fix(huaweicloud): preserve FunctionGraph region attribution

- Carry regional client keys through function discovery
- Cover regionless SDK clients with a regression test
- Document FunctionGraph initialization behavior

.env

@@ -72,8 +72,8 @@ NEO4J_APOC_IMPORT_FILE_ENABLED=false
 NEO4J_APOC_IMPORT_FILE_USE_NEO4J_CONFIG=true
 NEO4J_APOC_TRIGGER_ENABLED=false
 NEO4J_DBMS_CONNECTOR_BOLT_LISTEN_ADDRESS=0.0.0.0:7687
-# Neo4j Prowler settings
-ATTACK_PATHS_BATCH_SIZE=1000
+# Attack Paths graph settings
+ATTACK_PATHS_GRAPH_MUTATION_BATCH_SIZE=1000
 ATTACK_PATHS_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE_MAX_RETRIES=3
 ATTACK_PATHS_READ_QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=30
 ATTACK_PATHS_MAX_CUSTOM_QUERY_NODES=250
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ SENTRY_RELEASE=local
 # REO_DEV_CLIENT_ID=
 
 #### Prowler release version ####
-NEXT_PUBLIC_PROWLER_RELEASE_VERSION=v5.35.0
+NEXT_PUBLIC_PROWLER_RELEASE_VERSION=v5.37.0
 
 # Social login credentials
 SOCIAL_GOOGLE_OAUTH_CALLBACK_URL="${AUTH_URL}/api/auth/callback/google"

.github/workflows/api-container-checks.yml

@@ -113,6 +113,15 @@ jobs:
             api/changelog.d/**
             api/AGENTS.md
 
+      # api-container-build-push.yml resolves the SDK pin to the branch tip
+      # before building, so match it here and scan what ships. Push only: PRs
+      # stay deterministic against the committed lock.
+      - name: Refresh prowler SDK pin to current branch tip
+        if: steps.check-changes.outputs.any_changed == 'true' && github.event_name == 'push'
+        run: |
+          pip install --no-cache-dir "uv==0.11.14"
+          (cd api && uv lock --upgrade-package prowler)
+
       - name: Set up Docker Buildx
         if: steps.check-changes.outputs.any_changed == 'true'
         uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@4d04d5d9486b7bd6fa91e7baf45bbb4f8b9deedd # v4.0.0

.github/workflows/helm-chart-release.yml

@@ -38,11 +38,14 @@ jobs:
       - name: Set up Helm
         uses: azure/setup-helm@dda3372f752e03dde6b3237bc9431cdc2f7a02a2 # v5.0.0
 
-      - name: Set appVersion from release tag
+      - name: Set chart version and appVersion from release tag
         run: |
-          RELEASE_TAG="${GITHUB_EVENT_RELEASE_TAG_NAME}"
-          echo "Setting appVersion to ${RELEASE_TAG}"
-          sed -i "s/^appVersion:.*/appVersion: \"${RELEASE_TAG}\"/" ${{ env.CHART_PATH }}/Chart.yaml
+          # Strip any leading "v" so the chart version is valid SemVer 2.
+          RELEASE_TAG="${GITHUB_EVENT_RELEASE_TAG_NAME#v}"
+          echo "Setting chart version and appVersion to ${RELEASE_TAG}"
+          # Publish an immutable chart version per release instead of the static
+          # 0.0.1 in source, so every release is a distinct, addressable artifact.
+          yq -i ".version = \"${RELEASE_TAG}\" | .appVersion = \"${RELEASE_TAG}\"" ${{ env.CHART_PATH }}/Chart.yaml
         env:
           GITHUB_EVENT_RELEASE_TAG_NAME: ${{ github.event.release.tag_name }}
 

.trivyignore

@@ -35,6 +35,20 @@ CVE-2026-13221 pkg:perl-base exp:2026-08-15
 CVE-2026-13221 pkg:perl-modules-5.36 exp:2026-08-15
 CVE-2026-13221 pkg:libperl5.36 exp:2026-08-15
 
+# CVE-2026-57433 — Perl Storable signed integer overflow when deserializing a
+# crafted SX_HOOK record (retrieve_hook_common passes a wrapped negative count
+# to av_extend).
+# Packages: perl, perl-base, perl-modules-5.36, libperl5.36.
+# Why ignored: perl-base is part of Debian's "Essential: yes" set; it cannot be
+# removed without breaking dpkg. Prowler does not invoke perl at runtime and
+# never calls Storable's thaw/retrieve on attacker-controlled blobs, so the
+# vulnerable deserialization path is unreachable. Fixed upstream in
+# Storable 3.41; no Debian bookworm fix is available yet.
+CVE-2026-57433 pkg:perl exp:2026-08-15
+CVE-2026-57433 pkg:perl-base exp:2026-08-15
+CVE-2026-57433 pkg:perl-modules-5.36 exp:2026-08-15
+CVE-2026-57433 pkg:libperl5.36 exp:2026-08-15
+
 # CVE-2025-7458 — SQLite integer overflow.
 # Package: libsqlite3-0.
 # Why ignored: transitive dependency of CPython's stdlib sqlite3 module. The

AGENTS.md

@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ When performing these actions, ALWAYS invoke the corresponding skill FIRST:
 | Action | Skill |
 |--------|-------|
 | Add changelog entry for a PR or feature | `prowler-changelog` |
+| Adding ConfigRequirements guardrails to compliance requirements | `prowler-compliance` |
 | Adding DRF pagination or permissions | `django-drf` |
 | Adding a compliance output formatter (per-provider class + table dispatcher) | `prowler-compliance` |
 | Adding indexes or constraints to database tables | `django-migration-psql` |
@@ -84,6 +85,7 @@ When performing these actions, ALWAYS invoke the corresponding skill FIRST:
 | Creating ViewSets, serializers, or filters in api/ | `django-drf` |
 | Creating Zod schemas | `zod-4` |
 | Creating a git commit | `prowler-commit` |
+| Creating a universal (multi-provider) compliance framework | `prowler-compliance` |
 | Creating new checks | `prowler-sdk-check` |
 | Creating new skills | `skill-creator` |
 | Creating or reviewing Django migrations | `django-migration-psql` |

README.md

@@ -6,7 +6,10 @@
   <b><i>Prowler</b> is the Open Cloud Security Platform trusted by thousands to automate security and compliance in any cloud environment. With thousands of ready-to-use checks and compliance frameworks, Prowler delivers real-time, customizable monitoring and seamless integrations, making cloud security simple, scalable, and cost-effective for organizations of any size.
 </p>
 <p align="center">
-<b>Secure ANY cloud at AI Speed at <a href="https://prowler.com">prowler.com</i></b>
+<b>The Agentic Cloud Defender</i></b>
+</p>
+<p align="center">
+<a href="https://cloud.prowler.com/sign-up">Try Prowler Cloud</a>
 </p>
 
 <p align="center">
@@ -56,7 +59,7 @@ Prowler includes hundreds of built-in controls to ensure compliance with standar
 
 ## Prowler Cloud & Prowler Local Server
 
-[Prowler Cloud](https://cloud.prowler.com/) and Prowler Local Server, its self-hosted open-source version, are web applications that simplify running Prowler across your cloud provider accounts. They provide a user-friendly interface to visualize the results and streamline your security assessments.
+[Prowler Cloud](https://cloud.prowler.com/sign-up) and Prowler Local Server, its self-hosted open-source version, are web applications that simplify running Prowler across your cloud provider accounts. They provide a user-friendly interface to visualize the results and streamline your security assessments.
 
 ![Prowler Cloud](docs/images/products/overview.png)
 ![Risk Pipeline](docs/images/products/risk-pipeline.png)
@@ -123,24 +126,25 @@ Every AWS provider scan will enqueue an Attack Paths ingestion job automatically
 
 | Provider | Checks | Services | [Compliance Frameworks](https://docs.prowler.com/user-guide/compliance/tutorials/compliance) | [Categories](https://docs.prowler.com/user-guide/cli/tutorials/misc#categories) | Support | Interface |
 |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
-| AWS | 615 | 86 | 47 | 19 | Official | UI, API, CLI |
-| Azure | 190 | 22 | 21 | 16 | Official | UI, API, CLI |
+| AWS | 621 | 86 | 47 | 19 | Official | UI, API, CLI |
+| Azure | 191 | 22 | 21 | 16 | Official | UI, API, CLI |
 | GCP | 109 | 20 | 19 | 12 | Official | UI, API, CLI |
-| Kubernetes | 90 | 7 | 8 | 11 | Official | UI, API, CLI |
+| Kubernetes | 92 | 7 | 8 | 11 | Official | UI, API, CLI |
 | GitHub | 24 | 3 | 2 | 5 | Official | UI, API, CLI |
-| M365 | 109 | 10 | 6 | 10 | Official | UI, API, CLI |
+| M365 | 111 | 10 | 6 | 10 | Official | UI, API, CLI |
 | OCI | 52 | 14 | 5 | 10 | Official | UI, API, CLI |
 | Alibaba Cloud | 63 | 9 | 6 | 9 | Official | UI, API, CLI |
 | Cloudflare | 29 | 3 | 2 | 5 | Official | UI, API, CLI |
 | IaC | [See `trivy` docs.](https://trivy.dev/latest/docs/coverage/iac/) | N/A | N/A | N/A | Official | UI, API, CLI |
 | MongoDB Atlas | 10 | 3 | 1 | 8 | Official | UI, API, CLI |
 | LLM | [See `promptfoo` docs.](https://www.promptfoo.dev/docs/red-team/plugins/) | N/A | N/A | N/A | Official | CLI |
-| Image | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Official | CLI, API |
+| Image | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Official | UI, API, CLI |
 | Google Workspace | 65 | 11 | 3 | 6 | Official | UI, API, CLI |
 | OpenStack | 34 | 5 | 1 | 9 | Official | UI, API, CLI |
 | Vercel | 26 | 6 | 1 | 8 | Official | UI, API, CLI |
 | Okta | 29 | 8 | 2 | 2 | Official | UI, API, CLI |
 | Linode [Contact us](https://prowler.com/contact) | 10 | 3 | 1 | 4 | Unofficial | CLI |
+| Huawei Cloud [Contact us](https://prowler.com/contact) | 25 | 10 | 1 | 6 | Unofficial | CLI |
 | E2E Networks [Contact us](https://prowler.com/contact) | 27 | 6 | 0 | 2 | Unofficial | CLI |
 | Scaleway [Contact us](https://prowler.com/contact) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Unofficial | CLI |
 | StackIT [Contact us](https://prowler.com/contact) | 7 | 2 | 1 | 3 | Unofficial | CLI |

api/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,42 @@ All notable changes to the **Prowler API** are documented in this file.
 
 <!-- changelog: release notes start -->
 
+## [1.37.0] (Prowler v5.36.0)
+
+### 🔄 Changed
+
+- OCI provider secrets no longer require `region`; legacy `region` input is accepted for backwards compatibility but ignored before storing or scanning [(#11741)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11741)
+- Compliance overview ingest now runs in a single transaction per scan with a configurable `COPY` batch size (`DJANGO_COMPLIANCE_COPY_BATCH_SIZE`, default 2000), reducing write pressure on the database [(#11875)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11875)
+
+### 🐞 Fixed
+
+- Scan findings now recover resources missing from the in-memory cache after resource pre-resolution, preventing valid findings from being skipped [(#12002)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/12002)
+- Tenant-wide integrations that are not attached to any provider, such as Jira, are now visible and manageable by roles with `manage_integrations` and without unlimited visibility [(#12060)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/12060)
+- Output generation now removes the scan's temporary output directory before writing, so a re-run of the task for the same scan (e.g. broker redelivery after a worker is killed mid-run) no longer appends to the previous run's files and duplicates finding rows in the exported CSV and other outputs [(#12097)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/12097)
+
+### 🔐 Security
+
+- Integration responses no longer disclose providers outside the visibility of the role, including the resources sideloaded through `?include=providers` [(#12060)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/12060)
+- Integration connection checks, Jira issue type lookups and Jira dispatches now resolve the integration through the provider visibility of the role instead of the whole tenant [(#12060)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/12060)
+- Roles without unlimited visibility can no longer attach an integration to providers they cannot see, nor edit or delete an integration bound to them [(#12060)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/12060)
+- Kubernetes kubeconfig validation now rejects legacy `auth-provider.config.cmd-path` command authentication in Prowler Cloud/API [(#12091)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/12091)
+
+---
+
+## [1.36.0] (Prowler v5.35.0)
+
+### 🐞 Fixed
+
+- `attack-paths-scan-perform` Celery tasks now use the configurable long-task time limits instead of the six-hour defaults [(#12009)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/12009)
+- Attack Paths scans handle provider deletion races cleanly, detect stale tasks after 16 hours, use backend-specific graph synchronization batches, and report exhausted Neptune write retries with the original database error [(#12019)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/12019)
+
+### 🔐 Security
+
+- Jira integration credentials only accept bare Atlassian site names containing letters, numbers, and hyphens [(#12012)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/12012)
+- Social account linking requires a verified matching email from both the identity provider and the existing user account without sending account connection notifications [(#12013)](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/12013)
+
+---
+
 ## [1.35.0] (Prowler v5.34.0)
 
 ### 🐞 Fixed

api/Dockerfile

@@ -102,7 +102,9 @@ ENV PATH="/home/prowler/.local/bin:$PATH"
 RUN uv sync --locked --no-install-project && \
     rm -rf ~/.cache/uv
 
-RUN .venv/bin/python .venv/lib/python3.12/site-packages/prowler/providers/m365/lib/powershell/m365_powershell.py
+# Invoked as a module so the base image's Python minor version is not baked
+# into a site-packages path.
+RUN .venv/bin/python -m prowler.providers.m365.lib.powershell.m365_powershell
 
 USER root
 

api/changelog.d/attack-paths-iam-privesc-cartesian.fixed.md

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Attack Paths IAM privilege-escalation queries no longer build an all-nodes × all-resource-items cartesian product, fixing runtime errors and timeouts on accounts with many IAM roles, users, or groups

api/changelog.d/attack-paths-scan-time-limit.fixed.md

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-`attack-paths-scan-perform` Celery tasks now use the configurable long-task time limits instead of the six-hour defaults

api/changelog.d/jira-site-name-validation.security.md

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-Jira integration credentials only accept bare Atlassian site names containing letters, numbers, and hyphens

api/changelog.d/social-account-linking.security.md

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-Social account linking now requires a verified matching email from both the identity provider and the existing user account

api/pyproject.toml

@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ name = "prowler-api"
 package-mode = false
 # Needed for the SDK compatibility
 requires-python = ">=3.11,<3.13"
-version = "1.36.0"
+version = "1.38.0"
 
 # Shared ruff baseline (kept in sync with mcp_server/pyproject.toml).
 # target-version tracks this project's lowest supported Python.

api/src/backend/api/adapters.py

@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
-import logging
-
 from allauth.account.models import EmailAddress
 from allauth.core.exceptions import ImmediateHttpResponse
 from allauth.socialaccount.adapter import DefaultSocialAccountAdapter
@@ -17,8 +15,6 @@ from api.utils import accept_invitation_for_user
 from django.db import transaction
 from django.http import HttpResponseForbidden
 
-logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
-
 
 class ProwlerSocialAccountAdapter(DefaultSocialAccountAdapter):
     @staticmethod
@@ -105,12 +101,6 @@ class ProwlerSocialAccountAdapter(DefaultSocialAccountAdapter):
                     raise ImmediateHttpResponse(HttpResponseForbidden())
                 sociallogin.connect(request, existing_user)
 
-    def send_notification_mail(self, *args, **kwargs):
-        try:
-            return super().send_notification_mail(*args, **kwargs)
-        except OSError:
-            logger.exception("Failed to send social account connection notification")
-
     def save_user(self, request, sociallogin, form=None):
         """
         Called after the user data is fully populated from the provider

api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/database.py

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ from django.conf import (
 MAX_CUSTOM_QUERY_NODES = env.int("ATTACK_PATHS_MAX_CUSTOM_QUERY_NODES", default=250)
 
 TEMP_DB_PREFIX = "db-tmp-scan-"
+DATABASE_NOT_FOUND_CODE = "Neo.ClientError.Database.DatabaseNotFound"
 
 
 # Exceptions
@@ -44,6 +45,10 @@ class GraphDatabaseQueryException(Exception):
         return self.message
 
 
+class NeptuneWriteRetryExhaustedException(GraphDatabaseQueryException):
+    pass
+
+
 class WriteQueryNotAllowedException(GraphDatabaseQueryException):
     pass
 

api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/queries/aws.py

@@ -1927,12 +1927,20 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_CREATE_ACCESS_KEY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition(
             OR act.value = '*'
         WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal
 
-        // Find target users that the principal can create access keys for
-        MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_user:AWSUser)
+        // Pre-aggregate this statement's resource values into a list so the user
+        // match below is evaluated once per user (in-memory `any`) instead of
+        // building an (all-users x all-resource-items) cartesian product.
         MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem)
-        WHERE res.value = '*'
-            OR res.value CONTAINS target_user.name
-            OR target_user.arn CONTAINS res.value
+        WITH aws, path_principal, collect(DISTINCT res.value) AS res_values
+        WITH aws, path_principal, res_values, ('*' IN res_values) AS res_wildcard
+
+        // Find target users that the principal can create access keys for.
+        // Bind name/arn once so the `any` predicate reads locals.
+        MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_user:AWSUser)
+        WITH path_principal, path_target, res_values, res_wildcard,
+             target_user.name AS uname, target_user.arn AS uarn
+        WHERE res_wildcard
+           OR size([rv IN res_values WHERE rv CONTAINS uname OR uarn CONTAINS rv]) > 0
 
         WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target
         WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths
@@ -1975,16 +1983,24 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_DELETE_CREATE_ACCESS_KEY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition(
            OR act2.value = '*'
         WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, stmt2, path_principal
 
-        // Find target users that the principal can rotate access keys for
-        MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_user:AWSUser)
+        // Pre-aggregate both statements' resource values into lists so the user
+        // match below is evaluated once per user (in-memory `any`) instead of
+        // building an (all-users x res x res2) cartesian product.
         MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem)
-        WHERE res.value = '*'
-           OR res.value CONTAINS target_user.name
-           OR target_user.arn CONTAINS res.value
+        WITH aws, stmt2, path_principal, collect(DISTINCT res.value) AS res_values
         MATCH (stmt2)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res2:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem)
-        WHERE res2.value = '*'
-           OR res2.value CONTAINS target_user.name
-           OR target_user.arn CONTAINS res2.value
+        WITH aws, path_principal, res_values, collect(DISTINCT res2.value) AS res2_values
+        WITH aws, path_principal, res_values, res2_values,
+             ('*' IN res_values) AS res_wildcard,
+             ('*' IN res2_values) AS res2_wildcard
+
+        // Find target users that the principal can rotate access keys for.
+        // Bind name/arn once so the `any` predicates read locals.
+        MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_user:AWSUser)
+        WITH path_principal, path_target, res_values, res_wildcard, res2_values, res2_wildcard,
+             target_user.name AS uname, target_user.arn AS uarn
+        WHERE (res_wildcard OR size([rv IN res_values WHERE rv CONTAINS uname OR uarn CONTAINS rv]) > 0)
+          AND (res2_wildcard OR size([rv IN res2_values WHERE rv CONTAINS uname OR uarn CONTAINS rv]) > 0)
 
         WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target
         WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths
@@ -2019,12 +2035,20 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_CREATE_LOGIN_PROFILE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition(
             OR act.value = '*'
         WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal
 
-        // Find target users that the principal can create login profiles for
-        MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_user:AWSUser)
+        // Pre-aggregate this statement's resource values into a list so the user
+        // match below is evaluated once per user (in-memory `any`) instead of
+        // building an (all-users x all-resource-items) cartesian product.
         MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem)
-        WHERE res.value = '*'
-            OR res.value CONTAINS target_user.name
-            OR target_user.arn CONTAINS res.value
+        WITH aws, path_principal, collect(DISTINCT res.value) AS res_values
+        WITH aws, path_principal, res_values, ('*' IN res_values) AS res_wildcard
+
+        // Find target users that the principal can create login profiles for.
+        // Bind name/arn once so the `any` predicate reads locals.
+        MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_user:AWSUser)
+        WITH path_principal, path_target, res_values, res_wildcard,
+             target_user.name AS uname, target_user.arn AS uarn
+        WHERE res_wildcard
+           OR size([rv IN res_values WHERE rv CONTAINS uname OR uarn CONTAINS rv]) > 0
 
         WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target
         WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths
@@ -2097,12 +2121,20 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_UPDATE_LOGIN_PROFILE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition(
             OR act.value = '*'
         WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal
 
-        // Find target users that the principal can update login profiles for
-        MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_user:AWSUser)
+        // Pre-aggregate this statement's resource values into a list so the user
+        // match below is evaluated once per user (in-memory `any`) instead of
+        // building an (all-users x all-resource-items) cartesian product.
         MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem)
-        WHERE res.value = '*'
-            OR res.value CONTAINS target_user.name
-            OR target_user.arn CONTAINS res.value
+        WITH aws, path_principal, collect(DISTINCT res.value) AS res_values
+        WITH aws, path_principal, res_values, ('*' IN res_values) AS res_wildcard
+
+        // Find target users that the principal can update login profiles for.
+        // Bind name/arn once so the `any` predicate reads locals.
+        MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_user:AWSUser)
+        WITH path_principal, path_target, res_values, res_wildcard,
+             target_user.name AS uname, target_user.arn AS uarn
+        WHERE res_wildcard
+           OR size([rv IN res_values WHERE rv CONTAINS uname OR uarn CONTAINS rv]) > 0
 
         WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target
         WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths
@@ -2333,12 +2365,21 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_UPDATE_ASSUME_ROLE_POLICY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition(
         // Collapse the action-item fan-out: one row per (statement chain), not per matching action
         WITH DISTINCT aws, stmt, path_principal
 
-        // Find target roles whose trust policy this statement's resource can target
-        MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)
+        // Pre-aggregate this statement's resource values into a list so the role
+        // match below is evaluated once per role (in-memory `any`) instead of
+        // building an (all-roles x all-resource-items) cartesian product.
         MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem)
-        WHERE res.value = '*'
-           OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name
-           OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value
+        WITH aws, path_principal, collect(DISTINCT res.value) AS res_values
+        WITH aws, path_principal, res_values, ('*' IN res_values) AS res_wildcard
+
+        // Find target roles whose trust policy this statement's resource can target.
+        // Bind the role's name/arn once so the `any` predicate reads them from a
+        // local variable instead of re-reading the property store per resource.
+        MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)
+        WITH path_principal, path_target, res_values, res_wildcard,
+             target_role.name AS rname, target_role.arn AS rarn
+        WHERE res_wildcard
+           OR size([rv IN res_values WHERE rv CONTAINS rname OR rarn CONTAINS rv]) > 0
 
         WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target
         WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths
@@ -2373,12 +2414,20 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ADD_USER_TO_GROUP = AttackPathsQueryDefinition(
             OR act.value = '*'
         WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal
 
-        // Find target groups the principal can add users to
-        MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_group:AWSGroup)
+        // Pre-aggregate this statement's resource values into a list so the group
+        // match below is evaluated once per group (in-memory `any`) instead of
+        // building an (all-groups x all-resource-items) cartesian product.
         MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem)
-        WHERE res.value = '*'
-            OR res.value CONTAINS target_group.name
-            OR target_group.arn CONTAINS res.value
+        WITH aws, path_principal, collect(DISTINCT res.value) AS res_values
+        WITH aws, path_principal, res_values, ('*' IN res_values) AS res_wildcard
+
+        // Find target groups the principal can add users to.
+        // Bind name/arn once so the `any` predicate reads locals.
+        MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_group:AWSGroup)
+        WITH path_principal, path_target, res_values, res_wildcard,
+             target_group.name AS gname, target_group.arn AS garn
+        WHERE res_wildcard
+           OR size([rv IN res_values WHERE rv CONTAINS gname OR garn CONTAINS rv]) > 0
 
         WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target
         WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths
@@ -2462,16 +2511,24 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ATTACH_USER_POLICY_CREATE_ACCESS_KEY = AttackPathsQueryDefinitio
            OR act2.value = '*'
         WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, stmt2, path_principal
 
-        // Find target users the principal can attach policies to and create keys for
-        MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_user:AWSUser)
+        // Pre-aggregate both statements' resource values into lists so the user
+        // match below is evaluated once per user (in-memory `any`) instead of
+        // building an (all-users x res x res2) cartesian product.
         MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem)
-        WHERE res.value = '*'
-           OR res.value CONTAINS target_user.name
-           OR target_user.arn CONTAINS res.value
+        WITH aws, stmt2, path_principal, collect(DISTINCT res.value) AS res_values
         MATCH (stmt2)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res2:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem)
-        WHERE res2.value = '*'
-           OR res2.value CONTAINS target_user.name
-           OR target_user.arn CONTAINS res2.value
+        WITH aws, path_principal, res_values, collect(DISTINCT res2.value) AS res2_values
+        WITH aws, path_principal, res_values, res2_values,
+             ('*' IN res_values) AS res_wildcard,
+             ('*' IN res2_values) AS res2_wildcard
+
+        // Find target users the principal can attach policies to and create keys for.
+        // Bind name/arn once so the `any` predicates read locals.
+        MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_user:AWSUser)
+        WITH path_principal, path_target, res_values, res_wildcard, res2_values, res2_wildcard,
+             target_user.name AS uname, target_user.arn AS uarn
+        WHERE (res_wildcard OR size([rv IN res_values WHERE rv CONTAINS uname OR uarn CONTAINS rv]) > 0)
+          AND (res2_wildcard OR size([rv IN res2_values WHERE rv CONTAINS uname OR uarn CONTAINS rv]) > 0)
 
         WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target
         WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths
@@ -2596,16 +2653,24 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_PUT_USER_POLICY_CREATE_ACCESS_KEY = AttackPathsQueryDefinition(
            OR act2.value = '*'
         WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, stmt2, path_principal
 
-        // Find target users the principal can put policies on and create keys for
-        MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_user:AWSUser)
+        // Pre-aggregate both statements' resource values into lists so the user
+        // match below is evaluated once per user (in-memory `any`) instead of
+        // building an (all-users x res x res2) cartesian product.
         MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem)
-        WHERE res.value = '*'
-           OR res.value CONTAINS target_user.name
-           OR target_user.arn CONTAINS res.value
+        WITH aws, stmt2, path_principal, collect(DISTINCT res.value) AS res_values
         MATCH (stmt2)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res2:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem)
-        WHERE res2.value = '*'
-           OR res2.value CONTAINS target_user.name
-           OR target_user.arn CONTAINS res2.value
+        WITH aws, path_principal, res_values, collect(DISTINCT res2.value) AS res2_values
+        WITH aws, path_principal, res_values, res2_values,
+             ('*' IN res_values) AS res_wildcard,
+             ('*' IN res2_values) AS res2_wildcard
+
+        // Find target users the principal can put policies on and create keys for.
+        // Bind name/arn once so the `any` predicates read locals.
+        MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_user:AWSUser)
+        WITH path_principal, path_target, res_values, res_wildcard, res2_values, res2_wildcard,
+             target_user.name AS uname, target_user.arn AS uarn
+        WHERE (res_wildcard OR size([rv IN res_values WHERE rv CONTAINS uname OR uarn CONTAINS rv]) > 0)
+          AND (res2_wildcard OR size([rv IN res2_values WHERE rv CONTAINS uname OR uarn CONTAINS rv]) > 0)
 
         WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target
         WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths
@@ -2647,16 +2712,24 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_ATTACH_ROLE_POLICY_UPDATE_ASSUME_ROLE = AttackPathsQueryDefiniti
            OR act2.value = '*'
         WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, stmt2, path_principal
 
-        // Find target roles the principal can attach policies to and update trust policy for
-        MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)
+        // Pre-aggregate both statements' resource values into lists so the role
+        // match below is evaluated once per role (in-memory `any`) instead of
+        // building an (all-roles x res x res2) cartesian product.
         MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem)
-        WHERE res.value = '*'
-           OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name
-           OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value
+        WITH aws, stmt2, path_principal, collect(DISTINCT res.value) AS res_values
         MATCH (stmt2)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res2:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem)
-        WHERE res2.value = '*'
-           OR res2.value CONTAINS target_role.name
-           OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res2.value
+        WITH aws, path_principal, res_values, collect(DISTINCT res2.value) AS res2_values
+        WITH aws, path_principal, res_values, res2_values,
+             ('*' IN res_values) AS res_wildcard,
+             ('*' IN res2_values) AS res2_wildcard
+
+        // Find target roles the principal can attach policies to and update trust
+        // policy for. Bind name/arn once so the `any` predicates read locals.
+        MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)
+        WITH path_principal, path_target, res_values, res_wildcard, res2_values, res2_wildcard,
+             target_role.name AS rname, target_role.arn AS rarn
+        WHERE (res_wildcard OR size([rv IN res_values WHERE rv CONTAINS rname OR rarn CONTAINS rv]) > 0)
+          AND (res2_wildcard OR size([rv IN res2_values WHERE rv CONTAINS rname OR rarn CONTAINS rv]) > 0)
 
         WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target
         WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths
@@ -2698,17 +2771,31 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_CREATE_POLICY_VERSION_UPDATE_ASSUME_ROLE = AttackPathsQueryDefin
            OR act2.value = '*'
         WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, stmt2, path_principal
 
-        // Find target roles with customer-managed policies the principal can modify and update trust policy for
-        MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)
+        // Pre-aggregate both statements' resource values into lists so the role
+        // and policy matches below are evaluated with an in-memory `any` instead
+        // of building an (all-roles x res2) x (policies x res) cartesian product.
         MATCH (stmt2)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res2:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem)
-        WHERE res2.value = '*'
-           OR res2.value CONTAINS target_role.name
-           OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res2.value
-        MATCH (target_role)-[:POLICY]->(target_policy:AWSPolicy)
-        WHERE target_policy.arn CONTAINS $provider_uid
+        WITH aws, stmt, path_principal, collect(DISTINCT res2.value) AS res2_values
         MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem)
-        WHERE res.value = '*'
-           OR target_policy.arn CONTAINS res.value
+        WITH aws, path_principal, res2_values, collect(DISTINCT res.value) AS res_values
+        WITH aws, path_principal, res2_values, res_values,
+             ('*' IN res2_values) AS res2_wildcard,
+             ('*' IN res_values) AS res_wildcard
+
+        // Find target roles with customer-managed policies the principal can
+        // modify and update trust policy for. Bind name/arn once so the `any`
+        // predicates read locals instead of re-reading the property store.
+        MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)
+        WITH path_principal, path_target, target_role, res_values, res_wildcard,
+             res2_values, res2_wildcard,
+             target_role.name AS rname, target_role.arn AS rarn
+        WHERE res2_wildcard
+           OR size([rv IN res2_values WHERE rv CONTAINS rname OR rarn CONTAINS rv]) > 0
+        MATCH (target_role)-[:POLICY]->(target_policy:AWSPolicy)
+        WITH path_principal, path_target, res_values, res_wildcard,
+             target_policy.arn AS parn
+        WHERE parn CONTAINS $provider_uid
+          AND (res_wildcard OR size([rv IN res_values WHERE parn CONTAINS rv]) > 0)
 
         WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target
         WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths
@@ -2750,16 +2837,24 @@ AWS_IAM_PRIVESC_PUT_ROLE_POLICY_UPDATE_ASSUME_ROLE = AttackPathsQueryDefinition(
            OR act2.value = '*'
         WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, stmt2, path_principal
 
-        // Find target roles the principal can put inline policies on and update trust policy for
-        MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)
+        // Pre-aggregate both statements' resource values into lists so the role
+        // match below is evaluated once per role (in-memory `any`) instead of
+        // building an (all-roles x res x res2) cartesian product.
         MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem)
-        WHERE res.value = '*'
-           OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name
-           OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value
+        WITH aws, stmt2, path_principal, collect(DISTINCT res.value) AS res_values
         MATCH (stmt2)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res2:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem)
-        WHERE res2.value = '*'
-           OR res2.value CONTAINS target_role.name
-           OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res2.value
+        WITH aws, path_principal, res_values, collect(DISTINCT res2.value) AS res2_values
+        WITH aws, path_principal, res_values, res2_values,
+             ('*' IN res_values) AS res_wildcard,
+             ('*' IN res2_values) AS res2_wildcard
+
+        // Find target roles the principal can put inline policies on and update
+        // trust policy for. Bind name/arn once so the `any` predicates read locals.
+        MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)
+        WITH path_principal, path_target, res_values, res_wildcard, res2_values, res2_wildcard,
+             target_role.name AS rname, target_role.arn AS rarn
+        WHERE (res_wildcard OR size([rv IN res_values WHERE rv CONTAINS rname OR rarn CONTAINS rv]) > 0)
+          AND (res2_wildcard OR size([rv IN res2_values WHERE rv CONTAINS rname OR rarn CONTAINS rv]) > 0)
 
         WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target
         WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths

api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/retryable_session.py

@@ -10,6 +10,28 @@ import neo4j.exceptions
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
 
+class RetryExhaustedError(Exception):
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        retry_context: str,
+        method_name: str,
+        attempts: int,
+        elapsed_seconds: float,
+        last_error: Exception,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.retry_context = retry_context
+        self.method_name = method_name
+        self.attempts = attempts
+        self.elapsed_seconds = elapsed_seconds
+        self.last_error = last_error
+        last_message = getattr(last_error, "message", None) or str(last_error)
+        super().__init__(
+            f"{retry_context} {method_name} failed after {attempts} attempts over "
+            f"{elapsed_seconds:.3f}s. Last error: {last_message}"
+        )
+
+
 class RetryableSession:
     """Wrapper around ``neo4j.Session`` with a refreshable retry policy."""
 
@@ -19,11 +41,13 @@ class RetryableSession:
         max_retries: int,
         retry_if: Callable[[Exception], bool] | None = None,
         initial_retry_delay_seconds: float = 0,
+        retry_context: str | None = None,
     ) -> None:
         self._session_factory = session_factory
         self._max_retries = max(0, max_retries)
         self._retry_if = retry_if
         self._initial_retry_delay_seconds = max(0.0, initial_retry_delay_seconds)
+        self._retry_context = retry_context
         self._session = self._session_factory()
 
     def close(self) -> None:
@@ -54,6 +78,7 @@ class RetryableSession:
     def _call_with_retry(self, method_name: str, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> Any:
         attempt = 0
         last_exc: Exception | None = None
+        started_at = time.monotonic()
 
         while attempt <= self._max_retries:
             try:
@@ -68,17 +93,38 @@ class RetryableSession:
                 attempt += 1
 
                 if attempt > self._max_retries:
+                    if self._retry_context is not None:
+                        raise RetryExhaustedError(
+                            retry_context=self._retry_context,
+                            method_name=method_name,
+                            attempts=attempt,
+                            elapsed_seconds=time.monotonic() - started_at,
+                            last_error=exc,
+                        ) from exc
                     raise
 
                 delay = self._retry_delay(attempt)
-                logger.warning(
-                    "Graph session %s failed with %s; retry %s/%s in %.3fs",
-                    method_name,
-                    type(exc).__name__,
-                    attempt,
-                    self._max_retries,
-                    delay,
-                )
+                if self._retry_context is not None:
+                    error_message = getattr(exc, "message", None) or str(exc)
+                    logger.warning(
+                        "%s %s failed with %s: %s; retry %s/%s in %.3fs",
+                        self._retry_context,
+                        method_name,
+                        type(exc).__name__,
+                        error_message,
+                        attempt,
+                        self._max_retries,
+                        delay,
+                    )
+                else:
+                    logger.warning(
+                        "Graph session %s failed with %s; retry %s/%s in %.3fs",
+                        method_name,
+                        type(exc).__name__,
+                        attempt,
+                        self._max_retries,
+                        delay,
+                    )
                 self._refresh_session()
                 if delay:
                     time.sleep(delay)

api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/sink/base.py

@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ class SinkDatabase(Protocol):
     has a single graph, and isolation is label-based).
     """
 
+    sync_batch_size: int
+
     def init(self) -> None: ...
 
     def close(self) -> None: ...

api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/sink/neo4j.py

@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ DATABASE_NOT_FOUND_CODE = "Neo.ClientError.Database.DatabaseNotFound"
 class Neo4jSink(SinkDatabase):
     """Neo4j-backed sink. Multi-database cluster; tenant isolation is physical."""
 
+    sync_batch_size = env.int("ATTACK_PATHS_NEO4J_SYNC_BATCH_SIZE", default=1000)
+
     def __init__(self) -> None:
         self._driver: neo4j.Driver | None = None
         self._lock = threading.Lock()
@@ -203,7 +205,7 @@ class Neo4jSink(SinkDatabase):
         """
         from api.attack_paths.database import GraphDatabaseQueryException
         from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import (
-            BATCH_SIZE,
+            GRAPH_MUTATION_BATCH_SIZE,
             PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL,
             get_provider_label,
         )
@@ -251,7 +253,7 @@ class Neo4jSink(SinkDatabase):
                         total_key="rels",
                         deleted_key="deleted_rels",
                         initial_total=deleted_relationships,
-                        batch_size=BATCH_SIZE,
+                        batch_size=GRAPH_MUTATION_BATCH_SIZE,
                         drop_t0=drop_t0,
                     )
                     relationship_batches += phase_batches
@@ -270,7 +272,7 @@ class Neo4jSink(SinkDatabase):
                     total_key="nodes",
                     deleted_key="deleted_nodes",
                     initial_total=0,
-                    batch_size=BATCH_SIZE,
+                    batch_size=GRAPH_MUTATION_BATCH_SIZE,
                     drop_t0=drop_t0,
                 )
 

api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/sink/neptune.py

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ from urllib.parse import urlsplit
 
 import neo4j
 import neo4j.exceptions
-from api.attack_paths.retryable_session import RetryableSession
+from api.attack_paths.retryable_session import RetryableSession, RetryExhaustedError
 from api.attack_paths.sink.base import SinkDatabase
 from api.attack_paths.sink.drop import (
     NODE_DELETE_QUERY_TEMPLATE,
@@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ def _is_retryable_write_error(exc: Exception) -> bool:
 class NeptuneSink(SinkDatabase):
     """Neptune-backed sink. Single database; isolation is label-based."""
 
