_headers, monkeypatch, tmp_path
+):
+    monkeypatch.setenv(
+        "DJANGO_TOKEN_VERIFYING_KEY_FILE", str(tmp_path / "does-not-exist.pem")
+    )
+
+    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(mode="http", jwt_verifying_key=None)
+
+    assert auth.jwt_verifying_key is None
+
+
+async def test_http_mode_tolerates_a_token_issued_slightly_in_the_future(
+    http_request_headers,
+):
+    """Clock drift between the API host and this server must not reject fresh tokens."""
+    token = fake_jwt(iat=int(time.time()) + 10)
+    http_request_headers(authorization=f"Bearer {token}")
+
+    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(mode="http", jwt_verifying_key=JWT_VERIFYING_KEY)
+
+    assert await auth.get_valid_token() == token
+
+
+async def test_http_mode_rejects_a_jwt_declaring_the_none_algorithm(
+    http_request_headers,
+):
+    """`alg: none` is not in the pinned algorithm list, so the token is refused."""
+    http_request_headers(authorization=f"Bearer {unsigned_jwt()}")
+
+    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(mode="http", jwt_verifying_key=JWT_VERIFYING_KEY)
+
+    with pytest.raises(CredentialError, match="could not be verified"):
+        await auth.get_valid_token()
+
+
+async def test_http_mode_rejects_an_hmac_jwt_keyed_with_the_public_key(
+    http_request_headers,
+):
+    """An HS256 token signed with the public key as the secret is refused.
+
+    This is the algorithm-confusion attack: the public key is not secret, so a
+    verifier that honoured the token's own `alg` would accept it.
+    """
+    token = hmac_jwt_keyed_with(JWT_VERIFYING_KEY)
+    http_request_headers(authorization=f"Bearer {token}")
+
+    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(mode="http", jwt_verifying_key=JWT_VERIFYING_KEY)
+
+    with pytest.raises(CredentialError, match="could not be verified"):
+        await auth.get_valid_token()
+
+
+async def test_http_mode_rejects_an_expired_jwt_with_a_valid_signature(
+    http_request_headers,
+):
+    """A correctly signed but expired token is refused locally."""
+    http_request_headers(authorization=f"Bearer {fake_jwt(expires_in=-60)}")
+
+    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(mode="http", jwt_verifying_key=JWT_VERIFYING_KEY)
+
+    with pytest.raises(CredentialError, match="The token has expired"):
+        await auth.get_valid_token()
+
+
+async def test_http_mode_rejects_a_signed_jwt_without_an_expiration(
+    http_request_headers,
+):
+    """`exp` is required: a token that never expires is refused even if signed."""
+    token = jwt.encode({"sub": "user"}, JWT_SIGNING_KEY, algorithm="RS256")
+    http_request_headers(authorization=f"Bearer {token}")
+
+    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(mode="http", jwt_verifying_key=JWT_VERIFYING_KEY)
+
+    with pytest.raises(CredentialError, match="could not be verified"):
+        await auth.get_valid_token()
+
+
+async def test_http_mode_accepts_the_verifying_key_with_escaped_newlines(
+    http_request_headers,
+):
+    """The PEM arrives through an env file, where newlines are written as `\\n`."""
+    token = fake_jwt()
+    http_request_headers(authorization=f"Bearer {token}")
+
+    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(
+        mode="http", jwt_verifying_key=JWT_VERIFYING_KEY.replace("\n", "\\n")
+    )
+
+    assert await auth.get_valid_token() == token
+
+
+# ----------------------------------------------- JWT without a verifying key
+
+
+async def test_http_mode_without_a_verifying_key_only_checks_expiration(
+    http_request_headers,
+):
+    """With no key configured the token is forwarded for the API to verify."""
+    token = fake_jwt(signing_key=ROGUE_JWT_SIGNING_KEY)
+    http_request_headers(authorization=f"Bearer {token}")
+
+    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(mode="http", jwt_verifying_key=None)
+
+    assert await auth.get_valid_token() == token
+
+
 async def test_http_mode_rejects_a_jwt_whose_payload_is_not_an_object(
     http_request_headers,
 ):
@@ -99,27 +274,27 @@ async def test_http_mode_rejects_a_jwt_whose_payload_is_not_an_object(
     """
     http_request_headers(authorization=f"Bearer {_jwt_with_payload(['exp'])}")
 
-    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(mode="http")
+    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(mode="http", jwt_verifying_key=None)
 
     with pytest.raises(CredentialError, match="not a readable JWT"):
         await auth.get_valid_token()
 
 
 @pytest.mark.parametrize(
-    ("payload", "case"),
+    "payload",
     [
-        ({"sub": "user"}, "missing"),
-        ({"exp": "1700000000"}, "string"),
-        ({"exp": None}, "null"),
+        pytest.param({"sub": "user"}, id="missing"),
+        pytest.param({"exp": "1700000000"}, id="string"),
+        pytest.param({"exp": None}, id="null"),
     ],
 )
 async def test_http_mode_rejects_a_jwt_without_a_numeric_expiration(
-    http_request_headers, payload: dict, case: str
+    http_request_headers, payload: dict
 ):
     """`exp` is a numeric date: comparing anything else raises a `TypeError`."""
     http_request_headers(authorization=f"Bearer {_jwt_with_payload(payload)}")
 
-    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(mode="http")
+    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(mode="http", jwt_verifying_key=None)
 
     with pytest.raises(CredentialError, match="no readable 'exp' expiration claim"):
         await auth.get_valid_token()
@@ -129,7 +304,7 @@ async def test_http_mode_rejects_an_expired_jwt(http_request_headers):
     """An expired JWT is refused locally instead of being forwarded to the API."""
     http_request_headers(authorization=f"Bearer {fake_jwt(expires_in=-60)}")
 
-    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(mode="http")
+    auth = ProwlerAppAuth(mode="http", jwt_verifying_key=None)
 
     with pytest.raises(CredentialError, match="The token has expired"):
         await auth.get_valid_token()
@@ -141,5 +316,5 @@ def test_api_keys_and_jwts_use_different_authorization_schemes():
 
     assert auth.get_headers(FAKE_API_KEY)["Authorization"] == f"Api-Key {FAKE_API_KEY}"
 
-    jwt = fake_jwt()
-    assert auth.get_headers(jwt)["Authorization"] == f"Bearer {jwt}"
+    token = fake_jwt()
+    assert auth.get_headers(token)["Authorization"] == f"Bearer {token}"

mcp_server/uv.lock

@@ -792,6 +792,7 @@ source = { editable = "." }
 dependencies = [
     { name = "fastmcp" },
     { name = "httpx" },
+    { name = "pyjwt", extra = ["crypto"] },
 ]
 
 [package.dev-dependencies]
@@ -810,6 +811,7 @@ dev = [
 requires-dist = [
     { name = "fastmcp", specifier = "==3.4.5" },
     { name = "httpx", specifier = "==0.28.1" },
+    { name = "pyjwt", extras = ["crypto"], specifier = "==2.14.0" },
 ]
 
 [package.metadata.requires-dev]