+    sync_batch_size = env.int("ATTACK_PATHS_NEPTUNE_SYNC_BATCH_SIZE", default=500)
+
     def __init__(self) -> None:
         self._writer: neo4j.Driver | None = None
         self._reader: neo4j.Driver | None = None
@@ -206,6 +208,7 @@ class NeptuneSink(SinkDatabase):
         from api.attack_paths.database import (
             ClientStatementException,
             GraphDatabaseQueryException,
+            NeptuneWriteRetryExhaustedException,
             WriteQueryNotAllowedException,
         )
 
@@ -227,9 +230,17 @@ class NeptuneSink(SinkDatabase):
                 initial_retry_delay_seconds=(
                     NEPTUNE_WRITE_RETRY_DELAY_SECONDS if is_write_session else 0
                 ),
+                retry_context="Neptune write" if is_write_session else None,
             )
             yield session_wrapper
 
+        except RetryExhaustedError as exc:
+            last_error = exc.last_error
+            raise NeptuneWriteRetryExhaustedException(
+                message=str(exc),
+                code=getattr(last_error, "code", None),
+            ) from last_error
+
         except neo4j.exceptions.Neo4jError as exc:
             if (
                 default_access_mode == neo4j.READ_ACCESS
@@ -291,7 +302,7 @@ class NeptuneSink(SinkDatabase):
         graph's branching factor.
         """
         from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import (
-            BATCH_SIZE,
+            GRAPH_MUTATION_BATCH_SIZE,
             PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL,
             get_provider_label,
         )
@@ -330,7 +341,7 @@ class NeptuneSink(SinkDatabase):
                     total_key="rels",
                     deleted_key="deleted_rels",
                     initial_total=deleted_relationships,
-                    batch_size=BATCH_SIZE,
+                    batch_size=GRAPH_MUTATION_BATCH_SIZE,
                     drop_t0=drop_t0,
                 )
                 relationship_batches += phase_batches
@@ -349,7 +360,7 @@ class NeptuneSink(SinkDatabase):
                 total_key="nodes",
                 deleted_key="deleted_nodes",
                 initial_total=0,
-                batch_size=BATCH_SIZE,
+                batch_size=GRAPH_MUTATION_BATCH_SIZE,
                 drop_t0=drop_t0,
             )
 

api/src/backend/api/base_views.py

@@ -3,9 +3,10 @@ from api.db_router import MainRouter, reset_read_db_alias, set_read_db_alias
 from api.db_utils import POSTGRES_USER_VAR, rls_transaction
 from api.filters import CustomDjangoFilterBackend
 from api.models import Role, UserRoleRelationship
-from api.rbac.permissions import HasPermissions
+from api.rbac.permissions import HasPermissions, get_role
 from django.conf import settings
 from django.db import transaction
+from django.utils.functional import cached_property
 from rest_framework import permissions
 from rest_framework.exceptions import NotAuthenticated
 from rest_framework.filters import SearchFilter
@@ -100,6 +101,11 @@ class BaseRLSViewSet(BaseViewSet):
         context["tenant_id"] = self.request.tenant_id
         return context
 
+    @cached_property
+    def user_role(self):
+        """Role of the requesting user in the active tenant, resolved once per request."""
+        return get_role(self.request.user, self.request.tenant_id)
+
 
 class BaseTenantViewset(BaseViewSet):
     def dispatch(self, request, *args, **kwargs):

api/src/backend/api/decorators.py

@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
 import uuid
 from functools import wraps
 
+from api.attack_paths.database import GraphDatabaseQueryException
 from api.db_router import READ_REPLICA_ALIAS
 from api.db_utils import POSTGRES_TENANT_VAR, SET_CONFIG_QUERY, rls_transaction
 from api.exceptions import ProviderDeletedException
-from api.models import Provider, Scan
+from api.models import Membership, Provider, Scan, Tenant
 from django.core.exceptions import ObjectDoesNotExist
-from django.db import DatabaseError, connection, transaction
+from django.db import DEFAULT_DB_ALIAS, DatabaseError, connection, transaction
 from rest_framework_json_api.serializers import ValidationError
 
 
@@ -75,9 +76,11 @@ def handle_provider_deletion(func):
     """
     Decorator that raises `ProviderDeletedException` if provider was deleted during execution.
 
-    Catches `ObjectDoesNotExist` and `DatabaseError` (including `IntegrityError`), checks if
-    provider still exists, and raises `ProviderDeletedException` if not. Otherwise,
-    re-raises original exception.
+    Catches `ObjectDoesNotExist`, `DatabaseError` (including `IntegrityError`), and
+    `GraphDatabaseQueryException`, checks if provider still exists, and raises
+    `ProviderDeletedException` if not. Graph database errors also check whether the
+    tenant still exists and has memberships. Otherwise, re-raises the original
+    exception.
 
     Requires `tenant_id` and `provider_id` in kwargs.
 
@@ -92,11 +95,16 @@ def handle_provider_deletion(func):
     def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
         try:
             return func(*args, **kwargs)
-        except (ObjectDoesNotExist, DatabaseError):
+        except (ObjectDoesNotExist, DatabaseError, GraphDatabaseQueryException) as exc:
             tenant_id = kwargs.get("tenant_id")
             provider_id = kwargs.get("provider_id")
+            database_alias = (
+                DEFAULT_DB_ALIAS
+                if isinstance(exc, GraphDatabaseQueryException)
+                else READ_REPLICA_ALIAS
+            )
 
-            with rls_transaction(tenant_id, using=READ_REPLICA_ALIAS):
+            with rls_transaction(tenant_id, using=database_alias):
                 if provider_id is None:
                     scan_id = kwargs.get("scan_id")
                     if scan_id is None:
@@ -113,6 +121,13 @@ def handle_provider_deletion(func):
                     raise ProviderDeletedException(
                         f"Provider '{provider_id}' was deleted during the scan"
                     ) from None
+                if isinstance(exc, GraphDatabaseQueryException) and (
+                    not Tenant.objects.filter(pk=tenant_id).exists()
+                    or not Membership.objects.filter(tenant_id=tenant_id).exists()
+                ):
+                    raise ProviderDeletedException(
+                        f"Tenant '{tenant_id}' was deleted during the scan"
+                    ) from None
             raise
 
     return wrapper

api/src/backend/api/rbac/permissions.py

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 from enum import Enum
 
 from api.db_router import MainRouter
-from api.models import Provider, Role, User
-from django.db.models import QuerySet
+from api.models import Integration, Provider, Role, User
+from django.db.models import Q, QuerySet
 from rest_framework.exceptions import PermissionDenied
 from rest_framework.permissions import BasePermission
 
@@ -83,3 +83,32 @@ def get_providers(role: Role) -> QuerySet[Provider]:
     return Provider.objects.filter(
         tenant_id=tenant_id, provider_groups__in=provider_groups
     ).distinct()
+
+
+def get_integrations(
+    role: Role, providers: QuerySet[Provider] | None = None
+) -> QuerySet[Integration]:
+    """
+    Return a distinct queryset of Integrations visible to the given role.
+
+    Integrations with no providers attached are tenant-wide, as is always the case for
+    Jira, and stay visible regardless of the provider visibility of the role. Integrations
+    attached to providers are only visible when the role can access at least one of them.
+
+    Args:
+        role: A Role instance.
+        providers: Optional queryset of the providers accessible by the role, to reuse
+            an already resolved `get_providers(role)` result within the same request.
+
+    Returns:
+        A QuerySet of Integration objects visible to the role.
+    """
+    queryset = Integration.objects.filter(tenant_id=role.tenant_id)
+    if role.unlimited_visibility:
+        return queryset
+
+    if providers is None:
+        providers = get_providers(role)
+    return queryset.filter(
+        Q(providers__isnull=True) | Q(providers__in=providers)
+    ).distinct()

api/src/backend/api/specs/v1.yaml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 openapi: 3.0.3
 info:
   title: Prowler API
-  version: 1.36.0
+  version: 1.38.0
   description: |-
     Prowler API specification.
 
@@ -6629,8 +6629,10 @@ paths:
   /api/v1/integrations:
     get:
       operationId: api_v1_integrations_list
-      description: Retrieve a list of all configured integrations with options for
-        filtering by various criteria.
+      description: |-
+        Retrieve a list of all configured integrations with options for filtering by various criteria.
+
+        Integrations attached to one or more providers are only returned when the role can access at least one of those providers, and each integration lists only the providers visible to the role. Integrations not attached to any provider, such as Jira, are tenant-wide and are returned for every role.
       summary: List all integrations
       parameters:
       - in: query
@@ -6781,7 +6783,8 @@ paths:
     post:
       operationId: api_v1_integrations_create
       description: Register a new integration with the system, providing necessary
-        configuration details.
+        configuration details. Only providers visible to the role can be attached
+        to the integration.
       summary: Create a new integration
       tags:
       - Integration
@@ -6810,7 +6813,7 @@ paths:
     post:
       operationId: api_v1_integrations_jira_dispatches_create
       description: |-
-        Send a set of filtered findings to the given integration. At least one finding filter must be provided.
+        Send a set of filtered findings to the given integration. At least one finding filter must be provided. Jira integrations are tenant-wide and do not require unlimited visibility, while the findings sent are limited to the providers the role can access.
 
         ## Known Limitations
 
@@ -6883,7 +6886,8 @@ paths:
     get:
       operationId: api_v1_integrations_jira_issue_types_retrieve
       description: Fetch the available issue types from Jira for a given project key
-        and update the integration configuration.
+        and update the integration configuration. Jira integrations are tenant-wide
+        and do not require unlimited visibility.
       summary: Get available issue types for a Jira project
       parameters:
       - in: query
@@ -6924,7 +6928,8 @@ paths:
     get:
       operationId: api_v1_integrations_retrieve
       description: Fetch detailed information about a specific integration by its
-        ID.
+        ID. Integrations outside the provider visibility of the role are reported
+        the same way as one that does not exist.
       summary: Retrieve integration details
       parameters:
       - in: query
@@ -6978,7 +6983,8 @@ paths:
     patch:
       operationId: api_v1_integrations_partial_update
       description: Modify certain fields of an existing integration without affecting
-        other settings.
+        other settings. Integrations attached to providers outside the visibility
+        of the role cannot be modified by it.
       summary: Partially update an integration
       parameters:
       - in: path
@@ -7013,7 +7019,8 @@ paths:
           description: ''
     delete:
       operationId: api_v1_integrations_destroy
-      description: Remove an integration from the system by its ID.
+      description: Remove an integration from the system by its ID. Integrations attached
+        to providers outside the visibility of the role cannot be deleted by it.
       summary: Delete an integration
       parameters:
       - in: path
@@ -7033,7 +7040,9 @@ paths:
   /api/v1/integrations/{id}/connection:
     post:
       operationId: api_v1_integrations_connection_create
-      description: Try to verify integration connection
+      description: Try to verify integration connection. Integrations outside the
+        provider visibility of the role are reported the same way as one that does
+        not exist.
       summary: Check integration connection
       parameters:
       - in: path

api/src/backend/api/tests/test_adapters.py

@@ -302,7 +302,9 @@ class TestProwlerSocialAccountAdapter:
 
         sociallogin.connect.assert_called_once_with(request, create_test_user)
 
-    def test_verified_social_account_link_notifies_owner(self, create_test_user, rf):
+    def test_verified_social_account_link_does_not_send_notification(
+        self, create_test_user, rf
+    ):
         _verify_local_email(create_test_user)
         sociallogin = _real_oauth_sociallogin(
             create_test_user,
@@ -318,34 +320,7 @@ class TestProwlerSocialAccountAdapter:
             uid="verified-google-account",
             user=create_test_user,
         ).exists()
-        assert len(mail.outbox) == 1
-        assert mail.outbox[0].to == [create_test_user.email]
-
-    def test_notification_delivery_failure_does_not_break_verified_link(
-        self, create_test_user, rf
-    ):
-        _verify_local_email(create_test_user)
-        sociallogin = _real_oauth_sociallogin(
-            create_test_user,
-            uid="verified-google-account-without-smtp",
-        )
-        request = rf.get("/")
-
-        with (
-            context.request_context(request),
-            patch(
-                "allauth.socialaccount.adapter."
-                "DefaultSocialAccountAdapter.send_notification_mail",
-                side_effect=ConnectionRefusedError,
-            ),
-        ):
-            ProwlerSocialAccountAdapter().pre_social_login(request, sociallogin)
-
-        assert SocialAccount.objects.filter(
-            provider="google",
-            uid="verified-google-account-without-smtp",
-            user=create_test_user,
-        ).exists()
+        assert mail.outbox == []
 
     def test_pre_social_login_uses_verified_email_missing_from_extra_data(
         self, create_test_user, rf
@@ -367,7 +342,7 @@ class TestProwlerSocialAccountAdapter:
     def test_social_account_linking_settings_are_fail_closed(self):
         assert not socialaccount_app_settings.EMAIL_AUTHENTICATION
         assert not socialaccount_app_settings.EMAIL_AUTHENTICATION_AUTO_CONNECT
-        assert account_app_settings.EMAIL_NOTIFICATIONS
+        assert not account_app_settings.EMAIL_NOTIFICATIONS
 
     def test_save_user_social_with_invitation_joins_invited_tenant(
         self, rf, create_test_user, tenants_fixture

api/src/backend/api/tests/test_decorators.py

@@ -2,11 +2,12 @@ import uuid
 from unittest.mock import call, patch
 
 import pytest
+from api.attack_paths.database import GraphDatabaseQueryException
 from api.db_utils import POSTGRES_TENANT_VAR, SET_CONFIG_QUERY
 from api.decorators import handle_provider_deletion, set_tenant
 from api.exceptions import ProviderDeletedException
 from django.core.exceptions import ObjectDoesNotExist
-from django.db import DatabaseError, IntegrityError
+from django.db import DEFAULT_DB_ALIAS, DatabaseError, IntegrityError
 
 
 @pytest.mark.django_db
@@ -204,6 +205,106 @@ class TestHandleProviderDeletionDecorator:
         with pytest.raises(DatabaseError):
             task_func(tenant_id=str(tenant.id), provider_id=str(provider.id))
 
+    @patch("api.decorators.rls_transaction")
+    @patch("api.decorators.Provider.objects.filter")
+    def test_graph_database_error_provider_missing_or_soft_deleted(
+        self, mock_provider_filter, mock_rls, tenants_fixture
+    ):
+        tenant = tenants_fixture[0]
+        provider_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
+
+        mock_rls.return_value.__enter__ = lambda s: None
+        mock_rls.return_value.__exit__ = lambda s, *args: None
+        mock_provider_filter.return_value.exists.return_value = False
+
+        @handle_provider_deletion
+        def task_func(**kwargs):
+            raise GraphDatabaseQueryException("Temporary database not found")
+
+        with pytest.raises(ProviderDeletedException):
+            task_func(tenant_id=str(tenant.id), provider_id=provider_id)
+
+    @patch("api.decorators.rls_transaction")
+    @patch("api.decorators.Tenant.objects.filter")
+    @patch("api.decorators.Provider.objects.filter")
+    def test_graph_database_error_tenant_missing(
+        self, mock_provider_filter, mock_tenant_filter, mock_rls, tenants_fixture
+    ):
+        tenant = tenants_fixture[0]
+        provider_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
+
+        mock_rls.return_value.__enter__ = lambda s: None
+        mock_rls.return_value.__exit__ = lambda s, *args: None
+        mock_provider_filter.return_value.exists.return_value = True
+        mock_tenant_filter.return_value.exists.return_value = False
+
+        @handle_provider_deletion
+        def task_func(**kwargs):
+            raise GraphDatabaseQueryException("Temporary database not found")
+
+        with pytest.raises(ProviderDeletedException):
+            task_func(tenant_id=str(tenant.id), provider_id=provider_id)
+
+    @patch("api.decorators.rls_transaction")
+    @patch("api.decorators.Membership.objects.filter")
+    @patch("api.decorators.Tenant.objects.filter")
+    @patch("api.decorators.Provider.objects.filter")
+    def test_graph_database_error_tenant_without_memberships(
+        self,
+        mock_provider_filter,
+        mock_tenant_filter,
+        mock_membership_filter,
+        mock_rls,
+        tenants_fixture,
+    ):
+        tenant = tenants_fixture[0]
+        provider_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
+
+        mock_rls.return_value.__enter__ = lambda s: None
+        mock_rls.return_value.__exit__ = lambda s, *args: None
+        mock_provider_filter.return_value.exists.return_value = True
+        mock_tenant_filter.return_value.exists.return_value = True
+        mock_membership_filter.return_value.exists.return_value = False
+
+        @handle_provider_deletion
+        def task_func(**kwargs):
+            raise GraphDatabaseQueryException("Temporary database not found")
+
+        with pytest.raises(ProviderDeletedException):
+            task_func(tenant_id=str(tenant.id), provider_id=provider_id)
+
+    @patch("api.decorators.rls_transaction")
+    @patch("api.decorators.Membership.objects.filter")
+    @patch("api.decorators.Tenant.objects.filter")
+    @patch("api.decorators.Provider.objects.filter")
+    def test_graph_database_error_active_provider_and_tenant_reraises(
+        self,
+        mock_provider_filter,
+        mock_tenant_filter,
+        mock_membership_filter,
+        mock_rls,
+        tenants_fixture,
+    ):
+        tenant = tenants_fixture[0]
+        provider_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
+        graph_error = GraphDatabaseQueryException("Temporary database not found")
+
+        mock_rls.return_value.__enter__ = lambda s: None
+        mock_rls.return_value.__exit__ = lambda s, *args: None
+        mock_provider_filter.return_value.exists.return_value = True
+        mock_tenant_filter.return_value.exists.return_value = True
+        mock_membership_filter.return_value.exists.return_value = True
+
+        @handle_provider_deletion
+        def task_func(**kwargs):
+            raise graph_error
+
+        with pytest.raises(GraphDatabaseQueryException) as exc_info:
+            task_func(tenant_id=str(tenant.id), provider_id=provider_id)
+
+        assert exc_info.value is graph_error
+        mock_rls.assert_called_once_with(str(tenant.id), using=DEFAULT_DB_ALIAS)
+
     def test_missing_provider_and_scan_raises_assertion(self, tenants_fixture):
         """Raises AssertionError when neither provider_id nor scan_id in kwargs."""
 

api/src/backend/api/tests/test_rbac.py

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ from unittest.mock import ANY, Mock, patch
 
 import pytest
 from api.models import (
+    Integration,
+    IntegrationProviderRelationship,
     Membership,
     ProviderGroup,
     ProviderGroupMembership,
@@ -681,6 +683,363 @@ class TestLimitedVisibility:
             response.json()["data"]["relationships"]["providers"]["meta"]["count"] == 1
         )
 
+    @pytest.fixture
+    def jira_integration(self, tenants_fixture):
+        # Jira is a tenant-wide integration: it is not attached to any provider
+        return Integration.objects.create(
+            tenant_id=tenants_fixture[0].id,
+            enabled=True,
+            connected=True,
+            integration_type=Integration.IntegrationChoices.JIRA,
+            configuration={"projects": {"TEST": "Test project"}},
+            credentials={
+                "domain": "test",
+                "user_mail": "a@b.com",
+                "api_token": "token",
+            },
+        )
+
+    @pytest.fixture
+    def out_of_scope_integration(self, tenants_fixture, provider_factory):
+        tenant_id = tenants_fixture[0].id
+        integration = Integration.objects.create(
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+            enabled=True,
+            connected=True,
+            integration_type=Integration.IntegrationChoices.AMAZON_S3,
+            configuration={
+                "bucket_name": "bucket",
+                "output_directory": "output",
+            },
+            credentials={"aws_access_key_id": "key"},
+        )
+        IntegrationProviderRelationship.objects.create(
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+            integration=integration,
+            provider=provider_factory(),
+        )
+        return integration
+
+    def test_integrations_list_includes_tenant_wide_integration(
+        self,
+        authenticated_client_rbac_limited,
+        integrations_fixture,
+        jira_integration,
+        aws_provider_pair,
+    ):
+        # Integration 2 is attached to both providers, so make both visible to the role
+        # to assert the provider join does not duplicate it in the listing
+        ProviderGroupMembership.objects.create(
+            tenant_id=aws_provider_pair[1].tenant_id,
+            provider=aws_provider_pair[1],
+            provider_group=ProviderGroup.objects.get(name="limited_visibility_group"),
+        )
+
+        response = authenticated_client_rbac_limited.get(reverse("integration-list"))
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK
+        integration_ids = [item["id"] for item in response.json()["data"]]
+        # The tenant-wide Jira integration is visible without unlimited visibility
+        assert str(jira_integration.id) in integration_ids
+        # Integrations attached to more than one visible provider are not duplicated
+        assert integration_ids.count(str(integrations_fixture[1].id)) == 1
+        assert response.json()["meta"]["pagination"]["count"] == len(integration_ids)
+
+    def test_integrations_list_without_provider_groups_keeps_tenant_wide_integration(
+        self, authenticated_client_rbac_limited, integrations_fixture, jira_integration
+    ):
+        # A role with no provider group at all sees no provider, but still needs Jira
+        RoleProviderGroupRelationship.objects.all().delete()
+
+        response = authenticated_client_rbac_limited.get(reverse("integration-list"))
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK
+        integration_ids = [item["id"] for item in response.json()["data"]]
+        assert integration_ids == [str(jira_integration.id)]
+
+    def test_integrations_include_providers_hides_out_of_scope_providers(
+        self, authenticated_client_rbac_limited, integrations_fixture, aws_provider_pair
+    ):
+        # Integration 2 is related to provider1 (visible) and provider2 (not visible)
+        hidden_provider = aws_provider_pair[1]
+
+        response = authenticated_client_rbac_limited.get(
+            reverse("integration-list"), {"include": "providers"}
+        )
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK
+        included_ids = {item["id"] for item in response.json().get("included", [])}
+        assert str(aws_provider_pair[0].id) in included_ids
+        # Sideloaded resources must not disclose the provider the role cannot see
+        assert str(hidden_provider.id) not in included_ids
+
+    def test_integrations_list_with_sparse_fields(
+        self, authenticated_client_rbac_limited, integrations_fixture
+    ):
+        response = authenticated_client_rbac_limited.get(
+            reverse("integration-list"), {"fields[integrations]": "enabled"}
+        )
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK
+        assert all(
+            list(item["attributes"].keys()) == ["enabled"]
+            for item in response.json()["data"]
+        )
+
+    def test_integrations_list_excludes_out_of_scope_integration(
+        self, authenticated_client_rbac_limited, out_of_scope_integration
+    ):
+        response = authenticated_client_rbac_limited.get(reverse("integration-list"))
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK
+        integration_ids = [item["id"] for item in response.json()["data"]]
+        assert str(out_of_scope_integration.id) not in integration_ids
+
+    def test_integration_detail_out_of_scope_returns_404(
+        self, authenticated_client_rbac_limited, out_of_scope_integration
+    ):
+        response = authenticated_client_rbac_limited.get(
+            reverse("integration-detail", kwargs={"pk": out_of_scope_integration.id})
+        )
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND
+
+    def test_integration_connection_out_of_scope_returns_404(
+        self, authenticated_client_rbac_limited, out_of_scope_integration
+    ):
+        response = authenticated_client_rbac_limited.post(
+            reverse(
+                "integration-connection", kwargs={"pk": out_of_scope_integration.id}
+            )
+        )
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND
+
+    def test_integration_update_allowed_when_fully_visible(
+        self, authenticated_client_rbac_limited, integrations_fixture, jira_integration
+    ):
+        # Integration 1 is only related to provider1, which the role can access
+        integration = integrations_fixture[0]
+        payload = {
+            "data": {
+                "type": "integrations",
+                "id": str(integration.id),
+                "attributes": {
+                    "enabled": False,
+                    # integration_type is `amazon_s3`
+                    "credentials": {"aws_access_key_id": "new_value"},
+                    "configuration": {
+                        "bucket_name": "new_bucket_name",
+                        "output_directory": "new_output_directory",
+                    },
+                },
+            }
+        }
+
+        response = authenticated_client_rbac_limited.patch(
+            reverse("integration-detail", kwargs={"pk": integration.id}),
+            data=json.dumps(payload),
+            content_type="application/vnd.api+json",
+        )
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK
+        integration.refresh_from_db()
+        assert integration.enabled is False
+
+        # Tenant-wide integrations have no provider restricting the role
+        payload = {
+            "data": {
+                "type": "integrations",
+                "id": str(jira_integration.id),
+                "attributes": {"enabled": False},
+            }
+        }
+
+        response = authenticated_client_rbac_limited.patch(
+            reverse("integration-detail", kwargs={"pk": jira_integration.id}),
+            data=json.dumps(payload),
+            content_type="application/vnd.api+json",
+        )
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK
+        jira_integration.refresh_from_db()
+        assert jira_integration.enabled is False
+
+    def test_integration_create_rejects_out_of_scope_provider(
+        self, authenticated_client_rbac_limited, aws_provider_pair
+    ):
+        # provider2 is not in any provider group assigned to the role
+        payload = {
+            "data": {
+                "type": "integrations",
+                "attributes": {
+                    "integration_type": "amazon_s3",
+                    "configuration": {
+                        "bucket_name": "attacker_bucket",
+                        "output_directory": "output",
+                    },
+                    "credentials": {"aws_access_key_id": "key"},
+                },
+                "relationships": {
+                    "providers": {
+                        "data": [
+                            {"type": "providers", "id": str(aws_provider_pair[1].id)}
+                        ]
+                    }
+                },
+            }
+        }
+
+        response = authenticated_client_rbac_limited.post(
+            reverse("integration-list"),
+            data=json.dumps(payload),
+            content_type="application/vnd.api+json",
+        )
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST
+        assert not Integration.objects.filter(
+            integrationproviderrelationship__provider=aws_provider_pair[1],
+            configuration__bucket_name="attacker_bucket",
+        ).exists()
+
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize("submitted_providers", [True, False])
+    def test_integration_update_denied_when_shared_with_hidden_provider(
+        self,
+        authenticated_client_rbac_limited,
+        integrations_fixture,
+        aws_provider_pair,
+        submitted_providers,
+    ):
+        # Integration 2 is related to provider1 (visible) and provider2 (not visible).
+        # Editing it would reach beyond the visibility of the role, just like deleting
+        # it, so both are rejected consistently
+        integration = integrations_fixture[1]
+        visible_provider, hidden_provider = aws_provider_pair
+        payload = {
+            "data": {
+                "type": "integrations",
+                "id": str(integration.id),
+                "attributes": {
+                    "enabled": False,
+                    # integration_type is `amazon_s3`
+                    "credentials": {"aws_access_key_id": "new_value"},
+                    "configuration": {
+                        "bucket_name": "new_bucket_name",
+                        "output_directory": "new_output_directory",
+                    },
+                },
+            }
+        }
+        if submitted_providers:
+            payload["data"]["relationships"] = {
+                "providers": {
+                    "data": [{"type": "providers", "id": str(visible_provider.id)}]
+                }
+            }
+
+        response = authenticated_client_rbac_limited.patch(
+            reverse("integration-detail", kwargs={"pk": integration.id}),
+            data=json.dumps(payload),
+            content_type="application/vnd.api+json",
+        )
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN
+        integration.refresh_from_db()
+        assert integration.enabled is True
+        assert integration.providers.filter(id=hidden_provider.id).exists()
+        assert integration.providers.filter(id=visible_provider.id).exists()
+
+    def test_integration_delete_denied_when_shared_with_hidden_provider(
+        self, authenticated_client_rbac_limited, integrations_fixture
+    ):
+        # Integration 2 is related to provider1 (visible) and provider2 (not visible)
+        integration = integrations_fixture[1]
+
+        response = authenticated_client_rbac_limited.delete(
+            reverse("integration-detail", kwargs={"pk": integration.id})
+        )
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN
+        assert Integration.objects.filter(id=integration.id).exists()
+
+    def test_integration_delete_allowed_when_fully_visible(
+        self, authenticated_client_rbac_limited, integrations_fixture, jira_integration
+    ):
+        # Integration 1 is only related to provider1, which the role can access
+        integration = integrations_fixture[0]
+
+        response = authenticated_client_rbac_limited.delete(
+            reverse("integration-detail", kwargs={"pk": integration.id})
+        )
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT
+        assert not Integration.objects.filter(id=integration.id).exists()
+
+        # Tenant-wide integrations have no provider restricting the role
+        response = authenticated_client_rbac_limited.delete(
+            reverse("integration-detail", kwargs={"pk": jira_integration.id})
+        )
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT
+
+    def test_jira_issue_types_allowed_without_unlimited_visibility(
+        self, authenticated_client_rbac_limited, jira_integration
+    ):
+        with patch("api.v1.views.initialize_prowler_integration") as mock_jira:
+            mock_jira.return_value.get_available_issue_types.return_value = ["Task"]
+            response = authenticated_client_rbac_limited.get(
+                reverse(
+                    "integration-jira-issue-types",
+                    kwargs={"integration_pk": jira_integration.id},
+                ),
+                {"project_key": "TEST"},
+            )
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK
+        assert response.json()["data"]["attributes"]["issue_types"] == ["Task"]
+
+    def test_jira_issue_types_out_of_scope_returns_404(
+        self, authenticated_client_rbac_limited, out_of_scope_integration
+    ):
+        response = authenticated_client_rbac_limited.get(
+            reverse(
+                "integration-jira-issue-types",
+                kwargs={"integration_pk": out_of_scope_integration.id},
+            ),
+            {"project_key": "TEST"},
+        )
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND
+
+    def test_jira_dispatches_out_of_scope_returns_404(
+        self, authenticated_client_rbac_limited, out_of_scope_integration
+    ):
+        response = authenticated_client_rbac_limited.post(
+            reverse(
+                "integration-jira-dispatches",
+                kwargs={"integration_pk": out_of_scope_integration.id},
+            ),
+            data=json.dumps({}),
+            content_type="application/vnd.api+json",
+        )
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND
+
+    def test_jira_dispatches_allowed_without_unlimited_visibility(
+        self, authenticated_client_rbac_limited, jira_integration
+    ):
+        response = authenticated_client_rbac_limited.post(
+            reverse(
+                "integration-jira-dispatches",
+                kwargs={"integration_pk": jira_integration.id},
+            ),
+            data=json.dumps({}),
+            content_type="application/vnd.api+json",
+        )
+
+        # The integration is reachable: the request fails on payload validation, not RBAC
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST
+
     @pytest.mark.usefixtures("scan_summaries_fixture")
     def test_overviews_providers(
         self,

api/src/backend/api/tests/test_retryable_session.py

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
 
 import pytest
-from api.attack_paths.retryable_session import RetryableSession
+from api.attack_paths.retryable_session import RetryableSession, RetryExhaustedError
 from neo4j.exceptions import ServiceUnavailable
 
 
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ class TestRetryableSession:
             max_retries=3,
             retry_if=lambda exc: exc is retryable_error,
             initial_retry_delay_seconds=2,
+            retry_context="Neptune write",
         )
 
         assert session.execute_write(work) == "success"
@@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ class TestRetryableSession:
             max_retries=3,
             retry_if=lambda _: False,
             initial_retry_delay_seconds=2,
+            retry_context="Neptune write",
         )
 
         with pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info:
@@ -83,3 +85,81 @@ class TestRetryableSession:
         driver_sessions[0].close.assert_called_once_with()
         driver_sessions[1].close.assert_called_once_with()
         driver_sessions[2].close.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_retry_exhaustion_with_context_reports_attempts_and_elapsed_time(self):
+        error = RuntimeError("still retryable")
+        driver_sessions = [MagicMock() for _ in range(3)]
+        for driver_session in driver_sessions:
+            driver_session.execute_write.side_effect = error
+        session = RetryableSession(
+            session_factory=MagicMock(side_effect=driver_sessions),
+            max_retries=2,
+            retry_if=lambda _: True,
+            retry_context="Neptune write",
+        )
+
+        with (
+            patch(
+                "api.attack_paths.retryable_session.time.monotonic",
+                side_effect=[100.0, 127.1234],
+            ),
+            pytest.raises(RetryExhaustedError) as exc_info,
+        ):
+            session.execute_write(MagicMock())
+
+        assert exc_info.value.method_name == "execute_write"
+        assert exc_info.value.attempts == 3
+        assert exc_info.value.elapsed_seconds == pytest.approx(27.1234)
+        assert exc_info.value.last_error is error
+        assert exc_info.value.__cause__ is error
+        assert str(exc_info.value) == (
+            "Neptune write execute_write failed after 3 attempts over 27.123s. "
+            "Last error: still retryable"
+        )
+
+    def test_retry_exhaustion_with_zero_retries_reports_one_attempt(self):
+        error = ServiceUnavailable("still unavailable")
+        driver_session = MagicMock()
+        driver_session.execute_write.side_effect = error
+        session = RetryableSession(
+            session_factory=MagicMock(return_value=driver_session),
+            max_retries=0,
+            retry_context="Neptune write",
+        )
+
+        with pytest.raises(RetryExhaustedError) as exc_info:
+            session.execute_write(MagicMock())
+
+        assert exc_info.value.attempts == 1
+
+    @patch("api.attack_paths.retryable_session.time.sleep")
+    @patch("api.attack_paths.retryable_session.random.uniform", return_value=3.0)
+    def test_contextual_retry_warning_includes_original_error(
+        self, _mock_uniform, _mock_sleep
+    ):
+        error = RuntimeError("retryable detail")
+        first_session = MagicMock()
+        first_session.execute_write.side_effect = error
+        second_session = MagicMock()
+        second_session.execute_write.return_value = "success"
+        session = RetryableSession(
+            session_factory=MagicMock(side_effect=[first_session, second_session]),
+            max_retries=1,
+            retry_if=lambda _: True,
+            initial_retry_delay_seconds=2,
+            retry_context="Neptune write",
+        )
+
+        with patch("api.attack_paths.retryable_session.logger.warning") as mock_warning:
+            assert session.execute_write(MagicMock()) == "success"
+
+        mock_warning.assert_called_once_with(
+            "%s %s failed with %s: %s; retry %s/%s in %.3fs",
+            "Neptune write",
+            "execute_write",
+            "RuntimeError",
+            "retryable detail",
+            1,
+            1,
+            3.0,
+        )

api/src/backend/api/tests/test_sentry.py

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import logging
 from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
 
+import pytest
 from config.settings import sentry as sentry_settings
 from config.settings.sentry import before_send
 
@@ -82,6 +83,45 @@ def test_before_send_passes_through_non_ignored_log():
     assert result == event
 
 
+def test_before_send_ignores_cartography_missing_temporary_database_log():
+    log_record = _make_log_record(
+        msg="Cartography job failed with %s for database %s",
+        name="cartography.graph.job",
+        args=(
+            "Neo.ClientError.Database.DatabaseNotFound",
+            "db-tmp-scan-12345678",
+        ),
+    )
+
+    event = MagicMock()
+
+    assert before_send(event, {"log_record": log_record}) is None
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("logger_name", "message"),
+    [
+        (
+            "cartography.graph.job.worker",
+            "Neo.ClientError.Database.DatabaseNotFound for db-tmp-scan-12345678",
+        ),
+        (
+            "cartography.graph.job",
+            "DatabaseNotFound for db-tmp-scan-12345678",
+        ),
+        (
+            "cartography.graph.job",
+            "Neo.ClientError.Database.DatabaseNotFound for db-tenant-12345678",
+        ),
+    ],
+)
+def test_before_send_passes_through_similar_cartography_logs(logger_name, message):
+    log_record = _make_log_record(msg=message, name=logger_name)
+    event = MagicMock()
+
+    assert before_send(event, {"log_record": log_record}) is event
+
+
 def test_before_send_passes_through_non_ignored_exception():
     """Test that before_send passes through exceptions that don't contain ignored exceptions."""
     exc_info = (Exception, Exception("Some other error message"), None)

api/src/backend/api/tests/test_serializers.py

@@ -3,7 +3,12 @@ from api.v1.serializer_utils.integrations import (
     JiraCredentialSerializer,
     S3ConfigSerializer,
 )
-from api.v1.serializers import ImageProviderSecret, KubernetesProviderSecret
+from api.v1.serializer_utils.providers import ProviderSecretField
+from api.v1.serializers import (
+    ImageProviderSecret,
+    KubernetesProviderSecret,
+    OracleCloudProviderSecret,
+)
 from rest_framework.exceptions import ValidationError
 
 
@@ -190,6 +195,64 @@ class TestImageProviderSecret:
         assert "non_field_errors" in serializer.errors
 
 
+class TestOracleCloudProviderSecret:
+    def valid_secret(self, **overrides):
+        secret = {
+            "user": "ocid1.user.oc1..aaaaaaaexample",
+            "fingerprint": "aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff:00:11:22:33:44:55:66:77:88:99",
+            "key_content": "fake-base64-key-content",
+            "tenancy": "ocid1.tenancy.oc1..aaaaaaaexample",
+        }
+        secret.update(overrides)
+        return secret
+
+    def test_accepts_regionless_secret(self):
+        serializer = OracleCloudProviderSecret(data=self.valid_secret())
+
+        assert serializer.is_valid(), serializer.errors
+        assert "region" not in serializer.validated_data
+
+    def test_accepts_and_ignores_region_field(self):
+        secret = self.valid_secret(region="us-phoenix-1")
+        serializer = OracleCloudProviderSecret(data=secret)
+
+        assert serializer.is_valid(), serializer.errors
+
+        assert "region" not in serializer.validated_data
+
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+        "legacy_field, legacy_value",
+        [
+            ("region", None),
+            ("region", ""),
+            ("region", {"name": "us-ashburn-1"}),
+        ],
+    )
+    def test_accepts_and_ignores_any_legacy_region_value(
+        self, legacy_field, legacy_value
+    ):
+        serializer = OracleCloudProviderSecret(
+            data=self.valid_secret(**{legacy_field: legacy_value})
+        )
+
+        assert serializer.is_valid(), serializer.errors
+
+        assert legacy_field not in serializer.validated_data
+
+
+class TestProviderSecretFieldSchema:
+    def test_oraclecloud_schema_includes_legacy_region_field(self):
+        schema = ProviderSecretField._spectacular_annotation["field"]
+        oraclecloud_schema = next(
+            credential_schema
+            for credential_schema in schema["oneOf"]
+            if credential_schema["title"]
+            == "Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (OCI) API Key Credentials"
+        )
+
+        assert oraclecloud_schema["properties"]["region"]["deprecated"] is True
+
+
 class TestKubernetesProviderSecret:
     def test_valid_static_kubeconfig_is_accepted(self):
         kubeconfig_content = """
@@ -246,6 +309,36 @@ current-context: test-context
         assert not serializer.is_valid()
         assert "kubeconfig_content" in serializer.errors
 
+    def test_kubeconfig_with_auth_provider_cmd_path_is_rejected(self):
+        kubeconfig_content = """
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Config
+clusters:
+  - name: test-cluster
+    cluster:
+      server: https://kubernetes.example.test
+users:
+  - name: test-user
+    user:
+      auth-provider:
+        name: gcp
+        config:
+          cmd-path: /bin/sh
+contexts:
+  - name: test-context
+    context:
+      cluster: test-cluster
+      user: test-user
+current-context: test-context
+"""
+
+        serializer = KubernetesProviderSecret(
+            data={"kubeconfig_content": kubeconfig_content}
+        )
+
+        assert not serializer.is_valid()
+        assert "kubeconfig_content" in serializer.errors
+
     def test_malformed_kubeconfig_is_rejected(self):
         serializer = KubernetesProviderSecret(
             data={"kubeconfig_content": "apiVersion: ["}

api/src/backend/api/tests/test_sink.py

@@ -11,7 +11,11 @@ from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
 import neo4j
 import pytest
 from api.attack_paths import sink as sink_module
-from api.attack_paths.database import GraphDatabaseQueryException
+from api.attack_paths.database import (
+    GraphDatabaseQueryException,
+    NeptuneWriteRetryExhaustedException,
+)
+from api.attack_paths.retryable_session import RetryExhaustedError
 from api.attack_paths.sink import factory
 from api.attack_paths.sink.neo4j import DATABASE_NOT_FOUND_CODE, Neo4jSink
 from api.attack_paths.sink.neptune import (
@@ -123,6 +127,14 @@ class TestSinkFactory:
         assert mock_driver.call_count == 1
 
 
+def test_neo4j_sync_batch_size_defaults_to_1000():
+    assert Neo4jSink.sync_batch_size == 1000
+
+
+def test_neptune_sync_batch_size_defaults_to_500():
+    assert NeptuneSink.sync_batch_size == 500
+
+
 class TestGetBackendForScan:
     """``get_backend_for_scan`` routes by the row's recorded sink backend."""
 
@@ -372,6 +384,7 @@ class TestNeptuneRetryPolicy:
         assert (
             kwargs["initial_retry_delay_seconds"] == NEPTUNE_WRITE_RETRY_DELAY_SECONDS
         )
+        assert kwargs["retry_context"] == "Neptune write"
 
     @patch("api.attack_paths.sink.neptune.RetryableSession")
     def test_reader_session_does_not_enable_write_retry_policy(self, retryable_session):
@@ -384,6 +397,48 @@ class TestNeptuneRetryPolicy:
         kwargs = retryable_session.call_args.kwargs
         assert kwargs["retry_if"] is None
         assert kwargs["initial_retry_delay_seconds"] == 0
+        assert kwargs["retry_context"] is None
+
+    def test_writer_retry_exhaustion_preserves_neptune_error_details(self):
+        message = (
+            "Unexpected server exception 'Operation failed due to conflicting "
+            "concurrent operations (please retry), 0 transactions are currently "
+            "rolling back.'"
+        )
+        error = neo4j.exceptions.Neo4jError._hydrate_neo4j(
+            code="BoltProtocol.unexpectedException",
+            message=message,
+        )
+        retry_error = RetryExhaustedError(
+            retry_context="Neptune write",
+            method_name="execute_write",
+            attempts=4,
+            elapsed_seconds=27.1234,
+            last_error=error,
+        )
+        sink = NeptuneSink()
+        driver = MagicMock()
+        retryable_session = MagicMock()
+        retryable_session.execute_write.side_effect = retry_error
+
+        with (
+            patch.object(sink, "_get_writer", return_value=driver),
+            patch(
+                "api.attack_paths.sink.neptune.RetryableSession",
+                return_value=retryable_session,
+            ),
+            pytest.raises(NeptuneWriteRetryExhaustedException) as exc_info,
+        ):
+            with sink.get_session() as session:
+                session.execute_write(MagicMock())
+
+        assert exc_info.value.code == "BoltProtocol.unexpectedException"
+        assert str(exc_info.value) == (
+            "BoltProtocol.unexpectedException: Neptune write execute_write failed "
+            "after 4 attempts over 27.123s. Last error: "
+            f"{message}"
+        )
+        assert exc_info.value.__cause__ is error
 
 
 class TestNeptuneSinkDropSubgraph:

api/src/backend/api/tests/test_utils.py

@@ -171,6 +171,53 @@ class TestInitializeProwlerProvider:
             key="value", mutelist_content={"key": "value"}
         )
 
+    @patch("api.utils.return_prowler_provider")
+    def test_initialize_oraclecloud_provider_removes_region_string(
+        self, mock_return_prowler_provider
+    ):
+        provider = MagicMock()
+        provider.provider = Provider.ProviderChoices.ORACLECLOUD.value
+        provider.secret.secret = {
+            "user": "ocid1.user.oc1..fake",
+            "fingerprint": "00:11:22:33:44:55:66:77",
+            "key_content": "fake-base64-key-content",
+            "tenancy": "ocid1.tenancy.oc1..fake",
+            "region": "us-ashburn-1",
+        }
+        mock_return_prowler_provider.return_value = MagicMock()
+
+        initialize_prowler_provider(provider)
+
+        mock_return_prowler_provider.return_value.assert_called_once_with(
+            user="ocid1.user.oc1..fake",
+            fingerprint="00:11:22:33:44:55:66:77",
+            key_content="fake-base64-key-content",
+            tenancy="ocid1.tenancy.oc1..fake",
+        )
+
+    @patch("api.utils.return_prowler_provider")
+    def test_initialize_oraclecloud_provider_without_region_omits_scan_filter(
+        self, mock_return_prowler_provider
+    ):
+        provider = MagicMock()
+        provider.provider = Provider.ProviderChoices.ORACLECLOUD.value
+        provider.secret.secret = {
+            "user": "ocid1.user.oc1..fake",
+            "fingerprint": "00:11:22:33:44:55:66:77",
+            "key_content": "fake-base64-key-content",
+            "tenancy": "ocid1.tenancy.oc1..fake",
+        }
+        mock_return_prowler_provider.return_value = MagicMock()
+
+        initialize_prowler_provider(provider)
+
+        mock_return_prowler_provider.return_value.assert_called_once_with(
+            user="ocid1.user.oc1..fake",
+            fingerprint="00:11:22:33:44:55:66:77",
+            key_content="fake-base64-key-content",
+            tenancy="ocid1.tenancy.oc1..fake",
+        )
+
 
 class TestProwlerProviderConnectionTest:
     @patch("api.utils.return_prowler_provider")
@@ -185,6 +232,37 @@ class TestProwlerProviderConnectionTest:
             key="value", provider_id="1234567890", raise_on_exception=False
         )
 
+    @patch("api.utils.return_prowler_provider")
+    def test_oraclecloud_connection_test_uses_direct_credentials_without_region(
+        self, mock_return_prowler_provider
+    ):
+        provider = MagicMock()
+        provider.uid = "ocid1.tenancy.oc1..aaaaaaaexample"
+        provider.provider = Provider.ProviderChoices.ORACLECLOUD.value
+        provider.secret.secret = {
+            "user": "ocid1.user.oc1..aaaaaaaexample",
+            "fingerprint": "00:11:22:33:44:55:66:77",
+            "key_content": "fake-base64-key-content",
+            "tenancy": "ocid1.tenancy.oc1..aaaaaaaexample",
+        }
+        mock_return_prowler_provider.return_value = MagicMock()
+
+        prowler_provider_connection_test(provider)
+
+        mock_return_prowler_provider.return_value.test_connection.assert_called_once_with(
+            user="ocid1.user.oc1..aaaaaaaexample",
+            fingerprint="00:11:22:33:44:55:66:77",
+            key_content="fake-base64-key-content",
+            tenancy="ocid1.tenancy.oc1..aaaaaaaexample",
+            region=getattr(
+                OraclecloudProvider,
+                "_bootstrap_region",
+                OraclecloudProvider._home_region,
+            ),
+            provider_id="ocid1.tenancy.oc1..aaaaaaaexample",
+            raise_on_exception=False,
+        )
+
     @pytest.mark.django_db
     @patch("api.utils.return_prowler_provider")
     def test_prowler_provider_connection_test_without_secret(
@@ -356,7 +434,7 @@ class TestGetProwlerProviderKwargs:
         expected_result = {**secret_dict, **expected_extra_kwargs}
         assert result == expected_result
 
-    def test_get_prowler_provider_kwargs_oraclecloud_converts_region_string_to_set(
+    def test_get_prowler_provider_kwargs_oraclecloud_removes_region(
         self,
     ):
         secret_dict = {
@@ -377,8 +455,13 @@ class TestGetProwlerProviderKwargs:
 
         result = get_prowler_provider_kwargs(provider)
 
-        expected_result = {**secret_dict, "region": {"us-ashburn-1"}}
-        assert result == expected_result
+        assert result == {
+            "user": "ocid1.user.oc1..fake",
+            "fingerprint": "00:11:22:33:44:55:66:77",
+            "key_content": "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\nfake\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----",
+            "tenancy": "ocid1.tenancy.oc1..fake",
+            "pass_phrase": "fake-passphrase",
+        }
 
     def test_get_prowler_provider_kwargs_with_mutelist(self):
         provider_uid = "provider_uid"

api/src/backend/api/tests/test_views.py

@@ -2917,6 +2917,48 @@ class TestProviderGroupViewSet:
 
 @pytest.mark.django_db
 class TestProviderSecretViewSet:
+    @staticmethod
+    def _oraclecloud_secret(**overrides):
+        secret = {
+            "user": "ocid1.user.oc1..aaaaaaaakldibrbov4ubh25aqdeiroklxjngwka7u6w7no3glmdq3n5sxtkq",
+            "fingerprint": "aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff:00:11:22:33:44:55:66:77:88:99",
+            "key_content": "test-key-content",
+            "tenancy": "ocid1.tenancy.oc1..aaaaaaaa3dwoazoox4q7wrvriywpokp5grlhgnkwtyt6dmwyou7no6mdmzda",
+        }
+        secret.update(overrides)
+        return secret
+
+    def _create_oraclecloud_secret(
+        self,
+        authenticated_client,
+        oraclecloud_provider,
+        secret,
+        name="OCI Secret",
+    ):
+        data = {
+            "data": {
+                "type": "provider-secrets",
+                "attributes": {
+                    "name": name,
+                    "secret_type": ProviderSecret.TypeChoices.STATIC,
+                    "secret": secret,
+                },
+                "relationships": {
+                    "provider": {
+                        "data": {
+                            "type": "providers",
+                            "id": str(oraclecloud_provider.id),
+                        }
+                    }
+                },
+            }
+        }
+        return authenticated_client.post(
+            reverse("providersecret-list"),
+            data=json.dumps(data),
+            content_type="application/vnd.api+json",
+        )
+
     def test_provider_secrets_list(self, authenticated_client, provider_secret_fixture):
         response = authenticated_client.get(reverse("providersecret-list"))
         assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK
@@ -3076,7 +3118,6 @@ current-context: test-context
                     "fingerprint": "aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff:00:11:22:33:44:55:66:77:88:99",
                     "key_content": "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\ntest-key-content\n-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----",
                     "tenancy": "ocid1.tenancy.oc1..aaaaaaaa3dwoazoox4q7wrvriywpokp5grlhgnkwtyt6dmwyou7no6mdmzda",
-                    "region": "us-ashburn-1",
                 },
             ),
             # OCI with API key credentials (with key_file)
@@ -3088,7 +3129,6 @@ current-context: test-context
                     "fingerprint": "aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff:00:11:22:33:44:55:66:77:88:99",
                     "key_file": "/path/to/oci_api_key.pem",
                     "tenancy": "ocid1.tenancy.oc1..aaaaaaaa3dwoazoox4q7wrvriywpokp5grlhgnkwtyt6dmwyou7no6mdmzda",
-                    "region": "us-ashburn-1",
                 },
             ),
             # OCI with API key credentials (with passphrase)
@@ -3100,7 +3140,6 @@ current-context: test-context
                     "fingerprint": "aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff:00:11:22:33:44:55:66:77:88:99",
                     "key_content": "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\ntest-encrypted-key\n-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----",
                     "tenancy": "ocid1.tenancy.oc1..aaaaaaaa3dwoazoox4q7wrvriywpokp5grlhgnkwtyt6dmwyou7no6mdmzda",
-                    "region": "us-ashburn-1",
                     "pass_phrase": "my-secure-passphrase",
                 },
             ),
@@ -3258,6 +3297,103 @@ current-context: test-context
             == data["data"]["relationships"]["provider"]["data"]["id"]
         )
 
+    def test_provider_secrets_create_oraclecloud_without_region_stores_no_region(
+        self,
+        authenticated_client,
+        oraclecloud_provider,
+    ):
+        response = self._create_oraclecloud_secret(
+            authenticated_client,
+            oraclecloud_provider,
+            self._oraclecloud_secret(),
+        )
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_201_CREATED
+        provider_secret = ProviderSecret.objects.get()
+        assert "region" not in provider_secret.secret
+
+    def test_provider_secrets_create_oraclecloud_accepts_and_ignores_region(
+        self,
+        authenticated_client,
+        oraclecloud_provider,
+    ):
+        response = self._create_oraclecloud_secret(
+            authenticated_client,
+            oraclecloud_provider,
+            self._oraclecloud_secret(
+                key_content="  test-key-content  ", region=" us-ashburn-1 "
+            ),
+        )
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_201_CREATED
+        provider_secret = ProviderSecret.objects.get()
+        assert provider_secret.secret["key_content"] == "test-key-content"
+        assert "region" not in provider_secret.secret
+
+    def test_provider_secrets_update_oraclecloud_without_region_stores_no_region(
+        self,
+        authenticated_client,
+        oraclecloud_provider,
+    ):
+        create_response = self._create_oraclecloud_secret(
+            authenticated_client,
+            oraclecloud_provider,
+            self._oraclecloud_secret(),
+        )
+        provider_secret = ProviderSecret.objects.get(
+            id=create_response.json()["data"]["id"]
+        )
+        data = {
+            "data": {
+                "type": "provider-secrets",
+                "id": str(provider_secret.id),
+                "attributes": {"secret": self._oraclecloud_secret()},
+            }
+        }
+
+        response = authenticated_client.patch(
+            reverse("providersecret-detail", kwargs={"pk": provider_secret.id}),
+            data=json.dumps(data),
+            content_type="application/vnd.api+json",
+        )
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK
+        provider_secret.refresh_from_db()
+        assert "region" not in provider_secret.secret
+
+    def test_provider_secrets_update_oraclecloud_accepts_and_ignores_region(
+        self,
+        authenticated_client,
+        oraclecloud_provider,
+    ):
+        create_response = self._create_oraclecloud_secret(
+            authenticated_client,
+            oraclecloud_provider,
+            self._oraclecloud_secret(),
+        )
+        provider_secret = ProviderSecret.objects.get(
+            id=create_response.json()["data"]["id"]
+        )
+        data = {
+            "data": {
+                "type": "provider-secrets",
+                "id": str(provider_secret.id),
+                "attributes": {
+                    "secret": self._oraclecloud_secret(region=" us-ashburn-1 ")
+                },
+            }
+        }
+
+        response = authenticated_client.patch(
+            reverse("providersecret-detail", kwargs={"pk": provider_secret.id}),
+            data=json.dumps(data),
+            content_type="application/vnd.api+json",
+        )
+
+        assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK
+        provider_secret.refresh_from_db()
+        assert "region" not in provider_secret.secret
+
     @pytest.mark.parametrize(
         "attributes, error_code, error_pointer",
         (

api/src/backend/api/utils.py

@@ -252,12 +252,6 @@ def get_prowler_provider_kwargs(
             **prowler_provider_kwargs,
             "filter_accounts": [provider.uid],
         }
-    elif provider.provider == Provider.ProviderChoices.ORACLECLOUD.value:
-        if isinstance(prowler_provider_kwargs.get("region"), str):
-            prowler_provider_kwargs = {
-                **prowler_provider_kwargs,
-                "region": {prowler_provider_kwargs["region"]},
-            }
     elif provider.provider == Provider.ProviderChoices.OPENSTACK.value:
         # clouds_yaml_content, clouds_yaml_cloud and provider_id are validated
         # in the provider itself, so it's not needed here.
@@ -288,6 +282,11 @@ def get_prowler_provider_kwargs(
                 **{k: v for k, v in prowler_provider_kwargs.items() if v},
             }
 
+    elif provider.provider == Provider.ProviderChoices.ORACLECLOUD.value:
+        prowler_provider_kwargs = _normalize_oraclecloud_provider_kwargs(
+            prowler_provider_kwargs
+        )
+
     if mutelist_processor:
         mutelist_content = mutelist_processor.configuration.get("Mutelist", {})
         # IaC and Image providers don't support mutelist (both use Trivy's built-in logic)
@@ -300,6 +299,40 @@ def get_prowler_provider_kwargs(
     return prowler_provider_kwargs
 
 
+def _normalize_oraclecloud_provider_kwargs(secret: dict) -> dict:
+    """Normalize external OCI secret fields into SDK provider kwargs."""
+    prowler_provider_kwargs = secret.copy()
+    prowler_provider_kwargs.pop("region", None)
+
+    return prowler_provider_kwargs
+
+
+def _normalize_oraclecloud_connection_test_kwargs(secret: dict) -> dict:
+    """Normalize external OCI secret fields into test_connection kwargs."""
+    from prowler.providers.oraclecloud.oraclecloud_provider import OraclecloudProvider
+
+    prowler_provider_kwargs = secret.copy()
+    prowler_provider_kwargs.pop("region", None)
+
+    if (
+        prowler_provider_kwargs.get("user")
+        and prowler_provider_kwargs.get("fingerprint")
+        and prowler_provider_kwargs.get("tenancy")
+        and (
+            prowler_provider_kwargs.get("key_content")
+            or prowler_provider_kwargs.get("key_file")
+        )
+    ):
+        # Connection validation needs one OCI endpoint, but scans remain unfiltered.
+        prowler_provider_kwargs["region"] = getattr(
+            OraclecloudProvider,
+            "_bootstrap_region",
+            OraclecloudProvider._home_region,
+        )
+
+    return prowler_provider_kwargs
+
+
 def initialize_prowler_provider(
     provider: Provider,
     mutelist_processor: Processor | None = None,
@@ -402,6 +435,15 @@ def prowler_provider_connection_test(provider: Provider) -> Connection:
         if prowler_provider_kwargs.get("registry_token"):
             image_kwargs["registry_token"] = prowler_provider_kwargs["registry_token"]
         return prowler_provider.test_connection(**image_kwargs)
+    elif provider.provider == Provider.ProviderChoices.ORACLECLOUD.value:
+        oraclecloud_kwargs = _normalize_oraclecloud_connection_test_kwargs(
+            prowler_provider_kwargs
+        )
+        return prowler_provider.test_connection(
+            **oraclecloud_kwargs,
+            provider_id=provider.uid,
+            raise_on_exception=False,
+        )
     else:
         return prowler_provider.test_connection(
             **prowler_provider_kwargs,

api/src/backend/api/v1/serializer_utils/integrations.py

@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
 import os
 import re
 
+from api.models import Integration, IntegrationProviderRelationship, Provider
 from api.v1.serializer_utils.base import BaseValidateSerializer
+from django.db import transaction
 from drf_spectacular.utils import extend_schema_field
 from rest_framework_json_api import serializers
 
@@ -10,6 +12,24 @@ ATLASSIAN_SITE_NAME_REGEX = re.compile(
 )
 
 
+def replace_integration_providers(
+    integration: Integration, providers: list[Provider], tenant_id: str
+) -> None:
+    """Replace the provider relationships of an integration with the given set."""
+    # Atomic on its own, so callers without an ambient transaction cannot leave the
+    # integration with no relationships if the recreation fails halfway
+    with transaction.atomic():
+        IntegrationProviderRelationship.objects.filter(integration=integration).delete()
+        IntegrationProviderRelationship.objects.bulk_create(
+            [
+                IntegrationProviderRelationship(
+                    integration=integration, provider=provider, tenant_id=tenant_id
+                )
+                for provider in providers
+            ]
+        )
+
+
 class S3ConfigSerializer(BaseValidateSerializer):
     bucket_name = serializers.CharField()
     output_directory = serializers.CharField(allow_blank=True)

api/src/backend/api/v1/serializer_utils/providers.py

@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ from rest_framework_json_api import serializers
                     "kubeconfig_content": {
                         "type": "string",
                         "description": "The content of the Kubernetes kubeconfig file, encoded as a string. "
-                        "Kubeconfig exec authentication is not supported in Prowler Cloud for security reasons.",
+                        "Kubeconfig command-based authentication is not supported in Prowler Cloud for security reasons.",
                     }
                 },
                 "required": ["kubeconfig_content"],
@@ -295,16 +295,21 @@ from rest_framework_json_api import serializers
                         "type": "string",
                         "description": "The OCID of the tenancy.",
                     },
-                    "region": {
-                        "type": "string",
-                        "description": "The OCI region identifier (e.g., us-ashburn-1, us-phoenix-1).",
-                    },
                     "pass_phrase": {
                         "type": "string",
                         "description": "The passphrase for the private key, if encrypted.",
                     },
+                    "region": {
+                        "type": "string",
+                        "deprecated": True,
+                        "description": "Legacy OCI region field accepted for backwards compatibility but ignored; OCI scans all regions.",
+                    },
                 },
-                "required": ["user", "fingerprint", "tenancy", "region"],
+                "required": ["user", "fingerprint", "tenancy"],
+                "anyOf": [
+                    {"required": ["key_file"]},
+                    {"required": ["key_content"]},
+                ],
             },
             {
                 "type": "object",

api/src/backend/api/v1/serializers.py

@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ from api.v1.serializer_utils.integrations import (
     JiraCredentialSerializer,
     S3ConfigSerializer,
     SecurityHubConfigSerializer,
+    replace_integration_providers,
 )
 from api.v1.serializer_utils.lighthouse import (
     BedrockCredentialsSerializer,
@@ -1568,14 +1569,14 @@ class FindingMetadataSerializer(BaseSerializerV1):
 
 
 # Provider secrets
-KUBERNETES_KUBECONFIG_EXEC_ERROR = (
-    "Kubernetes kubeconfig exec authentication is not supported in Prowler Cloud "
-    "for security reasons."
+KUBERNETES_KUBECONFIG_UNSUPPORTED_COMMAND_AUTH_ERROR = (
+    "Kubernetes kubeconfig command-based authentication is not supported in "
+    "Prowler Cloud for security reasons."
 )
 KUBERNETES_KUBECONFIG_INVALID_ERROR = "Invalid Kubernetes kubeconfig content."
 
 
-def kubeconfig_contains_exec_auth(kubeconfig: dict) -> bool:
+def kubeconfig_contains_unsupported_command_auth(kubeconfig: dict) -> bool:
     users = kubeconfig.get("users", [])
     if not isinstance(users, list):
         raise ValidationError(KUBERNETES_KUBECONFIG_INVALID_ERROR)
@@ -1591,6 +1592,17 @@ def kubeconfig_contains_exec_auth(kubeconfig: dict) -> bool:
         if "exec" in user:
             return True
 
+        auth_provider = user.get("auth-provider", {})
+        if not isinstance(auth_provider, dict):
+            continue
+
+        auth_provider_config = auth_provider.get("config", {})
+        if not isinstance(auth_provider_config, dict):
+            continue
+
+        if "cmd-path" in auth_provider_config:
+            return True
+
     return False
 
 
@@ -1672,6 +1684,7 @@ class BaseWriteProviderSecretSerializer(BaseWriteSerializer):
                 validation_error.detail[f"secret/{key}"] = value
                 del validation_error.detail[key]
             raise validation_error
+        return serializer.validated_data
 
 
 class AwsProviderSecret(serializers.Serializer):
@@ -1786,8 +1799,10 @@ class KubernetesProviderSecret(serializers.Serializer):
         if not isinstance(kubeconfig, dict):
             raise serializers.ValidationError(KUBERNETES_KUBECONFIG_INVALID_ERROR)
 
-        if kubeconfig_contains_exec_auth(kubeconfig):
-            raise serializers.ValidationError(KUBERNETES_KUBECONFIG_EXEC_ERROR)
+        if kubeconfig_contains_unsupported_command_auth(kubeconfig):
+            raise serializers.ValidationError(
+                KUBERNETES_KUBECONFIG_UNSUPPORTED_COMMAND_AUTH_ERROR
+            )
 
         return kubeconfig_content
 
@@ -1813,14 +1828,32 @@ class IacProviderSecret(serializers.Serializer):
         resource_name = "provider-secrets"
 
 
+class LegacyOCIRegionField(serializers.Field):
+    def to_internal_value(self, data):
+        return data
+
+    def to_representation(self, value):
+        return value
+
+
 class OracleCloudProviderSecret(serializers.Serializer):
     user = serializers.CharField()
     fingerprint = serializers.CharField()
     key_file = serializers.CharField(required=False)
     key_content = serializers.CharField(required=False)
     tenancy = serializers.CharField()
-    region = serializers.CharField()
     pass_phrase = serializers.CharField(required=False)
+    region = LegacyOCIRegionField(required=False, allow_null=True)
+
+    def validate(self, attrs):
+        attrs.pop("region", None)
+
+        if "key_file" not in attrs and "key_content" not in attrs:
+            raise serializers.ValidationError(
+                {"key_file": "Either key_file or key_content must be provided."}
+            )
+
+        return attrs
 
     class Meta:
         resource_name = "provider-secrets"
@@ -1965,7 +1998,11 @@ class ProviderSecretCreateSerializer(RLSSerializer, BaseWriteProviderSecretSeria
         secret = attrs.get("secret")
 
         validated_attrs = super().validate(attrs)
-        self.validate_secret_based_on_provider(provider.provider, secret_type, secret)
+        validated_secret = self.validate_secret_based_on_provider(
+            provider.provider, secret_type, secret
+        )
+        if provider.provider == Provider.ProviderChoices.ORACLECLOUD.value:
+            validated_attrs["secret"] = validated_secret
         return validated_attrs
 
 
@@ -1997,7 +2034,11 @@ class ProviderSecretUpdateSerializer(BaseWriteProviderSecretSerializer):
         secret = attrs.get("secret")
 
         validated_attrs = super().validate(attrs)
-        self.validate_secret_based_on_provider(provider.provider, secret_type, secret)
+        validated_secret = self.validate_secret_based_on_provider(
+            provider.provider, secret_type, secret
+        )
+        if provider.provider == Provider.ProviderChoices.ORACLECLOUD.value:
+            validated_attrs["secret"] = validated_secret
         return validated_attrs
 
 
@@ -2716,6 +2757,37 @@ class ScheduleDailyCreateSerializer(BaseSerializerV1):
 # Integrations
 
 
+class IntegrationProviderVisibilityMixin:
+    """
+    Keep the `providers` relationship within the provider visibility of the role.
+
+    The view injects `allowed_providers` in the serializer context: `None` when the role
+    has unlimited visibility, and the queryset of visible providers otherwise. Roles with
+    limited visibility can neither attach providers they cannot see nor discover, through
+    the serialized output, the ones already attached.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
+        super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
+        allowed_providers = self.context.get("allowed_providers")
+        if allowed_providers is not None:
+            self.fields["providers"].child_relation.queryset = allowed_providers
+
+    def hide_restricted_providers(self, representation: dict) -> dict:
+        allowed_providers = self.context.get("allowed_providers")
+        # `providers` is missing when the request asks for a subset of the fields
+        if allowed_providers is None or "providers" not in representation:
+            return representation
+
+        allowed_provider_ids = {str(provider.id) for provider in allowed_providers}
+        representation["providers"] = [
+            provider
+            for provider in representation["providers"]
+            if provider["id"] in allowed_provider_ids
+        ]
+        return representation
+
+
 class BaseWriteIntegrationSerializer(BaseWriteSerializer):
     def validate(self, attrs):
         integration_type = attrs.get("integration_type")
@@ -2848,7 +2920,7 @@ class BaseWriteIntegrationSerializer(BaseWriteSerializer):
             )
 
 
-class IntegrationSerializer(RLSSerializer):
+class IntegrationSerializer(IntegrationProviderVisibilityMixin, RLSSerializer):
     """
     Serializer for the Integration model.
     """
@@ -2877,15 +2949,9 @@ class IntegrationSerializer(RLSSerializer):
     }
 
     def to_representation(self, instance):
-        representation = super().to_representation(instance)
-        allowed_providers = self.context.get("allowed_providers")
-        if allowed_providers:
-            allowed_provider_ids = {str(provider.id) for provider in allowed_providers}
-            representation["providers"] = [
-                provider
-                for provider in representation["providers"]
-                if provider["id"] in allowed_provider_ids
-            ]
+        representation = self.hide_restricted_providers(
+            super().to_representation(instance)
+        )
         if instance.integration_type == Integration.IntegrationChoices.JIRA:
             representation["configuration"].update(
                 {"domain": instance.credentials.get("domain")}
@@ -2893,7 +2959,9 @@ class IntegrationSerializer(RLSSerializer):
         return representation
 
 
-class IntegrationCreateSerializer(BaseWriteIntegrationSerializer):
+class IntegrationCreateSerializer(
+    IntegrationProviderVisibilityMixin, BaseWriteIntegrationSerializer
+):
     credentials = IntegrationCredentialField(write_only=True)
     configuration = IntegrationConfigField()
     providers = serializers.ResourceRelatedField(
@@ -2944,22 +3012,18 @@ class IntegrationCreateSerializer(BaseWriteIntegrationSerializer):
         tenant_id = self.context.get("tenant_id")
 
         providers = validated_data.pop("providers", [])
-        integration = Integration.objects.create(tenant_id=tenant_id, **validated_data)
-
-        through_model_instances = [
-            IntegrationProviderRelationship(
-                integration=integration,
-                provider=provider,
-                tenant_id=tenant_id,
+        with transaction.atomic():
+            integration = Integration.objects.create(
+                tenant_id=tenant_id, **validated_data
             )
-            for provider in providers
-        ]
-        IntegrationProviderRelationship.objects.bulk_create(through_model_instances)
+            replace_integration_providers(integration, providers, tenant_id)
 
         return integration
 
 
-class IntegrationUpdateSerializer(BaseWriteIntegrationSerializer):
+class IntegrationUpdateSerializer(
+    IntegrationProviderVisibilityMixin, BaseWriteIntegrationSerializer
+):
     credentials = IntegrationCredentialField(write_only=True, required=False)
     configuration = IntegrationConfigField(required=False)
     providers = serializers.ResourceRelatedField(
@@ -3004,15 +3068,13 @@ class IntegrationUpdateSerializer(BaseWriteIntegrationSerializer):
 
     def update(self, instance, validated_data):
         tenant_id = self.context.get("tenant_id")
-        if validated_data.get("providers") is not None:
-            instance.providers.clear()
-            new_relationships = [
-                IntegrationProviderRelationship(
-                    integration=instance, provider=provider, tenant_id=tenant_id
-                )
-                for provider in validated_data["providers"]
-            ]
-            IntegrationProviderRelationship.objects.bulk_create(new_relationships)
+        # Relationships are replaced here, so they are kept out of the default
+        # `ModelSerializer.update()`, which would otherwise reset them all. The view
+        # rejects updates on integrations shared with providers hidden to the role, so
+        # every existing relationship is visible to the requester at this point
+        providers = validated_data.pop("providers", None)
+        if providers is not None:
+            replace_integration_providers(instance, providers, tenant_id)
 
         # Preserve regions field for Security Hub integrations
         if instance.integration_type == Integration.IntegrationChoices.AWS_SECURITY_HUB:
@@ -3024,7 +3086,9 @@ class IntegrationUpdateSerializer(BaseWriteIntegrationSerializer):
         return super().update(instance, validated_data)
 
     def to_representation(self, instance):
-        representation = super().to_representation(instance)
+        representation = self.hide_restricted_providers(
+            super().to_representation(instance)
+        )
         # Ensure JIRA integrations show updated domain in configuration from credentials
         if instance.integration_type == Integration.IntegrationChoices.JIRA:
             representation["configuration"].update(

api/src/backend/api/v1/views.py

@@ -124,7 +124,12 @@ from api.models import (
     UserRoleRelationship,
 )
 from api.pagination import ComplianceOverviewPagination
-from api.rbac.permissions import Permissions, get_providers, get_role
+from api.rbac.permissions import (
+    Permissions,
+    get_integrations,
+    get_providers,
+    get_role,
+)
 from api.renderers import APIJSONRenderer, PlainTextRenderer
 from api.rls import Tenant
 from api.utils import (
@@ -281,6 +286,7 @@ from django.shortcuts import redirect
 from django.urls import reverse
 from django.utils.dateparse import parse_date
 from django.utils.decorators import method_decorator
+from django.utils.functional import cached_property
 from django.views.decorators.cache import cache_control
 from django_celery_beat.models import PeriodicTask
 from drf_spectacular.settings import spectacular_settings
@@ -6652,27 +6658,34 @@ class ScheduleViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet):
     list=extend_schema(
         tags=["Integration"],
         summary="List all integrations",
-        description="Retrieve a list of all configured integrations with options for filtering by various criteria.",
+        description="Retrieve a list of all configured integrations with options for filtering by various criteria.\n\n"
+        "Integrations attached to one or more providers are only returned when the role can access at least one of "
+        "those providers, and each integration lists only the providers visible to the role. Integrations not "
+        "attached to any provider, such as Jira, are tenant-wide and are returned for every role.",
     ),
     retrieve=extend_schema(
         tags=["Integration"],
         summary="Retrieve integration details",
-        description="Fetch detailed information about a specific integration by its ID.",
+        description="Fetch detailed information about a specific integration by its ID. Integrations outside the "
+        "provider visibility of the role are reported the same way as one that does not exist.",
     ),
     create=extend_schema(
         tags=["Integration"],
         summary="Create a new integration",
-        description="Register a new integration with the system, providing necessary configuration details.",
+        description="Register a new integration with the system, providing necessary configuration details. Only "
+        "providers visible to the role can be attached to the integration.",
     ),
     partial_update=extend_schema(
         tags=["Integration"],
         summary="Partially update an integration",
-        description="Modify certain fields of an existing integration without affecting other settings.",
+        description="Modify certain fields of an existing integration without affecting other settings. Integrations "
+        "attached to providers outside the visibility of the role cannot be modified by it.",
     ),
     destroy=extend_schema(
         tags=["Integration"],
         summary="Delete an integration",
-        description="Remove an integration from the system by its ID.",
+        description="Remove an integration from the system by its ID. Integrations attached to providers outside "
+        "the visibility of the role cannot be deleted by it.",
     ),
 )
 @method_decorator(CACHE_DECORATOR, name="list")
@@ -6685,18 +6698,27 @@ class IntegrationViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet):
     ordering = ["integration_type", "-inserted_at"]
     # RBAC required permissions
     required_permissions = [Permissions.MANAGE_INTEGRATIONS]
-    allowed_providers = None
+
+    @cached_property
+    def allowed_providers(self):
+        """
+        Providers the role can access, or None when it has unlimited visibility.
+
+        Resolved per request and independently of the action, so that writes are scoped
+        as tightly as reads.
+        """
+        if self.user_role.unlimited_visibility:
+            return None
+        return get_providers(self.user_role)
 
     def get_queryset(self):
-        user_roles = get_role(self.request.user, self.request.tenant_id)
-        if user_roles.unlimited_visibility:
-            # User has unlimited visibility, return all integrations
-            queryset = Integration.objects.filter(tenant_id=self.request.tenant_id)
-        else:
-            # User lacks permission, filter providers based on provider groups associated with the role
-            allowed_providers = get_providers(user_roles)
-            queryset = Integration.objects.filter(providers__in=allowed_providers)
-            self.allowed_providers = allowed_providers
+        queryset = get_integrations(self.user_role, providers=self.allowed_providers)
+        if self.allowed_providers is not None and self.action in ("list", "retrieve"):
+            # Restrict the relationship itself, so that the providers hidden to the role
+            # are left out of the sideloaded resources of `?include=providers` too
+            queryset = queryset.prefetch_related(
+                Prefetch("providers", queryset=self.allowed_providers)
+            )
         return queryset
 
     def get_serializer_class(self):
@@ -6711,16 +6733,33 @@ class IntegrationViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet):
         context["allowed_providers"] = self.allowed_providers
         return context
 
+    def get_object(self):
+        instance = super().get_object()
+        # Writes on an integration shared with providers hidden to the role would reach
+        # beyond its visibility, so both editing and deleting are rejected consistently
+        if (
+            self.action in ("partial_update", "destroy")
+            and self.allowed_providers is not None
+            and instance.providers.exclude(
+                id__in=self.allowed_providers.values("id")
+            ).exists()
+        ):
+            raise PermissionDenied(
+                "The integration is attached to providers outside the visibility of your role."
+            )
+        return instance
+
     @extend_schema(
         tags=["Integration"],
         summary="Check integration connection",
-        description="Try to verify integration connection",
+        description="Try to verify integration connection. Integrations outside the provider visibility of the role "
+        "are reported the same way as one that does not exist.",
         request=None,
         responses={202: OpenApiResponse(response=TaskSerializer)},
     )
     @action(detail=True, methods=["post"], url_name="connection")
     def connection(self, request, pk=None):
-        get_object_or_404(Integration, pk=pk)
+        get_object_or_404(self.get_queryset(), pk=pk)
         with transaction.atomic():
             task = check_integration_connection_task.delay(
                 integration_id=pk, tenant_id=self.request.tenant_id
@@ -6743,7 +6782,8 @@ class IntegrationViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet):
         tags=["Integration"],
         summary="Send findings to a Jira integration",
         description="Send a set of filtered findings to the given integration. At least one finding filter must be "
-        "provided.\n\n"
+        "provided. Jira integrations are tenant-wide and do not require unlimited visibility, while the findings "
+        "sent are limited to the providers the role can access.\n\n"
         "## Known Limitations\n\n"
         "### Issue Types with Required Custom Fields\n\n"
         "Certain Jira issue types (such as Epic) may require mandatory custom fields that Prowler does not "
@@ -6787,24 +6827,37 @@ class IntegrationJiraViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet):
             return []
         return super().get_filter_backends()
 
-    def get_queryset(self):
-        tenant_id = self.request.tenant_id
-        user_roles = get_role(self.request.user, self.request.tenant_id)
-        if user_roles.unlimited_visibility:
-            # User has unlimited visibility, return all findings
-            queryset = Finding.all_objects.filter(tenant_id=tenant_id)
-        else:
-            # User lacks permission, filter findings based on provider groups associated with the role
-            queryset = Finding.all_objects.filter(
-                scan__provider__in=get_providers(user_roles)
-            )
+    @cached_property
+    def allowed_providers(self):
+        """
+        Providers the role can access, or None when it has unlimited visibility.
 
-        return queryset
+        Resolved once per request and shared between the findings queryset and the
+        integration lookup.
+        """
+        if self.user_role.unlimited_visibility:
+            return None
+        return get_providers(self.user_role)
+
+    def get_queryset(self):
+        if self.allowed_providers is None:
+            # User has unlimited visibility, return all findings
+            return Finding.all_objects.filter(tenant_id=self.request.tenant_id)
+        # Findings are limited to the providers the role can access
+        return Finding.all_objects.filter(scan__provider__in=self.allowed_providers)
+
+    def get_integration(self, integration_pk):
+        """Retrieve the integration, honoring the provider visibility of the user's role."""
+        return get_object_or_404(
+            get_integrations(self.user_role, providers=self.allowed_providers),
+            pk=integration_pk,
+        )
 
     @extend_schema(
         tags=["Integration"],
         summary="Get available issue types for a Jira project",
-        description="Fetch the available issue types from Jira for a given project key and update the integration configuration.",
+        description="Fetch the available issue types from Jira for a given project key and update the integration "
+        "configuration. Jira integrations are tenant-wide and do not require unlimited visibility.",
         parameters=[
             OpenApiParameter(
                 name="project_key",
@@ -6817,7 +6870,7 @@ class IntegrationJiraViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet):
     )
     @action(detail=False, methods=["get"], url_name="issue-types")
     def issue_types(self, request, integration_pk=None):
-        integration = get_object_or_404(Integration, pk=integration_pk)
+        integration = self.get_integration(integration_pk)
 
         project_key = request.query_params.get("project_key")
         if not project_key:
@@ -6862,23 +6915,23 @@ class IntegrationJiraViewSet(BaseRLSViewSet):
 
     @action(detail=False, methods=["post"], url_name="dispatches")
     def dispatches(self, request, integration_pk=None):
-        get_object_or_404(Integration, pk=integration_pk)
+        self.get_integration(integration_pk)
         serializer = self.get_serializer(
             data=request.data, context={"integration_id": integration_pk}
         )
         serializer.is_valid(raise_exception=True)
 
-        if self.filter_queryset(self.get_queryset()).count() == 0:
-            raise ValidationError(
-                {"findings": "No findings match the provided filters"}
-            )
-
         finding_ids = [
             str(finding_id)
             for finding_id in self.filter_queryset(self.get_queryset()).values_list(
                 "id", flat=True
             )
         ]
+        if not finding_ids:
+            raise ValidationError(
+                {"findings": "No findings match the provided filters"}
+            )
+
         project_key = serializer.validated_data["project_key"]
         issue_type = serializer.validated_data["issue_type"]
 

api/src/backend/config/django/base.py

@@ -312,8 +312,8 @@ ATTACK_PATHS_SCAN_INACTIVITY_THRESHOLD_MINUTES = env.int(
     "ATTACK_PATHS_SCAN_INACTIVITY_THRESHOLD_MINUTES", 30
 )
 ATTACK_PATHS_SCAN_STALE_THRESHOLD_MINUTES = env.int(
-    "ATTACK_PATHS_SCAN_STALE_THRESHOLD_MINUTES", 2880
-)  # 48h
+    "ATTACK_PATHS_SCAN_STALE_THRESHOLD_MINUTES", 960
+)  # 16h
 
 # Selects where the persistent attack-paths graph is stored. The scan
 # temporary database is always Neo4j; only the sink is configurable.

api/src/backend/config/settings/sentry.py

@@ -91,6 +91,13 @@ def before_send(event, hint):
         log_msg = log_record.getMessage()
         log_lvl = log_record.levelno
 
+        if (
+            getattr(log_record, "name", "") == "cartography.graph.job"
+            and "Neo.ClientError.Database.DatabaseNotFound" in log_msg
+            and "db-tmp-scan-" in log_msg
+        ):
+            return None
+
         # The Neo4j driver logs transient connection errors (defunct
         # connections, resets) at ERROR level via the `neo4j.io` logger.
         # `RetryableSession` handles these with retries. If all retries

api/src/backend/config/settings/social_login.py

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ GITHUB_OAUTH_CALLBACK_URL = env("SOCIAL_GITHUB_OAUTH_CALLBACK_URL", default="")
 ACCOUNT_LOGIN_METHODS = {"email"}  # Use Email / Password authentication
 ACCOUNT_SIGNUP_FIELDS = ["email*", "password1*", "password2*"]
 ACCOUNT_EMAIL_VERIFICATION = "none"  # Do not require email confirmation
-ACCOUNT_EMAIL_NOTIFICATIONS = True
+ACCOUNT_EMAIL_NOTIFICATIONS = False
 ACCOUNT_USER_MODEL_USERNAME_FIELD = None
 REST_AUTH = {
     "TOKEN_MODEL": None,

api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/aws.py

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ import aioboto3
 import boto3
 import botocore
 import neo4j
+import neo4j.exceptions
+from api.attack_paths.database import DATABASE_NOT_FOUND_CODE
 from api.models import (
     AttackPathsScan as ProwlerAPIAttackPathsScan,
 )
@@ -347,6 +349,12 @@ def sync_aws_account(
                 )
 
             except Exception as e:
+                if (
+                    isinstance(e, neo4j.exceptions.Neo4jError)
+                    and e.code == DATABASE_NOT_FOUND_CODE
+                ):
+                    raise
+
                 logger.info(
                     f"Synced function {func_name} for AWS account {prowler_api_provider.uid} in {time.perf_counter() - func_t0:.3f}s (FAILED)"
                 )

api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/config.py

@@ -10,13 +10,10 @@ NormalizedList = _provider_config.NormalizedList
 PROVIDER_CONFIGS = _provider_config.PROVIDER_CONFIGS
 ProviderConfig = _provider_config.ProviderConfig
 
-# Batch size for Neo4j write operations (resource labeling, cleanup)
-BATCH_SIZE = env.int("ATTACK_PATHS_BATCH_SIZE", 1000)
+# Batch size for graph mutation operations (resource labeling and subgraph deletion)
+GRAPH_MUTATION_BATCH_SIZE = env.int("ATTACK_PATHS_GRAPH_MUTATION_BATCH_SIZE", 1000)
 # Batch size for Postgres findings fetch (keyset pagination page size)
 FINDINGS_BATCH_SIZE = env.int("ATTACK_PATHS_FINDINGS_BATCH_SIZE", 1000)
-# Batch size for temp-to-tenant graph sync (nodes and relationships per cursor page)
-SYNC_BATCH_SIZE = env.int("ATTACK_PATHS_SYNC_BATCH_SIZE", 1000)
-
 # Neo4j internal labels (Prowler-specific, not provider-specific)
 # - `Internet`: Singleton node representing external internet access for exposed-resource queries
 # - `ProwlerFinding`: Label for finding nodes created by Prowler and linked to cloud resources

api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/findings.py

@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ from cartography.config import Config as CartographyConfig
 from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger
 from prowler.config import config as ProwlerConfig
 from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import (
-    BATCH_SIZE,
     FINDINGS_BATCH_SIZE,
+    GRAPH_MUTATION_BATCH_SIZE,
     get_node_uid_field,
     get_provider_resource_label,
     get_root_node_label,
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ def add_resource_label(
     while labeled_count > 0:
         result = neo4j_session.run(
             query,
-            {"provider_uid": provider_uid, "batch_size": BATCH_SIZE},
+            {"provider_uid": provider_uid, "batch_size": GRAPH_MUTATION_BATCH_SIZE},
         )
         labeled_count = result.single().get("labeled_count", 0)
         total_labeled += labeled_count

api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/scan.py

@@ -372,7 +372,19 @@ def run(tenant_id: str, scan_id: str, task_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
 
     except Exception as e:
         exception_message = utils.stringify_exception(e, "Attack Paths scan failed")
-        logger.exception(exception_message)
+        temporary_database_missing = (
+            isinstance(e, graph_database.GraphDatabaseQueryException)
+            and e.code == graph_database.DATABASE_NOT_FOUND_CODE
+            and tmp_database_name in str(e)
+        )
+        if temporary_database_missing:
+            logger.warning(exception_message)
+        else:
+            logger.exception(exception_message)
+        cleanup_log_level = (
+            logging.WARNING if temporary_database_missing else logging.ERROR
+        )
+        cleanup_exc_info = not temporary_database_missing
         ingestion_exceptions["global_error"] = exception_message
 
         # Recover `graph_data_ready` based on how far the swap got
@@ -387,19 +399,24 @@ def run(tenant_id: str, scan_id: str, task_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
                 )
 
         except Exception:
-            logger.error(
-                f"Failed to recover `graph_data_ready` for provider {attack_paths_scan.provider_id}",
-                exc_info=True,
+            logger.log(
+                cleanup_log_level,
+                "Failed to recover `graph_data_ready` for provider "
+                f"{attack_paths_scan.provider_id}",
+                exc_info=cleanup_exc_info,
             )
 
         # Dropping the temporary database if it still exists
         try:
             graph_database.drop_database(tmp_cartography_config.neo4j_database)
 
-        except Exception as e:
-            logger.error(
-                f"Failed to drop temporary Neo4j database `{tmp_cartography_config.neo4j_database}` during cleanup: {e}",
-                exc_info=True,
+        except Exception as cleanup_error:
+            logger.log(
+                cleanup_log_level,
+                "Failed to drop temporary Neo4j database "
+                f"`{tmp_cartography_config.neo4j_database}` during cleanup: "
+                f"{cleanup_error}",
+                exc_info=cleanup_exc_info,
             )
 
         # Set Attack Paths scan state to FAILED
@@ -407,10 +424,12 @@ def run(tenant_id: str, scan_id: str, task_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
             db_utils.finish_attack_paths_scan(
                 attack_paths_scan, StateChoices.FAILED, ingestion_exceptions
             )
-        except Exception as e:
-            logger.error(
-                f"Could not mark Attack Paths scan {attack_paths_scan.id} as `FAILED` (row may have been deleted): {e}",
-                exc_info=True,
+        except Exception as cleanup_error:
+            logger.log(
+                cleanup_log_level,
+                f"Could not mark Attack Paths scan {attack_paths_scan.id} as `FAILED` "
+                f"(row may have been deleted): {cleanup_error}",
+                exc_info=cleanup_exc_info,
             )
 
         raise

api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/sync.py

@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import (
     PROVIDER_CONFIGS,
     PROVIDER_ISOLATION_PROPERTIES,
     PROVIDER_RESOURCE_LABEL,
-    SYNC_BATCH_SIZE,
     NormalizedList,
     get_provider_label,
     get_tenant_label,
@@ -116,6 +115,7 @@ def sync_nodes(
     Source and target sessions are opened sequentially per batch to avoid
     holding two Bolt connections simultaneously for the entire sync duration.
     """
+    batch_size = sink.sync_batch_size
     t0 = time.perf_counter()
     last_id = -1
     parents_synced = 0
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ def sync_nodes(
         with graph_database.get_session(source_database) as source_session:
             result = source_session.run(
                 NODE_FETCH_QUERY,
-                {"last_id": last_id, "batch_size": SYNC_BATCH_SIZE},
+                {"last_id": last_id, "batch_size": batch_size},
             )
             for record in result:
                 batch_count += 1
@@ -156,17 +156,17 @@ def sync_nodes(
 
         for labels, batch in parent_groups.items():
             rendered_labels = _render_labels(labels, extra_labels)
-            for sink_batch in _iter_sink_batches(batch):
+            for sink_batch in _iter_sink_batches(batch, batch_size):
                 sink.write_nodes(target_database, rendered_labels, sink_batch)
 
         for child_label, batch in child_groups.items():
             rendered_labels = _render_labels((child_label,), extra_labels)
-            for sink_batch in _iter_sink_batches(batch):
+            for sink_batch in _iter_sink_batches(batch, batch_size):
                 sink.write_nodes(target_database, rendered_labels, sink_batch)
             children_synced += len(batch)
 
         for rel_type, batch in rel_groups.items():
-            for sink_batch in _iter_sink_batches(batch):
+            for sink_batch in _iter_sink_batches(batch, batch_size):
                 sink.write_relationships(
                     target_database, rel_type, provider_id, sink_batch
                 )
@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ def sync_relationships(
     Source and target sessions are opened sequentially per batch to avoid
     holding two Bolt connections simultaneously for the entire sync duration.
     """
+    batch_size = sink.sync_batch_size
     t0 = time.perf_counter()
     last_id = -1
     total_synced = 0
@@ -217,7 +218,7 @@ def sync_relationships(
         with graph_database.get_session(source_database) as source_session:
             result = source_session.run(
                 RELATIONSHIPS_FETCH_QUERY,
-                {"last_id": last_id, "batch_size": SYNC_BATCH_SIZE},
+                {"last_id": last_id, "batch_size": batch_size},
             )
             for record in result:
                 batch_count += 1
@@ -229,7 +230,7 @@ def sync_relationships(
             break
 
         for rel_type, batch in grouped.items():
-            for sink_batch in _iter_sink_batches(batch):
+            for sink_batch in _iter_sink_batches(batch, batch_size):
                 sink.write_relationships(
                     target_database, rel_type, provider_id, sink_batch
                 )
@@ -247,10 +248,9 @@ def sync_relationships(
 
 def _iter_sink_batches(
     rows: list[dict[str, Any]],
-    batch_size: int | None = None,
+    batch_size: int,
 ) -> Iterator[list[dict[str, Any]]]:
     """Yield final sink write batches after source rows have been transformed."""
-    batch_size = SYNC_BATCH_SIZE if batch_size is None else batch_size
     if batch_size <= 0:
         raise ValueError("Sink batch size must be greater than zero")
 

api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/scan.py

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import copy
 import csv
 import io
 import json
@@ -6,7 +7,7 @@ import re
 import time
 import uuid
 from collections import defaultdict
-from collections.abc import Iterable
+from collections.abc import Callable, Iterable
 from datetime import UTC, datetime
 from typing import Any
 
@@ -49,6 +50,7 @@ from celery.utils.log import get_task_logger
 from config.django.base import DJANGO_FINDINGS_BATCH_SIZE
 from config.env import env
 from config.settings.celery import CELERY_DEADLOCK_ATTEMPTS
+from django.core.exceptions import ImproperlyConfigured
 from django.db import DatabaseError, IntegrityError, OperationalError, transaction
 from django.db.models import (
     Case,
@@ -99,6 +101,16 @@ COMPLIANCE_REQUIREMENT_COPY_COLUMNS = (
 FINDINGS_MICRO_BATCH_SIZE = env.int("DJANGO_FINDINGS_MICRO_BATCH_SIZE", default=3000)
 # Controls how many rows each ORM bulk_create/bulk_update call sends to Postgres.
 SCAN_DB_BATCH_SIZE = env.int("DJANGO_SCAN_DB_BATCH_SIZE", default=1000)
+# Rows per COPY statement when ingesting compliance requirement overviews. All
+# batches of a scan share one transaction/commit; the batch size only bounds the
+# client-side CSV buffer and how long each individual COPY statement runs on the
+# writer (memory footprint, lock time and slow-statement logging under load).
+COMPLIANCE_COPY_BATCH_SIZE = env.int("DJANGO_COMPLIANCE_COPY_BATCH_SIZE", default=2000)
+if COMPLIANCE_COPY_BATCH_SIZE < 1:
+    raise ImproperlyConfigured(
+        "DJANGO_COMPLIANCE_COPY_BATCH_SIZE must be a positive integer, got "
+        f"{COMPLIANCE_COPY_BATCH_SIZE}"
+    )
 # Throttle scan progress persistence: minimum progress delta (fraction 0-1)
 # between two persisted progress updates.
 PROGRESS_THROTTLE_DELTA = env.float("DJANGO_SCAN_PROGRESS_THROTTLE_DELTA", default=0.01)
@@ -356,30 +368,36 @@ def _bulk_update_resource_failed_findings_counts(
                 raise
 
 
-def _copy_compliance_requirement_rows(
-    tenant_id: str, rows: list[dict[str, Any]]
-) -> None:
-    """Stream compliance requirement rows into Postgres using COPY.
+class ComplianceRowScopeError(ValueError):
+    """A compliance requirement row does not belong to the scan being ingested."""
 
-    We leverage the admin connection (when available) to bypass the COPY + RLS
-    restriction, writing only the fields required by
-    ``ComplianceRequirementOverview``.
 
-    Args:
-        tenant_id: Target tenant UUID.
-        rows: List of row dictionaries prepared by
-            :func:`create_compliance_requirements`.
+def _compliance_requirement_rows_to_csv(
+    rows: list[dict[str, Any]], tenant_id: str, scan_id: str
+) -> io.StringIO:
+    """Serialize compliance requirement rows into a CSV buffer for COPY.
+
+    COPY runs on the admin connection, which bypasses RLS, so every row is
+    checked against the expected tenant/scan before it is written: a mismatched
+    row would otherwise be inserted verbatim into another tenant's data.
     """
-
     csv_buffer = io.StringIO()
     writer = csv.writer(csv_buffer)
 
     datetime_now = datetime.now(tz=UTC)
     for row in rows:
+        row_tenant_id = str(row.get("tenant_id"))
+        row_scan_id = str(row.get("scan_id"))
+        if row_tenant_id != tenant_id or row_scan_id != scan_id:
+            raise ComplianceRowScopeError(
+                "Compliance requirement row does not belong to the scan being "
+                f"ingested (expected tenant {tenant_id} / scan {scan_id}, got "
+                f"tenant {row_tenant_id} / scan {row_scan_id})"
+            )
         writer.writerow(
             [
                 str(row.get("id")),
-                str(row.get("tenant_id")),
+                row_tenant_id,
                 (row.get("inserted_at") or datetime_now).isoformat(),
                 row.get("compliance_id") or "",
                 row.get("framework") or "",
@@ -393,65 +411,100 @@ def _copy_compliance_requirement_rows(
                 row.get("total_checks", 0),
                 row.get("passed_findings", 0),
                 row.get("total_findings", 0),
-                str(row.get("scan_id")),
+                row_scan_id,
             ]
         )
 
     csv_buffer.seek(0)
+    return csv_buffer
+
+
+def _copy_compliance_requirement_rows(
+    tenant_id: str, scan_id: str, rows: Iterable[dict[str, Any]], batch_size: int
+) -> int:
+    """Replace a scan's compliance requirement rows using batched COPY.
+
+    We leverage the admin connection (when available) to bypass the COPY + RLS
+    restriction. The scan's DELETE and every COPY batch run on one connection
+    inside a single transaction with a single commit, so the writer takes one
+    fsync per scan instead of one per batch, and a failed ingest rolls back
+    without committing a partial delete/insert (which a retry would otherwise
+    delete again, feeding dead rows to autovacuum).
+
+    Args:
+        tenant_id: Target tenant UUID.
+        scan_id: Scan whose previous rows are replaced.
+        rows: Iterable of row dictionaries, consumed lazily batch by batch.
+        batch_size: Number of rows per COPY statement.
+
+    Returns:
+        int: total number of rows staged and committed.
+
+    Raises:
+        ComplianceRowScopeError: A row belongs to another tenant or scan.
+    """
+    # Normalized once so the per-row scope check compares like with like even if
+    # the caller passes UUID instances instead of strings.
+    tenant_id = str(tenant_id)
+    scan_id = str(scan_id)
+    total_rows = 0
+    batch_num = 0
     copy_sql = (
         "COPY compliance_requirements_overviews ("
         + ", ".join(COMPLIANCE_REQUIREMENT_COPY_COLUMNS)
         + ") FROM STDIN WITH (FORMAT CSV, DELIMITER ',', QUOTE '\"', ESCAPE '\"', NULL '\\N')"
     )
 
-    try:
-        with psycopg_connection(MainRouter.admin_db) as connection:
-            connection.autocommit = False
-            try:
-                with connection.cursor() as cursor:
-                    cursor.execute(SET_CONFIG_QUERY, [POSTGRES_TENANT_VAR, tenant_id])
-                    cursor.copy_expert(copy_sql, csv_buffer)
-                connection.commit()
-            except Exception:
-                connection.rollback()
-                raise
-    finally:
-        csv_buffer.close()
+    with psycopg_connection(MainRouter.admin_db) as connection:
+        connection.autocommit = False
+        try:
+            with connection.cursor() as cursor:
+                cursor.execute(SET_CONFIG_QUERY, [POSTGRES_TENANT_VAR, tenant_id])
+                # Idempotent re-run: clearing this scan's rows inside the same
+                # transaction keeps delete + reinsert atomic.
+                cursor.execute(
+                    "DELETE FROM compliance_requirements_overviews "
+                    "WHERE tenant_id = %s AND scan_id = %s",
+                    [tenant_id, scan_id],
+                )
+                for batch, _is_last in batched(rows, batch_size):
+                    if not batch:
+                        continue
+                    batch_num += 1
+                    csv_buffer = _compliance_requirement_rows_to_csv(
+                        batch, tenant_id, scan_id
+                    )
+                    try:
+                        cursor.copy_expert(copy_sql, csv_buffer)
+                    finally:
+                        csv_buffer.close()
+                    total_rows += len(batch)
+                    logger.info(
+                        f"Compliance COPY batch {batch_num}: staged {len(batch)} rows "
+                        f"({total_rows} total)"
+                    )
+            connection.commit()
+        except Exception:
+            connection.rollback()
+            raise
+
+    return total_rows
 
 
-def _persist_compliance_requirement_rows(
-    tenant_id: str, rows: Iterable[dict[str, Any]], batch_size: int = 10000
+def _bulk_create_compliance_requirement_rows(
+    tenant_id: str, scan_id: str, rows: Iterable[dict[str, Any]], batch_size: int
 ) -> int:
-    """Persist compliance requirement rows using batched COPY with ORM fallback.
+    """Replace a scan's compliance requirement rows via the ORM.
 
-    ``rows`` is consumed lazily in batches, so peak memory stays at ~``batch_size``
-    rows instead of the full set. A batch that fails COPY falls back to an ORM
-    ``bulk_create`` of just that batch.
-
-    Args:
-        tenant_id: Target tenant UUID.
-        rows: Iterable of row dictionaries reflecting the compliance overview
-            state for a scan.
-        batch_size: Number of rows per COPY batch (default: 10000).
-
-    Returns:
-        int: total number of rows persisted.
+    Fallback for when COPY is unavailable; the delete and every ``bulk_create``
+    share one RLS transaction so the replacement stays atomic.
     """
     total_rows = 0
-    batch_num = 0
-
-    for batch, _is_last in batched(rows, batch_size):
-        if not batch:
-            continue
-        batch_num += 1
-        try:
-            _copy_compliance_requirement_rows(tenant_id, batch)
-        except Exception as error:
-            logger.exception(
-                f"COPY bulk insert for compliance requirements batch {batch_num} "
-                "failed; falling back to ORM bulk_create for this batch",
-                exc_info=error,
-            )
+    with rls_transaction(tenant_id):
+        ComplianceRequirementOverview.objects.filter(scan_id=scan_id).delete()
+        for batch, _is_last in batched(rows, batch_size):
+            if not batch:
+                continue
             fallback_objects = [
                 ComplianceRequirementOverview(
                     id=row["id"],
@@ -473,20 +526,58 @@ def _persist_compliance_requirement_rows(
                 )
                 for row in batch
             ]
-            with rls_transaction(tenant_id):
-                ComplianceRequirementOverview.objects.bulk_create(
-                    fallback_objects, batch_size=500
-                )
-
-        total_rows += len(batch)
-        logger.info(
-            f"Compliance COPY batch {batch_num}: inserted {len(batch)} rows "
-            f"({total_rows} total)"
-        )
-
+            ComplianceRequirementOverview.objects.bulk_create(
+                fallback_objects, batch_size=500
+            )
+            total_rows += len(batch)
     return total_rows
 
 
+def _persist_compliance_requirement_rows(
+    tenant_id: str,
+    scan_id: str,
+    rows_factory: Callable[[], Iterable[dict[str, Any]]],
+    batch_size: int | None = None,
+) -> int:
+    """Persist a scan's compliance requirement rows, replacing any previous ones.
+
+    ``rows_factory`` must return a fresh row iterator on every call: the COPY
+    path consumes it lazily in batches (peak memory ~``batch_size`` rows), and
+    if COPY fails the whole ingest falls back to a single ORM transaction that
+    re-iterates the rows.
+
+    Args:
+        tenant_id: Target tenant UUID.
+        scan_id: Scan whose compliance overview rows are being replaced.
+        rows_factory: Callable returning an iterable of row dictionaries.
+        batch_size: Rows per COPY/bulk_create batch (default:
+            ``COMPLIANCE_COPY_BATCH_SIZE``).
+
+    Returns:
+        int: total number of rows persisted.
+    """
+    if batch_size is None:
+        batch_size = COMPLIANCE_COPY_BATCH_SIZE
+
+    try:
+        return _copy_compliance_requirement_rows(
+            tenant_id, scan_id, rows_factory(), batch_size
+        )
+    except ComplianceRowScopeError:
+        # Cross-tenant/scan rows are a bug in the caller, not a COPY failure:
+        # retrying through the ORM would persist the very rows we rejected.
+        raise
+    except Exception as error:
+        logger.exception(
+            "COPY bulk insert for compliance requirements failed; "
+            "falling back to ORM bulk_create",
+            exc_info=error,
+        )
+        return _bulk_create_compliance_requirement_rows(
+            tenant_id, scan_id, rows_factory(), batch_size
+        )
+
+
 def _create_compliance_summaries(
     tenant_id: str, scan_id: str, requirement_statuses: dict
 ) -> None:
@@ -605,6 +696,45 @@ def _process_finding_micro_batch(
         scan_resource_groups_cache: Dict tracking resource group counts {(resource_group, severity): {"total", "failed", "new_failed"}}.
         group_resources_cache: Dict tracking unique resources per group {resource_group: set(resource_uids)}.
     """
+
+    def build_resource_defaults_from_finding(finding: ProwlerFinding) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        check_metadata = finding.get_metadata()
+        group = check_metadata.get("resourcegroup") or None
+        return {
+            "tenant_id": tenant_id,
+            "provider": provider_instance,
+            "uid": finding.resource_uid,
+            "region": finding.region,
+            "service": finding.service_name,
+            "type": finding.resource_type,
+            "name": finding.resource_name,
+            "groups": [group] if group else None,
+        }
+
+    def recover_resource_after_cache_miss(finding: ProwlerFinding) -> Resource:
+        resource_uid = finding.resource_uid
+        resource_instance = Resource.objects.filter(
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+            provider_id=provider_instance.id,
+            uid=resource_uid,
+        ).first()
+        if resource_instance is None:
+            try:
+                with transaction.atomic():
+                    resource_instance = Resource.objects.create(
+                        **build_resource_defaults_from_finding(finding)
+                    )
+            except IntegrityError:
+                resource_instance = Resource.objects.filter(
+                    tenant_id=tenant_id,
+                    provider_id=provider_instance.id,
+                    uid=resource_uid,
+                ).first()
+                if resource_instance is None:
+                    raise
+
+        return cache_resource(resource_uid, resource_instance)
+
     # Accumulate objects for bulk operations
     findings_to_create = []
     dirty_resources = {}
@@ -643,7 +773,103 @@ def _process_finding_micro_batch(
 
     # All DB writes for this micro-batch run inside ONE rls_transaction,
     # with deadlock-retry at micro-batch granularity instead of per-finding.
+    missing_cache_value = object()
     for attempt in range(CELERY_DEADLOCK_ATTEMPTS):
+        resource_cache_originals: dict[str, Resource | object] = {}
+        failed_count_originals: dict[str, int | None] = {}
+        resource_field_originals: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {}
+        tag_cache_original = dict(tag_cache)
+        scan_resource_cache_original = set(scan_resource_cache)
+        scan_categories_cache_original = {
+            key: value.copy() for key, value in scan_categories_cache.items()
+        }
+        scan_resource_groups_cache_original = {
+            key: value.copy() for key, value in scan_resource_groups_cache.items()
+        }
+        group_resources_cache_original = {
+            key: set(value) for key, value in group_resources_cache.items()
+        }
+
+        def cache_resource(resource_uid: str, resource_instance: Resource) -> Resource:
+            if resource_uid not in resource_cache_originals:
+                resource_cache_originals[resource_uid] = resource_cache.get(
+                    resource_uid, missing_cache_value
+                )
+            resource_cache[resource_uid] = resource_instance
+            if resource_uid not in resource_failed_findings_cache:
+                failed_count_originals[resource_uid] = None
+                resource_failed_findings_cache[resource_uid] = 0
+            return resource_instance
+
+        def snapshot_failed_count(resource_uid: str) -> None:
+            if resource_uid not in failed_count_originals:
+                failed_count_originals[resource_uid] = (
+                    resource_failed_findings_cache.get(resource_uid)
+                )
+
+        def snapshot_resource_fields(
+            resource_uid: str, resource_instance: Resource
+        ) -> None:
+            if resource_uid in resource_field_originals:
+                return
+            resource_field_originals[resource_uid] = {
+                field: copy.deepcopy(getattr(resource_instance, field))
+                for field in (
+                    "name",
+                    "metadata",
+                    "details",
+                    "partition",
+                    "region",
+                    "service",
+                    "type",
+                    "groups",
+                    "updated_at",
+                )
+            }
+
+        def restore_attempt_caches() -> None:
+            for resource_uid, original_fields in resource_field_originals.items():
+                resource_instance = resource_cache.get(resource_uid)
+                if resource_instance is None:
+                    continue
+                for field, value in original_fields.items():
+                    setattr(resource_instance, field, value)
+            for resource_uid, original_resource in resource_cache_originals.items():
+                if original_resource is missing_cache_value:
+                    resource_cache.pop(resource_uid, None)
+                else:
+                    resource_cache[resource_uid] = original_resource
+            for resource_uid, original_count in failed_count_originals.items():
+                if original_count is None:
+                    resource_failed_findings_cache.pop(resource_uid, None)
+                else:
+                    resource_failed_findings_cache[resource_uid] = original_count
+            tag_cache.clear()
+            tag_cache.update(tag_cache_original)
+            scan_resource_cache.clear()
+            scan_resource_cache.update(scan_resource_cache_original)
+            scan_categories_cache.clear()
+            scan_categories_cache.update(
+                {
+                    key: value.copy()
+                    for key, value in scan_categories_cache_original.items()
+                }
+            )
+            scan_resource_groups_cache.clear()
+            scan_resource_groups_cache.update(
+                {
+                    key: value.copy()
+                    for key, value in scan_resource_groups_cache_original.items()
+                }
+            )
+            group_resources_cache.clear()
+            group_resources_cache.update(
+                {
+                    key: set(value)
+                    for key, value in group_resources_cache_original.items()
+                }
+            )
+
         try:
             with rls_transaction(tenant_id):
                 # 1) Pre-resolve Resources in bulk
@@ -678,19 +904,8 @@ def _process_finding_micro_batch(
                         resources_to_create = []
                         for uid in missing_uids:
                             f = first_finding_per_uid[uid]
-                            check_metadata = f.get_metadata()
-                            group = check_metadata.get("resourcegroup") or None
                             resources_to_create.append(
-                                Resource(
-                                    tenant_id=tenant_id,
-                                    provider=provider_instance,
-                                    uid=uid,
-                                    region=f.region,
-                                    service=f.service_name,
-                                    type=f.resource_type,
-                                    name=f.resource_name,
-                                    groups=[group] if group else None,
-                                )
+                                Resource(**build_resource_defaults_from_finding(f))
                             )
                         Resource.objects.bulk_create(
                             resources_to_create,
@@ -711,8 +926,7 @@ def _process_finding_micro_batch(
                             }
                         )
                     for uid, r in existing_resources.items():
-                        resource_cache[uid] = r
-                        resource_failed_findings_cache.setdefault(uid, 0)
+                        cache_resource(uid, r)
 
                 # 2) Pre-resolve ResourceTags in bulk
                 batch_tag_kv: set[tuple[str, str]] = set()
@@ -758,47 +972,50 @@ def _process_finding_micro_batch(
                     resource_uid = finding.resource_uid
                     resource_instance = resource_cache.get(resource_uid)
                     if resource_instance is None:
-                        # Should be unreachable after the pre-resolve step. Defensive log.
-                        logger.error(
-                            f"Resource {resource_uid} missing from cache after pre-resolve "
-                            f"on scan {scan_instance.id}; skipping finding."
-                        )
-                        continue
+                        resource_instance = recover_resource_after_cache_miss(finding)
 
                     # Detect resource field changes (defer save until end-of-batch bulk_update).
                     check_metadata = finding.get_metadata()
                     group = check_metadata.get("resourcegroup") or None
                     updated = False
                     if finding.region and resource_instance.region != finding.region:
+                        snapshot_resource_fields(resource_uid, resource_instance)
                         resource_instance.region = finding.region
                         updated = True
                     if (
                         finding.resource_name
                         and resource_instance.name != finding.resource_name
                     ):
+                        snapshot_resource_fields(resource_uid, resource_instance)
                         resource_instance.name = finding.resource_name
                         updated = True
                     if resource_instance.service != finding.service_name:
+                        snapshot_resource_fields(resource_uid, resource_instance)
                         resource_instance.service = finding.service_name
                         updated = True
                     if resource_instance.type != finding.resource_type:
+                        snapshot_resource_fields(resource_uid, resource_instance)
                         resource_instance.type = finding.resource_type
                         updated = True
                     if resource_instance.metadata != finding.resource_metadata:
+                        snapshot_resource_fields(resource_uid, resource_instance)
                         resource_instance.metadata = json.dumps(
                             finding.resource_metadata, cls=CustomEncoder
                         )
                         updated = True
                     if resource_instance.details != finding.resource_details:
+                        snapshot_resource_fields(resource_uid, resource_instance)
                         resource_instance.details = finding.resource_details
                         updated = True
                     if resource_instance.partition != finding.partition:
+                        snapshot_resource_fields(resource_uid, resource_instance)
                         resource_instance.partition = finding.partition
                         updated = True
                     if group and (
                         not resource_instance.groups
                         or group not in resource_instance.groups
                     ):
+                        snapshot_resource_fields(resource_uid, resource_instance)
                         resource_instance.groups = (resource_instance.groups or []) + [
                             group
                         ]
@@ -860,6 +1077,7 @@ def _process_finding_micro_batch(
                         muted_reason = mute_rules_cache[finding_uid]
 
                     if status == FindingStatus.FAIL and not is_muted:
+                        snapshot_failed_count(resource_uid)
                         resource_failed_findings_cache[resource_uid] += 1
 
                     check_metadata["compliance"] = finding.compliance
@@ -885,15 +1103,19 @@ def _process_finding_micro_batch(
                         # Denormalized resource arrays populated directly on insert
                         # (was previously a separate bulk_update; saves a CASE WHEN
                         # over thousands of rows per micro-batch).
-                        resource_regions=[resource_instance.region]
-                        if resource_instance.region
-                        else [],
-                        resource_services=[resource_instance.service]
-                        if resource_instance.service
-                        else [],
-                        resource_types=[resource_instance.type]
-                        if resource_instance.type
-                        else [],
+                        resource_regions=(
+                            [resource_instance.region]
+                            if resource_instance.region
+                            else []
+                        ),
+                        resource_services=(
+                            [resource_instance.service]
+                            if resource_instance.service
+                            else []
+                        ),
+                        resource_types=(
+                            [resource_instance.type] if resource_instance.type else []
+                        ),
                     )
                     findings_to_create.append(finding_instance)
                     resource_denormalized_data.append(
@@ -1013,6 +1235,7 @@ def _process_finding_micro_batch(
                         if r is None:
                             continue
                         # Manually bump updated_at since bulk_update bypasses auto_now.
+                        snapshot_resource_fields(uid, r)
                         r.updated_at = now_utc
                         resources_to_bulk_update.append(r)
                     if resources_to_bulk_update:
@@ -1034,6 +1257,7 @@ def _process_finding_micro_batch(
             # Successful execution: leave deadlock retry loop.
             break
         except (OperationalError, IntegrityError) as db_err:
+            restore_attempt_caches()
             if attempt < CELERY_DEADLOCK_ATTEMPTS - 1:
                 logger.warning(
                     f"{'Deadlock error' if isinstance(db_err, OperationalError) else 'Integrity error'} "
@@ -1708,8 +1932,10 @@ def create_compliance_requirements(tenant_id: str, scan_id: str):
                 )
 
             # Yield rows lazily (consumed batch-by-batch by COPY) so peak memory
-            # stays bounded; tally requirement_statuses in the same pass.
+            # stays bounded; tally requirement_statuses in the same pass. The
+            # ORM fallback re-iterates from scratch, so the tally resets first.
             def _iter_compliance_requirement_rows():
+                requirement_statuses.clear()
                 for region in regions:
                     region_stats = region_requirement_stats.get(region, {})
                     region_findings = findings_count_by_compliance.get(region, {})
@@ -1773,12 +1999,10 @@ def create_compliance_requirements(tenant_id: str, scan_id: str):
                                 "total_findings": total_findings,
                             }
 
-            # Idempotent re-run: clear this scan's rows before re-inserting.
-            with rls_transaction(tenant_id):
-                ComplianceRequirementOverview.objects.filter(scan_id=scan_id).delete()
-
+            # The delete of the scan's previous rows happens inside the same
+            # transaction as the inserts (see _copy_compliance_requirement_rows).
             requirements_created = _persist_compliance_requirement_rows(
-                tenant_id, _iter_compliance_requirement_rows()
+                tenant_id_str, scan_id_str, _iter_compliance_requirement_rows
             )
 
         # Create pre-aggregated summaries for fast compliance overview lookups

api/src/backend/tasks/tasks.py

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ from api.compliance import (
 from api.db_router import READ_REPLICA_ALIAS
 from api.db_utils import delete_related_daily_task, rls_transaction
 from api.decorators import handle_provider_deletion, set_tenant
+from api.exceptions import ProviderDeletedException
 from api.models import (
     Finding,
     Integration,
@@ -666,7 +667,13 @@ class AttackPathsScanRLSTask(RLSTask):
         scan_id = kwargs.get("scan_id")
 
         if tenant_id and scan_id:
-            logger.error(f"Attack paths scan task {task_id} failed: {exc}")
+            if isinstance(exc, ProviderDeletedException):
+                logger.warning(
+                    f"Attack paths scan task {task_id} stopped because its provider "
+                    f"or tenant was deleted: {exc}"
+                )
+            else:
+                logger.error(f"Attack paths scan task {task_id} failed: {exc}")
             attack_paths_db_utils.fail_attack_paths_scan(tenant_id, scan_id, str(exc))
 
 
@@ -790,12 +797,34 @@ def generate_outputs_task(scan_id: str, provider_id: str, tenant_id: str):
         if name not in frameworks_bulk and universal_bulk[name].outputs
     }
     frameworks_avail = get_compliance_frameworks(provider_type)
+    # Idempotency: a previous run of this task for the same scan may have left
+    # output files behind (e.g. broker redelivery after a worker was killed
+    # mid-run with task_acks_late, or a successful run on a deployment without
+    # S3 where the tmp dir is not removed). Output writers open files in append
+    # mode with a deterministic path (derived from scan.started_at), so reusing
+    # them would append every finding row again and duplicate the CSV/output
+    # rows. Start from a clean slate before (re)generating.
+    scan_tmp_dir = _scan_tmp_output_directory(tenant_id, scan_id)
+    if os.path.exists(scan_tmp_dir):
+        rmtree(scan_tmp_dir, ignore_errors=True)
+        # The writers below open output files in append mode with deterministic
+        # paths (derived from scan.started_at). Any stale file that survives the
+        # cleanup would get every finding row appended again, which is the exact
+        # duplication this guards against. Continuing is therefore unsafe: abort
+        # so `ScanReportRLSTask.on_failure` removes the tmp dir and the retry
+        # starts from a clean slate instead of publishing duplicated rows.
+        if os.path.exists(scan_tmp_dir):
+            raise RuntimeError(
+                "Could not remove stale output directory for scan "
+                f"{scan_id} before generating outputs; aborting to avoid "
+                "duplicated rows in appended outputs."
+            )
+
     out_dir, comp_dir = _generate_output_directory(
         DJANGO_TMP_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY, provider_uid, tenant_id, scan_id
     )
     # Removed on success here and on failure by ScanReportRLSTask.on_failure,
     # so partial artifacts do not accumulate and fill the disk (ENOSPC).
-    scan_tmp_dir = _scan_tmp_output_directory(tenant_id, scan_id)
 
     def get_writer(writer_map, name, factory, is_last):
         """

api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_attack_paths_aws.py

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import neo4j.exceptions
+import pytest
+from tasks.jobs.attack_paths import aws
+
+DATABASE_NOT_FOUND_CODE = "Neo.ClientError.Database.DatabaseNotFound"
+
+
+def _make_neo4j_error(code: str) -> neo4j.exceptions.Neo4jError:
+    return neo4j.exceptions.Neo4jError._hydrate_neo4j(
+        code=code,
+        message="graph query failed",
+    )
+
+
+def _resource_functions(failing_sync, following_sync):
+    return {
+        "failing_sync": failing_sync,
+        "following_sync": following_sync,
+        "permission_relationships": MagicMock(),
+        "resourcegroupstaggingapi": MagicMock(),
+    }
+
+
+def test_sync_aws_account_reraises_database_not_found_immediately():
+    error = _make_neo4j_error(DATABASE_NOT_FOUND_CODE)
+    failing_sync = MagicMock(side_effect=error)
+    following_sync = MagicMock()
+
+    with (
+        patch.object(
+            aws.cartography_aws,
+            "RESOURCE_FUNCTIONS",
+            _resource_functions(failing_sync, following_sync),
+        ),
+        patch.object(aws.db_utils, "update_attack_paths_scan_progress"),
+        patch.object(aws.utils, "stringify_exception") as stringify_exception,
+        patch.object(aws.logger, "warning") as warning,
+        pytest.raises(neo4j.exceptions.Neo4jError) as exc_info,
+    ):
+        aws.sync_aws_account(
+            SimpleNamespace(uid="123456789012"),
+            [
+                "failing_sync",
+                "following_sync",
+                "permission_relationships",
+                "resourcegroupstaggingapi",
+            ],
+            {},
+            MagicMock(),
+        )
+
+    assert exc_info.value is error
+    following_sync.assert_not_called()
+    stringify_exception.assert_not_called()
+    warning.assert_not_called()
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "error",
+    [
+        _make_neo4j_error("Neo.ClientError.Statement.SyntaxError"),
+        RuntimeError("resource sync failed"),
+    ],
+    ids=["different-neo4j-error", "non-neo4j-error"],
+)
+def test_sync_aws_account_warns_and_continues_for_other_exceptions(error):
+    failing_sync = MagicMock(side_effect=error)
+    following_sync = MagicMock()
+
+    with (
+        patch.object(
+            aws.cartography_aws,
+            "RESOURCE_FUNCTIONS",
+            _resource_functions(failing_sync, following_sync),
+        ),
+        patch.object(aws.db_utils, "update_attack_paths_scan_progress"),
+        patch.object(
+            aws.utils,
+            "stringify_exception",
+            return_value="formatted failure",
+        ),
+        patch.object(aws.logger, "warning") as warning,
+    ):
+        failed_syncs = aws.sync_aws_account(
+            SimpleNamespace(uid="123456789012"),
+            [
+                "failing_sync",
+                "following_sync",
+                "permission_relationships",
+                "resourcegroupstaggingapi",
+            ],
+            {},
+            MagicMock(),
+        )
+
+    assert failed_syncs == {"failing_sync": "formatted failure"}
+    following_sync.assert_called_once_with()
+    warning.assert_called_once()
+    assert "Continuing to the next AWS sync function" in warning.call_args.args[0]

api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_attack_paths_scan.py

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import logging
 from contextlib import nullcontext
 from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
 from types import SimpleNamespace
@@ -5,7 +6,9 @@ from unittest.mock import MagicMock, call, patch
 from uuid import uuid4
 
 import pytest
+from api.attack_paths.database import GraphDatabaseQueryException
 from api.db_utils import rls_transaction
+from api.exceptions import ProviderDeletedException
 from api.models import (
     AttackPathsScan,
     Finding,
@@ -250,6 +253,32 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun:
         mock_starting.assert_not_called()
         mock_create_db.assert_not_called()
 
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+        ("ingestion_error", "temporary_database_missing"),
+        [
+            (RuntimeError("ingestion boom"), False),
+            (
+                GraphDatabaseQueryException(
+                    message="Graph not found: db-scan-id",
+                    code="Neo.ClientError.Database.DatabaseNotFound",
+                ),
+                True,
+            ),
+            (
+                GraphDatabaseQueryException(
+                    message="Graph not found: db-tenant-id",
+                    code="Neo.ClientError.Database.DatabaseNotFound",
+                ),
+                False,
+            ),
+        ],
+        ids=[
+            "regular-error",
+            "temporary-database-missing",
+            "sink-database-missing",
+        ],
+    )
+    @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.logger")
     @patch(
         "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.utils.stringify_exception",
         return_value="Cartography failed: ingestion boom",
@@ -302,6 +331,9 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun:
         mock_drop_db,
         mock_event_loop,
         mock_stringify,
+        mock_logger,
+        ingestion_error,
+        temporary_database_missing,
         tenants_fixture,
         aws_provider,
         scans_fixture,
@@ -321,7 +353,11 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun:
         session_ctx = MagicMock()
         session_ctx.__enter__.return_value = mock_session
         session_ctx.__exit__.return_value = False
-        ingestion_fn = MagicMock(side_effect=RuntimeError("ingestion boom"))
+        ingestion_fn = MagicMock(side_effect=ingestion_error)
+        if temporary_database_missing:
+            mock_finish.side_effect = DatabaseError(
+                "Save with update_fields did not affect any rows"
+            )
 
         with (
             patch(
@@ -337,13 +373,28 @@ class TestAttackPathsRun:
                 return_value=ingestion_fn,
             ),
         ):
-            with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="ingestion boom"):
+            with pytest.raises(type(ingestion_error)):
                 attack_paths_run(str(tenant.id), str(scan.id), "task-456")
 
         failure_args = mock_finish.call_args[0]
         assert failure_args[0] is attack_paths_scan
         assert failure_args[1] == StateChoices.FAILED
         assert failure_args[2] == {"global_error": "Cartography failed: ingestion boom"}
+        mock_drop_db.assert_called_once_with("db-scan-id")
+        if temporary_database_missing:
+            mock_logger.warning.assert_any_call("Cartography failed: ingestion boom")
+            mock_logger.exception.assert_not_called()
+            mock_logger.log.assert_called_once_with(
+                logging.WARNING,
+                f"Could not mark Attack Paths scan {attack_paths_scan.id} as `FAILED` "
+                "(row may have been deleted): Save with update_fields did not affect "
+                "any rows",
+                exc_info=False,
+            )
+        else:
+            mock_logger.exception.assert_called_once_with(
+                "Cartography failed: ingestion boom"
+            )
 
     @patch(
         "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.scan.utils.stringify_exception",
@@ -1265,6 +1316,33 @@ class TestAttackPathsScanRLSTaskOnFailure:
 
         mock_fail.assert_called_once_with("t-1", "s-1", "boom")
 
+    def test_on_failure_logs_provider_deletion_as_warning(self):
+        from tasks.tasks import AttackPathsScanRLSTask
+
+        task = AttackPathsScanRLSTask()
+        error = ProviderDeletedException("provider deleted")
+
+        with (
+            patch("tasks.tasks.logger") as mock_logger,
+            patch(
+                "tasks.tasks.attack_paths_db_utils.fail_attack_paths_scan"
+            ) as mock_fail,
+        ):
+            task.on_failure(
+                exc=error,
+                task_id="task-abc",
+                args=(),
+                kwargs={"tenant_id": "t-1", "scan_id": "s-1"},
+                _einfo=None,
+            )
+
+        mock_logger.warning.assert_called_once_with(
+            "Attack paths scan task task-abc stopped because its provider or tenant "
+            "was deleted: provider deleted"
+        )
+        mock_logger.error.assert_not_called()
+        mock_fail.assert_called_once_with("t-1", "s-1", "provider deleted")
+
     def test_on_failure_skips_when_missing_kwargs(self):
         from tasks.tasks import AttackPathsScanRLSTask
 
@@ -1896,7 +1974,7 @@ class TestSyncNodes:
         mock_source_1.run.return_value = [row]
         mock_source_2 = MagicMock()
         mock_source_2.run.return_value = []
-        sink = MagicMock()
+        sink = MagicMock(sync_batch_size=1000)
 
         with patch(
             "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.graph_database.get_session",
@@ -1933,7 +2011,7 @@ class TestSyncNodes:
         src_1.run.return_value = [row]
         src_2 = MagicMock()
         src_2.run.return_value = []
-        sink = MagicMock()
+        sink = MagicMock(sync_batch_size=1000)
         sink.write_nodes.side_effect = lambda *_a, **_kw: call_order.append(
             "sink:write"
         )
@@ -1969,18 +2047,15 @@ class TestSyncNodes:
         src_2.run.return_value = [row_b]
         src_3 = MagicMock()
         src_3.run.return_value = []
-        sink = MagicMock()
+        sink = MagicMock(sync_batch_size=1)
 
-        with (
-            patch(
-                "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.graph_database.get_session",
-                side_effect=[
-                    _make_session_ctx(src_1),
-                    _make_session_ctx(src_2),
-                    _make_session_ctx(src_3),
-                ],
-            ),
-            patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.SYNC_BATCH_SIZE", 1),
+        with patch(
+            "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.graph_database.get_session",
+            side_effect=[
+                _make_session_ctx(src_1),
+                _make_session_ctx(src_2),
+                _make_session_ctx(src_3),
+            ],
         ):
             result = sync_module.sync_nodes("src", "tgt", "t-1", "p-1", sink, [])
 
@@ -2009,17 +2084,14 @@ class TestSyncNodes:
         src_1.run.return_value = [row]
         src_2 = MagicMock()
         src_2.run.return_value = []
-        sink = MagicMock()
+        sink = MagicMock(sync_batch_size=2)
 
-        with (
-            patch(
-                "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.graph_database.get_session",
-                side_effect=[
-                    _make_session_ctx(src_1),
-                    _make_session_ctx(src_2),
-                ],
-            ),
-            patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.SYNC_BATCH_SIZE", 2),
+        with patch(
+            "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.graph_database.get_session",
+            side_effect=[
+                _make_session_ctx(src_1),
+                _make_session_ctx(src_2),
+            ],
         ):
             result = sync_module.sync_nodes(
                 "src", "tgt", "t-1", "p-1", sink, normalized_lists
@@ -2037,7 +2109,7 @@ class TestSyncNodes:
     def test_sync_nodes_empty_source_returns_zero(self):
         src = MagicMock()
         src.run.return_value = []
-        sink = MagicMock()
+        sink = MagicMock(sync_batch_size=1000)
 
         with patch(
             "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.graph_database.get_session",
@@ -2066,7 +2138,7 @@ class TestSyncRelationships:
         src_1.run.return_value = [row]
         src_2 = MagicMock()
         src_2.run.return_value = []
-        sink = MagicMock()
+        sink = MagicMock(sync_batch_size=1000)
         sink.write_relationships.side_effect = lambda *_a, **_kw: call_order.append(
             "sink:write"
         )
@@ -2104,18 +2176,15 @@ class TestSyncRelationships:
         src_2.run.return_value = [row_b]
         src_3 = MagicMock()
         src_3.run.return_value = []
-        sink = MagicMock()
+        sink = MagicMock(sync_batch_size=1)
 
-        with (
-            patch(
-                "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.graph_database.get_session",
-                side_effect=[
-                    _make_session_ctx(src_1),
-                    _make_session_ctx(src_2),
-                    _make_session_ctx(src_3),
-                ],
-            ),
-            patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.SYNC_BATCH_SIZE", 1),
+        with patch(
+            "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.graph_database.get_session",
+            side_effect=[
+                _make_session_ctx(src_1),
+                _make_session_ctx(src_2),
+                _make_session_ctx(src_3),
+            ],
         ):
             total = sync_module.sync_relationships("src", "tgt", "p-1", sink)
 
@@ -2140,17 +2209,14 @@ class TestSyncRelationships:
         src_1.run.return_value = rows
         src_2 = MagicMock()
         src_2.run.return_value = []
-        sink = MagicMock()
+        sink = MagicMock(sync_batch_size=2)
 
-        with (
-            patch(
-                "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.graph_database.get_session",
-                side_effect=[
-                    _make_session_ctx(src_1),
-                    _make_session_ctx(src_2),
-                ],
-            ),
-            patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.SYNC_BATCH_SIZE", 2),
+        with patch(
+            "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.graph_database.get_session",
+            side_effect=[
+                _make_session_ctx(src_1),
+                _make_session_ctx(src_2),
+            ],
         ):
             total = sync_module.sync_relationships("src", "tgt", "p-1", sink)
 
@@ -2163,7 +2229,7 @@ class TestSyncRelationships:
     def test_sync_relationships_empty_source_returns_zero(self):
         src = MagicMock()
         src.run.return_value = []
-        sink = MagicMock()
+        sink = MagicMock(sync_batch_size=1000)
 
         with patch(
             "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.sync.graph_database.get_session",
@@ -3056,6 +3122,61 @@ class TestCleanupStaleAttackPathsScans:
         ap_scan.refresh_from_db()
         assert ap_scan.state == StateChoices.FAILED
 
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+        ("age_seconds", "should_clean"),
+        [
+            (960 * 60 - 1, False),
+            (960 * 60, False),
+            (960 * 60 + 1, True),
+        ],
+    )
+    @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.cleanup.recover_graph_data_ready")
+    @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.cleanup.graph_database.drop_database")
+    @patch(
+        "tasks.jobs.attack_paths.cleanup.rls_transaction",
+        new=lambda *args, **kwargs: nullcontext(),
+    )
+    @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.cleanup._revoke_task")
+    @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.cleanup._ping_workers")
+    def test_stale_threshold_boundary_is_strict(
+        self,
+        mock_ping,
+        mock_revoke,
+        mock_drop_db,
+        mock_recover,
+        age_seconds,
+        should_clean,
+        tenants_fixture,
+        aws_provider,
+    ):
+        from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.cleanup import cleanup_stale_attack_paths_scans
+
+        now = datetime.now(tz=UTC)
+        ap_scan, task_result = self._create_executing_scan(
+            tenants_fixture[0],
+            aws_provider,
+            started_at=now - timedelta(seconds=age_seconds),
+            worker="live-worker@host",
+        )
+        mock_ping.return_value = ({"live-worker@host"}, set())
+
+        with patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.cleanup.datetime") as mock_datetime:
+            mock_datetime.now.return_value = now
+            result = cleanup_stale_attack_paths_scans()
+
+        assert result["cleaned_up_count"] == int(should_clean)
+        ap_scan.refresh_from_db()
+        expected_state = StateChoices.FAILED if should_clean else StateChoices.EXECUTING
+        assert ap_scan.state == expected_state
+        if should_clean:
+            mock_revoke.assert_called_once_with(task_result, terminate=True)
+            mock_drop_db.assert_called_once()
+            mock_recover.assert_called_once()
+        else:
+            mock_revoke.assert_not_called()
+            mock_drop_db.assert_not_called()
+            mock_recover.assert_not_called()
+
     @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.cleanup.recover_graph_data_ready")
     @patch("tasks.jobs.attack_paths.cleanup.graph_database.drop_database")
     @patch(

api/src/backend/tasks/tests/test_tasks.py

@@ -420,6 +420,124 @@ class TestGenerateOutputs:
             assert result == {"upload": False}
             mock_scan_update.return_value.update.assert_called_once()
 
+    def test_generate_outputs_removes_previous_run_artifacts(self):
+        """Regression for PROWLER-2266.
+
+        Output writers open files in append mode with a deterministic path
+        (derived from scan.started_at). If this task runs again for the same
+        scan (e.g. broker redelivery after a worker is killed mid-run with
+        task_acks_late), reusing the leftover files appends every finding row
+        again, duplicating rows in the CSV/output while the API console keeps
+        showing a single finding. The task must start from a clean slate by
+        removing the scan's tmp output directory before (re)generating.
+        """
+        import tempfile
+        from pathlib import Path
+
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp_root:
+            # Simulate artifacts left behind by a previous run of the same scan.
+            scan_tmp_dir = Path(tmp_root) / self.tenant_id / self.scan_id
+            scan_tmp_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
+            stale_artifact = scan_tmp_dir / "prowler-output-aws-20260723120000.csv"
+            stale_artifact.write_text("HEADER\nold-finding-row\n")
+
+            with (
+                patch("tasks.tasks.DJANGO_TMP_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY", tmp_root),
+                patch("tasks.tasks.ScanSummary.objects.filter") as mock_filter,
+                patch("tasks.tasks.Provider.objects.get"),
+                patch("tasks.tasks.initialize_prowler_provider"),
+                patch("tasks.tasks.Compliance.get_bulk"),
+                patch("tasks.tasks.get_compliance_frameworks"),
+                patch("tasks.tasks.get_prowler_provider_compliance", return_value={}),
+                patch("tasks.tasks.Finding.all_objects.filter") as mock_findings,
+                patch(
+                    "tasks.tasks._generate_output_directory",
+                    return_value=("/tmp/test/out", "/tmp/test/comp"),
+                ),
+                patch("tasks.tasks.FindingOutput._transform_findings_stats"),
+                patch("tasks.tasks.FindingOutput.transform_api_finding"),
+                patch(
+                    "tasks.tasks.OUTPUT_FORMATS_MAPPING",
+                    {
+                        "json": {
+                            "class": MagicMock(name="Writer"),
+                            "suffix": ".json",
+                            "kwargs": {},
+                        }
+                    },
+                ),
+                patch("tasks.tasks.COMPLIANCE_CLASS_MAP", {"aws": []}),
+                patch(
+                    "tasks.tasks._compress_output_files", return_value="/tmp/compressed"
+                ),
+                patch("tasks.tasks._upload_to_s3", return_value=None),
+                patch("tasks.tasks.Scan.all_objects.filter"),
+            ):
+                mock_filter.return_value.exists.return_value = True
+                mock_findings.return_value.order_by.return_value.iterator.return_value = [
+                    [MagicMock()],
+                    True,
+                ]
+
+                generate_outputs_task(
+                    scan_id=self.scan_id,
+                    provider_id=self.provider_id,
+                    tenant_id=self.tenant_id,
+                )
+
+            # The stale artifacts from the previous run must be gone, so the
+            # append-mode writers cannot duplicate rows onto them.
+            assert not stale_artifact.exists()
+            assert not scan_tmp_dir.exists()
+
+    def test_generate_outputs_aborts_when_stale_cleanup_fails(self):
+        """Regression for PROWLER-2266.
+
+        If the stale output directory cannot be removed (e.g. permission error),
+        the leftover files would be reopened in append mode and every finding
+        row would be duplicated. The task must abort instead of continuing and
+        publishing duplicated rows, so the retry can start from a clean slate.
+        """
+        import tempfile
+        from pathlib import Path
+
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp_root:
+            scan_tmp_dir = Path(tmp_root) / self.tenant_id / self.scan_id
+            scan_tmp_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
+            stale_artifact = scan_tmp_dir / "prowler-output-aws-20260723120000.csv"
+            stale_artifact.write_text("HEADER\nold-finding-row\n")
+
+            with (
+                patch("tasks.tasks.DJANGO_TMP_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY", tmp_root),
+                patch("tasks.tasks.ScanSummary.objects.filter") as mock_filter,
+                patch("tasks.tasks.Provider.objects.get"),
+                patch("tasks.tasks.initialize_prowler_provider"),
+                patch("tasks.tasks.Compliance.get_bulk"),
+                patch("tasks.tasks.get_compliance_frameworks"),
+                patch("tasks.tasks.get_prowler_provider_compliance", return_value={}),
+                # `rmtree(ignore_errors=True)` swallows the failure and leaves the
+                # directory behind; simulate that with a no-op so the guard fires.
+                patch("tasks.tasks.rmtree"),
+                patch("tasks.tasks._generate_output_directory") as mock_gen_dir,
+                patch("tasks.tasks._compress_output_files") as mock_compress,
+                patch("tasks.tasks._upload_to_s3") as mock_upload,
+                patch("tasks.tasks.Scan.all_objects.filter") as mock_scan_update,
+            ):
+                mock_filter.return_value.exists.return_value = True
+
+                with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="stale output directory"):
+                    generate_outputs_task(
+                        scan_id=self.scan_id,
+                        provider_id=self.provider_id,
+                        tenant_id=self.tenant_id,
+                    )
+
+            # The task must abort before generating/publishing any output.
+            mock_gen_dir.assert_not_called()
+            mock_compress.assert_not_called()
+            mock_upload.assert_not_called()
+            mock_scan_update.assert_not_called()
+
     def test_generate_outputs_triggers_html_extra_update(self):
         mock_finding_output = MagicMock()
         mock_finding_output.compliance = {"cis": ["requirement-1", "requirement-2"]}

api/uv.lock

@@ -4673,8 +4673,8 @@ wheels = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "prowler"
-version = "5.32.0"
-source = { git = "https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler.git?rev=master#5dac8a0a53272e4db68c476fb969dc03e88beb68" }
+version = "5.35.0"
+source = { git = "https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler.git?rev=master#f5ea116763aeffede9f399c8934fc280eaccd315" }
 dependencies = [
     { name = "alibabacloud-actiontrail20200706" },
     { name = "alibabacloud-credentials" },
@@ -4762,7 +4762,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "prowler-api"
-version = "1.36.0"
+version = "1.38.0"
 source = { virtual = "." }
 dependencies = [
     { name = "cartography" },

claude_plugins/prowler/.claude-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
     "api_key": {
       "type": "string",
       "title": "Prowler API key",
-      "description": "API key token used to authenticate with Prowler Cloud / Prowler App via the Prowler MCP server. Create one at https://cloud.prowler.com.",
+      "description": "API key token used to authenticate with Prowler (Prowler Cloud, Prowler Private Cloud, or Prowler Local Server) via the Prowler MCP server. Create one at https://cloud.prowler.com.",
       "sensitive": true,
       "required": true
     }

claude_plugins/prowler/skills/framework-compliance-triage/SKILL.md

@@ -38,12 +38,12 @@ If the framework is not supported, tell the user, suggest they request it or con
 
 ### 1.1 Connect to Prowler Cloud
 
-Verify the Prowler MCP connection by calling `prowler_app_search_providers` — a successful response returns the list of providers. If the call fails, walk the user through troubleshooting: internet connectivity, Prowler Cloud credentials, and permissions on the Prowler Cloud account.
+Verify the Prowler MCP connection by calling `prowler_search_providers` — a successful response returns the list of providers. If the call fails, walk the user through troubleshooting: internet connectivity, Prowler Cloud credentials, and permissions on the Prowler Cloud account.
 For getting accurate information about configurations use `prowler_docs_search` to pull relevant instructions from the Prowler documentation.
 
 ### 1.2 Verify the provider is configured (or configure it)
 
-Call `prowler_app_search_providers` to check whether the target provider (AWS account, Azure Subscription, GitHub Account...) exists in the user's Prowler Cloud account. Handle the result based on what's found:
+Call `prowler_search_providers` to check whether the target provider (AWS account, Azure Subscription, GitHub Account...) exists in the user's Prowler Cloud account. Handle the result based on what's found:
 
 - **Provider not present.** Guide the user through adding and configuring it. Retrieve the relevant connection, credential, and permission instructions with `prowler_docs_search`.
 - **Provider present but misconfigured** (missing credentials, insufficient permissions, etc.). Walk the user through fixing the configuration, pulling the relevant guidance with `prowler_docs_search`.
@@ -57,15 +57,15 @@ Call `prowler_app_search_providers` to check whether the target provider (AWS ac
 
 The flow needs at least one completed scan with a compliance report available.
 
-Look for a completed scan first: call `prowler_app_list_scans` with the selected `provider_id` and `state: ["completed"]`, then call `prowler_app_get_compliance_overview` with each `scan_id` to find one whose compliance report is available. If one is found, continue to the next section.
+Look for a completed scan first: call `prowler_list_scans` with the selected `provider_id` and `state: ["completed"]`, then call `prowler_get_compliance_overview` with each `scan_id` to find one whose compliance report is available. If one is found, continue to the next section.
 
-If no completed scan has a report, call `prowler_app_list_scans` again with `state: ["available", "executing"]` to detect a scan in progress.
+If no completed scan has a report, call `prowler_list_scans` again with `state: ["available", "executing"]` to detect a scan in progress.
 
 > **Checkpoint — Scan-in-progress decision** *(conditional: an in-progress scan was detected)*
 >
 > Tell the user a scan is already running and ask whether to wait for it to complete or start a fresh one. Wait for the answer.
 
-If no scan is running (or the user chose to start a fresh one), trigger a new scan with `prowler_app_trigger_scan` and the `provider_id`. The link `https://cloud.prowler.com/scans?filter%5Bprovider_uid__in%5D={provider_id}` lets the user monitor progress.
+If no scan is running (or the user chose to start a fresh one), trigger a new scan with `prowler_trigger_scan` and the `provider_id`. The link `https://cloud.prowler.com/scans?filter%5Bprovider_uid__in%5D={provider_id}` lets the user monitor progress.
 
 When a scan is in progress (either pre-existing and elected to wait, or just triggered), stop the flow and ask the user to return when it's completed — restart this section to re-check the results.
 
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ Status taxonomy for failed requirements and their findings:
 
 ### Report template
 
-A fresh report is rendered like this (substituting values from the `prowler_app_get_compliance_framework_state_details` Prowler MCP tool response):
+A fresh report is rendered like this (substituting values from the `prowler_get_compliance_framework_state_details` Prowler MCP tool response):
 
 ````markdown
 # Compliance report: <compliance_id>
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ A fresh report is rendered like this (substituting values from the `prowler_app_
 
 Resolve the report path for the current `compliance_id` and provider account.
 
-If the file does not exist, call `prowler_app_get_compliance_framework_state_details` for the target scan, render the template above, and write the file with one initialization entry in the activity log.
+If the file does not exist, call `prowler_get_compliance_framework_state_details` for the target scan, render the template above, and write the file with one initialization entry in the activity log.
 
 If the file exists, read it and compare its `Scan ID` to the target scan from section 1.3. When the scan matches, reuse the file and summarize remaining `[FAIL]` and `[IN PROGRESS]` items in chat.
 
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ If the file exists, read it and compare its `Scan ID` to the target scan from se
 >
 > Tell the user the report on disk was generated from a different scan and ask whether to refresh it from the new scan. Wait for the answer.
 
-On confirmation, regenerate the failed-requirements section from the new `prowler_app_get_compliance_framework_state_details` response, carry forward the **Global remediation approach** block and the full activity log, and append an activity-log entry noting the scan change.
+On confirmation, regenerate the failed-requirements section from the new `prowler_get_compliance_framework_state_details` response, carry forward the **Global remediation approach** block and the full activity log, and append an activity-log entry noting the scan change.
 
 Once the file is current, surface the top failing requirements in chat: sort by finding count descending, show the top 5 with their codes and counts, and point to the file path for the full list.
 
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ Once approved, the loop proceeds through the batch without further prompts unles
 
 Pick the first `[FAIL]` requirement at the top of the failed-requirements section. Move its status and every finding under it to `[IN PROGRESS]`, and add a `**Fix plan**:` sub-bullet describing what will be done.
 
-Call `prowler_app_get_finding_details` for each `finding_id` to retrieve the failing resource and the Prowler Hub's remediation guidance for that check using the tool `prowler_hub_get_check_details` with the `check_id` from the finding details. Summarize the guidance in chat, and append it to the `**Fix plan**` note for each finding.
+Call `prowler_get_finding_details` for each `finding_id` to retrieve the failing resource and the Prowler Hub's remediation guidance for that check using the tool `prowler_hub_get_check_details` with the `check_id` from the finding details. Summarize the guidance in chat, and append it to the `**Fix plan**` note for each finding.
 
 If a finding does not apply to the target resource (Organization-only check on a User account, paid-tier feature, missing resource type, etc.), set the requirement status to `[SKIPPED]` with the reason, log it in the activity log, and move on without attempting the fix — even if it was missed during §3.2.
 
@@ -194,6 +194,6 @@ Move to the next `[FAIL]` requirement and repeat from section 3.3.
 
 > **Checkpoint — Rescan trigger** *(conditional: no `[FAIL]` requirements remain; all are `[FIXED-UNVERIFIED]` or `[SKIPPED]`)*
 >
-> Summarize what was applied, list any `[SKIPPED]` items with reasons, and ask whether to trigger a fresh scan with `prowler_app_trigger_scan` to verify the fixes end-to-end. Wait for the answer.
+> Summarize what was applied, list any `[SKIPPED]` items with reasons, and ask whether to trigger a fresh scan with `prowler_trigger_scan` to verify the fixes end-to-end. Wait for the answer.
 
 On confirmation, trigger the rescan. When it completes, restart section 2.1 with the carry-forward path — requirements no longer in the new FAIL list move to `[PASS]`, anything still failing reverts to `[FAIL]` with the previous fix attempt visible in the activity log.

contrib/k8s/helm/prowler-app/values.yaml

@@ -189,6 +189,11 @@ api:
     DJANGO_STALE_WHILE_REVALIDATE: "60"
     DJANGO_MANAGE_DB_PARTITIONS: "True"
     DJANGO_BROKER_VISIBILITY_TIMEOUT: "86400"
+    # Caps the Celery prefork pool size on the worker pods. Without it, Celery
+    # sizes the pool from the number of visible CPUs, so on large nodes the
+    # worker spawns one child per CPU, each loading the full Prowler SDK, and
+    # OOMKills under memory pressure. Raise it on bigger workers.
+    DJANGO_CELERY_WORKER_CONCURRENCY: "2"
 
   # Secret names to be used as env vars for api, worker, and worker_beat.
   secrets: []

docs/changelog.mdx

@@ -0,0 +1,652 @@
+---
+title: "Changelog"
+description: "New features and improvements in each Prowler release"
+rss: true
+---
+
+<Update label="v5.36.0" description="July 24, 2026">
+  ### 🎫 Finding Groups - Jira
+
+  <Note>
+  This feature is available exclusively in **Prowler Cloud** and **Prowler Private Cloud** with a [subscription](https://prowler.com/pricing).
+  </Note>
+
+  Selected Findings, Finding Groups, and mixed selections can now be sent to Jira. When you select multiple findings, choose between one grouped issue or separate issues. Generated issues keep their Prowler context with deep links and filter details, while the UI provides clear dispatch and failure feedback.
+
+  ![Send findings to Jira](/images/changelog/v5.36.0-finding-groups-jira.png)
+
+  Read more in the [Jira integration documentation](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-jira-integration).
+
+  ### 🕸️ Attack Paths - Queries
+
+  <Note>
+  This feature is available exclusively in **Prowler Cloud** and **Prowler Private Cloud** with a [subscription](https://prowler.com/pricing).
+  </Note>
+
+  Prowler Cloud now records which built-in Attack Paths queries returned data at the end of each scan. The query selector hides confirmed-empty queries for the selected scan, so you can focus on paths that exist without opening blank graph views. Errored, unknown, and parameterized queries remain available when they still require investigation or input.
+
+  All Attack Paths queries are now published on [Prowler Hub](https://hub.prowler.com), where you can browse the full catalog.
+
+  ![Attack Paths query selector](/images/changelog/v5.36.0-attack-paths-queries.png)
+
+  Read more in the [Attack Paths documentation](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-attack-paths).
+
+  ### 🧑‍🏫 New Tutorials: Connect Your AI Agents to Prowler Cloud
+
+  <Note>
+  This feature needs a Prowler Cloud API key, so it is available exclusively in **Prowler Cloud** and **Prowler Private Cloud** with a [subscription](https://prowler.com/pricing).
+  </Note>
+
+  New tutorials walk you through connecting your own AI agents to Prowler Cloud, so they can query your security posture and act on it programmatically.
+
+  Read more in the [AI agents documentation](/user-guide/ai-agents/index).
+
+  ### ☁️ Region-less Oracle Cloud Infrastructure Setup
+
+  Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (OCI) provider credentials no longer require a region. Existing clients can still send the legacy `region` field for compatibility, but the API ignores it before storing credentials or starting a scan. This removes an unnecessary step from OCI onboarding.
+
+  Read more in the [OCI documentation](/user-guide/providers/oci/getting-started-oci).
+
+  ### 🔍 Checks
+
+  #### AWS
+
+  - `sagemaker_notebook_instance_no_secrets` scans the `OnCreate` and `OnStart` lifecycle scripts of SageMaker notebook instances for hardcoded API keys, passwords, tokens, connection strings, and other secrets. Thanks to @kiranrajsg!
+
+  Read more in the [AWS documentation](/user-guide/providers/aws/getting-started-aws). Explore all AWS checks at [Prowler Hub](https://hub.prowler.com/check?provider=aws).
+
+  ### 🔐 Security
+
+  - Integration responses and operations now respect provider visibility, preventing hidden-provider disclosure and blocking unauthorized attachment, connection checks, Jira dispatches, edits, and deletion.
+  - Next.js was updated from 16.2.9 to 16.2.11, patching four high-severity and five medium-severity vulnerabilities.
+  - The unused `npm` CLI was removed from the UI container image, eliminating the bundled `node-tar` CVE-2026-59873 and reducing exposure to future bundled npm vulnerabilities.
+  - Vitest and its browser packages were updated from 4.1.8 to 4.1.10, resolving the critical `@vitest/browser` file-access permission bypass. These are development dependencies and have no runtime impact.
+  - Kubernetes kubeconfig validation now blocks legacy `auth-provider.config.cmd-path` command authentication, closing a command-execution bypass.
+  - `next-auth` was updated from 5.0.0-beta.30 to 5.0.0-beta.32, patching two critical Auth.js advisories: existence-based authorization checks that could fail open when a provider is misconfigured, and a homoglyph `@` bypass in email address normalization. The bump also pulls in the patched `@auth/core` 0.41.3 transitively.
+
+  ### 🙌 External Contributors
+
+  Thank you to our community contributors for this release!
+
+  - @kiranrajsg: AWS `sagemaker_notebook_instance_no_secrets` check ([#11843](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11843))
+  - @owenchenxy: Alibaba Cloud SSH and RDP security group checks now handle capitalized `Policy="Accept"` values correctly ([#12049](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/12049))
+  - @rsaladra: S3 bucket name validation no longer raises an invalid escape sequence `SyntaxWarning` at startup ([#12041](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/12041))
+  - @SujayKulkarni-2211: Updated the AWS check count in the README ([#12011](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/12011))
+
+  See the [full release notes on GitHub](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/releases/tag/5.36.0) for the complete list of changes.
+</Update>
+
+<Update label="v5.35.0" description="July 17, 2026">
+  ### 💬 Lighthouse AI - Side Chat
+
+  <Note>
+  This feature is available exclusively in **Prowler Cloud** and **Prowler Private Cloud** with a [subscription](https://prowler.com/pricing).
+  </Note>
+
+  Lighthouse AI now lives in a side panel you can open from anywhere in the app. Ask about the findings you are looking at without leaving the page, and expand to the full-page chat at any time: your draft, messages, and streaming response come along. Finding and resource details share the same panel, with tabs to switch between Details and Lighthouse AI.
+
+  ![Lighthouse AI side chat](/images/changelog/v5.35.0-lighthouse-ai-side-chat.png)
+
+  Read more in the [Lighthouse AI documentation](/getting-started/products/prowler-cloud-lighthouse#side-panel).
+
+  ### 🤖 Lighthouse AI - Take Action
+
+  <Note>
+  This feature is available exclusively in **Prowler Cloud** and **Prowler Private Cloud** with a [subscription](https://prowler.com/pricing).
+  </Note>
+
+  Lighthouse AI is no longer read-only. Ask it to do things and it will: connect or remove providers, trigger a scan, schedule daily scans, update scan settings, and manage your mutelist and mute rules, straight from the chat. Every action is gated by RBAC: Lighthouse can only do what the user asking could do themselves.
+
+  Read more in the [Lighthouse AI capabilities](/getting-started/products/prowler-cloud-lighthouse#capabilities).
+
+  ### ☁️ One-step AWS Organizations onboarding
+
+  <Note>
+  This feature is available exclusively in **Prowler Cloud** and **Prowler Private Cloud** with a [subscription](https://prowler.com/pricing).
+  </Note>
+
+  Onboarding an entire AWS Organization is now a single step. One CloudFormation quick-create link deploys the management account role and a service-managed StackSet that rolls the role out to every member account, replacing the manual StackSet console setup. Target the whole organization or a specific Organizational Unit or Root ID, and deploy from the management account or a delegated administrator. The S3 integration quick-create link also pre-fills the bucket owner account ID, preventing a stack validation error.
+
+  ![AWS Organizations onboarding wizard](/images/changelog/v5.35.0-aws-orgs-wizard.png)
+
+  Built on the full-organization CloudFormation template contributed by @jchrisfarris — thanks!
+
+  Read more in the [AWS Organizations documentation](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-cloud-aws-organizations).
+
+  ### 🎯 Scan configurations: exclude checks and services
+
+  <Note>
+  This feature is available exclusively in **Prowler Cloud** and **Prowler Private Cloud** with a [subscription](https://prowler.com/pricing).
+  </Note>
+
+  Scan configurations now accept `excluded_checks` and `excluded_services` to narrow the execution scope. Skip individual checks or entire services per provider, and the scan does not run them at all: less noise, faster scans, and no findings you would mute anyway.
+
+  Read more in the [Scan Configuration documentation](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-scan-configuration#limiting-the-scan-scope).
+
+  ### 🧭 Redesigned sidebar navigation
+
+  The sidebar was redesigned around how you actually work: grouped sections for security, settings, and help, a Home/Chat switch at the top, collapsible configuration entries, clearer active states, and a responsive mobile overlay.
+
+  ![Redesigned sidebar](/images/changelog/v5.35.0-new-menu.png)
+
+  ### 🔌 Prowler MCP tools renamed to `prowler_*`
+
+  Core Prowler tools in Prowler MCP moved from the `prowler_app_*` prefix to the shorter `prowler_*` namespace, and the MCP documentation was restructured around it. Legacy `prowler_app_*` names keep working in Lighthouse AI, so existing setups are not broken.
+
+  Read more in the [Prowler MCP tools reference](/getting-started/basic-usage/prowler-mcp-tools).
+
+  ### 🔐 Security
+
+  - Jira integration credentials now only accept bare Atlassian site names (letters, numbers, and hyphens), and Jira tenant information requests validate site names and no longer follow redirects.
+  - Social account linking now requires a verified matching email from both the identity provider and the existing user account, and account connection notification emails are disabled.
+  - 13 advisories reported by `pnpm audit` on the UI (3 high, 9 moderate, 1 low) are resolved with patched versions of `hono`, `ws`, `vite`, `dompurify`, `js-yaml`, `@opentelemetry/core`, and `@babel/core`, including `hono` CVE-2026-59896.
+
+  ### 🙌 External Contributors
+
+  No external contributors in this release.
+
+  Special mention to @jchrisfarris, whose full-organization CloudFormation template from v5.34.0 powers the new one-step AWS Organizations onboarding ([#10403](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/10403)).
+
+  See the [full release notes on GitHub](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/releases/tag/5.35.0) for the complete list of changes.
+</Update>
+
+<Update label="v5.34.0" description="July 15, 2026">
+  ### 🏷️ New product names
+
+  The Prowler family has grown, and the names now say what each product is. Same products, clearer names:
+
+  **Prowler products:**
+
+  - **Prowler Cloud** — the managed cloud security platform operated by the Prowler team.
+  - **Prowler Private Cloud** (formerly *Prowler Enterprise*) — the self-hosted deployment of Prowler Cloud in your own environment.
+  - **Prowler Hub** — the free public library of versioned checks, cloud service artifacts, and compliance frameworks.
+  - **Prowler Lighthouse AI** — The Agentic Cloud Defender in Prowler Cloud and Prowler Private Cloud.
+  - **Prowler MCP** — the MCP server that connects AI assistants and agents to Prowler, including the IDE plugins.
+
+  **Open source projects:**
+
+  - **Prowler CLI** — the command-line scanner for all supported providers.
+  - **Prowler Local Server** (formerly *Prowler App*) — the self-hosted web application and API to run scans, visualize findings, and manage providers.
+  - **Prowler Local Dashboard** — the web dashboard for visualizing Prowler CLI scan results, distributed with the CLI.
+  - **Prowler SDK** — the Python library behind Prowler CLI and Prowler Local Server.
+
+  See the full family in the [Prowler products documentation](/getting-started/products).
+
+  ### 🧭 Cross-Provider Compliance
+
+  <Note>
+  This feature is available exclusively in **Prowler Cloud** and **Prowler Private Cloud** with a [subscription](https://prowler.com/pricing).
+  </Note>
+
+  One framework, every cloud, a single answer. The new **Cross-provider** tab in Compliance takes the most recent completed scan of every compatible provider and rolls them up into a single compliance posture per framework, with a per-provider breakdown and a combined executive PDF report. Requirement status follows strict precedence (FAIL over PASS over MANUAL), so one failing provider is enough to flag a requirement across your whole estate.
+
+  ![Cross-provider compliance overview](/images/changelog/v5.34.0-cross-provider-compliance-overview.png)
+
+  Three universal frameworks support it today:
+
+  - **CIS Controls 8.1** — AWS, Azure, Google Cloud, Microsoft 365, Kubernetes, GitHub, Google Workspace, Okta, Oracle Cloud, Alibaba Cloud, Cloudflare, MongoDB Atlas, OpenStack, and Vercel.
+  - **CSA CCM 4.0** — AWS, Azure, Google Cloud, Alibaba Cloud, and Oracle Cloud.
+  - **DORA 2022/2554** — AWS, Azure, Google Cloud, Alibaba Cloud, and Cloudflare.
+
+  Filter by provider type, account, or provider group, drill into each framework's requirements, and export the combined PDF.
+
+  ![Cross-provider compliance detail](/images/changelog/v5.34.0-cross-provider-compliance-detail.png)
+
+  Read more in the [Cross-Provider Compliance documentation](/user-guide/compliance/tutorials/cross-provider-compliance).
+
+  ### 🏢 New Provider — E2E Networks
+
+  Prowler now scans [**E2E Networks**](https://www.e2enetworks.com/), with **27 checks** spanning compute nodes, networking, security groups, load balancers, block and file storage, and managed databases. Thanks to @deepak7093 for their 1st provider in Prowler!
+
+  Available in the Prowler CLI:
+
+  ```bash
+  export E2E_NETWORKS_API_KEY="your-api-key"
+  export E2E_NETWORKS_AUTH_TOKEN="your-auth-token"
+  export E2E_NETWORKS_PROJECT_ID="your-project-id"
+  prowler e2enetworks
+  ```
+
+  Read more in the [E2E Networks documentation](/user-guide/providers/e2enetworks/getting-started-e2enetworks). Explore all E2E Networks checks at [Prowler Hub](https://hub.prowler.com/check?provider=e2enetworks).
+
+  ### 🔐 Security
+
+  User role relationship updates in the API are now limited to the active tenant, preserving the role assignments the same user holds in other tenants.
+
+  ### 🔍 Checks
+
+  #### AWS
+
+  - `ec2_ami_account_block_public_access` — verifies AMI block public access is enabled at the account level in each Region, so AMIs cannot be shared publicly. Thanks to @goutham-hari!
+  - `datapipeline_pipeline_no_secrets_in_definition` — scans Data Pipeline object fields, parameter objects, and parameter values for hardcoded secrets with Kingfisher. Thanks to @YinkaMetrics!
+  - `elbv2_listener_pqc_tls_enabled` — verifies ELBv2 HTTPS/TLS listeners use post-quantum TLS security policies with TLS 1.2 or higher, helping reduce harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure.
+  - `amplify_app_no_secrets_in_environment` — scans Amplify app and branch environment variables and build settings (buildSpec) for hardcoded secrets with Kingfisher. Thanks to @Deep070203!
+
+  #### Azure
+
+  - `app_function_ensure_http_is_redirected_to_https` — verifies that Function Apps enforce HTTPS-only traffic. Thanks to @amandalal007!
+
+  #### Kubernetes
+
+  - `core_minimize_hostpath_volume_mounts` — detects Pods that use `hostPath` volumes. Thanks to @0xTaoZ!
+  - `core_readonly_root_filesystem_enabled` — verifies that every container in each Pod explicitly sets `readOnlyRootFilesystem: true` in its security context. Thanks to @Weedle02!
+
+  #### STACKIT
+
+  - `iaas_server_public_ip_attached` — flags IaaS servers that have a public IP address directly attached to a network interface. Thanks to @johannes-engler-mw!
+
+  Explore all checks at [Prowler Hub](https://hub.prowler.com/check).
+
+  ### 🙌 External Contributors
+
+  Thank you to our community contributors for this release!
+
+  - @jchrisfarris — Deploy AWS Organizations with the CloudFormation template in one step ([#10403](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/10403))
+  - @deepak7093 — New E2E Networks provider: 27 checks across compute nodes, networking, security groups, load balancers, block/file storage, and managed databases ([#11654](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11654))
+  - @goutham-hari — AWS `ec2_ami_account_block_public_access` check ([#11828](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11828))
+  - @YinkaMetrics — AWS `datapipeline_pipeline_no_secrets_in_definition` check ([#11821](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11821))
+  - @amandalal007 — Azure `app_function_ensure_http_is_redirected_to_https` check ([#11929](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11929))
+  - @0xTaoZ — Kubernetes `core_minimize_hostpath_volume_mounts` check ([#11837](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11837))
+  - @Weedle02 — Kubernetes `core_readonly_root_filesystem_enabled` check ([#11835](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11835))
+  - @johannes-engler-mw — STACKIT `iaas_server_public_ip_attached` check ([#11549](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11549))
+  - @janderik — Trailing newlines added to compliance, region, and fixture data files for POSIX compliance ([#11765](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11765))
+  - @Deep070203 — AWS `amplify_app_no_secrets_in_environment` check ([#11825](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11825))
+
+  See the [full release notes on GitHub](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/releases/tag/5.34.0) for the complete list of changes.
+</Update>
+
+<Update label="v5.33.0" description="July 7, 2026">
+  ### 🤖 Lighthouse AI — The Agentic Cloud Defender
+
+  <Note>
+  This feature is available exclusively in **Prowler Cloud** and **Prowler Private Cloud** with a [subscription](https://prowler.com/pricing).
+  </Note>
+
+  Lighthouse AI is now a full agentic assistant wired to the Prowler Cloud backend. Ask it about your findings, your compliance posture, or your riskiest resources, and watch it work: the agent discovers and runs the Prowler tools it needs to answer, with every tool call visible in the new agentic view. It reads your security data through read-only tools, so it can never touch secrets or modify your tenant.
+
+  ![Lighthouse AI agentic view](/images/changelog/v5.33.0-lighthouse-ai-1.webp)
+
+  The chat experience is rebuilt around **persistent sessions**: conversations stream in real time, stay in your session history, can be archived, and a **sidebar chat mode** lets you ask questions from any page in the app without losing your place.
+
+  ![Lighthouse AI sessions](/images/changelog/v5.33.0-lighthouse-ai-2.webp)
+
+  You control the brain behind it. Configure one or more LLM providers — **OpenAI**, **Amazon Bedrock**, or any **OpenAI-compatible** endpoint (OpenRouter, Ollama) — with connection testing built into the setup and per-provider model selection. Add a shared **business context** (your security goals, compliance needs, organizational priorities) and every session uses it to give answers that fit your environment.
+
+  ![Lighthouse AI LLM providers](/images/changelog/v5.33.0-lighthouse-ai-3.webp)
+
+  Read more in the [Lighthouse AI documentation](/getting-started/products/prowler-cloud-lighthouse) and the [multiple LLM providers guide](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-cloud-lighthouse-multi-llm).
+
+  ### 📄 Compliance PDF Reports Without Credentials
+
+  Compliance PDF reports no longer require the provider's credentials to be present. Findings are now enriched from the provider metadata stored in the database, so a report still generates even after the provider secret has been deleted or its credentials have become invalid.
+
+  Read more in the [compliance documentation](/user-guide/compliance/tutorials/compliance).
+
+  ### ⏳ Scan Queueing
+
+  Overlapping scans for the same provider now queue behind the active one instead of dispatching concurrent scan workers. Launch a manual scan while a scheduled one is running and it waits its turn. No more duplicated work or racing scans.
+
+  ### 🔐 Security
+
+  The Kubernetes provider credentials now reject kubeconfigs using `exec` authentication in Prowler Cloud, at the API and in the credential form, preventing user-supplied commands from running on Cloud workers.
+
+  Read more in the [Kubernetes provider authentication documentation](/user-guide/providers/kubernetes/getting-started-k8s#step-2-configure-kubernetes-authentication).
+
+  ### 🙌 External Contributors
+
+  Thank you to our community contributors for this release!
+
+  - @kratos0718 — Azure `postgresql_flexible_server_log_retention_days_greater_3` Flexible Server log retention fix ([#11761](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11761))
+  - @Sanjays2402 — `KeyError: 'MANUAL'` crash fix in the compliance summary table, shipped early in v5.32.1 ([#11823](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11823))
+
+  See the [full release notes on GitHub](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/releases/tag/5.33.0) for the complete list of changes.
+</Update>
+
+<Update label="v5.32.0" description="July 2, 2026">
+  ### 🔎 Findings Triage
+
+  <Note>
+  This feature is available exclusively in **Prowler Cloud** and **Prowler Private Cloud** with a [subscription](https://prowler.com/pricing).
+  </Note>
+
+  Triage findings straight from the Findings view. Each finding gets a triage status you can move through its lifecycle:
+
+  **Open → Under Review → Remediating → Risk Accepted → False Positive → Resolved**
+
+  Add a triage note to record the decision, mute a finding, all from the row's actions menu. The current status shows inline on every finding row, so you keep track of what has been reviewed and stop re-checking the same issues scan after scan.
+
+  ![Findings triage statuses](/images/changelog/v5.32.0-triage-1.png)
+
+  The status also follows the finding automatically across scans: when a finding flips from `FAIL` to `PASS` on the next scan it moves to **Resolved**, and when it flips from `PASS` back to `FAIL` it moves to **Reopened**. You always know whether an issue is genuinely fixed or has regressed, without touching it by hand.
+
+  ![Findings triage lifecycle](/images/changelog/v5.32.0-triage-2.png)
+
+  Read more in the [Findings Triage documentation](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-findings-triage).
+
+  ### ⚙️ Scan Configuration
+
+  <Note>
+  This feature is available exclusively in **Prowler Cloud** and **Prowler Private Cloud** with a [subscription](https://prowler.com/pricing).
+  </Note>
+
+  Create named, reusable scan configurations from a dedicated **Scans / Configuration** page. Each configuration is YAML that follows the structure of [`prowler/config/config.yaml`](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/blob/master/prowler/config/config.yaml), so you only include the keys you want to override; the rest fall back to the built-in defaults. Values are validated on save against a per-provider, type-safe configuration schema that range-checks each field and rejects unknown keys, so a malformed config is caught before it ever reaches a scan. Attach a configuration to one or more providers so it applies on their next scan, or save it now and attach providers later.
+
+  ![Scan configuration editor](/images/changelog/v5.32.0-config-1.png)
+
+  From the Providers view you can pick which configuration a provider uses (`Default` or any of your saved ones) without leaving the page. No more passing config files around by hand.
+
+  ![Scan configuration per provider](/images/changelog/v5.32.0-config-2.png)
+
+  Read more in the [Scan Configuration documentation](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-scan-configuration).
+
+  ### ✅ Per-Requirement Configuration Validation
+
+  <Note>
+  This feature is available exclusively in **Prowler Cloud** and **Prowler Private Cloud** with a [subscription](https://prowler.com/pricing).
+  </Note>
+
+  Compliance frameworks can now declare `ConfigRequirements` on a requirement, so it's reported as **FAIL** when its mapped checks ran under a configuration too loose to satisfy it. Even if every individual finding PASSed. This applies across all compliance outputs: CSV, OCSF, and console tables, and is the engine behind Scan Configuration's "marked as FAIL" behavior described above.
+
+  ![Per-requirement configuration validation](/images/changelog/v5.32.0-per-requirement-validation.png)
+
+  Read more in the [Configuration File documentation](/user-guide/cli/tutorials/configuration_file).
+
+  ### ⏱️ Okta — Request Throttling & Retries
+
+  Prowler now proactively throttles Okta API requests to stay under rate limits, with reactive retries on HTTP 429 as a safety net. Both are set in the scan configuration (or their equivalent CLI flags):
+
+  - `okta_requests_per_second` (config file) / `--okta-requests-per-second` (CLI) — cap the request rate. Default: 4 req/s.
+  - `okta_max_retries` (config file) / `--okta-retries-max-attempts` (CLI) — bound retry attempts. Default: 5.
+
+  This makes large Okta scans more reliable and less likely to be rate-limited.
+
+  Read more in the [Okta rate limit documentation](/user-guide/providers/okta/retry-configuration#request-throttling-requests-per-second).
+
+  ### 📉 AWS — Cap Resources Scanned per Service
+
+  Large AWS accounts can now cap how many resources Prowler analyzes for the highest-volume services, keeping scan time and cost under control. Set a global limit with `max_scanned_resources_per_service`, or override it per service:
+
+  - EBS snapshots (`max_ebs_snapshots`)
+  - Backup recovery points (`max_backup_recovery_points`)
+  - CloudWatch log groups (`max_cloudwatch_log_groups`)
+  - Lambda functions (`max_lambda_functions`)
+  - ECS task definitions (`max_ecs_task_definitions`)
+  - CodeArtifact packages (`max_codeartifact_packages`)
+
+  Limits are **disabled by default** (`0` = unlimited); only positive values cap the analyzed resources.
+
+  <Warning>
+  When a positive limit is set, compliance results reflect only the sampled resources, not every matching resource in the account.
+  </Warning>
+
+  Read more in the [configuration file documentation](/user-guide/cli/tutorials/configuration_file#supported-aws-resource-limits).
+
+  ### 🏷️ Azure — Filter by Resource Group
+
+  Azure scans can now be scoped to one or more resource groups with the new `--azure-resource-group` / `--azure-resource-groups` option. This lets you run focused assessments against specific environments, teams, or workloads instead of scanning every accessible resource in the subscription. Thanks to @Legin-ML for contributing this feature!
+
+  ```bash
+  # Single resource group
+  prowler azure --az-cli-auth --azure-resource-group rg-prod
+
+  # Multiple resource groups
+  prowler azure --az-cli-auth --azure-resource-group rg-prod1 rg-prod2
+  ```
+
+  Read more in the [Azure Resource Groups documentation](/user-guide/providers/azure/resource-groups).
+
+  ### 🧭 Provider Group Filter
+
+  Filter the **Overview, Findings, Resources, Scans, and Providers** views by provider group. Scope the whole app to a team, an environment, or a business unit in one click instead of filtering provider by provider.
+
+  ![Provider group filter](/images/changelog/v5.32.0-provider-group-filter.png)
+
+  Read more about managing provider groups in the [RBAC documentation](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-rbac).
+
+  ### 🔬 API — Timestamp Precision in Findings Filters
+
+  The `/api/v1/findings` endpoint now accepts full timestamps on the `inserted_at` and `updated_at` filters (`filter[inserted_at__gte]`, `filter[inserted_at__lte]`, and the `updated_at` variants), so you can query narrow time windows instead of whole days. Date-only filtering keeps working, so existing integrations are unaffected.
+
+  ```bash
+  # Findings inserted within a precise timestamp window
+  curl --globoff \
+    'http://localhost:8080/api/v1/findings?filter[inserted_at__gte]=2026-07-01T06:12:18Z&filter[inserted_at__lte]=2026-07-02T19:25:55Z' \
+    -H 'Authorization: Bearer <YOUR_TOKEN>' \
+    -H 'Accept: application/vnd.api+json'
+  ```
+
+  ### 🕸️ Attack Paths — Neptune as a persistent sink
+
+  Attack Paths can now persist its graph in **AWS Neptune** in addition to Neo4j, selectable via `ATTACK_PATHS_SINK_DATABASE=neptune` (default `neo4j`). Cartography's per-scan ingest database stays on Neo4j. The scan task preflights the ingest database and the configured sink before ingestion, and provider graph cleanup now deletes relationships in directed batches before deleting nodes.
+
+  This is the groundwork for scale: a managed graph database lets Attack Paths hold much larger graphs, extend coverage to more providers, and link resources across them so an attack path can cross provider boundaries instead of stopping at one cloud's edge.
+
+  Read more in the [Attack Paths documentation](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-attack-paths).
+
+  ### 🔐 New Secret-Scanning Engine — Kingfisher
+
+  Prowler's secret-scanning checks now run on [Kingfisher](https://github.com/mongodb/kingfisher) instead of `detect-secrets`. Scans run **fully offline by default**, and obvious placeholder values (e.g. `password123`, `changeme`) are no longer reported, cutting down false positives.
+
+  Opt in to **live validation** with the new `--scan-secrets-validate` flag (or the `aws.secrets_validate` config option): Prowler checks discovered secrets against the provider APIs, and any secret confirmed to be **live is reported as critical**, so you can prioritize the credentials that actually work.
+
+  <Note>
+  The `detect_secrets_plugins` configuration option has been removed, as it is no longer used by the new engine.
+  </Note>
+
+  Read more in the [secret detection documentation](/user-guide/cli/tutorials/pentesting#detect-secrets).
+
+  ### 🔍 Checks
+
+  #### AWS
+
+  - `stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk` — Step Functions state machines use a customer-managed KMS key for encryption at rest instead of the default AWS-owned key. Thanks to @Sid-0602!
+  - `waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled` — AWS WAF Classic Regional Web ACLs have logging enabled to a Kinesis Data Firehose stream. Thanks to @Sid-0602!
+  - **IAM privilege escalation** — the privesc checks now cover **AWS Bedrock AgentCore** paths across Runtime, Harness, Code Interpreter, and Custom Browser. Thanks to @MrCloudSec!
+  - `apigateway_restapi_no_secrets_in_stage_variables` — scans API Gateway REST API stage variables for hardcoded passwords, API keys, and tokens. Thanks to @chirag1206!
+  - `awslambda_function_no_secrets_in_code` — this check now supports a `secrets_ignore_files` audit-config option to skip files inside the deployment package by glob pattern (e.g. `*.deps.json`), suppressing .NET dependency-manifest false positives without masking real secrets.
+  - `s3_bucket_object_public` — spot-checks a configurable sample of object ACLs in each bucket and flags objects granted to the `AllUsers` or `AuthenticatedUsers` groups. Disabled by default; opt in via the `s3_bucket_object_public_enabled` configuration option. Thanks to @Synchx00!
+
+  #### Microsoft 365
+
+  New **Conditional Access** hardening checks:
+
+  - `entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops` — at least one enabled policy explicitly includes the Azure DevOps cloud application, rather than relying on a broad "All cloud apps" policy. Thanks to @mzl2233!
+  - `entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps` — every user, group, role, or application excluded from an enabled policy stays in scope of another enabled policy. Thanks to @UTKARSH698 with @arieleli01212 as co-author!
+  - `entra_conditional_access_policy_groups_management_restricted` — every security group referenced by an enabled or report-only policy is management-restricted or role-assignable. Thanks to @SAMurai-16!
+  - `exchange_application_access_policy_restricts_mailbox_apps` — every service principal with Microsoft Graph application-level Exchange mailbox permissions is restricted by an Exchange Online Application Access Policy. Thanks to @VasistAcharya!
+
+  ### 📚 Compliance
+
+  #### CIS Benchmark Refresh — Six New Versions
+
+  Prowler ships a coordinated refresh of the CIS Benchmarks across six providers:
+
+  - **AWS** — CIS Amazon Web Services Foundations Benchmark v7.0.0, adding the new Organizations section (2.1.1-2.1.6), resource policy (2.21), web front-end access logging (4.10), and VPC Endpoints (6.8) recommendations.
+  - **Azure** — CIS Microsoft Azure Foundations Benchmark v6.0.0.
+  - **GCP** — CIS Google Cloud Platform Foundation Benchmark v5.0.0.
+  - **Kubernetes** — CIS Kubernetes Benchmark v2.0.1.
+  - **GitHub** — CIS GitHub Benchmark v1.2.0.
+  - **Microsoft 365** — CIS Microsoft 365 Foundations Benchmark v7.0.0.
+
+  #### CIS Controls v8.1 — Universal Framework
+
+  A new **universal** (cross-provider) compliance framework mapping existing checks across 18 providers — AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes, M365, GitHub, AlibabaCloud, OracleCloud, GoogleWorkspace, Okta, Cloudflare, Vercel, MongoDB Atlas, OpenStack, Linode, StackIT, NHN, and Scaleway — to the 18 CIS Critical Security Controls and their Safeguards. Ships with a dedicated detail view and report mapping in the UI.
+
+  Read more in the [compliance documentation](/user-guide/compliance/tutorials/compliance). Explore the full compliance catalog at [Prowler Hub](https://hub.prowler.com/compliance).
+
+  ### 🙌 External Contributors
+
+  Thank you to our community contributors for this release!
+
+  - @chirag1206 — `apigateway_restapi_no_secrets_in_stage_variables` check ([#11188](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11188))
+  - @MrCloudSec — AWS Bedrock AgentCore privilege escalation paths in the IAM privesc checks ([#11726](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11726))
+  - @Sid-0602 — `stepfunctions_statemachine_encrypted_with_cmk` ([#11538](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11538)) and `waf_regional_webacl_logging_enabled` ([#11539](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11539)) checks
+  - @mzl2233 — `entra_conditional_access_policy_explicitly_targets_azure_devops` check ([#11182](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11182))
+  - @UTKARSH698 with @arieleli01212 as co-author — `entra_conditional_access_policy_no_exclusion_gaps` check ([#11577](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11577))
+  - @SAMurai-16 — `entra_conditional_access_policy_groups_management_restricted` check ([#11342](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11342))
+  - @vahidg — Azure PostgreSQL flexible server collection resilience fix ([#11595](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11595))
+  - @davletd — Azure `keyvault_logging_enabled` `AuditEvent` category fix ([#11660](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11660))
+  - @VasistAcharya — `exchange_application_access_policy_restricts_mailbox_apps` ([#11247](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11247))
+  - @Legin-ML — Filter scans at Resource Group level ([#10657](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/10657))
+  - @Synchx00 — `s3_bucket_object_public` check ([#9517](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/9517))
+
+  See the [full release notes on GitHub](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/releases/tag/5.32.0) for the complete list of changes.
+</Update>
+
+<Update label="v5.31.0" description="June 23, 2026">
+  ### 🗓️ Flexible Scan Scheduling
+
+  <Note>
+  Available exclusively in **Prowler Cloud**. Prowler Local Server supports daily scans only.
+  </Note>
+
+  ![Scan scheduling from the Providers page](/images/changelog/v5.31.0-schedule-1.png)
+
+  You can now set a per-provider scan schedule from the Providers page. Pick a **scan time** and a **repeat cadence**: Daily, Every 48 hours, Weekly (with a day-of-week selector), or Monthly. Schedules can be edited or removed at any time, and a new scan never interrupts access to existing data.
+
+  ![Schedule editor](/images/changelog/v5.31.0-schedule-2.png)
+
+  All schedules are listed in one place under the **Scheduled** tab in **Scan Jobs**, showing each provider's cadence, next scan, and last scan at a glance.
+
+  ![Scheduled tab in Scan Jobs](/images/changelog/v5.31.0-schedule-3.png)
+
+  Read more in the [scan scheduling documentation](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-scan-scheduling).
+
+  ### 📚 DORA — Expanded Provider Coverage
+
+  Prowler extends [**DORA**](https://www.eiopa.europa.eu/digital-operational-resilience-act-dora_en) (Digital Operational Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) coverage to **Azure**, **GCP**, **Cloudflare**, and **Alibaba Cloud**, mapping each provider's existing checks across the five DORA pillars.
+
+  ![DORA compliance for Alibaba Cloud](/images/changelog/v5.31.0-dora-alibaba.png)
+
+  <Note>
+  The framework follows the `<name>_<version>` naming convention as `DORA_2022_2554`.
+  </Note>
+
+  Read more in the [compliance documentation](/user-guide/compliance/tutorials/compliance).
+
+  ### 🚀 Guided Onboarding
+
+  <Note>
+  Available exclusively in **Prowler Cloud**.
+  </Note>
+
+  New accounts now get a guided first-run experience. The Overview greets you with an **"Add your first provider"** prompt: connect a provider so Prowler has something to scan and assess, then get started in one click (or skip for now).
+
+  ![Guided onboarding prompt](/images/changelog/v5.31.0-onboarding-1.png)
+
+  From there, contextual empty states across the product point you to the next action rather than leaving you stuck. Attack Paths, for example, explains that you need a completed scan before it can build a graph and links straight to **Scan Jobs**, with a **"See how it works"** affordance for first-timers.
+
+  ![Contextual empty states](/images/changelog/v5.31.0-onboarding-2.png)
+
+  ### 🔐 Optional SAML SSO `userType`
+
+  The SAML `userType` attribute is now optional. If your IdP does not send it, or sends it blank, Prowler keeps the user's existing roles unchanged instead of replacing them with a fallback role.
+
+  When `userType` is provided, Prowler still maps the user to the matching role. If that role does not exist yet, Prowler creates it with read-only access: visibility over all providers, with no management permissions.
+
+  Read more in the [SAML SSO documentation](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-sso).
+
+  ### 🏢 New Provider — Linode
+
+  Prowler now scans [**Linode**](https://www.linode.com/) (Akamai Cloud), covering its administration, compute, and networking services. Thanks to @varunmamillapalli for their 1st provider in Prowler!
+
+  <Note>
+  Linode is not officially supported. For more information, [contact us](https://prowler.com/contact).
+  </Note>
+
+  Read more in the [Linode documentation](/user-guide/providers/linode/getting-started-linode). Explore all Linode checks at [Prowler Hub](https://hub.prowler.com/check?provider=linode).
+
+  ### 🔍 Checks
+
+  #### AWS
+
+  **Post-Quantum Cryptography readiness** — get ahead of the migration to quantum-resistant cryptography:
+
+  - `cloudfront_distributions_pqc_tls_enabled` — CloudFront distributions enforce a post-quantum TLS 1.3 security policy.
+  - `apigateway_domain_name_pqc_tls_enabled` — API Gateway custom domain names use a post-quantum TLS security policy.
+  - `transfer_server_pqc_ssh_kex_enabled` — Transfer Family servers use a post-quantum hybrid SSH key exchange.
+  - `acmpca_certificate_authority_pqc_key_algorithm` — Private CA authorities use a post-quantum (ML-DSA) key algorithm (new `acmpca` service).
+  - `rolesanywhere_trust_anchor_pqc_pki` — IAM Roles Anywhere trust anchors are backed by a post-quantum (ML-DSA) PKI (new `rolesanywhere` service).
+
+  **Organization-wide governance:**
+
+  - `securityhub_delegated_admin_enabled_all_regions` — Security Hub has a delegated administrator, active in all opted-in regions, with organization auto-enable on. Thanks to @ernestprovo23!
+  - `config_delegated_admin_and_org_aggregator_all_regions` — AWS Config has a delegated administrator and an organization aggregator covering all regions. Thanks to @ernestprovo23!
+
+  **Machine learning:**
+
+  - `sagemaker_clarify_exists` — verifies at least one SageMaker Clarify processing job exists per scanned region, so bias-detection and model-explainability controls are in place. Thanks to @AlexanderSanin!
+
+  #### Azure
+
+  A large batch of new Azure checks spanning data, compute, identity, and networking:
+
+  - **Cosmos DB** — automatic failover, continuous backup policy, minimum TLS 1.2, and public network access disabled.
+  - **MySQL & PostgreSQL Flexible Servers** — geo-redundant backup and high availability.
+  - **AKS** — auto-upgrade, Azure Monitor (Container Insights), local accounts disabled, and Microsoft Defender enabled.
+  - **Databricks** — public network access disabled and secure cluster connectivity (no public IP).
+  - **Defender** — CSPM on the Standard tier.
+  - **Networking** — NSG association on subnets and DDoS Network Protection on VNets.
+  - **Entra ID** — app registration credential expiry, users with recent sign-in and strong authentication enforcement.
+  - **Recovery Services** — vaults with at least one protected backup item and vaults with adequate backup policy.
+
+  Thanks to @s1ns3nz0 for all these contributions!
+
+  #### GCP
+
+  New coverage for high availability and public-exposure detection:
+
+  - `cloudsql_instance_high_availability_enabled` — Cloud SQL primary instances use `REGIONAL` availability for automatic zone failover.
+  - `cloudfunction_function_inside_vpc` — Cloud Functions use a Serverless VPC Access connector for private egress.
+  - `cloudfunction_function_not_publicly_accessible` — detects `allUsers` / `allAuthenticatedUsers` IAM invocation bindings.
+  - `secretmanager_secret_not_publicly_accessible` — detects Secret Manager secrets with public IAM bindings.
+  - `secretmanager_secret_rotation_enabled` — verifies Secret Manager secrets have automatic rotation configured with a period of 90 days or less and no missed rotation.
+
+  Thanks to @s1ns3nz0 for all these contributions!
+
+  #### Kubernetes
+
+  New core checks for container resource governance and reliability: CPU limits, CPU requests, memory limits, memory requests, fixed image tags, liveness probes, and readiness probes. Thanks to @Nikhilkumar2311 for all these contributions!
+
+  #### Microsoft 365
+
+  - `entra_directory_sync_object_takeover_blocked` — hybrid Entra tenants block cloud object takeover through soft-match and hard-match directory synchronization. Thanks to @PrettyFox0 and @omobolajiadeyan!
+  - `entra_conditional_access_policy_no_deleted_object_references` — flags Conditional Access policies that reference user, group, or role objects that no longer resolve in the directory. Thanks to @ernestprovo23!
+
+  #### Oracle Cloud Infrastructure
+
+  - `identity_storage_service_level_admins_scoped` — CIS 3.1 control 1.15, ensuring storage service-level administrators exclude delete permissions.
+
+  Explore all checks at [Prowler Hub](https://hub.prowler.com/check).
+
+  ### 🐍 Python 3.13 Support
+
+  The Prowler SDK now supports **Python 3.13**. Thanks to @branchv!
+
+  ### 🔐 Security Updates
+
+  - **SDK** — `pytest` 8.3.5 → 9.0.3, `black` 25.1.0 → 26.3.1, `microsoft-kiota-*` → 1.9.9, and `aiohttp` → 3.14.0, patching known CVEs.
+  - **API** — `aiohttp` → 3.14.0 and `idna` → 3.15, patching known CVEs.
+  - **UI** — bumped vulnerable `Next.js`, React, AI SDK, `postcss`, `hono`, `qs`, `esbuild`, and Alpine OpenSSL packages; `dompurify` 3.4.2 → 3.4.10, patching XSS sanitization bypass advisories.
+  - **Containers** — base image bumped to `python:3.12.13-slim-bookworm` (patches `libgnutls30` CVE-2026-33845 and CVE-2026-42010) and `trivy` to 0.71.0 (patches embedded `golang.org/x/crypto` and Go stdlib CVEs).
+
+  ### 🙌 External Contributors
+
+  Thank you to our community contributors for this release!
+
+  - @varunmamillapalli — New Linode provider: administration, compute, and networking services ([#11633](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11633))
+  - @s1ns3nz0 — 20+ Azure & GCP checks across Cosmos DB, AKS, Databricks, Flexible Servers, Entra, networking, and GCP public-exposure
+  - @Nikhilkumar2311 — Kubernetes resource limits, requests, image tag, and probe checks ([#11373](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11373))
+  - @ernestprovo23 — AWS Security Hub/Config org-wide delegated admin checks ([#11259](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11259)) and M365 conditional access check ([#11236](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11236))
+  - @AlexanderSanin — `sagemaker_clarify_exists` check ([#11211](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11211))
+  - @PrettyFox0 with @omobolajiadeyan as co-author — M365 directory sync object takeover check ([#11098](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11098))
+  - @branchv — Python 3.13 support ([#9293](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/9293))
+  - @alinealfa — GCP audit-filtered aggregated sinks fix ([#11575](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11575))
+  - @b-abderrahmane — Configurable Celery worker concurrency ([#11075](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11075))
+
+  See the [full release notes on GitHub](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/releases/tag/5.31.0) for the complete list of changes.
+</Update>
+
+<Update label="Earlier releases">
+  Release notes for v5.30.0 and earlier, along with every patch release, are on [GitHub Releases](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/releases).
+</Update>

docs/developer-guide/attack-paths-queries.mdx

@@ -0,0 +1,467 @@
+---
+title: "Attack Paths Queries"
+---
+
+This guide explains how to write and maintain Prowler Attack Paths queries: the read-only openCypher queries that traverse the Cartography-ingested cloud graph to detect privilege escalation chains, network exposure, and other graph-shaped security risks.
+
+<Info>
+**New to Attack Paths?** Start with the user documentation:
+- [Attack Paths](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-attack-paths) - What Attack Paths detects, how to run built-in queries, and how to explore the resulting graph.
+- [Writing Custom openCypher Queries](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-attack-paths#writing-custom-opencypher-queries) - Run ad-hoc read-only queries from the Prowler App.
+</Info>
+
+## Introduction
+
+Attack Paths queries run against a property graph populated by [Cartography](https://github.com/cartography-cncf/cartography), an open-source graph ingestion framework, and enriched with Prowler findings. Every query is read-only openCypher (Version 9) so it runs on both the Neo4j and Amazon Neptune sinks.
+
+Two categories of query exist, each with a different isolation model:
+
+|                    | Predefined queries                                          | Custom queries                                                        |
+| ------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Where they live    | `api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/queries/{provider}.py`    | User-supplied through the custom query API endpoint                   |
+| Provider isolation | `AWSAccount {id: $provider_uid}` anchor plus path connectivity | Automatic `_Provider_{uuid}` label injection by `cypher_sanitizer.py` |
+| What to write      | Chain every `MATCH` from the `aws` variable                 | Plain Cypher, no isolation boilerplate                                |
+| Internal labels    | Never use                                                   | Never use (system-injected)                                           |
+
+For **predefined queries**, every node must be reachable from the `AWSAccount` root through graph traversal. That reachability is the isolation boundary.
+
+For **custom queries**, the runner injects a `_Provider_{uuid}` label into every node pattern, and a post-query filter handles edge cases, so query authors write natural Cypher without isolation boilerplate.
+
+The rest of this guide focuses on predefined queries, though the graph model, list-property handling, and compatibility rules apply to both.
+
+## The Graph Model
+
+### Cartography Schema
+
+Node labels, relationship types, and properties follow the upstream Cartography schema for each provider. Do not guess them, fetch the schema for the pinned Cartography version:
+
+```bash
+grep cartography api/pyproject.toml
+```
+
+Then read the schema for that exact tag:
+
+```text
+# Git pin (prowler-cloud/cartography@<TAG>):
+https://raw.githubusercontent.com/prowler-cloud/cartography/refs/tags/<TAG>/docs/root/modules/{provider}/schema.md
+
+# PyPI pin (cartography==<TAG>):
+https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cartography-cncf/cartography/refs/tags/<TAG>/docs/root/modules/{provider}/schema.md
+```
+
+The public schema reference for AWS is available at [Cartography AWS Schema](https://cartography-cncf.github.io/cartography/modules/aws/schema.html).
+
+### Prowler-Specific Additions
+
+The Prowler sync task enriches the Cartography graph with the following labels and relationships. These are not part of the upstream schema:
+
+| Label / Relationship   | Description                                                 |
+| ---------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `ProwlerFinding`       | Finding node (`status`, `severity`, `check_id`)             |
+| `Internet`             | Internet sentinel node used to model public exposure        |
+| `CAN_ACCESS`           | `(Internet)-[:CAN_ACCESS]->(resource)` exposure edge        |
+| `HAS_FINDING`          | `(resource)-[:HAS_FINDING]->(:ProwlerFinding)` finding link |
+| `TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL` | Role trust relationship                                     |
+| `STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW` | Principal can assume a role                                 |
+
+### Internal Isolation Labels
+
+The sync layer also adds internal labels used only for tenant and provider isolation: `_ProviderResource`, `_AWSResource`, `_Tenant_*`, and `_Provider_*`. These must never appear in query text, predefined or custom. The runner applies isolation automatically.
+
+## Query Structure
+
+### Provider Scoping Parameter
+
+| Parameter       | Property | Used on      | Purpose                                |
+| --------------- | -------- | ------------ | -------------------------------------- |
+| `$provider_uid` | `id`     | `AWSAccount` | Scopes the query to a specific account |
+
+The runner binds `$provider_uid` automatically. Every other node is isolated by path connectivity from the `AWSAccount` anchor.
+
+### Imports
+
+```python
+from api.attack_paths.queries.types import (
+    AttackPathsQueryAttribution,
+    AttackPathsQueryDefinition,
+    AttackPathsQueryParameterDefinition,
+)
+from tasks.jobs.attack_paths.config import PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL
+```
+
+Always reference `PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL` through f-string interpolation, never hardcode `"ProwlerFinding"`.
+
+### Definition Fields
+
+- **id**: kebab-case `{provider}-{category}-{description}`, e.g. `aws-ec2-privesc-passrole-iam`.
+- **name**: short, human-friendly label. Sourced queries append the reference ID: `"EC2 Instance Launch with Privileged Role (EC2-001)"`.
+- **short_description**: one sentence, no technical permissions.
+- **description**: full technical explanation, plain text.
+- **provider**: `aws`, `azure`, `gcp`, `kubernetes`, or `github`.
+- **cypher**: f-string Cypher body. Literal `{` and `}` are escaped as `{{` and `}}`.
+- **parameters**: `parameters=[]` when the query takes no input.
+- **attribution**: optional `AttackPathsQueryAttribution(text, link)` for sourced queries. The `link` uses the lowercase ID.
+
+Append the constant to the `{PROVIDER}_QUERIES` list at the bottom of the provider file.
+
+## The Predefined Query Template
+
+The canonical shape combines a principal walk, an optional target walk, deduplicated nodes, and a typed finding overlay:
+
+```python
+AWS_QUERY_NAME = AttackPathsQueryDefinition(
+    id="aws-kebab-case-name",
+    name="Label (REFERENCE_ID)",
+    short_description="One sentence.",
+    description="Full technical explanation.",
+    attribution=AttackPathsQueryAttribution(
+        text="pathfinding.cloud - REFERENCE_ID - permission",
+        link="https://pathfinding.cloud/paths/reference_id_lowercase",
+    ),
+    provider="aws",
+    cypher=f"""
+        // Find principals with the source permission
+        MATCH path_principal = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(principal:AWSPrincipal)-[:POLICY]->(policy:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {{effect: 'Allow'}})
+        MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem)
+        WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['permission_lowercase', 'service:*']
+           OR act.value = '*'
+        WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal
+
+        // Pre-aggregate the statement's resource values (see "Avoiding Cartesian Products")
+        MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem)
+        WITH aws, path_principal, collect(DISTINCT res.value) AS res_values
+        WITH aws, path_principal, res_values, ('*' IN res_values) AS res_wildcard
+
+        // Match each target once against the in-memory resource list
+        MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)
+        WITH path_principal, path_target, res_values, res_wildcard,
+             target_role.name AS rname, target_role.arn AS rarn
+        WHERE res_wildcard
+           OR size([rv IN res_values WHERE rv CONTAINS rname OR rarn CONTAINS rv]) > 0
+
+        WITH DISTINCT path_principal, path_target
+        WITH collect(path_principal) + collect(path_target) AS paths
+        UNWIND paths AS p
+        UNWIND nodes(p) AS n
+
+        WITH paths, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes
+        UNWIND unique_nodes AS n
+        OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}})
+
+        RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr
+    """,
+    parameters=[],
+)
+```
+
+Key points:
+
+- The principal walk types the `POLICY` and `STATEMENT` hops. Both are low-fan-out (each principal has a handful of policies; each policy a handful of statements), so the typed edge lets the planner cost a cheap inline filter.
+- The `(aws)--` hub hops stay anonymous. `AWSAccount` is a high-degree node that fans out to every principal, role, policy, and resource in the account; typing those edges forces the planner to enumerate from the hub and collapses performance on multi-tenant Neptune.
+- Other relationship types appear only where the file's existing queries already use one (`TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL`, `STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW`, `MEMBER_AWS_GROUP`, `HAS_EXECUTION_ROLE`).
+- The finding probe is typed `:HAS_FINDING` and left undirected. The type lets Neptune apply an inline edge filter; the missing direction matches the convention of the rest of the file.
+- Collapse duplicate rows after each permission gate with `WITH DISTINCT`, carrying only the variables needed by later clauses.
+- The `RETURN` shape `paths, dpf, dpfr` is the contract the serializer and visualizer depend on. Do not change it.
+
+## Avoiding Cartesian Products
+
+The most common performance defect in Attack Paths queries is a Cartesian product between a target set and a policy statement's resource items. When the two are written as independent `MATCH` clauses, the planner pairs every target with every resource item before any filter runs. On accounts with many IAM principals, that multiplies into hundreds of thousands of rows and the query errors or times out.
+
+### The Pattern That Causes It
+
+```cypher
+// One row per (target_role x resource_item): a Cartesian product
+MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)
+MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem)
+WHERE res.value = '*'
+   OR res.value CONTAINS target_role.name
+   OR target_role.arn CONTAINS res.value
+```
+
+The two `MATCH` clauses share no relationship, so the engine enumerates all targets multiplied by all resource items, applies a non-indexable `CONTAINS` to each pair, then expands the finding overlay for every surviving row. Cost grows with `targets × resources`, and a second constrained statement (`stmt2`) multiplies it again.
+
+### The Pattern That Avoids It
+
+Collect the statement's resource values into a list once, then match each target a single time against that in-memory list:
+
+```cypher
+// Pre-aggregate the statement's resource values into a list
+MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem)
+WITH aws, path_principal, collect(DISTINCT res.value) AS res_values
+WITH aws, path_principal, res_values, ('*' IN res_values) AS res_wildcard
+
+// Match each target once; bind name/arn to locals so the predicate reads them once
+MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)
+WITH path_principal, path_target, res_values, res_wildcard,
+     target_role.name AS rname, target_role.arn AS rarn
+WHERE res_wildcard
+   OR size([rv IN res_values WHERE rv CONTAINS rname OR rarn CONTAINS rv]) > 0
+```
+
+Cost now grows with `targets + resources` (linear) rather than `targets × resources`. The rewrite is a pure algebraic identity: the result set is unchanged.
+
+Guidelines:
+
+- **Aggregate resources before matching targets, not after.** `collect(DISTINCT res.value)` reduces the resource items to a single list per statement.
+- **Short-circuit the wildcard grant** with `('*' IN res_values)`. When a statement grants `*`, every target matches, so the list scan is skipped entirely.
+- **Bind `target.name` and `target.arn` to local variables** in a `WITH` before the predicate. The list comprehension then reads each once per target instead of re-reading the property store once per resource value.
+- **Use `size([... ]) > 0`, not `any(...)`.** The `any()`, `all()`, and `none()` predicate functions are not part of the openCypher specification and fail on Amazon Neptune. See [openCypher Compatibility](#opencypher-compatibility).
+- **For two-statement queries**, aggregate each statement's resources into its own list (`res_values`, `res2_values`) and combine the two `size([... ]) > 0` checks with `AND`.
+
+Every IAM privilege escalation query in `aws.py` uses this pattern. The lateral-movement variants that constrain the target with a relationship (`STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW`, `TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL`) already limit the target set before the resource filter, which keeps them efficient without further aggregation.
+
+## Privilege Escalation Sub-Patterns
+
+Four `path_target` shapes cover the common escalation types. Each shares the canonical template's `path_principal`, the resource pre-aggregation, the deduplication tail, and the `RETURN`; only the `path_target` `MATCH` and its resource predicate differ.
+
+| Sub-pattern         | Target                   | `path_target` shape                                                                                     | Example |
+| ------------------- | ------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------- |
+| Self-escalation     | Principal's own policies | `(aws)--(target_policy:AWSPolicy)--(principal)`                                                         | IAM-001 |
+| Lateral to user     | Other IAM users          | `(aws)--(target_user:AWSUser)`                                                                          | IAM-002 |
+| Assume-role lateral | Assumable roles          | `(aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:STS_ASSUMEROLE_ALLOW]-(principal)`                                      | IAM-014 |
+| PassRole plus service  | Service-trusting roles   | `(aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)-[:TRUSTS_AWS_PRINCIPAL]-(:AWSPrincipal {arn: '{service}.amazonaws.com'})` | EC2-001 |
+
+**Multi-permission queries** (for example PassRole plus a service-create action) add permission gates before `path_target`. Reuse the per-query counter for new variables (`act2`, `policy2`, `stmt2`) and collapse rows after each gate:
+
+```cypher
+MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(policy2:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement {effect: 'Allow'})
+MATCH (stmt2)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act2:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem)
+WHERE toLower(act2.value) IN ['service:*', 'service:createsomething']
+   OR act2.value = '*'
+WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, stmt2, path_principal
+```
+
+When a permission is an existence-only gate whose statement resource is not checked later, keep the policy and statement anonymous and carry only the variables still needed:
+
+```cypher
+MATCH (principal)-[:POLICY]->(:AWSPolicy)-[:STATEMENT]->(:AWSPolicyStatement {effect: 'Allow'})-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act3:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem)
+WHERE toLower(act3.value) IN ['service:*', 'service:othersomething']
+   OR act3.value = '*'
+WITH DISTINCT aws, principal, stmt, path_principal
+```
+
+## Network Exposure Pattern
+
+The Internet node is reached through `CAN_ACCESS` from an already-scoped resource, never as a standalone lookup:
+
+```python
+cypher=f"""
+    // Resource scoped through the account anchor
+    MATCH path = (aws:AWSAccount {{id: $provider_uid}})--(resource:EC2Instance)
+    WHERE resource.exposed_internet = true
+
+    // Internet node reached through path connectivity from the resource
+    OPTIONAL MATCH (internet:Internet)-[can_access:CAN_ACCESS]->(resource)
+
+    WITH collect(path) AS paths, head(collect(internet)) AS internet, collect(can_access) AS can_access
+    UNWIND paths AS p
+    UNWIND nodes(p) AS n
+
+    WITH paths, internet, can_access, collect(DISTINCT n) AS unique_nodes
+    UNWIND unique_nodes AS n
+    OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}})
+
+    RETURN paths, collect(DISTINCT pf) as dpf, collect(DISTINCT pfr) as dpfr,
+        internet, can_access
+"""
+```
+
+The `CAN_ACCESS` edge stays typed and directed (`-[:CAN_ACCESS]->`); that is its canonical sync-time orientation. Network-exposure queries extend the `RETURN` contract with `internet, can_access`.
+
+## Working with List-Typed Properties
+
+Some Cartography node properties carry a list of values: `AWSPolicyStatement.action`, `AWSPolicyStatement.resource`, `AWSPolicyStatement.notaction`, `AWSPolicyStatement.notresource`, `KMSKey.encryption_algorithms`, `CloudFrontDistribution.aliases`, the container-definition lists on `ECSContainerDefinition`, and many others. The graph models each such property as a set of child item nodes connected to the parent by a typed edge. Queries reach the values by traversing the edge; the parent does not carry the list as a single field.
+
+### Naming Convention
+
+For a list-typed parent property the sink stores:
+
+- **Child label**: `<ParentLabel><PropertyPascal>Item`. Example: `AWSPolicyStatement.resource` becomes `AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem`.
+- **Edge type**: `HAS_<PROPERTY_UPPER>`. Example: `resource` becomes `HAS_RESOURCE`.
+- **Child property**: `value`, a single scalar string per list element. For list-of-dict properties (rare; for example `SecretsManagerSecretVersion.tags`) the child carries the original dict keys as named fields per the catalog's `field_map`.
+
+### Variable Naming for Child-Item Matches
+
+`aws.py` uses a per-query counter for each `HAS_*` traversal so chained matches stay unambiguous. The counter resets at the top of every query.
+
+| Edge              | First  | Second  | Third   |
+| ----------------- | ------ | ------- | ------- |
+| `HAS_ACTION`      | `act`  | `act2`  | `act3`  |
+| `HAS_RESOURCE`    | `res`  | `res2`  | `res3`  |
+| `HAS_NOTACTION`   | `nact` | `nact2` | `nact3` |
+| `HAS_NOTRESOURCE` | `nres` | `nres2` | `nres3` |
+
+### Matching an Action
+
+To find statements that grant `iam:PassRole`, `iam:*`, or `*`, traverse the `HAS_ACTION` edge in its own `MATCH` clause and apply the predicate in the attached `WHERE`:
+
+```cypher
+MATCH (stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {effect: 'Allow'})
+MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(act:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem)
+WHERE toLower(act.value) IN ['iam:passrole', 'iam:*']
+   OR act.value = '*'
+```
+
+The literal-action list is case-folded with `toLower(act.value)` because IAM authors mix case (`iam:PassRole`, `iam:passrole`); the `*` wildcard never lower-cases.
+
+### Matching a Resource Against a Target
+
+To find statements whose resource can target a specific node, pre-aggregate the resource values and test the target against the list once (see [Avoiding Cartesian Products](#avoiding-cartesian-products)):
+
+```cypher
+MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_RESOURCE]->(res:AWSPolicyStatementResourceItem)
+WITH aws, path_principal, collect(DISTINCT res.value) AS res_values
+WITH aws, path_principal, res_values, ('*' IN res_values) AS res_wildcard
+
+MATCH path_target = (aws)--(target_role:AWSRole)
+WITH path_principal, path_target, res_values, res_wildcard,
+     target_role.name AS rname, target_role.arn AS rarn
+WHERE res_wildcard
+   OR size([rv IN res_values WHERE rv CONTAINS rname OR rarn CONTAINS rv]) > 0
+```
+
+Three predicates cover the resource cases: full wildcard (`*`), a pattern containing the target name (`arn:aws:iam::*:role/admin*`), and a pattern that is a prefix or component of the actual ARN.
+
+### Every-Item and Any-Item Predicates on a Custom Query
+
+Custom queries can express list predicates directly with pattern comprehensions. To check whether *every* item satisfies a predicate, count the counter-examples and require zero, together with a guard that ensures at least one item is attached:
+
+```cypher
+MATCH (stmt:AWSPolicyStatement)
+WHERE size([
+    (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(a:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem)
+    WHERE NOT toLower(a.value) STARTS WITH 's3:'
+    | a
+  ]) = 0
+  AND size([(stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(a:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem) | a]) > 0
+RETURN stmt
+LIMIT 25
+```
+
+To return the list of values directly, collect them from the child items:
+
+```cypher
+MATCH (stmt:AWSPolicyStatement {effect: 'Allow'})
+OPTIONAL MATCH (stmt)-[:HAS_ACTION]->(a:AWSPolicyStatementActionItem)
+RETURN stmt, collect(a.value) AS actions
+LIMIT 25
+```
+
+### Catalog of List Properties
+
+The provider catalog lives in `api/src/backend/tasks/jobs/attack_paths/provider_config.py` (`AWS_NORMALIZED_LISTS`). Beyond policy statements it includes KMS algorithms, ECS container-definition lists (`entry_point`, `command`, `links`, `dns_servers`, and others), CloudFront aliases, Inspector finding URL and vulnerability lists, and RDS event-subscription categories. To query a list property that is not in the catalog, add an entry there first so the sync layer materializes it. Properties absent from the catalog are serialized to a comma-delimited string and emit a one-time warning during sync.
+
+## Working with JSON-Encoded Properties
+
+Some Cartography properties represent nested objects, most notably `condition` on `AWSPolicyStatement` and `S3PolicyStatement` nodes. To keep the schema portable across graph backends, object-typed properties are stored as JSON-encoded strings:
+
+```
+'{"StringEquals":{"aws:SourceAccount":"123456789012"}}'
+```
+
+No JSON parser is available at query time, so use `CONTAINS` for substring checks against keys or known values:
+
+```cypher
+MATCH (stmt:AWSPolicyStatement)
+WHERE stmt.effect = 'Allow'
+  AND stmt.condition CONTAINS '"aws:SourceAccount"'
+RETURN stmt
+LIMIT 25
+```
+
+When a query needs to inspect the structured members of a condition (for example, to evaluate every operator and key), fetch the rows first and parse the JSON in application code. Cypher cannot navigate JSON object keys or values.
+
+## openCypher Compatibility
+
+Queries must run on both Neo4j and Amazon Neptune. Neptune implements a subset of Cypher, so several convenient constructs are unavailable. Avoid the following:
+
+| Feature                                 | Use instead                                                                                                                                 |
+| --------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| APOC procedures (`apoc.*`)              | Real nodes and relationships in the graph                                                                                                   |
+| Neptune extensions                      | Standard openCypher                                                                                                                         |
+| `any(x IN list ...)`                    | `size([x IN list WHERE pred]) > 0`                                                                                                          |
+| `all(x IN list ...)`                    | `size([x IN list WHERE pred]) = size(list)`                                                                                                 |
+| `none(x IN list ...)`                   | `size([x IN list WHERE pred]) = 0`                                                                                                          |
+| `reduce()`                              | `UNWIND` plus `collect()`                                                                                                                    |
+| `FOREACH`                               | `WITH` plus `UNWIND` plus `SET`                                                                                                              |
+| Regex `=~`                              | `toLower()` plus exact match, or `STARTS WITH` / `CONTAINS`                                                                                 |
+| `CALL () { UNION }`                     | Multi-label `OR` in `WHERE`                                                                                                                  |
+| Carried value plus aggregate expression | Project the aggregate first (`WITH principal_paths, collect(...) AS target_paths`), then combine lists in the next `WITH`                    |
+| `EXISTS { MATCH (pattern) WHERE pred }` | Standalone `MATCH (pattern)` plus `WHERE pred`; precede the downstream `collect(path...)` with `WITH DISTINCT <path-vars>` to dedupe the joins |
+
+The carried-value-plus-aggregate rule is worth calling out because it is easy to hit. Neo4j 5.x rejects an expression that concatenates a carried list variable with an aggregate in the same projection:
+
+```cypher
+// Rejected: "Aggregation column contains implicit grouping expressions"
+WITH principal_paths + collect(DISTINCT path_target) AS paths
+```
+
+Split it into two `WITH` clauses so the aggregation resolves before the concatenation:
+
+```cypher
+WITH principal_paths, collect(DISTINCT path_target) AS target_paths
+WITH principal_paths + target_paths AS paths
+```
+
+For list-typed properties in the catalog (action, resource, and so on), traverse the `HAS_*` edges to the child item nodes rather than reading a single field; `split(...)` and comma-string predicates do not apply.
+
+## Best Practices
+
+1. **Chain every MATCH from the account anchor.** An unanchored `MATCH (role:AWSRole)` returns roles from every provider in the graph; `MATCH (aws)--(role:AWSRole)` is scoped. A second-permission `MATCH` such as `MATCH (principal)--(policy2:AWSPolicy)--(stmt2:AWSPolicyStatement)` is safe because `principal` is already bound to the account subgraph.
+2. **Pre-aggregate resource lists before matching targets** to avoid Cartesian products (see [Avoiding Cartesian Products](#avoiding-cartesian-products)).
+3. **Type the finding probe.** Always `OPTIONAL MATCH (n)-[pfr:HAS_FINDING]-(pf:{PROWLER_FINDING_LABEL} {{status: 'FAIL'}})`. The type lets Neptune apply an inline edge filter; an untyped probe scans every incident edge of high-degree nodes.
+4. **Comment each MATCH.** One inline `// ...` line per clause explaining its role.
+5. **Never use internal labels.** `_ProviderResource`, `_AWSResource`, `_Tenant_*`, and `_Provider_*` are system isolation labels and must not appear in query text.
+6. **Reach the Internet node through path connectivity** with `(internet:Internet)-[:CAN_ACCESS]->(resource)`, never as a standalone match.
+7. **Preserve the RETURN contract.** `paths, dpf, dpfr` for the standard shape; add `internet, can_access` for network-exposure queries. The serializer and visualizer depend on these names.
+
+## Naming Conventions
+
+- **ID**: kebab-case `{provider}-{category}-{description}`, e.g. `aws-ec2-privesc-passrole-iam`.
+- **Constant**: `UPPER_SNAKE_CASE` `{PROVIDER}_{CATEGORY}_{DESCRIPTION}`, e.g. `AWS_EC2_PRIVESC_PASSROLE_IAM`.
+
+## Creating a New Query
+
+New queries come from one of two input sources: a [pathfinding.cloud](https://github.com/DataDog/pathfinding.cloud) research ID (for example `ECS-001`, `GLUE-001`) or a natural-language description from the requester. The aggregated `paths.json` is too large to fetch whole; query a single path by ID:
+
+```bash
+# Fetch a single path by ID
+curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DataDog/pathfinding.cloud/main/docs/paths.json \
+  | jq '.[] | select(.id == "ecs-002")'
+
+# List all path IDs and names
+curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DataDog/pathfinding.cloud/main/docs/paths.json \
+  | jq -r '.[] | "\(.id): \(.name)"'
+```
+
+Then follow these steps:
+
+1. **Read the queries module first** to match the existing style:
+
+   ```text
+   api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/queries/
+   ├── __init__.py
+   ├── types.py         # dataclass definitions
+   ├── registry.py
+   └── {provider}.py
+   ```
+
+2. **Fetch the Cartography schema for the pinned version.** Do not guess labels, properties, or relationships. See [The Graph Model](#the-graph-model).
+
+3. **Build the query** from the canonical template plus the appropriate sub-pattern (privilege escalation or network exposure). Pre-aggregate resource lists, traverse `HAS_*` edges for list-typed properties, and keep the `RETURN` contract.
+
+4. **Register** the constant in the `{PROVIDER}_QUERIES` list at the bottom of the provider file.
+
+5. **Verify compatibility** against the [openCypher Compatibility](#opencypher-compatibility) rules, and confirm the query parses and runs on Neo4j before it reaches Neptune.
+
+<Note>
+AI assistants connected through Prowler MCP Server can fetch the exact Cartography schema for the active scan with the `prowler_get_attack_paths_cartography_schema` tool, which guarantees that generated queries match the schema version pinned by the running Prowler release.
+</Note>
+
+## Reference
+
+- **pathfinding.cloud**: [github.com/DataDog/pathfinding.cloud](https://github.com/DataDog/pathfinding.cloud) (use `curl | jq`; the aggregated `paths.json` is too large for a single fetch).
+- **Cartography AWS schema**: [cartography-cncf.github.io/cartography/modules/aws/schema.html](https://cartography-cncf.github.io/cartography/modules/aws/schema.html).
+- **Neptune openCypher compliance**: [docs.aws.amazon.com/neptune/latest/userguide/feature-opencypher-compliance.html](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/neptune/latest/userguide/feature-opencypher-compliance.html).
+- **Neptune openCypher rewrites**: [docs.aws.amazon.com/neptune/latest/userguide/migration-opencypher-rewrites.html](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/neptune/latest/userguide/migration-opencypher-rewrites.html).
+- **openCypher specification**: [github.com/opencypher/openCypher](https://github.com/opencypher/openCypher).

docs/developer-guide/configurable-checks.mdx

@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ Only fields with a numeric range, a fixed value set, or a length cap are listed.
 | `max_unused_sagemaker_access_days` | `7..180` days | |
 | `max_security_group_rules` | `1..1000` | AWS hard limit is 1000 rules per security group |
 | `max_ec2_instance_age_in_days` | `1..1095` days | 3 years |
+| `max_ec2_instance_stopped_days` | `1..1095` days | 3 years |
 | `ec2_high_risk_ports` | each port `1..65535` | port 0 is reserved |
 | `max_idle_disconnect_timeout_in_seconds` | `60..1800` s | NIST AC-12: cap at 30 min |
 | `max_disconnect_timeout_in_seconds` | `60..3600` s | |

docs/developer-guide/environment-variables.mdx

@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ The former build-time variables map to the new runtime variables as follows:
 | `NEXT_PUBLIC_GOOGLE_TAG_MANAGER_ID` | `UI_GOOGLE_TAG_MANAGER_ID` |
 | `NEXT_PUBLIC_SENTRY_DSN`, `SENTRY_DSN` | `UI_SENTRY_DSN` |
 | `NEXT_PUBLIC_SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT`, `SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT` | `UI_SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT` |
+| `NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV` | `UI_CLOUD_ENABLED` |
+
+`UI_CLOUD_ENABLED` is a plain runtime boolean flag that enables Prowler Cloud behavior when set to the exact string `"true"` and defaults to off; unlike the other renamed variables it has no legacy fallback, so `NEXT_PUBLIC_IS_CLOUD_ENV` is no longer read.
 
 The build-time-only Sentry variables used for source-map upload — `SENTRY_ORG`, `SENTRY_PROJECT`, `SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN`, and `SENTRY_RELEASE` — keep their names, as they are not part of Prowler Local Server's runtime configuration.
 

docs/developer-guide/introduction.mdx

@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Prowler is constantly evolving. Contributions to checks, services, or integratio
   <Card title="Adding New Integrations" icon="link" href="/developer-guide/integrations">
     Prowler can work with other tools and platforms through integrations.
   </Card>
+  <Card title="Adding New Attack Paths Queries" icon="diagram-project" href="/developer-guide/attack-paths-queries">
+    Want to detect new privilege escalation or exposure patterns? Contribute read-only openCypher queries that traverse the cloud graph.
+  </Card>
   <Card title="Proposing or Implementing Features" icon="lightbulb" href="https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/issues/new?template=feature-request.yml">
     Propose brand-new features or enhancements to existing ones, or help implement community-requested improvements.
   </Card>

docs/developer-guide/lighthouse-architecture.mdx

@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ The MCP client manages connections to the Prowler MCP Server using a singleton p
 
 - **Connection Management**: Retry logic with configurable attempts and delays
 - **Tool Discovery**: Fetches available tools from MCP server on initialization
-- **Authentication Injection**: Automatically adds JWT tokens to `prowler_app_*` tool calls
+- **Authentication Injection**: Automatically adds JWT tokens to `prowler_*` tool calls
 - **Reconnection**: Supports forced reconnection after server restarts
 
 Key constants:
@@ -141,10 +141,14 @@ Key constants:
 - `RECONNECT_INTERVAL_MS`: 5 minutes before retry after failure
 
 ```typescript
-// Authentication injection for prowler_app tools
+// Authentication injection for core prowler_ tools (Hub/Docs excluded)
 private handleBeforeToolCall = ({ name, args }) => {
-  // Only inject auth for prowler_app_* tools (user-specific data)
-  if (!name.startsWith("prowler_app_")) {
+  // Only inject auth for prowler_* tools (user-specific data).
+  // The legacy prowler_app_ prefix is also accepted for a resilient rollout.
+  if (
+    !name.startsWith("prowler_") &&
+    !name.startsWith("prowler_app_")
+  ) {
     return { args };
   }
 
@@ -307,7 +311,7 @@ MCP tools are organized into three namespaces based on authentication requiremen
 
 | Namespace | Auth Required | Description |
 |-----------|---------------|-------------|
-| `prowler_app_*` | Yes (JWT) | Prowler Cloud and Prowler Local Server tools for findings, providers, scans, resources |
+| `prowler_*` | Yes (JWT) | Prowler Cloud, Prowler Private Cloud, and Prowler Local Server tools for findings, providers, scans, resources |
 | `prowler_hub_*` | No | Security checks catalog, compliance frameworks |
 | `prowler_docs_*` | No | Documentation search and retrieval |
 
@@ -315,7 +319,7 @@ MCP tools are organized into three namespaces based on authentication requiremen
 
 1. User authenticates with Prowler Local Server, receiving a JWT token
 2. Token is stored in session and propagated via `authContextStorage`
-3. MCP client injects `Authorization: Bearer <token>` header for `prowler_app_*` calls
+3. MCP client injects `Authorization: Bearer <token>` header for `prowler_*` calls
 4. MCP Server validates token and applies RLS filtering
 
 ### Tool Execution Pattern
@@ -323,7 +327,7 @@ MCP tools are organized into three namespaces based on authentication requiremen
 The agent uses meta-tools rather than direct tool registration:
 
 ```
-Agent needs data → describe_tool("prowler_app_search_findings")
+Agent needs data → describe_tool("prowler_search_findings")
     → Returns parameter schema → execute_tool with parameters
     → MCP client adds auth header → MCP Server executes
     → Results returned to agent → Agent continues reasoning

docs/developer-guide/mcp-server.mdx

@@ -18,11 +18,15 @@ The Prowler MCP Server brings the entire Prowler ecosystem to AI assistants thro
 
 The server follows a modular architecture with three independent sub-servers:
 
-| Sub-Server | Auth Required | Description |
-|------------|---------------|-------------|
-| `prowler_app` | Yes | Full access to Prowler Cloud and Prowler Local Server features |
-| Prowler Hub | No | Security checks catalog with **over 2,000 checks**, fixers, and **70+ compliance frameworks** |
-| Prowler Documentation | No | Full-text search and retrieval of official documentation |
+| Sub-Server | Tool Prefix | Auth Required | Description |
+|------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|
+| Prowler | `prowler_` | Yes | Full access to Prowler Cloud, Prowler Private Cloud, and Prowler Local Server features |
+| Prowler Hub | `prowler_hub_` | No | Security checks catalog with **over 2,000 checks**, fixers, and **70+ compliance frameworks** |
+| Prowler Documentation | `prowler_docs_` | No | Full-text search and retrieval of official documentation |
+
+<Note>
+The core Prowler sub-server is served under the `prowler_` tool prefix, while its source lives in the `prowler_app/` module for historical reasons. Tool names use the prefix; import paths use the module.
+</Note>
 
 <Note>
 For a complete list of tools and their descriptions, see the [Tools Reference](/getting-started/basic-usage/prowler-mcp-tools).
@@ -413,7 +417,7 @@ uv run prowler-mcp
 uv run prowler-mcp --transport http --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8000
 
 # Run with environment variables
-PROWLER_APP_API_KEY="pk_xxx" uv run prowler-mcp
+PROWLER_API_KEY="pk_xxx" uv run prowler-mcp
 ```
 
 For complete installation and deployment options, see:

docs/docs.json

@@ -72,15 +72,32 @@
                 "group": "Prowler MCP",
                 "pages": [
                   "getting-started/products/prowler-mcp",
-                  "getting-started/installation/prowler-mcp",
                   "getting-started/basic-usage/prowler-mcp",
-                  "getting-started/basic-usage/prowler-mcp-tools"
+                  "getting-started/basic-usage/prowler-mcp-tools",
+                  "getting-started/installation/prowler-mcp"
                 ]
               },
               {
                 "group": "Prowler for AI Agents",
                 "pages": [
-                  "getting-started/products/prowler-claude-code-plugin"
+                  "user-guide/ai-agents/index",
+                  "user-guide/ai-agents/claude-code",
+                  "user-guide/ai-agents/claude-desktop",
+                  "user-guide/ai-agents/codex",
+                  "user-guide/ai-agents/cursor",
+                  "user-guide/ai-agents/vscode"
+                ]
+              },
+              {
+                "group": "Prowler for MSPs and MSSPs",
+                "pages": [
+                  "getting-started/products/prowler-for-msps",
+                  "user-guide/tutorials/prowler-for-msps-sign-up",
+                  "user-guide/tutorials/prowler-for-msps-organization",
+                  "user-guide/tutorials/prowler-for-msps-team",
+                  "user-guide/tutorials/prowler-for-msps-customers",
+                  "user-guide/tutorials/prowler-for-msps-billing",
+                  "user-guide/tutorials/prowler-for-msps-branding"
                 ]
               }
             ]
@@ -136,6 +153,13 @@
                   "user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-rbac"
                 ]
               },
+              {
+                "group": "Attack Paths",
+                "pages": [
+                  "user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-attack-paths",
+                  "user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-attack-paths-active-queries"
+                ]
+              },
               {
                 "group": "Compliance",
                 "pages": [
@@ -148,7 +172,6 @@
                 "group": "Findings",
                 "pages": [
                   "user-guide/tutorials/prowler-alerts",
-                  "user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-attack-paths",
                   "user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-finding-groups",
                   "user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-findings-triage"
                 ]
@@ -195,6 +218,17 @@
               }
             ]
           },
+          {
+            "group": "Prowler for MSPs and MSSPs",
+            "pages": [
+              "user-guide/tutorials/prowler-for-msps-sign-up",
+              "user-guide/tutorials/prowler-for-msps-organization",
+              "user-guide/tutorials/prowler-for-msps-team",
+              "user-guide/tutorials/prowler-for-msps-customers",
+              "user-guide/tutorials/prowler-for-msps-billing",
+              "user-guide/tutorials/prowler-for-msps-branding"
+            ]
+          },
           {
             "group": "Prowler Lighthouse AI",
             "pages": [
@@ -217,7 +251,12 @@
           {
             "group": "Prowler for AI Agents",
             "pages": [
-              "getting-started/products/prowler-claude-code-plugin"
+              "user-guide/ai-agents/index",
+              "user-guide/ai-agents/claude-code",
+              "user-guide/ai-agents/claude-desktop",
+              "user-guide/ai-agents/codex",
+              "user-guide/ai-agents/cursor",
+              "user-guide/ai-agents/vscode"
             ]
           },
           {
@@ -333,6 +372,13 @@
                   "user-guide/providers/googleworkspace/authentication"
                 ]
               },
+              {
+                "group": "Huawei Cloud",
+                "pages": [
+                  "user-guide/providers/huaweicloud/getting-started-huaweicloud",
+                  "user-guide/providers/huaweicloud/authentication"
+                ]
+              },
               {
                 "group": "IaC",
                 "pages": [
@@ -455,7 +501,8 @@
               "developer-guide/mcp-server",
               "developer-guide/ai-skills",
               "developer-guide/prowler-studio",
-              "developer-guide/server-sent-events"
+              "developer-guide/server-sent-events",
+              "developer-guide/attack-paths-queries"
             ]
           },
           {
@@ -525,15 +572,16 @@
           "troubleshooting"
         ]
       },
+      {
+        "tab": "Changelog",
+        "pages": [
+          "changelog"
+        ]
+      },
       {
         "tab": "About Us",
         "icon": "/favicon.ico",
         "href": "https://prowler.com/about#team"
-      },
-      {
-        "tab": "Changelog",
-        "icon": "github",
-        "href": "https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/releases"
       }
     ],
     "global": {
@@ -570,7 +618,7 @@
     ]
   },
   "banner": {
-    "content": "Prowler App is now Prowler Local Server, and Prowler Enterprise is now Prowler Private Cloud. See [Prowler product families](/getting-started/products).",
+    "content": "Prowler App is now Prowler Local Server, and Prowler Enterprise is now Prowler Private Cloud. See [Prowler product families](/getting-started/products). Check the [latest changes](/changelog).",
     "dismissible": false
   },
   "markdown": {
@@ -660,6 +708,10 @@
     {
       "source": "/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-cloud-public-ips",
       "destination": "/security/networking"
+    },
+    {
+      "source": "/getting-started/products/prowler-claude-code-plugin",
+      "destination": "/user-guide/ai-agents/claude-code"
     }
   ]
 }

docs/getting-started/basic-usage/prowler-mcp-tools.mdx

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ Complete reference guide for all tools available in the Prowler MCP Server. Tool
 |----------|------------|------------------------|
 | Prowler Hub | 10 tools | No |
 | Prowler Documentation | 2 tools | No |
-| Prowler Cloud & Prowler Local Server | 32 tools | Yes |
+| Prowler Cloud, Private Cloud & Local Server | 39 tools | Yes |
 
 ## Tool Naming Convention
 
@@ -18,11 +18,11 @@ All tools follow a consistent naming pattern with prefixes:
 
 - `prowler_hub_*` - Prowler Hub catalog and compliance tools
 - `prowler_docs_*` - Prowler documentation search and retrieval
-- `prowler_app_*` - Prowler Cloud and App (Self-Managed) management tools
+- `prowler_*` - Prowler Cloud, Prowler Private Cloud & Prowler Local Server management tools
 
-## Prowler Cloud and Prowler Local Server Tools
+## Prowler Tools
 
-Manage Prowler Cloud or Prowler Local Server features. **Requires authentication.**
+Manage your Prowler deployment — Prowler Cloud, Prowler Private Cloud, or Prowler Local Server. **Requires authentication.**
 
 <Note>
 These tools require a valid API key. See the [Configuration Guide](/getting-started/basic-usage/prowler-mcp) for authentication setup.
@@ -32,44 +32,44 @@ These tools require a valid API key. See the [Configuration Guide](/getting-star
 
 Tools for searching, viewing, and analyzing security findings across all cloud providers.
 
-- **`prowler_app_search_security_findings`** - Search and filter security findings with advanced filtering options (severity, status, provider, region, service, check ID, date range, muted status)
-- **`prowler_app_get_finding_details`** - Get comprehensive details about a specific finding including remediation guidance, check metadata, and resource relationships
-- **`prowler_app_get_findings_overview`** - Get aggregate statistics and trends about security findings as a markdown report
+- **`prowler_search_security_findings`** - Search and filter security findings with advanced filtering options (severity, status, provider, region, service, check ID, date range, muted status)
+- **`prowler_get_finding_details`** - Get comprehensive details about a specific finding including remediation guidance, check metadata, and resource relationships
+- **`prowler_get_findings_overview`** - Get aggregate statistics and trends about security findings as a markdown report
 
 ### Finding Groups Management
 
 Tools for listing finding groups aggregated by check ID, viewing complete group counters, and drilling down into affected resources.
 
-- **`prowler_app_list_finding_groups`** - List latest or historical finding groups with filters for provider, region, service, resource, category, check, severity, status, muted state, delta, date range, and sorting
-- **`prowler_app_get_finding_group_details`** - Get complete details for a specific finding group including counters, description, timestamps, and impacted providers
-- **`prowler_app_list_finding_group_resources`** - List actionable unmuted resources affected by a finding group by default, including nested resource and provider data plus the `finding_id` for remediation details. Set `include_muted` to include suppressed resources
+- **`prowler_list_finding_groups`** - List latest or historical finding groups with filters for provider, region, service, resource, category, check, severity, status, muted state, delta, date range, and sorting
+- **`prowler_get_finding_group_details`** - Get complete details for a specific finding group including counters, description, timestamps, and impacted providers
+- **`prowler_list_finding_group_resources`** - List actionable unmuted resources affected by a finding group by default, including nested resource and provider data plus the `finding_id` for remediation details. Set `include_muted` to include suppressed resources
 
 ### Provider Management
 
 Tools for managing cloud provider connections in Prowler.
 
-- **`prowler_app_search_providers`** - Search and view configured providers with their connection status
-- **`prowler_app_connect_provider`** - Register and connect a provider with credentials for security scanning
-- **`prowler_app_delete_provider`** - Permanently remove a provider from Prowler
+- **`prowler_search_providers`** - Search and view configured providers with their connection status
+- **`prowler_connect_provider`** - Register and connect a provider with credentials for security scanning
+- **`prowler_delete_provider`** - Permanently remove a provider from Prowler
 
 ### Scan Management
 
 Tools for managing and monitoring security scans.
 
-- **`prowler_app_list_scans`** - List and filter security scans across all providers
-- **`prowler_app_get_scan`** - Get comprehensive details about a specific scan (progress, duration, resource counts)
-- **`prowler_app_trigger_scan`** - Trigger a manual security scan for a provider
-- **`prowler_app_schedule_daily_scan`** - Schedule automated daily scans for continuous monitoring
-- **`prowler_app_update_scan`** - Update scan name for better organization
+- **`prowler_list_scans`** - List and filter security scans across all providers
+- **`prowler_get_scan`** - Get comprehensive details about a specific scan (progress, duration, resource counts)
+- **`prowler_trigger_scan`** - Trigger a manual security scan for a provider
+- **`prowler_schedule_daily_scan`** - Schedule automated daily scans for continuous monitoring
+- **`prowler_update_scan`** - Update scan name for better organization
 
 ### Resources Management
 
 Tools for searching, viewing, and analyzing cloud resources discovered by Prowler.
 
-- **`prowler_app_list_resources`** - List and filter cloud resources with advanced filtering options (provider, region, service, resource type, tags)
-- **`prowler_app_get_resource`** - Get comprehensive details about a specific resource including configuration, metadata, and finding relationships
-- **`prowler_app_get_resource_events`** - Get the timeline of cloud API actions performed on a resource (AWS CloudTrail). Shows who did what and when, with full request/response payloads
-- **`prowler_app_get_resources_overview`** - Get aggregate statistics about cloud resources as a markdown report
+- **`prowler_list_resources`** - List and filter cloud resources with advanced filtering options (provider, region, service, resource type, tags)
+- **`prowler_get_resource`** - Get comprehensive details about a specific resource including configuration, metadata, and finding relationships
+- **`prowler_get_resource_events`** - Get the timeline of cloud API actions performed on a resource (AWS CloudTrail). Shows who did what and when, with full request/response payloads
+- **`prowler_get_resources_overview`** - Get aggregate statistics about cloud resources as a markdown report
 
 ### Muting Management
 
@@ -77,33 +77,50 @@ Tools for managing finding muting, including pattern-based bulk muting (mutelist
 
 #### Mutelist (Pattern-Based Muting)
 
-- **`prowler_app_get_mutelist`** - Retrieve the current mutelist configuration for the tenant
-- **`prowler_app_set_mutelist`** - Create or update the mutelist configuration for pattern-based bulk muting
-- **`prowler_app_delete_mutelist`** - Remove the mutelist configuration from the tenant
+- **`prowler_get_mutelist`** - Retrieve the current mutelist configuration for the tenant
+- **`prowler_set_mutelist`** - Create or update the mutelist configuration for pattern-based bulk muting
+- **`prowler_delete_mutelist`** - Remove the mutelist configuration from the tenant
 
 #### Mute Rules (Finding-Specific Muting)
 
-- **`prowler_app_list_mute_rules`** - Search and filter mute rules with pagination support
-- **`prowler_app_get_mute_rule`** - Retrieve comprehensive details about a specific mute rule
-- **`prowler_app_create_mute_rule`** - Create a new mute rule to mute specific findings with documentation and audit trail
-- **`prowler_app_update_mute_rule`** - Update a mute rule's name, reason, or enabled status
-- **`prowler_app_delete_mute_rule`** - Delete a mute rule from the system
+- **`prowler_list_mute_rules`** - Search and filter mute rules with pagination support
+- **`prowler_get_mute_rule`** - Retrieve comprehensive details about a specific mute rule
+- **`prowler_create_mute_rule`** - Create a new mute rule to mute specific findings with documentation and audit trail
+- **`prowler_update_mute_rule`** - Update a mute rule's name, reason, or enabled status
+- **`prowler_delete_mute_rule`** - Delete a mute rule from the system
 
 ### Attack Paths Analysis
 
 Tools for analyzing privilege escalation chains and security misconfigurations using graph-based analysis. Attack Paths maps relationships between cloud resources, permissions, and security findings to detect how privileges can be escalated and how misconfigurations can be exploited.
 
-- **`prowler_app_list_attack_paths_scans`** - List Attack Paths scans with filtering by provider, provider type, and scan state (available, scheduled, executing, completed, failed, cancelled)
-- **`prowler_app_list_attack_paths_queries`** - Discover available Attack Paths queries for a completed scan, including query names, descriptions, and required parameters
-- **`prowler_app_run_attack_paths_query`** - Execute an Attack Paths query against a completed scan and retrieve graph results with nodes (cloud resources, findings, virtual nodes) and relationships (access paths, role assumptions, security group memberships)
-- **`prowler_app_get_attack_paths_cartography_schema`** - Retrieve the Cartography graph schema (node labels, relationships, properties) for writing accurate custom openCypher queries
+- **`prowler_list_attack_paths_scans`** - List Attack Paths scans with filtering by provider, provider type, and scan state (available, scheduled, executing, completed, failed, cancelled)
+- **`prowler_list_attack_paths_queries`** - Discover available Attack Paths queries for a completed scan, including query names, descriptions, and required parameters
+- **`prowler_run_attack_paths_query`** - Execute an Attack Paths query against a completed scan and retrieve graph results with nodes (cloud resources, findings, virtual nodes) and relationships (access paths, role assumptions, security group memberships)
+- **`prowler_get_attack_paths_cartography_schema`** - Retrieve the Cartography graph schema (node labels, relationships, properties) for writing accurate custom openCypher queries
 
 ### Compliance Management
 
 Tools for viewing compliance status and framework details across all cloud providers.
 
-- **`prowler_app_get_compliance_overview`** - Get high-level compliance status across all frameworks for a specific scan or provider, including pass/fail statistics per framework
-- **`prowler_app_get_compliance_framework_state_details`** - Get detailed requirement-level breakdown for a specific compliance framework, including failed requirements and associated finding IDs
+- **`prowler_get_compliance_overview`** - Get high-level compliance status across all frameworks for a specific scan or provider, including pass/fail statistics per framework
+- **`prowler_get_compliance_framework_state_details`** - Get detailed requirement-level breakdown for a specific compliance framework, including failed requirements and associated finding IDs
+
+### User Management
+
+Tools for viewing the users in your tenant and identifying the authenticated user.
+
+- **`prowler_list_users`** - List the users in the tenant with their names and emails
+- **`prowler_get_user`** - Get detailed information about a specific user by ID, including join date and role/membership IDs
+- **`prowler_get_current_user`** - Identify which user the current credentials authenticate as
+
+### Role Management
+
+Tools for browsing RBAC roles and managing the role assigned to a user. A user holds exactly one role, so setting a role replaces the one they held before.
+
+- **`prowler_list_roles`** - List the roles defined in the tenant with their permission scope
+- **`prowler_get_role`** - Get detailed information about a specific role by ID, including granted capabilities, visibility scope, assigned users, and provider groups
+- **`prowler_get_user_roles`** - List the roles assigned to a specific user, with the capabilities each role grants
+- **`prowler_set_user_role`** - Set the role a user holds, replacing the role they had before (idempotent)
 
 ## Prowler Hub Tools
 
@@ -145,7 +162,7 @@ Search and access official Prowler documentation. **No authentication required.*
 - Use natural language to interact with the tools through your AI assistant
 - Tools can be combined for complex workflows
 - Filter options are available on most list tools
-- Authentication is only required for Prowler Cloud and Prowler Local Server tools
+- Authentication is only required for Prowler tools (Prowler Cloud, Prowler Private Cloud, or Prowler Local Server)
 
 ## Additional Resources
 

docs/getting-started/basic-usage/prowler-mcp.mdx

@@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ Configure your MCP client to connect to Prowler MCP Server.
 ## Step 1: Get Your API Key
 
 <Note>
-**Authentication is optional**: Prowler Hub and Prowler Documentation features work without authentication. An API key is only required for Prowler Cloud and Prowler Local Server features.
+**Authentication is optional**: Prowler Hub and Prowler Documentation features work without authentication. An API key is only required for Prowler tools (Prowler Cloud, Prowler Private Cloud, or Prowler Local Server).
 </Note>
 
-To use Prowler Cloud or Prowler Local Server features. To get the API key, please refer to the [API Keys](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-api-keys) guide.
+An API key authenticates the Prowler tools (Prowler Cloud, Prowler Private Cloud, or Prowler Local Server). To get the API key, please refer to the [API Keys](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-api-keys) guide.
 
 <Warning>
 Keep the API key secure. Never share it publicly or commit it to version control.
@@ -18,12 +18,36 @@ Keep the API key secure. Never share it publicly or commit it to version control
 
 ## Step 2: Configure Your MCP Host/Client
 
-Choose the configuration based on your deployment:
+Most users should use the **Cloud MCP Server** — it needs no installation and is maintained by Prowler. The [Local MCP Server](#local-mcp-server-configuration) configuration is provided afterwards for users who run the server themselves.
 
-- **HTTP Mode**: Prowler Cloud MCP Server or self-hosted Prowler MCP Server.
-- **STDIO Mode**: Local installation only (runs as subprocess of your MCP client).
+- **Cloud MCP Server (HTTP)**: the managed server at `https://mcp.prowler.com/mcp` (or your own self-hosted HTTP server).
+- **Local MCP Server (STDIO)**: local installation only (runs as a subprocess of your MCP client).
 
-### HTTP Mode
+### Step-by-Step Guides Per Agent
+
+The tabs below are a quick configuration reference. For a walkthrough with screenshots, troubleshooting, and client-specific caveats, follow the dedicated guide for your agent:
+
+<CardGroup cols={2}>
+  <Card title="Claude Code" icon="terminal" href="/user-guide/ai-agents/claude-code">
+    Plugin vs. MCP-only, and which Claude surfaces work
+  </Card>
+  <Card title="Claude Desktop App (Chat)" icon="comment" href="/user-guide/ai-agents/claude-desktop">
+    The Chat tab, via a local bridge
+  </Card>
+  <Card title="Codex" icon="code" href="/user-guide/ai-agents/codex">
+    CLI and the VS Code extension
+  </Card>
+  <Card title="Cursor" icon="arrow-pointer" href="/user-guide/ai-agents/cursor">
+    Global and project scopes
+  </Card>
+  <Card title="VS Code / Copilot" icon="microsoft" href="/user-guide/ai-agents/vscode">
+    Agent mode with secure key prompts
+  </Card>
+</CardGroup>
+
+## Cloud MCP Server Configuration (Recommended)
+
+Connect to the **Cloud MCP Server** at `https://mcp.prowler.com/mcp` over HTTP. This is the recommended path — no installation, always up to date. The same configuration works for a self-hosted HTTP server: just swap the URL.
 
 <Tabs>
   <Tab title="Generic Native HTTP Support">
@@ -61,10 +85,10 @@ Choose the configuration based on your deployment:
           "args": [
             "https://mcp.prowler.com/mcp", // or your self-hosted Prowler MCP Server URL
             "--header",
-            "Authorization: Bearer ${PROWLER_APP_API_KEY}"
+            "Authorization: Bearer ${PROWLER_API_KEY}"
           ],
           "env": {
-            "PROWLER_APP_API_KEY": "<your-api-key-here>"
+            "PROWLER_API_KEY": "<your-api-key-here>"
           }
         }
       }
@@ -74,72 +98,11 @@ Choose the configuration based on your deployment:
     The `mcp-remote` tool acts as a bridge for clients that don't support HTTP natively. Learn more at [mcp-remote on npm](https://www.npmjs.com/package/mcp-remote).
     </Info>
   </Tab>
-
-  <Tab title="Claude Desktop">
-    1. Open Claude Desktop settings
-    2. Go to "Developer" tab
-    3. Click in "Edit Config" button
-    4. Edit the `claude_desktop_config.json` file with your favorite editor
-    5. Install a reviewed version of `mcp-remote` in a dedicated local workspace:
-    ```bash
-    mkdir -p ~/.local/share/prowler-mcp-bridge
-    cd ~/.local/share/prowler-mcp-bridge
-    npm init -y
-    npm install --save-exact mcp-remote@0.1.38
-    ```
-    6. Add the following configuration:
-    ```json
-    {
-      "mcpServers": {
-        "prowler": {
-          "command": "/absolute/path/to/.local/share/prowler-mcp-bridge/node_modules/.bin/mcp-remote",
-          "args": [
-            "https://mcp.prowler.com/mcp",
-            "--header",
-            "Authorization: Bearer ${PROWLER_APP_API_KEY}"
-          ],
-          "env": {
-            "PROWLER_APP_API_KEY": "<your-api-key-here>"
-          }
-        }
-      }
-    }
-    ```
-  </Tab>
-
-  <Tab title="Claude Code">
-    Run the following command:
-    ```bash
-    export PROWLER_APP_API_KEY="<your-api-key-here>"
-    claude mcp add --transport http prowler https://mcp.prowler.com/mcp --header "Authorization: Bearer $PROWLER_APP_API_KEY" --scope user
-    ```
-  </Tab>
-
-  <Tab title="Cursor">
-    1. Open Cursor settings
-    2. Go to "Tools & MCP"
-    3. Click in "New MCP Server" button
-    4. Add to the JSON Configuration the following:
-    ```json
-    {
-      "mcpServers": {
-        "prowler": {
-          "url": "https://mcp.prowler.com/mcp",
-          "headers": {
-            "Authorization": "Bearer <your-api-key-here>"
-          }
-        }
-      }
-    }
-    ```
-  </Tab>
-
-
 </Tabs>
 
-### STDIO Mode
+## Local MCP Server Configuration
 
-STDIO mode is only available when running the MCP server locally.
+STDIO mode is only available when running the **Local MCP Server** on your own machine. See the [Installation guide](/getting-started/installation/prowler-mcp) to set it up first.
 
 <Tabs>
   <Tab title="Generic uvx installation">
@@ -152,7 +115,7 @@ STDIO mode is only available when running the MCP server locally.
           "command": "uvx",
           "args": ["/absolute/path/to/prowler/mcp_server/"],
           "env": {
-            "PROWLER_APP_API_KEY": "<your-api-key-here>",
+            "PROWLER_API_KEY": "<your-api-key-here>",
             "API_BASE_URL": "https://api.prowler.com/api/v1"
           }
         }
@@ -179,7 +142,7 @@ STDIO mode is only available when running the MCP server locally.
             "--rm",
             "-i",
             "--env",
-            "PROWLER_APP_API_KEY=<your-api-key-here>",
+            "PROWLER_API_KEY=<your-api-key-here>",
             "--env",
             "API_BASE_URL=https://api.prowler.com/api/v1",
             "prowlercloud/prowler-mcp"
@@ -205,7 +168,7 @@ Restart your MCP client and start asking questions:
 
 ## Authentication Methods
 
-Prowler MCP Server supports two authentication methods to connect to Prowler Cloud or Prowler Local Server:
+Prowler MCP Server supports two authentication methods to connect to Prowler (Prowler Cloud, Prowler Private Cloud, or Prowler Local Server):
 
 ### API Key (Recommended)
 

docs/getting-started/installation/prowler-app.mdx

@@ -128,8 +128,8 @@ To update the environment file:
 Edit the `.env` file and change version values:
 
 ```env
-PROWLER_UI_VERSION="5.34.0"
-PROWLER_API_VERSION="5.34.0"
+PROWLER_UI_VERSION="5.36.0"
+PROWLER_API_VERSION="5.36.0"
 ```
 
 <Note>

docs/getting-started/installation/prowler-mcp.mdx

@@ -5,12 +5,12 @@ title: "Installation"
 There are **two ways** to use Prowler MCP Server:
 
 <CardGroup cols={2}>
-  <Card title="Option 1: Managed by Prowler" icon="cloud" color="#10B981">
+  <Card title="Cloud MCP Server (Recommended)" icon="cloud" color="#10B981">
     **No installation required** - Just configuration
 
     Use `https://mcp.prowler.com/mcp`
   </Card>
-  <Card title="Option 2: Run Locally" icon="server" color="#6366F1">
+  <Card title="Local MCP Server" icon="server" color="#6366F1">
     **Local installation** - Full control
 
     Install via Docker, PyPI, or source code
@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ There are **two ways** to use Prowler MCP Server:
 </CardGroup>
 
 
-For "Option 1: Managed by Prowler", go directly to the [Configuration Guide](/getting-started/basic-usage/prowler-mcp#hosted-server-configuration-recommended) to set up your Claude Desktop, Cursor, or other MCP client.
-**This guide is focused on local installation, "Option 2: Run Locally"**.
+For the Cloud MCP Server, go directly to the [Configuration Guide](/getting-started/basic-usage/prowler-mcp#cloud-mcp-server-configuration-recommended) to set up your Claude Desktop, Cursor, or other MCP client.
+**This guide is focused on local installation, the Local MCP Server**.
 
 ## Installation Methods
 
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ Choose one of the following installation methods:
 
     ```bash
     docker run --rm -i \
-      -e PROWLER_APP_API_KEY="pk_your_api_key" \
+      -e PROWLER_API_KEY="pk_your_api_key" \
       -e API_BASE_URL="https://api.prowler.com/api/v1" \
       prowlercloud/prowler-mcp
     ```
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ Choose one of the following installation methods:
 
 ## Updating Prowler MCP Server
 
-When running Prowler MCP Server locally ("Option 2: Run Locally"), upgrade to the latest version using the same method chosen for installation. The hosted server (`https://mcp.prowler.com/mcp`) is always kept up to date by Prowler and requires no action.
+When running the Local MCP Server, upgrade to the latest version using the same method chosen for installation. The Cloud MCP Server (`https://mcp.prowler.com/mcp`) is always kept up to date by Prowler and requires no action.
 
 <Tabs>
   <Tab title="Docker">
@@ -219,19 +219,19 @@ Configure the server using environment variables:
 
 | Variable | Description | Required | Default |
 |----------|-------------|----------|---------|
-| `PROWLER_APP_API_KEY` | Prowler API key | Only for STDIO mode | - |
+| `PROWLER_API_KEY` | Prowler API key | Only for STDIO mode | - |
 | `API_BASE_URL` | Custom Prowler API endpoint | No | `https://api.prowler.com/api/v1` |
 | `PROWLER_MCP_TRANSPORT_MODE` | Default transport mode (overwritten by `--transport` argument) | No | `stdio` |
 
 <CodeGroup>
 ```bash macOS/Linux
-export PROWLER_APP_API_KEY="pk_your_api_key_here"
+export PROWLER_API_KEY="pk_your_api_key_here"
 export API_BASE_URL="https://api.prowler.com/api/v1"
 export PROWLER_MCP_TRANSPORT_MODE="http"
 ```
 
 ```bash Windows PowerShell
-$env:PROWLER_APP_API_KEY="pk_your_api_key_here"
+$env:PROWLER_API_KEY="pk_your_api_key_here"
 $env:API_BASE_URL="https://api.prowler.com/api/v1"
 $env:PROWLER_MCP_TRANSPORT_MODE="http"
 ```
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ Never commit your API key to version control. Use environment variables or secur
 For convenience, create a `.env` file in the `mcp_server` directory:
 
 ```bash .env
-PROWLER_APP_API_KEY=pk_your_api_key_here
+PROWLER_API_KEY=pk_your_api_key_here
 API_BASE_URL=https://api.prowler.com/api/v1
 PROWLER_MCP_TRANSPORT_MODE=stdio
 ```

docs/getting-started/products/index.mdx

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Read the [public announcement of the Prowler product families](https://prowler-w
 | Prowler Private Cloud | Prowler Cloud deployed in your own environment. Formerly Prowler Enterprise. See [pricing](https://prowler.com/pricing). |
 | [Prowler Hub](https://hub.prowler.com) | Free public library of versioned checks, cloud service artifacts, and compliance frameworks. |
 | [Prowler Lighthouse AI](/getting-started/products/prowler-cloud-lighthouse) | AI security analyst capabilities within Prowler Cloud and Prowler Private Cloud. |
-| [Prowler MCP](/getting-started/products/prowler-mcp) | MCP server that connects AI assistants and agents to Prowler, including IDE plugins such as [Prowler for Claude Code](/getting-started/products/prowler-claude-code-plugin). |
+| [Prowler MCP](/getting-started/products/prowler-mcp) | MCP server that connects AI assistants and agents to Prowler, including IDE plugins such as [Prowler for Claude Code](/user-guide/ai-agents/claude-code). |
 
 {/* Unreleased products. Uncomment these rows in the Prowler Products table when announced:
 | Prowler Registry | Distribution service for Prowler content such as checks and compliance frameworks. Free and paid tiers. |

docs/getting-started/products/prowler-claude-code-plugin.mdx

@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
----
-title: 'Prowler for Claude Code'
-sidebarTitle: 'Claude Code'
----
-
-End-to-end cloud security and compliance from inside [Claude Code](https://www.claude.com/product/claude-code), powered by the [Prowler MCP server](/getting-started/products/prowler-mcp). The plugin lets Claude walk a Prowler Cloud-connected account through a compliance assessment and remediate findings until the chosen security or industry framework is compliant.
-
-<Warning>
-**Preview**: this plugin is under active development. Please report issues on [GitHub](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/issues) or join the [Slack community](https://goto.prowler.com/slack) for feedback.
-</Warning>
-
-## Requirements
-
-<CardGroup cols={3}>
-  <Card title="Claude Code" icon="terminal">
-    Installed and signed in. See the [official install guide](https://www.claude.com/product/claude-code).
-  </Card>
-  <Card title="Prowler Cloud account" icon="cloud">
-    The free tier is enough to start. Sign up at [cloud.prowler.com](https://cloud.prowler.com).
-  </Card>
-  <Card title="Prowler API key" icon="key">
-    Create one at [cloud.prowler.com/profile](https://cloud.prowler.com/profile).
-  </Card>
-</CardGroup>
-
-## Installation
-
-<Tabs>
-  <Tab title="From GitHub (recommended)">
-    Inside a Claude Code session:
-
-    ```text
-    /plugin marketplace add prowler-cloud/prowler
-    /plugin install prowler@prowler-plugins
-    ```
-  </Tab>
-  <Tab title="From a local clone">
-    If you already have the repository checked out:
-
-    ```text
-    /plugin marketplace add /absolute/path/to/prowler
-    /plugin install prowler@prowler-plugins
-    ```
-  </Tab>
-</Tabs>
-
-## Configuration
-
-On first install, Claude Code prompts for your **Prowler API key**. The value is stored securely (macOS keychain or `~/.claude/.credentials.json`) and used to authenticate against Prowler Cloud.
-
-<Note>
-To rotate the key, uninstall and reinstall the plugin — Claude Code will prompt again.
-</Note>
-
-## Verify the installation
-
-In a Claude Code session:
-
-```text
-/mcp          → "prowler" appears as a connected server
-/plugin       → "prowler" enabled, skill listed as prowler:framework-compliance-triage
-```
-
-If `/mcp` reports the `prowler` server as failed, the most common cause is a rejected API key — re-issue one in Prowler Cloud and reinstall the plugin so it re-prompts.
-
-## Usage
-
-Open a conversation that mentions the framework you want to comply with. Examples:
-
-- *"Make my AWS production account compliant with CIS 4.0."*
-- *"Make my current Terraform project compliant with Prowler ThreatScore Compliance Framework based on the latest scan results."*
-- *"Help me get to 100% on PCI-DSS for this GCP project."*
-
-You pick a **primary tool** (Terraform, gh / az / aws CLI, web console, or mixed) and a **mode**:
-
-<CardGroup cols={2}>
-  <Card title="Claude-assisted (default)" icon="hand">
-    Claude shows each fix — target resource, exact commands, side effects, reversibility — and waits for your go-ahead before applying.
-  </Card>
-  <Card title="Claude autonomous" icon="robot">
-    Claude presents a single up-front plan grouped by shared fixes, waits for one confirmation, then proceeds. It pauses mid-loop if a fix has wide blast radius or a finding is not applicable.
-  </Card>
-</CardGroup>
-
-Claude tracks progress in a markdown report under `.prowler/` at your project root — one file per framework × account. Open it any time to see exactly where the flow is. When all findings are addressed, Claude proposes a fresh Prowler scan to verify everything end-to-end.
-
-## Uninstalling
-
-```text
-/plugin uninstall prowler@prowler-plugins
-/plugin marketplace remove prowler-plugins
-```
-
-The stored API key is removed automatically.
-
-## Troubleshooting
-
-| Symptom | Likely cause | Fix |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-| `/mcp` shows `prowler` as failed | Rejected API key | Generate a new one in Prowler Cloud and reinstall the plugin to re-prompt. |
-| Skill not invoked when expected | The skill description didn't match the prompt | Mention the framework name plus "compliance" or "compliant" in your prompt. |
-| "Framework not supported" | Prowler Hub does not list the framework for that provider | Open an issue or PR at [github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler). |

docs/getting-started/products/prowler-cloud-lighthouse.mdx

@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ The Agentic Cloud Defender does more than answer questions, it helps teams **fin
   <Card title="Normal and Agentic Views" icon="table-columns">
     Switch between the standard interface and a chat-first agentic view.
   </Card>
+  <Card title="Side Panel on Every Page" icon="comment-dots">
+    Open Lighthouse AI as a side panel from any page to get help in context.
+  </Card>
   <Card title="Provider Connection Checks" icon="plug-circle-check">
     Credentials are validated automatically when a provider is configured.
   </Card>
@@ -37,6 +40,20 @@ Promoting the chat to a top-level view gives Lighthouse AI the room it needs for
 
 <img src="/images/prowler-app/lighthouse/prowler-cloud/main-chat-page.png" alt="Lighthouse AI chat view in Prowler Cloud" />
 
+### Side Panel
+
+You do not have to switch to the full chat view to reach Lighthouse AI. A side panel is available on every page of Prowler Cloud. While collapsed it stays out of the way; open it from any dashboard, findings list, or configuration screen to ask questions without leaving what you are working on. Open it using the Lighthouse AI button, circled in red in the image below.
+
+<img src="/images/prowler-app/lighthouse/prowler-cloud/side-panel-closed.png" alt="Collapsed Lighthouse AI side panel on a Prowler Cloud page, with the button to open it circled in red" />
+
+Once open, the panel slides in alongside your current page and shares the same agent, tools, and persistent chat sessions as the full Chat View, so a conversation started in the panel can be reopened and continued later from either place.
+
+<img src="/images/prowler-app/lighthouse/prowler-cloud/side-panel-open.png" alt="Lighthouse AI side panel open alongside a Prowler Cloud page" />
+
+- **Available everywhere:** Summon the assistant from any page while you keep working in the normal view.
+- **Context-aware help:** Ask about the findings, resources, or compliance data you are currently looking at.
+- **Continuous sessions:** Conversations opened in the side panel are saved alongside the rest of your chat history.
+
 ### Tool Usage
 
 Lighthouse AI on Prowler Cloud renders the agent's work as it happens, so responses are easier to follow and to trust. Tool calls and reasoning steps appear in the order they occur within the conversation.
@@ -63,6 +80,53 @@ At the top of the configuration page, the optional **Business Context** field le
 
 Lighthouse AI on Prowler Cloud supports OpenAI, Amazon Bedrock, and OpenAI-compatible providers, with GPT-5.5 as the default. For per-provider setup and how to switch the default provider or model, see [Using Multiple LLM Providers](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-cloud-lighthouse-multi-llm).
 
+## Capabilities
+
+Lighthouse AI works through the [Prowler MCP Server](/getting-started/products/prowler-mcp), which gives the agent a growing catalog of tools to explore and act on your security data. These actions run inside Prowler and never modify your cloud resources. Everything the agent can do maps to one of the following capability areas.
+
+### Findings and Finding Groups
+
+- Search and filter security findings across every connected provider by severity, status, region, service, check, date range, and muted state.
+- Retrieve full finding details, including remediation guidance, check metadata, and affected resources.
+- Summarize findings with aggregate statistics and trends.
+- Browse finding groups aggregated by check and drill down into the specific resources each group affects.
+
+### Resources
+
+- List and filter cloud resources by provider, region, service, resource type, and tags.
+- Inspect a resource's configuration, metadata, and related findings.
+- Review the timeline of cloud API actions performed on a resource (AWS CloudTrail), including who did what and when.
+- Get an aggregate overview of the resources Prowler has discovered.
+
+### Compliance
+
+- Review high-level compliance status across all frameworks, with pass/fail statistics per framework.
+- Get a requirement-level breakdown for a specific framework, including failed requirements and their associated findings.
+
+### Attack Paths
+
+- List Attack Paths scans and discover the queries available for each completed scan.
+- Run graph-based queries to reveal privilege-escalation chains and exploitable misconfigurations.
+- Retrieve the Cartography graph schema to build accurate custom queries.
+
+### Scans and Providers
+
+- List, inspect, and rename security scans across providers.
+- Trigger manual scans and schedule automated daily scans for continuous monitoring.
+- Search connected providers and check their connection status, connect new providers, or remove existing ones.
+
+### Muting
+
+- Manage the mutelist for pattern-based bulk muting.
+- Create, update, list, and delete finding-specific mute rules, each with a documented reason and audit trail.
+
+### Security Check Catalog and Documentation
+
+- Browse and search the Prowler Hub catalog of security checks and compliance frameworks, including check code and automated fixers.
+- Search and retrieve official Prowler documentation to answer how-to and product questions.
+
+For the complete list of underlying tools, see the [Prowler MCP Tools Reference](/getting-started/basic-usage/prowler-mcp-tools).
+
 ## FAQ
 
 **Which LLM providers are supported?**
@@ -71,7 +135,11 @@ OpenAI (GPT models, including the default GPT-5.5), Amazon Bedrock (Claude, Llam
 
 **Can Lighthouse AI change my cloud environment?**
 
-No. Lighthouse AI has read-only access to security data and no tools to modify resources, even when the connected cloud credentials would allow changes.
+No. Lighthouse AI cannot modify the resources in your connected cloud providers (AWS, Azure, GCP, and others). It has read-only access to that environment and no tools to change it, even when the connected cloud credentials would allow it.
+
+**Can Lighthouse AI change my Prowler Cloud environment?**
+
+Yes. Lighthouse AI can take action within Prowler Cloud itself, such as connecting or removing providers, triggering and scheduling scans, and managing mute rules and the mutelist. See [Capabilities](#capabilities) for the full list of what it can do. These actions only affect your Prowler Cloud workspace, never the resources in your cloud providers.
 
 ## Looking for the Open Source Version?
 

docs/getting-started/products/prowler-for-msps.mdx

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+---
+title: "Prowler for MSPs and MSSPs"
+sidebarTitle: "Overview"
+---
+
+Prowler for MSPs and MSSPs is a dedicated console for Managed Service Providers (MSPs), Managed Security Service Providers (MSSPs), resellers and consultants who run cloud security for other organizations. It lets a provider onboard customers, group them, manage a team, and operate each customer's Prowler Cloud tenant on their behalf.
+
+The console is available at [partners.prowler.com](https://partners.prowler.com).
+
+<Card title="Sign Up for Prowler for MSPs and MSSPs" icon="rocket" href="https://partners.prowler.com/sign-up" />
+
+## What You Get
+
+* **Customer onboarding:** provision a Prowler Cloud tenant for each customer, with a billing plan selected up front.
+* **Delegated access:** open any customer's Prowler Cloud tenant from the console. Every action is attributed to you acting on behalf of that customer.
+* **Team and roles:** invite team members by email and assign a role that governs what they can do.
+* **Consolidated billing:** each customer carries its own plan, with month-to-date revenue reported across every customer.
+* **Branding:** upload your logo to appear alongside Prowler branding in the console.
+
+## Core Concepts
+
+Three objects make up the model. Getting these straight makes the rest of the documentation easy to follow.
+
+| Object | What it is |
+|---|---|
+| **Partner organization** | The provider's own company. The top-level container for everything below, created at sign-up. |
+| **Customer** | One of the provider's customers. Each customer maps to a Prowler Cloud tenant and carries its own billing plan. |
+| **Team member** | A user in the partner organization, holding a role that governs what they can do. |
+
+## How It Relates to Prowler Cloud
+
+| | Prowler Cloud | Prowler for MSPs and MSSPs |
+|---|---|---|
+| **Audience** | End customers | MSPs, MSSPs, resellers, consultants |
+| **Console** | [cloud.prowler.com](https://cloud.prowler.com) | [partners.prowler.com](https://partners.prowler.com) |
+| **Scope** | One organization's own cloud accounts | Many customer organizations |
+| **Billing** | Each organization pays for itself | The provider manages a plan per customer |
+| **Branding** | Prowler-branded | Your logo alongside Prowler branding |
+
+Your customers keep signing in to Prowler Cloud with their own users. Provider-side access is **additive** — it does not replace or restrict customer-side users.
+
+## The Console at a Glance
+
+Signing in lands you on the **Dashboard**. The sidebar carries:
+
+| Entry | What it does | Visible to |
+|---|---|---|
+| **Dashboard** | Partner Insights, a Billing Overview card and an Active Customers table | Everyone |
+| **Customers** | Add customers, review their posture and billing, and open their Prowler Cloud tenant | Everyone |
+| **Team** | Invite, re-invite, disable and remove team members | Roles with **Manage members** |
+| **Settings** | Profile, Partner Code, branding and security | Everyone; editing requires **Manage settings** |
+
+![Prowler for MSPs and MSSPs dashboard](/images/prowler-for-msps/dashboard.png)
+
+**Partner Insights** is the top row: **Total Customers**, broken down into active and non-paid; **Cloud Accounts**, broken down by cloud provider; and **Monitored Resources**, with a note on organizations whose critical risk has grown. Each card carries a 30-day trend.
+
+Below it, **Billing Overview** reports monthly expenses against the previous month and splits revenue for the period into annual, monthly and overage. **Active Customers** lists your customers with their provider count, resource count and last completed scan, and carries its own **Add Customer** button.
+
+## Getting Access
+
+Sign-up is self-service, approval is not. Register at [partners.prowler.com/sign-up](https://partners.prowler.com/sign-up), then verify your email address — the organization sits in **Pending email verification** until you do, and the Prowler team does not review it before that. Verifying moves the organization to **Pending approval**. Once approved, you can invite your team and start onboarding customers.
+
+## Next Steps
+
+<Columns cols={2}>
+  <Card title="Sign Up and Sign In" icon="user-plus" href="/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-for-msps-sign-up">
+    Register, verify your email, and get approved.
+  </Card>
+  <Card title="Your Partner Organization" icon="briefcase" href="/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-for-msps-organization">
+    Lifecycle, settings, Partner Code and closing your organization.
+  </Card>
+  <Card title="Onboarding Customers" icon="building" href="/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-for-msps-customers">
+    Add customers and open their Prowler Cloud tenants.
+  </Card>
+  <Card title="Managing Your Team" icon="users" href="/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-for-msps-team">
+    Invite team members and assign roles.
+  </Card>
+</Columns>

docs/getting-started/products/prowler-mcp.mdx

@@ -8,8 +8,29 @@ title: "Overview"
 **Preview Feature**: This MCP server is currently under active development. Features and functionality may change. We welcome your feedback—please report any issues on [GitHub](https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/issues) or join our [Slack community](https://goto.prowler.com/slack) to discuss and share your thoughts.
 </Warning>
 
+## Quickest Way to Connect: Cloud MCP Server
+
+The fastest way to get started is the **Cloud MCP Server** at `https://mcp.prowler.com/mcp` — no installation, always up to date, and maintained by Prowler. Just point your MCP client at the URL and authenticate with a [Prowler API key](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-api-keys) as a Bearer token:
+
+```json
+{
+  "mcpServers": {
+    "prowler": {
+      "url": "https://mcp.prowler.com/mcp",
+      "headers": {
+        "Authorization": "Bearer <your-api-key-here>"
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+<Card title="Connect Your MCP Client to the Cloud MCP Server" icon="cloud" href="/getting-started/basic-usage/prowler-mcp#cloud-mcp-server-configuration-recommended" horizontal>
+  Step-by-step setup for Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, VS Code, and other agents.
+</Card>
+
 <Note>
-Prowler MCP Server can run as a local instance, or as the hosted **Prowler MCP** at `https://mcp.prowler.com/mcp`. The hosted server also provides tools for Prowler Cloud-specific features such as [Alerts](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-alerts), [Scan Scheduling](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-scan-scheduling), and [Findings Triage](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-findings-triage). See [Deployment Options](#deployment-options).
+Prefer to run it yourself? The **Local MCP Server** runs on your own machine or infrastructure. The Cloud MCP Server additionally provides tools for Prowler Cloud-specific features such as [Alerts](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-alerts), [Scan Scheduling](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-scan-scheduling), and [Findings Triage](/user-guide/tutorials/prowler-app-findings-triage). See [Cloud vs Local MCP Server](#cloud-vs-local-mcp-server).
 </Note>
 
 ## What is the Model Context Protocol?
@@ -20,15 +41,16 @@ The [Model Context Protocol (MCP)](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) is an open s
 
 The Prowler MCP Server provides three main integration points:
 
-### 1. Prowler Cloud and Prowler Local Server
+### 1. Prowler Cloud, Private Cloud & Local Server
 
-Full access to Prowler Cloud and Prowler Local Server for:
+Full access to your Prowler deployment — Prowler Cloud, Prowler Private Cloud, or Prowler Local Server — for:
 - **Findings Analysis**: Query, filter, and analyze security findings across all your cloud environments
 - **Provider Management**: Create, configure, and manage your configured Prowler providers (AWS, Azure, GCP, etc.)
 - **Scan Orchestration**: Trigger on-demand scans and schedule recurring security assessments
 - **Resource Inventory**: Search and view detailed information about your audited resources
 - **Muting Management**: Create and manage muting lists/rules to suppress non-relevant findings
 - **Attack Paths Analysis**: Analyze privilege escalation chains and security misconfigurations through graph-based analysis of cloud resource relationships
+- **User & Role Management**: List the users in your tenant, identify the authenticated user, browse RBAC roles, and set the role a user holds
 
 ### 2. Prowler Hub
 
@@ -48,12 +70,53 @@ Search and retrieve official Prowler documentation:
 
 ## MCP Server Architecture
 
-The following diagram illustrates the Prowler MCP Server architecture and its integration points:
+The following diagram illustrates the Prowler MCP Server architecture and its integration points. MCP clients connect to either the **Cloud MCP Server** (recommended) or a **Local MCP Server**; both expose the same tools and reach the same Prowler backends:
 
-![Prowler MCP Server Schema](/images/prowler_mcp_schema.png)
+```mermaid
+flowchart LR
+    subgraph HOSTS["MCP Clients"]
+        chat["Chat Interfaces<br/>(Claude Desktop, LobeChat)"]
+        ide["IDEs and Code Editors<br/>(Claude Code, Cursor)"]
+        apps["Other AI Applications<br/>(5ire, custom agents)"]
+    end
+
+    subgraph SERVERS["Prowler MCP Server"]
+        direction TB
+        cloud["☁️ Cloud MCP Server (Recommended)<br/>mcp.prowler.com/mcp · HTTP<br/>Managed by Prowler · always up to date<br/>Adds Cloud-only tools (Alerts,<br/>Scan Scheduling, Findings Triage)"]
+        local["💻 Local MCP Server<br/>Self-run · STDIO or HTTP<br/>Python 3.12+ or Docker<br/>You manage updates"]
+    end
+
+    subgraph TOOLS["Prowler MCP Tools"]
+        prowler_tools["prowler_* tools<br/>(API key or JWT auth)<br/>Findings · Providers · Scans<br/>Resources · Muting · Compliance<br/>Attack Paths"]
+        hub_tools["prowler_hub_* tools<br/>(no auth)<br/>Checks Catalog · Check Code<br/>Fixers · Compliance Frameworks"]
+        docs_tools["prowler_docs_* tools<br/>(no auth)<br/>Search · Document Retrieval"]
+    end
+
+    api["Prowler API (REST)<br/>Cloud · Private Cloud · Local Server"]
+    hub["hub.prowler.com<br/>(REST)"]
+    docs["docs.prowler.com<br/>(Mintlify)"]
+
+    chat -->|HTTP| cloud
+    ide -->|HTTP| cloud
+    apps -->|HTTP| cloud
+    chat -->|STDIO or HTTP| local
+    ide -->|STDIO or HTTP| local
+    apps -->|STDIO or HTTP| local
+
+    cloud --> prowler_tools
+    cloud --> hub_tools
+    cloud --> docs_tools
+    local --> prowler_tools
+    local --> hub_tools
+    local --> docs_tools
+
+    prowler_tools -->|REST| api
+    hub_tools -->|REST| hub
+    docs_tools -->|REST| docs
+```
 
 The architecture shows how AI assistants connect through the MCP protocol to access Prowler's three main components:
-- Prowler Cloud and Prowler Local Server for security operations
+- Prowler Cloud, Prowler Private Cloud, or Prowler Local Server for security operations
 - Prowler Hub for security knowledge
 - Prowler Documentation for guidance and reference.
 
@@ -92,8 +155,8 @@ REQUIREMENTS:
 
 DATA TO FETCH:
 Use these MCP tools in this order:
-1. Prowler app list providers - To get all available configured provider in the account
-2. Prowler app get latest findings - To get findings information, if there are so many you can use the filter_fields to get less information, or pagination to get in different batches
+1. Prowler list providers - To get all available configured provider in the account
+2. Prowler get latest findings - To get findings information, if there are so many you can use the filter_fields to get less information, or pagination to get in different batches
 3. For most critical findings you can get more context and remediation with Prowler Hub to get remediations for example
 
 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS:
@@ -130,66 +193,48 @@ Generate the complete HTML file and display it
 ></iframe>
 
 
-## Deployment Options
+## Cloud vs Local MCP Server
 
-Prowler MCP Server can be used in three ways:
+There are two ways to run the Prowler MCP Server. For almost everyone, the **Cloud MCP Server** is the right choice — it needs no installation and is maintained by Prowler. The **Local MCP Server** exists for users who need to run it on their own machine or infrastructure.
 
-### 1. Prowler Cloud MCP Server
+| | ☁️ **Cloud MCP Server** (Recommended) | 💻 **Local MCP Server** |
+|---|---|---|
+| **Endpoint** | `https://mcp.prowler.com/mcp` | Runs on your machine or infrastructure |
+| **Setup** | Just configure your MCP client | Install via Docker, or source |
+| **Transport** | HTTP | STDIO (subprocess) or self-hosted HTTP |
+| **Maintenance** | Managed by Prowler, always up to date | You manage updates |
+| **Requirements** | None (just an MCP client) | Python 3.12+ or Docker |
+| **Cloud-only tools** | ✅ Alerts, Scan Scheduling, Findings Triage | ❌ Not available |
+| **Authentication** | API key or JWT token | API key/JWT (HTTP) or env vars (STDIO) |
 
-**Use Prowler's managed MCP server at `https://mcp.prowler.com/mcp`**
+### ☁️ Cloud MCP Server (Recommended)
 
-- No installation required.
-- Managed and maintained by Prowler team.
-- Authentication to Prowler Cloud or Prowler Local Server via API key or JWT token.
-- Includes tools for Prowler Cloud-specific features such as Alerts, Scan Scheduling, and Findings Triage.
+Prowler's managed MCP server at `https://mcp.prowler.com/mcp`. No installation, always up to date, and it includes tools for Prowler Cloud-specific features such as Alerts, Scan Scheduling, and Findings Triage. This is the path we recommend for nearly all users — go straight to the [Configuration guide](/getting-started/basic-usage/prowler-mcp#cloud-mcp-server-configuration-recommended).
 
-### 2. Local STDIO Mode
+### 💻 Local MCP Server
 
-**Run the server locally on your machine**
+Run the server yourself when you need full control over the deployment. It connects to Prowler Cloud, Prowler Private Cloud, or Prowler Local Server and can run in two modes:
 
-- Runs as a subprocess of the MCP client.
-- Possibility to connect to Prowler Local Server.
-- Authentication to Prowler Cloud or Prowler Local Server via environment variables.
-- Requires Python 3.12+ or Docker.
+- **STDIO mode** — the server runs as a subprocess of your MCP client. Authentication via environment variables.
+- **Self-hosted HTTP mode** — deploy your own remote HTTP server. Authentication via API key or JWT token.
 
-### 3. Self-Hosted HTTP Mode
-
-**Deploy your own remote MCP server**
-
-- Full control over deployment.
-- Possibility to connect to Prowler Local Server.
-- Authentication to Prowler Local Server via API key or JWT token.
-- Requires Python 3.12+ or Docker.
-
-## Requirements
-
-Requirements vary based on deployment option:
-
-**For Prowler Cloud MCP Server:**
-- Prowler Cloud account and API key (only for Prowler Cloud and Prowler Local Server features)
-
-**For self-hosted STDIO/HTTP Mode:**
-- Python 3.12+ or Docker
-- Network access to:
-  - `https://hub.prowler.com` (for Prowler Hub)
-  - `https://docs.prowler.com` (for Prowler Documentation)
-  - Prowler Cloud API or Prowler Local Server API (for Prowler Cloud and Prowler Local Server features)
+Both require Python 3.12+ or Docker, plus network access to `https://hub.prowler.com` (Prowler Hub), `https://docs.prowler.com` (Prowler Documentation), and the Prowler API or Prowler Local Server API (Prowler features). See the [Installation guide](/getting-started/installation/prowler-mcp) to get started.
 
 <Note>
-**No Authentication Required**: Prowler Hub and Prowler Documentation features work without authentication in both deployment options. A Prowler API key is only required to access Prowler Cloud or Prowler Local Server features.
+**No Authentication Required**: Prowler Hub and Prowler Documentation features work without authentication on both the Cloud and Local MCP Server. A Prowler API key is only required to access Prowler features (Prowler Cloud, Prowler Private Cloud, or Prowler Local Server).
 </Note>
 
 ## Next Steps
 
 <CardGroup cols={2}>
-  <Card title="Installation" icon="download" href="/getting-started/installation/prowler-mcp">
-    Install the Prowler MCP Server using uv or Docker
-  </Card>
   <Card title="Configuration" icon="gear" href="/getting-started/basic-usage/prowler-mcp">
-    Configure your MCP client to connect to the server
+    Connect your MCP client to the Cloud MCP Server
+  </Card>
+  <Card title="Tools Reference" icon="wrench" href="/getting-started/basic-usage/prowler-mcp-tools">
+    Explore all available tools and capabilities
   </Card>
 </CardGroup>
 
-<Card title="Tools Reference" icon="wrench" href="/getting-started/basic-usage/prowler-mcp-tools" horizontal>
-  Explore all available tools and capabilities
+<Card title="Local Installation" icon="download" href="/getting-started/installation/prowler-mcp" horizontal>
+  Run the Local MCP Server yourself using Docker, source, or uvx
 </Card>